UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
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... to Those Who Served
Foreword

This is the second and final volume in The Western Hemisphere subseries of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The area covered is vast, and so are the topics. The reader will embark upon a long journey and become involved in a complex series of events, ranging from guarding inland waterways to fighting the Japanese, from rounding up one forlorn German on the coast of Greenland to battling German submarines, from conducting staff conferences with the Navy to negotiating with His Britannic Majesty’s ministers, from withstanding the cold of the arctic or the heat of the tropics to overcoming the ever-present ennui of soldiers who wait for the stress of battle that never comes.

Guarding the United States and Its Outposts is instructive. Dealing often with the twilight between peace and war, it focuses upon problems of immediate relevance to the Army and the nation today. Then as now the nation found itself in a revolution in doctrine, weapons, and methods of defense. The way in which men caught in this revolution faced the situation can be a guide to those meeting similar circumstances today and in the future. This book highlights problems in unified command and contains excellent examples of military diplomacy, of how to get along, or fail to get along, with other armed forces of the United States and with our Allies. It contains authoritative accounts of several highly controversial events, especially the Pearl Harbor attack and the evacuation of the United States citizens of Japanese descent from the west coast of continental United States.

Washington, D.C.
25 May 1961

WILLIAM H. HARRIS
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Chief of Military History
The Authors

Stetson Conn, Chief Historian of the Department of the Army since 1958, holds the Ph.D. degree in history from Yale University and has taught history at Yale, Amherst College, and The George Washington University. After joining the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1946, he served as senior editor, as Acting Chief Historian, as Chief of the Western Hemisphere Section, and as Deputy Chief Historian before taking over his present post. He is coauthor of *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, the first volume of this subseries, and his previous publications include *Gibraltar in British Diplomacy in the Eighteenth Century*, a volume in the Yale Historical Series, and a chapter in *Command Decisions*, published in 1959.

Rose C. Engelman received her Ph.D. degree in history from Cornell University and taught at Hunter College before joining the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1949. Until 1953 she was a member of the Western Hemisphere Section, OCMH. She is now the historian of the U.S. Army Mobility Command in Detroit.

Byron Fairchild, a member of the OCMH staff from 1949 to 1960, received his Ph.D. degree in history from Princeton University and has taught at the University of Maine, Amherst College, and the Munson Institute of Maritime History. He is the author of *Messrs. William Pepperrell*, which in 1954 received the Carnegie Revolving Fund Award of the American Historical Association for the outstanding manuscript in any field of history. Dr. Fairchild is coauthor of *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, and *The Army and Industrial Manpower* in this series, and wrote a chapter in the official version of *Command Decisions*. He is at present a historian in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Preface

This is the second of two volumes on the plans made and measures taken by the Army to protect the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere against military attack by the Axis Powers during World War II. The global character of American participation in the war, described in the many volumes of this series, tends to obscure the primary and basic concern of the United States Government, and consequently of the Army, for the safety of the continental United States. The security of the Panama Canal and of the island of Oahu as the principal outposts of continental defense was of almost equal concern in the decades between World Wars I and II. When in the late 1930's the action of aggressor nations in the Eastern Hemisphere foreshadowed a new world war that would inevitably involve the security of the United States, Army and Navy planning officers concluded that the continental United States could not be threatened seriously by either air or surface attack unless a hostile power first obtained a lodgment elsewhere within the Western Hemisphere. To prevent that from happening, the United States adopted a new national policy of hemisphere defense.

In the opening chapters of the first volume of this subseries, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, the authors have described the evolution of the policy of hemisphere defense from 1938 to December 1941, in relation to contemporary American military means and the sequence of world events. These chapters were designed to introduce the story told in the present volume as well as the description of the new military relationships of the United States with the other American nations that completes the first volume. Consequently, the authors have chosen to use a shortened version of the concluding chapter of the first volume as an introductory chapter to this one.

After the introductory chapter this volume describes first the organization of Army forces for the protection of the continental United States before and during the war, the steps toward improving continental harbor and air defenses, the Army's role in civilian defense and in guarding nonmilitary installations, and the measures for continental security and threats to it.
after the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of the controversial character of the action, the authors have next included a rather detailed account of the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the west coast, and in Chapter VIII a briefer account of the similar action planned for Hawaii. This chapter is the last of three that summarize the Army's preparations for defending Oahu and its great naval base, the reaction of the Army's Hawaiian Department to the threat and then to the reality of war, and the measures taken by the Army after the Japanese attack to secure the Hawaiian Islands against invasion. In accordance with the chronology of enemy action, the narrative turns from Hawaii to Alaska and the Aleutian campaign, the only major ground operation to occur within the Western Hemisphere during the war. Then it shifts far southeastward to describe the system of Army defenses for the protection of the Panama Canal and the Caribbean area against enemy intrusion, erected within the framework of military cooperation with the Latin American nations described in detail in the first volume to this subseries. Because of the nature of the destroyer-base agreement of 1940 and the Army's focus toward South America, the account of the extension of the continental outpost line along the North Atlantic front is closely related at the outset to similar activity in the Caribbean area. In due course this extension became more intimately related to the preservation of the North Atlantic lifeline to Great Britain, and American participation in the defense of Iceland in 1941 was a prelude to action in Europe as well as a culmination of the defensive measures undertaken by the land and air forces of the United States before it became a full participant in World War II.

The events recorded in this volume occurred under circumstances and technological conditions that differed greatly from those of the present day. On the eve of World War II the concept of collective security, of hemisphere defense, had not yet been translated into firm international undertakings. The underlying threat was relatively clear-cut. Only if a hostile power acquired military bases within the Western Hemisphere could the United States be seriously threatened. Today the United States is an active member of the United Nations and the military ally of many nations in both hemispheres. The range of aircraft has transcended oceanic limitations, the intercontinental missile is a reality, and the potency of weapons has undergone a truly awful change. Nevertheless, the changes and complexities of the nuclear age have not eliminated, they have only added to and underscored, the basic threat and the old problems of national defense. The fundamental and necessary concern of the United States for its own
security remains, and this concern will continue to shape some of the general characteristics of its military defenses and of its military relationships with other American nations.

This is a work of joint authorship and endeavor. The introductory chapter and the chapters which follow on the continental United States and Hawaii are primarily the handiwork of Conn, the first two Alaska chapters, of Engelman, and the remaining chapters, of Fairchild. Much of the research for the whole volume was undertaken as a common enterprise. In preparing this volume the authors have profited immensely from participation in a large collaborative history program, in which almost every aspect of the Army’s activity before and during the war has been under scrutiny. Without the free interchange of information and criticism that such a program makes possible, the research and writing for this volume would have been much more difficult and we would have presented our story with much less confidence.

In particular we are indebted to Dr. John Miller, jr., Deputy Chief Historian of the Office of the Chief of Military History, who supervised the review of this volume and offered many helpful criticisms of it. The members of the review panel whom he assembled to discuss and criticize the volume were Lt. Col. Joseph Rockis, Chief of the Histories Division, and Dr. Leo J. Meyer, from within the office; and Professor Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., of The American University, and Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, former Chief Historian. To all of them we owe acknowledgment for constructive criticism, and especially to Dr. Greenfield, under whose immediate supervision this work was launched and brought near to completion. Brig. Gen. Paul McD. Robinett, former Chief of the Special Studies Division, also reviewed the whole volume with his usual thoughtfulness, and we are deeply obliged to many outside the Office of the Chief of Military History who have given freely of their time and knowledge in reviewing parts of it. Especially helpful comments were obtained from Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt on the west coast and Alaska chapters, from Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid on the Attu and Kiska operations, and from Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel and former Consul General B. Eric Kuniholm on Army activity in Iceland. For help of a different sort, we record our indebtedness to Dr. Herman Kahn, former Director of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, and to members of his staff, for access to and friendly guidance into the President’s papers; and to McGeorge Bundy, former professor at Harvard University, for access to the diary of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.

We wish also to express our appreciation to those members of the Edi-
torial Branch, headed by the late Miss Ruth Stout, who guided the manuscript through the last stage of preparation for the printer—especially to Mrs. Marion P. Grimes, whose copy editing was above and beyond the call of duty; to Mr. Billy C. Mossman, who prepared the maps; and to Miss Ruth Phillips, who selected the photographs. The index was compiled by William Gardner Bell.

These acknowledgments of assistance are in no way delegation of responsibility for the contents of the volume. The presentation and interpretation of events it contains are the authors' own, and we alone are responsible for faults of commission or omission.

Washington, D.C. 24 May 1962

STETSON CONN
ROSE C. ENGELMAN
BYRON FAIRCHILD
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. THE FRAMEWORK OF HEMISPHERE DEFENSE</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE COMMAND OF CONTINENTAL DEFENSE FORCES</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime and Planned Wartime Organization</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization, July 1940–December 1941</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wartime Organization</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PREPARATIONS FOR CONTINENTAL DEFENSE</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Defenses</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Preparations</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army and Civilian Defense</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarding Nonmilitary Installations</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE CONTINENTAL DEFENSE COMMANDS AFTER PEARL HARBOR</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Measures on the West Coast, 1941–42</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Measures on the East and Gulf Coasts, 1941–42</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarding the Sault Ste. Marie Canal</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Period of Reduction, 1942–45</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Background of Evacuation Planning</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Decision for Mass Evacuation</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Evacuation of the Japanese</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE REINFORCEMENT OF OAHU</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hawaiian Department Before 1941</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Preparations During 1941</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Approach to War</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Plan and Launching of the Attack</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Attack and the Response</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation and Judgment</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. THE HAWAIIAN DEFENSES AFTER PEARL HARBOR</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Impact of War</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Question of Japanese Evacuation</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midway</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. THE GARRISONING OF ALASKA, 1939–41</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Army Plans and Preparations</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alaska Defense Command</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making Ready To Defend the Navy's Bases</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Air Defense Problems</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfields, Radar, and the Construction Program</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing the Air Defenses</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Alert</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. ALASKA IN THE WAR, 1942</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Attack on the Aleutians</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army's Reaction</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Problems</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid to the Soviet Union</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Advance Westward</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. CLEARING THE ALEUTIANS</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attu Retaken</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiska—Grand Anticlimax</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. FORGING THE DEFENSES OF THE CANAL</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prewar Defenses</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Measures, August 1939–January 1940</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization and Expansion</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Puerto Rican Outpost, 1939–40</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alert of June 1940</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII. OUT FROM THE CANAL ZONE</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing the Caribbean Theater</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alert of July 1941</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Outposts in the Dutch West Indies</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing the Pacific Approaches</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion in the Republic of Panama</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength and Readiness of the Defenses, 1941</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Factors in Area Defense</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV. THE NEW BASES ACQUIRED FOR OLD DESTROYERS</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Local Setting</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning the Garrisons</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiating the Base Agreement</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launching the Construction Program</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV. MANNING AND ORGANIZING THE NEW ATLANTIC BASES</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Garrisons and Their Mission</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems of Organization and Command</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Administrative Problems</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI. THE CARIBBEAN IN WARTIME</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Effects of War</td>
<td>409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaping the Local Commands</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Blow</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Watch on the Canal</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The War Against the U-Boat</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing the Peak</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII. GREENLAND: ARCTIC OUTPOST</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of American Interest in Greenland</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenland's Strategic Importance Reappraised</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing the BLUIE Bases</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Defense of Greenland</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII. PLANNING THE ICELAND OPERATION</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Shifting Focus of American Interest</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The President's Decision and the War Department's Response</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems, Remote and Immediate</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIGO Planning, First Phase</td>
<td>472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A New Decision: Reinforcement, Not Relief</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First American Forces Land in Iceland</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIGO Planning, Second Phase</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Backward Glance at the INDIGO Planning</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustration</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six-Inch Gun Emplacement on Jasper Parapet</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor La Guardia in Action During Practice Alert</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camouflaged Airplane Factory</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantrymen on Beach Patrol</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Free Balloon</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Evacuees Arrive at the Colorado River Relocation Center</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop Maneuvers in Hawaii</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler Field After the Bombing</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Children Drilling</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Dutch Harbor</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Base at Kodiak</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction on Adak</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attu Landings</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Radar Installation</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama Airfields</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft Defenses of the Panama Canal</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Installations in the Bermuda Islands</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Edmund B. Alexander</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Troops in Trinidad</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installations in Newfoundland</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optical Height Finder Mounted on Old El Morro Fortress</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedoed Vessel Being Towed Into San Juan Harbor</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Tug Aiding Freighter Off Greenland</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned German Equipment in Greenland</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Supply Dump in Reykjavik</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gale in Iceland</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Posts in Iceland</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army Troops Arriving in Reykjavik, January 1942</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section of a Greenland Airfield, 1943</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Fighter Planes Over Camp Artun, Iceland</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Prisoners Under Guard in Greenland</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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GUARDING
THE UNITED STATES
AND ITS OUTPOSTS
CHAPTER I

The Framework of Hemisphere Defense

Before it entered World War II, the United States committed itself to defend the entire land area of the Western Hemisphere against military attack from the Old World. In the course of planning for this purpose, the United States Government defined the hemisphere as including all of the land masses of North and South America plus Greenland, Bermuda, and the Falklands (but not Iceland or the Azores) in the Atlantic area, and all islands east of the 180th meridian and all of the Aleutians in the Pacific. The armed power of the United States did not prevent minor enemy invasions of New World territory, as the Germans in Greenland and the Japanese in the Aleutians were to demonstrate. But its forces were strong enough by late 1941 to make a sustained attack on the hemisphere an unprofitable venture for hostile powers.

The commitment to defend the whole hemisphere by force was a new departure in the military policy of the United States, although it was a natural outgrowth of American policy and practice under the Monroe Doctrine. It was also a natural extension of the primary mission of the armed forces—defense of the homeland. For more than a century the possibility of a serious attack across continental land frontiers had been exceedingly remote, and until the late 1930s an effective attack by land-based air power was impracticable. Therefore, the Army had concentrated after World War I on protecting the continental United States against attack by sea and against coastal invasion backed by sea power. It was almost equally concerned with the defense of the Panama Canal Zone and Oahu, as the principal outlying bastions for continental defense.

1 This introductory chapter is a somewhat shortened version of the concluding chapter of the companion volume of this subseries, Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960). It is included here to provide a broader setting for the account that follows of the specific plans and measures for defending the continental United States and its outposts during World War II.
By the late 1930's a rapid increase in the range and striking power of military aircraft introduced a new and potentially serious threat to New World security, a development that coincided with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the secret and formidable preparation of the German nation for war. It was this coincidence that gave birth to the policy of hemisphere defense after Hitler made clear his power and his warlike intent during the Munich crisis of September 1938. The United States decided that as soon as possible it had to have the means to forestall the establishment of any hostile air base or other military installation on Western Hemisphere territory from which its continental area or the Panama Canal could be threatened or attacked. To prevent the establishment of enemy bases remained the essence of hemisphere defense during the prewar period of American military preparation from late 1938 to December 1941.

Whatever the United States did for hemisphere defense, it did primarily to safeguard its own national security and interests. As a senior general put it, "In the formulation of all these plans, the vital interests of the United States must be uppermost in our minds." The over-all purpose of the new policy, an Army planner noted, was to "deny an enemy bases from which he might launch military operations against any of the democratic nations of this hemisphere"; but its basic design was "to reduce to a minimum the likelihood of accepting war upon our own territory." All of the measures planned and taken in the name of hemisphere defense, including those taken during 1941 for the salvation of Great Britain and the British lifeline across the North Atlantic, had the fundamental objective of promoting the security of the United States itself.

The basic threat to national security, as conceived by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull from late 1937 onward, was the increasing probability that Germany in combination with Japan might achieve domination over the land masses of the Eastern Hemisphere, wreck the British Commonwealth of Nations, and eventually and almost inevitably threaten the Western Hemisphere with military attack and conquest. The Munich "settlement" gave reality to this specter. Nazi Germany acquired a superior military position for launching an offensive war, and the League of Nations henceforth became completely ineffectual as an instrument for preventing a general war in the Eastern Hemisphere. The amoral leadership of Hitler together with the tremendous lead of Germany over

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2 Memo, CG Third Army for WPD, 8 June 40, WPD 4175-11.
the democratic nations in rearmament made it appear probable by early 1939 that Germany would soon launch an offensive war of unpredictable dimensions.

On the other side of Eurasia, Japan had been engaged since 1937 in the conquest of China, and increasingly the Japanese Government was succumbing to the control of war lords who aimed at Japanese domination of all East Asia and Indonesia. Between 1938 and 1941 these developments made for a constant and serious threat of war between Japan and the United States, though not for a serious Japanese threat to territory in the Western Hemisphere. During the prewar period Army planners believed it in the realm of possibility only that Japan could establish bases in the Aleutians or western Alaska, in outer islands of the Hawaiian group, or in islands southwest of Hawaii and east of the 180th meridian. That Japanese aircraft carriers might launch hit-and-run attacks on Hawaii or Panama they considered a more likely possibility. Since the United States after 1937 kept the bulk of its naval strength in the Pacific, the Army and the government generally tended to discount these dangers, and hemisphere defense came to mean very largely Atlantic defense against the menace of Nazi Germany.

President Roosevelt and the military planners foresaw in 1939 that the greatest danger to the United States and to the rest of the hemisphere would be the defeat of France and Great Britain with the surrender or destruction of their naval power. Widespread German influence in Latin America, much of it clandestine and subversive in intent, constituted a more nebulous danger but a serious weakness in the American position. The smashing German victories of 1939 and 1940 naturally bolstered this influence. After France's defeat in June 1940, the Germans planned two specific operations which, if successfully carried out, would have required much more vigorous measures than were actually put into effect. The Germans planned to invade Great Britain and to sweep through Spain in order to capture Gibraltar and Northwest Africa. Hitler's decision to postpone these operations until he had conquered the Soviet Union greatly eased the Atlantic situation in 1941, but did not dissipate American concern for hemisphere defense until Germany lost its ability to shift its major war effort from east to west in 1942. The German threat that had most to do with drawing the United States into World War II was the air and sea attack on Great Britain and its North Atlantic lifeline, which in 1941 shifted the military focus of the United States toward the northeast and into the Battle of the Atlantic.

In defense planning, after World War II began in September 1939, the United States assumed that Hitler had embarked on a calculated scheme of
world conquest; and in 1941 it assumed that Germany and Japan were acting in close military concert. These were the safe and proper assumptions for military planning. Actually, the Germans and Japanese became associates rather than partners in conquest and did not act in close military concert either before or after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Whatever schemes for world conquest Hitler may have had in mind, he never spelled out more than Old World domination (except in what he construed as Japan’s proper sphere) and appropriate revenge against the United States for supporting his enemies by such tactics as a bombardment of New York City. Known Japanese plans for conquest were also limited to the Eastern Hemisphere, but unlike Hitler the Japanese, in furtherance of their plans, felt ready in 1941 to challenge the military power of the United States. After the Japanese unleashed their attack, and notwithstanding its unanticipated scope and violence, the United States Government decided that Hitler and German military superiority still posed the greater danger to the national security and to the whole Western way of life, and it reaffirmed the decision made in early 1941 that if the nation were drawn into the war it should strive to defeat Germany first.\(^4\)

The seriousness of the German threat in 1940 led the United States, for the first time in its history, to seek and enter into close military relations with most of the other Western Hemisphere nations. Generally, the other American nations were as aware as the United States of the Nazi menace to democracy, and Canada had almost immediately joined with Great Britain in the war. Inter-American solidarity in World War I furnished some precedents for wartime collaboration, but not for the military staff agreements and defense boards of World War II, or for the extensive deployment of United States forces throughout the hemisphere that occurred between 1939 and 1945. In view of the preponderant strength of the United States and its very recent abandonment of intervention, the other American nations entered into these military ties with an understandable concern for their own national sovereignty and interests.

Military relations with Canada differed from those with the Latin American nations, not only because Canada became a belligerent in September 1939 but also because Canada had not participated in the earlier Pan American gatherings that formulated the basic principles for association with the nations to the south. The close military contacts that developed with Canada

in 1940 and 1941 were also tied in with the growing military intimacy of the United States and Great Britain. Thus the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada–United States, was an immediate outgrowth of the destroyer-base negotiation with the British in August 1940, and joint war plan ABC–22 with Canada was based in large measure on the strategy developed jointly in the Anglo-American staff conversations of early 1941. On the other hand, the prewar and wartime association of the United States and Canada naturally reflected the tradition of the long-unguarded frontier, the economic and demographic intimacy of the two nations, and the precedent of joint boards and commissions created for various purposes during the preceding decades of the twentieth century.  

In the area of Latin America, the key to fulfillment of measures for defense was the success of the United States both before and after Pearl Harbor in staying within the bounds of its prewar political commitments, which collectively comprised the Good Neighbor policy. By 1938 national policy was against further territorial expansion in the New World, and the United States had ceased its political and military interventions in certain Caribbean countries and forewarned intervention for any purpose in any American nation. In general the United States had also committed itself not to “play favorites” among the American nations. On the other hand, to have any reality, hemisphere defense required the availability of existing or the development of new military bases. In its military planning the United States therefore assumed that when necessary its forces could use existing military bases and essential supporting facilities in other American nations and in colonial territories of the European powers. Until Pearl Harbor the United States as a matter of policy avoided either the lease or outright acquisition of new base sites in other American nations, and at least in theory avoided exclusive acquisition and use of new bases anywhere in the hemisphere except within its own territory. After Pearl Harbor it carefully avoided any use of military bases that could fairly be construed as an infringement on the sovereignty of other New World nations.

A fundamental of the policy and defense plans of the United States has been that potential Old World enemies must not obtain control over any territory in the Western Hemisphere, either by force or by negotiation. In Army usage before and during World War II the Monroe Doctrine meant just that and nothing more. Germany’s victory in the west in 1940

5 Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), contains the fullest description of the prewar and wartime association of the two nations.
naturally made this a problem of great moment, and the United States prepared to take any necessary steps to prevent British, French, Dutch, and Danish possessions from falling into German hands or under German control. To avoid any pretext for military attack, the United States also opposed the defense of French, Dutch, and Danish possessions by friendly belligerents, and insisted that these lands should be defended as necessary by United States or Latin American forces. After the destroyer-base exchange the United States also assumed a major share of the responsibility for defending British North Atlantic and Caribbean territories.

