1999 Fletcher Conference

Wednesday, November 3, 1999 9:00 to 10:30 a.m.
Panel 4:

Serving the Nation in the 21st Century

General Eric K. Shinseki
General James L. Jones
Admiral Donald L. Pilling
General Lester L. Lyles

Tuesday, November 2, 1999 3:30 to 5:00 p.m.

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Transcript

Pfaltzgraff: May I extend a cordial welcome to everybody to the second day of our conference. The title of panel number four is "Strategic Visions: Serving the Nation Into the 21st Century." As we all know, one of the over-arching themes of this conference is jointness. We have talked about the need for closer cooperation, about the need for integration, and about the need for interdependence to recall some of the terms that were used yesterday.

We believe that future success will be determined in large measure by our ability to achieve not only a Joint Strategic Vision, but also to develop the means for its implementation. And in doing so, to shed unnecessary redundancies. This leads to several important issues and questions that we hope to address in the panel that we have before us. First, how do we create and implement a joint vision? Secondly, how do we build forces that are agile as well as capable and lethal and readily deployable? How do [we] tailor budget priorities to a Joint Strategic Vision? Fourthly, how do we achieve necessary levels of synchronization and synergy? That is, among land forces, maritime capabilities and in aerospace. Fifth, what are the problems that we must surmount if we are to achieve optimum efficiency in joint operations?

I would say of course that is the optimum panel, to use the word optimum again, to help us address these issues and questions.

Let me give brief introductions to each of our panel members. First, of course, we have General Shinseki who became the 34th Chief of Staff of the United States Army on June 22, 1999. His previous assignments included Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Commanding General of United States Army, Europe, Commander NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia, and, most recently before becoming Chief of Staff, he was Vice Chief of Staff for several months.

Secondly, we will hear from General James Jones. General Jones became the 32nd Commandant of the United States Marine Corps in July of this year. His immediate prior assignment was as Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Among his many previous assignments, General Jones was Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Policies and Operations at Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.

Our third speaker will be Admiral Donald Pilling, who is Vice Chief of Naval Operations. An assignment that he began in November 1997. Among Admiral Pilling's previous assignments, he was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments. That is N8. And before that, he was Director for Programming (N80) on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. I can only point out here in great admiration that Admiral Pilling holds a Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Cambridge.

Finally, we have General Lester L. Lyles who several months ago became Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. Prior to this assignment, General Lyles was the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Among his many previous assignments, General Lyles was Commander, Space and Missiles Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base.

So with those brief introductions, we turn to our distinguished panel beginning with General Shinseki.

Shinseki: Well, good morning everyone. Bob, I think I'll be a little better prepared for my panel remarks this morning than I was for my concluding remarks for the Chairman's presentation last night. That's a warning to all of you. When you sit in a panel session or conference room with Bob Pfaltzgraff, you're liable to be called on. So everybody stay awake here.

Let me begin by acknowledging the presence of some old mentors and friends. First of all, our Army Vice Chief of Staff is here, Jack Keane and Tom Schwartz, recently confirmed for Korea. Tom, good to see you. General Gordon Sullivan, Association of the United States Army. General Foss, good to see you, sir. Fellow panel members, all of whom I know, distinguished guests. Especially General Jeremy Mackenzie who was kind enough to participate yesterday.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us this morning for this important discussion about national security and our options for protecting the interests of our country and looking after those of our friends and allies. Because we are called upon to do that from time to time. In the coming months, this debate will take different forms. The run up to our national elections next fall, the continuing crucial work of the Commission on National Security in the 21st century, the National Security Studies Group, posture hearings before Congress next year, the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001.

These will all impact the armed forces and the roles we are likely to be asked to perform in the next century. And hopefully this conference and others like it will inform the work and will lead to military capabilities that meet the requirements for strategic responsiveness and dominance. Strategic responsiveness and dominance. In the first quarter of the next century.

Two events in the past 10 years I think will continue to influence the future security environment in major ways. At least in the near term. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended four decades of a world divided around two superpowers which spent that time in a standoff where brinkmanship and statesmanship were sometimes indistinguishable. Nations that lived in the shadow of this Cold War tension, today exercise greater freedom of action. But that doesn't mean things are necessarily better.

The second major event was and is the ongoing explosion, global explosion, if you will, of communications and information technology. This revolution has created new industries, new communities, new markets, and new awareness. Perceived relative deprivation, that old term, has taken on new meaning. And the collision of these two events has left the world as dangerous as it ever was and global and regional security issues today involve greater instability and increased complexity.

Let me briefly make three assertions. First, the United States I think will retain its world leadership role for the foreseeable future. Second, regional conflicts will continue to involve violent action between the "haves" and the "have nots." And finally in this world, in this world where so many political boundaries no longer seem to make sense, where there's economic disenfranchisement creating floods of refugees who take their politics and their religions, to include fundamental extremism, with them wherever they go. Where drugs offer the opportunity for quick dollars and weapons of mass destruction are available and affordable to the high bidders. In this world, and despite its superpower status, U.S. leadership will continue to be challenged perhaps more frequently.

It is therefore incumbent upon us jointly to provide our national command authorities with strategic forces that are readily available, agile, and dominant once a decision is made to employ them. To this end last month, the Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera and I, articulated a vision for modeling the Army or attempting to meet this transformation requirement I just described. An Army that's more strategically responsive and dominant throughout the spectrum of operations we routinely refer to.

We settled on the use of force characteristics that describe the Army in terms of deployability, versatility, agility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. Now I know that all of this sounds like an exercise in alliteration, but these are meaningful terms and they do mean different things. To improve our strategic responsiveness, we committed to enabling our corps, Army corps, and our Army service component commands for missions as joint force headquarters. Enabling them to be able to perform that role.

Furthermore, we committed, as I indicated in my talk at the Association of the United States Army, to manning our combat divisions and armored calvary regiments at 100 percent of authorization by the end of Fiscal Year 2000. And setting a goal of meeting 100 percent of Military Occupational Specialty and grade-level authorization in those units (in other words, ensure our combat units have the right number of soldiers with the right job descriptions and rank) by the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2001. We intend to man the corps and do a 100 percent of authorization at Military Occupational Specialty and grade level of detail by Fiscal Year 2003. And I know this sounds like a lot of statistics, but in a large organization those are challenging goals.

We will enable our divisions to dominate across the full spectrum of operations by providing them the versatility and the agility to transition rapidly from one point on that spectrum to another with least loss of momentum. To do so, we must develop a vibrant capability for reach back communications and intelligence so that we can begin to aggressively reduce the size of our deployed support footprintsboth combat support and combat service support. As I have said before, if we don't deploy it, some maneuver commander won't have to feed it, fuel it, move it, house it, or protect it.

It is our intent that units deploy essentially with their fighters and their critical combat support, combat service support needs. Ninety percent of our lift requirements is composed of our support and logistics tail. We're going to attack that condition both through discipline and through a systems approach in our design of future equipment. We will look for future systems which can be strategically deployed by C-17, but also be able to fit in a C-130 Light Profile for tactical intra-theater lift. We will look for log support reductions by seeking common platforms, common chassis, standard caliber designs by which to reduce our stockpile of repair parts. This is part of that 90 percent lift requirement I talk about.

