CHAPTER 4
Exchange Procedures

 

12. Interchange of 1st and 10th Infantry Divisions

a. Stateside Preparations. A great measure of the success of Operation GYROSCOPE depended upon the attitude and preparation of the men and dependents involved. In the 10th Division the way for the change was paved by various types of orientation and special training of men and their families in the United States. The Transportation Section prepared a guide booklet that provided maps, explained the historical significance of various cities en route, and presented diagrams of the port of embarkation for personnel planning to drive from Fort Riley to New York. For those utilizing commercial transportation there were train and air schedules, as well as instructions on how to proceed after arrival in New York. Men with dependents found information on how to ship household goods and data pertaining to billeting at the port.1

In addition, 10th Division troops attended a wide variety of schools ranging from mountain and cold-weather training schools to bath and fumigation courses. Ninety-eight percent of the specialists were school-trained—the highest percentage of school-trained personnel ever to staff the division. Military personnel and their families filled the enrollment capacity of special German-language classes. German road signs were placed under their English counterparts along highways in the Fort Riley area.2

b. USAREUR Preparations. "As Commanding General, Northern Area Command, I take this opportunity to welcome you as a new member of our American community." With these introductory words Maj. Gen. Richard

1. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 17 Mar 55.
2. Ibid., 31 Mar, 2 Jun 55.

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W. Stephens, in Europe, prefaced a specially prepared 30-page booklet designed to orient incoming families concerning the command's facilities and services. The booklet provided information on the organization of Northern Area Command, a description of subarea cities, copies of regulations, furniture lists, lists of items for loan, and miscellaneous household data. There were also lists of commissaries, a grocery order blank, applications for commissary privileges, and requests for telephone service.3

c. The Actual Interchange.

(1) Advance Planning Groups and Parties. The movement of the 10th Division to USAREUR, its first return to Europe since World War II, was facilitated by several advance planning groups.

The first group arrived in Germany on 5 January 1955 and remained for over two weeks. Its members visited 1st Division installations and discussed many important matters: the composition and arrival dates of advance parties, the movement of increments to the New York Port of Embarkation and further destinations, the composition of shiploads of the first increment, the training program, and the uniform and equipment of arriving troops, among others.4 The planning group member interested in personnel matters obtained general information on USAREUR personnel policies and procedures, dependents' schools, housing, facilities such as banking and Special Services, and the division newspaper. The finance officer arranged for the pay of the advance party and the first increment. The intelligence officer discussed clearance requirements, arrangements for transfer of classified documents, and intelligence training needs. Another group member learned about scheduled field exercises, training grounds, maneuver and trespass rights, and ammunition requirements. The logistics group received a general briefing on procurement, the transfer of property, and facilities of casernes where 10th Division troops were to be stationed. These discussions laid the groundwork for the actual move and contributed much to the initial Gyroscope success.5

On 9 May 1955 a liaison officer, attached by the 10th Division to the 1st Division, left the United States to prepare for the arrival of the advance party.

The first segment of the advance party, consisting of 91 officers and men, arrived at Rhine-Main Airbase, Frankfurt, on 26 May, remained in Frankfurt overnight, and left the next morning for Wuerzburg. "Big Red One's" Operation WELCOME began on 29 May when the commanding general of the 1st Division and a representative of the mayor of Wuerzburg greeted

3. Ibid., 20 Apr 55.
4. Adv Planning Gp Opn GYROSCOPE Rept, 5 Jan-22 Jan 55. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.
5. Ibid.

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this party. The entire group, consisting of 60 officers, l22 enlisted men, 285 dependents, and 3 dogs, had arrived by 1 June 1955.6

They began work immediately. The historical background of the cities where they lived, their mission in Europe, and their training and specific duties were explained during orientation talks. The military personnel took over the jobs of their counterparts of the lst Division, who had left Wuerzburg during the first two weeks of May for rotation to the United States.7

(2) Increments. On 11 July the first shipload of the first main increment of the 10th Division, consisting of 1,494 officers, enlisted men, and dependents of the 86th Infantry Regiment, arrived at Bremerhaven. On 14 July the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division, including 1,164 officers, EM, and dependents, as well as 12 dogs, boarded the same ship that had brought the 86th Infantry overseas. Another serial of the 10th Division first increment reached Bremerhaven on 17 July, and on 29 July change-of-command ceremonies were held at Wuerzburg before a large audience of senior officers, visiting German dignitaries, and newly arrived dependents.8

The movement of the second increment of the 10th Division began on 2 September, and its 1st Division counterpart embarked on 11 September. The exchange followed the pattern set by the first increment. When this second phase ended on 27 September, an additional 1,687 officers, EM, and dependents had arrived.9