As for the territory of the Latin American nations, the United States pledged itself in military staff agreements negotiated in 1940 to employ its forces to assist in defeating any external attack by the armed forces of a non-American state or internal attack supported by a non-American state, if the recognized government of the nation concerned asked for such assistance. While the larger Latin nations had sizable military establishments, these were not equipped or trained to meet an Old World enemy force in strength. Nor did the United States have the means to help equip and train their forces sufficiently or in time to handle major threats from abroad. Therefore, prewar plans for hemisphere defense had to assume that United States forces would be required to defend the Latin American area against major overseas attacks. The large movement of trained Canadian forces to Great Britain made a similar assumption necessary for the northern reaches of the hemisphere. Acting on these assumptions, the United States in military negotiations with other American nations before Pearl Harbor had as its main objectives obtaining assured access to existing military base facilities, and receiving warning of impending enemy attacks in time to allow United States forces to reach threatened areas.

The leaders of the United States Army realized during the prewar years that even under the most auspicious circumstances the Army was ill prepared for any large-scale operations. With only a nucleus of trained and equipped troops, the Army undertook in 1940 to develop a large strategic reserve of units that for the most part would not be ready for even limited action before late 1941. Given this situation Army planning continued to be dominated by the idea of maintaining a perimeter defense of the citadel, the continental United States. Until 1939 the defense perimeter followed the continental shore line and was supported by strong but distant outposts in Panama and Hawaii. With military expansion and in accordance with the new policy of hemisphere defense, the defensive perimeter was extended from the citadel. By mid-1941 it included Greenland, Newfoundland, Ber-
muda, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad along the Atlantic front and Alaska and Oahu and the Canal Zone along the Pacific. Army planners wanted to project the perimeter southward to include the Galápagos Islands in the Pacific and the eastern tip of Brazil in the Atlantic. They believed that with this further extension the perimeter could be held by a minimum number of combat forces and that no enemy could establish a base for major operations in the Western Hemisphere without first capturing one or more strong-points in the perimeter.

As long as the United States Navy kept the bulk of its fleet in the eastern Pacific, neither Japan nor any other nation had the capability of establishing a hostile base from which to launch a major operation against the hemisphere’s Pacific front, and Nazi Germany with all of its military might could not act similarly in the northern Atlantic as long as the British Fleet was in being and based on the British Isles. In October 1940 the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, described the naval aspects of hemisphere defense as "fundamental," and said: "As long as the British fleet remains undefeated and England holds out, the Western Hemisphere is in little danger of direct attack." But, he added, "the situation would become radically changed" if the British Fleet were sunk or surrendered.6

If Britain fell and the British Fleet were lost, it was more than conceivable that the hemisphere might be invaded from the northeast via Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence estuary. This was the threat that aroused the interest of President Roosevelt in acquiring bases for United States forces in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland; it was a matter discussed at the first meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada—United States; and it remained a threat covered by Army expeditionary force plans in 1940 and 1941.

Partly because both British and American naval power was stationed so far away, the Army was most concerned during the prewar period with the situation in the Caribbean area and in eastern South America. The Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico were the Atlantic approaches to the Panama Canal, and also to the "soft underbelly" of the United States itself—its unprotected Gulf coast. Furthermore, two prime strategic materials—oil and bauxite—originated around these seas and traveled through them. After June 1940 the presence in this area of French colonies loyal to the Vichy Government added to the Army's concern.

In South America the bulge of Brazil, closer to Africa than to the nearest

of the Antilles, was the one point in the hemisphere vulnerable to large-scale air attack or invasion. Northeast Brazil was undefended, inaccessible to existing Brazilian Army forces, and beyond the range of United States air power based in the Caribbean area. Even if Britain survived, it seemed to Army planners that this position must be defended by United States forces if German forces moved into western Africa. Furthermore, they held, the effective defense of this one position would ensure the whole southern Atlantic front against external attack and reassure all of the Latin American nations against any serious threat from abroad. It was in order to make this position defensible that the Army arranged with Pan American Airways to construct two chains of airfields leading from the United States to eastern Brazil. But it could not persuade the Brazilians to request United States Army defenders for the area.

Germany's smashing victories in western Europe in the spring of 1940 had the immediate effect of re-emphasizing hemisphere defense as the basic military policy of the United States. On 23 May President Roosevelt and his principal advisers decided that the nation must avoid war with Japan and concentrate on what they called the "South American situation." Eastern Brazil was the most immediate cause for anxiety, and during the following weekend the President and the Army and Navy engaged in hurried planning for a possible expeditionary force to that area. Actually, the services were then unready to carry out any such plan, but they quickly prepared a more comprehensive one for defending the hemisphere on all fronts. This plan, RAINBOW 4, remained the basic guide for American military action until the spring of 1941. In June 1940, after France fell, the President and his principal military advisers confirmed their determination to avoid war or offensive action in the Pacific, ruled out intervention in the European war, and decided that the nation must concentrate on mobilizing its manpower and economic strength for hemisphere defense. Underlying these decisions was a grave doubt that Great Britain could survive through 1940.

The first breach in the June decisions on national strategy was the agreement with Great Britain to exchange destroyers for bases, concluded on 2 September. During September Army and Navy leaders as well as the President acquired a conviction that Great Britain could hold out at least six months more, and that even if the British Fleet was surrendered in the spring of 1941 it would take the Germans six additional months to make it useful. Therefore, Germany could not launch a major attack across the Atlantic before the autumn of 1941, and by then the United States expected to have a trained and equipped army of 1,400,000 men as well as greater naval
strength. While eventually Germany might muster the strength to challenge
the United States, a transatlantic invasion of the hemisphere by German
forces within the next two or three years appeared improbable, even if
co-ordinated with a Japanese offensive in the Pacific. With the bounds of
neutrality already broken by the destroyer-base exchange, and with a much
more optimistic outlook than in June, the United States Government from
September onward charted a new course of much greater aid to Great Britain.
Eventually and inevitably this new course disrupted plans for a perimeter
defense of the hemisphere, as plotted in RAINBOW 4.

While Germany stayed its military hand in the autumn and winter of
1940, the United States reached new decisions on national policy. These
reaffirmed a defensive posture in the Pacific and concentration on the At-
lantic and European situations. But the new policy went much further: it
assumed the salvation of Great Britain and the British Fleet, and it con-
templated American entry into the European war to defeat Germany. By
December 1940 the civilian and military leaders of the War and Navy
Departments were convinced that the United States must eventually enter
the war against Germany to save itself, and that to save itself it had to save
Great Britain. They also agreed that the eventual “big act” in getting into
the war would be the one undertaken by United States forces to help pro-
tect the North Atlantic seaway to Great Britain.7 President Roosevelt
matched these convictions with his conception of lend-lease. In effect, the
new orientation of national policy made Great Britain the pivot of measures
for defending the nation and the hemisphere during 1941. It also brought
the United States Navy into the midst of Atlantic action.

Although the Army was the more active service in preparations for
continental and hemisphere defense before 1941, it had actually been play-
ing a secondary role behind a first-line screen of naval power. The Navy
much more than the Army kept its eyes on the Pacific, where its main strength
lay and where it assumed its main task would be if war came. Nevertheless,
as the Army recognized, throughout the prewar years the Navy in conjunc-
tion with British naval power was carrying out its primary mission of provid-
ing the nation with a first line of defense at a distance. Army leaders were
also well aware during these years that only the Navy had a force in being
ready for war.

After September 1939 the principal task of the Navy in the immediate
defense of the hemisphere was to maintain a neutrality patrol in Atlantic

7 Diary of Henry L. Stimson, entry of 16 Dec 40, examined at Sterling Memorial Library, Yale
University.
waters to persuade belligerent warships, and especially German vessels, to keep away from American shores. The Navy gradually extended this patrol outward into the Atlantic, and the destroyer exchange, though temporarily weakening the patrol, provided new and improved bases for supporting its operations. Then, in January 1941, President Roosevelt authorized the Navy to prepare for the larger role in the Atlantic of helping to escort American aid to Britain. While the Navy was getting ready for this task, the United States and Great Britain agreed in staff conversations on the course of action they would follow if the United States entered the war, and Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act. But when the Navy in April came up with a forthright escort scheme in its Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 1, President Roosevelt after some indecision ordered a more circumscribed line of action that confined American naval operations to the western half of the Atlantic and to measures short of escort duty. Even so, it seemed to Army and Navy leaders in the spring of 1941 that the nation was on the brink of open war.

Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in June helped to postpone war in the Atlantic and to precipitate it in the Pacific. Intelligence of the impending German thrust eastward was one of the factors influencing the decision of President Roosevelt to send American troops to Iceland, and their arrival furnished a justification for escort operations by the United States Navy to the longitude of Iceland. Then in September and October came the "shooting war" and more open naval collaboration with Great Britain under the Navy's Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5.

Whether these successive Navy plans of 1941 were really measures for hemisphere defense was a bone of contention for isolationists then as it has been for some of Mr. Roosevelt's critics since. Granted that the broadening military operations of the United States in the North Atlantic were steps toward the defeat of Hitler's Germany, they were also genuine and effective defense measures, and their dual purpose should be recognized. Certainly under these plans and the associated plans of the Army the United States took its most effective action for Atlantic and hemisphere defense during 1941.

The Army played only a secondary role in the vigorous measures of mid and late 1941 for saving Great Britain and its North Atlantic lifeline. Execution of these measures meant that the Army could not carry out other plans for defense in the areas for which it had previously felt so much concern, the Caribbean and South America. On the other hand, with the North Atlantic increasingly secured and the Germans heavily engaged in the Soviet Union, new Army defense steps to the south had less urgency than before mid-1941. Thereafter the Army tried to keep the number of combat troops
sent into the Caribbean area to a bare minimum, and, beyond the Caribbean, it wished only to establish an air reconnaissance base southwest of Panama and send minimum defense forces to the eastern bulge of Brazil.

The position of President Roosevelt toward hemisphere defense after the spring of 1940 is somewhat difficult to determine from his addresses and other remarks. As a rule, his intimate conversations with advisers were not recorded. From his known remarks and actions it is apparent that after the summer of 1940 Mr. Roosevelt did not feel any acute concern about the possibility of a major military attack on the hemisphere for several years to come. There is no question about the President’s detestation of Hitler and the Nazis, nor about his appreciation of how great the threat to the United States would be if Germany secured a dominating position in the Eastern Hemisphere. Nor is there any question about Mr. Roosevelt’s determination to use all courses of action that American public opinion would support to stop Hitler.

One of these courses was an appeal to the traditional American doctrine of freedom of the seas. As early as October 1940, the President and Secretary of State Hull had emphasized in public addresses how essential friendly control of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans was to hemisphere defense. In January 1941 the President began to stress freedom of the seas rather than hemisphere defense as a rallying ground for military preparedness. He also took the position that there should be no "aggressors" peace. Furthermore, he believed that saving Great Britain alone was not enough, because the strength and security of Britain depended upon the continued support of the rest of the British Empire and its sea communications everywhere. In one of his most revealing utterances the President wrote:

A nationally known advertising man wrote me the other day... to suggest that we tell the truth, i.e., that we are not concerned with the affairs of the British Empire but are concerned with our own safety, the security of our own trade, the future of our own crops, the integrity of our own continent, and the lives of our own children in the next generation.

That, I think, is a pretty good line to take because it happens to be true and it is on that line itself that we must, for all the above purely selfish reasons, prevent at almost any hazard the Axis domination of the world.8

The President’s expressed goals clearly called for a larger effort in 1941 than the nation needed to make for the immediate defense of the hemisphere. They also called for a different sort of effort from that which Army planners

advocated, as illustrated in discussions about Iceland and the Azores. From the planners’ viewpoint it was not necessary nor even desirable to garrison either as a military outpost for the hemisphere; from the President’s point of view, both were essential guardians of Atlantic seaways, which had to be controlled to save Britain, and he was convinced that Britain’s salvation was an essential to hemisphere and national security.

Until late 1941 the President was apparently more reluctant about getting into the war than were some of his principal advisers. He kept his ears tuned sensitively to American public opinion and opinion polls, and to judge from the public opinion polls Mr. Roosevelt never let the actions of the United States get very far out of step with the opinion of the majority of its people. Several of the President’s advisers thought that he lagged behind the majority; and perhaps there was much truth in the remark of a distinguished English observer who wrote him: “I have been so struck by the way you have led public opinion by allowing it to get ahead of you.”

American opinion remained heavily opposed to any declaration of war until the attack on Pearl Harbor. But in 1940 and 1941 a majority indorsed every action taken in the name of hemisphere defense or freedom of the seas, including the support of Great Britain and military operations in the North Atlantic. The public also approved the action, urged by the President and taken by Congress on 13 November 1941, repealing prohibitions against arming American merchant ships and against allowing them to enter war zones. By that action Congress ended the apparent ambiguity and undercover character of Atlantic operations during the preceding months of 1941 and set the stage for war with Germany.

Then, before a full state of war could develop in the Atlantic, Japan struck in the Pacific. The Japanese Government wanted to convert the nations and colonial areas of eastern Asia and Indonesia into subservient tributaries of Japan, and the war in Europe seemed to provide a golden opportunity for conquest. The Japanese might have been willing to create their so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by negotiation, but they were not willing to limit their objective. When Great Britain and the United States and the other nations involved decided not to capitulate, Japan cast the die for war.

Until the summer of 1941 new Army measures for defense in the Pacific lagged behind Atlantic preparations. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson among others did not believe that Japan would go to war as long as Britain remained undefeated. Alarms in January and July 1941 produced some strengthening of Oahu’s Army air defenses and a more rapid garrisoning of

9 Pers Ltr, 3 Jun 41, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
Alaska. Since the Army's primary mission in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama was the guarding of naval bases and installations, the Navy had the chief voice in determining where Army Pacific reinforcements should go until August 1941. Then, under the impulse of a new design to contain Japan by air power, the reinforcement of the Philippines instead of hemisphere outposts became the goal. As a result some of Hawaii's newly acquired air strength was shifted to the Far East, and the movement of modern aircraft to Alaska was further postponed. The decision to reinforce the Philippines broke through the perimeter concept in the Pacific as the defense of Iceland and Great Britain had broken through it in the Atlantic. The Japanese attacked just as this reinforcement was getting under way.

A glance at the distribution of troops in mid-1942 shows that in the first few months after Pearl Harbor continental and hemisphere defense plans continued to provide the main guides to the actual deployment of Army ground and air forces, despite a large movement of forces to the Southwest Pacific and smaller movements to the British Isles and Iceland. At the beginning of July 1942, when the Army had about 800,000 officers and men assigned to active theaters and defense commands, Western Hemisphere garrisons and commands contained about three-fourths of this strength, divided about equally between defense commands in the continental United States and overseas outposts within the hemisphere. In other words, the Army did not begin to move the bulk of its ready forces across the oceans until after the nation and its outposts were reasonably secure. After 1942 the principal task of Army defenders within the hemisphere was to guard outposts that now became bases for the support of overseas offensives.¹⁰

The focus of Army planning had begun to shift from hemisphere defense to future operations outside the hemisphere long before, in late 1940 and early 1941. During 1941 military men moved somewhat more slowly than political leaders toward the new strategy, partly because the former were more aware than the latter of minimum defense needs and partly because military leaders were painfully aware of the unreadiness of most of the Army until late 1941 for offensive action. Indeed there was a remarkable coincidence between the Army's readiness for limited offensive action and the outbreak of full-scale war. Enough forces were ready in December 1941 so that Army planning and action could turn quickly and naturally to launching operations overseas that would obviate the need for hemisphere defense at home.

¹⁰ For graphic presentations of the distribution of Army forces among tactical commands in late 1941 and 1942, see charts 1, 2, and 3 in Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953) (hereafter referred to as Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42).
As the United States Army began its rapid expansion in the late summer of 1940 for the eventuality of war, it had a command organization far better adapted to the control of peacetime than of wartime operations. For many years the War Department had foreseen that this organization would have to be changed whenever a major war threatened, and it had planned accordingly. The plans for transforming the command system to a wartime basis were in fact partially carried out during the year and a half preceding the formal entry of the United States into World War II and immediately thereafter. They could not be carried out in full because the circumstances of American involvement in the war and the problems of defense during the initial mobilization of forces differed from those that had been assumed. Instead of beginning its mobilization on a relatively fixed M-day to deal with a clearly defined war situation, the Army spread its prewar expansion over many months during which the war outlook underwent continuous change. Even without these factors, the earlier plans for wartime organization would have required some modification because of the changed character and increasing complexities of warfare and therefore of the nature of the dangers that war would bring to the United States.

In planning for the command of active operations, the Army tried to adhere to certain basic strategic and organizational principles. It wanted to avoid dispersing its forces in a weak cordon defense of the frontier, whether of the continental United States or of the Western Hemisphere. Instead, it planned to group the bulk of Army ground and air forces in a mobile reserve within the continental United States. The very large expansion of the Army decided upon in the summer of 1940 required a tremendous training effort, and it was the Army's policy to meet current tactical needs with the least possible interference to the training program. In reorganizing its command structure, the Army tried to conform to the principle that the officers responsible for planning operations should also be responsible for executing them. Finally, the Army theoretically favored the establishment of unity of
command both over its own ground and air forces and over Army and Navy forces in potential or actual theaters of operations, although in practice not much progress was made in either direction before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Peacetime and Planned Wartime Organization

The National Defense Act of 1920 provided the basis for the establishment of a new command system for the Army after World War I. The War Department on 1 September 1920 established nine corps areas with fixed boundaries and gave their commanders full tactical and administrative control over all Army forces and installations within their areas except for those specifically exempted. The Army forces in the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, and the Philippines were organized into departments, identical in character and authority with the corps areas in the continental United States. Until the eve of World War II, the few Army troops in Puerto Rico and Alaska were not separately organized but were attached to the Second and Ninth Corps Areas, respectively. On 1 July 1939 Puerto Rico became a separate department, but Alaska remained under the Ninth Corps Area and successor defense agencies until 1 November 1943. Theoretically, from 1920 until 1932 Army forces at home and overseas were divided among three army areas, but these areas never had more than a nominal existence. Until the fall of 1932, the tactical control of the ground and air combat forces remained with the corps area commanders, who in turn were directly responsible to the Chief of Staff. Under the corps area commanders, the commanders of five coast artillery districts were responsible for planning and executing the Army's seacoast defense mission. Corps area commanders themselves were responsible for defending the Canadian and Mexican land frontiers and for protecting the nation against internal disturbances.¹

¹ The system of command began to change in the fall of 1932 when the War Department established four armies without fixed territorial bounds though located within the limits of specified corps areas—the First Army within the First, Second, and Third Corps Areas, for example. The initial "four-army" directives of 1932 seemed to indicate an intention to transfer...
all tactical responsibility except for internal security measures from the corps area to the army commanders, but modifications of the four-army plan in 1933 and 1934 restricted the army commanders to war planning and the direction of field maneuvers within their areas. Furthermore, until the autumn of 1940 the armies were not given separate commanders and staffs to perform these functions; the senior corps area commander within an army area served as the army commander, and used his corps area staff to conduct the army's business. Since three of the four army headquarters changed location between 1932 and 1940, this last provision meant in practice that much army staff work had no continuity. Under these circumstances, although General Staff war plans after 1932 regularly specified that the armies should work out detailed area defense plans, the armies could do little effective planning of this sort before the fall of 1939.

The War Plans Division of the General Staff defined the peacetime defense responsibilities of the corps area and army commanders in February 1940 in the following terms:

a. The missions of the several corps areas comprise: Defend as may be necessary important coastal areas in their respective corps areas; arrange with appropriate naval district commanders for cooperation of local naval defense forces in execution of assigned missions; provide anti-sabotage protection for such installations and establishments vital to national defense as cannot be adequately protected by local civil authorities; take necessary action under the Emergency Plan—WHITE; and, in certain cases, receive at detraining points, move to concentration areas, care for, supply, and move to ports of embarkation units designated for movement.

b. The armies are responsible for coordinating the defense of the coastal frontiers of the corps areas included in their respective army area; for exercising general supervision of the arrangements made by those corps areas with the naval districts concerned for the cooperation of their local defense forces; and for effecting any necessary coordination of anti-sabotage measures along corps area boundaries.

Irrespective of this definition, or of the wording of current regulations and directives, the army commanders during late 1939 and 1940 began to play a more active role in war planning and in the tactical direction of the military forces within their areas. Their authority was potentially enhanced by an act of 5 August 1939 giving them the rank of lieutenant general and thus...
making them superior in rank to the corps area commanders. A month later, after the outbreak of war in Europe, the War Department launched a series of immediate action measures to improve the Army's state of readiness. Thereafter, Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, commanding the First Army (and Second Corps Area) on the east coast, and (from December 1939) Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding the Fourth Army (and Ninth Corps Area) on the west coast, assumed the increasingly broad responsibility that circumstances required. Without any immediate change in existing regulations and directives, the army commanders began to exercise the superior tactical authority within their areas that had originally been proposed for them.

A second major change in the command structure occurred in 1935 with the creation of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force. This organization centralized control over all tactical air units in the continental United States under one commander. Until the fall of 1940 air units under the GHQ Air Force were divided among three wings located adjacent to the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts. The GHQ Air Force commander was directly responsible to the Chief of Staff until 1 March 1939, when he was placed under the intermediate command of the Chief of the Air Corps. The removal of air units from the control of armies and corps areas did not change the responsibility of their commanders for planning the co-ordinated ground and air defense of their areas, but increasingly the air organization began to engage in defense planning on its own behalf.6

The proper development and co-ordination of the means for air defense presented the Army with a new organizational problem late in 1939. Suc-

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cessful air defense depended upon the integrated action of interceptor planes, antiaircraft guns, and aircraft warning devices for detecting the approach of hostile aircraft. Interceptor aircraft were then under GHQ Air Force command, and most antiaircraft units were controlled by the coast artillery district commanders. The armies had been specifically charged in 1935 with planning for the employment of antiaircraft artillery and aircraft warning devices in air defense. The War Plans Division officer most concerned with the development of long-range radar equipment urged in November 1939 that corps area commanders be made responsible for planning its employment. Noting that the Fourth Army had previously turned over this task to coast defense commanders, he observed that an air attack on the United States was as likely to strike deep in the interior as against the coast. Therefore, he contended, only the corps areas provided a framework that could plan the nationwide employment of aircraft warning devices. A War Plans Division colleague expressed opposing views and urged that aircraft warning plans be a responsibility of the army commanders because they would presumably be called upon to execute these plans in the event of a real emergency. His views prevailed, and the War Department on 23 May 1940 directed the army commanders to develop plans for the effective use of aircraft warning devices and to select the sites for the location of detector stations.7

The graver problem of organizing a co-ordinated and effective air defense system under a united command occupied the attention of an Army Air Defense Board during the winter of 1939–40. There was general agreement that the War Department ought to create a new type of command that could exercise control over the various air defense elements in an emergency. The Air Corps wanted this new organization to be under the GHQ Air Force. After much discussion General Marshall decided to create an experimental Air Defense Command in the northeastern United States and to place it under the First Army. The War Department specified that its commander, although put under First Army Command, should be free to co-ordinate details of his work with the GHQ Air Force and corps area commanders.8

The division of responsibility for war planning and immediate defense action among corps area, army, Air Defense Command, and GHQ Air Force commanders did not matter too much so long as the likelihood of an attack on the continental United States appeared remote and the size of the Army

7 WPD Interoffice Memos, 30 Oct and 1 Nov 39, WPD 3640-3; Memo, WPD for CoFS, 31 Jul 40, AG 660.2 AA (1–1–40), sec. 1.
8 Ltr, TAG to CG's, 26 Feb 40, AG 320.2 (11-24-39).
was still too small to justify the establishment of the more elaborate organization planned for wartime. A transition toward reorganization became mandatory as the actual threat of war loomed in May and June 1940, and as the Army thereafter began its rapid expansion and the tremendous task of training the new Army for war employment if that should become necessary.