We will prioritize solutions which optimize smaller, lighter, more lethal, yet more reliable, fuel efficient, and more survivable options. We will seek technological solutions to our current dilemmas. We want the best combination of technologies that will provide survivability through low observable ballistic protection, long-range acquisition, deep targeting, early attack, first-round-kill at smaller caliber. Can we in time go to an all-wheeled-vehicle fleet where even the follow on to today's combat systems can come in at 50 to 70 percent less tonnage? That's the question I get asked most often as a result of the presentation at the Association of the United States Army.

I'll tell you, we don't know the answer to that question today, but I think so. And we're going to ask the question and then we'll go where the answers are. With the right technological solutions, we intend to transform the Armyactive duty, Reserve, and National Guardinto a standard design. With "Internetted" C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) packages that allow us to put a combat-capable brigade anyplace in the world in 96 hours once we have been ordered to lift off. A division on the ground in 120 hours. Five divisions in 30 days.

Being able to do so gives the national command authorities a genuine deterrent capability. When ordered, we intend to get to trouble spots faster than our adversaries can complicate crises. And once there, we intend to leverage for de-escalation and a return to stability through formidable presence. But if deterrence fails, we will be postured to prosecute war with an intensity that wins at least cost to us and our allies and sends clear messages for all future crises. And when technology permits, we will erase the distinctions which exist today in the Army between our heavy and our light forces and review our requirements for specialty units.

Now this commitment to change will require a comprehensive transformation of the Army. To this end, we will begin immediately as I announced at the Association of the United States Army to turn the entire Army into a full-spectrum forcethat's our orientationwhich is strategically responsive and intends to be dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations. We will jump-start this process by investing in today's off the shelf equipment to stimulate the development of doctrine, organizational design, and leader training. These are long-lead issues. Not the equipmentdoctrine, organizational design, leader training.

Even as we begin a search for the new technologies that will deliver the material needed in the longer term for the objective force that I'm describing, as quickly as we can acquire vehicle prototypes, we will stand up the first units at Fort Lewis, Washington, where the infrastructure, the maneuver space, and the gunnery ranges will accommodate such a transformation. Other units will follow. These are not the only two. It is our intent to have an initial set of prototype vehicles beginning to arrive at Fort Lewis this fiscal year. We're getting close, right, Jack? Going to make it happen.

In conclusion, we intend to provide more viable choices to deal with international conflict by strategic responsiveness. We mean providing ground options that, in conjunction with our other Services, gives the national command authorities a rheostat rather than a toggle switch for employing military force. The Army is pursuing change to correct shortfalls in its own unique land force capabilities and we believe that accompanying change and the nature and the capabilities of our Joint Force partners will provide the nation an unprecedented ability to accomplish its objectives in peace and in war, persuasively and invincibly. Thank you all very much.

Jones: I'm always interested and intrigued by the word "vision." I remember the QDR process. One of the favorite lines that came out of the experience of the QDR was that "a vision without resources is a hallucination." I think we should keep that in mind as we proceed with our respective visions because there is a ring of truth to that. But it certainly is a good thing to think about. Strategic vision is important and we have a solid foundation for a Joint Strategic Vision. The challenge, of course, is to make that a reality. It's a question, in my judgment, a fundamental question of balance and how we go about achieving that.

Certainly as a member of the Joint Chiefs, I'm concerned about balancing the capabilities of all of our Services to meet the defense need, but to do that in a way that avoids unnecessary redundancy and inefficiencies and waste, if you will, of the resources. But as a service chief, I'm also concerned about balancing near term readiness and modernization so that we can continue the work towards achieving this Joint Strategic Vision. I'm encouraged, as are my colleagues, with the progress we've made with this year's defense budget, which for the Marine Corps, at any rate, got us about halfway towards where we wanted to be. It is a positive step for the first time in a few years. But I must tell you without any equivocation that we are continuing to balance our readiness in the near term out of the budget provided for modernization and infrastructure modernization.

I completely agree with Rick Shinseki's comments on post-Cold War challenges to stability. We must be able to influence those events in regions where our interests lie. The requirements for forward-deployed forces and rapid force projection probably have never been greater. The word "expeditionary," which had a restricted application not too long ago, is now a much more common term.

I don't think that my service is new to this particular game or to the understanding and interpretation of the word "expeditionary," which has literally been our middle name for quite a while. To witness: Marine Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Units, and one that we're dusting off called a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. If I could pause on that for just a moment to tell you that we will bring the brigade concept back on-line. We never intended for it to disappear, but for reasons that have more to do with efficiencies of manpower and resources, five, six, seven years ago, we stood down our brigade headquarters. We subsumed that capability in the larger Marine Expeditionary Force and proceeded to essentially fall off the joint war fighting map sheet. The capability, however, was always resident. Our units still trained to the Maritime Prepositioning Force standards. As you know, we have three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons.

I've talked to the Chief of Naval Operations, and I've talked to the Chief of Staff of the Army about the capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Brigade commanders don't have the force structure to make them independent headquarters anymore, but they will be functional, they will be viable, and they will be part of the war fighting kit made available to our CINCs.

We place the highest values on the term "expeditionary." To the list provided by Dr. Pfaltzgraffagility, lethality, and deployabilityallow me to add three others that I consider to be very important. The first of these would be sustainability. For example, for a Maritime Pre-positioning Force, Marine Air-Ground Task Force of about 16,000 Marines and sailors with 30 days sustainment, the lift cost is about 250 C-141 equivalents. You get that in a Maritime Prepositioning Force ship right now.

Endurance is also important. Some missions require (as certainly the Army and the Air Force both know) long-term commitments.

The third quality I would add is versatility: the ability to execute more than one mission within the potential spectrum. I would cite the recent experience of our 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), which made a brief appearance in Kosovo. In the early days, we conducted a relief operation, backloaded on the ships, and then sailed around to meet humanitarian disaster relief requirements in Turkey. These Marines were inserted into a potential combat environment with a given set of rules of engagement. Those same Marines and sailors terminated that mission, got back on the ships, and then responded to a humanitarian crisis of significant proportions. That flexibility to do many different things is versatility.

These forces can deploy rapidly, and are also able to hit hard and to stay in the fight, if in fact there is one. We're talking about an expeditionary force that is also capable of delivering combined arms competence and, if you will, lethality.

Single dimensional responses will probably be inadequate in the future. So we must intelligently blend the unique contributions of each Service. I would add that coalition partners and even some governmental agencies will also be involved in this effort. Our capabilities must embrace all regimes; aerospace, land, maritime, information operations, and many others. It's very important, as we make our move in this direction, that we adopt the term "complementary, vice competitive" when we're talking about Services. There are, frankly, not enough of us left to be competitive, so we have to be complementary. There is no crowded battlefield and there are plenty of missions to go around. We need to study how best to achieve that. I'll touch on that in just a moment.

The Joint Strategic Vision, like Joint Vision 2010, can provide the baseline for shaping Service capabilities to the joint operating environment. It defines interoperability objectives in a broad sense. It's up to us to refine it. Synchronization, integration, and efficiency are the bywords of joint operations. Services have achieved much progress, but can, should, and will do much better in the future.

