The War Department

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

1941–1942

by
Maurice Matloff
and
Edwin M. Snell

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Foreword

This volume is a study of the evolution of American strategy before and during the first year of American participation in World War II. It is the story of planning by the War Department during that early and significant period in which the foundations of the strategy for the conduct of the war were established. The authors not only present the problems of the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army and of his principal plans and operations officers, but also emphasize joint and combined problems—the reconciliation of the Army views on strategy with those of the Navy and the integration of American and British views and their adjustment to the military policies of other associated powers, notably the Soviet Union.

It may seem to the reader that controversy and differences of opinion are stressed and that agreement and co-operative endeavor are slighted. Since planners are occupied with unsettled problems, their work necessarily involves differences of opinion. It is only when all sides of an issue are forcefully presented and the various solutions thereof closely scrutinized that the final plan has any validity. The reader must bear in mind that the differences related herein are those among comrades in arms who in the end always made the adjustments required of the members of a team engaged in a common enterprise. The execution of strategic decisions—the end result of debates, negotiations, and compromises set forth in the book—is narrated in the combat volumes of this series.

Mr. Maurice Matloff and Mr. Edwin M. Snell collaborated in writing this volume. Mr. Snell was formerly an instructor in English at Harvard University and Mr. Matloff an instructor in History at Brooklyn College. Mr. Snell served in the Army and Mr. Matloff in the Army Air Forces during World War II. Both joined the Operations Division historical project of the War Department General Staff in 1946. Mr. Matloff is now the Chief, Strategic Plans Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

ORLANDO WARD
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of Military History

Washington, D. C.
5 June 1952
Preface

This volume is a contribution to the study of national planning in the field of military strategy. National planning in this field extends from the simple statement of risks and choices to the full analysis of an immense undertaking. Strategic decisions are rarely made and military operations are rarely conducted precisely in the terms worked out by the planning staffs in the national capital. But the planning, which may at times seem superficial and futile even to the staffs, is the principal instrument by which political leadership arrives at an accommodation between the compulsions of politics and the realities of war, exercises control over military operations, and allocates the means necessary to support them.

This volume is the history of plans affecting the missions and dispositions of the U. S. Army during the early part of World War II, when it was quite uncertain how the military planning of the United States would be brought into keeping with the requirements of a world-wide war between two coalitions. The volume deals briefly with the joint war plans of the Army and Navy up to the fall of 1938, when the planners first explicitly took into account the possibility that the United States might be drawn into a war of this kind. From the fall of 1938, it follows the story of plans, as they directly concerned the Army, until the beginning of 1943. From that point in World War II, conveniently marked by the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the role of the Army in strategic planning changed; it will be the subject of further treatment in this series.

The purpose of this volume is to increase and organize the information available for the study of national strategic planning. Much of what has been written about the United States in World War II contains information about strategy. Some of it has been exceedingly useful in writing this volume. But the information is generally given in passing, in accounts of great decisions or particular military operations. Anyone that writes on the subject of strategic planning itself is venturing into territory generally familiar only to a few professional officers, and to them mainly through oral tradition and their own experience. Most of the choices the authors of this volume have had to make in research and writing they have therefore resolved, sometimes reluctantly, in favor of readers in need of organized information on the subject—specifically staff officers, civil officials, diplomatic historians, and political scientists.

The present volume is a product of co-operative effort. It is an outgrowth of a study of the history of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff, undertaken in 1946 by a group of associated historians, organized
by Dr. Ray S. Cline. The Operations Division represented the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army in national and international planning for military operations in World War II, and the history of the plans and operations is interwoven with the history of that division. Dr. Cline undertook to write the history of the division itself, in a volume published in this series, with the title: *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*. The study of the plans and their execution, continued and amplified by his former associates, became the basis of the present work.

The text of this volume was drafted in two main sections, one tracing the conflicts in plans for the employment of U. S. Army forces, from their appearance to their first resolution in 1942 (Snell), and the other dealing with the primary effects of the resolution of these conflicts on plans for carrying the war to the enemy (Matloff). In the process the authors drew on each other’s ideas, basic research, and writing. Each of the authors worked at length on the volume as a whole, one in the course of original planning and composition (Snell), and the other in the course of final preparation and revision (Matloff). The text as it stands represents a joint responsibility.

The present volume owes a great deal to Dr. Cline, and to Lt. Col. Darric H. Richards, who worked on the project as associate historian for more than two years. Both contributed in many ways to the general stock of ideas and information that the authors had in mind in undertaking this volume and left the authors several fully documented studies in manuscript. This volume draws on Dr. Cline’s studies of staff work on strategy in the early months of the war, and the authors have made extensive use of a narrative by Colonel Richards that follows the history of strategy in the Pacific into midwar.

In writing and rewriting the text, the authors had the help of Mrs. Evelyn Cooper, who assembled and analyzed much of the statistical information used, and of Mrs. Helen McShane Bailey, who drafted or reviewed for the authors countless passages and references. Nearly every page in the volume bears some mark of Mrs. Bailey’s wide knowledge and exact understanding of the records kept by the War Department.

Various people helped to smooth the way for the preparation of the volume. Miss Alice M. Miller initiated the authors and their colleagues, as she had for years been initiating staff officers in the mysteries of interservice and international planning. For making it possible to use great numbers of important documents at their convenience, the authors wish to thank Mr. Joseph Russell, Mrs. Mary Margaret Ganz Greathouse, Mr. Robert Greathouse, and Mrs. Clyde Hillyer Christian, and Mr. Israel Wice and his assistants. Miss Grace Waibel made a preliminary survey of records for one part of the volume. Credit for maintaining a correct text of the manuscript through repeated revisions is due to a series of secretaries, Mr. William Oswald, Mr. Martin Chudy, Miss Marcelle Raczkowski, Mrs. Virginia Bosse, and Mrs. Ella May Ablahat.
The authors are greatly obliged to several other members of the Office of the Chief of Military History—to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Office and the first and most attentive critic of this volume, who suggested a great many improvements; to Cols. John M. Kemper, Allison R. Hartman, and Edward M. Harris, who early interested themselves in this work; to Cols. Thomas J. Sands and George G. O'Connor, who were helpful in the final stages of the work; to Dr. Stetson Conn, Acting Chief Historian in the summer of 1949 during Dr. Greenfield's absence, and Dr. Louis Morton (Acting Deputy Chief Historian), who encouraged this work; and to Drs. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, for their special knowledge. Dr. Conn gave many valuable suggestions in the final revision of the manuscript.

We are also obliged to Miss Mary Ann Bacon, who gave the volume a thoughtful and watchful final editing. The pictures were selected by Capt. Kenneth E. Hunter; the outline maps were prepared by Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff. Copy editing was done by Mr. Ronald Sher, indexing by Mrs. Bailey, and the painstaking job of final typing for the printer by Mrs. Ablahat and Miss Norma E. Faust.

The authors are also obliged to those others that read all or parts of the text in manuscript—to Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, and Lt. Grace Persons Hayes, USN, of the Historical Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; to Dr. Wesley F. Craven of Princeton University, co-editor of the series, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II; to Professors William L. Langer and Samuel Eliot Morison of Harvard University; to Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, Cols. William W. Bessell, Jr., and George A. Lincoln, and Lt. Col. William H. Baumer; and to other officers that figured, some of them conspicuously, in the events recounted in the pages that follow.

MAURICE MÁTLOFF
EDWIN M. SNELL

Washington, D. C.
14 December 1951
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All pictures in this volume are from Department of Defense files.

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STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR
COALITION WARFARE
1941 – 1942
CHAPTER I

The War Plans

During the years between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II there were always a few officers at work in Washington on the war plans of the Army and Navy. It was the duty of these officers to study situations that could suddenly arise in which the federal government might resort to the use of armed force, and to propose the courses of action that the services should be ready to take. From time to time the War or Navy Department approved one of these studies as a war plan to guide the special plans and preparations of their staffs and operating commands. Several war plans were prepared jointly and approved by both departments for the common use of the Army and Navy.

During these years national policy was deeply influenced by popular beliefs relating to national security which had in common the idea that the United States should not enter into military alliances or maintain military forces capable of offensive operations. National policy provided a narrow basis and small scope for military planning. During the 1920’s the United States entered into international agreements to limit naval construction and to “outlaw” war. In the 1930’s the United States experimented with the use of diplomatic and economic sanctions to discourage military aggression, and with legislation intended to keep the United States out of European and Asiatic wars. As international tension increased, President Franklin D. Roosevelt became more and more anxious over the diplomatic and military weaknesses of the United States. But it was not until the summer of 1939 that he took official notice of the joint war plans of the Army and Navy. The planners had just finished a study of the situations in which the United States might enter a war begun by Germany and Japan. By the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Army and Navy were hard at work on their first strategic plan for coalition warfare, on the hypothesis that the United States would join the European colonial powers in defending their common interests in the western Pacific against attack by Japan.

The Study of War With Japan

The strategy of a war in the Pacific with Japan was the only part of American military planning that had a long, continuous history. Since the early 1900’s it had been evident that the United States Government, if it should ever oppose Japanese imperial aims without the support of Great Britain and Russia, might have to choose between withdrawal from the Far East and war with Japan.

After World War I the Army and Navy paid more and more attention to just this contingency as a result of the resurgence of Japanese imperialism, the exhaustion of Russia and its alienation from the Western world, the disarmament of the United
States, and the withdrawal of the United States from its temporarily close association with the European colonial powers. In the Pacific the Japanese had strengthened their position early in World War I by taking the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls. Japanese control of these strategically located islands was confirmed in 1920 by a mandate from the League of Nations. After the Washington naval treaty of 1922, the United States began to fall behind Japan in the construction of new naval vessels.

The Army and Navy watched with growing anxiety during the 1930's as Japan acquired control of Manchuria, seized strategic points on the north China coast, and forbade access to the mandated islands. The Japanese Government acted with growing confidence, in the belief that the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European colonial powers were not likely to take concerted action against its expansion. In 1933 the Japanese Government exhibited this confidence by withdrawing from the League of Nations in the face of the Assembly's refusal to recognize the Japanese puppet regime in Manchuria. Having taken this step with impunity, the Japanese Government served notice, in accordance with the 1922 treaty terms, of its intention to withdraw from the 1922 and 1930 naval limitations agreements, both of which accordingly expired in 1936.

By the mid-1930's the American military planners had finally concluded that Japan could be defeated only in a long, costly war, in which the Philippines would early be lost, and in which American offensive operations would take the form of a "progressive movement" through the mandated islands, beginning with the Marshalls and Carolines, to establish "a secure line of communications to the Western Pacific."\(^1\) The planners then faced the question of whether the makers of national policy meant to run the risk and incur the obligation of engaging in such a war. The State Department had not relaxed its opposition to Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent. This opposition, for which there was a good deal of popular support, involved an ever-present risk of armed conflict.

After the passage of the Philippine Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie bill) in 1934, the belief gained ground in the War Department that the United States should not run the risk nor incur the obligation of fighting the Japanese in the western Pacific. When the question finally came up in the fall of 1935, the Army planners took the position that the United States should no longer remain liable for a fruitless attempt to defend and relive the Philippines and the costly attempt to retake them. The senior Army planner, Brig. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, stated the case as follows:

> If we adopt as our peace-time frontier in the Pacific the line Alaska-Hawaii-Panama: a. Our vital interests will be invulnerable. b. In the event of war with Japan we will be free to conduct our military (including


The study of operations against Japan had taken precedence over other studies from the early 1920's. (See JB 325, sers 210, 237, and 270.) The first approved plan was Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, 16 July 1924, Joint Board 325, serial 228. This plan was approved by the Joint Board and the Secretary of the Navy in August 1924 and by the Secretary of War in early September 1924. (See Louis Morton, "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East," Military Review, XXIX (December, 1949), 22–39.)
THE WAR PLANS

naval) operations in a manner that will promise success instead of national disaster.²

This view was entirely unacceptable to the Navy planners. The whole structure of the Navy's peacetime planning rested on the proposition that the fleet must be ready to take the offensive in the Pacific should war break out. It was out of the question for the Navy planners to agree to give up planning offensive operations west of Hawaii. For two years the Army and Navy planners engaged in intermittent dispute over the military policy on which they should base plans for fighting a war with Japan. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Malin Craig, evidently shared the views of his planners, but he was either unable or unwilling to have the dispute brought before the President for decision.³

The weakness of the American position in the Far East and the danger of war steadily became more apparent. The expiration of the naval limitations agreements reopened the possibility that the United States might fortify Guam, thus partially neutralizing the Japanese position in its mandates (which were presumably being fortified, since it had become impossible to gain access to them or much intelligence about them). The Congress refused to authorize this step. In the summer of 1937 the Japanese began an undeclared war in China—the “China Incident”—bringing closer the moment at which the United States must choose either to accept or contest Japanese aims.

The planners finally came to an agreement by avoiding the disputed issues. Early in 1938 they submitted a revised plan, which the Joint Board (the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations) and the Secretaries at once approved. The Navy planners agreed to eliminate references to an offensive war, the mission of destroying Japanese forces, and the early movement of the fleet into the western Pacific, in return for the agreement of the Army planners to eliminate the proviso that any operations west of Midway would require the specific authorization of the President. The revised plan gave no indication of how long it should take the Navy to advance into the western Pacific and tacitly recognized the hopeless position of the American forces in the Philippines. Those forces retained the basic mission “to hold the entrance to MANILA BAY, in order to deny MANILA BAY to ORANGE [Japanese] naval forces,” with little hope of reinforcement.⁴

² App A to memo, Gen Embick, 2 Dec 35, sub: Mil Aspects of Sit that Would Result from Retention by U. S. of a Mil (incl naval) Commitment in P. I., JB 305, ser 573.

³ Records of these disputes are to be found under JB 305, ser 573; and JB 325, sers 617 and 618. General Craig was Chief of Staff from 1935 to 1939.

⁴ Jt A&N Bsc War Plan—ORANGE, 21 Feb 38, JB 325, ser 618, AG 223, AG Classified Files. This plan was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 26 February and by the Secretary of War on 28 February. Army and Navy forces in the Philippines would be “augmented only by such personnel and facilities as are available locally.” If war should not break out for several years, the Army garrison might have some support from the
Alternatives in a World War

The rising danger of war with Japan was in keeping with the growing insecurity of all international relations during the 1930's. Every nation with which the United States had extensive political and economic relations was affected by the prolonged economic crisis of the 1930's and by its social and political consequences. In Europe the principal phenomena were the renascence of German military power and aims under the National Socialist Party and the passivity of the British and French Governments, paralyzed by conflicts in domestic politics, in the face of the new danger.

In 1938 the American military staff extended the scope of war planning to take account of the reassertion of German imperial aims. The immediate cause was the German demand made on Czechoslovakia in September 1938 for the cession of a strip of territory along the border. The area contained a large German-speaking minority, among whom the Nazis had recently organized an irredentist movement in order to create a pretext for German intervention. The area also contained strong border defenses and a highly developed munitions industry, which made it by far the most important area, for military purposes, in Central Europe.

The German ultimatum, backed by German troops mobilized on the border of Czechoslovakia, amounted to a demand that Germany be recognized and accepted as the dominant military power on the Continent—an evident objective of German domestic and foreign policy since Hitler's accession to power in 1933. After consolidating his power at home, Hitler had accelerated German rearmament, reintroduced military conscription, and remilitarized the Rhineland. Thereafter, by forming an alliance with Italy (already dedicated to a program of tyranny, autarchy, chauvinism, and conquest), and by intervening in Spain and absorbing Austria, he had greatly strengthened the German position and weakened the British and French position in Central Europe and the Mediterranean. To complement these military measures he had sought to neutralize opposition abroad by subsidizing parallel political movements, propaganda, and treason and by negotiating bilateral trade arrangements and cartel agreements.

The British and French Governments, weighing the value of the French alliance with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union against their own unpreparedness, military and political, had an extremely hard decision to make. After conferences at Berchtesgaden and Munich, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, with the concurrence of Premier Édouard Daladier, agreed not to oppose the German ultimatum. In so doing, they went far to relieve Germany of the fear of having to fight again on two fronts at one time, for in abandoning Czechoslovakia, which upon the loss of the Sudeten area became indefensible, they greatly weakened the military alliance between France and the Soviet Union. Their decision constituted admission and resulted in the aggravation of the political and military weakness of their countries.

After Munich the prospect of a general European war, which had briefly seemed imminent, receded, but the military situ-
The war plans

... the various practicable courses of action open to the military and naval forces of the United States in the event of (a) violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the Fascist powers, and (b) a simultaneous attempt to expand Japanese influence in the Philippines. 5

The planners studied the problem during the winter of 1938-39, the winter during which the Germans annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia. They presented the result, five and a half months later, in April 1939. Their final report listed the advantages Germany and Italy would stand to gain by a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and described the form it could be expected to take. What Germany and Italy would try to do would be to establish “German and Italian regimes that would approach or attain the status of colonies,” with the usually alleged attendant advantages—increased trade, access to raw materials, and military and naval bases. They might acquire bases “from which the Panama Canal could be threatened to an extent that pressure could be exerted on United States Foreign Policies.” The probable means of German and Italian aggression with these objectives would be “direct support of a fascist revolution.” The planners concluded that the danger of this kind of offensive action in the Western Hemisphere would exist only (1) in case Germany felt assured that Great Britain and France would not intervene; and (2) in case Japan had already attacked the Philippines or Guam, and even then only in case the United States had responded to the Japanese attack by a counteroffensive into the western Pacific.

The planners considered it quite unlikely that in the near future Great Britain and

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France would give Germany the necessary assurances or that Japan would decide to attack. They nevertheless believed that the kind of problem posed—resulting from concerted aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan—was one that should be taken into account in future planning, and recommended steps to be taken “to overcome salient deficiencies in our readiness to undertake the operations that might be required.”

This study having been approved by the Joint Board, the planners proceeded to distinguish the principal courses of action open to the United States as a belligerent in the crises that seemed most likely to develop out of future German and Japanese moves and the delayed responses thereto in American foreign and domestic policy. They proposed to assume that to begin with “the Democratic Powers of Europe as well as the Latin American States” would be neutral. But they also proposed to set forth in each situation that might arise “the specific cooperation that should be sought” from these powers as allies or as neutrals and, moreover, to provide for possible action in case the United States “should support or be supported by one or more of the Democratic Powers,” that is, by Great Britain or France.

This projected series of new plans had a new title—the RAINBOW plans—that aptly distinguished these plans from the “color” plans developed in the 1920’s for operations against one or another single power (the plans for war with Japan, for example, were called Orange). The most limited plan (RAINBOW 1) would provide for the defense of the Western Hemisphere south to the bulge of Brazil (10° south latitude)—the Western Hemisphere being taken to include Greenland (but not Iceland, the Azores, or the Cape Verde Islands) to the east, and American Samoa, Hawaii, and Wake (but not Guam or the Philippines) to the west. Two other plans would provide alternatively for the extension of operations from this area either to the western Pacific (RAINBOW 2) or to the rest of South America (RAINBOW 3). The directive also called for modification of the first three plans under the contingency (RAINBOW 4) that Great Britain and France were at war with Germany and Italy (and possibly Japan), in which case it was assumed that the United States would be involved as a major participant.

After a few weeks’ work under these terms of reference, the Joint Planning Committee concluded that the requirements under this fourth contingency were “so different and divergent” from those in the three basic plans that separate plans would have to be made to deal with them. The planners pointed out that in case of war among the great powers—using current available forces—with Great Britain and France, and possibly the Soviet Union opposing Germany, Italy, and Japan, and possibly Spain, German and Italian operations in the western Atlantic and in South America would be very much restricted in scope, whereas Japanese operations in the Pacific might be very much extended in scope. The Japanese, if unopposed, might seize

... the English and French Islands in the South Pacific, east of 180th meridian, such as

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8 JPC study [Col Frank S. Clark and Capt Russell S. Crenshaw, USN], 21 Apr 39, JB 325, ser 634.
9 Ltr, SJB [Comdr John B. W. Waller] to JB, 11 May 39, sub: Jt A&N Bsc War Plans—RAINBOW 1, 2, 3, and 4, JB 325, ser 642. The letter contained the planners’ proposals which the Joint Board approved.
10 Ltr cited n. 9.
THE WAR PLANS

Marquesas, Societies, Samoa, and Phoenix Islands, as well as the extensive English and French possessions in the Western Pacific, and the United States possessions in the Pacific.

The committee therefore recommended that in addition to the three plans against the contingency of a war with Germany, Italy, and Japan, two plans, rather than one, should be drawn up to cover a war in which not only the United States but also Great Britain and France were involved against that coalition.

One plan should provide for a large-scale American effort against Germany; the other for a large-scale American effort against Japan. The committee stated these two cases as follows:

The United States, England, and France opposed to Germany, Italy, and Japan, with the United States providing maximum participation, in particular as regards armies in Europe.

The United States, England, and France opposed to Germany, Italy, and Japan, with the United States NOT providing maximum participation in continental Europe, but maintaining the Monroe Doctrine and carrying out allied Democratic Power tasks in the Pacific.

The latter of these contingencies, which the Navy staff had independently been discussing with the British naval staff in ever more definite terms since 1934, the committee considered to be peculiarly important, as involving problems "that might conceivably press more for answers" than all but the first, most limited basic plan (for defending the Western Hemisphere north of 10° south latitude). The committee therefore recommended that it should be placed second in order of priority in the list of five situations to be studied, explaining:

Whether or not we have any possible intention of undertaking a war in this situation, nevertheless we may take measures short of war, and in doing so should clarify the possible or probable war task that would be involved.11

On 30 June 1939 the Joint Board approved the recommended changes, including the recommended change in order of priority.12 The revised description of the Rainbow plans, as approved, read as follows:

a. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 1:
Prevent the violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting that territory of the Western Hemisphere from which the vital interests of the United States can be threatened, while protecting the United States, its possessions and its sea-borne trade. This territory is assumed to be any part of the Western Hemisphere north of the approximate latitude ten degrees south.

This plan will not provide for projecting U. S. Army Forces farther south than the approximate latitude ten degrees south or outside of the Western Hemisphere.

b. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 2:
(1) Provide for the missions in a.
(2) Under the assumption that the United States, Great Britain, and France are acting in concert, on terms wherein the United States does not provide maximum participation in continental Europe, but undertakes, as its major share in the concerted effort, to sustain the interests of Democratic Powers in the Pacific, to provide for the tasks essential to sustain these interests, and to defeat enemy forces in the Pacific.

12 For Navy studies and staff talks with the British, see Hist Monograph on U. S.-Br Nav Co-operation 1940-45, prepared by Capt Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, of the Hist Sec JCS, (hereafter cited as Kittredge Monograph), Vol I, Sec I, Part B, Ch 2; and Vol I, Sec I, Part D, Ch 4.

13 See Ref (b), ltr, JPC [Col Clark and Capt Charles M. Cooke, Jr., USN] to JB, 9 Apr 40, sub: Jt A&N Bsc War Plans—RAINBOW, JB 325, sers 642 and 642-1.
c. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan 
Rainbow No. 3:
(1) Carry out the missions of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 1.
(2) Protect United States' vital interests in the Western Pacific by securing control in the Western Pacific, as rapidly as possible consistent with carrying out the missions in a.

d. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan 
Rainbow No. 4:
(1) Prevent the violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protecting all the territory and Governments of the Western Hemisphere against external aggression while protecting the United States, its possessions, and its sea-borne trade. This Plan will provide for projecting such U. S. Army Forces as necessary to the southern part of the South American continent or to the Eastern Atlantic.

e. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan 
Rainbow No. 5:
(1) Provide for the missions in a.
(2) Project the armed forces of the United States to the Eastern Atlantic and to either or both of the African or European Continents, as rapidly as possible consistent with carrying out the missions in a above, in order to effect the decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or both. This plan will assume concerted action between the United States, Great Britain, and France.

Allied Operations in the Pacific

This analysis of possible courses of action was easily adapted to the situation that existed for several months after the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939. When the German Army moved into Poland the planning staffs were already working full time on plans for a war in the Pacific against Japan, in which the United States would be allied with the European colonial powers, within the terms of reference of Rainbow 2. Work on Rainbow 2 went on during the fall and winter of 1939 and into the spring of 1940. During this time—the period of the German-Soviet conquest and partition of Poland, the Soviet war against Finland, and the “sitzkrieg” on the Western Front—Rainbow 2 seemed to be, as the planners had expected it to be, the war plan most appropriate to the military situation. Great Britain and France were at war with Germany and its allies. They controlled northwestern Europe and northern Africa. Their fleets controlled the Atlantic and—though less securely—the North Sea and the Mediterranean. It could be assumed that only a Japanese attack would involve the United States in war, and that, in case of Japanese attack, the United States, while taking precautions in the Western Hemisphere, would set out—with the blessings of the British and French Governments—to sustain the interests of Democratic Powers in the Pacific, to provide for the tasks essential to sustain these interests, and to defeat enemy forces in the Pacific.

As the Joint Planning Committee had foreseen, planning against this contingency
was indeed complicated. The planners faced a war far more complex than that envisaged in the Orange plan, with an immensely greater range of possible Japanese operations to consider, and with very difficult problems of harmonizing American operations with those of the forces of Australia, New Zealand, and the European powers concerned.

The planners first had to assume how far the Japanese would have extended their control south and west at the moment the United States and the other "Democratic Powers" began to act. The Navy planners at the outset set up three alternative hypotheses. The first was that Japan would not have begun moving southward from Formosa. In that case the U.S. Fleet might move to Manila Bay, "with certain groups visiting Singapore, Kamranh Bay, and Hong Kong." Ground forces might be moved to the western Pacific at the same time or later. The Navy planners thought that these acts might prevent Japanese moves southward, and hence prevent a war in the Pacific. The second hypothesis was that Japan had taken Hong Kong, Kamranh Bay, and begun operations in the Netherlands Indies, that the United States would react by moving forces to the far Pacific, and that the Japanese in turn would begin operations to seize Guam and the Philippines. The third hypothesis was that the Japanese would already have control of the Netherlands Indies and would have forces in position to isolate Singapore and take the Philippines. In this case, as the Army planners pointed out, "the principal advantages of Allied participation will have been lost and the problem becomes essentially that of an Orange War." 17

Since extensive operations in the Southwest Pacific seemed less likely under the first and third hypotheses, planning for Rainbow 2 proceeded on the second hypothesis... that Japan has captured Hong Kong; occupied Kamranh Bay; dominates the coast of Indo China and has initiated operations against the Dutch East Indies, including British Borneo, and that Japan has forces available to undertake immediate operations against Guam and the Philippines when it becomes evident that armed forces of the United States will be moved in strength to the Western Pacific. 18

In this case, the main initial movement of American forces in the Pacific would be to Singapore and the East Indies. The Army planners emphasized that to retake the positions occupied by the Japanese would be a slow, step-by-step process, and that "every day's delay" in the arrival of American forces would allow the Japanese "to effect establishments that may require months to dislodge." As a result, they continued, it might be necessary to defer operations against the mandated islands and to take into account the danger that the Japanese might cut the lines of communication through the South Pacific, unless the extension of the Japanese lines might have forced them greatly to weaken their forces in the mandates. To avoid this danger, American forces would move to Singapore, not by way of the Philippines, but by way of the South Pacific: Canton (Phoenix

17 (1) Navy draft study, 5 Aug 39, on sit Rainbow 2. (2) Army second draft (Oct 39) of Rainbow 2. Both in Army files of the JPC, Development File for Rainbow 2, JB 325, ser 642-2.

18 This quotation is from the Navy draft study cited in n. 17. A fairly complete version appears in the fourth Army draft (fall of 1939). The assumptions in the fourth Army draft were rewritten and expanded by the Navy (21 November 1939), and stood thereafter little changed in the Navy correction of 11 April 1940 and the Army drafts of 11 May 1940 (fifth Army draft) and 20 May 1940 (sixth Army draft).
Islands), Suva (Fiji Islands), Simpson Harbor (Rabaul), Molucca Sea, and Java Sea. These forces would be supplied over the long route across the Atlantic, around the Cape of Good Hope, and across the Indian Ocean, although the planners expected that the United States could and would send air reinforcements by way of the South Pacific, either along the route traced above or by a more southerly route from Hawaii to Palmyra and Christmas, Canton and Hull islands, Suva, New Caledonia, New Guinea, Port Darwin, and Surabaja (Java). In this war, the joint tasks, in concert with British, French, and Netherlands forces, would be to establish U. S. forces in the East Indies area, obtain control of the area, and drive the Japanese out. The peace settlement would entail Japanese evacuation of Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Guam.

In trying to lay down assumptions as to the military position of Japan at the time when the United States would act, the planners also ran directly into a second problem—uncertainty as to the course of action of the European colonial powers. By April 1940 the planners had gone about as far as they could without having an explicitly approved basis for assuming what the European colonial powers would do. This, although not prerequisite to planning for joint action by the U. S. and British Navies—already well advanced on the basis of the President's implicit approval—was a sine qua non even of a hypothetical exploration of the politically explosive question of sending U. S. Army forces to defend European colonial possessions in the Far East. The planners had therefore no choice but to recommend that the United States Government should propose conversations with the British, French, and Netherlands authorities "as soon as the diplomatic situation permits." They also recommended that the diplomatic conversations "should be conducted in coordination with representatives of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations." It was logical for the planners to expect that the role of the United States in coalition strategy would be to protect and, if necessary, defend and re-establish its own position and that of the European powers in the western Pacific. The planners had selected this hypothesis for study after taking into account the physical facts of the military situation at the beginning of World War II—order of battle, distances, and so on. So far as it went, their analysis of the American role was correct, and it was to play an important part in strategic planning throughout World War II.

20 Army sixth draft RAINBOW 2, 20 May 40, in Army files of the JPC, Development File for RAINBOW 2, JB 325, ser 642-2.

21 In the Army files of the JPC, this recommendation for staff conversations first appears as a matter of urgency in the Navy's final revision (18 April 1940) to the Army's fourth draft plan RAINBOW 2, although all Army drafts contemplated staff conversations in which specific agreements would be reached as to the aid which the United States might expect from the British, French, and Dutch as a prerequisite to the assumption by the United States of the responsibility for "sustaining the interests of the Democratic Powers in the Pacific." Among the conditions stated by the planners, was the stipulation that Britain reinforce the Far Eastern naval forces by a minimum of one division of capital ships and insure the availability of Singapore to the U. S. Fleet. (Army files of the JPC cited n. 20.)
CHAPTER II

German Victories and American Plans

May 1940–January 1941

The very basis of planning for military operations in case the United States should enter World War II was changed by the German campaigns in Europe during the spring of 1940. The success of the German campaigns, which virtually disarmed France and threatened to disarm Great Britain, conclusively disposed of the possibility that the United States, should it become involved in war, could count on having allies strong enough to contain Germany and Italy and to contribute heavily to the prevention or prosecution of a war against Japan. Instead, the United States faced a strong possibility that the formidable coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan, having reached a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union and being assured of control over western Europe, would in concert proceed to seize the overseas possessions of the European colonial powers, destroying the very basis of American political and economic relations with the rest of the world and of the traditional military policy of the United States.

Early in April 1940, following the occupation of Denmark, German airborne and seaborne forces landed in southern Norway. They made good use of surprise and treachery and quickly gained control of the principal airfields. The British soon had no choice but to give up the attempt to establish Allied forces at Trondheim in central Norway. On 10 May, as a direct result of great discontent in Parliament over the conduct of the campaign in Norway, the Chamberlain government fell, and Winston S. Churchill took office as Prime Minister. The battle for Norway was over, although Allied forces continued to fight in the north at Narvik until late in May, when they, too, were finally evacuated.

Meanwhile, the Germans had overrun the Netherlands and Belgium, and were fast winning the battle for France. The German offensive on the Continent began on 10 May, the day on which Churchill became Prime Minister. After four days of fighting, culminating in the bombing of Rotterdam, the Netherlands Government was compelled to surrender. On the same day, 14 May, strong German armored forces broke through in the Ardennes forest. The gap rapidly became wider as German armored columns moved through in two directions, to cut off the Allied forces in Belgium from those in France and to isolate the French forces in the Maginot Line.
from those to the west. On 28 May the Belgian Army surrendered. On the following day the British began evacuating the greater part of their expeditionary force from Dunkerque. The evacuation, unexpectedly and almost unbelievably successful, even though all equipment had to be left behind, was completed on 4 June. On the next day the Germans began the attack southward on the re-formed French lines, which rapidly gave way. On 10 June, confident of the outcome, the Italian Government declared war on Great Britain and France. On 17 June the new head of the French Government, Marshal Henri Pétain, asked for an armistice.

Planning for the Worst

It seemed probable that Germany would next attempt to invade the British Isles. In any event, whether or not in preparation for invasion, Germany would certainly set about reducing the British Isles by bombardment and blockade if the British refused to negotiate.

The Army planners responded, characteristically, by warning against the overextension of American commitments. They strongly preferred to plan on the assumption that the United States, singlehanded, would have to see to the defense of the Western Hemisphere—somewhat as under the terms of Rainbow 4, but with the great difference that it was no longer the neutrality but the impotence of Great Britain and France that would bring about a condition favorable to concerted German, Italian, and Japanese action. The planners feared above all that the Germans and Italians might succeed in neutralizing, or even in gaining control of, part or all of the British and French Navies. They estimated that the military measures the United States could take during the next twelve months were not enough even to complement the political and economic measures that the United States might be forced to take to counteract the threat that Germany might acquire colonies and allies in the Western Hemisphere. They recommended accordingly that the United States should take no action involving possible military commitments outside the Western Hemisphere.

On 22 May the Army planners recommended this view to General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff, as the basis for an immediate strategic decision by higher authority. The planners reasoned that since the United States could not everywhere meet the dangers that threatened American interests—in the Far East, in South America, and in Europe—higher authority should at once decide "what major military operations we must be prepared to conduct." From the same facts, they also reasoned that the decision must be to defend the Western Hemisphere. It would be dangerous as well as useless to scatter about the world American forces, which for about a year could do no more than conduct

... offensive-defensive operations in South America in defense of the Western Hemisphere and of our own vital interests; such limited offensive operations in Mexico as the situation may require; possible protective occupation of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere; and the defense of Continental United States and its overseas possessions East of 180th Meridian.

1 General Marshall's appointment as Chief of Staff dated from 1 September 1939. He had previously been Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, from 6 July to 15 October 1938; Deputy Chief of Staff from 16 October 1938 to 30 June 1939; and Acting Chief of Staff from 1 July to 31 August 1939.
GERMAN VICTORIES AND AMERICAN PLANS

The planners repeated:

Intelligent, practical planning, and later successful action, require an early decision regarding these matters:

1st—As to what we are not going to do.
2nd—As to what we must prepare to do.²

On the same day General Marshall went over these points with President Roosevelt, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. Mr. Welles fully agreed. The President and Admiral Stark did not disagree. According to Marshall, they, too, "felt that we must not become involved with Japan, that we must not concern ourselves beyond the 180th Meridian, and that we must concentrate on the South American situation."³

The immediate effect on the war plans was the preparation of a new joint plan for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The planners suspended work on plans for fighting a war across the Pacific (RAINBOW 2 and RAINBOW 3) and recommended the deferment of their next project, plans for entering the war across the Atlantic (RAINBOW 5), in order to prepare plans for major operations in the Western Hemisphere, under the terms of reference of RAINBOW 4 as revised to fit the new world situation. The starting point for work on the revised RAINBOW 4 was as follows:

Special Situation:—The termination of the war in Europe is followed by a violation of the letter or the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled with armed aggression by Japan against United States' interests in the Far East. Other nations are neutral.

Purpose of the Plan:—To provide for the most effective use of United States' naval and military forces to defeat enemy aggression occurring anywhere in the territory and waters of the American continents, or in the United States, and in United States' possessions in the Pacific westward to include Unalaska and Midway.⁴

RAINBOW 4, drafted on these assumptions, was finished at the end of May and approved in due course by the Joint Board, the Secretaries, and the President.⁵

The Planners Overruled

The President was much less disposed than the military planners to believe that the Germans would be able to make peace in Europe on their own terms. Even during the dark days of June 1940 he made plain his desire that the nation and the armed forces should not plan simply on preparing for the worst. He himself meant to act instead on the hypothesis that the British Government and the British Isles would probably hold, and that the military situation would remain very much as it was in the West. On 13 June he presented this hypothesis to the chiefs of Army and Navy intelligence, asking whether they thought it

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⁵ JB 325, ser 642-4. Harry H. Woodring, Secretary of War, and Lewis Compton, Acting Secretary of the Navy, sent the plan to the President with their approval on 13 June. On 12 July the President asked the new Secretaries of War and Navy, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, to read the plan and talk with him about it. On 26 July they resubmitted the plan, with the same letter of transmittal, and on 14 August the President approved it.

For the full treatment of RAINBOW 4, see Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere.
reasonable and, assuming it to be reasonable, what they would expect the economic, political, military, and psychological effects to be.

The President's statement of the hypothesis covered the military situation throughout the world six months thence:

1. Time. Fall and winter of 1940.
2. Britain and the British Empire are still intact.
3. France is occupied, but the French Government and the remainder of its forces are still resisting, perhaps in North Africa.
4. The surviving forces of the British and French Navies, in conjunction with U. S. Navy, are holding the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and the Atlantic from Morocco to Greenland. The Allied fleets have probably been driven out of the Eastern Mediterranean, and are maintaining a precarious hold on the Western Mediterranean.
5. Allied land forces are maintaining their present hold in the Near East. Turkey maintains its present political relationship to the Allies.
6. Russia and Japan are inactive, taking no part in the war.
7. The U. S. active in the war, but with naval and air forces only. Plane production is progressing to its maximum. America is providing part of Allied pilots. Morocco and Britain are being used as bases of supplies shipped from the Western Hemisphere. American shipping is transporting supplies to the Allies. The U. S. Navy is providing most of the force for the Atlantic blockade. (Morocco to Greenland).

The President's hypothesis, together with his questions, was referred to the senior members of the Joint Planning Committee, who had worked on Rainbow 4. On the crucial point—the fate of Great Britain six months thence—they found it doubtful that Great Britain, as distinguished from the British Empire, would by that time "continue to be an active combatant." Germany had the intention, the equipment and forces, and the bases for powerful air attacks on British "port and naval bases facilities, railway communications, air bases, munitions depots and factories." Continuous air and submarine operations against British sea communications would result in heavy casualties and food shortages in England. "The actual invasion and overrunning of England by German military forces" appeared to be "within the range of possibility."

In the second place, the senior planners doubted that the French would be capable of putting up much resistance in North Africa, for they would be cut off from their own sources of supply and would not have been able to get ammunition for their weapons or replacements for both weapons and ammunition, even if they had been able to get food and clothing, from other sources, that is, the United States.

The planners accepted as reasonable the President's assumption concerning the naval situation, except that they considered it more probable that Allied naval forces would continue to hold a position in the eastern Mediterranean than that they would continue to hold a position in the western Mediterranean. They were all the more inclined, therefore, to expect that the Allied positions in the Near East would still hold. They also agreed that Turkey's foreign relations would probably be stable during the period, but doubted that the Soviet Union and Japan would not have entered the war, expecting rather that they might have taken concerted offensive action in the Far East.

They were strongly inclined to dispute the last assumption (paragraph 7) insofar
as it concerned American participation in the war as a belligerent, finding it unreasonable in the light of the "long-range national interests of the United States." In making this assumption the President was in effect anticipating decisions that were his to make, and the planners, in response, were trying, in anticipation, to discourage him from making those decisions. After explaining why they thought American intervention would be too weak and too slow to have much effect, they restated their main position—that the United States was in no shape to get into a war:

Belligerent entry by the United States in the next few months would not only disperse and waste our inadequate means, but would result in leaving the United States as the one belligerent to oppose the almost inevitable political, economic, and military aggression of totalitarian powers.

Our unreadiness to meet such aggression on its own scale is so great that, so long as the choice is left to us, we should avoid the contest until we can be adequately prepared. Early entry of the United States into the war would undoubtedly precipitate German subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere, which we are obligated to oppose. Our ability to do so, or to prepare Latin American countries to do so would thus be hamstrung.

Our entry into the war might encourage Japan to become a belligerent on the side of Germany and Italy, and might further restrict our efforts on behalf of the Allies.7

There were two policies of the President that especially disturbed the Army planners—the policy of making a show of strength in the Pacific in the hope of discouraging the Japanese from taking any new moves in the Far East, and that of furnishing munitions to the British at the expense of the armed forces that the United States was undertaking to train and equip for combat. General Marshall evidently shared their anxiety over these developments.

The U. S. Fleet, which had moved to Hawaii in April 1940 to conduct its yearly exercises, received orders to remain at Pearl Harbor instead of returning to the west coast, as it normally did. On 27 May, in answer to a question from Admiral James O. Richardson, the fleet commander, Admiral Stark stated that the fleet would continue there until further notice, with the purpose of dissuading the Japanese Government from moving southward to take advantage of the defeat of the Netherlands and the desperate situation of France and Great Britain.8 The specific move that seemed imminent, as the battle of France drew to its disastrous end, was the occupation of French Indochina.

The War Department staff believed that a show of strength in the Pacific might be taken by the Japanese Government as an occasion to open hostilities. On this ground the Army planners strongly objected to leaving the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Though it might perhaps strengthen the hand of men in the Japanese Government who favored a long-range policy of avoid-

7 Ibid.
8 The U. S. Fleet had been scheduled to return to the west coast of the United States on 9 May 1940, but Admiral Stark had ordered that it remain at Hawaii for two weeks longer, and then indefinitely. See Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931–April 1942 (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1948), p. 43. For correspondence between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Stark during this period, see Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Hearings) Part 14, pp. 923–1000. The letter of 27 May 1940, from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson, is reproduced in Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 14, p. 943. Admiral Stark's exact words were: "You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies."
ing conflict with the United States, the measure was not strong enough to bring about—it was of course not meant to bring about—a showdown decision on long-range Japanese policy. Its effect on short-range policy was to give the Japanese Government the option of ignoring the implied challenge or of accepting it on the most favorable terms. The Army planners believed that the United States should either withdraw the fleet from Pearl Harbor or prepare seriously for hostilities, consciously deciding "to maintain a strong position in the Pacific," and "in order to do so, to avoid any commitment elsewhere, the development of which might require the weakening of that position." The retention of the fleet in the Pacific might cause Japanese leaders to review and revise their plans, but it would act as a deterrent "only so long as other manifestations of government policy do not let it appear that the location of the Fleet is only a bluff." 

The planners did not draw the conclusion to which this belief naturally led—that the United States should reach an understanding with Japan. But this conclusion was very likely in their minds, and it was explicitly drawn by Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, who had left the General Staff in October 1938 to take command of the Fourth Corps Area. In a personal letter accompanying his formal comments on current plans for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, he repeated his long-standing objections to U. S. policy in the Pacific:

What seems to me of first importance at present is definitely to accept the fact that we cannot carry out the plan and also intervene in the Far East. Lippmann's article of yesterday, advocating an understanding with Japan is the plainest kind of common sense. I hope our State Department and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee can be made to see that a reversal of their past provocative attitude is a military essential of first importance in the new World situation.

The other feature of current national military policy that disturbed the Army was the transfer of munitions to the European allies. During the second half of May British and French purchasing agents in Washington were desperately seeking early delivery of munitions, over and above those for which they had contracted, both from orders placed by the Army and Navy and from Army and Navy stocks on hand—aircraft and engines, guns of all kinds from field pieces to pistols, ammunition to go with them, and miscellaneous critical supplies such as explosives, metals, and spare parts. Under great pressure from the White House, largely transmitted through the Secretary of the Treasury, who had for some time very energetically taken charge of such transactions, the Army and Navy in early June released considerable quantities of munitions then on hand—principally ground forces equipment, held in reserve against the day of mobilization, but urgently needed by the British who had

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9 (1) WPD study, n.d., sub: Decisions as to Natl Action, WPD 4250-3. It is worth noting that WPD suggested, as a partial substitute for keeping the fleet in Hawaii, the dangerous expedient—already under discussion—of restricting exports to Japan. This June study was evidently a draft of an aide-mémoire that Brig. Gen. George V. Strong was ready to submit to the Chief of Staff as a basis for talks with the President. (2) See memo, WPD for CoFS, 17 Jun 40, sub: Natl Def Policy, WPD 4250-3, quoted below, p. 20. It follows and expands the views submitted by WPD to Gen Marshall in memo cited n. 2.

committed and lost a great part of their own stocks of such equipment in France. The Army objected to several of these transactions on the ground that they would soon bring the United States to the point of risking its military security on the chance that American forces would not have to fight.\footnote{11}

Major Walter Bedell Smith, Assistant Secretary of the General Staff, made this clear, very informally, to Brig. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, military aide to the President, in connection with the transfer of five hundred 75-mm. guns. This transfer, directed by the White House, was opposed by G-4 and by the War Plans Division as “dangerous to the national defense,” since most of the matériel on hand would be needed “immediately upon mobilization and the remainder very shortly thereafter.” To conduct a year’s operations in the field, the Army would need almost as much more matériel as there was on hand, and it would take two years to produce this additional amount.\footnote{12} Major Smith left a record with General Watson in which he stated, “if we were required to mobilize after having released guns necessary for this mobilization and were found to be short in artillery matériel that everyone who was a party to the deal might hope to be found hanging from a lamp-post.”\footnote{13}

General Marshall shared the fears of the planners, and early on the morning of 17 June he held a staff meeting to discuss current strategic policy. He pointed out that, should the French Navy pass under German (or Italian) control, the United States would face “a very serious situation” in the South Atlantic, which Germany might bring to a head in a few weeks. He therefore asked:

Are we not forced into a question of reframing our naval policy, that is, purely defensive action in the Pacific, with a main effort on the Atlantic side?

He went on to explain:

There is the possibility of raids with resultant public reaction. The main effort may be south of Trinidad, with any action north thereof purely on the basis of a diversion to prevent our sending material to South America.\footnote{14}

\footnote{11}A great deal of material concerning these very complicated transactions, and Army views thereon, is gathered in an Office of the Chief of Staff file entitled Foreign Sale or Exchange of Munitions. This file of papers was compiled for the period April–October 1940 by the Secretary of the General Staff, Lt. Col. Orlando Ward.

\footnote{12}Memo, G-4 for CofS, 11 Jun 40, sub: Sale of 75-mm. Guns, OCS File, Foreign Sale or Exch of Mun. WPD’s concurrence is stated therein. The five hundred 75-mm. guns represented a second increment, arrangements having already been made to transfer 395 75-mm. guns. The notification to prepare to transfer the second increment came through the Secretary of War about noon on 11 June 1940. (See unsigned memo, 11 Jun 40, filed with above memo.)

\footnote{13}Memo, W. B. S. [Maj Smith] for CofS, 11 Jun 40, no sub, OCS file, Foreign Sale or Exch of Mun. Perhaps the most serious of the prospective shortages of finished munitions, apart from planes, that these transfers would render still more acute was a shortage of ammunition. Shortages of ammunition were not only an absolute limitation on wartime operations themselves but a very serious limitation on peacetime training, since the free use of ammunition was an important condition of alertness in overseas garrisons and a realistic, accelerated program for training recruits. (For a fuller treatment of this transaction, see Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950) pp. 310–12.)

\footnote{14}Notes on conf in OCS, 17 Jun 40, OCS Misc Conf, Binder 3. The remarks should be read in the light of the estimate made by the JPC in submitting RAINBOW 4 (JB 325, ser 642-4). The immediate need, upon the surrender of the British or French Fleet, would be to begin mobilizing, so as to be ready to send expeditionary forces a few months later. Meanwhile it would be necessary to take naval action.
Brig. Gen. George V. Strong then presented the opinion of the Army planners who, considering that the British might be defeated, believed "in defensive operations only in the Pacific and concentrating everything in this hemisphere." General Marshall, in reply, said that what mattered most was the uncertain fate of the British and French Fleets. On the assumption that these forces would defend the Atlantic, it would be entirely correct, as the Navy planners (according to General Strong) advised, to leave the United States Fleet in the Pacific. But, declared Marshall, he did not think the United States should make that assumption: "We have to be prepared to meet the worst situation that may develop, that is, if we do not have the Allied fleet in the Atlantic." 

General Marshall then took up the worst situation that might develop in the Pacific—a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Various Army and Navy officers concerned, including the planners, had for several years taken note of the possibility that the first move, or one of the early moves, of Japan in a Pacific war would be to strike at naval installations at Pearl Harbor—or at the fleet, if the fleet were there. They looked for attacks by sea and air, accompanied by hostile activity on the part of Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands, and possibly followed by the landing of forces. 

The Army was accordingly fearful of a Japanese reaction to the presence of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor, not only because the reaction would compel a diversion of American forces that might be needed in the Western Hemisphere but also because it might take the form of an attack on Pearl Harbor that the United States was not ready to meet. General Marshall began:

"Thinking out loud, should not Hawaii have some big bombers. We have 56. It is possible that opponents in the Pacific would be four-fifths of the way to Hawaii before we knew that they had moved. Would five or ten flying fortresses at Hawaii alter this picture?"

Brig. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, replied that they would be of no use since they would be "overwhelmed by hostile pursuit." He therefore believed that "we should not split our forces but should send more or none." He offered some reassurance in the form of an estimate that "we could put big planes there in three days if necessary," if only the reserves of bombs, ammunition, and other essentials could also be sent out in time. But, as the Chief of Staff remarked, "three days might be fatal." General Strong estimated that the Army would have "less than 24 hours notice." 

There was agreement on the current weakness of the Army to act in Latin America. General Strong estimated that there might be "a desperate need" for troops in South America within sixty days, specifically in Brazil and Uruguay. General Marshall observed that, although the Army was not able at once to send expeditionary forces, the United States might at least "be
able to guarantee to some of the South American governments the occupation and holding of certain key ports,” as he had earlier proposed to President Roosevelt, Admiral Stark, and Under Secretary Welles. In any case, he thought that it was time to mobilize the National Guard, and Generals Strong and Andrews agreed with him.\(^{18}\)

On sending more munitions to Europe General Marshall had no doubts, and his advisers apparently had none either. He stated, “With respect to further equipment for the Allies as per the President’s statement, we have scraped the bottom so far as the Army is concerned.”\(^{19}\)

General Marshall ended the conference by directing the officers present to consider the questions raised.\(^{20}\) One consequence was that all the planners recommended, in view of the possibility of a Japanese surprise attack on the Panama Canal or on naval installations at Pearl Harbor, that General Marshall should order an immediate alert of Army field commands to take all defensive precautions that could be taken without arousing public curiosity or alarm. General Marshall took the warning seriously enough to direct the staff to issue such an order, which was to remain in effect until further instructions were issued.\(^{21}\)

General Strong also drew up a statement of the views of the staff on the questions that had been raised with regard to strategy during the morning meeting. He recommended that General Marshall and Admiral Stark should consider asking the President to adopt the following policies:

1st A purely defensive position in the Pacific.

2d No further commitments for furnishing material to the Allies.

3d An immediate mobilization of national effort for Hemisphere Defense in order to meet the coming emergency.

General Strong elaborated on all three points. To adopt a defensive position in the Pacific meant “non-interference with Japanese activity in the Orient, loss of our precarious position in China, and possible serious limitation on sources of supply of strategic raw materials,” of which rubber was especially important to the United States. He flatly stated the reasons for entering into no new agreements to furnish munitions to the Allies:

This is a recognition of the early defeat of the Allies, an admission of our inability to furnish means in quantities sufficient to affect the situation and an acknowledgment that we recognize the probability that we are next on the list of victims of the Axis powers and must devote every means to prepare to meet that threat.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

Finally General Strong described the measures that should be undertaken upon full mobilization. These measures included, of course, adding to the Regular Army, calling the National Guard into federal service, and sharply increasing the production of munitions. They also encompassed an economic and military program in the Western Hemisphere:

... immediate preparation for protective seizure of key British and French possessions in the Western Hemisphere; preparation for immediate active military support of existing Governments in other American Republics and the furnishing them at the earliest possible date of means of defense on long term credits. It likewise involves a readjustment of our economic set-up to include other American Republics on a basis approximating equality.22

The Navy staff was on the whole in sympathy with these views, and Admiral Stark and General Marshall jointly submitted a similar set of recommendations to the President. The President, however, had enough faith in his own estimate of the situation to wait and see whether he could not proceed in his own way and at his own pace to deal with the dangers and uncertainties of the coming months.23 His military policy remained to offer encouragement to the British and warnings to the Japanese, within the range of what was possible and of what seemed prudent for a President nearing the end of a term in office, standing for re-election. His policy ran very close—as close as considerations of domestic politics would allow—to the proposals that Churchill had sent him a few days after taking office as Prime Minister. On 15 May, having described the desperate situation in the British Isles and having warned of the danger that Great Britain might give way, Churchill had asked that the President should then undertake to do everything possible “short of actually engaging armed forces.” In particular, he wanted the United States (1) to send critical munitions—forty or fifty old destroyers, several hundred of the most modern planes, antiaircraft guns and ammunition, and other goods, notably steel; (2) to give some assurance that the flow of materials should continue after the British could no longer pay for them; (3) to arrange for a naval squadron to make a visit, “which might well be prolonged,” to the ports of the Irish Free State, whose intransigent neutrality constituted a most serious threat to the British lines of communication; and (4) “to keep the Japanese quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore in any way convenient.”24

To begin with, the President had been able only to promise to do all he could to send planes, guns, ammunition, and steel, and to point to the presence of the U. S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor.25 But having

22 Memo, WPD for CoFS, 17 Jun 40, sub: Natl Def Policy, WPD 4250-3 (dictated and signed by Gen Strong).
25 The President stated he would consider carefully sending a naval squadron to Irish ports and explained that it would require an act of Congress to transfer destroyers to Great Britain. See (1) Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 25; (2) Robert E.
staked his military policy on the chance that the British would remain able and willing to resist, he had the Prime Minister's requests constantly to consider in the critical summer of 1940, and, given the difficulties reflected in the opinion of his military advisers and the political uncertainties he faced at home, the President acted with great boldness.

During the summer he sought, and the Congress granted, authority under which he was able to stop exports to Japan—strategic commodities, including machine tools, aviation gasoline, and iron and steel scrap. As his authority came to be interpreted, he was also authorized to release equipment of the American armed forces to foreign governments, providing the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would certify that to do so would not endanger national security. This authority he used, most notably in arranging with the British for the exchange of fifty old destroyers for a long-term lease of British bases in the Western Hemisphere. Finally he asked Congress to authorize the conscription of men by the armed forces for a year's training. The Congress responded by passing the Selective Service Act and authorizing the President to call out the National Guard and Organized Reserves, with the proviso that men inducted into the land forces, as well as the National Guard and Reserves called up, should not be employed beyond the Western Hemisphere except in United States territories and possessions.

**British Strategy and American Planning**

In the fall of 1940, seeing that the British, though so weak as to have to depend in the long run on American support, were still strong enough to make good use of it, the Army planners began to show less anxiety over the immediate effects and more over the remote consequences of furnishing that support. They realized as the danger to the British Isles became less acute, to support Great Britain might well amount to supporting, at first indirectly and then directly, British positions throughout the world—in short, to acquiescence in British grand strategy. The planners were very uneasy over the prospect. The two assumptions of British strategy that especially concerned them were that Great Britain could count on rapidly increasing material aid from the United States and that it might hope for a token commitment of American naval forces to the Southwest.
22 STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

Pacific. Both of these assumptions figured explicitly in the expectations and future plans of the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Army planners had their first formal briefing on British expectations and future plans in late September 1940, upon the return from London of two high-ranking Army officers, Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, head of the GHQ Air Force, and General Strong, chief of the Army planning staff. They had spent several weeks in England together with Rear Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, who was assigned to London on extended duty as a “special observer.” Although Emmons and Strong had gone for only a few weeks, it was significant that they had been sent at all, for it was the first time that any Army officer had been given the authority, and the opportunity, to discuss future plans with the British. In authorizing this visit the President had taken an important preliminary step toward authorizing the development of joint Army-Navy plans consistent with his belief that the British would probably manage to hold on and with his policy of encouraging them to expect American aid. To draw up appropriate plans—in effect, to provide against the contingency of armed intervention by the United States in an indecisive European war—the Army planners obviously had to begin working, as the Navy planners had long since been working, with the British military staff.

British Strategy

On American material aid, the British Chiefs made their position very plain. Admiral Ghormley asked

. . . whether, in making their plans for the future, the Chiefs of Staff were relying on receiving the continued economic and industrial support of the United States, and whether they counted upon the eventual active co-operation of the United States.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril L. Newall, Chief of Air Staff, answered simply and directly

. . . that in our plans for the future we were certainly relying on the continued economic and industrial co-operation of the United States in ever-increasing volume. No account, however, had been taken of the possibility of active co-operation by the United States, since this was clearly a matter of high political policy. The economic and industrial co-operation of the United States were fundamental to our whole strategy.

The British Chiefs could not, of course, count on any commitment of American forces in the same way that they could count on American material aid, but they were at pains to explain how much they needed and hoped for American support in the Pacific to underwrite their precarious position in the Far East. Events had invalidated the assumptions on which British Far Eastern strategy had previously rested: “first, that any threat to our [British] interests would be seaborne; secondly, that we should be able to send a fleet to the Far East within three months.” These assumptions the British had had to abandon: first, because the Japanese now threatened to expand into southeastern Asia, from which they could launch a land invasion of Malaya; second,

29 For the Ghormley-Emmons-Strong visit to London, see: (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 113–15; (2) Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic: September 1939–May 1943 (Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1947), pp. 40–41; and (3) WPD 4402, which contains copies of British minutes of the meetings held on 20, 29, and 31 August (officially known as meetings of the Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee).

30 Min, mtg Br-Amer Standardization of Arms Com, 31 Aug 40, WPD 4402-1.
because the British could no longer expect to send a fleet to the Far East. The change had not only altered plans for defending Singapore, which now required holding Malaya as well, but had left the British heavily dependent on the presence of the United States Fleet in the Pacific, since the threat of American counteraction in the Central Pacific was the main deterrent to Japanese action against the Netherlands Indies and Malaya. The British wanted to avoid war with Japan, though they granted that "the question as to how far we can afford to go in this respect" was "naturally an extremely difficult one." It was evidently "very much in the British interest," as Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord, remarked, that the United States Fleet should stay in the Pacific. As Sir Cyril observed, active American cooperation would be of "immense value" if war did break out: "The support of the American battle fleet would obviously transform the whole strategical situation in the Far East."

Except at these two points, British strategy did not involve explicit assumptions as to what the United States would do. It rested first of all on the assumption that British forces were strong enough to hold the British Isles:

The security of the United Kingdom is obviously vital, and must be our primary consideration. Although we do not underrate the grave threat with which we are faced, in view of our numerical inferiority in the air and Germany's occupation of the continental seaboard, we are confident of our ability to withstand any attacks on this country, and our whole policy is based on this assumption.

Outside the British Isles, the main immediate concern of the British was in the Middle East. They regarded an attack on Egypt, possibly from Libya, as imminent, and were currently reinforcing their garrisons in the Middle East to meet it, not only from India and from South Africa but also from the British Isles. To hold the Middle East was vital to their long-range plans for defeating Germany. These plans called for bombarding and blockading Germany, especially with the hope of creating an acute shortage of oil, but the British did not regard such means as sufficient. They intended, as they acquired striking forces, to "develop and exploit to the full" their possession of naval forces in amphibious operations "against the widely extended coastline of our enemies whenever opportunity offers."

Their chief objective at this stage was the elimination of Italy from the war:

We regard the elimination of Italy as a strategic aim of the first importance. The collapse of Italy would largely relieve the threat to the Middle East and free our hands at sea to meet the Japanese threat, while at the same time increasing the effectiveness of the blockade against Germany.

In connection with this aim, they were also concerned, though less immediately, with the danger of German occupation of French North and West Africa, against which they foresaw it might be necessary to act.

The ultimate British aim was the defeat of Germany, and the British Chiefs emphasized that it would remain such whatever might happen:

Although Italy is our declared enemy and other Nations, such as Spain, may be dragged into the war at Germany's heels, Germany is the mainspring of enemy effort. Whatever action may be necessary against any other country must, therefore, be related to our main object, which is the defeat of Germany.

Admiral Ghormley posed the question that bore most directly on the British Chiefs' ideas of how to achieve this aim. He asked

\[n\] Ibid.
“whether the Chiefs of Staff considered that the final issue of the war could only be decided on land.” Sir Cyril replied

...that in the long run it was inevitable that the Army should deliver the coup de grace. We hoped, however, for a serious weakening in the morale and fighting efficiency of the German machine, if not a complete breakdown, which would make the task of the Army much more easy.  

Whether to stake heavily on the realization of this hope, helping meanwhile to try to secure and exploit British positions in the Middle East and Far East, was a question to which the American planners must sooner or later address themselves.

The visit of Generals Emmons and Strong to England had mixed effects on the Army planning staff. The Army representatives had returned greatly influenced by what they had seen and heard. Like all Americans in England at the time, they had been mightily impressed by the coolness, confidence, and determination of the British under attack. As professional officers they spoke with new respect of British organization, training, equipment, and tactics, especially for defense against air attack. They had their attention drawn to the strategic possibilities of air bombardment, at which the British expected to succeed even while expecting the Germans to fail. But once they were back in Washington they were quickly reminded by General Marshall not to jump to conclusions on the basis of "the specialized situation at that time" in England. He told the Air Corps to take into account the kind of warfare in which situations changed rapidly as a result of offensive ground operations, and therefore directed the Air Corps to send observers not only to England, as recommended by General Emmons and Col. Carl Spaatz who had accompanied him, but also to the Middle East. And as to dealing with the British, he alluded to General Pershing’s experience in World War I with their "confirmed beliefs," and admonished his staff that the Germans "had always been six months ahead of the Allies," declaring that "in regard to war, their deductions were analytically sound."  

Perhaps as a result, Emmons and Strong were at pains to be cautious in their written report. And the views expressed by the Army planning staff at that time remained much the same as those it had expressed in the spring. The staff was as far as ever from conceding that it was sound to defer American defensive preparations in order to meet British operational requirements. The one significant change was in the estimate of the time factor. The staff now thought it reasonable to expect that the "British hold on the British Isles cannot be so weakened as to make the withdrawal of the British Fleet therefrom necessary in less than 6 months." Thus, on the basis of the estimate earlier made—that it would take...

\[\text{Notes on conf in OCS, 23 Sep 40, OCS Misc Conf., Binder 3. Officers attending this meeting with the Chief of Staff, besides General Emmons and Colonel Spaatz, were Maj. Gens. Henry A. Arnold, George H. Brett, Barton K. Yount, and General Strong. As an immediate result of this meeting, Brig. Gen. James E. Chaney of the Air Defense Command was sent to England, as Generals Emmons and Strong recommended, to get a first-hand impression of British air defenses. (See pers ltr, Col Ward, SGS, to Gen Chaney, 20 Sep 40, and handwritten note of Gen Marshall thereon, OCS 21105-12.) General Chaney was later assigned as Special Army Observer, London. For the dispatch of Air Corps officers as observers with the British Army in Egypt, see: (1) ltr, Sumner Welles to Gen Marshall, 7 Oct 40, AG 210.684 (10-7-40); and (2) ltr, Marshall to Under Secy State, 14 Oct 40, AG 210.684 (10-7-40).}

\[\text{Memo, Emmons and Strong for CofS, 25 Sep 40, sub: Obsns in England, WPD 4638.}\]
six months or more to train German and Italian crews to operate surrendered British vessels—it would be at least a year before Germany and Italy would be free to act in the Western Hemisphere, even if a part of the British Fleet, contrary to the stated intentions of the Churchill government, were surrendered, unless in the meantime the United States should become “seriously involved in the Far East.” Even so, the staff stood by its earlier conclusions. The staff still thought that the U. S. Government was in duty bound to prepare for “the worst possible situation.” The United States might have to act in Latin America, in the South Atlantic, or in the Pacific. The danger of a Japanese attack might become more acute.

... if the Japanese Government should become increasingly embarrassed by embargos on exports from the United States to Japan, and at the same time should become convinced that despite protests by the United States it was only throwing a bluff and would back down in the face of a serious situation.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{Plan Dog}

The first attempt to deal with American military strategy as a whole, comprehending the dispositions and missions of Army as well as Navy forces, on the assumption of concerted British and American operations, came at the time of President Roosevelt’s re-election. Following conversations between Admiral Stark and Secretary Knox in late October 1940, Admiral Stark, in consultation with Capt. Richmond Kelly Turner and other staff assistants, on 4 November drew up a long study dealing with the subject.\textsuperscript{36} Admiral Stark cited four feasible lines of action. Should the United States enter the war at an early date, he advocated the fourth course, Plan D, which was very similar to RAINBOW 5. From Plan D the memorandum came to be referred to as the “Plan Dog” memorandum.\textsuperscript{37}

Admiral Stark’s memorandum began with an allusion to an earlier statement of his to Secretary Knox

... that if Britain wins decisively against Germany we could win everywhere; but that if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and, while we might not \textit{lose everywhere}, we might, possibly, not \textit{win anywhere}. The defeat of Great Britain and the consequent disruption of the British Empire would greatly weaken the military position of the United States not only directly, by exposing the Western Hemisphere to attack, but also indirectly, by its constricting effect on the American economy. Without a profitable foreign trade the American economy could “scarcely support” heavy armaments (which the United States, so exposed, would need so much the more).

Admiral Stark proceeded to point out the danger of being drawn into war across the Atlantic and across the Pacific at the same time. He took up alternative plans for operations in the Pacific. He first rejected the

\textsuperscript{36} No copy of the 4 Nov study was retained in WD files. A version of the memo exists in WD files as Navy draft memo [Admiral Stark for SN], 12 Nov 40, no sub, WPD 4175-15. For identification of this memo, see Watson, \textit{Prewar Plans and Preparations}, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{37} For discussions of the Plan Dog memorandum, see: (1) Watson, \textit{Prewar Plans and Preparations}, Ch. IV; (2) Kittredge Monograph, App A to notes for Sec III, Part D, Ch. 13; (3) Morison, \textit{Battle of the Atlantic}, pp. 42-44; (4) Sherwood, \textit{Roosevelt and Hopkins}, pp. 271-72; and (5) Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere.
idea of “unlimited” commitment in the Pacific, the great objection, of course, being that it would strictly limit activity in the Atlantic and aid to Great Britain. He then stated the objections to a “limited” offensive. The object of a limited war against Japan “would be the reduction of Japanese offensive power chiefly through economic blockade.” Should limited operations be undertaken on an Allied basis,

... allied strategy would comprise holding the Malay Barrier, denying access to other sources of supply in Malaysia, severing her lines of communication with the Western Hemisphere, and raiding communications to the Mid-Pacific, the Philippines, China, and Indo-China.

In this event the United States, of course, would have to reinforce Alaska and Hawaii, establish naval bases in “the Fiji–Samoa and Gilbert Islands areas,” and deny Japan the use of the Marshalls as forward bases for light forces. It might be possible to reinforce the Philippines, particularly with planes. A very important condition, furthermore, was that the United States would almost certainly have to assist the British and Dutch forces along the Malay Barrier, not only with the Asiatic Squadron but also by “ships and aircraft drawn from our Fleet in Hawaii, and possibly even by troops.” A variant, constituting a second, strictly American, version of the limited war, would be naval action based in the Central Pacific, including perhaps the capture of the Marshalls or both the Marshalls and Carolines, to compel the Japanese to divert forces from the Malay Archipelago, thus “reducing the strength of their assault against the Dutch and British.” The first objection to the limited war against Japan was that the cost might be out of proportion to the results in constricting and weakening Japan. The second objection was that the United States would seriously limit its ability to withdraw naval units from the Pacific to the Atlantic. A third objection was that it might be very hard to prevent a limited from becoming an unlimited war, if only as a result of public impatience.

Admiral Stark’s unwillingness to risk an unlimited war in the Pacific rested on his belief that the British were not strong enough by themselves to hold their empire together and perhaps not strong enough to hold even the British Isles. Offensively the British were, in his opinion, still less able to carry out their aim of defeating Germany and would require “assistance by powerful allies” in men as well as in munitions and supplies. He raised the same question that Admiral Ghormley had raised in London—whether land invasion would be necessary—and concluded that although blockade and bombardment might conceivably be enough, the only certain way of defeating Germany was “by military successes on shore, facilitated possibly by over-extension and by internal antagonisms developed by the Axis conquests.” Great Britain, therefore, “must not only continue to maintain the blockade, but she must also retain intact geographical positions from which successful land action can later be launched.” He agreed with the British that their first concern, after providing for the security of the British Isles, must be to hold Egypt and, next to that, to maintain control over Gibraltar and West and Northwest Africa. His one specific suggestion for exploiting these positions was to conduct offensive operations in the Iberian Peninsula, which he thought might promise “results equal to those which many years ago were produced by Wellington.”

Admiral Stark reached the conclusion that the United States must prepare, in case
of war, for great land operations across the Atlantic and remain on "a strict defensive" in the Pacific. After taking up the probable disposition of American naval forces in case the United States were drawn into the European war, remaining at peace with Japan, he repeated:

This purely naval assistance, would not, in my opinion, assure final victory for Great Britain. Victory would probably depend on her ability ultimately to make a land offensive against the Axis powers. For making a successful land offensive, British man power is insufficient. Offensive troops from other nations will be required. I believe that the United States, in addition to sending naval assistance, would also need to send large air and land forces to Europe or Africa, or both, and to participate strongly in this land offensive. The naval task of transporting an army abroad would be large.

The soundest course of action, in other words, seemed to be to direct American efforts "toward an eventual strong offensive in the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific." Admiral Stark explained:

About the least that we would do for our ally would be to send strong naval light forces and aircraft to Great Britain and the Mediterranean. Probably we could not stop with a purely naval effort. The plan might ultimately require capture of the Portuguese and Spanish Islands and military and naval bases in Africa and possibly Europe; and thereafter even involve undertaking a full scale land offensive.

In adopting this course, the United States would have to accept the "possible unwillingness" of the American people to support large-scale land operations, the risk of British collapse while the effort was just under way, and the gradual reorientation of American foreign policy in the Far East so as to avoid major commitments against Japan. Admiral Stark concluded that the need to support Great Britain against its major enemy outweighed these risks. In the near future the proper course would be to continue in statu quo, leaving the fleet in the Pacific and providing material help to friendly powers.38

That it was the Navy rather than the Army staff that first tried to think through the relation between American and British plans was perfectly natural. The Navy had had continually to deal with the British and to reckon with their capabilities and intentions, because of the generally complementary relation between British and American fleet dispositions. The Navy, moreover, viewed with detachment, and with what seemed at times a certain complacency, the treacherous issues with which the Army must deal in raising and using huge conscript forces. It was entirely in character, therefore, for the Navy staff to take the lead in making due allowance for British plans and policies and in analyzing the conditions and acknowledging the difficulties.

What was really surprising was that the Army at once took up Admiral Stark's proposal. The War Department planners recommended that it should be taken as the basis of a joint Army-Navy study for presentation to the President.39 The staff commentary, with this recommendation, went to the President on the morning of 13 November along with the memorandum.40 In the afternoon General Marshall told the...
planners to initiate action to prepare a joint plan similar to the one proposed by Admiral Stark. Later in the month when this study had got under way, he made it clear that, insofar as the War Department agreed, the Army planners should simply adopt Admiral Stark's memorandum without change and get ahead with the study as fast as possible.

The American Position

The President in no way committed himself to the theory of strategy outlined in Admiral Stark's memorandum to the Secretary. Whatever he had had to say to Admiral Stark about the memorandum in mid-November apparently did not become a matter of record. An attempt by the Navy to have Admiral Stark's memorandum resubmitted to the President for formal review as a joint Army-Navy paper, with State Department support, finally came to nothing since the Secretary of State, although he was in "general agreement" with it, doubted the propriety of his "joining in the submission to the President of a technical military statement of the present situation."

The President, however, did authorize conversations between representatives of the American and British staffs to explore the problems raised by Admiral Stark, as Admiral Stark had recommended, and as the British themselves were eager to do. On 2 December—the very day of General Marshall's reply to Admiral Stark—the War Department learned through Admiral Ghormley the names of the British staff officers who were to come to Washington for the conversations. They were to come ostensibly as members of the civilian British Purchasing Commission in order to avoid public notice and comment, which might have very serious consequences.

In mid-January, a fortnight before the conversations were due to begin, the President held a conference on military policy with the three Secretaries, at which Admiral Stark and General Marshall were also present. The President began by considering how great was the likelihood that Germany and Japan might take concerted hostile action against the United States. He believed that there was "one chance out of five" of such an attack and that it might come at any time. He was, therefore, disposed to discount long-range plans:

talk over questions of national defense. (See penned note by General Marshall on the memorandum.)

For the history of this paper, see also: (1) WPD draft ltr, JPC to JB, 12 Dec 40, sub cited n. 42(1), incl Navy draft proposal of substitute for p. 1 of Army draft study, WPD 4175-15; (2) memo, Gen Gerow to CofS, 20 Dec 40, no sub, WPD 4175-15; (3) ltr, JPC [signed Col McNarney and Capt Turner] to JB, 21 Dec 40, sub cited n, 42(1), JB 325, ser 670; and (4) min, mtg JB, 14 May 41. See discussion of events leading to the staff conversations with the British, known as ABC-1, in Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 120.

he mentioned the "Rainbow" plan and commented on the fact that we must be realistic in the matter and avoid a state of mind involving plans which could be carried out after the lapse of some months; we must be ready to act with what we had available.

On the critical question in war plans—whether to plan for a major effort in the Atlantic or one in the Pacific—he took the position that the United States should stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the fleet based on Hawaii. On one point the President laid down a policy to govern the United States in case of war—the maintenance of material aid to Great Britain:

He was strongly of the opinion that in the event of hostile action towards us on the part of Germany and Japan we should be able to notify Mr. Churchill immediately that this would not curtail the supply of materiel to England.

His chief current preoccupation was, in fact, to maintain aid to Great Britain. As a basis for calculating what the United States could safely send, he took the needs for defending the Western Hemisphere eight months later

... on the basis of the probability that England could survive six months and that, thereafter, a period of at least two months would elapse before hostile action could be taken against us in the Western Hemisphere.

How far he was willing to go in this direction he indicated by announcing "that the Navy should be prepared to convoy shipping in the Atlantic to England." He made it clear that he was not seeking thereby to create an occasion of war with Germany, showing again that he feared American involvement for its immediate effect on aid to Great Britain. It followed logically from the President’s whole view of strategy that it was too early to define the offensive mission of the Army in case of war. He directed

... that the Army should not be committed to any aggressive action until it was fully prepared to undertake it; that our military course must be very conservative until our strength had developed; that it was assumed we could provide forces sufficiently trained to assist to a moderate degree in backing up friendly Latin American governments against Nazi inspired fifth column movements.27

Although the President was somewhat impatient with his military staff for wanting to deal with problems lying months or even years ahead, he did not object to their doing so in their conversations with the British representatives, and he understood that they would present their own views of these problems. He read and edited the agenda for the conversations drawn up by the Joint Planning Committee which stated these views in some detail.

The planners hoped that the American participants would not be unduly influenced by British ideas of strategy. After some pessimistic comments on recent British political and military leadership, the committee stated:

... we cannot afford, nor do we need, to entrust our national future to British direction, because the United States can safeguard the North American Continent, and probably the Western Hemisphere, whether allied with Britain or not.

United States’ army and naval officials are in rather general agreement that Great Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Germany unless the United States provides that nation with direct military assistance, plus a far greater degree of material aid than is being given now; and that, even then, success against the Axis is not assured.

It is to be expected that proposals of the British representatives will have been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the

27 This account of the conference is based on Marshall’s summary, memo, CoS for WPD, 17 Jan 41, sub: White House Conf Thursday, Jan 16, 1941, WPD 4175-18.
British Commonwealth. Never absent from British minds are their post-war interests, commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard our own eventual interests.48

In keeping with these views the planners proposed that the American representatives should be authorized to discuss future military operations only on the basis of an assumption doubly hypothetical—that the United States would enter the war as an ally of Great Britain and agree to adopt as a first aim the defeat of Germany and Italy—and that agreements based on this assumption would have merely the force of professional predictions, not of political commitments.49

The planners gave a very exact definition of existing American policy:

A fundamental principal [sic] of United States policy is that the Western Hemisphere remain secure against the extension in it of non-American military and political control. The United States has adopted the policy of affording material and diplomatic assistance to the British Commonwealth in that nation's war against Germany. The United States by diplomatic means has opposed any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory.

On the critical question of American policy toward Japan, in case the United States should enter the war as a partner of Great Britain, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff believed:

The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or from attacking the Dutch. Should Japan enter the war, United States' operations in the mid-Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean.50

And the American representatives laid down two principles to govern operational planning under the assumed circumstances:

As a general rule, United States forces should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plans from United States-British joint plans.

The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britain, but will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportion as to provide for future security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany.51

This statement, having been approved by the Joint Board and the Secretaries and read and amended by the President, was circulated to the British representatives on their arrival.52 This declaration fittingly marked the end of the independent adjustment of American military planning to the strategic requirements of World War II. The planners had reached a point beyond which they could go only as participants in

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48 Ltr, JPC [signed Col McNarney and Rear Adm R. K. Turner] to JB, 21 Jan 41, sub: Jt Instns for A&N Reps for Holding Stf Conv with the Br, Incl an Agenda for the Conv, JB 325, ser 674. This study was prepared pursuant to a Joint Board directive as proposed by Captain Turner at the Joint Board meeting of 11 December 1940. (See min, mtg JB, 11 Dec 40.)

49 App II to Incl (A) to ltr cited n. 48.

50 In the version finally circulated the last passage was modified to read “in the Atlantic or naval in the Mediterranean region.” This qualification was inserted by the President. (See memo, Private and Confidential, F. D. R. [President Roosevelt] for SN, 26 Jan 41, JB 325, ser 674.)

51 App II to Incl (A) to ltr cited n. 48.

52 (1) Min, mtg JB, 22 Jan 41. (2) Memo cited n. 50. (3) Memo for red, Lt Col William P. Scobery, 28 Jan 41, sub cited n. 48, JB 325, ser 674. The President's emendations affected references to contingencies—American entry into the war, the wartime relations between the United States and Great Britain, and American operations against Germany. (For discussion of some of the President's emendations, see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 373.)
the formation of coalition strategy. In spite of the objections of Mr. Stimson, the following passage was retained in the version presented to the British:

The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war, and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as this attitude is maintained, it must be supported by their responsible military and naval authorities.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{53} (1) See App II to Incl (A) to ltr cited p. 48. (2) For a discussion of Stimson’s views in the winter of 1940–41 and the spring of 1942, see Stimson and Bundy, \textit{On Active Service}, pp. 368–70.
CHAPTER III

British-American Plans

January–November 1941

The partial dissociation of military planning from national policy limited the usefulness of the American military plans, yet it had a beneficial effect. It left the President and the Army Chief of Staff in a fairly loose relationship in which they could take the measure of each other's problems before entering the invariably difficult relationships between a wartime political leader and his professional military advisers on strategy. Moreover, it left the Army planners a great deal of freedom to discuss with British staff officers the use of Army forces in coalition strategy, much more freedom than they would have had if American staff plans for using Army forces had been authoritative interpretations of the President's views on military strategy. The discussions did not, of course, lead—under the circumstances no discussions could properly have led—to agreement on the chief questions concerning the use of Army forces that would confront the United States and Great Britain as allies fighting against a common enemy, but they did a great deal to dispel ignorance and preconceptions, the formidable internal enemies that may easily be the undoing of military coalitions.

The Terms of Reference

The British-American staff talks opened in Washington on 29 January and continued to 29 March 1941. The meetings came to be referred to as the ABC meetings (American-British Conversations), and the final report by the short title, ABC-1.¹

The head of the American delegation was General Embick, who then represented the Army on the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (Canada-United States). Embick was the most experienced and most forthright of the American planners. His seniority was much in his favor, since it qualified him to meet the British Army

¹ Fourteen sessions were held. Although the conversations are often considered to have ended on 27 March 1941 (see statement in opening paragraph of ABC-1), a fourteenth meeting was held on 29 March, at which time approval was given to ABC-1. (Min, mtg U. S.-Br Stf Convs, 29 Mar 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 14th mtg, WPD 4402-89.)


Unless otherwise indicated, all documents cited in this chapter which are identified by either a B.U.S. or U. S. (Navy) serial number are filed in Item 11, Exec 4.
representative on equal terms. The other Army members were Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, the new head of the Army planning staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2; and Col. Joseph T. McNarney, an Air officer who was thoroughly familiar with current war planning. The Navy section was headed by Admiral Ghormley, the Special Naval Observer in London, who returned to the United States for the conferences. He was accompanied by Capt. Alan G. Kirk, the naval attaché, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee, the Army attaché, and the British delegation to the conference.

The British representatives were Rear Adm. R. M. Bellairs; Rear Adm. V. H. Danckwerts; Maj. Gen. E. L. Morris; Lt. Col. A. T. Cornwall-Jones, who had accompanied the newly appointed ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax; and two officers stationed in Washington, Air Commodore J. C. Slessor of the British Purchasing Commission and Capt. A. W. Clarke, RN, the British assistant naval attaché.

General Marshall and Admiral Stark welcomed the British representatives and dwelt on the need for secrecy, warning that public knowledge of the mere fact that conversations were in progress might have an unfavorable effect on the lend-lease bill, which was then before the Congress, and indeed "might well be disastrous."

At the first meeting the British delegation made clear that they had come as a corporate body representing the Chiefs of Staff in their collective capacity as military advisers to the War Cabinet, and had complete freedom to discuss the general strategic position and to consider dispositions in the event the United States should enter the war. Any conclusion reached, however, would have to be confirmed by the British Chiefs of Staff and the British Government. This reservation was similar to the one imposed by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations—that any plans agreed upon would be contingent upon future political action of both nations, as well as the approval of the respective Chiefs of Staff.

The agenda proposed by the U. S. staff committee provided for a general discussion of the national military positions of the
United States and Great Britain; consideration of the strategy of joint military and naval action by the United States and the British Commonwealth in both the Atlantic and the Pacific; operations to carry out the proposed strategy; and agreements on the division of responsibility by areas, forces to be committed, skeleton operating plans, and command arrangements. The British accepted this agenda but proposed to extend the discussion of courses of joint action to include strategy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East as well as in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The Washington Conversations

Before the opening of the conversations the American staff had very little chance to study the latest views of the British representatives. Admiral Ghormley and General Lee had tried to secure answers to a long list of questions that the American staff wanted answered—among others the relative importance to the British Empire of North Africa, Egypt, Palestine, the Malay Archipelago, and Hong Kong; British capabilities and strength in the Mediterranean; and the British plan of action if the Germans moved south into Italy. The British staff would not furnish the answers, on the ground that to do so might jeopardize the security of British war plans, until the British party had embarked for the United States. General Lee reported his concern over this development to the War Department, fearing that the American staff would not have sufficient time to study the British proposals and might find themselves rushed into agreements with the British by a march of events that might make time a vital consideration. This feeling of wariness unquestionably existed throughout the American staff at the beginning of the conference.

Grand Strategy and the Issue of Singapore

At the opening of the conversations the British representatives presented a clear, complete summary of their views. They began with three propositions of general strategic policy:

The European theatre is the vital theatre where a decision must first be sought. The general policy should therefore be to defeat Germany and Italy first, and then deal with Japan.

The security of the Far Eastern position, including Australia and New Zealand, is essential to the cohesion of the British Commonwealth and to the maintenance of its war effort. Singapore is the key to the defence of these interests and its retention must be assured.

The first two propositions were evidently in accord with the views of the American representatives; the third evidently was not.

As a corollary to their review of strategy the British proposed that American naval forces, after making necessary provision for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, should make their main effort in "the Atlantic and European theatres," and that American naval dispositions in the Pacific should nevertheless be such as to "ensure that Japanese operations in the Far East

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8 General Lee sent this report to the War Department on 7 January 1941, a month after he had been instructed to secure information and report to the War Department. (Msg, Lee to Miles, 7 Jan 41, No. 647, WPD 4402-1.) Admiral Ghormley had also failed to get advance information, and had so reported to Admiral Stark.
9 Statement cited 5, 6.
cannot prejudice the main effort of the United States and the British Commonwealth in the principal theatres of war.\textsuperscript{10} Read in the light of British views on grand strategy, this declaration amounted to a proposal that the United States should underwrite the defense of Singapore.

The British representatives frankly explained their position. As they pointed out, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India "must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations." It was a "cardinal feature" of British policy to retain "a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort"—the naval base at Singapore.\textsuperscript{11} It was, therefore, the aim of the British to persuade the Americans to recommend the adoption of this feature of British strategic policy as a feature of Anglo-American strategic policy and to agree that the United States, in recognition of the importance of holding Singapore, should send to Singapore four heavy cruisers and one aircraft carrier, together with planes and submarines.\textsuperscript{12}

This proposal had a long history and was an important feature of Prime Minister Churchill's strategic policy. On 15 May 1940, in his first official message to the President, the Prime Minister had proposed, among other measures, that the United States "keep the Japanese quiet in the Pacific, using Singapore in any way convenient" and gave notice that he would bring up the question again. (It was at that time that the U. S. Fleet was ordered to stay at Pearl Harbor.)\textsuperscript{13} Early in the fall, soon after the Japanese Government had announced its adherence to the alliance of the Axis Powers (the Anti-Comintern Pact), the Prime Minister had proposed that the United States send a naval squadron to Singapore.\textsuperscript{14} Admiral Stark and General Marshall had then recommended strongly against taking any such step.\textsuperscript{15}

The American staff representatives were particularly attentive to the revival of this proposal since the British Government was once again urging the same views on the United States through diplomatic channels.\textsuperscript{16} The American representatives, emphasizing the nonpolitical nature of the staff conversations, protested what appeared to them to be an attempt to secure...
political pressure to influence their decision on Singapore.  

On 11 February the British, at the request of the Americans, presented their views in writing. The U.S. Army members were unanimously of the opinion that acceptance of the British proposal would be contrary to the instructions that had been approved for their guidance and would constitute "a strategic error of incalculable magnitude," and so informed the Chief of Staff. On 13 February they met with their Navy colleagues to go over the British paper. Admiral Turner, who had prepared a statement in reply, traced the history of the successive British requests for American naval aid at Singapore, back to the fall of 1938 when President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull had "more or less committed the United States Fleet to actions in conjunction with the British forces in the Far East." The Army and Navy representatives were alike fearful that the President might accede to the urgent British demand and, at the suggestion of General Embick, they discussed how best to inform the President of the views of the American staff. 

The Army and Navy sections submitted their joint views to the Chief of Staff and


the Chief of Naval Operations and, finally, to the British. The British representatives acknowledged, indeed insisted, that it would not be necessary to hold Singapore in order to protect Australia and New Zealand or to prevent the movement of a large Japanese fleet into the Indian Ocean. The successful defense of Singapore would not prevent the Japanese from operating against British communications in the Indian Ocean, since the Japanese could certainly take and use Kamranh Bay or Batavia for this purpose. An American fleet in the Pacific, actively threatening the Japanese left flank, would be enough to prevent the Japanese from extending their operations so far from home.

The British representatives made it very plain that Singapore was none the less important to their government as a symbol of British ability and determination to protect the British Dominions and colonies and the overseas trade with them and with other countries in the Orient. The loss of Singapore, irrespective of its military value, would weaken the hand of those political leaders in Australia, New Zealand, and India—and also in China—who believed in the value of close association with Great Britain. The actual weakness of Singapore as a base, in view of the development of air power and the possibility of Japanese land operations in Malaya, did not detract from the symbolic value of Singapore but instead obliged the British to insist on its protection as an end in itself.

The British representatives did not rest their case entirely on the political importance of holding Singapore. They asserted also the operational value of Singapore as a "card of re-entry" into the South China Sea. They reasoned that, even though the fate of Singapore would not affect the rate and extent of Japanese conquests, it would
become vitally important at the point when
the war against Germany and Italy should
have taken a turn for the better. If the
British still held Singapore, they could hope
to re-establish their position in the South
China Sea; if they had lost Singapore, they
could not hope to do so. They concluded:

Even if we were able to eliminate Italy and
the Italian fleet as an active enemy; even if
with United States' assistance the situation in
the Atlantic and home waters were to undergo
some drastic change for the better, such as
would enable us to reduce our naval strength
in the west—even if Germany as well as Italy
were defeated, it is at least highly problemati-
cal whether we could ever restore the position
in the East. To carry out a successful attack
and gain a foothold against opposition in East
Asia and the Indies, thousands of miles from
our nearest base, would be a colossal under-
taking. It is open to doubt whether it would
be a practicable operation of war in any cir-
cumstances. In the conditions in which it
would have to be faced, when we should be
exhausted by the strain of a long and desper-
ate struggle from which we had only just
emerged, we are doubtful whether we should
even be able to attempt it.  22

In short, as the British representatives
stated, British insistence on the defense of
Singapore was based "not only upon purely
strategic foundations, but on political,
economic and sentimental considerations
which, even if not literally vital on a strictly
academic view, are of such fundamental
importance to the British Commonwealth
that they must always be taken into serious
account."  23 The British representatives
did not make entirely explicit the very
strong reasons, from a British point of view,
why the United States should intervene
promptly and decisively in the Far East.
The American representatives understood,
however, that the critical point was the
prestige of the British Empire in the Far
East and at home. They replied that the
concern of the British Government on this
score, as well as on the accompanying mili-
tary disadvantages, in particular the loss of
important sources of the rubber and oil of
the East Indies, was very natural. But, to
them, losses in the Far East seemed to be of
secondary importance:

The general moral effect of the loss of
Singapore and the Philippines would be severe. Singapore has been built up in public
opinion as a symbol of the power of the Brit-
ish Empire. The eastern Dominions, the
Netherlands East Indies, and China, look
upon its security as the guarantee of their
safety. Its value as a symbol has become so
great that its capture by Japan would be a
serious blow. But many severe blows have
been taken by these various nations, and other
severe blows can be absorbed without leading
to final disaster. 24

This comment, to be sure, did not deal
with the effect on Great Britain itself of the
weakening or loss of the British position in
the Far East, upon which (as the British
representatives had pointed out) the econ-
omy of the United Kingdom was heavily
dependent. But the American representa-
tives made it clear that, in their opinion, the
security of the North Atlantic and of the
British Isles was the common basis of
American-British strategy, and that it was
up to the British to do the best they could
to take care of their interests elsewhere,
even as it was up to the United States to
defend American interests overseas. Their
vital common concern was to meet and
eliminate the German threat to the security
of the North Atlantic and the British Isles.
On this basis the American representatives
refused to join the British in recommending

  22 The Far East—Appreciation, cited n. 18.
  23 Ibid.
  24 Statement by U. S. Stf Com, "The U. S. Mil-
itary Position in the Far East," Br-U. S. Stf Convs,
that the retention of Singapore or the security of the Far Eastern positions be recognized as vital Allied aims or that the United States send naval units to Singapore. Instead, they proposed that the British should recognize that

The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean regions. In explanation, they stated:

The United States Staff Committee agrees that the retention of Singapore is very desirable. But it also believes that the diversion to the Asiatic theater of sufficient forces to assure the retention of Singapore might jeopardize the success of the main effort of the Associated Powers. From the broad view this diversion would amount to employment of the final reserve of the Associated Powers in a non-decisive theater. A commitment on the part of the United States to assure the retention of Singapore carries with it a further commitment to employ the forces necessary to accomplish that mission. It implies that the United States will undertake the early defeat of Japan and that it accepts responsibility for the safety of a large portion of the British Empire. No one can predict accurately the forces that will be required in such an effort, but it is conceivable that a large part of United States army and naval forces would ultimately be involved.\(^25\)

### Aircraft Allocations

Two matters of great concern to the British delegation were the allocation of American-produced aircraft and the disposition of American air forces. The delegation proposed that the United States should develop its entire air program so as to meet the critical British needs during the first year of American participation in the war, deferring the planned expansion of American air forces to the extent that it conflicted with British demands for planes and equipment, and assigning such American units as became available (after meeting essential defense requirements) where the British currently had the most acute need of them, irrespective of the effect on the long-range American training program.

The discussion of air strategy did not produce a sharp conflict between British and American views. In answer to American questions, the British representatives explained that, of course, they were talking not about the current situation but about the hypothetical situation with which the conversations as a whole were intended to deal—the situation in which the United States and Great Britain would be fighting side by side. They recognized not only that the United States must provide for its own defensive requirements but also that American leaders "could not—if only for political reasons—afford to ignore the need to build up their own air services." They further explained that they did not aim at the aggrandizement of the Royal Air Force at the expense of the U. S. Army Air Corps. They acknowledged:

The British suggestion amounts simply to this; that, in the event of United States intervention in the war, the common cause could best be served if the United States authorities base their programme on first reducing the disparity between the air forces of Germany and those of the British and the United States which are actively engaged in war, by extending as much direct and indirect assistance as possible to the British; and that, with this end in view, the Associated Powers should be prepared to accept the inevitable result that United States collaboration, in the form of the provision of formed units in the second year, would be less than would be possible.
if the United States were to concentrate from the beginning on their own expansion.26

In deciding how to answer the British proposal the American staff committee had first to take into account the need to provide air forces for the security of the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere should the British Isles fall. The Army Air Corps estimated that forces required to meet this contingency to be 54 trained combat groups (the First Aviation Objective) plus personnel and facilities for immediate expansion to 100 combat groups (the Second Aviation Objective).27 There was every reason to believe that Germany had accurate knowledge of American production capacity and potential and would assume that American aid to Great Britain could not materially affect the relative air strengths before the winter of 1941–42. For the same reason, however, Germany could be expected to launch intensified air attacks and an invasion against the British Isles before the winter of 1941–42. On the basis of this reasoning, the critical period for Great Britain would extend until 1 November 1941. The American staff committee was inclined to take the risk of holding up its 54-group program as long as the United States was not actively engaged in the war.28

The details of the agreement were worked out in a separate report known by its short title, ABC–2.29 It provided that the first charge on American plane production would be the allocations made to the British and that until such time as the United States might enter the war, the British would receive the entire output from any new aircraft capacity. If the United States should enter the war, increases in output would be divided about equally between the United States and Great Britain. Though deferring fulfilment of the 54-group program, the U. S. Army Air Corps would start on a 100-group program to provide training facilities for 30,000 pilots and 100,000 technicians a year.

The policy adopted by the United States staff committee for active American air participation, should the United States enter the war, entailed protecting a U. S. naval base to be established in Iceland and furnishing air support to the Royal Air Force in the British Isles. Colonel McNarney explained this policy at the meeting of the United States staff committee with the British delegation on 17 February 1941:

This general policy envisioned that pursuit aviation would be so disposed as to afford protection to United States' naval operating bases. Bombardment aviation would be grouped in a single general area for operations with the British Bomber Command. That the United States forces would normally

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27 The Air Corps 54-group program called for a total delivery by 1 April 1942 of 21,470 tactical and training planes. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, Plans and Early Operations—January 1939 to August 1942, I, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 129, (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, AAF 1).
29 The work of an Air subcommittee, ABC–2 was submitted two days after the ABC–1 Report was completed. (ABC–2, ltr, Gen Embick, Admiral Ghormley, and Admiral Bellairs, to CofS, CNO, and (Br) CsoF, 29 Mar 41, sub: Air Collab. This document is reproduced in Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 15, pp.1543–50.) The members of the Air subcommittee were Air Vice Marshal J. C. Slessor, RAF, Captain Ramsey, USN, and Colonel McNarney, USA.
operate against objectives in Germany, but would, of course, operate against invasion ports or other vital objectives, in accordance with the demands of the existing situation.\(^{30}\)

Three groups of pursuit aviation were to be sent to the British Isles during 1941 as they became available, initially to Northern Ireland, where there would be two naval bases. Eventually, when these pursuit groups were broken in, they would be sent to more active sectors in England. Three groups of heavy bombers and two groups of medium bombers were to be sent to England to operate under U. S. commanders in the British Bomber Command. No commitments were made in the course of the staff conversations for air participation in the Far East or in the Middle East.\(^{31}\) But the Air Corps was exploring the possibility of sending aviation units to the Middle East some time later:

We have avoided any commitments in this area. However, in 1942 and 1943 it will probably be impossible to crowd any more operating units into the British Isles. We are now studying the possibility of supporting a large air force in Egypt, Asiatic Turkey and Syria via the Red Sea, with an airways via Takoradi, British Gold Coast to Cairo.

Subject to the provision of air forces for the security of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles, agreement was reached that the main objective of the Associated Powers would be to achieve air superiority over Germany at the earliest possible time, particularly in long-range striking forces.\(^{32}\)

### Concentration in the Atlantic

As the debates over naval and air strategy showed, the British and American staffs were preoccupied with different things and would disagree accordingly over long-term plans. But there was still a great deal of common ground in the belief that the United States, like Great Britain, had much more to fear from Germany than from any of the other great powers. The importance of this for Army plans lay in the willingness of the British to agree that U. S. Army forces should be used “in areas which are the most accessible to them, namely in the general area of the Atlantic.”\(^{33}\) It was entirely feasible to adjust British strategic plans with this policy, for as the United States began to concentrate forces in the North Atlantic area, the British Government would be free to continue sending some additional forces to the Middle East and Far East.

Even apart from reasons of strategic policy, the American staff had a very strong reason for desiring such a solution. The concentration of American forces in the Atlantic theater would enormously simplify relations between British and American commands. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner restated the principle, which had been contained in the instructions drawn up and approved for the American delegation

... that it is not the intention of the United States to agree to any breaking up and scattering of United States forces into small groups to be absorbed in the British commands. ... The United States proposes to accept full responsibility for operations in certain definite areas, or for executing specific tasks in areas of British responsibility. ... In brief, United States' forces are to be under United States' command, and British forces under British Command. ...”\(^{34}\)

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\(^{30}\) Min, 9th mtg U. S.-Br Stf Convs, 17 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 9th mtg.

\(^{31}\) Memo cited n. 28(2).

\(^{32}\) (1) Ibid. (2) ABC-1 Report.


\(^{34}\) (1) Min, 7th mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 14 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 7th mtg. (2) For the definition of the agreed areas of British and American strategic responsibility, see Annex 2, ABC-1.
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Only on this basis could the American staff hope to minimize the vexing problems resulting from the gradual intrusion of American forces into areas in which Great Britain had, and the United States did not have, a large political and economic stake and a clearly formulated policy, together with control of communications, a monopoly of intelligence, and long experience in dealing with the civil authorities.

For these reasons the American staffs were eager to develop plans for collaboration in the North Atlantic, and, since the British were ready to join in the project, it was in this field of planning that the conversations proved most fruitful. The tentative agreements reached by the representatives dealt mainly with the disposition of American forces up to the time of full American participation in the war and for a few months thereafter. The general theory then was that the United States should prepare to take over as far and as fast as possible responsibility for defenses in the North Atlantic, except in the British Isles.

For the Navy this meant the assumption of responsibility for North Atlantic convoys. The United States was already planning to begin very soon to convoy ships all the way across the Atlantic. One of the first agreements reached with the British regarding Atlantic operations concerned the use of American forces if the United States should enter the war:

The principal task of the naval forces which the United States may operate in the Atlantic will be the protection of associated shipping, the center of gravity of the United States' effort being concentrated in the North Atlantic, and particularly in the Northwest Approaches to the British Isles. Under this conception, United States' naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance. 35

For the Army, concentration in the Atlantic meant, to begin with, the garrisoning of Iceland, in addition to the leased bases, and of American naval bases in the British Isles. In the early stages of American participation, the Army would establish air and ground forces in Great Britain. American air strength in Great Britain would be used not only to defend United States land and naval bases but also to take the offense, in conjunction with the Royal Air Force, against German military power. All these moves would relieve the pressure on the British high command, allowing it to continue deploying forces to the Middle East and Far East with far greater assurance.

Exchange of Military Missions

Besides reaching these tentative agreements, the British and American representatives readily agreed to recommend the exchange of military missions. The U. S. military mission in London recommended by the conference was to consist of two members—a flag officer of the U. S. Navy and a general officer of the U. S. Army—with a secretariat and staff organized in three sections—a joint planning section, a Navy section, and an Army section. 36

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35 Min, 8th mtg Br-U. S. Stf Convs, 15 Feb 41, B.U.S. (J) (41) 8th mtg.
36 (1) The organization of the U. S. Military mission in London as envisaged at that time did not provide separate Air representation. General Arnold wanted an Army Air officer to be assigned to each board and committee so that American organization would correspond to the British organization. Arnold expressed this view to Ambassador John G. Winant during his visit to London
British military mission in Washington would consist of three members—a flag officer of the British Navy, a general officer of the British Army, and an officer of the Royal Air Force—with a joint planning staff, a Navy staff, an Army staff, an Air staff, and a secretariat. The Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand would be represented on the British mission in Washington by their service attaches.

Should the United States enter the war, these two missions were to be announced as the representatives of their respective Chiefs of Staff, and would then be set up, organized not only to collaborate in formulating military plans and policies but also to represent their own military services vis-à-vis those of the government to which they had been accredited.

At the conclusion of the agreements of ABC-1, recommendation was made that “nucleus missions” be exchanged at once. The Army War Plans Division (WPD) on 7 April 1941 recommended that the American nucleus mission be set up in London, separate from the military attaché’s office, in order to avoid political or diplomatic control, and that the general officer selected to head the mission be a major general qualified to assume command of the first units of the United States Army forces—primarily antiaircraft and Air Corps—that would be sent to the British Isles in case of war. General Marshall gave his approval to the early establishment of the nucleus mission in London, the senior Army member of which would be a major general designated the Special Army Observer, London, responsible directly to the Chief of Staff. Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, the Air Corps officer that had been sent to London to study British air defenses in the fall of 1940, was selected for the post. He was instructed to negotiate with the British Chiefs of Staff on military affairs of common interest, specifically those relating to combined action by American and British military officials and troops in British areas of responsibility, but not with a view to making political commitments. He was to try to arrange for American officials in England to take up military matters with the British through his group and not directly, Admiral Ghormley, who had been in London as the Special Naval Observer (SPENAVO) since the fall of 1940, received similar instructions from Admiral Stark. On 19 May General Chaney notified the War Department that he had established the Special Army Observer Group (SPOBS) in London.

Meanwhile the Navy Department had made office space available for the few officers of the British military mission who were already in Washington. On 18 May the
nucleus British military mission advised the War Department that the heads of the British mission would be Admiral Sir Charles Little, who had been Second Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Personnel; Lt. Gen. H. C. B. Wemyss, who had been Adjutant General to the Army Forces; and Air Marshall A. T. Harris, who had been Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. These officers, with the remaining members of their staffs, would be leaving the United Kingdom early in June and would set up their offices in a leased house adjoining the British embassy in Washington.41

With the establishment of these “nucleus missions,” the exchange of views and information between the British and American staffs became continuous, and the problems of coalition warfare came to be a familiar part of the work of the Army planners.

Rainbow 5

The strategy recommended by Admiral Stark and presented by the American staff for discussion with the British assumed a situation much like that proposed in the terms of reference for RAINBOW 5.42 Once ABC-1 had received the approval of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Joint Board issued a new directive for the preparation of RAINBOW 5, requiring that the plan be based on ABC-1 and on Joint United States-Canada War Plan 2 (ABC-22) which was then being drafted.43 The first Army draft of RAINBOW 5 was completed on 7 April and three weeks later the plan was submitted by the Joint Planning Committee for the Joint Board’s approval.

The general assumptions on which RAINBOW 5 was based, were as follows:

That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the “Free French” are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either:

- a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
- b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Thailand.

That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

The broad strategic objective of the Associated Powers under this plan would be the defeat of Germany and its allies. The national strategic defense policies of the

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41 Memo, Capt A. W. Clarke, Secy to Br Mil Miss in Washington, no addressee, 18 May 41, sub: Appts to the Br Mil Miss in Washington, WPD 4402-10. The British mission itself was to consist of about thirty-one officers, although a number of other British officers were coming to Washington at this time to be assigned to Admiralty Missions in North America, and to the administration of the British Air Training Plan which was being implemented in the United States. The joint secretaries selected for the mission were Comdr. R. D. Coleridge, RN, and Mr. W. L. Gorell-Barnes of the Foreign Office.

42 See above, p. 8.

United States and the British Commonwealth would be to secure the Western Hemisphere from European or Asiatic political or military penetration, maintain the security of the United Kingdom, and provide such dispositions as would ensure the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The strategy of the offensive against Germany and its allies set forth in RAINBOW 5 (as in ABC-1) was as follows:

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength.

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.45

American military operations would be governed by the following principles:

(a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and submarine forces.

(b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to such operations as will not materially delay this effort.

In accord with these principles the United States Army and Navy would be required to assume the general tasks, in co-operation with other Associated Powers, of defeating the Axis Powers and guarding United States national interests by the following:

a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a sustained air offensive;

b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and air offensive;

c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers;

d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military powers; and by

e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.46

The specific tasks assigned to the Army and the Navy under RAINBOW 5 were either already listed in ABC-1 or derived therefrom. In the western Atlantic the Army (in conjunction with the Navy) would be required to protect the territory of the Associated Powers, support Latin American republics against invasion or political domination by Axis Powers, provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana, and defend coastal frontiers and defense command areas. The Army would also be responsible for relieving British forces in Curaçao and Aruba, for preparing to relieve Marine forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, if the Navy had established such garrisons, and for building up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against Germany. The Navy in that area would be responsible for protecting the sea communications of the

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.
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Associated Powers, for destroying Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy, for protecting and routing shipping in the coast zones, and for preparing to occupy the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if such an operation became necessary.

In the United Kingdom and British Home Waters Area, the U. S. Army would co-operate with the Royal Air Force in conducting offensive air operations aimed primarily against objectives in Germany, provide ground defense for bases in the British Isles used primarily by United States naval forces, and provide a token force (one reinforced regiment) for the defense of the British Isles. The Army would also relieve the British garrison in Iceland as soon as practicable. In British Home Waters, the Navy, acting under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief of the Western Approaches, would be responsible for escorting convoys. The Navy would also be responsible for raiding enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under British strategic direction.

In the Pacific, RAINBOW 5 assigned to the Army the tasks of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers, preventing extension of Axis influence in the Western Hemisphere, and supporting naval forces in the protection of sea communications and in the defense of coastal frontiers and defense command areas. The Navy in the Pacific Ocean Area would protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers, destroy Axis sea communications, support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as longitude 155° east, and defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, and Guam. The Navy would also be required to support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East area by diverting enemy strength from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshall Islands and through raids on enemy sea communications, while preparing to establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Islands area.46

In the Far East, the Army would defend the Philippine coastal frontier, but no Army reinforcements would be sent to that area.47 The Navy would support the land and air forces in the defense of the Far Eastern territories of the Associated Powers, raid Japanese sea communications, and destroy Axis forces. The Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, would be responsible, in cooperation with the Army, for the defense of the Philippines as long as that defense continued and, thereafter, for the defense of the Malay Barrier, but the Navy, like the Army, planned no reinforcement of its forces in that area.48

RAINBOW 5, as drawn in April 1941, provided no plan for the employment of land forces in a major offensive against Germany. Lt. Col. Charles W. Bundy of the War Plans Division, taking note of this omission, explained:

A great deal of consideration was given to the employment of major land forces, but very correctly no plans for these land opera-

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46 Ibid. The “Malay Barrier,” as used in Rainbow 5, was defined as including the “Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia.”

47 The Navy had stated that it would not transport reinforcements from the United States to the Philippines after Mobilization Day (M Day). Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Jan 41, sub: Measures to be Taken in Event of Sudden and Simultaneous Action by Germany and Japan Against the U. S., WPD 4175-18.

48 (1) Sec VII, Incl A to rpt cited n. 43 (2) Par 2, memo, Admiral Stark, CNO, for CofS, 22 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeditions, Rainbow 5 Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.
tions were formulated; a plan must be formulated upon a situation and no prediction of the situation which will exist when such a plan can be implemented should be made now. One of the principal policies enumerated in Rainbow 5 is "The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany." 46

RAINBOW 5 was based on the time origin of Mobilization Day (M Day), which might precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments might put certain features of the plan into effect before M Day. The shipping schedule for overseas transportation of Army troops had been predicated on the assumption that M Day would not fall earlier than 1 September 1941. U. S. Army commitments to the British under ABC–1 would not become effective before that date. In the first few months of the war, under RAINBOW 5, 220,900 troops and at least 666 aircraft would have to be transported to overseas garrisons—44,000 troops to Hawaii, 23,000 to Alaska, 13,400 to Panama, 45,800 to the Caribbean area, and 26,500 to Iceland. By 1 November, 15,000 troops were scheduled for shipment to anti-aircraft and air defense installations in the British Isles and to other permanent overseas naval bases in foreign territory. By 1 February, 53,200 air striking forces, including defense units, were scheduled for shipment to the British Isles.

On a very tentative basis, the Army had planned to prepare the following forces for overseas employment; 24,000 troops and 80 aircraft for the west coast of South America; 86,000 troops and 56 aircraft for the east coast of South America; 83,000 troops and aircraft for transatlantic destinations, prepared to embark 20 days after M Day; and, finally, an expeditionary force of one army, two corps, and ten divisions, prepared to embark 180 days after M Day. 50

On 14 May, at its regular monthly meeting, the Joint Board approved RAINBOW 5 and ABC–1. 51 On 2 June, following approval by the Secretaries of War and Navy, RAINBOW 5 and ABC–1 were sent to the President, with the information that the British Chiefs of Staff had provisionally agreed to ABC–1 and had submitted it to the British Government for approval. 52 The President read both documents and on 7 June returned them to the Joint Board without approval or disapproval. Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, the President's military aide, offered the explanation:

The President has familiarized himself with the two papers; but since the report of the United States British Staff Conversations, ABC–1, had not been approved by the British Government, he would not approve the report at this time; neither would he now give approval to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, which is based upon the report ABC–1. However, in case of war the papers would be returned to the President for his approval. 53

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46 Draft memo, WPD [Col Bundy] for CofS [May 41], sub cited in n. 48(2). This memorandum was drafted not earlier than 22 May 1941, as it contains a reference to a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations of that date.

50 Sec VIII, Incl A to rpt, cited in n. 43.
51 Min, JB mtg, 14 May 41.
52 The Secretary of the Navy approved Joint Board 325, serial 642-5 (RAINBOW 5 and ABC–1) on 28 May 1941. Memo, Col Scobey, SJB, for CofS, 2 Jun 41, sub: Approval of JB Sers by SN, JB 325, ser 642-5.
54 On 5 July 1941 Under Secretary Welles informed
At the meeting of the War Council in Stimson's office on 10 June, the question came up of whether the President's not having approved RAINBOW 5 might interfere with Army preparations. General Marshall took the position that, although the Army did not know what changes President Roosevelt might make, the President had not after all disapproved the plan and the Army could go ahead on a tentative basis.

The main task undertaken by the Army within the terms of ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5 was planning for the first Army forces to be sent to the United Kingdom. The preparatory investigations, studies, and negotiations were complex and time consuming. Sites in Great Britain that might be used for Army installations, including depots and air bases, had to be inspected, and tentative arrangements made with the British for their development. The organization of U. S. forces in Great Britain had to be outlined, the positions of U. S. ground and air forces in the U. S. chain of command clarified, and command relationships with the British defined. The size and composition of the U. S. forces first to be sent had to be determined. ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5, the starting points for General Chaney's work, had provided, after U. S. entry into the war, for the dispatch of a token force—a reinforced regiment—to help defend the United Kingdom; ground and air forces to protect bases in the British Isles used by the United States; a bombardment force to conduct offensive operations against the objectives in Germany; and a base force to contain the administrative establishments and supply and replacement depots to serve all U. S. forces in the United Kingdom. The War Department needed specific recommendations as a basis for decisions about the command, strength, and location of American forces that might be stationed in the British Isles, as well as their supply, housing, and defense from air attack.

On the basis of Chaney's reports the War Department and GHQ, in the summer and fall of 1941, went ahead with detailed studies and tentative arrangements for sending troops to the British Isles.

A comprehensive report submitted by General Chaney on 20 September contained detailed recommendations for sending about
107,000 men, exclusive of a reinforced division for Iceland. All of the units would operate under British strategic direction. Material support in the main would have to be drawn from the United Kingdom. All, except the bomber force and the Iceland force, would be under British tactical command. General Chaney recommended that a supreme U. S. Army headquarters be established in England, and that this headquarters exercise the functions prescribed in ABC-1 for the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces British Isles (USAFBI) as well as those of the United States Army member of the military mission. The American commander would act as a theater commander and would be responsible for seeing that American troops were used in accordance with American strategic policy. How far General Chaney’s specific proposals would govern action upon American entry into the war remained dependent on a great many unpredictable contingencies and on the resolution at that time of several disagreements.

The War Department staff was most reluctant to establish any new garrisons or expeditionary forces. By midsummer of 1941, as the result of the Selective Service Act and the federalization of the National Guard, the Army had, for the time being, plenty of “bodies.” By August 1941 the Regular, Reserve, National Guard, and Selective Service components of the Army totaled about 1,600,000 officers and men. There were twenty-nine infantry divisions, four armored divisions, two cavalry divisions, and a tactical air force of about 200 squadrons and approximately 175,000 men. By the end of 1941 only two additional divisions were activated—the 5th Armored and 25th (Reserve) Infantry Divisions. The training of all these units and their supporting elements was just beginning. The shortage of materiel, particularly of new models—airplanes, tanks, guns, and small arms ammunition—handicapped training and impaired the immediate combat effectiveness of the troops. New matériel needed by the...
Army, planes and ammunition especially, was being diverted to the British, and to the Navy and Marine Corps. The War Department was consequently confronted with the problem of deciding whether to give the pieces of equipment that were beginning to emerge from the factories to soldiers in training or soldiers in the overseas garrisons. Since the needs of the latter were usually more urgent, troops in training often had to make shift with old matériel, or none at all. Even if all the troops had been ready and equipped, they still could not be sent overseas immediately. Large numbers of professional soldiers were needed as cadres in the United States to train other soldiers, and sufficient shipping space was not available. Though combatant ships of the "two-ocean" Navy, troop transports, and cargo vessels were under construction, it was clear that the movement of troops overseas would long be limited for want of ships.

Given the acute lack of experienced soldiers and the heavy competition for matériel, even the small-scale precautionary and defensive deployment of Army forces in 1941 for garrison duty in the Atlantic and Pacific put an almost unbearable strain on the Army.

At the time, the Army's mobilization problems were further complicated by existing legislative restrictions on the sending of troops outside the United States. Neither selectees nor National Guardsmen could be sent outside the Western Hemisphere. It was, moreover, impracticable to give these men overseas assignments even in the Western Hemisphere, since the Army had to be ready to release them after twelve months of service.

The Army's difficulties were discussed repeatedly during the spring and summer of 1941 in connection with plans to set aside expeditionary forces and to garrison Iceland. Admiral Stark thought it was more important at this time for the Army and Navy to prepare and assemble a highly trained amphibious force than it was to prepare a garrison for Iceland. The Admiral had in mind, of course, the possibility that the President might, on very short notice, order the Army and Navy to undertake an overseas expedition. Considering the Army's training and equipment problems, the War Department planners did not look with favor on Admiral Stark's suggested priorities of training, although they would have liked to drop planning for Iceland, had it not been a commitment under ABC-1.

On the same day that Admiral Stark

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61 For a War Department review of the state of preparedness of the Army in the early fall of 1941, see: (1) memo, WPDe for CofS, 22 Sep 41, sub: Overseas Possessions, Task Forces, and Leased Bases, WFD 4564-1, and (2) memo, WPDe for CofS, 7 Oct 41, sub: Ground Forces, with corrected copy of incl, memo, CofS for President, 14 Oct 41, sub: Est of Ground Forces Req, etc., WFD 4594. (A copy with various rough drafts is filed in Env 8, Exec 4.)
62 In addition to reinforcing the U. S. overseas garrisons—Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines—the War Department in 1941 had to provide troops to garrison the leased British bases in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana. Troops were also deployed, under separate agreements, to Newfoundland and Bermuda. From June through November, other Army movements overseas were to Greenland, Iceland, and Surinam (Dutch Guiana).
63 Ltr, Stark to CofS, 22 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Expeditions, RAINBOW 5 Development File, G–3 Regd Docs.
64 Memo, WPDe for CofS [May 1941], sub cited n. 63, RAINBOW 5 Development File, G–3 Regd Docs.
brought up his idea, the President directed the Army and Navy to prepare a Joint Army and Navy expeditionary force, to be ready within one month's time to sail from United States ports for the purpose of occupying the Azores. He declared in explanation that it was in the interest of the United States to prevent non-American belligerent forces from gaining control of the islands and also to hold them for use as air and naval bases for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The Joint Board agreed that the operation would be carried out by Army and Marine Corps troops, supported by a naval force from the Atlantic Fleet, with 22 June 1941 set as a tentative date for the departure of the expedition. Accordingly, the staffs prepared a joint basic plan for the capture and occupation of the Azores.

The decision for an operation against the Azores was perforce to be deferred when the President decided in early June to take the first steps toward the occupation of Iceland by U. S. troops. In accordance with instructions from the White House, General Marshall directed his staff planners to prepare a plan for the immediate relief of the British troops in Iceland.

As a result of the presidential directives of the last week of May and early June, the War Department planners realized that expeditionary forces might be called for in any of several areas on short notice. This possibility was brought home to them with still greater forcefulness at a meeting on 19 June of the President with the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. At this meeting the President inquired whether it would be possible for the Army to organize a force of approximately 75,000 men to be used in any of several theaters—for example, in Iceland, the Azores, or the Cape Verde Islands. The Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War again called to the President’s attention that the Army could not, under existing legislative restrictions, send forces outside the Western Hemisphere for any extended period without completely destroying the efficiency of all units directly or indirectly involved. General Marshall also pointed to the risks involved in sending half-trained and poorly equipped U. S. Army troops into any areas in which they might have to operate against well-trained and completely equipped German units.

Nevertheless, the move to Iceland was not to be called off. Upon receiving an invitation from the Icelandic Government on 1 July, the President directed Admiral Stark to move marines to Iceland at once, and told him to arrange with the Army for the relief of the marines and for sending whatever additional Army troops would be needed, in conjunction with the British forces that remained, to guarantee the security of Iceland. By this time the idea

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(1) Ltr cited n. 65. The plan bore the Army short title, GRAY, and the Navy short title, WPL 47. For fuller action, especially on the War Department position, see WPD 4422.

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Gerow Diary, 4 Jun 41 entry, Item 1, Exec 10.
of immediately relieving the entire British garrison had been abandoned. On 7 July 1941 the marines landed in Iceland. Immediately thereafter a pursuit squadron with necessary service units was ordered to Iceland as the first Army contingent. But it proved extremely difficult to set up an Army force to relieve the marines. The passage of legislation in August 1941 permitting the retention in service of the selectees, Reserve officers, and the National Guardsmen still left the problem of restriction on territorial service—a problem which was to remain with the Army until Pearl Harbor brought a declaration of war.

In the end, the Army force deployed to Iceland during 1941 was to number only about 5,000 men, the marines were required to stay to swell the American garrison to 10,000 men, and only a token British force was relieved for duty elsewhere. After weeks of strenuous staff work had been completed in Washington, the second Army contingent sailed on 5 September 1941 under the command of Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel. After taking into account the disruption in Army units already caused by the organization of this force, General Marshall decided that the marines would not be relieved by Army forces until 1942.

**Introduction to Grand Strategy**

In the early spring of 1941 German submarines were sinking ships in the Atlantic so fast that the President seriously considered ordering aggressive action by American warships in spite of the evident risk that it would bring the United States into the war. He finally decided not to take the chance and instead ordered into effect the more cautious plan of having American ships merely report German movements west of Iceland.

While the question was under consideration, the Army planners had to make up their own minds what decision would be wise. In keeping with a suggestion by Mr. Hopkins that the President needed professional military advice, General Embick, who had gone on leave after the staff conversations with the British, was brought back to Washington for a series of discussions with the President to “inform him as Commander-in-Chief of national strategy for the future, without regard to politics.”

At a conference with members of his plans staff early on the morning of 16 April, General Marshall presented the problem and asked how he should advise the President when he went with General Embick to the White House later that day.

If we have gotten to the point where we can no longer operate on a peacetime status,
should we recommend a war status? Or is it of importance to do something immediately? Is immediate action necessary?