In the wartime organization planned under the Defense Act of 1920 the capstone was to be a General Headquarters (GHQ). Until otherwise directed by the President; the Chief of Staff in wartime was also to serve as Commanding General of the Field Forces and to direct both ground and air operations through GHQ. Under GHQ, there might be one or more active theaters of operations, with commanders who would exercise full authority over all Army activities within theater boundaries. Theaters of operations might be established either overseas or in the continental United States; the remainder of the continental United States not included in theaters of operations would constitute the zone of the interior. The four armies in the continental United States on M-day (or before, if so directed by the War Department) would assume full responsibility for the defense of their areas against external attack; at the same time, they were to be prepared to move to a theater of operations if so directed. The corps area commanders on M-day would retain tactical responsibility for internal security only within the zone of the interior; theater commanders in the continental United States would assume this as well as all other tactical responsibilities.

The armed services had agreed to co-ordinate their frontier defense activities in peace and war in accordance with the provisions of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, as revised by the Joint Board in 1935 and subsequently amended. During peace, Joint Action provided for the co-ordination of local seacoast defense preparations between the Army's corps area com-

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9 FM 100–10, 9 Dec 40, pp. 5–12.
manders (or alternately, through the latter's subsidiary coast artillery district and harbor defense commanders) and the corresponding naval district commanders. Army commanders were responsible in peacetime for planning wartime coastal defense measures, and on M-day they were to assume responsibility for their execution. Joint Action provided for the establishment of four coastal frontiers (North Atlantic, Southern, Pacific, and Great Lakes) and for their subdivision in war into sectors and subsectors. These coastal frontiers were to become active commands in wartime, at which time the Army's coast artillery districts were to cease to exist as such and their commanders and staffs were to man the Army's portion of the wartime coast defense organization and be responsible in turn to the army commanders. The coastal command system prescribed in Joint Action had two outstanding deficiencies. First, it did not provide an effective means for establishing unity of command where it was really required. Unity of command was not established anywhere until the attack on Pearl Harbor illustrated the disastrous consequences of not doing so. Second, there was no clear delineation of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal air defense, and thus there was no agreement as to how an effective air defense of coastal regions should be organized and controlled.

Reorganization, July 1940–December 1941

The critical situation facing the United States in June 1940 furnished the immediate impetus for the first steps toward the establishment of a wartime command organization. With Britain’s early downfall still considered probable, and therefore the chance of early American involvement in the war believed likely, the War Department in July moved to activate GHQ. The order establishing a nucleus of GHQ specified that GHQ’s purpose was to assist the Commanding General of the Field Forces in the exercise of “jurisdiction similar to that of Army Commanders” over all mobile ground and air and fixed harbor defense forces in the continental United States. Army commanders at this time had jurisdiction over war planning and field maneuvers within their areas, but GHQ’s activities for the time being were expressly confined to the over-all direction and supervision of combat training.

The War Department also turned its attention, coincidentally with the establishment of GHQ, to a reorganization of the field forces in the con-

10 Joint Action, ch. V.
11 Ltr, TAG to CG's, 26 Jul 40, AG 320.2 (7–25–40).
tinental United States in order to give better direction to their training and to improve their readiness for action should the nation become involved in the war. This reorganization had to be adjusted to the rapid increase in the Army's strength that followed the induction of the National Guard, approved by Congress in August 1940, and the passage of selective service legislation in September. These measures together with an increase in Regular Army strength were to multiply the Army's numbers more than fivefold by the summer of 1941, and most of the men and units that were brought into federal service required intensive training. What the Army needed in 1940 and 1941 was a command system that would improve the normal peacetime machinery for the planning and direction of operations without unduly disrupting training.

The problem of fitting the Army's air arm into an effective reorganization of command was complicated by additional factors. Air Corps officers wanted a greater degree of autonomy in planning and directing the employment of air power, and they tended to resist the adoption of any organizational scheme that would place air planning and operations under ground commanders. The airmen had good reason for maintaining their position, since the problem of continental and hemisphere defense seemed increasingly to be primarily one of air defense. The technological improvement of aircraft also tended to render obsolete the older plans for coastal defense organization. The greater range and mobility of the new combat planes made it undesirable to set up any organization that would require the attachment of air units to relatively small territorial commands and restrict their employment to the confines of these commands. The scarcity of combat aircraft added emphasis to the other arguments against territorial attachment. In June 1940 the Army had adopted an ambitious program for organizing and equipping fifty-four air combat groups, but national policy after September dictated the diversion of an increasingly large proportion of American combat aircraft production to Great Britain and the other nations fighting the Axis Powers. During late 1940 and most of 1941, therefore, almost all of the combat airplanes available to the Army within the continental United States had to be used in training. There was virtually no "GHQ Reserve" of combat planes and units, and units in training had to be designated for current defense employment if that became necessary. The effective training of the rapidly expanding air forces required that in the meantime these units remain under air command.

With the easing of the critical Atlantic situation from September 1940 onward, the Army was able to concentrate more attention on training its
rapidly growing forces for future operations. Accordingly, the next moves toward a tactical reorganization were associated more with training than with the planning and direction of operations. A proposal of the G-3 Division of the General Staff in July 1940 that the corps areas be provided with additional tactical headquarters to facilitate training grew into a War Department directive of 3 October 1940 ordering the separation of the field armies and the corps areas. This directive and supplementary War Department orders provided the armies with separate commanders and staffs, and contemplated also a complete segregation of army and corps area headquarters and functions. The armies were given command of the ground combat forces, which had hitherto been under corps area control except during maneuvers, and the armies now assumed full responsibility for planning and directing the employment of these troops in the defense of the continental United States against external attack. Though the corps area commanders retained their responsibility for internal security measures, the corps areas thereafter became essentially supply and administrative agencies.\(^\text{12}\)

The War Department similarly initiated a reorganization of the combat air forces in the summer of 1940, after the adoption of the fifty-four group program. In August the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, directed the establishment of four air districts to replace the existing three-wing subordinate organization of the GHQ Air Force. These air districts were intended primarily to facilitate the supervision of training. Under the four air districts, GHQ Air Force units were to be organized initially into seventeen wings and forty groups. The existing Air Defense Command, operating in the northeast United States under the direction of the First Army commander, was to serve as a model for a nationwide air defense command system. This air reorganization was only partially carried through in 1940; the air districts were not activated until 15 January 1941, and the expansion of the air defense command system was not approved until March 1941. In the meantime, the War Department on 19 November 1940 removed the GHQ Air Force from the control of the Chief of the Air Corps and placed it under GHQ. The appointment, shortly before this change, of Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, the Chief of the Air Corps, to the additional post of Deputy Chief of Staff made it possible for him to continue to exert a measure of control over the operations of the GHQ Air Force.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{12}\) Ltrs, TAG to CG's, 3 and 7 Oct 40, and other papers, AG 320.2 (8-2-40) (4), sec. 2.

\(^{13}\) Ltr, TAG to CG's, 19 Nov 40, and other papers, AG 320.2 (11-27-40); Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, chs. 4 and 5; Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947), "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Head-
The organizational changes of late 1940 left a confused and unsatisfactory definition of responsibility for the planning and direction of current and future defense tasks in the continental United States. The confusion was such that subordinate ground and air commanders had to be reminded in December that GHQ still had no functions except those associated with training.\textsuperscript{14} The four armies had acquired responsibility for planning and controlling operations, but the armies were not territorial organizations and in theory were subject to transfer from their areas to overseas theaters of operations. The situation seemed to call for a new type of fixed territorial defense organization. In October 1940 the GHQ staff, noting that neither the armies nor the planned coastal frontier organization met existing requirements, proposed that four territorial defense commands be organized, with bounds approximating those of the armies. Maj. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, the GHQ Chief of Staff, personally objected to the term "defense commands" and wanted the new organizations called "theaters." Whatever they were called, these defense areas in peacetime were to engage only in planning and were to be commanded by army commanders assisted by a small separate staff, but they were to be so organized that in time of war they could be transformed into a theater of operations type of organization which would operate under GHQ and command the ground and air forces assigned for the execution of continental defense missions.\textsuperscript{15}

The War Plans Division incorporated the GHQ proposal for the creation of defense commands into a study on continental defense organization prepared by Col. Jonathan W. Anderson in late 1940 and presented to the Chief of Staff in mid-January 1941. It appeared to Colonel Anderson that the wartime defense organization prescribed by \textit{Joint Action of the Army and the Navy} was archaic, since \textit{Joint Action} provided for a narrow coastal frontier defense only, whereas the possibilities of air attack now required a defense in depth well into the interior of the country. Furthermore, political considerations demanded at least an outline defense organization for the
whole continental area. General McNair, in discussing these matters with Colonel Anderson, emphasized the desirability of holding to a minimum the forces tactically assigned to the First, Third, and Fourth Armies guarding the seacoast frontiers, and of keeping as many combat units as possible with the Second Army in the interior. General McNair’s thought was: “If we give to the First Army three corps, regardless of their needs, . . . they will plan the employment and distribution of three corps, and . . . it may be difficult at a critical time to pry these troops loose.” The First Army, on the other hand, naturally and strongly advocated a defense organization that would give it wartime control over all ground and air forces within its area, peacetime control of a nucleus of bombardment as well as pursuit aviation, and full air defense responsibility. It also wanted to extend the boundaries of the North Atlantic Coastal Frontier to include all United States garrisons established in the North Atlantic area. In principle, War Plans and GHQ agreed on the necessity of holding the ground and air forces assigned to defense missions to a minimum, and of retaining all possible forces in GHQ ground and air reserves from which they could be allocated to active theaters as necessary. General McNair wanted to place the air defense commands in peacetime under GHQ Air Force control in order to facilitate their training; War Plans wanted them under the defense commands in order to establish unity of command in peacetime over all Army defense elements that would be under the defense (or theater) commander in time of war.\footnote{Memo, Brig Gen Francis B. Wilby, CofS First Army, for Col Anderson, WPD, 30 Nov 40, no sub; Memo for File (recording conversation with Gen McNair), Col Anderson, WPD, 5 Dec 40; Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS 14 Dec 40, sub; Def Plans—Cont U.S.; OCS Brief of WPD Memo, 16 Jan 41. All in OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S., Bulky Package 37.}

The issue of where to put the air defense commands in the new continental defense organization had deeper implications. Giving the GHQ Air Force control over all air defense means would be another big step toward air autonomy. In November 1940, before War Plans circulated its continental defense proposal for comment, G–3 had taken the initiative in suggesting that the existing Air Defense Command and new commands modeled after it be put under the air districts, and that the air districts, under the GHQ Air Force, be given a very different function from that approved for them by General Marshall the preceding August. They would become tactical as well as training and administrative organizations. Each air district would have a bombardment-fighter force for offensive air operations and an air defense command for defensive purposes. This scheme would centralize air defense control for the whole United States in one
headquarters, to be located in Washington. Subject to the over-all control of GHQ, the GHQ Air Force would collaborate directly with the Navy in fending off sea and air invaders until an actual land invasion of the continental United States occurred; only then would unity of command over all ground and air forces be established. Adhering to these views, G-3 refused to concur in the War Plans study. In the meantime, and after he had heard "disturbing rumors," the commanding general of the GHQ Air Force urged General Marshall to put all air defense elements under the air districts and thus under his force. When General Marshall found time in mid-January to study and discuss the War Plans, G-3, and GHQ Air Force proposals, he noted that he was "considerably impressed" with the G-3 argument. This argument was further fortified shortly thereafter by Lt. Col. William K. Harrison, Jr., of the War Plans Division who, after observing the Air Defense Command's exercises at Mitchel Field, likewise recommended that the air defense commands be put under the air districts.17

An intensive and month-long round of discussions with respect to the peacetime continental defense system followed. Those who favored placing the air defense commands under the four territorial commands argued that there must be unity and continuity of command in peace and war over all defense elements. This argument undoubtedly would have carried more weight if the United States had been closer to war and its continental area more imminently threatened. Everyone agreed that in time of war each theater commander should have control over all air and ground forces within his area. But, as General Arnold pointed out, under existing circumstances it was impossible to foresee where real theaters of operations might be required, and thus it was impossible to delimit them in peacetime. General Arnold believed that the greatest immediate need was for air defense commands overseas in Hawaii and Panama, and that the GHQ Air Force was the proper agency for training mobile air defense commands within the United States that could be sent overseas where needed. He argued therefore that "the United States should be considered basically as a Zone of the Interior," in which "all elements of the Field Forces must be prepared for overseas operations primarily, and the defense of the United States secondarily."18


18 Memo, Gen Arnold (as DCofS for Air) for Gen Bryden, 6 Feb 41. OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S., Bulky Package 37. General Arnold stated the arguments in favor of Air control of air defense in three lengthy memorandums: two (27 Jan 1941 for General Bryden and 21 Feb 1941 for
Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, commanding the existing Air Defense Command, joined in urging the Chief of Staff to put air defense under the GHQ Air Force. Finally, after extended discussion, General Marshall decided to put the air defense system under the direction of the GHQ Air Force in time of peace and then directed the War Plans Division to work out a continental defense organization on this basis.

Accordingly the War Department on 17 March 1941 directed that the continental United States be divided into four strategic areas (Northeast, Central, Southern, and Western) to be known as defense commands. It defined a defense command as "a territorial agency with appropriate staff designed to coordinate or prepare to initiate the execution of all plans for the employment of Army Forces and installations against enemy action in that portion of the United States lying within the command boundaries." The new commands were to operate under the direction of GHQ, but not until the War Department enlarged the GHQ staff so that it could undertake this additional responsibility.

The defense commands were made responsible during peacetime for planning the defense of their areas against ground and air attack, the corps area commanders retaining their responsibility for internal security plans and measures. Other features of the new command system were described in some remarks of Colonel Anderson:

The four Army Commanders, in addition to their responsibilities as Army Commanders, are designated as Commanding Generals, Defense Commands. The responsibility of the Commanding General, Defense Command, includes all planning for the defense of the area, the coordination of these plans with the Navy, and the execution of them in war until such time as the War Department directs to the contrary. The Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, is given the responsibility for the peacetime organization and training for air operations and air defense throughout the entire continental United States. He exercises this responsibility through four Air Forces, each of these Air Forces replacing one of the existing Air Districts. In addition, he is responsible for the aviation and air defense portions of the defense plans for Defense General Marshall in his capacity of Deputy Chief of Staff, in file cited above; the third (3 Feb 1941 for General Marshall) in his capacity of Chief of the Air Corps, filed in AG 320.2 (11-24-39).


General Marshall's genuine puzzlement over the best solution to this problem is reflected in his remarks at conferences in his office on 14, 16, and 19 Feb 1941, and at the War Department General Council meeting on 19 Feb 1941. His decision was announced in Memo, DCofS Bryden for WPD, 28 Feb 41, WPD 4247-9; and elaborated in Memo for Rec, Col Anderson, WPD, 3 Mar 41, OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S., Bulky Package 37.

Ltr, TAG to CG's, 17 Mar 41, AG 320.2 (11-27-40).

Memorandum, TAG to CG's, 25 Mar 41, AG 320.2 (11-27-40).
Commands. Each Air Force is organized as a bomber command and an interceptor command, the latter replacing the currently named Air Defense Command. The above organization centralizes under the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, full control and responsibility for the peacetime development and training of aviation and means and methods of air defense. It decentralizes to the Commanding Generals, Defense Commands, responsibility for peacetime planning for coordination with the Navy and for execution of defense in war. It provides for unity of command in all elements employed in each Defense Command.23

The new organization in effect was designed to free the armies from defense responsibilities and thereby permit them to give their full attention to training ground combat units. Though the new defense commands, when activated in June and July, actually consisted of only a few headquarters staff officers engaged in regional planning, the defense command promised to provide a suitable means of transition toward a wartime theater organization, should that become necessary.

The March 1941 reorganization marked a further step toward air autonomy, but the Air Corps had plans for a new and more sweeping air reorganization. Nor was the Air Corps alone in questioning the adequacy of the March reorganization. Before the month was over General Marshall had given his approval to a virtually independent handling of air matters within the War Department.24 In April Secretary of War Stimson noted that the defense system established in March struck him as a “dangerous arrangement” pregnant with “possibilities for misunderstanding and trouble.”25 Mr. Stimson had previously indicated his approval of a unified command system for the Army’s air forces, and in his own office he had elevated Robert A. Lovett to the long-vacant post of Assistant Secretary of War for Air. With encouragement such as this, the Air Corps continued between April and June to work out the details of its planned reorganization.

In the air reorganization approved and instituted in June the GHQ Air Force disappeared. The new air establishment was an integral part of the War Department placed directly under the Chief of Staff. Its Chief, General Arnold, continued to occupy the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Air as well. The Army Air Forces had two components, the Air Corps to handle service functions, and the Air Force Combat Command to control combat training, planning, and operations. The charter of the Army Air Forces—Army Regulations 95-5 issued on 20 June 1941—in effect gave it complete

25 Stimson Diary, entry of 24 Apr 41.
authority over air defense planning and operations within the continental United States, at least until theaters of operations were established there. The Chief of the Army Air Forces delegated his specific responsibility for air defense planning to the Air Force Combat Command, which in turn called upon the commanders of the four regional air forces for local defense plans.

The War Department gave the Army Air Forces authority over air defense planning and operations within the United States without revoking any of the responsibility allocated in March to the defense commanders for all defense planning—air as well as ground—within their areas. To add to the confusion, their area defense plans were to be subject to the review and approval not of the Army Air Forces but of GHQ as soon as it was activated as an operational headquarters, as it was about to be.26 The following statement, agreed on by the Army Air Forces and the War Plans Division, represented an early effort to clarify the situation:

The Chief of the Army Air Forces, pursuant to policies, directions and instructions from the Secretary of War, has been made responsible for the organization, planning, training, and execution of active air defense measures, for continental United States. Active operations will be controlled by G.H.Q. These operations will be directed by appropriate commanders, either ground or air, as may be dictated by the situation.27

Subsequently, General Arnold agreed that neither the Army Air Forces nor its component Air Force Combat Command had any official authority to conduct or control air combat operations within a theater of operations established either overseas or within the continental United States.28

These interpretations failed to meet the basic objections leveled by the War Plans Division against the new air organization on the eve of its establishment. The War Plans staff then noted that "the essentials of proper organization require that responsibility and authority be centered in a single agency, and that where this authority and responsibility lie be clearly and definitely stated," and also that "no organization should be set up which requires material change to pass from a peace to a war basis." According to the War Plans Division, the new air organization failed in two vital points when tested by these principles. Noting that Assistant Secretary Lovett in

26 In commenting on the Operation and Concentration Plan, RAINBOW 5, distributed for comment by the War Plans Division in early July, G-3 noted that in paragraphs 32-34 of the plan the defense commanders were assigned the mission of defense against air attack, whereas paragraph 40 charged the Chief of the Army Air Forces with responsibility for active air defense measures. Memo, G-3 for WPD, 14 Jul 41, WPD 4175-18.
27 WPD Memo for File, 30 Jun 41, WPD 4247-18.
presenting the air organization for approval had agreed that GHQ should be ultimately responsible for the planning and conduct of operations, War Plans nevertheless held that the air organization as proposed failed "to grant the Commanding General of the Field Forces at GHQ command authority over all the means." The proposed organization also failed "to prescribe a rapid and certain means of coordinated employment of ground and air forces." All of which meant that while the air reorganization of June 1941 brought order within the Army's air arm, it had not eliminated the "possibilities for misunderstandings and trouble" that Secretary Stimson had foreseen after the March 1941 reorganization.

In the meantime the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941 followed by President Roosevelt's decision to extend the scope of American naval operations in the North Atlantic had again presented the prospect of active if limited American involvement in the war. It appeared by May that the Army might be ordered on short notice to arrange the dispatch of expeditionary forces from the United States to sundry strategic points along the Atlantic front. Such an order was actually issued on 22 May when the President directed that the Army and Navy prepare an expeditionary force ready to sail to the Azores within one month's time. The preparation and dispatch of a force of this sort required a type of detailed theater planning and executive supervision that no War Department agency was then prepared to perform.

General Marshall met this need by establishing an operations section in GHQ. The directive for this new agency, which he approved on 24 June, stated that GHQ should also prepare to divest itself of its training functions, thus indicating the intention of translating GHQ into the type of operational headquarters contemplated in prewar planning. GHQ was granted broad powers to plan and to control military operations, but only when it was authorized by the War Department to do so for specified commands and areas. When GHQ assumed its new operational functions on 3 July 1941, it also had instructions to take over the responsibility for defense planning in the continental United States as soon as its operational staff was ready to handle the work.30

As things worked out, before Pearl Harbor GHQ was not given the authority to command the new continental defense organization established in March and June 1941, and it had only limited authority over continental

30 WPD Office Memo and Note for Rcd, both dated 17 June 41, WPD 3209-11; Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Jun 41, WPD 3209-10; Ltr, TAG to CofS GHQ, 3 Jul 41, AG 320.2 (6-19-41).
defense planning. The terms of the new GHQ directive and a statement in the War Department RAINBOW 5 plan distributed in July together were interpreted by the War Plans Division and GHQ as giving the latter the responsibility for supervising the preparation of plans by the defense commands in the continental United States. Subsequently the War Department specifically authorized GHQ to supervise the preparation of continental as well as overseas regional defense plans and to consult with appropriate representatives of the Army Air Forces, the defense commands, and overseas organizations in the execution of this responsibility.31 Neither GHQ nor the defense commands were given the authority to approve or disapprove continental air defense plans; they could only co-ordinate the air defense portion of over-all plans with the plans of the Army Air Forces.

The operational mission of GHQ was further complicated by a fundamental difference of opinion as to how best to organize for continental and overseas defense. The method prescribed in March 1941 contemplated the segregation of continental defense forces from those of overseas areas and bases. Generals Drum and DeWitt, commanding the armies and defense commands on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, favored the linking of continental and overseas forces as the best way of permitting the projection of Army power in the direction of a hostile threat. General DeWitt wanted to keep Alaska under his command, and General Drum’s Northeast Defense Command headquarters in August 1941 assumed that even Army bases established in Great Britain would come under its authority.32 The Army Air Forces wanted to establish northeastern and northwestern air theaters that would tie in overseas areas and bases with the air forces stationed along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States.33 Under this plan the air strength of outlying bases could be kept at a bare minimum, since reinforcements could be readily shuttled from the continental United States without violating command boundaries.