But there's a warning to be issued here and that warning is to beware of the pitfalls that can be the enemy of effectiveness if you get carried away with it. Excess zeal in so-called "elimination of unnecessary redundancies" can lead to a joint operating capability that's lacking in depth. Defining the word "unnecessary" is key. It's wise to retain some overlap.

Joint experimentation will be a critical factor in our success. To this end, I support the joint experimentation of the Joint Forces Command. But how we achieve this and what it consists of is really what's important, so we certainly offer Marine Corps participation in that effort. Our Marine Air Ground Task Forces are good test beds for that type of experimentation. By virtue of our combined arms theology and historical expertise, we can, on a small scale, test concepts that could apply to the larger joint arena.

What is the impact of a specific concept on air, land, and sea components? I would offer our forces to the extent that would be useful to participate in such an experiment.

I also echo Rick's statement with regard to the National Security Studies Group and the Quadrennial Defense Review forums, which will be very important and will be vital towards shaping the forces of the future. Services have come a long way in implementing joint war fighting, but we can and should do more. To this end, we will hopefully participate in a series of conferences. As a service chief, I am interested in holding war fighting conferences with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force in the near future to discuss ways in which our Title X responsibilities can merge towards providing a more cohesive, more balanced force.

I would underscore the fact that it's extraordinarily important that the nation's two land forces achieve that commonality and achieve that mutual understanding. It is vital to the goals of the nation, and I think it can only lead to good things, not only tactically and operationally in the field, but also to the investments that we make in the purchases of our respective equipment, our long-term programs, and the effectiveness that we achieve when we use the taxpayers' precious resources.

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for allowing me to address you very briefly this morning and I look forward to answering your questions at a later time. Thank you.

Pilling: Thank you for the opportunity to speak about our visions in the context of a larger joint strategy, and our contribution to the security and economic prosperity of this nation in concert with our sister Services.

When we think about the future, three questions frame the Navy's thinking of its role in joint strategy. First, what is it that joint forces will be expected to do? Second, how will they carry out these expectations? And, third, what is the Navy's role in all of this?

What will we be expected to do (the "ends")?

There is probably no more fundamental question than the first one: what do we want our military forces to do? The National Military Strategy correctly describes two general objectives that we must continue to meet in the future: promoting peace and stability, and defeating adversaries. These objectives are best discussed when broken down further into four interrelated ends within these broader objectives:

The first end is regional stability. That our world is becoming a smaller place is indisputable. Instantaneous communications and computer links . . . coupled with an immense daily flow of capital goods and Services which know no geographic bounds . . . serve to join the major regions of economic activity around the globe in a complex web of interdependence. These globalization trends are neither all good nor all badthey are a fact of life, and our military must be able to respond to stresses and tears in this web that are caused by regional instability. Turmoil and duress in any major economic region of our world will necessarily cause disruption in others.

Forward-deployed forcesby "being there" with a sustainable and credible combat presencehelp "shape" these regional security environments every day. Through routine operations with friends and allies, we forge relationships of trust and confidence, powerful reminders to potential aggressors of our will to maintain peace and stability.

Forward-deployed combat power leads me to the second end of joint forces: deterrence of aggression. By maintaining a force in ready, with the means to target the political and military infrastructure of regional aggressors, we will give them reason to rethink their actions. With 80 percent of the world's population living within 500 miles of the seaincluding 84 percent of all cities of greater than a half-a-million peopleI am convinced that the Navy's joint contribution landward, with our sister Services, is the correct one.

The third end our nation will ask of military forces in the next century is to provide timely crisis response . . . where and when our nation's interests are at stake. Joint Forces deployed for peacetime presence are often those suddenly called upon to respond first to an emerging crisis . . . often as the enabler ofor in conjunction withother power projection forces from out of theater. Possible escalation demands that these forces be configured and trained for any mission they may encounter, and that they provide our National Command Authorities a variety of flexible response options for unexpected international crises, standing ready to bring their effects quickly to bear.

The fourth end of our future force posture will be the readiness to fight and win our nation's wars. We believe that the most important role of naval forces is to prevent war; Army and Air Force win them by focusing overwhelming combat power when and where required. And the critical role of the Naval Service is as an enabling force during the transition from crisis to conflict. Moreover, naval forces make their most important contributionpreventing warprecisely because both our allies and adversaries know they have the capability to perform their most critical contribution: to provide a timely response to any developing crisis that would threaten U.S. interestsor those of our allies and friends.

How will we do it (the "ways")?

Having addressed what joint forces will be expected to do in the 21st century, the second question for consideration is: how will they do it? We see three ways of achieving the ends I just described: control, attack, and sustainment within a new and expanded battlespace, whose limits are defined by our widely dispersed and networked forces and their sensor and weapons reach.

The concept of "control" is a familiar one to military strategists, and "sea control" has always been a unique naval contribution to joint warfighting. Control of the seas guarantees the flow of joint power projection forces to the theater of operations and assures the access of all nations to this international medium over which the vast majority of the world's goods will still move.

But it is no longer sufficient to think solely in terms of sea control . . . or area control. As I mentioned, naval and joint forces must have the ability to defeat or negate an adversary's capabilities by contributing to total battlespace control: sea, air, space, cyberspace and land control . . . the entire battlespace . . . as we project joint power and its influence . . . beyond the sea.

Battlespace control also means that we must be prepared to counter an adversary's strategy of denying our access to forward operating areas. Missiles, mines and submarines represent the least expensive and most likely means potential opponents will use in this pursuit. Our investmentssuch as in innovative undersea and organic mine warfare capabilitieswill strike at the heart of such an area denial strategy, and will allow joint and coalition forces the freedom to operate where their weapons and sensors can best be used.

Battlespace Sustainment

Finally, as we control and attack within a much larger battlespace . . . with new dimensions . . . we must sustain the activities of engaged joint forces. Therefore, the third way we will operate in the future is battlespace sustainment. Mobile, dispersed forces require an equally agile and tailored logistics system to support their distributed, dynamic operations. Logistics focused to arrive where and when neededwithout a large or vulnerable footprintfurther enable maneuver in an expanded battlespace. Sea-based logistics employing pre-positioning and strategic sea and airlift are key to sustaining future joint and coalition forces throughout the battlespace.

What is the Navy's Role in the Joint Arena (the "means")?

Having covered the first two questionswhat joint forces will be expected to do and how will they do itthe third question is . . . what is the Navy's role?

I propose two answers to this question . . . which go to the very heart of the means by which our future Navy will contribute to the ends of our nation's security and prosperity. I've mentioned the first one during my remarks, and it should come as no surprise to any of you. The second part may be less apparent, but will become self-evident upon further discussion.

Why the Navy? The first answer is its contribution through the means of forward presence. By controlling the seas, naval forces will remain forward-deployed where our most vital interests are concentrated, helping to provide the framework of security that enables other instruments of U.S. national power to promote stability and to shape regions of interest. This is the enduring role of our Naval Service. In cooperation with friends and allies, forward-deployed forces protect our shared interests; and through combat credible forward presence, naval forces deter aggression throughout the spectrum of conflict.

