17. Goals Fulfilled?

Operation GYROSCOPE planners envisioned 3 areas—morale, military efficiency, and monetary savings—in which the program would be of particular value. Since the system has been in operation for two years, some conclusion may be drawn about its effectiveness in Europe and whether it has, or has not, lived up to expectations.

a. Morale Factors. Morale was to have been improved by increased stability of family life, heightened esprit de corps, and a more favorable attitude of separated draftees toward the Army.

There is evidence that there were fewer family separations because opportunities for concurrent travel among Regular Army personnel of Gyroscope units were improved. Each full Gyroscope increment brought with it at least 200 to 300 dependents, many or most of whom would formerly have waited several months before joining their sponsors in Germany.

With respect to the other two morale factors, better esprit de corps and more favorable attitudes among separated draftees, many of the inducted filler personnel distinguished themselves by responsible leadership and by enthusiasm for making a success of their time in the service. This healthy attitude was attributed, in part at least, to the immediate feeling of "belonging" created by the Gyroscope plan.¹ No doubt the effect of Operation GYROSCOPE on morale and esprit de corps was good. The sense of belonging as well as being able to train as a group for a specific length of time contributed to the formation of close-knit

1. Ltr, 3d Armd Div to COFSA, 21 Jul 56, sub: Final Report, Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.

organizations. The majority of individual soldiers and officers questioned by a Department of the Army team visiting Germany felt that Gyroscope was a good thing for both personal and unit morale.²

In December 1956 operational requirements unexpectedly forced the Department of the Army to plan the return of the 10th Infantry Division to Fort Benning, Georgia, instead of to Fort Riley, Kansas, its original station. Concerned about personal hardships for men who had assumed obligations, such as the establishment of homes, in the Fort Riley area, the Department requested CINCUSAREUR to conduct an informal survey to determine the extent of the hardship or inconvenience that would result from this change.³ The resulting confidential surrey revealed that only about 15 enlisted men had actually undertaken personal obligations in the Fort Riley area.⁴ These few were given the option of reassignment to that station.⁵ Moreover, it was discovered that a high percentage of enlisted men with family ties in the East would prefer serving at Fort Benning. Thus it appeared that inability to return a Gyroscope unit to its scheduled home station would have little or no adverse effect upon morale.

With respect to the state of discipline, usually considered an indication of morale, the record of Gyroscope unite was somewhat contradictory. Offenses against Germans committed by personnel of incoming units did not exceed or were fewer than those of the replaced units. On the other hand, courts-martial rates as a whole were higher. For instance, from October 1954 to September 1955 the 1st Division had a total of 1,630 courts-martial, while the newly arrived 10th Division had 2,558 for the same months of 1955-56. The contrast was particularly striking in the 11th Airborne Division, which had 3,527 courts-martial from March to October 1956, while the 5th Infantry Division, which it replaced, had only 1,094 during the corresponding period in 1955. The increased number of courts-martial of new Gyroscope units in the command as attributed to the shortage in experienced NCO's—which was in turn caused by the shortage of family housing in Germany—as well as to all the difficulties inherent in placing great numbers of men in a new and strange environment.⁶

2. (1) Incl 2, to ltr, Seventy Army COFS to DA, 12 Apr 57, sub: Report on Status of Operation Gyroscope. (2) Memo, Lt Col R. P. Hatcher, USAREUR G3, to Col Anderson C/G3 Opns Br, 13 Mar 57, sub: DA Gyroscope Team Visit. Both in file above.
3. Cable DA-915253, DA fr DCSPER sgd Weible to CINCUSAREUR excl for Hodes, 20 Dec 56. In USAREUR SGS 322 GYRO (1956).
4. Cable SC-3776, CINCUSAREUR sgd Hodes to DA excl for Weible, 29 Dec 56. In file above.
5. Cable DA-486356, DA to CONARC, 5 Jan 57. In file cited above.
6. TAB E, to Comment 2, G1 to G3, to DF, G3 to G1, 2 Nov 56, sub: Status of Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opus Br files.

b. Military Factors. Among military factors expected to be improved by Gyroscope rotation, the retention of experienced personnel, most of whom were married, varied with the availability of family quarters. There is no doubt that greater stability of assignment enhanced training and teamwork. Unit rotation and packet replacements, by decreasing the number of casual assignments and the man-hours required to process casuals, tended toward better utilization of manpower. The general reserve was strengthened by the conversion of training divisions into TOE combat organizations.