But a system under which the continental air forces would provide overseas reinforcements on call was incompatible with a defense organization segregating continental and overseas Army forces. With the armies in theory also movable organizations, a similar incompatibility existed in the Armycontinental defense command relationship at the time of Pearl Harbor.

31 1st Ind, TAG to CG WDC, 11 Oct 41, on Ltr, WDC to TAG, 10 Sep 41, AG 381 (9-10-41); Memo, WPD for CofS, 23 Sep 41, revised and approved as a WD directive, 22 Oct 41, WPD 4175-18.
32 On the last point, see papers in WPD 4247-21.
33 See below, ch. XV, pp. 395-96.
The Wartime Organization

When the United States went to war on 7 December 1941, the Army’s responsibility for defending the nation’s continental area rested with the four armies and four air forces rather than with the defense commands that had been activated earlier in the year. The first step toward translating these continental defense commands into something more than planning agencies was taken the day before the Japanese struck in the Pacific. As a result of a suggestion first put forward by the War Plans Division in August 1941, the War Department on 6 December directed that the command of harbor and coast defense units should pass from army to defense commanders not later than 1 January 1942.34 The outbreak of war precipitated more far-reaching changes. After conferring with his principal subordinates on 11 December, General Marshall decided to designate the Western Defense Command (including Alaska) as a theater of operations. Instructions to this effect were immediately dispatched to General DeWitt, who took command of the new theater before midnight the same day.35 Also on the 11th, General Drum, the commander of the First Army, arranged an informal system for coordinating Army and Navy defense forces in the northeastern United States that lasted until the establishment of the Eastern Theater of Operations a fortnight later.36 On both coasts the commanders proceeded to organize the defense system long contemplated in Army and Navy planning, coastal frontier sectors and subsectors replacing the peacetime coast artillery district and local harbor defense organizations.

The Western Defense Command as a theater commanded the Fourth Army, the Second and Fourth Air Forces, and the Ninth Corps Area. General DeWitt retained personal command of the now subordinate Fourth Army and exercised control through a combined theater and army headquarters. As a theater commander, General DeWitt controlled all Army troops and installations within the bounds of the Western Defense Command (which comprised California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Arizona, Utah, Montana, and Alaska), except those specifically exempted by War Department instructions. These instructions imposed three important categories of limitations on his authority: those associated with the organization and movement of air units within his theater; those connected with the move-

34 Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 Aug 41, Ltr, TAG to CG's 6 Dec 41, and other papers, WPD 4247–9.  
35 Notes on Conf in OCS, 11 Dec 41, OCS Conf, binder 2; Rad, CG FF to CG Fourth Army, 11 Dec 41; Rad, Gen DeWitt to TAG, 12 Dec 41. Last two in AG 320.2 (12–11–41).  
36 Rad, Gen Drum to CofS, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4622–43.
ment of ground and air units and supplies through his theater to overseas destinations; and those pertaining to nontactical functions and installations that were kept under direct War Department control. The first group of limitations was designed to prevent any undue infringement of the autonomy of the air organization, its training of air units, and their availability for quick transfer to other theaters. The second and third groups were essential to the establishment of any theater of operations within the continental United States. These limitations did not seriously restrict General DeWitt's freedom to use the means available within his theater for defending it against both external and internal attacks.

On the east coast General Drum by conference had arranged an interim working organization for the Northeast Defense Command and a method of coastal defense collaboration between Army and Navy commanders. The First Army established a central headquarters to control all antiaircraft artillery units in the Northeast Defense Command. The Army and Navy commands set up a Joint Operations Office in New York that served as a model for joint operations centers which the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations asked other commands to establish. General Drum nevertheless believed that the informal arrangements made were inadequate, and he recommended the activation of the Northeast Defense Command as the supreme Army authority in the northeastern United States.

The War Department appreciated the desirability of centralizing the Army's command authority on the east coast, but it also recognized that the situation there differed fundamentally from that on the Pacific coast since there was no likelihood of any sizable land or air attack along the Atlantic front. Furthermore, the existing defense organization could not be readily translated into a theater of operations; the east coast was divided between two defense commands, the Northeast and the Southern, and each extended far into the interior of the continent. Air defense forces had to be organized so that they could be concentrated anywhere along the Atlantic coast, both in the continental United States and seaward to Newfoundland in the north and to the Caribbean in the south. With nothing more than minor air or naval attacks foreseeable, there seemed to be no justification for a theater

37 Tactical limitations on General DeWitt's authority were spelled out in Ltr, TAG to CG WDC, 11 Dec 41, WPD 4612-1. Nontactical (G-4 matters), in Ltr, TAG to CG WDC, 13 Dec 41, OCS 14943-78. In practice General DeWitt's command was usually referred to as the Western Defense Command rather than the Western Theater of Operations.

38 Rad, Gen Drum to CofS, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4622-43; Pers Ltr, Gen Drum to Gen Marshall, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4247-23; Memo, WPD for CofS, 30 Dec 41; Jt Ltr, CofS and CNO to Comdrs and CG's, 31 Dec 41. Last two in WPD 4621-1.

39 Proposed action papers for and against General Drum's proposal, Dec 41, WPD 4247-23.
organization of forces extending any great distance into the interior. Therefore, instead of activating the Northeast Defense Command, the Army established a new Eastern Theater of Operations under General Drum's command. The Eastern theater included Newfoundland and the continental coast from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico at the Florida-Alabama line, and extended inland to a line drawn about four hundred miles from the Atlantic coast. The theater forces consisted initially of the First Army, the First and Third Air Forces, units assigned or attached to the First, Second, and Third Corps Areas, the forces of the Newfoundland Base Command, and "all other units now stationed in the Eastern Theater of Operations." Units of these forces currently located outside the theater's boundaries were also put at the disposal of its commanding general. The limitations imposed on the theater commander's authority were virtually the same as those prescribed for the Western Defense Command. The new theater became active at noon on 24 December 1941.40

The War Department placed GHQ in command of the continental theaters established in December 1941, but did not extend its authority to include the Central and Southern Defense Commands.41 These commands, occupying about 55 percent of the continental United States, changed in area, but their authority and means for carrying out defense measures remained poorly defined until March 1942. As long as the Eastern and Western theaters lasted as such, the zone of the interior was restricted, in theory, to the areas of the Central and Southern Defense Commands. In accordance with prewar plans the corps areas' responsibility for internal security measures had passed to the theater commanders, but it remained with the corps areas in the zone of the interior. In both theaters the commanders began to organize a theater-type supply system and in doing so made further inroads on the functions of the corps areas.

The greatest anomaly in the December reorganization, and the one that called for immediate remedy, was the air defense situation. The War Department's theater directives placed the four existing continental air forces under

40 Ltr, TAG to CG's, 20 Dec 41, AG 371 (12–19–41); Memo, WPD for TAG, 25 Dec 41, WPD 4627-1.
41 On 28 December General Marshall explained to President Roosevelt 'that when the Western Defense Command had been set up and placed under GHQ, there had been a tendency on the part of GHQ to move everything on the east coast to the Western theater, and this condition had been remedied by setting up the Eastern Defense Command, which tended to balance this tendency on the part of GHQ.' Notes on White House Conf, 28 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs (1–28–42). Actually, War Department agencies rather than GHQ appear to have initiated most of the troop moves to the west coast after Pearl Harbor, and GHQ took the lead in urging a reduction in west coast strength. See Memo, CofS GHQ for CG FF, 23 Dec 41, WPD 4672–5.
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

Theater command, over the strong protest of the Army Air Forces, but left the Air Force Combat Command responsible for air defense measures in the Central and Southern Defense Commands. Early in January the Second and Third Air Forces were moved inland from the theaters and again came under Air Force Combat Command control, a move that did not satisfy the Army Air Forces, which wanted either to regain responsibility for all air defense means and measures in the continental United States or to be excused from any such responsibility altogether. General Arnold, as Chief of the Army Air Forces, protested to the War Department in late January that he was unable to discharge his assigned responsibilities for continental air defense; but as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, General Arnold directed that no action be taken on this protest, except to use it as an additional argument for War Department reorganization. 42

The garrisons of the two continental theaters at the beginning of 1942 contained the bulk of the trained or partly trained combat ground and air units of the Army in the continental United States. Their forces included nineteen of the thirty-four divisions, most of the antiaircraft regiments, and more than two-thirds of the available combat air units. A good many of the ground combat troops were being used to guard vital installations—a task for which Army field force units were neither designed nor trained. Despite instructions directing the theater commanders to continue the maximum degree of training compatible with tactical assignments, the existing deployment of ground and air forces was bound to interfere seriously with training, and furthermore it was threatening to freeze the bulk of the Army’s forces in a perimeter defense of the continental United States. Only the imminent threat of large-scale invasion could have justified a continued deployment of this sort. Since it was soon evident that no such threat was in the offing on either coast, GHQ had begun to study ways and means of reducing the theater areas and garrisons even before the activation of the Eastern theater on 24 December. 43

To correct the situation, GHQ proposed that the Eastern and Western theaters be reduced to coastal frontier areas approximately one hundred miles wide, with Newfoundland separated from the Eastern theater. Instead of com-

42 Rpt of Air Officer, GHQ, 6 Dec 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conf’s, binder 2; Ltr, TAG to CG’s, 30 Dec 41, AG 320.2 (12–30–41); Memo, AAF for TAG, 8 Jan 42, copy in OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./2; Memo, WPD for CofS, 15 Jan 42, and atchd WPD comment on AAF nonconcur, WPD 4627–2; Memo, LSK [Maj Lawrence S. Kuter] for SGS, 24 Jan 42, OCS 16125–591.

43 Rpt at GHQ Staff Conf’s, 19 and 20 Dec 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conf’s, binder 2; Memo, G–3 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 31 Dec 41; Memo, CofS GHQ for CG FF, 6 Jan 42. Last two in GHQ 320.2 Study on Organization of Eastern and Western Theaters.
manding the bulk of the field forces, the theaters were to be considered as task forces and would contain the air, antiaircraft, harbor defense, and troop guard units actually needed for defending the coasts against minor attacks. The First and Fourth Armies were to be separated from the theaters, or at least partially segregated from them, so that all of the armies could concentrate on training larger field units. The corps areas would also be removed from theater control and would assume all supply functions. The basic idea of the GHQ plan was to "reduce theater forces to the minimum required for defense of the coastal frontier, based on the present situation, and to return the maximum number of field forces to a training status."  

The War Plans Division agreed with the premises underlying GHQ's proposals but disagreed with the remedies suggested. War Plans wanted to maintain the existing theater boundaries but to restrict interference with training by large-scale exemption of units and installations from theater control. It wanted to keep Newfoundland in the Eastern theater in order to permit its ready air reinforcement. Pending the training of military police battalions that could replace the field units currently on internal guard duty, War Plans wanted to keep internal security responsibility under the theaters in order to avoid confusion and duplication in the assignment of troops to guard duty.

To resolve the conflicting recommendations of GHQ and the War Plans Division on continental organization, General Marshall decided to send Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Deputy Chief of Staff of GHQ, to make a survey of conditions on the west coast. Before General Clark's departure, the Chief of Staff apparently also decided that Generals Drum and DeWitt must be retained as commanders of the First and Fourth Armies, thus disposing of GHQ's recommendation that the armies and theaters be separated. After conferences with General DeWitt and other Army officials, General Clark recommended to General Marshall the abolition of theater status but the retention of the existing bounds of the Western and Eastern commands—the latter to be designated the Eastern Defense Command. The principal mobile ground force units to be assigned to the Eastern and Western commands would be approximately five and six regimental combat teams, respectively. He also proposed to divorce the corps areas and their functions from the defense commands, and to allot all internal security responsibility to the corps area commanders as soon as military police or other special types of guard units became available to replace field force units in guarding installations. The

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44 Various papers, 27 Dec 41–10 Jan 42, GHQ 3202 Study on Organization of Eastern and Western Theaters.  
only exception would be the retention by the Western Defense Command of
responsibility for guarding certain vital aircraft factories on the west coast.
These proposals would have placed the four continental defense commands
on a common plane, except that the Eastern and Western commands would
have retained control of defensive air units and responsibility for air defense
measures and also, of course, would have had the great bulk of the forces
assigned to defense missions.46

There was general agreement on the major purpose of the new GHQ
recommendations—a sharp reduction in field forces currently assigned to the
theater commands. General DeWitt vigorously disagreed with the proposal
to remove the Ninth Corps Area and particularly its control of antisabotage
measures from his jurisdiction.47 General DeWitt's position was supported
wholly or in part in the War Department by the Provost Marshal General,
by the War Plans Division, by G–1, and by G–3. All agreed that internal
security in the Western Defense Command should remain a defense command
responsibility. War Plans wanted both Eastern and Western commands to
retain it, and also wanted to keep the theater designations.48

Before any action could be taken on the GHQ recommendations and the
objections raised thereto, a new element entered the picture. The decision made
in February for a sweeping reorganization of the Army high command re-
quired a further modification of the continental defense organization, since
the reorganization contemplated placing the corps areas under a new service
command. General Marshall therefore approved General Clark's GHQ plan
in principle, but he directed that it be revised to conform to the proposed
general reorganization of the Army and modified in other minor particulars.49

The general reorganization of 9 March 1942 reduced the War Department
to two parts, the civilian offices of the Secretary of War and his assistants, and
the military staff headed by the Chief of Staff and consisting of the War
Department General and Special Staff divisions. Under the Chief of Staff,

46 Memo, Gen Marshall for Gen Clark, 18 Jan 42, OCS 21354–5; two Memos of Lt Col Bryan
L. Milburn, G–3 GHQ, n.d., but about 19 Jan 42, GHQ 320.2 Study on Organization of Eastern
and Western Theaters; Memo, Gen Clark for SGS, 29 Jan 42, and other papers, OCS 18417–33;
Memo, Gen Clark for Gen Marshall, 27 Jan 42; Draft Memo, CG PP for TAG, 29 Jan 42. Last
two in OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./2.
47 Pers Ltr, Gen DeWitt to Gen Marshall, 22 Jan 42, OCS 18417–33.
48 Memo, PMG for DCofS Bryden, 2 Feb 42; Memo, G–1 for DCofS Bryden, 1 Feb 42; Memo,
G–3 for Gen Bryden, 2 Feb 42. All in OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./2. Memo (not used), WPD
for CoSs, n.d., WPD 4627–2. The mounting suspicion of the west coast population of Japanese
descent appears to have been an important factor in these objections. See ch. V, below.
49 Memo, Gen McNair for Lt Gen Joseph T. McNarney, 6 Feb 42, GHQ 320.2 Army and
Corps, binder 11; Memo for WPD, unsigned and undated, but personally corrected and O.K.'d
by Gen Marshall, OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./2.
three major commands—the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Services of Supply (redesignated Army Service Forces a year later)—absorbed many of the old War Department bureaus and assumed control of all nondefense functions of the Army within the continental United States. GHQ was abolished, its training functions being absorbed by the Army Ground Forces, and its operating functions by the War Plans Division. This division (soon renamed the Operations Division) became the Chief of Staff’s command post for directing operations. Thus the continental theaters and commands came under the command direction of the War Plans Division, while the corps areas (presently renamed service commands) were placed under the intermediate control of the Services of Supply.\(^50\)

On the same day that the Army published the general reorganization plan, General McNair, who was about to take command of the new Army Ground Forces, proposed to General Marshall a scheme for shifting most of the larger field force units from continental theater to Army Ground Forces control. He also proposed that the First and Fourth Armies remain under the Eastern and Western commands but that they be virtually divorced from the training of large units (corps and divisions), most of which would be put under the Second and Third Armies.\(^51\) His recommendations were followed generally in the continental reorganization that became effective on 20 March.

\((\text{Map I})\)

In this reorganization the Eastern Theater of Operations was abolished and the Eastern Defense Command was established within the same area.\(^52\) Newfoundland remained under the administrative control of the Eastern Defense Command, and a month later the Bermuda Base Command was similarly attached to it. The Western Defense Command kept its bounds, including Alaska, and its theater status, but at this time the War Department intended that it too would cease to be a theater of operations as soon as the movement of the bulk of the Japanese population into the interior had been completed. All but one of the divisions were taken away from (though not necessarily taken out of) the Eastern Defense Command; the Western Defense Command kept direct control of two divisions, and the other major units within its bounds were placed under a joint control with the Army Ground Forces. The Eastern and Western Defense commanders might never-

\(^50\) WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42. For more detailed accounts of the March 1942 reorganization, see Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 148-53; and Cline, The Operations Division, pp. 90-95.

\(^51\) Memo, CofS GHQ for CG FF, 2 Mar 42, OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./3.

\(^52\) War Department directives issued shortly thereafter, on 31 Mar and 19 Apr 1942, reduced the Eastern Defense Command to the dimensions indicated on Map 3.
theless use any troops within their bounds in an emergency. Under the initial directive, the Western Defense Command continued to command the Ninth Corps Area, including its supply and internal security functions; in the rest of the United States the corps areas and all their functions passed to the control of the Services of Supply. A fortnight later the War Department also removed the Ninth Corps Area from Western Defense Command control, but the defense commander retained responsibility for Japanese and enemy alien evacuation and for guarding installations, as well as control over troops assigned to carry out these activities. The commanding generals of the Second and Third Armies continued to command the Central and Southern Defense Commands, which were now clearly charged with all Army responsibilities for repelling external surface and air attacks on their areas. Since this directive specifically exempted the air forces within the Central and Southern Defense Commands from defensive missions, the interior defense commands could get air support only by calling upon air units assigned to the Eastern and Western Defense Commands. The First and Fourth Air Forces remained with the Eastern and Western commands, which were also directed to centralize control over all antiaircraft units under the Air Forces' interceptor commands.\(^{53}\)

Soon after this reorganization, confusion developed over the control of internal security measures. The War Department on 22 April rectified the situation by authorizing the defense commanders to establish military areas within their commands. Within the military areas, the defense functions of the corps area commanders were to be put under the "direction and supervisory control" of the defense commanders, and otherwise the defense commanders were made "responsible for the planning and execution of all defense measures."\(^{54}\) Shortly thereafter, and with War Department approval, Generals Drum and DeWitt created military areas coextensive with the boundaries of their commands, and the Southern Defense Command established a military area along the entire Gulf coast. Thus in a wide belt along the coastal frontiers of the continental United States the Army continued to maintain unity of command and centralized control over all means assigned to defense.

The Army Air Forces challenged this unity and centralized control in June 1942 by raising anew the question of responsibility for continental air

\(^{53}\) Ltrs, TAG to CG's, 18 Mar and 2 Apr 42, AG 381 (3-2-42).

\(^{54}\) Ltrs, TAG to CG's, 22 Apr and 4 May 42, AG 381 (3-2-42). Remarks of Gen Marshall at War Council Mtg, 27 Apr 42, SW Conf, binder 2. The War Department took this action under authority of Executive Order 9066, 19 February 1942, issued then to facilitate the evacuation of the Japanese from the west coast. See ch. V, below.
defense, and specifically by asking that the First and Fourth Air Forces be returned to its control. The Air Forces also proposed to reorganize the four fighter commands directly responsible for active air defense measures along geographic lines very different from those of the defense commands. The fighter commands would also be given control of blackouts, dimouts, and radio broadcasts. The War Department passed these proposals on to the defense commanders and to Army Ground Forces for comment.55

Army Ground Forces' single comment on the proposals was, "Centralizing air defense would disrupt unity of command in the defense commands. . . . Since unity of command is deemed vital, the proposals are not favored." 56 This was the main reason for the War Department's rejection of the Air Forces' requests. Though recognizing that Air control would at least in theory permit a more uniform and better integrated continental air defense system, the War Department held that "the principle of unity of command within the geographical subdivisions is of paramount importance in order that the local defense effort may be coordinated under one commander located at the scene of action." 57 Besides, as General Drum pointed out, by midsummer of 1942 the existing continental defense organization was beginning to function in as efficient a manner as the limited means of the defense commanders permitted. He added a comment worthy of inclusion in any study of organization:

The success or failure of any organization depends as much on its being thoroughly understood by all concerned and competently administered by all echelons as on its original form. The present organization includes all elements essential to an effective defense grouped under a single responsible commander, has been developed for and is particularly well-suited to the assigned mission, and has the advantage of months of trial and error.58

General DeWitt considered that the proposed changes were "dangerously unsound and academic," that they would cripple the entire structure of west coast and Alaskan defense, and that in any event it was absurd to centralize control of west coast air defense in Washington, three thousand or more miles from the scene of action.59 The views of the defense commanders prevailed, and for the time being both the responsibility and the control of air defense

55 Memo, CG AAF for CofS (Attn: OPD), n.d. but received in OPD 15 Jun 42, OPD 381/71; Ltr, TAG to CG's, 25 Jun 42, AG 381 (3-2-42).
56 1st Ind, CG AGF to TAG, 6 Jul 42, on TAG Ltr, 25 Jun 42, OPD 381/71.
57 Memo, ACofS OPD for CG AAF (Through: DCoS), 1 Aug 42, WDCSA 381 Nat Def.
58 1st Ind, Hq EDC and First Army to CofS WD, 30 Jun 42, on TAG Ltr, 25 Jun 42, OPD 381/71.
59 1st Ind, Hq WDC and Fourth Army to TAG WD, 1 Jul 42, on TAG Ltr, 25 Jun 42, AG 381 (3-2-42).
means remained with the Eastern and Western Defense Commands. The Southern and Central Defense Commands kept the responsibility but never did get independent control of active air defense elements.

Before Pearl Harbor no one raised the issue of Army-Navy unity of command over continental United States defense forces. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of the Army Air Forces proposed that he be given command of all Army, Navy, and Marine Corps air operations launched from continental bases. General Arnold pointed out that in accordance with the RAINBOW 5 plan the Army Air Forces was responsible for the active air defense of the continental United States, and that the very limited number of combat and patrol aircraft available to both services seemed to require centralized control of those at hand. The War Plans Division recommended to General Marshall the establishment of air unity of command only on the more exposed west coast. The creation of continental theaters of operations during December and the allocation to them of active air defense responsibility changed one premise underlying General Arnold's proposal; and for the time being General Marshall withheld action on it.