The actual divisional change-of-command ceremony was conducted on 27 September when Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Jr., handed over the area and responsibilities to Maj. Gen. George E. Martin. These formalities completed the rotation of the second increment, and the 10th Division was officially in charge.10

6. (1) UP Press Release, 8 May 55. (2) USAREUR Press Release, 25 May 55. Both in USAREUR PID files. (3) USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 14, 7 Jun 55.
7. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 5 Jun 55.
8. (1) AP Press Release, 10 Jul 55. (2) Bremerhaven PIO Press Release, 16 Jul 55. Both in USAREUR PID files. (3) Cable N-571, 1st Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jul 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. II. (4) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 30 Jul 55.
9. (1) Cable BPE-A-11874, BPE to DA, 14 Sep 55. (2) Cable N-1019, 1st Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Sep 55. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.
10. Cable P271730Z, PIO 10th Inf Div Press Traffic Release, 27 Sep 55. In USAREUR PID files.

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On 13 November the first ship of the third increment docked in Bremerhaven with 1,492 soldiers and dependents of the 85th Regimental Combat Team. On 18 November the 41st Engineer Battalion assumed the duties of the departing 1st Division engineers in the last of the change-of-command ceremonies.11

d. Problem Areas. The first Operation GYROSCOPE was completed within 5 months.12 During this divisional interchange some basic patterns emerged and some difficulties that were to influence subsequent unit rotation operations developed.

(1) Transportation. All transportation phases functioned smoothly, both at the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and in the areas where incoming units were to be stationed. Incoming troops stepped off the ships and immediately boarded southbound trains, followed within a few hours by their dependents. Waiting buses at the various depots took the families immediately to their furnished quarters, which had been cleaned and stocked with an initial supply of food. Twelve hours after the 10th Division troops arrived at their final destinations, the same buses and trains in which they had been transported took the 1st Division men to the port, where their dependents, who had left a day earlier, were waiting. Since all processing and staging had been done at the home stations,-delay in sailing was eliminated. Baggage had been inspected, sent to the port, and leaded on the ship to be sorted and claimed by the men at sea.l3

(2) Operation WELCOME. Operation WELCOME played a big part in helping the newcomers feel "at home." Each family was met by a sponsor of the same rank who remained with the new arrivals for at least 24 hours, provided them with information, and helped them to get settled in their new homes. There was even an "Operation LITTLE GYRO," a special welcome in which wives not eligible for government quarters were greeted by 1st Division wives and escorted to furnished German apartments stocked with food. Officers and men of other units put cars at the disposal of the new families during the first two weeks to help them become familiar with the area.14

The new surroundings of the 10th Division were pleasant. The 1st Division had spent more than $5,000 in a post beautification programs new signs denoting various buildings had been painted; grass had been

11. (1) Cable AETEAG-11-56, 10th Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Nov 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III. (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 18 Nov 55.
12. The revised AR 220-20, 17 Oct 56, sub: Field Organizations, Operation GYROSCOPE, prescribed a divisional rotation period of 3 months.
13. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 11 Jul 55.
14. (1) The American Traveler, 22 Jul 55. (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 24 Sep 55.

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planted and the streets and parade ground had been re-paved; there was even a new flagpole with the insignia of the 10th and 1st Divisions embedded in the base.15

(3) Unit Properly. The transfer and disposal of unit fund property presented a problem of major proportions in this first Gryoscope exchange, because the 1st Division had accumulated much organizational property during its 12-year stay in Germany. Three alternative courses were proposed: that the USAREUR Central Welfare Fund make an outright grant to the 10th Division, so that it might purchase the property from the 1st Division; that the Central Welfare Fund buy the property and issue it to the 10th Division on a permanent basis; or that the Central Welfare Fund advance a loan, to be repaid over a specified period. The 10th Division preferred the second suggestions but USAREUR decided to advance the funds and request repayment. After the property of the 1st Division was evaluated by a disinterested board, each 10th Division unit was to receive a loan not to exceed Sl,000, to be repaid quarterly.

It was expected that once the Gyroscope program was under way such inequalities in unit fund property would eventually disappear.16

(4) Transfer of Military Equipment. Ten carloads of lumber, H of a ton of paper for orders, more than 1 million nails, and 7 tons of steel were used to move personal effects, not involving the transfer of heavy military equipment. However, one of the unsung features of Gyroscope was the exchange of equipment between rotating units.17

Upon its arrival in Germany the 10th Division took over all the 1st Division's equipment—everything from 21 -ton trucks to small items in the dayrooms. The dual purpose of the exchange was, of course, to save shipping costs and to maintain the operational readiness of both units. In carrying it out, the aim of the 1st Division was to have everything in such condition that the 10th would need to make no initial repairs or technical inspections immediately after arrival. Most of the gear had received a new coat of paint, and all TOE equipment had been thoroughly examined for possible defects.18

(5) Officer Personnel. According to the personnel policy that was valid at the beginning of Gyroscope, some officers were assigned to

15. The American Traveler, 9 Sep 55.
16. Ltr, 10th Inf Div to DA, 8 Feb 56, sub: Final Letter Report for Operation GYROSCOPE to Department of the Army. AG 370.2 AETA-CG. Copy in USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.
17. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 2 Jun 55.
18. The American Traveler, 9 Sep 55.