As General Marshall observed, the situation facing him as Chief of Staff of the Army was embarrassing since, if the President should make a decision at that time, anything that could be done immediately would have to be done by the Navy and not by the Army—Army forces would not be prepared for action until the fall. Secretary Stimson’s view, he reported, was that any military action at all by the United States, in whatever locality—Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, or Martinique—should be undertaken with an overwhelming force, and with a high degree of efficiency, even if contact with enemy forces were not imminent. General Marshall summed up the problem thus:

What I must be prepared to suggest is what should the President do. What do we think should be done. Of course, the President is also governed by public opinion. There are two things we must do: Begin the education of the President as to the true strategic situation—this coming after a period of being influenced by the State Department. The other thing is does he have to make a decision now? We must tell him what he has to work with.

The plans staff worked on this problem during the morning of 16 April and presented its conclusions to the Chief of Staff before noon. It evaluated Army capabilities as follows:

We are prepared to defend our possessions in the Western Hemisphere and the North American Continent against any probable threat that can be foreseen. Subject to the availability of shipping we can promptly relieve British forces in Iceland and relieve Naval forces that may undertake the occupation of the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands. We can undertake, likewise subject to the limitation of shipping, any operations that may reasonably be required in the Caribbean or in Northeast Brazil.

So far as Army operations were concerned, the staff could only advise the postponement of American entry into the war, declaring:

... it must be recognized that the Army can, at the present time, accomplish extremely limited military support to a war effort and from this point of view it is highly desirable that we withhold participation as long as possible.

On the other hand, the staff believed that it might well prove sound, from a military point of view, to enter the war before the Army could be of much use:

Upon the assumption, which appears reasonable, that the United States will enter the present war sooner or later, it appears to the War Plans Division highly desirable that our entry be made sufficiently soon to avoid either the loss of the British Isles or a material change in the attitude of the British Government directed toward appeasement.

It appeared from their study that the planners, despite their caution, were in favor of early entry of the United States into the war. General Marshall left no room for doubt. He asked the planners in turn to express their personal opinions. Colonel McNarney answered

... that anything that would tend to cause the fall of the British Isles would tend to put the whole load on the United States. That it is important that we start reducing the war-making ability of Germany. We do have a Navy in being and can do something. If we wait we will end up standing alone and internal disturbances may bring on communism. I may be called a fire-eater but something must be done.

Memo [WPD] for CofS, 16 Apr 41, sub: Strategic Considerations Peace or War Status, WPD 4402-9. This document was initialed by Colonel Anderson, acting head of WPD in the absence of General Gerow, who was then on sick leave.

Ibid.
Lt. Col. Lee S. Gerow and Colonel Bundy stated that they agreed completely with Colonel McNarney. Col. Jonathan W. Anderson, although in general agreement, was unwilling to take as strong a position as the rest.80

General Embick strongly disagreed. The situation did not seem to him so dangerous, in part because he did not believe that the loss of the Middle East would be fatal, even though it would be a heavy blow to the Churchill government. He acknowledged that should the United States enter the war fewer supply ships would probably be sunk in the Atlantic, and agreed that the loss of ships was a vital problem. But he declared that he himself would not advise entering the war and believed that to do so “would be wrong in a military and naval sense” and unjust “to the American people.” 81

During the summer of 1941 the Army staff came around to the view expressed by General Embick. The German attack on the Soviet Union, launched on 22 June 1941, undoubtedly conditioned this change of view. Even if the German forces were successful in reaching their major objectives in the Soviet Union during the summer and fall of 1941 (as American military intelligence considered probable), there was no longer any serious danger of an invasion of the British Isles until the spring of 1942, and until then the British position in the Middle East would also be much better.82

The change in the situation had quite the opposite effect on the views of the President and the British. The President decided to send additional Army forces to positions overseas, in spite of the earnest insistence of the War Department staff that the Army was not ready. The British, for their part, relieved by the German attack on the USSR, but at the same time anxious to forestall a possible reorientation of U. S. Army efforts toward the Pacific, ceased to dwell on the oft-repeated demand for American naval forces in the Southwest Pacific and began to urge an early entry of the United States into the war against Germany and the desirability of American collaboration in the Mediterranean.

**The Atlantic Conference**

The changes in the positions of the British and American staffs were evident in staff talks held during the Atlantic Conference in the summer of 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, on board the USS Augusta and H. M. S. Prince of Wales lying off Argentia, Newfoundland.83 On the military side, no agenda had been prepared or views exchanged with the British before the conference, nor had the President given the American staff authority to make commitments.

At this conference the American staff was given a reminder how important it was to the British to hold their position in the Middle East and gain control of the North African coast. On 3 July 1940, shortly after the fall of France, the British neutral-

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80 Notes on conf cited n. 77. Colonels McNarney, L. S. Gerow, Anderson, and Bundy were WPD representatives.

81 Notes on conf cited n. 77.


83 The American delegates to the military staff talks were Admirals Stark, King, and Turner, Generals Marshall and Arnold, Comdr. Forrest P. Sherman, and Colonel Bundy.
ized the threat of a hostile French Fleet in a naval action three miles west of Oran at Mers-el-Kebir, but failed in an attempt to take Dakar (23–25 September 1940). They had held and defeated the Italians in Libya (September 1940–January 1941), but German intervention in the Mediterranean created a more dangerous situation. German troops landed in Africa in February 1941 and entered Libya at the end of March. Early in April the Germans attacked in the Balkans, where the Italians had been waging a futile campaign for several months. The British had held their own against the Germans in Libya, but they had been quickly overwhelmed in Greece and Crete. Whatever reasons Hitler had had at the time for intervention in the Mediterranean, German forces there represented a constant danger, which would
greatly increase if Soviet resistance were to 
collapse or the German campaigns were to 
slacken on the Eastern Front.

During the staff talks the British brought 
up explicitly for the first time (on the mili-
tary level) the possibility of employing 
American troops in a combined operation 
in French North Africa and of using Ameri-
can help to reinforce the Middle East. 
Through these undertakings in particular, 
they believed that early American inter-
vention would entirely change the whole 
military situation. The American staff 
thus began to become acquainted with the 
British notion of what operations American 
intervention in the war would make pos-
sible. At the same time they also learned 
of the general methods by which the British 
Chiefs proposed to gain victory in Europe 
after blockade, bombing, subversive activi-
ties, and propaganda had weakened the 
will and ability of Germany to resist:

We do not foresee vast armies of infantry 
as in 1914–18. The forces we employ will be 
armoured divisions with the most modern 
equipment. To supplement their operations 
the local patriots must be secretly armed and 
equipped so that at the right moment they 
may rise in revolt.84

The emphasis on mobile, hard-hitting 
armored forces operating on the periphery 
of German controlled territory and eventu-
ally striking into Germany itself, rather 
than large-scale ground action to meet the 
full power of the German military machine, 
was in accord with the Churchillian theory 
of waging war on the Continent.85

During the conference the American 
military staff remained noncommittal on 
the British proposals and strategic views.86 
But after the conference the War Depart-
ment prepared comments which became 
the basis of a formal reply by the Joint Board 
to the British in the early fall of 1941. The 
War Department staff objected primarily to 
the proposition that early American inter-
vention would insure victory—perhaps even 
a quick victory—over Germany. They 
took the position that

Actually we will be more effective for some 
time as a neutral, furnishing material aid to 
Britain, rather than as a belligerent. Our 
potential combat strength has not yet been 
sufficiently developed. . . . We should . . . 
build, strengthen, and organize for eventual 
use, if required, our weapons of last resort— 
military forces.87

The Joint Board, elaborating on this view, 
characterized as “optimistic” the British 
conclusion that American intervention 
would make victory not only certain but 
also swift, and replied:

While participation by United States naval 
forces will bring an important accession of 
strength against Germany, the potential com-
batt strength of land and air elements has not 
yet been sufficiently developed to provide 
much more than a moral effect. Involv-
ment of United States Army forces in the 
early future would at best involve a piecemeal 
and indecisive commitment of forces against 

84 “General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs 
of Staff,” 31 Jul 41, Item 10, Exec 4. Colonel 
Bundy noted that this review was read paragraph 
by paragraph by Admiral Sir Dudley Pound to the 
asssembled British-American staff on board the 
H. M. S. Prince of Wales on 11 August 1941.

85 For the Prime Minister’s theory advanced 
during the conference, see memo for Admiral Stark, no 

86 For the staff discussions at the Atlantic Confer-
ence, see: (1) memo, Comdr Sherman for CNO, 18 
Aug 41, sub: Notes on Stf Conf, 11–12 Aug 41, and 
(2) memo, Col Bundy for CofS, 20 Aug 41, sub: 
Notes of Stf Conf, Aug 11–12, 1941 on board Prince 
of Wales, both in Item 10, Exec 4; and (3) Sher-
wood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 358.
87 WPD draft memo [WPD for CofS, Sep 41], sub: 
Gen Strategy—Review by Br CofS, WPD 4402-64. 
The memorandum was not delivered but was used 
informally in drawing up the Joint Board letter.
a superior enemy under unfavorable logistic conditions.\(^8\)

**Lend-Lease**

By the middle of 1941 there was every reason to expect that the adjustment of American national policy to the rapidly growing requirements of a world conflict would demand of the U. S. Army "a piecemeal and indecisive commitment of forces against a superior enemy under unfavorable logistic conditions." This was entirely consistent with the President's strategic policy, in which the readiness of the U. S. armed forces was a subordinate consideration. The main expression of American strategy was the program evolved by the President during 1940 of aiding other nations already defending themselves against military aggression. The first stage in carrying out this policy was to supply them with munitions.

The Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941 provided the basis for an extension of the scope and a great increase in the scale on which the President could execute this program. The Lend-Lease Act authorized the President to furnish material aid, including munitions, to all countries whose resistance to aggression was contributing to the defense of the United States. The principal recipient of American aid, on an ever greater scale, remained Great Britain. But the application of the Lend-Lease Act to China later in the spring of 1941 was an extremely important step in the clarification of American national policy, since it evidently disposed of any remaining possibility that the United States might be willing to acquiesce in the accomplished fact of Japanese hegemony on the Asiatic mainland.\(^9\) And the extension of the Lend-Lease Act to cover the Soviet Union, formally announced in November 1941, was of great consequence as a measure of the President's willingness to base American international policy on the principle of the common international interest in supporting resistance to armed aggression.

The War Department participated in the development of the critical aspect of the lend-lease program—the provision of munitions—but only by providing technical advice and handling the machinery of procurement and distribution.\(^9\) The one important connection then established between the lend-lease program and the future operations of the Army was the creation by the War Department of several field agencies to supervise lend-lease traffic overseas. Though they were specifically concerned with lend-lease operations, some of them...
were obviously of potential use as nuclei for U.S. Army theater headquarters.

In September 1941 the plans staff suggested to General Marshall “the need for a United States military mission in any major theater of war where lend-lease aid is to receive emphasis.” General Chaney’s observer group in London was “expected, in addition to other duties, to support the supply and maintenance phase of Lend Lease activities in the United Kingdom.” The staff recommended the appointment of special missions to do similar work elsewhere. Similar proposals came from G-2 and from Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Executive Officer of the Division of Defense Aid Reports.

One such military mission had, in fact, already been established on the other side of the world. In August 1941 the War Department had charged Brig. Gen. John A. Magruder with facilitating the flow of lend-lease materials to China. The first of the lend-lease missions, the American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA), was the prototype of missions sent elsewhere. The suggestion of sending special missions to all active combat zones was soon put into effect. In October 1941 the War Department, acting upon presidential instructions, established a military mission for North Africa, where lend-lease munitions were being used by British forces defending the Suez Canal. The task of this mission, headed by Brig. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, was supervising lend-lease activities, including American supply depots and maintenance facilities in support of British operations. General Maxwell set up his headquarters in Cairo on 22 November 1941.

Soviet entry into the war against Germany and Italy in June 1941 called for further extension of the lend-lease program. A series of conferences was held by a U.S. mission headed by W. Averell Harriman in London and by the Beaverbrook-Harriman mission in Moscow during September 1941. The agreement reached at Moscow in terms of munitions to be furnished the Soviet Union was incorporated in the First (Moscow) Protocol. This accord was signed by Mr. Harriman, Lord Beaverbrook, and Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M. Molotov on 1 October 1941. A month later President Roosevelt and Marshal Joseph V. Stalin endorsed the agreement. At the request of Harry Hopkins, Col.

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91 Memo, WPD for CoFS, 24 Sep 41, sub: Mil Miss in Iran, WPD 4596.

92 Actually SPOBS became a lend-lease mission only in a very limited sense. U.S. civil representatives in the United Kingdom were given important responsibilities for lend-lease, and heavy reliance was also placed on regular British-American channels in Washington.

93 For pertinent papers on the establishment of the Maxwell Mission, see: (1) WPD 4511-9, (2) WPD 4559-3, (3) Item 6, Exec 4, and (4) WPD 4402-72.


95 (1) For the protocol, see agreement, n.d., title: Confidential Protocol of Conf of Reps of U. S. A., U. S. R., and Gt Brit . . ., copy filed in separate folder annex, title: Russia (Moscow Conf), with WPD 4557. (2) For the formal decision to transfer supplies to the USSR under the Lend-Lease Act, see ltr, President to Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 7 Nov 41, WPD 4557-25. (3) For a detailed discussion of the Moscow conferences and aftermath, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 384–97.

Philip R. Faymonville remained in Moscow to act as lend-lease representative there. A military mission to the USSR was constituted at the end of October 1941, under Maj. Gen. John N. Greely, but never secured Soviet permission to go to Moscow.96

Another military mission assisted more directly in the dispatch of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union. By agreement between the British and Soviet Governments, their troops had entered Iran in late August—Soviet troops had occupied the northern part and British troops the southern part. Of the few routes left for sending supplies to the USSR, the route via the Persian Gulf ports and Iran was the most promising. The U. S. Military Iranian Mission, set up in October 1941, under Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, was assigned the task of assuring the establishment and operation of supply, maintenance, and training facilities for British, Soviet, and any other operations in the general area of the Persian Gulf, including Iran and Iraq.97 He began operations in Baghdad on 30 November 1941. Transporting supplies through Iran to the USSR ultimately proved to be a critical lend-lease operation.98

These missions, though their formal authority was much more restricted and their prospects for developing into Army headquarters were far more uncertain than those of the Chaney mission, had nevertheless much the same kind of importance as agencies through which the War Department began dealing with the practical problems of several important overseas areas—terrain and climate, transportation and communications, politics and administration, the performance of American equipment, and the treatment and behavior of American military personnel. The experience that the missions began to acquire in the fall of 1941 constituted an all too brief preparation for the tasks that the War Department was to face in supporting and controlling its far-flung overseas operations in World War II.

Victory Program

The most searching examination of long-range problems of strategy made by the Army to date, came in the summer of 1941 when the War Department staff undertook to estimate the size and composition of the Army forces that would be required to defeat Germany. Until then the American planners had only touched on the question of operations to defeat Germany and had not developed the idea—stated by Admiral Stark in November 1940—that large-scale land operations would be required. In the summer of 1941 an attempt to analyze long-term requirements for munitions, for inclusion in a comprehensive national arms program, raised the question of the ultimate size and composition of the Army and, therefore, of the scale and type of operations it would conduct.99

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96 For the Greely mission, see for example: (1) WPD 4557-10 and -17, and (2) OPD 210.648 Iran, 38.
97 For references to the Iranian mission, see especially: (1) WPD 4549-3, and (2) WPD 4596-3.
Planning for American production of munitions had been continually complicated for over a year by conflicts between the needs of the Army and requirements resulting, at first, from British and French purchases and, later, from lend-lease allocations. Future conflicts were certain to prove far more serious, should the United States enter the war. In July 1941 the President formally asked for an estimate of the munitions requirements of the armed services to help formulate a comprehensive national industrial plan.\(^{100}\)

The responsibility for carrying out the President's instructions within the War Department, for both the Army's ground and air arms, devolved initially upon the Army's War Plans Division. Its chief, General Gerow, soon put forward his idea of the method to follow in setting up industrial objectives:

> We must first evolve a strategic concept of how to defeat our potential enemies and then determine the major military units (Air, Navy and Ground) required to carry out the strategic operations.

General Gerow considered unsound the main alternative method—to calculate the supply of U.S. munitions that would have to be added to the production of potential Allies in order to exceed the production of potential enemies. It would be folly, he declared, to assume that "we can defeat Germany simply by outproducing her." He continued, by way of example:

> One hundred thousand airplanes would be of little value to us if these airplanes could not be used because of lack of trained personnel, lack of operating airdromes in the theater, and lack of shipping to maintain the air squadrons in the theater.\(^{101}\)

To adjust ultimate production to a strategic concept of how to defeat the nation's potential enemies, it was necessary to estimate the "strategic operations" and "major military units" that would be required to execute them. On this basis the War Department proceeded to make its strategic estimates and to calculate ultimate Army requirements for the initial "Victory Program" of September 1941.

Major Albert C. Wedemeyer played the leading role for the General Staff in conducting Army-wide studies on requirements of manpower.\(^{102}\) He assembled estimates of the strength and composition of task forces, of the theaters of operations to be established, and of the probable dates at which forces would be committed. He thus became one of the first of the Washington staff officers to attempt to calculate what it would cost to mobilize and deploy a big U.S. Army.\(^{103}\)

As a basis for estimating the munitions and shipping that the Army would need, the Army planners calculated on an ultimate Army strength of 8,795,658 men with "approximately 215 Divisions." Of the over 8,000,000 men, about 2,000,000 were to be allotted to the Army Air Forces. The planners accepted a supplementary study drawn up by the Army Air Forces War Plans Division (AWPD), which looked forward as far as 1945, when bombers with a "4,000 mile radius of action" would be in quantity

\(^{100}\) Ltr, President to SW, 9 Jul 41, photostat copy filed in WPD 4494-1.

\(^{101}\) Memo, Gen Gerow for John J. McCloy, ASW, 5 Aug 41, no sub, Tab G, Item 7, Exec 4.


\(^{103}\) The results of the studies furnished him were incorporated in: (1) "Estimate Army Requirements . . . ," September 1941; (2) "Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies (September 1941)"; and (3) a supplementary report, "War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941."
production.\textsuperscript{104} The Army would consist largely of air, armored, and motorized forces. Aside from the provision of service troops for potential task forces, relatively little attention was paid to the requirements of service troops in the build-up of overseas theaters. According to the Army estimates, approximately 5,000,000 men would eventually be moved overseas, requiring the maximum use of about 2,500 ships at any one time.\textsuperscript{105}

For purposes of estimating the Army's requirements, the planners made five primary assumptions about U. S. national policy:

a) *Monroe Doctrine*: Resist with all means Axis penetration in Western Hemisphere.

b) *Aid to Britain*: Limited only by U. S. needs and abilities of British to utilize; insure delivery.

c) *Aid to other Axis-opposed nations*: Limited by U. S. and British requirements.

d) *Far-Eastern policy*: To disapprove strongly Japanese aggression and to convey to Japan determination of U. S. to take positive action. To avoid major military and naval commitments in the Far East at this time.

e) *Freedom of the Seas*.\textsuperscript{106}

Other Army assumptions were that the principal theater of wartime operations would be Europe and that the defeat of potential enemies, among whom were listed Italy and Japan, would be "primarily dependent on the defeat of Germany." For want of essential equipment, U. S. field forces (air and/or ground) would not be ready for "ultimate decisive modern combat" before 1 July 1943.

In making its estimates the Army staff necessarily projected U. S. military opera-
BRITISH-AMERICAN PLANS

The steps to be executed before M Day or the beginning of hostilities required the United States to defend the Western Hemisphere; reinforce the Atlantic bases, Alaska, and the overseas garrisons; insure the delivery of supplies and munitions to Great Britain and other friendly powers; and prepare U.S. troops for active participation in the war. Finally the “Brief” outlined military operations, at first defensive and then offensive, that would lead to victory over Germany once war had been declared. Before the final ground operations were undertaken, overwhelming air superiority in Europe would have to be achieved, utilizing to the full air base facilities in the British Isles; enemy vessels would have to be swept from the Atlantic and the North Sea; and the foundations of German military power weakened by dispersion of enemy forces, blockade, subversive activities, and propaganda. No specific military measures for defeat of the potential enemy in the Far East, Japan, were considered. In fact, the Victory Program envisaged neither large-scale Army action against Japan, nor continued active Russian participation in the war.

When the Army planners spoke of blockade, propaganda, subversive activities, air superiority, the application of pressure upon Germany “wherever soft spots arise in Europe or adjacent areas,” and “the establishment of effective military bases, encircling the Nazi citadel,” they appeared to be in accord with British strategic theory. However, there was a sign of an incipient divergence from British theory—a belief that, sooner or later, “we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat.”

Vague as the Army strategic planners were about the preliminary preparations and conditions, they were disposed to think in terms of meeting the German Army head on. The great disputed issues of wartime strategy had not been—as they could not yet be—joined, much less resolved. As General Gerow observed, the strategic estimates for the Victory Program calculations were based upon “a more or less nebulous National Policy, in that the extent to which our government intends to commit itself with reference to the employment of armed forces had not yet been clearly defined.”

As a result, the War Department was free to as-

107 This “short of war” program was a summary of recommendations which were to be made in greater length in the “War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941.” In this estimate, the “short of war” steps involved military and naval protection of the Western Hemisphere and American shipping; establishment of military bases in Newfoundland, Iceland, Greenland, Bermuda, the Antilles, British Guiana, the United Kingdom, Alaska, and on U.S. islands in the Pacific; and finally the release of “merchant shipping, planes, foodstuffs, munitions to Russia, China, Great Britain and other powers opposing the Axis.” (“War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941,” Vol I, especially pp. 1–3, WPD 4510.)
sume that a high priority would be given to gathering forces for operations against the main body of the German Army. The Army estimates did not allow for the contingencies that a higher priority might be given to the lend-lease requirements of Great Britain and the USSR; that the President might accede to the desire of the British to secure and exploit their position in the Mediterranean; and that it might become necessary to make good, with logistically very costly operations across the Pacific, the strong political stand that the United States was taking against Japan.
CHAPTER IV

The Showdown With Japan

August–December 1941

By far the greatest weakness of the military planning undertaken during 1941 as a result of Admiral Stark’s original recommendations and the conversations with the British was that the Army staff, notwithstanding the warning given by Admiral Stark, was unwilling that the plans should take account of the possibility that the United States might become committed to large-scale support of military operations across the Pacific. The Army planners persisted in this unwillingness despite the stiffening of American policy in the Far East.

The first sign of the stiffening of American policy in the Far East in 1941 was the President’s decision formally to include therein the support of Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression. Until the spring of 1941 American aid to China had been limited to loans by the Export-Import Bank for the purchase of arms and other supplies in the United States. But during the months following the President’s re-election, while lend-lease legislation was being drafted and debated, the White House had been considering a more comprehensive program of aid to China. Early in the year Dr. Lauchlin Currie, one of the President’s administrative assistants, had gone to China at Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s request to examine the situation. He returned on 11 March 1941, the very day on which the President signed the Lend-Lease Act. At the end of March Dr. T. V. Soong, who had been representing the Chinese Government in negotiations in Washington, presented a list of the military requirements of China—a modern air force of 1,000 aircraft, with American instructors and technical advisers; weapons and ammunition to equip thirty divisions of the Chinese Army; and supplies for the development of the remaining overland line of communications between China and the West, by way of the Burma Road.1 During April the War Department reviewed these requirements, and Mr. Hopkins and General Burns of the Lend-Lease Administration joined Dr. Currie in another study of them. On 6 May the President declared the defense of China to be vital to the defense of the United States, thereby formally bringing aid to China within the scope of the Lend-Lease Act.2 At the same time Dr. Soong organized China Defense Supplies, Incorporated, to represent his government

1 A full history of American aid to China is given in Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. I. The troop strength of a Chinese division was about that of a U. S. regimental combat team, and its supply requirements were much less. In November 1941 the personnel strength of the thirty divisions was set by the Chinese at 10,000 each.

2 The President’s signed declaration is filed in AG 400.3285 (4–14–41), 1-A.
in lend-lease transactions. By mid-May the first lend-lease ship for China had left New York, carrying trucks, spare parts, and raw materials.

During the summer of 1941 the President made a second move in the development of Far Eastern policy—the imposition of a de facto oil embargo on Japan. This move, like the decision to extend comprehensive military aid to China, developed out of already established policy. Since July 1940 the President had had authority to control exports to foreign countries in the interest of American security and had cut off shipments to Japan of scrap metal, aviation gasoline, and most types of machine tools. To include oil among the exports to be licensed and, in fact, to shut it off, was an even more drastic step. The United States thereby would virtually compel the Dutch and the British to join in defying Japan, which was almost entirely dependent on outside sources for oil, unless they were willing to dissociate themselves completely from American Far Eastern policy. By forcing this choice on the Dutch and British, the United States would implicitly acknowledge that, in case they should follow the American lead in denying oil to Japan, the United States would have an obligation to defend their Far Eastern possessions. In case they should follow the American lead, moreover, Japan in turn would have to choose either to meet the American conditions for lifting the oil embargo—in effect, the evacuation of their military forces from the Asiatic mainland—or to secure, by the seizure of the Netherlands Indies, a supply of petroleum on their own terms, in the face of the strongly implied American commitment to oppose such action with military force. This choice the Japanese would have to make—or review, if they had already made it, as they apparently had—while they still had a few months' oil reserves, and before American military strength could become great enough to endanger their chances of seizing and holding the Netherlands Indies.

During July the President reflected upon the course to be followed by the United States now that Germany and the USSR were at war and Japan was preparing for the conquest of the European colonial empire situated about the South China Sea. When the possibility of imposing an oil embargo came up for discussion, Admiral Stark and General Marshall recommended against taking the step, on the ground that it would force Japan either to surrender its long-range strategic aims—which was unlikely—or to strike for oil in the Netherlands Indies—which would mean war.

On 24 July the President proposed to the Japanese that in return for the neutralization of French Indochina they accept the assurance of a continued supply of raw materials and food. This attempt at a settlement came to nothing; on the following day the

3 Until the spring of 1941, when Mexico was safely in the U. S. camp, there had also existed the possibility that a U. S. oil embargo would cause the Japanese to buy oil from Mexico.

4 For the views of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations on the proposed oil embargo, see Admiral Stark’s testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, and a memorandum from Admiral Turner to Admiral Stark on 19 July 1941, both in Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2380-84.

Japanese Government announced that the French regime at Vichy had consented to admit Japan to a joint protectorate over French Indochina. Japanese forces (which had already been stationed in large numbers in northern Indochina) at once extended military occupation over the entire colony.

The President, meanwhile, had announced that he wanted trade with Japan put under a comprehensive controlling order by which he could at will reduce or increase oil shipments to Japan. On 26 July he issued an executive order from Hyde Park freezing Japanese assets in the United States and halting all trade with Japan. The American press welcomed the President's order as an "oil embargo," and as time went on without any export licenses for oil being issued, it became evident that, whatever Stark and Marshall may have believed the President was going to do, he had in fact imposed an embargo on shipments of oil to Japan. The Dutch and British also joined in freezing Japanese assets. On the assumption, then generally accepted, that Japanese oil reserves would give out near the end of 1942, it could be expected that Japan would shortly be forced to resolve any remaining internal disagreements on policy, between giving in or carrying out the planned offensive southward.6

The Singapore Conversations

During the months immediately following the ABC–1 conversations it was not the planners in Washington but the Army and Navy staffs in the far Pacific that first took part in an effort to draw up an allied operational plan against the contingency of a Japanese attack. In April, as agreed between Stark and Marshall, on the one hand, and the British Chiefs, on the other, the British Commander in Chief, Far East, convened a meeting in Singapore of military representatives of the Netherlands, American, Australian, and New Zealand Governments for the purpose of devising such a plan under the terms of ABC–1.7

The American-Dutch-British (ADB) meetings conducted in Singapore from 21 to 27 April were based on the following assumption:

Our object is to defeat Germany and her allies, and hence in the Far East to maintain the position of the Associated Powers against Japanese attack, in order to sustain a long-term economic pressure against Japan until we are in a position to take the offensive.

Our most important interests in the Far East are:—(a) The security of sea communications and (b) The security of Singapore.

An important subsidiary interest is the security of Luzon in the Philippine Islands since, so long as submarine and air forces can

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For other accounts of the Japanese oil situation, see: (1) Oil in Japan's War, App to Rpt of Oil and Chem Div, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), pp. 10, 12, 15; (2) Oil in Japan's War, Rpt of Oil and Chem Div, USSBS, p. 1; (3) Judgment—International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Part B, Ch VIII, pp. 934–35: and (4) Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 63–64.


The American delegates were Capt. William R. Purnell, USN, Chief of Staff, Asiatic Fleet; Col. Allan C. McBride, Assistant Chief of Staff G–3, Philippine Department; and the naval and military observers in Singapore, Capt. Archer M. R. Allen, USN, and Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink. (See list in ABC 092.3 (27 Mar 41).)
be operated from Luzon, expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East are out-flanked.\(^8\)

The representatives worked out a general statement of strategy for the whole area, comprehending aid to China, for which the British already had a project. The British project called for the operation of air units and guerrillas in China, a much less ambitious program than the one then under discussion in Chungking and Washington. The conference arrived at the following conclusions:

To ensure that we are not diverted from the major object of the defeat of Germany and Italy, our main strategy in the Far East at present time must be defensive. There are, however, certain measures open to us which will assist greatly in the defence of our interests in the Far East, but which are themselves offensive.

It is important to organise air operations against Japanese occupied territory and against Japan herself. It is probable that her collapse will occur as a result of economic blockade, naval pressure and air bombardment. This latter form of pressure is the most direct and one which Japan particularly fears.

In addition to the defensive value of operation [sic] submarine and air forces from Luzon, referred to . . . above there is even greater value from the offensive point of view in holding this island. It is therefore recommended that the defences of Luzon should be strengthened and that every effort should be made to maintain a bombing force in the island in addition to building up a similar force in China.

Other positive activities which may be undertaken are as follows:—

(a) Support to the Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid and provision of equipment.
(b) Operation of Guerillas in China.
(c) Organisation of subversive activities in Japan.

So far as economic pressure is concerned the entry of the United States of America, the British Empire, and the Netherlands East Indies into a war against Japan would automatically restrict Japanese trade to that with the coast of Asia. Since China will be in the war against her, and our submarine and air forces should be able to interfere considerably with trade from Thailand and Indo-China, a very large measure of economic blockade would thus be forced upon Japan from the outset.\(^9\)

Maj. Gen. George Grunert, who was in command in the Philippines, and his assistant chief of staff, Col. Allan C. McBride, who had represented him at Singapore, both perceived that the recommendations of the Singapore conference were out of keeping with existing American plans. In forwarding the conference report to Washington, Grunert called attention to the discrepancy:

It will be noted that the conference emphasized the importance of the Philippines, particularly Luzon, as a strategic area for naval and air bases from which offensive operations could be conducted against Japanese territory and sea communications, and as of advantage to the Japanese in the event they were captured, hence the recommendation to strengthen defenses and augment the air force. Our present mission and restrictions as to means are not in accord therewith.\(^10\)

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\(^8\) Rpt, Off of CinC, China Station, 27 Apr 41, title: American-Dutch-British Convs Singapore, Apr 41 (short title, ADB), ABC 092.3 (27 Mar 41).
\(^9\) Ibid. (2) The official ADB report was not received in Washington until 9 June 1941. Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Jun 41, sub: ADB Convs, WPD 4402-18. (3) The official ADB report was not received in Washington until 9 June 1941. Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Jun 41, sub: ADB Convs, WPD 4402-18. (3) The British military mission, however, had circulated a telegraphic summary of the report in Washington on 6 May 1941. Memo, Secy Br Mil Miss for CofS, CNO, and Br Mil Miss, 6 May 41, sub: Rpt of Singapore ADB Conf, Apr 41, WPD 4402-18.
\(^10\) Ltr, Gen Grunert, CG Phil Dept, to ACofS WPD, 2 May 41, sub: ADB Convs of Apr 21-27, 1941, Held at Singapore, WPD 4402-18. Grunert went on to point out that the conference, though it had recommended the expansion of ground and air forces in the Philippines, had made the main object of Allied naval operations the defense of Singapore, treating the support of the Philippines as "more or less incidental." He concluded, therefore: "More emphasis on the defense and holding of the Philippines is considered necessary."
The Army and Navy staffs in Washington came to much the same conclusion and so informed the British military mission, declaring, moreover, that the United States intended "to adhere to its decision not to reinforce the Philippines except in minor particulars."11 More than a month later, early in July, Admiral Stark and General Marshall formally stated that they could not approve the ADB report because it was at variance with ABC-1 and did not constitute a "practical operating plan for the Far East Area." They, too, announced that the United States was not planning to reinforce the Philippines as recommended in the report but, in significantly more cautious terms,

Because of the greater needs of other strategic areas, the United States is not now able to provide any considerable additional reinforcement to the Philippines. Under present world conditions, it is not considered possible to hope to launch a strong offensive from the Philippines.12

Reinforcement of the Philippines

Admiral Stark and General Marshall did well to speak cautiously of American military policy in the Philippines. Three weeks later, when the President imposed the "oil embargo," he created a new Army command in the Philippines—the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE)—under Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur. The new command, formally established on 26 July 1941, comprehended the forces of the Philippine Department, and the Philippine Army, which by presidential proclamation was called into the service of the United States for the duration of the emergency. General MacArthur, who had completed his tour of duty as Chief of Staff in the fall of 1935, had since 1936 been serving as Military Advisor to the new Commonwealth Government of the Philippines. To assume command of USAFFE, he was called back to active duty with the rank of major general and was at once promoted to the rank of lieutenant general.13

The War Department staff, which apparently learned of the whole transaction only after it had been arranged with General MacArthur, began to modify its plans to suit the new situation.14 The staff at once recommended, and General Marshall approved, sending guns, light tanks, and antitank ammunition to the Philippines. The dispatch of 425 Reserve officers was approved the next day, and a little later, in response to a request from USAFFE, the Chief of Staff assured General MacArthur that "specialists, individuals, and organizations required by you will be supplied promptly . . . ."15 On 31 July General

12 Ltr, CNO and CofS to Sp Army and Nav Obsrs, London, 3 Jul 41, sub: Comment on Rpt of ADB Convs, Singapore, Apr 41, WPD 4402-18. Although dated as above, this letter was not dispatched until 26 July 1941.
13 MacArthur, who had held the rank of full general as Chief of Staff, had reverted to the permanent rank of major general after that tour. In December 1937, after thirty years' service, he retired as a full general. He was promoted to the rank of full general in December 1941.
14 For the correspondence preceding the creation of USAFFE and General MacArthur's appointment as its commanding general, see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 434–38.
Marshall declared that it was the policy of the United States to defend the Philippines, with the qualification that the execution of the policy would not "be permitted to jeopardize the success of the major efforts made in the theater of the Atlantic." 16

The shift in plans continued in early August as the War Department scheduled additional shipments of arms, troops, and equipment for the Philippines. Soon after assuming command of USAFFE, General MacArthur had been notified that plans were under way to send him twenty-five 75-mm. guns during September, another twenty-five during October; a company of M3 light tanks as soon as possible; a regiment of antiaircraft artillery (National Guard) as soon as legislative authority for their retention in the service was secured; and 24,000 rounds of 37-mm. antitank ammunition.17 Following a staff conference on 15 August, General Marshall approved plans for the shipment to the Philippines of tank, antiaircraft, and ordnance units—about 2,350 men—by 5 September. All necessary equipment for these units was to be provided including fifty-four tanks.18 The staff acknowledged that these actions amounted to nearly a complete reversal of the long-standing policy "to maintain existing strength but to undertake no further permanent improvements except as a measure of economy." 19

At the same time the terms and probable consequences of American Far Eastern policy became more sharply defined. On 6 August Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura presented his government’s proposal for a settlement in the Far East. The Japanese Government proposed that the United States should abandon its current policies—aid to China, refusal to recognize the status of Japan in Indochina, control and virtual elimination of trade with Japan, and the reinforcement of the Philippines. In return, Japan offered not to advance beyond Indochina, to evacuate Indochina when the "China Incident" was terminated, and, "at an opportune time," to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.20

A few days later, at the Atlantic Conference off Argentia, Newfoundland, the British presented a draft, "Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government," for adoption by the British, Netherlands, and American Governments, containing the warning that "any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation" in which the signatory government "would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war" with Japan. The President

16 Gerow Diary, 31 Jul 41 entry, Item 1, Exec 10.
17 (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 31 Jul 41, sub: Reinforcements of USAFFE, WPD 4559. (2) For a full account of the reinforcement of the Philippines, see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Ch. III. (3) See also Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIII.
19 Memo cited n. 18(2).
20 The reinforcement of the Philippines continued to hold a high priority. During September the Chief of Staff’s approval was given to the shipment of the 192d Tank Battalion, which was to sail in November, and defense reserves for 50,000 men, except for ammunition, were scheduled for completion by February 1942. (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 16 Sep 41, sub: Add Tnk Bn . . ., OCS 18136-60. (2) Memo, WPD for TAG through Maj Gen Richard C. Moore, DCoF, 23 Sep 41, sub: Supplies for Phil Army . . ., WPD 4560-1.
21 The text of Ambassador Nomura’s proposal of 6 Aug 41 may be found in U. S. Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931–41, II, 549–50.
did not act on this proposal—which would, in effect, have committed the United States to joint action with the British and the Dutch, but, shortly after his return from the conference, the American Government independently notified Japan to much the same effect, on a strictly American basis. In a note given to Ambassador Nomura on 17 August, the United States declared:

"This Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States."  

This action gave added significance to the establishment of USAFFE. By early fall the War Department staff regarded it as American policy to reinforce the Philippines as much as possible in order to "deter or minimize" Japanese aggression, even though other commitments precluded an attempt to make Pacific defenses entirely secure.  

_The B-17 and Defense of the Philippines_  

The notion that the Philippines could be defended, in spite of all the considerations that has led the planners so often to reject the idea, grew out of a new approach to the problem of operations in the western Pacific, involving the use of long-range Army bombers to neutralize Japanese offensive capabilities. The Army Air Corps' long-range bomber, the B-17, had gone into production in 1938. Lack of funds and competition with other types of planes and production had delayed deliveries of B-17's, and by the summer of 1941 not a single Army Air Forces group was completely equipped with the "modernized" B-17. But enough planes were coming off the assembly lines to justify planning for operations.  

By deferring the fulfilment of other urgent requirements for the B-17—to patrol the approaches to Hawaii, the Panama Canal, Alaska, and the continental United States—and by deferring plans for strategic bombing across the Atlantic, a fairly strong bomber force might be built up in the Philippines by early 1942 to take the place of the strong naval forces that neither the U. S. Navy, on the one hand, nor the British, Dutch, and Australian Navies, on the other, were willing to commit to the sup-

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22 (1) "War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941," Vol. I, p. 44, WPD 4150. (2) Memo, WPD for SW, 8 Oct 41, subj: Strategic Concept of P. I., WPD 3251-60. A copy is filed under Tab A, Book A, Exec 8. With this memorandum is a draft, apparently unused, and an attached estimate of the situation as of 2 October, summarizing the WPD view of the program.
port of the Philippines. A bomber force would threaten the movement of Japanese naval units and Japanese troop and cargo shipping south of Formosa, thus covering the Philippines and its communications south to the Netherlands Indies. By developing this threat, the United States might be able to force the Japanese either to accept a state of armed neutrality in the far Pacific, freeing American and British forces for operations against Germany, or to open hostilities before American forces should become heavily engaged across the Atlantic. In either case the U. S. Army was partly insured against the risk of being called upon to send large forces across both oceans in the early stages of hostilities.

In early August the Secretary of War approved a program for sending modern planes to the Philippines as soon as they became available. The Air Force, USAFFE, formerly the Philippine Department Air Force, then consisted of one squadron of P-40B’s, two squadrons of P-35A’s, one squadron of P-26A’s, and two squadrons of B-18’s. To the Far East, the AAF allocated four heavy bomber groups, to consist of 272 aircraft including 68 in reserve, and an additional two pursuit groups totaling 130 planes.

There were not enough planes available in the United States to carry out these plans at once. After the Secretary of War approved the program, arrangements were made for fifty P-40E’s to be sent directly from the factories and for twenty-eight P-40B’s to be taken from operating units, to be shipped to the Philippines in September. The 19th Bombardment Group, which had ferried the first B-17’s to Hawaii in May, was selected for permanent transfer to the Philippines and given priority in assignment of B-17’s. Yet so urgent was the need for heavy bombers in the Far East that the AAF did not wait for the 19th Group to pioneer an air route to the Philippines. A provisional squadron from the Hawaiian Air Force flew from Hawaii via Wake and Australia to Manila in September. As B-17’s became available in October and November they were flown to the Philippines. By the second week of November it was planned to send “all modernized” B-17’s from the United States to the Far East.

The South Pacific Ferry Route

A corollary to the program of reinforcing the Philippines was the development of an alternate route for ferrying bombers to the Philippines, less exposed to Japanese attack than the route via Midway and Wake. It was necessary both to develop and to defend such a route, not only in order to assure the continued arrival of the bombers themselves in case of hostilities but also in order to utilize bombers for the protection of surface communications on which the defense of the Philippines would remain heavily dependent. In August 1941, when it became evident that the defense of the Philippines had become an object—and indeed the chief immediate object—of

24 A detailed analysis of the need for heavy bombers was made by the AAF in September 1941 in AWPD/1. See (1) Chart 1, Sec I, and (2) Tab 17, Sec II, both in Part III, App II, JB 355, ser 707.

25 Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 172. Twenty-one B-17D’s, flown by members of the 19th Bombardment Group, had been ferried from Hamilton Field, California, to Hickam Field, Hawaii, on 13 May 1941. For the strength of air forces in the Philippines in 1941, see: (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. III, and (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 449-49.

26 Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 179, 185. Out of an estimated production in the United States of 220 heavy bombers by February 1942, 165 were scheduled for delivery to the Philippines.
American military policy, the Joint Board at once approved the project, long urged by the Army Air Corps, of developing such a route. Air Forces plans for a South Pacific air route were approved and received top priority among those agencies charged with its development. Funds were promptly made available from defense aid appropriations, on the basis of a presidential letter of 3 October that authorized the Secretary of War to "deliver aircraft to any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to any territory within the Western Hemisphere, to the Netherlands East Indies and Australia," and to construct the facilities needed for effecting such delivery. Although rapid progress was soon reported on the South Pacific route, the heavy bombers were to continue flying the northern route via Midway and Wake at least until mid-January 1942.

The Race Against Time

The great difficulty in reinforcing the Philippines was that such a development would at best take several months. The Japanese Government, forewarned, would meanwhile be free to initiate its planned offensive in the Southwest Pacific while the American position was still too weak to be held. The period of uncertainty would last perhaps eight months—from August 1941 to March 1942. The very small number of B–17's becoming available each month was only one of the limiting factors. A second, of scarcely less importance, was the slowness with which pursuit units could be made ready and shipped to the Philippines to protect the airfields from which the B–17’s would operate. A third was the shortage of antiaircraft artillery; a fourth, the shortage of bombs and ammunition; a fifth, the small number of radar sets and trained operators available. The last were of the greatest importance not only to warn of the approach of enemy planes but also to control friendly planes in the air and to enable them to make contact with the enemy. As the British had found, the proper use of radar could multiply by many times the security and efficiency of the defenses against air attack.

Besides calculating the length of time it would take for these various critical types of equipment and personnel to become available for shipment to the Philippines, the planners had to take into account the delay involved in getting them to the Philippines and in organizing them for effective operations after they had arrived. Finally they had to calculate the time needed to develop and secure a line of communication to the Philippines. The planners, considering all these factors together, could not reasonably expect the Philippines to be defensible much before the end of the winter 1941–42.

27 The reinforcement of the Philippines and the mobilization of the main part of the Philippine Army were scheduled to be carried out before the end of the winter 1941–42. (See memo, WPD for DCofS (Gen Moore), 8 Oct 41, sub: Phil, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8 and memo cited note 38.)

Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, who was called to Washington in October 1941 for instruction prior to his assumption of command of the U. S. Army Air Forces in the Far East, was told that the War Department recognized and was prepared to accept the risk of attack during the next few months but was going on the assumption that if hostilities came they would not begin before 1 April 1942. (See Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York, William Morrow and Company, 1946), pp. 5–11.)
Shipping Schedules

It quickly became the main immediate concern of the War Department to get troops and equipment to the Philippines. Nearly all the shipping available to the Army in the Pacific was assigned to this task, and the Army was also relying on the use of two large transports which had earlier been transferred to the Navy to help move the large forces involved in the initial plan to occupy Iceland. When, in August, the Navy proposed the immediate conversion of the transports Mount Vernon, Wakefield, and West Point to aircraft carriers, though for the purpose of supplying Army planes and personnel to the overseas bases as well as for Navy use, the Army took strong exception, pointing out that no large troop movement approaching 12,000 troops or more could be carried out without the use of at least two of these ships. The Joint Board, taking up the problem recommended, on 15 October 1941, that the Army withdraw its objections to the conversion of the West Point, Mount Vernon, and Wakefield to aircraft carriers, and immediately seek to acquire and convert suitable merchant tonnage of comparable troop capacity. The Army therefore had to send its troop reinforcements to General MacArthur in smaller increments which could be carried on ships available in November and December.\(^29\)

The schedule of shipments finally established in November provided for sending to the Philippines some 20,000 troops, about one third of them Air Forces units, on eleven troopships to sail from San Francisco between 21 November and 9 December 1941.\(^32\) The Holbrook, carrying 2,000 troops and equipment (the 147th Field Artillery Regiment and the 148th Field Artillery Regiment minus one battalion), and the Republic carrying 2,630 troops and equipment (the 2d Battalion of the 131st Field Artillery Regiment, the 7th Bombardment Group, and 48 Air Corps officers), sailed from San Francisco 21–22 November. Conveyed by the USS Pensacola, they were due to arrive in the Philippines on 4 January 1942. Sailings for 15,000 troops were scheduled for 5–9 December. The President Johnson with 2,500 troops (the 2d Battalion of the 138th Field Artillery Regiment and three squadrons of the 35th Pursuit Group), the Etolin with 1,400 troops (including the 218th Field Artillery Regiment minus the 2d Battalion) and the Bliss sailed from San Francisco on 5 December 1941. The following day the President Garfield sailed from the same port into Airplane Carriers. The Army had previously succeeded in getting the Navy to postpone the contemplated conversion in May 1941.\(^1\) Ltr, JB to SW, 16 Oct 41, same sub. Both ltr's in JB 320, ser 723.

\(^29\) At the time the Army proposed sending a square division to General MacArthur, it had been planned to use the three ships which the Navy proposed to convert to aircraft carriers, transporting the entire force in two trips across the Pacific. (Memo, G–4 for CofS, 26 Aug 41, sub: Indef Postponement by Navy of Conversion of Tr Transports Wakefield (Manhattan), Mt. Vernon (Washington) and the West Point (America) into Airplane Carriers, G–4/29717-65.) General MacArthur had previously stated that he would not need a division from the United States. (For an account of General MacArthur's reaction to the Army proposal, see Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, Ch. III, p. 63, MS.)

\(^30\) (1) Ltr, JPC to JB, 8 Oct 41, sub: Conversion of Tr Transports, Wakefield (Manhattan), Mount Vernon (Washington) and West Point (America)
with the remainder of the 35th Pursuit Group.\textsuperscript{33}

In addition to the 30,000 U.S. Army troops present, and those due to arrive in the Philippines, there were 80,000 troops in the Philippine Army, including the ten divisions to be activated by 15 December. The total strength of General MacArthur's command—present, en route, and under orders—amounted to about 137,000, considerably less than the 200,000 he had estimated as sufficient for defensive operations.\textsuperscript{34}

The Far Eastern Air Force had 35 four-engine bombers and 107 P-40E’s on hand, and 38 more P-40E’s and 52 A-24’s (dive bombers) were en route in the Pensacola convoy. In addition, 37 pursuits and 48 four-engine bombers were due to leave the United States by 6 and 10 December, respectively. As for ground force matériel, equipment for one antiaircraft regiment had recently arrived, as well as 105 tanks and 50 self-propelled 75-mm. guns (tank destroyers). Forty-eight 75-mm. guns were en route (with the Pensacola convoy), and more guns and a considerable amount of ammunition were scheduled to be shipped.\textsuperscript{35}

\textit{Aid to China versus Reinforcement of the Philippines}

The program for helping China went forward very slowly. At the end of the summer of 1941 the War Department released its first shipment of ammunition for the Chinese, and in October the first weapons were shipped to the Chinese Army. The scarcity of weapons on hand made the American staff extremely reluctant to release any, least of all to China. It was only after considerable prompting by Dr. Currie that the first shipment was released, at the expense of the Philippines. The activities of China Defense Supplies, Incorporated, had raised doubts of China’s ability to use and maintain matériel. The British, for their part, were disinclined to transfer—as the Joint Board suggested in September—to China an “appropriate amount” of the munitions allocated to them and continued to propose that the Chinese confine themselves to guerrilla operations. Finally, to deliver matériel to China was extremely slow, uncertain, and expensive, the more so because of the inefficiency and corruption with which the Burma Road was being administered. Although the United States was evidently willing to support China, the aid actually sent in 1941 was necessarily a mere token of American intentions and not

\textsuperscript{33} (1) Compilation of Papers, Tabs 1, 2, and 3, Folder Book 1, Exec 4. (2) Craven and Cate, AAFI, p. 192. (3) Rpt cited n. 32.

\textsuperscript{34} There is considerable variation in the calculations of troop strength in the Philippines made in Washington and in the Philippine Department on the eve of Pearl Harbor—based on different systems of accounting and time of reporting. The figures cited here are based on WPD sources. (See memo [WPD] for SW, 6 Dec 41, subj: Reinforcement of Phil, Tab 1, Folder Book 1, Exec 4.)

\textsuperscript{35} For detailed breakdowns of U.S. Army personnel (by type) in the Philippines on the eve of Pearl Harbor see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 448–49, and Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. II. The figures cited in the latter volume are largely based on the Philippine Department Machine Records Unit strength reports at the end of November 1941.\textsuperscript{8}
a significant contribution to the military capabilities of China.²⁶

Yunnan “War Scare”

At the end of October, Chiang Kai-shek advised General Magruder that he feared the Japanese were about to attack Yunnan and seize Kunming, thereby cutting the Burma Road. In the Generalissimo’s opinion, Kunming was the key city of the Far East—if it were lost, China would fall, the Japanese would attack Malaysia, and nothing could stop war in the Pacific. Air support would be the only help that could reach China in time. The Generalissimo asked General Magruder to inform Washington that he desired President Roosevelt to intercede with the British Government to have air support furnished China by British air forces at Singapore. In addition, he wished the United States to bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the Japanese. General Magruder concurred in Chiang’s estimate that only British or American air intervention could save Kunming.²⁷

The State, War, and Navy Departments and the Joint Board at once took up the Generalissimo’s views and General Magruder’s estimate. The War Department estimated from information available in Washington that the Japanese would probably not attack Kunming so soon as feared by the Generalissimo and General Magruder. At the same time the War Department restudied the whole program to send aid to China and reached the following conclusions:

²⁶ A full account of aid to China during 1941 is given in Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. I.

It is desirable that large Japanese forces be kept involved in China. However, from the larger viewpoint, prospective Chinese defeat would not warrant involvement of the United States, at this time, in war with Japan. Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter Japanese action.

Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by reinforcement of the Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.

Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied needs of Russia and Great Britain.

Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.²⁸

On 1 November, State Department and military representatives conferred at the State Department on the Chinese crisis and the general Far Eastern situation, and debated the merits of an immediate declaration of war by the United States. The State Department asked whether the Army and Navy were ready to support an immediate declaration of war against Japan. Two days later the Joint Board considered the
question, and Admiral Stark and General Marshall recommended to the President

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for direct aid to China be unfavorably considered.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum extent.

That no further ultimatum be issued to Japan.

Finally, on 8 November, Dr. Soong asked the President for one third of the Navy's dive bombers, and submitted a restatement of Chinese ordnance demands, without which, he stated, the Chinese could not hope to resist a Japanese attack on Kunming. The War Department replied to Soong, as it was advising General Magruder, that all the United States could do was speed the flow of lend-lease supplies and facilitate the build-up of the American Volunteer Group.

This statement of policy was in accordance with the War Department's determination that the reinforcement of the Philippines must take precedence over all other American commitments in the Far East. On that ground General Marshall disapproved a proposal to take twenty-four 3-inch antiaircraft guns from American troops and send them to China, later allocating to the U.S. troops 90-mm. guns then on lend-lease order. In a telephone conversation with Col. Victor V. Taylor of Defense Aid, on 4 November, General Marshall explained, "it would be an outrage for me to deny to MacArthur something that we send on a round about voyage up into China and I can't give any to MacArthur because I've got these regiments with only one battery, that ... have been in now for a year ..." This remark summed up the whole problem of the War Department—a disparity between policy and capabilities that answered their worst fears. The last hope was that the Japanese, upon learning—as they soon must learn—that the United States was fully committed, might reconsider. General Marshall fixed on 10 December as the date of the arrival of the first "really effective reinforcements" in the Philippines, observing that "after that date, but not before," it would be advantageous for the Japanese to learn of them.

Military Collaboration with the British in the Far East

During the summer and fall, as the United States proceeded with the development of military plans in the Far East, the
British staff continued to seek an understanding on the terms of American military collaboration in the event of war with Japan. In August, at the Atlantic Conference, it was agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff would prepare a fresh draft of the ADB report to bring it into accord with ABC-1. Two months later the U. S. Chiefs of Staff rejected also this draft (ADB-2) as not meeting the “present situation in the Far East.”

As the situation in the Far East moved toward a climax, the British informed the Americans that they were forming a capital ship force to send to Far Eastern waters. At the same time the British First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, wrote to Admiral Stark:

I do not consider that either ADB-1 or ADB-2 meet the new conditions [change of government in Japan] and I would suggest that the need for a conference to draw up strategic operating plans for Far Eastern Area based afresh on ABC-1 has now become urgent. . . . If you agree in principle to the abandoning of further discussions on ABD-1 and ADB-2 and to the holding of a fresh conference on basis of ABC-1, we can then proceed to discuss the agenda . . . .

In reply, Admiral Stark acknowledged the need for prompt action and stated that the Army was “reinforcing both land and air forces as rapidly as practicable and training Philippine Army intensively.” In regard to the proposed conference, he wrote, “CNO believes that ADB should not be revived as ABC-1 is an adequate major directive which should be implemented by a sound strategic operating plan” drawn up between British, Dutch, and United States naval and air forces. Less than a week later another communication from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the British, acknowledging the 5 November message, “cordially” concurred in the British decision to send more vessels to Singapore. They indicated that the American reinforcements were on the way to the Far East and urged the British to send air reinforcements to Singapore without delay “as a powerful deterrent against a possible Japanese move to the South.” They reiterated that “ADB-1 and ADB-2 do not meet the new conditions about to be established in the Far East Area,” and stated that “ABC-1 with certain revisions of assigned tasks is an appropriate major directive upon which satisfactory operating plans can be directly based.”

Finally, the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested new conferences to be held in Manila by Vice Adm. Sir Tom Phillips, Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet (British), with Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, and General MacArthur, Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.

Toward the end of November the War Department instructed General MacArthur to “proceed with preliminary [U. S. Army and Navy] conferences and thereafter hold conferences with the British and Dutch.” The objective was the development of ABC-1, still “regarded as a sound major directive,” by the “commanders on the

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spot” in terms of their own problems. Before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, General MacArthur was able to report on his discussions with Admiral Hart and Admiral Phillips, and on 7 December listed the arrangements he proposed to effect with the Navy and—unless otherwise directed—with Army and Air commanders of “potential allies.”

The noncommittal attitude that the American planners continued to exhibit during the late summer and fall of 1941 toward American collaboration in the defense of the Malay Barrier had actually survived the view of national strategic policy with which it had originally been associated—the assumption that American forces would not be committed to that area. It owed its survival largely to the circumstance that the United States, although it had assumed great military obligations in the Far East, had assumed them independently and on terms that virtually precluded close collaboration between the British and American military staffs. American plans for aiding China were far more comprehensive than the British plans, and promised not only to conflict with British lend-lease requirements but also to make the defense of the Burma line of communication to China far more important to the United States than it was to the British themselves, who were planning to make their main stand against the Japanese before Singapore. The British preoccupation with Singapore was also irreconcilable with American policy in the Southwest Pacific. The United States was undertaking to make the Philippines defensible. The very likelihood that the Japanese would forestall the completion of this undertaking raised questions of American policy so obvious and so fundamental that no one except the President of the United States could open formal discussion of them. He did not do so, and the military staffs were therefore obliged to avoid the momentous question whether the United States in that contingency would withdraw from operations in the Southwest Pacific or contribute to the defense of the Malay Barrier.

Reaction to Pearl Harbor

Even as the American troops and equipment destined for the Far East began to gather at San Francisco and the first shipments were loaded and embarked, the last hope of achieving a general settlement in the Pacific through diplomatic means faded and vanished. General Marshall and

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48 Memo, WPD for TAG, 28 Nov 41, sub cited n. 47, WPD 4402-112.
49 (1) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 Dec 41, No. 1045, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8. (2) Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 2 Dec 41, No. 1057, paraphrase filed WPD 4402-112. (3) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 7 Dec 41, No. 1112, WPD 4622-35. This message was received on 8 December. The action copy was sent by Maj. Laurence S. Kuter, Office of the Chief of Staff, to Col. Thomas T. Handy, for file in WPD without action, with the notation: “General MacArthur's proposed lines of action are entirely satisfactory. He states that he will go ahead unless the Chief of Staff decides otherwise. Thus, this paper would have required no answer even if the War had not broken.”

The date on documents used in this volume is determined by the time zone at the point of origin, unless otherwise indicated.
Admiral Stark continued to the last to seek more time. They informed the President, on 27 November, that "if the current negotiation ended without agreement, Japan might attack: The Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces." They observed that "the most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time." Although considerable Navy and Army reinforcements had been rushed to the Philippines, "the desirable strength" had not yet been reached. Ground forces totaling 21,000, they declared, were to sail from the United States by 8 December and it was "important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence." Finally Marshall and Stark recommended: "Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy." 51

In the first week of December ominous intelligence reports began to arrive with news of Japanese naval and troop movements in the Far East. 52 That the Japa-


51 Memo, Marshall and Stark for President, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far EasternSit, WPD 4544-13.

52 (1) Paraphrase of msg, Brink to WD, recd in WD, 6 Dec 41, No. 96, Item 7B, OPD Hist Unit File. (2) Msg, CINCAF to Nav Ops, 6 Dec 41, Item 3, Exec 10. (3) Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 424-25, 432. (4) Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 191. (5) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, nese were up to some "deviltry" was clear, but precisely when and where they would strike was not clear. On the morning of 7 December, while official Washington anxiously reflected on the hard decision that the President might have to make—in case Japan should strike in the area of the South China Sea, bypassing for the moment the Philippines—the War Department learned, through an intercepted Japanese message, that Japan would present to the United States later in the day a note which would put an end to further negotiations. At noon last-minute warning messages were sent by the War Department to the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the west coast. Through a series of fateful mishaps the message to Army headquarters at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, was delayed in transmittal. 53 While it was still on its way, the first wave of Japanese carrier-based planes—whose approach had gone, not undetected, but unheeded—came in from the north and leveled off for their bombing run over the Pacific Fleet riding at anchor unalerted in Pearl Harbor. This attack opened a campaign long since conceived and planned to drive the Western powers from the Far East. 54

53 (1) Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 224-25. (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIV.

54 For the story of the genesis of Japanese planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor, see: (1) Pearl Harbor Report, material from Japanese sources, pp. 52-54; (2) Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 13, pp. 415 ff.; (3) Morison, Rising Sun, Ch. V; (4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIV; (5) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. IV, and a particularly valuable unpublished manuscript, "The Decision for War"; and (6) Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 191, 193, 217, 270, 292, 294, 303, 332. Both Morton and Feis draw upon evidence gleaned from Japanese sources, including reports of the Japanese war trials.
About one o'clock in Washington on the afternoon of 7 December the first news of the attack on Pearl Harbor reached the War Department. The news came as a shock, even as the attack itself had come. It caught by surprise not only the American people at large, who learned of the attack a short while later, but also their leaders, including the very officers who had earlier been so much concerned over the possibility of just such an attack. One explanation is that these officers and their political superiors were momentarily expecting the Japanese to use all their forces against the weakly held British and Dutch positions in the Far East (and probably, but not certainly, against the Philippines). They were undoubtedly pondering the hard decisions they would have to recommend and make if this should happen. For this and perhaps for other reasons they had made no special effort to review the intelligence available and had paid no special attention to what the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii were doing. As they soon found out, the Japanese task force had also caught those commanders unprepared and had accomplished its destructive mission almost unopposed, leaving a great part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet sunk or disabled in Pearl Harbor. At the same time the southward advance of Japanese forces began as expected. During the afternoon and evening, news came in of Japanese forces moving into Thailand, bombing Singapore, and landing in Malaya. This news, coming in conjunction with the news from Hawaii—the successive reports of casualties and damage suffered by the fleet at Pearl Harbor and by Army and Marine air units—presented the American high command, not with the anticipated crisis in domestic and foreign politics but, instead, with an unexpectedly acute crisis in military operations.

The immediate fear of the War Department was that the Japanese might launch another carrier force against some important strategic target—the naval installations at Pearl Harbor (which were still intact), the aircraft factories on the west coast of the United States, or the locks of the Panama Canal. The War Department could do little to make these targets less vulnerable to air attack in the near future, but Marshall was determined that he and his staff should not do less than they could, merely because they could do so little. The Army's war plan RAINBOW 5 went into effect, insofar as it related to Japan, with the notification, on 7 December, to MacArthur and other commanders by the War Department that hostilities had commenced and operations would be governed by RAINBOW 5 as far as

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55 According to Robert E. Sherwood, the best informed opinion in Washington on the eve of Pearl Harbor was that "further Japanese aggression was imminent and that it would come in the Southwest Pacific, its probable objective being the Kra Isthmus, which joined the mainland of Thailand and Burma with the Malay Peninsula, six thousand miles from Pearl Harbor." (Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 424.)

56 Published sources cover very fully the sequence of events and reports on 7 December. See Pearl Harbor Hearings and Pearl Harbor Report, also memoirs of various public figures, in particular the notes of Harry Hopkins made at the close of the day (Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 430–34).

Apparently the first news of the attack that reached the War Department was a Navy message stating "This is not drill." It was signed by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and delivered to the Office of the Chief of Staff by a Navy enlisted man. The authors are indebted to Maj. Gen. John R. Deane and Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow for filling a gap in the records with their recollections on this point. (1) Ltr, Gen Deane to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 29 Mar 51. (2) Ltr, Gen Gerow to Gen Ward, 21 Mar 51. Both in OCMH Files. (3) See also Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 11, pp. 5235, 5551.
possible. During the first week of war, though there were many other affairs that demanded and shared his attention, General Marshall spent several hours daily at Army staff conferences and Joint Board meetings that were mainly taken up with measures to reinforce Hawaii, Panama, and the west coast. The movements to which he was most attentive were quite small—the movement of antiaircraft guns and six regiments of antiaircraft artillery to the west coast, the movement to Hawaii of thirty-six heavy bombers (by air) and (by train and ship) of ammunition, 110 pursuit planes, and some 7,000 men with their unit equipment. In addition the War Department ordered ammunition, air warning equipment, eighty pursuit planes, nine heavy bombers, and 16,000 men sent to Panama as fast as possible, and two pursuit groups and large ground forces (including two infantry divisions) to the west coast. It was an enormous job for the War Department as then constituted to keep track of these hurried movements, especially movements of munitions. Marshall insisted that his immediate subordinates “follow up” on them, especially the very officers upon whom he also relied for plans and recommendations on strategy—Arnold, Gerow, and the members of their staffs. 

Behind their immediate fear of air raids on vital installations was the knowledge that the Japanese had forestalled American plans to bring American military strength in the far Pacific up to that required to carry out American foreign policy in the Far East. The Far Eastern Air Force in being, though forewarned, was still by no means equipped, trained, or organized to defend an outpost so far from the United States and so near to Japan. The results of the first Japanese raids of 8 December on the Philippine Islands were a convincing demonstration. They left MacArthur with only seventeen heavy bombers and fewer than seventy pursuit planes.

The official paper on presidential approval of Army execution of Rainbow 5 is a penned note signed by General Marshall which stated, “I read to the President and Mr. Hull our message to MacArthur in Manila and to Commanders of Defense Areas, overseas garrisons, etc. They were approved orally.” General Gerow added, “Handed to me by C/S 4:50 PM Dec, 7/41.” (Filed with WPD 4544-20.)

At the Army staff meetings, held in the mornings of 8 through 12 December, the War Plans Division was represented by its chief, General Gerow, who was usually accompanied by another officer from the division. The Army Air Forces was represented by General Arnold or Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, or by both. (OCS Notes on Conf's, Decisions by CoFS, DCoFS, and Other Info, Dec 41. Cf. min. Conf's in OCoFS, 8-12, Dec, WDSCA CoFS Conf's, II.)

At the Joint Board meetings held during the afternoon on 8, 9, 10, and 13 December, Generals Bryden and Gerow, and either General Spaatz or General Arnold were also in attendance. (See min, JB mtgs.)

Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 175-93, 201. The Far Eastern Air Force, like the U.S. Army as a whole, was in the process of being organized. Figures on planes give some indication—but only an indication—of how far it was from being ready. Of 165 modern B-17's allocated, 35 were in the Philippines, 33 of which were in commission. Of 240 modern pursuit planes allocated, 107 (P-40's) had arrived, of which about 90 were in commission. Larger total figures published on various occasions incorporate numbers of obsolete or obsolescent craft, of little or no value in combat.

Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 8 Dec 41, No. 1133, WPD Msg File 1, 108. The figure given for pursuit planes includes P-35's. For the full story, see: (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, Ch. VI, and (2) Morton, Fall of the Philippines.
His air force, already half destroyed, was scarcely more of a threat to Japanese operations than the submarines and inshore patrol left behind in the Philippines by Admiral Hart’s Asiatic Fleet. The Japanese were free not only to land in the Philippines but also to move forces southward into the Netherlands Indies with every chance to isolate the Philippines before reinforcements should arrive in the area. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that the United States must accept the loss of the Philippines as inevitable and concentrate on strengthening the local defenses of Hawaii, Panama, Alaska, and the west coast.

Up to this point the War and Navy Departments were in substantial agreement. But Secretary Stimson went further. He had been in entire accord with the growing firmness of American policy toward Japan during 1941, and was convinced that to show any sign of an intention to withdraw from the conflict, even temporarily, would discredit the whole policy. He understood, moreover, that the people of the United States, whatever their views of foreign policy, would not accept a strategic withdrawal in the face of the enemy that had attacked Pearl Harbor. Finally, he shared with the professional soldiers and the American people a strong sense of obligation to do everything humanly possible to support MacArthur’s forces. As he had good reason to expect, Marshall supported and the President shared and approved his views. All agreed that it did not matter what the likelihood was of getting reinforcements to the Philippines nor what risks the attempt might entail. The United States could not withdraw from the Southwest Pacific.

The Pensacola Convoy

The development of this policy opened with a decision on a specific problem—the disposition of five ships bound for Manila, under the escort of the USS Pensacola, that had been in the South Pacific on 7 December. This convoy, the vanguard of several that had been scheduled to arrive in the Philippines during the early winter, put in at Suva in the Fiji Islands to await orders. There were some 4,500 men aboard, including one regiment and two battalions of field artillery and the ground echelon of a heavy bomber group, and large quantities of munitions—guns, ammunition, bombs, motor vehicles, aviation gasoline, fifty-two dive bombers, and eighteen pursuit planes.

On 9 December the Joint Board decided to order the Pensacola convoy to return to Hawaii. This decision was in accord with the views of the War Department staff. Marshall concurred without comment. But he was dissatisfied with the decision, for

\[\text{Memorandum for CofS} [6 \text{ Dec 41}], \text{sub: Transports for Phil, Tab 3, Folder Book 1, Exec 4. This paper lists current status of transports for the Philippines as of 6 December. The five ships escorted by the Pensacola after the convoy left Hawaii were the Holbrook and Republic, carrying troops and equipment, and the Meigs, Bloemfontein, and Admiral Halstead, carrying equipment and munitions.}\]

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he had to consider the position of MacArthur, and the assurance he had included in the instructions he had sent him on the afternoon of 7 December: "You have the complete confidence of the War Department and we assure you of every possible assistance and support within our power." He could not reconcile this pledge with the Joint Board's decision of 9 December.

The next morning Marshall stated the problem at the close of a conference with Stimson, Gerow, and two of the latter's assistants. He "pointed to the catastrophe that would develop if Hawaii should become a Japanese base, and he said that this thought was guiding the Navy in its actions." On the matter of the convoy, Marshall said that . . . he was concerned with just what to say to General MacArthur. He did not like to tell him in the midst of a very trying situation that his convoy had had to be turned back, and he would like to send some news which would buck General MacArthur up. Secretary Stimson at once went to the President, who ended the impasse by asking the Joint Board to reconsider its decision. The Joint Board took up the President's request at its meeting that afternoon:

In view of the President's desire that the Manila-bound convoy continue to the Far East, concurred in by the Secretary of War, the Board weighed the following factors:

a. The risk involved in proceeding to Australia as compared to the risk in returning to Hawaii.

b. The possibility of ultimately getting some of the supplies, in particular airplanes and ammunition, into the Philippines.

c. The utility of the supplies to the Dutch East Indies or Australia should it not be possible to deliver them to Manila. In particular, some might be available to defend the Navy base at Port Darwin.

d. The immediate requirements of the Oahu garrison for defensive material.

e. The capability of supplying Oahu with defense material from the United States.

During the discussion that followed, Army members abandoned the position they had taken the day before and instead advanced the opinion that Hawaii could be supplied from the United States and expressed a desire to continue the Manila-bound convoy to Australia and to make every effort to supply airplanes, ammunition, and other critical material to the Philippine garrison. The Board therefore agreed: "The Manila-bound convoy would be routed and escorted to Brisbane, Australia. Movement thereafter would be determined following arrival and depending upon the situation." On 12 December the convoy was ordered on to Brisbane, and the War Department made the senior Army officer aboard, Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, directly responsible to General MacArthur, with a primary mis-

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66 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 7 Dec 41, No. 736. Marshall added the pledge to the message drafted by WPD. (See draft filed WPD 4544-20.) This draft was evidently extracted from the volume prepared by WPD (Folder Book 1, Exec 4 cited [n. 64]) during the afternoon and evening of 6 December and taken to Marshall on the morning of 7 December to be gone over with the President. The volume included proposed messages to send to commanders in the field in the event of war with Japan. Marshall added the pledge (and made one other addition) to the proposed message for MacArthur, presumably before receiving news of the attack, since it does not include a reference to the attack. The volume includes a copy of the message as corrected by Marshall.

67 Min, mtg in OCoS, 0815 hours, 10 Dec 41, WDSCA CoS Conf, II. Gerow's assistants were Colonels Bundy and Handy. Bundy, the chief of the Plans Group, WPD, was killed two days later in the crash of a plane en route to Hawaii, and Handy succeeded him as chief of the Plans Group.

68 Min cited n. 67.

69 Min, JB mtg, 1445 hours, 10 Dec 41.
sion of getting reinforcements to the Philippines. First of all General Barnes was to have his planes unloaded and assembled and try to get them to the Philippines. Before unloading troops and other equipment he was to find out whether the Navy would undertake to send any ships through to the Philippines.\(^8\)

**Aircraft and Ammunition**

In Manila General MacArthur at once asked Admiral Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, whether he could bring the convoy on to the Philippines. Admiral Hart told him that he expected the Japanese to establish a complete blockade before the ships could reach the Philippines, and gave him the “impression” that he thought “the islands were ultimately doomed.” General MacArthur, in reporting their conversation, emphasized that as soon as people in the Philippines came to the conclusion that there was no hope of keeping open a line of communication, “the entire structure here” would “collapse” over his head. He declared and repeated that the battle for the Philippines was the decisive action of the war in the far Pacific: “If the western Pacific is to be saved it will have to be saved here and now”; and again he said, “The Philippines theater of operations is the locus of victory or defeat.” He urged that authorities in Washington review their strategy with this idea in mind, and furnish the air power needed to delay the Japanese advance: first of all, fighter planes to protect airfields and allow new ones to be built and, second, bombers to operate against Japanese air bases, communications, and installations. He concluded by declaring that the retention of the islands would justify “the diversion here of the entire output of air and other resources.”\(^7\)

MacArthur’s estimate gave the War Department something definite to go on in getting support for “every effort to supply airplanes, ammunition and other critical material to the Philippine garrison.” A measure of the urgency of his need was his report that as of 12 December he had in commission twelve heavy bombers, and he had so few P-40’s left (twenty-seven) that he had ordered the pilots to avoid direct combat in order to save the planes for reconnaissance and “to make [a] show of strength.”\(^13\)

\(^8\)(1) Msg, OpNav to CTF 15, 10 Dec 41, WPD Msg File 1, 583. (2) Memo, WPD for Comdr D. H. Harries, RAN, Australian Nav Attaché, Australian Legation, 12 Dec 41, sub: Msg to U. S. Mil Attaché, Australia, WPD 4628-1.

For measures taken by the War Department to alert General Barnes at sea and General MacArthur in Manila to the change in instructions, see memo, WPD for CNO, 12 Dec 41, sub: Msgs for Transmission (Convoy to Brisbane), WPD 4628, and memo, WPD for CSigO, 12 Dec 41, sub: Msg for Transmission (Convoy to Brisbane), WPD 4628. The message was sent on the same day to MacArthur as message No. 776.
On Sunday, 14 December, Stimson went over the problem with Marshall, and found that he, too, felt that the United States could not abandon the effort, however desperate, since to do so would be to “paralyze the activities of everybody in the Far East.” The Secretary again went to the President, who at once agreed and instructed the Navy to co-operate. The War Department thereupon assured MacArthur:

Your messages of December thirteenth and fourteenth have been studied by the President. The strategic importance of the Philippines is fully recognized and there has been and will be no repeat no wavering in the determination to support you. The problem of supply is complicated by Naval losses in the Pacific but as recommended in yours of December fourteenth bomber and pursuit reinforcements are to be rushed to you. Keep us advised of the situation as you see it.

On 15 December Marshall ordered two transports to be loaded to take pursuit planes and ammunition to Australia. On the following day and the morning of 17 December two additional shipments were scheduled, which would bring to 230 the pursuit planes shipped from the United States to Australia by early January, in addition to the eighteen in the Pensacola convoy.

How to get these planes from Australia to the Philippines was something else again. General Marshall had asked Admiral Stark to see whether the Navy would make an aircraft carrier available. Meanwhile, General Arnold was hurrying preparations to send eighty heavy bombers (B-24’s) via Cairo, three a day, for use in ferrying critical supplies between Australia and the Philippines.

Conferences on Coalition Strategy against Japan

The determination to do what was possible did not signify that the War Department thought there was much chance of saving the Philippines. But it did represent a step in defining American strategy in the Pacific. The President, in adopting the policy of reinforcing the Philippines, had clearly indicated the direction of American strategy in the Far Eastern area. The next step was to correlate American strategy with the plans of the other powers arrayed against Japan. Several days before Roosevelt declared himself, Chiang Kai-shek had urged the President to offer a plan for joint action by the powers at war with Japan. The President, who had already been considering such a step, now proposed that two military conferences be held concurrently in the Far East by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China—once at Chungking (to which the Soviet Union should be invited to send a

Note for rc'd cited n. 76(1).
Msg No. 787 cited n. 75.
Plans and preparations for this movement had been under way for a week. See (1) min, conf in OCofS, 9 Dec 41, WDCSA CofS Conf's, II, and (2) memo, Col Bissell for ACofS WPD, 9 Dec 41, sub: Mtg in Gen Arnold's Off, 9:30 Dec 9, 1941, WPD 3807-105.

See Note for rc'd cited n. 76(1).
Memo [no originator] for CofS, 17 Dec 41, no sub, Hq ASF files under CofS, GS (1), May–Jun 42.
representative) to consult on strategy on the Asiatic mainland, and one at Singapore to consult on operations in the Southwest Pacific. The purpose of these meetings was to consider plans to occupy Japanese forces on all fronts in an effort to prevent them from concentrating forces on one objective after another.\(^{81}\) Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, then in India, was designated the War Department representative for the proposed Chungking conference, to be assisted by General Magruder, already in Chungking. Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink, the U. S. military observer in Singapore, was named War Department representative for the conversations at Singapore.

The President may have been under the impression that Japanese forces were overextended, presenting, in the words of MacArthur, a "golden opportunity" for a "master stroke." General MacArthur himself hoped that the Soviet Union would take advantage of the opportunity, and the War Department at first shared his hope.\(^{82}\) But Stalin had meanwhile made it plain that the Soviet Union was not going to do so.\(^{83}\) MacArthur for some time persisted in the belief that the U. S. Pacific Fleet should make a diversionary counterattack west of Hawaii, but the fleet was actually much too weak to do so.\(^{84}\) The Chinese Army was incapable of offensive action. There was, therefore, no real threat to prevent the Japanese from concentrating air and naval strength against one after another of the widely separated positions then held by the Allies in the Southwest Pacific and southeastern Asia.

The conferences held at Chungking (17 and 23 December) and at Singapore (18 and 20 December) nevertheless served to demonstrate that the United States Government was not preparing to withdraw from the Far Eastern war but was, instead, determined to take a more active part.\(^{85}\)

\(^{81}\) For an interim War Department answer to Magruder’s message, cited [n. 80]; see msg, Stimson to Magruder, 13 Dec 41, Tab China, Book 1, Exec 8. The President communicated with the Generalissimo on 14 December making the definite proposal for the conference in Chungking. See Romer, and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.

\(^{82}\) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 10 Dec 41, No. 198, WPD 4544-26.

For early War Department hopes of Soviet intervention in the Far East, see: (1) min, mtg in OCoS, 10 Dec 41, WDCSA CoS Conf. II; (2) notes by WPD offs with copy of msg No. 198, cited above, WPD 4544-26; (3) WPD study, title: Gen Strategic Review, incl with memo, WPD for CoS [23 Dec 41], sub: Gen Strategic Review, WPD 4402-136; and (4) paper, no addressee, no sig, n.d., title: Assistance to the Far East, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8.

\(^{83}\) Msg, Stalin to Chiang Kai-shek, 12 Dec 41, translated copy, initialed by Gen Gerow and Brig Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Tab China, Book 1, Exec 8.

Ambassador Maxim Litvinov had earlier stated to the President the desire of the Soviet Government to remain neutral. (See min cited n. 82(1).)


\(^{85}\) See, for example, ltr, Col Brink to CoS, 25 Dec 41, sub: Inter-Allied Conf, Singapore, Dec 18, 20, 1941, WPD 4544-31. This is the final report of the Singapore conference. The American position is summarized in the final sentence of a statement sent by General MacArthur and Admiral Hart, which Colonel Brink read and distributed: "We reiterate the strategic policy enunciated by President Roosevelt:—The Far East area is now the dominant locus of the war and the most rapid and concentrated effort should be made by convergent action of the Allies."
The President saw them as part of a worldwide effort to establish international military collaboration on a more permanent basis, which also encompassed the British-American meetings scheduled to begin shortly in Washington, and conversations in Moscow, which he proposed, between representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, and China.  

The Singapore conference produced the first concrete proposal for such collaboration. According to the War Department representative, Colonel Brink, the conference clearly showed "an immediate need for one supreme head over a combined allied staff for detailed coordination of USA British Australia and Dutch measures for movements to their designated locations, institution and maintenance of air and sea lines of communication and the strategic direction of all operations in Pacific area." The logical location of the Allied headquarters would be at Bandung in Java, and "unofficial opinions" among the representatives at Singapore indicated that a "USA Commander acquainted with the Pacific area would not only be acceptable but desirable."  

**Decision to Establish a Base in Australia**

Along with the first orders for moving planes and ammunition to the Far East and the President's proposal of regional military conferences among the powers fighting Japan, went another development of great strategic significance—the decision to establish an advanced American military base at Port Darwin in northern Australia. This decision was a logical consequence of the determination to continue the fight in the Southwest Pacific whatever might happen. To carry this decision into effect in the War Department, which was certain to be a full-time job, General Marshall selected a staff officer, Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who saw the problem as he himself did, who knew the situation in the far Pacific, and who had the very important added qualification that he knew MacArthur very well. On 14 December General Eisenhower presented himself to General Marshall. Marshall gave him the problem of Far Eastern strategy to work on. Eisenhower came back with the answer that the United States must keep open the Pacific line of communication to Australia and go ahead as fast as possible to establish a military base there. This answer corresponded with the conclusion reached that day by Stimson and Marshall and approved by the President. Marshall told Eisenhower to go ahead.  

On 17 December General Marshall approved Eisenhower's plan for establishing a base in Australia. It was first of all to be an air base, and, as had been recommended by his staff, he designated a senior Air officer to take command—General Brett, who was then attending the Allied military conference at Chungking.  

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86 For the President's proposal for conversations in Moscow, see copy of msg, President to Stalin [15 Dec 41], Tab Collab, Book 1, Exec 8.  
87 Msg, Brink to Marshall [via British channels], 21 Dec 41, OGS 18136-179.

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88 Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Dec 41, sub: Plan for Australian Base, WPD 4628-1. General Eisenhower was the action officer.  
89 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Magruder for Brett, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4628.
B. Clagett was ordered from the Philippines to take over command from Barnes until Brett arrived.

The forces in Australia thus became the nucleus of a new overseas command even though they were still part of MacArthur’s U. S. Army Forces in the Far East and had the primary mission of getting vitally needed supplies to the Philippines.\(^9^1\) It was evident that the establishment of this new command implied a more comprehensive strategy in the Southwest Pacific than the desperate effort to prolong the defense of the Philippines. Stimson at once saw this and stated the thesis very clearly to three of his civilian assistants:

I laid before them the issue which was now pending before us, namely as to whether we should make every effort possible in the Far East or whether, like the Navy, we should treat that as doomed and let it go. We all agreed that the first course was the one to follow; that we have a very good chance of making a successful defense, taking the southwestern Pacific as a whole. If we are driven out of the Philippines and Singapore, we can still fall back on the Netherlands East Indies and Australia; and with the cooperation of China—if we can keep that going—we can strike good counterblows at Japan. While if we yielded to the defeatist theory, it would have not only the disastrous effect on our material policy of letting Japan get strongly ensconced in the southwestern Pacific which would be a terribly hard job to get her out of, but it would psychologically do even more in the discouragement of China and in fact all of the four powers who are now fighting very well together. Also it would have a very bad effect on Russia. So this theory goes. It has been accepted by the President, and the Army is taking steps to make a solid base at Port Darwin in Australia.\(^9^2\)

During the following week events made it clear to all concerned that the United States was committing itself to the defense of the Southwest Pacific, in collaboration with its allies, and not simply to the reinforcement of the Philippines. The Manila-bound convoy arrived at Brisbane on 22 December. On the same day General Clagett flew in from the Philippines to take temporary command of Army forces in Australia, pending the arrival of Brett. Clagett reported that, after the unloading of the aircraft, the convoy was to go on to Port Darwin, picking up its escort from the Asiatic Fleet at the Torres Strait (between New Guinea and Australia), as ordered by MacArthur, in the hope that Marshall would get the Navy to try to run the convoy through to the Philippines.\(^9^3\) But the Japanese had already made their first landing in Sarawak (in Borneo), and another force was on its way to Jolo (between Mindanao and Borneo). The isolation of the Philippines was nearly complete.

MacArthur had not yet given up the other hope that planes might be brought by carrier to within flying distance of the Philippines, as he had earlier recommended.\(^9^4\) The War Department at once answered that it was out of the question.\(^9^5\)

\(^{91}\) (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Brett, 17 Dec 41, No. 31, WPD 4628. (2) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to U. S. Mil Attaché, Brisbane, for Barnes, 17 Dec 41, No. 30, WPD Msg File 1, 972. (3) Ltr, Moore to Brett, 19 Dec 41, AG 381 (12–31–41).

\(^{92}\) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 396–97.

\(^{93}\) (1) Msg, Clagett to U. S. CsofS [via Australian radio channels], 22 Dec 41, Tab ABDA Reps, Book 1, Exec 8. The message was delivered to WPD by Commander Harries of the Australian Navy just before noon on 23 December. (2) See msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 18 Dec 41, no number, WPD Msg File 1, 970, for MacArthur’s directions and expectations.

\(^{94}\) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 22 Dec 41, No. 40, WPD Msg File 1, 1293.

\(^{95}\) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 23 Dec 41, WPD Msg File 1, 1340.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Utilisation of U. S. Forces in Australia.

1. U. S. combat troops, now in Australia and expected there at approximate dates indicated:

a. Now present:
   18 fighter planes
   52 dive bombers

   Elements of 2 regiments of artillery. No ammunition available until about January 8, when small amount will arrive.

b. Expected soon:
   (1) 58 fighter planes (about Jan. 8).
   (2) To begin arriving in theater on or about Jan. 13 or 14; three heavy bombers per day until a total of eighty are assembled. These bombers are now directed to report to General MacArthur upon arrival at Bangkok, and to proceed from there to my district. For the present there is a large number of bombs, 600 lb.
available in northern Australia. One hundred and ten bombs, 1000 pounds, have arrived.

Draft memorandum for the president with revisions in General Marshall's handwriting, and message for Brig. Gen. John A. Magruder which was inclosed. (Blurred stamps dated "Jan 2 1951," indicate declassification of document.)
(3) 55 fighters, about Jan. 16
(4) 70 fighter planes, about Jan. 16. (It is possible that capacity of ship is only 40 planes.)
Later, pilots and crews available for all planes.
(5) A complete pursuit group (60 planes) will leave an air base on the Kitty Hawk about Jan. 16. Additional ships necessary for personnel.

Note:

Lates at which there can arrive in Australia necessary ground crews and maintenance facilities for all the planes listed in the first three shipments are still uncertain. But, including the oil to be sent from Philippine Islands to Australia, and with maximum help from Australian sources, all planes can operate usefully temporarily pending the arrival of necessary maintenance units. The U.S. Air Corps has already allocated and directed to the West Coast a grand total of 333 fighter planes for shipment to Australia, including those already arrived or enroute. The above represents the maximum capacity of ships now available.

2. All American forces in Australia are commanded by Major General George H. Brett, under the direction of General MacArthur.

6. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff jointly recommend:
   a. That immediate request be made upon Australian, British and Dutch authorities to render maximum assistance to
   b. U.S. Command in preparation of base, air elements for combat, and
   c. Establishment of bases, with particular view to the immediate entry of these air forces into action.

-2-
b. That General Brritt's command be temporarily designated as a separate U. S. Force, and that all U. S. personnel and material arriving in that region be directed to report to him for orders.

c. That British and American Commanders be directed to exert maximum effort to insure the early entry of the U. S. Air Force into action, particularly for the support of Singapore.

4. The current U. S. Air Corps objective in air power in the southwestern Pacific, exclusive of China and Russia, is: (From General Arnold to Chief of Staff, December 30)

2 Heavy Groups -- 80 planes

2 Medium Groups -- 114 planes

3 Light Groups -- 151 planes

6 Pursuit Groups -- 480 planes.

This strength will be attained as rapidly as shipping facilities permit.
2. All U.S. forces under his command, under Gen. Scott's orders, have been under orders to take his instructions from Gen. McClellan. However, the situation in the Philippines apparently has changed in an extent that makes it necessary that present plans must be changed.

Cev. C.교, forwarded to General McClellan. The following instructions were sent:

James Scott, December 24, 7 A.M.

Quoting.
BRIG. GEN. JOHN MACRUDER,
U.S. MILITARY MISSION,
CHUNGKING, CHINA.

FOR BRETT PROCEED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO AUSTRALIA TO ASSUME COMMAND OF U.S. ARMY INTERESTS IN THAT REGION STOP REPORT ARRIVAL AND FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY WITH A PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATION OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN VIEW OF SITUATION IN PHILIPPINES AT THAT TIME

M. MARSHALL

WTD Message Center
Time out: 24 December, 1941
4:13 P.M.

[Stamp: Unclassified, secret, restricted, confidential]

[Stamp: Regraded by TAG per OCS/18136-171]
meanwhile had been getting ready for the invasion of Luzon, and MacArthur foresaw that his forces would have to fall back through central Luzon to the final defensive positions on Bataan peninsula, covering Corregidor, according to long-established plans. In view of this estimate of the situation, the War Department discounted heavily the possibility of any pursuit planes at all getting to the Philippines, even if a route could be found to fly them northward from island to island. MacArthur was left to extract such reassurance as he might from the declaration that the War Department would nevertheless “press in every way for the development of a strong United States air power in the Far East based on Australia.”

The same estimate of the situation caused the War Department to send word to General Brett at Chungking to get to Australia as quickly as possible “to assume command of U. S. Army interests in that region.”

On 24 December MacArthur announced that he had ordered south to the Netherlands Indies and Australia what was left of his own heavy bomber force—fourteen B-17’s—which could no longer operate for lack of fighter protection. The President in turn then recognized that “there was little likelihood that the land and air rein-

forcement now on their way from the U. S. A. via Australia could arrive at their destination.” He wanted them to be used “in whatever manner might best serve the joint cause in the Far East.”

The plan for establishing a “solid” base in Australia had by that time become a major commitment of Army air forces. The immediate goal was to establish nine combat groups in the Southwest Pacific—two heavy and two medium bombardment groups, one light bombardment group, and four pursuit groups. A part of this force—one group of medium bombers and two pursuit groups—was allocated to the defense of the Netherlands Indies.

This force represented the largest projected concentration of American air power outside the Western Hemisphere, considerably larger than the forces that had been scheduled for shipment to the Philippines before 7 December, and a very substantial part of the fifty-four groups that the Army expected to have by the end of the winter. Furthermore, it would require a heavy investment in crews and planes to build up these forces—much larger than the investment to build up comparable forces elsewhere—since the rate of attrition would at first be high, as a result not only of action by numerically superior enemy forces but also of the constant use of hastily organized half-trained units operating from improvised bases in unfamiliar areas at the end of a long, uncertain supply line. The commitment to bring these air forces up to pro-

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98 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Brett, 24 Dec 41, WPD Msg File 1, 1382. (2) See also, msg (originator WPD), Marshall to U. S. Mil Attaché, Melbourne, for Brett, 25 Dec 41, No. 41, WPD 4628-3, Tab ABDA Reps, Book 1, Exec 8.
99 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 25 Dec 41, no number, WPD Msg File 1, 1462. General Breerton was in command of the B-17 force that was moved south. The B-17’s had been operating from Port Darwin for several days.
100 Notes on mtg at White House, beginning at 1800, 24 Dec 41, of President and Prime Minister and others, sent by Brigadier L. C. Hollis of Br Jt Stf Miss to “Secretary General to the United States Chiefs of Staff,” Tab Collab, Book 1, Exec 8.
101 As approved by Marshall, 28 Dec 41. See extract from memo, AAF for CoFS, 26 Dec 41, sub: Air Units . . ., WPD 3817-107.
jected strength would evidently affect all other strategic plans, by further widening the existing gap between planes and air units available and planes and air units needed to carry them out.

It was less evident at first, except to staff officers working on detailed plans, that another immediately critical effect on strategy would be to intensify the shortage of ships and naval escort vessels. These officers began estimating what it would take to build airfields in Australia (at Townsville and Port Darwin), to finish building airfields on the way from Hawaii to Australia, to construct the port facilities required, to defend these installations against raids, and to quarter and ration the troops employed. Most of the men and most of the supplies and equipment would have to be shipped from the continental United States. The first demand on ships and naval escort vessels was to move goods to the United Kingdom. If the defense of the South and Southwest Pacific came next, what would remain to meet other Allied demands, to reinforce overseas garrisons, to deploy American troops in the North Atlantic, and to send expeditionary forces into the South Atlantic? These hard questions were much in Army planners' minds when the first wartime British-American staff conference opened in Washington, 24 December 1941, after two and a half weeks of American participation in open hostilities.
The First Full Dress Debate Over Strategic Deployment
December 1941–January 1942

The military conversations that began in Washington during the last week in December 1941, which accompanied the first wartime meetings of the President with the Prime Minister (the ARCADIA Conference), gave the American military staffs the chance at once to reassure and to warn the British staff concerning the military effects of American reaction to the Japanese attack.

On 14 December the Prime Minister and his party, which included the British Chiefs of Staff, had set out on H. M. S. Duke of York. The War Department's preparations began on 18 December, on the receipt of a short message suggesting the agenda for the meetings, sent ahead by the British Chiefs of Staff. The British message listed five principal topics for the conference:

(i) Fundamental basis of joint strategy.
(ii) Interpretation of (i) into terms of immediate Military measures, including re-distribution of forces.
(iii) Allocation of joint forces to harmonise with (i).
(iv) Long term programme based on (i), including forces to be raised and equipped required for victory.
(v) Set up joint machinery for implementing (ii), (iii) and (iv).

Several of the War Department planners, working together, hurriedly prepared “notes” on the British message.

Although the Army planners had something to say in their notes about each of the five points raised by the British Chiefs of Staff, the discussions among staff officers that followed and the discussions of the military leaders with the President amounted only to a reserved exchange of views on military dispositions in the near future.

The President and the military leaders were extremely cautious and went into the conference without trying to define the American position. The preparations served chiefly to remind the President that the military staffs believed the United States and Great Britain would have all they could do to stop the Japanese and to remind the military staff that the President was anxious to undertake in the Atlantic as strong a demonstration as possible of British and American

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1 According to Churchill's memoirs, he himself originated the proposal to cross the Atlantic to meet the President (Grand Alliance, pp. 608–10.)

2 Msg from Br CofS aboard H. M. S. Duke of York, 18 Dec 41, Item 5, Exec 10. This is the original WD copy.

3 For an account of these preparations, see Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 87–89.
The possible movements involving U. S. Army forces fell under five main headings: (1) establishment of an air force based in Australia; (2) strengthening of other positions in the Pacific, especially in Hawaii; (3) reinforcement of British troops in the Middle East; (4) "acquisition" of positions in the South Atlantic—in northeastern Brazil, the Cape Verde Islands, or on the western or northwestern coast of Africa; and (5) relief of British garrisons in Northern Ireland and Iceland (and of the U. S. Marine provisional brigade on duty in Iceland). The Army was most certain of the immediate need to undertake movements under the first heading, and the President was most precise about the immediate need for movements under the last heading.

The exchange of views indicated that the President and Chiefs of Staff were alike uncertain how to proceed with the discussion of strategy until they had had a chance to talk with their British opposites. As the conference was to show, much more clearly than had yet been shown—or could have been shown—the President and the Prime Minister as political leaders in some ways had more in common with each other than either had with his Chiefs of Staff. Likewise, the Chiefs of Staff—particularly those of the same service—might agree with one another more readily on what could be done than they could agree with the heads of their respective governments.

Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff arrived in Washington on 22 December; the Prime Minister and the President talked over the situation that evening. On 23 December they began military discussions with the Chiefs of Staff. They held another such meeting on 26 December and, after the Prime Minister's return from Ottawa, two other meetings (1 and 4 January). The Prime Minister then went to Florida for several days to rest. After his return he and the President held two more meetings with the Chiefs of Staff, on 12 and 14 January. Mr. Hopkins, Lord Beaverbrook, and (usually) the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy attended along with the Chiefs of Staff and the senior planners. At these plenary sessions at the White House the President and the Prime Minister reached or confirmed their military decisions, after a review of the conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff.  

The Army planners apparently expected that, after the preliminary British-American meetings, the scope of military conversations would be extended to include the representatives of Australia, China, and the Soviet Union. But the military conversations at ARCADIA—unlike the political conversations, which led to the drafting and signing of the Declaration of the United Nations—involved only the British and American staffs.

The British and American Chiefs of Staff met together twelve times during the conference in an effort to reach agreement on the outstanding military problems so far as...
FIRST DEBATE OVER STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT

possible before presenting them to the President and the Prime Minister. General Marshall and General Arnold represented the Army at these meetings, which were held in the Federal Reserve Building, and the senior Army planner, General Gerow, or his deputy, General Eisenhower, also attended. To help formulate the problems for their meetings, the Chiefs of Staff relied on a committee of British and American planners, who met ten times during the conference and who in turn divided up their work among subcommittees. The War Plans Division, the Air War Plans Division, and (for shipping questions) the G-4 Division furnished the Army members of these subcommittees.

**Grand Strategy**

At the opening of the conference it was evident that the British delegation could take for granted American agreement on strategy up to the point to which the British-American staff conversations had gone earlier in the year. It remained the American view, notwithstanding the dangerous situation in the Pacific, that the basis of strategy must be collaboration among the powers at war with Germany, with the primary object of defeating Germany. The powers at war with Germany must increase their production of munitions and raise forces equal to the object and, while doing so, defend themselves at home, hold their strategic outposts as best they could, and weaken German resistance to the extent necessary to prepare for the final assault. The fullest statement of the American view, prepared in the War Department, was an affirmation of American agreement on these propositions, carefully worded so as to introduce no new element.

The British retained their by then familiar view of strategy, looking ultimately to the establishment at various points in Europe of armored forces which, with the help of patriot forces rallying to the cause, would liberate occupied Europe and defeat Germany. Their theory of these operations, already stated by the British Chiefs in August 1941, the Prime Minister restated at some length for the President, in a document drawn up during the voyage from England. His aim was to make full use of the advantages that the United States and Great Britain could expect to have—command of sea and air, and the aid of the people of occupied Europe. He envisaged landings,

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6 "Proceedings of the American-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conferences Held in Washington, D. C., on Twelve Occasions between December 24, 1941 and January 14, 1942," filed with ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.

Note that the term "Joint" was still being used to denote international as well as interservice deliberations; the fixed distinction between "Joint" and "Combined" was recommended and adopted at the conference.

7 Min, ARCADIA mtgs, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.

8 Min, Jt [British-American] Plng Com Mtgs, Tab 3, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2.

9 WPD paper, 21 Dec 41, sub: Notes on Agenda Proposed by Br, Folder Book 2, Exec 4. This compilation included two versions of the American view of grand strategy. The latter, fuller version is contained in the first paragraph of the second section of the first study, entitled: General Strategic Review. This was prepared in WPD after consultation with Navy and Army Air planners. The earlier, shorter version is in a "tentative first draft" prepared in WPD and sent to General Marshall and Secretary Stimson on 19 December.

The "tentative first draft" was circulated with minor revisions as a Joint Board paper. (See mimeographed paper, sub: Tentative U. S. Views on Sub of Br Memo, Dec 18, attached to memo, JB [Col Scoey] for JPS, Army Sec, 3 Jan 42, sub: JB 325 ser 729—Gen Strategy, with JB 325, ser 729, Army JPC file, G-3.)

10 The statement of the British Chiefs in August 1941 at the Atlantic Conference is quoted and discussed above, pp. 55 ff.
perhaps as early as the summer of 1943, "in several of the following countries, namely, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the French Channel coasts and the French Atlantic coasts, as well as in Italy and possibly the Balkans." He explained:

In principle, the landings should be made by armoured and mechanised forces capable of disembarking not at ports but on beaches, either by landing-craft or from ocean-going ships specially adapted. The potential front of attack is thus made so wide that the German forces holding down these different countries cannot be strong enough at all points. An amphibious outfit must be prepared to enable these large-scale disembarkations to be made swiftly and surely. The vanguards of the various British and American expeditions should be marshalled by the spring of 1943 in Iceland, the British Isles, and, if possible, in French Morocco and Egypt. The main body would come direct across the ocean.

It need not be assumed that great numbers of men are required. If the incursion of the armoured formations is successful, the uprising of the local population, for whom weapons must be brought, will supply the corpus of the liberating offensive. Forty armoured divisions, at fifteen thousand men apiece, or their equivalent in tank brigades, of which Great Britain would try to produce nearly half, would amount to six hundred thousand men. Behind this armour another million men of all arms would suffice to wrest enormous territories from Hitler's domination. But these campaigns, once started, will require nourishing on a lavish scale. Our industries and training establishments should by the end of 1942 be running on a sufficient scale.

According to the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs remained in accord with this theory of operations on the Continent and ready to urge the idea of "the mass invasion of the continent of Europe as the goal for 1943," in three phases; first, "Closing the ring"; second, "Liberating the populations"; and third, "Final assault on the German citadel." But the version of British grand strategy that they presented for consideration to the American Chiefs—unlike the version they had presented in August—was not at all explicit on the manner of invading the Continent, although quite explicit about British aims in the Mediterranean. This version, presented by the British Chiefs of Staff on their arrival in Washington, began with a statement of agreed principles, leading to the agreed conclusion "that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should be diverted from operations against Germany." The British Chiefs then went on to develop certain corollaries. First they listed the essential features of grand strategy:

The realisation of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost required the security of the main areas of war industry.

The maintenance of essential communications.

Closing and tightening the ring around Germany.

Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.

Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

In elaborating on these statements the British Chiefs developed their theory of operations against Germany. The first
stage was that of “Closing and tightening the ring round Germany,” which they defined as “a line running roughly as follows: Archangel–Black Sea–Anatolia—the Northern Seaboard of the Mediterranean—the Western Seaboard of Europe.” They explained:

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

They looked forward to limited offensives on the Continent as the next stage, conceivably in 1942 but more probably in 1943, “either across the Mediterranean or from Turkey into the Balkans, or by simultaneous landings in several of the occupied countries of North-Western Europe.” They proposed that the allocation of troops and matériel should provide for carrying out such operations as a “prelude” to the assault on Germany, the direction and scale of which would evidently depend on the development of these limited offensives.13

It was a foregone conclusion that the British representatives would reintroduce the concept of passing from the defensive to the offensive in the Mediterranean. As late as October, the War Department had had a reminder of the British adherence to this approach from Colonel Bundy, who had talked over future plans with British officers while he was en route to Moscow with the Harriman mission. As he reported, they looked forward to using North Africa “as a stepping stone to cutting Italy out, and finally closing in on the continent.” As previously instructed by General Marshall, Colonel Bundy had been entirely noncommittal as to the War Department view.14

The American planners had remained noncommittal. They did not go so far as to propose that the United States should either accept or reject the British concept of the transition from the defensive to the offensive against Germany. Before 7 December the nearest they had come to stating a principle to govern decisions during the transitional period was to emphasize the need for economy of effort in “subsidiary” theaters. They classified as subsidiary theaters not only the Far East but also Africa, the Middle East, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Scandinavian Peninsula, in accordance with their premise that the plains of northwest Europe constituted the main theater, where “we must come to grips with the enemy ground forces.” 15

At the time of the ARCADIA Conference the Army planning staff again stated the idea of a great final offensive “with the main effort in Western Europe,” which should be “made in conjunction with the strongest possible Russian offensive on the Eastern Front and secondary offensives wherever feasible.” The staff was convinced that this must be the final step, seeing “no other area in which it would be feasible from a logistics viewpoint to transport and main-

13 Memo, Br CsofS [for Amer CsofS], 22 Dec 41, sub: Amer-Br Strategy, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2. This is the first version of WW-1, the first paper presented at the ARCADIA Conference. WW–1 (standing for War Conference) was the British code for ARCADIA papers. The American code was ABC–4 (carried over from earlier American-British conversations of early 1941, beginning with ABC–1). The American code for WW–1, as revised and finally approved, was ABC–4/CS–1.  

14 Memo, Col Bundy for CofS (through ACofS, WPD), 24 Oct 41, sub: Trip with Harriman Miss, WPD 4557-12. For the Harriman mission, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 385–95.  

tain forces required for an operation of such magnitude." The Army planners were disposed to consider all other operations as strictly holding operations and to regard with disfavor any proposal to establish and maintain in a "subsidiary" theater the favorable ratio of Allied to enemy forces that would be necessary in order to take the offensive there.

It appeared to the Army staff that the United States and Great Britain would in any event be compelled to act in accord with this view of strategy for several months to come. Thus from the American point of view there was no reason for dwelling on the principle for the time being. The staff reached the following conclusions about American and British capabilities:

It appears that the best which Great Britain can do at the present time is to maintain its position in the British Isles and the Middle East and to attempt to send reinforcements to the Far East. Any British operation, other than those stated, must necessarily be of an opportunist nature, executed with exceedingly small forces and with very doubtful chances of success.

* * *

At the present time the United States can only inadequately defend its coasts against air raids, hold Hawaii, the Panama Canal and other existing bases, gradually complete the relief of the British in Iceland, reinforce the Philippines or Dutch East Indies, occupy Natal, and possibly occupy some other base not seriously defended by Axis forces or sympathizers (Cape Verdes or Azores). It will be practicable and may be necessary to send some armored or infantry divisions to the British Isles in the winter or spring. . . . The shortage of U. S. flag shipping, there being only enough to carry about 60,000 men simultaneously, precludes the possibility of executing more than one, or at most two, of these operations concurrently.

The Northwest Africa Project

The British Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, had a specific reason for proposing at once that the American Chiefs of Staff should concur in the British view of the conduct of operations against Germany and specifically that they should accept the conception of "Closing and tightening the ring around Germany." The Prime Minister was hoping for a chance to move soon into French North Africa and wanted American help. He was expecting a favorable American response if the war with Japan did not force the project into the background. He made his proposal at the opening meeting of the conference on 23 December at which he and the President told the Chiefs of Staff what they wanted done. He explained that there were 55,000 British troops and the necessary ships ready to move into Algeria in case Empire forces should gain a decisive enough advantage in the shifting war in the Libyan Desert to push westward to the Tunisian frontier. He therefore “offered for consideration the proposition that at the same time United States forces, assuming French agreement, should proceed to land on the Moroccan coast by invitation.”

16 Study, title: Gen Strategic Review, in Notes on Agenda Proposed by Br, 21 Dec 41, p. 9, Tab i, Folder Book 2, Exec 4.

17 Study, title: Immediate Mil Measures, in Notes on Agenda Proposed by Br, 21 Dec 41, pp. 5, 8, Tab ii, Folder Book 2, Exec 4.


19 Notes, G.C.M. [Marshall], 23 Dec 41, sub: Notes on Mtg at White House with President and Br Prime Minister Presiding, WPD 4402-136. Compare the full account of the Prime Minister’s views written for the President, in Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 648-49.
The current British successes in Libya were merely the latest occasion for reviving the expectation that influential French leaders might "invite" an Allied occupation of North Africa, in anticipation of their being no longer bound or protected by the terms of the French-German armistice and their loyalty to the government at Vichy. The Prime Minister believed it essential to be ready to take advantage of this disposition, in the hope of gaining important military objectives at small cost. He hoped to seize the moment when the cost would be least—when French forces, released from their allegiance to any government in metropolitan France, might even help instead of opposing the operation—certainly much less than it would later become, when the Germans would have established political and military control over North Africa.

The American military staff was familiar with the project of occupying French North Africa. A statement of the advantages to be gained from such a move had appeared in a report written for the Joint Board in September:

Prevention of Axis penetration into Northwest Africa and the Atlantic Islands is very important, not only as a contribution to the defense of the Western Hemisphere but also as security to British sea communications and as a potential base for a future land offensive. In French North and West Africa, French troops exist which are potential enemies of Germany, provided they are re-equipped and satisfactory political conditions are established by the United States. Because the British Commonwealth has but few troops available and because of the unfriendly relations between the British and the Weygand regime, it seems clear that a large proportion of the troops of the Associated Powers employed in this region necessarily must be United States troops. In August 1941, during the staff talks that accompanied the conference of the President and the Prime Minister aboard the Prince of Wales, the British staff had mentioned the project as one of the means by which early American intervention would "revolutionize" the military situation. The American planners, in commenting on this point in late September, had advised the Joint Board that the United States did not then have "land forces adequate in strength and suitably equipped for operations in North Africa." They added that the success of such an operation as the United States might launch would depend largely on co-operation by French forces, and that French co-operation was too uncertain to plan on. This remained the American position till the time of the Arcadia Conference.

American planning during 1941 had provided for assembling an expeditionary force for possible use in the South Atlantic during the period after full mobilization. The most ambitious task contemplated for such a force in Joint Board plans under development before 7 December was the taking of Dakar. More recently, the President had drawn special attention to this project. The War Department acted accordingly.

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21Ltr, JPC to JB, 25 Sep 41, sub: Gen Strategy—Review by Br CsoSs, JB 325, ser 729. This statement of American views was superseded by the paper, cited in n. 9, entitled: Tentative U. S. Views on Sub of Br Memo, Dec 18.

22The plan for Dakar being developed before Pearl Harbor bore the code name Black. The code name Black was dropped, apparently because the Navy thought it indicated Africa by association of ideas, and the plan was briefly called Picador and, finally, Barrister. (See draft papers in Black and Barrister Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.)

23Notes, SW, sub: Memo of Decisions at White House, Sunday, Dec 21, 1941, WDCSA 381 (12-21-41) (SS).
General Marshall ordered Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell to Washington with the intention of putting him in command of an expeditionary force to be made ready for an operation against Dakar.\(^{24}\)

Even this operation, according to the Army planning staff, was more than the United States should try.\(^{25}\) Col. Matthew B. Ridgway had the occasion to explain for Vice President Henry A. Wallace why the United States should not carry out the operation. Ridgway explained that

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\ldots\text{difficulties of troop movement and logistical support by sea of the forces required, would in my opinion, make this a very hazardous operation at this time, in view of shipping shortages and the ability of German and German-controlled forces to arrive in that area much more rapidly than ours could.}
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I added that in my opinion there was a psychological factor of tremendous importance. Our first major effort must be insured of success beyond any reasonable doubt, for failure would react to our profound disadvantage at home and abroad.\(^{26}\)

For operations in North Africa, against which these objections applied with even greater force, there was no developed Army-Navy plan, and the President had gone only so far as to say that the area should be studied in preparation for the ARCADIA Conference.\(^{27}\)

Apart from the current lack of means, the War Department staff objected to French North Africa as a theater of operations. The staff held that the landing forces would be fighting at a great disadvantage, since their lines of communication would be exposed to attack through Spanish Morocco, and since lack of port facilities, railroads, and roads would slow the whole operation. The staff was also inclined to object to landings in northwest Africa as a diversionary operation, concluding that even the attainment of the final objective of control of all North Africa, although "tremendously favorable" to the anti-Axis powers, would be only an "indirect contribution to the defeat of the Nazis."\(^{28}\)

After the Prime Minister had made his proposal, a far stronger statement of these views was drawn up by Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, who continued to be Marshall's senior adviser on grand strategy. General Embick objected to the British views on operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean as "persuasive rather than rational" and as "motivated more largely by political than by sound strategic purposes."\(^{25}\) He objected first of all to the assumption that the control of North Africa was of so great strategic importance, dissenting from the "suggestion that Allied occupation of North Africa would restore to the Allies communications through the Mediterranean" and from the "implication that North Africa would afford an advantageous area from which to launch an invasion of Europe." He went on to declare:

It is my conviction that under present conditions North West Africa is a theater far more favorable to the Germans than to ourselves. The British state their man power is exhausted. They propose 55,000 as their contribution to a joint force. This would be merely a token contribution to the Allied force

\(^{24}\) WPD note for rcd, 21 Dec 41, Tab Collab, Book 1, Exec 8.
\(^{25}\) See passage quoted above, p. 18, from study cited \(^{17}\).
\(^{26}\) Memo, Ridgway for Marshall, 23 Dec 41, no sub, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8.
\(^{27}\) Notes cited \(^{n. 23}\).
that would be required if that area becomes a theater of operations prior to the time the German military machine is materially weakened.

He specifically foresaw "continuous and heavy losses" of troop carriers and naval escort which the United States and Great Britain could ill afford and a serious risk of strong counterattack by German forces through Spanish Morocco, at the end of a line of communication "completely protected save for the short passage at the Strait." He concluded by expressing the conviction "that our acceptance of a commitment in North West Africa at this time, would prove to be a mistake of the first magnitude."

Whether or not Marshall shared this view, he was careful not to say. What he had to bear in mind was that the Prime Minister's proposal interested the President. As a political leader the President was obliged to weigh essentially political as well as "strictly" military needs in seeking common ground on which to conduct Allied military operations. Furthermore, the Prime Minister's proposal met one of his own political conditions for military strategy. The President explained that

... he considered it very important to morale, to give this country a feeling that they are in the war, to give the Germans the reverse effect, to have American troops somewhere in active fighting across the Atlantic. To begin "Closing and tightening the ring round Germany" was a course of action obviously well adapted to this end. Throughout the conference the American Chiefs of Staff avoided debate on the soundness of the strategy of encirclement or of the proposed first step in carrying it out, the occupation of North Africa. General Stilwell, who had just begun to study the Dakar operation, was reassigned to this operation.

The Planners' Estimates of the Forces Required

The President's interest in the Prime Minister's proposal made the preparation of a preliminary estimate on operations in French North Africa the first business before the Chiefs of Staff and the planners. On 26 December the planners presented a draft paper on the "Northwest Africa Project," which served to show on what scale the operation would have to be begun, given little or no opposition to the landings and initial occupation and about three months before the Germans could mount a heavy counterattack from Spain. On the critical question of the size of the forces required, the paper was a compromise between American and British views. The American planners estimated the requirements for ground forces during the first three months at a somewhat higher figure than the original British estimate, and the ultimate requirement for both ground and air forces at about three times the figure proposed by the British planners. They compromised on an estimate of requirements for the first three months.

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30 At an Army-Navy meeting early in the conference Marshall noted that he had talked with Embick, who "had sat on the Supreme War Council during the World War and felt that the British greatly exaggerated the importance of North Africa, that even if American troops did go into Casablanca [sic] they would not be covered from attacks by Spanish Morocco." (Conf in Stark's Off, 1130, 27 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Conf (1-28-42) (SS).)
31 Notes, G. C. M. [Marshall], 23 Dec 41, sub: Notes on Mtg at White House with President and Br Prime Minister Presiding, WPD 4402-136.
months of the operation—six divisions (including two armored divisions), supported by a fair sized air force (385 aircraft), and by heavy antiaircraft defenses (114 heavy guns and 252 light guns) for port and base facilities. The American ground forces taking part would be an amphibious division, an armored division, and an infantry division. The American air units (the main body of the air force) would be two pursuit groups, one medium bomber group, one light bomber group, and one observation group. The British would furnish three divisions, three fighter squadrons (forty-eight planes), and the antiaircraft units. British and American forces would each provide their own service units."

Behind this compromise lay a serious disagreement on the concept of the operation. The British originally proposed using only one American division (a Marine division), and about four British divisions during the first three months. The Americans originally proposed using during the same period the equivalent of about one British and six American divisions (including one Marine and two armored divisions). The explanation of the difference was that the American planners anticipated, as the British did not, a need for sending large forces into Algeria before the operation was over. The American planners in effect proposed that U.S. forces should carry out the operation in French Morocco and the British forces in Algeria, as the Prime Minister had indicated. They were willing to agree with the British planners that the initial British landing at Algiers should be on a small scale—one armored brigade (about the same as an American regiment), one infantry brigade group (about the same as an American regiment reinforced), three fighter squadrons, and two antiaircraft regiments. But they anticipated that ultimately the eastward extension of British and American forces from their base on the Atlantic (at Casablanca) would involve large forces. How large, would depend on whether the area to be held would be only the triangle Casablanca—Agadir—Oran, or would include Algeria. Even in the former case, the American planners calculated that a ground force of five infantry divisions and two armored divisions, supported by an air force of seven pursuit groups and six to eight bombardment groups (including three groups of heavy bombers) would be necessary. On this basis, the American estimate called for transporting over 200,000 men to North Africa as against the 100,000 men required in the British estimate. In case the operation were extended further eastward to occupy and hold Algeria, the American planners foresaw the need for a force half again as large—about 300,000 men."

"The American view, as the Army planning staff explained, was that if "the operation is worth undertaking it should be done in sufficient strength to give a reasonable chance of ultimate success." Although the staff did not regard even the forces in the American estimate as large enough to be certain to hold against the

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22 The compromise plan was circulated as Annex 2 to min, CsoS Conf, 26 Dec 41, ABC 337 Arcadia (24 Dec 41), 1. It bore the title: Project—Gymnast, and the code U.S. Serial ABC-4/2. For drafts, see ABC 337 Arcadia (24 Dec 41), 2. The original American and British estimates appear in a typescript entitled: Initial or Three Months Force, filed in envelope with Item 13, Exec 4.

heaviest attack that the Germans might launch, the staff doubted that the Germans considered the area of enough importance to make so heavy an attack, and also pointed out that a force mainly dependent on the Atlantic ports and the rail and road communications therefrom could scarcely be much larger.  

Although it was impossible to do any practical planning by simply splitting the difference between estimates based on two such different views of the North African project, it was necessary for the planners to agree at once on a tentative estimate for submission to the President and the Prime Minister. They therefore settled on a temporary compromise, whereby they presented—as upper and lower limits—two sets of figures for ground forces and a fairly high estimate for air forces (some 1,400 planes) with a qualification that the size of British and French forces would be “affected by the assistance that may be furnished by French and Spanish units in North Africa.” The force was still not large enough, from the American point of view, to achieve the stated objective: “to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy and to open the Mediterranean route.” But by stating this objective, the planners at least made it clear that the force had to be a large one, particularly in air units, which had to be strong enough to undertake “offensive air operations against Axis bases and ports in the Mediterranean area” on which counter-attacks might be based.

The Report of the Shipping Experts

The planners at the same time presented a preliminary study of questions affecting the priority of projects in the Atlantic. The principal one was availability of troopships. Even before the opening of the conference the American staff had been well aware of the shortage of American troop shipping. Possibly the British had not fully realized how little American shipping would be available; if so, they very soon learned. On 24 December, at their first meeting, the British-American planners set up a special subcommittee, on which Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and his adviser on transportation, Col. Charles P. Gross, represented the Army, to investigate shipping requirements and availability of shipping. This subcommittee

34 WPD study, n.d., title: Basis of WPD Est of Forces Req to Hold Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, filed in folder with Item 13, Exec 4.
35 The President asked for an estimate by 26 December for the information of a State Department official who was to leave by Pan American clipper the following day. (Note, Lt Col John T. Lewis [ASGS], for Gen Gerow, 24 Dec 41, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8.) This note recorded a telephone call for General Gerow from General Marshall, who had been notified of the President’s instructions by Under Secretary Welles.

The official referred to apparently was H. Freeman Matthews bearing the President’s and Prime Minister’s instructions for sounding out General Maxime Weygand about returning to North Africa and assuming command there with Allied support. (See (1) William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 209, and (2) William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, Wittlesey House, 1950), p. 75.)
submitted a formal report on 26 December, with only a general statement on the British shipping shortage but with a complete breakdown of all American troop shipping. The total troop lift of existing American flag shipping of all types, including some ships not as yet converted to military use, came to about 200,000 men, but a very great part of it was already committed to maintaining present Army and Navy forces overseas and to sending reinforcements already ordered. The subcommittee calculated that the maximum American troop lift available for new operations in the Atlantic by mid-January would be about 25,000. Additional capacity would gradually become available in the Atlantic for new operations—about 18,000 by 1 February, about 15,000 more by 1 March, and an additional 24,000 by 1 April.39

The three divisions, air forces, and service units that would compose the American part of the planners' estimated three months' force would run well over 60,000 men. On this basis, the planners pointed out in their study on priorities that so far as they could see there would be no prospect of any other major troop movement in the Atlantic for at least three months if the North African operation were undertaken. Similarly, the diversion of British shipping to the operation would "seriously curtail" the projected series of troop movements from the British Isles to the Middle East and thence to the Far East.40

The Relief of British Troops in Iceland and Ireland

These reports, taken together, raised a question to which the Chiefs of Staff and the planners, British and American alike, needed an answer before they could go very far: Should actual preparations for the North African operation, which might or might not be undertaken, take precedence over the loading and dispatch of troops for movement in the North Atlantic? The North African operation would obviously take precedence over other operations in the Atlantic—the occupation of Brazil, the Cape Verde Islands, the Azores, the Canary Islands, and Dakar—which were also contingent on negotiations with foreign powers and for which there would be little or no need if the North African operation were to be launched. The movement of troops to Northern Ireland and Iceland was in a different category. As the British and American staffs had recognized in making their plans earlier in 1941, British forces were already overextended. Any new British commitments overseas would increase rather than decrease the need for American troops in the British Isles and Iceland. The American forces sent to Iceland and Ireland would either add protection against invasion or allow the release of seasoned British troops from the defense of the home islands in order to strengthen British positions in


the Middle and Far East. Although there was no immediate prospect of an invasion of the British Isles, the British could dispatch reinforcements to the Middle and Far East—or undertake the occupation of French North Africa—during the first half of 1942 only by considerably increasing the risk of an invasion of the British Isles during the summer. On these grounds, the American planners not only appreciated but were inclined to emphasize the need for deploying U.S. Army forces in the North Atlantic.