A Maritime Concept for the Information Age

Clearly, sea control will remain the cardinal prerequisite to assured access forward. But as we look towards the futureand take stock of the lessons we learned in the recent conflict in Kosovowe have come to realize that being present forward will not suffice alone. The Naval Service has developed a Maritime Concept for the Information Age which defines how future forces will continue to assure their access forward . . . despite these new challenges . . . by exploiting two key operating domains. The first will remain the seas, that international medium where U.S. naval forces continuously and legally sail . . . anytime, anywhere. But in the future, our naval forces must parallel their command of the seas with their dominance of a second international medium . . . and that is cyberspace. To ensure our continued maritime dominance, future naval forces needand will havea shared, real-time understanding of the battlespace as improvements in information technology provide dispersed and highly mobile naval forces with preemptive information superiority. The capability to provide a common shared awareness of the threat and to control the timing of our actions, will allow naval forces to remain forward despite an adversary's attempts to preclude our presence by their own attempts to useor misusethis new operating realm. Which is why command of the seas must now be paralleled by speed of command in cyberspace, providing us the superior knowledge to act rapidly inside of an adversary's decision timeline.

Conclusion

In sum, the Navy will continue to assure access forward in support of U.S. military strategy by directly and decisively projecting U.S. influence and power ashore using two means: command of the seas . . . through its presence forward, and speed of command . . . by knowledge superiority. Together, these are the two means by which maritime power will continue to advance and protect our shared interests. Through this joint strategy, the Navy and its sister Services will continue to support our nation by helping to provide the framework for stability needed for its economic prosperity and national security. Thank you.

Lyles: Good morning. It's great to be here this morning at this year's IFBA Symposium. Bob, I thank you for inviting me to participate. Let me start by congratulating the Army and the Fletcher School for assembling such a very impressive list of panels and participants this week. This is my second opportunity to speak before this type of symposium. Last year, I spoke up at Cambridge, Massachusetts to the IFPA Symposium. At the time, as Bob noted, I was a Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and of course I talked about missile defense and specifically national missile defense.

Some of you may have been there at that particular time. I started that presentation by giving sort of a true, but humorous, vignette as to how I got selected for the BMDO job. Well, things have changed. Obviously, I'm no longer in that capacity. But let me tell you a little bit about getting started in the Vice Chief's job.

I got selected, confirmed, and promoted and put into this position in the end of May of this year. I knew it was going to be a very, very daunting enterprise for me. I was replacing a guy with some very, very large footprints in terms of capabilities. Super personality, very dynamic individual, very charismatic, great golfer, a fighter pilot. Almost all the attributes you might want to have for a leader. And I'll be honest with you. I had some trepidation about my ability to fill that position.

So what did I do? I decided to consult a fortune teller to ask for a little bit of advice and find out what was going to happen in my tenure as a Vice Chief. I went to this fortune teller and she looked in her scope, looked at her crystal ball, thought for a minute, and then promptly spoke up and said, "Well, you're going to confront a major theater war that's going to tax the United States Air Force's ability to support all the activities. Congress is going to make an assault on your number one acquisition program, the F-22. You're going to continue to have budget shortfalls and the money is just going to be short to get everything accomplished you want to get accomplished. And to make matters worse, the Redskins are going to continue to lose to the Dallas Cowboys."

I stopped her right there and I said, "All of that is going to happen in my tenure?" And she said, "Wait a minute, I've only gone through the first 100 days." And sure enough, if you look back 100 days from last May, that's exactly what occurred.

Well, a lot has changed over the last year since last year's IFPA Symposium. Lots of changes that impact the United States Air Force. We've had two major confrontations with regional antagonists. Of course I'm talking about Operation Desert Fox and the preparations we made last year for another confrontation in Iraq, and, obviously, Operation Allied Force. Two significant applications of military force, both using aerospace power as one of the major instruments of force.

During this past year, NATO has conducted its first offensive military operation and we learned a lot about the alliance's capability and capacity to plan and execute a military action as a unified force. And as you've heard from the previous speakers, the service chiefs, this year all the Services are conducting some form of vision update. And that's certainly true of the United States Air Force. This is a very, very important and worthwhile point of self-explanation and we're all embarked upon that.

And within the Air Force, we're planning and implementing a series of changes designed to make us more responsive to the needs of our regional CINCslong-term organizational changes that will ensure that all of our CINCs have the aerospace power necessary to conduct their peacetime engagements and to meet their wartime requirements.

And literally as I speak today, the reason I'm here and not General Mike Ryan, our Chief of Staff, is that he is with the other senior leaders of the United States Air Force, all of our four stars, most of our three stars, our Secretary of the Air Force. They're all at our Corona conference, Corona Fall as we call it, out at the Air Force Academy devoting the major portion of their time talking about the strategic vision for the United States Air Force and where we want to be in the 21st century.

So in some respects, what I'm going to talk to you about just briefly in these few minutes is sort of a teaser for next year. Bob, I'm going to tell you in outline what it is we're focusing on and maybe next year somebody can come back and talk to you about where we're actually going to go based on the results of this Corona conference.

Well, when we think about visions and think about the vision future, I like to remember a statement made a couple of years ago by Richard Haws in his book Reluctant Sheriff. He wrote that a sure sign that experts are encountering difficulty with figuring something out is their use of the word "post" as a prefix. Such a label reveals that people know only where they have been, not where they are now, and much less where they are headed. And in this new world context, we, in the United States Air Force, are focusing on our vision for the future to make sure that we don't become a post-Cold War Air Force. I'm certain of where we are and, more importantly, I'm certain of where we are headed. We are focusing on where we're trying to go.

Two years ago, we were a forward-deployed force focused almost exclusively on deterring and, where necessary, winning a major confrontation with the Eastern block. In contrast, today's Air Force is engaged throughout the world, conducting a variety of small-scale contingencies and Peacetime engagement missions that simply were not on our plate a few years ago. Let me just give you an example of Fiscal Year 1999, as an example.

Well, we flew over 69,000 mobility missions to over 140 countries in the past year. On every continent. We delivered over 50 tons of aid to victims of Hurricane Mitch in South and Central America and we're continuing efforts, humanitarian efforts, throughout the world wherever we're called upon. We conducted 65 deployments to Central and South America to support counter narcotics operations. We deployed, just so far, literally today, 80 units and have flown over 19,000 sorties in Operations Northern and Southern Watch over Iraq. All of which in addition to Operation Desert Fox and Operation Allied Force.

Let me just mention specifically Allied Force to give you a feel for exactly what the Air Force was doing. We refer to this situation as a major theater war equivalent for the United States Air Force. If you look at what we accomplished and what we did, 38,000 NATO sortiesmost of which are flown by the United States Air Force10,000 strike missions, 820 NATO aircraft520 of which were United States Air Force aircraftwere involved in that. We, the Air Force, had 18,000 airmen deployed3,200 Air National Guard and 1,100 Reservists. We flew 11,000 airlift sorties and 7,000 air refueling sorties. We unloaded 300 million pounds of fuel as part of that.