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the 10th Division as late as 2 months before items scheduled to rotate from the United States—a policy that prevented such officers from participating in the training of their assigned units. In addition, some 10th Division officers who had been sent to California for special training did not return to their units at all before departing from the United States. Thus they arrived overseas with little or no idea of the unit's capabilities. To correct these difficulties, the 10th Division suggested that, in the future, officers be thoroughly integrated before movement overseas and that, when possible, complete officer cadres be assigned to Gyroscope units before the training period.19

(6) Enlisted Personnel. AR 220-20 established three replacement or "filler" groups of enlisted men, one for each increment. This plan worked out well for the first increment, but thereafter fillers entered the division in a continuous flow, because of increasing enlistments for Gyroscope. This development facilitated reception and did not hamper training excessively. On the other hand, enlistees thus incorporated into the second and third increments would be ready to return to the United States as early as three months before their units' rotation date. This situation created a need for filler personnel from the pipeline to keep the unit at operational strength while in Germany.

Although not expecting to face large RA separations until January 1958, the 10th Division recommended a continuing and energetic recruiting campaign to offset losses.

Looking to the future, the division suggested that trainees in the United States be incorporated into Gyroscope units over as short a period as possible, in order to facilitate troop replacement upon separation.20

(7) Housing. After much persuasion, stateside planners had realized that there would probably never be enough dependent housing for all eligibles. Therefore, since one of the chief purposes of Operation GYROSCOPE was to give added incentive to the career soldier, the possibility of assigning a higher dependent housing priority to career NCO's than to non-career NCO's would have to be seriously considered. The 10th Division held that the Army should not assume any obligation to transport families of non-career NCO's overseas for short periods.

Other suggestions pertaining to the housing situation were to appoint a liaison officer in the overseas command to coordinate housing; to establish a roster as of R-minus-60 instead of the previously required R-minus-120, so that units would be better stabilized before housing requirements were stated; and to make bulk allotment of quarters

19. Ltr, 10th Div to DA, 8 Feb 56, cited above.
20. Ibid.

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to the division, which would then submit a roster of the personnel being assigned.21

(8) General. Other minor suggestions included slight alterations in the composition of the regimental combat team; more accurate estimates by the overseas command of the number and types of security clearances required; inclusion of the Civil Affair/Military Government section in the advance party instead of the second increment; and issuance of passport letters to all personnel likely to be granted concurrent travel, in order to avoid last minute delays.

In the final analysis, however, the first Gyroscope movement was a distinct success. The general logistics annex to AR 220-20 was found to be a sound and workable plan, and no criticisms of the supply or transportation arrangements were expressed.

13. The Rotation of Unlike Divisions

The exchange of the 1st and 10th Infantry Divisions, involving like units as visualized initially by Gyroscope planners, had created many problems, most of which were solved. However, the next Gyroscope moves—exchanging two infantry divisions with an airborne and an armored -division, respectively—brought new difficulties to light.

a. The 3d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions. The Department of the Army announced in March 1955 that the 3d Armored Division, in the United States, would be converted from a training to a full-strength tactical division and designated to gyroscope with the 4th Infantry Division, USAREUR, in May 1956. Moreover, the armored division's new cadre and filler personnel were to be Gyroscope-qualified. Thus this division was presented with the double problem of internal reorganization and full attainment of Gyroscope posture, all within one year's time.23

(1) Training. Originally, the 3d Armored Division was to be operationally ready within 72 hours after arrival in Germany, but later instructions stipulated that it was to be ready immediately upon arrival. Training would have to be conducted in the United States on the basis of available information about lock conditions and requirements in Germany. Some of the first personnel to depart for Europe would have to begin their preparations within 6 months. Intensive training would be necessary to develop individual soldiers capable of becoming useful members of small-unit teams, combat units trained in depth, and a combat-ready division

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. (1) Cables DA-97939, 2 Mar 55, and DA-977515, 11 Mar 55, DA to CINCUSAREUR. Both in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I. (2) Spearhead, A History of the 3d Armored Division, (Darmstadt, Germany, 1957), Ch. IX.