The plan adopted at the outset of the ARCADIA Conference, in accordance with the wishes of the President and the Prime Minister, was to carry through the already planned relief of British troops and U.S. marines in Iceland by a U.S. Army division and to send a force of two or more divisions to relieve the British garrison in Northern Ireland. The Army had at once proceeded to set up a Northern Ireland force (code name MAGNET) composed of the 32d, 34th, and 37th Divisions, with an armored division attached, together with air forces. In addition to releasing British

41 (1) Notes, SW, sub: Memo of Decisions at White House, Sunday, Dec 21, 1941, WDCSA 381 (12-21-41) (SS). The President noted that a force of two divisions or more would go to Northern Ireland. (2) Notes, G. C. M. [Marshall], 23 Dec 41, sub: Notes on Mtg at White House . . . , WPD 4402-136. The initial ARCADIA decision, taken at this meeting, was to send three divisions to Northern Ireland. (3) Min, CsofS Conf, 24 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. Field Marshal Sir John Dill remarked that he understood the Northern Ireland force was to consist of three infantry divisions plus one armored division, and General Marshall agreed.

42 (1) Conf in OCoF S, 0830, 26 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Conf s (1-28-42) (SS). (2) Memo for red, 26 Dec 41, sub: Mg s Held in OCoF S, WPD 4497-22.

Originally the 3d Armored Division was to be sent, but the 1st Armored was substituted a few days later. See memo, GHQ for WPD, 31 Dec 41, sub: Changes in Tr Designations, and note for red, Gen

troops for service in more active theaters, the President and the Prime Minister expected that the arrival of American forces in the British Isles would be encouraging to the British people and hoped that the replacement of British by American forces in Ulster might improve relations with the Irish Free State, which were of considerable practical military importance. The President looked forward to the early relief of the U.S. Marine brigade in Iceland. Admiral King was very insistent on this point, objecting to the further retention on garrison duty of a very sizeable portion of the small U.S. forces then trained for landing operations.

The Army was ready to make the forces for the initial movements available at once. The division sent to Ireland did not need to be fully trained or equipped and therefore could be sent without affecting the Army's readiness to undertake overseas operations. The only thing that delayed the movements was that all U.S. troopships then available in the Atlantic would be needed to transport the U.S. forces required for the initial occupation of French Morocco. Similarly, all available British troop lift would be needed to move the British forces. The specific question before the Chiefs of Staff and the planners was whether all the ships should be held for the North African operation, or whether

43 See also p. 117, below. In recognition of the hope for better relations with the Irish Free State, the War Department first settled upon Maj. Gen. Edmund L. Daley, a corps commander who was of Irish descent and a Catholic, to head the MAGNET Force. General Daley, however, relinquished command of the force when it moved to Northern Ireland. (See conf cited n. 42(1).)

44 See notes and min cited n. 41.

45 Notes cited n. 41(2).
some of them could be used for the movement of troops to Iceland and the British Isles. They thus had the occasion to point out to the President and the Prime Minister that if the North African operation were undertaken, the relief of British troops in Ireland and Iceland would have to be postponed.

The President and the Prime Minister, in their opening conference with the Chiefs of Staff, had given no indication of whether they would give precedence to the projects in the North Atlantic or to the projected North African operation if they had to choose. To be sure, Field Marshal Sir John Dill had said at the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, in answer to a direct question from General Marshall, that the North African project would take precedence over the relief of the British garrisons, but the planners needed a clear declaration of policy. How necessary it was, became evident on the afternoon of 26 December when the Chiefs of Staff and the senior planners met with the President and the Prime Minister to consider the problem.

Sir John Dill and General Marshall in turn explained that there was certainly not

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*Min cited n. 41(3)*
enough shipping to go around. Marshall recommended that ships should be gotten together “and made ready for contingent use.” The President then declared the time was not right to invade North Africa and suggested that, since it was so uncertain when the right time might come, it was worth considering whether they should not go ahead with plans for the movement to Northern Ireland, with the understanding, however, that so long as the ships were in port, they might still be diverted to the North African operation. The Prime Minister strongly questioned the conclusion that there was not enough shipping. Recollecting that during World War I two million men had been moved to France in five months, he asked how it was possible that the United States and Great Britain could not now move a quarter of a million men in three months. He felt that the shipping could be found, and concluded by saying that he would be “frightfully unhappy if he had to adjust between expeditions.” No formal decision was reached at the meeting, but as the rest of the discussion showed, the Chiefs of Staff had in fact made their point, although they did not answer the Prime Minister’s question.

The Army and Navy went ahead, as the President had suggested, to prepare for the first movements to Ireland and Iceland. The British Chiefs of Staff, after corresponding with authorities in London, agreed to Admiral King’s proposal that the U. S. marines in Iceland be relieved on the arrival of the first U. S. Army contingent. On 1 January the President and the Prime Minister formally approved a motion introduced by Marshall to load the first shipments for Iceland and Northern Ireland, on the basis, as stated by the President, that it should be done in “such a manner that these operations could be halted if other considerations intervened.” The ships, which were then being loaded were to sail on 15 January, with 14,000 troops for Northern Ireland and 6,000 for Iceland (4,500 to relieve the marines), but they could be unloaded and used for the North African operation, with six days’ delay, if the decision to do so were taken before 13 January.

As soon as the President and the Prime Minister had reached this tentative decision, the War Department established an Army headquarters in England, under the command of General Chaney, the special Army observer in London, who was designated Commander, United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), to whom the Northern Ireland force (but not the Iceland force) would report. This command was intermediate between the informal “nucleus mission,” of which he had been in charge, and a theater command, which the War Department did not set up until late in the spring.

The Northwest Africa Project Considered as a Military Operation

Having brought to the attention of the President and the Prime Minister the fact

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47 Conf at White House, 1630, 26 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Conf (1-28-42) (SS).
48 Min, 7th mtg CsofS Conf, 31 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.
49 (1) Memo, CofS, no addressee, 1 Jan 42, sub: Initial Atlantic Tr Movmt, WDCSA 381, 1 (SS).
   (2) Rcd, mtg at White House, 1830, 1 Jan 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Conf (1-28-42) (SS).
that there was not enough shipping to go around, the Chiefs of Staff on the next day went over the planning committee's initial report on the North African operation (which had been given the British code name GYMNAST). Both the British and American Air members, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal and Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, were deeply disturbed that so large an air force was allocated. Portal explained

... that in allocating planes, the large strategy must be the primary consideration, rather than local requirements; that in the matter of Greece it was realized that there was an insufficient number of troops and planes, yet those available were allocated despite the expectations that this force would be knocked down. Although this happened, the strategic importance of this operation was great because it delayed the attack on Russia for two months.51

General Marshall made it clear that he did not believe in taking in North Africa the kind of risk that the British had taken in Greece. He was perfectly willing that the paper should go back to the planning committee for further consideration, but he declared—in words reminiscent of Colonel Ridgway's remarks on the Dakar operation—that

... this operation might result in the first contact between American and German troops. Success should not be jeopardized by failure to provide adequate means. A failure in this first venture would have an extremely adverse effect on the morale of the American people.52

The planners, reconsidering their compromise paper in the light of the remarks of Portal and Marshall, could not agree on the scope of the operation and the size of the force it would ultimately require. They reported to the Chiefs of Staff that it was "premature" for them to make any recommendations on those points.53 The Chiefs of Staff in turn recognized that an operation on the scale acceptable to the American staff would have an effect not only on projects in the North Atlantic—the only effect the planners had as yet considered—but also on the reinforcement of positions in the Pacific. On 31 December they returned the subject to the planning committee to be restudied in the wider context of strategy and in the light of the American conviction that the operation, even though it must still assume political preparation, would not rely on the ready collaboration of French forces in North Africa nor on a weak German reaction.54

The study made from this new point of view added to the evidence that any operation the American staff would be willing to undertake was beyond the means available. On the assumption that it was necessary to prepare to meet opposition, the assault convoy must include not only assault troops but also armored units, and the landing forces must at once have air support. They must take airfields and unload large quantities of fuel and essential equipment. The first convoy must include aircraft carriers, to protect the convoy and the initial landings, and, if possible, to carry the first complement of planes to be flown in to the seized airfields. This was only the most important of the new problems of amphibious operations, on which neither the British nor the American planners could speak with any great confi-
idence as yet. How long it would take to land a single convoy at Casablanca was an important factor. The expedition would for a long time be dependent on the port of Casablanca, partly because other Atlantic ports could not take ocean-going vessels, and partly because there would not be enough air and naval cover for more than one port. With the long period for unloading at Casablanca (estimated at ten to fourteen days) went a correspondingly great risk of submarine attacks, especially on aircraft carriers accompanying the assault convoy. The capacity of the port of Casablanca was a limiting factor determining not only how long it would take to unload the assault convoy but also how long it would take to unload the initial three months' forces, supplies, and supporting units through that port. The planners expected this phase to take four months, no matter how many ships were available. Incomplete and conflicting intelligence presented another problem. The military planners did not know what to make of the various reports on the attitude of French leaders and troops and hesitated to plan in ignorance of vital operational data, in particular with reference to airfields.

The experience of dealing with such a problem, although useful, was discouraging. On 4 January Admiral Turner, the senior Navy planner, reported to Admiral Stark and Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, that the planning committee believed that

... it will be impracticable in the near future to capture French North Africa if important resistance is encountered. Therefore, it is considered that no plan should be made for such a project at this time. It is recommended that the Chiefs of Staffs issue a directive on this point.

In the afternoon the problem was discussed at great length, first in a staff meeting of American officers held by the Secretaries of War and Navy and then in an American-British meeting convened by the President and the Prime Minister. At the latter meeting the President and the Prime Minister confirmed the decision of 1 January to go ahead with the first shipments to Northern Ireland and Iceland. As the Prime Minister was well aware, these movements themselves constituted an important, if indirect, contribution to the opening of an offensive in the Mediterranean. He was very emphatic on the need for them and concluded that the planners should go ahead with SUPER-GYMNAST, “but make no diversion of shipping on the Ireland relief; that we should take no real ships from real jobs; and that we could talk about the matter again in a few days.”

The ARCADIA study of the North African operation ended inconclusively. On 10


56 Conf cited n. 55.

57 Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 684–85. “Though few, if any, saw it in this light, this was in fact the first step towards an Allied descent on Morocco, Algeria, or Tunis, on which my heart was set. The President was quite conscious of this, and while we did not give precise form to the idea I felt that our thoughts flowed in the same direction, although it was not yet necessary for either of us to discuss the particular method.”

58 Conf cited n. 55(2). SUPER-GYMNAST was the code name given at ARCADIA to a projected U. S.-British operation in North Africa that would combine the American plan of a landing at Casablanca with the British plan for a landing further eastward on the Mediterranean coast (GYMNAST). GYMNAS was often used loosely to refer to either operation.
January, as a basis for future planning, the British planners reintroduced the estimate for the first three months’ force on which the committee had originally agreed to compromise. Except for the first American and the first and second British convoys, they presented even these estimates as “guesses” of what the task force commander might consider necessary, and the guesses included no estimate of air strength. The British did not propose what, for planning purposes, should be taken to be the total strength required for the operation. Their purpose was in fact only to present “a suggested convoy programme” that would fully utilize the limited port capacity of Casablanca. This schedule indicated that the maximum forces that could be landed (including two convoys to Algiers) during the four months following the first sailings would be some 180,000 troops (about half British and half American).^60^ 

Reinforcement of the Southwest Pacific

At this point in the conference, planning for troop movements in the Atlantic finally converged with planning for troop movements in the Pacific. It then appeared that—quite apart from the availability of troop shipping and the capacity of the port of Casablanca—the proposed shipping schedule was far too ambitious for any North African operation begun before the latter part of May 1942. The factor that actually limited American participation in any North African operation begun before that time would be the shortage of cargo vessels in the Atlantic that would result from the desperate effort to contain the Japanese in the South and Southwest Pacific.^61^ During the conference the American planners had been getting impatient with the protracted study of movements in the Atlantic because it was holding up decision on movements to the Pacific. They expected the Japanese might “overextend” themselves until they had isolated the projected American base in northern Australia.^62^ By the end of the first week of the conference, the British staff, like the American staff, began to show concern over the danger to the northern and eastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand. The British, quite apart from their dismay at the Japanese advances in Malaya and Burma, were obliged to consider the security of Australia and New Zealand, if they were to keep forces from these dominions in North Africa and in India, as they very much wanted and needed to do. The British planners accordingly began to consider sympathetically the American planners’ views. They brought up for discussion the whole question of the defense of the air ferry route from Hawaii to Australia, together with the Navy’s project for establishing a refueling station at Borabora (some 2,300 miles south of Hawaii in the Society Islands which, like New Caledonia, were in the hands of the Free French).^63^ The American planners

^60^ Br plng paper, 10 Jan 42, title: Super-Gymnast [WW (JPG) 2], ABC 337 Arcadia (24 Dec 41), 2.


^62^ (1) Notations by Eisenhower, 1 and 4 Jan 42 entries, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File. (2) Notes on mtg, War Council, 5 Jan 42, WDCSA, SW Confs, Vol II.

^63^ Paper, Br Jt Stf Miss, 30 Dec 41, title: Pacific Islands Air Route—Def Arrangements [MM (41) 234], ABC 337 Arcadia (24 Dec 41), 2.

Three days earlier (27 December) Prime Minister John Curtin, in a signed article in the Mel-
agreed that, besides arranging for local defense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, Samoa, and Borabora, the United States should consider helping Australia and New Zealand with the defense of New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands, if the Australian and New Zealand Governments could not make adequate provision for it.64

While waiting for information on the Fijis and New Caledonia, the War Department was rapidly drafting orders for shipments to the “island bases” in the South Pacific that were the Army’s responsibility.65 The projected garrisons were 2,000 for Christmas Island and 1,500 for Canton Island.66 In the next lower priority came a force of about 4,000 troops, requested by the Navy to garrison a refueling station on Borabora on the convoy route to Australia.67 The orders called for only small Army contingents at these bases, on the assumption, clearly expressed by Marshall, that the Navy would relieve the Army garrisons in case of heavy attack.68 In addition, the Army undertook to send a pursuit group (700 men) to Suva to supplement the New Zealand garrison. The Navy at the same time went ahead with its preparations to garrison Palmyra and American Samoa.

During the closing days of the conference, the American staff also projected additional forces for the Southwest Pacific. In view of the growing possibility of air raids on northern Australia, the first step (using the largest British liners on the Pacific run) was to add antiaircraft units (numbering, with necessary services, about 10,000 troops) to the pursuit units and an air base group (numbering about 6,000) already approved for shipment. These 16,000 troops were in addition to projected shipments of 10,000 air troops.69 A further increase was involved when it appeared that, for the next six months, Australia would have no forces available to send reinforcements to New Caledonia, where there was only a company-sized Australian garrison and some 3,700 ill-equipped Free French troops. The planners regarded this island as the logical target of a Japanese attempt to gain control of the northern and eastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand, because it was large enough to be strongly held and contained important nickel mines.70 Adequate defense for New Caledonia was especially important since the local Free French authorities in control of the island were threatening to prohibit future work on a large airfield there, lest its completion serve as an additional temptation to the Japanese to occupy the island.


64 Min, 6th mtg Jt Plng Com, 3 Jan 42, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2.
65 Memo, WPD for CofS, 4 Jan 42, sub: Tr Mvnts to Pacific Bases, WPD 4571-22.
66 (1) Ibid. (2) D/F, WPD for GHQ, G-3, G-4, and AAF, 10 Jan 42, sub cited n. 65, WPD 4571-22.
68 Notes on mtg, War Council, 5 Jan 42, WDCSA, SW ConfS, Vol II.
69 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Jan 42, no sub, WPD 4630-30. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 9 Jan 42, sub: AA Arty for SUMAC, with attached memos, WPD 4630-20. (3) Memo, WPD for G-3 and G-4, 10 Jan 42, sub: Priority for Mvnt to “X,” WPD 4630-34. (SUMAC and “X” were both code designations for Australia.)
70 Draft rpt, Jt Plng Com to CsofS Com [8 Jan 42], title: Def of Pacific Islands Route, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2. This was a second revision, circulated by the British members.
In anticipation of a decision to send additional U.S. reinforcements to the Pacific, the War Department staff organized a task force of about 16,000 troops (a heavily reinforced infantry brigade, about 10,000 men plus supporting service units), under Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, with a view to their possible employment as a garrison for New Caledonia. Together with this force, the staff also planned to send about 5,000 additional troops for Australia, including air replacements and engineer units urgently requested by General Brett. This convoy brought to about 37,000 the number of Army troops that the American planners were preparing to send at once to the Southwest Pacific, with 10,000 more to follow.

Even before this last addition was made, the proposed shipments to the South and Southwest Pacific exceeded the troop lift then available in the Pacific. The American Chiefs of Staff accordingly asked the British Chiefs of Staff to consider diverting...
troopships from the Atlantic specifically to get reinforcements to Australia with all possible speed. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed to refer the question at once to General Somervell and his British opposite, Brigadier Vernon M. C. Napier, for study and recommendations, and later in the same meeting instructed them to study also the possibility of sending American forces to New Caledonia.73

Under their new directive the shipping experts quickly came forward with a solution that gave unquestioned precedence to American shipments to Australia and British shipments to the Near and Far East, at the expense of the North African operation, the reinforcement of Hawaii, and the movements in the North Atlantic. On the basis of the recommendation of the shipping experts, the American Chiefs of Staff on 12 January proposed to reduce the Iceland convoy of 15 January from 8,000 to 2,500; the Ireland convoy, from 16,000 to 4,100. By using the troop lift thus released, together with the Kungsholm (then allocated to the State Department—troop lift, 2,900) and two American vessels then on the South American run (combined troop lift, over 2,000), the United States could send 21,800 troops to the Southwest Pacific—General Patch's task force and essential ground service units for the Australian force. The United States thus could still keep in readiness on the east coast the Navy combat loading vessels which could lift a Marine division (12,000 men).74

This disposition of American troop shipping did not mean the discontinuance of the North Atlantic convoys. Shipments to Iceland could go on at a rate of as many as 2,500 troops a month. The British planners were willing to recommend arranging British schedules so as to help keep up shipments to Northern Ireland.75 By the end of February over 20,000 troops would be dispatched to Northern Ireland. On this basis, the initial effect in the North Atlantic was to postpone by about a month the release of the first British division in Northern Ireland and the U. S. Marine brigade in Iceland.76

The President and the Prime Minister were by then quite ready to accept these consequences of the evident need to give precedence to the defense of the Southwest Pacific. There was not much question but that, in addition to the effect on deployment in the North Atlantic, the withdrawal of American troopships from the Atlantic would have the effect of postponing a full-scale planned operation in North Africa. The Prime Minister and the President also accepted this consequence, the more readily because the Prime Minister foresaw that the reported arrival of German reinforcements in Africa would postpone the date at which German forces would be pushed back to Tripoli, and because the President had received reports indicating that negotiations with French authorities could be put off for a while. The President was still interested in a North African operation, and wanted to know as definitely as possible when it could begin, so as not to start negotiations

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73 Min, CsofS Conf, 11 Jan 42, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.
74 (1) Min, CsofS Conf, 12 Jan 42, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. (2) Min, conf at White House, 12 Jan 42, sub: SUPER-GYMNAST, GYM-NAST and SUPER-GYMNAST Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.

75 The schedules provided for dispatching to Northern Ireland 7,000 troops by 1 February on the Queen Mary; 9,000 troops 15–20 February on three British transports; and 4,400 troops by 24 February on the George Washington.
76 Min cited n. 74(2).
prematurely, for, as he pointed out, as soon as negotiations were begun the German Government would learn of them. He stressed the need of landing before the Germans would have had time to react, stating that assault forces should actually be loaded before negotiations were begun.77

General Marshall at once answered to the point by observing that the factor limiting American participation in the North African operation would not be transports but cargo shipping.78 The following day the American planners elaborated upon this answer in a report to the Chiefs of Staff. They concluded that the mounting of the full-fledged North African operation would have to await the return from the Southwest Pacific not only of the troop transports—due back about the third week of April—but also of the cargo ships required by the troop movements to the Southwest Pacific—which were not due back till after the middle of May. Furthermore, American participation in any operation that might be mounted earlier would depend on finding eight cargo vessels to match the troop lift provided by the Navy combat loaders. If the interim operation were to be speeded up by diverting troopships from the Hawaii and North Atlantic runs, still more cargo shipping—thirteen to fifteen vessels—would have to be found.79

There was a simple reason why cargo shipping at this point replaced troop shipping as the critical factor. It required far more tonnage to establish forces in a new and largely undeveloped area directly in the path of the main Japanese offensive than to supply the same number of troops sent as reinforcements to areas better developed and less immediately threatened. Once the greater part of American troop shipping was diverted to the garrisoning of the island bases in the South Pacific, the development and local defense of the Australian air base, and the development of air operations north of Australia, the ratio of tonnage to troops greatly increased. General Eisenhower commented, “Somervell (G-4) did a good job finding boats. We’ll get off 21,000 men . . . to Australia; but I don’t know when we can get all their equip. and supply to them. Ships! Ships! All we need is ships!” 80 The great New York convoy that was to leave for the Southwest Pacific was only a part of what was rapidly becoming a major movement of American and British troops for the purpose of containing the Japanese advance. The projected American shipments, besides the 21,000 troops in the New York convoy to the Southwest Pacific, then included the garrisons for the island bases (nearly 8,000) and three convoys from the west coast to Australia—the first (7,000 troops) ready to sail, the second (14,000 troops) to sail at the end of the month, the third (11,000 troops) to sail some time in February.81 The initial shipments required to house and feed these forces, to provide them with guns and ammunition, planes, fuel, and engineer equipment would amount to well over a half-million tons of cargo (over and above what they could obtain locally).

77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
80 Notations by Eisenhower, 12 Jan 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.
81 For the west coast convoys to the Southwest Pacific, see Marshall’s statement in minutes cited n. 74(2). Total projected strength for the Southwest Pacific (including 4,500 troops already in Australia) was then about 59,000 troops.
Apart from the consequences for the timing of the North African operation, the new demands for cargo shipping brought the President and the Prime Minister to another problem. The shipping experts, after making an estimate of cargo shipping, concluded that the effort to contain the Japanese advance would require seven additional cargo ships, and they recommended that the ships be obtained by cutting lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union by about 30 percent during the next three or four months.\textsuperscript{82} This recommendation the President and the Prime Minister would not accept, but they agreed to divert the seven ships to the Army's needs and to leave it up to Mr. Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook to find some way or other of securing equivalent tonnage to meet the scheduled shipments to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{83}

Neither the President nor the Prime Minister gave up their determination to launch the North African operation. They were willing to postpone it until the end of May in order to deal with the Pacific crisis, but if the moment came to act, they were ready to start the operation with what they had. They reaffirmed their position on 14 January, the last day of the conference:

The President then stated that if the Germans should move into the Gymnast area in the interim, the thing to do would be to utilize whatever forces were available.

The Prime Minister observed that in this case we should make a slash with whatever forces were available and, if necessary, operate on the guerrilla basis.\textsuperscript{84}

The American planners could scarcely doubt that once the Japanese offensive was contained, if not before, the North African operation would again become the first question of American-British strategy.

\textsuperscript{82} Min cited n. 74(1).

\textsuperscript{83} Min cited n. 74(2).

\textsuperscript{84} Conf at White House, 1730, 14 Jan 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Conf (1–28–42) (SS).
CHAPTER VI

Army Deployment and the War Against Japan

December 1941–March 1942

During the ARCADIA Conference Japanese forces took Hong Kong (which surrendered on 25 December) and Manila (2 January), began heavy air raids on Rangoon, compelled the troops covering the southernmost part of Malaya to withdraw south of Kuala Lumpur, landed at several points in Borneo and the Celebes, and made their first air attacks on Rabaul. The Japanese had for the time so little to fear on other fronts, and their lines of communication from their southern front to their advance bases in the South China Sea and from there northward to Japan were so short, that they could concentrate forces more quickly than the Allies at any given point. They presumably intended not to pause until they had seized Singapore and Rangoon and the northern approaches to Australia.

An attempt to meet them on equal terms at these points would require Great Britain and the United States, handicapped by lack of a concerted plan and subject to conflicting and urgent demands from other quarters, to expend far more in this area than anyone in Washington or London had proposed before Pearl Harbor. In terms of planes, ships, and escort vessels, Great Britain and the United States would have to exert an effort several times greater than that of which the Japanese were capable. Only then could the Allies counterbalance the advantages that the Japanese had by virtue of their head start, superiority in aircraft carriers, and relatively short interior lines of communication from their production centers to the fronts and between sectors. But the ARCADIA Conference did not take up the proposition, the force of which was more evident with every day that passed, that the Allied position was greatly overextended.

Allied Strategy Against Japan

During the conference, the one general statement on the war against Japan was that introduced by the British Chiefs in their opening statement on American-British strategy. As one of the steps to be taken in 1942 to put the grand strategy into effect, they listed “the safeguarding of vital interests in the Eastern theatre,” with the following elaboration:

The security of Australia, New Zealand, and India must be maintained, and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured.
Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:

a. Hawaii and Dutch Harbour [Alaska].
b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines.
c. Rangoon and the route to China.¹

The British statement entirely omitted one point that remained of interest to the President and the American staff—the future role of the Soviet Union in Far Eastern strategy. Both had acknowledged the fact that the Soviet Government intended to avoid hostilities with Japan and recognized that it was logical for the Soviet Government not to enter into any arrangements with the United States that might have the effect of hastening Soviet involvement.² Nevertheless, it was American policy to lay the basis for American air operations against Japan from Siberian bases,³ and for this use the Army Air Forces proposed to allocate one group of heavy bombers.⁴ The project did not come up during the conference, presumably because the British Government had dissociated itself from the attempt to encourage Soviet collaboration in the Far East.⁵ The President and the Chiefs of Staff did mention the possibilities that in the spring Japan might attack or the Soviet Union might intervene.⁶ The American representatives made two additions to the British statement of Far Eastern strategy, both of which indicated that American views still comprehended future collaboration with the Soviet Union against Japan. To the above-listed three strategic positions to be held in the Far East, the American Chiefs added “the Maritime Provinces of Russia.” At the instance of the U. S. Army Air Forces, the Chiefs also incorporated in the paper a supplement listing air routes to be established and maintained throughout the world, including a route via Alaska to Vladivostok. This was the extent of ARCADIA discussions of the role of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan.⁷

¹ Memo, Br CsofS, 22 Dec 41, sub: Amer-Br Strategy, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2. This is the first version of WW-1, which in the revised form accepted by the American Chiefs (but not submitted to the President and the Prime Minister for approval) acquired the American serial number ABC-4/CS-1.
³ For the statement of the Soviet Government’s position, see above, [p. 85].
⁴ Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Airplane Reqmts for AAF, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8.
⁵ See for example, memo, G-2 for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Russian Present Attitude in the War, WPD 4557-35. This memorandum includes a paraphrase of a message from the American ambassador in London, giving remarks made by Sir Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after a conference with Marshal Stalin. The memorandum stated: “His [Stalin’s] attitude about the Far East is perfectly loyal, and he thought he would be able to help there in the Spring. However, at the moment he doesn’t want to provoke Japan. Therefore Eden thought it would be very unwise to speak to him about air bases for the United States in Siberia.”
⁶ (1) Notes cited n. 2(3). (2) Min, 1st mtg CsofS Conf, 24 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.
⁷ See various drafts of WW-1 (ABC-4/CS-1) under Tab K, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 2.
After listing the positions that the United States and Great Britain must make it their “immediate object” to hold, the British Chiefs had concluded that the “minimum forces required to hold the above” would have to be “a matter of mutual discussion.” This declaration stood in the final version adopted by the British and American Chiefs. But the Chiefs did not proceed to a “mutual discussion” of the dispositions of their forces. They evidently considered it to be contrary to current policy to acknowledge that the United States and Great Britain must write off any of their “vital interests in the Eastern theatre,” or to reckon what it might cost to “safeguard” the others.

For the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia, the British and American planners did compile tables showing “the estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent.” The planners compiled these tables to accompany recommendations drawn up for the Chiefs of Staff, at their direction, on the disposition of forces in the area or due to arrive during January. As directed, the planners considered the alternative assumptions that the Philippines and Singapore would both hold; that Singapore and the Netherlands Indies, but not the Philippines, would hold; and that neither Singapore nor the Philippines would hold. For the interim guidance of the various commands concerned they drew up a resolution adopting all the standing national objectives in the region, without distinction, as Allied strategy. With slight modifications, the Chiefs approved the resolution:

(a) To hold the Malay Barrier... as the basic defensive position in that [Far East] theatre, and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

(b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the theatre, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

(c) To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines’ Garrison.

(d) To maintain essential communications within the theatre.

There was little else they could do. It was the policy of the British Government to assert that Singapore could and would be held, and to conduct on this basis its relations not only with the American Government but also with the Australian Government and the Netherlands Government-in-exile.

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8 Ibid.
9 Annexes to ABC-4/3, 28 Dec 41, title: Supporting Measures for SW Pacific (Far East and Adjacent Regions), ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. This report from the Joint Planning Committee was adopted by the Chiefs on 31 December. As presented, it bore the British serial WW (JPC) 3; as adopted, the serial WW-4.
10 ABC-4/3, 31 Dec 41. The principal changes made in the planners’ draft resolution (contained in ABC-4/3, 28 Dec 41) were the addition of “land” forces to paragraph (a) on defense of the Malay Barrier, and of “and to the defense of India” to paragraph (b).
11 For the declaration of British policy at the conference, see: (1) notes cited n. 2(3); (2) conf in Stark’s Off, 27 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mts and Cons (1-28-42) (SS); and (3) min cited n. 6(2).
12 Cf. Churchill, Grand Alliance. He has omitted (p. 668) the remarks dealing with Singapore in his original paper for the President on the war against Japan. The volume includes (p. 668) a reprint of a message of 25 December 1941 to Prime Minister Curtin of Australia, expressing Churchill’s hope and determination to hold Singapore for some time. In his concluding estimate of 10 January for his Chiefs of Staff (p. 703) he indicated that he still hoped that Singapore would hold out longer than any other Allied position north of Australia. In a later volume Churchill explains that, assuming Singapore Island had been fortified against attack from the mainland, he expected a siege to last at least two months. (Hinge
The policy of the United States was analogous, for it was desirable from the American point of view not to concede in advance the loss of the Philippines or Burma. It was American policy to support the position of General MacArthur in the Philippines as long as possible. It was also convenient to assume that the British, with Chinese help, might hold Burma and thus postpone the difficult decisions that would have to be made, in case Burma were lost, with reference to the American program for the support of China.

**The ABDA Command**

By the time the planners were at work on their study for the Chiefs, the ARCADIA Conference had taken under consideration a proposal for establishing "unified command" in the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia. The conference finally adopted this proposal, setting up the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) Command, whose jurisdiction comprehended the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, and Burma. The Allied commander in the ABDA theater, Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, received for guidance the same comprehensive declaration of Allied aims that the Chiefs had approved, together with an even more hopeful statement of the strategic concept:

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to further preparations for the offensive.

The act of setting up the ABDA Command—though not the definition of strategy nor the listing of forces, which remained unchanged—represented an adjustment to the actual military situation. In agreeing to create the command and present the accomplished fact to the Australian Government, the Netherlands Government-in-exile, and the Chinese Nationalist Government (whose interests were also affected), the conference demonstrated that the British and American Governments were ready and willing to take bilateral action in the field of military affairs, in spite of differences in national policy and notwithstanding the embarrassments they might incur in the fields of domestic and foreign policy.

The proposal to establish "unified command" in the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia originated with General Marshall, who declared, in introducing it, that its

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12 Of Fate, pp. 47 ff.) This is entirely credible, though at some damage to American illusions about the close, effective liaison between British political leaders and their military staffs.

13 The directive to the planners began with the qualification: "Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved . . . ." The planners made their recommendations on dispositions, and the Chiefs adopted them, subject to this qualification. (See ABC-4/3, 31 Dec 41.)
adoption would solve nine tenths of the problems of British-American military collaboration.\(^{14}\) As he explained during the debate that followed, his immediate aim was to place on a single officer responsibility for initiating action to be taken in Washington and London with reference to strategic deployment to and within the area.\(^{15}\) According to Marshall, Wavell was the “logical man,” since he knew India, was “used to moving troops,” and had “been engaged in active operations which included both a successful operation and a setback.” What was no less important, the choice of Wavell served to overcome the fear of the Prime Minister that British forces might be diverted from the defense of Singapore and “wasted” on the Philippines or Borneo.\(^{16}\)

Besides fixing responsibility in the theater for getting Washington and London to act, the Arcadia Conference fixed responsibility in Washington and London, by providing that General Wavell should report to a new British-American military committee that was to be established in Washington. This committee consisted of the senior American officers that had dealt with the British Chiefs during the conference and senior representatives that the British Chiefs would leave behind them. The committee was called the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS).\(^{17}\)

Doubts and misunderstandings greeted both the proposal to set up the ABDA Command and the proposal to place it under the CCS. To General Marshall’s declaration that the whole area from northwest Australia to Burma constituted a “single natural theater,” the Prime Minister objected that a single commander could not control the scattered operations in the vast area. Besides having this objection, he and his Chiefs of Staff were apparently reluctant to place on a British commander the onus of defeat and a burden of recriminations from the various other Allied nations concerned. However, with the help of Mr. Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook and the agreement of the President, General Marshall won the Prime Minister’s assent to the proposal to establish the ABDA theater with General Wavell as its commander.\(^{18}\)

It was as natural for the British to misunderstand General Marshall’s proposal when he first made it as it was for them to accept it when they understood it. He proposed that the Allied commander would have no authority to move ground forces from one territory to another within the theater. During the period of “initial reinforcements” he could move only those air forces that the governments concerned chose to put at his disposal. He would have no power to relieve national commanders.

\(^{14}\) For Marshall’s introduction of the proposal, see: (1) min, 2d mtg CsoS Conf, 25 Dec 41, ABC 337 Arcadia (24 Dec 41), 1; and (2) memo for file, Eisenhower, 28 Dec 41, sub: Notes Taken at Jt Conf of CsoS on Afternoon, Dec 25, in envelope (Data and memos on mtg at White House...), with WPD 4402-136.

\(^{15}\) Min, 4th mtg CsoS Conf, 27 Dec 41, ABC 337 Arcadia (24 Dec 41), 1.

\(^{16}\) The remarks on Wavell appear in conference cited n. 11(2).

\(^{17}\) Annex 2, title: Higher Direction of War in ABDA Area, to ABC-4/5, cited [n. 13(2)]. It was agreed that thereafter the term “Combined” would be used to refer to British-American collaboration.

\(^{18}\) For these transactions, see: (1) min and memo for file cited n. 14; (2) conf at White House, 1630, 26 Dec 41, WDOSA 334 Mtgs and Conf (1-28-42) (SS); and (3) conf cited n. 11(2).

See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 439-78, and Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 644-706.
or their subordinates, to interfere in the tactical organization and disposition of their forces, to commandeer their supplies, or to control their communications with their respective governments. Marshall agreed that the limitations were drastic, but pointed out that what he proposed was all that could then be done, and declared that "if the supreme commander ended up with no more authority than to tell Washington what he wanted, such a situation was better than nothing, and an improvement over the present situation." It was this restricted authority that General Wavell was given over the vast ABDA Command.

When it came to providing for the "higher direction" of the ABDA Command, General Marshall found himself in agreement, not in disagreement, with the British Chiefs of Staff, and it was not the Prime Minister, but the President, who hesitated lest the automatic interposition of professional views on deployment of British and American forces should make it harder rather than easier to reach politically acceptable strategic decisions. When the question of the "higher direction" of the ABDA Command first came up, the President turned for advice to Admiral King, who recommended setting up a special body in Washington to deal only with strategy in the Southwest Pacific, on which the Australian Government and the Netherlands Government-in-exile, as well as the American and British Governments, would be represented.

The President was himself inclined toward this solution. The British Government, on the other hand, meant so far as possible to settle questions of strategic policy in the Southwest Pacific directly with Australian and Netherlands officials in London, and did not want Australian and Netherlands representatives in Washington to take part in British-American deliberations there, although they would, of course, be consulted by American officials and the American military staff in Washington. The British Chiefs of Staff accordingly proposed to put the ABDA commander under the British-American Chiefs of Staff committee in Washington. Admirals Stark and King agreed with Marshall to recommend this solution to the President. The President replied with a "re-draft" of their proposal, in which he reverted to the procedure originally recommended by Admiral King, with the difference that the Washington committee would include representatives not only of the Netherlands and Australia but also of New Zealand.
The Chiefs of Staff stuck to their original proposal, modifying it in form but not in essence. They explained their adherence to it partly on the ground that it would be quicker and less confusing not to duplicate in Washington the machinery already in use in London for consulting the Dominions and Netherlands Governments. They also believed that the British-American Chiefs of Staff committee in Washington was peculiarly qualified to make recommendations on the questions that must be brought before the President and the Prime Minister—the provision of additional reinforcements, major changes in policy, and departures from the basic directive to the ABDA Supreme Commander. Sir Dudley Pound, they added, had just talked to the Prime Minister and had come away with the impression that he would accept this solution. The President, after talking it over with the Prime Minister, announced that he, too, would accept it.

Meanwhile, the British had arranged for General Wavell to go to Java to assume command as soon as possible. On 10 January he set up temporary headquarters at Batavia. On the same day the British Chiefs proposed and the American Chiefs agreed that the British Government should ask the Australian and Netherlands Governments to authorize General Wavell to take command of their forces in the area even though those governments were not satisfied with the idea of making him responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a body on which they were not represented. General Wavell assumed command on 15 January (G. M. T.), although he was "not yet in a position to establish office or exercise sector operational control."

Loss of Malaya, Fall of Singapore, and Ground Force Dispositions

Within a month after the Arcadia Conference, as the Japanese offensive continued all along the extended "front" of the ABDA Command, it became evident that the British and American programs of reinforcement for the Far East must be reconsidered. The development that first called for decision was the collapse of the British position in Malaya. After the capture of Kuala Lumpur, new Japanese landings in the rear of British positions, continued Japanese infiltration along the
front, and heavy Japanese pressure at weak points quickly undid successive attempts to hold a line across the peninsula in Johore Province. By the end of January the main body of the defending troops had been evacuated to the island of Singapore. A week later the Japanese, strongly supported by planes and artillery, established a beachhead on the island. Thereafter, they rapidly repaired the causeway, drove into the town of Singapore, and, finally, on 14 February gained complete control of the water reservoirs of the island. On 15 February the British garrison surrendered.

The retreat from the mainland to the island of Singapore at the end of January resulted in changes in plans for disposing ground forces assigned to the ABDA Command. It was too late to do anything about the 18th British Division, one brigade of which had arrived at Singapore on 13 January and the other at the end of the month, or about the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade, which had also arrived at the end of the month. But there were still large forces being diverted from the Middle East to Malaya whose disposition was to be considered—the British 7th Armoured Brigade, due to arrive in February, the 7th Australian Division, due at the end of February, and the 6th Australian Division, due in March. The destination of these troops was changed to the Netherlands Indies. The 7th Armoured Brigade was to proceed to Java; with the agreement of the Australian Government, the 7th Australian Division was to proceed to Sumatra and the 6th to Java.

When the fall of Singapore became imminent, it was obvious that further changes must be made. The first sign was a report sent by General Wavell on 7 February, after his return from Burma, that he was trying to divert “all or part” of the 7th Armoured Brigade to Burma, since he had been impressed with the need for armored troops there at that season, when the rice fields were dry. On 12 February Washington learned that he had ordered this change. There remained the question of the two Australian divisions (and a possible question of the disposition of a third Australian division, the 9th, which was also due to be returned from the Middle East). On 13 February, in anticipation of the early fall of Singapore and in view of the movement of an escorted Japanese convoy toward southern Sumatra, General Wavell cautiously opened the question of conceding the loss of Sumatra and, in turn, of Java, and diverting one or both of the Australian divisions to Burma or Australia. He remarked that this course would be advantageous “from purely strategic aspects,” but would “obviously have the most serious moral and political repercussions.” In conclusion, he declared, “We shall continue with present plans until situation enforces changes. This message gives warning of serious change in situation which may shortly arise necessitating complete reorientation of plans.”

On 16 February Wavell sent to London a long report on the situation, in which he presented the case for accepting the loss of Java.

To sum up, Burma and Australia are absolutely vital for war against Japan. Loss of Java, though severe blow from every point

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31 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsooS, 7 Feb 42, ABDA 00884, A. W. 7, OPD file of msgs to and from ABDA (hereafter cited as OPD ABDA Msg File).
32 Msg, WO to Br Army Stf, Washington, 12 Feb 42, 72057, OPD ABDA Msg File.
33 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsooS, 13 Feb 42, ABDACOM 01156, CCOS 7, OPD ABDA Msg File.
of view, would not be fatal. Efforts should not therefore be made to reinforce Java which might compromise defense of Burma or Australia.

He continued:

Immediate problem is destination of Australian Corps. If there seemed good chance of establishing Corps in island and fighting Japanese on favourable terms I should unhesitatingly recommend risk should be taken as I did in matter of aid to Greece year ago. I thought then that we had good fighting chance of checking German invasion and in spite results still consider risk was justifiable. In present instance I must recommend that I consider risk unjustifiable from tactical and strategical point of view. I fully recognize political considerations involved.

Wavell then recommended that the 7th Australian Division, which was approaching Ceylon, and also, if possible, the 6th, should be diverted to Burma rather than to Australia, on the following ground:

Presence of this force in Burma threatening invasion of Thailand and Indo-China must have very great effect on Japanese strategy and heartening effect on China and India. It is only theatre in which offensive land operations against Japan [are] possible in near future. It should be possible for American troops to provide reinforcement of Australia if required.³⁴

The Decision To Send the 41st Division to Australia

Sending American ground forces to Australia, as General Wavell suggested, would serve much the same purpose as sending American ground forces to the British Isles. The arrival of the first American ground forces in Australia, as in the British Isles, would be reassuring, and would have the same practical effect of releasing Imperial ground forces for combat or police duty in the Middle East and India, to which it was inexpedient to assign American ground forces.

The policy of the War Department, during and after the Arcadia Conference, had been to postpone decisions on the commitment of Army ground forces to Australia. The planners, trying to anticipate the disposition of Army divisions during 1942, had concluded that two infantry divisions would probably be sent to the Southwest Pacific.³⁵ But in the opinion of the senior plans and operations officer for the area, General Eisenhower, this development would be contrary to War Department policy:

The War Department concept of present and future Army participation in the ABDA Theater involves an Air Corps operation, exclusively. All other types of forces, auxiliary services and supplies dispatched to the area have as their sole purpose the support of the Air contingent. We should resist any expansion of this concept, regardless of the size the air operation may eventually assume or of the number and types of supporting troops.³⁶

The only American ground force then present in the ABDA Command was a partly equipped brigade of field artillery, on its way to the Philippines, that had arrived at

³⁴Msg, Wavell to CIGS and Prime Minister, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 01288, OPD ABDA Msg File. Part of Wavell's message is quoted in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 140-41.

³⁵(1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 11 Jan 42, no sub, Tab Misc, Book 2, Exec 8. (2) Memo, WPD for Board of Economic Warfare, 17 Jan 42, sub: Australia as Base of Supplies and Opns, WPD 4630-41.

³⁶Draft memo, D. E. [Eisenhower] for CofS, n.d., sub: WD Contl of Australian Opns, Item 27, Exec 10. This penciled draft, in General Eisenhower's hand, was written some time in late January or early February 1942. It is filed with an extremely interesting personal letter to Eisenhower and strategic estimate for WPD from Lt. Col. Willard G. Wyman, and copies of later papers of Eisenhower on grand strategy.
Brisbane on 22 December with the Pensacola convoy. The brigade had gone no farther than Port Darwin, where it had been broken up. One of its regiments, the 147th Field Artillery, was assigned to the defense of Port Darwin, which had been made part of the ABDA Command. The 2d Battalion of the 131st Field Artillery Regiment, part of the Texas National Guard, had been moved to Java. The remaining battalion and headquarters of the 148th Field Artillery Regiment were under orders to defend Kupang, on the island of Timor.

The War Department also kept in mind the possibility that General Patch’s task force, aboard the large convoy that sailed from New York on 22 January, might on its arrival in Australia be assigned to Australia or in the ABDA area, in case of emergency, instead of being transshipped to New Caledonia.

On 14 February, the day after Wavell’s warning message, came an abrupt change in War Department policy—a decision to send reinforcements of ground and service troops to Australia. The original troop list, presented by General Eisenhower and orally approved by General Marshall, called for one reinforced infantry brigade and 10,000 service troops. The staff soon revised the list and proposed, instead, to send to Australia 8,000 service troops, one tank destroyer battalion of 800 men, and one triangular division (15,000 troops). General Marshall agreed, and selected the 41st Division, under Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller. The first movement orders were issued at once.

To get the ships for the movement General Marshall appealed to the White House. He telephoned Hopkins on 14 February that the Army was short of troop shipping for 19,000 men and the “necessary complement” of cargo ships. Mr. Hopkins answered that he “would work on it.” After a conference at the White House, Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator, undertook to furnish the additional ships over and above what the Army and Navy “could scrape together.” General Somervell, in reporting the result of the conference, announced that he expected to have arrangements completed by 16 February. By that date shipping had been found for 20,000 troops, enough for

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37 See msg, Gen Wavell to Lt Gen V. A. H. Sturdee [Chief, Australian Army Gen Stf], 31 Jan 42, ABDACOM 00576, OPD ABDA Msg File, for plans to send the 148th Field Artillery Regiment (minus one battalion) to Timor. The convoy with reinforcements for Timor, escorted by the U.S. cruiser Houston and the destroyer Peary, finally set out on 15 February, but had to turn back because of heavy air attacks. (Msg, Wavell to Marshall, 16 Feb 42, ABDACOM 01308, OPD ABDA Msg File.)

Wavell assigned the 147th Field Artillery Regiment to Port Darwin and requested that it should be left there, even though it involved a change in the plans of the War Department, which had intended to use one of the regiments in General Patch’s task force. The War Department agreed to do so. (1) Msg, Wavell to Marshall, 14 Feb 42, ABDACOM 01173, Vol 1, Item 11, Exec 2. (2) Msg, Marshall to Wavell, 14 Feb 42, No. 130, WPD Msg File 9, 890.)

all the troops that the War Department wanted to send, except for one regiment of the 41st Division. By 19 February, shipping for this regiment, too, had been made available, and the staff directed it to be shipped.

British and American political and military authorities had meanwhile been considering General Wavell's recommendations. It was evidently necessary to concede at once the loss of south Sumatra, the Japanese having already established themselves at Palembang, and to establish a new line of defense across the Indian Ocean—Australia, Ceylon, and Burma. Authorities in Washington and London both urged that the Australian Government should consent to the temporary diversion to Burma of the 7th Australian Division, on the understanding that the 6th and 9th Divisions would be returned to Australia.

The Australian Government refused, in spite of the appeals of the President and the British Prime Minister. The prospects in Burma were most uncertain. The Japanese had crossed the Salween River, and the British command in Burma had just given the order (on 19 February) to abandon the line of the Bilin River and fall back across the Sittang, which, although more defensible, was also the last barrier before Rangoon. The Australian Prime Minister, after summarizing for Churchill what Australia had already done to support the ABDA Command, recapitulating the agreements with reference to returning Australian divisions, and referring to the dangers then facing Australia, stated the reasons of the Australian Government for refusing to divert the 7th Division to Burma:

Notwithstanding your statement that you do not agree with the request to send the other two divisions of the A.I.F. Corps to Burma, our advisers are concerned with Wavell's request for the corps and Dill's statement that the destination of the Sixth and Ninth Australian Divisions should be left open as more troops might be badly needed in Burma. Once one Division became engaged it could not be left unsupported and inferences are that the whole corps might become committed to this region or there might be a recurrence of the experiences of Greek and Malayan campaigns. Finally in view of superior Japanese sea power and air power it would appear to be a matter of some doubt as to whether this division can be landed in Burma and a matter for greater doubt whether it can be brought out as promised. With the fall of Singapore, Penang and Martaban, the Bay of Bengal is vitally vulnerable to what must be considered the superior sea and air power of Japan in that area. The movement of our forces to this theatre, therefore, is not considered a reasonable hazard of war, having regard to what has gone before and its adverse results would have gravest consequences on morale of Australian people. The Government, therefore, must adhere to its decision.

The doubts of the Australian Government, which the British Chiefs of Staff had
come to share, were soon borne out by the disastrous Battle of Sittang Bridge (on 22–23 February), which was followed by the evacuation of Rangoon and the retreat northward of the defending armies.47

The action then taken by the United States, though it did not affect the immediate issue in Burma, established a policy that had a much wider application: that of American intervention, based on American aid, in settling the future disposition of Australian (and New Zealand) ground forces in the Middle East and India. Roosevelt, in appealing for Curtin’s agreement on the specific issue, clearly set a precedent. In explanation of the American decision “to send, in addition to all troops and forces now en route, another force of over 27,000 men to Australia,” the President declared that the Allies must “fight to the limit” for the two flanks, “one based on Australia and the other on Burma, India and China,” and continued:

Because of our geographical position we Americans can better handle the reinforcement of Australia and the right flank.

I say this to you so that you may have every confidence that we are going to reinforce your position with all possible speed. Moreover, the operations which the United States Navy have begun and have in view will in a measure constitute a protection to the coast of Australia and New Zealand.

The President also inserted a statement of the belief that, given the Allied forces in the area and en route, the “vital centers” of Australia were not in immediate danger, notwithstanding the speed with which the Japanese were moving. This message established in its simplest form the view of

strategy embodied in the decision to send the 41st Division to Australia.48

*The Isolation of Java and Air Force Dispositions*

During the first three weeks of February, while the Japanese took Singapore and occupied southern Sumatra, they also undertook, with complete success, an air offensive to isolate Java. Given the extent of the island of Java, the only chance of defending it lay in the possibility that Allied naval and air action north of Java might gain time to allow the development of an Allied fighter air force in Java strong enough to control the air over the island and the approaches thereto. This aim achieved, Allied reinforcements could continue to move north from Australia, and Allied bombers could prevent the Japanese from landing and supporting large ground forces in Java.

*Attempt to Move Pursuit Planes to Java*

The development of a fighter command in Java, around the nucleus of the small, ill-equipped Netherlands Air Force, which had sought but had not received modern equipment from the United States and Great Britain, depended on the early arrival of reinforcements. The defense of Malaya and of Singapore and the approaches thereto claimed all British fighter reinforcements. The only hope was that the American pilots and the crated P-40’s that arrived in Australia could be moved, by one means or another, to Java. The attempt to move these planes to Java took

47 For views of Br Chiefs, see msg, Br Csofar to Jt Stf Miss, 21 Feb 42, COS (W) 70, OPD ABDA Msg File.

48 Msg, President to Curtin, 20 Feb 42, No. 330, OPD ABDA Msg File.
precedence over the fulfillment of the urgent needs of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), which was quite inadequate to defend Port Darwin and the northeastern approaches to Australia.\(^9\)

By early February about 300 P-40’s had arrived in the Southwest Pacific.\(^50\) The program under which these planes had been shipped, initiated before the ARCADIA Conference on the assumption that they would be transshipped or flown to the Philippines, had been increased early in the conference to provide about 330 P-40’s.\(^51\) During January this program had been further increased to provide, all told, about 640 pursuit planes, most of the increase being P-39’s (including P-400’s, an early inferior variant of the P-39 designed for export).\(^32\) The P-39’s and the balance of the P-40’s were due to be shipped during the next few weeks.\(^53\)

The immediate problem was not the lack of planes in Australia, but the want of preparations for getting them into Java. It would take so long to make these preparations that there was no choice but to try to move the planes to the front a few at a time, in violation of every principle laid down in Air Corps doctrine, and notwithstanding the statement of policy hopefully incorporated in General Wavell’s directive:

The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized.\(^54\)

The American command in Australia attempted to assemble the pursuit planes at Brisbane, where there were as yet neither the trained men nor the tools and spare parts for this task, and to ferry them to Java by way of undefended, unfamiliar fields no less ill-equipped to service them—Port Darwin, Kupang (Timor), and Waingapu (Sumba). On 25 January the first thirteen

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\(^{9}\) For War Department policy on allocations of aircraft between ABDA Command and the RAAF in early February, see: (1) msg, Marshall to Wavell for Brett, 5 Feb 42, No. 77, Tab ABDA, Book 3, Exec 8; (2) memo, WPD for TAG, 6 Feb 42, sub: Far Eastern Sit (this contained msg for Maj Gen Julian F. Barnes); and (3) memo WPD for TAG, 6 Feb 42, same sub (this contained a paraphrase for General Wavell of the message sent to Barnes). Last two in Tab ABDA, U. S. Reps, Book 3, Exec 8.

\(^{50}\) Memo [WPD] for CofS, 6 Feb 42, sub: Subs for Poss For Discussion Other Than Mentioned by You on Tel, Tab Misc, Book 3, Exec 8. This figure corresponds to the following breakdown by shipments:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Number} & \text{Ship} \\
18 & \text{Blomfontein (Pensacola convoy)} \\
55 & \text{Polk} \\
67 & \text{Mormacsun} \\
50 & \text{Coolidge and Mariposa (12 Jan convoy)} \\
111 & \text{Hammondsport}
\end{array}
\]


\(^{51}\) For the program initiated in mid-December, see above, Ch. IV.

For the totals allocated by the end of December, see: (1) Annex I, min, 2d mtg CofS Conf, 25 Dec 41, ABC 357 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1; (2) memo, Col Edgar P. Sorensen (for CofAS) for ACofS WPD, 27 Dec 41, sub: Sum of Aircraft Currently Assigned to or Destined for “X,” WPD 4630-6; and (3) table annexed to ABC-4/3, 31 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1.

\(^{52}\) For the totals allocated during January and February, see WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).

\(^{53}\) On 3 February the AAF announced projected shipments during the month, including 19 P-40’s and 212 P-39’s (which presumably included P-400’s). (WPD Daily Sum, 3–4 Feb entry, copy in Exec 7.) The shipments announced by AAF on 23 February as then en route actually exceeded these totals. They included 259 P-39’s and 48 P-40’s. (WPD Daily Sum, 23–24 Feb entry.)
planes arrived at Surabaja. By the end of January, before any others had even set out from Brisbane, Wavell warned that the Japanese might soon interdict this route and asked whether in that event he might have a carrier to move planes to Java. The reality of the danger was borne home by daily reports of enemy air attacks over Java, Bali, and Timor, one of which (on Bali, 5 February) destroyed the greater part of a second flight of P-40's en route to Java.

Besides these first two flights, three others took off from Port Darwin. The third, which left on 9 February, met bad weather conditions, and all the P-40's crashed en route. The fourth, leaving on 11 February, got through to Java to join the survivors of the first and second flights. The fifth took off from Port Darwin on 19 February and turned back because of bad weather conditions. All but one of its planes were shot down in the overwhelming air attack on Port Darwin that day. Several planes on the ground and six ships in the harbor were also destroyed, eight other ships damaged, and base and port facilities wrecked. This attack closed the last route for flying pursuit planes to Java.

The CCS had ruled out Wavell's request for an aircraft carrier to bring planes within flying distance of Java, with the possible exception of the British carrier Indomitable, which was due in the theater at the end of the month with a load of Hurricanes. The attack on Port Darwin conclusively disposed of the alternative of shipping planes from northern Australia. The one way left of getting pursuit planes to Java (at least before the arrival of the Indomitable) was to ship them from Western Australia to southern Java (Tjilatjap). On 9 February Wavell had announced that by this route the British ship Athene would take in crated planes, and the American seaplane tender Langley would carry in assembled planes.

By 19 February ABDA headquarters was prepared to acknowledge that the situation in Java was irretrievable. Even before receiving news of the raid on Port Darwin of that day, Wavell discounted the possibility of getting reinforcements from Port Darwin, in view of enemy landings in Bali (begun on 17 February), which commanded the ferry route. To offset the increasingly high attrition to be expected as the Allied force in Java dwindled were the prospects of supply by the Langley, which was admittedly "hazardous," and of supply by the British carrier Indomitable, which seemed "doubtful and late." Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, the ABDA air chief, es-

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55 For this enterprise, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 384–86.
56 Msg, Wavell to CCS, 30 Jan 42, ABDA 00522, OPD ABDA Msg File.
58 For a documented, detailed account, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 387–88, 393.
59 For this enterprise, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 384–86. Owing, apparently, to an error in transmission, Wavell understood that the United States would furnish a carrier, and the CCS had to send a second message to correct the mistake. See (1) msg, Wavell to CCS, 9 Feb 42, ABDA 00945; (2) msg, CCS to Wavell, 12 Feb 42, DBA 15; and (3) msg, Wavell to CCS, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 01316. All three in OPD ABDA Msg File.
60 Msg cited n. 59(1).
estimated that at the "present scale of fighting" the Allied fighter force in Java would "not remain effective beyond next two weeks." 63

What to do in this situation the CCS left up to General Wavell to the extent of giving him "discretion to augment defence of Java with available naval forces and with U. S. aircraft now at your disposal assembling in Australia." The same message also contained instructions governing Allied troops then in Java:

JAVA should be defended with the utmost resolution by all combatant troops at present in the Island for whom arms are available. Every day gained is of importance. There should be no withdrawal of troops or air forces of any nationality and no surrender. Amendments to these instructions caused by emergency changes in the situation should be referred to Washington, and if this is not possible will be decided by you on the spot.62

The purpose of this paragraph of instructions was to settle policy on evacuation, but Wavell adopted it as a basis for deciding on 22 February to send the Langley to Java.63

This decision came somewhat unexpectedly, since he had acknowledged the day before that as a result of the heavy losses in the fighting of 20 February the air forces left in Java—which he estimated as fewer than forty fighters, about thirty medium and dive bombers, and ten heavy bombers—could "only hope to fight for few more days at most." He had apparently given up hope of getting in any more planes, unless by the Langley.64 His decision of 22 February to send the Langley to Java, he announced with the following explanation:

This may enable us to keep going until arrival aircraft from INDOMITABLE but in absence of continual and increasing flow of fighters and bombers this is likely only to gain certain time but is in accordance with your instructions that every day is of value.65

Later on during the day Wavell sent a longer explanation to the same effect:

To carry out instructions in your D. B. A. 19, it is essential that we should have fighter and bomber reinforcements. I have accord-

61 Msg, Wavell to CCS, 19 Feb 42, ABDA 01679, repeated as 01987, CCOS 15, OPD ABDA Msg File.

62 Msg, CCS to Wavell, 20 Feb 42, DBA 19, OPD ABDA Msg File.

63 Both this paragraph of instructions (paragraph 1 of the above cited message) and the quoted authorization to commit naval forces and American planes to Java (paragraph 2 of the above cited message) were adopted from a message from London containing the recommendations of the Pacific War Council. (See msg cited n. 61(1).)

The CCS soon liberalized the instructions and made their application even clearer. See (1) msg, CCS to Wavell, 21 Feb 42, DBA 20; (2) msg, Br Jt Stf Miss to Br CsoFS, 21 Feb 42, JSM 58; and (3) msg, CCS to Wavell, 22 Feb 42, DBA 22. All three in OPD ABDA Msg File.

64 Both paragraph of instructions in DBA 19 (cited n. 62) was slightly changed from the recommendation on which it was modeled, drawn up by the Pacific War Council (in COS (W) 58, cited n. 61(1)). The recommendations of the Pacific War Council were repeated to Wavell (as 71398 MO l), in spite of the attempt of the CCS to forestall this action. Wavell may have inferred from the changes in wording that the instructions of the CCS did not apply simply to the problem of evacuating forces from Java.

65 Msg, Wavell to CCS, 22 Feb 42, ABDA 01996, CCOS 17, OPD ABDA Msg File. The Langley sailed the same day.
ingly ordered LANGLEY to proceed Java as soon as possible to disembark fighters and BRETT is ordering few bomber aircraft immediately available from Australia to proceed. Hope also that aircraft from INDOMITABLE will be sent if still in time. With these reinforcements valuable time may be gained by defence JAVA and blows inflicted on enemy naval and air forces. Otherwise our air force will practically disappear within very short period.66

The real meaning of the decision came out in a third message of 22 February, which reported the conference Wavell and Brett had had with the governor general of the Netherlands Indies, with reference to the liquidation of Wavell's headquarters. In this report, Wavell declared: "It should be made quite clear to Dutch that withdrawal of ABDA HQ will NOT repeat NOT mean stoppage of warlike supplies to JAVA and public announcement to this effect should be made." 67 About the only "warlike supplies" of any consequence that were immediately available for movement were American planes. Wavell announced that he was sending Brett to Australia the next day to "hasten despatch of air reinforcements from Australia." 68 The War Department for a few days continued to avoid making the decision between the desperate hopefulness of the Netherlands command and the evident hopelessness of the situation in Java. On 23 February command in the ABDA area passed to the Dutch. On 25 February, in answer to a question from Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, who had thereupon taken command of American forces in Australia, the War Department replied:

The purpose of the War Department to support the NEI defense by every practicable means has not repeat not been changed. The extent to which pursuit planes should be transferred to Java must be determined by you in accordance with the desires of the ABDA Commander, the availability of shipping, and the practicability of landing these planes in Java and operating them effectively therefrom.69

The "practicability of landing these planes in Java and operating them effectively therefrom" was soon thereafter decided. The Langley, with its thirty-two P-40's, went down off Java on 27 February as a result of several direct hits by enemy bombers. The pilots were picked up by two other ships, neither of which arrived in port. The Sea Witch, one of four ships from Melbourne that had made a rendezvous with the Langley at Fremantle, had also been ordered to Java, rather than to Burma, its original destination. The Sea Witch got through with its cargo of twenty-seven crated P-40's, all of which had to be thrown into the sea during the evacuation of Java, in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the Japanese. The War Department then finally agreed with General Brett

66 Msg, Wavell to Br CsoS and CCS, 22 Feb 42, ABDA 02047, A.W. 12, OPD ABDA Msg File.
67 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsoS, 22 Feb 42, ABDA 02076, CCOS 19, OPD ABDA Msg File.
68 Ibid. This and other messages indicate how great the pressure was on Wavell to do something to placate authorities in the Netherlands Indies, including Dr. H. J. van Mook, the lieutenant governor, who had just returned from the United States. They continued to insist that the situation in Java was not irretrievable. See, for example: (1) msg, Lt Gov van Mook to Gen Marshall, 22 Feb 42, no number; (2) msg, Dutch CinC Java to Netherlands Govt in London, quoted in full in msg, Br CoF S to Jt Stf Miss, 24 Feb 42, W. 83; (3) msg, Br CsoS to Jt Stf Miss, 25 Feb 42, COS (W) 82; and (4) msg, Lt Gen H. ter Poorten to Gen Marshall, 28 Feb 42, no number. All four in OPD ABDA Msg File.
that no more pursuit planes should be shipped to Java unless there were a change in the situation that promised "greater safety in transit." Thus ended the attempt to build up a fighter command in Java, an attempt that all told had cost perhaps half of the American pursuit planes and a great many of the pilots that had by then arrived in Australia, and that had put into action for about a fortnight one steadily dwindling provisional squadron in Java.

Transfer of Air Units to Burma and India

Even while the attempt to send fighter reinforcements to Java was beginning ABDA headquarters, the CCS, and the War Department began to prepare against the probability that it would fail. On 7 February General Brett, repeating and confirming General Wavell’s report of the desperate situation of the fighter command in Java, went on to outline the problem of air operations in the area for consideration by the War Department "in connection with future operation." He understood that "every effort must be made to retain and maintain a strong defensive force in Java." But he warned the War Department:

To protect our air striking force it may become necessary to readjust our idea of the method of hopping the Barrier and eventually taking up the offensive. . . . It may be necessary to work from the flanks.

Brett’s plan was to base air striking forces, with adequate protection by pursuit planes, in India and Burma and at Port Darwin. On operations based in India and Burma he observed:

Burma can be occupied in depth with India as bases from which fighters can easily be flown to fields in North Burma and even into China. Airfreight transport would be more usable. Water transport might be difficult. The Burma Road and other supply lines leading north from Rangoon would require energetic American action. The air operations would have tendency to (one) relieve pressure on Singapore by action on Bangkok and Saigon (two) give a direct line of action toward Formosa, Shanghai and eventually Japan.

ABDA headquarters was especially interested in the development of an American bomber force based on Burma. To prepare for the reception of such a force, as part of the American Volunteer Group, was the mission that had originally taken General Brett to the Far East. These preparations the ABDA Command had resumed. General Wavell had announced on returning from Rangoon on 26 January that he proposed to send a squadron of long-range bombers to operate from Burma, where they would have "excellent targets." On 7 February, returning from a second visit to Burma, Wavell announced that he had taken with him and had left in Burma an American officer, Col. Francis M. Brady, to "go into questions of operation of [heavy bombers from . . .

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70 Msg, Marshall to Brett, 1 Mar 42, No. 478, WPD Msg File 10, 31. On 28 February Brett replied to the War Department message of 25 February (No. 424) that he considered further shipments of pursuit planes "unwarranted wastage." For Brett’s message of the 28th (No. 391) to which the War Department referred in the message of 1 March, see OPD ABDA Msg File.

71 See Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 387–92, 397–99, 411.


73 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. II.

74 Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br CsoFS, 26 Jan 42, ABDA 00357, OPD ABDA Msg File.
Burma and China." As indicated by Wavell's announcement, made at the same time, that he intended to divert the 7th Armoured Brigade from Java to Burma, the immediate concern of ABDA headquarters was then with the reinforcement of Burma.\(^{75}\)

The War Department fell in with the idea of transferring heavy bombers from Australia to Burma and suggested, "in view of the urgency of this situation and the necessity for earliest possible action," that Wavell also transfer from Australia the necessary ground crews and supply troops, rather than wait six weeks or more for them to come from the United States. The ABDA Command already had personnel for two groups (the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups) and could expect another (the 43d), soon to sail from the United States. The War Department proposed he should send the 19th Group to Burma. There it could be built up with bombers being flown via the South Atlantic and central Africa, of which thirty-three were then en route. The War Department left it to him to decide whether the depleted American Volunteer Group (operating in Burma under agreement with Chiang Kai-shek) could provide the necessary fighter protection until the arrival of replacements then on the way (a shipment of fifty P-40's due to have arrived at Takoradi, Gold Coast, where they would be assembled and flown to the Far East, and another shipment of thirty pursuit planes that had just sailed for Karachi), or whether the War Department in addition should reassign to Burma "one of the four pursuit groups you have or will have in Australia."\(^{76}\)

In spite of this general agreement, plans in the theater waited on events and on decisions from Washington. On 16 February, following the fall of Singapore, General Brett announced, in response to the proposal of the War Department, that he was planning to send Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton to Burma "to prepare for any force which you may organize to meet situation there" and that he would "make effort to send maintenance crews to India and Burma to assist in preparation for possible arrival of combat equipment."\(^{77}\)

Brett's plan was to send to Burma or to Calcutta most of the ground units of the 7th Bombardment Group, those of the 51st Pursuit Group (less one squadron) together with Headquarters Squadron of the 35th Pursuit Group, and air base units, all of which he had ordered moved from Melbourne to Fremantle in a convoy of four ships. Besides these units, all told nearly 3,000 troops, the heavy convoy also carried bombs, ammunition, and thirty-seven crated P-40's. This convoy he expected to arrive about the middle of March. He was also making tentative plans to divert to Akyab both the B-17's en route from the United States and those committed to Java, having heard from Colonel Brady in Burma that a squadron of B-17's could operate for a short while from Akyab with British supplies and munitions, maintenance crews, and fighter and antiaircraft protection.\(^{78}\)

The convoy finally sailed from Australia on 22 February, but for neither Rangoon

\(^{75}\) Msg, Wavell to CCS and Br Cs of S, 7 Feb 42, ABDA 00884, A. W. 7, OPD ABDA Msg File.

\(^{76}\) Msg, Marshall to Wavell, 11 Feb 42, No. 116, AG 381 (11–27–41), 2-B. The message was specifically in response to messages from Brett of

\(^{77}\) Msg, Brett to Marshall, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 372, AGWAR 17, OPD ABDA Msg File. Brett referred to the message of 11 February (No. 116, cited n. 76) from the War Department and the earlier messages from him referred to therein.

\(^{78}\) Msg, Brett to WD, 18 Feb 42, ABDA 448A. Vol IA, Item 1i, Exec 2.
nor Calcutta. It went, instead, to Karachi, on the northwest coast of India, to avoid the rapidly growing danger from Japanese operations in the Bay of Bengal. The units left behind much of their equipment, and the convoy carried only ten pursuit planes. The Sea Witch with its twenty-seven planes had been diverted to Java, along with the Langley, which Brett had apparently hoped to send to Burma.  

Circumstances also modified the plan for diverting heavy bombers to Burma. Brett's original plan was part of the plan of ABDA headquarters, following the fall of Singapore, to shift major forces from the defense of Java to the defense of Burma. The unwillingness of the Australian Government to divert the 7th Australian Division to Burma, the Battle of Sittang Bridge, and, thereafter, the insistence in turn of General Wavell and of the War Department on continued support of Java, cut the ground out from under this plan. Brett did send Brereton to India (via Ceylon) on 25 February with two heavy bombers. Four others, salvaged from the final collapse of the air defenses of Java, followed a few days later. These six bombers, together with two others of the thirty-three mentioned by the War Department as en route from the United States via Africa, arrived in time to serve as air transports during the evacuation of southern Burma in early March.  

**Air Commitments in Asia**

Concurrent with the abortive planning in the theater for the diversion of American air forces to Burma, went the resumption and acceleration of planning in the War Department for building up an air force on the Asiatic mainland with the ultimate objective of bombing Japan. The plans made in 1941 in connection with the American Volunteer Group had called for one pursuit group and one bomber group. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the pursuit group of the AVG was already established in Burma. Crews for the bomber group were in Australia, and General Brett was en route to Burma to make preliminary arrangements for the reception of the force. After 7 December these commitments had continued to figure in the plans of the Army Air Forces. The War Department had undertaken to bring the pursuit group of the AVG to full strength, as a unit of the U.S. Army (the 23d Pursuit Group). In January the War Department had acted on this commitment by sending out two shipments of pursuit planes, one to Takoradi and the other to Karachi, for the 23d Pur-

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79 For the component parts of the convoy, see msg, Brett to Arnold, 2 Feb 42, No. 339, Vol IA, Item li, Exec 2.
80 See (1) msg, Wavell to CGIS and Prime Minister, 16 Feb 42, ABDA 01288, OPD ABDA Msg File, and (2) msg cited n. 78.
81 Msg, AMMISCA (Chungking) to TAG, 23 Feb 42, No. 307, Vol IA, Item li, Exec 2. This transmitted the report from Brady, who was then in Calcutta, that Brett had directed "no definite plans be made to employ B-17 planes in Burma or China in immediate future because of military situation in Java."
82 Craven and Cat, AAF I, pp. 395–96, 493.
83 For detailed memoirs of the story of the AVG through 7 December 1941, see Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949), Chs. VII–IX.
84 Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Airplane Reqmts for AAF, Tab Misc, Book 1, Exec 8.
suit Group. The War Department had also begun preparations for bombing Japan. It was premature to plan for achievement of this objective on a continuous basis with a prospect of operational results proportionate to the expense. But for the sake of the tonic effect on the American public and the unsettling effect on Japanese plans and dispositions, the Army Air Forces had set up two missions, without provision for replacement, to achieve this feat of arms. One of these was the Halverson Project (HALPRO), a force of twenty-three B-24's, to be sent out late in the spring under Col. Harry A. Halverson, which was to operate from advance bases in China. The other project was the Doolittle mission, three squadrons of B-25's under Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle, with the objective of carrying out a carrier-based raid on Tokyo.

By mid-February it had become very uncertain whether American bombers could operate from China in the near future. The limiting factor was air transport, by which all lend-lease for China was to move, at least for several months. After mid-February the conditions under which bombers could operate elsewhere in Asia were rapidly determined. The loss of Singapore disposed of the possibility that an American bomber force operating from Burma might be incorporated under a single Allied command with the air forces in the Southwest Pacific. Within the next week, as it became evident that the loss of Rangoon in turn was but a question of time, the other possibility—that the force might become part of an Allied command in Burma—also disappeared. An air force in Asia would have to operate from India under an American commander directly responsible to the War Department, and it would have to be decided in Washington, rather than in the theater, which of its now entirely distinct missions the force should carry out—the support of Chinese or British operations.

The American commander that was to provide the connecting link between American air operations based on India and those based on China was Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who was then being sent to China to assume his dual role as commander of the American air force in China and director of the lend-lease program for China. He was to be the link between the American air forces in India and those in China, and he was to be directly responsible to the War Department.

For a brief history of HALPRO, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 341-42.


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86 These are the shipments mentioned above in the message to Wavell of 11 February (cited n. 76). The date on which action was initiated was 9 January, and it was then decided that AAF would "furnish air support to the Chinese Government in the China Theater." (See WPD Daily Sum, 9 Jan entry, copy in Exec 7.)

87 During the ARCADIA Conference the Chiefs mentioned once, vaguely and briefly, the project of sending heavy bombers—General Arnold declared that it would not be worth sending less than fifty—to bomb the Japanese home islands from advance bases in China. (1) Min, 1st mtg CsofS Conf, 24 Dec 41, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41), 1. (2) "Notes on China" [Jan 42], Item 17, Exec 10.

88 For a brief history of HALPRO, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 341-42.

89 (1) The Doolittle raid answered the long-held wishes of the President. See the President's directive to the Navy, as reported in memo, Col S for Gen Gerow, 17 Jan 41, sub: White House Conf, Thursday Jan 16, 1941, WPD 4175-18. (2) The execution of such a raid was also recommended by the Pacific War Council in London after the fall of Singapore. See msg, Br CsofS to COS, 18 Feb 42, COS (W) 58, OPD ABDA Msg File.

89 (1) Directive memo, Col John Y. York, Jr. (by direction of CoAS) for AAF, 11 Feb 42, sub: Experiments with Gasoline for China Theater, Tab 10. (2) Memo, Col Clayton L. Bissell for CAAF (Attn Maj Gen Millard F. Harmon), 18 Feb 42, sub: Chinese Project, Tab 4. (3) Memo, Col. Nathan F. Twining (for CoAS) for Col Howard A. Craig (Plans Div), 1 Apr 42, sub: HALPRO, Tab 11. All three in OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files. This file was compiled by Lt. Col. Thomas S. Timberman of OPD.
mander of U. S. Army forces in China, Burma, and India, and as chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his capacity as supreme Allied commander in China. Stilwell’s appointment to serve in this dual role, following a month of negotiation, had been formally announced to Chiang Kai-shek on 1 February, and Stilwell’s instructions (drafted by himself) had been issued the next day.\(^9\)

Superfically considered, General Stilwell appeared a natural choice for such an assignment, since he knew the military situation in China better than any other American general. Considered more closely, he appeared to be ill-chosen to represent the Army in a zone in which air forces were to be the principal (and probably the only) American forces engaged and strategic bombing was to be the ultimate American military objective, since he was especially suited by experience and inclination to train and command ground forces. His choice also appeared singularly unfortunate in that he would have to deal constantly with matters of high American, Chinese, and British policy and with the men that made high policy, though he himself dislied to do so and—what was more—was unfavorably disposed toward the particular policies and political leaders with whom he would have the most to do. Considered still more closely, however, Stilwell’s great knowledge of the Chinese and Japanese armies and his exceptional fitness for training and commanding ground forces gave him unique qualifications to carry out American strategy on the mainland of Asia, since the successful use of Chinese ground forces was the main condition of putting American air forces in position to conduct strategic bombing operations against Japan. There was, moreover, a great advantage, from the point of view of the War Department, in Stilwell’s disinclination to be a “political general,” since it was an expression of his complementary determination to be a “military general,” whose main aim would be to serve rather than to influence the purposes of General Marshall.\(^9\)

The War Department’s plan for establishing an air striking force in India was distinct from the project of diverting bombers from the Southwest Pacific to Burma, but it incorporated the ground crews and service troops that Brett was preparing to send from Australia. On 20 February General Arnold informed General Brett that the War Department intended to utilize these troops in establishing an air force at Bombay that was to consist of one heavy bomber group and one pursuit group. He stated that these units were to be used in Burma only after they had been completely organized. The force would be available to General Stillwell for use in China, and its ultimate objective was long-range bombing of Japan from bases in China.\(^9\)

Soon thereafter the War Department decided to send General Brereton to India to

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\(^9\) Some such review of Stilwell’s qualifications seems to have gone on during the Arcadia Conference, when the War Department was starting to make plans and to negotiate with the Chinese Government for the appointment of a senior American officer to go to China. (See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. II.)

\(^9\) Msg, Arnold to Brett, 20 Feb 42, No. 178, WPD Msg File, 1.
command the new force.\footnote{(1) Msg, Brett to TAG, 21 Feb 42, ABDA 492. (2) Msg, Arnold to Brett, 24 Feb 42, No. 409. Both in AG 381 (11–27–41), 2C.}  It was designated the Tenth Air Force, with headquarters at Karachi. It would at first be made up of the bomber group and the pursuit group, for which most of the ground personnel were being sent from Australia; the air depot group and miscellaneous service units, which also were to be sent from Australia; and an air force headquarters and headquarters squadron and an air depot group, to be sent from the United States.\footnote{Memo, AAF [Col Harold L. George for Gen Arnold] for CofS, 24 Feb 42, sub: Estab of an Amer Air Force in India, OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files.} The War Department sent word of the decision to Chungking on 25 February and followed on 28 February with a summary statement of the forces assigned.\footnote{(1) Msg, Marshall to AMMISCA, 25 Feb 42, No. 228, AG 381 (11–27–41), 2C. (2) Msg, Marshall to Stilwell (AMMISCA) 28 Feb 42, No. 239, WPD Msg File 10, 40.} On 2 March the War Department received word from General Brereton by way of Cairo that he had assumed command of the American air force in India then assigned to General Stilwell, and that he would establish his headquarters at Delhi, so as to be near the British authorities on whose cooperation he must so largely depend.\footnote{Msg, Breereton to Arnold, 2 Mar 42, AMSEG 516, WPD Msg File 10, 375.} Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Tenth Air Force, and the 3d Air Depot Group embarked on 19 March from Charleston, S. C., along with other units for General Stilwell—the ground echelon of the 23d Pursuit Group, personnel for the 1st Ferrying Group, and miscellaneous service units—all told over 4,000 officers and men.\footnote{Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 494.} A few days later Col. Caleb V. Haynes left with an advance detachment of planes—one B–24, four B–17's, and six C–47's. Besides the five bombers of this flight, the War Department counted on getting to General Brereton twelve B–17's that were out of commission along the air ferry route across Africa and in India. To make up the complement of fifty bombers for the Tenth Air Force, thirty-three others were to be sent “as soon as practicable.” There were no pursuit planes scheduled for the Tenth Air Force, aside from the ten that had arrived with the convoy from Fremantle.\footnote{Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 20 Mar 42, No. 308, WPD Msg File 14, 2217.}

The employment of American air combat forces in Asia—the 23d Pursuit Group, HALPRO, the Doolittle mission, and the Tenth Air Force—was only one part of the program of the AAF, which had three other projects that concerned General Stilwell and the Chinese. One was the establishment of an air route into China from northeast India, the only means of getting lend-lease aid to China (and of supporting American bomber operations in China) for several months to come, even on the supposition that northern Burma would be held and the Burma Road reopened. For this purpose the AAF planned to allocate a hundred transports as fast as they became available. A second project was to fly thirty-three A–29's to China, under the command of Lt. Col. Leo H. Dawson. The AAF hoped to have the planes for the Dawson mission ready to move by the end of March. On arrival in China the pilots were to be assigned either to the Tenth Air Force or the 23d Pursuit Group. A third project was the shipment to China of some 250 obsolescent pursuit planes (P–66's and P–43's); 72 had already been
shipped out since January, and another 50 were due for early shipment.

The program as a whole was insubstantial, involving a far wider dispersion of effort, a much heavier overhead investment, and correspondingly greater initial waste in proportion to the operational results to be achieved than the original program of 1941. The original program of 1941 had envisaged an initial concentration of American air power and supply in Burma, supporting at once British and Chinese operations. American efforts were now to be dispersed across the entire subcontinent of India and could be linked with American efforts in China only at a great expense of time, men, and matériel. The War Department was aware of the existence of the difficulty, if not yet of its proportions. On 20 February, when the new program was taking shape, Col. Clayton L. Bissell, who handled it in the General Staff, and who was to become the senior officer for air operations on General Stilwell’s staff, sent the Army Air Forces the following estimate of "possible developments":

A. Most of above aircraft plus others may be used in India rather than in China. Plan accordingly.

B. Available air transport may be incapable of supporting China with absolute essentials and may be incapable of maintaining more than a token air force in China until rail and road can carry supplies through.

C. A new India-Burma Theatre may be formed with which the above may be amalgamated or at least integrated.

The Siberia Project

The one part of the Air Forces’ planning for the Far East of which nothing at all came during the early part of 1942 was the planning that had to do with American air operations in Siberia. The United States Government tried to open negotiations, in the face of the declared Soviet neutrality in the Far East and the dissociation of the British Government from the whole project, by asking the Soviet Government for information on air facilities in Siberia, in order to make plans for the delivery of lend-lease planes via Alaska. The War Department had been seeking this information ever since the first discussions, in the summer of 1941, of sending aid to the Soviet Union. During the fall of 1941, in planning for early deliveries under the First (Moscow) Protocol, the Army has accepted the necessity of shipping planes to overseas delivery points—Basra, Murmansk, and Archangel—from which they would be flown by Soviet flyers to the Soviet fronts or elsewhere. But the Army had persisted

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100 For the program as a whole, see: (1) memo, Col Bissell for CAAF (Attn Gen Harmon), 18 Feb 42, sub: Chinese Project, Tab 3; (2) chart, title: China Aviation Project, forwarded with memo, Col Bissell for Gen Arnold, 20 Feb 42, no sub, Tab 3; (3) memo [Col Bissell] for Gen Harmon, n.d., sub: Chinese Project (this memo refers to and modifies memo of 18 Feb cited above), Tab 3; and (4) memo, Col Twining (for CoFAS) for Dir War Orgn and Movmts, 14 Mar 42, sub: Pilot Replacements for China Theater, Tab 1. All four in OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files.

101 Chart cited n. 100(2), copy filed Tab 3, OPD China Green Book, OCMH Files.

102 For the Soviet declaration of neutrality, see above [Ch. IV]. See also memo, AAF [Asst SAS] for CofS, 16 Jan 42, sub: Siberian Air Bases, WPD 4557-43.

103 Soviet representatives then rejected the proposal as impracticable. See memo, Lt Col George C. MacDonald for Robert A. Lovett [ASW for Air], 5 Aug 41, no sub, WPD 4557-1.

104 See (1) Extract of Rpt of Sp Miss to USSR on Allocation of Aircraft from U. K. and U. S. Pdn, WPD 4557-18; (2) study, 2 Nov 41, OCAC, sub: Plan for Delivery of Airplanes to Russia, Air AG 452.1 Russia (45); and (3) ltr, SW to Secy State [22 Nov 41], no sub, WPD 4557-26.
in attempts to get information on facilities for air delivery via Alaska and Siberia, through the Harriman mission, through a courier sent from London by General Chaney, and finally, through the State Department, which had instructed the American ambassador, Admiral William H. Standley, to do what he could.\(^{105}\)

The failure of these attempts and the affirmation of Soviet neutrality in the war against Japan, made in December 1941, had left it to American officers to adopt any of several views on the matter of future negotiations. One view, presented by Colonel Faymonville, the senior military representative of the Lend-Lease Administration in the Soviet Union, was that a general agreement on strategy was prerequisite to any progress on negotiations over the Alaska-Siberia route.\(^{106}\) Another view, twice presented by the AAF, was that negotiations should be reopened with the proposal to commit an American bomber force to operations against Japan from advance bases in the area of Vladivostok. The AAF first made this proposal just after the ARCADIA Conference, in compliance with a request originating in the State Department for comments on the course to be followed in future negotiations with the Soviet Government.\(^{107}\) The only result at the time was that Mr. Stimson apparently took the matter up with the President informally.\(^{108}\) The Air staff again submitted the proposal in March during the course of a general review initiated by the President "in regard to the position of Great Britain and the United States" in the event of Soviet involvement in the war against Japan.\(^{109}\) As in January, the AAF assumed that the Soviet Union would co-operate as soon as the United States should commit itself to sending a force of long-range bombers to Siberia. In anticipation of favorable Soviet response, the AAF recommended that air units assigned to other theaters should be tentatively reassigned to provide the force.\(^{110}\)

General Marshall's plans and operations staff considered the project impracticable in itself and inconsistent with American strategy. A full analysis was written for submission to Marshall and transmission to the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), to show that of all lines of action open to the United States to help the Soviet Union against Japan:

The most valuable assistance which can be rendered to Russia is to contain Japanese forces, mainly her air force, in the South


\(^{106}\) Memo, G-2 for CofS, 20 Dec 41, sub: Russian Present Attitude in War, WPD 4557-35. This included a paraphrase of a message from Faymonville.

\(^{107}\) Memo, AAF for CofS, 17 Jan 42, sub: Siberian Air Bases, and ltr [SW for President], 14 Jan 42, both in WPD 4557-43.

For the whole transaction, see: (1) memo, Col Ridgway for Chief of Plans Gp, WPD, 9 Jan 42, sub: Proposed Air Serv to Siberia via Alaska, and (2) memo, WPD for Orme Wilson [Ln Off, State Dept], 27 Jan 42, sub: Air Route to Siberia via Alaska, both in WPD 4557-43.

\(^{108}\) See memo cited n. 107(2).

\(^{109}\) For initiation of this review, see: (1) memo, President for Stark and Marshall, 4 Mar 42 (circulated as JCS 16, 6 Mar 42, title: U. N. Action in Case of War Between Russia and Japan), and (2) memo, CofS for President, 5 Mar 42, sub: War Between Russia and Japan, both in OPD 380.3, 2.

\(^{110}\) Memo, CofAS for WPD, 8 Mar 42, sub: Assistance to Russia in Event of Russian-Japanese Hostilities, OPD 380.3, 2. To encourage co-operation the AAF also suggested that military relations with the Soviet Union should be put on the same basis as military relations with Great Britain. (This memo was submitted in response to memo, WPD for CAAF, 7 Mar 42, same sub, OPD 380.3, 2.)
Pacific and the sooner our action clearly indicates to Russia that we shall do this the greater advantage she can gain from that assistance.\[111\]

Another study listed the various reasons for considering the AAF project impracticable:

The logistical difficulties, personnel and material losses that would be incurred, lack of adequate facilities in Siberia, inability of Russia to supply vital necessities upon arrival and during operation, and lack of sufficient U.S. shipping facilities available for this purpose preclude the possibility of sending supplies, reinforcements and airplanes to Siberia for combat purposes in the event of war between Japan and Russia.

This study, too, held that "diverting action in the South Pacific" was a "more logical approach to giving aid to Russia" and added that "an offensive against Germany" was "the most logical approach to giving aid to Russia."\[112\]

When the joint planning committees (the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee (JUSSC), and the Joint Staff Planners) took up the question, they did not pass judgment either on the strategic value or on the practicability of the AAF project, but simply pointed out that a great deal more would have to be known about the Soviet position and facilities in Siberia, and thus reverted to the unanswered primary question of how to get the Soviet Government to give any information or permit an American survey party to gather it.\[113\]

On this question, as on the related question of the value and practicability of American operations in Siberia, there was a disagreement between the Air staff, hopeful of Soviet receptiveness, and Marshall's plans and operations officers, who were skeptical of the success of negotiations, at least under existing circumstances. Marshall's advisers were willing to meet with Soviet staff officers and explain to them how, in practice, Soviet distrust must limit the scale and effectiveness of American aid of any kind. But that was all they expected to accomplish, and they were doubtful that the Soviet Government would be receptive to a proposal to hold staff conversations.\[114\]

The Army planners believed in any event that the Soviet Government had no incentiv

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\[111\] WPD study, 8 Mar 42, sub: An Analysis of Lines of Action Open to U.S. for Rendition of Assistance to Russia in Event of Hostilities Between Russia and Japan in Spring of 1942, incl with memo, WPD for CofS [8 Mar 42], sub cited. There is no indication that the study left the Strategy Section, where it was prepared, although there is a forwarding memo, Lt Col R. H. Givens, Jr., for ACofS WPD [7] Mar 42, sub cited. Both items with JCS 16 in ABC 381 (1–23–42).

\[112\] Memo, Capt John H. Caughey for Gen Eisenhower, 11 Mar 42, sub cited n. 111, with JPS 19/D in ABC 381 (1–23–42). Caughey was a member of the Combined Subjects Section, S&P Group, WPD.

\[113\] The JCS referred the problem to the JPS (see min, 5th mtg JCS, 9 Mar 42) in JPS 19/D, 10 Mar 42. The JPS referred it to the JUSSC (see min, 4th mtg JPS, 11 Mar 42), in JPS 19/1D, 12 Mar 42. The JUSSC study is JPS 19/2, 20 Mar 42, title cited n. 109(1). The JPS discussed this paper in their 7th meeting (21 March) and their 8th meeting (25 March), and at the latter meeting Admiral Turner was directed to draw up a paper for the JCS. The paper, as drafted by Turner, is incl with memo, Turner for JPS, 28 Mar 42, sub: U. N. Action in Case of War Between Russia and Japan, with JPS 19/D in ABC 381 (1–23–42). (The paper, as circulated to the JCS, is JCS 16/1, 29 Mar 42.)

\[114\] The question of staff conversations was raised by G–2. See memo, G–2 for CofS (through WPD), 16 Feb 42, sub: Stf Confs with Soviet Mil Authorities, OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1. For an alternative proposal, see memo, Brig Gen Henry S. Aurand for Gen Eisenhower, 2 Mar 42, sub: G–2 Study . . ., OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1. The WPD response is given in: (1) memo, no sig, 25 Mar 42, no sub, OPD 400.3295 Russia, 1; (2) notes, H. [Col Handy] for Gen Crawford, n.d., attached to above cited memo; and (3) min, 7th mtg JPS, 21 Mar 42.
tive to enter into formal negotiations and also that it would be unwise for the American Government to do so. They observed that it was not “practicable” to couple lend-lease questions with strategic questions, and that it would be “impossible to restrict the discussions of our own plans to those matters with respect to which we would be willing to disclose our intentions.”

They expected that any agreements reached with the Soviet Government in the field of military operations would be on the basis of quid pro quo, and recognized that the United States had not yet tried to deal—and was actually not ready to deal—on this basis with the Soviet Union:

The fact is that it is we who want the information [about Siberian airfields], yet we cannot trade supplies for it. Russia is most anxious to avoid belligerency in eastern Siberia; but it is this area which interests us. Until we have some concrete offer with which to trade, Stalin is unlikely to talk with us—he is suspicious of our motives and unimpressed by our military effectiveness.

Colonel Handy made the same point when the question came before the Joint Staff Planners. The Joint U. S. Strategic Committee had suggested that the United States might propose to establish a commercial airline between Alaska and Siberia “for the purpose of carrying supplies and gaining information on the airfields in Siberia.” This proposal (which had previously been under consideration in the State Department) Colonel Handy brushed aside, characterizing it as “a subterfuge which would not deceive the Russians.” He went on to observe, “we might as well be frank about what we want.”

The JPS concluded that the only way to get information on air facilities in Siberia “would be through a direct agreement between the highest United States and Soviet political authorities.” The JPS, therefore, recommended that the JCS request the President “to initiate steps on the political level looking toward a more complete military collaboration between the United States and the U. S. S. R.” In case he should succeed, a survey of facilities in Siberia could be made, conversations begun on the staff level, and “realistic plans” developed.

On 30 March the JCS sent a memorandum to this effect to the President, who read and returned it without comment. Plans and negotiations remained suspended on this note until the late spring of 1942.

The inconclusive end of these studies could not have been so very unexpected to the Air Forces, and it was obviously welcome to the Army planners. As it was, U. S. forces, in particular U. S. Army Air Forces, had evidently undertaken to do a great deal more than they could carry out.

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116 Memo cited n.114(1).
117 JPS 19/2 cited n. 119.
118 (1) Min cited n. 114(3). (2) See D/F, WPD for CofAAF, 23 Feb 42, sub: Air Route Between U. S. and Soviet Union by Way of Alaska, WPD 4557-43. This D/F transmitted a letter from the Assistant Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, 18 February 1942, asking for suggestions on a memorandum then being drafted for transmission to the Soviet Government with reference to the establishment of a commercial airline between Alaska and Siberia. (See also memo for red on D/F. No copy of the letter itself is in this file.)
119 JCS 16/1, 29 Mar 42, title: U. N. Action
120 Files consulted do not contain a copy of the memorandum. Its tenor is clear from a summary given in JCS 16/2, 19 Jun 42, title: U. S. Aid to Russia in Case of Attack by Japan.
121 The JCS 16 series remained on the JCS agenda during the rest of 1942 and was taken up again in December. See min, 44th mtg JCS, 1 Dec 42. For the negotiations and plans during the second half of 1942, see below, Ch. XV.
for a long time to come. The belated disorganized movements of U. S. Army forces into the Pacific and the Far East had as yet almost no effect on Japanese operations, but they had already called into question the extent to which the United States would be able and willing to fulfill prior commitments to help the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union against Germany. The War Department planners were dismayed lest the United States, in starting to do everything at once, fail to accomplish even the most necessary tasks, and they had already set themselves to answer the question which, if any, operations against Japan were now to be numbered among the essential missions of the U. S. Army. They were quite sure that it was no longer possible to evade or defer the question and that U. S. Army deployment in the Pacific must be controlled by the requirements of grand strategy.
CHAPTER VII

Army Deployment in the Pacific
And Grand Strategy

January–March 1942

The collapse of the ABDA Command and the continued movement of American troops into the South and Southwest Pacific raised in acute form the great question of strategy that had been deferred by the ARCADIA Conference—the relation between plans for U. S. Army deployment in the Pacific and plans for U. S. Army deployment in the Atlantic. Of some 132,000 Army troops that embarked for overseas destinations from the beginning of 1942 through the middle of March, only about 20,000 sailed for Iceland and Northern Ireland. During the same period over 90,000 left for stations along the “line” Hawaii–Australia.\(^1\) Still other commitments to the Pacific remained to be fulfilled. To set a limit to future movements of Army forces into the Pacific and find a basis for increasing the rate at which Army forces would be moved across the Atlantic became, during February and March, the chief concern of General Marshall and his advisers on the War Department staff, and the focus of their discussion of future plans with the Army Air Forces and the Navy.

Army Deployment in the Atlantic
January–February 1942

During the weeks following the ARCADIA Conference the movement of U. S. Army forces in the Atlantic went forward very slowly. As agreed at the conference, the first convoys for Northern Ireland and Iceland were reduced, only 4,500 troops of the 34th Division being in the first contingent that sailed for Northern Ireland on 15 January. At the same time, 1,900 troops embarked for Iceland.\(^2\)

The next convoy for Northern Ireland was to sail about 10 February with approxi-

\(^1\) The remainder of the 132,000 went mainly to the Caribbean, with small numbers going to Alaska, the Atlantic bases, and India. (1) For a contemporary summary by periods, see memo, Lt Col Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., Chief, Plng Sec, Transportation Br, G–4, for Gen Marshall, 15 Mar 42, sub: Tr and Cargo Mvmts Since Dec 7, 1941, File CoIS, GS (1) Mar–Jun 42, in Hq File, ASF. (2) For general breakdown by areas, see OPD (WPD) Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).

\(^2\) For the ARCADIA decision, see above, Ch. V.

For the sailings, see: (1) ltr, TAG to Gen Chaney, London, 16 Jan 42, sub: Duties and Responsibilities of CG USAFBI (England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales), WPD 4497-29; (2) paper, U. S. JPS to CPS, 25 Jan 42, sub: Mvmt of U. S. Trs to N Ireland, with CPS 4 in ABC 370.5 N Ireland (1–22–42); (3) Sum of Hist Events and Statistics, NY POE 1942, p. 10, OCT HB NYPE (this summary lists 4,000 troops as sailing).
mately 15,000 troops in six British returning liners, their equipment in fifteen cargo ships. The search for ships for these convoys began almost immediately after the first contingent of troops for Northern Ireland had left the United States. In the latter part of January 1942, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) discussed a proposal for using U. S. Navy combat-loaded ships and accompanying cargo vessels for one movement of Army troops to MAGNET in early February.\(^3\) By 25 January it had become evident that it would be impossible to provide sufficient cargo ships for this move from either the American or British sources. The planners therefore proposed that instead of British liners, which had little or no cargo capacity, U. S. Navy combat-loaded transports and accompanying cargo vessels allocated to the U. S. amphibious force be employed for one trip. The planners recognized that this proposal had certain military disadvantages. Since the ships would be gone for five weeks, this plan would delay possible U. S. participation in a North African operation until 1 April; it would prevent the U. S. amphibious force from being employed on any other landing operation during that period; and it would mean the temporary suspension of amphibious training. It would be politically unwise, however, to suspend further movements to Northern Ireland during February, and for this reason planners recommended using the Navy combat-loaded ships in spite of the military disadvantages.\(^4\)

This plan was approved by the President and Prime Minister and arrangements were made for its execution.\(^5\) At the same time the Chief of Staff stated that he wished the planned movement of 4,179 men to Iceland to be carried out and 800 additional men to be sent there in a combat-loaded ship in the same convoy, provided housing was available.\(^6\) The delay caused by the lack of British escort vessels postponed the sailing of the second INDIGO-MAGNET convoy from 10 February to 18 February, when 5,200 troops sailed for Iceland and 9,000 for Northern Ireland.\(^7\)

Deployment to the smaller Atlantic bases was largely neglected during this period. The Army began ordering contingents of no more than a few hundred men at a time to islands in the Caribbean, to Bermuda, and to Newfoundland. At the same time detachments of the Marine Corps were sent to guard air bases in northeast Brazil.\(^8\)

**Deployment Hawaii–Australia**  
**January–March 1942**

The main body of Army troops moved from January through March went to the Pacific, most of them to Australia and New Caledonia. During January two convoys and the Navy seatrain _Hammondsport_ sailed for the Southwest Pacific from San

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\(^3\) Notes of discussion by U. S. CsofS, 21 Jan 42, submitted to CCS, with CCS 5/1 in ABC 381 _GYMNAST_ (1–15–42).

\(^4\) Paper cited b. 2(2).

\(^5\) Min, 3d mtg CCS, 3 Feb 42.

\(^6\) Memo, Gen Gerow for Maj Gen Brehon B. Somervell, 6 Feb 42, sub: Feb Mvmt to N Ireland and Iceland, Book 3, Exec 8.

\(^7\) Memo, Col Gross for Gen Somervell (G–4), 19 Feb 42, sub: Sailings, WPD 4497–37.

\(^8\) For the shipments ordered, see: (1) incls to weekly memos, G–3 for CofS or CG Field Forces, sub: Tr Mvmts for Week Ending . . . , WPD 4624–5; and (2) OPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).
Francisco, and one large convoy sailed from New York. In mid-February the *Queen Mary* sailed from Boston and the *Monterey* and *Matsonia* from San Francisco. Early in March another large convoy sailed from New York, followed a week later by the *Queen Elizabeth* sailing from San Francisco and, after the middle of the month, by a convoy from San Francisco. These shipments to the Southwest Pacific amounted to about 79,000 troops, nearly four times the number of American troops that left during the same period to make the much shorter voyage across the North Atlantic.⁹

Of these 79,000, about 57,000 were for Australia, 24,500 of whom were still en route at the end of March. Of those that had reached Australia by that time—altogether about 37,000, including those that had embarked in December aboard the *Pensacola* convoy and the *Polk*—as many as 2,000 were dead or missing (including the 2d Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, lost in Java), and some 3,000 had been sent to the Tenth Air Force, leaving the strength then present in Australia at about 32,000.¹⁰

Except for the third and last contingent of the 41st Division and a tank destroyer battalion—some 8,000 men—these shipments completed the movements to Australia and New Caledonia that the War Department had planned during January and February. The air combat units that the War Department meant to send to Australia were two heavy bombardment groups, two medium bombardment groups, one light bombardment group, and three pursuit groups.¹¹ By the latter part of March the last of these units, and of the aviation units allocated to support them, had arrived, and filler replacements were on the way.¹² The ground units present in

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⁹ Detailed information on the shipments is found in a variety of sources and tabulated in Strategic Plans Unit Study 1, in OCMH Files. The source for shipments from New York (except for breakdown by destination) is a report entitled: Summary of Historical Events and Statistics, NY POE 1942 (of which a copy is filed in OCT HB NYPE). There is no such comprehensive Transportation Corps report for the San Francisco port. There does exist a source for shipments from San Francisco in January and February (except by the *Hammondsport*) in the form of a report entitled: Shipping Situation at SFPE Following Pearl Harbor (OCT HB SFPE). Other data can be found in War Department messages of the time.

For a more detailed breakdown of shipping—cargo as well as troop—see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare.

¹² The heavy bomber groups were the 19th (which had absorbed the remnants of the squadron of the 7th from Java) and the 43d. The medium bomber groups were the 22d and 38th. The light bomber group was the 3d (which absorbed the personnel of the 27th). The three pursuit groups were the 49th, the 35th, and the 8th. They are all given as present in the 6 April list cited above, along with two transport (troop carrier) squadrons (the 21st and 22d) and three separate pursuit squadrons (the 21st and 34th, which had been transferred without personnel or equipment from the Philippines, and the 68th, which had been allocated first to New Caledonia and then to Canton Island and was actually to be sent to Tongatabu). (For an account of the actual status of the air units present in Australia, see Craven and Cate, *AAF I*, pp. 411-14.)
Australia were the 147th Field Artillery Regiment, the 148th Field Artillery Regiment (less one battalion), and the equivalent of two regiments of antiaircraft artillery. About 4,000 service troops (including a regiment of engineers and a quarter-master battalion) had arrived. About 12,000 more were on the way, along with about half the 41st Division and one of the two tank destroyer battalions assigned to Australia.13

In New Caledonia there was a garrison of about 17,000—the task force (code name POPPY) that had made up the greater part of the shipment from New York on 22 January. The convoy had landed in the latter part of February at Melbourne, and the POPPY Force was there hurriedly reloaded for New Caledonia with part of its supplies and equipment, which had been sent separately from the west coast and had not all arrived. It sailed on 7 March and arrived at Nouméa on 12 March.14 The force consisted of a brigade of infantry (two regiments), a regiment of artillery (155-mm. howitzers), a battalion of light tanks, an antiaircraft regiment, and a battalion of coast artillery. It also contained a pursuit squadron, which arrived a few days later from Australia.15

Reinforcements for New Caledonia numbering about 5,000 left the United States during March. The original instructions issued to General Patch, the commander of the New Caledonia force, were to plan “on the assumption that additional forces will not be immediately available.”16 But the original plan had assumed that a regiment of light artillery, to be taken from the brigade already in Australia, would there be incorporated in the force. The War Department, having acceded to General Wavell’s request to leave the entire brigade committed to the ABDA Command and having recognized, moreover, the need to strengthen the ground defenses of Australia, was obliged to send another regiment of artillery from the United States to New Caledonia.17 This regiment (72d Field Artillery, 105-mm. howitzers) sailed on 3 March with the first contingent of the 41st Division to bring the force up to the planned strength of a triangular division, reinforced. The War Department also added a third regiment of infantry (the 164th) and a battalion of pack artillery (75-mm. howitzers), which sailed later in the month with the second contingent of the 41st Division.18

13 See 6 April list cited n. 10(2).
14 Great confusion attended the transshipment. See especially (1) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Barnes, 12 Feb 42, No. 321, WPD Msg File 9, 893; (2) msg (originator WPD), same to same, 18 Feb 42, No. 351, WPD Msg File 9, 1201; (3) msg (originator WPD), same to same, 21 Feb 42, No. 382, WPD Msg File 9A, 1480; (4) memo, CoS for President, 23 Feb 42, no sub, AG 370.5 (2–15–42), 1; (5) notes on War Council, 2 Mar 42, WDCSA, SW Conf, Vol II; (6) msg, Brett to TAG, 8 Mar 42, No. 540, WPD Ready Ref File of Msgs, Australia, Sec 2; (7) memo for rcd, 18 Mar 42, OPD 381 New Caledonia, 20; (8) papers filed with WPD 3718–17; (9) Craven and Catc, AAF I, pp. 430–31; and (10) see above, Ch. VI.
15 See 6 April list cited n. 10(2). The combat units were as follows: 51st Infantry Brigade; 200th Field Artillery; 754th Tank Battalion (L); 70th Coast Artillery (AA); 3d Battalion, 244th Coast Artillery; and 67th Pursuit Squadron. In addition there were some 4,000 ground service troops and two battalions of aviation engineers.
16 Memo, WPD for TAG, 22 Jan 42, sub: Def of New Caledonia, WPD 3718–17.
17 For the agreement to leave the entire brigade of field artillery committed to the ABDA Command, see Ch. VI, above.
18(1) See 6 April list, cited n. 10(2). (2) For the additions, see also OPD 381 New Caledonia, 2, 6.
The Army garrisons along the South Pacific line of communications represented a much smaller commitment. To the Fiji Islands (code name **FANTAN**), the link between New Caledonia and Samoa, the United States was to send only a pursuit squadron, leaving it to New Zealand to reinforce the ground garrison. The 70th Pursuit Squadron—which with services amounted to 725 men—was put under orders early in January and arrived at Suva at the end of that month.19 The Army garrison for Borabora (code name **BOBCAT**) in the Society Islands, which was to serve as a refueling station for convoys from the west coast to Australia, left on 27 January from Charleston, S. C. This garrison numbered about 3,900 men, including the 102d Infantry (less one battalion) and an antiaircraft regiment (the 198th).20 The Army garrisons for Christmas (code name **BIRCH**) and Canton (code name **HOLLY**) sailed from San Francisco on 31 January. The BIRCH garrison, aboard the **President Johnson**, numbered nearly 2,000 men, including the 12th Pursuit Squadron, a battalion of infantry, and two battalions of coast artillery. The HOLLY garrison of about 1,100 men, aboard the **President Taylor**, included two companies of infantry and two battalions of coast artillery, but no pursuit squadron (although one was assigned to the island).21

In March one other large shipment to the Pacific was undertaken—the movement to Hawaii of most of the 27th Division. The 27th was a square division (the only square division sent overseas). On 7 March two battalions of infantry (from the 165th Infantry and the 108th Infantry) left San Francisco aboard the **Grant**. On 10 March the **Lurline** and the **Aquitania** (lent by the British along with the **Queen Mary** and the **Queen Elizabeth**) left with the 106th Infantry and a battalion of the 105th, two batteries of field artillery, and headquarters and medical troops. On 29 March the **Aquitania** made a second trip, with most of the remaining troops of the 165th Infantry, two regiments of field artillery (105th and 106th), and a regiment each of engineer and quartermaster troops.22

### The Shortage Along the Line Hawaii–Australia

These shipments to the Pacific did not constitute a completed program. In the first place, they did not fill the demand for ground forces. In the latter part of February and again in early March, Admiral King proposed that the Army should garrison additional islands in the South Pacific—Tongatabu (Tonga Island group) and Efate (New Hebrides).23 There were also new requirements for troops in the Southwest Pacific (in addition to the remainder of the 41st Division). After the

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20 Charleston POE rcds, filed OCT HB CPE. For this force, see 6 April list, cited n. 10(2), and papers filed WPD 4571-24.
21 See 6 April list cited n. 10(2), and rpt cited n. 9(2).
22 The remaining combat elements sailed during the first week in April. For the movement of the 27th Division, see: (1) AG 370.5 (12–26–41) Sec 1, and (2) Capt Edmund G. Love, *The 27th Infantry Division in World War II* (Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1949), p. 18.
23 (1) The only record found of the earlier request (18 February) is a copy of the reply sent by General Marshall. Memo, CofS for COMINCH, 24 Feb 42, sub: Estab of U. S. Garrison in Efate, New Hebrides . . ., Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8. (2) The latter proposal is contained in memo, Admiral King for JCS, 2 Mar 42, sub: Occupation for Def of Tonga Tabu and Efate, ABC 381 (3–2–42).
return of the two Australian divisions ordered home from the Middle East (one of which was already on its way), one Australian and one New Zealand division would still remain in the Middle East. Early in March, upon the opening of a new campaign in the North African desert, the British Prime Minister requested the President to send two additional divisions to the Southwest Pacific so that these Dominion troops might remain in the Middle East.24

Besides these new demands, the War Department had still to send to Hawaii the ground troops it had promised to the new Army commander in Hawaii, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons. From the close of the Arcadia Conference until the end of February, the shipment of men to Hawaii had been entirely suspended (except for a small movement aboard the Republic, including the advance party of the 27th Division), in favor of the immediate execution of planned movements to the South and Southwest Pacific.25 This delay, of which the War Department had warned General Emmons on 12 January, left to be moved some 55,000 of the 100,000 ground troops allocated to his command, and the movement of the greater part of the 27th Division in March left over 40,000 still to be shipped.26 There was, moreover, a deficit to be met in service troops for the forces recently sent (and any new forces to be sent) to the South and Southwest Pacific. The amount of the deficit was as yet undetermined, it being uncertain how far locally available labor would supply the needs for unloading and warehousing cargo, construction of facilities, laying out of roads and airfields, and other services. But in any event the movement of over 40,000 additional ground troops to Hawaii, two new garrisons (perhaps 10,000 men) to the South Pacific, and two more divisions (about 30,000 men) and the remainder of the 41st Division (about 7,500 men) to the Southwest Pacific—together with the movement of service units to meet existing deficits and those created by new movements—would certainly involve the continued use throughout the spring of most of the troop shipping available in the Pacific. It would, moreover, involve continued heavy pressure on cargo shipping. The scheduled movement of munitions and other supplies and equipment had not as yet caught up with the troop movements already initiated, and supplementary shipments of supplies and equipment, as of service troops, would have to be scheduled as the limitations on what was locally available became established.

Another measure of existing deficits and prospective demands in the Pacific was the number of airplanes needed to meet the requirements of commands there. Beginning in the latter part of December, most of the Army planes dispatched from the United States had been destined—as most of the Army troops had been destined—for Australia, with the object of creating a

24 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 4 Mar 42, No. 37, circulated as CGS 56.
25 For the one shipment to Hawaii between mid-January and the end of February, see rpt cited n. 9(2).
26 For the allocation of ground forces to Hawaii and the breakdown by types of unit, see: (1) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Emmons, 11 Jan 42, No. 956, WPD Msg File 5, 618; (2) msg, Ft. Shafter to TAG, 13 Jan 42, No. 1677, WPD Msg File 6, 734; and (3) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Emmons, 19 Jan 42, No. 1047, WPD Msg File 6, 1048.

For the strength present in Hawaii, see WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).

For War Department warning of the delay in shipments to Hawaii with explanation, see D/F, WPD for TAG, 12 Jan 42, sub: Tr Mvmt, Pacific Bases and Hawaii, WPD 3444-19, and msg, Marshall to Emmons, 16 Jan 42, no sub, No. 1013, WPD Msg File 6, 875.
“balanced” American air force in the Southwest Pacific. By mid-March most of the air and ground crews and air service units assigned had arrived. But delays, losses, and diversions had left too few medium and heavy bombers on hand in Australia for operations of any kind. In mid-March the force had twenty-six B-17’s. Of these, twelve were then in shape to operate, as against an assigned strength (for two heavy bomber groups) of eighty operational planes plus reserves. There were only one or two B-25’s, not in commission, as against an assigned strength (for two medium bomber groups) of 140 operational planes plus reserves. Light bombers and pursuits were more nearly up to strength. There were forty-three A-24’s and one or two A-20’s in Australia, of which twenty-seven were operational, as against an assigned strength (for one light bomber group) of fifty-seven plus reserves. There were about 350 pursuit planes (P-40’s, P-400’s, and P-39’s), of which half were operational and the rest to be repaired or assembled, as against an assigned strength (for three pursuit groups) of 240 operational planes plus reserves.

There was a like shortage of planes, especially of heavy and medium bombers, throughout the Pacific. The other major air force in the Pacific, the Hawaiian Air Force, had received no reinforcements since the emergency shipments of December 1941. From January through March there remained a great gap between the number of planes authorized and the number present. As in Australia, the status of pursuit planes was relatively satisfactory. The number on hand (a good many of them obsolete or obsolescent) fell from about 200 at the beginning of January to about 180, as compared with 225 authorized. The number of light and medium bombers was about twenty-five, and the allocation of these was decreased from thirty-nine to correspond to this actual strength. Ninety-six heavy bombers were allocated to Hawaii, but the number present dropped from forty-three in January to thirty-one in mid-February.

The drop in the number of heavy bombers present was the result of the diversion of a squadron of B-17’s to the South Pacific, to support a naval task force (the ANZAC Force) that had been set up to operate in the increasingly exposed zone east and northeast of Australia. These were the only

**Notes**

27 (1) Chart, 15 Mar 42, title: Trs in Australia and New Caledonia. This chart gave as present about 20,000 (including air service personnel), with about 2,000 en route and no others under orders or projected. (2) Memo, no sig, for Col Handy, 26 Mar 42, sub: Status Air Squadrons in Australia. Both with CPS 24 in ABC 381 Australia (1-23-42). (3) WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).

These figures changed very little through the rest of the spring. Cf. memo, Col William L. Ritchie [Actg Chief SWP Sec] for AGofS OPD and Chief Theater Gp, 1 Jun 42, sub: Info on Forces in SW Pacific Theater, Tab Allied Comd, Vol V, Item li, Exec 2.

28 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 411-13. (2) Cf. figures in WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45). (3) Figures on plane strength are also given in WPD brief, Notes on . . . CPS 9th mtg.

19 Mar 42, with CPS 24 in ABC 381 Australia (1-23-42).

29 Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 452. For figures on aircraft strength in Hawaii during January, February, and March, see WPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45). The number of planes in Hawaii was reported by General Emmons to Assistant Secretary McClory on his visit there to be “. . . 33 first class 4-engine heavy bombers; 15 second class 4-engine bombers; 17 medium bombers; 9 light bombers; 152 first class pursuit planes; 31 second class pursuit planes.” These figures were apparently given to McClory sometime after 26 February. (See McClory’s statement in Notes on War Council, Monday, Mar 23, 1942, WDCSA, SW Consfs, Vol II.)
bombers operating between Hawaii and Australia in February and March. The Army pursuit squadrons assigned to New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Christmas (but not those assigned to Canton and Palmyra) were present with their planes. But the one bombardment unit assigned to the South Pacific—a squadron of medium bombers for New Caledonia—was due to be diverted from Australia only late in the spring, when the flight crews should arrive from the United States, and only over the objections of the Army Air Forces. Of all the deficiencies in the planned deployment of Army forces on the main Pacific “line” Hawaii–Australia (as also in Alaska), the shortage of bombers, and particularly the lack of bombers in the South Pacific, had become and was to remain the focus of the most persistent criticism from the Navy Department and from both Army and Navy commanders in the Pacific. And it was the point at which the War Department was least willing to revise and expand the planned deployment of Army forces in the Pacific.

The Question of Additional Commitments

The emergence of the deployment of Army forces—and especially bomber units—in the Pacific as a critical question of American strategy dated from mid-February. The entry for 17 February, in the private notes kept by General Eisenhower during his tour of duty on the General Staff, gives an idea how strongly he and his associates felt about the issue:

The Navy wants to take all the islands in the Pacific—have them held by Army troops, to become bases for Army pursuit and bombers. Then! the Navy will have a safe place to sail its vessels. But they will not go farther forward than our air (Army) can assure superiority.

The amount of air required for this slow, laborious and indecisive type of warfare is going to be something that will keep us from going to Russia’s aid in time!!

The occasion for this declaration was Admiral King’s proposal, formally addressed to General Marshall the following day, to garrison additional islands, in particular the island of Efate, in the South Pacific. The formal reply (drafted by Eisenhower or one of his assistants and revised by Marshall) described the proposal as “a joint project with rather far-reaching implications.” Marshall declared that he wanted to do “anything reasonable” that would make “offensive action by the fleet practicable,” but asked for an explanation of these questions:

a. What is the general scheme or concept of operations that the occupation of these additional islands is designed to advance? Are the measures taken purely for protection of a line of communications or is a step-by-step general advance contemplated?

b. What islands will be involved?

c. What Army troops, particularly Air, will your proposal eventually involve? I feel that a definite statement on this point is necessary. Requirements for troops, especially Air Forces, for operations and for training and expansion are such that I must know definitely the extent of each commitment.

d. Your proposal contemplates the employment of Army forces as occupational troops. Has the question of the availability of the Marines been fully explored? Ground troops, less AA, are available for garrisons, but continuation of the practice of detailing “detachments” for garrisons will result in destruction of the combat effectiveness of the trained forces.

30 Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 430–33.
Divisional teams from which these troops would have to be taken.\textsuperscript{32}

Marshall went on to state that American operations in the Southwest Pacific (in which he included the South Pacific) must "for several reasons be limited to the strategic defensive" so far as air and ground forces were concerned. The first reason was the "geography and communications of Australia" taken together with "enemy advantages in the layout of air fields and other communications facing Australia." The second reason was the limiting effect of the tonnage required for the long voyage to the far Pacific, which restricted commitments of ground forces. The third reason was the limiting effect of demands on the Army air forces throughout the world:

\ldots the requirements for U. S. air units in other theatres (Burma–China, Alaska, Hawaii, Panama–Caribbean, Great Britain for German bombing, now the Near East, a possible African expedition, and the U. S. Coastal regions) would seem definitely to limit for some time to come the extent to which we can provide for a further expansion in the Pacific–Australian theatre.

General Marshall acknowledged that the Navy might be able, in case some land-based air cover were provided, to "carry on an offensive campaign against the Japanese flank in the Southwest Pacific theatre." He then concluded:

I, therefore, feel that if a change in basic strategy, as already approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is involved, the entire situation must be reconsidered before we become involved more seriously in the build-up of Army ground and air garrisons in the Pacific Islands.\textsuperscript{33}

When Admiral King repeated his proposal early in March, he requested ground garrisons for only two islands—Efate and Tongatabu—and to this proposal the War Department quickly acceded.\textsuperscript{34} In determining the composition of the task force for Tongatabu (code name BLEACHER), which was to be a base of naval operations, the planners assumed that it would probably not be attacked by major forces so long as the Allies held Samoa, the Fijis, and New Caledonia. They provided a force to deal with raids and to deny the Tonga Islands to any Japanese force moving from the south against the Fijis or Samoa. This force, under the command of Brig. Gen. Benjamin C. Lockwood, Jr., was similar to the one provided for Borabora—a regiment of antiaircraft, a regiment of infantry (reinforced) less one battalion, and a pursuit squadron (the 68th) which was to be sent from Australia—all told, about 7,200 men.\textsuperscript{35}
plan for garrisoning Efate assumed the probability of a Japanese assault before attacking either New Caledonia or the Fijis. The Navy agreed to provide for air defense with a Marine defense battalion and a Marine fighter squadron. The Army agreed to send a force to Efate (code name ROSES) of about 4,900 men, consisting of a reinforced regiment of infantry (the 24th Infantry). The force commander, Brig. Gen. Harry D. Chamberlin, was to exercise unity of command over the joint forces.36

The Eisenhower Studies

The joint agreement to send these two additional garrison forces into the South Pacific did not indicate agreement between the War and Navy Departments on the question of Army deployment in the Pacific. The leader in formulating the Army view was General Eisenhower. As chief War Department operations officer for the Pacific, had recognized and had in fact insisted that the movement of reinforcements to the ABDA area should take precedence over "everything else—Magnet, Gymnast, replacements in Ireland." 37 But he also considered this policy as necessarily temporary.