We dropped 23,000 bombs throughout that conflict. And if you look at the real statistics as counted by General Wes Clarke and the forces' leaders over in EUCOM, we had less than one-tenth of 1 percent collateral damage. Certainly not what's usually stated in the press. So this was really a significant effort.

For the United States Air Forceif you look at percentage of active duty aircraft involved in Allied Forcewe had, in every category, more of a percentage of our aircraft involved in that conflict than we did during Desert Storm, and certainly even than Vietnam. This was a major theater war for us.

In all, the United States Air Force throughout the world supported over 160 operations and exercises with nearly 900 deployments around the globe in fiscal year '99 alone, and the year is not over. And nor is this an aberration. This is really the future as far as we're concerned. I'm reminded of a statement made by Billy Mitchell. "In the development of air power, one has to look ahead and not backward and figure out what is going to happen and focus not too much on what has happened." And that's exactly what we're trying to do as we're figuring out our strategic vision for the United States Air Force.

We're taking into context all of the things that we've done over the past year and making sure that we've shaped the right sort of vignette, the right sort of analogy, and the right sort of strategy for the Air Force of the 21st century. As we do that, what's being focused on at Corona Fall in Colorado Springs today, and the rest of this week, is to build upon our Air Force core competencies. Those core competencies are aerospace superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, information superiority, precision engagement, and agile combat support.

And we're looking at each one of those areas to make sure that we understand how they fit into the context of the 21st century needs for our national security objective. Not just for the Air Force alone, but looking at it in the context of Joint Vision 2010 or even the evolving Joint Vision 2015. We're looking at each one of those core competencies in the area of preparedness, in the areas of readiness, in the areas of modernization, equipment, and future concept. And we will build upon each one of them.

The questions we're asking ourselves, do we have the right kind of balance in each one of those core competencies? Do we have the right kind of organizational structure to meet the needs of the national security objectives? Do we have the right force structure? Do we have the right resources to support the force structure? Do we have the right sort of personnel and skills and are we training properly to do this job and do it very, very well? So we're looking at each one of those and we will build upon them.

We're also going to look at them in the context of the full spectrum of crises. How do we employ each one of those core competencies against all the spectrum that we may have to encounter? Whether it's humanitarian efforts, small-scale contingencies, or, God forbid, a major theater war.

Now we're not just looking at our existing core competencies. We think that is a very solid foundation. But we have to look, as I stated in the quote from Billy Mitchell, where we are going, what kind of things do we need to build upon, what areas still need to have additional work? Well, the areas we're going to focus on as we do that is, first and foremost, command and leadership. Are we developing the aerospace leadership for the future? Do we have the right skills, the right preparation, are we putting our people in the right places so they can execute and lead the aerospace forces we need for the future?

Do we have the proper integration of air and space? Do we have real aerospace integration? We've talked in the past about being an air and space force evolving to a space and Air Force. We've got away from that rubric for the United States Air Force and we really know that we need to focus on air and space integration. It is a total journey and we need to make sure that every airman and every civilian that's part of the United States Air Force is involved in that journey so that we will have aerospace leaders and aerospace forces in the future to prosecute any sort of contingency we may be involved in.

How do we make sure we have an expeditionary aerospace force? This is an area that we know is really the tenet, major tenet, for the United States Air Force of the future. We're getting back to our expeditionary roots. And as I stated in a speech recently to the Marine Corps Aviation Association, we're taking major lessons learned from the United States Marine Corps. We are in fact an expeditionary force. And you can take the basic tenets and descriptions of a Marine Expeditionary Force, substitute aerospace in front of that and you will find the exact same tenets that we have for our United States Air Force. We will be rapid, we'll be lighter, we'll be leaner, we'll be more lethal, and we'll still be able to support the CINCs' needs throughout the world.

Do we have a future total force? We say we have a total force today and we certainly indicated that and demonstrated that during the air campaign of Allied Force. But are there some things we could do better to integrate totally the Guard and Reserve and all the things we're trying to do in the United States Air Force?

And then finally, a very, very important tenet, how do we make sure that we are innovative and adaptive and we're making that a major, major part of everything we do for our vision and for our final resources and force structure for the future? This is an area where we can take a lesson learned from our other Services. As an example, I applaud General Shinseki and the United States Army for their innovative way they're using innovation and experimentation and the kind of things they're doing to make sure that that's the major part of everything they do in the United States Army. We're going to take some lessons learned from that and try to improve upon it for the United States Air Force.

So we're learning. We have a lot to learn still in what we're trying to do. We tried to make sure that the 21st century of the United States Air Force is one that has the right sort of focus, the right sort of sight picture. The 21st century Air Force will be an expeditionary aerospace force. It will be a total force, even better than it is today. It will be a fully integrated aerospace force. It will be a leader in technology and innovation and it will always focus on command and leadership in everything we try to accomplish. Thank you very much and I look forward very much to your questions. Thank you.

Pfaltzgraff: Well, thanks to the panel for this stimulating series of presentations. We now have the opportunity for questions and discussion. Let's begin on this side of the room. Would someone like to pose a question?

Taylor: Thank you very much. My name is Terrence Taylor from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. None of our speakers mentioned the question of nuclear forces. And I was wondering whether they've been de-emphasized so much that they were a matter for simply, perhaps, treaty negotiation. So if I wonder if any of our speakers would like to respond? Whether the new thinking about the structure and use given the new environment as we look forwards for that part of the U.S. Armed Forces force structure?

Lyles: Well, let me start, if you don't mind, Bob. For the United States Air Force, if anything we're trying to make sure that we don't lose sight of the importance of that part of our national strategic and objectives. We are trying to make sure that we are putting the right sort of emphasis on sustainment and, to some extent, modernization of our nuclear capabilities. I did not talk about that, but if you look at all the things we're trying to do in terms of force structure, in terms of our future vision, we want to make sure that the nuclear component, the very important nuclear component, is not one that we overlook. So we will continue to put the right sort of emphasis and resources in that area.

Pfaltzgraff: Admiral Pilling, would you like to comment on that question?

Pilling: Certainly, one of the things that struck me is the strategic force capability we have in this country is almost an absolutely fundamental thing. That's probably why none of us even mentioned it. You will remember in the Bush administration on the tactical side there was a policy decision that naval forces would not routinely deploy with tactical nuclear weapons. And so there has been de-emphasis in that part of the equation. But on the strategic side, there's never been a change from the Navy's perspective.

Pfaltzgraff: Okay. Any other comments from the panel? Okay. Let's move on to our next question.

Baumgarten: Yes, sir, Neil Baumgarten, Defense Daily. Mostly a question for General Shinseki, but the other panelists can comment in as well, please. General Kern has spoke in the past about the need for increasing precision strike capability to Army forces. However, you didn't really touch upon this very much in your vision statement. I was wondering if you could elaborate on how increasing precision strike capability, possibly down to even the platoon level, fits into your vision for the Army for the future? Thank you.