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capable of carrying out sustained operations of a tactical nature.24

As an approach to the training problem, the division requested training directives from USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters in Germany. This information and guidance was incorporated into the division's training plans. To facilitate their fulfillment, several measures were adopted: emphasis was placed on subjects listed as mandatory in USAREUR directives; unit training was started at an early stage; battalion tests were given after the 18th week; combat field exercises took place after the completion of battalion tests; instruction through practice was given precedence over lectures; and routine training, such as drills, was limited to a minimum.25

Seventh Army had emphasized the importance of M-48 tank training in the United States because of the critical area in which the division was to be stationed. Such training was to include complete familiarization with the vehicle, as well as completion of qualification firing, because the USAREUR gunnery program at Belsen-Hohne was to end in May 1956 and the next divisional training program in Europe might not begin for another year after the division's arrival. To accomplish this training in the United States, the division was granted permission to complete its firing in two increments during the winter of 1955-56.26

(2) Equipment. Other problems grew out of the difficulty of exchanging equipment between an armored and an infantry division. The Department of the Army stated that the only items to be brought to Europe by the 3d Armored Division would be those that could not be obtained either from the departing 4th Infantry Division or from USAREUR stocks. Under the tank modernization program, USAREUR would be provided with some medium tanks directly, and would be able to furnish them to the 3d Armored, whereas M-48 tanks and special artillery were to be furnished in the United States and shipped overseas with the division.27 Moreover, an advance group reached an agreement with USAREUR headquarters that all armored personnel carriers would be shipped with the division, in order to reduce the number of changes in the installation of vehicular radios.28

24. Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, sub: Final Report, Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.
5. Ibid.
26. (1) Cable 5258, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Sep 55. (2) Cable SC-2670, USAREUR to DA, 6 Oct 55. (3) Cable DA-991441, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Nov 55. All in USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.
27. Cable DA-988229, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Sep 55. In file above.
28. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 23, 20 Sep 55.

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When it was recommended that all future M-48 tanks issued to the 4th Infantry Division be equipped with armored-type radios, to eliminate the issue of additional radio equipment, the division requested the conversion of 46 radios from infantry- to armored-type and the issuance of 16 new sets. The new sets issued were boxed and installed before the 3d Armored Division actually arrived. It February 1956 additional signal equipment for the armored division began to arrive from the United States, and thereafter the plans for transferring equipment worked on schedule until the rotation was completed. All 4th Infantry Division equipment that would not be needed by the 3d Armored was inventoried and returned to supply depots in Germany.29

Coordinating the delivery of the 3d Armored Division's equipment with the arrival of its personnel presented difficulties. The equipment was originally scheduled to arrive at the casernes approximately 30 days before the personnel. Seventh Army disagreed with this plan, because the approximately 700 vehicles involved could not be evacuated in an emergency. The alternative adopted was Seventh Army's suggestion to receive, reprocess, and store the equipment in depots west of the Rhine, pending delivery to the units' home stations on the arrival dates of the 3d Division's increments.30 The Rhine Ordnance Depot was considered the only suitable storage location, and the USAREUR Transportation Division could make the necessary rail movements within a 72-hour period.31

In the early spring of 1956 it appeared that the exchange would create a shortage of such equipment as gas masks, QM spare parts, and post, camp and station-type property in Europe. Shelter halves, blankets, field range components, and mess gear were in too short supply to allot for the replacement of the 4th Infantry Division's unserviceable equipment before its rotation date. In April it also became obvious that adequate supplies of organizational clothing and equipment would not be available for the incoming 3d Armored Division unless prompt action was taken. Moreover, about 3,000 members of the 4th Armored, which was not returning to the United States as a unit but was to be scattered and its personnel reassigned, were temporarily assigned to the incoming 3d Armored, creating additional supply problems for that division. The situation was corrected by a rapid build-up of theater stocks, and supplies of clothing and individual equipment were adequate when the division arrived. Spare parts were also acquired on a rush basis. The requisitions were processed as preparation for overseas movement

29. (1) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. (2) USAREUR Sig Div Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56.
30. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 28, 20 Dec 55.
31. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Confs, No. 1, 10 Jan 56; No. 3, 24 Jan 56.