(1) Execution of Mass Movements. Certainly one area of positive military achievement was in directing mass movements. There can be no doubt that from the first exchange the technical aspects of the operation were handled extremely well and provided much valuable experience. Gyroscope moves generally went according to schedule; in many ways they facilitated the tasks of the transportation and other technical services. Although the interchange of unlike units imposed an undue workload on some supply activities, the exchange of like units caused no great difficulty.⁷

(2) Effects on Combat Readiness. Since the major mission of the United States Army, Europe, was to be combat ready at all times, perhaps the most significant factor in the Gyroscope operation was its effect on the command's ability to carry out this mission. Training was the most important single factor in operational readiness. Incoming personnel had to complete the following training before departure from the United States: complete basic training; complete advanced individual training appropriate for the type of unit concerned; and a minimum basic unit training consisting of 2 weeks each of squad, section, platoon, and company tactics. However, the training could be modified according to the time available, and Army training tests were not mandatory on any level.⁸ Battalion- and larger-unit training would be conducted principally overseas.

In practice, three periods of reduced combat readiness occurred during the Gyroscope exchanges. The first such period was from the time a new unit arrived in the command until it completed battalion tests. The length of time required by any specific unit to attain a satisfactory degree of combat readiness depended upon the amount of training it had already received in the United States and upon the opportunities provided for it to function in an operational capacity before departing for Europe.⁹ The FY 1956 army training tests showed the proficiency and

7. Comment 2, USAREUR G4 to G3, to DF, USAREUR G3 to G4, 16 Mar 57, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE In file above.
8. AR 220-20, cited above, p. 15.
9. (1) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. (2) Ltr, Seventh Army COFS to DA, 12 Apr 57, cited above.

training of 10th Infantry Division officers and NCO's to be satisfactory after 4 months. All officers and NCO's in the 3d Armored Division were considered capable of performing their assigned jobs after a short time in the theater. After 4 months, 11th Airborne Division officers in the grade of captain and above, together with the higher-ranking noncommissioned officers, were considered proficient, although the junior officers and the lower-ranking NCO's were in a state of readiness equivalent only to the squad or platoon level of training. Because of training area limitations and other priority commitments, the 8th Infantry Division was not able then to undertake the tests until it had been in the command for 7 months.¹⁰

USAREUR's combat readiness was therefore affected by insufficient training of Gyroscope units in the United States before their departure for Germany. In late 1955 Seventh Army recommended that this training include company and battery tests, as a minimum, before units were transferred to Germany.¹¹ The request was repeated and emphasized by Gyroscope divisions, such as the 10th, whose commanding general said: "It is highly desirable that a revision be made in the Gyroscope training policy, to require that company/battery ATT's (Army Training Tests) be completed before departure from the United States. The tactical operational mission and responsibilities which must be immediately assumed upon arrival in USAREUR are such that company/battery-sized units must be capable of performing as units upon arrival."¹²

A few months later USAREUR indicated that the completion of battalion training tests before departure from the United States was not feasible and that training after arrival in Europe would better equip the units for their mission in Germany.¹³ This stand may have been based on the realization that a Gyroscope unit's training benefited from continuity and stability of personnel, and that the low training level of incoming Gyroscope units was offset to a great extent by such stability and the resulting high morale. Moreover, Europe provided a fresh outlook for forming combat plans, analyzing terrain, and developing combat SOP's.¹⁴

10. (1) Seventh Army Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jul 55-30 Jun 56. (2) Incl 1, to ltr, Seventh Army COFS to DA, 12 Apr 57, cited above.
11. Ltr, Seventh Army to DA, 5 Dee 55, sub: Rotation of Units under Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR SGS 322 Army (1955), B/P, Vol. III.
12. TAB F to DF, USAREUR G1 to G3, 2 Nov 56, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opus Br files.
13. Ltr, Maj Gen E. D. Post, USAREUR DCOFS, to DA, 12 Apr 57, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE. In file above.
14. Comment 2, USAREUR G1 to G3, to DF, USAREUR G3 to G1, 2 Nov 56, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE.

The second period of reduced combat readiness began when the midterm replacement packets were received and continued, in decreasing importance, until the replacements became fully integrated into the unit.

The third period occurred about three months before a unit's return to the United States. The main causes of reduced efficiency at this time were transfers of key personnel because of Gyroscope criteria; losses through the departure of the advance party; and the channeling of energies into administrative preparations for departure, such as technical inspections and the turnover of property and equipment.¹⁵

c. Monetary Factors. The third reason for initiating Operation GYROSCOPE was anticipated monetary savings. These were expected to be achieved through increased reenlistment rates, better utilisation of transportation facilities through mass movement, and better maintenance of equipment.