Shinseki: Well, I alluded to it when I talked about early acquisition, okay, of target arrays, target acquisition, deciding what you're going to go after. Shoot first, kill early. In that sense, precision munitions do play significantly in what we're trying to describe as the new environment that says we don't necessarily begin with the description of an armored vehicle as, if hit, will not be penetrated. So if you're going to change that environment, you have to engage early and begin to take out those potential threats to our ground armored forces.

Jones: I'd like to just add my two cents on that. And that would be along the lines that I think the lethality of our small units is going to be a thing of the future. That officers much lower in the chain of command will have reached that capability for a far greater range of assets than perhaps we had as battalion commanders and regimental commanders in the past. And the survivability of those units will be in direct relation to the things that they have to support them. And so precision strike will be one of those utensils, one of those tools, I should say.

But I think the battlefield of the future will see more junior officers, more small unit leadership depending on that, in fact, for their survival. Because we'll be putting them probably at distances that in the past we would only consider putting battalions and bigger sized units.

Pilling: To do what General Jones has just described, goes back to that description that says you've got to be able to see the array early. You've got to be able to target deep and decide, because you have a finite number of these assets, decide which of the targets that need to be attacked, shoot first, and kill early.

Pfaltzgraff: Next question. Please.

Gregory: My name's Colonel Tim Gregory. I'm from the British Embassy. All the panelists mentioned at some stage the importance of working with coalition partners and allies. Yet as you move forward technologically and place greater importance on networking and situational awareness, it's going to be very difficult for you to integrate allies into your plot and yet give them the same degree of situational awareness that they require to carry out a high technology battle. I was just wondering if the panelists would care to comment on that?

Pfaltzgraff: Who would like to begin this very important area for discussion?

Panel Member: Tim, I would start by saying we have made fairly strong efforts to ensure that what you describe, I won't say doesn't exist, but to the degree it does, that we minimize that through our liaison efforts and our collaborative efforts. There are two sides to this. I think investments on the part of our allies needs to help close that gap. But even as much as we reach back to try to ensure that, to the degree we can share that technology, that we do. I think this is a question that has two sides to our discussion here. I think there's more that can be done.

Pfaltzgraff: I'm sure there's some other comments on this question and perhaps even including what types of investments from your vantage points would be most appropriate from an allied perspective.

Pilling: I'd like to just address what we have in mind in the Navy. We are essentially building an at-sea internet, which we call Information Technology XXI, "IT XXI," which will allow naval forces, regardless of the national ensign flying from the fantail, to join into that internet by setting up standards so that all the participants can share in the informationso we're not building an exclusive network at sea because it's very important to be able to interoperate with our coalition allies.

Pfaltzgraff: Any of the other panel members like to comment on this?

Lyles: Well, certainly this is an area that was another major lesson learned from an allied force in the air campaign over Kosovo. And we're engaged literally today in discussions with allied nations and our friends about how we can work together even better in the future sort of contingencies. The kind of things we're concerned about are our dependence and rapidly increasing dependence on situation awareness, sensor-to-shooter capability. All of those kinds of things that played so very well in Kosovo and will be growing even more in the future. We want to make sure that this is not just a single thing that we do for the United States forces and we exclude our allied partners.

To go along with that is the issue of precision weapons. We want to make sure specifically that there's an opportunity for everybody to share in a fight, if you will, and that we're not just depending on one nation to have to do all the precision sort of engagements. So we've identified some problems. We're not quite sure exactly what the final solutions are. Dialogue and communication and try to share resources and technology ultimately is the way to try to address it, but we have a little ways to go before we get there.

Panel Member: And, Tim, I'd just add one more point to this and that is, and I may be out a bit on a limb here, but in our business, it is technology overmatch that carries the day. And so as we share, we want to be sure that our investments are in fact controlled so we don't end up facing our own technology someplace down the road. And I think we need to be better at it.

Pfaltzgraff: General Jones?

Jones: I associate myself with the comments of the panelists. I would also kind of like to say that technology sharing is not necessarily a one way street. We certainly recognize that we don't have the primacy and the monopoly in technology. And so I think working within the alliances, it can certainly be much more of a two-way street as well.

Pfaltzgraff: Okay, another question from here.

Swan: Colonel Guy Swan from J5 on the Joint Staff. I'd like to ask the panel members to put on their Joint Chief hat for a minute and take off their Service Chief hat to answer this question. First of all, as we build a force that appears to be focused on speed, lethality, precision strike, and, more importantly, able to limit civilian collateral casualties and friendly casualties, do we not run the risk of building a force that becomes the tool of first resort for our political leaders rather than a tool of last resort? In other words, it just seems to be one of the ironies of the RMA. What I'd like you to do is how would you advise civilian leaders to put that into perspective of balancing the use of military power with the other elements of national power? Thank you.

Pfaltzgraff: Who would like to begin with that interesting question? General Jones.

Jones: I think that one of the pitfalls that we have to watch out for is that we don't put too much of one capability or the other in one limited basket. The rush towards being expeditionary is good, but it's also good if it's tempered, as Admiral Pilling said, by the reality of who amongst us in our Services does in fact fight and win the nation's wars if in fact it gets to the last resort. And in talking about General Shinseki's articulation for the direction of the Army, he and I have had private discussions on exactly that fact.

The Marine Corps is a one MRC force. It is not the force of land decision. We play an increasingly important part as a percentage of those forces. For example, we have 20 percent of the infantry battalions available, in the active side, available to the United States right now. That's historically probably a pretty high percentage when you think about the Marine Corps. But we, I think, are in complete agreement with the force of decision in land warfare is the United States Army. And so in moving in these directions of being expeditionary, we should be careful that we don't sacrifice the instrument of last resort and I think we're all very well aware of that. But I think it's an excellent question.

Pfaltzgraff: Would other members of the panel like to make a comment on this question?

Shinseki: I'd just like to pick up on what General Jones said. As you can tell, we've spent a bit of time talking. I think we can both say neither one of us has been on a battlefield overly crowded. There was always room for more. But I will take the last comment he made and that's a phrase that the Commandant has used before and which I think is an apt one. That is Marines win battles and the Army wins wars. And if that's a proper corollary and I accept that, this business is about deterrence and then winning when deterrence fails. So if you go back to the statement Marines win battles and the Army wins wars, then if we're talking about deterring wars, then it takes an Army to deter wars.

Ultimately, if you're going to be called to put it on the line, you have to have the capability to deploy significant force that's going to turn off that option. And if it fails to turn it off, then you can prosecute war decisively. And so the issue here is not about expeditionary encroachment by the Army. I think that the Marines are the force of choice for expeditionary missions. But when we talk about deterring war and follow the Commandant's line here, Marines win battles, but armies win wars, then the Army has got to have the capability to get there fast and be able to deter that conflict. Otherwise, we follow the course of events and say, yes, we will go ultimately conflict where the Army is engaged.

So I think the question that Guy posed is a good one, but I think we need to keep our focus on what it is standing military forces are paid to do. And that is to be prepared. Non-negotiable. They callwe deliver, fight our nation's wars, and win them decisively.

Pfaltzgraff: Would other members of the panel like to comment on this very interesting question as well?

Pilling: Only just an observation. I think the question is driven by what might be a lesson mislearned from Kosovo in that we didn't have any casualties. And I think it would be the moral and professional responsibility of the Joint Chiefs to advise our civilian leaders that combat is a dangerous environment and they would have to accept that that was our best military judgement. We won't make any bones about that.