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shortages and the pertinent items were shipped directly to Europe.32

(3) The Movement. The original plans for the movement of the 3d Armored Division provided for it to be shipped as a unit over a 30-day period beginning 1 May 1956.33 Movement in exact increments, as prescribed in AR 220-20, was impractical, primarily because of the division's mission and the unbalanced deployment of its combat commands after arrival in Germany.34 The actual move took more than 6 weeks. The first group of 1,600 men and dependents arrived in Europe on 12 May 1956, and change-of-command ceremonies were held on 10 June, but the movement was not completed entirely until 30 June.35

The technical details of Gyroscope-type movement continued to be well-executed in this exchange. Maj. Gen. Robert W. Porter, Jr., commander of the advance party of the 3d Armored Division, made this comment on the arrival of the first increment of that division in May 1956:

The entire operation was conducted in an outstandingly efficient manner; appearance, morale, and conduct of the troops was superior and the subject of much favorable comment from impartial observers; despite the arrival of three ships on 12 May and berthing schedule being disrupted by morning fog, the port staff maintained excellent control and the planned debarkation and entraining schedules were met; troop train on which I rode was not overcrowded, had comfortable berths, and served hot meals promptly; the dependent trains were on schedule; splendid planning job at the Kaserne—upon arrival troops began a constructive program which will attain full operational readiness in the least possible time; full supply and equipment were available on station for the units; housing was assigned and hosts with keys were present.38

32. (1) USAREUB CINC's Wkly Stf Confs, No. 1, 10 Jan 56; No. 3, 24 Jan 56; No. 7, 14 Mar 56. (2) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. (3) Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, cited above. (4) Cable DA-387391, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Feb 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956). (5) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 16 Jun 56.
33. Cable SC-2035, USAREUR to DA, 2 Mar 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.
34. Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, cited above.
35. 4th Inf Div Press Release, n.d. In USAREUR PID files.
36. Cable AETFCS-7-5, 3d Armd Div Adv Party, sgd Porter, to 3d Armd Div. 13 May 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).

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(4) Summary. In several respects the interchange of the 4th Infantry and 3d Armored Divisions was not a true Gyroscope operation. In the first place, the 4th Infantry Division was phased out, not rotated and almost 3,000 men were left behind with the 3d Armored, to be returned to the United States as casuals. Moreover, the 3d Armored Division arrived and closed in at its overseas station in much less than the stipulated time for a Gyroscope move. Finally, equipping the armored division overseas was a special problem because it took over from an unlike organization. The division's final report37 reviewed its supply difficulties but endorsed the Gyroscope program enthusiastically. It stated that the operation had contributed to greater individual and unit proficiency, higher esprit, and improved morale. Moreover, it predicted that the extension and continuation of Gyroscope would result in greater economy and efficiency in the field. Besides making a number of suggestions for correcting supply procedures, the report recommended placing small-unit exercises earlier in the training schedules of divisions destined for Gyroscope.

b. The 11th Airborne and 5th Infantry Divisions. In early 1955, when it was announced that the 5th Infantry Division in Germany was to be replaced by the 11th Airborne Division, it was realized that this second Gyroscope interchange of unlike divisions would create many new logistical, budgetary, and training problems. For example, the maintenance of jump qualifications would not only necessitate additional construction and financial expenditure, but would probably reduce the infantry capability of the airborne division. Although it was felt that at least one year would be required to execute the necessary planning for the exchange, the problems were not considered insurmountable.38

(1) Training. The degree of airborne capability to be maintained by the 11th Airborne Division after its arrival in Europe was one of the first problems discussed. The Department of the Army stated the various alternatives, taking into consideration not only USAREUR's needs and facilities, but the necessity for maintaining the division's morale. The division could maintain individual jump proficiency with only one-third of the special airborne TOE equipment usually required, thus easing local logistical problems. It could maintain airborne capability training-wise if provided with enough equipment to train one regimental combat team at a time. Finally, it could retain its full airborne operational capability if its entire complement of equipment was made available in Europe.39

USAREUR held that only individual jump proficiency should be required, because the division would be deployed and utilized as an ordinary

37. Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, cited above.
38. Memo, Col W. R. Peers, C/OACOFS G3, Unit Reqmts Sec, to USAREUR ACOFS, G3, 19 Feb 55, sub: Report of G3 Staff Visit to USAREUR. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.
39. Cable DA-979235, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 7 Apr 55. In file above.

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infantry division. Its mission would be one of delay and defense training. The schedule of training as a normal infantry division would allow time for only minimum airborne training. Facilities for developing more than individual proficiency were lacking, and any attempt to maintain 100 percent airborne divisional capability would mean a vastly increased logistical problem.40

The Department of the Army did not make an immediate decision. As the summer advanced the question became more urgent because of the time required for construction, acquisition of supplies, and other preparatory measures.41 The final Departmental decision was that after rotation to Europe the 11th Airborne Division would be required to carry on individual jump proficiency training only, although airborne capability should be maintained to the maximum degree possible without interfering with the command's operational mission.42