Reenlistment rates rose, on the whole, after the announcement that a given unit would participate in the Gyroscope program. However, no conclusive figures could be produced because of the variety of factors upon which enlistments depended. The commanders of units already gyroscoped to Europe agreed that it was as yet too early to make any valid assessment.¹⁶

The financial advantages of moving large groups of men and dependents stemmed from complete utilization of transportation facilities. During each Gyroscope move all means of transportation were fully used. Ships arrived at Bremerhaven filled to capacity and returned to the United States on the following day, also with complete passenger loads. The same was true of trains and busses. Other areas of savings were in the decreased use of transient billeting facilities and in the reduced burden of allowance payments to families waiting in the United States for transportation to Germany.

The Gyroscope program requirement that all unit equipment be inspected before turnover to the incoming unit resulted in much better maintenance as well as in an increased sense of responsibility for equipment. The care and maintenance of dependent housing was also facilitated through simultaneous signing in and out, since there was no interim period during which no one was responsible for the quarters.

18. Size of Units to be Rotated

In almost every aspect of the exchanges, difficulties increased with the size of the rotating units. It was found that rotation of

15. Ltr, Seventh Army COPS to DA, 12 Apr 57, cited above.
16. Comment 2, USAREUR G1 to G3, to DF, USAREUR G3 to G1, 2 Nov 56, sub: Report on the Status of Operation Gyroscope. In file above.

entire divisions affected operational readiness more adversely than did exchange of smaller units, which could before quickly integrated into the command's operational structure. When the units of a division, including commend and staff agencies, were rotated in large increments, the newly arrived personnel were unfamiliar with the terrain, with war plans, and with command procedures dealing with operations, training, intelligence, administration, and logistics. On a divisional scale the necessary-familiarization period often continued for as much as 4 to 6 months, but was appreciably shorter for smaller units.¹⁷

The attempt to interchange unlike divisions, such as an airborne or armored division with an infantry division, greatly added to the difficulties by aggravating problems of equipment, mission, and training; by hindering USAREUR's combat efficiency; and by causing personnel and morale problems within the divisions. For example, delay in the construction of airborne facilities affected the 11th Airborne's mission as well as troop morale adversely.¹⁸

The technical services also found their tasks more difficult when an entire division rotated. USAREUR transportation authorities found that battalion- and company-size rotations caused fewer problems because the smaller units were better integrated, more aware of personnel problems, and not as likely to require last-minute transfers. Logistical problems were also greater when divisions were exchanged. For example, the inspection of equipment and procurement of replacements for unserviceable equipment created inordinate workloads that decreased proportionately when smaller units made the change.₁₉

Personnel problems were greatly magnified when entire divisional attempted to achieve Gyroscope posture. Twenty-five thousand assignments were made in order to place the four departing divisions in Gyroscope posture. Nevertheless, not a single division gyroscoping to the United States was able to fulfill the eligibility requirements of AR 220-20 without reservation.²⁰

17. (1) Ltr, Seventh Army COFS, to DA, 12 Apr 57, cited above. (2) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 12 Apr 57, same sub. In SGS 322 GYRO (1957).
18. Memo, Brig Gen R. Hackett, USAREUR Compt, to Mr. C. L. Burgess, Asst Secy of Def, 20 Oct 55, sub: Army Request for Authorization to Use Dollars Instead of DM in Germany. In USAREUR SGS 600.1 (1955), Vol.III, Item 62.
19. (1) Ibid. (2) 1st Ind, to ltr, USAREUR to CO BPE, 15 Dec 56, sub: Report on Status of Operation GYROSCOPE. In USAREUR G3 Opns Br files.
20. DF, USAREUR G3 to Gl, 2 Nov 56, cited above.

To summarize: rotation of battalion- or regimental-size units brought most of the anticipated Gyroscope advantages, with far fewer difficulties than did division-size exchanges. From the standpoint of the individual soldier, the anticipated goals of assignment stability, a sense of security, concurrent travel of dependents, a sense of goal and mission, and a higher motivation for an Army career were adequately provided by the smaller unit moves. Moreover, small-unit exchanges brought about much less disruption of combat readiness, placed a lighter workload on the technical services, and required fewer personnel reassignments.²¹

21. Ibid.