Lyles: I'll echo the comment of the other panel members. In some respects, there's sort of a fine balance there. Obviously, if you look at the ultimate situation, we all consider strategic nuclear forces as the ultimate last resort. But I think we can't lose sight of our tactical capabilities and making sure they have the right speed, lethality, and precision strike so that any adversary could look at that also as, if you will, an instrument of last resort. Knowing that it will be so powerful it becomes a deterrent factor just like strategic nuclear forces are. So there's a fine balance there and we can't back off on it, I'm afraid. Otherwise it could easily become something that we have to employ.

Shinseki: That's an interesting comment Les Lyles makes and it's an appropriate reminder. But I would say the admonition to all of us who have stood up here representing our Services is to be competent and capable and ready at the conventional business so that we never leave our national command authority's only option as the final option. And that's what this is about. It's to ensure that conventionally we have provided every opportunity to resolve this without going to the ultimate option.

Pfaltzgraff: Okay. Let's now move over to this side of the room and the person right in the middle there. Yes, please.

Audience Member: I'm from Booz Allen. General Shinseki, as you've challenged the Army to move to a capability of five divisions in 30 days, which really brings it down from a 75-day capability we currently have now, you've challenged the support footprint and the equipment mix and the equipment size, but what do you need from lift on the strategic side to do that? Have you started working with the Navy and the Air Force on looking at the current mix of strategic lift to accomplish that?

Shinseki: Good question. Other than just exposing the vision to Navy and Air Force, we have not gotten down to the kinds of details that we need to be able to answer that question. But it will require that. If we go to a capability where we are able to do this with smaller platforms, there will be still some impact, but not as significant as it may sound when we say five divisions in 30 days. But the 75-day scenariosand I recognize that Dr. Ted Warner is here and I failed to recognize him earlierbut the 75-day scenario is driven by priority.

There are allocations for lift in that sequencing that allow divisions, Army divisions, to arrive at about that time. Reprioritization could change that. And my offer here is that a lighter, equally lethal and survivable, but a lighter form of that capability can get there earlier and, therefore, make the reallocation of lift attractive.

Pfaltzgraff: Now we have another question over here.

Atkinson: Edward Atkinson, the Institute of Land Warfare. I wanted to ask about close air support. We have very little experience in this decade in that. Least of all in Kosovo, I guess. Now we're talking about the Air Force being effectively stressed out in the Kosovo operation so it probably would not have had a great many sorties left over for that sort of thing. And at the same time, the Army has developed an inherent strike capability, deep strike capability, and certainly it has its own close air support platform. So how serious are we about inter-service close air support or is that sort of a dying concept?

Pfaltzgraff: Who would like to begin with this?

Lyles: Okay, I knew there was going to be one of those questions. Okay, first, it's certainly not dying. And perhaps I put too much emphasis on this being a major theater war equivalent for the United States Air Force. We were not stressed out to the point of not being able to accomplish the mission or an expansion of the mission if that were necessary over the airs of Kosovo or even someplace else within the world. Close air support is another major mission set, if you will. When we talk about global engagement being one of our competencies, we don't overlook close air support as being one of those engagement possibilities and missions that we have to accomplish.

Now what are we doing in terms of platforms to try to do that? We obviously have to make sure we have the right mix, the right capabilities, the right technologies, but we are putting resources to upgrade the A-10s, as an example, to continue using F-16s, as an example, to do close air support missions. We work very closely with the Army to make sure their capabilities for close air support and ours are complementary and that we're working together. There are a lot of things that are going on from a joint perspective in this area. Probably too many to even begin to enumerate tonight or today, but this is not a dying mission at all. It's one that will continue to have emphasis.

Jones: I think it's no surprise to anybody in this room that the Marine Corps considers close air support one of our core competencies. As a matter of fact, our concept of combined arms expertise has close air support as one of our foundational tenets. We practice it, we live it. It is something that is absolutely well-formed in the minds of our junior officers from the time they get commissioned on up till the time they deploy operationally. And we will continue to make those investments in the close air support that are required.

As a service chief, I'm satisfied that the concept and the operational competence is alive and well. And we're happy to demonstrate our commitment to that anytime anybody wants to see it. What I am concerned about in terms of fire support (and these are things that I'm working with Rick here to correct) is the amount to which we've allowed our land-based fire support systems to atrophy in the United States Marine Corps. To where we have essentially one tube of the M-198 Howitzer. We have one program on the books coming along in the lightweight 155-mm Howitzer. But when you compare what Marine Corps land artillery systems and fire support systems were 15 years ago to what we have left today, I'm really concerned that we have marginalized ourselves without really doing what we need to do to shore up those capabilities. And so frankly in terms of our dependence, we might be a little bit over-dependent on close air support. And some of the interesting lessons of Kosovo and the impact the weather has on aircraft delivery systems are still very much open for discussion, I think, and cause me to look in other areas and to work with the United States Army to see where the Marine Corps should go with regard to its fire support systems.

The fact that we didn't get into rockets of any kind except by inter-service agreement is something that we're taking a hard look at at this time. So I thank you for that question and I just wanted to expand on it a little bit to show you some concerns that are very real and I think will recall some additional investments on our part.

Shinseki: I would just add from the Army's perspective that, doctrinally, close air support is still very much a vibrant part of the way we see the execution of ground combat. Especially the close fight. And the fact that we have attack helicopters with capabilities that give us additional fire is not a commentary on the Air Force's support for us. They still provide massive capabilities for large target reduction. When those targets are presented. And it takes a ground force to stop a large military movement and present the kind of targets that close air support has a field day with. I think without the presentation of those targets, close air support will be less effective. So it is a hand-in-glove operation.

Pilling: One additional comment. We deploy with the United States Marine Corps, so close air support is still a meaningful mission for us. And our aircraft, our pilots still train to it. But even more important, we have initiated some robust programs in the Navy to enable surface fire support. To be able to make up for some of the shortfalls you might have on land based tubes. And in particular, we're actually initiating a new class of ships called the land attack destroy, DD21, whose primary mission is going to be land attack and support of the forces coming in to shore.

Pfaltzgraff: Now we are rapidly running out of time. What I'd like to do is to ask those who have questions to pose them very quickly and then I'm going to give the panel members an opportunity to respond to the questions as concluding comments. So we'll begin here. But please be concise with your question. But again, wait for the microphone. And then we'll have a wrap up from the panel after this is all over. The questions.

Liney: Tom Liney, Association, United States Army. For many years, the Army would not consider fighting except as a combined arms team. We've made enormous strides in fighting jointly among the Services. But the strategic environment that's been described here and that we have confronted in Kosovo and Somalia and other places in the post-Cold War world have indicated a need for integrated operations as part of an interagency team. So I would ask the panelists what do you envision to be your contribution to the future of interagency operations and what are you doing to press the process to improve interagency operations so that the KFOR doesn't become "forever four?"

Pfaltzgraff: Okay, next question. Back here.