(2) Construction and Funds. The conduct of minimum airborne training for the division in Europe would require construction projects amounting to an estimated $700,000.43 The projects planned were two 34-foot jump towers and one parachute rigging and packing building in each area designated for an airborne regiment. Since there were no funds available for the purpose, USAREUR hoped to persuade the Department of the Army either to provide FY 1956 contingency funds or to reprogram to Germany funds scheduled for France but not required there until FY 1957. In any case, the difficulties were not considered critical enough to warrant a request for a delay in the arrival of the airborne division.44

In August 1955 the required construction projects were awaiting Department of the Army approval. Since, as initially planned, they were also subject to the approval of four Congressional committees, it seemed that they could not possibly be completed before April to November 1956, depending on the approval date and the type of project.45 Concerned about the possible delay, 11th Airborne representatives who visited Germany in September 1955 requested that special funding action be taken, so that the facilities might be ready before the arrival of the division

40. Cable SC-3296, USAREUR to DA, 16 May 55. In file above.
41. DF, USAREUR G3 to COFS, 1 Jul 55, sub: Airborne Training and Capability for 11th Airborne Division. In file above.
42. Cable DA-985200, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Jul 55. In file above, B/P, Vol. II.
43. Cable SC-1956, USAREUR to DA, 25 Feb 55. In file above.
44. Memo, Maj Gen B. P. Storke, USAREUR ACOFS G4 to COFS, 20 Jul 55, sub: Reference SC-1275. In file above.
45. USAREUR CINC's Wkly Stf Conf, No. 18, 2 Aug 55.

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in March 1956.46 Finally, the construction needed was made a Repairs and Utilities project in January 1956 and was accomplished at a cost of $507,000.47

(3) Equipment. The 11th Airborne Division originally was to take overseas all TOE equipment not organic to a regularly constituted infantry division.48 However, in August 1955, after the Department of the Army had decided that the division would maintain only individual airborne proficiency in Europe, instructions were issued that only one-third of the special airborne equipment would accompany the division to Germany.49

The Seventh Army Ordnance Division assisted greatly in the difficult interchange. It completed technical inspections of equipment to be exchanged and also provided ordnance support to both the incoming and outgoing divisions until approximately one month after the arrival of the 11th's own ordnance battalion.50

(4) The Movement. The 11th Airborne Division began to arrive in Germany on 23 January 1956, when the first increment of approximately 1,900 officers, troops, and dependents landed at Bremerhaven. The official change-of-command ceremonies took place on 28 February, and the exchange of the prescribed three increments was completed by the first of April.51 Thereafter the division could not follow the usual Gyroscope pattern because of the large Regular Army component—about 98 percent—inherent in an airborne outfit. Because there were 80 few draftees in the division, large personnel losses could be expected to occur monthly as RA enlistments expired. Thus, instead of receiving its replacements in one packet filler group mid-way through the European tour, the division

46. Cable FCPJO-30-9-30, 11th Abn Div to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Sep 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.
47. Program 11, USAREUR Cons Program, FY 57, Schedule 11-6 (GER), 15 Jan 56, sub: USAREUR Military Construction Line Item Status Report, Germany, FY 1954-55-56. In USAREUR Hist Div Lib.
48. Cable SC-25096, USAREUR to DA, 2 Apr 55. DECLASSIFIED. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.
49. Cable DA-985921, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Aug 55. In file above, B/P, Vol. II.
50. Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56.
51. (1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 24 Jan, 28 Feb. 1 Mar, and 2 Apr 56. (2) Ltr, 11th Abn Div to CG VII Corps, n.d., sub: Final Report of Movement Problems for Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

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required a continuous stream of replacements to maintain at least 90 percent strength.52

(5) Summary. As in the case of the 3d Armored Division, the movement of the 11th Airborne to Europe was not a true Gyroscope operation.53 To the difficulties of supply and equipment inherent in the interchange of unlike divisions another problem was added: providing a certain amount of airborne training to a division whose assigned mission was strictly that of an infantry division. A solution was worked out.

No difficulty was experienced with the transportation mechanics of the over-all movement, but the division, in its final report, made a number of recommendations concerning other factors. One was that earlier and more definite information should be given to units scheduled for gyroscoping, both for publicity purposes and facilitating training. Another was that the Gyroscope posture of airborne units transferring from the United States to overseas stations should be 130 percent of TOE enlisted strength, instead of 110, because of the constant losses through enlistment expirations of such a unit's Regular Army enlisted personnel. Further, the arrival of replacements should be spaced accordingly over a period of months, instead of concentrated at the mid-cycle.54

14. The 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions

The Gyroscope exchange of the 8th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado, with the 9th Infantry Division, USAREUR, was a return to the original scheme of exchanging like divisions. The 8th's advance planning group came to Germany in February 1956 to prepare for the move scheduled for August and September 1956. Since this was the second full-scale exchange of infantry divisions the problems were fewer than when the 1st and 10th Divisions rotated.55

