3. Initial Steps

The merits of unit rotation were never seriously questioned, but its introduction was delayed by the heavy requirements of the Korean conflict.¹ With the end of those hostilities Department of the Army plans began to take shape, and in the summer of 1954 they were submitted to the major overseas commands for comment. To USAREUR the plan was presented formally by a Department of the Army briefing team, at a headquarters staff conference in Heidelberg on 9 August 1954. On the following day representatives of Seventh Army, VII Corps, and USAREUR general and technical staff divisions attended another briefing, followed by a conference to coordinate their positions.

a. Command Reactions. The initial conclusions, which were favorable, were reported in a letter that the briefing team took back to Washington. No commander in Europe had been satisfied with the existing personnel replacement procedures. The proposed plan had many favorable features to recommend it. USAREUR would be ready to initiate the new program on 1 July 1955, although the command would have less than 11 months in which to overhaul its procedures.²

The Commanding General, Seventh Army, commented two weeks later that several points needed clarification. What, for example, would be the rotation scheme for officers? How would mid-cycle replacements in a Gyroscope unit be handled? However, despite the many problems that were bound to arise, he was of the opinion that the benefits of the new plan

1. Comments of Gen Charles L. Bolte, VCOFSA, in Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 14 Nov 54.
2. Ltr, Gen W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, to Gen M. Be Ridgway, COFSA, 11 Aug 54, no sub. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1954), B/P.

would be so great that every effort ought to be made to put it into effect.³

With further consideration, the opinions of USAREUR staff divisions continued to be generally favorable, although there was some apprehension that a few units directly subordinate to these staff divisions would be hampered in performing their missions if included in the plan.⁴ The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, for example, urged that certain military police and counterintelligence detachments not be rotated as units because of the nature of their missions and the need for continuity of operation. Provision for the exemption of these units was made in later Department of the Army directives. The Medical Division felt that its efficiency and training would be affected adversely. Since most medical officers were draftees serving for two years, a division designated for Gyroscope rotation would experience a virtually complete replacement of; its medical staff at some point during its overseas tour. On the other hand, the Chaplain Division, whose officers usually served for longer periods, was most enthusiastic, believing that it would be extremely beneficial for troops to be under the influence of the same chaplain over a two- or three-year period.⁵

Since unit replacement with no time overlap except that of the incoming unit's advance party would reduce USAREUR's combat effectiveness temporarily, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, recommended a general overlap of some two weeks to permit the incoming unit to become acquainted with its overseas duties. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1 and G4, were quick to point out, however, that the benefits of such an overlap would be offset by its disadvantages: first, much of the monetary saving achieved by unit rotation would be lost if the ships and trains that transported incoming units were not utilized immediately by returning units; second, during the period of overlap it would be extremely difficult to house the incoming troops; and finally, concurrent travel of dependents, one of the most desirable features of unit rotation, would be entirely out of the question. The Department of the Army recognized the validity of these objections to a general overlap. Obviously, special efforts would have to be made, through training in the United States, so that units arriving overseas would be ready to assume their missions immediately.

3. Ltr, Lt Gen A. C. McAuliffe, CG 7th Army, to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Aug 54, no sub. In file above.
4. Through FY 1957, Gyroscope movements to and from Europe involved Seventh Army units exclusively. No USAREUR units had been rotated and no such movements were being planned.
5. Ltr, Gen Hoge to Gen Ridgway, 10 Sep 54, no sub. In file above.
6. Incl 1, USAREUR G3, to ltr, CINCUSAREUR to COFS, 10 Sep 54, no sub. In file above.

The Department of the Army team had stated that in the first Gyroscope operation the 1st Infantry Division in USAREUR would probably interchange with the 82d Airborne Infantry Division in the United States. Although USAREUR had long advocated the assignment of an airborne division to Europe, the mission of the 1st Infantry Division was considered such that an airborne division would not be capable of fulfilling it. Thus, although it was realized that the 82d Airborne had prestige to recommend it, USAREUR objected to it as a replacement in Europe for the 1st Division. The consensus was that the interchange of like units would avoid many operational complications and would be more prudent initially.⁷

b. Approval of the Plan. Although many rumors concerning unit rotation had been in circulation, the first official public confirmation of the plan appeared in a press release distributed in September 1954.⁸ In mid-October the Secretary of the Army announced his approval of the program, to begin on 1 July 1955.⁹ In Gyroscope I the 10th Infantry Division, Ft. Riley, Kansas, would exchange stations with the 1st Infantry Division in USAREUR, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Ft. George G. Meade, Maryland, would replace the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment in USAREUR.¹⁰ Two days later the Army Chief of Staff released the necessary message of confirmation^.ll