On 19 February he listed priorities for use of American shipping in the war effort. The first priority was: "Maintenance of existing garrisons. Defense aid to Russia. Essential supplies to UK and critical items, only, to China." Second priority was for approved reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific, this to include approved new garrisons not adjacent to the lines of communication, and possible items of lend-lease for the Netherlands Indies. Third, came approved units and material reinforcements for Hawaii; fourth, for Panama and Alaska. British lend-lease had fifth priority (so far as use of American shipping was required); approved reinforcements for the Caribbean area (less Panama), sixth; continuation of Northern Ireland and Iceland movements, seventh. Finally, Eisenhower mentioned filler replacements for Hawaii. The above listing, Eisenhower noted, represented the degree of urgency in actual or projected operations at the time the memorandum was prepared.38

A few weeks earlier, on 22 January, General Eisenhower had described in his personal notes the existing disagreement over strategy and his own solution:

The struggle to secure the adoption by all concerned of a common concept of strategical objectives is wearing me down. Everybody is too much engaged with small things of his own. We've got to go to Europe and fight—and we've got to quit wasting resources all over the world—and still worse—wasting time. If we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma; we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible.39


The ROSES Force reached Efate on 4 May 1942. Ltr, TAG to CG WDC, 5 May 42, sub: Info re Destinations of Secret Tr Mvmts, AG 370.5 (3–20–42), 1. Meanwhile a small Army force had been sent from New Caledonia to garrison Efate pending the arrival of the ROSES Force. See memo, WPD for TAG, 8 Mar 42, sub: Dispatch of Adv Det from POPPY Force to Efate, OPD 381 Efate, New Hebrides, 7, and msg (originator TANGIER), Patch to CINCPAC for Marshall, 19 Mar 42, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8.

37 Notations by Eisenhower, 17 Jan 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

38 Memo, Eisenhower for Somervell, 19 Feb 42, no sub, WPD 2789-32.

39 Notations by Eisenhower, 22 Jan 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.
The idea took more definite form in February, immediately after the fall of Singapore, when Eisenhower had become head of the Army plans and operations staff. He wrote: "We’ve got to go on a harassing defensive west of Hawaii; hold India and Ceylon; build up air and land forces in England, and when we’re strong enough, go after Germany’s vitals." Again, three days later: "We’ve got to keep Russia in the war and hold India!! Then we can get ready to crack Germany through England." On 28 February, Eisenhower prepared a formal study setting forth his conclusions and recommendations on world strategy as well as on Pacific deployment. The study presented an outline of world-wide strategic objectives and their application to the Southwest Pacific. It defined in three main propositions what had remained indeterminate in Army, joint, and combined plans since the ABC–1 conversations:

1. In the event of a war involving both oceans, the U. S. should adopt the strategic defensive in the Pacific and devote its major offensive effort across the Atlantic.

2. We must differentiate sharply and definitely between those things whose current accomplishment in the several theaters over the world is necessary to the ultimate defeat of the Axis Powers, as opposed to those which are merely desirable because of their effect in facilitating such defeat.

3. The United States interest in maintaining contact with Australia and in preventing further Japanese expansion to the Southeastward is apparent. . . . but . . . they are not immediately vital to the successful outcome of the war. The problem is one of determining what we can spare for the effort in that region, without seriously impairing performance of our mandatory tasks.

In dealing with the first of these three points, the memorandum applied the "strategic axiom" that the commander should first attack and defeat the weaker force of a divided enemy. Eisenhower reasoned that although Germany and its satellites were "stronger in total combat power" than Japan, Japan was still "relatively stronger" since it was not at war with the Soviet Union and much less accessible to attack by the main forces of the other Allied powers. Moreover, it took three to four times as many ships to transport and maintain a given American force in the Pacific as in the Atlantic. Therefore, Eisenhower concluded, "logistic reasons, as well as strategic axiom, substantiate the soundness of the decision to concentrate against the European Axis."

The memorandum recognized, however, that agreement upon a theater of primary interest did not provide a detailed guide for immediate operations, and that, even though it was correct to concentrate against the enemy in Europe, the immediate problems of the Pacific theater remained to be faced. "The significance of the current strategic and tactical situation in the Southwest Pacific is important," said Eisenhower, "both psychologically and materially, and we must be as careful to avoid unwarranted weakness as to abstain from unnecessary commitments." He continued:

Over-simplification of the Japanese problem, because our primary objective lies elsewhere, is likely to discount the enormous advantages that will accrue to our enemies through conquest of India, the domination of the Indian Ocean, the severing of all lines of

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40 Ibid., 19 Feb 42 entry.
41 Ibid., 22 Feb 42 entry.
42 Memo, WPD for CoS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Strategic Conceptions and their Application to SW Pacific, Env 35, Exec 4. This paper was prepared as one of a series of studies on defensive deployment in the Pacific then being undertaken by the joint and combined staffs as well as in the War Department.
British communications to the Near and Middle East and the physical junction of our two principal enemies. Important, but less critical, advantages will accrue to them, also, through conquest of Australia and the islands immediately to the east thereof.

Having asserted the second main postulate, the doctrine of the "necessary" as distinguished from the "desirable," Eisenhower listed three objectives in the first category—always assuming that the "continental United States and Hawaii, the Caribbean area, and South America north of Natal" were secure:

a. Maintenance of the United Kingdom, which involves relative security of the North Atlantic sea lanes.
b. Retention of Russia in the war as an active enemy of Germany.
c. Maintenance of a position in the India-Middle East Area which will prevent physical junction of the two principal enemies, and will probably keep China in the war.

On the other hand he named as "things... highly desirable," even approaching the necessary:

b. Holding of bases west and southwest of Hawaii.
c. Security of Burma, particularly because of its influence on future Chinese action.
d. Security of South America south of Natal.
e. Security of Australia.
g. Other areas and bases useful in limiting hostile operations and facilitating our own.

When he came to deal in detail with the Southwest Pacific—the area to which by far the most Army forces had been committed since Pearl Harbor—he acknowledged the interest of the United States in maintaining contact with Australia and in containing Japanese expansion to the southeastward. But he went on to point out that the collapse of the Malayan defenses and loss of portions of the Netherlands Indies erased one of the original reasons for deciding to support the Southwest Pacific—to deny to the Japanese the natural resources in those areas. By 28 February, Japan controlled ample sources of oil and tin, and practically the entire rubber resources of the world. Eisenhower therefore listed present objectives, with the reservation that they were not vital to the winning of the war:

a. To maintain a reasonably safe line of communications to Australia . . .
b. To maintain the most advanced bases possible for eventual offensives against the Japanese Empire.
c. To create diversions in favor of the vitally important India-Burma area.
d. To deny the enemy free access to the Southeastern Pacific and its natural resources . . .
e. To support the battle in the N.E.I. as long as possible, . . .

After a summary of the ground and air forces in the Southwest Pacific and a review of the military situation, Eisenhower proposed that (1) New Caledonia be garrisoned with the heavily reinforced triangular division originally scheduled for use there; (2) the 41st Division and at least five battalions of antiaircraft artillery be assembled in Australia as reserve and for occupation of island bases; (3) an amphibious force be organized, in co-operation with the Navy, for seizing island bases considered essential to the furthering of the general plan in the Southwest Pacific; (4) the American air forces in Australia be utilized in support of Java and in covering northern Australia; (5) if resistance in Java ceased, U. S. air forces be used in support of island bases; and (6) one medium group, one pursuit group,
and one light squadron be retained temporarily in Australia and, as additional material became available, be withdrawn to Hawaii to provide a mobile reserve for employment to the southwest.

Eisenhower then introduced a specific recommendation for offensive action, a proposal that followed logically from his view of the military situation as a whole and that explained his other recommendations. In elaborating on what was meant by “task of keeping Russia in the war,” he urged “immediate and definite action,” first “by direct aid through lend-lease,” and second “through the early initiation of operations that will draw off from the Russian front sizeable portions of the German Army, both air and ground.” More specifically:

We should at once develop, in conjunction with the British, a definite plan for operations against Northwest Europe. It should be drawn up at once, in detail, and it should be sufficiently extensive in scale as to engage from the middle of May onward, an increasing portion of the German Air Force, and by late summer an increasing amount of his ground forces.

The choice of northwestern Europe as the invasion point followed from the fact that another of the three essential objectives—protecting the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic sea lanes—could be achieved concurrently with building up resources in the British Isles for a cross-Channel assault. Greater shipping economy thus could be effected than if another “‘first priority’ convoying” problem were created by establishing a “large force at any location other than the Northeast Atlantic.” Indeed, asserted Eisenhower, “The United Kingdom is not only our principal partner in this war; it offers the only point from which effective land and air operations against Germany may be attempted.”

Joint Study of Priorities for Deployment

The whole subject of scheduled movements overseas and long-run strategy had meanwhile come under study for the JCS and the CCS. On 11 February the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee, since it was already studying American aspects of the problem, was directed to satisfy a CCS request for recommendations for over-all deployment by the United Nations in the Pacific areas.

The initial JUSSC papers comprised majority and minority reports. Although the papers were devoted chiefly to a discussion of the Pacific areas, they had something to say about the general strategic situation in the world, especially as it affected the special situation in the Japanese theater of war. Both the majority and the minority reports dwelt on the need to sustain the Soviet war effort and to defeat Germany first, and concluded that the European situation indicated “the compelling necessity for economy

43 (1) JPS Directive 1 to JUSSC, 28 Jan 42. This directive, the first of JPS to its working subcommittee, JUSSC, was forwarded as JPS 2, 30 Jan 42, title: (Directive No. 1) Strategic Deployment of Land, Sea and Air Forces of the U. S. (2) CCS 34, 9 Feb 42, title: Economical Employment of Air Forces against Japan. The title later was changed to “The Economical Employment of Armed Forces Against Japan.”

44 (1) Min, 4th mtg CCS, 10 Feb 42. (2) Min, 13th mtg CPS, 11 Feb 42. (3) JPS 2/1, 11 Feb 42, title: Directive to JUSSC.

45 These reports on “Review of the Strategic Situation in the Japanese Theater of War” were submitted to the JPS on 18 February 1942. The majority report was JPS 2/2, originally JPS 12/1. The minority report was JPS 2/2-A, formerly JPS 12/1-A. Both are filed in ABC 370 (1–28–42). The minority report was the work of one member of the committee and was not signed, but it was undoubtedly the work of the Air Forces representative.
of force in other theaters in order to permit concentration of effort against the principal objective.” The minority report placed even greater emphasis on the ideas that Germany was the principal enemy and that it was necessary to guard against any diversion of strength from the main objective, the defeat of Germany. Both the reports stated:

The availability of shipping controls all decisions concerning overseas movements during 1942. The total capacity available to the United Nations in 1942, even if the building program is accomplished, will not exceed the capacity available in 1941. The shipping situation is so critical as to necessitate effective pooling of shipping and restriction of non-military use to an absolute minimum. The remainder must then be used on the shortest runs practicable in the manner which will contribute most to the early defeat of Germany.

The principal point of difference between the majority and minority reports related to the capacity of the United States and Great Britain to provide adequate air forces and shipping in the Pacific while conducting air operations in Europe to gain superiority over Germany in 1942 and support an invasion of the Continent. Although the reports agreed that “the courses of action to be taken in the Japanese theater must be such as to reduce to a minimum the diversion of forces that might be effectively employed against Germany,” the minority report stated:

The effective defense of the Western Pacific, including the defense of all the important islands desired as bases there, would require a large proportion of our available forces, and would jeopardize the success of the offensive against Germany. Consequently, it must be accepted that we are unable to establish a system of bases and forces, so disposed as to give depth to the defense of the line between Hawaii and Australia.

Thus the minority—presumably the AAF member—recommended virtual abandonment of the Southwest Pacific region—including Australia and the island base chain protecting the approach to Australia from Hawaii. The majority report declared that Australia should be held, and that sea and air communications with Australia must be made secure if Australia were to be supported and remain available as a base for further operations:

Since communications from Australia to the westward are now liable to constant interruption, due to the fall of Singapore, the importance of the Anzac area has been greatly increased. On the security of the Anzac area depends the maintenance of communications between Australia and the United States. Not only must New Caledonia, Fiji and other important shore positions in the area be garrisoned. There must also be provided a mobile air force of long range aircraft to operate with the mobile naval surface forces.46

The minority felt that Australia should be held by minimum forces and that the defense of Australia and New Zealand should be a British responsibility. It indicated that, with the fall of Singapore, the importance of the Anzac area had been somewhat reduced (rather than greatly increased), since it was too distant from Japan for the waging of a decisive offensive against Japan. The minority paper insisted that the United States and Great Britain must accept the fact that they might be forced to relinquish the lines of communication from the United States to Australia if its defense should jeopardize the success of the offensive against Germany. The lines of communication, it contended, should be secured with the forces already provided.

46 The Anzac area covered the eastern and northeastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand, including the ocean reaches between them and New Caledonia.
The result of the planners' study was a significant change in alignment. The minority member acquiesced in the view that the United States could and should hold the line Hawaii–Australia, with the minimum force necessary and at the same time prepare for a maximum offensive across the Atlantic. Thereupon the argument among the planners shifted to the question of what the minimum necessary forces in the Pacific would be—a question on which the Navy planners, rather than the Air planners, found themselves in the minority, insisting that more Army forces, especially air forces, would be needed to hold the Japanese.47

**JCS Decision on Deployment Policy**

The Joint Staff Planners unanimously recommended “that the JCS at once decide on a clear course of action, and execute this decision with the utmost vigor.” 48

They reported irreconcilable differences among themselves and presented three possible courses of action which different members of their committee supported. A middle-of-the-road course—which echoed Eisenhower's 28 February study—was listed as the third alternative. The three alternatives were:

(A) Ensure the security of the military position in the Pacific Theater by strong reinforcements . . . at the expense of executing a vigorous offensive against Germany with United States Forces. Contain Japanese forces in the southern portion of the Pacific Theater; inflict attrition; and exert economic pressure by the destruction of vessels . . . .

(B) While Russia is still an effective ally, concentrate the mass of our forces for a vigorous offensive, initially from bases in England, with the objective of defeating Germany. Until Germany has been defeated, accept the possibility that the Southwest Pacific may be lost.

(C) Provide the additional forces in the South Pacific Area considered by the Joint Strategic Committee as the minimum required for the defensive position and simultaneously begin to build up in the United Kingdom forces intended for offense at the earliest practicable time. This course of action contemplates that the British would provide the bulk of the forces for any offensive undertaken in 1942 from the United Kingdom.49

Thus squarely presented was the issue of where the United States and Great Britain should make their first great offensive effort. Implicit in any decision in favor of the third alternative was acceptance of the United Kingdom as the major offensive base. With very little recorded discussion the JCS agreed, on 16 March 1942, that “of the courses of action available,” it was “preferable” for the United States “to begin to build up forces in the United Kingdom” and to restrict Pacific forces to the number allotted in “current commitments.” 50

Concurrently the JCS considered a paper in which the War Department carefully re-
viewed the related question of defense forces for Hawaii.\(^{51}\) This paper, approved by Generals Arnold and Marshall, maintained that in providing rapidly for adequate defense of the Hawaiian Islands it was essential to avoid overdefense, since all troops and armament assigned there were being contained by Japan without any drain on its own military resources, and the amount of shipping available for other purposes was unnecessarily reduced. The Army planners estimated that so long as the United States could keep reasonable naval strength in the Hawaiian area and were engaging the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific, attacks on Hawaii would be limited to naval and air raids. The study concluded that the ground and air forces projected by the Army, combined with the local naval defenses would “assure retention of the islands, prevent serious damage to installations . . . and permit freedom of action to the Pacific Fleet.” It recommended that Army forces should be increased to authorized levels as soon as possible after commitments of higher priority had been filled. Although the Hawaiian Department had requested substantial reinforcements in addition to those authorized in January, the JCS accepted this recommendation on 2 March and the President approved their decision on 13 March.\(^{52}\)

Strategic Deployment in the Pacific

Soon after these decisions were reached, a number of changes had to be made in War Department troop commitments, all of them making it even harder to carry out the compromise policy of holding the line in the Pacific while preparing for an offensive across the Atlantic. Early in March the Prime Minister had asked that the United States send one division to New Zealand and one to Australia in addition to the U.S. Army forces already allocated to Australia. The Dominions could on that basis consent to leave one New Zealand and one Australian division in the then critical Middle East battle zone. The Prime Minister suggested that “shipping would be saved and safety gained by the American reinforcement of Australia and New Zealand rather than by a move across the oceans of these divisions from the Middle East.”\(^{53}\) The Army planners recommended that the United States agree to send the additional divisions for which the Prime Minister had asked, provided only that Australia and New Zealand definitely agreed to retain an equivalent number of troops in the Indian Ocean area. It was not perfectly clear from the Prime Minister’s message whether or not he knew of the assignment of the 41st Division to Australia nor, therefore, whether his proposal would require sending two divisions or only one to the Southwest Pacific in addition to the forces already there.\(^{54}\)
its reply, which Roosevelt forwarded to Churchill, the CCS recognized the importance of the area of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East and agreed that the Australian and New Zealand divisions now in that area should remain and that the United States would dispatch one division to New Zealand and one to Australia as replacement for their forces as follows:

The 41st Division is leaving the U. S. by the eighteenth of this month reaching Australia about April 10. The next convoy of half a division could leave about April 15 and the remainder about May 15. If the total number of New Zealand and Australian troops retained for fighting in the Middle East, India or Ceylon are in excess of these two divisions, a third U. S. division can leave for the Southwest Pacific about May 15.

These movements would require that some twenty-five cargo ships be withdrawn from lend-lease service to the Red Sea and China.

The United States also agreed to furnish shipping to move two British divisions (40,000 men) with their equipment from the United Kingdom to the Middle East and India in April and May. This movement would require the withdrawal of eleven lend-lease ships from sailings for Burma and the Red Sea, and was contingent on a number of important matters, namely, that during that period a North African operation not be undertaken, the movement to Northern Ireland be limited to those troops which the two convoys planned for the Middle East could bring over from the United States, and movements to Iceland be stopped. This movement would also have the effect, the U. S. joint planners estimated, of seriously curtailing American contribution to an air offensive and virtually eliminating American contribution to a land offensive against Germany in 1942. The joint planners found that under the new commitments the availability of troop transports would become the limiting factor during the second and third quarters of 1942, after which the availability of cargo shipping would again control. Although the tentative commitments might possibly have some effect on transportation of troops to the United Kingdom, all Pacific troop movements were expected to be carried out as indicated in the previous schedules. The planners suggested that should the British not be willing to launch an offensive in the European theater in 1942, the agreed strategic concept should be re-evaluated and the possibility of concentrating American offensive effort in the Pacific considered.

One other change occurred in the JCS 23 deployment schedules when the 27th Division, previously authorized by the War Department for Hawaii, replaced a Marine amphibious division which the JUSSC had recommended be sent to Hawaii. With the addition of these three Army divisions, Army forces allocated to Hawaii, Australia, and the lines of communication for 1942

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55 CGS 56/1, 6 Mar 42, title: Msg from Prime
Minister on Current Sit.

56 Appendix II of JCS 23 listed another circumstance affecting the earlier deployment recommendations, namely that the War and Navy Departments, the Munitions Allocation Committee, the Maritime Commission, and with certain reservations, the War Shipping Administration had agreed on a proposed allocation of American cargo ships (over 5,000 tons deadweight) for the year 1942. This appendix is a supplementary report by the JUSSC prepared in accordance with JPS directive. (See min, 4th mtg JPS, 11 Mar 42.)

57 App II, JCS 23.

58 For effect on troop movements to the United Kingdom, see below, Ch. VIII.

59 See (1) Addendum to WPD Notes on JCS 23 in ABC 370 (1-28-42); and (2) JPS 21/7, 18 Apr 42, title: Def for Island Bases along Lines of Communication between Hawaii and Australia.
amounted to over 275,000—about 35 percent of the total projected overseas deployment of the U. S. Army and about half of the projected Army deployment outside the Western Hemisphere. (See Chart 2.)

Strategic Responsibility and Command in the Pacific

The debate over Army commitments in the Pacific was accompanied, and its outcome was very largely determined, by a clarification of American responsibilities for military operations in the Southwest Pacific, following on the collapse of the ABDA Command. Within the week after the fall of Singapore the CCS accepted as virtually certain the loss of Sumatra and Java. On 23 February they ordered General Wavell to dissolve his headquarters at Batavia, permitting command to pass to the Dutch, whose forces were still engaged, with some Allied aid, in fighting a delaying action in Java. Although this transfer of authority technically placed the United States forces in the Philippines under Netherlands command, MacArthur was to “continue to communicate directly with the War Department.” The two senior U. S. Army officers in the Batavia headquarters were ordered, upon release by Wavell, to proceed to the two flanks of the disintegrating ABDA area—General Brereton to India, to become Commanding General, Tenth U. S. Air Force, with headquarters at Karachi, and General Brett to resume command of all U. S. forces in Australia. These interim readjustments marked the end of the first short-lived experiment in international unified command for World War II.

60 The total forces “on shore in overseas positions” in the Pacific recommended in JPS 2/6 and incorporated in JCS 23 were (in round numbers) 416,000, of whom 225,000 were then present in the areas or en route. (JCS 23, Annex A, title: Forces Req to Secure SW Pacific.) The breakdown (in round numbers, including projected ground and air strength for 1942) was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (Alaska)</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (Panama)</td>
<td>79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (Central, South, and Southwest Pacific)</td>
<td>229,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>416,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figure of over 275,000 given in the text for the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific represents the 229,000 in JCS 23, with allowance of over 45,000 for forces, including the 27th, 32d, and 37th Divisions, not included in JCS 23. The figure 275,000 corresponds roughly with the calculation made at the time by WPD. (See Addendum cited n. 59(1).)

Projected Army commitments to the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific rose steadily during the spring. (See OPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).) As of 2 April commitments were about 260,000; for 23 April, about 276,000; for 4 June, about 290,000.
MacArthur Ordered to Australia

A far more important readjustment in command had meanwhile come under consideration—the transfer of General MacArthur from the Philippines to Australia.65 The War Department had opened the question of his transfer early in February with a message to MacArthur, which stated that in the event of the loss of Bataan peninsula there might be a greater need for him elsewhere, and which assured him that any order for him to give up the "immediate leadership" of his forces in the Philippines would come directly from the President.66 On 22 February the President decided to order MacArthur to Australia to assume command of American forces there, with the intention of getting the Australian and British Governments to accept him "as commander of the reconstituted ABDA Area."67

**Division of World Into Areas of Strategic Responsibility**

While these readjustments in command were being made, the President and the Prime Minister entered into negotiations to allocate strategic responsibility as between Great Britain and the United States. The President first introduced the subject of a division of responsibility among theaters by the two countries on 18 February in a communication to the Prime Minister. He wrote:

> It seems to me that the United States is able because of our geographical position to reinforce the right flank [Australia and New Zealand] much better than you can and I think that the U.S. should take the primary responsibility for that immediate reinforcement and maintenance, using Australia as the main base. . . . Britain is better prepared to reinforce Burma and India and I visualize that you would take responsibility for that theater. We would supplement you in any way we could, just as you would supplement our efforts on the right flank.69

he would "look after the Australian side." (See *Hinge of Fate*, p. 143.)

65 For a detailed account of this transaction, see Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*.

66 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 4 Feb 42, Item 1a, Exec 10. (2) There was no further correspondence on the matter until 21 February, when the War Department requested MacArthur's views. Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 21 Feb 42, Item 1a, Exec 10. Copy also in WDCSA 370.05 Phil (3-17-42) (SS). (3) These messages were both sent with the utmost secrecy. Memos, Eisenhower for Off in Charge of Code Room, 4 Feb and 21 Feb 42, atchd to above cited copies of draft msgs in Item 1a, Exec 10.

67 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 22 Feb 42, No. 1078, WDCSA 370.05 Phil (3-17-42) (SS). This message was sent by Eisenhower, received in the Philippines 2257, 22 February 1942, and delivered to MacArthur in person at midnight 22–23 February (both Washington time). (2) Ltr, SW to Honorable Earl Warren, Attorney General, State of California, 14 Apr 42, with atchd certificate by Eisenhower and memo for rcd by Col Charles K. Gailey, Jr., Exec OPD, OPD 210.3, 53.

Churchill on 20 February had already "surmised" that if MacArthur were evacuated from Corregidor MacArthur himself had the choice of the exact moment and manner of his departure. He notified the War Department that he expected to leave the Philippines for Australia about 15 March.68

68Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 26 Feb 42, No. 373, WDCSA 370.05 Phil (3–17–42) (SS).

For correspondence on the manner of departure, see: (1) msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 24 Feb 42, No. 358, and (2) msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 25 Feb 42, No. 1087, both in WDCSA 370.05 Phil (3–17–42) (SS); and (3) memo, WPD for TAG, 26 Feb 42, sub: Far Eastern Sit, Item 10, Exec 10.

69Msg, President to Prime Minister, 18 Feb 42, No. 106, with JPS 11 in ABC 323.31 POA (1–29–42), 1-A.
A few days later the British Chiefs of Staff indicated that they were thinking along similar lines.  

On 7 March the President proposed that the world be divided into three general areas for the prosecution of the war against the Axis: (1) the Pacific area, (2) the Middle and Far East area, and (3) the European and Atlantic area. The first region would be an American responsibility, the second British, and the third combined American and British.

On the next day General Marshall discussed the issue at the White House.  

General Eisenhower meanwhile prepared a study along the lines of the President’s proposal. Eisenhower defined the three areas of strategic responsibility as follows: (1) The Pacific area, which included the American continents, China, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, but excluded Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, was to be an area of American responsibility. (2) The Indian Ocean and Middle East area—the Indian Ocean and all land areas contiguous thereto west of Singapore, and the Middle and Near East—was designated an area of British responsibility, with American assistance limited to material aid from surplus production. It was stipulated that the United States should have access to bases in India and routes to China within this area. (3) Europe and the Atlantic, in which the major effort against Germany was to be made, was to be an area of British-American joint responsibility.

Eisenhower further proposed, following the sense of the 7 March White House meeting, that the CCS exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategy and the allocation of war material in all areas, in addition to direct supervision of all strategic and operational matters in the European and Atlantic area. In the Indian Ocean and Middle East area the British Chiefs of Staff were to exercise jurisdiction; in the Pacific area the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were to exercise jurisdiction.

On 9 March the President sent a personal message to the Prime Minister asking him, in view of the developments in the Southwest Pacific area since the ARCADIA Conference, to consider the operational simplification that had been proposed in Washington. The operational responsibility for the Pacific area would rest on the United States, with decisions for the area being made in Washington by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in consultation with an advisory council representing Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands Indies, China, and possibly Canada. The supreme command in the Pacific area would be American. The middle area—extending from Singapore to and including India, the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Libya, and the Mediterranean—would be a British responsibility, but the United States would continue to allocate to it all possible munitions and vessel assignments. The third area—Europe and the Atlantic—would be a joint British-American responsibility and would include definite plans for establishment of a new front on the European Continent. “I am becoming more and more interested in the establishment of

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70 Msg, CsofS to Jt Stf Mis, 23 Feb 42, W. 76, with CPS 19/D in ABC 323.31 POA (1–29–42), 1-A.
71 Sum of conf at White House on “Strategic Responsibility of United Kingdom and United States,” 7 Mar 42, circulated by JCS on 9 Mar 42 as JCS 19.
72 Min, 5th mtg JCS, 9 Mar 42.
this new front this summer,” the President added.74

The Prime Minister replied on 18 March, generally concurring in the President's proposals and stating that he and the British Chiefs of Staff saw “great merits in simplification resulting from American control over Pacific sphere and British control over Indian sphere and indeed there is no other way.” The Prime Minister implicitly accepted the postponement of a combined

North African operation and movements of American troops to the United Kingdom as a necessary corollary to the use of shipping for deployment to the Southwest Pacific and movement of British troops to the Middle East. With the understanding that British and American efforts everywhere could be directed by “machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee acting directly under you and me,” the Prime Minister also approved the President’s proposals for “executive conduct” of the war.

In regard to the Pacific theater, Churchill wrote:

On supreme and general outlook in Pacific we are both agreed on the paramount importance of regaining the initiative against Japan... We assume that any large-scale
methods of achieving this would be capable of being discussed by combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington . . . .

And in summing up:

. . . I feel that your proposals as I have ventured to elaborate and interpret them will achieve double purpose namely (a) integrity of executive and operational action and (b) opportunity of reasonable consultation for those whose fortunes are involved.75

Creation of SWPA and POA

While the President and the Prime Minister were reaching agreement on the worldwide division of strategic responsibility, the JCS were considering the subdivision of the Pacific theater, which they assumed would become a responsibility of the United States. The Navy was primarily concerned with the “threat to the line of communications between the Americas and Australia–New Zealand,” and Admiral King had made the first formal proposal for revision of command arrangements in the Southwest Pacific immediately after the fall of Singapore.76 The War Department planners considered various alternatives suggested by Admiral King.77 At the same time the War Department informally told Brett of its agreement with the principle expressed by the New Zealand and Australian authorities meeting

75 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Mar 42, No. 46, with JCS 19/1 in ABC 371 (3–5–42).
76 Memo, Admiral King for JCS, 16 Feb 42, sub: Changes in ABDA and/or Anzac Areas Evolving from Developments in Far East, with min, 5th mtg CCS, 17 Feb 42, in ABC 381 SWPA (1–12–42). King also proposed in this memorandum that Burma be separated from the ABDA Command and transferred to a new India–Burma–China Theater.
77 (1) WPD brief, Notes on . . . CPS 19/D, with CPS 19/D. (2) WPD brief, Notes on . . . CCS 9th mtg, 3 Mar 42, Demarkation of New Strategic Areas in Japanese War Zone, with CCS 53. Both in ABC 323.31 POA (1–29–42), 1-A.
the "Southwest Pacific Area" be established as a subarea command in the Pacific theater "to comprise all land areas in the Pacific for which the U. S. is made responsible, southwest of the line Philippines—Samoa (both inclusive), thence south along the meridian of 170° W." The participating governments—Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands Indies, and the United States—would select a supreme commander whose directive would be prepared by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in collaboration with representatives of these governments. The sea and island areas in the Pacific Ocean northeast of the Southwest Pacific Area would be known as the North Pacific Area and "placed under the command of a U. S. Navy officer." 81

The JCS acting "in anticipation of final approval of the division of the world into three major theaters," thereupon modified their proposal by extending the boundary of the area northward to include the Philippines and renaming the area the Southwest Pacific Area. But they retained the separation of Australia from New Zealand and New Caledonia, ruling that the defense of these islands, as the Navy insisted, was essentially a part of the defense of the lines of communication from the United States. 82

On this basis the JCS proceeded to set up commands in the Pacific theater, in effect making the Army responsible for operations in Australia and to the north and northeast, to and including the Philippines—the Southwest Pacific Area—and making the Navy responsible for operations in the rest of the Pacific theater—the Pacific Ocean Area—except for a small Southeast Pacific area (for which no command was established). 83 [See Chart 2.] General MacArthur was to be Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who was in command of the Pacific Fleet, was to become Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (POA), directly controlling the South Pacific subarea through a deputy whom he would designate. 84

Organization of SWPA

On 10 March, in anticipation of General MacArthur's arrival in Australia, the War Department had sent to General Brett the following instructions, as approved by the President:

Within the hour [of General MacArthur's arrival in Australia] you will call upon the Prime Minister or other appropriate governmental official of Australia, stating that your

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81 Memo, CoS for JCS [9 Mar 42], sub: Creation of SWPA, Tab Collab, Book 4, Exec 8. This memorandum, prepared by General Eisenhower, was circulated as JCS 18/2.

82 (1) Min, 5th mtg JCS, 9 Mar 42. (2) For Admiral King's restatement of the point at issue, see memo, King for President, 5 Apr 42, with CCS 57/2 in ABC 323.31 POA (1–29–42), 2.

83 In May, when Admiral Nimitz took command of the Pacific Ocean Area, Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command (CDC), asked what would be the effect of the new division of the Pacific theater, so far as his command was concerned. The War Department informed him: "Pacific Ocean Areas placed under CINCPAC do not include Southeast Pacific Area. Consequently there is no change in command status, Pacific Sector, Panama Sea Frontier." (Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Andrews, 9 May 42, CM-OLT 1941.)

84 (1) Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 Mar 42. (2) Memo, CNO for CofS, 19 Mar 42, sub: Comd Areas in Pacific Theater, with JCS 18/2 in ABC 323.31 POA (1–29–42), 2. (3) Min, 7th mtg JCS, 23 Mar 42.

The boundary between the Indian and Pacific theaters was definitely fixed on 24 March 1942. The CCS also agreed at the meeting of that day that the directive to the Supreme Commander, SWPA, would be issued by the United States Government "in direct consultation as necessary with the Australian Government." (Min, 13th mtg CCS, 24 Mar 42.)
call is made by direction of the President. You are to notify the Prime Minister that General MacArthur has landed in Australia and has assumed command of all U. S. Army forces therein. You will propose that the Australian Government nominate General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, and will recommend that the nomination be submitted as soon as possible to London and Washington simultaneously.85

On 11 March MacArthur and his party left Corregidor for Mindanao, from which planes were still able to operate. When he arrived in Australia six days later, the War Department announced that he would be supreme commander in that region, including the Philippines, "in accordance with the request of the Australian Government."86 On the same day Roosevelt sent a personal message to Churchill telling him of MacArthur's arrival in Australia and explaining that both the Australian and New Zealand Governments had suggested appointment of an American supreme commander in the Southwest Pacific. "This action," the President stated, "will in no way interfere with procedure of determining strategic areas and spheres of responsibility through established channels."87

On 18 March the War Department sent MacArthur a long summary of the plans for command arrangements as of that date, telling him that the President had approved his assumption of "Supreme Command in Australia and region to north, including the Philippines," and that upon completion of British-American negotiations he probably would be appointed formally as commander of the Southwest Pacific Area.88

The first task facing MacArthur after his arrival in Australia was to consolidate the organization of the land, sea, and air forces of the United States and Australia that had been put under his command. General MacArthur had been instructed to take over from General Brett the command of U. S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) but the day after his arrival the War Department rescinded these instructions, explaining that as supreme commander of an international command he would not be "eligible to retain direct command of any national force." The War Department informed him that Brett, therefore, should "temporarily resume his position as Commanding General of USAFIA," indicating further that, upon the reorganization of commands in the Pacific, Brett should command Allied air forces in Australia, an Australian officer should command Allied ground forces, and Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary should command Allied naval forces.89

85 (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 10 Mar 42, sub: Far Eastern Sit. This memorandum had notation that this message from Marshall to Brett was No. 613. (2) For Presidential "OK-FDR," see memo, SGS for Hopkins, 10 Mar 42, no sub. Both in Item 10, Exec 10.
86 (1) WD press release, 17 Mar 42, copy in Item 10, Exec 10. (2) For MacArthur's trip to Australia, see Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. XX.
87 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 17 Mar 42, Item 10, Exec 10. The President noted that he had authorized a press release in order to forestall enemy propaganda to the effect that the United States was abandoning the Philippines.
88 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur (CG USAFFE, Melbourne), 18 Mar 42, No. 739, WPD Msg File 13, 1885.
89 (1) Msg cited n. 88. (2) The final directive to MacArthur also provided specifically that he was ineligible to "command directly any National force." Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Apr 42, CM-OUT 0482.
By agreement between MacArthur and the Australian Government, Brett was at once put in command of combined air forces, and MacArthur soon thereafter relieved him of responsibilities for USAFIA. These responsibilities, primarily for the operation of American base facilities in Australia, reverted to Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, who in fact had had a fluctuating and uncertain share of these responsibilities ever since his arrival with the first American troop convoy in Australia in December. MacArthur proposed that they should continue to include command of American grounds forces in Australia. But the War Department continued to insist on the need for a combined ground command, under an Australian officer, in line with the precedent of the ABDA Command. The War Department emphasized the importance of following that precedent, noting that it had been developed "after much difficulty," and explained that it had been set to avert a situation where the supreme commander of ABDA area (Wavell) might have personally become "to intimately involved in defense of Singapore and Burma and not sufficiently detached in point of view to take care of interests of Philippines and Netherlands East Indies." The War Department concluded: "This basis for Supreme Commander has been accepted as the policy to guide in future combined operations of United Nations . . . ."

MacArthur at once fell in with the policy outlined by the War Department for command of combined air, ground, and naval forces and proposed that Barnes' command be set up as an American service command, with purely administrative and supply functions, separate from Australian administration and supply, which would continue to be under the Australian Government.

**Directive to MacArthur**

The formal directive naming MacArthur as Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, and Admiral Nimitz as Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, was issued by the JCS on 30 March and promptly approved by the President. The two first and most important points in the mission as-
signed to MacArthur were to “hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for future offensive action against Japan, and in order to check the Japanese conquest of the Southwest Pacific Area” and to “check the enemy advance toward Australia and its essential lines of communication . . . .” 94 Although his directive included the provision that he should “prepare to take the offensive,” the mission assigned him was primarily defensive, in accordance with the strategy in the Pacific that the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had developed in March. He was to maintain the American position in the Philippines and protect communications and route shipping within the Southwest Pacific Area. He was directed to exert economic pressure on the enemy by destroying his transport vessels and to support the operations of friendly forces in the Pacific Ocean and Indian theaters.

There were certain broad limitations on MacArthur’s authority. As supreme commander, he was authorized “to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials,” but was declared ineligible to command directly any national force and was not responsible for the internal administration of the respective forces under his command.

The JCS reserved to themselves the exercise of jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy, with the Army Chief of Staff acting as agent for the JCS. General jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and related factors including the allocation of forces and war materials was given to the CCS.

Finally, and most tellingly, the scope of General MacArthur’s operations was restricted not by his directive but by the policy that the War Department had meanwhile adopted to govern the deployment of Army forces in the Pacific. The War Department undertook to bring to full strength the air units already assigned to Australia—two heavy bomber groups, two medium bomber groups, one light bomber group, and three pursuit groups—and to send to Australia the 41st and 32d Divisions. As soon as MacArthur arrived in Australia, the War Department informed him that Army commitments to the Southwest Pacific Area would be limited to these units, the limits being “fixed by shortages in shipping, which is of the utmost seriousness, and by critical situations elsewhere.” 95 The implications of the War Department’s policy were quite as important as the explicit limitation on authorized strength. The rate at which the War Department met its commitments to the Southwest Pacific Area and the state of training of the troops that were sent might also be cut for the same reason that the authorized strength itself was limited—in order to meet other commitments. Under its adopted policy, moreover, the War Department was not likely to demand, and still less likely to obtain, the commitment of sufficient naval reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific to enable General MacArthur to conduct any offensive operations, even

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94 (1) Min, 8th mtg JCS, 30 Mar 42. (2) Memo, U. S. Secy CCS for Marshall, 1 Apr 42, with CCS 57/2 in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 2. (3) Memo, CofS and COMINCH for President, 30 Mar 42, no sub, and incl directives for CINCPOA and Supreme Comdr, SWPA, photostats in ABC 323.31 POA (1-29-42), 1-B and OPD 384 PTO, 4. (4) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Apr 42, CM-OUT 0482. This message is quoted from the directive to the Supreme Commander, SWPA, 30 March 1942.

95 Msg cited n. 88.
when his air units should be reorganized and equipped and his divisions adequately trained for combat operations. The forces at his disposal were only a small fraction of those he would need to make good the pledge he had given the Philippine nation and to avenge the defeat and imminent surrender of the remnants, hungry and bitter, of the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.96

96 The War Department continued its helpless preoccupation with the Philippines to the end of the Philippine Island Campaign. For the detailed story of the close of that campaign, see Morton, Fall of the Philippines.
CHAPTER VIII

The Principle of Concentration in the British Isles

The program of the War Department for limiting Army commitments in the Pacific was in keeping with previous understandings on British and American strategy. But the purpose of the War Department in advancing this program went beyond the previous understandings and was in conflict with the announced intentions of the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff. As General Eisenhower had urged in February, the War Department began planning to gather U. S. Army forces in the British Isles as rapidly as possible, in preparation for an invasion of northwestern Europe across the English Channel. The reason given by Eisenhower for beginning at once to plan on this basis was the fear of a collapse of the Red Army in 1942. A collapse of the Red Army would leave Great Britain and the United States with little prospect of victory in northwestern Europe.¹ Back of this reasoning lay the fear of becoming committed successively to a whole series of limited operations—peninsular campaigns in Europe and island campaigns in the Pacific. Behind this fear lay the conviction that these limited operations would serve only to restrict the enemies' positions without greatly reducing their actual and potential strength, while tying down such large Allied armies and building up such formidable demands on overseas supply routes as to rule out the possibility of mounting a "decisive" campaign against the heavily defended main position of either Germany or Japan.

There seemed to be some chance that the War Department could avoid making such a series of commitments. The British shared the War Department's fears, in so far as operations against Japan were concerned, and the U. S. Navy shared its fears, in so far as operations against Germany were concerned. There was a possibility that Admiral King might accept what could not but seem to him a very inadequate provision for "defensive" operations in the Pacific, in order to avoid a prolonged involvement in secondary campaigns against Germany that might indefinitely postpone decisive action against Japan. There was a parallel possibility that, in order to assure that U. S. Army forces would not become heavily committed to operations against Japan, the British Chiefs might be ready to forego their long-considered strategy of opening in the Mediterranean several limited offensives against Germany. There was of course no certainty, even if the military staffs should reach agreement on this basis, whether the President and the Prime Minister would accept it, restraining their desire to commit forces to action as fast as they became available.

¹ For Eisenhower's studies, see above, Ch. VII.
The first condition of gaining approval for the War Department's plan for concentration in the British Isles was fulfilled when Admiral King acquiesced in the limitation of Army strength in the Pacific. The second condition was fulfilled by the agreement of the British Chiefs, through their representatives in the CCS, to discontinue active planning for the joint British-American invasion of North Africa.

The Cancellation of Super-Gymnast

At the very end of the Arcadia Conference the President and the Prime Minister had agreed to defer this operation until May, in order that the military staffs might go ahead with the scheduled reinforcement of positions in the South and Southwest Pacific and in southeast Asia, but it was evident that neither of them had given up the idea and that they expected to bring it up again in the late spring, and that they were strongly disposed to act sooner if they should receive an “invitation” from the French.

After the Arcadia Conference the planners set out to fix the meaning of the primary assumption of the plan—that the French authorities would issue an “invitation.” The British planners in Washington stated that they presupposed “whole-hearted French cooperation,” especially on the part of the French Fleet units under the control of the Vichy government, whereas the Arcadia language seemed to allow for “slight uncoordinated resistance.” The combined planners and Maj. Gen. Lloyd R. Fredendall, who had succeeded General Stilwell in command of the American forces assigned to the African operation, eventually agreed to plan on the assumption that Vichy French authorities would be helpful and would have bound themselves to prevent the French Fleet units from opposing the operation.

Securing assurances of this kind from Vichy seemed much less probable at the end of February 1942 than it had in December 1941. In December initial successes of General Sir Claude Auchinleck’s Eighth Army offensive in Libya, which had started auspiciously in November, had caused the British to anticipate an early approach to Tunisia and a French invitation to occupy North Africa. By the end of January 1942 the initiative had passed to the Afrika Korps, and the British had fallen back to eastern Libya to establish a defensive line that would protect Egypt. United States and British military opinion was unanimous that “far from cooperating, the Vichy French will continue to aid the Axis . . . until such time as the Axis is on the run.”

The unfavorable turn of events in North Africa after the Arcadia Conference simplified the problem for the Army planners, since it put entirely out of the question the Super-Gymnast operation, which they believed to be beyond the means of the United States and Great Britain, and unwise in

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2 See provisions of JCS 23 discussed in Ch. VII above.

3 See above, Ch. V.

4 CPS 2, 22 Jan 42, title: Super-Gymnast.

5 (1) Min, 2d mtg CPS, 2 Feb 42. (2) CPS 2/1, 10 Feb 42, title: Super-Gymnast. (3) CPS 2/2, 10 Feb 42, same title. (4) Min, 3d mtg CPS, 14 Feb 42. (5) CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42, same title.

6 CCS 5/2, 3 Mar 42.

At this time it became known that Vichy was furnishing war materials for the use of Axis troops in Libya. The U.S. Government issued a strong note threatening the recall of the American ambassador. For accounts of this crisis in relations between the United States and the Vichy government, see: (1) Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 233–37, and (2) Leahy, I Was There, pp. 76–77.
itself. Plans were made for the invasion of North Africa in case the French should issue an "invitation" some time soon. But even on this assumption, the War Department concluded that the requirements of the operation could be met only by suspending all movements to Iceland and Ireland, and reducing reinforcements to Australia and Hawaii to a "trickler." Furthermore, cargo ships, which were critical in supporting SUPER-GYMNAST, could be made available only at the expense of the Soviet aid program and Red Sea service. The British, too, were held back by a want of shipping, which made SUPER-GYMNAST "almost certainly impossible from the British point of view during 1942." 

The conclusion drawn by the planners after several weeks of study was that planning for the invasion of North Africa was "an academic study and should be treated as such." On 3 March 1942 the CCS agreed to drop SUPER-GYMNAST as an immediate operational possibility.

Meanwhile, the President and the Prime Minister were also reaching agreement to lay aside the North African project. On 4 March the Prime Minister wrote to the President: "I am entirely with you about the need for GYMNAST, but the check which Auchinleck has received [in Libya] and the shipping stringency seem to impose obstinate and long delays." A few days later, in a message discussing the division of strategic responsibility, the President wrote to the Prime Minister: "It is understood that this presupposes the temporary shelving of Gymnast." The Prime Minister, concurring in the President's proposals for movement of British troops to the Middle East and for deployment of U.S. forces to the Southwest Pacific, implicitly accepted this conclusion. In conformity with the agreement reached by the CCS, the three War Department commands were told that "no forces, material, or shipping" would be "held in readiness" for SUPER-GYMNAST, and air force and service units assigned to the operation would be released immediately. This marked the end of the American operation were completed in April. Col. John E. Hull finished the convoy program with a British staff officer, Brigadier G. K. Bourne, before "putting the plan in cold storage." (See (1) min, 12th mtg CPS, 26 March 42, and (2) ltr, Bourne to Hull, 6 April 42. GYMNAST and SUPER-GYMNAST, Development File, G-3 Regd Docs.) Ltr, Prime Minister to President, 4 March 42, CCS 56 in ABC 311.5 (1-30-42). This statement about GYMNAST greatly relieved the minds of the CCS, who were at the moment deliberating on ways of informing the President and Prime Minister that SUPER-GYMNAST was not feasible. (See min, 9th mtg CCS, 3 March 42.)

"Memo, G-4 for WPD, 14 Feb 42, sub: Shipping for SUPER-GYMNAST, WPD 4511-65, circulated as CPS 2/3. For General Gerow's original inquiry, which led to the submission of the G-4 memo, see min cited n. 5(4)."

"Memo, WPD for CGs AGF, AAF, and SOS, 22 March 42, sub: Ops SUPER-GYMNAST, OPD 320.2 Air Corps, 6. This memo carried out CPS recommendations of 3 March 42 in CCS 5/2."
planning begun in December 1941 for a combined British-American invasion of North Africa and opened the way for the War Department's proposal to concentrate forces in the British Isles.

The Washington Studies

As early as August 1941, a G–2 officer had written a paper urging the creation of a second land front as soon as practicable to divert German resources from the Russian front, as the "only possible method of approach to an ultimate victory of the democracies." This study pointed out that a second land front would also serve as a base for possible future offensive operations provided its location was in a theater containing a vital strategic objective. Proceeding from the axiom that a line of supporting operational bases had to form the base line of an equilateral triangle with assault objective at its apex, the paper advocated a landing on the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkerque in order to capitalize on supporting ground and air bases in England for mounting and protecting the assault forces.17 By the summer of 1941 the War Department planners had come to believe (as Admiral Stark had earlier concluded) that very large ground force operations in Europe would be necessary in order to bring about the defeat of Germany.18 But neither then nor thereafter had they even tried to work out any plan of operations in Europe. Nor would it have been to any purpose for them to do so while the future scope and scale of American involvement in the Pacific remained entirely undefined and undefinable.

Finally, in March 1942, assuming that the War Department had succeeded in fixing limits to future claims for Army forces in the Pacific and could ignore the prospect that Army forces might be sent into North Africa, the War Department staff formulated and advanced its plan for future operations against Germany—a plan essentially different from the plan that the British had advanced.

Preliminary American Studies

General Eisenhower recommended in his 28 February study, "Strategic Conceptions and Their Application to the Southwest Pacific":

We should at once develop, in conjunction with the British, a definite plan for operations against Northwest Europe. It should be drawn up at once, in detail, and it should be sufficiently extensive in scale as to engage from the middle of May onward, an increasing portion of the German Air Force . . . .

Eisenhower asserted that the United Kingdom offered the only point from which effective land and air operations against Germany could be attempted and pointed out that the gathering of forces in the British Isles for a cross-Channel assault would also protect the United Kingdom and the North Atlantic sea lanes.19

On 6 March the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee agreed that "the only means for quickly applying available force against the German war machine" was "use of the British Isles as a base area for an offensive to

17 (1) Study by Lt Col Edwin E. Schwien [penciled date, August 1941], title: An Essential Strategic Diversion in Europe, WPD 4402-77. (2) See also, memo, Col Scobey (WPD) for Lt Col Ralph C. Smith (G–2), 24 Sep 41, sub: Strategical Diversion Paper by Col Schwien, WPD 4402-77.

18 See above, Ch. III, pp. 45[45] 58–61[61].

defeat the German armed forces.” The committee stated the general principle: “If the war is to be won in Europe, land forces must be developed and trained which are capable of landing on the continent and advancing under the support of an overwhelming air force.” This meant “strict economy of force in other theaters.” The committee emphasized the importance of supporting the Soviet Union as the only power “actively and aggressively operating against Germany” and listed as one means “a supporting offensive in 1942” based on the British Isles. The committee did not assert that such an offensive was possible, but did recommend “a maximum effort in cooperation with the British in offensive action operations against Germany” after minimum forces had been allocated to secure the Pacific area.

The planners estimated that a force large enough to cause a “material diversion of German forces from the Russian front” would amount to about 600,000 ground troops, supported by an air force of some 6,500 planes. They further estimated that after needs in the Pacific, India—Burma—China, and other areas in the Atlantic were taken care of, the cargo shipping available to the Army would be sufficient to transport and maintain in the European theater only the following forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Air Forces (Aircraft)</th>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1942</td>
<td>50,000 (700)</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1942</td>
<td>114,000 (1,400)</td>
<td>191,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1943</td>
<td>183,000 (2,300)</td>
<td>252,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was evident that the Army forces that could be moved to Great Britain in 1942 were not enough for a major offensive, but the planners believed that they would be “adequate to assist effectively in such an offensive in the fall of 1942” and could be progressively increased. “Their prospective availability,” they added, “should enable the British to initiate an offensive even sooner.”

The planners were thinking in terms of a British-American air offensive to be begun in the last two weeks of July 1942 followed by an assault with ground forces six weeks later. They concluded that the military prospects of the USSR were the crux of the military situation in Europe and perhaps in the world, and that the United Nations could most effectively assist the Soviet Union in 1942 by:

a) delivering the maximum quantities [of] appropriate munitions to the Red Army, and b) creating a diversion of the maximum number of German air and ground forces from the Russian front by launching as strong an air and ground offensive as it is possible to form from British and American Forces available after all essential strategic deployments in other theaters are provided with the minimum forces consistent with their missions.

The planners suggested destroying enemy forces in the general area of Calais—Arras—St. Quentin—Soissons—Paris—Deauville and establishing bases in that area to facilitate the extension of offensive air and ground operations against German military strength. The chief purposes of this mission would be to divert German forces from the Eastern theater and to destroy German air and ground forces. The planners also expected that such an operation would call

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20 JPS 2/5, 6 Mar 42, title: Review of Strategic Sit in Japanese Theater of War.
21 JPS 2/6, 6 Mar 42, title: Strategic Deployment of the Land, Sea and Air Forces of U. S.
22 Ibid., and Annexes A—H thereto.
23 See JPS 2/6, Annex C—Forces Req for Offensive Action in European Theater. This paper contains a discussion of “projected offensive operations in Europe” in two parts: “Strategic Considerations” and “A Plan for Invasion of Europe.”
forth the support of the people in occupied France, and encourage other European peoples to resist the Axis. On the all important matter of timing, they stated:

An analysis of the available U. S. and British air and ground forces indicates that the British must furnish initially the bulk of the forces if the offensive is launched in time to accomplish effective assistance to the Russians. . . . It is not possible at this time to state the definite date on which the combined US-British air and ground offensive will be undertaken. However, preparations should be based on a D day between July 15 and August 1st.

Before the deployment issue finally reached the JCS, estimates of United States forces had to be revised in the light of fresh commitments made subsequent to the original JUSSC study. One of these commitments involved the provision of United States shipping for the movement of 40,000 British troops from the British Isles to the Middle East and India, and the consequent withdrawal of eleven lend-lease cargo ships from sailings for Burma and the Red Sea during April and May. The second commitment was the movement of two additional United States divisions, one to Australia and one to New Zealand, and the withdrawal of twenty-five lend-lease ships from sailings for Burma and the Red Sea for this purpose. These commitments, which caused troop transports to become the limiting factor during the second and third quarter of 1942, would reduce the number of troops that could be moved to the United Kingdom, if all other troop movements were carried out as previously recommended. The revised estimates were:

by July 1, 1942, only 40,000 troops, instead of 101,000;
by October 1, 1942, only 180,000 troops, instead of 305,000; and
by January 1, 1943, only 390,000 troops, instead of 435,000.

This delay in the movement of U. S. forces to the British Isles obviously would prevent effective American participation in an offensive in Europe in mid-1942. The planners did not change their general strategic recommendations and listed several expedients that might ease the situation in regard to troop movements to the United Kingdom so that it might still be possible to keep to the previous schedule.24

The British Plan for 1943

On 16 March, with very little recorded discussion, the JCS settled the dispute over Army deployment in the Pacific, stating that “of the courses of action available” it was “preferable” for the United States to restrict Pacific forces to the number allotted in “current commitments” and “to begin to build up forces in the United Kingdom.” 25 At a meeting of the JCS a week later, Marshall reported that the British had presented a paper on the possibilities of an invasion of the Continent in 1943, representing a quite different view from the American paper on the subject recommending action in 1942. 26 The British study, which had been prepared in London in December 1941, consisted of a tentative plan for landing troops in the vicinity of Le Havre in the early summer of 1943 “under conditions of severe deterioration of German military power.” It flatly stated that the operations would have to be postponed unless the enemy already had been “weakened in strength and morale” before

25 (1) Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 Mar 42. (2) See above, Ch. VII.
26 Min, 7th mtg JCS, 23 Mar 42.
1943. This British plan conceived of a powerful fast-moving attack, landing troops quickly on the Continent and advancing rapidly into the Ruhr. For this purpose the most suitable landing area would be east and west of Le Havre. In addition to the necessary RAF and Royal Navy forces, commandos, airborne and antiaircraft brigades, six armored divisions, and six and one-third infantry divisions would be necessary for the operation. American aid was viewed as facilitating battleship cover, providing sufficient escorts, and permitting conversion of some British Army units for necessary administrative duties.\(^27\)

At General Marshall's suggestion, the CCS directed the combined planners to reconcile the British views with those previously set forth by the JCS (in JCS 23) which seemed, by implication, to recommend an invasion of the Continent, at least by British forces, in 1942.\(^28\) Specifically, the planners were to report on (1) the possibility of landing and maintaining ground forces on the Continent in 1942, and (2) the possibility of an invasion in 1943. If the latter were a possibility, the planners were to attempt to reconcile the matériel estimates of the British and American planners.\(^29\)

**Combined Studies**

The first study prepared by the combined planners concluded that the decisive limitation upon the proposed invasion, for either target date, lay in the shortage of cargo shipping.\(^30\) This differed radically from the views of the U. S. planners, who had concluded that troop shipping would remain the limiting factor for the greater part of the year. The combined planners took the position that the date of the invasion would depend upon the amount of additional cargo shipping that could be found. But even in the event that cargo shipping could be found, there were not enough landing craft available or in sight for a beach landing either in 1942 or 1943. After analyzing the factors important to invasion attempts on 15 September 1942 and 1 April 1943, the combined planners concluded that (a) it was not possible in 1942 to put on the Continent the ground forces necessary for an invasion and provide for their support, and (b) an invasion early in 1943 was a possibility, provided the USSR was still actively fighting and containing the bulk of the German forces. This was an assumption different from the one made by the Joint Chiefs that it was very doubtful whether the USSR could continue the fight against Germany without the diversion

\(^{27}\) (1) Br War Cabinet-Jt Fling Stf study, 9 Dec 41, title: Opns on Continent in Final Phase. (2) Ltr, Sir John Dill to Gen Marshall, 16 Mar 42. Dill simply turned this copy of the British study over to Marshall personally "apropos of the offensive about which we spoke today." (3) Ltr, Marshall to Dill, n.d. Copies of all three filed in front of CPS 26/D in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 1. This British study, JP (41) 823 (0), was marked as the second revised draft. The CPS used a later, almost identical draft, dated 24 December 1941, which bore the code name ROUNDUP, for their studies. (See CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42. A copy of 24 Dec study is in JCS rcds, CCS 381 (5-23-42), 1.)


\(^{29}\) CPS 26/D, 25 Mar 42.

\(^{30}\) CPS 26/1, 3 Apr 42, title: Offensive Opns in Europe. The subcommittee used a British study (Opn ROUNDUP, JP (41) 1028, 24 Dec 41) as a basis for determining the maximum effort possible in one day in the landing area in northern France, and an American study (App I, Annex C, JCS 23) in reaching an estimate of the minimum number of troops required for the operation.
of German strength through the creation of another front. These differences necessitated further study to determine whether the Red Army could and would continue organized resistance even though a second front was not created in 1942. Meanwhile, planning was to be continued for an invasion in 1943, with a provision in the plans for an attempt to invade the Continent in 1942 in the event of an imminent Soviet collapse, or the development of a critical situation for Germany, which would make that power vulnerable to an attack in the West.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{Eisenhower Memorandum of 25 March}

While this study of a future European offensive was going on in the combined staff, the War Department operations staff was trying independently to reach a “coordinated viewpoint” on the “major tasks of the war.” On 25 March Eisenhower, in a memorandum, urged on General Marshall the necessity of deciding on the “theater in which the first major offensive of the United Powers must take place.” This decision, setting “the principal target of all United Powers,” was needed to regulate training and production programs and deployment of forces. Reitering his comments of 28 February, General Eisenhower stated that the “immediately important tasks, aside from protection of the American continent, are the security of England, the retention of Russia in the war as an active ally and the defense of the Middle East. . . . All other operations must be considered in the highly desirable rather than in the mandatory class.” He then declared that “the principal target for our first major offensive should be Germany, to be attacked through western Europe,” and supported this choice with a long list of reasons: Since the lines of communication to England had to be kept safe in any event, operations in Western Europe would not involve a further dispersion of air and naval protective forces. By using the shortest possible sea route, the United States could maintain a large force with a minimum strain on shipping. The early gathering of air and ground forces in Great Britain would carry a sufficient threat to prevent Germany from complete concentration against the USSR. A cross-Channel attack represented the direct approach by superior land communications to the center of German might. The forward base in England already had the airfields from which a large air force could operate to secure the air superiority essential to a successful landing. A major portion of the British combat power could be used without stripping the home defenses of the United Kingdom. Finally, this plan provided for attempting an attack on Germany while German forces were engaged on several fronts.

Eisenhower pointed out that the success of the plan for taking the offensive depended on securing complete agreement among the CCS that the attack against Germany through Western Europe constituted the eventual task of their governments. With such a plan, training and production sched-
ules could be adjusted, “overwhelming air support” built up, ample ships and landing craft found, and combat strength hus-banded. Eisenhower and his staff felt so strongly the necessity of having “a target on which to fix . . . [their] sights” that he declared, “unless this plan is adopted as the eventual aim of all our efforts, we must turn our backs upon the Eastern Atlantic and go, full out, as quickly as possible, against Japan!” Above all, he emphasized “the tremendous importance of agreeing on some major objective” for a “coordinated and intensive effort.”

On the very day that Eisenhower presented this memorandum, General Marshall went to the White House for lunch, together with Stimson, Knox, King, Arnold, and Hopkins, to discuss possible offensive operations. According to Stimson, Marshall “made a very fine presentation” of the case for a cross-Channel attack, and he and Marshall came away from the meeting with the President’s approval of the idea and his order to put it “in shape if possible over this weekend.” It was at this meeting, too, that Hopkins suggested that as soon as the plan had been perfected by the JCS, it should not be taken up with the British members of the CCS, but should be taken up directly with the highest British authorities.

Estimates for Invasion

During this last week of March, while the combined planners were trying to reconcile American and British ideas about timing, the Army planners began to assemble detailed data to satisfy the presidential directive to get the plan in shape. In so doing, the Army planners resurveyed the possibilities of a planned invasion in the spring of 1943 and an emergency attack, if necessary, in the fall of 1942. G-2 estimated the number of British forces available for an invasion of the Continent. G-3 and G-4 estimated the readiness for combat of major U. S. Army units, indicating the status of their equipment and training as of 15 September 1942 and 1 April 1943. By the latter date at least eighteen and probably twenty-one divisions would be trained and equipped. They would include two divisions trained for amphibious operations, six armored divisions, five motorized divisions, and one airborne division. By mid-August 1942 about six infantry, three armored, and two motorized divisions would be available. Army Ground Forces estimated the balanced ground forces necessary and available for the offensive as 975,394 for April 1943 operations and 364,585 for September

32 Memo, Eisenhower for CoS, 25 Mar 42, sub: Critical Points in Development of Coordinated Viewpoint as to Maj Tasks of the War, OPD 381 BOLERO, 6. Attached are tables of ground forces and landing craft and on separate slip of paper, Marshall’s penned note: “Hold for me. GCM.”

33 For reference to the “Pacific alternative” discussed in JCS 23 in connection with deployment studies, see above, p. 161.

34 Informal memo, Col Louis J. Compton, Chief, Br Empire Branch, G-2, for WPD, 25 Mar 42, sub: Br Forces Available for an Invasion of Continent, Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

1942 operations. Army Air Forces drafted its own outline plan for air operations in support of an attack on either 15 September 1942 or 1 April 1943. It was estimated that 733 combat aircraft would be necessary and available by mid-September 1942 and 3,296 by April 1943. The Services of Supply (SOS) provided estimates for the forces that could be shipped to the British Isles and maintained there. SOS believed that, with the shipping prospectively available, only three and a half infantry divisions, with supporting troops, a force of about 105,000, or two armored divisions and supporting troops numbering 60,000 men, could be landed in the British Isles by mid-September. Of the more than one million men that the War Plans Division had estimated to be the minimum number to be assembled in Great Britain by the spring of 1943, probably not more than 400,000 could be transported by U. S. shipping.

The Evolution of the Marshall Memorandum

On the basis of all the information gathered from G-2, G-3, and SOS, the War Department planners on 27 March drew up an outline of an invasion plan. This plan was a very simple sketch of the operations, giving the area of assault, the timing of the landings, and the forces necessary. After General Eisenhower and Colonel Thomas T. Handy and Colonel Hull had discussed the plan, they presented it to Marshall on 1 April, along with a memorandum repeating strategic justification for the choice of theater. General Marshall at once gave the plan his approval and support, suggesting important changes in language which Eisenhower and his two assistants incorporated. Marshall and Stimson presented the plan to the President the same day and succeeded in winning his approval and complete support for it immediately. For some time the President had been thinking

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39 This plan was prepared by Lt Col Voris H. Connor under supervision of Col Hull in Future Plans Sec, S&P Gp, OPD, title: Plan for Ops in NW Europe, copy filed AAG 381 War Plans, Sec G. No copy retained in OPD files. An appendix in six sections is attached: I, Topography and Communications; II, Coast Line from the Seine to the Scheldt; III, Enemy Forces in West Europe; IV, Table of Landing Craft Availability; V, Brief of Air Operations in Support of Invasion of Northern France; and VI, Outline of Ground Operations.
40 The only documentary record dating the submission of the outline plan to the Chief of Staff is in the OPD 1700 Report, 1 Apr 42, Current Gp Files, DRB AGO.
41 For presidential approval, see: (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 418-19 (Stimson said the President accepted the BORERO Plan on 1 April); and (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 521.
42 A memorandum drafted by OPD referred to the “President’s tentative decision of April 2nd, respecting our major effort.” (See memo, ACoS for King [COMINCH and CNO], 6 Apr 42, sub: Strategic Deployment in Pacific against Japan, OPD 381 PTO, 10.) The tentative nature of the decision presumably derived from the fact that final decision required British approval. Thus the date of approval may have been either 1 or 2 April, or possibly both. (For the different versions of the plan, see Appendix A below, p. 383.)
of "a new front on the European Continent" and only three weeks before had told the Prime Minister that he was "becoming more and more interested in the establishment of this new front this summer, certainly for air and raids." \(^{42}\) The President directed Marshall and Hopkins to go to London to present the plan to the Prime Minister and his military staff and secure their agreement. \(^{43}\)

The draft, which came to be known as the Marshall Memorandum, outlined the objective, the timing, the combat strength, and the strategic advantages of operations in northwestern Europe. First, it listed the arguments for selecting northwestern Europe for the first British-American offensive:

\(^{42}\) See msg, President to Prime Minister, 9 Mar 42, No. 115, with memo, SW for CofS, 25 Mar 42, in ABC 371 (3-5-42).

Very much the same view, emphasizing an air effort, had been taken by Hopkins. On 14 March he wrote a memorandum to the President on "Matters of Immediate Military Concern," stressing the importance of "getting some sort of a front this summer against Germany." \(^{1}\) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 521. \(^{2}\) See also the President's letter to the Prime Minister on 18 March 1942, in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 299–301.

\(^{43}\) (1) See memo, Actg CofS for SW, 12 Apr 42, sub: Review of Current Sit, OPD 381 BOLERO, 6, for reference to Marshall's position as negotiator "in the name of the President." The memorandum was drafted by Eisenhower. \(^{2}\) See paper, n.d., title: Opn MONICUM, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5, for composition of delegation. In addition to Hopkins and Marshall, the party included Col. Wedemeyer, OPD; Col. Howard A. Craig, Air Forces planner; and Comdr. James R. Fulton, physician to Hopkins.
It is the only place in which a powerful offensive can be prepared and executed by the United Powers in the near future. In any other locality the building up of the required forces would be much more slowly accomplished due to sea distances. Moreover, in other localities the enemy is protected against invasion by natural obstacles and poor communications leading toward the seat of the hostile power, or by elaborately organized and distant outposts. Time would be required to reduce these and to make the attack effective.

It is the only place where the vital air superiority over the hostile land areas preliminary to a major attack can be staged by the United Powers. This is due to the existence of a network of landing fields in England and to the fact that at no other place could massed British air power be employed for such an operation.

It is the only place in which the bulk of the British ground forces can be committed to a general offensive in cooperation with United States forces. It is impossible, in view of the shipping situation, to transfer the bulk of the British forces to any distant region, and the protection of the British islands would hold the bulk of the divisions in England.

The United States can concentrate and use larger forces in Western Europe than in any other place, due to sea distances and the existence in England of base facilities.

The bulk of the combat forces of the United States, United Kingdom and Russia can be applied simultaneously only against Germany, and then only if we attack in time. We cannot concentrate against Japan.

Successful attack in this area will afford the maximum of support to the Russian front.\textsuperscript{44}

The draft went on to state that a decision as to the main effort had to be made at once so that the Allies could direct all “production, special construction, training, troop movements and allocations” to that end. The American proposal was to direct all plans and preparations to the “single end” of “an attack, by combined forces of approximately 5,800 combat airplanes and 48 divisions against western Europe as soon as the necessary means can be accumulated in England—estimated at April 1, 1943.”

The plan contemplated three main phases:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Preparation, involving:
  \begin{enumerate}
  \item Immediate coordination of procurement priorities, allocations of material and movements of troops and equipment.
  \item Establishment of a preliminary active front.
  \item Development of preparations for possible launching of an “emergency” offensive [in 1942].
  \end{enumerate}
\item Cross-Channel movement and seizure of beachheads between Le Havre and Boulogne.
\item Consolidation and expansion of beachheads and beginning of general advance.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{enumerate}

The plan was based on four assumptions:

\begin{enumerate}
\item the line Alaska–Hawaii–Samoa–Australia would be held and Pacific garrisons increased from present approximate strength of 175,000 to about 300,000;
\item American commitments in troops and ships to New Zealand, the Middle East, and the China–India theater would be met;
\item the USSR would continue to contain the bulk of German forces (the plan stressed the necessity of continuing shipments of material aid to the USSR to help keep the Red Army effective in the war);
\item Axis forces would remain at approximately their April 1942 strength.
\end{enumerate}

The United States proposed to furnish about one million men—including thirty divisions—and 3,250 combat aircraft, for an invasion on 1 April 1943. If the British

\textsuperscript{44} The preparatory phase constituted what later became known by the code name \textit{Bolero}. The contingency mentioned as part (3) of this preparatory phase (a.) became known as \textit{Sledgehammer}. The actual cross-Channel movement and the consolidation (b. and c.) became known as \textit{Roundup}.

\textsuperscript{45} Tab A, Item 5a, Exec 1. This is the Chief of Staff’s notebook. See Appendix A below, p. 384.
made available eighteen divisions and 2,550 combat aircraft, the combined forces would be strong enough to establish air superiority and make a landing on a six-division front between Le Havre and Boulogne. One American airborne division and American and British parachute troops would be used to slow German reinforcements, while "strong armored forces," drawn from the six American and three British armored divisions assigned to ROUNDUP, "rushed in to break German resistance" and eventually to spearhead a general movement toward the Belgian port of Antwerp.

The admittedly weak point in the American plan was that merchant shipping and landing craft would not be available in sufficient quantity by the time that aircraft, ground equipment, and ammunition could be supplied. However difficult it might be to make up shortages in the latter categories, it was evident that shipping and landing craft were the limiting factors. It was estimated that American troop shipping could transport only about 40 percent of the forces required by 1 April 1943, leaving some 600,000 men to be transported by shipping from British or other sources. American shipping alone could not move the entire force until late summer of 1943, but it was anticipated that after the British had completed their movement of reinforcements to the Middle and Far East, they could aid in the movement of United States troops to England. Even so, it appeared uncertain whether there would be enough cargo shipping. The lack of sufficient landing craft—7,000 were considered essential—presented even more serious problems, which could be met only through an accelerated construction program.

Finally, the Marshall Memorandum presented in some detail a "Modified Plan" for the "emergency" invasion that might have to be launched in September or October 1942. This landing operation would take place if the situation on the Soviet front became so desperate that only a British-American attack in the west would prevent its collapse, or if the German position in Western Europe "critically weakened." The maximum forces that could be transported across the Channel would be used if and when this operation were launched. Landing craft would be sufficient to sustain only about five divisions, half British and half American, at any time in the fall of 1942. In any case, only three and one-half American divisions, including the Northern Ireland force, could be shipped to the United Kingdom by 15 September 1942, and only about 700 American combat aircraft would be available.

Apart from this contingent emergency operation, the only American activity scheduled for 1942 was the inauguration of air

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46 For detailed discussion of shipping and landing craft problems, see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, pp. 29-37, 100-109, MS.
47 Ibid., Ch. XII, p. 27, MS.
48 This was in line with the "middle-of-the-road" proposal (C) of JCS 23, 14 March 1942. (See above, Ch. VII.)
attacks and minor coastal raids, which would be of some help to the USSR and would make “experienced veterans of the air and ground units,” as well as raise the morale of both the troops and the general public. The planners dwelt on the advantage to be derived in the long preparatory phase by giving the troops in the United Kingdom “intensive and specialized training,” beginning with “fundamentals of technique in loading and unloading of boats,” and advancing through “constant raiding by small task forces.” The whole program presented was directed toward a main effort in 1943 and, in this respect, was quite different from the program earlier proposed by the JUSSC and by General Eisenhower, which assumed a 1942 attack was possible and necessary.  

The London Conference

The American representatives arrived in the British Isles on 8 April and, during the following week, met with the British Chiefs of Staff in London to discuss the American proposal. The meetings were devoted primarily to general strategy; little attention was paid to clarifying the problems of shipping and landing craft upon which the invasion so heavily depended. At the first meeting, Marshall explained that “the reason for his visit was to reach a decision as to what the main British-American effort was to be, and when and where it should be made.” He emphasized the importance of arriving at a “decision in principle” as soon as possible so that production, allocation of material, training, and troop movements could go forward.  

Throughout the meetings the American representatives dwelt on “two main considerations.” The first of these was that the Red Army should be maintained as an effective fighting force in 1942. Indeed, Colonel Wedemeyer later stated that this was the “main objective” of the American plan. The second was that the U. S. Army, then being built up and trained, should engage in active operations on the ground and in the air to gain combat experience. Such experience, incidentally, would lead to improvements in equipment.

One reason the Americans were anxious for a speedy decision on the BOLERO plan was that it might check the tendency to disperse forces on secondary tasks. Early in the conference the British argued that it was essential to hold the Middle East whatever else happened, and also showed great concern for the Indian Ocean area. The Americans could not agree to the primary importance of the Middle East, India, and Burma since, as Wedemeyer put it, they were sure the military objective of Germany in 1942 was the destruction of the Russian armies. While Wedemeyer agreed that Japanese successes should not be allowed to go so far as to prevent the defeat of Germany, he warned that the Allies must expect some loss of territory in the Pacific in order to concentrate on Germany. In attempting to win British agreement, the

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38 The issue was still being debated in Washington in the combined staff during the time that the Marshall Memorandum was being presented to the American and British Governments.


40 (1) Min cited n. 51(1). (2) Min, mtg, Br-Amer Plng Stfs, London, 11 Apr 42, Tab N, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.

41 Min cited n. 51(1).

42 Min, mtg, 10 Apr 42, no tab (left side of file), ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 5.
American representatives exploited the basic line of strategic argument developed during the previous two months. As Wedemeyer phrased it:

The United Nations must adhere to the broad concept of strategy, viz, that Germany is our principal enemy . . . [and therefore] the dissipation of our combined resources . . . should be discontinued or at least held to a minimum, in consonance with the accepted strategy of concentration on offensive operations in the European theater, with concurrently defensive operations in all others.  

In reply to a British call for American fighters in the Middle East to enable the British to assemble a reserve in the United Kingdom for continental operations, Marshall stated that current American commitments to the Southwest Pacific, Middle East, and other theaters would be fulfilled, but that additional reinforcements would have to be carefully limited. Marshall emphasized that it was essential for the United Nations to focus attention on the main project—offensive operations on the Continent—lest it be reduced to the status of a "residuary legatee" for which nothing was left.

The American representatives explained that the flow of American troops and aircraft to the United Kingdom would not reach large proportions until the fall of 1942, because of shipping limitations and other American commitments. Marshall pointed out that by the end of August the United States commitments to reinforce the Pacific and the garrisons in Northern Ireland and Iceland should be completed. He hoped, therefore, that by mid-September five groups of air forces and three and a half Army divisions could be moved to Great Britain. Until that date the shipping restrictions were so great that no forces, other than those required for minimum defensive purposes, could be transported to the British Isles. As far as the timing of the emergency operation in 1942 was concerned, Marshall said that he could not press for one before September since a substantial American land force could not be sent over before then. If action became necessary before September, such American forces as were in the British Isles would be available. His own belief was that it might be necessary to take action on the Continent in the next few months, either because the Soviet Union would be in a serious position or because a favorable opportunity would present itself.

On 14 April the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the American proposal, agreeing that planning should begin immediately for a major offensive in Europe in 1943 and for an emergency landing, if necessary, in 1942. On the evening of the same day, at a meeting of the War Cabinet Defence Committee attended by Marshall and Hopkins, the Prime Minister formally accepted the "momentous proposal" of the American representatives and predicted that the "two nations would march ahead together in a noble brotherhood of arms."
As General Marshall was well aware, this agreement was only a beginning in dealing with a very treacherous problem. Everyone agreed "in principle," he reported, but "many if not most" of the participants held "reservations regarding this or that." It would require "great firmness" to avoid "further dispersions." The reservations applied directly to the projected operation for 1942 and only indirectly to the projected operation for 1943, the fate of which was certain to be determined by the decision made about the 1942 operation. The Prime Minister has since recorded that he did not even at that time believe that the contingent operation for 1942 (SLIDGEMAN) would prove feasible; that he regarded the proposal as merely one additional proposal to be considered during the spring along with the operations he himself wanted to undertake (the North African operation and possibly one in Norway); and that his satisfaction in receiving General Marshall's proposal and his readiness to accept it grew out of his anxiety lest the United States continue to direct its main efforts to the Pacific.

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The Prime Minister did not express these broad reservations at the time of the conference. The one explicit reservation on the British side was the determination to strengthen and secure the precarious British positions in Egypt and in the Indian Ocean area. The Prime Minister and his staff were both more explicit and more united in their determination to hold these vital positions in the British sphere of strategic responsibility than were the President and his staff to hold the line Hawaii–Australia, for which the United States was responsible. It remained uncertain whether, for the sake of mounting a cross-Channel operation, the British would withhold reinforcements needed in the Middle East and India, as the Americans proposed to withhold reinforcements needed in the Pacific.

During the conference the British Chiefs made it quite clear how important they considered the Middle East and India to be. After the conference the Prime Minister went over the same ground in a message to the President. The range of disagreement between the British and American staffs over the defense of that whole area was within the same relatively narrow limits as the disagreements within the Army and between the War and Navy Departments on the defense of the Pacific. Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower had stated in very strong terms the importance of preventing a junction of Japanese and German forces somewhere east of Suez and west of Singapore. General Marshall had made it plain that he, too, believed in collaborating with the British to meet any emergency in the area. But Marshall also believed in taking a calculated risk there, as in the Pacific, for the sake of building up a powerful offensive force in the British Isles.

The question did not become critical during the London conference. The situation in the Libyan Desert had eased somewhat since the middle of March. The British Chiefs agreed to drop the proposal that the JCS had made—to send an American air force to Egypt equipped with planes from British allocations. Nor did they press their demand for U.S. Navy reinforcements to

Department of the formal acceptance by the British Government, see msg, Marshall to Stimson, 15 Apr 42, CM-IN 3939.

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(1) Paper cited in n. 56. (2) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 17 Apr 42, No. 70, Book 1, ABC 381 BOLERO (3–16–42), 4. (3) Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 181–85.
meet the crisis that had developed in the Indian Ocean. In lieu of both these projects, they accepted the very modest temporary expedient of strengthening the American bomber force in India (General Brereton's Tenth Air Force) and putting it at the disposal of the British India Command for operations in the Indian Ocean. The broad question of the relation between this newly accepted American proposal and the long-standing commitments of the British in the Middle East and India simply remained open.

From the American point of view there was little more to say than what the President said in answer to the Prime Minister's declaration of the British concern over the defense of Egypt and the Indian Ocean. The President tried to reassure the Prime Minister that the juncture of German and Japanese forces seemed remote but agreed that a close watch must be kept on the situation. "In the meantime," he added, "we have had a good crack at Japan by air [the Doolittle raid] and I am hoping that we can make it very difficult for them to keep too many of their big ships in the Indian Ocean."

The Bolero Plan

The fact that the London agreement involved no discussion with the British of the defense of the Middle East and India, parallel with the previous Army-Navy discussion of the defense of the Pacific, was a direct result of the irregular manner in which the American proposal was drawn up and presented. The course of action urged by the War Department was at variance with the long-standing plans and expectations of the British Chiefs of Staff. Any agreement that was not preceded by and based upon a full and explicit analysis—even if not by a reconciliation—of the differences was liable to be upset at any time by a reassertion of the differences.

The War Department staff was naturally disposed to make the most of the London agreement. As Eisenhower noted upon Marshall's return, "... at long last, and after months of struggle, ... we are all definitely committed to one concept of fighting! If we can agree on major purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin to fall in line and we won't just be thrashing around in the dark." It was in this spirit that the American planners in Washington approached the problem of working out a detailed, long-range plan for the concentration of American forces in the British Isles. This phase of the planning (which bore the code name Bolero) was the only phase in which the Washington staffs, British and American, were deeply involved. Detailed planning for the operations themselves—Sledgehammer, the contingent operation in case of an emergency in 1942, and Roundup, the scheduled operation for 1943—was to be carried on, appropriately enough, in London.

The Bolero plan covered the preparatory phase of mounting the cross-Channel

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64 For establishment of the Tenth Air Force in India, see above, Ch. VI. For negotiations following on British requests for U. S. reinforcements in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area, see below, Chs. IX, X.

65 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 22 Apr 42, No. 139, Book 1, ABC 381 Bolero (3-16-42), 4.

66 Notations by Eisenhower, 20 Apr 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

67 Sledgehammer and Roundup were British code names. The name Roundup had been assigned to the 1941 British study for a cross-Channel operation in 1943 mentioned earlier in the text. The retention of the same code name was doubtless intentional but altogether inappropriate, given the very different strategic assumptions of the 1941 British study and the 1942 American proposal.
operation, involving "1) immediate coordination of procurement priorities, allocations of material and movements of troops and equipment and 2) the establishment of a preliminary active front." Only the most hurried and superficial investigation of the complex logistic problems involved had been made before the London conference, and the conference contributed very little to an understanding of them or to agreement about them. Everything remained to be done.68

**Phasing of Troop Movements**

The first thing that the planners in Washington tried to do was to schedule the shipment of troops for the next few months. As long as SLEDGEHAMMER remained a possibility, it was important to move as many ground divisions and supporting units to the United Kingdom as was possible before September. In the short run, this need was even more pressing than that of hastening troop movements to relieve future congestion in the BOLERO program. Cargo shipments, on the other hand, were distinctly secondary as far as SLEDGEHAMMER was concerned but of prime importance to BOLERO. Thus, the requirements of SLEDGEHAMMER and BOLERO not only overlapped but competed in determining shipments during the summer. For BOLERO, moreover, the problem of long-range scheduling was far more important than that of total shipping resources. The ratio of available troop shipping to cargo shipping at any given time was likely to be entirely unrelated to actual deployment needs.

The results of early efforts to acquire troop shipping over and above what had been scheduled for MAGNET were not encouraging. It appeared that, if ships were to be provided to meet Army and Navy commitments for BOLERO, British and American shipping schedules would have to be drastically rearranged and aid to Russia and other Allies would have to be reduced. This was a choice the President and the Prime Minister were loathe to make.69 But by early June, as a result of the preliminary search for shipping and rearrangement of schedules by Washington and London authorities, the shipping prospects seemed more hopeful. By then the estimated number of United States troops that might be shipped in time for SLEDGEHAMMER had been raised from 105,000 to about 150,000. For ROUNDUP in April 1943, it then seemed that over 890,000 United States troops would be present in the British Isles.70 The early movements were scheduled so as to build, first, an air force and, second, a ground force in the United Kingdom in time for offensive operations on the Continent in 1942. The schedule also took account of the need for service troops in the United Kingdom to prepare for the troops to follow. By early June about 40,000 troops had arrived or were en route. Of these, 15,000 were in the 1st Armored Division, 15,000 in the 34th Infantry Division, and the remainder in the air and antiaircraft units and theater headquarters.71

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68 For an account of this whole aspect of the London conference, see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.
69 CMT 5/3, 8 May 42, title: Availability of UN Shipping for Mil Transport.
70 Memo, Col Hull for ACofS OPD, 21 May 42, sub: Tr Mvmt Scheds for BOLERO and NABOB, ABC 381 Boler (3–16–42), 1. NABOB was the U. S. Navy code name for Northern Ireland.
71 CPS 26/4, 7 Jun 42, title: BOLERO Emb Sched. For accounts of the deployment programs as well as troop and cargo movements to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1942 for BOLERO, see: (1) Strategic Plans Unit Study 2, OCMH Files, and (2) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.
The Landing Craft Problem

The most critical item in the planning of all the invasion operations was the provision of landing craft. The idea of using large numbers of specially constructed craft for landing operations was so new that no generally accepted doctrine had been developed. The Army knew very little about landing craft and, during the first years of the war, the Navy was urging other types of construction, with the result that landing craft requirements were not determined until too late to affect SLEDGEHAMMER.72

The United States program for mass production of landing craft got under way in April 1942. A White House conference on 4 April resulted in a tentative construction program being set up under which the United States was to make available 8,200 craft in the United Kingdom for ROUNDUP, of which 6,700 were to be carriers for small tanks and vehicles. The objective for SLEDGEHAMMER was 2,500 craft, including 2,000 tank and vehicle carriers. This number, supposed to be sufficient to move two infantry divisions and two regiments of tanks in one trip, did not correspond to the expected U.S. troop participation in SLEDGEHAMMER. But, as Eisenhower wrote, if SLEDGEHAMMER comes off at all, "it will be carried out with whatever personnel and equipment is actually available at the time. The maximum portion of the landing equipment set up for the main BOLERO plan which can be made available by the time of execution of the 'Modified' plan is the desirable amount." 73

The London conference had not gone into the matter of the types of landing craft and the numbers of each type that would be required, and no one expressed doubt whether sufficient craft could be produced in time. Although War Department planners had furnished him with a somewhat higher estimate, General Marshall proposed 7,000 for ROUNDUP, a figure that turned out to be much too low.74 It was obvious that the British had given a great deal more thought than the Americans to the problem of landing craft, and they took the initiative in the discussions. From the first they questioned the emphasis of the American construction program on small craft. A British spokesman pointed to the difficulty of moving large numbers of the small craft across the Atlantic in the limited shipping available and urged greater emphasis upon United States construction of larger vessels that could cross the ocean under their own power. He also pointed out that larger craft were necessary for crossing the Channel and establishing beachheads.75

It was not until the first part of May that British objections to the small landing craft program became emphatic, and by then the American procurement program was four or five weeks old and a good many craft of the smallest types were scheduled for delivery.76 The issue was resolved at a White House meeting on 5 May at which the British suc-

72 See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII, p. 100, MS.
73 Memo, Gen Eisenhower for Lt Gen Somervell, 10 Apr 42, sub: Landing Craft to be Available Sep 15 for BOLERO, OPD 560, 5.
74 Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.
cessfully presented their objections to the American production program.\(^7\) At the President's direction, a new program of requirements was drawn up based on a shift to larger, ocean-going landing craft.\(^8\)

The very next day the "Special Committee on Landing Craft for the Continent," a subcommittee of the Washington Bolero committee, of which General Eisenhower and Colonels Hull and Wedemeyer were members, met to prepare a statement for the President on the availability of landing craft for operations in September 1942 and April 1943.\(^9\) At the meeting the planners agreed that small craft could apparently be made available in considerable numbers for an operation in September 1942, but that the production of ocean-going tank landing ships (ATL's) could be increased only by giving it precedence over other construction, including priorities for hulls, engines, and equipment. General Eisenhower described this meeting in his personal notes. "This morning I attended a committee meeting on 'landing craft' at which were discussed the questions on which I begged the answers last February. Who is responsible for bldg landing crafts? Will the number of each type be sufficient? etc.? How . . . can we win this war unless we crack some heads?"\(^10\)

On 14 May General Somervell and Vice Adm. Frederick J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, submitted to the President a comprehensive study, with an estimate of the number of landing craft that could be made available by 15 September 1942 and by April 1943. With an estimated force of from three to four American divisions in the United Kingdom by September, the landing craft estimated as available could carry assault elements to the number of 21,000 men, 3,000 vehicles, and 300 tanks. For Roundup, current plans called for an assault force of approximately 77,000 men, 18,000 vehicles, and 2,250 tanks, which meant that the United States would have to build some 765 craft of several types by March 1943. Construction in time would be physically possible only if landing craft were given priority over all other items in the defense program of production.\(^11\)

As a result of this study and other findings, the President two days later called a meeting attended by General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board (WPB). A number of expedients and proposed solutions were considered, but no decision was reached except that the program of antisubmarine construction and carrier building would not be delayed for any other project. The President, General Marshall recorded, did not indicate the next steps to be taken, other than to say that "work must be gotten under way as quickly as possible."\(^12\)

The landing craft program was heavily handicapped. The responsibility for procurement and for co-ordination of the program was given to the Navy, already bogged down in heavy naval construction schedules. Both the Navy and the shipyards to which

\(^7\) Memo, Marshall for Somervell and Eisenhower, 16 May 42, no sub, Item 4, Exec 1. Admirals King and Land, Harry Hopkins, and Donald M. Nelson were present.

\(^8\) See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Ch. XII.


\(^10\) Notations by Eisenhower, 6 May 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

\(^11\) Memo, Gen Somervell and Admiral Horne for President, 14 May 42, sub: Landing Craft for Bolero Opn, WDCSA 400 (S).

\(^12\) Memo, Marshall for Eisenhowe and Somervell, 16 May 42, no sub, OPD 381 Bolero, 10.
contracts were let were inexperienced in building the larger types of landing craft, and the problems they faced were unprecedented. The landing craft program had to compete with other programs already begun, for marine engines, steel, and other material. The new program for ATL's and Giant Y's (large landing craft, infantry) meant a reversal of policy for the Navy, which had been concerned chiefly with shipbuilding and with construction of small landing craft—personnel carriers—for ship-to-shore operations. During the first quarter of 1942 landing craft had been low on the priority list because the threat of German submarines necessitated the construction of destroyer escorts. Navy leaders continued to defend the naval shipbuilding program against a higher priority for landing craft. Only briefly—in the summer of 1942—was the landing craft program to be given priority over all other shipbuilding.82

Reorientation of Mobilization Programs

The adoption of the Bolero-Roundup strategy entailed a re-examination and re-

82 See min, 17th mtg CPS, 14 May 42, and min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.

The production of landing craft from mid-May into the summer was greatly affected by strategic developments discussed below, Chs. X-XIII. For later debates on the program, see especially: (1) CCS 78, 7 Jun 42, title: Landing Craft; (2) min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 June 42; (3) memo, Eisenhower for Somervell, 13 Jun 42, sub: Landing Craft, Book 3, ABC 381 Bolero (3-16-42), 4.

For discussion, see Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), Ch. I; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 554; and George E. Mowry, Landing Craft and the War Production Board Historical Reports on War Administration: WPB Special Study No. 11 (rev. ed., Washington, 1946).

orientation of plans and programs of all kinds—production and allocation priorities, troop basis calculations, long-range deployment estimates, and even the Victory Program. Of course, many items besides landing craft were in short supply. Production and distribution plans would have to be reviewed, and many of them changed, in keeping with the undertakings agreed on in London. The JCS and the President soon decided on a way of determining priorities in the production of munitions and requested the War Production Board to increase production for a “decisive land and air offensive involving amphibious operations”—aircraft, ships, tanks, and guns as well as landing craft and amphibious equipment.84

To help the Munitions Assignments Board (MAB) in the distribution of British and American munitions, the CCS, toward the end of March 1942, had developed a general guide.85 The CCS had grouped the several theaters of war in three general classes according to strategic importance and the imminence of combat operations. “Priority A” included the United Kingdom (but only in respect to air operations), the Middle East, India–Burma, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands on the lines of communication from the United States. Next came Hawaii and the United Kingdom, which were assigned “Priority B,” for ground forces operations. The rest of the world was classed as “Priority C.” Forces in training were to be given 100 percent of equipment and ammunition except in criti-

84 (1) JCS 30, 5 Apr 42, title: Priorities in Pdn of Mun Based on Strategic Considerations. (2) Min, 9th mtg JCS, 6 Apr 42. (3) Min, 13th mtg JCS, 4 May 42. (4) Pers ltr, President to Nelson, 4 May 42, with JCS 30 in ABC 400 (2-17-42), 1.

85 (1) Min, 12th mtg CCS, 17 Mar 42. (2) CCS 50/2, 23 Mar 42, title: Directive for Asgmt of Mun.
The acceptance of the Bolero plan necessitated an amendment to this directive. The effect of the amendment, as adopted early in June, was that "forces assigned to operations on the continent of Europe" were placed in Priority A and were to continue to have first priority at all times after large operations on the Continent were begun.

It was also necessary to estimate the total forces that would be present in each theater on given dates, since the assignment of munitions to the various theaters depended on the size of the forces present. For this purpose the War Department planners, in early April, prepared a survey of proposed deployment of American forces for 1942.

According to this survey almost 540,000 ground forces would be in overseas theaters by 30 June, and this number would increase to more than 685,000 by December 1942. Of this number, about 43,000 ground troops would be in the United Kingdom by 30 June (including one infantry and one armored division) and 185,000 by 31 December (including two infantry divisions, two infantry motorized divisions, and three armored divisions). Ten American air combat groups with a strength of 37,900 men were projected for the United Kingdom for 30 June and forty-two air combat groups, totaling 151,000 men, for the end of the year.

The British then supplied similar information on proposed British deployment for 1942, and the British document combined with the American survey constituted "The Tentative Deployment of United Nations for 1942." The CCS accepted this as a guide for the assignment of munitions. Though revisions were made later in the summer, it served the immediate purpose of providing an approximate calculation of Allied armament requirements for preparing to take the offensive.

Finally, the Bolero plan entailed a review of the War Department Troop Basis. The Army's mobilization schedule, as established in the War Department Troop Basis for 1942, called for a total strength of 3,600,000 enlisted men by 31 December 1942. In May the President approved an increase in the Troop Basis from 3,600,000 to 4,350,000 by the end of 1942. Of this 750,000 increase, approximately 300,000 were for necessary services to support military operations.

The document, informally called TDUN and dated 27 April 1942, consisted of appendices to the earlier report on munitions assignment (CCS 50/2), filed with CCS 50/2 in ABC 400 (2–17–42), 1.

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86 The provision to give troops in training 100 percent equipment was based on a recommendation of Colonel Handy, who feared that the policy suggested earlier by the British of strictly limiting the use of equipment and ammunition except in combat areas would destroy the U. S. Army training program and relegate the United States to the role of wartime arsenal. See (1) memo, Handy for Jt Secretariat, 21 Mar 42, no sub, with CPS 17/1/D, and (2) WPD notes on agenda, 9th mtg CCS, 3 Mar 42, with CCS 50, both in ABC 400 (2–17–42), 1; (3) min, 9th mtg CPS, 19 Mar 42; and (4) memo, WPD for Marshall, n.d., sub: Points Raised by Sir John Dill re CCS 55, with CCS 55 in ABC 400 (2–17–42), 1.

87 Memo, JPS for Rear Adm Charles M. Cooke, Jr., Brig Gen Thomas T. Handy, et al., 2 Jun 42, sub: Amendment of CCS 50/2, Directive for Asgmt of Mun, ABC 400 (2–17–42), 1. This amendment was approved by the JPS, CPS, JCS, and CCS in early June. See (1) min, 18th mtg CPS, 5 Jun 42, and (2) min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.

88 Memo, OPD for CoS [10] Apr 42, sub: Proposed Deployment of AGF and AAF for 1942 as Basis for Asgmt of Mun, with JCS 23 in ABC 370 (1–28–42). The three charts prepared by OPD were entitled: (a) Tentative Deployment of AGF for 1942; (b) Tentative Deployment of USAAF—1942 (Transport, Observation, and Training); and (c) Tentative Deployment of USAAF Combat Units—1942. Together, these charts comprised "The Tentative Deployment of United States Forces" (TEDA). (See AG Regd Docs File: TEDA.)
Bolero and 150,000 were for additional air requirements for Bolero.\textsuperscript{91} Air units were listed as first priority, essential service units second, ground forces third, and additional service units to lay the ground work for the troops to follow, fourth.\textsuperscript{92} This tentative Troop Basis, the War Department emphasized, was flexible and would permit substitutions and changes in priority.

At the same time the Victory Program, the Army's pre-Pearl Harbor estimate of its equipment requirements, came under close scrutiny. Since the 1941 Victory Program was premised on a strategic policy of offensive operations in Europe, which was still official British-American policy, the War Department planners concluded that no cuts should be made, and that the rate of production of matériel should be increased.\textsuperscript{93}

Establishment of the European Theater of Operations

In the latter part of May, while the mobilization programs were being reviewed in Washington, General Eisenhower, accompanied by Generals Arnold and Somervell, and Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark, made a trip to the United Kingdom to observe the progress of planning for Bolero there. On this trip Eisenhower served as Marshall's representative in discussions with General Chaney and American and British planners. He outlined to the British Chiefs of Staff the American position on the over-all command organization for Roundup—that one man and not a committee must be in command. General Eisenhower reported: "It is quite apparent that the question of high command is the one that is bothering the British very much and some agreement in principle will have to be reached at an early date . . . ." However, no one thought it necessary as yet to name the supreme commander for Roundup, and, as far as Sledgehammer was concerned, it already had been decided that an emergency operation in 1942 would be under British command.\textsuperscript{94} Eisenhower got the impression that the British were skeptical about Sledgehammer and this impression was reinforced by Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, in his talks with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in Washington a few days later.\textsuperscript{95}

Upon his return to the United States on 3 June, General Eisenhower observed: "Our own people are able but . . . it is necessary to get a punch behind the job or we'll never be ready by spring 1943 to attack. We must get going."\textsuperscript{96} Within a week General Marshall announced the establishment of a European Theater of Operations for the U. S. Army (ETOUSA) and selected Eisenhower, himself, as commander.\textsuperscript{97} By agreement of the U. S. War


\textsuperscript{92} Pers Itt, Col Hull, OPD, to Brig Gen Charles L. Bolté, Hq USAFBI, 19 May 42, Tab 57, Book 2, ABC 381 Bolero (3-16-42), 4.

\textsuperscript{93} Memo, Wedemeyer for Eisenhower, 4 May 42, sub: Reexamination of Victory Program, Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec 8.

\textsuperscript{94} Eisenhower's account of the Bolero trip, 23-30 May 42, with CCS 72 in ABC 381 Bolero (3-16-42), I.

\textsuperscript{95} Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 582. For Mountbatten's visit to Washington, see below, Ch. XI.

\textsuperscript{96} Notations by Eisenhower, 4 Jun 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.

\textsuperscript{97} Msg, Marshall to CG USAFBI, London, 8 Jun 42, CM-OUT 1697. This directive was repeated in a message dispatched to Iceland on 22 June. See (1) msg, OPD to Indigo, 22 Jun 42, CM-OUT 5458; (2) notations by Eisenhower, 11 Jun 42 entry, Item 3, OPD Hist Unit File.
and Navy Departments, and under the principle of unity of command, ETOUSA was to be a joint command in which the Army exercised planning and operational control over all U. S. Navy forces assigned to that theater. The Commanding General, ETOUSA, was directed to co-operate with the forces of the British Empire and other nations but to keep in view the fundamental rule “that the forces of the U. S. are to be maintained as a separate and distinct component of the combined forces.”

The stage was now set for sending the new American commander and his staff. On 10 June Marshall informed the British Chiefs of Staff that General Eisenhower would soon leave for London with General Clark, designated to command the U. S. II Army Corps. Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, the Air commander, left the same morning and Rear Adm. Henry K. Hewitt, chosen to be Admiral Mountbatten’s naval opposite, was to leave within the week.

These were the first steps in gearing the command organization of U. S. forces to the contemplated major offensive in the European theater. General Marshall, in informing General Chaney of Eisenhower’s appointment, explained the reason for the change. It was necessary to have as commanding general in the ETO an officer who was “completely familiar with all military plans and affairs and who has taken a leading part in the military developments since December seventh.” Eisenhower was soon to have a chance to show, as a commander, the great adaptability he had shown as a staff officer, for, ironically enough, before he and his party actually arrived in London—24 June—the whole view of strategy that he had urged was being superseded in favor of the Prime Minister’s long-cherished plan for invading North Africa.

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28 The ETO included Finland, Norway, Sweden, the British Isles, and Iceland; a considerable portion of the Continent of Europe, including the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, France, the Low Countries, and Germany as then defined. (See msg, Marshall to CG U. S. Forces, London, Indigo, and Iceland, 10 Jun 42, CM-OUT 3810 (6/16/42). This message was dated 10 June but actually not sent until 16 June.)

29 Min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.

30 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Chaney, London, 11 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2543. Chaney served briefly as head of the newly designated command until his departure on 20 June.
CHAPTER IX

Prior Claims Versus BOLERO

April 1942

The work done on the Bolero plan in Washington during the spring of 1942 was an exercise as useful in its way as maneuvers and rehearsals by troops in training. It was excellent practice for the planners to try to fit the next movements of men and equipment to the British Isles into a long-range program running well into 1943. But it was still an exercise. Outside the War Department no one was much disposed to decide current questions in accordance with the effect on operations in 1943. Four cases of great importance came up during April in which expectations created by established American policies conflicted with projected requirements for concentration in the British Isles. They involved conflicts between (1) the defense of the Middle East and AAF plans, (2) the claims of China and British-American plans, (3) the Soviet lend-lease program and War Department plans, and (4) the defense of the Pacific "line" Hawaii-Australia and Bolero. The outcome of these conflicts, largely dependent on highly unpredictable military developments, was so uncertain that long-range planning by the military staffs necessarily remained exploratory and controversial, in spite of the agreement in principle on concentration in the British Isles.

The Defense of the Middle East

The support of the British position in the Middle East was the least well defined of the prior claims on American men and matériel that existed at the time of the beginning of Bolero planning. In March the President had so acted as to support the British without sending American forces there. While renewing the understanding that the British should retain full responsibility for the Middle East, he had supplemented lend-lease commitments by agreeing to put at their disposal tonnage sufficient to move 40,000 troops for reinforcing the Middle East command and had agreed to send two American divisions to the Southwest Pacific so that an Australian and a New Zealand division might remain in the Middle East.1

What the United States must directly contribute to the defense of the Middle East remained uncertain. The War Department had left in statu quo the missions—North African, Iranian, and Russian—set up in the fall of 1941 to supervise the moving, storing, and transfer of lend-lease supplies and equipment in the Middle East. The heads of these missions were dissatisfied with the help received from the British au-

1 See above, Ch. VII.
thorities on whose co-operation they depended, with the limitations of the small staffs under them (mainly civilian technicians), and with the facilities and the local labor at their disposal. The solution was to send them service troops trained and equipped to do the job.

There were two objections to this solution, both of which had been raised soon after Pearl Harbor, when General Maxwell of the North African mission had requested U. S. service troops for the Middle East. One objection, which had been decisive at the time, was the lack of troopships. The other was based on reasons of policy—American combat forces were not due to be sent to the Middle East, and the War Department, therefore, should not send service troops, since service troops should go only to "areas where they will eventually come under the control of a theater commander of our own combat forces." The War Department had refused Maxwell's request, although it had not entirely ruled out the possibility of favorable action later in the year. Both General Somervell (then G-4) and Col. Henry S. Aurand (Defense Aid Director) had concurred, although they believed that the War Department should adopt only on a temporary basis the policy of not sending service troops to the Middle East. General Eisenhower had agreed with them, remarking:

It seems foolish to put a lot of expensive equipment into a place and then let it deteriorate because of lack of maintenance. If translated into ship-tons we'd probably find it cheaper to provide tech. maintenance units than to ship more material.

Eisenhower's advice, during the emergency of March, was to do everything possible to help the British except to send combat troops:

For many reasons the combat units in this region should be British, but our interest in the whole matter is such that we should give the British every possible encouragement and assistance in building up the defenses now. For example, I would go as far as to strip American mechanized units down to bare training requirements, and to find every possible pursuit and bomber airplane that could be dispatched to the area without damaging our ability to expand, provided only the British will guarantee to have the trained units there to operate this equipment effectively.

The reasons why the British Empire should continue to furnish the combat units in the Middle East were many. Two of the most obvious and most serious were not discussed formally. One was that some American observers distrusted the competence and the tactical doctrine of the Brit

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2 For establishment of the Army missions in the Middle East to deal with lend-lease problems, see above, [Ch. III]. For an account of the missions and the difficulties faced, see Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia.

3 (1) Memo, Maj Elmer J. Rogers, Jr., for ACofS WPD, 31 Dec 41, sub: Serv Trs for Dispatch to Middle East, WPD 4511-28. According to this memorandum, the troops requested by Maxwell came to over 15,000. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 23 Jan 42, no sub, and inc chart, title: Units Requested by Maxwell, in 414 AMSEG 103, 20 Dec 41, WPD 4511-28. According to this, the troops requested came to over 22,000.

4 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 2 Jan 42, No. 310. (2) Msg, same to same, 3 Jan 42, No. 316. Both in WPD Msg File 5.

5 Concurrences are filed with memo cited n. 3(1).


Another reason for sending service units was to take over construction projects then being handled by private contractors. Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson urged this and General Marshall agreed. (See Notes on War Council, 19 Jan 42, SW Conf, Vol II, WDCSA.)

7 Memo, OPD for CofS, 16 Mar 42, sub: Atchd ltr from Sir John Dill, OPD 381 Middle East, 1. The attached letter is not in this file. It is perhaps the letter of that date in WDCSA 381 War Plans (S).
ish command in Egypt. To commit inexperienced American combat troops to the Libyan front would be to risk serious public criticism should they suffer heavy casualties or should they be involved in a major defeat. A second reason was that American forces stationed in other parts of the Middle East would be replacing Empire forces whose duties were not only to defend but also to occupy the territory, and would thereby become involved in highly controversial questions of British Middle Eastern policy.

These reasons applied mainly against sending ground forces, and for the time outweighed the one strong reason for sending ground forces—economy in the use of shipping. The United States by sending divisions direct to the Middle East could achieve a net saving in the use of shipping by reducing movements from the United States to the British Isles and from the British Isles to the Middle East, thereby not only cutting miles-per-ton but also eliminating one series of loading and unloading operations and decreasing traffic in the dangerous waters of the northeastern Atlantic. In March Admiral King therefore raised the question of sending American divisions to the Middle East, and Sir John Dill took it up with General Marshall. Marshall opposed the move as a further dispersion of American forces. He also objected to intermixing American forces in a predominantly Empire theater, observing that it would be hard to arrange for their supply and command. Marshall objected also to the alternative, suggested by Sir John Dill, that U. S. troops should defend the Syria line, replying that this would take too long.

But at the same time, in response to British requests, Marshall offered to send American air forces to Egypt—five groups, the planes to come out of British allocations, the United States furnishing personnel and auxiliary equipment.

General Marshall explained his position to the President. He spoke of the “disastrous consequences” of the loss of the Middle East, which would allow German and Japanese forces to join in the Indian Ocean. He went on:

Agreements with the British, prior to December 7, have always placed the Middle East in the sphere of exclusive British responsibility. However, the critical nature of the present situation is such that I have already informed Sir John Dill that the War Department stood ready to assist, in every practicable way, in improving Middle East defenses. He noted that the United States could help with personnel, but not with planes. He concluded:

Of course, the meat of the situation is the necessity of meeting our responsibilities in the Southwest Pacific, the reinforcement of Alaskan defenses, and, above all, the gathering of air power in England.

Secretary Stimson took strong exception to General Marshall's willingness to concede so much to the defense of Egypt. He thought the opening declaration on the consequences of the loss of the Middle East

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8 For their criticism, see Ch. XI, below.
9 (1) Min, 4th mtg JCS, 7 Mar 42. (2) Min, 6th mtg JCS, 16 Mar 42.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Min, 13th mtg CCS, 17 Mar 42, and annex thereto.

A copy of the original proposal drafted by General Arnold to meet the original request is filed in OPD 320.2, 49. With it is a note in red pencil from [illegible], on a disposition form of Office, Chief of Air Staff, to Col. John E. Upston, stating that the paper was a copy of one that Arnold "said he would submit to the Comb C/C." (For the resultant directive, see D/F, OPD for AAF, 17 Mar 42, sub: Air Task Force for Cairo, OPD 320.2 Egypt, 2.)

13 Memo, CofS for President, 18 Mar 42, no sub, WDCSA 381 War Plans (S).
to be an "overstatement" and regretted that Marshall had committed the War Department to do everything possible to help in the crisis. On the project of sending air forces to the Middle East he remarked, "I don't see how we can do any of this." On the concluding paragraph listing the other American tasks, he remarked, "This should have been put first." Secretary Stimson himself ended by saying:

The Middle East is the very last priority—of all that are facing us. We have foreseen for months that the British would be howling for help here that we really should not give them—and I think now is the time to stand pat.13

To equip American air units with British planes for employment in a British theater, as Marshall had offered to do, presented a way out of an impasse in combined planning—the irreconcilability of scheduled plane allocations to the British and the projected expansion of American air forces. At the end of the ARCADIA Conference General Arnold had agreed with Sir Charles Portal, the British Chief of Air Staff, on a tentative schedule of allocations to the British from American production of 1942.14 But by March Arnold was intent on reducing allocations to the British. These allocations and the requirements for the expansion of American air forces, added to other estimated requirements (principally Soviet lend-lease schedules and commitments to the Pacific) gave a total far exceeding expected American production. According to Arnold, the effect of satisfying the British would be to cut by more than one half the projected expansion of American air forces. He contended that deliveries to the British could be cut back since they already had relatively large reserves.15

Early in April, when Marshall's proposal to concentrate American forces in the British Isles was under discussion in London, Secretary Stimson himself took to the President General Arnold's case for reducing plane allocations to the British. On 9 April he reported:

I showed the President the charts showing the present allocation of the pooled production of the U.S. and U.K., and he seemed much impressed by the fact that the U.S. was getting so little of the production. He asked if our Air Corps knew what the British were doing with all of their allotments. I told him that I did not think that we knew . . . I left the charts with him and also the memorandum with tabs.16

Three days later the Secretary wrote to the President an eloquent presentation of General Arnold's case. He owned that he himself had not understood how long it took to complete the training of air forces for combat and how costly it was to slight the later stages of training, in which specialized units were developed, using the equipment they

14 For the Arnold-Portal agreement of 13 Jan 42, see Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 248-49.
16 Memo, Conf, Stimson with President, 9 Apr 42, WDCSA 381 War Plans (S). The rest of the memorandum dealt with air problems, concluding with the President's remarks on the recent loss of the two British cruisers off Ceylon. "He said that he had heard that they had expected support from the R.A.F., but that through some misunderstanding it had not been given. He said that he was more than ever convinced of the vice of a separate air force such as the British had."
would use in combat and dealing with situations resembling those they would actually meet in combat. The Secretary therefore urged on the President the need for reallocation, and stated in general terms the policy that seemed to him required by the proposal Marshall and Hopkins had taken to London:

The sum and substance of this is that, unless we are to court disaster in our coming efforts of “holding” and “striking” during this year of crisis, we must at once lend our major effort to accumulating and training the Air Forces which we have planned for the purpose of holding our vital indispensable key positions and striking the blow which we hope will save Russia. Not an hour can be spared. Not a plane can be unnecessarily given away. We are so far behind that it will require Herculean efforts to catch up.  

The project of sending air groups to Cairo had meanwhile been held in abeyance. Finally, as a result of the negotiations in London, the project was dropped, partly in order to send reinforcements to the Tenth Air Force—to help meet the incursion of the Japanese in the Indian Ocean—and, more generally, in order to go ahead with the BOLERO plan, which was due to absorb all available American air units. General Marshall’s proposal to concentrate American forces in the British Isles thus entailed the disappointment of British expectations in the Middle East that he himself had encouraged. It reopened, moreover, the very question of strategic policy that his offer of air units had been intended to settle, at least temporarily—the question of allocations of planes to the British.

**Anglo-American Collaboration and the Support of China**

General Marshall’s readiness to collaborate with the British in the defense of the Middle East and India—an essential condition of British co-operation in mounting an offensive from the British Isles—was extremely difficult to reconcile with the development of the program of aid to China. The difficulty became conspicuous at the beginning of April when the minuscule Tenth Air Force was diverted to the mission of bombing the Andaman Islands, recently seized by the Japanese as a further move into the Indian Ocean. During early April the danger in the Indian Ocean became evident, with the appearance of a strong Japanese naval force which conducted air raids on Ceylon and against the Indian coast and sank two British cruisers (the *Dorsetshire* and *Cornwall*) and an aircraft carrier (the *Hermes*). On April 14 General Marshall sent word from London that the British Chiefs were greatly concerned and “most urgently” required American naval assist-

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17 Ltr, SW to President, 12 Apr 42, WDCSA 452.1 (S).

For a statement of the program of the AAF, see memo, AAF [CoFAS] for WPD, 20 Mar 42, sub: AAF Plans and Projects, OPD 580.4 (3-16-42), 1.

18 See memo cited n. 17. This summary lists and briefly describes the project with the note: “This plan is definitely not crystallized.”


20 The CCS put the question in the hands of a special committee, composed of General Arnold, Rear Admiral John H. Towers (Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics), and Air Marshal Douglas C. S. Evill (British Air member of the CCS). (1) Min, 15th mtg CCS, 7 Apr 42. (2) CCS 61/D, 9 Apr 42, title: Aircraft Sit of U. N.

The committee made very little progress. See ltr, Dill to Marshall, 15 May 42, no sub, and ltr, CoS to Dill, 17 May 42, no sub, both in WDCSA 452.1 (S).

For settlement of the question, entailing the provision of U.S. air units for the Middle East, see below, pp. 226 ff.
ance and American air units, particularly bombers, in the Indian theater. The con-
sequences, should the Japanese succeed in extending naval control into the western
Indian Ocean, would be disastrous for the Allied position in the Middle East. Mar-
shall directed Eisenhower and Arnold to inform Admiral King and send him "as
quickly as possible your appreciation and a
proposed reply." 21

The War Department reply, read and ap-
proved by the President, agreed that the
British did need everything they requested,
but indicated that the United States could
not then send so much. The Navy could
not release any major fleet unit for use in
the Indian Ocean, but Admiral King was
willing to use the aircraft carrier Ranger
to ferry pursuit planes across the Atlantic.
The planes could be assembled en route,
then flown off to land on the west coast of
Africa and follow the ferry route to India.
The Army Air Forces had no planes avail-
able for transfer to India or the Middle
East, but there were in the United States
planes allotted to the British—including
bombers whose departure for England had
been held up by the congestion of the north
Atlantic ferry route—that could be diverted
at once. The message proposed alterna-
tive plans—to use the bombers to bring
the Tenth Air Force to full operational strength
at once, or to ferry them to India (with
American crews) and turn the planes over
to the British on arrival. The War Depart-
ment pointed out that there was some doubt
in Washington whether there were trained
British pilots and crews in India to operate
the planes under the second alternative.
The message concluded:

We desire to remind you that the Tenth Air
Force has been assigned to General Stilwell
with an original purpose of supporting his
operations. Since this diversion of the Tenth
Air Force to another mission will adversely
affect the Chinese situation and Stilwell's
operations we deem it especially important
that no attempt be made to divert any of the
airplanes required to keep the AVG at full
operational strength and that former assur-
ances to the Generalissimo and Stilwell in
this regard be adhered to.22

General Marshall decided in favor of re-
inforcing the Tenth Air Force with planes
allocated to the British and placing it under
the strategic direction of the British for
operations in the Indian Ocean and the Bay
of Bengal, at the same time attempting to
placate the Chinese Government by giving
first priority, so far as pursuit planes were
concerned, to building up the AVG.23 The
War Department so notified General Stil-
well, adding an explanation to be given the
Generalissimo:

The Naval situation in the Bay of Bengal
and the Indian Ocean has deteriorated seri-
ously in the past few days and the threat
against Calcutta and the Eastern coast of
India is critical not only to India itself but
to our future ability to assist China. We
deem it of transcendent importance to estab-
lish speedily some air protection along this
coast to avoid risk of destruction of the Brit-

21 Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 14 Apr 42, CM-
IN 3714. The British Chiefs stated the conse-
quences of Japanese control of the western Indian
Ocean as follows: (1) the Allies would be unable
to support forces in the Middle East, and the Ger-
mans would gain access to oil and other resources
of the area, and the Far East; (2) the loss of oil
supplies from Abadan would be irreparable; (3) the
southern supply route to the Soviet Union would be
cut; and (4) Turkey would fall an easy prey to the
Germans, and German naval forces would be able
to enter the Black Sea and turn the Soviet position
in the Caucasus.

22 Msg (originator OPD), McNarney to Marshall,
14 Apr 42, CM-OUT 2583. The original typed
message bears notation "OK—FDR," Item 5,
Exec 1.

23 Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 14 Apr 42, CM-IN
3720.
ish Eastern Navy, which would open up northeast India to invasion and permit the enemy to cut air communications into China.\textsuperscript{24}

Stilwell, who had not been consulted, protested the decision in view of its probable effect on the Chinese Government, which had had a series of disappointments, including the news that the Doolittle mission would be carried out as planned, in spite of the objections of the Chinese.\textsuperscript{25} The real problem, which was yet to be explained to the Chinese, or indeed to Stilwell himself, was not that British requirements in the Middle East and India—as was strategically necessary—took precedence over commitments to China, but that even the minimum British requirements could scarcely be met if the United States and Great Britain were to carry out General Marshall's proposal for the concentration of forces in the British Isles. If the primary effect of the BOLERO plan would be to leave very precarious the British position in the Middle East and India, its secondary effect would certainly be to leave nothing but token forces available to support China.

At this point Chinese suspicions and discontent in the face of British-American military collaboration at last emerged in full force in the form of a message from Chiang Kai-shek to T. V. Soong in Washington, which Soong sent to the President via Mr. Hopkins.\textsuperscript{26} The burden of the complaint was that the disposition of American forces and—even more important—the distribution of American munitions were worked out by the United States in close collaboration with the British, without consulting the Chinese, and, moreover, without giving the same consideration to commitments to China or the demands of China that was given to commitments to the Soviet Union and demands of the Soviet Union. The text of Chiang's telegram to Soong read as follows:

With what has been happening lately, I am afraid you could no longer avoid having a frank heart-to-heart talk with the President, which I am sure he will not misunderstand. As you know, I have to fight continually against demoralizing doubts on the part of my officers, who concluded that American attitude towards China is in essence no different from that held by other nations, that both in the all-important matters of joint-staff conferences and war supplies, China is treated not as an equal like Britain and Russia, but as a ward.

The President has consistently shown himself to be the one great friend of China, and I may say on our part we have been loyally responsive. We have placed Chinese armies under American command, and we have shown every readiness to support American policies, sometimes even against our own judgment. All that we have and all that we are, we truly and unreservedly contribute to the cause of the United Nations.

What a contrast this is to the attitude of the British and Russians who, whenever it concerns their own interests, will not make concessions in the general interest, so that to this day they will not concede to the United States the direction and the location of the Supreme Military Council. The result of this non-cooperation is that there is in existence no organization to formulate and execute over-all strategy, and every country looks to its own immediate interests, so that the Axis is successfully imposing its grand strategy. What a difference there is between our attitude towards the United States and that of Britain and Russia!

If in future the Anglo-American joint staff is not enlarged to include China, and China
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is kept out of the Munitions Assignments Board, then China would be just a pawn in the game. Gandhi told me when I visited India: “They will never voluntarily treat us Indians as equals; why, they do not even admit your country to their staff talks.” If we are thus treated during the stress of war, what becomes our position at the peace conference? You must insist that we have our own stand, and we have our own independent position to uphold.27

The long commentary that Soong wrote for the President to accompany this message made the same points. He concluded:

Finally, the Generalissimo feels himself entirely out of touch with the main decisions of strategy, which profoundly affect China’s future. Whether an offensive will start from Australia, whether it is considered feasible to hold Burma, what steps are taken to protect the Indian Ocean route, what air forces will be sent to India, Burma and China, on all these vital questions his role is that of an occasional listener. Also, be it remembered it is from these decisions of strategy that stems the question of allocations of munitions.28

In this conclusion Soong hit the vital point of the whole issue. The development of effective British-American collaboration on strategic plans, begun at General Marshall’s instance during the Arcadia Conference and leading to the adoption of his proposal for concentration of American and British forces in the British Isles, was entirely contrary to the desires and interests of the Chinese Government. Whatever Soong may then have known of the Bolero plan—and he was generally well informed about current developments in Washington—the plan would unquestionably entail the postponement of any American efforts to help China on a sufficiently large scale to prevent the further deterioration of relations with China. It remained to be seen whether the President would accept this consequence.

