The forthcoming QDR will serve as the primary vehicle for a fundamental reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and priorities for the next administration. Therefore, this strategic reappraisal must challenge present assumptions, analysis, and conclusions. In order to benefit from the QDR process, the U.S. government and the broader defense community must undertake several critical tasks. First, we must harness the intellectual capital now and provide a framework for identifying key issues and assessing our range of options. Second, we must draw upon the useful lessons learned from the 1997 QDR. Third, the civilian leadership must be actively engaged in the process at an early stage, providing guidance and articulating priorities. And fourth, strategic principles set within the new security environment of the early 21st century must guide and drive the review.

The QDR provides a framework for developing defense strategy by: identifying and prioritizing national interests and threats; allocating resources in accordance with those priorities; and reconfiguring the force structure based on the resource decisions. The 1997 QDR identified many of the emerging security trends and defense priorities in the post-Cold War era. The review foresaw small-scale contingencies as a priority and for the first time addressed extensively asymmetric threats as a new challenge. Criticisms have included its overly cautious analysis, its failure to prioritize adequately the military's missions, and its budget-based rather than strategy-driven approach. The next QDR must prioritize America's national interests and threats through a concerted effort between civilian and military leaders as fully as possible. The impact of commercial globalization on acquisition practices must pervade the QDR process. The next QDR must match resources with mission requirements. In this resource allocation process, many Cold War defense systems that are no longer needed must be discarded. For instance, the need to invest and acquire counterproliferation capabilities for missions ranging from missile defense to consequence management are now greater than ever given that WMD use is among the most likely threats to the United States and it forces abroad.

The 1997 QDR was organized around strategy, force structure, and modernization. While this was a useful approach to understand and shape the debate, different methods have been suggested. For example, the General Accounting Office has recommended a mission-based template while some foreign policy experts have constructed a range of strategic paradigms that might unfold in the next 25 years as the basis for security planning. Alternative worlds ranging from multipolarity to chaos could determine the key requirements for the Armed Forces. A more novel methodology that focuses on the fundamental assumptions underlying the current defense strategy has also been proposed. The following factors illustrate the compelling need for reassessing the assumptions of the previous QDR:

· Congress has challenged the DoD's approach to defense, particularly in the area of resource allocation.

· Defense strategy must move beyond a Cold War paradigm to reflect as fully as possible the new security landscape.

· The QDR must shift from a Service-centric perspective toward a decidedly joint approach.

· New assumptions are required to help identify the most pressing issues confronting the United States in framing force structures based on national security strategy.

Future missions are not likely to resemble those of the Cold War and new requirements such as missile defense, homeland defense, and information operations must be central to the debate. Future conflicts will not necessarily resemble the two major theater wars (MTW) scenario envisioned by the last QDR. Further, the last review neglected the changing role of NATO and failed to anticipate contingencies such as Operation Allied Force. This deficiency in addressing conflicts beyond the MTW construct was particularly glaring given that the airpower used in that campaign resembled what would have been required in a major theater war. Declining public support for smaller-scale contingencies, such as the operations in Haiti and Bosnia, may erode our ability to cope with MTWs. Future opponents will not operate according to our standards and expectations of short wars and few casualties, making the commitment to a MTW more complex and perhaps more difficult. The level of U.S. forward-deployed forces overseas should be considered in the next QDR. Some have questioned whether U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia presently totaling 100,000 respectively is essential for the future. New technologies will decrease reliance on manned platforms to deliver munitions and enable the United States increasingly to execute the same missions with robotics and unmanned aerial vehicles.

New equipment in the future will not necessarily lead to lower operating costs. The Department of Defense must consider the financial impact of new platforms in order to prevent the diversion of modernization funds to support Operations & Maintenance costs. Given that the defense budget will probably not remain at current levels in real terms in the coming years, a fundamental reassessment of how the DoD allocates resources is sorely needed. Last but not least, the driving force throughout the QDR process must be national security needs in a changing global setting in which the United States must prepare for a spectrum of contingencies and threats.

page created 31 October 2000

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