The devastating submarine offensive that developed along the Atlantic coast from January 1942 onward, and the continued threat of carrier-based air attack on the west coast, required as much offshore air reconnaissance as the Army and Navy could provide, as well as bombardment aviation ready to strike at submarine and surface vessels. The conduct of air reconnaissance and bombardment operations against ships (unless they comprised a hostile invasion force) was a Navy mission, and the theoretical argument for Navy unity of command over such operations was sound enough. But in early 1942 the Navy had very few shore-based planes available for such work, and the Army had to provide the bulk of the planes so employed on both coasts. The Army's air arm in early 1942 was itself too short of trained bombardment units to assign any of them permanently to reconnaissance, which from the Air Forces' point of view was distinctly a secondary mission. Besides, by the end of January both continental theater commanders had worked out satisfactory arrangements with the Navy for co-ordination of air operations over the sea. At General Marshall's request, General Clark of GHQ had also investigated this problem on the west coast in late January. He joined with the local commanders in recommending against any attempt to establish air unity of command there. The Navy had so few planes that almost all of the reconnaissance was being done by the Army anyway, and the co-ordination of

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60 Memo, CofAAF for CofS, n.d. but between 7 and 13 Dec 41, OPD Exec 8, bk. 1; Memo, ACoFS WPW for CofS, 7 Dec 41, OCS 212278-7, commenting on this proposal.
Army and Navy air operations was as good as could be expected under the circumstances.  

The Navy rather than the Army was the first to propose a system of command unity for continental frontiers. This development came about in connection with a reorganization and redesignation of naval coastal defense forces. "Sea frontiers" were replacing "naval coastal frontiers"; and these sea frontiers, which were to contain almost all of the Navy's coastal combat forces (ships and planes), were being put under fleet command. The Navy's fleet commander, Admiral Ernest J. King, proposed that the sea frontiers also command all Army air units allocated to overwater operations. General Marshall countered with the proposal "that full unity of command in all continental coastal frontiers and Alaska be vested in the Army over all naval forces which do not normally accompany the fleet."

Informal discussion between General Marshall and Admiral King in mid-February produced a tentative agreement on continental unity of command. This arrangement would have placed the Navy's sea frontier commanders under Army command except during fleet operations off the coast. It would have put Army harbor defense forces except antiaircraft units, and all other Army units engaged in operations "involving missions in or over sea areas," under the Navy sea frontier commanders. Thus Army overwater air operations would have been under intermediate Navy command, but the Army theater or defense commander would have retained authority to allot, withhold, or rotate air units for this purpose as he desired. During adjacent fleet operations, the normally allotted sea frontier forces (Army and Navy) would have been under fleet command, but this command would not have extended to other Army continental defense forces. Details of the arrangement were still unsettled when General Marshall and Admiral King transmitted an interim joint directive on 25 March vesting the Navy sea frontier commanders immediately with unity of command "over all Army air units allocated by defense commanders for operations over the sea for the protection of shipping and for antisubmarine and other operations against enemy seaborne activities."

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61 Min, War Council Mtgs, 26 Jan 42, SW Conf, binder 2; Memo, Gen Clark, DCoS GHQ, for Gen Marshall, 27 Jan 42, OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./2.
62 Memo, Adm King for U.S. CSoS, 5 Feb 42; Memo, CoS for Adm King, 11 Feb 42. Both in WPD 2917-44.
63 Memo, ACoS WPD for Gen Arnold, 16 Feb 42, WPD 2917-46; Remarks of Gen Marshall at War Council Mtgs, 16 Feb and 23 Mar 42, SW Conf, binder 2; Memo, Adm King for Gen Marshall, 19 Mar 42; Jt Dispatch, CoS and CinC to CG's, 25 Mar 42. Last two in OPD 384 (4-3-42).
Instead of the agreement contemplated during February and March, the Army and Navy in April agreed on a different plan for continental coastal command—the essential difference being that in a "state of non-invasion" unity of command would not extend beyond the scope of the 25 March directive. If invasion threatened, the Army and Navy chiefs were to declare either a "state of fleet-opposed invasion" or a "state of Army-opposed invasion." In the first case, the only change in the normal command relationship would be to put under Army command such local naval defense forces as were exempt from sea frontier command. In the second case, the Army would command all coastal defense forces, including those of the Navy's sea frontiers. Admiral King and General Marshall on 18 April declared a "state of non-invasion" to exist, and within the continental defense commands (except in Alaska) this condition remained unchanged throughout the war. Unity of command in the continental United States during World War II was therefore confined to Navy command of Army air units allocated to the Navy's sea frontier commands for overwater missions.\(^64\)

After mid-1942 the need for continental defense activity progressively declined, but it was not until September 1943 that the First and Fourth Armies were separated from the Eastern and Western Defense Commands, and the First and Fourth Air Forces taken away from them and restored to the Army Air Forces. Thereafter the theory of Army unity of command was maintained by prescribing that, with War Department approval, the commanding generals of the Eastern and Western Defense Commands might assume command of any air units within their territorial jurisdiction to meet a serious hostile threat.\(^65\) On 27 October 1943 the War Department terminated the Western Defense Command's theater status, detached Alaska from it, and designated the latter a separate theater of operations effective 1 November 1943. The Eastern Defense Command absorbed the functions and area of the Central Defense Command at the beginning of 1944, and a year later similarly absorbed the Southern Defense Command. Thus the Army's continental defense structure remaining in 1945 was a mere shell of that created in December 1942, but organizationally it still reflected the principles advocated in prewar planning of wartime unified command responsibility and over-all territorial coverage.

\(^{64}\) Jt Dispatch, CofS and CinC to CG’s, 18 Apr 42; Ltr, TAG to CG’s, 11 May 42. Both in OPD 384 (4-3-42).

\(^{65}\) Hq EDC and First Army, GO 15, 9 Sep 43; Hq WDC and Fourth Army, GO 87, 14 Sep 43; Memo, CG AAF for CofS (Through: OPD), 10 Aug 43; Memo, ACoSF OPD for CofS, 5 Sep 43. All in AG 381 (3-2-42).
CHAPTER III

Preparations for Continental Defense

Until the nation went to war in December 1941 the military preparations for guarding the continental United States centered around four lines of activity: harbor defense, defense against air attack, civilian defense, and the protection of vital nonmilitary installations. Although primarily concerned with measures for protection against bombardment from the air, the Army did not entirely neglect the fixed coastal defenses that offered limited protection against surface attack. Seacoast defense against a determined surface attack or invasion would have required the integrated employment of all types of Army mobile ground and air forces in addition to the harbor defense units, but plans for employing mobile forces for this purpose remained comparatively nebulous until after the United States entered the war. Prewar plans for an integrated employment of the major air defense elements—aviation, antiaircraft artillery, and an aircraft warning service—were far more concrete, though actual preparations on the eve of Pearl Harbor left much to be desired. Civilian defense, associated with air defense but not considered a direct Army responsibility, received a good deal of military attention during the prewar period that helped to limit military commitments thereafter. On the other hand, the Army had to do much more when war came than it had planned to do in safeguarding nonmilitary installations.

Harbor Defenses

For more than a century before World War II harbor defenses had constituted the primary element of the means employed by the Army for seacoast defense. Harbor defenses consisted of permanently installed guns of various calibers, which could be supplemented in an emergency by mobile coast artillery guns and controlled mine fields. Their purpose was, first of all, to guard the defended area against invasion and capture; secondly, to protect the area against naval bombardment, and shipping against submarine or surface torpedo attack; and finally, to cover the seaward approaches to the
principal naval anchorages sufficiently far out to enable ships of the United States Navy to emerge and meet attack. Indeed, the location of naval shore installations and fleet anchorages was the most important factor in determining the location of Army harbor defenses, and the Navy's insistence on the necessity of such defenses was the principal reason for their retention and improvement during World War II. Adequate protection of bases and ships in port freed the Navy for offensive action. The War Department was also well aware of the fact that the maintenance of permanent seacoast defenses gave major coastal cities a sense of security which might help to ensure against an unsound dispersion of the Army's own mobile ground and air forces in a war emergency.  

For a good many years before World War II the Army had recognized the inadequacy of existing harbor defenses. They offered no protection against aerial bombardment, and, since most seacoast guns were outranged by modern naval armament, they could no longer guarantee defense against naval bombardment. In studying the situation in 1923, the War Department decided that either a larger fleet or a much larger number of aircraft would provide more effective protection for harbor areas than the existing defenses, but it also held that the use of either would be highly uneconomical. It concluded, "When it comes to preventing enemy ships from sailing into a harbor and taking possession, the cheapest and most reliable defense appears to be guns and submarine mines."  

Primarily for the latter reason, the General Staff decided in 1923 that permanent seacoast fortifications should still be considered essential. It recommended the abandonment of a number of harbor defenses that were no longer of military value and concentration on the improvement of those remaining, particularly by providing them with new long-range guns and more antiaircraft protection. It also urged more combat aviation to supplement harbor defenses. It called for the retention of permanent defenses for eighteen coastal areas—the same eighteen that were to be included in the modernization program of 1940 and that still possessed fixed defenses in 1945.  

1 Memos, WPD for CofS, 8 Mar 23 and 6 Aug 31, WPD 1105 and 1105-55; unsigned and undated study (Jan 41?), title: Harbor Defenses, Their Purposes, Composition, and Organization, WPD 1105-69; Joint Action, par. 19. See FM 4-5, 29 Jul 40, for details of Coast Artillery organization and tactics.  

2 Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Mar 23, WPD 1105. This study, approved on 17 Apr 1923, remained the basic definition of War Department policy with respect to harbor defenses until the eve of World War II.  

3 Ibid; Rpt of Harbor Def Bd, 27 Jul 40, AG 602 (4-30-40), sec. 1; tab A, OPD Interoffice
Between 1923 and the onset of the war emergency in the early summer of 1940, the Army gave a good deal of thought to the improvement of harbor defenses. It drafted new defense projects for each harbor area between 1930 and 1932, and in 1931 it established a Harbor Defense Board to supervise the execution of these projects and outlined the basic policies that were to guide the board in its recommendations. As a result of the growing tension between the United States and Japan, most of the meager funds available for harbor protection between 1933 and 1938 were spent on improvements along the Pacific coast. The threat of war in Europe in 1939 prompted larger appropriations and the resumption of work on gun installations along the Atlantic front. The end of naval armament limitations during the 1930's had also re-emphasized the need for better long-range guns; to meet this need the Army had adopted the 16-inch barbette carriage gun as the standard harbor defense weapon against capital ships, but only a few had been installed. Existing harbor defense projects called for many other improvements, and it was estimated in February 1940 that to complete approved projects would cost about $60,000,000. Three months later, the Chief of Coast Artillery described the existing defenses in these terms:

With but few exceptions our seacoast batteries are outmoded and today are woefully inadequate. Nearly every battery is outranged by guns aboard ship that are of the same caliber. More alarming than this is the fact that every battery on the Atlantic Coast, and all but two of the batteries on the Pacific Coast, have no overhead cover so are open to attack from the air.

Despite his protests, the War Department decided that the general shortage of antiaircraft guns was so critical that no mobile and no more fixed antiaircraft guns could be included in harbor defense projects.

The Harbor Defense Board was engaged in a resurvey of seacoast defense needs at the time of France's downfall in June 1940. Until then, the pos-

Memo, 24 Oct 45, OPD 660.2/62. From Maine to the State of Washington, these locations were: Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, New Bedford, entrances to Narragansett Bay, eastern entrance to Long Island Sound, New York Harbor, the Delaware and Chesapeake entrances, Charleston, Key West, Pensacola, Galveston, San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and the entrances to the Columbia River and Puget Sound. The Navy considered all of the defenses except those at Galveston essential to its purposes. Memo, WPD for CofS, 6 Aug 31, WPD 1105-55.

Various papers and studies, WPD 1105 and WPD 3617; Ltr, SW to Senator Augustine Lonergan, 19 Aug 32, WPD 3793-40.

Memo, CofCA for CofS, 31 May 40, WPD 1956-77.


In March the Veterans' Administration had raised anew the old question as to whether the Army had any more posts that might properly be abandoned. This had initiated a resurvey of harbor defense posts and needs.
sibility of any naval attack on the American coast line had appeared very remote; thereafter, at least until the fate of the British and French fleets became known, the United States faced the real possibility of serious naval inferiority in either the Atlantic or the Pacific. The new naval outlook resulted in an enlargement of the current survey into a complete reassessment of harbor defenses.\(^8\)

The board’s report of 27 July 1940 recommended the general adoption of the 16-inch gun as the primary weapon and the 6-inch gun as the secondary weapon in all fixed harbor defenses. It proposed that defense projects include 27 new 16-inch two-gun casemated batteries and partial air cover for 23 primary batteries (including ten 16-inch) already installed or previously approved. The 16-inch guns had a maximum range of about twenty-five miles, and, at least theoretically, could keep any hostile ship at a safe distance from any of the twelve harbor areas where they were to be installed. The board also proposed the construction of 50 new 6-inch two-gun barbette carriage batteries, which would provide long-range fire (about fifteen miles maximum) against cruisers and other lighter ships, and which would greatly reinforce the 63 existing secondary batteries (mostly 6-inch and 3-inch semi-modern barbette carriage guns) that were to be retained. Its plan called for the abandonment of 128 obsolete and obsolescent seacoast batteries as soon as the 77 new batteries were installed. Thereafter, too, coastal defenses could be manned with substantially fewer troops. The board estimated that the whole program would require three years to complete and would cost about $82,000,000—less than the cost of one new battleship.\(^9\)

After careful consideration the General Staff approved the proposed modernization program. Informal questioning of the senior members of the Navy’s War Plans Division elicited the unanimous opinion that, in the absence of the fleet, land-based aviation alone could not be considered a sufficient defense against naval attack. In the Army only the Chief of the Air Corps disagreed with this opinion. He thought that airplanes could be safely substituted for land-based guns in coastal defense. The formal approval given the modernization program in early September 1940 was accompanied by a recommendation that $62,000,000, or about three-fourths of the

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\(^8\) On the general situation and other American defense preparations in June and July 1940, see Conn and Fairchild, *Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, ch. II.

\(^9\) Ltr, Maj Gen Walter C. Baker (CofCWS), President, Harbor Def Bd, to TAG, 27 Jul 40, AG 602 (1-40-40), sec. 1. In 1940 the board consisted of the Chiefs of Coast Artillery, Engineers, Ordnance, Chemical Warfare Service, and Air Corps, as well as the Chief Signal Officer, with the senior member being the presiding officer. The board’s recommendations with respect to mobile coast artillery are mentioned below.
estimated total cost, be allotted for construction and contract authorization through 30 June 1942.\footnote{Various papers, dated 7 Aug–11 Sep 40, AG 662 (4–30–40), sec. 1, and WPD 4279–2. The program was officially approved on 5 Sept, and the TAG letter announcing it was dated 11 Sept.}

The planning, construction, and emplacement of seacoast guns and their auxiliary equipment took a long time under the best of circumstances. This was particularly true of the big guns. From the beginning the 1940 modernization program had to compete with the general and rapid expansion of the whole Army, and the program was also slowed by the continuously expanding naval construction program. By July 1941 only four 16-inch gun batteries were ready for action, and construction work had been started on only five others. By then it appeared that the 16-inch gun program could not possibly be completed for several years and that in the meantime the planned expansion of American air and sea power would make the full program unnecessary. After rearguing the merits of airplanes versus guns in seacoast defense, the War Department in the late summer of 1941 decided to limit active work to those batteries that could be completed by 30 June 1944. As a result all work on fourteen of the thirty-seven 16-inch batteries planned for the continental United States was indefinitely deferred.\footnote{Various papers, dated 2 July–2 Sep 41. WPD 4279–21.} The expansion of overseas base activity during 1941 was an important factor in delaying the continental 6-inch gun program, the War Department in November giving priority to the completion of twenty 6-inch gun batteries in outlying bases.\footnote{1st Ind, TAG for CofCA, 3 Nov 41, on Memo, CofCA for WPD, 4 Oct 41, AG 660.2 (9–11–40), sec. 1.} In consequence, the condition of the continental fixed harbor defenses on the eve of Pearl Harbor was not much different from what it had been before the adoption of the modernization program fifteen months earlier.

The Army's mobile coast artillery in the continental United States in December 1941 consisted of six tractor-drawn 155-mm. gun regiments and parts of one 8-inch gun railway regiment. At this same time there were thirty-one regiments and three separate battalions of fixed-gun harbor defense units in the United States or, roughly, five times as many fixed-gun forces as there were mobile.\footnote{Two studies by Lt. Col. Edward M. Harris, prepared in August 1949, summarize the organization and deployment of Army seacoast artillery units from World War I through World War II. In OCMH.} Plans in the 1930's had contemplated using a much larger proportion of mobile guns, particularly of railway guns, to supplement fixed-gun defenses in wartime. But railway artillery had such limited tactical mobility and such extreme vulnerability to air attack that it had been
all but discarded as a coastal defense weapon before the United States entered
the war. After Pearl Harbor, railway guns were used at a few east and west
coast locations but were replaced as soon as other weapons became available.
Pending the completion of approved 6-inch gun projects, the Army used
155-mm. gun batteries to cover their positions; and sixteen batteries of
these guns had been installed along the Atlantic front by December 1941.
During the war the Army made much wider use of tractor-drawn batteries,
placing them at many points along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts.
It used at the maximum seventy-two 2-gun batteries, both to bolster
permanent harbor defenses and to provide temporary protection to ports that
had no fixed-gun installations. For a while during 1942 the Army also drafted
field artillery batteries of 75-mm. guns and 105-mm. howitzers into coastal
defense service. This proceeding was reversed at the beginning of 1944 when
the Army discontinued the use of mobile guns in coast defense at home and
put coast artillery weapons of this type into field service.

As an integral part of harbor defenses the Army for many years had planned
to install strings of electrically controlled mines across the ship channels
and narrows of port approaches. Army mine fields were intended primarily
to prevent submarines from slipping into inner harbor areas. Controlled mine
fields, as provided for in harbor defense projects, were quickly installed in
many harbor entrances after the declaration of war. They caused much trou-
bale, since the mines then available were of a buoyant type that rested only
fifteen feet below the water’s surface, and passing ships frequently fouled the
connecting cables. In 1943 the Army replaced the buoyant mine with a newly
developed ground mine that all friendly ships could clear without danger and
that had an explosive charge powerful enough to destroy any sort of enemy
vessel that might attempt to intrude. Ground mine fields remained in position
until the summer of 1945.

During the war Army harbor defenses were further improved by the intro-
duction of radar and by the provision of new means for dealing with fast-

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14 Memo, WPD for CoFS, 8 Apr 39, WPD 3617-39; Rpt of Harbor Def Bd, 27 Jul 40, AG
602 (4-30-40), sec. 1.
15 History of the Eastern Defense Command (hereafter cited as Hist of EDC), OCMH, ch. 4,
and History of the Western Defense Command, 17 March 1941–30 Sept 1945, OCMH (hereafter
cited as Hist of WDC), ch. 14.
16 Memo, CofCA for ACofS WPD, 8 May 41, WPD 2521-81, and other papers in this WPD
file and in AG 660.3 (8-23-41); Memo, CoFS for CNO, 10 Feb 42, tab E, title: Misc Information
Concerning Use of Controlled Mines During War, WPD 1105-70; Hist of EDC, pp. 26–28;
Study by Col Herbert C. Reuter, 5 Sep 49, A Summary of Historical Information Pertaining to
Controlled Submarine Mining, prepared in connection with the transfer of submarine mine
responsibility from the Army to the Navy in 1949, copy in OCMH.
moving torpedo boats. Radar, though never completely reliable, normally permitted the operation of Army guns and searchlights at their maximum range instead of at a visual range determined by weather conditions.\textsuperscript{17} Studies in late 1940 convinced the Army that it had no adequate weapons to deal with motor torpedo boats. Coast Artillery School tests in 1941 indicated that the best weapon would be the 90-mm. antiaircraft gun; but, because of the shortage of such guns, existing 3-inch fixed guns had to serve as makeshift antimotor torpedo boat weapons until late 1942. Thereafter the Army installed special antimotor torpedo boat defenses along the Pacific and northeast Atlantic coasts, ideally in a grouping of two fixed and two mobile 90-mm. guns, and two mobile 37-mm. or 40-mm. antiaircraft guns. Toward the end of the war some of the fixed 90-mm. guns were about the only actively manned Army harbor defense elements, and incidentally they were also the only shore-based antiaircraft weapons ready to operate as such along the east coast.\textsuperscript{18}

It was the Navy's responsibility to control all ship movements within defended harbor areas, and the Navy supplemented the Army's defenses by installing harbor nets and booms, by planting contact mines and detection devices in outer harbor approaches, and by conducting offshore patrols.\textsuperscript{19} Mine sweeping was also the Navy's business, and German mine-laying submarines gave the sweepers some work of this sort to do along the Atlantic coast between May and November 1942.\textsuperscript{20}

In each harbor the device for managing all of the defenses was the harbor entrance control post, manned by both Army and Navy officers. A joint directive defined the mission of these posts as follows:

To collect and disseminate information of activities in the defensive sea area; to control unescorted commercial shipping in the defensive coastal area; and to take prompt and decisive action to operate the elements of the harbor defense, in order to deny enemy action within the defensive coastal area.\textsuperscript{21}

Harbor entrance control posts began to appear during 1941. Throughout the war they were maintained at all defended harbors, providing the main link

\textsuperscript{17} Hist of EDC, p. 29; for types of harbor defense radar, see Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1956) (hereafter cited as Terrett, The Emergency), app.

\textsuperscript{18} Various papers, WPD 3617-63 and WPD 1105-103; Hist of EDC, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{19} "Joint Action," ch. III, and Memo, CNO for Commandants, Naval Districts, 5 Nov 40, sub: Jt Def of Harbors, WPD 1105-65, describe the respective responsibilities of the two services during World War II.


\textsuperscript{21} Jt Cir, approved by CNO, 29 May 41, and by CoS, 23 Jun 41, distributed by Ltr, TAG to CG's, 25 Jun 41, AG 660.2 (5-29-41).
between higher command headquarters and all subordinate elements of a harbor defense. It was generally believed during the war that these posts permitted a close interservice co-operation that gave the whole harbor defense system a high degree of potential efficiency, but the enemy's failure really to challenge the system leaves this a matter for conjecture.

Until 1940 fixed harbor defenses were maintained on a caretaking basis, and the guns were not actually manned except at a few forts for training purposes. Regular Army harbor defense forces numbered about 4,200 men in 1939—less than one-third of the number regularly maintained in harbor defenses before World War I and less than one-tenth of the number that would have been required to man the existing equipment with only one relief. Army mobilization plans in 1938 and 1939 contemplated that the National Guard would provide the bulk of the approximately 50,000 troops that would be needed for harbor defenses in wartime, but National Guard units of this sort numbered only 7,000 men in 1939. There was little change in harbor defense strengths until the fall of 1940, when the induction of the National Guard into federal service permitted the partial manning of all active installations. As the rehabilitation and reinforcement of harbor defense posts continued through 1941, units were recruited to full strength and all fixed guns were manned and put in operating condition. By the fall of 1941 the strength of harbor defense forces was approximately 45,000, and they were almost the only troops specifically assigned by the Army to continental defense until the formal entry into war in December.