Mann: Paul Mann, Aviation Week. One of yesterday's panelists suggested that perhaps as much as 50 percent of the weapons that you will want or need in 2025 do not yet exist. Admiral Pilling suggested this morning or reminded us this morning that about 80 percent of the world's 6 billion population lives next to or close to a coastline. In the context of both of those observations, what weapons do you think you're going to need in 2025 to prosecute urban warfare that you do not have today?

Pfaltzgraff: Yes, another question here. Please.

Cappacio: Tony Cappacio out of Bloomberg News. For the panelist, can you each talk a little bit about the level of support the Joint Strike Fighter now receives in your respective Services? Are there fissures of support right now? Opposition growing? And for General Shinseki, as a consumer of what the Joint Strike Fighter will bring, are you concerned at all that there's an erosion of support within your sister Services?

Pfaltzgraff: Okay, one more. One more question.

Audience Member: I'd like to ask if you believe that to facilitate the translation of the joint vision and the joint plans and programs requires any changes or reforms in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)?

Pfaltzgraff: Well, let's now give the panel members an opportunity for quick answers to these questions. I know they are questions that require more than quick answers. But let's begin with General Lyles for a couple of minutes and then we'll work our way across and conclude the panel session this way. General Lyles.

Lyles: Okay. Let me very quickly try to run through the four questions that were posed. Integrated operations and our contribution. In many respects, this may sound like a pat answer, but the core competencies that I mentioned earlier in my brief remark are exactly the kind of contributions that we would put to any sort of operation, whether it's integrated or it's something where we're acting unilaterally. All the things that we're trying to do in terms of sensor-to-shooter capability, rapid mobility, information superiority, precision engagement, we think need to be applied across the whole spectrum of operations and we need to make sure we're working very closely with the sister Services to understand their needs in this regard. So that as we put investments and resources to these various needs that we're not overlooking the needs of what the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps need to prosecute their missions.

2025, urban warfare. You could almost use the same answer. As we look at our contribution to supporting the other Services, we need to make sure we understand how they will be fighting and how we can help them to best effectively accomplish their specific missions.

Joint Strike Fighter. Tony, there's no fissure amongst the Services. We all support the Joint Strike Fighter. Obviously, there are resource issues everybody's dealing with, but there is unified support for the program. And as far as the PPBS system, it always needs improvement.

Pilling: On the question on integrated operations, I'd only make the observation that the interagency process is a political process and service chiefs are really in the position of providing military advice. We are a military organization that is under civilian control.

On the sort of weapons we might need in 2025, I think if you look at the Navy's programs versus every one of our strike programs for the future, it emphasizes increases and improvements in range, precision, lethality. We'll have a tactical Tomahawk in a few years that will have a 1,600-nautical-mile range, which is quite a capability. And we're trying to extend the range of our, what you would call a sea based artillery, our naval service fire support and beyond the small number of miles that we have today into the hundreds of miles in the future.

On support of the Joint Strike Fighter, I'm right where Les is. There's real money on the table there and we haven't touched it. And on revising the PPBS, I think, it may a misimpression, that PPBS is such a rigid system, it doesn't change. I've been doing this for about 26 years and PPBS in every cycle is different. So it does reflect the realities of what's changing in the military.

Jones: With regard to the integrated operations and where we're going, you can see from General Lyles' comments and his borrowing from the Marine Corps to develop the Expeditionary Air Force, we are working together. I noticed though that they didn't borrow our hair cut standards, but in order to be truly expeditionary, you have to go the whole way, Les. You can't get in halfway.

I think the work the National Security Studies Group is doing is going to be extremely important in re-scoping what the elements of national security are and how they play. Certainly the agency process is going to be more of a player. It isn't going to be restricted anymore to just the Defense Department, the State Department, the National Security Council. There will be other agencies that will have to learn how to play in a more integrated process. And I think the work of the National Security Studies Group will embrace some of that. But there is no question in my mind that, at least on the inter-service level, that we'll have a high degree of cooperation and we're heading in the right direction.

2025, what weapons do we need to prosecute urban warfare? I think we're starting that work as presently the non-lethals. The Marine Corps is the executive agent for non-lethal weapons. We had done some work in a chemical-biological environment and we probably need more organizations to deal with that if that's in fact the size threat that it has the potential to be. I'm a very big supporter of the work the Army is doing in getting the Guard and the Reserve and the regular establishment to become much more cohesive and to start the national discussion really about how to organize for combat to do the missions that pertain to urban warfare. And within that, some of that might come under the title of homeland defense.

Joint Strike Fighter support. JSF is extraordinarily important to the Marine Corps and now that the V-22 is in production, it is in fact the number one aviation acquisition priority. I had spent a lot of time in my previous incarnation as the military assistant to the Secretary of Defense learning a lot about aviation programs, this one in particular, working with industry, working with people who are managing the program. And I'm pleased with the solidarity and the progress of the program and I think it's absolutely an important capability that we bring on-line on time and on cost.

Pfaltzgraff: Thank you. And now finally, General Shinseki.

Shinseki: I'll start with trying to answer, I think Tom Liney's question. I agree with Don Pilling at our level, our roles are to provide military advice. However, out in the field, as you know, the interagency process, and I think that's maybe where you're coming from, that interagency process does extend down.

And what you do have are young commanders in the field that have to deal with it and learn how to adjust. Fairly well structured in their education and development process and pure military approach, war fighting approach to solving problems based on a decision making cycle and suddenly they're cast into an environment in which they provide great capability but may not be able to have the final say on what describes the outcome. And so they have to learn how to work inside that process.

I've got to tell you that the kids that we have out there are very good, very competent. They adjust, they learn how to maximize what they bring to the equation and get buy-in. But it's something that we ought to think about in our education as we raise youngsters for more and more of these missions which are fairly recent. I think there's a virtue in running exercises. As you may know, before we deploy a force to Bosnia, for example, we will do a mission rehearsal exercise in which we do in fact bring interagency actual players in sometimes, even representatives from former warring factions to play their roles. To give, you know, a bit more authenticity to the training.

In terms of the question on littorals and urban warfare, a good question, I would say that the basic line or the bottom line to your question is it occurs on land. And, yes, the Army is interested and we are working with the Marines to talk about dealing with the issue of urban warfare. It gives situation awareness a different flavor. The intelligence systems that we devised in our development process are very well focused on large units, large platform formations. But you get inside built up areas and it's a different requirement for situational awareness. Our intelligence systems aren't as finely tuned to do that for you, and the issue is how do commanders remain decisive in that environment when those equations change. And I think there's a lot of work to be done there, maybe less on munitions and more work in these other areas I've suggested. I don't know, Tony, whether that question on Joint Strike Fighter was intended for me or General Jones. For me? I mean, everybody here has signed up for it, so I guess I'm comfortable. On PPBS, there's nothing wrong with PPBS. Nothing at least that more dollars won't solve.

Pfaltzgraff: Well, I think we all are in the debt of this panel for an outstanding contribution to this conference. This is an excellent exercise in jointness. Note that all of the questions required joint answers. So we have an outstanding contribution to the work that we're doing here. May I on our behalf, collective behalf, express thanks to you for being with us and giving us these insights.