4. Assignment and Coordination of Staff Responsibilities

USAREUR staff agencies were now able to begin detailed planning for participation in the largest peacetime troop movement in U.S. history. Time was short and immediate action was necessary if the program was to be implemented by the target date. Unable to wait for detailed instructions from the Department of the Army, USAREUR based its initial plans upon the broad outlines as announced, and drafted its own instructions. It was a rare opportunity for a major command to establish practices for the entire Army on the basis of its own experience.

7. Memo, Col A. S. Collins, GS to Gen card, 12 Aug 54, no sub. In file above.
8. Cable DA-552139, DA from CIAO to all comas, 29 Sep 54. In file above.
9. Cable DA-555631, DA to all comas, 12 Oct 54. In file above.
10. The 187th Airborne Infantry Regimental Combat Team in Japan would also exchange stations with the 508th Airborne Infantry Regimental Combat Team at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky.
11. Cable DA-556391, HA to all comas, 14 Oct 54. In file above.

a. The Control Room. To centralize and facilitate the monitoring of plans and to enable the USAREUR Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff to check on the current status of planning, the establishment of a War Room was suggested by G1, initially designated as the monitoring agency. In December 1954, when the task of monitorship wan transferred to G3, the establishment of such a room was left to the latter's discretion. G3 preferred to receive weekly reports from the various staff divisions and to summarize them at the weekly Staff conferences. However, the reports were rarely received in time to be useful. Information concerning delays in construction, shortages in transportation for non-Gyroscope personnel, and other matters of importance was not being brought to the attention of all interested staff agencies. The Gyroscope Control Room was therefore established in July 1955 to centralize all pertinent information and to keep it current.¹² The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G1, G3, and G4, and the technical services concerned were assigned will and cabinet space for posting information requested by the Control Officer, as well ad other material of general interest. The Control Room also served as a briefing room for visitors.¹³

b. The Role of the Technical Services. The Transportation, Engineer, and Quartermaster Divisions were to play important roles in Operation Gyroscope.

(1) The Transportation Division. It was estimated that the 1st Infantry Division would return to the United States with more than 16,000 enlisted personnel, approximately 825 officers, 5,500 dependents, over 1,000 private automobiles, and 33 family pets. The Transportation Division—the technical service most concerned—would be responsible for carrying out the move as expeditiously and economically as possible.

To cut transfer time to a minimum and reduce costs accordingly, incoming units would be moved directly from ship to train upon arrival. Vessels and rail transportation provided for the incoming increment would also be utilized by the outgoing increment. Returnees would depart within four to six hours after the arrival of their replacements, and ships would not be delayed in the harbor for more than four days. Thus, few additional housing facilities would be required at the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation, and the need for temporary housing at posts and stations would be eliminated. Close coordination would be maintained between German and American rail officials and the units being moved.¹⁴ Since it

12. USAREUR Stf Memo 39, 8 Jul 55, sub: Coordinated Control of Operation GYROSCOPE.

13. The Control Room was discontinued in 1956 after Gyroscope had become a routine matter under G3 control.

14. (1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to sub comds, 17 Feb 55, sub: Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), Vol. I, B/P, Tab #1. (2) AR 220-20, 7 Apr 55, sub: Operation Gyroscope, Unit Rotation.

was Department of Army policy to provide concurrent or simultaneous travel for the maximum number of families, the ships used in the operation would be of the type that afforded facilities for dependents. When ship space was not available, provisions would be made to move eligible dependents by air.

Problem areas soon developed in the transportation of privately owned vehicles. Those of the outgoing unit had to be sent to the port of embarkation before rotation day, but those of the replacing unit would not be available immediately upon the owners' arrival. During the interim dependents would be without private means of transportation; if an alert was called they would be seriously handicapped unless other evacuation vehicles were provided. The Transportation Division, therefore, would not only have to step up its regularly scheduled military bus service in the affected areas during the vulnerable period; but would have to hold a number of busses in reserve for evacuation purposes. Moreover, to hold to a minimum the number of individuals off duty during the period, administrative leaves for driving privately-owned vehicles to and from the port of embarkation would have to be staggered carefully.