War and the establishment of theater-type commands on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts led to an increase in harbor defense forces. The January 1942 Troop Basis allotted harbor forces a strength of 54,000, and their actual strength was about 70,000 from the spring of 1942 until mid-1943. In the early months of the war, harbor defense forces manned obsolete as well as more modern weapons. War Department orders generally ended this practice before the close of 1942, and most of the coastal defense mortars and disappearing carriage guns were dismantled during 1943.

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23 Hist of EDC, ch. 2, and History of the Northeastern Sector, Eastern Defense Command, OCMH (hereafter cited as Hist of NE Sector: EDC), pp. 1–2, give a brief survey of Atlantic coast developments during this period. The latter is filed with retired EDC records.
24 Memo, G-3 for WPD, 15 Jan 42, WPD 3674-83; The higher actual strength resulted principally from the temporary use of field artillery units during 1942, and thereafter from the overstrengths authorized during the transition from general to limited service.
25 Ltr, SW to CG’s Def Comds, 18 Jul 42, OPD 660.2/23; Hist of EDC, p. 25.
The War Department tried to speed up the modernization program after the outbreak of war, with indifferent success. Though site construction for the whole program could have been completed within a year or so, manufacture of weapons and their accessories faced competition not only from the naval building program but also from the production of more urgently needed Army weapons—tanks, for example. By September 1942 the prospect of completing the modernization of heavy seacoast artillery during the war appeared dim, and even if built it seemed even more unlikely that the guns would ever be used. With Navy concurrence, the Army cut back the 16-inch gun program by abandoning ten continental battery projects previously deferred. On paper this move actually increased the number of currently au-

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26 Memo, G–4 for TAG, 26 Dec 41, and accompanying OCS Memo for Red, OCS 18585–95; D/F, WPD to SOS, 26 Mar 42, OPD 660. 2/2.
authorized projects, but subsequent cancellations cut the big-gun program much further. During 1943 and 1944 substantial reductions also occurred in the 6-inch gun program, principally because the Army had a much more pressing need for field artillery weapons.

When the war ended the future of coast artillery was still uncertain. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided in early 1945, "As to major caliber and minor caliber fixed seacoast artillery, all that we now have, emplaced in continental and overseas harbor defenses, should be retained and maintained in serviceable condition, with the recognition that subsequent developments may demonstrate the desirability of substituting some type of new weapon therefor." Current OPD thought in October 1945 held that, until new weapons capable of performing Coast Artillery missions were developed, existing installations ought to be maintained in the best possible condition and provided with modern fire control instruments. Between 1940 and 1945 the modernization program had cost more than $220,000,000, and it had provided the continental United States with nearly two hundred modern and modernized guns—including nineteen 16-inch and forty-eight 6-inch long-range batteries. Though the total number of gun installations had declined by more than one half since May 1940, the later equipment was far superior to the earlier in its capacity to resist attack by large ships. In 1945 no attack of this sort on the continental United States could be foreseen for many years to come, and when the war ended all seacoast artillery except a few 90-mm. antiaircraft guns was placed in a strictly caretaking status.

Air Defense Preparations

When the GHQ Air Force was established in March 1935, its principal mission was the defense of continental coastal frontiers. Two months later the War Department issued a general directive on air defense to the four army commanders, designed to stimulate planning and preparations for an integrated defense by aviation, antiaircraft artillery, and an Army-controlled aircraft warning service against air attacks that might be launched against the continental United States, as well as for "passive" measures for the protection

27 Memo, Chief, S&P Group, for Chief, North American Theater, OPD, 30 Sep 43, OPD 660.2/50; Ltr, OPD to COMINCH, 31 Oct 42, AG 660.2 (9-11-40), sec. 1; Ltr, COMINCH to CofS, 8 Nov 42; Memo, CG SOS for CofEngrs, CSigO, CofOrd, and CofCWS, 20 Nov 42. Last two in OPD 660.2/23.
28 JCS Policy Memo 15, 20 Mar 45.
of the civilian population and industry. In accordance with this directive some preliminary planning was done and test air defense exercises were held during 1937 and 1938. In the latter year the acceptance in national policy of a new theory of air defense, which called for major reliance on the projection of air power outside the United States to interdict the establishment of hostile air bases elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, led in the spring and summer of 1939 to a general reassessment of the nation's aviation policy and its means for air defense.

Aircraft

The report of an Army Air Board submitted in June 1939 embodied the basic policies that guided the development and employment of Army aviation during World War II. The report designated three basic missions for military aviation, the air defense of the continental United States, similar defense of overseas possessions, and "operations outside of the United States and its possessions as required by the situation." It defined the continental defense mission in these terms:

To provide in the United States (zone of the interior) the necessary close-in air defense of our most vulnerable and important areas, to include, where necessary, reasonable protection against off-shore carrier attacks. These forces are not intended to repel a mass air attack or to afford air protection to our entire coastline, but are designed to limit the effectiveness of air raids upon our exposed vital areas.

The Air Board recommended the establishment and maintenance of nine major air bases, which would ring the continental United States from New England to the Pacific Northwest. These were to be the main operating bases for the approximately fourteen tactical groups that were to be maintained by the GHQ Air Force. This force, which would contain 104 heavy, 84 medium, and 142 light bombardment airplanes and 324 pursuit planes, was now to have a mission of performing frontier defense, reinforcing overseas possessions, and furnishing expeditionary striking forces within the Western Hemisphere as required. The board based its estimate of the air strength needed for continental defense, as well as for the other purposes mentioned, on a careful assessment of the aviation strength and capabilities of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Despite their ominous and growing air power, these nations in 1939 did not have any planes capable of even a one-way transoceanic flight
with a bomb load for a direct attack on the United States, and as late as February 1942 Germany had only a few planes that could have been used for this purpose. If the United States was successful in preventing the establishment of hostile air bases in the hemisphere, then only carrier-based or tender-based planes could pose a real threat of air attack. Japan had six carriers built, and Germany was constructing two; but, because of American naval strength in the Pacific, it was assumed that no more than two enemy carriers would be employed at any one time in hit-and-run raids against either coast of the United States, and that even raids of this sort would be fairly improbable. The chief danger, as the planners saw it in 1939 and indeed throughout the prewar period, was that which, if France and Great Britain were defeated, would come from the projection of German and Italian air power by stages across the North Atlantic or from Africa to Brazil in the southern Atlantic. The continental air bases were therefore to be used not only for home defense but also as springboards for the projection of American air power to meet this danger.  

In a reassessment of the air defense situation after the outbreak of war in Europe, a new Air Defense Board decided that the continental United States needed only 68 medium bombers and 270 pursuit planes specifically for defense purposes. This estimate was reaffirmed in May 1940, on the eve of Germany's onslaught against the West, because it was believed that a force of this strength could deal adequately with a two-carrier attack on either coast. The German triumph in France produced a quick upward revision of the Army's over-all aviation goal, but no provision was made during the summer of 1940 or in the succeeding months of mobilization for allotting more planes to continental defense. Indeed, in the build-up of air power under the new 54-group program, planes were allotted among the wings and, in 1941, among the air forces in the continental United States without any particular reference to continental defense.

Despite its seeming unreadiness for action, not only because of its rapid expansion but also because of the drain of American aircraft production to the fighting nations of the Old World, the Air Force Combat Command of 1941 (the successor of the GHQ Air Force) had a good deal of latent combat strength, which it was to exhibit as soon as the United States plunged into the

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34 Tab C, Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 39, WPD 3807-41; tab F, Rpt of Comm 2, Air Def Bd, 3 May 40, OPD Exec 12, item 17.
war. In June 1941 its 22 bombardment groups contained only about a quarter of the airplanes they were supposed to have, and its 17 pursuit groups had an even smaller proportion of their required strength in planes. Between June and November 1941 the number of combat aircraft fit for action more than doubled, and the Air Force Combat Command on 30 November had about 480 bombardment and 650 pursuit planes of modern and semimodern types; but only 4 of its bombardment and 5 of its pursuit groups had anywhere near their full complement of planes. A state of war brought a quick redistribution of strength in December 1941 and January 1942, which gave the continental United States more aviation protection than had been planned for it at any time before Pearl Harbor.\footnote{Air Force Combat Comd Status Rpts, 30 Jun and 30 Nov 41, OPD Exec 16, items 27 and 29. See ch. IV below, for the deployment of aviation in continental defense after Pearl Harbor.}

\textit{Antiaircraft Artillery}

The first significant step toward improving continental antiaircraft artillery protection came in June 1937, primarily because of growing tension between the United States and Japan. This was a plan for increasing the Army's 3-inch antiaircraft gun strength from 135 to 472, and it included the procurement of enough guns to equip thirty-four Regular Army and National Guard mobile antiaircraft regiments. At that time the Army had only five skeletonized regiments of this sort in continental service, and most of its 3-inch weapons were installed as fixed guns in harbor defenses. In effect, the antiaircraft guns then available could have done little more than help protect the harbor defenses themselves. The new plan promised to provide enough weapons by the summer of 1940 to give at least some protection to other military installations and to industrial areas along the coasts.\footnote{Various papers, WPD 1956-41 and WPD 1956-54; Memo, WPD for CofS, 7 Aug 39, WPD 4078-11.}

The Army also had a long-range plan for augmenting its antiaircraft strength as a phase of the Protective Mobilization Plan first prepared in 1933. Under this plan and its four projected augmentations, the number of antiaircraft regiments would be increased progressively to a total of 80 for an Army of 4,000,000 men, of which 50 were to be assigned to the field forces engaged in major operations and 30 held in a reserve available for defending vital installations along the coastal frontiers. This plan provided the base for a careful survey and recalculation of antiaircraft needs undertaken by the War Plans Division in the spring and summer of 1939. It was apparent to the
planners at the outset that the National Guard and Organized Reserves would have to furnish the bulk of antiaircraft forces, since the Regular Army could not hope to maintain enough units of this sort in peacetime to meet the needs of a real war emergency. The War Plans Division also acknowledged that the number of regiments projected in the Protective Mobilization Plan was "grossly inadequate" to meet the requirements of home defense. Practical considerations would in all probability limit the antiaircraft defense of vital installations to those within a hundred miles or so of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and within this zone the defense of naval installations would have a high priority. 

The completed General Staff study on antiaircraft needs contained recommendations based on a number of other assumptions. Accepting the estimate of the Air Board, it held that any likely air attacks on the United States would be hit-and-run affairs launched from carriers and would therefore be far less destructive than those possible within the narrow confines of Europe. Since raids of this sort would incur great risk to the attacker, they would be carefully aimed at objectives vital to an American war effort, most of which were located in or near metropolitan centers. To the planners it appeared obvious that ship-based raids would be less likely along the coast where the major portion of the United States Fleet was located. Since the United States was keeping most of its naval strength in the Pacific, this study and later plans gave greater emphasis to the Atlantic than to the Pacific coast, even though Japan had a number of carriers in operation and Germany and Italy had none. Along the Atlantic coast, the vital and densely populated area between Boston and Norfolk was to receive the greatest protection, the study designating more than two-thirds of all the first-priority allocations of gun battalions for the defense of that region. Lastly, since in all probability the Army in a war emergency could not furnish enough antiaircraft artillery to supply even the most reasonable needs of all localities, antiaircraft units and equipment would have to be kept mobile so that they could be concentrated where they would be most needed.

The antiaircraft study as approved forecast an initial requirement of 87

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38 The Army during the prewar period never did calculate the needs for aviation and antiaircraft artillery for defending the continental United States against land-based air power, because until 1942 transoceanic bombardment was impossible and also because it was assumed that American air power would be successful in preventing the establishment of any hostile air base within the Western Hemisphere.

battalions of 3-inch or larger antiaircraft guns, and 57 battalions of 37-mm. automatic guns, for continental coastal defense under the assumptions outlined above. Under the most unfavorable foreseeable circumstances (that is, neither the Navy nor the air arm available to protect the coastal approaches), there would be a need for 157 additional battalions of big guns and 97 more automatic weapons battalions. The estimate of initial requirements represented the equivalent of 72 antiaircraft regiments for continental defense, in contrast to the 30 regiments originally allocated under the Protective Mobilization Plan. Objections that the technological improvement of bombardment aircraft had outmoded existing antiaircraft equipment were countered with the assumption that there could and would be comparable advance in antiaircraft gun efficiency. The study assumed that most of the big gun battalions would get the new 90-mm. instead of the existing 3-inch weapon for high altitude firing, and that the 37-mm. automatic gun would replace the .50-caliber machine gun then in current use for lower altitude saturation firing. The planners also rejected the claim of certain air enthusiasts that defensive aviation could entirely supplant antiaircraft guns in air defense. They argued that it could not be safely assumed that enough defensive aviation would be constantly available or that planes would be alerted in time to meet attacking aircraft before they reached their objectives. Furthermore, the use of combat aviation for purely defensive purposes represented a wasteful diversion from its primary offensive mission, and the provision of antiaircraft artillery even in a very modest quantity would help free the air arm as well as the Navy for offensive action.\textsuperscript{40}

The exploration of antiaircraft needs in the spring and summer of 1939 set the pattern for Army thinking and planning on the subject until the summer of 1942. The chief problem was to get the men and equipment needed. When the war began in Europe there were only 5 Regular Army and 13 National Guard mobile antiaircraft regiments in existence. The Army organized 4 new Regular Army regiments in the fall of 1939, and it planned to increase the regimental strength of the National Guard from 13 to 28. This expansion, if carried through, would provide 37 regiments instead of the 34 for which equipment was to have been procured under the 1937 plan. The 37 regiments would have to serve all purposes—reinforcement of overseas garrisons, field force duty, and continental coastal defense.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid. For further details on the organization and development of antiaircraft units and equipment, see Army Ground Forces Study 26, by Lt. Col. Alvin M. Cibula, \textit{The Antiaircraft Command and Center} (Washington, 1946); and Constance McLaughlin Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, \textit{The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War}, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), ch. XIV.
In the spring of 1940 a committee of the Air Defense Board reconsidered antiaircraft as well as aviation needs for home defense, and reached the conclusion that even the defeat of France and Great Britain would not require any change in the current Protective Mobilization Plan objective of 37 antiaircraft regiments, of which 25 were now earmarked for the field forces and only 12 for defense of continental installations. The War Department approved this conclusion, as well as the committee’s reaffirmation of the earlier long-range plan for 30 regiments for continental service in a fully augmented Army. In doing so it did not reject the August 1939 antiaircraft plan, but accepted the 37-regiment goal as the most that could be accomplished in the development of a balanced force of arms before war actually broke out.\textsuperscript{41}

By the autumn of 1941 the Army actually had 37 antiaircraft artillery regiments and 9 separate gun battalions in service in the continental United States.\textsuperscript{42} Most of these units still needed much training, and they were even shorter in equipment and ammunition than in training. As of September 1941, the War Department considered the equivalent of about 18 antiaircraft regiments (instead of 12 as planned in 1940) available for continental defense purposes, but because of weapons and ammunition shortages it did not anticipate that any units earmarked for home defense would be ready until the summer of 1942.\textsuperscript{43}

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Army deployed about two-thirds of its antiaircraft units and almost all of the antiaircraft weapons available to guard vital installations on the east and west coasts. In units this deployment amounted initially to about 29 regiments. From December 1941 until January 1944 the number of regiments engaged in continental defense remained approximately the same, the total varying between a strength of 24 and 32 regiments.\textsuperscript{44} Though the number of regiments deployed appeared to represent a rather exact fulfillment of prewar plans, in fact this probably happened more by chance (what chanced to be available in December 1941) than by design.

During the first six months of war the Army actually intended to provide a much more extensive antiaircraft artillery coverage for the east and west coasts of the United States. The first wartime Troop Basis of January 1942 provided for the equivalent of 60 prewar regiments for continental defense

\textsuperscript{41} Tab F, Rpt of Comm 2, Air Def Bd, 3 May 40, OPD Exec 12, item 17; Memo, WPD for CofS, 29 Nov 40, WPD 4079–36.
\textsuperscript{42} Army Station List, 15 Oct 41, AG 322 (10–8–41).
\textsuperscript{43} D/F, WPD to CofAS, 4 Sep 41, WPD 1956–94.
\textsuperscript{44} See below, ch. IV. OPD Weekly Status Maps, 5 Feb 1942–20 Jan 1944, AG 061, show the actual strengths during 1942 and 1943.
by the end of 1942. The Eastern Theater of Operations in February submitted an elaborate antiaircraft artillery defense plan that called for a minimum of about 100 regiments and a maximum of nearly 300 for the defense of the east coast area alone—and the maximum would have required a troop strength of about 458,000. A study of the first priority provisions of this plan, together with a re-examination of the August 1939 plan, led the War Department to approve a plan for providing the coastal areas with the equivalent of 100 antiaircraft regiments by the end of 1943, and the continental defense commanders were so notified in May 1942. The new War Department plan, like that of 1939, allotted more than two-thirds of the projected antiaircraft strength to the east coast. But all of these 1942 projects remained paper plans never to be carried out during World War II. In fact, throughout 1942 and 1943, the west coast had greater antiaircraft artillery strength than the east coast; and in general the continental defense commanders had to get along with the unit strength allotted to them when the United States entered the war.

Aircraft Warning Service

Army preparations for an aircraft warning service, the third major element of an air defense system, began with preliminary test exercises on both coasts in 1937 and 1938. During those years also, the Signal Corps was developing the first American radar equipment for detecting the approach of aircraft, the SCR–268 for use with antiaircraft artillery searchlights and the long-range SCR–270 for discovering the approach of enemy planes in time to alert defensive aviation. The prospective availability of the SCR–270 led the War Department in May 1940 to direct the army commanders to select sites for locating detectors along the coasts and also to adjust their existing aircraft warning service plans to the use of radar. With the commanders' recommendations in hand, the War Department on 2 August 1940 approved a plan to provide the continental coastal frontier with a ring of

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45 Memo, G–3 for WPD, 15 Jan 42, WPD 3674–83. These regiments would have required about 108,000 troops, twice as many as this Troop Basis provided for manning harbor defenses.

46 Antiaircraft Artillery Def Project, ETO, 1942, 10 Jan 42, submitted to the General Staff by Lt, GHQ to TAG, 4 Feb 42, AG 660.2 AA (1–1–40), sec. 1; various papers, WPD 4627–5, especially Memo, CofCA for WPD, 21 Feb 42.

47 Memo, WPD for G–3, 8 Mar 42, WPD 1956–96; Memo, OpD for TAG, 18 May 42, OPD 660.2 AA/13. Throughout this antiaircraft discussion all figures of regimental strength have been reduced to the common denominator of the prewar mobile regiment, which contained one battalion manning twelve large guns and a second battalion manning thirty-two automatic guns.

48 Terrett, *The Emergency*, ch. V, and app pp. 318–25, in which the Army radars of World War II are identified and described.
The Signal Corps' SCR–270 radar (and its fixed version, the SCR–271) had a range, when competently operated, of between 100 and 150 miles. When production of the SCR–270 was just beginning in early 1941, the Chief of the Air Corps described this set as "no good" and asked that it be replaced by British radar models as soon as possible. After the United States entered the war there was much more widespread criticism of the SCR–270 and continued demands that it be replaced by British equipment. Actually, most of the criticism seems to have been misdirected; the lack of trained manpower to operate the machines, rather than the machines themselves, appears to have been chiefly at fault. In any event the SCR–270 was the radar that served the Atlantic and Pacific coasts during 1942 and 1943, the years of active continental defense.

At the end of November 1941 the Army was completing preparations for installing mobile radars at thirteen locations along the Atlantic coast and ten locations along the Pacific front. After Pearl Harbor the War Department allocated almost all its available SCR–270's to continental use. Fortunately, this equipment had the great advantage of mobility, and by early January 1942 the Army had been able to install 31 of these sets along the east coast and 27 along the west coast. By mid-July 1942 these numbers had been increased to 41 and 31, respectively. The antiaircraft forces by then were also fairly well supplied with SCR–268's to guide their operations. Thereafter the number of long-range radars in continental defense use declined, as the prospect of air attack faded and the demands of overseas forces mounted.

Barrage Balloons

A fourth air defense element, the barrage balloon, received considerable attention but only scant development before the United States entered

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49 Ltr, TAG to CG's First, Third, and Fourth Armies, 23 May 40; Memo, WPD for CofS, 31 Jul 40. Both in AG 660.2 AA (5–22–40). Also, various background papers, WPD 3640.
51 George Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M. Oakes, and Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Test, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957), pp. 95–97.
53 History of the Western Defense Command, vol. III, ch. 10, contains a map of the overwater coverage of the twenty-five radar installations maintained along the west coast in 1943.
the war. The Air Corps began work on a barrage balloon in 1938, but more active preparations did not get under way until the beginning of 1941, after reports during the summer and fall of 1940 had indicated the effectiveness of balloons in Great Britain and Germany in interfering with low-level bombardment. After the Air Corps had developed a large and relatively high-altitude-type balloon, the Chief of Staff decided to transfer most barrage balloon activity to the Coast Artillery Corps. When the Coast Artillery took over at the beginning of June 1941, the Army had three barrage balloon companies and just three balloons. But it had tentatively decided to acquire 3,000 more balloons, and plans evolved during the summer and fall of 1941 to expand the barrage balloon force to be used for continental defense purposes alone to eighty-five batteries, each flying thirty-five balloons.54 By 1 November 1941, five battalions of three batteries each were being organized and trained at the Barrage Balloon Training Center at Camp Davis, North Carolina. The Army sent three of these battalions to bolster the air defenses of the west coast soon after the outbreak of war. It also decided to replace the Air Corps type of balloon with the smaller British balloon which, although designed to fly at lower levels, was easier to handle, less expensive to manufacture and operate, and readily procurable.

As one part of the new antiaircraft project approved in the spring of 1942, a maximum of forty balloon battalions of prewar strength for continental defense was to be provided. The number actually employed for this purpose during the war was a little more than one-tenth of this strength, and in the United States balloon battalions were used only at a few west coast locations and at the Sault Ste. Marie Canal.55

The Air Defense System

The experimental Air Defense Command activated in early 1940 provided the model for the four continental interceptor commands established under the Air Force Combat Command in June 1941.56 The plans of the new Army Air Forces contemplated that the interceptor commands would control nineteen air defense regions to be established within the United States, and that each region would be provided with a pursuit group and a separate aircraft warning organization. Within the latter there would be a central information center to receive word of aircraft movements from the

54 Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Jun 41, WPD 1098-22; various papers, AG 452.3 (10-5-40) (1).
55 Directory, Army of the United States, 1 Nov 41; Memos, CofCA for CofS, 15 and 18 Feb 42, AG 452.3 (10-5-40) (1); Memo, OPD for TAG, 18 May 42, OPD 660.2 AA/13.
56 See ch. II above.
coastal radar stations and from a civilian ground observer's organization through intermediate filter centers. The information center in turn would alert all air defense elements and issue air raid warnings to the civilian defense organization. In the fall of 1941 the Army Air Forces assumed that it would command the whole air defense system in the continental United States in time of war, by exercising operational control over the ground elements of the system.