The Soviet Lend-Lease Program

A third conflict between previous commitments and the new strategy developed in the War Department had to do with the Soviet lend-lease program. In the First (Moscow) Protocol of October 1941 the United States had undertaken to deliver to the Soviet Union each month through June 1942 given quantities of supplies. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the American armed forces had taken over critical munitions and ships, including those allocated to the Soviet Union under the Moscow Protocol.29 The President had tried to put a stop to the diversion of munitions allocated to the Soviet Union and had warned that any deficits would have to be made up by 1 April.30 This was easier said than done.31 How critical the shipping shortage was, the President himself was forced to recognize at the Arcadia Conference, at the end of which

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27 Msg, Chiang Kai-shek to Soong, 19 Apr 42, Item 19b, Exec 10.
28 Memo [Soong] for President [20 Apr 42], no sub, Item 19b, Exec 10.
he reluctantly consented to the diversion of seven cargo ships allocated to the Soviet lend-lease program, in order to move supplies and equipment to the Southwest Pacific. Finally, in the middle of March 1942 he flatly insisted that the commitments to the USSR be met. He directed that Mr. Nelson of the War Production Board get materials "released for shipment at the earliest possible date regardless of the effect of these shipments on any other part of our war program." At the same time he instructed Admiral Land of the War Shipping Administration that "the meeting of the Russian Protocol must have a first priority in shipping." As a result of these orders, shipments to the Soviet Union rose in March to more than 200,000 short tons and in April to nearly 450,000 short tons, as against about 375,000 short tons shipped between October 1941 and March 1942, bringing the cumulative total to over 1,000,000 tons. This was still only about half of what the United States had undertaken to export by the end of June.

To meet the June deadline while bringing the Pacific garrisons to authorized strength would require an intensive effort, rigidly restricting other projects. But the temporary effect was of far less concern to the War Department (and to the Navy Department) than the long-range effects of the President’s intention, which he announced soon thereafter, of renewing American commitments to the Soviet Union on the same basis for the period July–December 1942. In his directive to the Secretary of War, he wrote:

I understand that, from a strategical point of view, the Army and Navy feel that aid to Russia should be continued and expanded to maximum extent possible, consistent with shipping possibilities and the vital needs of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations and others of the United Nations. I share such a view.

The War Department did indeed believe in continuing and expanding aid to the Soviet Union, but only insofar as it would not interfere with preparations to open a "new front in Europe." Marshall soon had occasion to point out the limitation on lend-lease aid that was implicit in this view of strategy.

Plane Allocations

The projected invasion of the Continent could be expected to affect, first of all, allocations of critical equipment needed by units undertaking advanced training—especially planes. Of all critical items they

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32 See above, Ch. V.
34 Ibid.
35 (1) Rpt cited n. 31. (2) See also Stettinius, Lend-Lease, pp. 205 ff.
36 On 11 April in passing on War Department proposals to change production objectives, the President made "the distinct proviso that the protocol agreement with Russia be lived up to." He added that "the total supplies to be sent to Russia between July first and January first must be at least as great as today and actually increased as much as possible." (Memo, President for SW, 11 Apr 42, Item 28, Exec 10.)
37 Ltr, President to SW, 24 Mar 42, with JPS 28/D in ABC 400.3295 Russia (19 Apr 42), 1.
38 See (1) memo, OPD for CoFS, 28 Feb 42, sub: Strategic Conceptions and Their Application to SW Pacific, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8; (2) memo, OPD for CoFS, 25 Mar 42, sub: Critical Points in Development of Coordinated Viewpoint as to Maj Tasks of the War, Item 56, Exec 10. (These memos are discussed above in Chs. VII and VIII.) See also memo, ACoFS for SW, 12 Apr 42, sub: Review of Current Sit, OPD 381, 6 (this copy bears initials of Eisenhower as action officer) and OPD brief, Notes on CCS 47 . . ., n.d., with CCS 47 in ABC 452.1 (1–22–42), 1.
were in greatest demand by foreign governments and by American commands overseas. Of all the Army training programs, moreover, the program for training air units was by far the most exigent in its demands for extended advanced training with precisely the equipment the units would use in combat. Allocations to the Soviet Union were involved only indirectly in Arnold’s recommendations at the end of March. He contented himself with observing that any increase in allocations to the Soviet Union ‘should be met by an even further reduction in commitments to the British,’ in order to obtain the net reduction he considered to be necessary.\(^{39}\) Secretary Stimson agreed with Arnold that the immediate step to be taken was to cut allocations to the British, on the ground that they already had reserves beyond what they needed for operations or could use in training. But he concluded his recommendations on policy with a sweeping statement that specifically included allocations to the Soviet Union:

All requests for planes for areas not essential to our own plans must be refused. The time is past for all gifts of planes—all gifts of planes based upon sentimental or good development purposes. The time may even soon come when we will have to determine whether more effective efforts to save Russia will be made through our own air forces rather than through the planes turned over to her air forces.\(^{40}\)

At the end of the month Marshall made the same point. In the course of discussion by the JCS on the allocation of planes as between the United States and Great Britain, he stated that ‘while no change should be made in delivery of planes in accordance with existing protocol, the number of planes to Russia would have to be drastically reduced, if not altogether stopped, by August or, at the latest, in September.’\(^{41}\)

The problem was by no means peculiar to the development of air power nor equally serious for all aspects of the air program itself. The most critical issue of all at the time was the allocation of transport planes. The settlement of this issue would therefore constitute a test case. Transport planes had not been listed in the Moscow Protocol, but in November 1941 Soviet representatives had requested 600 transport planes over a six-month period, later reducing the number to 400, and finally asking for an immediate allocation of 100 and 25 a month thereafter.\(^{42}\) At the beginning of April the Munitions Assignments Board found it necessary to review proposed allocations of transport planes for the rest of 1942.\(^{43}\) The War Department submitted to the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) the Army’s requirements as estimated by the AAF.\(^{44}\) Having measured these and other requirements against expected production, the Munitions Assignments Board acceded to the Soviet request to the extent of allocating twenty-nine transport planes to the Soviet Union for May and June. Arnold

\(^{39}\) Min, 12th mtg JCS, 27 Apr 42.

\(^{40}\) As stated by Brig Gen Harry J. Malony, min, 16th mtg CCS, 21 Apr 42.

\(^{41}\) For War Department recommendation against granting initial request for 600 transport planes, see ltr, DCoS [Gen Moore] to Gen Burns [Off of Lend-Lease Admin], 24 Dec 41, no sub. A copy, drafted in WPD, is filed with memo, WPD for DCoS, 24 Dec 41, sub: Transport Planes for Soviet Russia, WPD 4537-36.

\(^{42}\) Memo, Mun Asgts Com (Air) [Col Edmund C. Langmead, Secy, for Gen Harmon, Chm] for WPD, 28 Mar 42, sub: Transport Airplane Reqmts for 1942, OPD 452.1, 7.

\(^{43}\) 1st Ind, OPD to Mun Asgts Com (Air), 3 Apr 42, to memo cited n. 43.
was "emphatically opposed" to this action, and on his initiative the JCS requested the CCS to disapprove it.\textsuperscript{45} The JCS pointed out that the number of transport planes available was "entirely insufficient to meet urgent and pressing needs," and that it was then and had "for some time been impossible to assign more than a very few transport airplanes to the important mission of training parachute and air-borne troops, which constitute an essential component for the contemplated U. S. effort." The JCS concluded:

To meet the training requirements for and to have in combat the 200 transport airplanes in August and the 400 transport airplanes in November, which have been allocated for the main effort, and to provide, in addition, the essential minimum requirements of the U. S. Ferrying Command, Air Service Command, and for overseas areas where the U. S. Army Air Forces are operating, will require every transport plane that is now available or that can be provided by the entire U. S. production.\textsuperscript{46}

On 21 April the CCS considered the recommendation. The question was evidently one of a conflict between military and political considerations.\textsuperscript{47} In the discussion by the CCS, Rear Adm. John H. Towers, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, "stressed the importance of making at least a small allocation to Russia in view of the political considerations." Sir John Dill observed that in case no transport planes should be allotted to the Soviet Union, "it would be necessary to give a very well reasoned explanation." Marshall agreed that "a very carefully phrased reply would have to be made." He observed that "the operational effect of such a small number of aircraft in Russia would be small although the political effect might be considerable." For the projected cross-Channel invasion, on the other hand, even small numbers of planes were, at the time, of first importance. Marshall explained:

The next three months were the critical ones; and it was essential not to cut down training facilities. During his visit to England he had seen exercises carried out by British airborne formations and the number of aircraft available [to U. S. forces] for this important form of training (17) [transports] was hopelessly inadequate.

After considering the statements of General Arnold and General Marshall, the CCS agreed to countermand the order of the Munitions Assignments Board.\textsuperscript{48}

The subject was not closed. Before the CCS had considered the JCS recommendation, Admiral Towers had proposed, in a memorandum to Admiral King, that the recommendation should "be held in abeyance and the subject be again brought up before the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Admiral Towers' principal points were that the MAB had acted in complete awareness of the military and political implications, that what Arnold had wanted the CCS to do was to "repudiate a firm agreement" simply to benefit the Army, and that CCS action was in any event useless, since "Mr. Hopkins, as an individual, will get the President to overrule any such decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff." The memorandum concluded with the postscript, "There are many other transports in hands of Air Force that

\textsuperscript{45} (1) CCS 65, 21 Apr 42, title: Allocation of Transport Airplanes for USSR. (2) Min, 11th mtg JCS, 20 Apr 42.

\textsuperscript{46} CCS 65, 21 Apr 42.

\textsuperscript{47} This fact had been recognized by the MAB in making the allocation, as stated by Malony in minutes cited n. 42.

\textsuperscript{48} Min cited n. 42.
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could be assigned to parachute troop training.”

On the day following the CCS decision Admiral King forwarded Admiral Towers’ memorandum to General Marshall, noting: “I am impressed with the above presentation—and think you should know of it.” On 27 April Marshall replied at considerable length. On the assumption that Admiral Towers was “not fully informed” of the Bolero plan, Marshall explained that a critical weakness in the initial proposal made to the British had been the lack of planes to transport parachute troops, airborne infantry, and gliders, and that future allocations would not serve to train units for the invasion “in view of the time schedule under which we are directed to operate.” On the basis of AAF estimates he analyzed United States needs and showed that allocations fell short by 379 planes. He concluded:

In the circumstances I can no more agree to the diversion of additional transport plane equipment to Russia, while charged with a primary responsibility for the preparation of a major offensive, which will require an heroic effort if launched in 1942, than you could approve the diversion of your ships from naval task forces forming for operations in the immediate future. Neither of us can be expected to fight a war and still give away our weapons beyond some reasonable point. As far as I am concerned, we have passed that point in aircraft.

At the same time Marshall also submitted to the President a full explanation of the critical need for transport planes, accompanied by a statement of his views on lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union. He believed that shipments to the Soviet Union should be increased “in every practicable way,” and hoped in particular to furnish the Red Army “with greater strength in mechanized items.” But he reiterated his belief that whatever help the United States might send, “the greatest service to Russia will be a landing on the European continent in 1942, and we must not jeopardize that operation or risk the sacrifice of the troops engaged by scattering the vital materiel required for what we know will be a hazardous undertaking.” He therefore recommended “that we undertake no commitment involving the provision of transport airplanes for Russia.”

Marshall had also to counter a proposal, which had been made to the JCS by the American members of the Munitions Assignments Board, that, in lieu of military transports from current production, the United States should transfer to the Soviet Union a “reasonable number” of transports from commercial airlines. Marshall and Arnold were both opposed to this proposal, and the JCS accordingly disapproved it. According to AAF, about fifty planes could be taken from the commercial airlines without disrupting services essential to the war effort. The Army was reluctant to originate a proposal to take over transports from commercial airlines. However, as Marshall recognized, Soviet representatives “resented

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*[49] Memo, Towers for King [20 Apr 42], sub: Allocation of 29 Transports to Russia During May and June, WDSCA Russia (S).

[50] Note, King to Marshall, 22 Apr 42, penned on memo cited n. 49.

[51] Memo, CofS for King, 27 Apr 42, no sub, WDSCA Russia (S).

[52] Memo, CofS for President, 27 Apr 42, sub: Transport Airplanes for Russia, WDSCA Russia (S).


[54] Min, 12th mtg JCS, 27 Apr 42.

the large civil air services still running.”

If the President should then decide to reduce those services, it was logical, in view of the large deficit expected, that the Army should get the planes withdrawn. Marshall therefore recommended to the President that “all transport planes of the U. S. Commercial airlines be immediately earmarked for Army use,” being left “in their present status until required for military operations.”

The President replied that he “fully” appreciated the needs of the Army, but could not see why, if the Army and Navy needed planes, it was enough simply to earmark commercial transports for future military use. He asked just how many commercial transports there were in the United States and what they could do, observing: “The old expression ‘pigs is pigs’ should be translated into the modern terms ‘planes is planes.’” The Secretary of War thereupon undertook to see what further reductions could be made.

Although not satisfied with the Army’s cautious approach to the question of commercial transports, the President was apparently satisfied that the Army’s need for transport planes was critical. On 1 May

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56 Min, 16th mtg CCS, 21 Apr 42.
57 Memo cited [n. 52].
58 Informal memo, F. D. R. for SW and CofS, 5 May 42, WDCSA Russia (S).

Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, having opened the memorandum, sent it on to Marshall, making a copy for Secretary Stimson. (See covering memo, J. J. McCloy for CofS, 5 May 42, filed with above memo.)
59 Memo, SW for President, 7 May 42, sub: Analysis of Air Transportation Reqsmts for War Program, WDCSA Russia (S).
60 With reference to the President’s memorandum of 5 May cited (in n. 58) above, Colonel Deane stated: “Answer sent by CofS this date—5/7/42—and a directive issued by the President on the subject. JRD.” This note appears on the covering memorandum from McCloy cited in n. 58. On the covering memorandum also appears an unsigned note in pencil: “Gen. Arnold prepared the letr referred to, but Col. Deane was not furnished with a copy of the letr.” The answer may be the memorandum cited in n. 59. (See also Arnold, Global Mission, p. 331.)
61 Memo, Smith for Marshall, 1 May 42, sub: Transport Planes for Russia, incl draft of ltr, MAB to Soviet ambassador, with JCS 42 in ABC 452.1 (1-22-42), 1.
62 Informal memo, Smith for CofS, 7 May 42, WDCSA Russia (S).

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The Immediate Reinforcement of the Pacific

During April, while raising the question of the eventual subordination of the Soviet lend-lease program to the BOLERO plan, the War Department also restated and defended the thesis that BOLERO schedules should take precedence over any new commitments of Army forces to the Pacific. The debate began on 29 March, four days after the War Department project for con-
centration in the British Isles had gone to the President, when Admiral King sent to General Marshall a protest over the allocation of Army aircraft to the Pacific:

In my opinion the strength of the air forces planned to be sent to Australia, to the South Pacific, and to the Hawaiian Islands is inadequate to implement surely and effectively the strategic concept on which the detailed plans are based.

He objected specifically to the idea of relying on the diversion of the bombers assigned to Generals MacArthur and Emmons in case of an attack in the South Pacific. He was dubious of support from either source—from MacArthur since he was independent of Navy control, from Emmons since he was too far away and needed to keep all his bombers in Hawaii. Admiral King therefore recommended that “at least one heavy bomber group should be assigned to the South Pacific Area, in addition to all aircraft planned by J.C.S. 23.”

The essential difference between Admiral King’s view of Pacific strategy and the War Department view was that he proposed to “implement surely and effectively” the aim of holding the line Hawaii—Australia, whereas the War Department insisted on stopping at half-way measures that might or might not slow down a Japanese thrust enough to give the United States time to react. Admiral King did not repudiate the general idea of concentrating large American forces against Germany but only the idea—the key to the War Department plan—of commencing to do so while the issue in the Pacific was still in doubt. He held that the needs of the Pacific, “although possibly smaller than those of Europe,” were “more urgent in point of time,” and therefore recommended not only that the Army assign one group of heavy bombers to the South Pacific but also that

... movement of Army units, and particularly air forces, to positions in the Pacific be given priority over movements to Europe and to the Indian Ocean and Middle East Theaters.64

The War Department reply came a few days later after the President had decided to send Hopkins and Marshall to London. The War Department stood by its earlier figures on deployment and the reasoning behind them, and cited in support the President’s “tentative decision” in favor of immediate concentration in the British Isles, thus giving notice that the War Department, as was to be expected, meant to appeal to that “decision” in order to close off further debate on deployment to the Pacific.65

The President, however, had already reopened the debate by asking the JCS to re-study the “adequacy of defenses of the Fiji Islands and New Caledonia,” concerning which the governments of Australia and New Zealand were no less uneasy and dissatisfied than was the Navy Department. The JCS, in order to be able to comply with the President’s request, initiated a review of Pacific deployment as a whole.66 From the beginning, the Army and Navy planners faced the prospect of a deadlock on the point in JCS 23 to which Admiral King had objected—the allocation of bombers to the South Pacific. A special joint subcommittee, the senior planners, and the JCS in turn

63 Memo, King for CofS, 29 Mar 42, sub: Strategic Deployment in Pacific Against Japan, Navy File A 16-3 (1).

64 Ibid.

65 Memo, McNarney [ACofS] for King, 6 Apr 42, sub cited n. 63, OPD 381 PTO, 10. This memo was based on draft memo [CofS for King], 1 Apr 42, same sub, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8.

66 (1) Memo, Capt John L. McCrea (USN) for Marshall, King, and Arnold, 2 Apr 42, no sub, with JPS 21/2/D in ABC 381 Pacific Bases (1-22-42), 1. (2) Min, 9th mtg JCS, 6 Apr 42.
reviewed the arguments. At each stage they ran into flat disagreement. Navy representatives insisted on the need to station bombers at the strong points on the lines of communication. Army representatives argued that bomber forces should be shifted to these points, when it appeared necessary, from Hawaii and Australia. They acknowledged that this course involved greater risks, but repeated the argument that the risks must be accepted in order to go ahead with plans for a bomber force in the British Isles.

A month of study and fruitless debate ended, early in May, with a deadlock. Admiral King then submitted to the JCS a formal restatement of his objection to the Army views. He pointed out that the Japanese were free to attack wherever they pleased and stated his belief that they would do so in such force that it was far from certain that the American defenses would "hold." He then referred to the earlier Japanese exploitation of the weakness of Allied forces "spread out too thin," urging that "we must not commit the same error in the Pacific Ocean Areas." He concluded:

Important as the mounting of BOLERO may be, the Pacific problem is not less so, and is certainly the more urgent—it must be faced now. Quite apart from any idea of future advance in this theater we must see to it that we are actually able to maintain our present positions. We must not permit diversion of our forces to any proposed operation in any other theater to the extent that we find ourselves unable to fulfill our obligation to implement our basic strategic plan in the Pacific theater, which is to hold what we have against any attack that the Japanese are capable of launching against us.

The JCS could agree only to submit the disagreement to the President.

Meantime the issue had become still broader. While the JCS had been disputing, the President had taken under consideration claims of the Australian Government and of General MacArthur. They had for some time been representing a large-scale Japanese attack on Australia as imminent. Late in April Prime Minister Curtin of Australia reopened with Prime Minister Churchill the subject of the return of Dominion forces to Australia. Specifically, Mr. Curtin proposed diverting to Australia two British divisions (one of them an armored division) due to be sent to India "until such time as the 9th Australian Imperial Force Division and the remainder of the 6th Division are returned." He also transmitted a proposal that the British send

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67 The special joint subcommittee was made up of the JUSSC and additional members chosen by Admiral Turner and General Handy. (For the appointment of the committee, see min, 11th mtg JPS, 8 Apr 42.)

68 See JPS 21 series, JCS 48, and the following: (1) OPD brief, Notes on ... 13th mtg JPS, 22 Apr 42, with JPS 21/7 in ABC 381 Pacific Bases (1-22-42), 2; (2) min, 14th mtg JPS, 25 Apr 42; (3) memo, JPS for JCS, 2 May 42, sub: Aircraft Deployments, incorporated in JCS 23 (Army members were willing to recommend certain additions in the South Pacific as a basis for "the eventual future Air Force which cannot be established for a considerable time in the future"—13 light bombers and 25 pursuit planes above current War Department commitments); and (4) min, 13th mtg JCS, 4 May 42.

JCS 48 was never approved by the JCS, though it was on the agenda for several months.

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69 Memo, King for JCS, 4 May 42, sub: JCS 48—Def of Island Bases in Pacific, OPD 381 Gen, 62.

70 Min cited n. 68(4).

71 See estimate of the Australian Chiefs of Staff prepared "in conjunction with" MacArthur's staff, forwarded to the War Department in msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 4 Apr 42, CM-IN 1070 (R).

For earlier discussion, which had begun during the ABDA period, see: (1) CCS 18, 13 Jan 42, sub: Possible Japanese Action Against Australia and New Zealand; (2) CCS 18/1, 13 Mar 42; (3) WPD notes on CCS 18/1, in ABC 384 (1-31-42); and (4) notes for Army planner, 9th mtg CPS, 19 Mar 42, with CPS 24 in ABC 381 Australia (1-23-42).
an aircraft carrier to add to MacArthur’s naval forces and a request for additional shipping on the run from Australia to the United States.\(^2\)

What gave these proposals a peculiar character was Mr. Curtin’s explanation that he was presenting them at the request of MacArthur. The British Prime Minister sent them to the President, expressing curiosity to know whether the President or his Pacific War Council had passed on them and whether MacArthur had “any authority from the United States for taking such a line.” Though Churchill ruled out these proposals as unsound, on the ground that India was in greater danger than Australia, he considered them to be “none the less a cause of concern when put forward on General MacArthur’s authority.”\(^3\) The President, too, was concerned, being somewhat uneasy (as Admiral King reported) over the use Mr. Curtin had made of MacArthur’s opinions.\(^4\)

The War Department, called upon to comment on Churchill’s message, suggested that the proposals be taken as coming—as earlier ones to the same effect had come—from Mr. Curtin, on his own responsibility, and offered the explanation that in Melbourne it might seem natural and proper to present them as MacArthur’s estimate of what was needed to meet the situation with which they were jointly preoccupied. It had been assumed in Washington, to be sure, that MacArthur, since he was operating under the direction of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, would transmit his recommendations to Washington. The War Department had in fact lately received from him a request for aircraft carriers, and had told him that they were “not now available.” But the War Department had received no request for more transpacific shipping nor for the British divisions destined for India. MacArthur to send all such requests to the JCS, who would then bring up for consideration by the CCS any involving British forces. This point having been cleared up, the British Prime Minister might rest assured that “any request reaching you from Mr. Curtin is made upon his own responsibility.”\(^5\)

The proposed message, drawn up by the War Department, was acceptable to the President, so far as it went. He only added that, if Mr. Churchill liked, he would himself urge Mr. Curtin not to press for the release of the Australian divisions.\(^6\) The President had to do rather more to satisfy MacArthur, who took very ill the War Department statement of policy governing his relations with Curtin.\(^7\) As he observed, it seemed “to imply some breach of frankness” on his part. General MacArthur explained that he had not outlined except to the War Department his own ideas on grand strategy, but when asked, had given Curtin his own opinion on specific questions connected with the defense of the Southwest Pacific, in the belief that it was his duty to

\(^{2}\) *Msg, Prime Minister [Churchill] to President, 29 Apr 42, No. 73, Item 62, Exec 10.*

\(^{3}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{4}\) *Memo, King for Marshall, 29 Apr 42, no sub, Item 62, Exec 10. King transmitted the President’s instructions that the War Department draft a reply.*

\(^{5}\) *Draft memo, CoS for President, 29 Apr 42, sub: Dispatch from Prime Minister, Item 53, Exec 10.*

\(^{6}\) *Added to copies of WD draft [in hands of Col Gailey and Col Sexton]. See draft memo cited n. 75.*

\(^{7}\) *The brief War Department statement of policy on relations between MacArthur and the Australian Government stated in the draft of a proposed message to Churchill (contained in draft memo cited in n. 75), was transmitted to Australia in msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 30 Apr 42, CM-OUT 6034 (R).*
do so and "for [no] other purpose" than Curtin’s personal information. He assured General Marshall, "I have no idea of bringing pressure to bear through any channels open to the Australian Government in order to support indirectly any views that I may hold." He disclaimed all responsibility for their being put to any such use and told General Marshall "Our government should pay no attention to anything attributed to me except that which I communicate to them over my own signature." Finally, he offered what amounted to a justification, on grounds of policy, of the views that he had expressed in Melbourne on the need for additional reinforcements. He pointed out that he could hardly continue as an Allied commander without the confidence of the Australian Government, which was—and long before his arrival had been—preoccupied with the security of Australia.  

The President, to whom Marshall referred the message (as he normally referred messages from MacArthur treating of grand strategy or policy), wrote a long conciliatory answer, to show that he understood and accepted MacArthur’s relations with the Australian Government. He began:

I have seen your telegram No. 151 of May third to George Marshall and I want you to know that I fully appreciate the difficulties of your position. They are the same kind of difficulties which I am having with the Russians, British, Canadians, Mexicans, Indians, Persians and others at different points of the compass. Not one of them is wholly satisfied but I am at least succeeding in keeping all of them reasonably satisfied and have so far avoided any real rows.

After this disarming statement of his approach to strategy, the President explained on what basis he was making his critical decisions:

In the matter of grand strategy I find it difficult this Spring and Summer to get away from the simple fact that the Russian armies are killing more Axis personnel and destroying more Axis materiel than all the other twenty-five United Nations put together. Therefore, it has seemed wholly logical to support the great Russian effort in 1942 by seeking to get all munitions to them that we possibly can, and also to develop plans aimed at diverting German land and air forces from the Russian front.

The President acknowledged that MacArthur would “feel the effect of this,” but went on to assure him that the United States would (a) send him “all the air strength we possibly can,” (b) “secure, if possible,” the Pacific lines of communication, and (c) strike “as often as possible” against Japanese communications. He dwelt especially on this last point, on the cumulative effect of destroying Japanese ships and planes in preparation for later operations.

The President at the same time commented on the relations between Curtin and MacArthur. He declared that one of the problems, in trying to some extent to keep everyone satisfied, was to “avoid any future public controversies” between Churchill and Curtin, and asked for MacArthur’s help:

I see no reason why you should not continue discussion of military matters with Australian Prime Minister, but I hope you will try to have him treat them as confidential matters and not use them for public messages or for appeal to Churchill and me.

In respect to the case at hand, he declared his hope that Australia would leave its troops in the Middle East. At the War Department’s suggestion, he pointed out that the release and replacement of these troops would take so much shipping as to
reduce the strength of the British forces in the Middle East by 60,000. He concluded with a graceful reference to his dependence, as in this case, on MacArthur’s fulfillment of his peculiar two-fold mission: “I well realize your difficult problems, and that you have to be an ambassador as well as Supreme Commander.”

The President’s message invited a reply, not only by its tone throughout but also in specific terms:

I wish you would let me have your personal guess on whether Japan will continue large operations against India and Ceylon or will stop at approximately the Calcutta line. Also, as to whether an all-out attack will be launched against Australia or New Zealand. MacArthur replied at length to these questions, restating his objections to the theory of concentrating for an attack in Europe and estimating his additional needs. He began with his estimate of the situation, concluding that the soundest course for Japan was to attack southward, securing its position in the Pacific, before attempting any large operation against India. Allied forces in the Pacific, in order to meet this attack, should not only take adequate defensive measures but should also prepare to take the offensive, or at least to threaten offensive action, at the “earliest possible moment.” The United States in so doing would accomplish two things—“meet the demand of the immediate strategic situation” and “satisfy American public opinion by providing an adequate effort in the only theatre which is charged exclusively to the United States.” He then proceeded to adapt to the support of this view the President’s reason for approving the Bolero plan—the urgent need of supporting the Soviet Union. Since it was not practicable to send enough direct aid to the Soviet Union, a “second front,” he agreed, was necessary. He concluded: “That front should be in the Pacific theatre. Nowhere else can it be so successfully launched and nowhere else will it so assist the Russians.” Just as Marshall had argued that an attack on the Continent would relieve German pressure, MacArthur argued that a second front in the Pacific would relieve Japanese pressure, permitting the Soviet ally “either to utilize his Siberian resources in direct support of his European front or to join his allies in the Pacific attack.” This course of action would protect not only Australia but also India, and more effectively, in his belief, than India could be defended in the Indian Ocean. Finally, he repeated, a second front in the Pacific “would have the enthusiastic psychological support of the entire American Nation.”

General MacArthur then proceeded to explain what he needed, in addition to what he was already to get, in order even to defend the huge area of his responsibility. It was somewhat more than Prime Minister Curtin had proposed—three “first class” divisions from the United States, two aircraft carriers, and an increase from 500 to 1,000 front-line planes, together with personnel and matériel to keep the air units constantly at full strength.

MacArthur concluded his rebuttal by rejecting, as inappropriate to the case, the strategy, mentioned by the President, of wearing down the Japanese by destroying
their planes and ships. Even though the military potential of Japan was in some respect diminishing, it was in other ways growing—as a result of the conquest of rich areas—and, what was far more important, the issue during the coming months would be decided, not by Japanese potential, but by Japanese "strength at the point of application of power," at which the United States was weakest:

At that point, as has always been the case since the beginning of this war, she has the advantage in both numbers and quality of troops. Due to her unchallenged command of the seas she is able to concentrate on a chosen objective and overwhelm the defenders through superiority of means although the actual numbers of the forces she utilizes may not be large.80

Thus, early in May the President had to reckon with the objections to the Bolero plan of General MacArthur as well as those of Admiral King. To carry out the plan as General Marshall envisaged it would require the President to overrule the two senior American officers that were preoccupied with strategy in the Pacific.

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80 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 8 May 42, CM-IN 2333.
CHAPTER X

Decisions in Favor of a
"Second Front"

May 1942

The four cases of prior claims versus Bolero that arose in April 1942 all came up again in May—those of the Pacific, the Middle East, China, and the Soviet Union. In each case the President decided in favor of Bolero, although with some reservations and with the significant qualification that the basis for his decisions was not the desire to protect the long-range project for invasion in 1943 but simply his determination to get "action" across the Atlantic in 1942.

The Pacific Theater versus Bolero

In early May, during the exchange of messages initiated by Prime Minister Curtin with reference to the defense of Australia, there was also an exchange of views in Washington that virtually compelled the President to decide between the views of General MacArthur and General Marshall on the then crucial question of grand strategy. The President himself initiated this exchange. On 29 April he spoke about the needs of Australia to the Pacific War Council—the extraordinary body he had recently set up to keep him in touch with the situation in the Pacific. His naval aide furnished the JCS with the following account of what he said:

"The President remarked . . . that it was his desire that the total number of planes assigned to the U.S. Army in Australia be raised to one thousand, the distribution as to types being left to the discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, the President directed that I inform the Chiefs of Staff that it was his desire to have in Australia 100,000 troops in addition to the personnel of air forces required to maintain the plane program referred to in paragraph one of this memorandum."

General Marshall was out of Washington at the time on a tour of inspection. The War Department staff, studying the matter pending his return, reapplied the familiar arguments to this new directive. The staff estimated that the directed increase over approved allocations (about 25,000 ground

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1 Memo, McCrea for JCS, 1 May 42, sub: Aircraft and Trs for Australia, Item 53, Exec 10.

The Pacific War Council was created in Washington on 1 April 1942, with membership consisting of the President, Mr. Hopkins, and political representatives of the United Kingdom, China, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Canada. Representatives of India and the Philippines were added later. The President had desired a special body for control of Pacific matters at the time of the ARCADIA Conference, but Churchill and Marshall had dissuaded him. (See (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 515-16; and (2) Cline, Washington Command Post, p. 101.)
troops and about 100 planes) would cut about in half (from two pursuit groups to one) the initial American contribution to air operations based on the British Isles, and would take enough ships to eliminate two Atlantic convoys, cutting back scheduled deployment to the British Isles by about 50,000 men. The proposed increase in troops and aircraft for Australia would completely unsettle BOLERO schedules, and even more broadly, the whole basis of current Anglo-American planning. The staff concluded:

If new commitments and continuous reinforcement of secondary theaters are to interfere with the execution of these plans the faith of the British in our firm promises will be destroyed, coordination will be lost and the success of the plan will be doomed.  

The War Department staff recognized it as altogether natural that the Navy and the Australian and New Zealand Governments should persist in demanding additional commitments to the Pacific and acknowledged that it would evidently be “desirable” to meet their demands. But having reviewed the background of the decision to plan on concentrating in the British Isles, the staff observed:

We are presented with a choice which is do we intend to devote ourselves unreservedly to the idea of defeating the European Axis by concentrating our power in the Eastern Atlantic, accepting calculated risks in all other theaters, or are we going to permit our resources to be distributed equally throughout the world and give up entirely the thought of decisive offensive action on our own part.  

Marshall adopted the same approach. Returning to Washington on 3 May, he wrote another memorandum, more personal in tone, to send to the President. He began by referring to the difficult time he had had on his trip to London in April, having at best so little to offer and facing the scepticism of the British staff. He went on to restate the arguments of his staff, took note of Admiral King’s continued dissatisfaction with the allocation of planes to the South Pacific, and then added an argument of his own. He spoke of the needs of Hawaii and Alaska, and declared that if anything more were to be sent to the Pacific, he had rather it went to those outposts, where the United States was risking its own most immediate interests, than to Australia. He had preferred to accept the risks at those points in the Pacific “in order to stage an early offensive on the Continent of Europe.” He would recommend against doing so any longer if it became a question of “reducing our planned effort from the British Islands in favor of an increase in Australia.”

Finally, three days later, Marshall brought together in a longer paper the two main claims involved in the case of the “Pacific Theatre versus Bolero”—those of the South Pacific, just restated on 4 May by Admiral King, and those of the Southwest Pacific, as finally represented in the President’s “directive” of 29 April. The paper led up to a flat recommendation that the President should choose between giving unqualified precedence to BOLERO and dropping it entirely:

If the “Bolero” project is not to be our primary consideration, I would recommend its complete abandonment. We must remember that this operation for 1942 depends primarily upon British forces and not our own. They have far more at stake than do we and are accepting very grave hazards

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3 Draft memo [CofS for President], n.d., sub: Increase in U. S. Commitments to Australia, Item 53, Exec 10.

5 Ibid.

4 Memo, CofS for President, 4 May 42, no sub, OPD 381, 62; copies in Item 53, Exec 10 incl copy corrected in pen by Marshall.
to which our own risks are not comparable. They have accepted the "Bolero" project with a firm understanding that it would be the primary objective of the United States. If such is not to be the case, the British should be formally notified that the recent London agreement must be canceled.

Leaving no doubt of his meaning, Marshall ended:

I present this question to you as Commander-in-Chief, and request that you discuss the matter with Admiral King, General Arnold and me, and give us a formal directive for our future guidance.

The President at once replied:

1. I have yours of May sixth regarding the Pacific Theatre versus "Bolero." In regard to the first paragraph I did not issue any directive of May first regarding the increase of combat planes to Australia to a total of 1,000 and the ground forces to a total of 100,000. I did ask if this could properly be done. I understand now that this is inadvisable at the present time and I wholly agree with you and Admiral King.

2. In regard to additional aircraft to the South Pacific Theatre, it is my thought that all we should send there is a sufficient number of heavy and medium bombers and pursuit planes in order to maintain the present objective [written in the President's hand in place of "strength"] there at the maximum.

3. I do not want "Bolero" slowed down.

4. The success of raiding operations seems to be such that a large scale Japanese offensive against Australia or New Zealand can be prevented.

This note was itself a partial substitute for the personal meeting and formal directive for which Marshall had asked. The War Department could treat as settled, for the time being, the question of added rein-

forcesments for the Southwest Pacific. The note did not settle the question of bombers for the South Pacific, for it did not decide the very question at issue between Marshall and King—what the "present objective" in the South Pacific was. They agreed that the objective was to "hold," but they attached different meanings to the expression. To King it meant "make secure"; to Marshall it meant "defend" the island bases. More specifically, they disagreed whether the Army should stand ready to "send" bombers into the South Pacific to meet a particular threat or to "station" bombers there.

But it was possible to take the President's general declaration that he did "not want 'Bolero' slowed down" as covering the South Pacific as well as Australia. The operations staff so interpreted it, as confirmation of the War Department's policy governing deployment throughout the Pacific.

On the basis of this interpretation all that remained to be done was to make up the difference between actual and authorized strength. The War Department staff hoped to do so, for the most part, by the end of August and thus at last to make the final payments on the debts that had constituted a prior claim on troops, ships, and

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5 Memo, CofS for President, 6 May 42, sub: Pacific Theater versus Bolero, and three incls, with JCS 48 in ABC 381 Pacific Bases (1-22-42), 2.

6 Memo, FDR for Marshall, 6 May 42, filed with JCS 48 in ABC 381 Pacific Bases (1-22-42), 2.

7 The War Department took that position in the latter part of May, in response to the renewal of demands by the Australian Government, strongly representing the likelihood of a Japanese attack on Australia. (For WD action, see: (1) memo, Handy for Marshall, 17 May 42, no sub, and incls, and (2) ltr, CofS to Dill, 22 May 42, no sub, both in Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec 8.)

8 Memo, OPD for Secy JCS, 13 May 42, sub: U. S. Army Objectives in Pacific, OPD 320.2 PTO, 3. This memorandum was a statement "of the action the Army proposed to implement the President's Memorandum to General Marshall of 6 May, 1942, relative to the deployment of forces in the Pacific Theater as provided in JCS 48." (See memo cited n. 6.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GEORGE MARSHALL:
Chief of Staff

1. I have yours of May sixth regarding the Pacific Theatre versus "Bolero". In regard to the first paragraph I did not issue any directive on May first regarding the increase of combat planes to Australia to a total of 1,000 and the ground forces to a total of 100,000. I did ask if this could properly be done. I understand now that this is inadvisable at the present time and I wholly agree with you and Admiral King.

2. In regard to additional aircraft to the South Pacific Theatre, it is my thought that all we should send there is a sufficient number of heavy and medium bombers and pursuit planes in order to maintain the present there at the maximum.

3. I do not want "Bolero" slowed down.

4. The success of raiding operations seems to be such that a large-scale Japanese offensive against Australia or New Zealand can be prevented.

F.D.R.

incl 4
planes since the beginning of the emergency deployment to the Philippines in October 1941.

The President's Review of Strategy

At this point the President made quite plain the reason for his insistence that Bolero should not be "slowed down." It was his determination to engage American forces in action across the Atlantic in 1942. He had already stated that he wanted some such action in 1942, first at the Arcadia Conference and, more recently, in a message to the Prime Minister, to whom he had confided early in March his increasing interest in establishing a "new front" on the Continent during the summer. In a statement on 6 May he made it quite plain how strongly he believed in a "new front" in 1942. It was an unusually full written statement of his views on strategy addressed to his principal military advisers—Hopkins, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the members of the JCS. Therein he reviewed the situations in all the principal theaters. He understood that the "general strategic plan," at least for several months to come, called for "a continuous day to day maintenance of existing positions and existing strength" everywhere except in the Atlantic area. The general plans for the Atlantic area called for "very great speed in developing actual operations." The President made it clear that he meant just that:

I have been disturbed by American and British naval objections to operations in the European Theatre prior to 1943. I regard it as essential that active operations be conducted in 1942. I fully realize difficulties in relation to the landing of armed forces under fire. All of us would like to have ideal materiel to work with. Materiel is never either ideal, or satisfactory, or sufficient. We have to use "any old method of transportation which will get us to our destination."

It was not entirely clear what scale of operations would satisfy the President's demand for a second front. The first objective he set for 1942 was to gain control of the air "over the Netherlands, Belgium, and France." Assuming this attempt would have succeeded, he looked forward to landings "at one or many points" in greater or lesser force:

... (a) raids based on commando operations using a comparatively small number of troops and withdrawing them within a few hours, or not more than twenty-four hours; (b) super commando operations using a more larger [sic] number of troops—even up to 50,000 with the objective of damaging the enemy as well as possible and withdrawing this relatively large force within two days or a week; (c) establishment of a permanent front backed by a sufficient force to give reasonable certainty of adequate reinforcements and the avoidance of being pushed into the sea.

Although the President appeared to recognize that the means available might not be sufficient to justify an attempt to establish a "permanent front" on the Continent, his statement of the objective of operations in 1942 appeared to leave little room for choice. He put the case for an operation across the Atlantic in 1942 on the ground that it was then "the principal objective" to help the Soviet Union. "It must be constantly reiterated," he said, "that Russian armies are killing more Germans and destroying more Axis materiel than all the twenty-five united nations put together." The two essentials were to keep up shipments to the Soviet arctic ports and to open "a second front to compel the withdrawal of
German air forces and ground forces from the Russian front. In closing, the President reasserted his determination to launch operations in 1942, and not merely to plan and mount a contingent operation:

The necessities of the case call for action in 1942—not 1943. In a recent memorandum of the United Nations it was stated that there was agreement on a second front—provided the equipment and materiels were available. But they went on to say that it might have to be created any way, if Russia were to be seriously endangered even if the operation on the part of the British and the United States had to be called an operation of desperation.

If we decide that the only large scale offensive operation is to be in the European area, the element of speed becomes the first essential.

**Deadline in the Pacific**

The President’s review of strategy confirmed the War Department's interpretation of his declaration on the case of the Pacific theater versus BOLERO, specifically in defining the current approach to strategy in the Pacific (and in the other theaters that the War Department regarded as “secondary”) as the “continuous day to day maintenance of existing positions and existing strength.” This approach did not preclude, but in fact required, constant adjustments. The first major adjustment to be made in the Pacific was the diversion of the 37th Division (then awaiting shipment to New Zealand) to the Fiji Islands. Up to this time the United States had undertaken to send only a pursuit squadron to the Fijis. New Zealand, which remained responsible for the defense of the Fijis, still had only a small garrison there. It was obviously unsound for the United States to leave such a weak point between Samoa and New Caledonia. Early in May General Marshall therefore suggested to the JCS the diversion of the 37th Division from New Zealand to the Fijis, nearer “the area of probable operations.” It was a timely suggestion. There were enough American forces in the South Pacific (or en route) to give the New Zealand Government some confidence in the intention and ability of the United States to hold in that area. It was no longer very likely that the Army would increase its commitments to the area. Admiral King fell in with the proposal, and the New Zealand Government shortly ac-

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9 Memo, F. D. R. for SW, CofS, Arnold, SN, King, and Hopkins, 6 May 42, WDSCA 31 (SS), 1. The President used the argument that Soviet forces were destroying more enemy troops and materiel than all the other nations at war with Germany in his message of the same day to MacArthur (see p. 214, above). The President had already used it in his fireside chat of 28 April 1942. *(The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942 Volume* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 228.)

10 For preparation to ship the 37th Division to New Zealand, see: (1) memo, OPD for SOS, AGF, and TAG, 12 Apr 42, sub: Mvmt of 37th Div to SPOONER, and (2) memo, same for same, 14 Apr 42, same sub. Both in OPD 370.5 New Zealand, 7; and (3) OPD Ltr of Instns to Maj Gen Robert S. Beightler, Sr., 28 Apr 42, OPD 370.5 New Zealand, 8.

11 For the deployment of the 70th Pursuit Squadron to the Fijis, see: (1) memo, G-3 for CofS, 5 Jan 42, sub: Tr Mvmts for Week Ending Midnight Jan 3-4, 1942, WPD 4624-5; and (2) memo, Chief, Theater Gp, for ACoS OPD, 16 Jun 42, sub: Recommendations Made by Gen Richardson, Ref BIRCH, HOLLY, FANTAN, and POPPY, OPD 333 (Gen Richardson’s Trip), 15. (Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., was commander of the VII Corps.)

12 For reports on this point, see: (1) memo for rcd [9 Apr 42], OPD 381 Fiji, 5; (2) memo, G-3 Hawaiian Dept for CofS, 1 Apr 42, sub: Visit to Viti Levu, OPD 381 Fiji, 1 (this memo bore endorsement of Gen Emmons); and (3) msg, Col John L. McKee [Ft. Shafter] to Gen Eisenhower, 9 May 42, CM-IN 2357 (R).

13 Min, 13th mtg JCS, 4 May 42.
ceded. After a few days of hurried changes in orders, the main contingent of the 37th Division sailed from San Francisco in the latter part of May. It arrived safely at Viti Levu in the Fijis on 10 June 1942.

Besides making this change in plans for deploying ground forces in the South Pacific, the War Department was compelled in May to make emergency changes in plans for deploying air forces. The operations staff set out simply to accelerate scheduled deployment of air forces to the area. Eisenhower announced this policy on 8 May, two days after the President had closed the case of the Pacific theater versus Bolero.

He wrote to Arnold:

Since we have won our point in resisting unwarranted reinforcement by Air Forces of the Islands between Hawaii and Australia, it is my opinion that we should reach and maintain the amounts indicated . . . as quickly as possible.

But Admiral King soon had occasion to reopen the question whether War Depart-

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15 For WD action, see: (1) msg (originator OPD), Marshall [to CG SFPE] for Beightler, 13 May 42, CM-OUT 2644 (R); (2) ltr, ACofS OPD to Beightler, 16 May 42, sub: Jt A&N Plan for Relief of New Zealand in Fiji Islands, OPD 381 Fiji, 9; (3) msg, Marshall [to SFPE] for Beightler, 22 May 42, CM-OUT 3054 (5/24/42) (R); and (4) memo for rcd, 8 Jul 42, OPD 370.5 Fiji Islands, 9.
16 See msg, Beightler to Marshall, 10 Jun 42, CM-IN 3312 (6/11/42) (R), for the arrival of the Fantan force in the Fiji Islands.
17 Memo, Eisenhower for Arnold, 8 May 42, no sub, OPD 381, 62. Eisenhower inclosed copies of the recent correspondence between the President and Marshall.

Arnold replied, indicating his agreement, and giving the numbers of planes he expected to have sent by 1 July, together with additions to be sent as soon as possible thereafter, provided it would not seriously interfere with planned deployment in the Atlantic. (Memo, Arnold for Eisenhower, 14 May 42, no sub, OPD 381 PTO, 21.)

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18 For WD action, see: (1) msg (originator OPD), Marshall [to CG SFPE] for Beightler, 13 May 42, CM-OUT 2644 (R); (2) ltr, ACofS OPD to Beightler, 16 May 42, sub: Jt A&N Plan for Relief of New Zealand in Fiji Islands, OPD 381 Fiji, 9; (3) msg, Marshall [to SFPE] for Beightler, 22 May 42, CM-OUT 3054 (5/24/42) (R); and (4) memo for rcd, 8 Jul 42, OPD 370.5 Fiji Islands, 9.
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18 Min, 14th mtg JCS, 11 May 42.
in this background Admiral King proposed that the Army prepare to give a practical test of the AAF theory that the bombers in Australia and Hawaii should be relied on as a mobile force available for the defense of the South Pacific. He pointed out that so far as he could learn, "few if any bombers" could then operate from the South Pacific islands, for lack of "ground crews, ammunition, spare parts, and fuel." He proposed that the Army should supply these deficiencies in time to shift bombers to the South Pacific, if only on a "trial run," by 25 May.19

General Marshall at once heeded the very specific warning and agreed to the equally specific proposal of Admiral King. They worked out the plan with their two air chiefs—General Arnold and Admiral Towers—on the same afternoon. What they decided to do was to use in the South Pacific two squadrons of heavy bombers that were then in Hawaii and due to be flown to Australia. These were to be stationed on a temporary basis in the Fijis, New Caledonia, Tongatabu, and (possibly) Efate, and organized into provisional squadrons led by officers from Hawaii. Most of the service elements were to be furnished by troops already in Australia awaiting the arrival of the planes. The "whole procedure," Marshall explained to the operations staff, was "to be on the basis of a temporary measure until the Japanese have shown their hand."20

The effort to meet Admiral King’s deadline in the South Pacific was only just under way when further study indicated that the Japanese were going to attack, instead, in the Central and North Pacific. On 16 May the War Department learned from General Emmons, who had had the information from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet), that naval intelligence had identified the immediate Japanese objectives as Midway and Unalaska (Dutch Harbor).21 Naval authorities in Washington confirmed this information, and Admiral King advised Marshall that he had recommended strong naval concentrations near Hawaii and, to the north, in the Kodiak–Cold Bay region.

19 Ltr, COMINCH to CofS, 12 May 42, sub: Sit in S Pacific and SWPA as of End of May 42, Tab Navy, Book 5, Exec 8.

On 14 May Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, sent word of his complete agreement with the contention of Admiral King, and made a lucid statement of the Navy’s case on the assignment of bombers to the South Pacific. (Msg, CINCPAC to COMINCH, 14 May 42, copy filed with JCS 48 in ABC 381 Pacific Bases (1–22–42), 2.)


For staff action on the projected plane movements, see msg, Arnold to Emmons, 13 May 42, CM-OUT 2643 (the entire movement was to be completed by 25 May), and msg (originator AAF), Marshall to Emmons, 14 May 42, CM-OUT 2725 (R).

The War Department also planned to send an antiaircraft regiment from Hawaii to the Fijis about 20 May, the regiment in Hawaii to be replaced by one from the Western Defense Command (WDC), sailing from San Francisco about 23 May. The loss of these was, in turn, to be made up by a cross-country movement of units from the Eastern Defense Command (EDC). Two barrage balloon battalions were also alerted to start at once for the west coast. (See msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 12 May 42, CM-OUT 2490 (5/13/42) (R); memo for rcd [12 May 42], OPD 320.2 Fiji, 2; and memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 13 May 42, no sub, Item 67a, Exec 10.)

For a summary of the steps the Army was taking, see memo, CofS for King, 13 May 42, sub: Sit in S Pacific, Item 67a, Exec 10. For acknowledgment, see memo, King for Marshall, 17 May 42, no sub, OPD 381 PTO, 28.

21 Msg, Emmons to Marshall, 16 May 42, CM-IN 4577.
to counter the expected Japanese blows. At that point, the War Department redirected its attention to Hawaii and Alaska and, once again, to the west coast. By 20 May arrangements were complete for holding in Hawaii three bomber squadrons—two medium and one heavy—en route to the South Pacific. Upon the assurance of Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commander general of the Western Defense Command and of the Fourth Army, that it would be feasible to operate aircraft from the most exposed fields at Umnak and in the Cold Bay region, the War Department also ordered limited air reinforcements, including a few B-17's, to the Eleventh Air Force in Alaska.

By 21 May the Army and Navy had worked out plans for setting up a joint naval and air defense force in the North Pacific with Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald, Commander, U. S. Naval Task Force 8, exercising control of the joint force under the principle of unity of command, and Brig. Gen. William O. Butler, Eleventh Air Force leader, in command of air elements.

Despite the strong indications that the Japanese thrust would strike Midway and the Aleutians, General Marshall remained concerned over a possible threat of raids on the west coast, which Army intelligence, believing that the Japanese would feel obligated to retaliate for the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, still considered to be a “first priority.” Marshall himself went to the west coast to supervise dispositions, accompanied by Brig. Gen. James H. Doolittle and a member of the operations staff. The War Department, in addition to reorganizing west coast air defenses, arranged to make ground forces in training (and thus under the jurisdiction of Army Ground Forces), available to General DeWitt if he should need them.

The hurried activity to meet the expected Japanese attacks in the Central and North Pacific did not divert King from his effort to persuade Marshall to increase the allotment of Army bombers to the South Pacific. General Marshall, on his return from the west coast, found waiting for him a memorandum in which Admiral King once again urged the adoption of the Navy view on the long controverted question. This time

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22 (1) Memo, Handy for Marshall, 17 May 42, no sub, Tab Navy, Book 5, Exec 8. (2) Memo, CNO for CofS, 18 May 42, sub: Strengthening of Hawaiian and Alaska Defs, Item 67a, Exec 10. Admiral King requested the Army to strengthen Hawaiian defenses, particularly by retaining there forces destined for the South and Southwest Pacific. The Navy apparently had concluded soon after 12 May that the Japanese were likely to attack in the Central Pacific, and delay the offensive in the Southwest Pacific. See Admiral Nimitz' estimate of the situation (in msg cited n. 19).


24 (1) Msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 21 May 42, CM-OUT 4284. See draft of this message approved by Marshall and Arnold, Item 14, Exec 10. (2) For DeWitt's requests, see msg, DeWitt to Eisenhower, 21 May 42, CM-IN 5690.


King cast his views in the form of a memorandum for transmission from the JCS to the CCS. Once again he called attention to the fact that the “superiority of Japanese Forces, plus freedom to act on interior lines,” gave them the initiative. The Navy had lately been able to hold its own since it had “timely information” of Japanese fleet movements (gleaned from Japanese messages intercepted and decoded). But King warned:

Even if this availability of timely information continues, the continued successful opposition of powerful Japanese offensives appear improbable with the means now in hand. If the timely information should become unavailable in the future and the present disparity in forces is allowed to continue, disaster in the PACIFIC AREA is probable.

Admiral King proposed a concentration of air and sea power in the zone Fiji-Australia by 1 July, the Army’s part in which would be to increase air strength in the area “as rapidly as possible, giving this objective first priority (even over BOLERO).” He proposed, specifically, that by this date the Army should reach the strength recommended through April and May by the Navy planners—a total of 175 heavy bombers, 280 medium bombers, 26 light bombers, and 795 pursuit planes.30

The warning that the Japanese might stop using the broken code was a very high card, but General Marshall continued to act on the basis that the requirements of BOLERO were trumps. He replied that he was “prepared to support” Admiral King’s proposal to concentrate naval surface vessels in the South and Southwest Pacific by 1 July, but that he was “not in complete accord” on the proposed concentration of air power, so far as it pertained to Army aircraft. He resummarized what the Army was doing to meet the more immediate crisis in the Central Pacific and concluded that to do more was then out of the question: “No more heavy bombers can be sent out of the United States at this time without causing a very serious check or stoppage in the development of heavy bomber squadrons for BOLERO or anywhere else.”30 Thus, in spite of General Marshall’s appealing the question to the President three weeks before, and in spite of his readiness to co-operate in meeting a specific threat of imminent attack, the disagreement on Pacific strategy remained unresolved at the end of May.

The Role of the United States in the Middle East

During May the scale of American commitments to the Middle East remained uncertain, but there did not remain much doubt that the Army would finally have to contribute substantially to the defense of that area. The President, in his review of strategy on 6 May, did not anticipate any early change in the status quo in the “Near East and East Africa Theatre,” except the provision of service troops to handle the growing lend-lease traffic:

The responsibility in this theatre is British with the exception that the United States must furnish all possible materiel to the British in Libya, Palestine, Syria and must especially bolster up unloading and assembly operations in Egypt and in the Persian Gulf and in pushing transportation from the Persian Gulf to Russia.31

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30 Draft memo [JCS for CCS], sub: Sit in Pacific, incl with memo, COMINCH and CNO for CofS, 24 May 42, same sub, Item 67a, Exec 10.
But in the latter part of the month he was compelled to act on the deadlocked question of plane allocations for the British. On 19 May he finally sent General Arnold and Admiral Towers to London to negotiate directly with Air Marshal Portal, on the basis of a compromise whereby American units would have a prior claim on American planes, but would be committed to action as soon as possible. He described the situation to the Prime Minister in the following words:

Today it is evident that under current arrangements the U. S. is going to have increasing trained air personnel in excess of combat planes in sight for them to use. We are therefore anxious that every appropriate American-made aircraft be manned and fought by our own crews. Existing schedules of aircraft allocations do not permit us to do this.

He then announced his view on the policy to be adopted:

I think the maximum number of planes possible should be maintained in combat and the minimum number consistent with security be held in reserve and in operational training units, and that American pilots and crews be assigned to man American-made planes far more greatly than at present on the combat fronts.

On the basis of this principle, the British reintroduced the project that the JCS had earlier brought up, then abandoned, of setting up an American air force in the Middle East. At the end of May General Arnold and Admiral Towers finally accepted this project as one of the elements in a compromise on plane allocations, in spite of the fact that it was a major diversion from BOLERO. They brought the compromise back to Washington early in June for review and ratification by the CCS.  

The Question of Support for General Stilwell

During May, as the deadline in the Pacific drew near and while the negotiations on British plane allocations approached agreement, the problem of supporting China became increasingly critical. The Chinese plea for a voice in the determination of strategy and the allocation of munitions, made in April after the diversion of the Tenth Air Force, was still unanswered. The Japanese had driven the British and Chinese forces out of north Burma and were threatening to launch a general offensive with the apparent objective of capturing air bases in southeastern China. Toward the end of May the chief of the recently arrived Chinese Military Mission to the United States, Lt. Gen. Hsiung Shih-fei, presented two messages from Chiang Kai-shek dealing with the existing military situation, concluding with the warning: "... if Chinese do not see any help from their Allies, Chinese confidence in their Allies will be completely shaken. This may presage total collapse of Chinese resistance. Never has the situation looked more critical than today."  

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32 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 19 May 42, No. 147, with CCS 61/1 in ABC 452.1 (1–22–42), 1.

For a later, unsuccessful attempt to apply the principle to the USSR, see below, Ch. XV.

33 (1) See Craven and Cate, AAF J, p. 567. (2) For action on this compromise, see below, pp. 245, 248–49.

34 It was finally rejected on 13 June 1942. See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. V.

35 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Stilwell, 24 May 42, CM-OUT 5022. The messages from Chiang Kai-shek were relayed to Stilwell for his information.
In sharp contrast, Brig. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell, who had been representing General Stilwell in Chungking during the campaign in northern Burma, had recommended only a few days before that the United States should bring pressure to bear on China to use available troops to eject the Japanese from parts of southeastern China. The War Department had not acted on this recommendation for, as General Marshall had pointed out, the United States was in no position to urge the Chinese to act when the United States was doing so little to support China. On receiving Chiang Kai-shek's warning, the War Department operations staff recommended that General Stilwell should be left alone to deal with the situation as best he could and that in order to improve his position the Tenth Air Force should be returned to him. This recommendation General Marshall approved.36

General Stilwell, who had emerged on 20 May at Imphal at the end of the long retreat through northern Burma, was far from satisfied with this concession. In reporting his plans for the deployment of the Tenth Air Force in direct support of China, he at last made the almost inevitable recommendation that American ground combat forces—one or more divisions—should be sent at once to the Far East:

My belief in decisive strategic importance of China is so strong that I feel certain a serious mistake is being made in not sending American Combat Units into this Theater to regain Burma, clear Thailand, and then from China force entry into the triangle Hanoi Hainan Canton from which control can be disputed of Major Enemy Air Lanes from Japan and Manchuria and enemy sea lanes in the South China Sea.37

The movement of an American division to southeastern Asia was the one step that would really bind the United States to the development of that area as a major theater of war, for then—and then only—the successful prosecution of operations in the theater would become an essential condition of American national policy. Even if the move were not followed by the commitment of additional American ground forces, it would be followed by the development of large service and air commands in the theater and by whatever other concessions might be necessary to secure the effective collaboration of British and Chinese ground forces. For this very reason the recommendation was, of course, entirely out of keeping with the plans that had emerged for the concentration of forces in the British Isles.

Interestingly enough, the War Department's reply to General Stilwell did not allude to the strategic plans that had been developing in Washington and London since his departure in February for the Far East. The War Department responded gravely, much as it responded to proposals from General MacArthur dealing with questions of grand strategy, that his analysis was "fully appreciated" in Washington, but that to ship one or more American divisions to the theater would "involve an undertaking which we are simply not in a position to make." The War Department made, instead, the counterproposal that American lend-lease matériel in India, which could not then be used by the Chinese, should be offered to the British, in return for their agreement to launch an offensive in Burma.

36 (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 24 May 42, sub: Sit in China Theater, OPD 381 CTO, 41. (2) Stilwell was notified by msg, Marshall to Stilwell, 24 May 42, CM-OUT 5022 (R).

with the objective of reopening the Burma Road. The decision, of course, was up to Chiang Kai-shek, and, added the War Department, it would be “important that Chinese hopes for reopening of the road should not be prematurely raised.” This message, like messages to General MacArthur in similar circumstances, was first submitted to the President and met with his approval. The President’s approval made it reasonably certain that the support of China would remain subordinate to the development of current British and American plans.38

**The Second Soviet Protocol and the Second Front**

Of all those problems raised or aggravated by the development of the BOLERO plan, there was one on which the President had yet to declare himself—that of the relation between the Soviet lend-lease program and the BOLERO plan. On 7 May the White House circulated a draft of a second protocol, containing schedules to be proposed by the American and British Governments to the Soviet Government for the fiscal year July 1942–June 1943.39 The schedule satisfied the President’s directive that shipments should either be maintained or increased during that period. Under the Second Protocol, the United States would offer about 7,000,000 and Great Britain about 1,000,000 short tons of munitions and other finished goods, machinery, raw materials, and food, of which Soviet representatives would select for shipment about 5,000,000 short tons. Except for 500,000–600,000 tons included for movement in Soviet bottoms across the North Pacific (subject to negotiations between the Soviet and Japanese Governments), the United States and Great Britain would be prepared to export these goods in their own ships—an estimated 3,300,000 tons in convoys around the North Cape to Murmansk and Archangel, an estimated 1,100,000 tons by way of the Persian Gulf. Allowance being made for a 10 percent loss en route, about 3,000,000 tons was expected to arrive at the Soviet arctic ports, and about 1,000,000 tons at the Persian Gulf ports. These amounts corresponded to the estimated capacity of these ports and of the overland transportation systems serving them.40

Most of the military supplies and equipment itemized in the draft protocol were expected to become available as fast as they could be shipped. These included tanks and vehicles, which accounted for by far the greater part of the tonnage of military items.41 But there was reason to doubt

38 (1) Memo, OPD for CoFS, 26 May 42, sub: Keeping China in the War. (2) Memo, CoFS for President, 28 May 42, same sub. Both in OPD 381 CTO, 44. (3) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Stilwell, 28 May 42, CM-OUT 5991.

39 (1) For an account of the Russia aid program, including the formulation of the Second Protocol, see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare. (2) The protocols are published in U. S. Dept. of State, Soviet Supply Protocols, cited p. 57n.

40 (1) Memo, Mun Asgmts Bd (MBW) [Gen Burns] for JCS, 12 May 42, sub: Summarized Rpt on Status of Proposed Second Soviet Protocol, with JPS 28/D in ABC 400.5295 Russia (19 Apr 42), 1. (2) Memo, MBW for JCS, 12 May 42, sub: Status of Proposed Second Soviet Protocol. This memorandum, which analyzes the program more in detail, is an enclosure with the memorandum cited immediately above. (3) Draft of Jt statement, appended to draft protocol, incl with above cited papers.

41 The total tonnage of military items to be offered under the terms of the draft protocol was 1,110,000 short tons, valued at $2,000,000,000. Over 90 percent of this tonnage was accounted for by tanks and vehicles; trucks accounted for over half the tonnage. (See Second (Washington) Protocol, Sched of U.S. Stores, incl with memo cited n. 40(1).)
whether the United States, as assumed in the draft protocol, could keep up the rate of shipments reached in March and April under the President's drastic directive of mid-March. The weight of the German U-boat campaign in the western Atlantic began to be severely felt during these early months of 1942, and from March through May one fourth of all the ships the United States sent to Russia around the North Cape were lost.\(^{42}\) The Combined Military Transportation Committee (CMTC) estimated that shipping losses in excess of replacements would leave the United States and Great Britain till the end of 1943 with tonnage far less than their anticipated needs.\(^ {43}\)

On 1 May, before the draft protocol was circulated, Admiral King had proposed that the joint planners should prepare a report on the feasibility of meeting the President's directive. He pointed to the shortage of ships, the heavy cost of running convoys to Murmansk and Archangel—upon which the program still so largely depended—and "the requirements incident to the manning of a front in continental Europe as to munitions of all kinds and as to shipping for transporting them." It seemed to him that the last consideration in particular should be "a compelling argument toward a Russian agreement with reduction of their current munitions protocol."\(^ {44}\) A subcommittee met on 19 May to consider the question, and found good reason to doubt the feasibility of the program outlined by the Munitions Assignments Board.\(^ {45}\)

The Munitions Assignments Board gave the assurance "that all requirements incident to manning a European front plus the other needs of the United States Army and Navy had been considered prior to arriving at the figures shown."\(^ {46}\) Although the figures themselves did not entirely bear out that assurance, the draft protocol did contain reservations that partly answered War Department objections. It contained a general reservation which read:

It is understood that any program of this sort must be tentative in character and must be subject to unforeseen changes which the progress of the war may require from the standpoint of stores as well as from the standpoint of shipping.\(^ {47}\)

This qualification was much more sweeping than the one included in the First (Moscow) Protocol in October 1941, which had provided for consultation and readjustments in the event that the "burden of defense"

\(^2\) Stettinius, Lend-Lease, p. 207. \(^2\) Cf. Churchill, Hinge of Fate, Ch. 15, and Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, Chs. VI and VII.

\(^3\) The CMTC had found that there would be a shortage of cargo tonnage from June 1942 through December 1943 which would always be greater than 3,500,000 dead-weight tons, and would rise to a high of 4,400,000 in December 1942 and January 1943. These calculations were based on estimates of construction, losses, and United States and British requirements. The committee's findings, announced in CMT 5/3 of 4 May 1942, were later summarized and discussed in JPS 28/1.
should be “transferred to other theatres of war.” 48 Besides the general reservation, the draft protocol included a reservation applying only to planes. They were to be made available at the same rate as before, but only “for the first few months of the next protocol period.” During that time the United States and Great Britain would be studying their resources and requirements “in the light of new plans which are under consideration,” and, when the study was completed, would make commitments “for the balance of the year.” 49

General Marshall suggested changes in both these reservations. He proposed to the JCS that the general reservation should be simplified to read: “You will of course realize that any program of this sort must be subject to changes due to unforeseen developments in the progress of the war.” He proposed to modify the reservation with regard to planes by providing that deliveries under the Second Protocol would not begin till 15 August—by which date deliveries under the First Protocol should have been completed—and that the United States would then undertake to furnish each month 12 medium bombers and at least 50 fighter planes and 50 light bombers, the numbers to be greater—up to 100 fighter planes and 100 light bombers, as before—“provided the rate of attrition suffered in the British-American air offensive over the European continent permits.” 50

The revisions suggested by Marshall, having been approved by the JCS, went to the President.51

The question of the relation between the Second Protocol and the “second front” came to a head at the end of May, during conversations between President Roosevelt and Foreign Commissar Molotov. 52 Molotov came to Washington from London, where he had found the British Government prepared to meet the British schedules in the Second Protocol and noncommittal about opening a second front.53 In Washington he found quite a different view. The President declared that the American Government “hoped” and “expected” to open a second front in 1942, and presented as the “suggestion” of General Marshall and Admiral King the proposal that the Soviet Government, in order to help, should accept a reduction in tonnage during the period of the Second Protocol, from 4,100,000 to 2,500,000 tons, by cutting shipments of general supplies, not munitions.

The President’s assurance did not divert Mr. Molotov from trying to increase the scale of lend-lease commitments. He asked specifically for a monthly American convoy to Archangel and for deliveries, via the Persian Gulf and Iran, of 50 B-25’s, 150 Boston bombers (A-20’s), and 3,000 trucks monthly. The President would not promise to send convoys to Archangel or to increase

49 Second Protocol, Sched of U.S. Stores, Group I (Armament and Mil Equip), Item 1 (Airplanes), with JPS 28/D in ABC 400.3295 Russia (19 Apr 42), 1.
50 Min, 15th mtg JCS, 18 May 42.
51 (1) Ibid. (2) Notes on War Council, 18 May 42, SW Conf, Vol II, WDCSA. In this meeting of the War Council, Marshall’s recommended qualification on commitments of planes was interpreted as follows: “. . . the Russian contract to be filled up to August, thereafter the Russians to receive 50 pursuit planes, 50 light bombers and 12 medium bombers.”
52 The conversations lasted from 29 May through 1 June 1942.
53 The rest of this chapter is based mainly on an account of these negotiations in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 556-78.
54 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 326 ff.
allocations of critical items for the Persian Gulf route over the current commitments, which had been renewed in the draft protocol. Mr. Hopkins authorized his military executive, General Burns, to confirm those commitments—12 B–25's, 100 A–20's (through October), and 3,000 trucks a month—and to announce the President's views on convoys. Burns' oral statement on these points was the only tangible result of the negotiations on the Second Protocol.44

The President's policy went a long way to meet Admiral King's objections to the large shipping commitments contained in the draft protocol. It did not meet Marshall's requests for reduction in plane allocations, and, what was a great deal more serious from the point of view of the War Department, it contained a strong commitment to open a "second front" in 1942. The President went so far as to issue a communiqué drafted by Molotov that included the statement: "In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942." General Marshall objected that the statement was "too strong." It was indeed too strong to apply to the negotiations just concluded. It was also much too strong to bode well for the BOLERO plan—with its emphasis on 1943—in coming negotiations with the British.

44 The Second Protocol was finally signed in Washington, 6 October 1942. It had meanwhile served as a basis for the Soviet lend-lease program. (See State Dept rpt on War Aid Furnished by U. S. to USSR, p. 3, cited [205n] above.)
CHAPTER XI

Future Plans and Current Operations

June 1942

During the course of his conversations with Molotov at the end of May the President explained, first to General Marshall and Admiral King and then to the Prime Minister, that his purpose in declaring his hope and expectation of opening a second front in 1942 was to reassure the Soviet Government. The declaration did indeed contain an implied assurance of American independence in dealing with the Soviet Union, since it was quite different from the noncommittal declaration that the British Government independently had made to Molotov in London. The British had stated:

We are making preparations for a landing on the Continent in August or September 1942. . . . Clearly, however, it would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if, for the sake of action at any price, we embarked on some operation which ended in disaster and gave the enemy an opportunity for glorification at our discomfiture. It is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such as to make this operation feasible when the time comes.

We can therefore give no promise in the matter . . . .

The more encouraging words of the President, however they might be read as a clue to his intentions, did not cancel the words of the British Government, which had the more force since planning for the operation was centered in London and since British troops would bear the brunt of the operation for some time. Molotov was openly skeptical and asked what answers he should “take back to London and Moscow on the general question that has been raised?” The President could only answer that he was looking forward to an agreement with the British, and that . . . Mr. Molotov could say in London that, after all, the British were even now in personal consultation with our staff-officers on questions of landing craft, food, etc. We expected to establish a second front. General Arnold would arrive next day (Tuesday,

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\footnote{1 Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 568-70. See Hopkins’ notes of a meeting of 30 May and his copy of a cablegram he redrafted and sent to the Prime Minister that day.}

\footnote{2 Quoted in memo, Br CsofS for War Cabinet, 2 Jul 42, sub: Future Opns, WP (42) 278 (also COS (42) 195 (O)), Tab 19, ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-B.}

In late May or early June a copy of the British aide-mémoire had been given to Hopkins. The text of it is in Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 577, and Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, p. 342.
June 2d) from London, and with him Lord Mountbatten, Marshal Portal, and General Little, with whom it was planned to arrive at an agreement on the creation of a second front.  

The President's notion of a cross-Channel operation in 1942 was very much like that he had given his military chiefs earlier—a great air offensive over northwestern Europe that should be accompanied by landings on a scale appropriate to the circumstances. He explained his idea to the Prime Minister:

After discussion with the Staffs, I believe that the German air forces cannot be destroyed unless they have been forced to take the air by preliminary or temporary actions by ground forces. If we can start this phase early in August we can produce one of the following results:

1. Divert German air forces from the Russian front and attempt to destroy them.

2. If such air forces are not moved to the west, we can increase our operations with ground forces and determine on the establishment of permanent positions as our objective.  

The President's plan rested on the assumptions that the RAF, with American reinforcements, would be so powerful and control of the air so decisive that Germany would have to divert air forces from the Eastern Front in order to prevent Allied forces from establishing a beachhead or to dislodge them once they had established one. But even on these assumptions the chance of a strategic success was directly in proportion to the risk of tactical failure—the stronger the German reaction, the more probable the result that Allied troops would once again have to be evacuated in the face of superior German forces, as earlier from Norway, Dunkerque, and Greece.

The Revival of Gymnast

Whether or not the President was prepared to run such a risk, it was becoming quite plain that the British Government was not on this occasion prepared to do so. The British Government, in the statement delivered to Molotov, had already declared itself opposed to undertaking "for the sake of action at any price" an operation "which ended in disaster and gave the enemy an opportunity for glorification at our discomfiture." The opposition of the British Government was reinforced, if not produced, by the hope and expectation of diverting the President's interest in a second front from a cross-Channel operation to some other operation more in conformity with British strategy.

The visit of Lord Louis Mountbatten to Washington (to which the President alluded in his final conversation with Molotov) was the opening of the British campaign to achieve this objective. On 28 May, while Molotov was on his way to Washington, the Prime Minister had sent ahead a report of the talks in London. The gist of the report was that the British Government had given no commitment to undertake an operation, but had simply discussed the current state of plans and preparations, though holding out the possibility of more definite statements after the talks in Washington were over. In the same report the Prime Minister had also notified the President that he would soon send

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4 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 31 May 42, quoted in Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 569.

General Marshall had expressed the same idea at the morning conference with Molotov on 30 May. (Op. cit., p. 564.) Compare with the President's statement of 6 May to Hopkins, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and the JCS, quoted above, pp. 221–22.
Mountbatten to talk over difficulties that had arisen in planning for cross-Channel operations and also to present the idea of an operation in northern Norway (JUPITER). To gain a foothold in northern Norway would serve the valuable purpose of securing the northern route for sending supplies to the Soviet Union. It went without saying that it would also serve to redeem the British failure in Norway, which had been the occasion of Churchill's rise to power in 1940. Besides this operation, Churchill also alluded to his earlier plea for an operation in North Africa—"We must never let GYMNST pass from our minds."  

Coming to Washington early in June, Mountbatten presented to the President and Hopkins the British case against trying to gain a foothold across the English Channel in 1942 (SLEDGEHAMMER). The principal point in the British case was that given the number of landing craft available, the operation must be so limited that Germany (which then had an estimated twenty-five divisions in France) would not have to withdraw ground forces from the Russian front to deal with it. The President suggested postponing the operation until later in the fall, so as to provide more landing craft, American troops, and matériel. The postponement would carry with it the disadvantage that there would be less time to seize a port. Mountbatten pointed out that, in order to support the expedition through the winter, it would be necessary to hold a port, perhaps Cherbourg, since it was out of the question to supply troops over the beaches in winter.

British misgivings about SLEDGEHAMMER inevitably raised the question of the feasibility of ROUNDUP, the operation projected for 1943. If it would not be sound to launch SLEDGEHAMMER even as a desperate reaction to the imminent collapse of Soviet resistance, then the possibility of such a collapse might serve as a basis to argue against, rather than for, BOLERO. The idea evidently occurred to the President, for he remarked (as quoted by Mountbatten) that he "did not wish to send a million soldiers to England and find, possibly, that a complete collapse of Russia had made a frontal attack on France impossible." He then expressed the closely related proposition that it might be wise to divert perhaps six American divisions (the number due to be sent to the British Isles in the summer and early fall) to the Middle East or to operations in French North Africa. He also owned that he had been much struck with the Prime Minister's admonition not to forget GYMNST.  

A few days after Mountbatten's conversation with the President, Marshall had his staff prepare for submission to the President a summary of the most recent studies of the Army planners on GYMNST. The earlier plans (for SUPER-GYMNST) has provided for the use of the American force in conjunction with a British force of about 90,000, including three divisions, and had contemplated landings at Algiers as well as near Casablanca. The June studies en-

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5 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 556. (2) See also Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 340, 348-53.

6 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 582-83. Sherwood quotes the account Mountbatten sent to the President summarizing the report he had made to the Prime Minister of the conversation. On 10 June Mountbatten gave an account of this conversation to the CCS. The conversation, he noted, had lasted five hours. The minutes contain only very general statements about it. (Min, 24th mtg CCS, 10 Jun 42.) On 19 June the British Chiefs of Staff summarized for the American Chiefs of Staff the points the President had made. (Min, 27th mtg CCS, 19 Jun 42.)
visaged the use of only American forces and an invasion to be supplied only through the Atlantic ports of French Morocco, principally Casablanca. The use of American troops was expected to conciliate French opinion and save shipping; the use of the Atlantic ports, to minimize losses of both shipping and the naval escort committed to support the operation. The June studies assumed full French co-operation, Spanish neutrality, and the availability of British shipping assigned to the Middle East run. They estimated the American force at 220,000, including six divisions and twenty-four squadrons of planes, as compared with the force of about 150,000, including four divisions and the Eighth Air Force, which the earlier American plans had allotted to SUPER-GYMNAST.

General Marshall advised against undertaking the operation. He mentioned the reasons why the operation itself was risky—that it would gain momentum slowly and would for some time hang on uncertain political decisions. He also drew attention to the danger of “thinning out” naval escort to meet new commitments. But these objections, however serious in themselves, were incidental to his main objection, which he expounded at length, that a North African operation would be an untimely, ineffectual departure from BOLERO.

Marshall and his staff had good reason to be concerned over the possibility of a reversion to GYMNAST. On 17 June the President took up the question with his military advisers, in anticipation of the arrival of the Prime Minister and his staff in the United States. Secretary Stimson, who shared the belief of Marshall and his staff, was no less concerned and he wrote a long memorandum of his own to the President—his “brief in defense of BOLERO.”

On 19 June, the day on which the Secretary submitted his views to the President, the Prime Minister and his staff arrived in the United States to take up the problems discussed by the President and Mountbatten against the background of the already critical situation in Libya. The Prime Minister went to Hyde Park to go over the ground with the President and Hopkins. The British Chiefs of Staff went directly to Washington to confer with the American Chiefs of Staff.

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7 Stf study, title: Occupation of NW Af by U. S. Forces, incl with memo, CofS for President, 16 Jun 42, sub: GYMNAST Opn. GYMNAST and SUPER-GYMNAST Development File, OPD Regd Docs. The study is based on a draft filed in Item 53, Exec 10.

The memorandum itself bears no indication of its having been sent to the President, but it is doubtful the paper that Marshall took with him to the White House on the following day, spoken of by Stimson in his diary. “Marshall had a paper already prepared against it [GYMNAST] for he had a premonition of what was coming.” (Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 419.) Another reference, undoubtedly to the same memorandum, indicates that it must have been prepared in a great hurry to be taken to the meeting at the White House. (See memo, OPD for CofS, 17 Jun 42, Book 5, Exec 8.)

For the plans (SUPER-GYMNAST), see Ch. VIII above.

8 Memo, CofS for President, cited n. 7.

9 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 419-23. The account contains a quotation, from the Secretary’s diary for 17 June, concerning the meeting of that day at the White House, and the full text of the Secretary’s memorandum to the President, dated 19 June, which had “the unanimous endorsement of General Marshall and his staff.”

10 See min, 27th mtg CCS, 19 Jun 42. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, “explained that the Prime Minister’s visit was the outcome of conversations with Admiral Mountbatten who had given an account of his talks with the President.” Brooke then listed the problems which, according to Mountbatten’s report, the President had been considering. The list corresponds with the account of Mountbatten’s conversation with the President, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 582–83.
The staff conversations in Washington began on a note of agreement—agreement to wait and see before making new plans. The British and American chiefs alike had under them field and fleet commanders whom they could not provide for ahead with adequate means to react to enemy moves, whether strong or weak. Over them were their respective heads of government, inclined to minimize the dangers of leaving field and fleet operations so dependent on decisions in the capitals and the arrival of reinforcements sent hurriedly and belatedly from home. As professional officers, the Chiefs of Staff were uncomfortably aware how quickly military situations could change and how important it was to have uncommitted reserves in the field and at home. In this respect they were more cautious than the President and the Prime Minister.

Of the many contingencies for which allowance had to be made, the greatest was then, as before, a decisive turn in the German offensive in Russia. The key to the War Department’s entire theory of operations in 1942 was the contention that Great Britain and the United States must be prepared to react to a rapid change in the situation on the Eastern front. The forces committed to SLEDGEHAMMER constituted in effect a strategic reserve for that purpose. The need for such a reserve was borne out by the latest British intelligence estimate, transmitted from London the week before, on the “possible course of [the] Russian Campaign and its implications.” This estimate included the statement:

Margin between success or failure very narrow and it may be touch and go, which adversary collapses first. If Germans realise they cannot avoid further winter campaign in Russia and faced with threat of Anglo-American invasion in the West, collapse may, as in 1918, ensue with startling rapidity.\footnote{Msg, JIC, London, to JIC, Washington, 9 Jun 42, WDCSA Russia (S). This message (FEUDAL 26) was a summary of a British JIC paper, JIC (42) 200.}

General Eisenhower welcomed the British estimate, which brought into relief the very point on which rested the case for a rapid concentration of forces in the British Isles—the strong possibility of a quick shift in the situation on the Eastern Front. Eisenhower commented: “Time for us to do something—whatever we can!” He suggested to Col. John R. Deane that General Marshall should consider sending the estimate to the President, for the sake of the statement it contained of the favorable and unfavorable factors in the campaign—Soviet morale, numbers, and production as against the superior German position, armor, and command, even though the estimate itself was perhaps “too rosy,” as the British Chiefs of Staffs had been inclined to believe.\footnote{Marginal note in pencil on copy of JIC msg cited n. 11 and atchd note signed DE.}

The British Chiefs of Staff, in view of the uncertainty of the war on the Eastern Front, agreed with the American Chiefs that American and British plans should be left contingent on the issue of the summer’s operations. In the opening meeting in Washington, they declared that in the consideration of plans for the rest of 1942 “the crux of the matter was the degree of reliance we could place on the Russian front holding.” On this point they themselves suspended judgment, saying:

The position was hard to assess and, while General Anders \[Lt. Gen. Wladislaw L. Anders, Commander in Chief, Polish Army in the Middle East\] felt that if the Germans could exert on the Russian front this summer three-quarters of the effort they had achieved
in 1941 the Russians would crack, he doubted if the Germans could produce this degree of effort. No preparations for any large attack had been reported and the Russians' showing, both at Sevastopol and in the Kharkov area, was encouraging.

The British Chiefs gave little encouragement to hopes of launching operations in 1942, except for raids, across the English Channel. But they saw a good chance of establishing forces on the Continent in 1943 so long as the Red Army held its own. They held, moreover, that it would be wise in any event to go ahead with Bolero until September 1942. By that time they expected it to be possible to make a reliable estimate of the situation on the Eastern Front. If it should then seem likely that the Red Army would hold its own during the fall and winter, it would be sound to concentrate on preparations for an invasion in 1943. If not, American reinforcements that had by then been shipped to the British Isles would be needed for the defense of the British Isles. It would then be necessary to prepare for an alternative operation, perhaps in North Africa. But until then the Bolero plan "held good on either hypothesis" as to the outcome of events on the Eastern Front.  

The American representatives did not formally abandon the position Marshall had previously taken. Eisenhower's comment was of particular interest in view of his new assignment in London. He expressed a reluctance to discontinue plans for Sledgehammer, asserting that if the collapse of Soviet resistance seemed imminent, "there was a possibility at least of securing a bridgehead and holding it as Malta or Tobruk had been held," and that the attempt, if supported by the full power of air forces in the British Isles, would compel the Germans to withdraw air forces from the Eastern Front. King said he was "entirely opposed" to operations in North Africa in 1942. He was against opening a new front "with all the increase in overheads and escort and transportation problems involved therein." The situation in North Africa at the time "did not augur well" for an operation in 1942. Finally, the operation would require the withdrawal of naval forces from the Pacific, thus increasing the risks already taken there, "which had given him considerable anxiety."  

There was small chance of agreement with the British staff on the subject of Sledgehammer. But Sir Charles Little, representing the British Navy, said that he "felt sure" Sir Dudley Pound would agree with Admiral King in opposing Gymnast, since the naval situation in the Atlantic "was already difficult enough without taking on a large new commitment." Indeed, the British staff appeared ready to concur in the other objections raised against Gymnast—that it would cut reinforcements to the Middle East without compensating effects, would probably have little effect on the Eastern Front, and would slow down Bolero. The willingness of the British staff to agree that Gymnast was unsound and that Bolero should be continued, created broad ground for agreement with the American Chiefs of Staff. Marshall at once moved over to this ground:

GENERAL MARSHALL said that large scale operations on the Continent in 1943...
would clearly not be possible unless all efforts were concentrated now on their preparation. If we changed our plan now, and opened up another front, we should probably achieve nothing. If we went ahead, we should at least ensure the safety of the United Kingdom, whatever happened in Russia, and any change of plan could be made in about September when we knew what the situation on the Eastern front was going to be.

As a token of his willingness to come to agreement on this basis, he at once agreed that there was "no reason" why the United States should not send an armored division to the Middle East to help relieve the critical situation there.\footnote{Min cited n. 13(3).}

The main points of agreement the CCS set down in the form of a paper for submission to the President and the Prime Minister. Their report advised against any considerable operation in the Atlantic theater in 1942 unless it became necessary or "an exceptionally favorable opportunity presented itself." They advised further study of possible operations in Western Europe given such a contingency—against Brest, the Channel Islands, or northern Norway. As to the comparative merits of these operations, they concluded:

In our view each would be accompanied by certain hazards that would be justified only by reasons that were compelling in nature. Any of these plans, however, would be preferable to undertaking Gymnast, especially from the standpoint of dispersing base organization, lines of sea communication, and air strength.\footnote{CCS 83, 21 Jun 42, title: Offensive Opns in 1942 and 1943.}

The CCS did not present these conclusions formally to the President and the Prime Minister.\footnote{See note by Secretaries on cover sheet, CCS 83/1, 24 Jun 42.} For them to have done so would have been presumptuous and useless, for the conversations that had been going on meanwhile at Hyde Park had taken a very different turn from the staff talks in Washington. The Prime Minister opened with a dramatic appeal to the President's known desire for "action" in 1942. He declared that the British were making "arrangements" for a landing of six or eight divisions across the Channel in September, as they had agreed to do. But, he went on, "no responsible British military authority" had so far been able to make a plan for September 1942 "which had any chance of success unless the Germans become utterly demoralized of which there is no likelihood." He asked whether the American staffs had a plan:

If so, what is it? What forces would be employed? At what points would they strike? What landing craft and shipping are available? Who is the officer prepared to command the enterprise? What British forces and assistance are required?

If, he maintained, a plan could be found that offered "a reasonable prospect of success," he would be glad to agree to it:

... HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT will certainly welcome it and will share to the full with their American comrades the risks and sacrifices. This remains our settled and agreed policy.

But if a plan could not be found that offered a good chance of establishing a permanent lodging on the Continent, the British Government was opposed to undertaking the operation at all, on the grounds that it "would not help the Russians whatever their plight, would compromise and expose to NAZI vengeance the French population involved and would gravely delay the main operation in 1943." The
Prime Minister then put the argument for GYMNAST thus:

But in case no plan can be made in which any responsible authority has good confidence, and consequently no engagement on a substantial scale in France is possible in September 1942, what else are we going to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic Theatre during the whole of 1942? Ought we not to be preparing within the general structure of BOLERO some other operation by which we may gain positions of advantage and also directly or indirectly to take some of the weight off Russia? It is in this setting and on this background that the operation GYMNAST should be studied.20

The President responded as readily to the approach of the Prime Minister as the American staff in Washington had to the approach of the British Chiefs of Staff. On the next day Hopkins sent to Marshall and King, along with the Prime Minister's appeal, the instructions that they should prepare to discuss with the President the following possibilities:

On the assumption that the Russian Army will be hard pressed and retreating in July; that the German forces are in August (1) dangerously threatening Leningrad and Moscow and (2) have made a serious break through on the southern front threatening the Caucasus;

On the above assumptions, at what point or points can (a) American ground forces prior to September 15, 1942, plan and execute an attack on German forces or in German controlled areas which can compel the withdrawal of German forces from the Russian front; (b) British forces in the same area or in a different area aid in the same objective? 21

These questions of the President, like those of the Prime Minister, brought into sharp relief the one point on which the British and American staffs had disagreed—the grounds for trying to establish a bridgehead on the Continent in 1942. The War Department staff drafted studies on both sets of questions, in the form of memoranda, for submission to the President.22

To the Prime Minister's assertion that his staff, after detailed study, had advanced no plan acceptable to the British Government, the War Department staff proposed to reply, not by offering different operational plans, but by appealing to the original agreement, the very purpose of which was, so far as operations in 1942 were concerned, to get ready to do what could be done, in case something must be done. The War Department had not even made a detailed operational plan, it having been agreed in April that the detailed plans would be made in London. But the War Department was still ready to recommend an operation in the situation and for the purpose originally described by Marshall—to do what was possible to meet a sudden turn of events, for better or worse, on the Continent. Accord-

20 Memo, Prime Minister for President, 20 Jun 42, Book 5, Exec 8. The memorandum, although bearing the date 20 June, appears to have been given to the President the day before. See memorandum, cited n. 21(1), by which Hopkins, through Captain McCrea, forwarded it to Marshall and King.

The policy on SLEDGEHAMMER that the Prime Minister at this time expounded to the President had been formally adopted on 11 June. (See below, pp. 266–67.)


On 23 June Marshall sent a memorandum to the President based on the first of these drafts. Memo, CofS for President, 23 Jun 42, no sub, OPD 381 Gen, 62.
ing to current studies, the American forces that could be employed in such a contingency would be three (possibly four) infantry divisions, one armored division, one regiment of parachute troops, five heavy bomber groups, five fighter groups, and two transport groups. Marshall had proposed landing in the Pas-de-Calais area, but the staff was also willing to consider other possible operations that had not been thoroughly explored—against the Channel Islands or the Cotentin peninsula or (with sufficient support from carrier-borne planes) against Brittany or even farther south along the west coast of France. On landing craft, the staff adopted the figures given in a recently approved combined study. The craft available would have a capacity of about 20,000 men, about 1,000 heavy vehicles, and something over 300 light vehicles. But according to the War Department, several expedients might be used to land more men—to reduce the transport assigned to assault divisions and to use transport planes and makeshift with small craft not specifically adapted to the purpose. The War Department held that, by cutting into the transport requirements of the assault troops and using smaller and lighter vehicles, it might be possible to land the combat elements of two divisions, and proposed further investigation of the other expedients. The War Department was not disposed to make an issue of command, de-
claring only that the United States would name a qualified American officer or accept a qualified British officer. Finally, the staff repeated the estimate Marshall had originally presented—that the British could supply “at least 5 divisions and the bulk of its air force without undue hazard to the United Kingdom.”

The Army staff adduced three arguments in support of SLEDGEHAMMER. First, the staff pointed out that the original agreement explicitly envisaged a desperate operation against odds. Its aim would be to secure a bridgehead on the Continent, but like any operation against odds, it might of course “lead to disaster.” It would not be in accord with the original agreement nor would it be in accord with the demands of the situation predicated therein to make a strong likelihood of success a condition of launching the operation.

Second, the staff pointed out that the “power of the immense British Air Force in the U. K. alone, in support of operations within its effective range, would more than counter balance many shortages in other means.” The staff therefore asked:

If disaster is to be expected in an operation supported by the entire British Air Force based in the U.K. and a large increment from the United States Army Air Force, what chance can any other operation without such support have?

Third, the staff reasserted the closely related proposition that the preliminary air offensive against the Continent, together with large-scale raids across the Channel, were more likely than attacks at any other point “to directly or indirectly take some of the weight off Russia.” The German High Command could not afford to disregard even the threat to establish a front on the Continent. A “continuous air offensive” would “without a doubt bring on the major air battle over Western Europe.” This battle “in itself would probably be the greatest single aid we could possibly give to Russia.”

In conjunction with this last point the staff examined the Prime Minister’s question of “standing idle” in 1942 and his proposal to reconsider GYMNAST. The staff offered the proposition that to mount a continuous air offensive and launch large-scale raids against the Continent would not be to “stand idle.” The previously expressed views of the President indicated that he might find this argument acceptable. Finally, the staff came to GYMNAST itself:

The operation GYMNAST has been studied and restudied. Its advantages and disadvantages are well known. One of the greatest disadvantages is the fact that the operation, even though successful, may [not] and probably will not result in removing one German soldier, tank, or plane from the Russian front.

The staff dwelt on this last point in drafting a reply to the questions posed by the President and Hopkins. The staff pointed out that the War Department had considered the obvious alternative courses before ever proposing the concentration of American forces for a cross-Channel operation, and reasserted that only such an operation, carried out boldly and inventively by Brit-
ish and American forces together, could cause withdrawal of German forces from the Eastern Front before 15 September:

British and American forces can execute an attack prior to September 15, 1942, somewhere in the area between Holland inclusive and Spain inclusive, of sufficient power possibly to threaten German security and thus cause them to divert forces from the Russian Front. The success attained in such operations will be based on many factors, such as:

- Acceptance of sacrifice and danger in securing a lodgement and in conducting vigorous exploitation.
- Intelligent and wholehearted adaptation of expedients and improvisations throughout all phases of the operation.

The staff explicitly recognized that the Bolero plan entailed a change in British strategy:

Prior to the acceptance of the Bolero Plan, British deployments and operations apparently were undertaken primarily with a view to maintaining the integrity of the British Empire. The Bolero Plan insures coordination and cooperation within the United Nations and envisages the creation of conditions that will facilitate continuity of offensive effort to bring about the decisive defeat of the enemy.

The staff concluded:

a. If the Germans have a strangle hold upon the Russian Army they will not be diverted from their purpose by pin prick operations. The farther any such pin prick operation is removed from the Nazi citadel, the less will be its effect.

b. Modern war requires that successful employment of ground forces must be supported by over-whelming air power. The most effective air support can be accomplished by the operations contemplated in the Bolero Plan.

c. Accepting calculated risks and based on sound strategic considerations, the Modified Bolero Plan promises the best chance of diverting German forces from the Eastern Front in 1942.²⁵

On 21 June the Prime Minister and General Marshall presented their cases to the President at a long, heated meeting at the White House, also attended by Hopkins, General Sir Alan Brooke, and Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay.²⁶ After the meeting was over Ismay drafted for consideration by the American chiefs a new version of the CCS report on offensive operations for 1942–43, a version in keeping with the Prime Minister’s stated views on the subject. The new version began as follows:

1. Plans and preparations for operations on the continent of Europe in 1943 on as large a scale as possible are to be pushed forward with all speed and energy. It is, however, essential that the United States and Great Britain should be prepared to act offensively in 1942.

2. Operations in Western Europe in 1942 would, if successful, yield greater political and strategic gains than operations in any other theatre. Plans and preparations for the operations in this theatre are to be pressed forward with all possible speed, energy and ingenuity. The most resolute efforts must be made to overcome the obvious dangers and difficulties of the enterprise. If a sound and sensible plan can be contrived, we should not hesitate to give effect to it. If on the other hand detailed examination shows that despite all efforts, success is improbable, we must be ready with an alternative.²⁷

These conclusions nullified the agreement reached on 20 June by the CCS to discourage any new operation across the Atlantic in 1942. The effect on that agreement was

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²⁵ Draft memo cited n. 22(2).

²⁶ For accounts of this meeting, see: (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 423–24 (the account of the Secretary, who was not present, was based on reports from Hopkins and Marshall); and (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 591–92.

²⁷ Paper, incl with memo, Gen Smith for CofS, 21 Jun 42, Item 4, Exec 1. The memorandum begins: “Attached is a draft of General Ismay’s notes of today’s conference approved by General Brooke.”
still more evident in the next conclusion, proposing an alternative to SLEDGEHAMMER, which General Ismay formulated as follows:

3. Provided that political conditions are favorable, the best alternative in 1942 is Operation Gymnast. Accordingly the plans for this operation should be completed in all details as soon as possible. The forces to be employed in GYMNAS T would in the main be found from BOLERO units which had not yet left the United States. 28

This conclusion was quite different from the agreement of the CCS, who, having listed other operations besides SLEDGEHAMMER that might be launched from the British Isles, had concluded that, risky as they were, any of them "would be preferable to undertaking GYMNAS T." 29

The War Department staff at once seized upon the statement. Working from Marshall's notes of the meeting, the senior Army planner (General Handy) and the U. S. Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (General Smith) drafted a different version which they believed to be "more in line" with Marshall's ideas "as to the points on which we should agree." In their version, GYMNAS T was simply one alternative, along with operations on the Iberian Peninsula (which General Ismay had mentioned) or against northern Norway (a project known to be a favorite of the Prime Minister). 30 They realized that they themselves would "not be able to reconcile the two drafts with the British." 30 They left the task to Marshall, who succeeded in working out a compromise with the British, which was circulated on 24 June. In this, the final draft, Ismay's version of the controversial passage was modified to begin: "The possibilities of operation Gymnast will be explored carefully and conscientiously, and plans will be completed in all details as soon as possible." 31

American Commitments to the Middle East

The Prime Minister’s effort to reinstate GYMNAS T as an Allied plan coincided with the development of a very dangerous military situation in Libya. At the end of May the Afrika Korps had taken the offen-

28 CCS 83/1, 24 Jun 42. The original version by General Ismay was also modified to provide for study of operations both against the Iberian Peninsula and against northern Norway. (For later considerations of these alternatives, see below, Chs. XII and XIV.)

The Prime Minister, whose personal project it was, expected the invasion of Norway to be an affair mainly for British forces. But partly in response to his eagerness to invade Norway, the War Department organized a special regimental combat force of selected U. S. and Canadian volunteers, the First Special Service Force, under Lt. Col. Robert T. Frederick. The project (PLough) provided for training the force to operate in snow, using a special-purpose tracked vehicle in the development of which the Prime Minister had taken an active interest. The existence of this elite unit turned out to be something of an embarrassment. The Prime Minister did not readily give up the Norway venture, but it was not well regarded by his own staff; it was out of keeping with American views on operations against Germany; and its specific value to him became relatively less as operations in North Africa lessened his need for a great military success, and development of other routes to the Soviet Union reduced the importance of the protection of the northern route, the principal military purpose of JUPITER. (See below, Ch. XIV, p. 310.) The PLough Force was finally committed to the Kiska operation (15-19 August 1943) and was sent to Italy in November 1943 to participate in the Italian campaign. (See especially, Lt. Col. Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force (Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1947).)
sive. At first the British staff had been rather optimistic. But in the interval between Admiral Mountbatten’s visit of reconnaissance in Washington and the arrival of the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff, operations took a turn for the worse. Under heavy attack the British Eighth Army gave way along the line Ain el Gazala and, after a battle on 12 June in which it lost a great many tanks (estimated to have been 300), began retreating eastward. During the confusion of the retreat came the unexpected news of the fall of Tobruk (21 June), which had a strong effect in both Washington and London, for Tobruk had held during the previous German offensive (April 1941) and its loss gave Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel a good port through which to support his advance eastward.  

The Establishment of USAFIME

The opening success of the German campaign in the Libyan Desert virtually assured the ratification of some such agreement as the American and British air chiefs had worked out in London providing for an American air force in the Middle East, and made the establishment of an Army command in Cairo urgent. On 16 June the War Department issued directives to establish regional commands in Africa and the Middle East. The War Department set up two commands—U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME) under Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, with headquarters at Cairo, and U. S. Army Forces in Central Africa (USAFICA) under Brig. Gen. Shepard W. FitzGerald, with headquarters at Accra (British West Africa). USAFICA was set up to supervise the construction and defense of airfields across Africa, a mission of importance to, but distinct from, the defense of both India and the Middle East. The jurisdiction of USAFIME covered most U. S. Army installations within the territory formerly assigned to the North African and Iranian missions.

The establishment of USAFIME pointed to a new policy, the scope of which was as yet very uncertain. General Maxwell was at last promised service units (about 6,000 men), and Services of Supply proceeded to activate the required units (over and above the 1942 Troop Basis) for shipment beginning in October. But the new headquarters would acquire much broader responsibilities than those of a service command if American air units should arrive in Egypt. The choice of Maxwell was dictated by expediency and uncertainty, to maintain the continuity of American-British relations in Cairo, and the War Department made this quite clear with the first message that informed him of the establishment of the new command. He was to be

East Theater, (2) D/F, OPD for TAG, 13 Jun 42, sub: Comd in African Middle Eastern Theater (with this are filed a memo for rcd and an undated first draft), and (3) memo, Upston for Exec OPD, 19 Jun 42, same sub, all three in OPD 384 Africa, 7; and (4) 1700 Rpt, 11 Jun 42, OPD Current Gp Files, DRB AGO.

32 Churchill received the news of the fall of Tobruk at the White House while on his second visit to Washington. For his reaction to this heavy blow, see *Hinge of Fate*, p. 383.

33 For the negotiations in London, see above, Ch. X.

34 WD ltr, 16 Jun 42, sub: Comd in African Middle Eastern Theater, AG 320.2 (6-13-42) MS-E-M.

For preceding action, see: (1) memo, OPD for CofS [8 Jun 42], sub: Comd in African-Middle
the “initial” commander, but “in case an appreciable number of combat troops” were sent out later on, he would “probably” be replaced.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Air Reinforcements}

The defense of Egypt depended, first of all, on gaining time to re-equip, reorganize, and reinforce the Eighth Army. It was of decisive importance to slow down the arrival of German replacements and reserves of men, equipment, and supplies, and therefore of the greatest urgency to reinforce the British Middle East air force, in particular with bombers. The principal objectives were the North African ports (including the newly won port of Tobruk) at which Axis replacements and reserves arriving from Europe must be unloaded and assembled before beginning the trip eastward across Libya.

The first step taken by the United States to help in the emergency was to hold in Egypt a special group of B-24’s assigned to China, under Col. Harry A. Halverson.\textsuperscript{38} This group (HALPRO) had been ordered to stop en route to undertake one dangerous special mission, the bombing of oil fields and storage areas at Ploesti, Rumania.\textsuperscript{39} On 11-12 June, twelve or thirteen planes of the group had carried out this mission—the first U. S. air mission flown against any strategic target in Europe—with inconclusive results.\textsuperscript{40} At British request, seven others on 15 June flew a mission against Italian Fleet units in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{41} Colonel Halverson reported that if he were to fly one more mission he would not have enough planes left from the twenty-four originally assigned to him to proceed with his mission to the Far East.\textsuperscript{42} His group was nevertheless ordered to remain in Egypt until further notice to fly any mission in support of the British for which heavy bombers were suitable.\textsuperscript{43}

To reinforce the HALPRO group the President decided to borrow for use in the Mediterranean the bomber echelon of the Tenth Air Force in India. This small force, under General Brereton, had finally, late in May, been transferred from British command in OPD had objected to it, “due to other commitments.” (Memo, Col Nevins for Chief, S&P Group, 9 May 42, sub: Recommendation for Execution of War Plan BLACK and Bombing of Ploesti, OPD 381 Africa, 5.)

For the President’s personal interest in carrying out a raid over Ploesti, see ltr, Maj Chester Hammond to CofS, 28 Apr 42, sub: Info Relative to Certain Bombing Flights, WDCA 381 War Plans (S).

\textsuperscript{37} Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 15 Jun 42, CM-OUT 3813 (6/16/42) (R).

\textsuperscript{38} For HALPRO, see [Ch. VI] above.

\textsuperscript{39} See memo, AAF for CofS, 16 May 42, sub: Modified Plan for HALPRO, WDCA, HALPRO (SS), for a description of the project as of this time.

\textsuperscript{40} Four of the planes were forced down in Turkey, where the crews were interned. The others landed at various places in Syria and Iraq. (See OPD Daily Sums for 13-17 Jun 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.)

\textsuperscript{41} (1) Msg, Br CsofS to Dill [War Cabinet Offs to Jt Stf Miss, COS W 197], 8 Jun 42, Item 15, Exec 10. (2) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Halverson, 10 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2175. (3) OPD Daily Sum, 17-18 Jun 42, and work sheet of African-Middle East Sec with OPD Daily Sum, 18-19 Jun 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.

\textsuperscript{42} Msg, Halverson to Marshall, 17 Jun 42, CM-IN 5576 (R).

\textsuperscript{43} See msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 18 Jun 42, CM-OUT 4477 (R), sent in reply to msg cited n. 42.
mand to General Stilwell.\footnote{44} Stilwell had hardly had a chance to put it to use when the order arrived from Washington on 23 June to send Brereton to Cairo with his heavy bombers (twenty-four, ten of which were then in shape to go).\footnote{45} Brereton was to return his force to Stilwell's command when he had completed his mission of assisting the British in the Middle East. On his arrival in Cairo he took command of a new overseas headquarters, U. S. Army Air Forces in the Middle East.\footnote{46}

A third emergency measure taken in Washington during June, at the direction of the President, was to begin moving from the United States a squadron of light bombers (A–29's) assigned to the Tenth Air Force and to order it held at Khartoum in the Sudan. The President did not intend these planes to be committed in the Middle East except in case of extreme necessity, and then only at his direction.\footnote{47} The Chinese Government first learned of the decision only after it was made and at once expressed strong resentment, at first understanding that the United States was diverting these planes to the Middle East, as it had already diverted the HALPRO group and the 9th Bomber Squadron of the Tenth Air Force.\footnote{48} The President quickly explained his reasons and corrected the misunderstanding, and held to his decision.\footnote{49} It was not until the end of July, when the squadron was assembled at Khartoum, that he released it to proceed to China.\footnote{50} These actions did not undo the effect of the diversions of air units and planes. The diversions themselves, and the fact that they were made—as the earlier diversion of the Tenth Air Force in April had been made—without even consulting the Chinese Government, precipitated a new, still more violent outbreak of resentment in Chungking, and the issuance of an ultimatum—the "three

\footnote{44} The Chinese Government learned of the decision, as then understood by OPD, from Stilwell, who had received an information copy (CM-OUT 6083) of msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Brereton, 24 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6075 (R). For the Generalissimo's protest, see msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 26 Jun 42, CM-IN 8586 (R).

\footnote{45} See (1) Ch. VI, above, and (2) memo for rcd, sub: Activation of 23d Pursuit Gp, OPD 320.2 CTO, 31, for the history of the flight.

\footnote{46} Msg, Maxwell to Marshall, 29 Jun 42, CM-IN 9610 (R).

\footnote{47} See (1) Ch. VI, above, and (2) memo for rcd, sub: Activation of 23d Pursuit Gp, OPD 320.2 CTO, 31, for the history of the flight.
demands" of Chiang Kai-shek for American support—that became the starting point of a new set of negotiations with China.51

The United States had meanwhile undertaken a much more ambitious project to reinforce the Middle East air force, under the compromise that General Arnold had brought back from London early in the month.52 This compromise was still unratified, and far from clarified, when the British Chiefs arrived in Washington. The Army planner then sent the other members of the CPS a schedule listing eight groups for the Middle East, with a view to an early settlement. Arnold at the same time directed that three groups should be prepared for shipment early in July—a heavy bomber group, a medium bomber group, and, if possible, a pursuit group. But the details of the final settlement were still so uncertain that the operations staff thought it "inadvisable" to pass on the information to Maxwell in Cairo.53

On 21 June General Arnold, Admiral Towers, and Air Vice Marshal Slessor (representing Air Marshal Portal) signed an agreement covering the long controverted issues. Under the Arnold-Slessor-Towers (or Arnold-Portal-Towers) agreement the United States would send to the Middle East six (not eight) air groups—one group of heavy bombers, two of medium bombers, and three fighter groups.54

Even before concurring in the proposed agreement, Marshall and King went ahead to direct the movement of the three groups that Arnold had ordered prepared—a heavy bomber group, a medium bomber group, and a fighter group. The 57th Fighter Group (P-40's) was ordered to begin loading at once on the USS Ranger, loaned by the Navy to transport the planes and crews to Takoradi (Gold Coast), whence they would fly to Cairo. A group of B-24's (the 98th Bombardment Group, Heavy) already partly assembled in Florida and a group of B-25's (the 12th Bombardment Group, Medium) then in California were scheduled to fly to Cairo by the South Atlantic ferry route, the first squadrons to depart as soon as they were ready.55 Ground echelons and equipment were to leave early in July by the SS Pasteur.56 Finally, on 25 June, Marshall and King, having initiated action to move the three first groups to the Middle East, tentatively and informally concurred in the Arnold-Portal-Towers agreement, so as to settle the matter before the Prime Minister's return to London, which was urgent in view of the criticism awaiting him in Parliament on the conduct of the war in Libya. They concurred, "subject of course to such modifications as may be made necessary by unforeseen changes in the shipping

51 For a brief account of the "three demands," in connection with American planning later in the summer, see below, Ch. XIV. A full account is to be found in Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Chs. V and VII.
52 See above, Ch. X.
54 CCS 61/1, 22 Jun 42, title: Aircraft Sit of U. N. The schedules contained in Annex A of the agreements are given in Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 568–69.
situation or in aircraft production." A week later the CCS tentatively approved the agreement, subject to the same qualification.

**Ground Reinforcements**

The possibility of sending large American ground forces to the Middle East came up during the June conferences as one of the points the President had mentioned to Mountbatten on his visit to Washington. In the British summary of the President's remarks the point appeared as follows:

The possibility of economizing shipping by dispatching substantial U. S. forces to the Middle East rather than by reinforcing the Middle East by British forces from the United Kingdom.

The President's suggestion was pertinent to the immediate situation, since the British deployment program then provided for sending three divisions (one of them an armored division) to the Middle East by the early part of August, and the British Chiefs of Staff were considering the movement of two more divisions "if the situation deteriorated." The President's suggestion was also pertinent in that it offered an alternative to GYMNAST and SLEDGEHAMMER, and thus a way out of the impasse created by the disagreement of the Prime Minister and General Marshall.

On the basis of the initial rapprochement with the British Chiefs, General Marshall made a modest opening bid toward a settlement. At the second meeting with the British Chiefs (20 June), Marshall announced that he "had been examining the possibility of sending a U. S. armored division, desert trained, to the Middle East, and saw no reason why this should not be done. The division was available." Following the conference at the White House on 21 June, the Combined Military Transportation Committee was directed to consider the implications, for shipping, of moving the 2d Armored Division to the Middle East. The committee met on 23 June and drew up alternative schedules, variously affecting BOLERO. The War Department was at the same time considering what units would have to go with the 2d Armored Division if it were sent to the Middle East as part of a task force, under the command of Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.

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57 Memo, Col S for Dill, 25 Jun 42, no sub, OPD 452.1, 51. This action superseded the action that Colonel Wedemeyer was taking through the JPS and the British planners with the same end in view. (See informal memo, A. C. W. [Wedemeyer] for Handy, 25 Jun 42, OPD 452.1, 51.)

58 Min, 30th mtg CCS, 2 Jul 42.

For remarks on the qualification, which was extremely important, see: (1) memo, Lt Col Russell L. Vittrup for JPS, 25 Jun 42, sub: Aircraft Sit of U. N., with CCS 61/1 in ABC 452.1 (1-22-42), 1; and (2) min, 21st mtg JPS, 26 Jun 42.

59 See p. 235 above.

60 Min (rev), 27th mtg CCS, 19 Jun 42.

61 Ibid.
But the White House meeting of 21 June, which put the planners to work on the project, also showed that the Prime Minister was not to be diverted from his hope of invading French North Africa. As a result, the CCS did not act on Marshall's offer, though they did not entirely eliminate it from possible consideration. When the CCS met on the morning of 25 June to consider the findings of the committee on deployment to the Middle East, Marshall, though he did not withdraw his offer, made an additional proposal. The new proposal was one he could offer and the British Chiefs of Staff could accept by itself, noncommittally, while awaiting a determination of the question of operations in 1942, from which the disposition of the 2d Armored Division could not be dissociated. Marshall proposed that the Army send to Egypt 300 M4 tanks and 100 self-propelled 105-mm. guns and 150 men specially qualified to work with tanks and self-propelled artillery (as well as 4,000 Air Corps personnel, under the three-group deployment program for July). This movement would involve no direct conflict with BOLERO schedules. He also offered to make available, in the United Kingdom, instructors and equipment from the 1st Armored Division to train British troops in

to see the Chief of Staff before leaving. The decision had already been made not to send a task force.

Army planners concluded that it would take as much as five months from the time an American armored division was alerted until the time it actually reached the fighting front in the Middle East. This finding in itself raised serious doubts of the practicability of the project. (See Tab A to draft memo [OPD for CoS, probably written 22-23 Jun 42], sub: Movmt of One U. S. Armored Div to Middle East, Item 56, Exec 10, and ltr, Lt Col William H. Baumer, Jr., for Gen Ward, OCMH, 3 May 51, OCMH Files.)

* For discussion of the project in July and August, see below, Ch. XII.

the use of the American equipment sent to the Middle East. On the same day the President and the Prime Minister approved this proposal and the War Department went to work to carry it out.

**The Crisis in Egypt**

The American response to the crisis in the Middle East, prompt though it was, affected operations during the summer mainly as a factor in the plans of the British commands in London and Cairo and only incidentally as a factor in the balance of forces on the Egyptian front. During July the actual striking force at General Brereton's disposal in Egypt—the depleted HALPRO group, with the reinforcements from India—was strong enough only to send out a few planes at a time. These
flights continued the task already begun by the HALPRO group, attacking shipping and port installations to prevent supplies and reinforcements from reaching the Afrika Korps.

It was several weeks before the planes sent out from the United States could begin operating in Egypt. The USS Ranger, with the 57th Fighter Group, sailed on 1 July; the first echelons of the bomber groups left in mid-July, and at the same time the SS Pasteur sailed with the first troops and equipment. The first planes arrived in Egypt at the end of the month. Ground personnel and equipment began to arrive during the first part of August.

The ground force equipment took even longer to arrive. The guns and tanks were at first to be shipped in two seatrains but were loaded instead in three fast ships, which sailed early in July. One ship was sunk; its cargo of tanks and guns was replaced and loaded on another. The ships arrived in Egypt early in September.

These movements of American troops and equipment were begun in a state of extreme uncertainty over the outcome of the battle in the desert. In the last week of June, following the return of the Prime Minister and his party to England, the British Eighth Army continued to fall back until it finally established its main line of defense at El Alamein, only seventy-five miles west of Alexandria. On 29 June Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believed that it would be a matter of a week or less before the "final military decision" and warned that the "probability of a British catastrophe must now be counted upon." He therefore recommended that no more planes be sent to the Middle East and that all supplies at sea be stopped at Massaua (Eritrea) "until the military situation in Egypt becomes clarified."

On the following day Marshall asked his staff for an estimate of the situation to give to the President. General Strong was again pessimistic. The chief of operations, Brig. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, was somewhat less so. His more hopeful view was shared by General Smith who, as American secretary to the CCS, was most closely in touch with current British views. They talked over the situation by telephone while Handy was working on the estimate to be sent to the President, comparing notes as follows:

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70 OPD Daily Sums, 7-8, 16-17, 17-18 Jul 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.

In August the 33d Pursuit Group was also ordered to be moved to Cairo. (OPD Daily Sum, 18-19 Aug 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.) This order was soon countermanded, and the 79th Fighter Group substituted. (Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 21 Aug 42, CM-OUT 7149 (8/23/42) (R), and OPD 381 Africa, 26, and other cases in that file.) The needs of the North African campaign (TORCH) required the change. (For the discussions, see Ch. [XIV], below.)


72 (1) OPD Weekly Status Rpts, AG 061 (4 Sep 45). (2) OPD Daily Sum, vol for Aug 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.


74 (1) Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 29 Aug 42, WDCSA Middle East (S). (2) Paper, unsigned, 8 Sep 42, title: Sit in Middle East, OPD 381 Middle East, 30.

75 Memo, G-2 [Gen Strong] for CoFS, 29 Jun 42, sub: Stoppage of Reinforcement and Supplies for Egypt, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42), 1-B, 3.
Smith: I believe I’d cross off that statement on the bottom about there being a strong possibility of their being in Cairo in 96 hours. I’m inclined to doubt that. They have scrapped [sic] up over 300 tanks.

Handy: I said two weeks, he quoted me for that. He quoted George Strong for 96 hours. That statement we had in there Strong dictated. He asked me in his office and I told him 2 weeks because I don’t feel it’s gone at all.

Smith: These Johnnies up here feel there’s a darn good chance.

Handy: Rommel’s pretty well strung out. That depression [Qattara depression] must be a helluva place to do anything in. He’s got Tobruk now and that’s a good harbor they’ve never had before. Still another fellow had it before he did.

Smith: Apparently there’s not much left there. They got everything out of Matruh. Their idea is not to get pinned down anywhere and they’re wise there.

The President had indicated his own anxiety in his request for a report on the situation, in which he asked for a detailed estimate of what would happen and what might be done in case the Germans gained control of the Nile delta within the next ten days. Marshall’s reply restated the long-held opinion of the War Department that the loss of the Nile delta would lead to the loss of the whole Middle East. On the basis of the President’s assumption—which fell between the estimates of G-2 and of the operations staff—Marshall reported that Rommel, after doing his best to destroy the retreating British forces, would move to take Cyprus, thence into Syria, and finally across into Mesopotamia and down to the head of the Persian Gulf. The British Eighth Army (after blocking the Suez Canal, a point about which the President was particularly interested) would probably have to retreat southward along the Nile into the Sudan. To stop the Germans in Syria and assure the resistance of Turkey would require much larger reinforcements than could be sent in such a short time. Marshall advised against trying to hold the Middle East once Egypt was lost, saying that “a major effort in this region would bleed us white.” He believed there was nothing more to do at the moment but wait and see what General Auchinleck, who had taken command in Egypt, would do.

The great concern of the President and his advisers was reflected both in detailed inquiries as to the British plans and in extensive correspondence with the American commanders in Cairo on their own plans for evacuating American units and destroying American equipment left behind. But there was apparently no move on the part either of the War Department or of

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76 Tel conv, Handy with Smith, 30 Jun 42, Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8.


78 Memo, CofS for President, 30 Jun 42, no sub, OPD 381 Middle East, 14. For OPD draft corrected in ink by Handy, see Item 53, Exec 10.

79 For interest in British plans see, besides papers cited above, tel conv, Handy with Smith, 1 Jul 42, Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8, and papers filed with memo, OPD for CofS, 2 Jul 42, sub: Notes on Mtg in Off of Secy State, Book 6, Exec 8. The subject of the meeting was British policy with reference to the French Fleet units in Alexandria.

General Maxwell at once withdrew part of the mission personnel to Asmara, Eritrea. On preparations for withdrawal of U. S. forces and equipment, see: (1) msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Maxwell, 24 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6044 (R); (2) msg, Maxwell to Marshall, 3 Jul 42, CM-IN 1253 (7/4/42) (R); (3) msg (originator SGS), Marshall to Brereton and FitzGerald, 1 Jul 42, CM-OUT 0162; (4) memo, OPD for CofS, 4 Jul 42, sub: Sum of Sit in Middle East, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42), 1-B, 4; (5) notes on War Council, 6 Jul 42, SW Confs, Vol II, WDCSA; and (6) OPD Daily Sums, 2-3, 9-10 Jul 42, Current Gp File, DRB AGO.
the President to suspend the shipments scheduled for the Middle East. In fact, early in July the President, at the instance of the Prime Minister, asked Stalin to release to the British forty A-20’s at Basra, part of a month’s consignment (of 100 A-20’s) for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government readily acceded.\textsuperscript{80} Marshall acted with equal promptness in response to a request for ammunition. Early in July Sir John Dill reported that the Middle East Command was low on 37-mm. ammunition and would be dangerously short for a period of several days after the middle of the month, until the expected arrival of a large shipment. He asked Marshall to have the Air Transport Command (ATC) change its schedule of shipments to the Middle East so as to get 5,000 rounds of 37-mm. ammunition to Egypt in time to meet the shortage.\textsuperscript{81} Colonel Deane, Secretary of the General Staff, directed this change on behalf of Marshall.\textsuperscript{82} The ammunition arrived in time to help meet the shortage.\textsuperscript{83} The President did take very seriously one expression of American doubt and distrust—that of Col. Bonner F. Fellers, U. S. military attaché in Cairo. Fellers held a low opinion of British leadership and slight hopes of British prospects in the war in the desert, but his estimates, although they doubtless contributed to the cautious advice of the War Department G-2 (to whom he reported), had led him to recommend exactly the opposite course.\textsuperscript{84} During the spring Fellers repeatedly urged that the United States should intervene by recruiting, equipping, and taking command of an international corps in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{85} He had also recommended sending a large American

Shipt of 37-mm Am to Egypt. This memorandum listed steps taken, noting that 900 rounds had been lost in transit. Note and memos in WDCSA Middle East (S).

\textsuperscript{80} Sherwood, \textit{Roosevelt and Hopkins}, p. 599.

\textsuperscript{81} (1) Pers ltr, Dill to Marshall, 3 Jul 42, WDCSA Middle East (S).