(2) The Engineer Division. The Engineer Division would have the tasks of supervising individual clearances of quarters and the turn over of much government property, as well as of packing household goods and other personal property of the personnel of outgoing units. The 1st Infantry Division was expected to ship approximately 5,000 short tons of household goods and 1,500 tons of hold baggage. Time and money would be saved by mass processing, but individual engineer units would be overburdened to such an extent that outside assistance would become imperative. Therefore the use of labor service personnel to assist in packing, crating, and loading household goods during peak periods was authorized.¹⁵

(3) The Quartermaster Division. USAREUR quartermaster units were concerned with making housing facilities ready for immediate occupancy by dependents. During the 60 days before the rotation date all unserviceable household furniture and equipment would have to be repaired or replaced, and before families departed, their apartments would have to be checked again carefully. Area commanders were instructed to supply incoming families temporarily with essential bed linen, minimum kitchen utensils for immediate housekeeping, and subsistence sufficient to maintain them until they could obtain supplies through normal channels.

c. The Public Information Division's Role. Operation GYROSCOPE presented the Army with a story loaded with personal appeal.¹⁶ If

15. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 10, 19 Apr 55, p. 5.
16. The Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, 12 Mar 55.

increased enlistments and reenlistments, together with the necessary volunteers for Gyroscope units, were to be obtained, the story would have to be told both to the public and to the Army itself. Public information officers therefore tried to get full accounts into both the military and the civilian press. External publicity centered around travel opportunities and the increased stability of family life offered by Gyroscope, and upon the ceremonies to be held when the first increments of the 1st and 10th Divisions reached New York and Bremerhaven, respectively. In addition to fact sheets on the operation, histories of the two divisions were prepared and distributed to the American and German press. All Army publications were alerted, and arrangements were made to house and feed reporters covering the events. Original plans called for a ticker tape parade of 1st Division units up New York's Fifth Avenue to City Hall, but problems of assembly, the probable resultant delays in movement, and the fact that the units would be without field equipment other than rifles made it advisable to substitute dockside ceremonies for the parade.¹⁷

The USAREUR internal publicity campaign began in April 1955 with recruiting and reenlistment efforts among 1st Division personnel The same features and benefits of Gyroscope emphasized in the popular appeals were stressed to troops. Concurrent travel, stabilized tours, unit pride, fewer housing problems, and a sense of belonging were among the features most stressed. The campaign also informed personnel about better chances for promotion, the prospect for better-trained and more efficient teams, decreased likelihood of misassignment, easier handling of personal problems, the tendency toward better officer-enlisted men relations, chances of more schooling and gains from the experience of others, better discipline, and the opportunity to establish friendships comparable to the long-term relationships of civilian life. The purpose of this internal publicity program was to retain the maximum number of qualified enlisted personnel for the Gyroscope program before the division returned to the United States. Similar efforts were also made in the 10th Division.¹⁸

5. The "Little Gyroscope'' Experiment

To test Gyroscope plans, in the spring of 1955 the 216th Field Artillery Battalion was moved as a unit in a "Little Gyroscope" from the United States to the Darmstadt area of West Germany. Fifty-four wives and 102 children accompanied the military personnel of the unit on board the USNS Patch. When the ship docked at Bremerhaven on 25 March 1955, the unit, including dependents, moved directly to waiting trains. Within 24 hours all personnel were at their new posts. Each dependent family

17. USAREUR PID Public Relations Plan, Gyroscope, 1 May 55. In USAREUR PID files.
18. The American Traveler, 7 Apr 550 In Hist Div Lib.

was met at the Darmstadt railroad station by a member of the 760th Field Artillery Battalion, and was driven in the host's automobile to its new home. The apartments had been prepared for the new occupants; each kitchen was filled with provisions calculated to last for three days, beds had been made, individual commissary accounts had been opened, and post exchange and class VI cards were distributed immediately.¹⁹

With the success of "Little Gyroscope," the command was ready to undertake Gyroscope I..

19. UP Press Release, 25 Mar 55. In USAREUR PID files.