The 8th Division's major problems, like those of the 3d Armored, were caused by the necessity to convert from a training division to a full-strength TOE combat Gyroscope division while continuing to perform normal functions in the United States. New key officers were assigned very late and had little time to become familiar with the unit policies and problems. The recruiting program began late, causing difficulty in acquiring qualified NCO's. Enlisted personnel entered the division too

52. Comment 2, USAREUR G3 to G1, 21 Aug 56, sub: 11th Airborne Final Letter for Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.
53. Ibid.
54. Ltr, 11th Abn Div to CG VII Corps, cited above.
55. Cable ALCDS-G-7, 8th Inf Div to CINCUSAREUR, 5 Jan 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).

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late to receive the prescribed 20 weeks training. There were also problems of equipping the division within a short time for the movement overseas; and a shortage of automotive parts made it necessary for some equipment to be turned over to the incoming 9th Division in poor condition.56

In spite of these preparatory difficulties, the interchange was carried out according to schedule. The training program, which included courses in interior guard duty, code of conduct, battle drill, effect of special weapons, and German traffic signs and relations, was continued on board ship. The first contingent of the 8th Division, consisting of 1,500 soldiers and dependents, arrived in Germany on 24 August 1956. The commanding general reached Germany by mid-September, and the actual transfer of mission and responsibility from the 9th to the 8th took place on 9 October 1956.57

15. The Exchange of the 2d and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiments

Regimental-size units, as well as entire divisions, were incorporated into the Gyroscope exchange program. The first regiments chosen were the 2d Armored Cavalry, USAREUR, and the 3d Armored Cavalry in the United States. Advance planning groups were exchanged in January 1955 in preparation for the rotation in August 1955.58

Contrary to existing directives, under which armored cavalry regiments assigned to USAREUR were to retain three separate 105-mm howitzer self-propelled battalions instead of howitzer companies, the incoming regiment was to include organic howitzer companies. This organizational change, which saved 800 personnel spaces, was made because of directed strength reductions.59

The principal difficulty in the rotation of these two regiments grew out of operating commitments requiring three companies of the 2d Armored Cavalry to continue border surveillance through July 1955. It was feared that the time remaining before the exchange in August

56. Ltr, Col L. D. Smith, 8th Inf Div COFS, to TAG, 4 Apr 57, sub: Gyroscope Rotation Movement Problems. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.
57. (1) Cable AETHGC-11, 8th Inf Div to 5th Army, 10 Oct 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956). (2) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 6 and 25 Aug 56.
58. Cable SC-10325, USAREUR to DA, 5 Jan 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.
59. Memo, Col W. R. Peers, C/OACOFS G3, Unit Requirements Section, to ACOFS G3, 19 Feb 55, sub: Report of G3 Staff Visit to USAREUR. In file above.

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would be insufficient for that organization to complete technical inspections and to turn over property to the incoming 3d. USAREUR therefore requested that the advance parties from the 3d Armored Cavalry arrive in Germany not later than the first week in June.60 When it was found that training and processing requirements would not permit the advance party to be sent from the United States before the last week in June, the Department of the Army asked that the 2d Armored Cavalry's operational commitments on the border be given to adjacent units.61

The final solution was to attach the advance party and the 1st and 2d battalions of the 3d Armored Cavalry directly to the 2d, thus allowing the 2d to retain responsibility for its emergency mission, tactical readiness, and border operations until completely relieved by the 3d. From 11 to 15 August the missions were to be carried out by a task organization consisting of one battalion of the 2d Armored Cavalry plus two newly-arrived battalions of the 3d. On 15 August the 3d was to assume command completely, but until that date the 2d Armored Cavalry would retain responsibility for all missions.62

The movement was carried out as planned. Two battalions of each regiment exchanged places on 11 and 12 August. By 15 August the third battalion, plus headquarters units, of the 3d Armored Cavalry had arrived and taken command. Thus the exchange was carried out with minimum disruption of the important border mission.

16. Rotation of Battalion-Size units

The Army Regulation establishing Gyroscope procedures stipulated that antiaircraft artillery units and administrative and technical service units not organic to divisions would not be included in the program initially. However, after experience with the unit rotation system the feasibility of rotating battalion-size units was to be considered.64

In the spring of 1955 the question of rotating battalions was examined, looking toward the nomination by USAREUR of an engineer construction battalion, a signal corps construction battalion, and a transportation truck battalion to begin such a program.65 At first

60. Cable SC-2472, USAREUR to DA, 25 Mar 55. In file above.
61. Cable DA-978642, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 30 Mar 55. In file above.
62. Cable 210900Z, 3d Armd Cav to VII Corps, 21 Apr 55. In file above.
63. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ad.), 13 Aug 55.
64. AR 220-20, cited above, p. 2.
65. Cable DA-301889, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Apr 55. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. I.