\textsuperscript{82} (1) Memo, Deane for Dill, 9 Jul 42. This was to inform Dill that all the necessary orders had been given. (2) Note, Dill to Deane, 9 Jul 42, acknowledging Deane’s memo. (3) Memo, SOS [Brig Gen Lucius D. Clay] for SGS, 15 Jul 42, sub: Airplane

\textsuperscript{83} For Fellers' estimate of the situation in June, see, in particular, msg, Fellers to G-2, 17 Jun 42, CM-IN 6008 (6/19/42) (R), and paraphrased msg, Alexander C. Kirk to State Dept, 30 Jun 42, Tab Misc, Book 5, Exec 8.

\textsuperscript{84} For this proposal and War Department reaction, see: (1) memo for rcd, Handy, 1 Apr 42, and (2) paper, Hull, title: Comments Regarding U. S. Orgn of Alien Mil Forces in Middle East, filed with memo cited above, both in OPD 320.2 Middle East, 1; (3) msg, Fellers to G-2, 25 Apr 42, CM-IN 7165 (4/27/42) (R); (4) mtg of Gen Council, 4 May 42, OPD 334.8 Gen Council, 1; (5) memo, Hull for ACofS OPD, 11 May 42, sub: Formation of an Allied Legion in Middle East Theater, OPD 322.9 Foreign Legion, 1; and (6) msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Fellers, 15 May 42, CM-OUT 2983 (R).
bomber force to the Middle East.\textsuperscript{85} At the
end of May he had urged, in addition to
 equipping six divisions in the Middle East,
 transferring the Tenth Air Force from India
 and sending from the United States two
 armored and two infantry divisions and an
 air force of three hundred heavy bombers.
 After the fall of Tobruk he repeated his
 plea.\textsuperscript{86} But by then he had come to
dwell more on the immediate need for planes, and,
in particular, heavy bombers.\textsuperscript{87}

The recommendations made by Fellers
 may have influenced (and may even have
 been influenced by) the discussions carried
 on and the actions taken in Washington
during the June crisis, but neither the Presi-
dent nor the War Department adopted his
 extreme view of the need for uninvited, un-
limited American intervention. The pos-
sibility of sending several American divi-
sions to the Middle East, raised by the Presi-
dent early in the month, came up at the
 White House meeting on 21 June. Setting
down the War Department's reasons for
 opposing the move, Marshall declared that
 such a great change would result in "ser-
ious confusion of command" and would re-
quire the abandonment of BOLERO in favor
 of operations in the Mediterranean that,
 however ambitious, would still be "inde-
 cisive." In introducing these familiar
 arguments, he stated:

The matter of locating large American
ground forces in the Middle East was dis-
 cussed Sunday night. The desirability of
 the United States taking over control of opera-
tions in that area was mentioned. It is my
 opinion, and that of the Operations staff, that
 we should not undertake such a project.

Before submitting the paper (on 23 June)
Marshall added a postscript that testified to
the President's interest in Fellers' dis-
patches:

The attached was prepared for your con-
sideration before I had heard your comment
this afternoon regarding Fellers' last mes-
sage, 1156. I would make this comment.
Fellers is a very valuable observer but his
responsibilities are not those of a strategist
and his views are in opposition to mine and
those of the entire Operations Division.\textsuperscript{89}

This answer did not dispose of Colonel
Fellers' recommendations, which the Presi-
dent was to reconsider several weeks later.\textsuperscript{90}
But for the time Marshall carried his point,
with the support of Stimson.\textsuperscript{91}

On 2 July
the War Department formally restated and
confirmed the policy of a limited commit-
ment in the Middle East:

Since the Middle East is an area of British
strategic responsibility the U. S. Army forces
in that area are limited for the most part to
those engaged in delivery of military supplies
to friendly forces in the area, and to those
cooperating with British Middle East forces
by mutual agreement.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{85} See, for example, msg, Fellers to G-2, 24 Apr
42, CM-IN 6969 (4/25/42) (R). This message
came to the attention of the President.

\textsuperscript{86} (1) Msg, Fellers to G-2, 30 May 42, CM-IN
9024 (5/31/42) (R). (2) Msg, Fellers to G-2,
21 Jun 42, CM-IN 7184 (6/22/42) (R). He
recommended sending two armored divisions,

\textsuperscript{87} (1) Paraphrased msg cited n. 84.

\textsuperscript{88} (1) Msg, Fellers to G-2, cited n. 84. (2)
Msg, Fellers to G-2, 18 Jun 42, CM-IN 6311
(6/19/42) (R). (3) Msg, Fellers to G-2, 19 Jun
42, CM-IN 6491 (6/20/42) (R). (4) Msg, Fellers
to G-2, 21 Jun 42, CM-IN 7266 (6/22/42) (R).
(5) Paraphrased msg cited n. 84.

\textsuperscript{89} Memo, CofS for President, 23 Jun 42, sub:
Amer Forces in Middle East, WDCSA Middle East
(S). No. 1156 is msg cited n. 87(2).

\textsuperscript{90} See below, Ch. XIII.

\textsuperscript{91} On memo cited n. 89 appear the following
notes in pen: "Secretary of War/Please glance at
this/G. C. M." and "I approve/HLS."

\textsuperscript{92} Ltr, SW to Secy State, 2 Jul 42, drafted by Col
Upston and forwarded via CofS for signature of
SW, by memo, OPD for CofS, 1 Jul 42, sub: Desig-
nation of CG USAFIME, OPD 584 Middle East, 3.
The War Department followed this cautious policy in handling the problem of command of Army forces in Egypt, leaving General Maxwell in control and thus reassuring the British Chiefs that the War Department still regarded the role of the U. S. Army in the Middle East as that of a co-operative auxiliary. The occasion for asserting this policy came soon after General Brereton arrived in Cairo. He objected in the strongest terms to having to deal with the British through Maxwell, a ground officer junior to him who had as yet commanded no troops. He inferred the War Department had not intended he should have to do so. A reply went out at once to both officers, over Marshall's signature, stating that the War Department had so intended and expected them to work in harmony. They at once answered with assurances that they were getting on well together.

The closing of the incident did not settle the issue. Marshall sounded out British opinion and found that the Middle East Command preferred to leave things as they were. General Arnold objected that it was unsuitable to keep a ground officer in command of a theater which, from the point of view of American combat operations, was an air theater. But the British preference confirmed General Marshall's disposition to leave things as they were. Maxwell remained the American commander in the Middle East.

The War Department aim was simply to co-operate with the British Chiefs of Staff, as a condition of their co-operation in going ahead with the Bolero plan. A few days after the close of the June meetings in Washington, General Marshall listed the various extraordinary measures taken to get air reinforcements, guns, and tanks to Egypt. He characterized these measures as "concessions" made for the sake of agreement on the Bolero plan, explaining:

The visit of Prime Minister Churchill has involved us in a struggle to keep diversions of our forces to other theaters from interfering with the Bolero plan. The Prime Minister felt that it was doubtful if we could do anything on the European coast in 1942. During these conferences Tobruk fell which made matters worse. The Prime Minister favored an attack on Africa to ease the pressure on the British in this theater. The result of the conferences, however, was that we managed to preserve the basic plan for Bolero.
Consequences of the Battle of Midway

The revival of the GYMNAST plan coincided with the development of new American plans in the Pacific, which, like the modification of American policy in the Middle East, resulted from a sudden, if not entirely unanticipated, change in the military situation. The crisis of the latter part of May in the Pacific ended early in June with the news of a clear American victory. As naval intelligence had predicted, the main Japanese force struck in the Central Pacific. On the afternoon of 3 June Army bombers made contact with the Japanese force west of Midway. In the three days that followed the Navy won a victory notable in several respects. It was the first clear American victory of the war; it was decided entirely in the air; it confirmed the Navy's belief in the tactics of naval air attack on surface vessels and in the greatness of the advantage possessed by a fleet supported by long-range land-based reconnaissance; and finally, it reduced the Japanese superiority in aircraft carriers. A turning point had been reached in the Pacific war.

Central Pacific

The victory at Midway had still another meaning, of special importance to the Army. The Japanese, after six months' uninterrupted success, had for the first time failed in an attempt to seize a strategic position. The Japanese, had they won, could and presumably would have seized Midway and perhaps one or more of the other outlying islands in the Hawaiian group. To meet and dispose of the constant threat that they could have exercised from this advance position, the Army would have been compelled to send large reinforcements to Hawaii. The American victory at Midway left the War Department staff more than ever determined to maintain its position on deployment to the Central Pacific.

General Eisenhower stated the case informally a few days later:

General Handy has been asked to have entire Hawaiian strength restudied. However—things in Pacific are better than when we made our first allocation. So why disperse further? We may have made mistakes in our calculations, particularly as to ground forces; but I am more than ever convinced that our authorized allocations in air are sufficient—if kept up to strength! Other members of the staff came to the same conclusion as Eisenhower, even after studying the less complacent conclusions of two observers recently returned from the Pacific—Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr. (VII Corps commander), who had gone as the personal representative of General Marshall, and Col. John L. McKee, a member of the operations staff. Both these observers agreed with General Emmons (and Admiral Nimitz) that the War Department had authorized for Hawaii neither enough ground forces nor enough air forces. The

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The AAF units that took part in the Battle of Midway claimed credit for having sunk or damaged several Japanese vessels during the engagement. These claims were disputed at the time and have since been discredited, but they did influence Army views on operations in the Pacific.


103 (1) Ltr, Richardson to CofS, 1 Jun 42, sub: Hawaii, OPD 320.2 PTO, 6. (2) Memo cited n. 102. (3) Memo, McKee for ACoS OPD, 15 Jun 42, sub: Reinforcements for Central Pacific Area,
staff finally recommended sending two regiments of the 40th Division, to complete two triangular divisions to garrison the outlying islands of the Hawaiian group, then defended by the 27th (square) Division. The staff also recommended sending a few other badly needed troops—air base security troops (nine battalions), ordnance troops (part of a battalion), and quartermaster troops (three service battalions)—over and above previously allotted strength. In mid-July Marshall approved the recommendations. The staff did not recommend, and Marshall did not then propose, any increase in the number of planes allocated to the Central Pacific.

North Pacific

The outcome of operations in the North Pacific was less favorable. Japanese forces landed unopposed in the western Aleutians, on Kiska and Attu, opening a new front that American forces were not prepared to defend. Army air forces in Alaska reacted weakly to this operation and to a raid on Dutch Harbor which had preceded it, demonstrating—if there were any need to demonstrate—the ineffectiveness of the hurriedly reinforced Eleventh Air Force and of the extempore arrangement for joint Army-Navy action. But the Japanese had done only what the War Department had long conceded they might do, and the staff was still intent on postponing increases in the strength of Alaskan defenses.


For Richardson’s mission see OPD 333 Gen Richardson’s Trip. For McKee’s mission, see msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 2 May 42, CM-OUT 0418 (R).

The bsc study was memo, Col Joseph Smith (S&P, OPD), Col Carl D. Silverthorne (Theater Group, OPD), and Col Frederic E. Glantzberg (AWPD) for ACofS OPD, 3 Jul 42, sub: Garrison of Hawaii and Central Pacific Bases, OPD 320.2 PTO, 6. For initiation of the study, see other papers in the same file, Cases 4 and 6.

See also (1) memo, Col Elmer J. Rogers, Jr., for Col Wedemeyer, 3 Jul 42, sub: Reinforcement for Central Pacific Areas, OPD 320.2 PTO, 6; (2) memo, Wedemeyer for Streett, 3 Jul 42, sub: Add Pers, Armament, and Equip for Def of Bunch and Holly, OPD 320.2 PTO, 7; and (3) memo, Wedemeyer for Handy, n.d., no sub, OPD 320.2 PTO, 6.

OPD’s recommendations were approved by General Marshall at a conference with General Handy and Colonel McKee on 13 July. For this conference, see memorandum for record filed with the directive that followed (memo, OPD for AGF and SOS, 16 Jul 42, sub: Reinforcements for Hawaii, OPD 370.5 Hawaii, 18).

For staff action immediately thereafter on the defense of Hawaii, see in particular: (1) OPD 320.2 Hawaii, 121, 126, 145; (2) OPD 320.2 PTO, 6; and (3) OPD 370.5 Hawaii, 18, 40.

104 Of the correspondence dealing with the performance of Army aviation and Army-Navy command relations in the North Pacific, see in particular: (1) msg, Gen Marshall to Gen DeWitt, 6 Jun 42, CM-OUT 1492 (R); (2) msg, Maj Gen Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., to COMALSEC, 7 Jun 42, copy in OPD 384 WDC, 5; (3) msg, Marshall to DeWitt, 10 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2348 (R); (4) msg, DeWitt to Marshall, 17 Jun 42, CM-IN 3444; and (5) msg, Buckner to Marshall, 20 Jun 42, CM-IN 6347.

107 See note for rcd, 9 Jun 42, with OPD 320.2 ADC 75, and msgs, Marshall to DeWitt, 9 and 17 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2170 (R) and 4143 (R).

110 See note for rcd, 9 Jun 42, with OPD 320.2 ADC 75, and msgs, Marshall to DeWitt, 9 and 17 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2170 (R) and 4143 (R).

field artillery—from the Western Defense Command (WDC) to Alaska, and from less exposed positions in Alaska (Sitka and Anchorage) to more exposed positions (in particular to Nome). The War Department also agreed to send to Alaska for the time being (in exchange for a squadron of P–38’s) a group of P–39’s (54th Fighter Group) that had been diverted from Bolero to the Western Defense Command in the emergency, and to send for the protection of Nome a squadron of B–24’s equipped with air-to-surface-vessel radar. Beyond these strictly defensive measures the War Department did not go, although DeWitt promptly submitted a plan for counteraction in the Aleutians, and the staff began, of necessity, to study the possibilities.

South and Southwest Pacific

The specific consequences in the Central and North Pacific of the Japanese attacks of early June, important as they were, were incidental to the effect in the South and Southwest Pacific. It was highly probable that the Japanese would launch their next attack, as Admiral King had at first expected them to launch their last one, against the American lines of communication to Australia. But their attack and defeat off Midway had cut the decisive advantage they had had in aircraft carriers and, what was more, had lost them the advantage of having forces deployed and organized to undertake the operation. Strategically, the Japanese high command still had the initiative. Japanese forces were still numerically superior and so could still concentrate for an attack without fear of a concentration of American forces in another sector. But the American high command had the option of seizing the initiative, if only in a very limited sense. American forces could concentrate in the sector in which the Japanese were expected to attack—Fijis–Australia— at a calculated risk of exposing other positions to Japanese attack. American forces, in short, could seize the tactical initiative. By acting quickly they could, perhaps, upset Japanese plans and thus gain an initial advantage in the coming struggle to hold open the lines of communication to Australia.

Admiral Nimitz opened the discussion of operations in the South Pacific at the end of May with a very modest proposal to

General MacArthur. He told MacArthur that he had a Marine raider battalion to lend him (if Admiral King were willing) for landing operations against Tulagi (Solomons) or some other Japanese advance base, supported by MacArthur's own naval forces. MacArthur liked the idea of attacking, but he did not believe the battalion together with what he had available would make up a force strong enough for such an operation. The Army and Navy staffs in Washington took the same view. It was left up to Nimitz and MacArthur to go ahead with plans for a raid on one of the Japanese positions, if they should agree it would be worth trying, but not to undertake to land and hold a position without previous approval from Washington.

The first proposal to come after the Battle of Midway was MacArthur's. He had plans of his own for much more ambitious operations in the New Britain–New Ireland area, preparatory to launching an attack on Rabaul. He urged them at once on the War Department. To carry them out he asked for an amphibious division and a naval task force including two carriers. With that force he would undertake to recapture "that important area, forcing the enemy back 700 miles to his base at Truk," thus obtaining "manifold strategic advantages both defensive and offensive," which could be further exploited at once.

The War Department staff, which had been awaiting this proposal, had already gone to work to calculate what forces MacArthur would need to open such an offensive and how shipping schedules could be arranged to get them to him. On receiving MacArthur's proposals, the staff at once opened discussions with the Navy. Remarkably enough, in view of the long effort of the War Department to restrict Army deployment and operations in the Pacific, the operations staff expressed entire agreement with the bold idea of advancing by way of eastern New Guinea and New Britain to Rabaul, the forward operating base of the Japanese forces in the South Pacific. To attack Rabaul would be to attack the vital point on the lines of communication between Truk, the strategic assembly point some 700 miles to the north of Rabaul, and the Japanese forward positions in the Solomons. If the attack succeeded, the Japanese position in the Solomons "would almost fall of its own weight."

Within a few days Marshall presented the War Department plan to Admiral King. It required a Marine division for the assault and three Army divisions from Australia to follow up. The Army air component would include, besides planes then available to MacArthur, the B–17's held in Hawaii and the additional sixteen sent there from the west coast in late May. To provide fighter cover for the landings, which

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113 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 8 Jun 42, CM-IN 2264 (R).
114 For stf studies, see: (1) memo, Chief of Strategy Sec for ACoS OPD, 8 Jun 42, sub: Offensive Action in SWPA in Case of War Between Russia and Japan, OPD 381 SWPA, 63; (2) memo, Col Robert H. Wylie for CG SOS, 8 Jun 42, sub: Transportation Plan—Amph Div, SW Pacific, ind to OPD, 10 Jun 42, OPD 370.5 SWPA, 1; and (3) msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 10 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2319 (R).
116 Memo, OPD for CoFS, 11 Jun 42, sub: Admiral King's Communication to Honorable Walter Nash, New Zealand Legation, OPD 370.5 Fiji, 6.
would be out of range of American land-based pursuit planes, the Navy would have to furnish three carriers (and escort for them), in addition to the naval forces of MacArthur and whatever naval assistance the British might provide. Marshall, after summarizing the plan, dwelt on the point that the operation, in order to succeed, must be mounted as soon as possible—some time early in July—and that they must reach a decision at once. He asked Admiral King to meet him to talk over the proposed operations.

General Marshall intimated to MacArthur that he expected complications, and MacArthur assured him that he well understood "the extreme delicacy of your position and the complex difficulties that face you there." In making his proposal, Marshall had put himself in a position vis-à-vis Admiral King rather like his position vis-à-vis the British two months before. The operation he proposed would depend very heavily on Navy forces, especially at the outset, and might prove very costly to them, much as SLEDGEHAMMER would depend on—and might prove very costly to—British forces.

On the "working level" the Army and Navy staffs quickly came to substantial agreement, but to no purpose, since Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr. (Assistant Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet), speaking for Admiral King, objected, first, to risking carriers in the narrow sea between New Guinea and the Solomons, where they would be exposed to attacks from Japanese land-based aircraft without protection from American land-based aircraft, and second, to putting the operation under MacArthur. About two weeks passed while the staffs did what they could. As the Army operations representative complained to his chief: "Both their and our detailed plans become more and more difficult of rapid accomplishment the longer the bickering in high places continues."

Finally, Admiral King, speaking for himself, wrote to Marshall explaining his own plan (along the lines of RAINBOW 2). It was in essence a plan he had long since had in mind, and it had no doubt been in his mind—and in Marshall's—during the debates over deployment and command in the Pacific. As he had explained to the President early in March, he looked forward to striking in the South Pacific as soon as American garrisons had made reasonably secure the "strong points" along the lines of communication. These strong points being secured, the Navy would not only cover the vulnerable American lines of communication to Australia but also—"given the naval forces, air units, and amphibious troops"—

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117 Memo, CofS for King, 12 Jun 42, sub: Opns in SW Pacific, OPD 381 SWPA, 73.
119 Memo, OFD for CofS, 24 Jun 42, sub: Opns in SW Pacific, OPD 381 SWPA, 76.
120 Memo cited n. 119(1). It should be noted that from 21 to 25 June, the JCS were preoccupied with a critical situation in the Middle East and the reconsideration of strategy for 1942. (See section on "Crisis in Egypt," pp. 250-55 above.)
121 For an early anticipation of such a proposal, see memo, CofS for COMINCH, 24 Feb 42, sub: Estab of U. S. Garrisons in Efate . . ., Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8. This memo is quoted and discussed in Ch. VII, above.
could take the initiative, attacking the weakest Japanese position:

... we can drive northwest from the New Hebrides into the Solomons and the Bismark [sic] Archipelago after the same fashion of step-by-step advances that the Japanese used in the South China Sea. Such a line of operations will be offensive rather than passive—and will draw Japanese forces there to oppose it, thus relieving pressure elsewhere. \(^{122}\)

Admiral King, in proposing this course of action to General Marshall in June, set the final aim of seizing Rabaul and occupying eastern New Guinea. Since General MacArthur had meanwhile made explicit provision for preliminary landings in the Solomons as well as in New Guinea to seize airfields and thus provide protection for naval surface forces, the operations proposed by King and MacArthur were very similar in scope. \(^{123}\) But King's idea of the operation was nonetheless quite different from MacArthur's, as Admiral Cooke's objections had already indicated. Admiral King held that these operations should be under naval command throughout, not (as the working planners had agreed) in the assault stage only. Admiral Nimitz would retain control until it came time to occupy the islands on a permanent basis, at which time MacArthur would acquire jurisdiction. \(^{124}\)

General Marshall protested, of course, that MacArthur should command the entire operation, chiefly on the grounds that the operation lay "almost entirely in the Southwest Pacific area" and that it was "designed to add to the security of that area." \(^{125}\)

But Admiral King had the much stronger argument that Admiral Nimitz should control the commitment or withdrawal of naval forces in the light of the whole naval situation in the Pacific. King proposed that the Navy should logically retain control of primarily naval and amphibious operations such as these, by the same reasoning that had led him to agree to Army exercise of unity of command over operations against Germany, which would be mainly on and over land. He stated, provocatively, that he thought the operation important enough to be launched "even if no support of Army forces in the Southwest Pacific area is made available." \(^{126}\)

General Marshall promptly objected to the inference that Army support would be contingent on command: "Regardless of the final decision as to command, every available support must be given to this operation, or any operation against the enemy." He again requested Admiral King to talk over the problem with him at once. \(^{127}\)

Marshall had very good reason to disavow any intention of allowing strategic commitments to be determined by bargaining over command. King, in stating his ideas about command for this operation, had advanced a theory more or less applicable to operations in the Pacific for a long time to come—that Marshall should be willing to accept Navy command of primarily naval and amphibious warfare. This solution at least implied a sharp division of labor be-

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\(^{122}\) Memo, King for President, 5 Mar 42, no sub, Tab Misc, Book 4, Excc 8.

\(^{123}\) See msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 24 Jun 42, CM-IN 7976. MacArthur declared that in his message of 8 June (cited n. 113) he had omitted purposely the step-by-step explanation of what he proposed to do, and that the Navy had misconceived his plan for the operations in the New Britain–New Ireland region.

\(^{124}\) Memo, King for CofS, 25 Jun 42, sub: Offensive Ops in S and SWPA, OPD 381 SWPA, 80.

\(^{125}\) Memo, CofS for King, 26 Jun 42, sub cited n. 124, OPD 381 SWPA, 80.

\(^{126}\) Memo, King for CofS, 26 Jun 42, sub cited n. 124, OPD 381 SWPA, 80.

\(^{127}\) Memo, CofS for King, 29 Jun 42, no sub, OPD 381 SWPA, 80.
between the Army and Navy in the determination of plans and control of operations, with the JCS supporting Army views and control of operations against Germany and Navy views and control over operations against Japan.

MacArthur quickly seized on the point, and made known his displeasure. After learning that King had directed Nimitz to go ahead on the basis of the Navy proposal, MacArthur declared:

It is quite evident in reviewing the whole situation that Navy contemplates assuming general command control of all operations in the Pacific theater, the role of the Army being subsidiary and consisting largely of placing its forces at the disposal and under the command of Navy or Marine officers. I shall take no steps or action with reference to any components of my Command except under your direct orders.128

MacArthur, in his next message hastened to remove any possible misapprehension that he meant to offer “anything short of the fullest cooperation” once it should have been decided to go through with an operation.129 But King apparently saw that a solution, to be acceptable, should not appear to slight MacArthur. He offered a way out. He proposed to Marshall that Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley, the newly appointed Navy commander in the South Pacific, should control operations against Tulagi, and that MacArthur should thereafter assume control of operations toward Rabaul.130 As MacArthur at once pointed out, it would be hard thus to transfer command between phases of the operation. Marshall recognized the force of the objection, but concluded that the proposed arrangement offered the only basis on which the Army and Navy could “successfully and immediately go ahead with this operation.”131 He therefore accepted the proposal and drafted a joint directive, providing for an operation in three phases: (1) to take the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent positions; (2) to take Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guinea; and (3) to capture Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Britain—New Ireland area. The first phase (Task One) was to be under the control of Admiral Nimitz. MacArthur would be in charge of the second and third phases (Tasks Two and Three).132

Admiral King did not especially like the solution. He had since made and still preferred an alternative proposal to let Admiral Ghormley execute the operation directly under the JCS.133 General Marshall had been and remained opposed to this proposal, which was likely to involve the JCS too deeply in the conduct of overseas operations to promise well either for the operations themselves or for the performance by the JCS of their own proper functions.134 So Admiral King, “in order to make progress in the direction in which we are agreed that we should go,” consented to plan for an operation in three phases, with command passing between the first and second phases. He proposed a target date of 1 August for

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128 (1) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 28 Jun 42, CM-IN 9329. (2) See msg, COMINCH to CINC-PAC, 27 Jun 42, Tab Navy, Book 5, Exec 8, for the message from King to Nimitz referred to in the text.
130 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 29 Jun 42, CM-OUT 7501.
131 Informal memo, CofS for King, 1 Jul 42, OPD 381 SWPA, 80.
132 Jt Directive for Offensive Ops in SWPA, 2 Jul 42, OPD 381 SWPA, 83.
133 For this proposal, see Navy draft msg containing Jt Directive . . ., 30 Jun 42, Item 67a, Exec 10.
134 Memo, CofS for King, 1 Jul 42, OPD 381 SWPA, 80.
initiating the first phase, and that arrange-
ments for the second and third phases be
made not later than 20 July. General
Marshall sent to General MacArthur a
hopeful yet anxious comment on the re-
sult:

I feel that a workable plan has been set up
and a unity of command established without
previous precedent for an offensive operation.
I wish you to make every conceivable effort
to promote a complete accord throughout this
affair. There will be difficulties and irrita-
tions inevitably but the end in view demands
a determination to suppress these manifesta-
tions.

In anticipation of these arrangements, the
War Department had meanwhile been re-
examining the problem of jurisdiction over
Army forces in the South Pacific. This
problem had been a point of contention in
Washington ever since January, when the
first Army garrisons were sent. On 19
January the War Department staff had
drafted a letter to be sent to General Em-
mons, the Army commander in Hawaii,
making him responsible, under the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral
Nimitz, for the defense of New Caledonia
and Borabora, as well as Christmas and
Canton islands. But the staff had
dropped the proposal since Admiral King
objected to it. As a result, General Em-
mons' mission was not extended to include
any broadly defined responsibility for Army
forces along the line Hawaii–Australia.

The want of joint arrangements for unity of
command beyond the defense of the Ha-
waiian Islands group was a serious defect,
as both the War and Navy Departments ac-
knowledged. In mid-February the Navy
had raised several questions relating to this
problem, among them the question of Gen-
eral Emmons' point of view "due to his lim-
ited mission," and of Admiral Nimitz' au-
thority to move Army forces beyond the
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. These ques-
tions had come up in connection with the
diversion of the squadron of B–17's from
Hawaii to the South Pacific to operate in
connection with the ANZAC Task Force.
They had remained pertinent and impor-
tant questions throughout the spring, as a
result of the War Department's refusal to
provide a separate bomber force for the
South Pacific. The most obvious solution

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135 Memo [King] for Marshall, 2 Jul 42, OPD 381
SWPA, 80.
136 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacAr-
thur, 3 Jul 42, CM-OUT 0677.
137 Unused memo, WPD for TAG, 19 Jan 42, sub:
Def of New Caledonia, WPD 3718-14.
138 Informal memo, EJK [King] for ACoS WPD,
19 Jan 42, WPD 3718-14. King objected that
"this set-up" was "not consonant with (a) the
projected creation of the ANZAC area, (b) the
facts of the case in connection with the U. S. Army
General comdg U. S. troops, etc. in Australia."
139 For the continued confusion over Emmons' re-
sponsibilities, see: (1) msg, Emmons to Marshall,
27 June 42, CM-IN 9002; and (2) msg (originator
OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 4 Jul 42, CM-OUT
1179.
140 For the arrangements made in May for joint
action in the defense of the Hawaiian Islands group,
under a state of "fleet opposed invasion," by which
Emmons was made the "task force Commander
Hawaiian Defense Sector," see: (1) msg,
COMINCH to CINCPAC, 14 May 42, OPD 384
Hawaii, 1; and (2) ltr, Gen Richardson to CoFS,
1 Jun 42, Rpt 2, copy under Tab Misc, Book 5,
Exec 8.
141 Navy paper, title: Agenda for Evening of Mon-
day 16 Feb, WPD 4449-8. The War Department
staff advised General Marshall on the first question
that the limitation of Emmons' assigned mission
doubtless did make him "unwilling to commit his
long-range striking aircraft to any offensive mission
planned by the CinCPac which might contribute
only indirectly to the defense of Hawaii." On the
other question, the staff expressed doubt that Nimitz
had authority to move Army units outside the
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. (See WPD study, sub:
Notes for CoFS, WPD 4449-8. For details of the
transaction, see also other papers filed with the
above.)
142 See above, Ch. VII.
was to establish Army command channels in the Pacific parallel to the Navy command channels, so that General Emmons' views on the strategic disposition of the bombers stationed in Hawaii would be based on the same broad calculation of risks as those that Admiral Nimitz had to make in considering the disposition of the Pacific Fleet. Early in April, after the establishment of the Pacific Ocean Area, the Navy Department had directed Admiral Nimitz to name a flag officer to take command in the South Pacific.\textsuperscript{143} To correspond with this command, which was given to Admiral Ghormley, General Emmons in May had proposed that an Army officer be appointed as his deputy to command Army forces in the South Pacific.\textsuperscript{144} The War Department staff, which had first thought of setting up a separate Army command in the area under General Patch, had dropped that idea in favor of having a single Army command in the Pacific, with a deputy in the South Pacific—an arrangement substantially in accord with Emmons' proposal.\textsuperscript{145} But finally, in June, shortly before Admiral Ghormley assumed command in the South Pacific, the War Department staff arrived at a solution less symmetrical, but more in keeping with the actual situation in the Pacific.

Shortly after the Battle of Midway, General Eisenhower and Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Chief of Air Staff, discussed the problem and the related problem of bomber operations in the Pacific. As a result of these discussions the War Department proposed that an Army commander be appointed for all Army forces placed under Admiral Ghormley, and that a Pacific mobile air force be set aside in Hawaii, to be used anywhere in the Pacific, at General Marshall's discretion.\textsuperscript{146}

With this proposal the War Department in effect conceded that naval strategy should control operations in the South Pacific. Even this concession was not enough. Admiral King took exception on two counts. He did not want the proposed Army commander's jurisdiction under Admiral Ghormley to extend to the operations of Army forces, as the War Department had proposed; and he wanted two mobile air forces set up—in Australia and Hawaii—rather than the one—in Hawaii—proposed by the War Department. Marshall accepted the changes.\textsuperscript{147} General Harmon, who was given the new command as Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (CG USAFISPA, or in Navy form, COMGENSOPAC), received his formal letter of instructions on 7 July.\textsuperscript{148} Like the other officers—Emmons, Stilwell, and Eisenhower—that General

\textsuperscript{143} Msg, COMINCH to CINCPAC, 4 Apr 42, Item 7c, Exec 10.
\textsuperscript{144} Ltr, Emmons to CofS, 20 May 42, sub: Army Comd in SPA, OPD 384 PTO, 18.
\textsuperscript{145} Memo for rcd, OPD 384 PTO, 16.
\textsuperscript{146} (1) Draft memo, OPD for CofS, n.d., sub: Army Comd, SPA, with atchd informal memo, Handy for Harmon, 13 Jun 42, OPD 384 PTO, 18. (2) Memo, OPD for CofS, 25 Jun 42, same sub, with incl ltr, CofS to King, 26 Jun 42, same sub, OPD 384 PTO, 16.
\textsuperscript{147} Ltr, King to CofS, 2 Jul 42, sub cited n. 146, with atchd informal memo, GCM for Handy, OPD 384 PTO, 18.
\textsuperscript{148} For notification to the Army commanders in the Pacific, see: (1) msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Jul 42, CM-OUT 0840; and (2) msg, Marshall to Emmons, 4 Jul 42, CM-OUT 1100.

The 19th Bombardment Group (H) was designated as the Australian Mobile Air Force, and the 11th Bombardment Group (H) as the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force. (See msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 11 Jul 42, CM-IN 3694, and msg, Emmons to Marshall, 16 Jul 42, CM-IN 5463.)

\textsuperscript{148} Ltr, OPD to Harmon, 7 Jul 42, sub: Ltr of Instns to CG USAFISPA, with atchd memo for rcd, OPD 384 PTO, 18. Harmon arrived in the South Pacific and assumed command at the end of the month.
Marshall had sent out from Washington since Pearl Harbor to take command of Army Forces in strategically critical theaters, Harmon had a good idea how the War Department intended to treat problems in his theater—knowledge that he was expected to keep in mind.

Up to this point no one appears to have raised the question of sending additional Army forces into the South Pacific, last raised by King at the end of May. The agreement just reached had given to Admiral King an implied claim on the War Department for help in the South Pacific, and to General MacArthur an implied assurance of War Department support, albeit deferred, in the Southwest Pacific. But King and MacArthur had still to state their expectations, and General Marshall to state his intentions, with regard to the question of Army forces for the planned three-part offensive.

The issuance of the new directive at once opened the question. MacArthur and Ghormley, after conferring on 8 July, recommended that Task One (Santa Cruz and Tulagi) be postponed until means were available in the Pacific to follow up immediately with Tasks Two and Three (eastern New Guinea and Rabaul). King, in commenting on their recommendation, insisted on going ahead in any case with Task One and pointed out that MacArthur had suddenly grown more conservative:

I take note that about three weeks ago MacArthur stated that, if he could be furnished amphibious forces and two carriers, he could push right through to RABAUL. Confronted with the concrete aspects of the task, he now feels that he not only cannot undertake this extended operation but not even the TULAGI operation.

The point of King's observation was not lost on the War Department, which would thus face once again, in a new context, with the familiar demand for additional commitments to the Pacific, even though Army forces present in the Pacific or en route (estimated by the planners to be 252,000) already exceeded the total strength that the War Department had undertaken to have in the Pacific by the end of the year (237,000).

How far the War Department would go to meet these demands would depend partly on the fortunes of war in the South Pacific, in the Libyan Desert, on the Eastern Front in Europe, and on the high seas, where Allied shipping losses continued to be heavy. It would also depend partly on the President's estimate of the situation and, finally, on his decision whether to go ahead gathering Army forces in the British Isles. For the time being, until he had made his decision, there was small chance that the War Department would make many concessions to Admiral King and the Pacific commands.

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149 See above, Ch. X.
151 Memo, King for CofS, 10 Jul 42, sub: MacArthur-Ghormley Seven-Part Despatch on SW Pacific Offensive Ops, Item 67a, Exec 10.
152 Pointed out in OPD brief [14 Jul 42], Notes on . . . JCS 25th mtg, 14 Jul 42, Strategic Policy and Deployment of U. S. and Br Forces (CCS 91), with CCS 91 in ABC 381 (9–25–42), 2.
CHAPTER XII

The Elimination of the Alternatives

July–August 1942

On 8 July the War Department operations staff estimated that a decision “on any emergency operations in the European Theater in 1942” could not be long postponed and that it must come “not later than August 1.”¹ On the same day the British War Cabinet made a move toward a decision, a move that resulted almost automatically from its action four weeks before (11 June), when it had declared, with reference to SLEDGEHAMMER:

(a) We should not attempt any major landing on the Continent this year unless we intended to stay there;

(b) All plans and preparations for “Sledgehammer” should be pressed forward with the greatest vigour, on the understanding that the operation would not be launched, except in conditions which held out a good prospect of success;

(c) The Chiefs of Staff should have authority to ask for the necessary shipping to be taken up for “Sledgehammer” on the 1st July, without further reference to the War Cabinet.

The Prime Minister in June had further defined the conditions for launching SLEDGEHAMMER in a statement of two principles, “generally approved” by the War Cabinet:

No substantial landing in France unless we are going to stay; and

No substantial landing in France unless the Germans are demoralized by failure against Russia.²

In view of these declarations (the basis of the Prime Minister’s eloquent appeal to the President), the British Chiefs of Staff found themselves, by 1 July, in the curious position of having authority to mount an operation that their government evidently did not intend to launch. To prepare themselves against this situation they had on 24 June asked the Minister of War Transport to submit by 1 July an estimate of the cost of withdrawing ships for use in SLEDGEHAMMER. On 30 June they received the report, which estimated that it would mean tying up some 250,000 tons of shipping and analyzed the consequences for the British shipping program.³ At the same time the British Chiefs received a report they had requested from Admiral Mountbatten, who pointed out that to mount SLEDGEHAMMER would tie up all landing craft in the British Isles and all his instructors trained in landing operations. It would thus not only rule out large-scale raids on the French coast but

¹ Memo, OPD for G-2, 8 Jul 42, sub: Est of Russian Sit, OPD 381 Russia, 1.

² Quoted in memo, Br CsofS for War Cabinet, 2 Jul 42, sub: Future Ops, WP (42) 278, (COS (42) 195 (O)), ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B, 19.

³ Memo, Minister of War Transport for Br CsofS, 30 Jun 42, sub: Opn SLEDGEHAMMER, COS (42) 192 (O), circulated as Annex I to memo cited n. 2.
also suspend amphibious training for all forces not assigned to SLEDGEHAMMER. The result would be to slow down preparations for landings in 1943. The one justification for mounting the operation, in the judgment of Mountbatten, would be a fixed intention of actually carrying out SLEDGEHAMMER.\(^4\)

Against the disadvantages of mounting an operation so very unlikely to be launched, the British Chiefs of Staff weighed the advantages:

In the first place, our preparations are bound to keep the Germans guessing. They may not force them to withdraw troops from their Eastern Front, but they are unlikely to weaken their Western Front, particularly in air forces. Secondly, the mounting of "Sledgehammer" will be a useful dress-rehearsal for "Round-up," especially for Commanders and Staffs.

But they concluded that beyond question the disadvantages outweighed the advantages, and declared: "If we were free agents, we could not recommend that the operation should be mounted." They ended by stating the limitations on British freedom of action—the cautious declaration on SLEDGEHAMMER given in May to Molotov, and the compromise directive on future plans worked out in Washington in June. They pointed out that if the War Cabinet should decide not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER, the Soviet Government would soon discover that preparations were not going ahead, and that, whatever the decision, it would be necessary to reopen the question at once with the U. S. Government.\(^5\)

The British Government soon acted on the recommendation of its Chiefs of Staff. On 8 July the Joint Staff Mission in Washington received notification of the decision taken not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER and of the hope expressed by the War Cabinet that the United States would agree to the invasion of North Africa.\(^6\)

**The Pacific Alternative**

The stated British objections to SLEDGEHAMMER had a great deal of force. The heavy odds against successful landings in France in 1942 and the great cost of mounting a purely contingent operation were indeed fundamental objections, which could have been urged with telling effect against it when Marshall first proposed it. The risks and costs were obviously great. Had the British in April refused, therefore, to plan for a contingent operation, as part of the whole scheme General Marshall proposed, it would of course have been open to the War Department to join the Navy Department and the Pacific commands in advising the President that the United States should not assume the risks involved in diverting available forces from the Pacific. The War Department operations staff had so recommended. In the words used by General Eisenhower to conclude his exposition of the manifold reasons for single-minded concentration of Army forces in the British Isles:

WPD further believes that, unless this plan is adopted as the eventual aim of all our efforts, we must turn our backs upon the Eastern

\(^{4}\) Memo, Chief of Combined Ops [Mountbatten] for Br CsofS, 30 Jun 42, sub: Certain Implications of Mounting Opn SLEDGEHAMMER, COS (42) 194 (O), circulated as Annex II to memo cited \[^{2}\].

\(^{5}\) Memo cited \[^{2}\].

\(^{6}\) Msg, War Cabinet Offs to Jt Stf Miss, Washington, 8 Jul 42, COS (W) 217, Item 9, Exec 5. The British themselves proposed to investigate further the prospect of operations in northern Norway (JUPITER).
Atlantic and go, full out, as quickly as possible, against Japan!  

In July the alternative to go "full out, as quickly as possible" against Japan still remained. It would greatly lessen the dangers perpetuated and the tensions created by Army deployment policy in the Pacific. On 10 July Marshall proposed this alternative. When the JCS met that afternoon he read the dispatch from the British War Cabinet announcing the decision not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER. He did not touch on the reasons given by the British for the decision, but passed at once to the two questions raised by the decision: (a) should the United States agree to invade North Africa? (b) did the British really want to invade the continent in 1943? Marshall repeated his objections to GYMNAST as an operation "expensive and ineffectual" and his conviction "that it was impossible to carry out SLEDGEHAMER or ROUNDUP without full aggressive British support." He then proposed a momentous change in strategy, which would at once rule out the North African operation and settle the basis for future collaboration with the British: "If the British position must be accepted, he proposed that the U. S. should turn to the Pacific for decisive action against Japan." He went on to list the military and political advantages that (as MacArthur had already pointed out) would attend this course of action:

He added that this would tend to concentrate rather than to scatter U. S. forces; that it would be highly popular throughout the U. S., particularly on the West Coast; that the Pacific War Council, the Chinese, and the personnel of the Pacific Fleet would all be in hearty accord; and that, second only to BOLERO, it would be the operation which would have the greatest effect towards relieving the pressure on Russia.

Admiral King, of course, was ready to make common cause with Marshall. He repeated his own objection to GYMNAST—"that is was impossible to fulfill naval commitments in other theaters and at the same time to provide the shipping and escorts which would be essential should that operation be undertaken." Admiral Towers supplemented the case against GYMNAST by declaring that the transfer of aircraft carriers from the Pacific to the Atlantic for GYMNAST would result in a "most unfavorable" disposition of forces. King also expressed doubt of the British intentions, declaring:

... that, in his opinion, the British had never been in wholehearted accord with operations on the continent as proposed by the U. S. He said that, in the European theater, we must fight the Germans effectively to win, and that any departure from full BOLERO plans would result in failure to accomplish this purpose.

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney in turn observed that "in his opinion, the R. A. F. was not enthusiastic over BOLERO." 

Admiral King readily agreed to join Marshall in submitting to the President (with minor modifications) a memorandum that Marshall had already drawn up expounding his case. It first presented the argument against GYMNAST:

Our view is that the execution of Gymnast, even if found practicable, means definitely no Bolero-Sledgehammer in 1942 and that it will definitely curtail if not make impossible the execution of Bolero-Roundup in the Spring of 1943. We are strongly of the opinion that Gymnast would be both indecisive

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7 Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, 25 Mar 42, sub: Critical Points in Development of Coordinated Viewpoint as to Maj Tasks of the War, OPD 381 BOLERO, 6.

8 Min, 24th mtg JCS, 10 Jul 42. For similar reasons advanced by MacArthur, see above, Ch. IX.

9 Min cited n. 8.
and a heavy drain on our resources, and that if we undertake it, we would nowhere be acting decisively against the enemy and would definitely jeopardize our naval position in the Pacific.

The memorandum passed to a recommendation that the President should urge the Prime Minister "that we go through with full Bolero plans and that we attempt no other operation which would detract from this major effort." The memorandum stated the consequences of British unwillingness to go ahead with Bolero:

Neither Sledgehammer nor Roundup can be carried out without full and whole-hearted British support. They must of necessity furnish a large part of the forces. Giving up all possibility of Sledgehammer in 1942 not only voids our commitments to Russia, but either of the proposed diversions, namely Jupiter and Gymnast, will definitely operate to delay and weaken readiness for Roundup in 1943.

Finally, the memorandum offered an alternative course to be followed should the President fail to persuade the Prime Minister:

If the United States is to engage in any other operation than forceful, unswerving adherence to full Bolero plans, we are definitely of the opinion that we should turn to the Pacific and strike decisively against Japan; in other words assume a defensive attitude against Germany, except for air operations; and use all available means in the Pacific. Such action would not only be definite and decisive against one of our principal enemies, but would bring concrete aid to the Russians in case Japan attacks them.10

At the same time General Marshall independently drew up a more informal summary of his reasoning, which concluded with a plain statement of his aim:

I believe that we should now put the proposition up to the British on a very definite basis and leave the decision to them. It must be made at once. My object is again to force the British into acceptance of a concentrated effort against Germany, and if this proves impossible, to turn immediately to the Pacific with strong forces and drive for a decision against Japan.11

Marshall's reasoning was a consistent extension of the very reasoning that had led the War Department to propose the concentration of Army forces in the British Isles. The War Department's aim was to commit the bulk of U. S. Army forces to one main front at a time, and thereby to realize the advantages of long-range planning over a single main line of overseas communication. The War Department had adopted this approach on the assumption that in order to defeat either Germany or Japan it would probably be necessary to defeat very large German and Japanese forces on their home soil. For the War Department, the danger in opening an additional front was to be measured, not in terms of the combat units

10 Memo, CofS, COMINCH, and CNO for President, 10 Jul 42, no sub, OPD 381 Gen, 73.

11 Memo, CofS for President, 10 Jul 42, sub: Latest Br Proposals Relative to BOLERO and GYMNAST. This memorandum was drafted in OPD. Various copies, with corrections by Marshall, are filed Item 4, Exec 1, and Item 53, Exec 10. A copy in the latter file bears the note, dated 10 Jul 42: "Chief signed this C. K. G." The initials are those of Colonel Gailey, OPD Executive.

Secretary Stimson, it may be noted, "cordially endorsed" the proposal of a "showdown" with the British. Later, his attitude changed, and he became "not altogether pleased with his part" in the transaction. (Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 424-25.)

Two other statements of the Pacific alternative, incorporating arguments apparently intended to influence British opinion, are contained in: (1) msg (originator OPD), Gen Marshall to Lt Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, 13 Jul 42, CM-OUT 3546 (R) (there was no distribution of this msg in WD; for text, see memo, OPD for WDCMC, 13 Jul 42, sub: Ops for this Year, several copies filed in Army files, incl copies in OPD 381 ETO, 2 and under Tab 9, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B); and (2) OPD draft msg, President to Prime Minister, n.d., Item 9, Exec 5.
initially committed, but in terms of the ultimate effect on the employment of manpower, and specifically on the Army troop basis. "Concentrating" Army forces in the Pacific was in every way an inferior line of play to concentrating them in the British Isles (for all the reasons that the staff had listed in February and March), but the military staffs assumed it must be done sooner or later, and it was hence a development more desirable than the opening of a main offensive front in the Mediterranean—a development that the War Department (and the Navy Department) hoped entirely to avoid.

Upon receiving the proposal, the President, who was then at Hyde Park, telephoned to ask General Marshall and Admiral King to prepare a full exposition of "your Pacific Ocean alternative" and send it to him that afternoon by plane. He wanted:

... a detailed comprehensive outline of the plans, including estimated time and overall totals of ships, planes, and ground forces. Also, any proposed withdrawal of existing or proposed use of ships, planes, and ground forces in the Atlantic.

Finally, he wanted to be advised of the probable effect of the change on the defense of the Soviet Union and the Middle East.  

The answer, signed by all three members of the JCS, began by acknowledging that there was no plan to cover the case, adding that though the staffs were at work, it would take them some time to draw one up. After alluding to the projected landings in the Solomons, the hope of extending the operation into New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, and the limitations that had affected these plans, the memorandum traced the lines of advance from the South and Southwest Pacific—either "northward along the TRUK–GUAM–SAIPAN line" or "northwestward through the Malay barrier and Borneo to the Philippines" or along both lines—and mentioned the possibility of operations from China and (in case of war between Japan and the USSR) from Siberia.

The memorandum then explained, in simple terms, the effect on the disposition of forces and shipping. The effect on naval strength in the Atlantic would be small, mainly to allow for "some strengthening of anti-submarine measures." The effect on Army deployment would be great. The only ground forces to be moved across the North Atlantic would be two divisions to the British Isles and 15,000 troops to Iceland, to fulfill commitments made at the ARCADIA Conference. The air forces set up for BOLERO would be cut back by two thirds, leaving only eighteen out of fifty-two groups due to be sent to the British Isles. There would be a correspondingly great reduction in service forces.

The shift to the Pacific would cut the rate of Army deployment. Even if all the shipping allocated to BOLERO—half of which was British shipping—were made available for use in the Pacific, the number of troops that could be transported (with equipment) each month would be cut from 100,000 to about 40,000. The greater distance, any withdrawal of British shipping, and the lack of developed Pacific bases would all limit the rate at which forces could be put into action in the Pacific. Accordingly, some air units would be held in the United States and Alaska in readiness for operations in Siberia. It was as yet too soon to plan long-range ground force deployment. The short-term plan was to
divert at once to the Pacific airborne and parachute units and the three trained amphibious divisions set up for Bolero, and additional troops as necessary to garrison positions seized from the Japanese.

The memorandum concluded with a statement of the effect of the shift on the active fronts. On the Eastern Front it would be unfavorable, but might be counterbalanced by a favorable effect on the Far Eastern Front, in case of war between the USSR and Japan. The effect of the shift on the position in the Middle East would be small, although the change was likely to have some indirect effect by drawing the attention of the Japanese away from India.13

Early in the morning of the next day (Monday, 13 July) General Marshall asked the War Department for an analysis of what Gymnast might cost and what it might accomplish, and for the answer to several questions concerning the Pacific alternative:

What is there in the outline of the Pacific plan prepared on Sunday, July 12, that might be compromised in favor of providing more means to the United Kingdom?

What would be the effect of the Pacific plan on allocation of landing craft? What has already gone to England? What can or should be sent to the Pacific including Alaska?

What was the effect of the cut in the estimated production of landing craft for vehicles? Is that cut definite and final or could the situation be improved?

Is the landing craft already sent to England sufficient for commando operations?

If the British give us tonnage, can we afford to send them more divisions? If so, how many?

What changes in schedule of airplane deliveries would be effected by a change in the Pacific plan? Figure out on a time basis what the schedule of delivery of airplanes would be to England and to the Pacific area.14

Marshall wanted the answers before Thursday, 16 July.15 The planning staff of SOS went to work at once to prepare a statement of requirements and resources for a major deployment against Japan over the remaining nine months covered by the Bolero plan (July 1942–March 1943).16

The statement, submitted by Somervell on 14 July, was calculated on the diversion from Bolero to the war against Japan of all but thirteen air groups (out of fifty-three), all but two divisions (out of fourteen) and most of the service troops:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Groups</th>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Service Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Siberia and Alaska</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(Alaska) 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Somervell measured roughly how far it would be possible to carry out the shift to the Pacific with the statement that the backlog of units built up in the United States, for lack of ships to move and supply them, would be considerable. The planning branch of SOS also asked the services to recalculate the service troop basis in the British Isles.

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13 Memo, Marshall, King, and Arnold for President, 12 Jul 42, sub: Pacific Ops, OPD 381 Gen, 73.
14 Memo, J. R. D. [Deane] for CofS, 13 Jul 42, sub: Conf Held in Marshall’s Off Monday, Jul 13, 1942, at 8:15 A.M., WDCSA Bolero (SS). The officers were Generals Arnold, Somervell, and McNarney, Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy (Chief, OPD), Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer (the Army planner), Colonel Ritchie (Chief, Southwest Pacific Theater Section, OPD), and Colonel Deane (Secretary, General Staff).
15 See memo cited n. 14. Marshall may already have heard the report, which he passed on to Eisenhower later in the day, that he might be sent to London with Hopkins on Thursday or Friday. (See msg cited n. 11(1)).
16 ASF Plng Diary, Plng Br, 13 Jul 42 entry. The planning branch, SOS, also asked the services to recalculate the service troop basis in the British Isles.
would require an additional construction program for approximately 400,000 troops. Under the Pacific alternative, as under the Bolero plan, the limiting factor was likely to be the amount of cargo shipping available. He estimated that the lack of cargo shipping during the period might cut back, by perhaps 100,000 men, deployment for which troop shipping would be available, although, as he remarked in closing, no forecast of available cargo shipping for so many months ahead could be very accurate.

As it turned out, General Marshall had no occasion to go into the details of the Pacific plan with the President, nor to reargue the case against Gymnast, of which the operations staff, as instructed, prepared a new version. On 14 July the President sent word to Marshall that he did not approve the Pacific alternative, that he would confer with him Wednesday morning (15 July) and probably with all the members of the JCS in the afternoon, and that he had “definitely” decided to send him with Admiral King and Mr. Hopkins to London “immediately” (if possible on Thursday, 16 July). At the meeting of the JCS on the afternoon of 14 July Marshall read the message. General Wedemeyer took notes on the discussion that followed:

... it was indicated that unquestionably the President would require military operations in Africa. The relative merits of operations in Africa, in Northwest Africa, and in the Middle East were discussed. All agreed to the many arguments previously advanced among military men in the Army and Navy that operations in the Pacific would be the alternative if Sledgehammer or Bolero were not accepted wholeheartedly by the British. However, there was an acceptance that apparently our political system would require major operations this year in Africa.

The President objected to the very idea of delivering an ultimatum to the British. He made this perfectly clear to Stimson and Marshall upon his return to Washington on the 15th. He also held that it would be a mistake to try to defeat Japan first. He thought it would be impracticable until the U.S. Navy had been greatly strengthened. He also held it would be uneconomical to try to defeat Japan first, for much the same reason that the War Department held a Mediterranean offensive to be uneconomical—that it would not contribute to the defeat of Germany and would be unnecessary after the defeat of Germany. On 16 July he stated this view formally in his instructions to Hopkins, Marshall, and King on their mission to London:

9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German dom-

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\[\text{Memo, Somervell for CoS}, 14\ Jul\ 42,\ sub:\ \text{Opns in Pacific, Tab 11, Item 1, Exec 5.}\]

\[\text{1) OPD study, title: Effects of Gymnast on our Bsc Strategy, the second of seven studies in vol, title: Data Prepared by OPD, 15 Jul 42. Handy’s copy (No. 10) is filed Item 6, Exec 1. (2) OPD study, title: Comparison of Opn Gymnast with Opn Involving Reinforcement of Middle East ..., 15 Jul 42, Tab 4, Item 1, Exec 5.}\]

\[\text{2) Memo, Marshall for King, 15 Jul 42, no sub, WDCSA 381 War Plans (S).}\]

\[\text{Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 602.}\]
inination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.\textsuperscript{23}

**The Eastern Front and the Alternatives**

The President, on his return to Washington on 15 July, indicated that, as the JCS had inferred, he would require operations of some kind in Africa in case the British would not agree to carry out Sledgehammer. Of the various alternatives the JCS had discussed, he was apparently rather inclined to favor the reinforcement of the Middle East by several American divisions. On 15 July he gave General Marshall a preliminary statement of points to govern the negotiations in London. The first page of the President’s outline read as follows:

1. Proceed with Sledgehammer & stay in France if we can.
2. Get all U. S. Troops in action as quickly as possible.
3. Proceed in all other theater. as now planned.
4. Keep up aid to Russia but via Basra.

The second page read:

1. Abandon Sledgehammer 1942.
2. Slow up Bolero 1943 for the coming three months.
3. Take all planes now headed from U. S. to England & reroute them to (a) Middle East & Egypt (majority) (b) S. W. Pacific (minority).
4. Send 5 divisions to England slowly.
5. Send 5 divisions to Middle East fast.
6. Speed up Bolero preparations by October—so that Bolero Roundup will be ready April 1943.
7. Keep up aid to Russia, but via Basra.\textsuperscript{24}

Some of these points the War Department staff incorporated in a draft of instructions for the conference, which Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy and General Marshall in turn revised. The draft was addressed to Marshall and King (not Hopkins).\textsuperscript{25} The effect of the instructions proposed by the War Department, had the President adopted them, would have been simply to rule out any change in American commitments, or any action by American ground forces (aside from raids) across the Atlantic in 1942, except in case a collapse of Soviet resistance seemed imminent. The effect would also have been, in any event, to rule out operations against French North Africa. In short, the War Department proposed to stand pat.

**The President on the Alternatives**

The President was willing to give his representatives in London one more chance to persuade the British to undertake a cross-Channel operation in 1942, but not to put off a decision on an alternative operation across the Atlantic in case the Prime Minister held his ground. The President appreciated the doubts of his military leaders that the Prime Minister might not be any more willing to undertake an American-style cross-Channel operation in 1943 than


\textsuperscript{24} Two sheets of pencil notes on White House stationery, no sig, n.d., Item 35, Exec 10.

\textsuperscript{25} The War Department draft of instructions is quoted in full in Appendix B for comparison with the instructions issued on 16 July, discussed below in the text, and printed in Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 603–05.
ALTERNATE SETS OF SUGGESTIONS, IN PRESIDENT’S HANDWRITING,
given to General Marshall on 15 July 1942 to govern the negotiations at the London
conference. This was a rough draft; the final instructions were given to the Ameri-
can delegates the following day.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1. Abandon Nedaheimen 1942
2. New of Bolon 1943 for the coming three months.
3. Take all planes now headed from U.S. to England a month them.
   (a) Middle East or Egypt (majority)
   (b) N.W. Pacific (minority)
4. Send 5 divisions to England shortly.
5. Send 5 divisions to Middle East fast.
6. Speed up Bolon Air operations by October - so that Bolon P Framed will be ready April 1943.
7. Keep up and to Russia, but via Russia
in 1942, whatever his present professions. But he was not disposed to resolve these doubts by means of an ultimatum, which would indeed have been ill-adapted to the purpose of securing the “full,” “wholehearted” collaboration of the proud leader of a great people. Besides, he agreed with the Prime Minister that a diversion to the Mediterranean would not rule out a cross-Channel operation in 1943. Finally, his willingness to take a chance on future British intentions and on the consequences of

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26 For the President’s remarks on the point, see notes taken by Hopkins on the President’s conversation, on the evening of 15 July, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 602.

For British professions with reference to Round-up, see: (1) msg, War Cabinet Offs to Jt Stf Miss, Washington, 8 Jul 42, COS (W) 217, Tab 6, and (2) msg, Prime Minister to Dill, 12 Jul 42, Tab 5, both in Item 1, Exec 5. The second message is an answer to a letter from Sir John Dill noting that the decision not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER was likely to lead the Americans to turn to the Pacific. (For this ltr, n.d., code JSM 293, see WDCSA 381.) The Prime Minister in replying ignored the subject. After alluding to the case against SLEDGEHAMMER and recapitulating briefly the case for GYMNAST, he concluded: “However if the President decided against ‘Gymnast’ the matter is settled. It can only be done by troops under the American flag. The opportunity will have been definitely rejected. Both countries will remain motionless in 1942 and all will be concentrated on ‘Round-up’ in 1943.”

27 Sherwood observes, in this connection, that the President had the more reason to deal gently at this moment with the Prime Minister, because of the latter’s political difficulties at home, growing out of the defeats in Libya. (Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 601-02.)

28 Ibid., p. 603. The President was ‘prepared to accept’ a “substantial reduction in BOLERO for the next three months.”

The President had stated his view in his message to Field Marshal Dill: “‘Gymnast’ does not interrupt the vast preparations and training for ‘Round-up’ now proceeding on this side. It only means that 6 United States divisions will be withdrawn intact from ‘Round-up’. These might surely be replaced by new U. S. Divisions which would be ready before the transportation schedule is accomplished.” (Msg cited n. 26(2).)

a diversion from BOLERO was reinforced by his own determination to get “action” across the Atlantic, which he asked for in his instructions to Hopkins, Marshall, and King: “It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.”

Even these instructions did not in so many words “require military operations in Africa.” Instead, the President simply required that his emissaries in London should reach a decision. The inclusion of Mr. Hopkins as a member of the mission itself indicated that the mission had plenary powers, and the President inserted after the formal opening sentence a second paragraph, which explicitly stated the theme of decision:

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill’s visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

(a) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.
(b) Tentative plans for the year 1943 . . . .

The President then proceeded to eliminate the central idea of the draft instructions—that decisions should be left contingent on the outcome of operations on the Eastern Front. The first step in making the change was to introduce at once (as paragraph 3) the statement of principles that had appeared in the draft instructions as a basis for investigating the courses of action open “in the event Russian collapse becomes probable”:

3. (a) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.
(b) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

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29 Memo cited n. 23.
(c) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.
(d) All available U.S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.
(e) It is of the highest importance that U.S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

A second step was to rephrase the policy to be followed in supplying the USSR. In place of the bare reference to the continuation of shipments via the Persian Gulf and the suspension of the northern convoys, the President introduced a statement of good hopes and good intentions:

4. British and American materiel promises to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

A third step was to restate the draft provision with reference to SLEDGEHAMMER, which the American representatives were still to urge, but not as a contingent operation; they were instead directed (in paragraph 5): "You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent." A fourth change was in the provision for discussions in London in case the American representatives should conclude (and inform the President) that SLEDGEHAMMER was "impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purposes." The President's own statement of his views was not that the two nations in that case should go ahead with plans for ROUNDUP so long as it looked as if the Red Army could contain large German forces, but instead:

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time, and determine upon another place for U.S. Troops to fight in 1942.

The passages that followed did not explicitly limit the choice of "another place" for an operation in 1942. Instead, the President simply passed to the point that a cross-Channel operation in 1943 would apparently depend on the outcome of operations on the Eastern Front, and thence to the declaration (in paragraph 8): "The Middle East should be held as strongly possible whether Russia collapses or not." After calling attention to the numerous consequences of the loss of the Middle East, he concluded:

(8) You will determine the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely either or both of the following:

(a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.

(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.

The President then made his formal declaration of opposition to the Pacific alter-
native, and closed with the following ad-
monitions:

10. Please remember three cardinal prin-
ciples—speed of decision on plans, unity of
plans, attack combined with defense but not
defense alone. This affects the immediate
objective of U. S. ground forces fighting
against Germans in 1942.

11. I hope for total agreement within one
week of your arrival.84

The President’s representatives arrived in
London on Saturday, 18 July. They first
conferred with the Americans stationed
there—Admiral Stark, Lt. Gen. Dwight D.
Eisenhower, and General Spaatz. During
the first three days of their meetings with
the British in London (20–22 July) they
tried to persuade the British Chiefs of Staff
of the merits of a revised version of SLEDGE-
HAMMER that had been hurriedly worked
up by General Eisenhower’s staff—an oper-
ation to secure a foothold on the Cotentin
(Cherbourg) peninsula. They urged in its
favor the good effect at the very least of
heartening the Soviet Government by giv-
ing concrete evidence of an intention to en-
gage a part of the German Army at the first
moment, and the advantage of having a
starting point for operations in 1943. By
accepting the objective of securing a “per-
manent” lodgment on the Continent, on
which the British Government had insisted,
they evaded the chief political objection of
the Prime Minister only to run directly into
the most forcible objections of his Chiefs of
Staff. In short, they had at last to face the
fact that the British Government, in requiring
permanent landings, had set a condition
that the British Chiefs of Staff believed to
be impossible to satisfy. On 22 July, at a
conference attended by the Prime Minister
and his principal military leaders and ad-
visers, the American representatives ac-
knowledge[d] defeat.85

They reported the impasse to the Presi-
dent, who owned that he was not altogether
surprised and agreed that the matter might
as well be dropped. He directed them to
settle with the British on one of five alter-
natives, listing them in order of preference:
(1) a British-American operation against
French North Africa (either Algeria or
Morocco or both); (2) an entirely Ameri-
can operation against French Morocco
(GYMNAST); (3) combined operations
against northern Norway (JUPITER); (4)
the reinforcement of Egypt; (5) the rein-
forcement of Iran.86

A detailed account of the plans and discussions
appears in Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. I.
An important account told from the point of view
of the two leading participants is in Sherwood,

Important documents for the American case and
British views are: (1) min, Combined Stf
Conf . . ., 20 Jul 42, (2) paper, 21 Jul 42,
title: Reasons Supporting U. S. CsoS Proposals
Re Opn SLEDGEHAMMER, and (3) rev min, Com-
bined Stf Conf Held at No. 10 Downing St, 22
Jul 42, all with CCS 83 in ABC 381 BOLERO (3–16–
42), 2; and (4) memo, Marshall and King for
President, 28 Jul 42, no sub, WDCSA 319.1 (TS).

(1) Msg, Marshall to SW, 23 Jul 42, No. 576,
WDCSA SLEDGEHAMMER (SS). (2) Drafts of
rpt to President, 22 Jul 42, no sub, WDCSA 319.1
(TS). (3) Msg, President to Hopkins, Marshall,
and King, 23 Jul 42, WDCSA 381, 1. The Presi-
dent added the latest intelligence with reference to
North Africa. The American legation in Berne had
just passed on a report that the French were plan-
ing to strengthen the coastal and air defenses of
French Morocco; that an Allied force of perhaps
150,000 would be able to seize control of all air-
fields in French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia; and
that troops in French Morocco were likely to prove
more co-operative than those stationed farther east.

84 (1) Memo cited n. 25. (2) For the Presi-
dent’s opposition to the Pacific alternative see para-
graph 9, quoted above, pp. 272–73.
Roundup or Torch: CCS 94

In view of the persistence with which General Marshall had argued the case against GYMNAST, and the readiness with which he had modified his opposition to sending American forces to Egypt, it would have been consistent for him at this point to propose sending more American forces to the Middle East. The latest instructions he had from the President still listed it as an acceptable course of action. It was also the course that the War Department operations staff had recommended. In the series of briefs compiled on 15 July, the staff had compared the advantages and disadvantages of the two courses of action. The advantages of GYMNAST were that it would have a "shorter and more secure line of communication," would remove the threat of German operations in the South Atlantic, and would furnish bases for air operations in the Mediterranean. The disadvantages were that it involved opposed landings, without adequate port facilities, and would have little or no direct effect on any critical front of the war. The staff's conclusion was that the lesser of the two evils would be to reinforce the Middle East.37

But General Marshall and Admiral King turned away from the Middle East alternative, toward GYMNAST. They were undoubtedly influenced by a desire to avoid the political and tactical embarrassments that would unavoidably result from employing American divisions in any capacity in the Middle East.38 On this point, the Prime Minister was apparently in agreement, for unlike his Chiefs of Staff and in spite of the President's evident interest, he had never shown any desire to obtain American ground forces for the Middle East. Presumably Marshall also took account of the circumstance that a North African operation was the one operation that would have the full support of both the President and the Prime Minister—a very important consideration when it came to requisitioning ships, planes, and naval escort to carry out an operation—and of the fact that the Allied assault forces and the Allied commander would be American.

According to Mr. Hopkins, Marshall and King turned toward GYMNAST for two reasons: "first, because of the difficulty of mixing our troops with the British in Egypt, and secondly because if we go to Syria we may not do any fighting there."39 Their own explanation, given to the President as soon as they came back to Washington, was that they chose the alternative of operations in French North and Northwest Africa as the best line of action open in the event the Allies were compelled, by a dangerous weakening of Soviet resistance, to abandon the build-up for a strong cross-Channel attack in 1943. In their own words:

Nothing developed [in the discussions through 22 July] which changed our considered opinion that Great Britain is the only area from which the combined strength of the United Nations can be brought to bear against our principal enemy—Germany, so that no avoidable reduction in our preparation for ROUNDUP should be considered as long as there remains any reasonable possibility of its successful execution. A Russian

37 (1) OPD study, 15 Jul 42, title: Comparison of Opn GYMNAST with Opn Involving Reinforcement of Middle East . . . , Tab 4, Item 1, Exec 5. (2) The operations chief, General Handy, later in the summer still recommended sending the equivalent of a corps to the Middle East in preference to undertaking TORCH in some of its forms. Msg, Handy to Marshall, 22 Aug 42, CM-IN 8444 (8/23/42). (3) See also p. 290, below.

38 For a brief allusion to these embarrassments, see above, pp. 198–99.

39 Msg, Hopkins to President, 24 Jul 42, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.
collapse this Fall or a termination of the present campaign leaving Russia relatively impotent and incapable of offensive action would, however, make the objective of a continental operation in 1943 impossible of attainment. In this event the United Nations are forced to a defensive, encircling line of action against Germany for the coming year unless a crackup in German morale, of which there is no present indication, should occur unexpectedly. Combined operations against the West and Northwest Coasts of Africa for the purpose indicated above is the logical line of action in this alternative.\(^\text{40}\)

Thus, in effect, General Marshall and Admiral King reverted to the characteristic feature of Marshall's initial agreement with the British Chiefs of Staff on their June visit to Washington, a feature that the President had eliminated from the draft instructions of 15 July—the idea of waiting a while to see what happened on the Eastern Front before deciding to divert forces from Bolero.

On 24 July Marshall and King proposed this approach to the British Chiefs of Staff. They proposed in the first place to go on planning a cross-Channel operation on a large scale (Roundup) to be executed by 1 July 1943. They took note of the decision that Sledgehammer, the cross-Channel operation for 1942, was "not to be undertaken as a scheduled operation." To satisfy the objections to it which had been advanced by the British staff during the previous month, they proposed that preparations for it be continued only in so far as they did not "seriously interfere with training for Round-Up."

In the second place, Marshall and King proposed for 1942 "a combined operation against the North and Northwest Coast of Africa,"\(^\text{41}\) but not as a simple alternative to cross-Channel operations for the year within the framework of the accepted strategy of Bolero. They proposed instead:

That it be understood that a commitment to this operation renders Round-Up, in all probability impracticable of successful execution in 1943 and therefore that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for the CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN THEATER, except as to air operation.

They proposed that the decision whether to abandon Roundup and to accept the strategic defensive be put off till 15 September, and be made then on the basis of the probable course of the war in Russia as it would affect the prospects for successful invasion of the Continent in the first half of 1943.\(^\text{41}\)

The memorandum of the American Chiefs was discussed and adopted, with amendments, by the American and British Chiefs of Staff, meeting as the CCS. Admiral Pound tended to agree with General Marshall and Admiral King that Gymnast, as the operation in North and Northwest Africa was still called, was inconsistent with Roundup. General Sir Alan Brooke and Air Marshal Portal did not agree that the two operations were inconsistent.

In the memorandum as adopted, submitted to the Prime Minister, and published as CCS 94, the statement of implications was modified so as to allow for the British view that an operation in French North Africa meant no break in the continuity of combined strategy. In this version blockade was included with air operations as an exception to the defensive strategy.

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\(^{40}\) Memo cited n. 35(4).

\(^{41}\) Memo, U. S. CsofS for Br CsofS, 24 Jul 42, circulated as Annex to min, 32d mtg CCS (held in London on the same day), with CCS 94 in ABC 381 (7-25-42), 1.
egy involved in undertaking operations in North and Northwest Africa, and the qualifying clause was added:

... that the organization, planning, and training, for eventual entry in the Continent should continue so that this operation can be staged should a marked deterioration in German military strength become apparent, and the resources of the United Nations, available after meeting other commitments, so permit. 42

As corollaries of the defensive strategy, if accepted, the American Chiefs proposed releasing fifteen U.S. air groups committed to BOLERO and, probably, shipping for the movement of a division to the Southwest Pacific. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed. Finally, the American Chiefs proposed and the British agreed to fix a pair of limiting dates— the latest practicable dates for launching the operation and for beginning to assemble shipping, escort, and troops. They agreed that 1 December 1942 was the latest practicable date for launching the operation; the other date was to be determined after study. Neither the memorandum as proposed, nor as adopted, nor the recorded discussion by the CCS dealt with the critical question whether this undetermined date might be earlier than 15 September, the limiting date for the decision not to undertake ROUNDUP.

The memorandum, as proposed and as adopted, specified that combined plans be worked up at once. The CCS directed the British Joint Planners to prepare an outline plan with all haste. It was agreed, as proposed by the American Chiefs, that U.S. heavy and medium bomber units in the United Kingdom would be available for the operation as needed, and that American forces committed to the operation would require British assistance. In the memorandum as proposed nothing more specific was said about British troops. In the discussion of the memorandum General Marshall stated that though assault troops should all be American, later military operations to the eastward, inside the Mediterranean, according to the American understanding, would be carried out mainly by British forces. 43 A provision to this effect was incorporated by the CCS. Discussion also made it clear that all were agreed on the need to name at once a commander for the projected operation. 44

Reconvening the following day (25 July), the CCS gave the code name TORCH to the operation and took up arrangements for command and for staff planning. They readily agreed on the appointment of an American TORCH commander, with headquarters in London, to be responsible to the CCS for all training and planning for TORCH and, until it should be decided to mount TORCH, for SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP as well. On his arrival, the nucleus of the commander’s staff would be formed in London by a group of British and U. S. staff planners, but until the decision should actually be made to mount TORCH, he should not have operational command. 45

42 Memo by CCS, 24 Jul 42, sub: Ops in 1942/43, circulated as CCS 94, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 1.

43 It was on this basis that OPD officers in Washington were at this time redrafting studies of the operation, which was therefore once more assuming the aspect of SUPER-GYMNAST. See section, “TORCH: The Time and The Place,” pp. 284 ff., below.

44 Besides provisions mentioned above, CCS 94 provided that in case the British Chiefs of Staff should decide to move an armored division to the Middle East, it should be an American armored division from the United States, to be shipped in British bottoms. This provision was part of the memorandum as proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

45 Min, 33d mtg CCS (London), 25 Jul 42.
The Decision To Invade French North Africa

The first report sent back by Hopkins, on 24 July, of the turn taken toward GYMNAST included a request that the President should express his own ideas by cable. The President at once replied in favor of landing in North Africa as soon as possible, "in order to forestall air concentrations by the Germans." \(^{46}\) On the same day General Marshall and Admiral King sent to the President a message transmitting the substance of their agreement with the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 94). \(^{47}\)

On 25 July, Hopkins again summoned the President's aid, this time asking the President to name a date for the invasion, not later than 30 October 1942. He explained:

Although I believe that the intention here is to mount the operation aggressively, unless the written language of the orders is precise there may be difficulties when it comes to carrying out the orders by the secondary personnel. \(^{48}\)

The President at once adopted this cavalier approach to the carefully qualified agreement embodied in CCS 94. He sent word that the target date for the landings should be not later than 30 October 1942. He explained:

Although I believe that the intention here is to mount the operation aggressively, unless the written language of the orders is precise there may be difficulties when it comes to carrying out the orders by the secondary personnel. \(^{48}\)

By simply ignoring CCS 94, the President created a curious situation, which the CCS recognized at their meeting on 30 July, their first meeting after the return of Marshall and King from London. Admiral Leahy, who (for the first time) sat as the senior American representative, opened the discussion of CCS 94 by suggesting that the date of launching TORCH should be advanced as far as possible. \(^{51}\) He gave it as his impression:

. . . that both the President and the Prime Minister now firmly believe that the decision to undertake TORCH has already been reached and that all preliminary arrangements are proceeding as rapidly as possible in order that the operation may be undertaken at the earliest possible date.

Sir John Dill said that he, too, understood that the decision had been made and would be carried out as quickly as possible. \(^{52}\) General Marshall did not consider the final de-

\(^{46}\) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.
\(^{47}\) Msg, Marshall and King to President, 24 Jul 42, CM-IN 8566.
\(^{48}\) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.
\(^{49}\) Msg, President to Hopkins, Marshall, and King, 25 Jul 42, WDCSA 381, 1 (SS).

\(^{50}\) Min, 34th mtg CCS, 30 Jul 42.
cision to have been made. He carefully brought the discussion back to the thesis he and Admiral King had posed—that a decision to mount TORCH would be a decision to abandon ROUNDUP. He was now trying simply to get the President and the Prime Minister to acknowledge that this was so, and not to evade or postpone a decision. He stated that the staff was now at work on a study “of all implications of TORCH with a view toward recommending that the operation be launched at the earliest possible moment.” He conceded that a decision between TORCH and ROUNDUP should come “almost immediately because of the logistic considerations involved”—specifically the conversion of ships for combat loading, which, according to a “flash estimate” by the staff, would mean a lapse of over three months (ninety-six days) between a decision and the landings in Africa. Since a decision could not be postponed till mid-September, it would not take the form of a decision to abandon ROUNDUP and, as a corollary, to undertake TORCH. Instead it would take the form of a decision to undertake TORCH and, as a corollary, to abandon ROUNDUP.

Admiral King adopted the same approach, saying that it was “his impression that the President and Prime Minister had not yet reached an agreement to abandon ROUNDUP in favor of TORCH.” He, too, believed that the “whole case” should be presented to the President and the Prime Minister, including the problem—a corollary to TORCH as it had been to GYMNAST, as he and General Marshall both warned—of maintaining the security of the British Isles against invasion.

Admiral Leahy had little choice but to announce “he would now tell the President that a definite decision was yet to be made.” He believed it would be “acceptable” to wait a week, as Marshall and King proposed, for the results of the staff study under way, so long as the result would be “a definite decision, with the date of landing set.” The CCS agreed that they would then report to the President and Prime Minister “recommending any necessary change in the date for the decision to mount TORCH.”

The President promptly forestalled this last move to bring to his attention the “implications” of launching an invasion of North Africa. On the evening of 30 July he concluded the series of deliberations initiated by the Prime Minister over two months before with the following announcement:

The PRESIDENT stated very definitely that he, as Commander-in-Chief, had made the decision that TORCH would be undertaken at the earliest possible date. He considered that this operation was now our principal objective and the assembling of means to carry it out should take precedence over other operations as, for instance, BOLERO. He mentioned the desirability of sending a message immediately to the Prime Minister advising him that he (the President), as Commander-in-Chief, had made this decision and requesting his agreement since we are now, as far as the record in [sic] concerned, committed to the provisions of C. C. S. 94, which calls for

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53 For a specific statement on the point, see pers ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 30 Jul 42, in G. C. M. file under Eisenhower, D. D.

54 Min cited n. 52.

For the “flash estimate” cf. msg, Br Jt Stf Miss for Br CsofS, 31 Jul 42, JSM 329 (ref COS (W) 233), Tab 73, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. According to this message, the JPS had hurriedly guessed that a landing on the west coast of North Africa could be made by 30 October.

55 Min cited n. 52.

56 Ibid.
the final decision to be made by September 15th.57

* The Time and The Place 58

The President’s decision for Torch did away with the need for a report from the CCS “recommending any necessary change in the date for the decision to mount Torch.” But there remained the question, then under study: What was the “earliest possible date” for landing in North Africa? Was it in fact sound, from a military point of view, to plan on landings by 30 October at the latest, according to the suggestion sent back from London by Hopkins and adopted by the President? Being told that the CCS were going to report on this question, the President agreed to await their recommendation before communicating with the Prime Minister.59 On 2 August the War Department staff confirmed the “flash estimate” to which Marshall had referred in the CCS meeting of 30 July, and gave the Navy’s estimate that 7 November was “the earliest reasonable date for landing of the force based on availability of combat loaders.”60 On 4 August the British Chiefs of Staff set a provisional target date of 7 October.61 On the same day Marshall and King put the American estimate before the President, tacitly conceding that the American and British staffs were not in agreement nor likely to agree.62 They recommended that he should ask the Prime Minister to concur in an operation for 7 November.63 The President took the matter under advisement.64

The difference between the American and British estimates went beyond a simple difference in calculations of the time necessary to convert and assemble troopships for the assault. Nine of the transports being modified for combat loading would be ready by 15 September, the tenth by 1 October. One additional Navy combat loader would be available by 10 October. But the boat crews and the landing troops would still be unprepared. The War Department staff had allowed time not only to convert ships but also to complete amphibious training with rehearsals in which the boat crews and the assault troops would use the ships as-

57 Memo, Gen Smith for JCS, 1 Aug 42, sub: Notes of Conf Held at White House at 8:30 P. M., July 30, 1942, Tab 14, Item 1, Exec 5. Admiral Leahy, Generals Arnold and Smith, and the President’s naval aide, Captain McCrea, were at this meeting. For other topics discussed at the meeting, see below, (Ch. XIII.)

58 The timing of the British offensive in the Libyan Desert (Lightfoot) and the congressional elections of November 1942 apparently were not taken into account explicitly in the selection of the final target date for Torch. For evidence on these points, see Appendix C, below.

60 Memo cited n. 57.

61 Msg, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 4 Aug 42 (COS (W) 236), WDCSA Torch, 1.


63 Memo, Marshall and King for President, 4 Aug 42, no sub, WDCSA Torch, 1. This memorandum, like the one cited immediately above, was drafted by OPD and went to the President via the Navy Department.

64 (1) Memo, Leahy for Marshall, 5 Aug 42, no sub. This memorandum contains questions of the President on the above cited memorandum to him on Torch. (2) Memo, Marshall for President, 6 Aug 42, sub: Torch. This memorandum gives the answers. Both memos in Tab 18, Item 1, Exec 5. (3) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Aug 42, CM-OUT 1632.
signed to them for the operation. General Marshall himself insisted on such rehearsals, this being a point the British were ready to sacrifice for the sake of speed. Still another factor was the time needed to train the 2d Armored Division and the tank battalions attached to the 3d and 9th Divisions. These units were not due to be equipped with the M4 tank, which they would use in battle, until 17 September. In calling attention to this point, the staff warned against the dangers of improvised expeditions and alluded to the “disasters” suffered “by the British in Norway, France, the Balkans, and in Crete.”

The disagreement over the target date for Torch was symptomatic of disagreement over the scope of the operation, its objective, and the risks to be taken. The British planners envisaged initial landings on a wide front in the Mediterranean, eastward at least as far as Algiers, to be followed by forces strong enough to advance into Tunisia. They estimated that the Torch ground forces would finally amount to between ten and twelve divisions. The operation would be timed and aimed to secure the coast of Algeria and Tunisia before the coming of winter on the Eastern Front should have eased German needs for troops in Russia. According to this plan, landings on the Atlantic coast would not come at the same time as the landings inside the Mediterranean, but about three weeks later. The British doubted that forces could land against opposition on the Atlantic coast, where there was usually a heavy surf. And they doubted that the forces landed on the Atlantic coast would be of much help to the “main” operation for some time, since they would be held back by limited port facilities and poor land communications with the Mediterranean coast.

During the second half of July, in response to the negotiations in London, the American staff in Washington had changed over from the assumptions of Gymnast (an all American force landing at Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco) to the assumptions of Super-Gymnast (which also involved British occupation initially involving some 80,000 American troops, who would land and establish themselves in the vicinity of Algiers, seize the city, and then drive quickly eastward toward Tunis, while British forces, landing on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco, should move southward to seize Dakar. (See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.) Apparently the President, like the British, considered the landings on the Atlantic coast to be almost entirely irrelevant to the success of the “main” operation inside the Mediterranean.

* (1) Memo, OPD for CofS, 6 Aug 42, sub: Torch, Tab 21, Item 1, Exec 5. (This memo consists of comments on msg cited n. 61.) (2) Draft study, title: Torch, n.d., Tab 21. (3) Study, Wedemeyer for JFS, 10 Aug 42, no title, Tab 71. (4) Memo, OPD for CoFS, 18 Aug 42, sub: Effect of Different Dates on Strength of Effort in Sp Opn, Tab 69. Last three in ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-B.

** (1) Note, Handy for Wedemeyer, on memo, Secy JPS for JFS, 11 Aug 42, sub: Projected Opns, transmitting study cited n. 65(3). (2) Msg cited n. 61.

*** OPD draft memo [CofS for President], n.d., sub: Date of Torch Landing Opns, Tab 70, ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-B. Cf, memo cited n. 65(1). This contained the statement that the War Department was determined Torch should not be like the battles of Norway and Bull Run.

** The version of the British Chiefs was rather like that of the President, expounded in his cable of 24 July to Hopkins. The President envisaged an operation initially involving some 80,000 American troops, who would land and establish themselves in the vicinity of Algiers, seize the city, and then drive quickly eastward toward Tunis, while British forces, landing on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco, should move southward to seize Dakar. (See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.) Apparently the President, like the British, considered the landings on the Atlantic coast to be almost entirely irrelevant to the success of the “main” operation inside the Mediterranean.

* (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 31 Jul 42, CM-IN 10945. (2) Msg, same to same, 1 Aug 42, CM-IN 0472. (3) Msg, same to same, 2 Aug 42, CM-IN 0796. (4) Msgs, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 4 Aug 42, COS (W) 235 and COS (W) 237, WDCSA Torch, 1. (5) For the current British version of Torch, see OPD study, 7 Aug 42, ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-A.
troops and simultaneous landings inside the Mediterranean at Oran and Algiers). They realized that the strategic aim of the operation would be correspondingly more ambitious—"Eventual establishment of bases and additional forces for offensive operations against LIBYA and ITALY." But they still thought of Casablanca as the "principal port of debarkation during the early stages of the operation." By relying on Casablanca, the American staff hedged against the risk of heavy losses in ships and escort vessels that might be incurred in supplying the expedition entirely through Mediterranean ports and against the risk of a military debacle in case of rapidly developing strong opposition. As a corollary, both the speed and scale of operations in Algeria and eastward into Tunisia would initially be sharply restricted by the limited port facilities on the Atlantic and the slender overland communications. British staff members conceded that an operation planned on these terms might be sounder—given a defensive purpose.

The 9 August Plan

It fell to General Eisenhower to try to reconcile the divergent views of the operation. Just before he left London for Washington, General Marshall, on the afternoon of 26 July, had personally informed General Eisenhower that he was to be the Allied commander of the expedition to North Africa. General Marshall had added that it would take a little while before the appointment would be made official, but that, in the meantime, Eisenhower was to proceed promptly with the necessary planning. Eisenhower was formally designated Commander in Chief.

70 The July studies were drafted by the War Department planners on the "working level," who then had gone over them with their associates in the Navy Department and the British Joint Staff Mission. The officers directly concerned were Brig. Gen. John E. Hull (concurrently the head of the European Theater Section in OPD and senior Army representative on the BOLERO Combined Committee and the JUSSC), Col. George A. Smith, Jr., and Maj. William H. Baumer, Jr. (members of the Future Operations Section of the Strategy and Policy Group of OPD, in which the basic studies were prepared), Capt. F. F. Thomas (head of the Atlantic Section of the Navy's Plans Division) and Maj. E. H. Baume (British Joint Staff Mission).

71 (1) The July studies are in Item 6, Exec 1, Tab F, and incl development file. (2) Cf. draft memo, OPD for CofS, 27 Jul 42, sub: Tr Mvmts to Africa, Item 56, Exec 10.

72 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 1 Aug 42, CM-IN 0472.
THE ELIMINATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES

Allied Expeditionary Force, in early August 1942.\textsuperscript{74} Even before his status as the Allied commander of the North African expedition was clarified, Eisenhower and his staff went to work, in close collaboration with the British, on an outline plan. The War Department reminded him that landings on the Atlantic coast were in the American view essential and should come at the same time as the landings on the Mediterranean coast.\textsuperscript{75}

Eisenhower's first outline plan, finished on 9 August, incorporated the principles of simultaneous landings and of a landing date early in November. The plan did take account of the British warning against landings on the Atlantic coast. It provided that should the condition of the surf prevent landing there, the Casablanca task force should land inside the Mediterranean instead.\textsuperscript{76}

The British planners had already objected to the plan, since it did not satisfy their principal condition: "We must have occupied the key points of Tunisia within 26 days of passing Gibraltar and preferably within 14 days." For this purpose they were prepared to assign one corps (with a high proportion of armored units) and some fifteen squadrons of planes (four to five groups) to the operation against Tunisia. They therefore believed that the landings on the Atlantic coast should have a lower priority than the landings in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{77}

General Eisenhower was disposed to agree with the British planners, as he explained to General Marshall in sending on their appreciation. He had cut out the landings eastward of Algiers, except for a landing by a regimental combat team at Bone (to seize the airfield), since those landings would be exposed to attack by planes based on Sicily and Sardinia. He had also concluded that the landings on the Atlantic coast must be postponed "a few days," for lack of air support. There were not enough aircraft

\textsuperscript{74} For the directive, approved by the CCS on 13 Aug 42, see Incl A, CCS 103/1, 27 Aug 42, title: Opn TORCH.

\textsuperscript{75} Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Aug 42, CM-OUT 0728. The message had been shown to Admiral Cooke, and Admiral King concurred in it.

\textsuperscript{76} Draft Outline Plan (Partial) Opn TORCH, Hq ETOUSA, 9 Aug 42, copy in ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-A. The plan was "prepared jointly by a British-American group of planners."

\textsuperscript{77} Brief of Appreciation of Opn TORCH, Br Jt Plng Stf, copy forwarded with pers ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 Aug 42, Tab 25a, Item 1, Exec 5.
carriers to cover landings both “inside” and “outside” the Mediterranean, nor could the lack be made up by using Gibraltar as an advance base, since it would be a “dead give-away” to concentrate planes there before the invasion:

The airfield there literally lies on the Spanish border and there is no hope of concealing activity from spies and agents. Because of the limitations upon the Gibraltar airfield, planes cannot be passed through at a sufficient rate to meet minimum demands on both the north and west coasts, assuming reasonable success in seizing airdromes.78

The British Chiefs, to whom the August outline plan was presented informally, reiterated the British objections to the American version of the operation. They reasserted that the British purpose was the invasion of Tunisia. “Indeed it can be said,” concluded the British Chiefs, “that the whole conception of ‘Torch’ may stand or fall on this question of early Allied occupation of Tunisia.” In order to advance quickly into Tunisia, it was necessary to land as far east as Bône. In order to land so far east, it was necessary to postpone the landing at Casablanca as both unfeasible and irrelevant. The ultimate success of the whole operation would necessarily depend rather on the unpreparedness of the Germans than on the effectiveness of the expedition itself. It was only consistent to attack as soon as the expedition could be assembled, sacrificing training for speed.79

The 21 August Plan

The criticism by the British Chiefs of Staff of the 9 August outline plan had two immediate results. On 12 August the President directed Marshall and King to have the project restudied, stating that it might become desirable or necessary to launch the operation on 7 October, as proposed by the British Chiefs, even with only one third the forces that could be used a month later.80 The second result of British criticism was that on 13 August General Eisenhower informed the War Department that the American members of his staff were now convinced of the soundness of the British reasoning. Therefore they were drawing up a new plan in which they were eliminating the landings at Casablanca and moving up the date.81 On 14 August he asked what General Marshall thought of this new version of Torch.82 In reply, Marshall stated the Washington view to be that the operation as it was now proposed would have less than a fifty-fifty chance of success.83 Eisenhower replied that he concurred in the Washington estimate, in view of various logistical and political factors. It was also the estimate of his deputy, General Clark, and of General

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78 Pers ltr cited n. 77. Eisenhower at first wrote that the landings on the Atlantic coast should come “five to ten days later . . .,” then changed it to “a few days.”

79 (1) Memo, Br CsofS, 11 Aug 42, transmitted by pers ltr, Ismay to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 42. (2) See also Br CsofS min in COS (42), 85th mtg (O), and part of COS (42), 233d mtg, min 4, 11 Aug 42. Both in WDCSA Torch, 1.
Patton, who was then in London to confer on plans for the task force under his command that would sail direct from the United States. But they all believed that there was nevertheless a better than fair chance of success if Spain were to stay neutral and the French were not to put up effective resistance.\(^{84}\)

Planning went ahead in London on the basis of the British concept of TORCH, and a second outline plan was worked out.\(^{85}\) The second outline plan was finished on 21 August and circulated on 25 August. The date of landings was moved to 15 October, this being itself admittedly tentative. The objective of the operation was in these plans defined as follows:

A Combined land, sea, and air Assault against the Mediterranean Coast of ALGERIA, with a view to the earliest possible occupation of TUNISIA, and the establishment in FRENCH MOROCCO of a striking force which can insure control of the STRAITS of GIBRALTAR, by moving rapidly, if necessary, into SPANISH MOROCCO.\(^{86}\)

The assault forces, with supporting troops and air force ground elements, were to be brought in two convoys: one from the United States, to land forces at Oran; one from the United Kingdom, which would split in the Mediterranean, the main force landing at Algiers, and a small force at Bône. Combat-loaded troops for the three landings were to amount to about eight regimental combat teams: four at Oran, three at Algiers, and one at Bône. The plan called for an initial Western Force of 39,400, all elements included, and an estimated total Western Force of about 250,000, including two armored and five infantry divisions. As tentatively estimated, four divisions, two American and two British, with other troops in proportion, would make up the Eastern Force, from the United Kingdom.

General Eisenhower's comment on the 21 August plan was that in several ways it must be regarded as tentative: the date was probably too early; planning for the task force of General Patton, which was to land at Oran, was not far advanced; too little was known to be at all sure of the schedules for United States convoys and for building up the U. S. air force in the American sector. Besides, Eisenhower observed, more thorough study of available naval support was requiring the reduction of the forces contemplated to the point where they were no longer strong enough to deal with resistance that could be offered, and would at the same time do less to discourage resistance. Furthermore, the expedition would be badly exposed on the flank. It was, he declared, his personal opinion that simultaneous landings inside the Mediterranean and at Casablanca would make a great difference, supposing the two governments could find any way to cut their commitments elsewhere so as to provide the additional naval cover to make the landings possible.\(^{87}\)

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\(^{84}\) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Aug 42, CM-IN 5608.

\(^{85}\) For Patton's selection as the commander of the task force to be embarked directly from the United States, and for his trip to London, see: (1) tel conv, Gen Hull with Gen Patton, 1045, 30 Jul 42, Book 6, Exec 8, and (2) msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 31 Jul 42, CM-OUT 9255.

\(^{86}\) For the story of planning in August in London on TORCH, see Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa, Ch. II.

\(^{87}\) (1) Ltr, Eisenhower to Ismay (for CCS), 22 Aug 42, submitting the outline plan and calling attention to his comments as commander in chief of the operation, to be submitted for consideration with it, Incl A to CCS 103, 25 Aug 42. (2) Ltr, Eisenhower to CCS, 23 Aug 42, Incl C to CCS 103.
Objective of Torch

During the week that preceded the issuance of this second outline plan, no one in Washington had had an exact idea what form the plan was taking. General Handy had therefore been sent to London when the second plan was nearly ready, and there represented the views of General Marshall and his staff in the discussions that followed. On 22 August he sent a full report to Washington. Handy, like Eisenhower, emphasized the weakness of the operation and the threat to its flank. He concluded that the 21 August outline plan was too risky, and that Torch should either be given up or be replanned with modest, limited ends. He continued that with continental or Pacific operations out of the question, there were still three courses of action preferable to the plans as they stood. The best, if naval forces could somehow be found, would be to carry out Torch, as Eisenhower had recommended, with simultaneous landings inside and outside the Mediterranean. The next best would be to send General Patton’s task force to the Middle East. This course of action would formally satisfy the President’s condition that American troops go into action against the Germans. Should neither of these courses of action be feasible, there was still a third: to limit the purpose of Torch.

If the operation were replanned with limited ends, Handy observed, Torch would still provide for landings inside and outside the Mediterranean, though not in enough force to give much chance of occupying the north coast of Africa and finally of opening the Mediterranean. Plans should still be based on the date of 7 November rather than of 15 October, mainly so that the United States could furnish more of the troops to be used, and those troops better trained. Even such an operation was to be preferred to that currently proposed in London and set forth in the second outline plan: such an operation did not run the risk of a “major debacle.” Handy’s final sentence summed up the view of the War Department staff: it was better to take a chance on the surf at Casablanca than on the closing of the Strait of Gibraltar. General Eisenhower and General Clark agreed with Handy, with the important reservation that they still thought it better to go ahead with the operation as currently planned if the French and Spanish could be expected to acquiesce. In London, as in Washington, the operation was regarded as very risky. Handy reported, as Eisenhower had the week before, that while the American officers were energetic, they were nonetheless pessimistic; they were giving the operation a less than even chance of succeeding.
The American staff officers in Washington were not part of the combined staff charged with Torch planning, and therefore were not inhibited by the existing directive issued to Eisenhower from taking a position of their own. The directive had provided for a decisive move against the German and Italian forces in North Africa. The opening sentence read:

The President and the Prime Minister have agreed that combined military operations be directed against Africa, as early as practicable, with a view to gaining, in conjunction with Allied Forces in the Middle East, complete control of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea.

The directive provided for the initial establishment

... of firm and mutually supported lodgements in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area on the north coast, and in the Casablanca area on the northwest coast, in order that appropriate bases for continued and intensified air, ground and sea operations will be readily available. 91

The operational plans being made in terms of available resources were no longer in keeping with the objectives thus defined. The British had already moved to eliminate the contemplated landings in the area of Casablanca, or, properly speaking, to postpone them and leave them contingent, in order to provide the necessary naval support for landings inside the Mediterranean, on the ground that the latter could not be abandoned without abandoning the objective itself. According to the War Department, the step they had taken was illogical. 92

The British staff had in fact arrived at the conclusion that the circumstances which had led to taking it—that less was available than had been assumed at first—required that the objective itself be redefined. The chance of reaching the objective originally set was altered quite as much by eliminating one phase as by eliminating the other. The War Department staff therefore proposed limiting the objective to “the early and complete military domination of Northwest Africa from Rio de Oro, exclusive, to Oran, inclusive.” Within these limits, the operation would initially establish “firm and mutually supporting lodgements in the Agidir [sic]—Marrakech—Casablanca—Rabat—Fez area in French Morocco and in the Oran—Mostaganem—Mascara area in Algeria.” 93 On 25 August the JCS proposed such a directive, which became the starting point for a new series of discussions. 94 As Handy pointed out, this was in effect the third course of action that he had proposed. 95

91 Directive for CinC, Allied Expeditionary Force, as approved at 36th mtg CCS, 13 Aug 42, Tab 26a, Item 1, Exec 5.

92 The difference between London and Washington over objectives was accompanied by different estimates of enemy intentions. In commenting on the draft manuscript of this volume, Colonel Baumer, who as a member of OPD had been directly involved in Torch planning, concluded that this difference was decisive. (Ltr, Col Baumer to Gen Ward, 17 Apr 51, OCMH Files.) But it is doubtful whether the War Department was greatly influenced by G-2. In this, as in other cases—compare for example, the decision whether to support the British after the first battle of El Alamein, discussed above in Ch. XI, pp. 251 ff.—General Marshall and the planners appear to have asked themselves simply whether the chance should be taken, and to have made up their minds without being much influenced by intelligence estimates.

93 OPD study, n.d., sub: Ultimate Objective of Torch Opns, Tab 28, Item 1, Exec 5.

94 See (1) memo, Smith for Secy, Br Jt Stf Miss, 25 Aug 42, sub: Directive for Opn Torch, Tab 76, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B (this forwards the text of the new directive proposed by the JCS requesting that it be transmitted to the British Chiefs of Staff, in London, for approval); (2) msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 25 Aug 42, CM-OUT 7500; and (3) msg, same to same, 25 Aug 42, CM-OUT 7858.

95 The original directive of 13 August, the proposed directive, and the reply of the British Chiefs of Staff were circulated as CCS 103/1, 27 Aug 42.

The British Chiefs of Staff now declared themselves willing to put off the operation till November so as to be able to land in three places, with additional naval escort, as Eisenhower had recommended on 23 August to the CCS and as Handy had recommended on 22 August to Marshall. Eisenhower reported that he had not encouraged them to expect that the additional naval escort could be obtained. Marshall replied that it could not be provided.

The British staffs in London and Washington were as strongly opposed to the modified directive of the JCS as they had been to the first outline plan (of 9 August) and as the War Department had been to the second outline plan (of 21 August). The British position was that the limited operation, even though it at first risked less, ran in the end the same risks, without any prospect of gain. The JCS reiterated that it did not run the two risks that must not be run—prolonged attrition at a high rate to shipping and escort vessels, and a disaster involving American arms, which would have the most serious effects all over the world.

At this point the President and the Prime Minister intervened and within a week agreed on a definite version of the operation. On 30 August, replying to a message from the Prime Minister, the President confirmed the demand for a landing on the Atlantic coast, and recognized that currently only one other initial landing seemed possible. The President proposed, however, that the two governments reconsider economies in use of naval escort so as to provide for a third landing. If it still could not be made, the President expected to be able to arrange for an unopposed landing at Algiers within a week after the other landings. The President was still hoping for an early date.

The Prime Minister and his staff remained full of misgivings and very reluctant to abandon the landings at Algiers.

In view of this response the President, on the recommendation of the JCS, proposed a reduction in the Oran force in order to

96 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall and OPD, 24 Aug 42, CM-IN 9341. Eisenhower noted that the British Chiefs were relying on the President's statement that TORCH and the convoys for the USSR should take precedence over all other operations.

97 Msg cited n. 94(3). The Navy, facing the Japanese attack in the Solomons, had no ships to spare. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff at the same time failed to consider favorably Handy's recommendation to send Patton's task force to the Middle East.


There were doubtless individual British staff members with different opinions. (For one instance, see memo, Marshall to Hopkins, 29 Aug 42, Tab 34, Item 1, Exec 5.)

It is to be noted that American opinion was less than unanimous. Eisenhower's own position was that the proposed directive would put American troops in action with the least risk, but did not pro-

vide, as the second outline plan did, for a "worth while strategic purpose." (Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 25 Aug 42, CM-IN 9526.) Admiral Cooke took a position rather like that of the British. He envisaged definite political commitments to guarantee Spanish neutrality. (See memo, Cooke for King, 29 Aug 42, sub: TORCH Opn and atchd memo, Cooke for King, 29 Aug 42, no sub, Tab 43, Item 1, Exec 5.)

99 (1) Memo, Leahy for Marshall and King, 31 Aug 42, transmitting text of msg sent by President to Prime Minister, 30 Aug, WDCSA TORCH, 1. (2) For Marshall's draft of reply to Prime Minister, see pers ltr, Marshall to Hopkins, 29 Aug 42, Tabs 33, 34, Item 1, Exec 5.

Substantively, the President's message differed in two respects from the text of Marshall: in setting a definite limiting date of 30 October for the landings, with the hope expressed that they might be as early as 14 October; and in proposing the re-examination of the problem of finding naval support for the landing at Algiers.

100 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Chief OPD, 31 Aug 42, CM-IN 12132. (2) Msg, Prime Minister to President (142), 1 Sep 42, Tab 38, Item 1, Exec 5.
provide one regimental combat team as part of a force to land at Algiers.\textsuperscript{101} The Prime Minister and his staff finding this still inadequate, the JCS on 3 September recommended, and the President on 4 September proposed, a similar reduction in the force for Casablanca.\textsuperscript{102} On 5 September

\textsuperscript{101} Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 2 Sep 42, CM-OUT 0679 (R).

\textsuperscript{102} See msg, Prime Minister to President, 3 Sep 42 (replying to 182), quoted in msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 3 Sep 42, CM-IN 1095.

The definite fixing of the size of the Algiers force remained in the text as sent only as a result of the last minute intervention of the Chief of Staff, who wanted the message sent as soon as possible, so that Eisenhower or Clark would not have to come to Washington, as the British were then suggesting, to go over the whole matter. (Memo, CofS for Leahy, 4 Sep 42, Tab 42, Item 1, Exec 5.)

\textsuperscript{103} (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 5 Sep 42 (144, replying to 183), Tab 46, Item 1, Exec 5. (2) AFHQ (G-3) Outline Plan C \textit{(Provisional)} for Opn TORCH, 5 Sep 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-A.
The disagreement during August over the time and place of the landings in North Africa was at the center of a vast confusion and uncertainty. The President, by serenely ignoring the terms of the agreement (CCS 94) reached in July, ended in the quickest possible way the attempt of General Marshall, with the acquiescence of his American colleagues and the British Chiefs, to delay the “decision” on TORCH. But General Marshall and his staff did not intend that CCS 94 should lapse, and the President’s action did not stop them from applying their interpretation of CCS 94 to questions at issue with the British and the Navy.

The “Final” Decision on Torch

As late as 22 August it was evident, in the recommendations that General Handy sent back from London, that the War Department staff had not entirely given up the idea that the North African operation might not be launched after all. This disposition had the sanction of General Marshall’s own example. On 19 August, in connection with the question when to separate responsibility for TORCH from responsibility for SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, he declared to the staff that as he understood CCS 94, the responsibilities would not be separated “until the positive order for the Torch operation was given,” that is, until the moment came “when the troops were actually committed to movements to base ports, etc.” That moment, he went on, had not yet arrived. General Eisenhower and the British Chiefs apparently believed that “a final decision” on TORCH had been made. General Marshall disagreed:

The decision to mount the operation has been made, but it is still subject to the vicissitudes of war. Whether or not we should discuss this phase of the matter with General Eisenhower I do not know.1

General Marshall’s position was an expression of his determination to treat the decision to invade North Africa as a momentous change in grand strategy. He and his advisers feared that to launch TORCH would lead to adopting the British aim of acquiring and exploiting control of the Mediterranean basin. Some bitterness entered into their dissatisfaction, for it appeared that in urging the concentration of American forces in the British Isles they had

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1 Memo, G. C. M. for OPD, 19 Aug 42, Tab 25b, Item 1, Exec 5.
merely facilitated the execution of the strategy they had hoped to supersede. Sir John Dill, whose chief duty was to understand General Marshall and keep on good terms with him, was sufficiently perturbed to write a note of gentle protest to him about the attitude displayed by members of his planning staff. Dill began:

I am just a little disturbed about TORCH. For good or for ill it has been accepted and therefore I feel that we should go at it with all possible enthusiasm and give it absolute priority. If we don’t, it won’t succeed.

From what our Planners tell me, there are some of your people who feel that TORCH is not a good operation. That, of course, must be a matter of opinion but those who are playing a part in mounting the operation must be entirely whole-hearted about it, or they cannot give it all the help it should have and overcome all the difficulties that will arise.

Sir John closed by declaring: “All I aim at is to ensure that we all think alike—and enthusiastically.”

General Marshall replied that he agreed that the officers charged with executing the TORCH operation must lend their “complete support” and their “most energetic cooperation.” But he went on to say that there must be “absolute candor” among the planners, whose business it was to plan and prepare for several operations at the same time and to try to foresee and provide against all contingencies. Marshall was not impressed with Dill’s final plea that they should “all think alike—and enthusiastically.”

The answer ended with the statement: “You may feel sure that U. S. Planners will enthusiastically and effectively support decisions made by the Commander-in-Chief.”

**CCS 94 and the Arcadia Statement of Grand Strategy**

How closely the attitude of the War Department was connected with War Department views on grand strategy was shown in the main part of Sir John Dill’s letter to Marshall. He drew attention to the fact that the American planners in Washington in their discussion of grand strategy were appealing to CCS 94, while the British planners appealed to the statement that the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed, and the American Chiefs had accepted, in December 1941 at the beginning of the ARCADIA Conference. This statement (in ABC-4/CS-1) prescribed for 1942, and perhaps 1943, a strategy of “tightening and closing the ring round Germany,” by blockade, bombardment, and peripheral operations, specifically in the Mediterranean. Sir John’s remarks were as follows:

Another point which I think will require clearing up, and that is to what extent, if at all, does C. C. S. 94 alter ABC-4/CS.1. I have just re-read ABC-4/CS.1. It certainly covers TORCH and I should have said that it still holds the field as a guide to our major strategical policy. At any rate everyone

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2 Secretary Stimson, it may be noted, was himself bitter over the decision to land in North Africa, and had told the President exactly how he felt about the matter. His example doubtless had the effect of encouraging officers in the War Department to express their doubts and dissatisfaction. For the Secretary’s views, his statement of them to the President, and the suspension of his relations with the White House for several months thereafter, see his own account. (Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 420-26.)

3 Pers ltr, Dill to Marshall, 8 Aug 42, WDCSA TORCH, 1.

4 Pers ltr, Marshall to Dill, 14 Aug 42, WDCSA TORCH, 1. This file also contains a first draft by General Handy, corrected in Marshall’s hand. The draft contains a much fuller exposition of the credo of the Army planning staff. (Both versions of the principal passage changed by Marshall are given in Cline, *Washington Command Post*, p. 165n.)
should be quite clear on this matter. At present our Chiefs of Staff quote ABCM/CS.1 as the Bible whereas some of your people, I think, look upon C. C. S. 94 as the revised version!

It was expecting a great deal to ask General Marshall to disavow CCS 94. He had silently concurred in the version of strategy presented by the British Chiefs during the Arcadia Conference, and he could not but concede that it covered the Torch operation. But he had long since made quite plain his belief that the course of action propounded in the Arcadia paper, beginning with "closing and tightening the ring" around Germany, would not bring about the defeat of Germany, and would not, therefore, justify leaving the Japanese to hold the strategic initiative in the Pacific. CCS 94 came close to meeting his views, in providing that a decision to undertake the Torch operation would amount to accepting a "defensive" strategy of encirclement (so far as ground operations were concerned) and would justify a diversion of large air forces to the Pacific. The mere fact that the British Chiefs had agreed to CCS 94, if only for the sake of avoiding dispute, gave him an advantage in negotiations, and he was not likely to relinquish it and to restore to the British the advantage they had gained by his acquiescence in the Arcadia paper.

In answering Sir John, General Marshall acknowledged that the Arcadia paper included "many of the premises involved in the Torch operation in its general concept." He took his stand on the "inconsistencies" between ABCM/CS.1 and CCS 94. His first reference was to strategic bombing:

To illustrate, ABCM/CS.1, which provides for "the wearing down of Germany's resistance by ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American forces", is of necessity modified by the provisions in CCS 94, one of which contemplates the withdrawal of 15 groups of aircraft projected for the United Kingdom for the furtherance of offensive operations in the Pacific; the other makes available for transfer from the United Kingdom to the African Theater such heavy and medium bomber units as may be required.

To this contention the British could properly have replied that the principle of bombarding the Continent at the expense of other strategic aims was not a principle they had advanced at Arcadia but a principle the War Department itself had advanced subsequently, and that CCS 94 modified the subsequent proposal (Bolero) and not the Arcadia agreement.

General Marshall also read into the Arcadia agreement the peculiarly American idea that operations in the Mediterranean were not operations against Germany, and that offensive operations in the Mediterranean were not, for purposes of grand strategy, offensive at all:

Paragraph 3 of ABCM/CS.1, under the subject "Grand Strategy", states that it should be a cardinal principle of our strategy that only the minimum of forces necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should be diverted from operations against Germany. Paragraph e (4) of CCS 94 indicates we have accepted the fact that a commitment to the Torch operation renders Roundup (operations directly against Germany) in all probability impracticable of successful execution in 1943 and that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for Continental Europe except as to air operations and blockade. The requirements for the effective implementation of Torch as now envisaged, and agreed upon would, in my opinion, definitely preclude the offensive operations against Germany that were contemplated in ABCM/CS.1.
After pointing to these two "inconsistencies," General Marshall shifted his ground to make the more telling point that it was after all in the common interest to take into account events that had happened and undertakings that had been made since the *Arcadia* Conference:

ABC-4/CS-1 contemplates also such action in the Pacific as will deny to Japan access to raw materials. If we were to implement that provision rigidly, you can readily appreciate the full implications with reference to other projected operations. Therefore, while constituting a guide for our overall strategy, ABC-4/CS-1, it seems to me, must be considered in the light of subsequent agreements, particularly if those agreements serve to modify our concept of strategy as required by developments in the situation.

Marshall thus confirmed Sir John's observation that the British planners and the War Department planners approached the problem of future plans with quite different views. Their disagreement was merely a sign of the real difficulty: *Torch*, even the cautious American version, fitted easily into British strategy; American strategy had to be fitted to *Torch*, and the American planners were loath to make the adjustment.

**The Middle East**

One indication of the reluctance of the Army planners to reconcile themselves to the President's decision was their view of the still undecided battle for control of Egypt and Libya. On 30 July, at the very moment of deciding to go ahead with *Torch*, the President granted an interview to Colonel Fellers. Fellers' outspoken criticism of the British command in Egypt and his recommendation for full American intervention had led to his being recalled from Cairo to Washington. In presenting his case to the President, Fellers again recommended an intense effort to reinforce the British, urging that during the next few weeks American bombers be sent to Egypt at the rate of ten a day. His views had not changed since his return. The substance of them, according to the President's brief summary, was as follows:

Colonel Fellers was very pessimistic as to the ability of the British to hold the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal. He had estimated that General Rommel would penetrate the British positions by the last of August.

Whatever may have been the President's reasons for seeing Colonel Fellers in person, there was no question but that the President was unready to accept the restrictive effects of *Torch* on other projects, the effects in the near future as well as the long-range effects to which General Marshall had unsuccessfully tried to draw his atten-

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8 For Fellers' views, see above, Ch. XI. For his recall, see: (1) ltr, WD to Maxwell, 20 Jun 42, sub: Ltr of Instns, OPD 384 Africa, 12; (2) msg, Marshall to Maxwell, 27 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6697 (R); (3) msg, Maxwell to Marshall, 27 Jun 42, CM-IN 8926 (R); (4) msg, same to same, 7 Jul 42, CM-IN 2659 (7/8/42) (R), and subsequent comment thereon in memo, no sig, for Wedemeyer, 26 Sep 42, no sub, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42); (5) msg (originator OPD) Marshall to Maxwell, 10 Jul 42, CM-OUT 2774; and (6) stf correspondence filed OPD 319.1 Africa, 13.

9 The President stated that Fellers had recommended sending ten bombers a day to Egypt, even though they were of little use against vehicles in the desert. (Memo, Secy JCS for U. S. JCS, 1 Aug 42, sub: Notes of Conf Held at White House at 8:30 P. M., Jul 30, 1942, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B, 79.)
tion. Characteristically, the President combined the announcement of his decision on Torch with the question whether the United States might not be able to send more planes to the Middle East (and perhaps a convoy to the Soviet arctic ports as well). In reply Marshall submitted a report telling what was being done, with only the remark that additional reinforcements for the Middle East would be at the expense of Torch or Bolero.

Marshall's policy had been to co-operate with the British Chiefs of Staff in the Middle East in the hope of "preserving the Bolero plan." His staff, vexed by the disappointment of this hope, went so far as to urge on General Marshall the view that

The Middle East should be held if possible, but its loss might prove to be a blessing in disguise. The British, once free of the tremendous drain upon their resources represented by Middle East requirements, might then be in a position to launch an effective offensive based on the British Isles, and directed against the enemy's citadel on the Continent.

This last protest was a measure of how far the War Department planners were from meeting the British planners on the basis of thinking "alike" and "enthusiastically" about the problems of combined strategy in the Mediterranean. Even after reconciling themselves to the decision to mount Torch, they were sure to disagree with the British over the exploitation of Torch and the complementary offensive (Lightfoot) that the British were planning to launch westward from El Alamein.

The Pacific

The reluctance of the War Department planners to adjust their aims to the prospect of a North African operation appeared likewise in their unwillingness to increase Army commitments in the Pacific. The only notable concessions that the Army had made since the Battle of Midway on the allocation of forces to the Pacific were the provision of two infantry regiments (from the 40th Division) and a few supporting units to Hawaii, and the assignment of a few more bombers to General MacArthur.

The most urgent question was what additional means, if any, the Army should provide to carry out operations in the South

Study . . . , Tab IV, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42), 1-B.

A dissent was entered by the chief of the Strategy Section, Col. Frank N. Roberts, who was "inclined to go against my experts in the section, and to recommend that the 300 [bombers] be sent to ME." (Informal memo, F. N. R. for Wedemeyer, n.d., Tab IV, ABC 381 Middle East (3-10-42), 1-B.)

The study submitted to Marshall (quoted in the text and cited above) went to McCloy with Fellers' memo, as an OPD study and not as a communication from the Chief of Staff, but Marshall first gave it a thorough editing all the same. (See corrected drafts filed OPD 381 Middle East, 26 and WDCSA Middle East (S.).)

These conflicts are discussed in Ch. XIV, above.

See above, pp. 256 ff.
THE INTERPRETATION OF CCS 94

and Southwest Pacific. The consideration of this question, raised on 8 July by General MacArthur and Admiral Ghormley, had been suspended during the brief interlude of rapprochement between King and Marshall over the "Pacific alternative" (10–14 July). It was opened on 14 July by Admiral King, who then passed on to General Marshall with his concurrence the recommendation of Admiral Nimitz that the Army should send three additional antiaircraft regiments to the South Pacific.16 On 15 July Admiral King urged General Marshall to act on the proposal.17 Marshall, on the recommendation of his staff, gave way to the extent of agreeing to send one regiment—the 76th Coast Artillery (AA)—from the west coast as a partial replacement for the regiments due to be moved into the Solomons from Borabora and Tongatabu.18 Admiral King was willing to accept this solution, on the assumption that in the near future the Army would send additional units to complete the replacement of units moved forward from these bases.19 Admiral Ghormley protested that the antiaircraft defense of Borabora and Tongatabu were already at an "irreducible minimum," and notified Washington that he planned to use Marine antiaircraft until more Army units arrived. Thereupon, the Navy Department again requested that three regiments should be sent at once, and the War Department again refused to do so.20

The Navy pressed its objections not only to the provision for antiaircraft defense but also to the Army's approach in general. Admiral Nimitz urged the provision of an adequate, continuous flow of land and air replacements and reinforcements to consolidate the forward positions to be seized. The Navy Department agreed that the Army should provide them, calling attention to Japanese capabilities and recent reports of increased Japanese activity in the southwestern Pacific.21 The War Department reiterated that forces to garrison forward positions should be brought up from the rear. They would come from New Caledonia, and would be replaced in New Caledonia from Tongatabu and Borabora. The forces taken from Borabora and Tongatabu would not be replaced; nor would replacements be sent to Hawaii and Australia for the mobile bomber forces assigned to the operation.22

The negotiations in London at the end of July placed the argument over Pacific deployment on a new basis. Under the terms of CCS 94, one of the conditions of abandoning ROUNDUP, launching TORCH, and adopting a "defensive encircling" strategy

19 See memo, OPD for CofS, 17 Jul 42, sub cited n. 17, OPD 320.2 PTO, 21. This memorandum also listed the first steps taken to carry out the plan. For later steps, see papers filed OPD 370.5 Fiji, 10.
against the Continent was the withdrawal of forces from Bolero for use in the Pacific. In that contingency, the CCS agreed that

... over and above the U.S. forces required from Bolero for operations in North and North West Africa, the following readjustments of present U.S. commitments to Bolero will be made for the purpose of furthering offensive operations in the Pacific:

1. Withdrawal of the following air forces:
   - 3 groups heavy bombers
   - 2 groups medium bombers
   - 2 groups light bombers
   - 2 groups fighter planes
   - 2 groups observation planes
   - 4 groups transport planes

2. Probably shipping to move one infantry or Marine division from U.S. West Coast to South West Pacific.

Admiral King took this provision to mean that he could expect the Army to commit at least the additional bombers to the line Hawaii–Australia for which he and the Pacific commanders had so long been asking. On 1 August he sent to General Marshall a request he had just received from Admiral Nimitz for two more heavy bombardment groups for Hawaii, to be used to meet a Japanese attempt to take advantage of the diversion of American forces to the Solomons operation. Admiral Nimitz held that existing air strength in Hawaii was not enough to furnish a reserve or even to "constitute a reasonable defense" when most of the Pacific Fleet was operating to the southwest. Admiral King at the same time repeated to General Marshall his own opinion that the land and air forces available in the South Pacific were inadequate. He requested that Marshall should review, "in the light of the recent decisions reached in London to reinforce with air the Pacific Ocean Areas," the Army's decision of 27 July not to reinforce the South Pacific.²⁸

The operations staff was not ready to make concessions, as it indicated in a message to General Emmons, who (as on previous occasions) had sent word of his hearty agreement with Admiral Nimitz' recommendations.²⁹ The staff (with General McNarney's concurrence) advised Marshall to answer Admiral King to the same effect. The staff advised standing pat on the decision to commit no additional ground forces and making no specific commitment of additional air forces, since there were none available for immediate deployment and since the result of the London conferences was as yet uncertain.³⁰ General Marshall withheld action, and explained himself to General Handy with the question: "In view of the present So. Pacific situation is this the time (or the manner) for replying to the Navy's paper?"³¹

The uncertainty of the situation in the South Pacific at that moment—the marines were landing on Guadalcanal—was all the more reason why Admiral King should press his case.³²

²³ Par e, CCS 94, 24 Jul 42.
²⁴ Memo, King for CofS, 1 Aug 42, sub cited n. 21 OPD 320.2 PTO, 37.
²⁵ Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 4 Aug 42, CM-OUT 1424 (8/5/42) (R).
²⁷ Informal memo, G. C. M. for Handy, atchd to memo cited n. 26 (1).
²⁸ For accounts of the Marine landings on Guadalcanal, see: (1) Miller, Guadalcanal, Ch. III, and (2) Samuel Eliot Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942–February 1943 (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1949), Chs. I and II.
THE INTERPRETATION OF CCS 94

On 8 August (the first landings in the Solomons were on the 7th) Admiral King again wrote, in connection with recommendations he had just received from Admiral Ghormley and General Harmon, that although shortages of shipping would prevent the immediate dispatch of the additional forces requested, plans should be made "for first, the Air reinforcements and second, Ground reinforcements." 29

The War Department staff remained unmoved. In a message for Harmon, the War Department repeated what it had told him before his departure for Nouméa and again more recently—that no additional air units were available and garrisons for newly acquired forward bases would have to be drawn from forces available in the rear areas in the South Pacific. 30 Once again the staff advised General Marshall to stick to the position that there were already enough ground forces in the Pacific to launch the operations then planned (including Tasks Two and Three) and to garrison the Solomons, and to notify Admiral King that the availability for the Pacific of the fifteen air groups listed in CCS 94 depended on what happened across the Atlantic. 31 Again, Marshall withheld action. 32

The War Department made one concession. On the recommendation of Admiral Nimitz, the War Department told General Harmon that if he thought best he could for the time being hold in the South Pacific bombers en route to Australia and warned General MacArthur that it might become necessary for him to shift pursuit planes (initially a squadron) to Guadalcanal. 33

The unwillingness of the staff to commit additional forces to the Pacific was in keeping with its interpretation of CCS 94. The withdrawal of forces from BOLERO for the Pacific was contingent on the decision to abandon ROUNDUP and launch TORCH, and General Marshall held that the "final" decision to do so was yet to be made. What he had apparently not told the staff—or Admiral King—was that he intended to use the provision to regain some of the freedom of action as between the Navy and the British that he had given up in April. He had already explained this in a letter he had sent to General Eisenhower soon after returning from London:

I regarded the list of withdrawals for the Pacific as one which gave us liberty of action though not necessarily to be carried out in full, and no dates were mentioned. . . . I am quite certain that an additional heavy

29 Memo, King for Marshall, 8 Aug 42, sub: Minimum Army Reinforcements Necessary to Provide Adequate Garrisons for Present Bases, to Conduct Ops Incident to Tasks Two and Three, and to Relieve Amph Units in Seized Areas, OPD 320.2 PTO, 37.
30 (1) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Harmon, 8 Aug 42, CM-OUT 2412. (2) See msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Harmon, 4 Aug 42, CM-OUT 0253, for the earlier reminder. The only additional units due to be sent were air service units needed to operate the mobile air force in the South Pacific. (3) For Harmon's views, see in particular, ltr, CG USAFISPA to COMSOPAC, 4 Aug 42, sub: Tr Disposition and Re-enforcement, OPD 320.2 PTO, 71.
31 For Tasks Two and Three, see above, pp. 262-63
For follow-up, see msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 12 Aug 42, CM-IN 4236 (R), and msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 12 Aug 42, CM-OUT 4048.
bomber group must go into the Pacific in August. Additional withdrawals will depend on the development of the situation there.  