In fact, the continental air defense system after Pearl Harbor differed in several respects from that plotted during 1941. As already noted, the air forces on the east and west coasts were put under the theater commanders and remained there for defense purposes until September 1943. The anti-aircraft forces, instead of depending upon the aircraft warning service, had their own separate observation and alert systems and, in general, occupied a more autonomous position in relation to the interceptor commands than projected in 1941 plans. The principal combat mission of Army aviation along the American coasts turned out to be the conduct of antisubmarine operations under Navy operational control. During the war more than 6,000 ground observer posts supplemented the coastal radar system in the aircraft warning service, but how effective this system would have been in detecting and charting the approach of hostile planes is very uncertain. Though the system was most elaborate in the northeastern United States, early in 1943 the training officer at the Boston filter center guessed that the chances of intercepting hostile planes before they attacked were about one in ten, while the executive officer at the same station estimated them at one in twenty.57

The Air Forces acknowledged before the end of 1943 that its flight training program in coastal areas had made the aircraft warning service almost completely ineffective, because it was impossible under the circumstances to identify aircraft accurately.58 Air defense had been sacrificed to air training for the offensive.59

The Army and Civilian Defense

Civilian defense during World War II comprehended all measures of "passive" defense necessary to safeguard civilian lives and property to the

57 Min, WD Gen Council Mtg, 1 Mar 43.
58 Incl to JPS 333, 1 Dec 43, ABC 384 North America (11-29-42), sec. 2. See ch. IV, below.
59 For further details on the origins and deployment of the various elements of the continental air defense system, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. VI, Men and Planes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955) (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate, eds., Men and Planet), ch. I.
maximum degree possible against enemy action, particularly against air action in the form of high explosive, incendiary, or gas bombardment. In Army plans and practice before and during the war, it also included the spotting of aircraft movements by civilians at thousands of ground observer posts. The effectiveness of both types of activity depended on building an immense organization of civilian volunteer workers, and the American civilian defense organization that developed during the war has been called "the greatest example of mass mobilization . . . ever voluntarily undertaken by the citizens of the United States." The Army played a substantial role in planning the civilian defense organization and in advising and assisting it, but, in order to concentrate military energy and forces on active defense measures, from the summer of 1940 onward the Army resisted efforts to make civilian defense a direct War Department responsibility.

As noted earlier, the War Department had included civilian defense planning in its general directive of May 1935 to army commanders on air defense preparations. In the following year the Chemical Warfare Service, which because of its apprehensions of gas attack took the lead in urging Army civilian defense planning, prepared and published Passive Defense Against Air Attack, a handbook forecasting a range of protective activities similar to those actually undertaken during the war. At the urging of the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service in June 1939 the General Staff launched a thorough investigation of civilian defense problems, and the directive initiating this study broadened its scope to include civilian protection against sabotage and internal disturbances as well as all forms of external attack.

In its initial completed form (October 1939) the civilian defense study proposed the establishment within the War Department of an agency to be called the Civilian Defense Bureau and extensive collaboration between Army officers and civilians in planning the details of civilian defense. The General Staff dropped the latter idea because it feared the Army might be-

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60 PMG Study 3B-1, 30 Apr 46, title: Defense Against Enemy Action Directed at Civilians, OCMH (hereafter cited as PMG Study 3B-1, 30 Apr 46).
61 ASF Monograph, War Department Relationships With the Office of Civilian Defense, completed in May 1943, in OCMH, is an inadequate treatment, but the two volumes of appended documents are a useful compilation on the organization of civilian defense protective services during the war. (This work is hereafter cited as WD Relationships with OCD.)
62 Ltr, TAG to CG's, 21 May 35, AG 660.2 AA (5-15-35); Memo and Incls, WPD for CofS, 26 May 38, WPD 4078. Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), chapter X, describes the work of the Chemical Warfare Service in this field before and during World War II.
63 WPD Interoffice Memo, 1 Jun 39, WPD 4078-3.
come involved in too much expense and too many requests for immediate assistance.\textsuperscript{64} It also shied away from a separate civilian defense bureau, agreeing instead that civilian defense preparations could be combined with internal security functions in the Provost Marshal General's office provided for in current mobilization plans.

The Civil Defense Plan as approved on 18 March 1940 stated that the War Department should:

1. Exercise general supervision of civil defense planning.
2. Provide for administrative control of civil defense by appropriate War Department and civil agencies.
3. Co-ordinate civil defense measures with other War Department activities.
4. Authorize the use of military personnel to assist local, municipal, and state authorities.
5. Prepare essential instruction material for the guidance of civil, military, and private agencies.\textsuperscript{65}

The plan and accompanying staff study assumed that, as soon as the situation required, the War Department should and would assume national direction of civilian defense preparations through a provost marshal general's office; that this office would work through the corps area commanders with state civilian defense councils; and that civilian defense organized on a local and municipal basis would operate under state supervision and (indirectly) under Army control. The plan included organization for antisabotage and other internal security functions as well as for combating external attacks.\textsuperscript{66}

The Army thus had a civilian defense plan in hand but had done little to implement it when the events of May and June 1940 brought the United States face to face with the possibility of an early and ill-prepared entry into the war. The initiative for immediate action came from the American Legion, which in early June presented President Roosevelt with a plan, called the Service of Security Plan, for using the Legion's national and local units as a semimilitary civilian defense and internal security organization. As a matter of principle the President and his military advisers had to reject this proposal, believing as they did that any civilian defense organization must be built upon state police powers and public channels of authority.\textsuperscript{67} On the assumption that a federal civilian agency rather than the Army itself would be made generally responsible for civilian defense, the Chief of Staff vetoed the proposal to activate the office of the Provost Marshal General im-

\begin{list}{\textsuperscript{}}{\setlength{itemsep}{0pt} \setlength{parskip}{0pt} \setlength{parsep}{0pt} \\
\textsuperscript{64} Memo, G-3 for WPD, 12 Dec 39, WPD 4078-3. \\
\textsuperscript{65} Tab 8, Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Feb 40, WPD 4078-3. \\
\textsuperscript{66} Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Feb 40, and accompanying papers, WPD 4078-3. \\
\textsuperscript{67} Various papers, WPD 4078-21 and WPD 4078-25.}
mediately and, instead, approved the establishment in July 1940 of a Civil Defense Branch in the G–3 Division to exercise War Department civilian defense functions. On 2 August the President established the Division of State and Local Co-operation, primarily as a federal agency for the handling of civilian defense matters, and later in the same month he asked the American Legion to index and classify its membership in preparation for home defense duty.88

After it became apparent that Great Britain was not likely to fall, the tempo of civilian defense preparation declined. The new G–3 branch nevertheless kept busy on what has been called "the most important basic work done by the Army in civilian defense" during the war—the preparation, in collaboration with the appropriate services and service arms, of nine instructional pamphlets on civilian defense organization and procedure for protection against air attack. After the Secretary of War's appointment of the National Technological Advisory Committee in January 1941, its civilian membership helped in the preparation and review of these pamphlets, thus providing the sort of civilian advice that had been rejected for reasons of economy in December 1939. These War Department manuals were printed and widely distributed during 1941 and early 1942, and they provided local civilian defense organizations with much of the technical information that they needed to guide their operations. After the establishment of the Office of Civilian Defense in May 1941, the War Department transferred to it the responsibility of completing the pamphlets and of distributing them.69

In December 1940 General Marshall decided that the Army ought to take a more active hand in civilian defense preparations, and one result was the dispatch of a War Department Civil Defense Mission to England in January 1941 to observe and study the British civilian defense system. A number of other missions—municipal, state, and American Legion—visited Great Britain during the winter and early spring of 1940–41, and British arrangements for civilian defense had a substantial influence on American

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69 Memo, SGS for G–3, 5 Oct 40, OCS 17967–44; Remarks of CoS and SW at War Council Mtg, 26 May 41, SW Conf, binder 1; Ltr, SW to Dir OCD, 23 Jun 41, OCS 15491–48; Testimony of Mr. Walter D. Binger (of the National Technological Advisory Comm), 9 Jan 47, Report of War Department Civil Defense Board (Washington, February 1947), an. 1.
preparations. By early 1941 these preparations were under way all over the nation, but especially along the east coast. As early as August 1940 twenty-six states had established civilian defense councils of one sort or another, and the American Legion, carrying out the President's suggestion of the preceding August, in February 1941 registered more than 800,000 World War I veterans (not all of them Legionnaires) for home defense duty. In February also, the United States Conference of Mayors urged the need for establishing an effective federal agency for co-ordinating civilian defense matters, and the War Department made a similar recommendation on 17 March 1941. In April, before the President acted on these recommendations, the Army Air Corps arranged with the American Legion for it to take over the task of organizing and training the tens of thousands of ground observers who would be needed for the aircraft warning service.

President Roosevelt established the Office of Civilian Defense on 20 May 1941 and chose Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia of New York as its Director. The order creating the new office specified that its activities should be carried out along two more or less separate lines. One line of activity, under the jurisdiction of the Volunteer Participation Committee, was intended to promote public backing of the defense effort. The other line, under the supervision of the Board for Civilian Protection, included all measures directly concerned with the safeguarding of civilian lives and property against the hazards of enemy action. Before Pearl Harbor the activities under the Volunteer Participation Committee—which developed to include such functions as salvage, victory gardens, child welfare, and nutrition study—occupied the attention of most employees in the Office of Civilian Defense; even during the war about 60 percent of its employees were engaged in this sort of work. It was the universal opinion of civilian as well as military civil defense experts after the war that this diffusion of activity weakened the Office of Civilian Defense from the outset as an agency for supervising civilian protection measures. Furthermore, the office was

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71 Notes on Conf in ODCofS, 4 Feb 41, OCS Conf, Binder 10; 1st Ind. TAG for CofCWS, 24 Jul 41, on Memo, CofCWS for TAG, 30 Apr 41, AG 383 (3-6-41) (1); American Legion, Proceedings, 1941, p. 382.

72 The President is reported to have characterized it at the time as "sort of a ballyhoo committee." (Memo of Interv with President, 20 May 1941, attd to 20 May 1941 entry in Stimson Diary.) Mr. Wayne Coy, in his testimony before the War Department Civil Defense Board on 17 Dec 1946, stated that its establishment was perhaps uppermost in the President's mind in creating the Office of Civilian Defense. Report of War Department Defense Board, an. 1, pp. 208-09.
never given authority to direct civilian defense but only to enlist the voluntary co-operation of state and local organizations.73

Mayor La Guardia himself had a keen interest in protective activities. With the President’s approval, he obtained the services of Brig. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser, whose distinguished Army career had culminated in duty as Deputy Chief of Staff before his retirement in 1940, not only as Army member of the Board for Civilian Protection but also as Assistant Director of the Office of Civilian Defense and head of its Division of Civilian Protection. In June 1941 the War Department transferred some of the functions of the G–3 Civil Defense Branch to General Gasser and his small staff, and thereafter worked through General Gasser and (from July 1942 onward) his successor, Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant 3d, in guiding the lines of civilian defense activity with which the Army was concerned. In July 1941, when the Office of Civilian Defense ordered the creation of nine regional offices with boundaries coterminous with those of the Army’s corps areas, the War De-

73 Report of War Department Civil Defense Board, an. 1.
partment arranged to have one full-time and one part-time officer serve in each regional headquarters; and just before Pearl Harbor the Army authorized a staff of eight officers for each regional headquarters. These arrangements allowed a considerable degree of Army influence over protective measures without the assumption of any direct Army control over civilian defense.\(^{74}\)

The outbreak of war spurred the American public into a mass mobilization for civilian defense. By the end of January 1942 some 8,500 local community organizations had enrolled more than 5,000,000 volunteers, and the number of persons engaged in home defense activities of all sorts remained at about that figure for the succeeding year.\(^{75}\) There was an immediate and widespread demand in December 1941 that the War Department take over direct responsibility for civilian protection, and proposals to abolish the Office of Civilian Defense and turn over its protective duties to the Army continued to be advanced in Congress and elsewhere during the first half of 1942. The War Department successfully resisted these proposals, and the creation in April 1942 of the new Civilian Defense Board, which ostensibly gave the Army a stronger voice in the formulation of civilian defense policy, helped to still them.\(^{76}\) Nevertheless, in practice the Army exercised a good deal of indirect control of civilian protective services and made substantial contributions to them during 1942. This control was most extensive and most expertly exercised on the west coast, where Mr. James C. Sheppard, the regional civilian defense director from March 1942 onward, worked closely with the Army commander, General DeWitt, and usually followed his precepts.\(^{77}\)

Soon after the establishment of the Office of Civilian Defense Mr. La Guardia had asked the Secretaries of War and Navy for a statement of what they considered their proper sphere in civilian defense. Their answer, based on the Joint Board's consideration of the subject, specified the following military responsibilities:

(a) Maintenance of contact with Federal, State, and local authorities, through the Office of Civilian Defense and its appropriate agencies in the field, in order to insure coordination of War Department and Navy Department activities in relation to civilian

\(^{74}\) WD Relationships With OCD, pp. 12, 14, 65; Testimony of Gen Gasser, 23 Dec 46, Report of War Department Civil Defense Board, an. 1.
\(^{75}\) PMG Study 3B-1, 30 Apr 46, exhibit F, p. 5.
\(^{76}\) Stimson Diary, entry of 18 Dec 41; Ltr, SW to Chairman, Senate Comm on Military Affairs, 30 Mar 42, OCS 15491-133; Memo, Chief, Admin Services, SOS, for G-1, 30 May 42, AG 383 (5-30-42) (2); WD Relationships With OCD, p. 12.
\(^{77}\) Testimony of Gen DeWitt, 12 Dec 46, and Mr. Sheppard, 13 Jan 47, Report of War Department Civil Defense Board, an. 1.
PREPARATIONS FOR CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

defense where there is an overlap, and to render such assistance as may be feasible and mutually agreeable.

(b) Operation of all armed forces in combating enemy forces.

(c) Declaration, by the appropriate military authority of a state of alarm during periods of danger of aerial and other attacks,

(d) Enforcement, in conjunction with the civil authorities, of radio silences, blackouts, and other necessary protective measures in connection with active military defense.

(e) Assistance to the Office of Civilian Defense in the preparation of such legislation as may be necessary to authorize action specifically as indicated in sub-paragraph (d), above, by the military authorities, prior to the declaration of a national emergency.78

Some confusion in responsibilities for air raid warnings existed after the war began. In early 1942 it was made clear that the Army was responsible for detecting the movements of aircraft, for ordering air alarms, and for providing news about past or future air raid alarms. The civilian defense organization had the responsibility of disseminating air raid warnings to the public after the Army had ordered it to do so.79 Air raid alarms, blackouts, and dimouts raised problems of law enforcement within the realm of state police powers. Most states passed appropriate legislation to take care of the situation, and Army officers at regional headquarters frequently had an active hand in the drafting and enactment of these laws.80

In two other spheres, not specifically mentioned above, the Army contributed very materially to the efficiency of civilian protective activities. One was in the provision of equipment. Before Pearl Harbor the War Department had agreed to provide gas masks and other equipment needed for civilian protection, and Congress had appropriated $85,000,000 for the purchase of such equipment. Based on estimates of needs submitted by the Office of Civilian Defense, the Army planned the production of 50,000,000 gas masks for civilian use. Five million of them were actually produced, of which only 60,000 were on hand in December 1941. The only extensive distribution of gas masks was made to the west coast in late May 1942, just before the Battle of Midway. During the war the Army supplied civilian defense organizations with a number of other types of equipment such as steel helmets and protective clothing. By controlling the procurement and supply of civilian defense equipment the War Department could ensure that its production did not impede supply to the armed forces.81

78 Ltr, SW and SN to Mr. La Guardia, 29 Sep 41, AG 383 (3-26-41) (1).
79 Memo, SGS for SW, 27 Feb 42; Memo, SW for Dir OCD, 9 Mar 42. Both in OCS 15758-122.
80 PMG Study 3B–1, 30 Apr 46, exhibit F, p. 6.
81 The Chief of CWS initiated War Department preparations for supplying civilian defense equipment by Memo for TAG, 30 Apr 41, AG 383 (3-26-41) (1), and War Department policy on the subject is delineated in Memo, TAG for Chiefs of Arms, Services, and Bureaus, 18 Sep 41, in this same file. On post-Pearl Harbor supply see WD Relationships With OCD, pp. 45—48.
The other contribution was the Army's school system for training civilians, principally municipal firemen and policemen, to handle the various types of bombs—explosive, incendiary, and gas—that air attack might bring. The Chemical Warfare Service instituted a school for this purpose at Edgewood Arsenal, Md., in June 1941. After the United States entered the war regional schools with a similar course were established at six colleges, each staffed by an Army complement of six officers and twenty-five enlisted men. Special courses in problems of bomb disposal and engineering were also provided for civilians during 1942 at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., and Fort Belvoir, Va. About 8,500 civilians attended these Army schools, and in turn acted as instructors in local civilian protection schools throughout the nation. The government entrusted the training of aircraft spotters and air raid wardens to the American Legion, which for the latter purpose set up and conducted at its own expense fifty-six schools in thirty-one states. The American Red Cross also participated widely in training civilian defense workers in first aid.

The Army's interest and activity in civilian defense rapidly declined after 1942 because of the increasingly remote threat of serious enemy attack. The Office of Civilian Defense recommended its own abolition in August 1943, but the President decided to maintain it in order to support civilian morale during the war effort and to continue a minimum of protective services. Most of these services came to an end before the Office of Civilian Defense was formally abolished on 30 June 1945.

The great weakness in the American civilian defense system during World War II was its lack of any clear direction by a nationwide authority. The Army moved into this vacuum partially and informally, and perhaps adequately, considering the slight threat of serious enemy action against civilian lives and property in the United States during the war. It is doubtful whether a system so haphazardly planned and organized could have stood up under the strain of heavy attack. After the war was over it was generally recognized that civilian defense must continue to depend on the principle of self-help among individual civilians in local communities, backed by local

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82 Brophy and Fisher, *The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War*, Chapter X, describes the operation of these schools in detail.

83 WD Relationships With OCD, pp. 39-43; PMG Study 3B-1, 30 Apr 46, exhibit F.


85 Mauck MS, *Civilian Defense in the United States, 1940-45*, ch. V.
and state organizations operating under state police powers. But to secure uniformity in practice and effective mutual aid across state boundaries in a serious emergency this local foundation and organization needed much firmer guidance than it had during World War II from either the Army or the Office of Civilian Defense.

Guarding Nonmilitary Installations

During World War II the United States Army had to assume the major responsibility for protecting those public works, public utilities, and industrial plants in the continental United States whose continued operation it deemed vital to the war effort. In prewar planning the War Department had sought to limit the responsibility so that troops trained for combat would not have to be diverted in wartime to guard nonmilitary installations, a task for which they were not trained and for which they presumably could not be spared. Theoretically, state and local governments and private industry itself had the basic responsibility for guarding public works and private properties against the hazards of sabotage and open enemy attack. Therefore the War Department tried to adhere as closely as it could to the policy that Secretary of War Newton D. Baker had enunciated on 7 November 1919 in the following terms:

The true rule to be followed is that the public military power of the United States should in no case be substituted for the ordinary police powers of the States, and should be called into service only when the state, having summoned its entire police power, is still unable to deal with the disorder which threatens it. The constitutional obligation of the government of the United States is a guaranty conditioned upon the primary exercise by the States of their full power for the preservation of their own domestic peace. The responsibility for the security of property be it federal, state, municipal, or private, rests first upon the local government, then upon the state, and only devolves upon the Federal Government when all other forces of the locality or state have been exhausted or have been found insufficient to meet the emergency.86

Actually, the Army discovered during World War II, as it had during World War I, that it could not adhere to this policy. With the induction of the National Guard into federal service the states lost their normal instrument for large-scale internal security tasks, and the “home” and “state” guards raised

86 As quoted in Memo, G–3 for Gen Gasser, Bd for Civilian Protection, 14 Jun 41, WD Relationships With OCD, tab 14; and also in Memo, G–3 for TAG, 13 Sep 41, OCS 21084–20, an approved basic policy directive for Army-wide distribution on the subject of guarding nonmilitary installations.
as substitutes proved to be generally unavailable for extended guard duty. In both wars the states were reluctant to provide guards for federal properties and works. In any event, the vital installations that needed guarding were very unevenly distributed geographically, and it was too much to expect that the states at their own expense would assume this responsibility when it would have required such disproportionate degrees of effort on their part.\(^{87}\)

During the first few months of American participation in World War I the states had employed more than 100,000 National Guardsmen on defense tasks, principally to guard installations. After the National Guard entered federal service, many of the states organized home guard units and secured arms and some other equipment for them from the federal government. After the war it was estimated that the aggregate strength of these units had been about 79,000. Generally, the States had been unwilling to call out these units for extended duty at United States-owned properties or around communication facilities and public works. To guard these the Army organized a special force, the United States Guards, which had 48 battalions with a total strength of 26,284 officers and enlisted men on 11 November 1918. In function, at least, these battalions resembled the military police battalions (zone of the interior) that the Army hastily organized in World War II.\(^{88}\)

To carry out its acknowledged responsibility for protecting the United States from internal disorder and insurrection, the Army after World War I had developed a WHITE plan to govern the use of federal troops to quell domestic disturbances. During the pre-World War II period each corps area had the responsibility for maintaining a current Emergency Plan—WHITE for dealing with such disturbances as might foreseeably arise. At the outbreak of the European war in 1939 the corps areas were ordered to prepare plans for guarding defense industries and to be ready to execute these plans when so ordered by the War Department.\(^{89}\) As noted above, the original Civil Defense Plan of early 1940 contained measures for protection against sabotage. These measures were extracted from it in the summer of 1940 and put into the counter-fifth column plan, developed by G–2 and approved by the War Department on 22 October 1940. Since a primary purpose of the fifth column technique was to divert combat troops from field operations to internal

\(^{87}\) These conclusions, so far as World War I experience was concerned, were carefully pointed out in tabs 2 and 3 to the basic civilian defense study of 20 February 1940, WPD 4078–3, but they seem to have been overlooked in the later prewar planning.