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USAREUR planners believed that signal and engineer construction battalions were two widely scattered, in small increments, throughout Germany and France to benefit from unit rotation, but agreed to discuss the problem with Department of the Army representatives at a conference in April.66 As a result of the discussions, USAREUR proposed that all nondivisional TOE technical service units in the command participate in unit rotation beginning early in 1956. Units were to be nominated by calendar quarters for exchange during 1956, 1957, and 1958. Moreover, the units scheduled were to be so distributed throughout the command as to reduce peak loads of packing and crating in any one locality.67

A Department of the Army announcement in September 1955 stated that 20 battalions were scheduled to exchange duty stations between Europe and the United States in the spring and summer of 1956. Thus, the program was officially begun.68

a. Interchange of the 25th and 40th Signal Battalions. The 25th Signal Battalion (Construction) in the United States was chosen to rotate with the 40th Signal Battalion, Germany, in the first of these smaller unit moves. As was often the case with units in the United States that were earmarked for Gyroscope movements, the time before rotation was insufficient for the completion of normal training schedules.69 However, the 25th solved the training problem by instituting an on-the-job program to make seasoned linemen, drivers, mechanics, and clerks out of 600 recruits in about 8 weeks. None of these recruits had had any previous Signal Corps training. Bypassing the usual schools because of the early Gyroscope deadline, the battalion offered 4 courses that ran simultaneously for the 8 weeks and consisted almost entirely of practical experience, except for 5 days of classroom work for prospective drivers.70

The advance party of this first technical service unit to rotate from the United States to a foreign post left on 10 February 1956. The main body of the battalion arrived in Germany on 9 April, and the 40th Signal Battalion departed the next day. Only 152 dependents sailed with the main increment, and all of these seemed to be satisfied with the usual Gyroscope family benefits.71

66. Cable SC-27920, USAREUR to DA, 18 Apr 55. In file above.
67. Cable SC-33853, USAREUR to Seventh Army, 20 easy 55. In file above.
68. Cable DA-548967, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 19 Sep 55. In file above.
69. Cable AHFKC-7-456, First Army to CINCUSAREUR, 25 Oct. 55. In file above, B/P, Vol. III.
70. The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 22 Mar 56.
71. USAREUR Press Release, 9 Apr 55, sub: Six Battalions "Gyroing" in April. In USAREUR PID files.

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b. Exchange of Unlike Field Artillery Battalions. The problem of interchanging unlike units was as difficult on the battalion level as on the divisional. In February 1956 plans to rotate certain unlike field artillery battalions were announced. Similarity of TOE provided the basis for the rotation of such units.72 Seventh Army, which preferred the interchange of artillery units of like caliber and type, noted that units earmarked for rotation to Europe should be reorganized and retrained to allow the exchange of like units.73 USAREUR's ability to perform its combat mission was likewise considered to be dependent upon having units operationally ready upon arrival in Germany to take over the mission of the unit it was replacing. The exchange of a 155-mm towed gun battalion for an 8-inch self-propelled howitzer battalion—as suggested by the Department of the Army—would necessitate considerable retraining of chiefs of howitzer sections, cannoneers, prime-mover drivers, and artillery and vehicle mechanics. It would also prolong the period before the incoming units would be ready to assume their mission.74

Seventh Army later modified its position, noting that the retraining and reorganization it had recommended for exchanges of this kind were desirable but not essential.75 USAREUR likewise thought it would be possible to rotate 155-mm towed gun battalions with 8-inch towed—instead of self-propelled—howitzer battalions without retraining the entire units, if the special weapons assembly technicians and gun mechanics were trained in the United States. When the question was revived in the fall of 1956, the Department of the Army stated that all training in forward assembly techniques and the handling of atomic ammunition would be accomplished-in the United States before units were sent to Europe. Furthermore, 155-mm towed gun battalions sent to Germany would be redesignated as 8-inch towed howitzer battalions after arrival. These stipulations were acceptable to USAREUR, and the rotations were scheduled.76

72. Cable DA-998097, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 29 Feb 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).
73. Cable 5261, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Bar 56. In file above.
74. Cable 5270, Seventh Army to CINCUSAREUR, 28 Her 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).
75. DF, USAREUR ACOFS G3 to COPS, 5 Apr 56, sub: Rotation of Separate Battalions. In file above.
76. DF, Col R. E. Haines, USAREUR Dep ACOFS G3 to SGS, 19 Oct 56, sub: Rotation of Field Artillery Battalions. In file above.

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