On 13 August Admiral King called General Marshall’s attention to the two appeals, as yet unanswered, for reinforcements and again stressed the need for additional air units in Hawaii and the South Pacific. The situation in the South Pacific had meanwhile become extremely precarious, as a result of naval losses (four cruisers) incurred in a surprise engagement on 8 and 9 August off Savo Island and the withdrawal of American naval support from the Solomons area. Marshall finally authorized the commitment of one heavy bomber group to Hawaii, which was to be used to replace the mobile air force in Hawaii and not to be used in the South Pacific. General Arnold designated for this purpose the 90th Bombardment Group (H).  

In submitting an answer for Admiral King, to inform him of the commitment of the 90th Group to Hawaii and the authorization given to divert planes to the South Pacific from the Southwest Pacific, the staff once again proposed that Marshall should hold fast to the policy of sending no additional ground forces. Once again Marshall withheld action.

Meanwhile, during the two weeks of Marshall’s silence on the policy to be adopted with reference to deployment in the Pacific, the War Department had opened negotiations on the second phase (Task Two) of the projected offensive in the South and Southwest Pacific, the phase of operations against the east coast of New Guinea, under the command of General MacArthur. Following the Japanese landings in late July in the Buna–Gona region, Admiral King had asked the War Department to find out what MacArthur planned to do in response. MacArthur replied to the War Department in a long message describing the disposition of Japanese forces, assessing Japanese capabilities, and giving a detailed plan for countermeasures and an ultimate offensive against Rabaul. He recommended the opening of this phase of operations as soon as the first phase in the Solomons was complete. The principal defensive measures he was taking were the development of air bases in northeastern Australia and the strengthening of the Port Moresby garrison with two Australian brigades, antiaircraft units, and fighter squadrons. In preparation for Tasks Two...
and Three he was building air bases on New Guinea. One at Milne Bay was already occupied by fighter planes and defended by a garrison of about 5,000 men. He was concentrating two American divisions (the 41st and 32d) at Rockhampton and Brisbane to be trained and prepared for action. As a step toward initiating offensive operations, he was sending the 7th Australian Division to New Guinea; a few troops were to be sent as reinforcements to secure the crest of the Owen Stanley Range. The factors limiting operations in New Guinea would be shipping and naval support to keep open the lines of communication.\(^{39}\)

On 14 August General Marshall reminded Admiral King of the original agreement to execute the three-phase plan of operations "without interruption" if the means were available, and suggested, on the basis of MacArthur's message, that there appeared to be means for beginning operations against Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guinea. Marshall took note of the fact that Admiral Nimitz appeared to favor such a course. Finally, he proposed asking MacArthur and Admiral Ghormley whether it were feasible to launch a "limited Task Two," how soon it could be done, and at what point command should pass to MacArthur.\(^{40}\) A request for answers to these questions, and for additional detailed information desired by King, went to MacArthur and Ghormley the following day.\(^{41}\)

On 20 August Admiral King informed General Marshall that the development of the Solomons campaign would prevent Admiral Ghormley from releasing any forces to participate in Task Two in the near future, and he inclosed a request from Ghormley for reinforcements in the South Pacific and a list of the forces that Harmon, with Ghormley's approval, had recommended. He stated that it would be necessary to send both air and ground forces, as provided in CCS 94.\(^{42}\)

By that time it was no longer the uncertainty of future plans across the Atlantic but the urgency of providing for the invasion of North Africa that limited the commitment of additional Army forces to the Pacific. On 21 August General Arnold struck the new note by urging the needs of TORCH as a reason for refusing to commit any more air forces to the Pacific.\(^{43}\) Admiral Leahy concurred, advising Marshall:

> It seems to me that General Arnold is exactly correct in principle. Why not plan to save all possible planes for "Torch" and meet the requests of Ghorm—

\(^{39}\) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 3 Aug 42, CM-IN 1607. A copy went to King, who dealt with it in memo cited n. 29.

At Marshall's direction, a brief of this message was sent to the President. See (1) note, G. C. M. on copy of CM-IN 1607, filed Item 23a, Exec 10, and (2) memo, CofS for President, 6 Aug 42, sub: Ops in SW Pacific, OPD 381 SWPA, 95.

\(^{40}\) Memo, King for CofS, 14 Aug 42, sub: Early Initiation of Limited Task Two, OPD 381 PTO, 84. This represents a revision of a draft by OPD. See draft, with Marshall's corrections, in Item 67a, Exec 10.

\(^{41}\) Memo, King for CofS, 15 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, Item 67a, Exec 10. Attached is the draft message to send to MacArthur and Ghormley. The memorandum itself bears a note from Brig. Gen. John R. Deane (SGS) that the message as drafted was dispatched on 15 August.

\(^{42}\) Memo, King for CofS, 20 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, OPD 370.5 PTO, 9.

A list of the reinforcements requested came with the memorandum as Inclosure B. The ground reinforcements requested by Harmon included two infantry divisions, three antiaircraft regiments, and sundry field, coast, and antiaircraft artillery battalions, all to be sent "as early as practicable." His most urgent demands for air reinforcements were for three fighter squadrons and plane replacements in all categories.

ly [sic] and MacArthur for additional ground troops, partially trained if none better are available.\footnote{Note, WDL \[Leahy\] to Marshall [22 Aug 42], Item 67b, Exec 10.}

General Marshall acted on this advice. He answered the request for more planes, as the staff had earlier advised him to do, simply by transmitting to Admiral King a statement of the steps already taken—the commitment of one additional group to Hawaii and the authorization given for redistributing planes in the South and Southwest Pacific.\footnote{See memo, CofS for King, 24 Aug 42, sub cited [n. 40] OPD 370.5 PTO, 9, which is in answer to memo cited [n. 42], containing simply a reference to memo, CofS for COMINCH [21 Aug 42], sub cited [n. 35] OPD 320.2 PTO, 37. This last memo is based on memo cited [n. 37(1)] submitted by the staff on 15 August, which Marshall had revised and for the time withheld.}

General Marshall at the same time asked General Somervell to tell him what troopships would be leaving for the Pacific in the near future, and the operations staff to see what changes might be made in shipments in order to meet the requests of the Pacific commanders.\footnote{Shortly thereafter, in a detailed analysis of air strength in and en route to the South and Southwest Pacific, the War Department incorporated the policy of no further commitments of planes to the Pacific, but adopted a still more liberal policy on the redistribution of planes in the Pacific by authorizing Admiral Nimitz to shift aircraft “as necessary to the success of the present operation.” This concession removed the inhibition on the diversion from Hawaii of the 90th Bombardment Group (H). (Memo, CofS for COMINCH, 25 Aug 42, sub: Air Reinforcements for S Pacific Opns, Item 67b, Exec 10.)}

In the light of Somervell's findings and consultation with Army Ground Forces, the operations staff concluded that about 20,000 men—an antiaircraft regiment, the 43d Division, and supporting troops—could be sent to the South Pacific in the latter part of September and early October, on two conditions: (a) that the Navy would release ships with a troop lift of about 13,000 (of a total troop lift for the period of about 20,000), and (b) that the War Department would postpone scheduled shipments to MacArthur during the period, except for headquarters troops for I Corps, which the staff thought to be essential. Pending the arrival of the reinforcements, General Harmon would have to go ahead on the presently prescribed basis of moving forward garrison forces from the rear areas to consolidate newly acquired positions and relieve Marine units for future landing operations.\footnote{Even the value of this concession, as Admiral Leahy had anticipated, was limited by the prior claim of Torch for the best trained divisions. The division that had been training for service in the Pacific—the 3d Division—had already been trans-}

During the next week the War Department went ahead on this basis to prepare for the shipment of the antiaircraft regiment, the 43d Division, and supporting units.\footnote{(1) Memo, SOS for CofS, n.d., sub: Shipping Capabilities for Reinforcement of S Central Pacific. (2) Memo, OPD for CofS, 22 Aug 42, sub: Shipping Capabilities for Reinforcement of S Pacific, with three incls and Tabs A-E. Both in OPD 370.5 PTO, 9. (3) Memo, AGF for CofS (attn OPD), 22 Aug 42, sub: Add Forces, S Pacific Theater, OPD 370.5 PTO, 14.}

ferred to the east coast for use in the North African landings. There was nothing to do but send a division that had not been fully trained, leaving the South Pacific commanders—and the division itself—to make the best of the situation.

The Navy Department quickly fell in with the proposed changes, accepting the concession for what it was worth.

The War Department then informed General MacArthur of the postponement of scheduled shipments to his command. At the end of August the Navy indicated that the overseas destination of the reinforcements would be Auckland. Early in September, on receiving confirmation from General Harmon, the War Department issued the movement orders.

The concessions made by the War Department in August did not end the disagreement with the Navy Department and the Pacific commands over the demands they advanced under CCS 94. Instead, the disagreement became more intense. The landings in the Solomons, as Admiral King had from the first expected, produced a strong Japanese reaction and a correspondingly urgent need for more American forces, particularly air forces. The reaction had already begun. By 21 August the marines had eliminated the first echelon of a Japanese combat force (about 900 men) that had landed on 18 August. A few days later (23–25 August) a naval task force had turned back a second Japanese convoy (Battle of the Eastern Solomons).

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49 For the substitution, see: (1) memo, Streett for McNarney, 17 Aug 42, no sub, OPD 381 PTO, 85; (2) memo, King for CoFS, 18 Aug 42, sub: Third Army Div—Relief for, Item 67a, Exec 10; and (3) memo, CoFS for King, 21 Aug 42, sub: Relief of Third Div, OPD 370.5 WDC, 105.

50 The Army did undertake to give what training it could to the 43d Division. (1) Memo, CoFS for King, 24 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, OPD 370.5 PTO, 9. (2) Memos, OPD for AGF and SOS, 10 and 14 Sep 42, sub: Change in Directive for Tr Mvmts, OPD 370.5 PTO, 14.

51 For transactions with the Navy, see: (1) memo, Col Leonard H. Rodieck for Gen Streett, 23 Aug 42, sub: Availability of Navy Shipping to SPA, OPD 370.5 PTO, 11; (2) memo, CoFS for CNO, 24 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, OPD 370.5 PTO, 9; (3) memo, Col Silverthorne for Gen Streett, 26 Aug 42, sub: Navy Ships for Mvmt 43d Div, OPD 370.5 PTO, 12; and (4) memo, King for CoFS, 26 Aug 42, sub: Transportation of 13,000 Army Trs, OPD 381 PTO, 84.

52 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 28 Aug 42, CM-OUT 8981 (R). The War Department asked MacArthur to recommend in what priority to send the units allocated to him.

A full list of units the War Department intended to send MacArthur is contained in memo, OPD for CINCSWPA, 10 Aug 42, sub: Add Units Authorized for U. S. Forces in Australia, OPD 320.2 Australia, 53. This memo was drawn up to be delivered to MacArthur by Maj. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger. MacArthur had been told to expect this memorandum in msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 8 Aug 42, CM-OUT 2515 (R).
mons) at the cost of damaging the Enterprise, the one American carrier then in operation in the Pacific. Further and stronger Japanese action was a virtual certainty in the near future, posing demands that were sure to conflict with the demands of TORCH, which had been enlarged by the final agreement of the President and the Prime Minister on 5 September to land forces in North Africa simultaneously at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers.

55 For an account of the operations at Guadalcanal, see: (1) Miller, Guadalcanal, and (2) Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal.
CHAPTER XIV

Counting the Costs of TORCH

August–November 1942

The plan for Operation Torch, as it finally took shape after the compromise of early September 1942, left London some room to hope for a quick victory in North Africa, while providing Washington with some assurance against the fear of a demoralizing defeat. The most likely result of the compromise was a long, expensive operation. The plan adopted was unfavorable to the prospect not only of a short, cheap campaign in North Africa but also of a campaign of any kind in Europe in 1943. A long campaign in North Africa would use the men and munitions, the ships and naval escort, needed for a great sustained operation of the kind the War Department has proposed to launch in Europe in 1943. And the steadfast unwillingness in Washington to risk everything on speed and surprise in North Africa did not favor the Prime Minister’s hope of carrying out bold attacks by small mobile forces against other positions on the periphery of German-controlled territory.

The effect of Torch on British and American strategy gradually became apparent in the late summer and the fall of 1942. First, the military staffs had to recalculate the initial requirements—in particular naval escort and air support—for the three simultaneous landings. These increases did not, of course, measure the increase in the total cost of the operation, which the staffs could not even estimate until after the landings, when they could at last decide what to expect, for the purposes of planning, from French authorities in North Africa, the German High Command, and the Spanish Government. If there should be serious initial opposition on the part of the French forces in North Africa, if there should be a strong German reaction in Tunisia followed by the movement of large reinforcements to the front, or if the Spanish Government should allow the movement of German forces into Spain and Spanish Morocco, the entire operation might be endangered and would certainly be prolonged. But even while so much remained uncertain, the two governments

1 See above, pp. 292–93.

2 For estimates, see: (1) memo, OPD for WDCMC, 3 Aug 42, sub: Torc Opn, Tab 78, ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-B; (2) msg, Br CsofS to Jt Stf Miss, 4 Aug 42, COS (W) 236, WDCSA Torc (SS); (3) memo, G–2 for CofS, 4 Aug 42, sub: Comd of Torc Opns, WDCSA Torc (SS); (4) msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Aug 42, CM-IN 5608; (5) memo, OPD for SW, 10 Nov 42, sub: German Capabilities in Iberian Peninsula, and (6) JCS memo for info No. 35, 28 Nov 42, sub: Axis Capabilities in Mediterranean Area, both in ABC 381 Mediterranean Area (11–28–42); and (7) Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa, pp. 68–88 MS.
and their military staffs had to begin reckoning the costs. If these were higher than the British staff had estimated as necessary to obtain the objective and higher than the American staff had believed the objective to be worth, it was also true that the costs could in part be charged off to the delays and compromise accepted for the sake of reaching agreement. If the two governments set a high value on agreement, they had to stand ready to pay the price for it.

The actual and prospective costs of TORCH, as they were calculated and recalculated from August through November 1942, had effects not only on planning for later British and American operations in Europe but also on making and fulfilling commitments to Allied forces in the other theaters of war. In the Middle East the threat of a renewed attack by the Afrika Korps, though eased by the arrival of British and American reinforcements in the late summer and early fall, remained real and immediate until the great British victory at El Alamein, just preceding the TORCH landings. Elsewhere the Allied situation remained precarious throughout the period.

On the Russian front German forces had overrun the Don and were penetrating the valley between the Don and the Volga. The Battle of Stalingrad, begun in August, lasted throughout the period. The Battle of the Atlantic was still going badly. The Chinese war effort was almost completely demoralized, and the prospect of a counteroffensive in Burma, based on India, was still very uncertain. In the Pacific the battle for control of the Solomon Islands had become a desperate test of the troops engaged and of the intentions of the Japanese and American high commands. The initial and subsequent requirements of TORCH limited and unsettled American plans for helping all Allied Powers and conducting all American operations and thus gradually blurred the outlines of American strategic planning.

The Order of Priorities for Shipping

The principal projects for shipping American troops and matériel abroad that were bound to be affected by TORCH were five: (1) all BOLERO movements of ground and air force units to the United Kingdom; (2) the movement of U. S. Army Air Forces units and missions personnel to the Middle East and India; (3) the convoys to the USSR; (4) the relief of British troops in Iceland by part of a U. S. division; and (5) the movement (under CCS 94) of a U. S. division and fifteen air groups (to be diverted from BOLERO) to the South Pacific.

On 4 August the British Chiefs of Staff recommended a revised order of priority for shipments, as follows: (1) TORCH, (2) convoys to the Middle East, (3) movement of U. S. Army Air Forces units to the United Kingdom, (4) the relief of Iceland, and (5) BOLERO. This proposal, which seemed to the U. S. Army planners reasonable, was brought before a meeting of the CCS two days later by Sir John Dill. The combined planners recommended that a high priority also be assigned to the Pacific theater. As

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3 Msg [Br] CsoS to Jt Stf Miss (Washington), 4 Aug 42 (COS (W) 236), WDCSA TORCH, 1.
4 35th mtg CCS, 6 Aug 42. (2) The comments of Army planners are in memo, OPD for CofS, 6 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, Tab 21, Item 1, Exec 5. This memorandum contains a systematic review of COS (W) 236.
5 28th mtg CPS, 7 Aug 42. The recommendations of the CPS were circulated as CCS 100, 8 Aug 42, title: Gen Order for Priority of Shipping Mvmts.
COUNTING THE COSTS OF TORCH

amended and approved by the CCS on 13 August, the new order of priority read:

1. TORCH—(To take precedence over other shipping in the Atlantic while being mounted).
   - Middle East
   - Pacific Ocean
   - Russian supplies shipped by way of the southern route.
3. Relief of Iceland.
4. BOLERO
5. India and China

NOTE.—If supplies are to be sent to Russia via the northern route, priority 6 is recommended.6

The fulfilment of the requirements of TORCH had a direct bearing on the execution of the rest of the program of shipping U. S. Air Forces units and missions personnel to the Middle East and India. Taking into account the primary needs of TORCH, the CCS on 13 August approved the recommendation of a committee of British-American transportation experts that the rest of the shipments scheduled for the Middle East and India be carried out, but that they should not be accelerated even though they had fallen behind schedule. These shipments could be accelerated only by using the Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth, which were the only ships left that were fast enough to make the North Atlantic run for BOLERO service unescorted. Since TORCH would for some time take up all available escort, the two Queens were the only troop-carrying ships that could be used on the run during the North African operation. Further interference with that run the CCS were not then prepared to accept.7 As it later turned out, the schedule as then approved for Middle East shipments left too little leeway for TORCH requirements.8 However, as King pointed out at the time of the decision, the CCS must then reserve ships for sending units to the Middle East in order to retain the option of sending them.9

The withdrawal of shipping and naval escort from the sea lanes in time to mount TORCH was certain to call into question other important commitments of the United States and United Kingdom. A striking example was the interruption of the convoys that went by the northern route to the Soviet Union. How long to continue sending these convoys depended on what date would be set for TORCH. On 12 September, when the mid-September convoy had sailed and the next was half loaded, the question as formulated in London was how likely it was that TORCH might be postponed beyond 8 November 1942. If that were likely, it might be desirable to run at least one convoy, accepting the postponement of TORCH until 15–19 November or perhaps later, if losses during the voyage were unusually great.10 While the mid-September convoy was still in dangerous waters, reports came in that

CMTC, concurred in by CPS to the CCS. (2) See earlier papers in CCS 87 series, for background. (3) See min cited n. 6(2), for subsequent approval of the provision of the report.

For the diversion of the 33d Pursuit Group from the Middle East to TORCH, see pp. 319–20 below.

Min. 28th mtg JCS, 11 Aug 42. It was necessary to decide at once what to do with the Aquitania and the Mauretania, which were en route to the United States. If they were not utilized on the Middle East run, and were rerouted, ships suitable for the unescorted voyage might not readily be found. (CCS 87/3 and CCS 87/4.)

Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Sep 42, CM-IN 4988. This message contains a report on an important conference with Churchill at Chequers, the official country residence of the British Prime Ministers.

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6 (1) CCS 100/1, 14 Aug 42, title cited n. 5. (2) Min. 36th mtg CCS, 13 Aug 42.
7 (1) CCS 87/4, 9 Aug 42, title: Shipping Implications of Proposed Air Force Deployment, rpt by
twelve ships had been lost.11 When the mid-September convoy was run, thirteen out of forty ships had been sunk, even though there had been an escorting group of seventy-seven ships of various types protecting the convoy. The Prime Minister attached so much importance to the continuation of the northern route convoys that even then he considered proposing that TORCH be put off long enough to allow for one more convoy.12 The Prime Minister ended by proposing instead to inform Stalin that, though large-scale convoys like that of mid-September would be impossible for the rest of the year, he and the President were looking for some way to keep on sending supplies by the northern route on a smaller scale. At the same time he brought up again the possibility of operations in northern Norway. The chief strategic purpose would be to secure the northern route to Archangel and Murmansk. And to open staff conversations with the Soviet military staff on those operations, he believed, might in the meantime help offset the effect on the Soviet Government of interrupting the convoys.13

Both proposals received a cool reception in Washington.14 Nothing more was said, Leahy’s memorandum. (Papers 56 and 58, ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-B.)

11 The Prime Minister then took up the question with the President. Msg, Prime Minister to President, 14 Sep 42, Tab 50, Item 1, Exec 5.
12 Pers ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Sep 42, Paper 59, ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-B. This letter reports a conference with the Prime Minister.
13 (1) Msgs, Prime Minister to President, 22 Sep 42, Nos. 151 and 154, Paper 57, ABC 381 (7–25–42), 4-B. (2) Pers ltr cited n. 12.
14 (1) Ltr, President to Prime Minister, 25 Sep 42, Item 42, Exec 10. (2) Memo, Deane for Marshall and King, 26 Sep 42, no sub, Item 63a, Exec 10. This memorandum transmitted information from Leahy, on the response of the President, Leahy, and Hopkins to the messages from the Prime Minister. Mention is made of a draft message prepared by the Chiefs of Staff and given to Admiral Leahy. This is probably identical with a text preceding the Prime Minister’s messages and for the time being, about operations in northern Norway. Shipments were reduced to the movement of unescorted merchantmen, one at a time, from Reykjavik, to the Russian White Sea ports. In mid-December, convoys began again on a smaller scale.15

Pacific requirements were not so readily reduced. To the continued heavy demands of the Pacific bases were added, during the TORCH period, the requirements for sustaining the Solomons operation in the South Pacific.16 The Solomons operation was in direct competition with TORCH for combat loaders.17 And the needs for naval support of TORCH, as finally planned, were so great that it was out of the question to transfer from the Atlantic to the Pacific any U. S. Navy units to help meet the critical situation in the Solomons. The situation was so tight that it was not until early September, when the President and
the Prime Minister were about to agree on a compromise version of Torch, that the Navy finally furnished a definite list of U. S. naval vessels available for Torch.\textsuperscript{18} According to that list, the most that the Navy could spare for the North African venture was one modern battleship, two old battleships, one aircraft carrier, two converted aircraft carriers, two 8-inch cruisers, three large 6-inch cruisers, forty destroyers, and six fast minesweepers. 

The most dangerous weakness in both oceans, as Admiral Turner had feared, was the want of aircraft carriers. By October 1942 four of the seven carriers with which the United States had entered the war had been sunk in the Pacific—the Lexington, the Yorktown, the Wasp, and the Hornet.\textsuperscript{19} The latter two carriers were lost during the contest for Guadalcanal.\textsuperscript{20} In addition, the Saratoga and Enterprise had been damaged by the Japanese during the naval battles for Guadalcanal. In November the Pacific Fleet was down to its last active aircraft carrier, the Enterprise, and even that survivor was damaged and out of action for most of the month. The only large aircraft carrier remaining was the USS Ranger of the Atlantic Fleet, and since the Ranger was the only carrier at all likely to be available to protect General Patton’s forces during the landings on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco, it could not be withdrawn from the Atlantic to reinforce the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The new urgent demands for shipping and escort affected other claims on shipping and escort, lower on the list of strategic priorities, until the success of operations in North Africa and the Solomons was assured. It was necessary once more to put off the long-planned relief of the British troops that remained in Iceland.\textsuperscript{21} The movement of service troops to Iran had also to wait on developments in North Africa, in spite of the desire of the President and the Prime Minister to accelerate the movement of Soviet lend-lease traffic through the congested Persian Gulf ports to northern Iran.\textsuperscript{22}

The want of ships and naval escort furnished the War Department strong grounds for pleading once again that the United States could not give substantial military support to China, much less satisfy Chiang Kai-shek’s “three demands” of 28 June 1942. These three demands represented Chiang’s summary of requirements in terms of ground and air forces, and lend-lease tonnage for the maintenance of the China theater—three American divisions, 500 planes, and 5,000 tons monthly airlift into China.\textsuperscript{23} The War Department recommended to the President on 9 October 1942 that . . . the extremely serious shortage of ocean shipping for troop transport, including Naval escorts for such convoys through dangerous waters, not to mention the long turn around to India, make it utterly impracticable this fall to send and maintain United States Divisions in the China India theater . . . . The United States is waging this war on far flung

\textsuperscript{18} (1) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 4 Sep 42, CM-OUT 1673. (2) Draft msg [President to Prime Minister], 4 Sep 42, Item 9, Exec 1.


\textsuperscript{20} Morison, \textit{Struggle for Guadalcanal}, pp. 133, 222. The Wasp was sunk on 15 September 1942 and the Hornet on 27 October 1942.


\textsuperscript{22} See pp. 336 ff., below, for the establishment of the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC).

\textsuperscript{23} OPD draft memo [CofS for President, 2 Oct 42], sub: Support of China, Item 54, Exec 10.
fronts and demands for men and particularly materials and ship tonnage are now beyond our present capacity.\textsuperscript{24}

Similar restrictions also had a direct bearing on postponing operations for ejecting the Japanese from the Aleutians. At a time when all available means were being used either to mount TORCH or to bolster the precarious position in the southwestern Pacific, the United States could not afford to begin operations in what was, by common consent, an indecisive theater. During October and November 1942, General Marshall repeatedly refused General DeWitt permission to assemble forces for an operation in the Aleutians. The Army and Navy agreed that neither the shipping nor the troops could be made available.\textsuperscript{25}

The search for escorts for TORCH focused the attention of U. S. Army planners and the military chiefs on Allied programs of shipbuilding and ship allocation, which needed to be reviewed in the light of the new plans and the heavy toll of Allied shipping still being taken by German submarines in the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. The proposed reply for Chiang Kai-shek was sent to the President on 9 October 1942. The United States persuaded Chiang to modify the terms of his three demands. (See (1) Romamus and Sunderland, \textit{Stilwell’s Mission to China}, Ch. VII; and (2) \textit{Ch. XVII} below.)

\textsuperscript{25} (1) Particularly useful War Department files on the story of strategic planning in connection with the Aleutians in the fall of 1942 are OPD 381 ADC and WDCSA Alaska (SS). (2) See also Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere.

\textsuperscript{26} In the month of November 1942 the total Allied losses of merchant vessels by submarine action in the Atlantic “for the first and only time surpassed 600,-000 tons.” (See Morison, \textit{Battle of the Atlantic}, p. 324, and msg, Prime Minister to President, 2 Dec 42, No. 216, Tab 12/6, Item 4, Exec 5.) Even then, the long debate on whether the Army or the Navy should control air operations against submarines had not been settled. For a partial explanation of the jurisdictional disputes, see: (1) Craven and Cate, \textit{AAF I}, pp. 514–55; (2) Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, \textit{Europe: Torch to Pointblank—August 1942 to December 1943}, II, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1949), 377–411 (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, \textit{AAF II}); and (3) Morison, \textit{Battle of the Atlantic}, pp. 237–47.

These actions at the end of 1942 constituted an acknowledgment that the effects of TORCH on the Allied shipping situation would be prolonged far into 1943. Allied operations in North Africa, at first severely limited by existing port and overland transport capacity, and still limited by the size and frequency of the convoys that the British and American naval commands would run with the available escorts, could not...
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as yet be sustained on a big enough scale to overcome the large forces the Germans were moving into Tunisia. In North Africa, as in the Solomons, the issue became a test of the willingness and ability of both sides to meet the demands of air operations for which neither side was well prepared—to maintain the flow of their own supplies and reinforcements and to interdict the flow of enemy supplies and reinforcements to the front. The effects of haste and waste, the rate of attrition, and the scale and duration of the effort in North Africa depended largely on the willingness of the German High Command to invest in the continued defense of a position that must sooner or later be abandoned. It was, therefore, impossible to calculate with any certainty just how serious the limiting effect of TORCH on Allied shipping schedules might be. But it was evident that the demands of TORCH and the losses incurred would bear heavily on Allied shipping schedules. The War Department planners concluded that in any event, unless current commitments were altered or canceled, no new operations could be launched by the United States for several months to come.20

Allotment and Preparation of Ground Troops

The problem of making ground strength available for TORCH was complicated for planners on both sides of the Atlantic by their uncertainty how many divisions would be used in the operation, and what would be the precise composition of assault and follow-up forces. The original decision that only American troops should be used in the assaults soon had to be changed. Only ten regimental combat teams, two armored combat commands, and a Ranger battalion were available.21 Few of these troops, moreover, had received the necessary amphibious training. In setting aside ground forces in the United States for TORCH and in allocating the necessary priorities, Army planners in the United States calculated in the summer of 1942 on a basis of seven divisions from the United States.22 In one combination or another, these almost always included the 3d, 9th, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions, 2d and 3d Armored Divisions, and the 4th Motorized Division, in addition to the 1st and 34th Infantry and 1st U. S. Armored Divisions in the United Kingdom. Accepted political strategy and logistical considerations required that the United States furnish as large a part as possible of the total expeditionary force. A more definitive determination of the total number of troops to be employed—both British and American—was introduced with the promulgation of the 20 September outline plan. According to that plan the United States was ultimately to furnish about seven divisions and two regimental combat teams; the British would furnish four to six divisions.23

The problems of furnishing fully trained and equipped troops for the assault forces

20 The Weekly Strategic Resume cited n. 17. For a full treatment of supply factors (including the long holdovers and uneconomical routing of ships and inefficient port operations) limiting the TORCH operation, see: (1) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, and (2) Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa.


22 This number was carried over from the War Department planners' studies of June and July. See memo, OPD for CGs AGF and SOS, 2 Sep 42, sub: Preparation of Units for Overseas Serv, OPD 370.5 Task Force, 3a.

23 CCS 103/3, 26 Sep 42, title: Outline Plan, Opn TORCH. The plan itself bears the date 20 September 1942.
from the United States and United Kingdom continued to plague the planners almost to the eve of the actual launching of the operation. Combat-loading troop transports were to be available in time for the operation—at the immediate expense of troop shipments to the United Kingdom—but there was all too little time to train and rehearse crews to handle the debarkation of men and equipment and the assault troops themselves. The need for such training affected not only the date of launching the operation but also the choice of troops, for it required the use in TORCH of all available Army troops that had had any training in landing operations.

Informal agreement had been reached on 18 July between War and Navy Department representatives on “amphibious” training and organization. This arrangement provided for training three Army engineer amphibian brigades and an amphibious corps of two or more Army divisions. The original reason for the Army’s undertaking to train amphibian brigades was the anticipated need for the projected cross-Channel operations (SLYDEHAMMER-ROUNDUP) and the inability of the Navy to provide sufficient boat crews within the prospective time available. After the shift to TORCH, the need for training amphibian brigades continued to exist—and with time pressing more heavily on Army authorities than ever. Though the Army-Navy understanding of 18 July was never formally approved by the JCS, it continued to serve as if it had been, so far as preparations for TORCH were concerned.

Even before the terms of the agreement were presented formally to the JCS in early August, three amphibian brigades had been activated and were in training. One of these brigades, with a strength of about 7,000, was set up to load, man, and unload assault craft for an entire division. As a result of the TORCH decision, however, the Army postponed the organization of two additional brigades that it had scheduled for activation in August.

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31 The immediate result of the decision taken on 30 July to withdraw ten small ships for partial conversion to use as combat loaders was to cut by about 20,000 the scheduled August troop shipments to the United Kingdom. (See msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 31 Jul 42, CM-OUT 9255.)

32 For the effect on the date of TORCH, see above, Ch. XII.

33 For the background of Army-Navy consideration of this subject, see ABC 320.2 Amph Forces (3–13–42). 1.

34 (1) Memo for rcd, Lt Col Edward B. Gallant, 18 Jul 42, sub: Conf, Amph Tng, Jul 18, 1942, ABC 320.2 Amph Forces (3–13–42), 1. (2) For the engineer amphibian brigades, see typescript by Herbert N. Rosenthal, entitled, The Engineer Amphibian Command, in Engr Hist Files, Baltimore.

35 Memo, King for Marshall, 5 Feb 43, sub: Army Engr Amph Boat Crews, with JCS 81/1 in ABC 320.2 Amph Forces (3–13–42), 1.

36 The agreement of 18 July 1942 had been signed by General Handy and Admiral Cooke, with the concurrence of Marshall and King. The Navy's refusal to ratify it formally was based on its unwillingness to be committed on a permanent basis to a program which included provision for training Army engineer amphibian brigades. The 18 July arrangement was circulated on 10 August as JCS 81. (Memo, JPS for JCS, 10 Aug 42, sub: Distribution and Composition of U. S. Amph Forces, ABC 320.2 Amph Forces (3–13–42), 1.) JCS 81 was superseded by JCS 81/1, approved by the JCS and circulated on 5 September 1942.

37 By early August the scale of U. S. assault forces was well enough established to make it relatively certain that the fourth and fifth brigades would not be needed for TORCH. Furthermore, suitable personnel were not, according to Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, available. After consulting with various officers in SOS, G-3, and OPD, Handy of OPD authorized their suspension. (See tel conv transcripts, Handy with McNair, and with Brig Gen Floyd L. Parks, 7 Aug 42, Book 6, Exec 8.)

38 Neither the 2d nor the 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade was used in North Africa. Together with the 4th Engineer Amphibian Brigade—which was later activated—they were sent to the Southwest.
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The training of Army divisions for assault landings—which was also subject to dispute with the Navy—was thrown into even greater confusion by TORCH, confusion aggravated by the uncertainty that existed during August over the composition of TORCH forces, and especially over the composition of the assault forces that were to sail from the United States. As Handy observed on 7 August, the assault force from the United States must consist either of two infantry divisions or of one infantry division and one armored division. These possibilities affecting the disposition of the 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions raised a number of corollary questions for the Army planners. If only one of these divisions were used in the assault landings, which one would be chosen? Should the other be used in the follow-up for TORCH or be dispatched to meet commitments to the Pacific? Faced with the necessity of speeding amphibious training for the assault forces for TORCH, the Army planners in early August disregarded, for the moment at least, possible far-reaching consequences of setting aside both divisions for possible use in TORCH landings. Making allowance for the uncertainty of the composition of the assault force from the United States, military authorities moved quickly to set up the Atlantic Amphibious Corps (Maj. Gen. Jonathan W. Anderson, commanding) with the 3d and 9th Divisions and the 2d Armored Division.

There was no unity of command in TORCH until the expedition set sail from the United States. For training, the Atlantic Amphibious Corps, designed as part of Patton's task force for TORCH, came under the general supervision of Admiral Hewitt, Commander Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet. Army and Navy authorities tried in the summer of 1942 to straighten out the lines of command for that corps—a test case in joint Army-Navy planning and training. The temporary arrangements adopted for amphibious training and organization in preparation for TORCH by no means settled, but rather drew attention to, the jurisdictional problems that would have to be resolved if training for assault landings was to keep pace with plans for amphibious warfare in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Problems of training, equipping, and utilizing amphibious forces for the TORCH landings arose also across the Atlantic, in the British Isles. In the summer of 1942 Eisenhower's headquarters had to decide whether the 1st Infantry Division, already in England, could be used in the amphibious assault force sailing from the United

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41 Tel conv, Handy with Parks, cited n. 40.
42 In Operations in North African Waters (pp. 23–31), Morison summarizes the difficulties encountered in joint planning and training for this amphibious operation. He points out that service traditions and organization at that time made the Army and Navy more receptive to a "temporary partnership" than to "organic unity" in the conduct of amphibious operations. (For an account of amphibious training for TORCH, see also Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa.)
43 Ultimately parts of both the 3d and the 9th Infantry Divisions participated in the initial landings.
44 This arrangement was in accord with the provision of the 18 July agreement for an amphibious corps of two or more divisions.
45 (1) OPD draft ltr, DCoS to COMINCH and CNO, 6 Aug 42, sub: Employment of Amph Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, atchd to memo, OPD for DCoS, 4 Aug 42, sub: Amph Forces, OPD 353 Amph Forces, 29. This was sent out to the Navy on 6 August 1942. (2) See also tel conv, Handy with Parks, cited n. 40.
Kingdom. It was better trained than the 34th Division, stationed in Northern Ireland, and was, therefore, the choice for leading the assault force. In mid-August, however, a ship carrying nearly all its medium and about a third of its light artillery weapons together with other equipment went aground off Halifax on the voyage from the United States to the United Kingdom. Eisenhower was at that time planning on an early or mid-October date for launching TORCH. This mishap required him to train assault troops from the 34th Division instead of from the 1st.\textsuperscript{46} In Washington the Army planners speedily set in motion War Department machinery to send to the New York Port of Embarkation weapons to replace those carried in the ship which had run aground.\textsuperscript{47} Even so, the schedule left so little leeway that Eisenhower was unwilling to commit himself to using the 1st Division though he ordered it held ready to be trained in the event the invasion was put off until November.\textsuperscript{48} Late in August, when it became clear that the operation would not be launched until November, plans were made to use the 1st Division along with elements of the 34th Division in the assault force sailing from the United Kingdom. These plans were confirmed upon the agreement of the President and the Prime Minister on 5 September.\textsuperscript{49}

Equipping and training armored forces introduced further problems of urgency and difficulty for the Army planners. In early August planning for TORCH generally began to assume that the assault force for Casablanca would probably be one armored division and one infantry division instead of two infantry divisions, even though this change would require additional combat-loading vessels.\textsuperscript{50} Besides the probable use of the armored division for the assault, all plans called for another armored division from the United States. In order to provide another trained armored division besides the 2d then receiving amphibious training, the 3d Armored Division was transferred from Camp Polk, Louisiana, to the Desert Training Center, California, for training and maneuvers. On 2 September it was designated for General Patton’s Task Force “A.” After completing maneuvers in mid-October 1942, it was transferred on 24 October to Camp Pickett, Virginia, for assignment to the Western Task Force. Shortage of shipping, however, finally precluded its being used in TORCH.\textsuperscript{51}

The shuttling of the 3d Armored Division back and forth across the country illustrated the difficulties of planning during the summer and fall of 1942 as a result of uncertainty over the probable deployment even of major combat elements. The movement of that division was one of three large rail

\textsuperscript{46} (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 17 Aug 42, CM-IN 6236. (2) Memo, CofS for President, 20 Aug 42, sub: TORCH Opn, WDCSA TORCH, 1. At the same time the shortage of combat-loading vessels available in the United Kingdom for amphibious training reduced from two to one the number of requested U.S. combat teams that could be trained there at the time. Amphibious training in the United Kingdom, therefore, began with one regimental combat team of the 34th Division instead of two from the 1st Division, as originally contemplated.

\textsuperscript{47} Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 15 Aug 42, CM-OUT 4636.

\textsuperscript{48} Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Aug 42, CM-IN 6998.
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movements to which the Chief of Staff in the fall of 1942 called the attention of his staff. Though he conceded that sudden demands, state of training, and deficiencies in equipment had forced such moves in the past, he believed that there were more of them than necessary. The Army planners explained the shuttling of the 3d Armored Division on the grounds that no similar unit near the east coast had had desert training. The two other large-scale transcontinental movements noted by the Chief of Staff were also related by the Army planners to the uncertainty over TORCH. Both the 43d and the 29th Divisions, involved in these shifts, had been moved to new stations in the uncertain period before the final determination of requirements for TORCH. The tentative allocation of seven divisions to TORCH left very few divisions available in the United States for other uses.

The build-up for TORCH drew heavily on U. S. ground and supporting units in the United States and in the United Kingdom. As Marshall pointed out at the close of October, eight or nine divisions in the United States had been stripped of so many trained men to fill units for TORCH that six to eight months would be required to restore them to their former level of efficiency. Efforts to meet Eisenhower's needs for service troops, he added, had resulted “almost in the emasculation” of remaining American units. The reserves of the Army were drained for TORCH. To the demands of TORCH on units in the United States were added the heavy demands on American strength in the British Isles—the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Armored Division, and the 1st Ranger Battalion, with supporting troops transferred to North Africa in the fall of 1942 for service with II Corps.

Of course, with the heavy demands for troops went correspondingly heavy demands for equipment. According to the calculations by Army planners on 2 August, two infantry and two armored divisions in the United States would be equipped on or about 10 October, and three additional divisions (one motorized) could be equipped later in the fall. In effect, the only divisions in the United States that would be fully equipped before the close of 1942 were divisions that had to be ready for TORCH. The actual demands of TORCH on divisional equipment in the summer and fall of 1942 confirmed—in large measure—these calculations. Divisions in training in the United

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54 Memo, McNair, AGF, for ACofS OPD (through G-3, WD), 13 Nov 42, sub: Excessive Tr Mvmts, OPD 370.5 Task Force, 101.
55 Army authorities did their best to cut down such transcontinental movements and the consequent taxing of transportation facilities in the zone of interior, but, in the late fall, one division was needed for the British Isles and one for the South Pacific. The 29th and 43d were selected as best available and were again shifted within the zone of interior.
56 A good example of the difficulties and confusion faced by SOS in the zone of interior in readying its units for overseas service for TORCH, as a result of lack of sufficient time, was the dispatch of the 829th Signal Service Battalion. (See Cline, Washington Command Post, pp. 435-42.)
57 Memo, Hq ETO for TAG and incl, 14 Dec 42, sub: Tr List, U. S. Trs Transferred to N Af from UK, Tab 58, Item 2, Exec 5.
58 Memo, OPD for CoFS, 2 Aug 42, sub: TORCH, Paper 45, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B.
States and available for shipment to other theaters were stripped of equipment. The extent of that depletion led Marshall to observe in the fall of 1942 that in mounting TORCH the War Department had "scalped" units in the United States for equipment. The demands of TORCH also cut deeply into the American supplies and equipment that had been accumulated in the British Isles, and were due to limit accumulation during the next few months.

Provision of Air Units

It was evident from the beginning that most of the American air units for operations in North Africa, like most of the ground and service troops, would have to come from resources previously allotted for the projected major cross-Channel operation. CCS 94 expressly provided that all American heavy and medium air units in the United Kingdom would be available for TORCH. It had soon thereafter been accepted that TORCH could not be carried out on any other basis. The rest of the TORCH air force would come from the United States, from units scheduled to go to the United Kingdom and to the Middle East.

In early August Army planners estimated that withdrawals for TORCH would leave very little air strength in the United States for other uses in 1942. Activation of new units in the United States would have to be deferred to provide replacements for losses in TORCH. All that could be shipped to England during the rest of 1942, over and above TORCH requirements, would be five bomber groups in September and six troop carrier groups from August through October. Of the fifteen groups to be diverted from BOLERO to the Pacific (under CCS 94), the first would not become available till December.

The TORCH air force, as projected in mid-August, was to consist of two heavy bomber groups, three medium bomber groups, one light bomber group, four fighter (two P-38 and two Spitfire) groups, and one troop carrier group. The Eighth Air Force, then in the early stages of testing the American doctrine of high altitude daylight
bombing, held the main AAF resources as well as the most highly trained men available for service in Africa.\footnote{See Craven and Cate, \textit{AAF II}, p. 51.} The Eighth Air Force was charged with the organization, planning, and training of the new air force for North Africa. The Eighth was also to contribute its heavy bombers, and on an order from Eisenhower on 8 September it had to discontinue operations from the British Isles, notwithstanding the protests of the Army Air Forces.\footnote{See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 51–52, 59–60. This contains a brief description of the difficulties encountered in equipping, training, and readying for combat the medium and light bombers for Torch. The original August plan provided for bomber groups—three medium and one light—to fly to England and there be indoctrinated, processed, and initiated into combat. Eventually, as a result of the experience with bad weather in the North Atlantic, the route was closed to twin-engine aircraft.}

The shortage of fighter planes was so serious that it could not be met by using all American units in the United Kingdom together with those in the United States available for Bolero. American planning for a Torch air force—pushed by Patton and Doolittle—proposed, therefore, using P–39’s in England in transit to the Soviet Union and the 33d Pursuit Group (P–40’s) which was in the United States and awaiting shipment to the Middle East.\footnote{Memo, DCoS (for CoS) for COMINCH, 5 Sep 42, sub: Air Reinforcements for Guadalcanal–Tulagi Area, Book 6, Exec 8.} The release to Torch of the P–39’s en route to the Soviet Union was arranged by Eisenhower with the Prime Minister. The United States undertook to replace them via Alaska as soon as practicable.\footnote{\textit{(1) Ltr, Patton to CG AAF (through OPD), 26 Aug 42, sub: Air Support Torch, Item 7, Exec 1. (2) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 31 Aug 42, CM-OUT 0233. (3) Ltr, Patton to CG AAF (through OPD), 9 Sep 42, sub: Air Support Torch, Incl B to JCS 97/1.}}

The most pressing and serious problem in allocation of air units for Torch was a shortage of fighters and observation planes, particularly long-range models. General McNarney stated the problem on 5 September in response to a proposal from the Navy that P–38 reinforcements be sent to the South Pacific:

The reinforcements which you propose can only be effected by diversion from Torch. All the P–38’s now in the U. K. or being organized in the U. S. for movement to U. K. are allotted to Torch and the number is believed to be insufficient. No other fighter planes can make the long initial flights required across the Atlantic or from U. K. to Casa Blanca [sic] and Oran but the P–38 type. If we withdraw these planes we, in effect, impose a drastic change, if not the abandonment of Torch.\footnote{\textit{(1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 12 Sep 42, CM-IN 4988. (2) Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 12 Sep 42, CM-OUT 4316.}}
was mixed, because of a rather general belief that Allied air superiority in the Middle East would help assure the success of Torch. But the JCS agreed to recommend the War Department proposal to the CCS and at the same time authorized General Arnold to seek the informal concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff. Arnold thereupon wrote to Air Marshal Douglas C. S. Evill of the British Joint Staff Mission for his concurrence. Evill did not concur, in view of the need for fighter planes for the Middle East. In order to resolve the problem the CCS agreed on 18 September to refer it to Eisenhower for his views. Following a discussion with Doolittle, commander of the Twelfth Air Force for North Africa, Eisenhower agreed that the 33d Pursuit Group should be diverted to Torch as proposed, but he also recognized the need for sending fighter planes as reinforcements to the Middle East and the bearing on Torch of air superiority in the Middle East. The British Chiefs of Staff, concurring, called attention to Eisenhower's reservations. The 33d Group was assigned to the Twelfth Air Force and its P-40's were launched from an auxiliary aircraft carrier accompanying the assault convoy to Casablanca. Though the Middle East had been given a priority in shipping second only to Torch itself, the limited Allied resources available in the summer and fall of 1942 left little leeway beyond the fulfillment of requirements of the number one priority, Torch.

In meeting the claims of Torch the Army also left unsatisfied the Navy's continued demands for substantial air reinforcements for the Pacific. In August 1942 the problems of immediate and eventual air reinforcements for the Pacific were merged with the question of Torch requirements. Since August General Marshall had conceded that one group of heavy bombers should go to Hawaii and had relaxed restrictions on the use in the South Pacific of bombers assigned both to Hawaii and to Australia. But there remained as a source of disagreement between the services the broader question of priorities to govern the assignment of the remainder of the fifteen groups scheduled for withdrawal from Bolero as they became available in succeeding months. Army planners—in accord with AAF views—continued to argue in September that there be no further diversions to the Pacific—beyond the heavy bombardment group currently authorized for Hawaii—until the requirements of Torch, the Middle East, and the United Kingdom had been met. In supporting the AAF position in joint planning discussions, Army planners observed that there was some doubt that facilities available in the South Pacific could support more aircraft than were en route or present. Navy planners, agreeing that

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74 See Craven and Cate, AAF II, pp. 25, 63.
75 Min, 32d mtg JCS, 8 Sep 42.
76 (1) Ltr, CG AAF to Evill, 9 Sep 42. (2) Ltr, Air Commodore S. C. Strafford (for Evill) to Arnold, 10 Sep 42. (3) Ltr, Arnold to Evill, 12 Sep 42. These ltrs are incl to CCS 112, 17 Sep 42, in ABC 381 (7-25-42), 1.
77 Min, 40th mtg CCS, 18 Sep 42.
78 (1) Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Sep 42 (No. 2996), paraphrase attd to CCS 112/1, 21 Sep 42, title: Immediate Allocation of 33d Pursuit Gp. (2) Msg, same to same, 13 Sep 42, CM-IN 5411.

The War Department proceeded to comb U. S. air resources for replacements for the 33d Group for the Middle East. (See Craven and Cate, AAF II, p. 25, and min, 34th mtg CCS, 22 Sep 42.)

79 See above, Ch. XIII.
80 (1) OPD brief, Notes on ... JPS 32d mtg, 2 Sep 42, with JPS 48 in ABC 381 (9-25-41), 3. (2) JPS 48, 28 Aug 42, title: Detailed Deployment of U. S. Air Forces in Pacific Theater. This contained views of Army and Navy planners on the JUSSC.
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Torch and the Middle East should hold top priorities, countered that diversions to the Pacific should precede further deployment to the United Kingdom (Bolero).

The decision to invade North Africa was not at all hard to reconcile with the great aim of the Army Air Forces—strategic bombing against Germany. Through the use of alternate air bases in the Mediterranean to complement long-range strikes from the United Kingdom, the Air staff hoped to minimize the effects of the change in plans. A difference of opinion arose with the Navy over the relations of the strategic air offensive to ground operations in Europe. The Navy held that the projected bomber offensive from the United Kingdom could not be considered apart from a European invasion and that Torch had postponed the one as well as the other, thereby permitting the release of aircraft for use in the Pacific and elsewhere. The Air staff argued strongly that strategic bombardment, as originally conceived and as it must still be conceived, was a separate offensive operation, related to but distinct from a European invasion. Delaying the invasion had left a theater that, in the immediate future, would become purely an Air theater, requiring more than ever the concentration of air power against Germany.

These divergent views were further elaborated on the JCS level. Arnold maintained that air forces operating in the United Kingdom and the Middle East were directly complementary to Torch and must be kept in the same priority. He cited the views of Eisenhower, Patton, Clark, and Spaatz to support his argument. King continued to maintain, as in August, that the CCS had released the fifteen groups for deployment to the Pacific, and that the situation there demanded they be sent. Arnold replied that the decision to launch Torch had not altered the Allied strategy of concentrating against Germany, and that Torch—in conjunction with the development of strategic bomber offensive—promised the most decisive results of any pending Allied operation. He held that the withdrawal of any of the fifteen groups would preclude the success of the operation. Marshall and Leahy held to a middle-of-the-road policy: Torch and the Middle East were to take precedence, and the allocation of new units would be decided as they became available. Marshall added (as he had earlier told Eisenhower) that he regarded the main purpose for the American proposal to withdraw the fifteen groups from Bolero as the transfer of jurisdiction over their final assignment back to the JCS. Further discussions were postponed until Arnold, accompanied by Brig. Gen. St. Clair Streett, Chief, Theater Group, OPD, could make an inspection of the facilities available in the Pacific.

The upshot of the discussions in the joint staff and of the Arnold-Streett survey was...
an agreement reached by the end of October 1942 that the uncommitted balance of the fifteen groups withdrawn from Bolero was to form a part of a general United States strategic air reserve precisely as Marshall had intended.\textsuperscript{87} Claims on air units for operations against Japan would, as before, be weighed against claims for operations across the Atlantic. In effect, General Marshall had regained some of the freedom of action he had lost in the spring by proposing to give absolute priority to the concentration of American forces in the British Isles.

\textit{Effects on Plans for a Cross-Channel Operation}

\textbf{The War Department Thesis}

The great initial withdrawals of Bolero units for Torch, the related withdrawal of Bolero air units for future disposal, the improbability that the American version of Torch would allow of a quick victory and the corollary probability that many deferred claims against Allied resources would accumulate for several months, all tended to confirm the contention of American military leaders, expressed in the London conference of July, that Torch would almost certainly entail the postponement of the major cross-Channel effort scheduled for the spring of 1943. In early August, Marshall and his staff restated this view. They believed it probable that Torch would not merely delay Roundup but would be, in effect, a substitution for that undertaking in 1943.\textsuperscript{88} They were quite certain that in any event the movement of troops to the British Isles would be considerably reduced for at least four months after the assembly of shipping and escorts for the assault landings for Torch began. And, in Marshall's opinion, the invasion of French North Africa, undertaken with due allowance for the uncertainties involved and with a determination to see it through to a successful conclusion, would preclude the "offensive" operations "directly" against Germany contemplated in the original document on "American-British Grand Strategy," dating from the Arcadia Conference.\textsuperscript{89}

\textit{Slowdown of Bolero}

By the late summer of 1942 the War Department had a fairly well-defined idea what revisions must be made in the Bolero troop basis down to the spring of 1943 and how the mission of Army forces during that time should be redefined to fit the new conditions produced by the deviation from the strategy of Sledgehammer-Bolero-Roundup. According to the revised Army planning for its forces in the United Kingdom to the spring of 1943, the U. S. air force was to be built up in the United Kingdom to increase offensive operations against the Continent; a balanced ground force was to be maintained in the United Kingdom as a reserve for Torch, for the defense of the United Kingdom, and in preparation for emer-

\textsuperscript{87} (1) Min, 38th mtg JCS, 20 Oct 42. (2) Min, 39th mtg JCS, 27 Oct 42. By 26 October, of the fifteen groups three had been committed: one heavy bomber group to Hawaii; one half of another heavy bomber group to the South Pacific; and one and a half troop carrier groups divided among the Middle East, Alaska, and the South Pacific. Twelve groups were still uncommitted. (See JCS brief, 26 Oct 42, title: JCS 97/3 Deployment of U. S. Air Forces in Pacific Theater, with JCS 97/3 in ABC 381 (9-25-41), 3.)

\textsuperscript{88} Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Aug 42, CM-OUT 2023.

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Emergency action on the Continent. Toward the close of the summer the Chief of Staff accepted the Army planners’ proposal for a balanced ground force of 150,000 U. S. troops in the United Kingdom. They had pointed out to him, on 27 August, that the change in strategic policy from BOLERO to TORCH had by that time resulted in stopping the movement of major ground force elements to the United Kingdom. A great number of supporting combat and service troops had been prepared for movement to the United Kingdom on the basis of the BOLERO requirement of an over-all force of about one million men by April 1943. The continuation of shipments of these troops would not only result, his staff planners observed, in stripping the United States of such troops but would also lead to an unbalanced ground force in the European theater. They therefore called for a balanced ground force, similar to the one envisaged early in the war—for the purpose of relief or defense—under the MAGNET (Northern Ireland) plan.

According to the revised War Department estimates of the late summer of 1942, the air forces in the United Kingdom would total approximately 95,000 by 1 April 1943. That number represented the original air force figure set up for BOLERO, less 100,000 to be diverted for TORCH. Services of Supply troops (about 60,000 to support this air force, as well as the projected balanced ground force) would give the United States a total force of about 305,000 in the United Kingdom by 1 April 1943. By 30 September 1942 the Army would have 160,000 troops in the United Kingdom or en route, over and above the forces required for TORCH. In order to bring the force in the United Kingdom up to the total strength of 305,000 by 1 April 1943, it would be necessary to ship 145,000 troops there. The use of the fast-sailing and unescorted Queens on the North Atlantic run appeared to be the most practicable means of expediting these shipments without interfering with TORCH.

In early November 1942 the War Department tentatively approved, for planning purposes, a new reduced strength for American forces in the United Kingdom set at approximately 427,000. This figure represented an increase of over 100,000 above the original estimates of the late summer. Shortly thereafter—on 12 November—in submitting his revised estimates for the European theater to General Marshall, Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle, Deputy Commander, European Theater of Operations, stated that, as of about 30 November 1942, there would be slightly more than 25,600 U. S. Services of Supply troops left in the United Kingdom. About 84,800 more men would be required to meet the estimated figure of 110,463 SOS troops. He indicated that after the withdrawals for the North African operation, United States ground forces in the United Kingdom would total, as of about 30 November, only 23,260 troops—including the 29th Infantry Division. Over 136,000 more ground

90 Memo, Lt Col E. H. Qualls, OPD, for Gen Hull, 7 Sep 42, sub: BOLERO Com Mtg, File 3, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.
Colonel Qualls was a member of the committee for BOLERO movements in OPD’s European Theater Section, then headed by General Hull.

91 Memo, OPD for CofS, 27 Aug 42, sub: 5440 Shipts of Tr Units, Paper 39, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B.

92 Memo cited n. 90.
force troops would be needed to reach an estimated total of approximately 159,000. In an accompanying note General Spaatz, the commanding general of the Eighth Air Force, stated that combat units of the Eighth Air Force that would remain in the United Kingdom after the departure of the Twelfth Air Force would be seven heavy bomber groups, one single-engine fighter group, and one observation group. Additional combat units scheduled for the United Kingdom in November and December included one medium bomber group, one twin-engine fighter group, and one troop carrier group. General Spaatz pointed out that the Twelfth Air Force had priority in the European theater. The only ready source from which replacements for the Twelfth could be drawn was the Eighth Air Force, which was also actively engaged. The process of withdrawing aircraft and combat crews from the operating organization of the Eighth Air Force, he observed, had already begun. Unless steps were taken to counteract this trend, the Eighth was likely to be bled of its operating strength. He recommended that a sustained air offensive against Germany be made the principal mission of American forces in the British Isles, and that their growth be controlled accordingly.

Thus the trend in Army planning during the fall of 1942 was to increase the proportion of air and supporting service troops in the British Isles, although the staff still planned to have a “balanced” ground force of about 150,000 there by the spring of 1943. The tentative plans for increasing American forces in the British Isles in part reflected the close dependence of the Twelfth Air Force on the Eighth. In part, they also reflected the agreement of Marshall, Arnold, Eisenhower, Spaatz, and their advisers that air operations against Germany should be resumed and intensified during the North African campaign. Even on this reduced scale, the schedules for the BOLERO movements could not be met with the trained and equipped ground combat units and cargo shipping then available. In the latter part of October Army planners estimated that the troop lift of the four remaining convoys to the United Kingdom for the balance of 1942 would be only 4,000, 3,300, 8,000, and 8,000, these figures representing the maximum which cargo shipping could support. In early December the Chief of Staff called the attention of the President to the fact that the monthly flow of United States troops to the United Kingdom was then only 8,500. Troops were moving even more slowly than the Army had wished or expected.

The Army planners had not given up the idea that the United States and Great Britain must save their strength to engage and defeat the German Army in northwestern Europe. But this idea, the polestar by which the planners had steered, had been obscured; they had been thrown off their course; and they were no longer even sure of their position. The day of landing in France seemed as far away as it had six months before, or further. To gather huge ground forces in England to await a hypo-
The hypothetical break in German military power appeared neither possible nor desirable, particularly in the light of other and more immediate demands. If the British remained unwilling to agree to a cross-Channel offensive until German military power was broken, there remained the “Pacific Alternative,” and the Army planners once again argued for its adoption in that event. Clarification of the subsequent lines of strategic action in the European theater for 1943 for the ultimate defeat of Germany would have to await the outcome of current operations and basic decisions of top Allied political leaders. Meanwhile, the War Department staff strove to keep alive the idea that it would finally prove necessary to undertake a very large cross-Channel operation against a still formidable German Army, while the Air staff further explored the idea that in any event a great air offensive over the European Continent—from bases both in the British Isles and in the Mediterranean—should have the first claim on American air forces.

Churchill on Bolero-Roundup

In a conference with General Eisenhower and his staff during the latter part of September, the Prime Minister took notice of the effect of the North African operation on the War Department’s plans for 1943. As Eisenhower wrote to Marshall immediately after the conference, it appeared that “for the first time the Former Naval Person [Churchill] and certain of his close advisers” had “become acutely conscious of the inescapable costs of TORCH.” Eisenhower went on to observe:

The arguments and considerations that you advanced time and again between last January and July 24th apparently made little impression upon the Former Naval Person at that time, since he expresses himself now as very much astonished to find out that TORCH practically eliminates any opportunity for a 1943 Roundup.

The Prime Minister could no longer simply assume, Eisenhower pointed out, that TORCH could be reconciled with Soviet expectations of a second front and of material aid:

Although the memorandum prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, when you were here, and later approved by both governments, definitely states that the mounting of TORCH would in all probability have to be a substitute for 1943 ROUNDUP, while the several memoranda you presented called attention to the effects of TORCH upon the possibilities of conveying materials to Russia and elsewhere, these matters have now to be met face to face, and with an obviously disturbing effect upon the Former Naval Person.

The Prime Minister was still quite unwilling to acknowledge that TORCH would strain United States and British resources to the utmost, for that would be, in effect, to acknowledge that the United States and Great Britain would remain in 1943—as they had been in 1942—unable to meet the expectations of the Soviet Government with reference either to the shipment of supplies or to the establishment of a “second front.” He declared that the United States and United Kingdom could not confess to an inability to execute more than a thirteen-division attack in the Atlantic theater during the next twelve months. They must not acknowledge that TORCH left nothing to spare.

The Prime Minister wrote to the President that the conference with Eisenhower

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Footnotes:

88 Pers ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Sep 42, Paper 59, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B. Eisenhower, Clark, and Smith attended this staff conference.

89 Ibid.
and other American officers had left him much troubled on that score, saying "I gained the impression at the conference that Roundup was not only delayed or impinged upon by Torch but was to be regarded as definitely off for 1943. This will be another tremendous blow for Stalin. Already Maisky [Soviet ambassador to Great Britain] is asking questions about the spring offensive." The Prime Minister ended his message by saying, "To sum up, my persisting anxiety is Russia, and I do not see how we can reconcile it with our consciences or with our interests to have no more P Q's [northern route convoys to Russia] till 1943, no offer to make joint plans for Jupiter, and no signs of a spring, summer, or even autumn offensive in Europe."  

The Prime Minister's discomfort over the probable elimination of Roundup as a possibility—not necessarily to be realized—for 1943 was all the greater when he learned, in the fall of 1942, of the War Department's definite plans for scaling down the Bolero preparations in the United Kingdom. In the latter part of November there came to his attention a letter from General Hartle stating that under existing directives from the War Department any construction in excess of requirements for a force of 427,000 would have to be done by British labor and materials. Lend-lease materials, the War Department had stated, could not be furnished for these purposes. The Prime Minister took the occasion to sound out the President on the meaning of this great reduction from the original estimates under the Bolero plan to have 1,100,000 American troops in the British Isles by 1 April 1943. He took the reduction to indicate that the United States had given up planning for an invasion in 1943. To abandon Roundup, he declared, would be "a most grievous decision." He pointed out that Torch was no substitute for Roundup and only employed thirteen divisions against the forty-eight projected for Roundup. He reported that although his previous talks with Stalin had been based on a postponed Roundup he had never suggested that a second front should not be attempted in 1943 or 1944. One of the arguments he himself had used against Sledgehammer, the Prime Minister added, was that it would eat up in 1942 the "seed corn" needed for a much larger operation in 1943. Only by building up a Roundup force in the United Kingdom as rapidly as other urgent demands on shipping permitted could the troops and means be gathered to come to grips with the main strength of the European enemy nations. The Prime Minister conceded that, despite all efforts, the combined British-American strength might not reach the necessary level in 1943. In that case, he believed that it became all the more important to launch the operation in 1944. He asked that another British-American conference be held, either in London, with Hopkins representing the President (as in July), or in Washington as in June.

General Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, reassured the Prime Minister that the War Department directive on authorized construction in the United Kingdom referred only to the necessity of keeping Bolero preparations in the United King-

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100 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 22 Sep 42, No. 151, Item 63, Exec 10.
101 Msg, Smith to Marshall, 26 Nov 42, CM-IN 11164. A copy of this message was sent to the President.
102 Msg, Prime Minister to President [25 Nov 42], No. 211, WDSCA 381, 1 (SS). This message was shown to Marshall and Handy in the War Department.
dom in line with the revised estimates in the anticipated troop build-up. He pointed out that, as had been agreed during the July conference in London, Torch commitments made Roundup improbable in 1943 and necessitated revision of Bolo estimates based on the temporarily reduced troop lift. Other operations that the Prime Minister was urging could only be mounted at the expense of Torch and would have the same effect. He reassured the Prime Minister that none of these considerations, however, implied any change in the American conception of the Bolo-Roundup plan.

This was not the kind of assurance the Prime Minister needed. The Prime Minister wanted to continue operations in the Mediterranean, after gaining control of the coast of North Africa, with an operation against Sardinia (Brimstone). American officers therefore had some reason to go on discounting the Prime Minister's assertions about Roundup. They knew that he was anxious lest American forces be committed to larger offensive operations in the Pacific, and lest it be alleged he had dealt in bad faith with the Soviet Union. The kind of operation actually being undertaken in French North Africa, over the protests of London, was hard to reconcile with the idea of undertaking an operation of any kind on the Continent in 1943. The Prime Minister could hardly expect, therefore, unqualified reassurance that the President still thought that Torch did not rule out Roundup. But he could expect and wanted a declaration leaving open the possibility of some such operation.

Such a reassurance he soon received from the President. The President reminded him that the mounting of Torch postponed necessarily the assembling of forces in the British Isles. The North African operations must continue to take precedence, against the possibility of adverse situations developing in Spanish Morocco or in Tunisia. The United States, the President added, was much more heavily engaged in the Southwest Pacific than he had anticipated a few months previously; nevertheless, a striking force should be built up in the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible for immediate action in the event of German collapse. A larger force for later use should be built up in the event that Germany remained intact and assumed the defensive. Determination of the strength to be applied to Bolo in 1944 was a problem, the President observed, requiring “our joint strategic considerations.” The Prime Minister accepted the American explanations and wired the President that he was completely reassured.

The idea of a cross-Channel operation in 1943 thus remained alive for purposes of negotiation and of the staff planning associated therewith. It was evidently out of the question to plan on undertaking in 1943 the kind of cross-Channel operation the War Department had proposed, and necessary to defer to 1944 the great decisive campaign on the plains of northwestern Europe that the American planners, unlike the British planners, had always believed unavoidable.

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103 Msg cited n. 101.
104 Churchill, in Hinge of Fate (pp. 648–59) gives an exposition of his views in late 1942 on a 1943 Roundup.
105 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 657–58. Preliminary drafts of the President's reply to the Prime Minister, drawn up by Marshall and his staff and bearing the date 25 November 1942, are contained in War Department files. For reply of President to Prime Minister’s msg No. 211, see WD drafts of msg (25 Nov 42), Item 63a, Exec 10. Other copies are filed in WDCSA 381, 1 (SS).
106 Msg cited n. 101.
CHAPTER XV

British and American Plans and Soviet Expectations

The American and the British Governments had been aware in the early summer of 1942 that a decision to invade North Africa might complicate relations with the Soviet Union. As the British Chiefs of Staff had noted on 2 July, in recommending that SLEDGEHAMMER should not be mounted, the Soviet Government would soon become aware that preparations were not proceeding according to the tentative declaration given to Mr. Molotov in May. Pending the result of further Anglo-American negotiations, there was nothing definite to tell the Soviet Government. On 8 July the Prime Minister, in notifying Sir John Dill of the War Cabinet’s decision not to mount SLEDGEHAMMER, had ended with the information: “Naturally we are not as yet telling the Russians that there is no possibility of Sledgehammer.” But the London conference in late July and the President’s decision to mount TORCH made the problem real and immediate. The uneasiness in the War Department in early August found expression in a paper from the operations staff to General Marshall on the effect of launching TORCH:

Allied military action in any area other than on the continent of Europe, particularly if it is an operation of the magnitude of Torch, quite probably would have an adverse effect on Russian decisions.

Churchill undertook to go to Moscow to break the news to Stalin—“a somewhat raw job,” as he expressed it to President Roosevelt. Churchill has since recorded that, though he felt his mission was “like carrying a large lump of ice to the North Pole,” still it was better “to have it all out face to face with Stalin, rather than trust to telegrams and intermediaries.” Churchill arrived in Moscow in mid-August—at a critical moment in the Battle of Stalingrad. The United States was represented at the conference by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, and, in the accompanying Anglo-American-Soviet staff conversations, by General Maxwell, the senior American officer in the Middle East, and Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, who had been sent by the President to explore the possibilities of co-operation between American and Soviet air forces in the Far East.

The conference began in a somber mood with Stalin and Churchill in sharp disagreement over the postponement of the “second

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1 See Ch. X above.
2 Msg, War Cabinet Offs to Jt Stf Miss, Washington, 8 Jul 42, COS (W) 217, Item 9, Exec 5.
front." Stalin of course drew attention to the failure of the United States and Great Britain to deliver the supplies that had been promised to the Soviet Union and to continue the preparations for a second front as described to Molotov in May and as anticipated in the Anglo-Soviet communiqué of 12 June 1942. He spoke of the great sacrifices being made by the USSR to hold 280 German divisions on the Eastern Front. It did not seem to him too difficult for the British and Americans to land six or eight divisions on the Cotentin peninsula in 1942. Stalin made the same point that Molotov had made in May—nobody could be sure whether conditions would be as favorable for opening a second front in Europe in 1943 as they were in 1942. In the discussions on TORCH Stalin wavered between expressions of interest and lack of interest. At the conclusion of the conference, he seemed reconciled to the operation.

Late in the month of August abbreviated accounts of the conference were sent directly to the War Department from Army representatives abroad. On 26 August Eisenhower transmitted to Marshall the report he had received from the Prime Minister upon the latter's return to England:

During his recent visit to an Allied Capital he [the Prime Minister] explained the reasons for his rejection of Sledgehammer, but apparently without completely convincing his hearer of the military soundness of his views. He then outlined Torch to his hearer as it was understood when you were here and awakened great interest in this proposition. Before the former Naval person terminated his visit to that Capital he was told "May God prosper that operation."

On 30 August the War Department also received from General Bradley a delayed account of the staff conversations that had accompanied the conference. Bradley reported on a meeting of 15 August, which he and Maxwell had attended, between British Field Marshals Brooke and Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder and Soviet Marshals Kliment E. Voroshilov and Boris M. Shaposhnikov. The Americans had taken little part in the discussions at this meeting. The Soviet officers had urged opening the second front in Europe at once, if only with the available six British divisions and using the Channel Islands as a base. After two hours argument, however, Bradley reported, the Russians appeared to accept the "British decision" that no cross-Channel operation would be executed in 1942.

The Caucasus Project

Anxious to offset the announcement of the change in their plans for a second front in 1942, the President and Prime Minister were eager to do something to show that they were still determined to defeat Germany as quickly as possible, and were convinced that it would require the combined

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7 A picturesque detailed description of the meetings with Stalin in mid-August is contained in Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 472–502.

For an account of Harriman’s contemporary reports to Washington on the conference, see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 616–21. No copies of Harriman’s reports have been found in War Department files. War Department leaders may, of course, have learned of them one way or another.

The tense atmosphere of the meetings was later described to the War Department General Council by Col. Joseph A. Michela, U. S. military attaché in Moscow. He stated that Churchill had at one point threatened to leave but was persuaded to remain. (Mtg, Gen Council, 26 Oct 42, OPD 334.8 Gen Council, 26.)
efforts of all three nations to do so. One means of doing so would be to establish direct military relations with the Soviet Union in the field, in an area in which the Soviet forces were adjacent—the Middle East—by committing small British and American forces to the direct support of Soviet forces in the Caucasus.

A proposal to send a British-American air force to the Caucasus was introduced by the Prime Minister into his conversations with Stalin of mid-August.\(^{10}\) He suggested transferring air forces from Egypt to the Baku–Batumi area. His offer was contingent on the success of operations in the Libyan Desert. Stalin did not reject this proposal, but nothing was settled at the time, beyond an agreement in principle that once a definite offer had been made and accepted, British air representatives should go at once to Moscow and thence to the Caucasus to make plans and preparations.

When the President learned of the Soviet reaction to the Prime Minister's tentative offer, he wrote to General Marshall:

I wish you would explore very carefully the merits and possibilities of our putting an American air force on the Caucasian front to fight with the Russian armies. Churchill, while in Moscow, cabled that Stalin would welcome such cooperation. If such an enterprise could be accomplished would it be advisable to have British air also represented?\(^{11}\)

General Marshall's advisers concluded that a Caucasus air force could not go into operation before 20 January 1943, and that the need for U. S. air forces elsewhere might well prove to be greater than the need for them in the Caucasus. Weather conditions, moreover, would seriously interfere with Caucasus operations up to 1 April. The staff pointed out also that to support operations in the Caucasus would reduce the volume of lend-lease aid sent to the Soviet Union via the Persian Gulf. The staff, therefore, concluded that no American air force should be sent to the Caucasus in 1942, but that the possibility suggested by the President should be kept under study during the rest of the year, on the assumption that British participation would be essential. Marshall forwarded these conclusions to the President on 26 August 1942.\(^{12}\)

On 30 August the War Department learned something about the British proposal from General Bradley's delayed report of the staff conversations that accompanied the mid-August conference in Moscow.\(^{13}\) According to Bradley's report the British were considering the inclusion of perhaps one American heavy bomber group in the projected Caucasus air force, but had evaded repeated questions by the Soviet representatives about the exact composition of the force. On the same day in a long message to the President, the Prime Minister elaborated on his ideas on the British-American air force for the Caucasus. He proposed that the British should furnish nine fighter squadrons and three light and two medium bombardment squadrons; the Americans, one heavy bombardment group already in the Middle East, and, to supplement insufficient land transport, an air transport group of at least fifty

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\(^{10}\) In a message to the Prime Minister shortly before the Moscow conference of mid-August 1942, the President had expressed interest in the possibilities of aiding the Soviet Union by direct air support to them on the southern end of their front. (See Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 616.)

\(^{11}\) Memo, President for CofS, 21 Aug 42, OPD 381 Russia, 6.

\(^{12}\) Memo, CofS for President [26 Aug 42], sub: Merits and Possibilities of Placing an Amer Air Force on the Caucasian Front, submitted for Marshall's signature with memo, OPD for CofS, 24 Aug 42, same sub, both in OPD 381 Russia, 6.

\(^{13}\) Msg cited n. 9.
planes, which would have to come from the United States. The Americans would fight together with the British components under an RAF officer, who would be under Soviet strategic command. The Prime Minister reasoned that the project would employ British and American air forces at a critical point, reinforcing the Red Air Force and serving as “the advance shield of all our interests” in Iran. This proposal, like his earlier suggestion to Stalin, was contingent on a favorable issue of the battle for Egypt.\footnote{Msg, Prime Minister to President, 30 Aug 42, No. 141, with CCS 122 in ABC 370.5 Caucasus (10–13–42).}

General Marshall continued to oppose the project. On 18 September, with the concurrence of General Arnold, he recommended to the President that the Caucasus air force should not include American units, except for an air transport group which the British could not furnish.\footnote{Memo, CofS for President, 18 Sep 42, sub: Proposed Anglo-Amer Air Force for Opn in Caucasus Area, incl draft msg [President to Prime Minister], OPD 381 Russia, 7.} The Army staff pointed out that the U.S. Government, having already demonstrated its willingness to support Soviet military operations, need not concern itself with what the Prime Minister had called the “moral effect of comradeship” with the Russians.\footnote{For the staff study and action, see: (1) memo, Wedemeyer for ACofS OPD, 6 Sep 42, sub: Proposed Anglo-Amer Air Force for Opn in Caucasian Area; (2) memo, OPD for CofS, 17 Sep 42, same sub (with this memo, bearing Gen. Arnold’s initials in concurrence, was submitted a draft msg [President to Prime Minister] and a draft memo [CofS for President]); and (3) note, H. [Handy]: “Coordinate with Gen. Arnold and prepare a proposed action,” on cover sheet. All in OPD 381 Russia, 7.} General Marshall emphasized the point that the extremely difficult command decision to transfer units from Egypt would, in any event, devolve upon the British since they were responsible for operations in the Middle East, and that it could be better made and carried out by the British on their own responsibility.

The President did not adopt the policy recommended by the War Department nor did he accept the Prime Minister’s proposal. Instead, he came to the conclusion that American units should take part in the operations, as proposed by the Prime Minister, but that the “definite” offer for which the Soviet Government supposedly was waiting should not depend on the course of other operations.\footnote{Memo, Secy JCS [Deane], for OPD, 10 Oct 42, sub: U.S. and Br Air Units for Soviet Use in Caucasus, Item 20, Exec 1. This memorandum gives excerpts on the subject from several messages between the President and Prime Minister. See especially, excerpts from messages Nos. 186 and 187, 16 and 27 September, President to Prime Minister.} His conviction was strengthened early in October when he was considering the draft of a message the Prime Minister intended to send to Stalin to announce the suspension of the convoys to Murmansk.\footnote{See msg, Prime Minister to President, 22 Sep 42, No. 151, Item 63a, Exec 10.} The President reasoned that, having made the unwelcome decision to invade North Africa and being forced as a result to take the even more unwelcome step of suspending regular convoys to Murmansk, the American and British Governments should do something to make up in part for the loss of support which the Soviet Government had been led to expect, in particular since the defense of the Caucasus was at a critical stage. He declared: “The Russian front is today our greatest reliance and we simply must find a direct manner in which to help them other than our diminish-
ing supplies.” He therefore advised that the Prime Minister’s message to Premier Stalin should mention without qualification the British-American determination to send proposed air forces to the Caucasus.  

On 8 October the President agreed that the force should be made up as originally proposed by the Prime Minister—including one American heavy bomber group and one transport group—and should be transferred to the Caucasus early in 1943.  

The Prime Minister so informed Stalin, and the President independently sent confirmation on 9 October.  

Up to this point the Soviet Government had continued to show interest in the project. On 6 October Stalin inquired of General Bradley, who had been waiting since early August 1942 to ask about a proposed American survey of air installations in Siberia, whether he could find out how many units were to be sent to the Caucasus, and when. Stalin was willing that Bradley should undertake a survey in the Caucasus as well as in Siberia, stating that he considered the Caucasus project to have priority. Both Stalin and Molotov, according to Bradley, regarded the situation in the Caucasus as most serious.  

Bradley then recommended to the War Department that the United States should offer to send at once at least a token force, and that he be authorized to make a preliminary survey in the Caucasus. Upon being informed that a specific proposal had been made to send a British-American force to the Caucasus early in 1943, he strongly recommended that the force should be composed entirely of American air units and that the first of them, at least, should be sent at once and not in 1943. He explained that his recommendations reflected his observation that Soviet officials distrusted the British and heavily discounted future commitments. He proposed that he should be authorized to carry out negotiations and make plans to execute his recommendations.  

The War Department replied that the project must be carried out as the President had proposed. Granted that Bradley’s reasoning was sound, the War Department explained, the United States did not have available the units to act as he recommended. Even the President’s more modest proposal would be fulfilled only by cutting replacements for American units then in action. Bradley was therefore not to undertake the survey he had proposed unless instructed to do so.  

On 13 October, in response to questions from the JCS, the British Chiefs of Staff made definite recommendations on the composition and authority of a mission to Moscow to work out details, as soon as the

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29 Msg, President to Prime Minister, 5 Oct 42, Item 63, Exec 10. The message refers to the Prime Minister’s message No. 154. The message of 5 October was transmitted to General Marshall by Comdr. W. L. Freseman, White House aide, for Admiral Leahy. This file also contains a War Department draft reply, with the notation “Draft sent to Pres.”  
30 Msg, President to Prime Minister (No. 192), as quoted in memo cited n. 17.  
31 Msg, President to Prime Minister (No. 193), as quoted in memo cited n. 17.  
32 (1) Msg cited n. 22(1). (2) Msg, Bradley to Marshall, 5 Oct 42, CM-IN 2940 (10/7/42). (2) Memo, Bradley for CoFs, 8 Dec 42, sub: Mtg with Mr. Stalin, Incl 5 with ltr, Bradley to CoFS (through OPD), 14 Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Miss, bound in vol, title: Rpt of Brad-
Soviet Government should have accepted the offer of the President and Prime Minister. The mission the British Chiefs of Staff proposed would work out such problems as the "operational role," the facilities required for airfields and road reconnaissance, and the tonnage needed to maintain the British-American force. The mission would be sent by the British Middle East Command, with American representatives to come from USAFIME. The proposed force, the British stated in response to further questions, was to be under a British commander with the rank of air marshal. On the diplomatic level, the British Government would conduct the necessary negotiations with the Soviet Government.

The British proposals raised no objections except on the subject of command. The War Department operations staff recommended that an Air Corps officer should be put in command, "inasmuch as the heavy portion of the striking force (Heavy Bombers) is American, and the key logistical support comprising the Air Transport Group is likewise American." General Arnold considered it quite probable on the basis of past experience that in the end the United States would have to furnish all the planes. He stated that should the United States have to furnish fighter planes, he would request that an American commander be appointed.

On 20 October the JCS accepted the British proposals in so far as they concerned the method of carrying on negotiations. The British named Air Marshal P. H. Drummond to head the mission. The JCS designated as the senior American representative the commanding general of the IX Air Force Service Command, Brig. Gen. Elmer E. Adler, who was suggested for the position by the War Department. On 25 October the War Department sent Adler his instructions.

The AAF had already instructed General Brereton, the Ninth Air Force commander, to organize a new heavy bomber group (to be equipped with B-24's) from personnel and planes already in the Middle East, to be ready for operations in Transcaucasia at the beginning of January 1943. In so doing he was to redistribute personnel so that the new group (the 376th) would be about equal in experience to the other groups in the Ninth and Tenth Air Forces. He was also to tell Washington what else he would need from the United States, and he was to begin working with the British on logistic plans.

At the end of October the British Government was still waiting for a sign that the Soviet Government would accept the offer made by the Prime Minister on 8 October. The British and American staffs continued to wait for a reply during the opening weeks of the campaign for North Africa—the beginning of the British offensive on the Ala-

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26 These recommendations came in response to a series of questions raised by Secretary of the JCS, General Deane. Memo, Brigadier Vivian Dykes for Deane, 13 Oct 42, sub: Proposed Despatch of U.S. and Br Air Forces to Caucasus, incl with memo, Secy JCS for JPS, 13 Oct 42, no sub. Both memos are incls to JPS 72/D, 13 Oct 42.

27 Memo, Secy, Reps of Br COS, for Secy JCS, 16 Oct 42, circulated as JCS 131/1, 17 Oct 42.

28 OPD brief, Notes on ... JCS 38th mtg, 20 Oct 42, with JCS 131/1 in ABC 370.5 Caucasus (10–13–42).

29 Min, 38th mtg JCS, 20 Oct 42.

30 Ibid.


32 Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Adler, 24 Oct 42, CM-OUT 8602 (10/25/42).

33 Msg (originator AAF), Marshall to Brereton, 10 Oct 42, CM-OUT 3346.
mein Line (23 October, Operation LIGHTFOOT) and the British-American landings in French Morocco and Algeria (8 November, Operation TORCH). Finally, as the War Department learned on 13 November 1942, the British, still ignorant of Soviet intentions, arranged for the Drummond-Adler mission to go to Moscow.34

On 22 November, the day after its arrival in Moscow, the mission held its first meeting with Soviet representatives, Lt. Gen. Fedor Y. Falalaeyev, Chief of Staff, Red Air Force, presiding. It quickly became evident that the Soviet Government had no intention of accepting the offer of an air force in the Caucasus. Soviet representatives proposed instead that in place of an air force, Great Britain and the United States should send planes to the Soviet Union—in addition to those already scheduled to be sent. They gave several reasons. Lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union would be decreased by the amount it would take to support a British-American force in the Caucasus. Soviet air units, which could be shifted according to operational needs, would make more effective use of the planes than could a British-American force, which would be restricted to a limited area. British and American troops would find it hard to get used to the primitive facilities of Soviet units. The Soviet representatives made the mission aware, moreover, that the Soviet Government did not want Allied soldiers to fight alongside Soviet soldiers or in Soviet territory. Adler reported that the Soviet representatives made it “quite clear” that from the Soviet point of view fraternization might have “a deleterious political effect” and the presence of Allied forces in the Caucasus “might give a future hold on or near their oil resources.”35

The mission, while agreeing to report Soviet objections and the Soviet counterproposal, took the position that the counterproposal should come from Premier Stalin to the Prime Minister and the President, since the mission was not authorized to discuss it.36 Three weeks passed while the mission and the British and American Governments waited for Stalin to make a formal proposal. The Soviet Government finally conceded a point—that the crews could be sent with the planes to fight in Soviet air units.37 In spite of this concession, the War Department staff and the JCS in turn took the position that the mission ought to be instructed that the Soviet counterproposal was unacceptable so that the mission could either go ahead on the basis of the original proposal or return to the Middle East. The War Department was especially interested in making it clear that it was as undesirable to send planes with crews as without crews. The policy at stake was the one the President had adopted in May 1942, which had served as the basis of the Arnold-Slessor-Towers agreement of June 1942: the allocation of planes to Allies should not slow down the activation of American air units or lead to the breaking up of units already

34 (1) Msg, Gen Parks for G-2, 13 Nov 42, CM-IN 5791. The mission left Cairo on 16 November. (2) See also ltr, Gen Adler to CoS, 30 Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Activities—Russian Miss, WDCSA Russia (S).


For a summary account of the mission, see ltr cited n. 34(2).

36 Msg cited n. 35(1).

37 For the modified proposal, presented by General Falalaeyev, see msg cited n. 35(3).
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organized. Moreover, as War Department planners recognized, the important differences in the British and Soviet positions were essentially political. The political aspect of the project—the “comradeship in arms” in a strategically important area—which made it desirable from the point of view of the Prime Minister, made it undesirable from the Soviet point of view.

The mission continued to mark time in December awaiting the outcome of the impasse in negotiations. The Soviet Government continued to show no disposition to deal with the question on a political level. On 13 December Molotov informed Air Marshal Drummond that, since the United States and Great Britain were apparently not going to accept the Soviet views as a basis for discussions, the Soviet Government was unwilling to proceed. Thereupon Soviet representatives asked when the mission was planning to leave, explaining that flying conditions would soon become very bad.

The JCS were still of the opinion that the American and British Governments should make it clear that they were prepared to negotiate only on the basis of the original British-American proposal. The JCS advised the President that the mission should be so instructed. Passing over the political considerations, the JCS took the position that, as Marshall said, “it would be a great mistake” to provide heavy bombers instead of the heavy bomber group which the United States was committed to send, since it would take Soviet forces about six months to train units and construct facilities for heavy bomber operations.

The President remained unwilling to drop the project until he knew for certain that Stalin would not accept it. On 16 December he sent a message asking Stalin’s views and offered the concession that the force need not operate as a whole under a single British (or American) commander, but only under British and American commanders by units. He thereby matched the Soviet concession to accept planes with crews. On 20 December Stalin answered stating that the crisis had passed in the Caucasus and that the main fighting then and thenceforth would be on the central front. Stalin said that he would be very happy to get planes for use there, especially fighter planes, but that he had enough pilots.

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38 (1) Memo, Streett for Arnold, 30 Nov 42, Br and Amer Participation in Caucasus, Item 11, Exec 1. (2) Proposed msg to Drummond-Adler miss, incl with memo, Arnold for Deane, sub: Anglo-U. S. Force in Caucasus, with CCS 122/1 in ABC 370.5 Caucasus (10–13–42). Gen Handy, ACoS OPD, stated his concurrence in note, 2 Dec 42, OPD 381 Russia, 12. (3) Memo, Secy JCS for Leahy, Marshall, King, and Arnold, 3 Dec 42, sub: Aircraft for Caucasus. (4) Note for red, R. J. B. [Lt Col Brown], 5 Dec 42. Last two in OPD 452.1 Russia, 20.

39 For the Prime Minister’s explicit statement on the “overriding political benefits” of the original plan, which the Soviet counterproposal would not permit, see msg, Prime Minister to President, 3 Dec 42, No. 220, Item 11, Exec 1.


41 Msg, COS to Jt Stf Miss [COS (W) 394], 16 Dec 42, Item 11, Exec 1. This message was at once circulated to the JCS.

42 (1) Min, 46th mtg JCS, 15 Dec 42. (2) Memo, Leahy for President, 16 Dec 42, sub: Anglo-Amer Air Units in Caucasus, OPD 381 Russia, 14.

43 Memo, Handy for CofS, 16 Dec 42, no sub, OPD 381 Russia, 17.

44 Msg, President to Stalin, 16 Dec 42, draft in Item 11, Exec 1.

The War Department was very much concerned during the drafting of this message—by Leahy for the President—to learn exactly what the President had in mind. See (1) memo, Handy for CofS, 16 Dec 42, no sub, Item 11, Exec 1, and (2) note, H. H. A. [Arnold] to Handy, in pen on memo cited above.
and crews. The President replied that he was glad to know there was no longer any need of British and American help in the Caucasus and that he meant to do everything within his power to keep deliveries of planes up to schedule. He concluded by pointing out that the United States, like the Soviet Union, lacked planes, not men to fly them, and could not add to its commitments except by leaving trained units without planes.

On this note the negotiations ended. On 25 December 1942 the mission left Moscow for the Middle East.

The Persian Gulf Service Command

The other means of closer collaboration with the Soviet Union in the Middle East was the development of an alternative route for lend-lease aid. Even before the announcement of the Torch decision to the USSR, American and British authorities had been considering ways and means of increasing the volume of traffic via the Persian Gulf, to which the traffic over the Murmansk and Archangel route might be shifted. By July naval and military authorities, both in Washington and London, facing heavy shipping and naval escort demands throughout the world and continued heavy losses in the Atlantic, were increasingly concerned over the prospect of subsequent losses in the Murmansk convoys. The convoy en route to Murmansk in early July (PQ 17) had suffered unprecedented losses. American officials could not avoid the conclusion that the suspension of convoys via the North Cape was inevitable. So long as Japan and the USSR remained at peace, traffic in nonmilitary supplies might be shifted to the Pacific for transport in vessels under Soviet registry. If technical difficulties could be solved, lend-lease planes might in time be shifted to the projected Alaska-Siberia ferry route. But for the delivery of other military equipment—in bulk mainly military vehicles and tanks—the only alternative to the North Cape route was the Persian Gulf route. The Persian Gulf ports and overland transportation in Iran had by the early summer of 1942 been developed by the British to the point where they could handle about 40,000 tons a month for the Soviet Union. It was essential to increase monthly tonnage to more than three times that amount.


Before the close of July 1942, Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding (Assistant Executive, Munitions Assignments Board) was designated as a representative of Mr. Hopkins and the War Department to visit Iran and investigate ways and means of increasing the volume of lend-lease traffic via the Persian Gulf. The War Department had under consideration at the same time the proposal by Mr. Harriman, forwarded from London to Washington in early July, that the United States should offer to take over the operation of the Iranian railroad. This policy had been recommended by Maj. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler a short time earlier and had been suggested by the Prime Minister the year before. Harriman estimated that only three or four more convoys could be sent via the northern route before winter set in. He pointed out that there was no time to lose if the Persian Gulf were to be ready to handle additional traffic by winter. Marshall and King agreed, in accord with Harriman’s proposals, that all trucks to be sent in July were to be sent via Iran and all of the bombers sent to the Soviet Union after July were to be flight delivered.

The increasing concern of the President and Prime Minister over the restrictive effects of Torch on northern convoys to the USSR intensified their interest in further development of the Persian Gulf route. Upon his return from the Moscow conference of mid-August 1942, Harriman stopped off at Tehran and Cairo to study the problems of the supply route from the Persian Gulf ports over the Iranian railroad into the Soviet Union. In Cairo he rejoined Churchill. As a result of discussions in Cairo, the Prime Minister requested the United States to take over the development and operation of the British-controlled section of the Iranian railroad and of the ports serving it. On 22 August 1942, in accord with the Prime Minister’s request, Harriman submitted a series of definite proposals. Generals Maxwell and Spalding, who had taken part in accompanying staff talks with British officials in the Middle East, concurred in his recommendations. The operations staff referred the directive to the Services of Supply. By 4 September 1942, SOS worked up a detailed plan for operating and developing the British-controlled Persian transportation facilities.

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51 See memo, Brig Gen Wilhelm D. Styer for Gen Somervell, 4 Jul 42, no sub, WDCSA Russia (S), and memo, Marshall and King for Hopkins, 15 Jul 42, no sub, Item 37, Exec 10.

For Spalding’s recommendations and action taken on them by the Munitions Assignments Board and War Department, see: (1) msg, Gen Spalding to Gen Burns, 24 Jul 42, CM-IN 8947 (7/26/42) (R); (2) memo, MAB (Gen Burns) for OPD, 27 Jul 42, sub: Delivery of Fighter Planes to Russia, and (3) memo, OPD for SOS, 29 Jul 42, sub: Delivery of Fighter Planes to Russia, both in OPD 452.1 Russia, 7; and (4) msg (originator OPD), Burns to Spalding, 1 Aug 42, CM-OUT 0251 (R).

A full account of the action taken in the summer of 1942 to increase the flow of supplies via the Persian Gulf route is contained in Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, Ch. X.

52 (1) Msg, Harriman to Hopkins [ALUSNA, London, to OpNav, No. 131220], 13 Jul 42, WDCSA Russia (S). (2) Memo, Marshall and King for Hopkins, cited n. 51. For authority and concurrence on this memorandum see notes attached to copies in WDCSA Russia (S).

53 Memo, Marshall and King for Hopkins, cited n. 51.

54 Msg, Harriman (signed Maxwell) to President, 22 Aug 42, CM-IN 8567 (8/23/42).

While the CCS were resolving the difficult question of the division of authority between British military authorities and U. S. Army Forces in the Middle East in the control of the new project in the Persian Gulf area, the War Department proceeded with arrangements for a new American command. On 1 October the War Department issued a directive designating Brig. Gen. Donald H. Connolly as Commanding General, Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC). Connolly (who was shortly thereafter promoted to major general) was given the primary mission "to insure the uninterrupted flow of an expanded volume of supplies to Russia." Although he was subject to the administrative supervision of the Commanding General, USAFIME, he was to have "wide latitude," with authority to deal directly with British, Iranian, and Soviet authorities in all matters which did not require diplomatic channels. On other than administrative matters Connolly was instructed to report directly to Washington. Therefore, in so far as the conduct of its major task was concerned, the PGSC was from the outset largely autonomous in fact.

Although these arrangements for control of the Persian Gulf ports and southern Iranian rail and road transport left Connolly to a large extent independent in carrying out his primary mission, his responsibilities in Iran were otherwise limited. The new arrangements for the Persian Gulf area did not alter the basis of Anglo-Iranian-Soviet relations as established in August 1941. The British remained responsible for policy in southern Iran and almost entirely responsible for the defense of southern Iran. Connolly at best could expedite delivery of lend-lease aid only as far as Tehran.

The modifications that the War Department had been compelled to adopt for the Middle East by the exigencies of the autumn of 1942 did not alter the contention of the Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 29 Aug 42, no sub, Ops SOS 1942-43 in Hq ASF file, Sp Collections Subsec, DRB AGO. (6) Tab A with CPS 46/2, 10 Sep 42, title: Development of Persian Transportation Facilities.

For the compromise on British-American command prerogatives in the Middle East, see especially: (1) CCS 109, 2 Sep 42, title cited n. 55(6); (2) OPD brief cited n. 55(3); (3) CPS 46/2, 10 Sep 42; (4) CPS 46/3, 16 Sep 42, title cited n. 55(6); (5) pers ltr, Lt Col W. E. V. Abraham [JSM] for Gen Wedemeyer, 17 Sep 42, with CCS 109/1 in ABC 520 Persia (9-2-42), 1; (6) min, 40th mtg CCS, 18 Sep 42; (7) CCS 109/1, 22 Sep 42, title cited n. 55(6); (8) min, 34th mtg JCS, 22 Sep 42; and (9) memo, Secy JCS [Comdr McDowell] for ACoS OPD and Aide COMINCH, 23 Sep 42, sub: Development of Persian Transportation Facilities, with CCS 109/1 in ABC 520 Persia (9-2-42), 1.

The subject is described in considerable detail in Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, Chs. X, XI.

The British responsibility for defense was clearly stated in CCS 109/1. See also msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Connolly, 15 Nov 42, CM-OUT 4986 (R).

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56 It was not until more than a year later, when the Middle East had ceased to be a major theater of operations, that PGSC, reorganized as the Persian Gulf Command (PGC) on 10 December 1943, became autonomous in name as well as in fact. The British responsibility for defense was clearly stated in CCS 109/1. See also msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Connolly, 15 Nov 42, CM-OUT 4986 (R).

57 There was later some talk about extending American operation to the northern section of the railroad. (1) See msg, Admiral Standley to State Dept, 26 Feb 43 [No. 215 in 3 secs]. (2) For WD reaction to the idea, which had no support on the political level, see papers filed with above msg, incl msgs (originator OPD), Marshall to Brereton and Connolly, 2 Mar 43, CM-OUT 588 and CM-OUT 589. First two in OPD 617 Iran, 7. (3) The question is treated definitively in Motter, Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia.
officers responsible for Army plans that American policy was best served by minimizing military commitments in the Middle East, for whatever purposes.

During September and October, while the main questions of command were being settled, SOS went ahead setting up a troop list for the PGSC, and made tentative schedules for the shipment of units and of the heavy equipment they would need in carrying out their mission. As finally revised, the troop list called for units with a total strength of about 24,000. Most of the units had originally been designated for BOLERO; a few of them—about 4,000 troops—were in excess of the 1942 Troop Basis. By the end of September the War Department had cleared orders to activate these additional units. During October the operations staff cleared with Army Ground Forces the requests of SOS for ground units to be included in the force and issued movement orders for the force, which was to be shipped in several echelons. The first echelon was due to be shipped on 20 October 1942; the second, on 1 November 1942; and the remaining units, during December 1942 and January 1943.

Toward the end of October 1942, Connolly arrived to set up the new command. Not until early in 1943 did an appreciable number of the allocated American forces begin to arrive in the Persian Gulf area. The full effect of these added commitments did not begin to be felt until late in the spring of 1943. The establishment of the PGSC in October 1942 was to have little immediate effect on the delivery of lend-lease matériel to the USSR, but laid the basis for increased deliveries in the later war years.

**Air Collaboration in Alaska and Siberia**

Like the Middle East, the North Pacific was an area in which supporting operations of the United States and the USSR might become closely related and in which an alternative route for lend-lease might be developed. One course of action, which did not present any great problems of strategy and policy, was to increase the ocean-going traffic in "nonmilitary" supplies from Portland and Seattle to Vladivostok and Soviet arctic ports. But it was as ever no simple

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41 See, for example, memo, Wedemeyer for Chief, Africa Middle East Theater, OPD, 10 Dec 42, sub: Scope of PGSC, with CCS 109/1 in ABC 520 Persia (9–2–42), 1.

42 (1) Memo, SOS for OPD, 2 Sep 42, sub: Activation of Units above Tr Basis. (2) 1st Ind, OPD for SOS, 4 Sep 42, to above memo. Both in OPD 320.2 Middle East, 24. (3) Memo, SOS for G–3, 20 Sep 42, sub: Persian Gulf Railway Comd, OPD 617 Iran, 5.

43 (1) Memo, OPD for AGF and SOS, 5 Oct 42, sub: Tr Mvmts to Middle East. (2) Memo, OPD for SOS, 10 Oct 42, sub: Priorities for Nov Shipt of Trs to PGSC. Both in OPD 370.5 Middle East, 28. (3) Memo, OPD for TAG, 10 Oct 42, sub: Mvmt Orders, Shipt No. 1616, OPD 370.5 Iran, 4. (4) Memo, SOS for OPD, 26 Oct 42, sub cited n. 56(9), with CCS 109/1 in ABC 520 Persia (9–2–42), 1. (5) Memo, AGF for OPD, 2 Nov 42, sub: AGF Units for PGSC, OPD 370.5 Iran, 3. (6) Memo, OPD for SOS and AGF, 4 Nov 42, sub: Tr Mvmts to PGSC, OPD 370.5 Middle East, 35.

44 On 1 October U. S. Army ground strength in Iraq-Iran was 310; on 31 December, 400; and on 14 January 1943, 5,890 troops. (OPD Weekly Status Maps for 1 Oct and 31 Dec 42, and 14 Jan 43, AG 061 (4 Sep 45).)

45 Motter, *Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, Tables 1 and 2, pp. 481, 486; Charts 8 and 12, pp. 506, 508.


From June through December 1942, 117 ships sailed from Western Hemisphere ports for Vladivostok carrying 560,000 gross long tons of cargo. (State Dept Rpt (cited p. 205, n. 31) on War Aid furnished by U. S. to USSR, pp. 14–15, copy filed Item 5, OPD Hist Unit File.)
matter to divert lend-lease planes for delivery by way of the North Pacific, or to carry out any other project for joint Soviet-American air action in the Far East, although the United States persisted in trying to make at least a beginning. In May 1942 General Arnold had reopened the question, undaunted by the earlier failures to get any information from the Soviet Government on air facilities in Siberia or by the scepticism and objections of the War Department General Staff. Since the discussions of early 1942, which had ended inconclusively, one channel had opened that he could use directly and independently—the Soviet Purchasing Commission. General Arnold had often to deal with Maj. Gen. Alexander I. Belyaev, the head of this mission, in connection with the allocation and delivery of airplanes under the First (Moscow) Protocol. In his dealings with Belyaev, Arnold could at least juxtapose the questions of lend-lease and his plans in the North Pacific, even though it was contrary to American policy to make such a connection in formal official discussions. As Arnold explained to Eisenhower early in May, he intended to keep the subject of Siberia open through this channel, even though Soviet authorities had originally rejected as impracticable the idea of American air operations in Siberia. Arnold declared: “We cannot let the matter rest here. We must develop the facilities as quickly as possible. Furthermore, we must move into them so that when world conditions make it necessary there can be no argument about the matter.”

Besides continuing his talks with General Belyaev, Arnold had also proposed that the War Department should again impress on Admiral Standley the importance of getting information on air installations in Siberia. He submitted to the General Staff a message to this effect for transmission to Standley, and Eisenhower co-operated to the extent of sending the message, redrafted and addressed to the military attaché, who, as a member of Admiral Standley’s staff, could properly convey to him the War Department view.

In mid-May the military attaché reported that the Soviet Government, though unwilling as before to permit American ferrying operations in Soviet-controlled territory, did appear willing to consider taking delivery of American planes in Alaska. Although Arnold’s idea was, of course, that American pilots should deliver the planes in Siberia, thus familiarizing themselves with flying conditions and facilities there, AAF informed Admiral Standley that the Soviet proposal—which, of course, would mean that Soviet pilots would familiarize themselves with flying conditions and facilities in Alaska—would be considered in Washington.

67 For earlier negotiations and staff discussions, see above, Ch. VI.
68 Memo, Arnold for Eisenhower, 5 May 42, sub: Possible Siberian Opns, OPD 452.1 Russia, 3.
In Washington there was no room left to doubt that the subject would have to be taken up through political channels. An Army intelligence officer reported in mid-June that while arranging for a call by General Belyaev on General Strong, head of G-2, he had talked with Belyaev's aide, who had told him "substantially as follows."

Only last week Major General James H. Burns [Executive, Munitions Assignments Board] talked with General Belyaev on that time worn old topic of our releasing air information on Eastern Siberia. As military men, our lips have been sealed on that subject for over a year.

General Burns said "Why don't you let us deliver those planes that can fly by Bering Straits—then we can use what shipping we have to send you more material instead of filling our ships with those pitiful, knocked down and crated planes?"

General Belyaev answered "That is a matter entirely out of the hands of the military and in the hands of the politicians. The only thing to do is to have your politicians get in touch with Litvinov."

In late May and June the conditions for discussion on the political level appeared more favorable than any that had previously existed. The renewal of commitments to send material aid to the Soviet Union, the beginnings of preparations for the early invasion of the Continent—which the President discussed at length with Molotov at the end of May—and a conclusive demonstration of American naval strength in the Pacific all indicated that American efforts might prove to be of rapidly growing importance, and of rapidly growing interest to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Japanese naval offensive in the North Pacific in late May and early June gave some reason to believe that Japan might turn its attention away from the Southwest Pacific. In mid-June, on the basis of recommendations drawn up by the War Department and accepted by the Navy, the President proposed to Stalin a meeting of the American and Soviet representatives. He pointed out the immediate advantages of establishing a ferry route via Alaska and Siberia, and the subsequent advantage—in case of Japanese attack—of its being operated by American crews, who would be ready to operate against Japanese forces and installations from Siberian bases. To facilitate preparations he proposed that the Soviet Government should authorize a preliminary survey by one American crew.

At the beginning of July 1942 the Soviet Government agreed to the proposed conversations in Moscow and the projected survey flight—in so far as they would help in arranging for the delivery of lend-lease planes to Soviet crews in Alaska. The Soviet Government did not allude to the possibility...
that either of these proposals would serve, as the President had suggested, to facilitate American air operations based on Siberia. The Soviet Government simply repeated its earlier declaration of willingness to accept plane deliveries in Alaska, as had been urged by General Arnold in March 1942 and proposed by Admiral Standley in Moscow toward the end of April.\(^77\) The President soon decided to go ahead on the basis of this partial acceptance of his proposals. On 6 July 1942 he informed the Soviet Government that he had designated as his representative to go to Moscow, Maj. Gen. Follet Bradley, who would be assisted by the U. S. military and naval attachés there.\(^78\)

General Bradley left Washington at the end of July. Before leaving, he was briefed in detail by the War Department strategic planners on the background and objectives of his mission.\(^79\) In stating his own conception of it, he differentiated three phases.\(^80\) The first was to arrange for the delivery of planes to Soviet crews in Alaska; the second, to arrange for a survey of air facilities in Siberia; and the third, to discuss U. S. air operations based in Siberia. He recognized that the Soviet Government had agreed to the first project and to the second only in so far as required by the first. This view of his mission was confirmed in War Department instructions issued to him on 20 July.\(^81\) Before his departure for Moscow, Bradley also went over with Arnold and with General Belyaev of the Soviet Purchasing Commission a provisional schedule of plane deliveries via Alaska and the arrangements for a small American party to survey Siberian air facilities.\(^82\) Finally, Bradley saw the President, who advised him to bear in mind the various circumstances favoring Soviet-American military collaboration—the probability of an early Japanese attack on Siberia, the disadvantages of sending planes by any route other than the North Pacific, and the willingness of the U. S. Government to furnish whatever the Soviet Union needed if a way could be found to deliver it.\(^83\)

General Bradley arrived in Moscow in early August 1942—a few days before the TORCH announcement was made.\(^84\) For two months it remained uncertain whether the Alaska–Siberia ferry route would go into operation. During the second half of August a small survey party under Col. Alva L. ...

\(^{77}\) Msg, Standley to President and Secy State, 4 Jul 42 [No. 237], Item 37, Exec 10.

\(^{78}\) Msg, President to Stalin [OpNav to ALUSNA, Moscow], 6 Jul 42, Item 37, Exec 10. General Bradley was then in command of the First Air Force.

\(^{79}\) (1) Memo, Col Gailey [Exec OPD] for Chief of S&P Gp [OPD], 10 Jul 42, sub: Miss to USSR. (2) Memo, OPD for G–2, 10 Jul 42, same sub. (3) Memo, OPD for AAF, 10 Jul 42, same sub. All in Tab Misc, Book 6, Exec 8.

\(^{80}\) Memo, Bradley for Arnold, 15 Jul 42, sub: Miss to Moscow, Item 37, Exec 10.

\(^{81}\) Ltr, SW to Bradley, 20 Jul 42, sub: Ltr of Instn, WD CSA Russia (S). He was authorized to deal in detail with technical problems involved in planning for common action in the North Pacific and was empowered to discuss, without making commitments, the courses of action which would be opened by Soviet participation in the war against Japan.


\(^{83}\) Memo, Bradley for ColS, 22 Jul 42, sub: Visit with President, WD CSA Russia (S). The President also instructed Bradley specifically to look into the possibility of sending supplies to China by way of Siberia.

\(^{84}\) Bradley's report on his mission lists his first conference in Moscow as being on 6 August 1942. Ltr, Bradley to ColS (through OPD), 14 Dec 42, sub: Rpt of Miss, bound in vol, title: Rpt of Bradley Miss to Russia . . . , filed in back of OPD file on F. O. Bradley.
Harvey flew in a Soviet bomber over the ferry route, by Seimchan, Yakutsk, and Krasnoyarsk west to Moscow. Colonel Harvey reported that the route was practicable. The principal difficulty, as it had meanwhile become evident from the discussions being held at Moscow, was that the Soviet representatives considered that the United States would have to furnish forty-three transport planes to ferry Soviet crews to Alaska. This figure was based on the assumption that the twelve medium bombers, one hundred light bombers, and one hundred fighters due to be received each month would all be flown over this route. The War Department replied that the United States could furnish only ten transport planes for use over that route. The Soviet Government at length agreed to begin ferrying operations on a reduced scale. Planes had begun to arrive at Fairbanks, which had been chosen as the delivery point, when General Belyaev in Washington announced, on 19 September 1942, that only the planes then at Fairbanks would be accepted for ferrying across Siberia. The War Department held up all flights, awaiting information from Bradley.

On 21 September Bradley reported that Soviet officials in Moscow professed ignorance of the order. Early in October 1942 the Soviet Government decided to go on with ferrying operations after all, but the War Department had meanwhile decided that the route was closed, except for delivery of planes already at Fairbanks. Bradley strongly protested the War Department action. After a conference with Soviet representatives in Washington held on 6 October 1942, the War Department agreed to reopen the route.

While progress was being made slowly and haltingly in opening the ferry route, Bradley was still awaiting an interview with Stalin and a chance to raise the question of a more extensive survey of Siberian air facilities. On 6 October 1942 he was finally granted an audience. He then brought up the question of a further survey of Siberian air installations to follow the earlier cursory survey made by Colonel Harvey in August. Stalin stated that the Soviet Government was well aware that its neutrality pact with Japan would not prevent a Japanese attack, and that the attack might come at any time. Although he was primarily interested in the air ferry route, and in the possibility, suggested by the British in August, of air assistance in the Caucasus, he authorized Bradley to undertake a survey of air facil-

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85 For a complete report, see Sec III, Harvey Siberian Survey Miss, pp. 2–3, in Proceedings of Jt U. S.-Russian Mil Miss Convened in Moscow, U. S. R., 1942, Incl. 1 with ltr cited n. 84.
86 See Sec IV, Transports, pp. 6–11, in Proceedings . . . , cited n. 85.
87 Ltr, Belyaev to Arnold, 19 Sep 42, Item 37, Exec 10.
ities in Siberia in the vicinity of Manchuria. The General Bradley advised the War Department to postpone the survey until the United States could make a specific proposal for using the bases in case of war between Japan and the Soviet Union. He believed that the United States should first offer something more definite in justification of the survey than the information furnished him before leaving Washington—the War Department had designated two squadrons of bombers for use in such a contingency.

The War Department replied that he should undertake only to survey facilities for air supply into China—as the President had directed—returning to Washington for further instructions before starting to survey facilities for possible air operations against Japan.

Bradley returned to Washington early in December 1942 and made his detailed report. Since he had reason to believe that the Soviet Government might be willing to consider U. S. air operations based in Siberia, Army planning officers collected the extensive, though necessarily tentative, studies of such operations into a single War Department plan. These studies had become of increasing interest in the fall of 1942 following the occupation of Adak. The Army strategic planners recommended that Bradley be sent back to make the survey already authorized, on the basis of a new proposal by the United States to commit three heavy bomber groups to Siberia immediately in the event of hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union. The proviso was that the Soviet Union could make available adequate facilities and furnish the main items of bulk supply.

The Chief of Staff presented this proposal to the JCS with a message to that effect for transmission to Stalin. Following JCS approval of the draft message, the President sent it on 30 December to Stalin.

In answer, Stalin made it very clear that he wanted planes at once in the Caucasus and not air units at some later date in Siberia. The President replied that the units in question were not available and would become available only if Japan should attack the Soviet Union, as a result of redisposing United States forces in the Pacific. The President alluded to an explanation he had already made—in connection with the proposed Caucasus air force—that the United States did not have aircraft capable of such a mission.

Short title of this plan is WDOPD-ASOR, code name: BAZAAR.

On 7 December Bradley reported orally to the General Council. (Mtg, Gen Council, 7 Dec 42, OPD 334.8 Gen Council, 32.) His full written report to the Chief of Staff was submitted a week later. This consists of a forwarding memorandum and nine studies bound in the volume cited n. 84.

WD Plan for Air Support of Russia in Event of Attack by Japan on USSR, G-3 Rcd Docs.
that were not assigned to units and that the United States did not intend to make units inoperative by withdrawing aircraft from them. On this note the correspondence ended. The War Department thereupon reached an agreement with JCS to take no further action on the matter.

The Alaska–Siberia ferry route had meanwhile continued in operation with results that were disappointing, even after allowance was made for the lack of transports. The delivery of aircraft had been slowed down not only by Soviet indecision but also by the need for special winterization of planes and installation of radio compasses. Upon Bradley’s return from Moscow Marshall had proposed, and the JCS had agreed, to develop the route so that by the spring of 1943 it could handle all planes assigned to the Soviet Union. But by the end of the year only eighty-five planes had been delivered in Alaska for transfer, and experience with the difficulties of the route led the AAF planners to rely for the time being on air and water deliveries to the Persian Gulf ports.

In the end, the United States had to accept the fact that the Soviet Government wanted, not closer collaboration, but more planes. The Second Protocol offered to the Soviet Government in June 1942 had fixed commitments for only three months in advance. It had provided that in October 1942 commitments were to be made “for the balance of the year on the basis of developments incident to the progress of the war.” In October there were pending before the Munitions Assignments Board, Soviet requests for an increase that would nearly double the rate of factory deliveries for transfer to the Soviet Government. The Soviet requests amounted to an average of slightly over 400 planes monthly for the last three months of 1942.

### Soviet Plane Requirements

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While the Munitions Assignments Board was considering these requests, the President

### U.S. Soviet Commitments Requests

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</tbody>
</table>

Total: 636, 1,230

Compiled from memo, MBW for JPS, 8 Oct 42, sub: Asgmt of Aircraft to USSR, filed with JCS 124 in ABC 452.1 (1–22–42), 2.
told the JCS that the United States must at least maintain the scale of its commitments. To do less, he declared, would be to go back on the promise in the Second Protocol to renew the commitments in the light of “developments incident to the progress of the war.” He asked the JCS to “give immediate and careful consideration to increasing this number.” He indicated how he thought it might be done: “I wish you would consider particularly, in reaching a decision on this point, the present number of planes and plans to augment them in inactive theaters of the war, including Continental United States.”

In effect, the President was suggesting that AAF might cut back its schedules for activating new units, though he was apparently not prepared to direct such a move in the face of rapidly expanding American air operations over the Continent and, before long, in North Africa and in the South Pacific. AAF was, of course, opposed to any cutback and so advised the Munitions Assignments Board. On 6 October General Arnold notified the Soviet Purchasing Commission of this action. General Arnold dwelt on the point that he hoped in the near future to improve the rate of deliveries overseas, which up to that time had not kept up with factory deliveries. He also hoped, beginning in January 1943, to send no more P-40’s, but only P-39’s, as the Soviet Government desired. Nevertheless his estimate of future deliveries provided for no increases in fighters and medium bombers, for the decrease which he had earlier requested in light bombers, and for no deliveries of heavy bombers or observation planes.

On 8 October the Munitions Assignments Board announced its decision simply to continue commitments at the existing rate. Following this announcement, the President received from Stalin an urgent request that plane allocations to the Soviet Union should be increased, at least for the next few months, to 500 planes a month. This was a figure somewhat higher than the average monthly total contained in the previous Soviet request. On 10 October 1942 the President asked Hopkins to tell Marshall that in view of this personal request from Stalin he wanted to send some additional planes at once, even if it meant withdrawing them from the coastal defenses of the United States. Hopkins explained to Marshall that the President understood it was out of the question to send 500 planes a month, but would like to be able to tell Stalin that over and above all of the U. S. protocol commitments the United States could and would send to him, as soon as possible, 300 additional planes, preferably at the rate of 100 a month, beginning immediately.

Marshall, after consulting with AAF, reaffirmed the War Department position that the Army’s need for planes was urgent and should come first. He stated that no additional planes could be sent to the USSR except at the expense of “our active combat theaters,” or of a serious curtailment of TORCH, then in the final planning stage. He reminded the President that the mission of the coastal defense units was in fact operational training, with a defense mission superimposed; that the units were only at half strength; and that the planes they had were unsuitable for “an active

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107 Memo, President for JCS, 1 Oct 42, circulated as JCS 123, 7 Oct 42.
108 Ltr, Arnold to Belyaev, 6 Oct 42, no sub, OPD 452.1 Russia, 14.
109 Memo cited n. 106.
theater." He explained that for every twenty-five additional fighter planes that the United States should undertake to send monthly to the Soviet Union, AAF would be able to maintain one less fighter group overseas; for every thirteen medium or light bombers, one less bombardment group.\textsuperscript{111}

The JCS had still to respond to the President’s directive of 1 October 1942, in which he had asked them to consider carefully whether some increase in plane allocations to the Soviet Union could not be made.\textsuperscript{112} Before the JCS had prepared their reply, the President had accepted the need to postpone until January 1943 any increase over the existing commitments as reviewed by the Munitions Assignments Board. The JCS, therefore, decided on 13 October not to take up the question until the arrival of Admiral Standley, who was soon to return to Washington from the Soviet Union for conferences.\textsuperscript{113} They agreed that their basic difficulty was their ignorance of how critical the needs of the Soviet Union really were.

The JCS accordingly consulted with Admiral Standley after his arrival in Washington a few days later. He fully approved of the proposal, which by then had been made to the Soviet Government, to send a British-American air force to the Caucasus. He felt that this measure, together with the continuance of the current rate under the protocol, would be completely satisfactory to the USSR and preferable to providing only a slight increase. On 24 October, with this confirmation of their opinions, the JCS answered the President’s appeal by recommending that the existing rate be continued.\textsuperscript{114}

Thus, by the early fall of 1942, the President as well as the Prime Minister had to reckon with the effect of Torch—added to the needs of other active theaters—on lend-lease to the USSR. Just as the Prime Minister had had to acknowledge that he must suspend the monthly northern convoys, so the President had to admit that he could not increase plane allocations to the USSR in the immediate future. Although apparently not completely satisfied, the President did not reopen the question of plane allocations until he had first tried to get the Soviet Government to accept, as the British Government had earlier accepted, American air units in lieu of American planes.\textsuperscript{115} Upon the Soviet refusal to accept this solution, the prospect of a satisfactory settlement of the plane allocations problem seemed as remote as ever.

**Conclusion**

By the end of November 1942 the President and the Prime Minister could tell themselves that they had really tried to compensate for the effects of Torch on lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union. But the War Department expected no improvement in British-American military relations with the USSR in the immediate future except where such collaboration would clearly contribute

\textsuperscript{111} Memo, CoS for President, 10 Oct 42, no sub, Item 54, Exec 10. An appended note states “memo as sent.” An earlier WD draft is filed with this memorandum.

\textsuperscript{112} The JPS had submitted to the JCS a draft study in response to the President’s directive. (This study was circulated as JCS 123/, 11 Oct 42, title cited n. 105.)

\textsuperscript{113} Min, 37th mtg JCS, 13 Oct 42.

\textsuperscript{114} Memo, JCS for President, 24 Oct 42, sub: Allocation of Aircraft under the Russian Protocol, with JCS 123/1 in ABC 452.1 (1–22–42), 2.

\textsuperscript{115} For an indication that the President had not given up the idea of increasing plane allocations to the USSR in the near future, see pers ltr, President to Prime Minister, 30 Nov 42, Item 63a, Exec 10.
to the one common interest—the early defeat of Germany.\textsuperscript{116} In other words, the question of the "second front" remained critical. The Prime Minister was anxious to reach an understanding. He told the President in early December 1942, with reference to proposed staff conferences in Moscow, that "what we are going to do about Roundup," would be "almost the sole thing they will want to know."\textsuperscript{117} In the absence of specific manifestations of a definite British-American understanding on this issue, the fact that the War Department had long been pressing for the early establishment of a second front had proved of little assistance in American dealings with the Soviet Government.

\textsuperscript{116} (1) Draft memo [Gen Arnold for JCS], n.d., sub: Mil Policy Toward Russia. (2) Memo, Wedemeyer for Handy, 10 Dec 42, same sub. (3) Memo, Handy for Arnold, 13 Dec 42, no sub. All in OPD 381 Russia, 13.

\textsuperscript{117} Msg, Prime Minister to President, 2 Dec 42, No. 216, Item 63a, Exec 10.
By December 1942, a year after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the tide of war was beginning to turn in favor of the Allies. The strategic initiative was slipping away from both Germany and Japan. The Red Army had not only held the invading German armies but also inflicted mortal losses on them. In North Africa, Guadalcanal, and New Guinea the offensive power of the western Allies was beginning to make itself felt. After a year of crises, the danger of losing the war had become remote, but the prospect of winning it was also remote. The specific problem of applying the growing American strength to the defeat of Germany seemed more complicated, if not more difficult, than it had a year earlier.

Growth of the U. S. Army

When the Army planners came to survey the world-wide strategic situation a year after Pearl Harbor, they could look back on a year of unprecedented expansion of the Army. Fluctuations in British-American military plans and changing operational needs had greatly affected the programs for expanding the U. S. Army in 1942—in total growth and in internal distribution of strength, as well as in overseas deployment. From a total strength of 1,686,403 (including 37 active divisions and 67 air combat groups) on 31 December 1941, the Army had grown to 5,397,674 (including 73 active divisions and 167 air combat groups) by the close of 1942. This expansion in total strength exceeded original War Department estimates of strengths for 31 December 1942, those in the Victory Program Troop Basis of late 1941, and those in the War Department Troop Basis of January 1942. The Victory Program Troop Basis, circulated in late December 1941, had projected total Army strength as 3,973,205 commissioned officers and enlisted men (to include 59 divisions and an air force of


The War Department Troop Basis was issued somewhat informally at first and in 1944–45 very formally by G–3, WDGS, to provide a basis for the activation and organization of units, including combat divisions.
804,439) by 31 December 1942. The approved War Department Troop Basis of January 1942 had projected total Army strength as 3,600,000 enlisted men (to include 73 divisions and an air force of 998,000) by the same date. These early blueprints for building, equipping, and supplying the wartime Army had been drawn before the defensive strength of the Soviet Union, the influence of British strategy, and the extent of American commitments in the Pacific had become fully evident.

Additions to the total strength in the Troop Basis for 1942 had been made mainly to meet modifications in British-American war plans and changing operational requirements of that year. One important revision of the 1942 goal of 3,600,000 men had been made in May 1942, when the President authorized an increase of 750,000 men, chiefly to support the new plan for the build-up of strength in the United Kingdom (Bolero). Another important addition had been made in September 1942, when the armed forces were faced with expanding requirements for the Pacific and North African offensives. At that time the President and the JCS approved another increase for the Army, this time of 650,000, raising the authorized enlisted strength of the Army by the end of 1942 to 5,000,000. These additions were necessary to cover overdrafts on the 1942 Troop Basis already made or planned.

Distribution of strength within the Army shifted greatly in 1942. Both the air forces and service forces grew more rapidly than estimated in the January 1942 Troop Basis. During 1942 the ground arms more than doubled, but the service branches and the Air Corps increased over fourfold. Among the ground forces themselves, moreover, in the early defensive phase of the war, anti-aircraft units were authorized over and above the numbers at first planned, and the Coast Artillery Corps (mainly anti-aircraft) actually expanded more rapidly in 1942 than the other ground arms. Anti-aircraft units were sent to the defense commands and to the several overseas theaters. Finally, the dispersion of Army forces on defensive and supply missions and the requirements of the first offensive operations raised the proportion of service and air units more and more above the proportion given in the Troop Basis of January 1942.

Changes in the military situation and in military plans affected not only the way in which the Army grew in 1942 but also expectations of the growth of the Army thereafter and calculations of the total number of divisions, the "cutting edge" needed to win World War II. The assumption in com-

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2 For the Victory Program Troop Basis of December 1941, see: (1) memo, Wedemeyer for L. T. Gerow, 19 Dec 41, no sub, WPD 4494:23; (2) memo, WPD for G-4, 27 Dec 41, sub: Tr Basis for Victory Program, WPD 4494:26. (3) Tr Basis for Victory Program [Dec 41], env with WPD 4494:26; and (4) memo, Wedemeyer for Gerow, 7 Jan 42, sub: Victory Program, Folder Book with WPD 4494.

4 For the War Department Troop Basis of January 1942, see: (1) memo (drafted by G-3), SW for President, 8 Jan 42, no sub, WPD 3674:81; (2) memo, G-3 for WPD, 15 Jan 42, sub: Mobilization and Tng Plan, Jan 42, WPD 3674:83; (3) copy, 1942 Tr Basis, WPD 3674:90; and (4) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 198-99.

5 (1) Memo, OCS (SGS) for WDGS and three Comds, 19 May 42, OPD 320.2 Bolero, 8. (2) Min, 31st mtg JCS, 1 Sep 42. (3) Memo, Leahy for President, 30 Sep 42, no sub, with JPS 57/5/D in ABC 370.01 (7-25-42), 2. (4) Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 202-09.

6 For the growth of the Army by branches in 1942, in terms of percentages and strength figures, see Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, p. 210 and table, p. 203. See also Strength of the Army report cited n. 1(1).
mon use in the War Department throughout most of 1942 had been that it would ultimately be necessary to support at least two hundred divisions. The official estimates in the Victory Program Troop Basis of late 1941 had projected an Army at peak strength of approximately 215 divisions. In keeping with the assumption that the Red Army might collapse and the United States and Great Britain might have to defeat Germany unaided (and in accordance with the War Department determination to ignore the possibility of a dispersion of effort requiring large service forces), this initial Victory Program projected an Army consisting primarily of air, armored, and motorized forces capable of defeating the huge armies of Germany and its allies.\(^7\) The projected number of divisions grew in 1942, partly because estimated requirements for defeating Japan were superimposed on the original estimates of requirements for defeating Germany. In September G-3 reached its peak estimate of about “350 divisions necessary to win the war.”\(^8\)

Late in 1942 the War Department long-range estimates were finally called into question by the JCS. In November the Joint Staff Planners projected an Army strength of over ten million men by 31 December 1944 and ultimately—by 31 December 1948—of over thirteen million. The thirteen million-man Army would contain 334 divisions. The JCS rejected these estimates as excessive.\(^9\) By the close of 1942 the planners were beginning to take account of experience and to recalculate long-range requirements to fit the expectation that large service forces and air forces would often precede and always accompany the movement of ground forces. The approved goal for air groups which had been set in January 1942 at 115 and changed in July to 224, was raised in September to 273.\(^10\) Given the anticipated limitations in shipping, it was apparent that the projected deployment of a huge air and service force overseas by the end of 1944 would greatly restrict the number of combat divisions which could be sent overseas by that time. In late 1942, moreover, procurement plans for the armed services for 1943, particularly for the Army ground program, were revised downward by the JCS—in conformity with a War Production Board recommendation. It was clearly undesirable to withdraw men from industry and agriculture too long before they could actually be employed in military operations. Given one year to train a division, the mobilization of much more than a hundred divisions by the end of 1943 appeared to be premature. All these indications pointed to the need for scaling down previous long-range calculations, as well as for economizing in the use of manpower within the Army.\(^11\)

The result was the distribution in January 1943 by G-3 of an approved Army Troop Basis authorizing a total Army strength of 8,208,000 by the end of 1943, and setting the mobilization program for \(^{\text{7}}\)See Interim Rpt by Sp Army Com, 1 Jun 43, title: Rev of Current Mil Program, submitted with memo, Col Ray T. Maddocks, Col Edwin W. Chamberlain, and Lt Col Marshall S. Carter for CofS, 1 Jun 43, sub: Rev of Current Mil Program, filed in ABC 400 (2-20-43).


\(^{\text{9}}\)(1) JCS 154, 24 Nov 42, title: Tr Bases for All Servs for 1944 and Beyond. (2) Min, 44th mg JCS, 1 Dec 42.

\(^{\text{10}}\)The 273-group program remained the AAF guide in World War II. (1) Craven and Gate, AAF I, pp. 250–51. (2) Arnold, Global Mission, p. 356.

\(^{\text{11}}\)For a full analysis of what was taken into account in late 1942 in calculating the Army Troop Basis, see Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 214–17.
1943 at one hundred divisions. This Troop Basis marked a turning point in War Department and Joint Staff calculations, though it was still too early to say to what extent the various causes of mobilizing more slowly would operate to limit the final size of the Army and the number of divisions it would contain.

Expansion of the Army Overseas

The disposition of Army forces, like the rate of growth and the composition of the wartime Army, was actually quite different from what the military planners had projected. Army forces outside the continental limits of the United States had risen from about 192,000 men in December 1941 to approximately 1,065,000 men in December 1942. The ratio of overseas troops to total Army strength had risen from about 11 percent in December 1941 to about 19 to 20 percent from August through December 1942. Progressively larger numbers of troops were sent abroad in each of the latter months of 1942, but the rapid growth of the Army through new inductions held the overseas ratio in this period at a fairly stable rate. Included in this overseas deployment a year after Pearl Harbor were 17 divisions and 66 air combat groups.

Deployment to the United Kingdom

Largely as a result of successive commitments in the Pacific and Mediterranean, for which the War Department had not allowed, the distribution of troops was also at variance with the Army’s plans. The chief effect had been to retard the growth of Army forces in the British Isles. The BOLERO plan had had scarcely more to do with the actual movement of Army forces overseas than the tentative schedules drawn up in 1941 under RAINBOW 5.

By July 1942 Army troops already present in or en route to areas other than the British Isles had exceeded the War Department objectives for deployment to those areas for December 1942. By December 1942 section is based on the sources of, and tables in, Appendix E, below. Since the various statistical summaries of Army overseas strength in early December 1942 do not agree exactly, all figures cited are to be taken, with the cautions noted in Appendix E, as the best estimates available.

The figures cited in this section in connection with original BOLERO planning are based mostly on those approved by the JCS in JCS 23 (14 March 1942), and on the Marshall Memorandum (BOLERO plan) itself. JCS 48 (2 May 1942), intended as a revision of JCS 23, was not actually approved. (For discussion on JCS 23, the Marshall Memorandum, and JCS 48, see Chs. VII, IX, above.)

U. S. Army Ground Forces

(INCLUDING SERVICE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Dec 42</th>
<th>Present or</th>
<th>Jun 42</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>En Route</td>
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<td>JCS 23 and 48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific (includes Alaska)</td>
<td>237,836</td>
<td>252,230</td>
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<td>117,040</td>
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<td>CBI-[Middle East]–Africa*</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>7,440</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>330,046</td>
<td>376,710</td>
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</table>

*No figures were cited for the Middle East in JCS 23 or JCS 48.
other commitments had repeatedly been exceeded, but forces for the British Isles had not attained the strength projected in early BOLERO planning. Instead of a strength of about 500,000 troops planned for December 1942, the actual figures for the United Kingdom showed as present and en route, by early December 1942, slightly more than 170,000 (including about 123,000 ground and 47,000 air troops.) Only one division (29th Infantry) and the approximate equivalent of sixteen air combat groups were then present in the British Isles.

In effect, the American forces that became available in 1942 had served as a pool upon which all theaters and operations had laid claims since British-American war plans had changed and immediate operational needs and demands in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Pacific had required their deployment. The collapse of the whole project of preparing a cross-Channel invasion for 1943 and the heavy withdrawals already made and projected from BOLERO forces in the United States and the United Kingdom had led the War Department in the late summer and fall of 1942 to revise downward its estimated Army deployment objectives to be attained in the United Kingdom by the spring of 1943. Under the BOLERO plan of the spring of 1942, the United States was to furnish approximately 1,000,000 men (including 30 divisions) for an invasion from the United Kingdom by 1 April 1943. By the end of 1942 the War Department had scaled down the objective to a balanced ground force of 150,000 by the spring of 1943—for supporting, defensive, and emergency offensive operations—and, at an indeterminate date, to a force which would reach a total of approximately 427,000.

Deployment to North Africa

The demands of the North African campaign, then in progress, continued to constitute a first claim on American forces and resources. As a result of the failure to forestall the German defense of Tunisia and the determination of the German High Command to reinforce the position there, the British and American staffs faced the problem of building up, over a much longer line of sea communications and a much less developed line of land communications, a decisive superiority over the forces the Germans chose to commit to Tunisia. The cost of the effort was compounded by haste and waste. The primary effects were felt in the ports of Great Britain, the United States, and North Africa, and the secondary effects on all the active fronts, in the capitals, and throughout the training camps, factories, and shipyards of the United States and Great Britain.

Deployment to this area—which had followed from the TORCH decision—was still in progress as American forces sought in the closing weeks of 1942 to consolidate their holdings and prepare for the decisive fight for Tunisia. At the beginning of December 1942 all or parts of six divisions (the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions) were present, along with eleven air combat

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19 For varying early planning estimates of December 1942 figures for the United Kingdom, see: (1) JCS 23, 14 Mar 42; (2) Tentative Mvmt Sched, AGF, BOLERO plan, 9 May 42, and Folder 2, Tab 38 in ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4; (3) CPS 26/3, 13 May 42, title: First Rpt of BOLERO Combined Com; and (4) paper, Troop Ship Capabilities to Accomplish BOLERO, Plng Div, Transportation Serv, SOS, 21 May 42, Folder 2, Tab 71, ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42), 4.

20 See above, pp. 322 ff.

21 See p. 307] above.
groups. The ground troops, estimated at 128,000, were slightly more numerous than those in the United Kingdom. The air troops were calculated at somewhat under 13,000. However, the air forces in the United Kingdom constituted a reserve which could be and was heavily drawn upon for North Africa. The effect of the deviation from Bolero became even more strikingly apparent by 21 December 1942 when the total U.S. Army forces in French North Africa slightly exceeded those in the British Isles. By that time the number of ground combat troops in French North Africa was almost double the total strength of ground combat troops in the British Isles. The trend was also projected, in Army planning estimates at the close of 1942, for troop movements in the near future. The projected total U.S. troop strength for North Africa was then estimated at 450,000, somewhat more than the total projected for the United Kingdom.

Deployment to Iceland

A year after Pearl Harbor, Iceland, which had been included in the European Theater of Operations as set up in June 1942, had been garrisoned with a fairly large Army force. Over 40,000 troops were present in early December 1942, including the 5th Infantry Division, two fighter squadrons, and a number of antiaircraft and coast artillery units. Another 12,000 American troops were projected for Iceland according to current War Department planning. American troops had begun to arrive in Iceland in late 1941, even before the United States entered the war. The major objectives of deployment to Iceland were the protection of the transatlantic air ferry routes and sea lanes and the relief of the British garrison.

Deployment to the Middle East

In the Middle East, events of 1942 had forced successive modifications in the Army's policy toward that area of British strategic responsibility. At the beginning of December 1942 about 25,000 American troops were present in or en route to the Middle East—primarily service and air troops, including seven air combat groups. The enlarged Middle East commitments by the close of the year reflected, in part, the increased operational air activities by United States forces in support of British-American offensive action in the Mediterranean. In part, it reflected the greater need for service units required to construct, operate, and maintain the Persian Gulf supply route for shipments to the Soviet Union.

Besides the troops belonging to U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME), there were those of U.S. Army Forces in Central Africa (USAFICA), which had been set up in June 1942 to control U.S. Army forces across equatorial Africa. USAFICA was to unify air transport activities along the trans-African air routes—dispatching American aircraft to the Middle East, the USSR, India, and China. By early December 1942 Army personnel in the Central Africa area, mostly air and service troops required for the operation of the Central Africa air ferry route, numbered about 5,000.

Deployment in the Western Hemisphere

Similarly reflecting changing needs and plans of the critical first year of United States participation in the war was the state of deployment in the Western Hemisphere (excluding the continental United States) at the end of 1942. In early December
1942 approximately 237,000 U.S. troops were present in or en route to bases in the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America, Alaska, and the rest of North America. This total included about 185,000 ground troops and 50,000 air troops (nine combat groups) actually present. The total U.S. Army strength in these Western Hemisphere bases exceeded by a substantial margin the total U.S. Army strengths in either the United Kingdom or North Africa. It also exceeded—by over 100,000—the ceilings, envisaged as part of the original BOLERO planning, on strategic deployment for the area by December 1942. The heavy outlay—in antiaircraft, air, and scattered infantry units—represented in part a carry-over from the early defensive phases of the war for garrison forces to meet threats of invasion, naval bombardment, and sabotage in the North American and Latin American theaters. Fluctuations in plans for the European offensive, the long-continued threat to the security of the South Atlantic area from French West Africa, combined with the continued critical shipping shortage and the demands of antisubmarine warfare, had as yet precluded an extensive “squeezing out” process to shift Army strength to more active theaters outside the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, as American forces were committed to limited offensives, American overseas theaters were built up, and Allied demands for American planes increased, further allocations to the Western Hemisphere of U.S. troops—especially service, air, antiaircraft, and sundry infantry units—were made in 1942 for the extension, operation, and protection of North and South Atlantic air ferry routes.

The main operational development in the Western Hemisphere was the heavy allocations for Alaska. A year after Pearl Harbor there were over 87,000 troops (present or en route) including about 72,000 ground and 14,000 air troops (2 air combat groups) actually in the area. This total was more than twice the number envisaged for the area by the close of 1942.

During 1942, additional troops were also dispatched for the construction and operation of the Alcan Highway (opened in November 1942) in western Canada. This project, authorized by a joint agreement between Canada and the United States, was originally planned and initiated to improve transportation links between Canada, United States, and Alaska and thereby to reduce threats to Alaskan installations.

The increase in Army strength in Alaska reflected the changing situation in and plans for the northern Pacific in the year following the United States entry into war. Japanese landings in the western Aleutians in June 1942 had made it politically urgent to dispatch some reinforcements to Alaska and to develop Alaska as an advance base. Critical needs for trained combat divisions, ships, and planes elsewhere in the Pacific, and in the European theater, in strategically more decisive areas, precluded immediate action to recapture Kiska and Attu. The build-up in sundry categories of Army personnel, nevertheless, continued to grow in this secondary theater. The first countermeasures were taken in the summer of 1942. American troops landed at Adak on 31 August. Advance airfields were developed and air strikes undertaken against Japanese installations in the Kiska region. In addi-

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22 Army forces in Latin America (including South America and the Caribbean Defense Command) came to about 120,000 troops including 7 air combat groups; troops in North America (including Newfoundland, Greenland, Bermuda, Bahamas, and eastern and western Canada) to 30,000.
tion to providing for defensive-offensive needs for Alaska, the increased allocations at the end of 1942 also included personnel for servicing the Alaska–Siberia air ferry route for delivery of lend-lease aircraft to the USSR (opened in September 1942). At the close of the year, as pressure became stronger upon the War Department for dislodging the Japanese from the Aleutians, a further increase to about 100,000 troops was projected for Alaska.

**Deployment to the CBI**

In the China–Burma–India theater early limitations on Army deployment had been maintained far more successfully during 1942 than either in the Middle East or in the Western Hemisphere. In the Asiatic theater, as in the Middle East, the circumstances of world war had plunged the American troops into an area of highly complicated jurisdictional, strategic, and logistical problems for the Allies. Basic strategic considerations, as well as limited Allied resources for mounting major attacks on the Asiatic mainland and pressing immediate needs of other theaters, combined to keep the CBI theater, throughout 1942, low on the list of priorities set by the CCS for overseas deployment. For the United States, one objective of strategic policy since the very beginnings of the international conflict had been to keep China actively in the war without a major investment of American forces. In accord with American policy, General Stilwell’s mission to China had been directed in February 1942 toward increasing both the effectiveness of American assistance to the Chinese Government and the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. After the Burma Road was cut by the Japanese, American policies and Stilwell’s mission had remained the same. The problems had become far more difficult—supporting the Chinese, getting their cooperation, and exercising pressure through China on Japanese strategic policy. But for the U. S. Army the area remained a secondary air and supply theater. From the summer of 1942 onward, the technical and tactical instruction of Chinese forces in India became an increasingly important activity. A year after Pearl Harbor about 17,000 American troops were present in or en route to the China–Burma–India area. This total included about 10,000 air troops (4 air combat groups) and about 5,000 service troops actually in the theater. The total strength was close to early wartime Army and joint planning estimates for the end of 1942, only slightly exceeding the total commitments for the area projected in the JCS 23 study of mid-March 1942.

**Deployment to the Pacific**

The great divergence from early American planning for the war against Japan in 1942 was in the scale of Army strength reached in the Pacific by the end of that year. The character and extent of deployment in the Pacific were shaped by the requirements of a largely oceanic theater with its main bases lacking in railroads, docks, and warehouses; separated by vast stretches of water; and situated thousands of miles from the west coast of the United States. The Pacific war provided, therefore, a formidable exercise in the science of logistics. For every combat division of 15,000 ground troops sent to the Pacific, for example, twice as many service troops were required for transport and supply. The first year of the war in the Pacific was largely spent by the United States armed forces in establishing and protecting supply lines and bases from
which offensives might later be undertaken against Japan.

The trend in excess of allocations over commitments for the Pacific during 1942 had fallen into two major phases, roughly divided by the Battle of Midway of June 1942. During the early months of the war in the Pacific, the War Department had tried to keep the forces and means allotted to the minimum consistent with the agreed objectives of defending Australia, New Zealand, and the lines of communication from the United States to the Southwest Pacific. Strategic deployment planning had not kept abreast of operational planning to meet the requirements of this defensive phase. The critical need of reinforcements and readjustments for delaying and containing the Japanese advance led to successive ad hoc increases in allotments of Army troops to the Pacific. Adjusting the requirements in ground forces was largely a matter of overcoming shipping limitations. Pacific air deployment, however, was the subject of a great deal of controversy among the American planners, complicated by the commitments of planes to the Allies and by the determination of the AAF to initiate large-scale daylight bombardment of Western Europe. In executing the build-up and holding policy in the Pacific, the War Department did not fully anticipate the great need for air and ground service-type units for Australia and Pacific island bases. By the beginning of June 1942 about 245,000 U. S. Army troops—nearly half of those stationed outside the United States (about 505,000), or over three quarters of those stationed outside the Western Hemisphere (about 320,000)—had been sent to defend the line Hawaii–Australia.24 They included seven of the ten divisions outside the United States and nearly all the air combat units outside the Western Hemisphere.25

The rebuff to the Japanese forces in the Coral Sea (May 1942) and Midway battles (June 1942) by no means slowed down Army deployment to the Pacific. That deployment, in the new phase of the Pacific war, was no longer calculated in terms of garrisoning a "line" of bases to support a harassing naval defensive, but in terms of tactical offensive moves beyond that line. Until August 1942 the actual numbers deployed each month in the Pacific continued to be greater than those deployed in the Atlantic.25 A series of limited offensive operations, beginning with the Marine landings on Guadalcanal in August 1942, was plotted and inaugurated. Emergency reinforcements were dispatched in the fall of 1942 for both the Guadalcanal and Papua about 46,000 troops en route to destinations outside the continental United States. For purposes of this computation, Iceland is classified as outside the Western Hemisphere.

For a simplified breakdown as of 31 May, by months, for major theaters, see Strength of the Army, 1 May 46, pp. 56–57, prepared by Strength Accounting Br, AGO, under direction of Strength Accounting and Statistics Off, OCS.

24 As of the beginning of June 1942 divisions overseas, including those en route, were: 34th Infantry and 1st Armored (en route), Northern Ireland; 5th, Iceland; 24th, 25th, and 27th, Hawaii; Americal, New Caledonia; 37th (en route), Fijis; and 41st and 32d, Australia. (See OPD Overseas Tr Basis, 1 Jun 42, filed in Off of Army Comp-troller.)

Figures for air units in the Pacific as of the beginning of June 1942 are extremely confusing because of emergency transfers. Principal air combat units were then located in Hawaii, Australia, and on the lines of communication. (For the overall distribution of air groups, see: (1) OPD Weekly Status Map, 4 Jun 42, AG 061 (4 Sep 45); and (2) OPD Overseas Troop Basis, 1 Jun 42.)

25 OPD Weekly Status Maps, Jan–Aug 42, AG 061 (4 Sep 45). This statement holds true whether or not deployment within the Western Hemisphere is included.

23 These figures are based on OPD Weekly Status Map, 4 Jun 42, AG 061 (4 Sep 45). They include
Campaigns, tactically offensive moves against advanced enemy positions in the South and Southwest Pacific area. The allocation and movement of service units, filler replacements, and air units to the Pacific commands remained unsettled problems. The growth of air, ground, and service forces in the South and Southwest Pacific was accompanied by a multiplication of higher echelons of Army branch and island commands within these areas—particularly in the South Pacific, where a separate Army command, U.S. Army Forces in South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), had been established in July 1942. Among the added activities of the Army in that area was the assumption in early December 1942 of responsibility on Guadalcanal, involving the employment of several Army and Marine ground combat forces.

The cumulative results of the piecemeal process by which the Pacific theater had been built up to meet the changing needs during the year after Pearl Harbor were indicated in the division of Army strength among the Pacific areas at the close of 1942. By 3 December 1942 a total of about 145,000 air and ground troops was in the Central Pacific Area (including 4 divisions and 4 air combat groups). Totals for the South Pacific Area then numbered about 91,000 (3 divisions and 5 air combat groups), and for the Southwest Pacific Area about 110,000 (2 divisions and 10 air combat groups).

In each of these sections of the Pacific the limitations on Army deployment set as part of the original BOLERO planning had been substantially exceeded. Though the Central Pacific then contained the greatest number of Army troops, events of 1942 had considerably reduced the threat of Japanese invasion and capture of island bases in this sector that had appeared so imminent early in the war. Before the close of the year some of the garrison strength was being transferred to aid offensive action in the South and Southwest Pacific. No similar slackening off in Army build-up appeared in prospect for the South and Southwest Pacific Areas. On the contrary, the trend toward continued increases of Army forces for these areas seemed stronger than ever.

For the Pacific theater as a whole, the total of Army forces deployed a year after Pearl Harbor (about 346,000) was about equal to the total Army forces deployed in the United Kingdom and North Africa (about 347,000). The Pacific build-up exceeded by about 150,000 the total number projected for the area by the end of 1942 in the original BOLERO planning. Nine of the 17 divisions overseas and 19 of the 66 air combat groups overseas were in the Pacific.

In effect, by 31 December 1942 slightly over one half of the divisions overseas and about one third of the air combat groups were in the Southwest Pacific. In the South Pacific were the 32d and 41st Infantry Divisions. The 25th Division began moving to Guadalcanal from Hawaii on 25 November and arrived on 17 December 1942.

By 31 December 1942 current and projected strengths, air and ground, for the South and Southwest Pacific, as shown on the OPD Weekly Status Map of that date (AG 061, 4 Sep 45) (reproduced in Chart 3 below), were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Pacific</td>
<td>108,630</td>
<td>189,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Pacific</td>
<td>102,880</td>
<td>146,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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26 During most of December the Americal Division, the 147th Infantry, the reinforced 2d and 8th Marines of the 2d Marine Division, and Marine defense battalions were the ground forces available to the Army command under General Patch. (See Miller, Guadalcanal, p. 214.)

27 The divisions in the Central Pacific Area were the 24th, 27th, and 40th Infantry present, and 25th Infantry in process of transfer. The three divisions in the South Pacific were the Americal, 37th, and

43d Infantry Divisions. In the Southwest Pacific were the 32d and 41st Infantry Divisions.

28 The 25th Division began moving to Guadalcanal from Hawaii on 25 November and arrived on 17 December 1942.

29 By 31 December 1942 current and projected strengths, air and ground, for the South and Southwest Pacific, as shown on the OPD Weekly Status Map of that date (AG 061, 4 Sep 45) (reproduced in Chart 3 below), were:
overseas were deployed in the war against Japan. All the remaining overseas divisions, and slightly over one half of the overseas air combat groups were deployed in the war against Germany. The rest of the overseas air combat groups were distributed among Latin American and South Atlantic bases. The total U. S. Army forces then deployed in the war against Japan exceeded by about 50,000 the total U. S. Army forces deployed in the war against Germany.20

(See Chart 3.)

Distribution of Aircraft and Shipping

The cumulative effects of the successive diversions of 1942 were also shown in the relative distribution of aircraft in the overseas theaters at the end of the year. Of the total Army Air Forces planes (5,626) on hand overseas at the close of December 1942, less than half (2,065) were deployed against Germany. The total number of planes deployed against Germany only slightly exceeded the total (1,910) deployed against Japan.21 Allocations of aircraft had exceeded commitments by the end of 1942, particularly in the Pacific and Alaska.22 In addition, a good many planes had been sent to meet the special operational and supporting needs that had developed during 1942 in both of the essentially supply and air theaters—the Middle East and China—Burma—India. Within the European theater itself, the requirements of the North African campaign were draining the United Kingdom of U. S. aircraft. Barely one half of all the U. S. combat planes envisaged in the Marshall Memorandum of the spring of 1942 for the cross-Channel invasion on 1 April 1943 (3,250) were on hand in theaters across the Atlantic at the end of 1942. Less than one third of these combat planes projected for 1 April 1943 were actually in the United Kingdom at the end of 1942. In effect, as the Army planners emphasized, strength and resources originally earmarked for the main effort, BOLERO-ROUNDUP, had served in 1942 as a pool from which aircraft, as well as air units, had been diverted to secondary efforts.23 The accepted British-American view of strategy called for the main effort to be made against Germany. The trend, however, as Army planners observed at the close of the year, was toward the continued diversion of planes to the Pacific, the secondary theater, rather than toward a concentration of air forces against Germany, the main enemy.24

20 Figures based on (1) AAF Statistical Digest (1945), Table 1, p. 4; and (2) OPD Weekly Status Map, 31 Dec 42, AG 061 (4 Sep 43). In this computation, total forces deployed in the war against Japan—including Alaska and CBI—amounted to approximately 461,000. Forces deployed against the European Axis Powers—including Africa—Middle East and Persian Gulf Service Command—numbered about 411,000.

21 The figures in this section are based on AAF Statistical Digest (1945) tables, pp. 151–78. According to these tables, total aircraft on hand in each theater at the end of December 1942 was: ETO, 944; Mediterranean, 1,121; POA, 386; Far East Air Forces, 957; CBI, 271; Alaska, 296; and Latin America, 539.

The figures on airplanes have been checked against figures in (1) OPD Weekly Status Map, 31 Dec 42, AG 061 (4 Sep 45), and (2) Tab Aircraft, SYMBOL: Casablanca Books, Vol II, Exec 6.

22 See JCS 23, 14 Mar 42 and JCS 48, 2 May 42.

23 Memo, Col Lindsay for Col Maddocks, 4 Jan 43, sub: Remarks on Gen Partridge’s Memo re Commitments of U. S. AAF, with CCS 135/2 in ABC 381 (9–25–41), 4.

24 (1) Memo, Brig Gen Earle E. Partridge, JUSSC, for Gen Wedemeyer and Brig Gen Orvil A. Anderson, 30 Dec 42, sub: Projected Commitments of U. S. AAF, with CCS 135/2 in ABC 381 (9–25–41), 4. (2) See also OPD graph attached to memo cited n. 33.
The costs of maintaining the widely dispersed air forces were heavy. To furnish planes and many items needed on short notice to keep the overseas combat units in operation, the AAF had had to expand its air ferry and transportation service. General Arnold described the problem as one of making “too little go twice as far as would be necessary under normal operating conditions.” He went on to explain:

Dispersed as they are in seven active theaters totalling thirteen operational areas, our air forces require many more planes on the spot as reserve and in transit to replace attrition losses than if we had the same number concentrated in one theater. The distances between the United States and the theaters of operations were so great that it was necessary to maintain in each theater from 20 to 50 percent reserve, and to begin delivery of planes to make up operational losses as much as three months before they would actually be placed in combat service. As a result, American production capacities were being strained to the utmost and American training units were not up to strength.\(^35\)

The scattering of men and planes among the theaters of operations was paralleled by the parceling out of shipping to move and maintain troops overseas. Throughout 1942, shortages—especially of escort vessels and landing craft—imbalance between available troop and cargo shipping, and the heavy rate of sinkings had made “shipping” the “limiting factor” in Army overseas deployment. During 1942 shipping in the service of the Army had grown from 871,368 dead-weight tons (31 December 1941) to 3,940,791 dead-weight tons (31 December 1942)—an increase of over 350 percent.\(^36\) The distribution of shipping between the Atlantic and the Pacific during 1942 showed how great an effort it was to move, establish, and support forces in the South and Southwest Pacific—the voyage was long, the unloading was often slow, and the forces were dependent for many of their supplies upon the United States. Since turnaround time in the Atlantic was much shorter, the shift in the distribution of tonnage in favor of the Atlantic in the latter part of the year was far less pronounced than the shift in the ratio of troops and munitions moved. Through mid-1942 the total troop and cargo tonnage under Army control engaged in the Pacific area (including Alaska) had each month actually exceeded total troop and cargo tonnage for the Atlantic (including the Caribbean). Beginning with July, monthly dead-weight cargo tonnage engaged in the Atlantic exceeded that engaged in the Pacific, reversing the trend of the previous half year. Until December 1942 troop tonnage in Army service in the Pacific (with the exception of February and July) continued to exceed troop tonnage in the Atlantic for each month of that year. In December 1942 the total of almost four million cargo and troop dead-weight tons under Army control was, as it had been since July, divided in favor of the Atlantic—a dead-weight tonnage of 1,520,677 was engaged in the Pacific area, and 2,420,114 engaged in the Atlantic area. The sharp increase in tonnage in the Atlantic theaters of operations in that month over November 1942

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\(^35\) Min, 3d mtg MRP, 28 Aug 42, ABC 334.8 MRP (5–6–42). The occasion of Arnold’s remarks on the U.S. aircraft situation was a meeting in Washington of Military Representatives of Associated Pacific Powers.

\(^36\) The figures on shipping in this section are based on Appendix G below, Dead-weight Tonnage of Vessels under Army Control in Pacific and Atlantic Areas from November 1941 through December 1942.
reflected largely the increase in shipping activity in the Atlantic–Mediterranean area attendant on and resulting from the North African campaign.

Shipping limitations continued to affect planning for future overseas deployment of United States troops. In December 1942, SOS planners calculated that, on the basis of prospective increases in American shipping capabilities, a total of almost one million U.S. Army troops might be moved and maintained overseas in 1943, in addition to the one million already overseas at the end of 1942. Current commitments to move troops during 1943, including replacements and reinforcements for troops already overseas, were expected by the SOS planners to absorb the larger part (a total of 628,000) of the approximately one million troops that might be moved overseas in 1943. The shipping capacity left for overseas deployment and maintenance of United States troops might be further reduced if additional commitments for the United Kingdom economy or the Russian Protocol were made. In accord with current United States shipping estimates, increases of approximately 210,000 in the first quarter of 1943, and another 240,000 in the second quarter, and about 265,000 in each of the remaining quarters, might be made in the number of U.S. Army troops deployed overseas. War Department planners estimated that a total of thirty-seven additional American-equipped combat divisions would become available for task forces by the end of 1943—seven at the end of the first quarter, twelve at the end of the second, eight at the end of the third, and ten at the end of the fourth. Supporting combat and service units, air and ground, they expected, would be available for such task forces as might be organized, given the availability of divisions and shipping. By shifting air strength, they concluded, the United States and its associates could support any ground operation that they were capable of undertaking. Available shipping—including escorts, combat loaders, and landing craft—stood out, in their calculations, as “the controlling factor” in American planning for 1943.

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37 (1) See memo, Maj Gen Charles P. Gross, Chief of Transportation, for Gen Somervell, 7 Dec 42, sub: Shipping Implications of Certain Proposed Opns, Item 20, OPD Hist Unit File. (2) Cf. with Incl IX (8 Jan 43) to SOS Logistics study, 4 Dec 42, title: Proposed Opns in Certain Theaters [in Strategic Logistics Div, ASF Plng Div Files A 47-147], superseding and correcting estimates of 7 Dec 42 memo.


See Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, Chs. XIV, XV, and XXII for the conclusions that (a) the planners included escorts with troop and cargo carrying ships as “shipping,” and (b) that only in these broad terms was the “shipping shortage” a limiting factor.
CHAPTER XVII

After TORCH

What to do after completing the conquest of North Africa was the crucial question of Allied strategy at the end of 1942. Since operations in North Africa were almost certain to continue for several months and since it was uncertain how many months they would last, it was too early for a final decision to be made. But the British and American staffs, still much preoccupied with the progress of the first big combined operation, began to feel out each other's positions on future Allied strategy.

The War Against Germany

On 18 November the Prime Minister cabled the President that the "paramount task" before the United States and the United Kingdom was, first, to conquer North Africa and open the Mediterranean to military traffic and, second, to use the bases on the African shore "to strike at the underbelly of the Axis . . . in the shortest time." He spoke of the advantages of using either Sardinia or Sicily as air bases to attack Italy and called for a "supreme effort" to bring Turkey into the war in the spring. He concurred in a proposal the President had sent him that the CCS should "make a survey of the possibilities including forward movement directed against Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, Greece, and other Balkan areas and including the possibility of obtaining Turkish support for an attack through the Black Sea against Germany's flank." In accord with these desires of the President and the Prime Minister, the CCS on 19 November had directed the combined planners to examine the situation in the Mediterranean and recommend a policy for subsequent action in the area.

At a White House meeting on 10 December 1942, the President took up with the JCS the question of the next move after the close of the campaign in North Africa. General Marshall gave reasons for not undertaking any new operations in the Mediterranean. The first thing to be done, he observed, was to clear enemy forces from Tunisia in order to hold the area without using large forces and to be prepared to safeguard the lines of communication in the

1 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Nov 42, No. 155, circulated as JCS 153, 18 Nov 42, title: Plans and Opns in Mediterranean, Middle East, and Near East.
2 Ibid. No copy of the President's message has been found in War Department files.
3 See CCS 124, 19 Nov 42, title cited n. 1, and CPS 49/D, 19 Nov 42, title: Plng and Opns Subsequent to TORCH.
4 For the ensuing reports and debates, see especially: (1) min, 39th mtg CPS, 20 Nov 42; (2) CPS 49/1, 27 Nov 42, title cited above; (3) informal memo, A. C. W. [Wedemeyer] for Handy [about 1 Dec 42], no sub, and (4) memo, Embick for Marshall, 1 Dec 42, sub: Minority Rpt on Future Action in Mediterranean, both with CPS 49/D in ABC 381 (11-17-42); (5) min, 41st mtg CPS, 4 Dec 42; and (6) CPS 49/2, 5 Dec 42, same title as CPS 49/D, above.
5 Min, mtg at White House, 1430, 10 Dec 42, Tab 42, Item 2, Exec 5. Present at this conference with the President were Generals Marshall, Arnold, and Deane, Admirals Leahy and Edwards, and Mr. Hopkins.
Strait of Gibraltar. He once again called attention to the logistic difficulties of operations in the Mediterranean and repeated his opposition to "dabbling" wastefully in that area. Before any new operations were undertaken there, he wanted to make sure that they would be worth the cost. Marshall wanted to settle the North African campaign quickly in order to increase the rate of troop movements to the United Kingdom—then about 8,500 men a month. He declared it to be important to build up a balanced force to strengthen the defenses of the British Isles and to take advantage of possible German disintegration on the Continent. He specifically argued that it was important for the United States and the United Kingdom to be ready in March or April 1943 to launch emergency operations against the Brest peninsula or Boulogne, or both, if there were signs that the German air force was becoming weaker or if German forces started to move through Spain.

The President was of the opinion that there then was no need for an immediate decision on the next strategic move, and that a decision could possibly be delayed until as late as 1 March 1943. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to build up forces both in the United Kingdom and in North Africa with the greatest possible speed. These two strong striking forces would be prepared to execute whatever line of action should be chosen. The President declared that even if British and American forces did not succeed in driving the enemy out of Tunisia immediately, they were helping the Soviet Union. He expressed the belief, moreover, that operations through Turkey would be well worth considering as a next possible strategic move, provided Turkey could be persuaded to cooperate. But the President did not commit himself to any course of action. So far as the War Department planners could tell, it was still an open question whether he would commit the United States to further operations in the Mediterranean. Planning for such eventualities had, of course, to be continued.

Role of Air Power

In the closing weeks of the year, while the Army planners were studying possible future operations in the Mediterranean, they were also examining plans for air bombardment in the European theater. The Army Air Forces remained as eager as ever to concentrate air power against Germany. General Arnold held that bombing was the only means of maintaining pressure against Germany, and that an integrated air offensive from the United Kingdom and North Africa would offset the dispersion of Allied forces caused by the North African operation. The main force would be based in

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5 Shortly before the White House meeting, the President and the Prime Minister on the one hand, and Stalin on the other, had exchanged views on the role of Turkey. Agreeing on the desirability of having Turkey enter the war on the Allied side in the spring of 1943, the Soviet leader expressed his willingness for staff conversations to be held in Moscow. (See msg, Prime Minister to President, 2 Dec 42, No. 216, Item 4, Exec 5.)

6 (1) Memo, Col Roberts and Col John C. Blizzard, Jr., S&P OPD, for Gen Wedemeyer [latter part of Nov 42], sub: Outlines of Strategy. (2) Memo, Roberts for Wedemeyer [latter part of Nov 42], sub: Strategy. Both in Item l0a, Exec 1. (3) Memo, Chief, S&P OPD for ACofS OPD, 16 Nov 42, sub: Consideration of Offensive Ops in Mediterranean Subsequent to Sp Opn, ABC 381 (7-25-42), 4-B, 80. (4) Study [evidently by OPD], 25 Nov 42, title: Strategic Lines of Action in European Theater, Book 7, Exec 8. (5) Weekly Strategic Sums of Policy Com, OPD, 28 Nov 42 and 5 Dec 42, Tab Policy Com, 17th and 18th mtgs, ABC 334.3 Policy Com (1 Aug 42), 3.
the United Kingdom. Arnold declared that a minimum force of 2,225 U.S. heavy and medium bombers based in the United Kingdom and utilizing American “precision methods” would in six months have a great enough effect to make a land offensive against Germany possible.7

Commenting on these views, the Army planners had pointed to the limitations of weather upon a sustained “all-out” bomber offensive, as well as to the reservations of the British about any kind of cross-Channel offensive before the complete collapse of Germany. If the British would not agree to exploit a favorable situation created by the proposed bombing operations, they observed, then the operations would in large part be wasted.8

Recognizing that air power was a strategic weapon of great importance, the Army planners cast about for a proper role for it in the changed circumstances of the European war. They were favorably inclined to that part of the recommendations of the AAF—with which General Eisenhower was in accord—for developing United Kingdom, North African, and other Mediterranean bases, as they became available, into a single area for air operations.9 They recommended a more extensive air offensive throughout the European theater from these bases and intensive Allied pressure regardless of the specific line of land action eventually adopted in the theater. The Army planners did not accept the more extreme claims being advanced by exponents of victory through air power.10 They still saw a need for a tactically oriented air offensive before and during a combined land offensive across the Channel; they were not willing to rely solely on “strategic bombing” to prepare the way for the defeat of Germany.

Summary of Main Alternatives

Examination of the possible courses of action in 1943 and thereafter led the Army planners to the conclusion that there were three main alternatives—victory through strategic bombing, cross-Channel invasion, and continued pressure in the Mediterranean region.11

They rejected the first alternative—victory through strategic bombing—believing that only the concerted use of air and land offensives would produce the decisive defeat of Germany. The second alternative—the cross-Channel operation—involved a reversion to ROUNDUP as soon as the enemy was expelled from North Africa. The Army planners had not given up the idea that there must be a decisive campaign in northwestern Europe, but they could not see how or when it could be launched. To resume plans for ROUNDUP in 1943 would be to ignore the fact that a decisive, large-scale cross-Channel operation would not be feasible from United Kingdom, North Africa, and Middle East, see Ch. XIV, above.

10 Weekly Strategic Resume of Policy Com, OPD, 26 Dec 42, Tab Policy Com, 21st mtg, ABC 334.3 Policy Com (1 Aug 42), 3.

11 Ibid.
sible, as a matter of logistics, before mid-1944. It would mean accepting the sacrifice of many of the psychological and tangible advantages promised by TORCH. It would also be to disregard the fact that large ground forces would be required to safeguard North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, the Army planners were very much impressed by the heavy cost in casualties of the Allied raid on Dieppe in August 1942. They thus accepted once more the indefinite postponement of ROUNDUP.

The third alternative—continued pressure in the Mediterranean region—was the line of least resistance. The strategic objectives for 1943 would be to open the Mediterranean to Allied shipping, and to knock Italy out of the war. The proponents of this alternative pointed out that the United States and the United Kingdom could not decide, perhaps before mid-1943, when and where the decisive blow against Germany would be struck. In the meantime, limited operations in the Mediterranean would be of some help to the Soviet Union by making supply routes shorter and safer and by giving Germany no respite. Such operations could be carried out within the limited means at the disposal of the United States and the United Kingdom in 1943 and could be supplemented by the all-out air offensive against Germany. Rejecting the first alternative and convinced that the second must be postponed, the Army planners in the closing weeks of 1942 turned with considerable misgivings toward the third alternative for 1943.13

The study of the War Department planners had thus brought them by the turn of the year to no conclusion on which they could heartily agree regarding the course to be followed in the European–Mediterranean area after TORCH. But they were beginning to face up to the need for some new way of going about the defeat of Germany. Air bombardment as a strategic weapon suggested a combination of possibilities consistent with the view of strategy to which the American military chiefs adhered. Although the relations among the possible elements—cross-Channel, air bombardment, and Mediterranean—were still confusing to the War Department planners, they were beginning to think in terms of possible permutations and combinations of operations. They were still speaking—as a carry-over from earlier 1942 planning—largely in terms of this operation or that. But by the very circumstances of their involvement in the Mediterranean, they were now being compelled to consider the possibilities of this and that course. The transition to the strategic initiative in the European theater, along with the growth of the resources at their disposal, had brought them to a new stage in strategic planning.

12 See (1) ltr, Mountbatten, Combined Ops Hq, England, to Marshall and OPD, 17 Dec 42, Tab 32, and (2) paper, n.d., title: Sum of Combined Rpt on Dieppe Raid, Tab 47, both in Book 7, Exec 8; (3) paper [evidently written near the end of 1942], title: Is a Second Front Possible, Item 10a, Exec 1; and (4) OPD cover sheet, 2 Jan 43, sub: The Dieppe Raid (CB 94244). OPD 381 ETO, 53.

13 The pros and cons of possible operations in the European–Mediterranean area for 1942 are summarized in the series of outline strategic plans and studies assembled by OPD. (See SYMBOL: Casablanca Books (Dec 42–43), Vol I—Strategy and Plans, Handy’s copy, Exec 6.) While these papers bear no dates, they were drawn up in the Operations Division at the close of December 1942 and the beginning of January 1943. Similar, but not identical versions of some of the plans are contained in Item 14, Exec 1. (For a detailed discussion, see Strategic Plans Unit Study 3, OCMH Files.)
The War Against Japan

As long as plans for operations across the Atlantic in 1943 remained indeterminate, it was impossible to resolve the uncertainties and disagreements of the American planners over future operations in the Pacific. But since a large-scale continuation of operations in the Mediterranean was highly probable, they began to project a parallel development of operations in the Pacific. The Army planners continued to work on the principle—which was never stated in so many words—that further "diversions" to operations in the Mediterranean, as required to maintain the momentum of the "diversionary" operations initiated there in 1942, justified parallel "diversions" to operations in the Pacific, as required for the same reasons. This equation remained the basis of War Department dealings not only with Admiral King and General MacArthur but also with the British, since the effective check on British proposals involving increased U.S. Army commitments in the Mediterranean was always the prospect that the JCS would recommend correspondingly more ambitious plans in the Pacific.

South and Southwest Pacific

In the late fall of 1942, American forces in the South Pacific were still desperately fighting off a series of Japanese thrusts aimed at dislodging them from their foothold in the southern Solomons. General MacArthur had begun a campaign to relieve the Japanese threat to Port Moresby, the advance Allied base on the southern coast of New Guinea. During October and November, Australian troops drove the Japanese back across the Owen Stanley Range, while American troops—transported to the northeast coast primarily by air—joined in bottling up the Japanese in the Buna-Gona area. From the middle of November 1942 until the middle of January 1943, the Allied troops engaged in bitter fighting to eliminate the Japanese from their strongly defended positions.  

In October 1942 the President had told General Marshall that he believed the northeast coast of New Guinea should be secured as soon as possible. Then operations could be undertaken against the New Britain-New Ireland area and from there against Truk, the important Japanese base in the Carolines. The President’s view was entirely in accord with that of the Army strategic planners who had long been maintaining that Rabaul was the key to the Japanese position in the Southwest Pacific, and the best way to approach Rabaul was from New Guinea.

Although the immediate objective was the elimination of the threat to Port Moresby, the Papua Campaign was actually the first step in securing the northeast coast of New Guinea. This move was essentially the limited Task Two that General Marshall and his staff advisers had proposed shortly after the launching of Task One, as part of the scheme of operations against Rabaul.

As soon as the Allied forces in the South and Southwest Pacific had shown that they

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14 For this phase of the war in the Southwest Pacific, known as the Papua Campaign, see Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

15 For an exchange of views on limited Task Two, see: (1) memo, GofS for CNO, 14 Aug 42, sub: Early Initiation of Limited Task Two, OPD 381 PTO, 84; and (2) memo, CNO for GofS, 20 Aug 42, same sub, OPD 370.5 PTO, 9.

For the discussion of Tasks One, Two, and Three, in June–July 1942, see Ch XI. Task One had been launched with the landings in Guadalcanal in August 1942.
could withstand powerful Japanese counter-thrusts, Marshall urged that definite plans be drawn up for continuing the offensive, as provided in the joint directive of 2 July 1942. On December 1 he sent to Admiral King for comment the draft of a new joint directive to proceed with the next steps: “Seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomon Islands, northeast coast of New Guinea, New Britain and New Ireland.” Subject to the approval of the JCS, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were to provide jointly the necessary task forces and to maintain and protect the lines of communication. The target date for beginning these campaigns was also to be determined jointly by MacArthur and Nimitz. MacArthur was to be charged with the strategic direction of the forces involved. A naval officer was to be in direct command of all naval and amphibious operations.

Weeks of proposal and counterproposal followed, and as had happened in June 1942, the expectation that the Navy would favorably consider the Army recommendations was disappointed. The same issues of unity of command, maintaining the flexibility of the Pacific Fleet, and the risks involved in the employment of naval forces under the strategic control of other than naval officers were carried over from the June discussions. Briefly stated, the War Department called for “an elbowing-forward movement” along the Solomons and New Guinea axes.\(^\text{16}\) Except for the completion of Task One, all subsequent action would take place in the Southwest Pacific Area. Therefore, strategic control should be vested in General MacArthur. The Navy argued that Task One could not be considered completed until the Guadalcanal–Tulagi area had been made secure and developed into an air and naval base. A step-by-step advance up the Solomons chain would be necessary, but doubts were expressed about the possibilities offered by North East New Guinea as a base of operations. Admiral Halsey’s command in the South Pacific should not, in any case, be disturbed. Unified command should be set up over the whole Pacific theater and General MacArthur be given strategic direction of operations in the Southwest Pacific under Admiral Nimitz.\(^\text{18}\) This proposal was an entirely natural continuation of the line of reasoning the Navy Department had taken on previous occasions and was accompanied by the same justification as before—the very strong operational argument that the Pacific Fleet should not be divided between two commands. The War Department agreed that a single commander should some day be appointed for the whole Pacific theater, but once again pointed out that this was a matter for higher authority and that a de-

\(^{16}\) Memo, CofS for CNO, 1 Dec 42, sub: Proposed Jt Directive for Offensive Opns in SWPA. For earlier drafts of this memo, see OPD draft memo [CofS for CNO], 28 Nov 42, same sub, and OPD draft memo [CofS for CNO], 30 Nov 42, same sub. All in OPD 381 SWPA, 83.

\(^{17}\) For Army views, see especially: (1) memo, CofS for CNO, 2 Dec 42, sub: Strategic Direction of Ops in SW Pacific, (2) draft memo, CofS for CNO, 21 Dec 42, sub cited above, all three in Item 67b, Exec 10; (4) memo, Gen Handy for Capt Connolly, USN, 29 Dec 42, no sub, and (5) memo, CofS for CNO, 8 Jan 43, sub cited in (1), both in OPD 384 PTO, 43 (the 8 Jan 43 memo had been drafted in OPD and revised; an OPD draft showing slight revision by Marshall is filed in Item 67b, Exec 10).

\(^{18}\) For the brief summary of the Navy’s position, see especially: (1) memo, V. D. Long for Marshall, et al., 15 Dec 42, sub: Future Ops in Solomons Sea Area, incl ltr, CINCPAC to COMINCH, 8 Dec 42, same sub; (2) Navy draft memo, CNO for CofS [23 Dec 42], sub cited n. 17(1); and (3) ltr, King to Marshall, 6 Jan 43. All in Item 67b, Exec 10.
AFTER TORCH

Decisions could be made only after prolonged consideration, because of the "political, international and organizational implications." The War Department also reminded the Navy that provision must be made for shifting air forces as well as naval forces in the Pacific from one sector to another. The action proposed by the Army, besides solving the problem at hand, would be "a positive step toward eventual unification of command of all forces in the Pacific." 19

By early January 1943, when the Chiefs of Staff left for the Casablanca Conference, the Army and Navy had reached no agreement on the details of the strategy and command arrangements for continuing operations against Rabaul. 20 Nor had the JCS as yet received MacArthur’s detailed plans for the employment of forces in those operations. 21 In anticipation of these meetings, the War Department planners had themselves drawn up for the Army representatives an outline strategic plan for an Allied offensive to seize and occupy Rabaul. A condition of the War Department plan was that Allied operations in the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Bismarck Archipelago be placed under the operational control of a single commander. 22 The reason for this condition was to make sure that the two jaws of the pincers would come together on Rabaul. Among the advantages of the operation, the War Department planners observed, were bringing the key Japanese naval base at Truk within range of Allied bombers, extending the area of Allied air reconnaissance, and removing the existing threat to the Hawaii–Australia supply route. This operation, moreover, would continue the offensive against Rabaul already opened. Seven U. S. Army and Marine divisions, five Australian and New Zealand divisions, three Marine raider battalions, and one U. S. parachute regiment—all told, about 187,000 combat troops—would be required to execute the proposed plan. All these Allied forces were allocated to the area but not all of them had been sent. There were, moreover, deficiencies in certain kinds of shipping—especially small ships for coastwise use—and some of the divisions within the area lacked equipment and training for jungle and amphibious operations.

To make possible continued operations—aimed at Rabaul—the War Department had taken steps to send essential reinforcements to MacArthur. As a partial compensation for the immediate involvement of available trained amphibious troops and amphibious equipment in South Pacific operations, the War Department had dispatched a parachute regiment and additional transport planes to the Southwest Pacific. A jungle-trained combat team, moreover, had been sent to that area. An engineer amphibian brigade had been organized for shipment to Australia along

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19 (1) Memo cited n. 17 (4). (2) Cf. above, pp. 258–65, for the exchange of views on the same subject in June.

20 For further treatment of Army-Navy views on command and strategy in the South and Southwest Pacific, see John Miller, Jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.

21 For the WD exchange with MacArthur, see: (1) msg (originator OPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 7 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2273; (2) msg (originator OPD), same to same, 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2833; (3) msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 10 Jan 43, CM-IN 4574; and (4) msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 11 Jan 43, CM-OUT 3664.

22 For a discussion of MacArthur’s plans for the Southwest Pacific, see Miller, Reduction of Rabaul.
with a unit to assemble and repair landing craft. Such steps were in line with the relaxation of War Department restrictions on Pacific deployment following the combined agreement on TORCH. In addition, the JCS had approved, at the end of November 1942, the diversion of the 25th Division—tentatively scheduled for Australia—to the South Pacific, on the condition that the 1st Marine Division would be released to General MacArthur. Contingents of the Marine unit began to arrive in the Southwest Pacific in December, the vanguard of a first-class division experienced in landing operations.

**Limited Operations in the Aleutians**

During October and November 1942 the threat of further Japanese penetration in the Aleutian area remained of secondary importance so far as the Army planners were concerned. Since all available means were being used to bolster the precarious Allied position in the South and Southwest Pacific and to execute TORCH, American strength could not be spared for immediate operations in the Aleutians. For that reason, the War Department had repeatedly refused to approve urgent recommendations from General DeWitt of the Western Defense Command that he be allowed to assemble forces to eject the Japanese from the Aleutians.

In the closing weeks of 1942 the Washington staffs reconsidered the question of operations in the Aleutians. Late in November reports had come in that the Japanese had landed a reconnaissance party on Amchitka, an island just to the east of Kiska. Admiral Nimitz at once recommended to Admiral King that Amchitka be occupied as soon as possible by an Army garrison. He pointed to the possibility that the Japanese might construct an airfield there—they had been unable to complete one on either Kiska or Attu.

In mid-December 1942 General Marshall and Admiral King reached an agreement on a joint directive to Admiral Nimitz and General DeWitt for the preparation of plans to occupy both Amchitka and Kiska. Amchitka was to be occupied as soon as possible and an amphibious force was to be trained for the Kiska operation. But Marshall thought that for tactical and logistical reasons the operation should not be undertaken in the near future, and at his request no target date was set.

The War Department remained reluctant to commit additional forces to Alaska until final agreement on the dates of the offensive operations was reached. The

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23 For correspondence on the exchange of the divisions, see especially: (1) memo, Handy for Cooke, 28 Nov 42, sub: Change of Destination of 25th Div, and (2) memo, Silverthorne for Handy, 28 Nov 42, sub: Contact with Navy Ref First Marine Div—25th Div Exch, with attached Navy draft of proposed jnt dispatch, both in OPD 370.5 PTO, 45; (3) msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 30 Nov 42, CM-OUT 9526; (4) msg, Marshall to Emmons, 30 Nov 42, CM-OUT 9556; (5) memo for rcd, 30 Nov 42, OPD 370.5 PTO, 45; and (6) msg, Marshall to Harmon, 1 Dec 42, CM-OUT 0181.


25 Copy of Navy msg, 22 Nov 42, CINCPAC to COMINCH, OPD 381 ADC, 47.

26 (1) Memo, CNO for CofS, 15 Dec 42, sub: Directive to Occupy Amchitka in Order Subsequently to Expel Japanese from Kiska and All of Aleutians. (2) OPD memo for rcd, HAB [Col Henry A. Barber, Jr.], 16 Dec 42, same sub. (3) Memo, CofS for CNO, 16 Dec 42, same sub, with incld redrafted directive. All in OPD 381 ADC, 50. The OPD copy of memo to CNO has the notation, "Signed Dec 16, 1942, and dispatched by Col. Young, OCS." On a copy of the directive in WDCSA Alaska (SS) is the notation, "Ok'd by Navy and dispatched Dec. 18, 1942."
Chief of Staff expressed dismay that so many troops were being committed to Alaska for an essentially defensive role:

The present strength in Alaska I am informed is about 85,000 men and approved commitments will raise this figure to over 98,000. Considering the desperate fighting in which we are involved in the Solomons, New Guinea and Tunisia, and Stilwell's predicament in Burma, we cannot afford this continual increase in Alaska.\(^7\)

On 20 December the War Department specifically told DeWitt that the forces for the occupation of Amchitka would have to be taken from those currently available to him.\(^8\)

While detailed operational plans for the Amchitka and Kiska operations were being prepared in the theater, the War Department strategic planners, in anticipation of the Casablanca discussions, drew up an outline plan for the occupation of Kiska.\(^9\) On the assumption that the impending landings on Amchitka would be successful, the proposed target date for the undertaking against Kiska was set for early May 1943. Based on the estimates submitted by General Dewitt, a total ground force—assault and reserve—of approximately 25,000 would be required, including one infantry division, one infantry regiment, and sundry other ground units trained in landing operations.

The purposes of the projected operation were to reduce the threat of further Japanese aggression in the Aleutians and Alaska, remove a Japanese observation post in the North Pacific, and deny the use of Kiska Harbor to the Japanese.\(^10\) The planners were not at all sure that it would be worth the expense in American lives, shipping, and equipment to remove a position that was then costly to the Japanese because of American air attacks. Even after the Japanese were driven from Kiska, furthermore, they would still have a listening post in the Aleutian area on Attu, and to remove this would take a further investment of American forces and resources. The operation would not, the planners maintained, result in the reduction of the American air and ground garrisons in Alaska. On the contrary, it would increase the Alaskan garrison by the number of forces required to occupy Kiska. Though acknowledging the advantages of removing the Japanese threat in the northern Pacific, the Army planners were still wary of the further scattering of American strength.

At the same time that the planners were engaged in exploring the problem of ejecting the Japanese from the Aleutians, they were also considering the possibilities of using the northern route of approach to Japan.\(^11\) In September 1942 Admiral King had called for the study of ways and means of supporting Soviet troops in the Far East and of using Soviet bases to strike at Japan itself should war break out between Japan and the USSR.\(^12\) A special subcom-

\(^7\) (1) Original OPD draft of ltr, Marshall to DeWitt. (2) Ltr, same to same, 17 Dec 42. Both in OPD 381 ADC, 44. (3) D/F, OPD for TAG, 17 Dec 42, sub: Reduction of Kiska, OPD 381 ADC, 48.

\(^8\) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to DeWitt, 20 Dec 42, CM-OUT 7134.


\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) The northern route runs roughly via Alaska, the Aleutians, and the Kamchatka Peninsula into the Kuril Islands and the maritime provinces of the Soviet Union.

\(^12\) Memo, King for JCS, 21 Sep 42, sub: Campaign Against Japan via the Northern Route, ABC 381 Japan (5-31-42), 1.
mittee of the JPS reported at the end of November 1942, listing what would have to be done to prepare against this contingency. This included recapturing the western Aleutians—to ensure the safety of the lines of communication—and obtaining Soviet co-operation in plans and preparations for a campaign against Japan via the northern route. On 5 January 1943 the JCS approved these recommendations, with slight modifications, for planning purposes.

Consideration of the northern route, however, was to be temporarily abandoned by the Army staff planners following the Soviet Government's refusal early in January 1943 to allow a survey of facilities in eastern Siberia. The cancellation of the survey project (Bazaar) seriously curtailed the planning that could be done for a campaign against Japan by way of the northern route. But the unopposed landings by an American task force on Amchitka, begun on 12 January 1943, just before the opening of the Casablanca Conference, raised the question of further operations in the Aleutians. The Army planners had to allow for another active front, which was likely to require a further dispersion of American forces in an indecisive area.

Plans for Burma Operations

The strategic location and manpower of China had continued to figure throughout 1942 as essential—if somewhat abstract—factors in planning the war against Japan. Large Japanese ground forces were still in China. To make more use of bases in China and of the huge reserves of Chinese manpower would threaten Japanese positions on the Asiatic mainland and allow air operations both against Japanese coastwise traffic and against the Japanese home islands. It might well force the Japanese to divert strength from other areas, specifically from the South and Southwest Pacific. To realize these possibilities, China's troops would have to be armed and its bases equipped with supplies from the United States and Great Britain on a much greater scale than in 1942, when only a trickle of supplies had reached China, carried by a few transport planes from India over the Hump.

Throughout 1942 Allied leaders and strategists remained in general agreement that they must keep China in the war, and appeared to agree that the best way to do it was to reopen land communications through Burma. In the words of the JCS, the course of action in the Far East in 1943 should be:

Conduct offensive operations in Burma with a view to reopening the supply routes to China, thereby encouraging China, and supplying her with munitions to continue her war effort and maintain, available to us, bases

[33] JPS 67/1, 30 Nov 42, title: Campaign Against Japan via the Northern Route. Army representatives on this special subcommittee included Cols James K. Tully and William H. Wood, and Lt. Col. Paul W. Caraway, all of OPD, and Col Dabney O. Elliott of the Strategic Logistics Division, SOS.

[34] Min, 49th mtg JCS, 5 Jan 43.

For background, see: (1) OPD brief, Notes on . . . JPS 48th mtg, 2 Dec 42, with JPS 67/1 in ABC 381 Japan (5-31-42), 1; (2) min, 52d mtg JPS, 30 Dec 42; and (3) JCS 182, 1 Jan 43, title cited n. 33.

[35] For detailed discussion of Soviet-American negotiations for the survey of eastern Siberia, see Ch. XV, above.


[37] Japanese troops in China during 1942 were there mainly for occupation and training. See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. V.
essential for eventual offensive operations against Japan proper.\cite{39}

Various proposals and plans—American, British, and Chinese—for an offensive in Burma had been under consideration in Washington since the summer of 1942.\cite{38} It had soon become apparent to the combined planners that, for lack of necessary means, a major land offensive to retake all of Burma could not be launched before late 1943, if then.\cite{40} The combined chiefs directed, in early November 1942, that planning for this offensive continue. At the same time they decided to explore the possibilities of a limited operation earlier in 1943.\cite{41} By early December 1942 General Marshall had ready for the JCS the War Department’s proposal for a limited offensive operation to be launched by the Generalissimo and General Stilwell in March 1943.\cite{42} It was to follow a British operation to seize Akyab, which was already under way, and a British thrust toward the Chindwin River that was to begin in February 1943. The War Department proposed that a limited spring offensive, to be launched by forces converging from India and China, be aimed at opening a land supply route into China connecting Ledo with Myitkyina and Bhamo thence to Wanting on the Burma Road. General Marshall stated to the JCS that he considered the proposed Burma operation to be of the “utmost importance.”

To reopen a land route from Burma to supply the interior of China would make possible the use of greater American air power in China, since the required base facilities could be supplied overland rather than by air. There was even a good possibility, in Marshall’s opinion, of using bases in China to carry out the long-cherished project of bombing Japan proper. The bombing of Japan would influence opinion in India and China and among the Soviet forces on the Siberian front and would “seriously complicate” the Japanese position in the South and Southwest Pacific.

A condition of that operation, as Marshall went on to point out, was that Tunisia and Tripoli were in Allied hands, and that no major land offensive would be undertaken in the African–European theater before the summer of 1943. In order to know whether or not operations could be undertaken against Burma in 1943, it would be necessary to know whether there would be an operation against Sardinia in the spring of 1943. To meet the shipping requirements of an operation against Sardinia would immeasurably complicate the preparations for a campaign in Burma.

General Stilwell was showing progress in reorganizing and training the Chinese fighting forces. By early December, 32,000 Chi-
nese troops, armed with American weapons, were being trained in India at Ramgarh. Chinese forces in Yunnan Province, moreover, were being reorganized and consolidated by the Generalissimo. But Stilwell still lacked the necessary road-building machinery and engineers, medical service, and communication troops. To make up the deficiencies would require the shipment from the United States of 63,000 measured cargo tons and 5,000–6,000 men during January and February 1943. The problem was to secure the necessary shipping. The JCS agreed, on 8 December, to direct further study of the logistical and strategic implications of the projected operation, and to acquaint the President with the plan.43

Meanwhile, the projected operation against northern Burma for March 1943 was being studied in the theater. The limited offensive, as conceived in General Marshall’s proposal of early December 1942 (JCS 162), had the approval of Chiang Kai-shek, at least in principle.44 But complex and delicate issues in connection with such an undertaking were being raised in New Delhi and Chungking. One great obstacle in the way of any combined Burma operation was the problem of command. Relations among the three nationalities participating were already characterized by command arrangements as intricate as their military and political objectives were diverse. After several conferences between Stilwell and the Generalissimo and Stilwell and Wavell, the three of them reached an agreement whereby the Generalissimo would in person command the Chinese forces from China. The Generalissimo, Wavell, and Stilwell were apparently in agreement also that the command of all forces operating from India would be under the British. Stilwell recommended to Chiang that he accept British supreme command when the British and Chinese efforts converged in Burma. But no decision had been reached on this score by the end of the year.45

The question of mutual support also threatened to affect a spring operation. In November 1942 Chiang had agreed to a combined operation for the spring of 1943—as then proposed by Field Marshal Wavell—provided he was reasonably assured of Allied air superiority and naval control of the Bay of Bengal. On these conditions he promised to have fifteen divisions ready for the operation by mid-February.46 But it was far from certain that these conditions would be fulfilled. In the early part of December one of the War Department planners went so far as to declare flatly, “It should be clear enough by now that the British do not want the Chinese to go into Burma.” He went on to predict:

They will by one means or another do everything possible to block any Chinese forces from operating in Burma. This is, of course, a political matter. . . . In any event, do not expect the British to allow Chinese operations in Burma, nor themselves to be aggressive in their own operations, if any.47

Events appeared to bear out this prediction. Toward the close of the year the

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43 Min cited n. 42(2).
45 (1) Memo, CofS for Hopkins, 9 Dec 42, sub: Comd in CTO, OPD 381 CTO (12–5–42). (2) OPD paper, 6 Jan 43, title: Existing Sit, Tab F Asiatic Theater, SYMBOL: Casablanca Books, Vol II, Exec 6. (3) See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Ch. VII.
46 Msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Nov 42, CM-IN 1965 (11/5/42). This reports a conference between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek.
47 Memo, Col Roberts for Gen Wedemeyer, 12 Dec 42, no sub, with CPS 43/4 in ABC 384 Burma (8–25–42), 1-A.
Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, Admiral Sir James Somerville, advised that it would not be practicable, with the naval forces available, to control the Bay of Bengal. Chiang thereupon complained to the President that the British were going back on earlier promises to furnish the necessary naval support in the Bay of Bengal for a Burma operation.  

At the same time Chiang also told the President that Field Marshal Wavell had two months earlier promised that the British would provide seven divisions for the recapture of Burma. More recently, Chiang declared, the British commander had told Stilwell the British could use only three divisions for limited operations aimed at taking Akyab and forming a line on the Chindwin River. It would be impossible, Chiang informed the President, for the Chinese to undertake the offensive unless the British carried out their undertakings.

The British on their part were also stressing the logistical difficulties in the way of their own advance beyond the Chindwin River into Burma. On the question of naval support, Sir John Dill explained to the Chief of Staff that the British had no destroyers to guard their old battleships, which did not dare venture into the Bay of Bengal unprotected. He saw little possibility of securing destroyers in time for an operation at the end of March 1943.

The inevitable reaction set in at Chungking. On 27 December 1942, Chiang announced to Stilwell that the Chinese would make all preparations to jump off on the date set, and then, if the British Fleet appeared, they would jump off. If not, they would not “move a finger.” On 9 January 1943 Chiang cabled to the President that he was convinced that the attempt to retake Burma would have to be a combined overland and seaborne operation. Unless the Allied navies could prevent enemy reinforcements by sea, or enable a landing force to attack the Japanese in the rear in south Burma, the enemy would be in a position to concentrate rapidly against the armies in the north. Therefore, he considered that in an advance restricted to north Burma the Allies would be risking probable defeat. He was also convinced that the Allies would have to muster adequate forces on both the Indian and the Chinese sides for success in the limited spring operation. In his opinion, the forces which Field Marshal Wavell currently proposed to use were too small. He announced to the President that, with no hope of naval support, it would be better to wait a few months, or even until the fall, to begin the Burma campaign, but that an air offensive in China should, in the meantime, be undertaken as a preparatory measure. He repeated that the Chinese were proceeding with preparations for the Burma offensive and that they would be ready when their Allies were ready.

Just before the Casablanca Conference—in accord with Marshall’s desire—the President urged Chiang Kai-shek to delay a final decision not to take part in the north Burma operation until after the President had conferred with Churchill. The War Department staff, of course, prepared plans for the Burma campaign to be taken to the

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48 See msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 28 Dec 42, CM-IN 12657, transmitting msg, Chiang to President, Item 22, Exec 10.
49 OPD paper cited n. 45(2).
50 Memo, Marshall for Handy, 5 Jan 43, no sub, Item 22, Exec 10.
51(Msg, Stilwell to Marshall, 28 Dec 42, CM-IN 12796 (12/30/42).
52 OPD paper cited n. 45(2).
But the development of American military policy with reference to China was likely simply to take the form of an extension of the policy of 1942—"keeping China in the war"—a policy that presupposed, and had so far succeeded in eliciting, only very limited collaboration from the British and the Chinese.55

**British-American World Strategy for 1943**

Though the British and American planners had been discussing post-TORCH operations since the launching of the North African operation, the British and American Chiefs of Staff did not enter into any general exchange of views on world strategy for 1943 until the last hurried days of preparation before Casablanca. On 26 December 1942 the JCS circulated for the consideration of the British Chiefs of Staff a summary of their views on operations in 1943.56 They pointed out that the accepted principle of British-American strategy, reduced to its simplest form, read:

To conduct the strategic offensive with maximum forces in the Atlantic–Western European theater at the earliest practicable date, and to maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters with appropriate forces. The JCS assured the British that they still regarded this version as basically sound, but they prepared a modified version that gave notice of their intention to match operations in the Mediterranean with operations against Japan.

Conduct a strategic offensive in the Atlantic–Western European Theater directly against Germany, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining the accepted strategic concept in other theaters. Continue offensive and defensive operations in the Pacific and in Burma to break the Japanese hold on positions which threaten the security of our communications and positions. Maintain the strategic defensive in other theaters.

The JCS recommended, it will be noticed, that the principal offensive effort of the United Nations in 1943 be made "directly against Germany" in Western Europe, rather than against satellite states. They did not even mention the possibility of post-TORCH seaborne offensives in the Mediterranean. They argued for an integrated air offensive from the United Kingdom, from North Africa, and, as far as practicable, from the Middle East, and the build-up as rapidly as possible of adequate balanced forces in the United Kingdom in preparation for a land offensive against Germany in 1943. After the expulsion of enemy forces from North Africa, they looked to consolidating the North African position, safeguarding the Allied lines of communication, and preparing for intensive air operations against Italy. Furthermore, the
JCS recommended the eventual transfer of excess forces from North Africa to the United Kingdom in anticipation of the invasion of Western Europe in 1943. They proposed that Turkey should be maintained in a state of benevolent neutrality until such time as help, in the form of supplies and minimum specialized forces, would insure the security of Turkish territory and make it available for Allied use.

Turning to the Pacific, the JCS recommended offensive and defensive operations to secure Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and the lines of communication thereto, and to keep the initiative in the "Solomon–Bismarck–East New Guinea Area." As for the Far East, the JCS urged offensive operations in Burma, with the immediate aim of reopening the supply routes to China.

The British Chiefs of Staff replied on 2 January 1943 that on most issues they were in agreement with their American colleagues. The British Chiefs stated that the main point of difference was that

We advocate a policy of following up TORCH vigorously accompanied by as large a "BOLERO" build-up as possible, while the U. S. Chiefs of Staff favor putting their main effort into "ROUNDUP," while adopting a holding policy in the Mediterranean other than in the air.

The British Chiefs proposed the exploitation of TORCH in order to knock Italy out of the war, bring Turkey into the war, and give the enemy no time for recovery. The exploitation of TORCH during the spring of the year would, in the British view, offer a good chance of eliminating Italy by the combination of an air offensive on the largest scale and amphibious assaults (as against Sardinia, Sicily, and finally the mainland of Italy). Along with the American Chiefs of Staff, they urged the increased bombing of Germany. They also proposed the gathering of forces in the British Isles—but only to the extent that the other operations proposed by them would permit. The British estimated that about twenty-odd British-American divisions would be ready to re-enter the Continent in August or September 1943, if conditions at that time appeared favorable for success. In their opinion, this course of action would give greater relief to the USSR than would concentration on BOLERO at the expense of all other operations; nor would it render improbable the main Burma operation (ANAKIM) in the winter of 1943–44.

The British Chiefs contended that the strongest force that could be assembled by August 1943 for an attack upon northern France would be at most thirteen British and twelve American divisions. Of these divisions, six (four British and two American) would be the most that could be organized as assault forces with the shipping and landing craft that could be made available. The gathering of these forces, the British Chiefs argued, would result in curtailment of activities in other theaters; lead to only a slight increase in the scale of bomber offensive against Germany and Italy; and mean the abandonment of operations against Sardinia and Sicily and of any amphibious operations in the eastern Mediterranean. ANAKIM, moreover, could not be undertaken in 1943 because all available landing craft would be wanted in the United Kingdom. Even if this cross-Channel operation were undertaken, an expedition on an adequate scale to overcome strong German resistance could not be staged. A force of

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57 CCS 135/1, 2 Jan 43, title: Bsc Strategic Concept for 1943—The European Theater. This was a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff commenting on CCS 135, 26 December 1942.
twenty-five divisions would be only slightly over one half the force originally planned for Roundup; for seven months, while the force was being built up, the USSR would be getting no relief and the Germans would have time to recuperate.

The British Chiefs therefore recommended “limited offensive operations in the Pacific on a scale sufficient only to contain the bulk of Japanese forces in that area.”

They also proposed that operations to reopen the Burma Road be undertaken as soon as resources permitted. The British estimated that the Japanese were engaged almost to the limit of their resources and that their capabilities would not increase so long as “communications with Germany are kept severed.”

The unsatisfactory exchange between the American and British Chiefs before Casablanca was accompanied by the failure of the planning subcommittee of the CCS to agree on a course of action subsequent to Torch. The planners reported that they were helpless because of the lack of agreement on higher levels as to over-all strategy and even as to the general area for subsequent offensive action.

In the remaining week before the departure of the American delegation for Casablanca, the JCS had their planners review the American and British proposals. General Marshall was particularly concerned over the difference in British and American estimates of the cost of post-Torch Mediterranean operations. He pointed out to the American military chiefs that the British were evidently “adamant in relation to establishing a front in France.” On the other hand, he was “adamant against operations which would result in unwarranted loss of shipping.” Admiral King was especially anxious to counteract what he believed to be the British underestimation of Japanese capabilities. In his opinion, unless constant pressure were maintained to prevent Japanese consolidation of their conquests, the Allied cause would be jeopardized. He went so far as to suggest the desirability of the Allies’ deciding on a percentage basis what part of the over-all effort should henceforth be directed against Japan. General Marshall questioned the feasibility of this approach. On the basis of detailed findings of the joint planning committees, the Joint Chiefs were prepared to reargue, at the conference, the case for immediate concentration of forces in the British Isles.

The choice for 1943 appeared to be either to continue operations in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific on a large scale, while sending to the United Kingdom whatever U.S. forces could be spared from these operations, or to open no new land campaigns in the Mediterranean or the Pacific so as to accumulate forces for an invasion.

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68 CCS 135/2, 3 Jan 43, title: Amer-Br Strategy in 1943. This paper contains a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.

69 (1) Min, 41st mtg CPS, 4 Dec 42. (2) Min, 42d mtg CPS, 17 Dec 42. (3) CCS 124/1, 30 Dec 42, title: Plans and Opsns in Mediterranean, Middle East and Near East.
of the Continent and a campaign in Burma. There was every reason to expect the President and the Prime Minister to choose the first course, although General Marshall would do his best to dissuade them.

Staff Planning and the President's Position

General Marshall's intention to do just that became very evident in the discussion of the JCS with the President at the White House on 7 January 1943—the only such meeting held in direct preparation for the forthcoming conference. At this meeting the President inquired of the JCS whether all were in agreement that the American delegation should meet the British "united in advocating a cross-Channel operation." General Marshall told the President that there was a difference of opinion, particularly among the planners, although the American Chiefs themselves regarded a cross-Channel operation more favorably than an operation in the Mediterranean. For Marshall the issue was "purely one of logistics." Though he was willing to take some "tactical" risks, "logistical hazards" were unacceptable. In accord with the reasoning of his staff, he went on to say that Sicily was probably a more desirable objective than Sardinia—apparently preferred by the British—but that any operation in the Mediterranean would, of course, reduce the strength and resources that could be sent to the United Kingdom.

Marshall warned above all against the loss of tonnage from operations in the Mediterranean. He personally favored a cross-Channel operation against the Brest peninsula sometime after July 1943. The losses in that operation would be in troops. The current shipping situation was so critical that "to state it cruelly, we could replace troops whereas a heavy loss in shipping, which would result from the Brimstone [Sardinia] Operation, might completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations against the enemy in the near future."

Marshall concluded that in view of current differences in American and British military opinion on the critical issue of cross-Channel versus Mediterranean operations, "the question had resolved itself into one thing or the other with no alternative in sight." The President, seeking to postpone a final decision, renewed the request he had made in early December 1942 that the JCS consider the possibility of an intermediate, compromise position. He suggested the possibility of gathering American forces in England and making plans for operations in northwestern Europe as well as in the Mediterranean, leaving the actual decision in abeyance for a month or two. The decision would then be made on the basis of the existing situation.

In spite of the President's warning that "at the conference the British will have a plan and stick to it," the JCS and the President reached no understanding about what they would say to the British on the great issue of European strategy. The President left the JCS free to state their own views at the forthcoming conference. He did not commit himself specifically to those views. Left undefined was the American position on the relations of any new action in the Mediterranean to a cross-Channel offensive and air operations in Europe, and to operations in the Pacific and Far East. On the significant question, then under con-

\[\text{Min, mtg at White House, 7 Jan 43, Item 45, Exec 10. Present at the meeting were the President, Admirals Leahy and King, and Generals Marshall, Arnold, and Deane.}\]
sideration in Washington, how much more lend-lease aid to promise the USSR, the President left the JCS uncertain how far he was willing to go. He did not define his views on the conflict—which had long troubled Generals Marshall and Arnold and their staffs—between increased air aid to the USSR and American air training programs and plans and operations. He simply proposed not to answer Soviet requests for more aircraft and to send General Marshall to discuss the matter with Stalin after the Casablanca Conference.

The most striking illustration of the want of understanding between the White House and the military staffs was the President's announcement, at the 7 January meeting, of his intention to support the "unconditional surrender" concept as the basic Allied aim in the war. The President simply told the JCS that he would talk to the Prime Minister about assuring Stalin that the United States and Great Britain would continue on until they reached Berlin and that their only terms would be "unconditional surrender." No study of the meaning of this formula for the conduct of the war was made at the time by the Army staff, or by the joint staff, either before or after the President's announcement.

Without having made even a real effort to reach agreement on the problems of the coming year, the President and a small military staff delegation departed, a few days later, for Casablanca.

*The Casablanca Conference*

On 14 January 1943 the President and the Prime Minister met, in company with their leading political and military advisers, at Casablanca. They spent ten days reviewing the questions at issue in global strategy and considering the next move after Torch. There were practical reasons for the choice of Casablanca as a meeting place. Any plans for subsequent action were directly related to the course of the North African campaign, and it was desirable to canvass the possibilities with the commanders on the spot. The hopes for a quick termination of that campaign had been disappointed, and uncertainty when it would end complicated and unsettled all British-American planning for the future.

As the exchange of opinion before the Casablanca Conference indicated, General Marshall had felt neither obliged nor encouraged to try at once to unite the American representatives, from the President down, on a revised version of the plan to concentrate forces in the British Isles. At the conference General Marshall fought a strong rear guard action in defense of the plan. This was a logical course for him to follow, since his own planning staff had at first taken the Torch decision so ill and had afterwards been so engrossed in carrying it out that they had had only a few weeks in which to face the situation it had created. This course also served notice on all that concentrating for a major cross-Channel operation was still a cardinal objective in American strategic planning.

The British brought to the conference a very complete staff and fully prepared plans and positions—in striking contrast to the small American staff and incomplete Amer-
In any event, General Marshall succeeded in making no real change in the direction Allied strategy had taken in the second half of 1942. The Casablanca Conference merely recognized that the initiative would be maintained by the Allies both in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean, and defined short-range objectives in those areas in terms of operations in the South and Southwest Pacific and against Sicily. No real long-range plans for the defeat of the Axis powers emerged from the conference. The questions of Asiatic and cross-Channel operations were simply left open for future negotiation and decision. Agreement on a round-the-clock bomber offensive from the United Kingdom was reached, but it was not tied precisely to Mediterranean or cross-Channel operations. Nor were the relationships among these operations and Pacific-Asiatic undertakings clearly defined. There were significant portents in the American staff's stress on enlarg-
ing the scope of operations against Japan and in the President's announcement of the unconditional surrender concept. But the important thing for the immediate future was that the advances already begun in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific would be carried on in the two areas in which U.S. deployment had been especially heavy in 1942.

**The Future of Planning**

The indecisiveness of the Casablanca Conference on basic strategic issues—which appeared to the American staff to be a victory for the British Chiefs—brought home to the Army strategic planners the need to adjust themselves to a new phase of coalition warfare. The effect of General Marshall's rear guard action at the conference was to give them the time they badly needed to regroup for a "counteroffensive" in their dealings with the British in 1943. The problem of limiting operations in "subordinate" theaters, which the War Department planners had tried—and failed—to solve in simple terms, had become so complex that the Army planners had not only to start all over again but also to work much more patiently and thoroughly—and as a result more slowly—than they had in early 1942. The boldness and simplicity of the studies that General Eisenhower had submitted, the sense of conviction and urgency that had appeared in the oral and written presentations of the War Department case—by Stimson and Robert A. Lovett, Marshall, Arnold, and Wedemeyer—had had their effect, though not the effect intended. But their arguments were most evidently not strong enough in themselves to overcome the gravitational pull on the President of the diverse claims urged by the British Prime Minister, Admiral King, and General MacArthur. What was needed was a far more elaborate and extensive analysis of the "American position" than could be developed in the minds of a few War Department officials who had strong preconceptions and enormous operating responsibilities. To this task of analysis, similar to that that the British staff had long since made for the "British position," the American planners would have to address themselves.

The strategic planners had to face up to the problems of preparing for maximum offensive effort in the global conflict. The effect of the Casablanca Conference was to drive home to the Army planners what had already begun to be apparent to them in the closing weeks of 1942: The new stage of the coalition war demanded new planning processes, techniques, quantitative calculations, and ideas. On the basis of the bare beginnings made in these directions in late 1942, the Army strategic planners would have to start anew in 1943 to plan for victory.

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*The development of War Department views and plans will be further treated in the volume, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-44, now being prepared for the series by Maurice Matloff, co-author of this volume.*
Appendix A

Outline Plan for the Invasion of Western Europe—Marshall Memorandum

Several versions of the plan are extant, some with and some without dates. The dated copies all bear the date 2 April. The many versions of the plan are similar in substance but vary considerably in language and order of presentation. Presumably for security, no formal file entry for the plan was ever made in either the regular OPD decimal file system or the files of the Office of the Chief of Staff. Even the President did not keep a copy. Since the plan was covered with a memorandum, the British called it the “Marshall Memorandum.” The BOLE RO—ROUNDUP—SLEDGHAMMER terminology came into use a few weeks later.

War Department files contain several versions besides the one described in the text. A second version of the plan was the one presented to Marshall by Eisenhower, Handy, and Hull. It bears a number of revisions of language, though not of basic ideas, penned by Marshall. A third version of the plan, incorporating these revisions of cover memorandum, was subsequently prepared by Eisenhower, Handy, and Hull. A fourth version incorporated penciled revisions that had been made on copy No. 1 of the third version. In this version the memorandum itself contained a subsection headed “Outline Plan for Invasion of Western Europe,” which took the place of the attached study of previous versions. This copy bears further minor penciled revisions by General Marshall. A fifth version, incorporating these last minor revisions, was the one taken to London by Marshall. It was included, with Marshall’s copy of the second version, in the Chief of Staff’s book prepared for the April conference in London. The book also included charts, maps, and papers on “Shipping Capabilities—1942,” “Landing Boats,” divisional “Fitness for Battle,” American ground and air forces “Disposition and Strength,” and aircraft operational capacities. Another copy of this fifth version was carried to London by Wedemeyer.

The third version of the plan was probably the one shown to the President by Marshall since he later indicated that he had shown a preliminary draft that was subsequently altered in “language and method of presentation.” It is possible, however, that the second version, presumably ready on 1 April, was approved by the President on 1 April as indicated by Stimson.

1 In n. 39, p. 183, above.
4 Memo, no source, 2 Apr 42, sub: Opns in W Europe, Item 4, Exec 1.
6 It is filed Tab A, ABC 381 BOLE RO (3–16–42), 5. On the cover sheet of this file, before Tab A, is a note in pencil: “This is genesis of OVERLORD operation. First termed BOLE RO—later ROUNDUP—finally OVERLORD. ACW.” Several mimeographed copies of the memorandum are filed as Item 30B, Exec 10.
7 Msg, Marshall to McNarney, 12 Apr 42, CM-IN 3210.
MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING

Subject: Instructions for London Conference—
July, 1942.

1. You will proceed immediately to London as my personal representatives for the purpose of consultation with appropriate British authorities on the conduct of the war.

2. You will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER, bearing in mind the vital urgency of sustaining Russia this year. This is of such great importance that grave risks are justified in order to accomplish it. If you consider that, with the most complete and wholehearted effort on the part of the British, SLEDGEHAMMER is possible of execution, you should strongly urge that preparations for it be pushed with the utmost vigor and that it be executed in case Russian collapse becomes imminent. The geographical objective of a cross-channel operation in 1942 is not of vital importance, providing the great purpose of the operation can be achieved, i.e., the positive diversion of German air forces from the annihilation of Russia. SLEDGEHAMMER should be executed on the basis of our remaining in France, if that is in any way practicable.

3. If you are convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me. In that case my views as to our immediate and continued course of action are that we should continue our present plans and preparations for ROUNDUP, while carrying out planned activities and present commitments in other areas. We should proceed at top speed with ROUNDUP preparations, intensifying air attacks and making frequent and large-scale Commando raids. This action should be continued until it is evident that Russia can not, any longer,

*Draft memo, no sig, for Gen Marshall and Adm King, 15 Jul 42, sub: Instrns for London Conf—July 1942. Three identical carbon copies (single spaced) of the draft as finally corrected (third version) are filed (two under Tab 2, and one under Tab 5), Item 1, Exec 5. Copies of the first version (one bearing Handy's penned corrections) and of the second version (one bearing Marshall's penned corrections) are filed Item 35, Exec 10. The above quoted draft is the third version.
APPENDIX B

contain appreciable German forces. Material aid to Russia should continue with the bulk delivered through Basra, the northern convoys to Russia to be suspended.

4. You will, with the British authorities, investigate the courses of action open to us in the event of a Russian collapse. In this investigation, and in the recommendations you make as to the course to be pursued, you will be guided by the following principles:

   a. Our aim must continue to be the complete defeat of the Axis powers. There can be no compromise on this point.
   b. We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.
   c. Effective coordinated use of British and American forces should be sought.
   d. Available U.S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used. It is very important that U.S. ground troops are brought into action against the enemy in 1942.
   e. Any course of action adopted should include support of an air offensive from the British Isles by strong U.S. air forces and the assurance of the security of that base for operations against Germany by U.S. ground reinforcements.

5. The subjects listed below are considered as appropriate for discussion with the British in arriving at our course of action in case of Russian collapse. Your discussion will not necessarily be restricted to these subjects. The United States will not be committed to a course of action to be followed in the event of Russian collapse without my specific approval.

   a. A continental invasion in 1943. This course of action may be impracticable unless strong German forces are contained on the Russian front. However, it should be investigated.
   b. All-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible.
   c. Operations in the Middle East with U.S. air forces now planned, with such ground forces as can be reasonably sustained, while at the same time using the bulk of our strength against Japan. The purposes of the Middle East operation would be to secure the area; to protect vital oil resources and to cover the Russian flank (if any remains).

6. You will take note that the state of Russia in the spring of 1943 may be such as to make ROUNDUP impracticable, by reason of the resistance that Germany can then bring to bear in France. It is this possibility that emphasizes the urgent necessity to do SLEDGEHAMMER this year when it is certain that Germany’s effort against Russia will afford the best opportunity that can be expected to do any part of BOLERO.
Appendix C

TIMING OF TORCH

The records consulted for the month of August, the time of the debate over the date for launching TORCH, contain no indication that the British spoke of wanting the operation to follow promptly after the planned offensive in the Libyan Desert (LIGHTFOOT, for which a target date had not yet been set), or that the President alluded to the desirability of having it come well before the congressional elections of 4 November. It is clear, however, that Churchill considered the relation of LIGHTFOOT to TORCH. In a message to the War Cabinet on 6 August, he stated his view that “a victory over Rommel in August or September may have a decisive effect upon the attitude of the French in North Africa when ‘Torch’ begins.” Following an understanding between Churchill and General Alexander, the Prime Minister advised the President on 26 August that if Rommel had not attacked by the August moon, the British would attack by the end of September. On 17 September when Churchill had had no further notice from General Alexander as to the definite date for LIGHTFOOT, he inquired as to the general’s intentions. General Alexander replied that 24 October had been chosen for LIGHTFOOT, and that he had “carefully considered the timing in relation to ‘Torch’ and have come to the conclusion that the best date for us to start would be minus 13 of ‘Torch’ [then fixed for November 4].” Churchill notified the President on 22 September that “General Alexander will attack in sufficient time to influence Torch favourably should he be successful.”

It appears from the silence of the record that the President did not introduce the November elections into the discussion of the timing of TORCH. Unwillingness to have imputed to him, in case the operation should fail, that partisan reasons had overruled military judgment, may even have influenced him to acquiesce in the later date, once he understood what the reasons were. The postponement of TORCH (from the October date which the President had hoped for) may have been a disappointment to the President, but Robert E. Sherwood states that Roosevelt said at the time, “this was a decision that rested with the responsible officer, Eisenhower, and not with the Democratic National Committee.” Another reference to the matter came during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, when Marshall remarked: “that he had felt embarrassed over the date of this operation [HUSKY] remembering as he did the incentive which had existed for hastening TORCH in view of the U. S. elections. In spite of that, it had not proved possible to advance the date.” The Prime Minister said that “there had been much admiration in England of the fact that the election had not been allowed to influence in the slightest the course of military events.”

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1 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 461.
2 See Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 529.
3 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 588.
4 Msg, Former Naval Person [Churchill] to President, 22 Sep 42, No. 151, Item 63a, Exec 10.
5 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 630.
6 Min, 3d ANFA mtg, 23 Jan 43, Casablanca Conf Book.
Appendix D

MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ARMY STRENGTH IN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AND OVERSEAS, FROM NOVEMBER 1941 THROUGH DECEMBER 1942 (IN THOUSANDS)

The total strength of the United States Army, as of 31 December 1942, was estimated at 5,398,000. Of this total number, approximately 1,065,000 officers and enlisted men were stationed outside of the continental United States. The month-by-month number is shown in the following table and chart, together with the percentage ratio of overseas troops at monthly intervals, for the period from November 1941 through December 1942.

Strength and Deployment of U. S. Army*

(In thousands)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Continental United States</th>
<th>Overseas</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td><strong>1941</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>165</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
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<td>1,494</td>
<td>192</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1942</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>1,673</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,145</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>246</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,388</td>
<td>2,058</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>13.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>2,185</td>
<td>476</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,835</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,074</td>
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<td>602</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,273</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>617</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>3,585</td>
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<td>737</td>
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Appendix E

Geographic Distribution of Army Strength in Overseas Theaters—Early December 1942

Statistical summaries for Army overseas strength a year after Pearl Harbor are found in a number of diverse sources, published and unpublished. There are certain discrepancies in strength figures and even in identity and number of units cited in the various sources used as a result partly of differences in time of reporting—varying from a few days to a few weeks—and partly of varying statistical bases of counting and reporting. Wherever possible, these data have been checked against one another and reconciled.

The strength figures in each of the following tables are taken from the OPD Weekly Status Map of 3 December 1942. Figures in the monthly Strength of the Army Reports for 30 November 1942 correspond roughly with the 3 December Status Map figures. Figures in the OPD Weekly Status Maps include ground service with ground troops and air service with air troops. The OPD Weekly Status Maps do not necessarily correspond with other statistical records kept in the field or in Washington during the war, but they did provide the War Department with its most reliable detailed contemporary summary of over-all Army deployment for planning purposes. Rough as their statistics are, they still represent one of the most valuable sources available on total deployment, area by area, of personnel present, en route, and projected. The post-1945 reports of the Strength of the Army, issued by Office, TAG, Strength Accounting Branch, as part of its STM-30 series, contain revised and official monthly summaries on actual Army strength and deployment in theaters of operations and major commands during the war years.

The number and identity of divisions are taken from: (1) Directory of the Army of the U.S. Outside Continental Limits of the U.S. as of 7 December 1942; and (2) Combat Chronicle, An Outline History of U.S. Army Divisions, prepared by the Order of Battle Section, OCMH.
### STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

#### Army Strength in Overseas Theaters

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<th>Region</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>En Route</th>
<th>Projected</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>760,960 (17 Divs)</td>
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<td>1,560,190 (30 Divs)</td>
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<td>Air</td>
<td>202,100 (66 Groups)</td>
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<td>420,610 (73 Groups)</td>
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<td><strong>EUROPEAN THEATER:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>British Isles and Iceland:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>156,970 (2 Divs)</td>
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<td>912,160 (21 Divs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>50,190 (16 Groups)</td>
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<td>214,500 (30 Groups)</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia):</td>
<td>127,980 (6 Divs)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,600 (11 Groups)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>MIDDLE EAST–AFRICA:</strong></td>
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<td>Egypt–Levant States–Eritrea–Aden, Iran–Iraq, Palestine:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>6,590</td>
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<td>36,560</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air</td>
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<td><strong>CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA:</strong></td>
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<td>Hawaii, Fanning Island, Christmas, Canton, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>122,540 (4 Divs)</td>
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<td><strong>SOUTH PACIFIC AREA:</strong></td>
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<td>Borabora, Fiji Islands, Efate, Espiritu Santo, Tongatabu, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Guadalcanal, Tongareva, Aitutaki:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>77,580 (3 Divs)</td>
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<td>122,610 (4 Divs)</td>
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<td>Air</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td><strong>SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia, New Guinea, and the Philippines:</td>
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<td>128,340 (2 Divs)</td>
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<td>Ground</td>
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<td>Air</td>
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<td><strong>CHINA–INDIA:</strong></td>
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### Western Hemisphere:

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<th></th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>En Route</th>
<th>Projected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alaska:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>72,050</td>
<td>83,650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>13,950</td>
<td>(2 Groups)</td>
<td>14,740  (1 Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North America (Newfoundland, Greenland, Bermuda, Bahamas, Eastern (Crimson Project) and Western (N.W. Service Command) Canada):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>27,540</td>
<td>47,190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>6,550  (1 Group)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin America (South America: Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela; Caribbean Defense Command: Puerto Rico, St. Thomas, St. Croix, Jamaica, Antigua, Panama, Trinidad, Curaçao, Aruba, St. Lucia, Surinam, British Guiana; Ascension; Guatemala; Galápagos; Cuba):</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>84,950</td>
<td>96,870</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>32,630</td>
<td>(7 Groups)</td>
<td>44,620  (8 Groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Summary for "TOTAL" is taken from: (1) OPD Weekly Status Map, 3 Dec 42; (2) Army Service Forces Statistical Review, App G; (3) AAF Statistical Digest, Table 1; (4) SYMBOL: Casablanca Books, Vol II, Exec 6; and (5) Monthly Strength of the Army.

2 Certain divisions and combat groups were not complete. For the shipment of divisions overseas in 1942 see Appendix E, below. The number of air combat groups overseas, a year after Pearl Harbor, varies in different compilations. The difficulties of arriving at an exact figure for the first week in December 1942 are increased by the necessity of adding incomplete groups, converting lists of squadrons to the equivalent number of groups or parts of groups, and taking into account at least one group in transit to the United States. The figure—66—used here is based on the AAF Statistical Digest total for 30 November 1942.

3 The strength figures for the ETO are only estimated in the Weekly Status Map of 3 December, since there was some confusion and lag in reporting units en route from the British Isles to North Africa. As of 21 December, strength figures (present) were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British Isles</th>
<th>Iceland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>77,668</td>
<td>24,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>43,549</td>
<td>10,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>51,212</td>
<td>3,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172,429</td>
<td>38,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projected</td>
<td>422,460</td>
<td>51,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4 5th Infantry Division (Iceland) and 29th Infantry Division (British Isles).

5 As of 21 December strength figures (present) were: AGF, 141,409; SOS, 2,566; AAF, 33,812; total, 177,787. The total projected as of 21 December was 450,000. (Memo cited n. 3.)

6 1st and 2d Armored Divisions; 1st, 3d, 9th, and 34th Infantry Divisions. Only elements of the 2d Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions were present.

7 The 24th, 25th, 27th, and 40th Infantry Divisions. The 25th Infantry Division began moving to Guadalcanal from Hawaii on 23 November 1942 and arrived on 17 December 1942.

8 The Americal, 37th, and 43d Infantry Divisions. The Americal Division left New York as a task force and was constituted and organized as a division after its arrival in New Caledonia.

9 The 32d and 41st Infantry Divisions.
Appendix F

SHIPMENT OF DIVISIONS—1942

There is a vast amount of detailed information on the shipment of divisions overseas in World War II, but a simple table with precise dates and brief explanatory notes for the main phases in the movement of divisions overseas in 1942 has not been found in Department of the Army files. The sources of information on which this table and the accompanying notes were based are scattered in diverse Army files and publications. A compilation of the assembled detailed data from which the table and notes were drawn is contained in Strategic Plans Unit Study 4. Further detailed information can be secured by consulting official division records now located at the Field Records Division, Kansas City Records Center, Kansas City, Missouri.

The most useful sources consulted were: (1) division headquarters history data cards of the Organization and Directory Section, Operations Branch, Adjutant General's Office; (2) "Combat Chronicle, An Outline History of U. S. Army Divisions," prepared by the Order of Battle Section, OCMH; (3) report, title: Summary of Historical Events and Statistics New York Port of Embarkation, 1942, OCT HB NYPE; (4) Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation Historical Report 1, title: Description of the Port and its Operation through October 31, 1942, OCT HB HRPE; (5) combat operations reports of the divisions on file in Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office; and (6) division histories published by division associations. It was necessary to rely heavily on the history data cards maintained by the Organization and Directory Section, Operations Branch, Adjutant General's Office. These history data cards were compiled during the war from whatever sources were available—water transportation reports, strength reports, station lists, postal reports, and AG letters—and are therefore not entirely accurate. Discrepancies were also found in the combat operations reports for departure and arrival dates of divisions.

There are a number of explanations for these discrepancies. Scheduled departures might be changed or delayed; availability of shipping might send units of the division in different convoys; time of arrival of a ship might be reported as a different day from that of debarkation of troops; and ships arriving at one harbor might be diverted to another harbor for unloading. The time factor might also account for differences of one day, depending on the use of the Washington date or the local overseas date, or the hour—before or after midnight.

The dates given in this table represent the closest possible adjustment of the conflicting data found in the records and are reliable within a very small margin of error.

In the study of the phases of movement of those divisions shipped overseas during 1942, it appeared that, unless the movement was made on a ship of the size of the Queen Mary or Queen Elizabeth, a division's movement would usually be divided into shipments of an advance detachment, followed
at a later date by the division headquarters and the main body of troops, and frequently by a rear echelon movement of units held in port-of-embarkation backlog, depending on the availability of shipping. If the destination was in a combat area, a regimental combat team would often comprise the first echelon of a divisional movement. In the light of piecemeal movements of the elements of a division, it was found most useful in establishing dates to chart the movement of the division headquarters. Unless otherwise indicated, the dates used in the table for sailing, arrival, and reshipment refer to the division headquarters. These dates do not necessarily coincide with those for the movement of the advance echelon or the rest of the division.
Appendix G

**Dead-weight Tonnage of Vessels under Army Control in Pacific and Atlantic Areas from November 1941 through December 1942***

During the year 1942, shipping in the service of the Army grew from a total of 871,368 dead-weight tons to a total of 3,940,791 dead-weight tons—an increase of 352 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pacific Area (Including Alaska)</th>
<th>Atlantic Area (Including Caribbean)</th>
<th>Total DWT</th>
<th>Troopships DWT</th>
<th>Cargo Ships DWT</th>
<th>Total DWT</th>
<th>Troopships DWT</th>
<th>Cargo Ships DWT</th>
<th>Grand Total DWT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov 30 1941</td>
<td>222,963</td>
<td>306,201</td>
<td>529,164</td>
<td>78,561</td>
<td>170,789</td>
<td>249,350</td>
<td>778,514</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 31</td>
<td>247,233</td>
<td>328,885</td>
<td>576,118</td>
<td>120,403</td>
<td>174,847</td>
<td>295,250</td>
<td>871,368</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 31 1942</td>
<td>493,320</td>
<td>460,226</td>
<td>953,546</td>
<td>216,639</td>
<td>259,337</td>
<td>475,976</td>
<td>1,429,522</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 28</td>
<td>345,546</td>
<td>949,373</td>
<td>1,294,919</td>
<td>380,697</td>
<td>384,894</td>
<td>765,591</td>
<td>2,060,510</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 31</td>
<td>502,417</td>
<td>1,087,223</td>
<td>1,589,640</td>
<td>228,214</td>
<td>327,951</td>
<td>556,165</td>
<td>2,145,805</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 30</td>
<td>610,283</td>
<td>1,281,190</td>
<td>1,891,473</td>
<td>164,640</td>
<td>513,136</td>
<td>677,776</td>
<td>2,569,249</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31</td>
<td>506,145</td>
<td>1,435,316</td>
<td>2,031,461</td>
<td>135,109</td>
<td>583,089</td>
<td>718,198</td>
<td>2,749,659</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 30</td>
<td>433,203</td>
<td>1,230,926</td>
<td>1,664,129</td>
<td>216,032</td>
<td>880,169</td>
<td>1,096,201</td>
<td>2,760,330</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 31</td>
<td>319,507</td>
<td>1,268,492</td>
<td>1,587,999</td>
<td>320,543</td>
<td>1,495,196</td>
<td>1,815,739</td>
<td>3,403,738</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 31</td>
<td>329,320</td>
<td>1,140,141</td>
<td>1,469,461</td>
<td>323,096</td>
<td>2,002,458</td>
<td>2,325,554</td>
<td>3,795,015</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 30</td>
<td>360,993</td>
<td>1,204,743</td>
<td>1,565,736</td>
<td>327,554</td>
<td>2,098,325</td>
<td>2,425,879</td>
<td>3,991,615</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 31</td>
<td>362,973</td>
<td>1,157,105</td>
<td>1,520,078</td>
<td>343,830</td>
<td>2,132,293</td>
<td>2,476,123</td>
<td>3,996,201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 30</td>
<td>351,658</td>
<td>1,223,842</td>
<td>1,575,500</td>
<td>287,298</td>
<td>1,758,839</td>
<td>2,046,137</td>
<td>3,621,637</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 31</td>
<td>381,123</td>
<td>1,139,554</td>
<td>1,520,677</td>
<td>452,163</td>
<td>1,967,951</td>
<td>2,420,114</td>
<td>3,940,791</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Transportation Monthly Progress Report, January 1943, Statistics and Progress Branch, Control Division, Transportation Corps, Services of Supply, War Department, p. 16.*
This volume was written from several groups of records kept by the War Department before and during World War II, interpreted with the help of a number of other sources, principally service histories and published memoirs. From these sources may be established long and fairly complete series of official transactions in 1942 dealing with strategic planning. For 1941 and earlier years, when strategic planning was only loosely related to the development of national policy and to current operations, the sequence of official transactions was very often broken, and much of the evidence will be found, if at all, in other sources than those used by the authors.

Official Records

Documents of several kinds were used in preparing this volume: (1) studies and other papers drawn up for use within the War Department; (2) correspondence of the War Department with the Navy Department and the British Joint Staff Mission; (3) messages to and from Army commanders in the field; (4) minutes of meetings of the Joint Board and the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and their sub-committees, and papers circulated for consideration at these meetings; and (5) various records pertaining to the President (meetings at the White House, War Department correspondence with the President, and the President's own correspondence on military affairs with other heads of government). Each of the several sets of records in which these documents were found and consulted will be kept intact and in due course will be transferred to The National Archives of the United States. These records are described in Federal Records of World War II, Volume II, Military Agencies, prepared by the General Services Administration, Archives and Records Service, The National Archives (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951). (Hereafter cited as Federal Rcds.)

The principal record groups used in preparing this volume are those kept by the following offices: (1) Office of the Chief of Staff and the divisions of the War Department General Staff (Federal Rcds, pp. 92–151); (2) Headquarters, Army Air Forces (Federal Rcds, pp. 151–234); (3) Headquarters, Army Service Forces (Federal Rcds, pp. 253–302); and (4) Office of The Adjutant General (Federal Rcds, pp. 63–67).

Most of the material for this volume was taken from the files of the Operations Division (and its predecessor, the War Plans Division) of the War Department General Staff, in particular: (1) the official central correspondence file of the War Plans Division (WPD); (2) the official central correspondence file of the Operations Division (OPD); (3) the WPD and OPD Message Center file; (4) the plans file of the Strategy and Policy Group, OPD (ABC); and (5) the informal high-policy file of the Executive Office, OPD (Exec). The Strategy and
Policy Group records contain a virtually complete set of papers issued by the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subcommittees, with OPD drafts, comments, and related papers, and constitute one of the most important collections of World War II records on matters of joint and combined strategic planning and policy. The Executive Office files, informally arranged, contain documents on policy and planning that were of particular interest to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD. Many of them are to be found nowhere else in War Department files. All these files, with the exception of the Executive Office files (still in the custody of the G–3 Division of the General Staff) were located at the time of writing in the Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office (DRB AGO). Formal strategic plans are Registered Documents (Regd Docs) of the G–3 Division. Such plans are held by G–3 unless they have been declared obsolete, in which case they are located in a special collection of the Classified Files, Adjutant General's Office.

Certain topics treated briefly in this history were based on such extensive research that meticulous documentation became too lengthy for publication. The studies prepared were organized into a special file, numbered chronologically, and are cited by name and number, for example, "Strategic Plans Unit Study 1." Occasional reference is also made to the OPD History Unit File, which consists of documents collected by Dr. Ray S. Cline for the volume, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, in the series, *UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II*. Both the Strategic Plans Unit File and the OPD History Unit File are now in the custody of the Office of the Chief of Military History, and will some day be retired to the Departmental Records Branch, AGO.

In the annotation of these sources, the type of communication is always indicated. Normally four other kinds of descriptive information are presented—originator, addressee, date, and subject. A file reference is not given for all documentation that may be readily located and positively identified without one—AG letters, messages in the Classified Message Center series, and minutes and papers of the JCS and CCS and their subordinate committees. AG letters can best be located by the Adjutant General's Office by the numbers of the letters; the classified messages can be located by date and classified message number in any of several file series; the JCS and CCS papers and minutes can be found by the numbers assigned to them by the JCS and CCS; and Joint Board papers and minutes can be located by the Joint Board subject number and serial number. The official file of the JCS and the CCS is under the control of the JCS, as is the official set of Joint Board papers and minutes. (Federal Reeds, pp. 2–14.)

Other Records

The authors have compared and supplemented their findings in the records with accounts in other officially sponsored histories dealing with the United States armed forces in World War II. The Navy has not undertaken any comparable research into strategic planning, but valuable work has been done on Navy plans in the classified monographs prepared in the Historical Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, and Lt. Grace Persons Hayes. The authors have also consulted and cited the narratives of naval operations written by the skilled hand of Samuel Eliot Morison in the series *HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II*. For the
operations of the Army Air Forces, the indispensable secondary source is the series published by the Air Force, THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. These volumes also contain concise summaries of the strategic planning back of the operations described.

Finally, the authors have repeatedly used, often in manuscript form, the work of their colleagues writing the history of the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, especially the manuscript, The Logistics of Global Warfare, by Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley and the volume, Stillwell's Mission to China, by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952).

This volume could hardly have been written without the help of published works drawing on the recollections of prominent participants and official records to which the authors did not have access, notably:


A typescript copy of the original manuscript of the present volume, bearing the title, “Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1939–42,” and containing unabridged footnotes, has been deposited in OCMH Files where it may be consulted by students of the subject.
Glossary of Abbreviations

AA Antiaircraft
A&N Army and Navy
AAC Army Air Corps
AAF Army Air Forces
ABC American-British Conversations (Jan-Mar 41)
ABDA (COM) Australian-British-Dutch-American (Command)
ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff
Actg Acting
ADB American-Dutch-British
ADC Alaska Defense Command
Add Additional
Admin Administration
Adv Advance
AEF Allied Expeditionary Force
AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters
AG Adjutant General
AGF Army Ground Forces
AGO Adjutant General's Office
Alt Alternate
ALUSNA U. S. naval attaché
Am Ammunition
Amer American
AMMISCA American Military Mission to China
Amph Amphibious (ian)
Arty Artillery
ASF Army Service Forces
Asgmt(s) Assignment(s)
ASW Assistant Secretary of War
ATC Air Transport Command
Atchd Attached
AVG American Volunteer Group (in China)
AWPD Air War Plans Division
Bomb Bombardment
Br British, branch
Br Jt Stf Miss British Joint Staff Mission
Bsc Basic
BuAer Bureau of Aeronautics
CAAF Chief Army Air Forces
CBI China–Burma–India
CCS (CCOS) Combined Chiefs of Staff (British-American)
CDC Caribbean Defense Command
CG Commanding general
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chem</td>
<td>Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chm</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIGS</td>
<td>Chief Imperial General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAF</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-IN</td>
<td>Cable message, incoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-OUT</td>
<td>Cable message, outgoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMTC</td>
<td>Combined Military Transport Committee</td>
</tr>
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<td>CNO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CofAAC</td>
<td>Chief of Army Air Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoAC</td>
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<td>Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>Commander Alaskan Sector</td>
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<td>Commander</td>
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<td>Comdt</td>
<td>Commandant</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMGENSOPAC</td>
<td>Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the South Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>Commission</td>
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<td>COMINCH</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVEU</td>
<td>Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSOPAC</td>
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<td>Conv(s)</td>
<td>Conversation(s)</td>
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<td>Chief(s) of Staff (British)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPE</td>
<td>Charleston Port of Embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Combined Staff Planners</td>
</tr>
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<td>CSigO</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTF</td>
<td>Commander Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTO</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Engineer</td>
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<td>North Africa</td>
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<td>Naval</td>
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<td>NYPE</td>
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<td>Office of the Chief of Transportation</td>
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<td>Office of the Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>TEDA</td>
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<td>USAFBI</td>
<td>United States Army Forces in the British Isles</td>
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<td>USAFFE</td>
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<td>United States Army Forces in Australia</td>
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<td>USAFISPA</td>
<td>United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area</td>
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<td>United States Strategic Bombing Survey</td>
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<td>Western Defense Command</td>
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<td>WDCMC</td>
<td>War Department Classified Message Center</td>
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<td>Chief of Staff, U. S. Army</td>
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<td>War Production Board</td>
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<td>War Plans Division</td>
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## Glossary of Code Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ANAKIM</strong></td>
<td>Plan for recapture of Burma.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BARRISTER</strong></td>
<td>Plan for capture of Dakar (formerly <strong>BLACK</strong> and <strong>PICADOR</strong>).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BAZAAR</strong></td>
<td>Plan for American air support of USSR in event of Japanese attack on Soviet Union. Also code name for U.S. survey project of air facilities in Siberia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIRCH</strong></td>
<td>Christmas Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BLACK</strong></td>
<td>Plan for seizure of Dakar (later <strong>PICADOR</strong> and <strong>BARRISTER</strong>).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BLEACHER</strong></td>
<td>Tongatabu.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BOBCAT</strong></td>
<td>Borabora.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BOLERO</strong></td>
<td>Build-up of U.S. forces and supplies in United Kingdom for cross-Channel attack.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BRIMSTONE</strong></td>
<td>Plan for capture of Sardinia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FANTAN</strong></td>
<td>Fiji Islands.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GRAY</strong></td>
<td>Plan for capture and occupation of the Azores.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GYMNAST</strong></td>
<td>Early plan for invasion of North Africa, referring to either the American idea of landing at Casablanca or the British plan for landing farther eastward on the Mediterranean coast. (See <strong>SUPER-GYMNAST</strong>.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HALPRO</strong></td>
<td>Halverson Project—bombing detachment for China-Burma-India theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOLLY</strong></td>
<td>Canton Island.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INDIGO</strong></td>
<td>Plan for movement of troops to Iceland.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JUPITER</strong></td>
<td>Plan for operations in northern Norway.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LIGHTFOOT</strong></td>
<td>British offensive operations in Libyan Desert, launched from El Alamein in October 1942.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MAGNET</strong></td>
<td>Movement of first U.S. forces to Northern Ireland.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MODICUM</strong></td>
<td>Party sent to London to present Marshall Memorandum, April 1942.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NABOB</strong></td>
<td>Northern Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ORANGE</strong></td>
<td>Prewar plan of operations in event of war with Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVERLORD</strong></td>
<td>Plan for invasion of northwest Europe in 1944.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PICADOR</strong></td>
<td>Plan for seizure of Dakar (formerly <strong>BLACK</strong>, later <strong>BARRISTER</strong>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLough</strong></td>
<td>Project for training U.S. and Canadian volunteers for snow operations in northern Norway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RAINBOW</strong></td>
<td>Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis aggression involving more than one enemy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ROSES</strong></td>
<td>Efate.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ROUNDUP</strong></td>
<td>Plan for major U.S.-British attack across the Channel in 1943.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SLEDGEHAMMER</strong></td>
<td>Plan for limited cross-Channel attack in 1942.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SPOONER</strong></td>
<td>New Zealand.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUMAC</strong></td>
<td>Australia.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUPER-GYMNAST</strong></td>
<td>Plan for Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, combining U.S. and British plans and often used interchangeably with <strong>GYMNAST</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYMBOL</strong></td>
<td>Casablanca Conference, 14–23 January 1943.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TORCH</strong></td>
<td>Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, November 1942.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WHITE POPPY</strong></td>
<td>Nouméa, New Caledonia.</td>
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<td><strong>“X”</strong></td>
<td>Australia.</td>
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The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943–1944
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–1943
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945
The Army and Economic Mobilization
The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces
The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific
The Fall of the Philippines
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CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul
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