\(^{89}\) Rads, TAG to CG's of Corps Areas, 2 Sep 39, AG 381 (8–24–39), sec. 1.
secure missions, the aim of the plan was Army cooperation through the corps area commanders with state and local guards and police forces in order to avoid the use of Army forces in an emergency. The corps area commanders were instructed on 1 November 1940 to gather information as discreetly as possible about state and local plans for dealing with fifth columnists and to transmit it to the War Department.  

By August 1941, all of the corps areas had completed local counter-fifth column plans, and the War Department arranged for a peacetime test of the First Corps Area (New England) plan in October 1941. In the same month, the War Department transferred the responsibility for supervising this work from G-2 to the Office of the Provost Marshal General, which had been activated on 31 July. But, when large numbers of Army combat troops were assigned by the corps area commanders to guard duty immediately after Pearl Harbor, they acted generally under the WHITE plans rather than under the counter-fifth column plans.

The War Department's prewar plan for mobilizing a 4,000,000-man Army had been revised in 1939 to include the activation of 56 military police battalions for duty in the continental United States. Only 3 battalions of this sort were in existence in September 1941 when the Army constituted the Corps of Military Police. Two months earlier Director La Guardia of the Office of Civilian Defense had recommended that the Army activate the rest of the 56 battalions at an early date; though acknowledging the primary responsibility of state and local governments and private operators to guard installations, Mr. La Guardia had pointed out how unprepared they were to take over the task in a real war emergency. The Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff rejected his recommendation because they believed that any move to prepare Army troops for guard duty would discourage state and local preparations along this line, and also because they hoped that the newly formed State Guards could provide the extra protection that would be needed in time of war.

After Congress approved the induction of the National Guard in September 1940, the War Department sponsored a bill, passed on 21 October 1940, that permitted a state to raise and maintain substitute forces during peacetime whenever all or a part of its National Guard was in federal service. The Army accepted the responsibility for supervising the training of these

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90 Various papers, dated Jul–Nov 40, WPD 4357 and OCS 15435.
91 Memo, G-2 for CofS, 25 Aug 41, OCS 15435–38; Ltr, TAG to CG’s, 3 Nov 41, WPD 4357.
forces through the corps area commanders and for providing them with some items of surplus equipment, including Enfield rifles. Originally, the War Department had planned to provide enough equipment to supply State Guard units at half the strength of inducted National Guard units. In November 1941, it doubled the authorized allotment of equipment in order to permit the states to raise a total force of 222,552 officers and enlisted men. By the end of October 1941 forces totaling 108,765 officers and enlisted men had been recruited in thirty-six states, and their equipment included 93,901 Enfield rifles turned over to them by the Army without charge. The Army was not able to give the State Guards much help in their training, and in particular it could not supply them with enough training manuals to go around. Men in the State Guards could be drafted into federal service, but most of them were older men above draft age. Many of them (four-fifths of the officers, and one-third of the enlisted men) had had some previous military experience. Almost all of them were fully employed men who drilled in their spare time and who could not reasonably be expected to serve on extended active duty.  

The unsuitability of the State Guards for extended duty, as well as their general unreadiness for action, helped to inspire new recommendations in September and October 1941 from Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, from the head of the G–2 Division, and from the corps area commanders on both coasts for the activation of additional military police battalions or, alternately, the earmarking of infantry battalions for use as guards if the United States went to war. With reluctance General Marshall finally approved a compromise scheme for giving military police training to one infantry regiment in each of eight National Guard divisions scheduled to be triangularized. The Chief of Staff explained his reluctance on the following grounds:

There can be no argument as to the importance of protecting our plants against sabotage, but I am convinced that the use of soldier guards is an expensive and not particularly efficient expedient. In effect, we recognize this when we use civilian guards to protect War Department buildings which offer a problem in protection somewhat similar to that of industrial plants. Soldiers are not trained as watchmen and are gen-

93 Memo, CofS for USW, 21 Apr 41, OCS 21169-26; Memo, G-3 for CofS, 5 Aug 41, OCS 20475-35; Ltr, Chief of Natl Guard Bur to SW, 31 Oct 41, OCS 21169-72; Ltr, CofS to Mr. Thomas H. Beck, 26 Nov 41, OCS 15491-91. For further details on the organization and activities of State Guards before and during the war, see the Annual Report of the Chief of National Guard Bureau, 1941, 1942, and 1946; also Natl Guard Bur, WDSS, MS, State Guard Training, OCMH.

94 Memo, CG Ninth Corps Area for CG Fourth Army, 18 Sep 41, GHQ 381 Preparedness for War, binder 2; Memo, G-2 for CofS, 16 Oct 41, OCS 20615-26.
erally younger and more impulsive than is desirable for men on such special duty. It is possible that a service of civilian guards may become necessary for plant protection, but I am sure that military units should be kept as an emergency reserve under the Corps Area commanders. We are planning to increase our Military Police force for this particular purpose.

If the War Department were to accept responsibility for guarding plants and installations, I anticipate an endless stream of requests from owners to obtain a detail of troops for their plants. Plainly, we could not afford such a diversion of our military effort. . . . It would be a mistake for the War Department to recede from the policy that the protection of plants and installations is the primary responsibility of operators, owners, and local and state governments. If these agencies prove ineffective they are backed up by the field forces which are available as a final reserve.\textsuperscript{95}

The military police training of the National Guard regiments had just begun when the United States plunged into the war. The corps area commanders immediately requisitioned thousands of field force troops from the army commanders to guard vital installations all over the nation, but especially along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. Requests for protection poured in to the War Department, not only from private sources and from local and state governments but also from other federal departments; the Secretary of the Interior, for instance, wanted a much stronger Army guard at Hoover, Grand Coulee, and Shasta Dams.\textsuperscript{96} Special instructions went out on 8 December to relieve Air Corps forces from guard duty, but none of the ground arms and services were immune. As an example, the Third Corps Area commander drafted 16 officers and 400 enlisted men for protective duty from the training cadre of the Quartermaster Replacement Center at Camp Lee, Va., and thus brought the training of about 9,000 troops to a virtual standstill.\textsuperscript{97} As of 17 December 48,107 Army troops and 13,556 State Guards were reported on guard duty throughout the nation, and in addition thousands of "irregular" state and local forces were called into action along the Pacific coast.\textsuperscript{98} Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, temporarily commanding the Southern California Sector of the Western Defense Command, neatly summarized the situation when he noted in his journal on 20 December:

Requests for Army Guards: Terminal Island, shipbuilding plants, commercial radio stations, railroad bridges and tunnels, railroad crossovers, dams, water supply, power plants, oil wells, tanks, and refineries. Aircraft manufacturing plants, hospitals, aqueducts, harbor defenses, airfields, offices of Interceptor Command, etc., etc. Everybody

\textsuperscript{95} Memo, CofS for USW, 27 Oct 41, OCS 20615-26.
\textsuperscript{96} Memo, G-3 for CofS, 9 Dec 41, OCS 14561-27.
\textsuperscript{97} Memo for Rcd on Memo, G-3 for TAG, 29 Dec 41, OCS 17529-136.
\textsuperscript{98} Memo, SW for President Roosevelt, 24 Dec 41, OCS 20615-33; Annual Report of the Chief of National Guard Bureau, 1942, p. 79.
makes a case for his own installation, and nobody gives a damn if the Army bogs down and quits training. Right now (December 20) we have seven regiments of infantry in the area, four of which are on guard duty.99

The day after Pearl Harbor, Director of Civil Defense La Guardia stressed to the President the immediate need for additional Army military police battalions to guard "bridges, power plants, water works," and so forth. "No city has enough police for emergency," wrote Mr. La Guardia. "States can't help much. Home Guard not constituted or prepared for such duty day-in and day-out." President Roosevelt sent his letter to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson with a penned note that read: "Harry Stimson—How about this. We ought to do something. FDR."100 On 16 December Presidential Executive Order 8972 appeared, "authorizing the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to establish and maintain military guards and patrols, and to take other appropriate measures, to protect certain national defense material, premises, and utilities from injury or destruction." By the third week in December the War Department had capitulated and planned to activate fifty-one additional military police battalions for continental duty as soon as possible.101 This would provide a total of fifty-four such battalions, with a strength of about 30,000 officers and men. The War Department planned to command them with officers over age for combat duty and fill them with limited service and overage enlisted men.102

Though new military police battalions could not be ready to replace field force units for several months, the Army after December 1941 rapidly withdrew combat troops from guard duty except along the Pacific coast. In mid-February 1942 a total of 31,123 Army troops and 3,742 State Guards were still performing guard duty, but more than three-fourths of these were on duty in the Ninth Corps Area.103 Pressure for more rather than fewer Army guards remained strong, and General Marshall during February and March had to put on a veritable campaign to impress Congress and the public with the necessity of concentrating on offensive preparations.104 By May 1942 the Army had the quota of ZI military police battalions that had been planned the preceding December, and subsequent authorizations in-

100 Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
101 Ltr, SW to Dir OCD, 24 Dec 41, OCS 20615-33.
102 Ltr, Admin Asst to SW to Chairman, Senate Comm on Military Affairs, 21 Jan 42, OCS 21169-72.
103 Notes on Conf in ODCofS, 17 Feb 42, OCS Conf, binder 32.
104 See, for examples, Memo, CoFS for ASW John J. McCloy, 24 Feb 42, OCS 15450-15; Ltr, CoFS to Hon. Warren R. Austin, U.S. Senate, 28 Feb 42, WDCSA 381 Nat Def (2-28-42).
creased the number available for continental duty to a maximum of eighty-nine in late 1942.  

During early 1942 the War Department was under considerable pressure also to support a "federalization" of the State Guards in order to make them a more efficient and available force for home defense. Such a move would have made the State Guards a force analogous to the British Home Guard and would, of course, have given it greater prestige and also a greater claim on federal military supplies. The War Department resisted these approaches, insisting that the allocation of police powers under the American constitutional system required that the states themselves keep an emergency force in being. Soon after American entry into the war the State Guard system as a device for protecting installations received one body blow when federal government agencies decided that they could not grant "administrative leave" to their own employees for active duty with the state forces. Another came in early 1942 when the Army because of its own acute shortages called in all of the Enfield rifles that had been loaned to the State Guards before the outbreak of war. In the later war years the Army provided a good deal of equipment and training direction to the State Guards, but it could not spare much of either during 1942 when the need for guarding installations was felt most acutely.  

To meet this need, particularly to guard government-owned and privately owned industries engaged in vital war production, the Army hit upon a new expedient. In practice during 1942 and 1943 it used military police battalions primarily to guard public works and large installations such as ports of embarkation. From the beginning of the war the Army had depended wherever possible on the civilian guards employed by private industries to protect them, internally and externally, against any sabotage the enemy might attempt. In the summer of 1942 the Army began to organize these guards as "auxiliary military police," in a manner that in effect put them under Army rule and regulation. The auxiliary military police, whose strength reached a maximum of about 200,000 during 1943, never became soldiers, but they did become an Army-controlled force that satisfactorily answered World War II requirements for plant protection in the continental United States.  

105 Directory, Army of the United States, 15 May 42; Office of the PMG, MS, World War II: A Brief History, OCMH, p. 11.  
106 Ltr (WD draft), President Roosevelt to Governor Culbert L. Olson of California, 29 Apr 42, WDSCA 381 Nat Def (5-7-42); Annual Report of the Chief of National Guard Bureau, 1946; Natl Guard Bur, WDSS, MS, State Guard Training, OCMH.  
107 PMG, MS, Auxiliary Military Police Program, OCMH.
CHAPTER IV

The Continental Defense Commands After Pearl Harbor

Essentially, the external defense problem of the continental defense commands after Pearl Harbor was one of preparing to fend off relatively minor surface attacks and, along the Pacific front, air attacks that might be launched from a carrier striking force. But even minor attacks could have caused extensive damage to vital installations and areas, and successful "nuisance" attacks might have had an almost calamitous effect on preparations for offensive operations overseas. After the Pearl Harbor experience the War and Navy Departments were also peculiarly sensitive to the prospect of the criticism that would certainly follow any sort of surprise attack that they had not prepared to meet as best they could.

Only the west coast was alerted before the enemy attacked. The war alert that was flashed on 27 November 1941 to the Philippine, Hawaiian, and Caribbean commanders had gone also to General DeWitt in his capacity of Commanding General, Western Defense Command. On the following day, a separate antisabotage alert was sent to him as Fourth Army commander. General DeWitt promptly communicated these alerts to his Army Air and Navy colleagues and to his subordinate commanders in the western United States and Alaska. His reply to Washington on 28 November described the defensive dispositions he had ordered and contained the assurance that "should hostilities occur this command [is] now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay." 1 In fact General DeWitt had already started intensive defensive preparations before he received the alert, and on 25 November he had asked the War Department to approve his new measures and the method of co-ordination that he was pursuing with Air and Navy commanders, so that the RAINBOW 5 plan would be executed at

1 Telg Hq WDC to CofS, 28 Nov 41, WDC 381 RAINBOW 5/28. This file also contains the 27 November warning. The 28 November antisabotage alert is in WDC 381 EPW/25.
once if war started. On 29 November the War Department expressed its formal disapproval of any measures beyond those required by the 27 November alert, for a reason most clearly expressed in an Army Air Forces memorandum of 29 November: "The President has issued very definite instructions that he wishes Japan to take first action if such action is to be taken." The disapproval did not change General DeWitt's course, and a conference on 1 December among Army, Army Air, and Navy commanders produced a joint Pacific coast defense plan that they were able to invoke as soon as hostilities began.

The final warning that General Marshall sent about noon on 7 December also went to General DeWitt, and three hours later he and the other continental defense commanders were informed that hostilities with Japan had commenced. The second message announced that the War Department RAINBOW 5 plan was to be placed in effect at once against Japan, and on 8 December the defense commanders were told to prepare as well for war with Germany and Italy. The formal announcement of a general state of war between the United States and the Axis Powers followed on 11 December.

The Army's RAINBOW 5 plan as revised through November 1941 specified that the continental defense commands should operate in wartime under Defense Category B, which under current definitions meant that they might be subjected to minor attacks. Army activity under this category would have been limited to a partial manning of harbor defense installations. As soon as accurate news of the extent of the Pearl Harbor damage reached General DeWitt he decided that the Pacific coast must operate under the higher Category C. On 11 December he directed all Army (including Army Air) commanders in his area to operate under Category C, and three days later the War Depart-

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2 Memo, CofAS for CG Air Force Combat Comd, 29 Nov 41, copy in WDC 381 WPR/40. This copy did not reach Headquarters, Western Defense Command, until 7 December 1941. Copies of the other documents referred to are in this file and in WPD 4544-13 and WPD 4544-18.

3 WDC 370.26/13 contains the record of this conference and the joint defense plan.

4 Memo, WPD for TAG, 7 Dec 41, WPD 4544-30, contains the message transmitted to WDC at 12:11 p.m., and Memo, WPD for TAG, 7 Dec 41, WPD 4544-20, the message sent at 3:00 p.m. The second message, actually composed before the news of Pearl Harbor reached Washington, contained the instruction that "antiaircraft artillery and other mobile ground forces in the United States will continue their present training missions until otherwise directed by the War Department." Since General Marshall considered that this instruction was inconsistent with the actual situation as it became known in the afternoon and evening of 7 December, the continental commanders were told on 8 December to disregard it. Entry of 8 Dec 41, GHQ 314.81 Diary; Memo, WPD for TAG, 8 Dec 41, WPD 4544-21.

5 Memos, WPD for TAG, 8 and 11 Dec 41, WPD 4175-18, embodying messages to be sent to the commanding generals of GHQ, the defense commands, and overseas commands.
ment authorized this category for all of the continental coastal frontiers. Category C areas were those in which minor attacks were anticipated "in all probability," and required a full installation and manning of harbor defenses and the provision of other ground and of air defense forces in accordance with strengths available and the immediate outlook along the particular frontier. The continental frontiers remained under Category C until April 1943, but during December 1941 both east and west coasts and during the first half of 1942 the west coast in particular received attention well beyond what Category C specifications required.

Defense Measures on the West Coast, 1941–42

Until the Japanese attacked in the Pacific, the United States had counted on its Hawaiian bastion and on the Pacific fleet to provide a secure barrier against any serious attack on the continental west coast. After Pearl Harbor it seemed, at the outset, that this barrier had been broken and that the 1,300-mile length of the west coast could be attacked by the Japanese in strength and almost at will. The most vital installations along this coast were military aircraft factories that had sprung up during the prewar years at Los Angeles and San Diego in the south and at Seattle in the north. In December 1941 nearly half of the American military aircraft production (and almost all of the heavy bomber output) was coming from eight plants in the Los Angeles area. The naval yards and ship terminals in the Puget Sound, Portland, San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas, and the California oil industry were of only slightly less importance to the future conduct of the war. In the first two weeks of war it seemed more than conceivable that the Japanese could invade the coast in strength, and until June 1942 there appeared to be a really serious threat of attack by a Japanese carrier striking force. These calculated apprehensions were fanned in the first few days of war by a series of false reports of Japanese ships and planes on the very doorsteps of the Pacific states.

6 Ltr, Hq WDC to CG's, 11 Dec 41, WDC 381 WPR/37; Memo, WPD for TAG, 14 Dec 41, WPD 4175–18. Joint Action, par. 31, prescribed the five categories of defense, A, B, C, D, and E. The manuscript History of the New York-Philadelphia Sector, Eastern Defense Command, in OCMH (hereafter cited as Hist of NY-Phila Sector, EDC), 198–202, contains a good description of them as they existed in the continental United States during World War II.

7 Min, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41; Tel Conv, Gen Marshall with Gen DeWitt, 8 Dec 41, WDC 381 WPR/48; Stimson Diary, entry of 9 Dec 41; WPD estimates of situation, 12 and 18 Dec 41, WPD 4622–37. On the problems of air defense after Pearl Harbor, see also the excellent Chapter VIII in Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 2–7, reflects one west coast commander's initial concern and subsequent exasperation in the days immediately
This was the outlook that persuaded the War Department to establish the Western Defense Command as a theater of operations on 11 December and that led it to concentrate its first attention after Pearl Harbor on the rapid reinforcement of the Army's ground and air garrisons along the west coast. When the war started, the Fourth Army had available fairly adequate harbor defense forces, 11 of the 12 infantry regiments allotted to it under the current RAINBOW 5 plan, and about 5 antiaircraft artillery regiments which lacked two-thirds of their equipment. The Second and Fourth Air Forces had only a fraction of their assigned strength in planes, and they were critically short of bombs and ammunition. During November and early December General DeWitt had requested more ground troops for defense purposes, but these were denied until the Japanese struck.\(^8\)

On and after 7 December General Marshall and his staff worked feverishly to strengthen the west coast defenses as rapidly as they could. A pursuit group from Michigan began to arrive in the Los Angeles area on 8 December, but it was the reinforcement of antiaircraft artillery defenses that received the most attention during the week after Pearl Harbor. By 17 December nine additional antiaircraft regiments had been rushed from various parts of the United States to the west coast, and, with some assistance from Marine Corps units, the vital installations in the Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego areas were thereby provided with at least some antiaircraft artillery protection. The Army also moved two additional divisions and many lesser types of ground combat and service units to the west coast before the end of December and made the 3d Division, already there, available for defense use. As a result of these moves the Western theater's major Army combat units in January and February 1942 included six infantry divisions, a brigade of cavalry, about fourteen antiaircraft regiments, and the equivalent of three pursuit and three bombardment groups. The troop strength of the Western Defense Command numbered about 250,000 at the beginning of February, and of these nine-tenths were ground troops. Approximately 100,000 of the ground forces were actively engaged in manning harbor antiaircraft defense equipment, in maintaining a beach and forward patrol along the coast line, in patrolling the

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\(^8\)Memo, Gen DeWitt for CG GHQ, 14 Nov 41, and subsequent exchanges, GHQ 381 Preparedness for War, binder 2; various papers, WPD 4175–18.
Southern Land Frontier, and in performing antisabotage duties at vital installations.9

By the third week in December, as the pattern of Japanese operations and the disposition of Japanese naval forces became known, apprehensions about an imminent and serious attack on the west coast subsided. The Western theater continued to have a high priority for equipping its air and antiaircraft units, but the flow of material for its other forces suddenly dropped off. General DeWitt was told that these forces would have to await the fulfillment of more pressing needs, and he was also denied the additional infantry division and cavalry regiment that he had requested.10 His equipment shortages were further aggravated by orders that required him to make up shortages of units being shipped through the Western Defense Command to overseas destinations and to supply antiaircraft guns for arming merchant ships in Pacific coast ports. The general assured GHQ that he would not let troops go overseas without equipment “if it takes every gun I have,” but naturally he wanted the items replaced and his own shortages made up as soon as possible.11 In instructions to his subordinate commanders issued on the last day of 1941, General DeWitt himself recognized that there was no longer any immediate danger of an invasion in force. By then the principal external threat to the Western theater appeared to be from the air, and “maximum air defense [was] therefore most important.” 12

The Second and Fourth Air Forces, located in the Western Defense Command when the war began, were there primarily for the training of units, and they had only a secondary and very subordinate mission of providing an air defense and an attacking force along the Pacific front. At the end of November 1941 the two air forces had a combined strength of 100 bombardment and 140 pursuit planes, many of them obsolete and obsolescent types.13 During December the Army Air Forces went through a rapid expansion that enabled it by mid-January to assign the Fourth Air Force (which by then had taken over the air defense responsibility for the entire west coast) 461 pursuit and 219 bombardment planes. Except for heavy

10 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with SGS, 23 Dec 41; Memo, Gen Clark for Gen McNair, GHQ, 23 Dec 41. Both in GHQ 320.2 WDC Strength, binder 1. Memo, CofS GHQ for CG FF, 23 Dec 41, WPD 4612-5.
11 Memo, DCofS GHQ for WPD, 30 Dec 41, WPD 4612-8.
12 Ltr, CG WDC to CG's, 31 Dec 41, WDC 381 EPW/38.
13 Air Force Combat Command Status Rpt, 30 Nov 41, OPD Exec 16, item 27. This strength in planes was about the same as that of the Hawaiian Air Force at the beginning of the war.
bombers, the Fourth Air Force was thereby provided with more planes than had been allotted to the continental west coast in December planning.\(^{14}\)

While the early 1942 west coast air strength looked impressive on paper, it was actually subject to many qualifications, the most important of which was that only 39 of the bombers and 239 of the pursuit planes were ready for combat action.\(^{15}\) Rather acute bomb and ammunition shortages continued, and the deficiencies in personnel qualified to operate the planes were even more serious. On 12 March the Fourth Air Force commander noted that his bombardment squadrons were "all dangerously short of experienced pilots and navigators, and almost totally lacking in bombardiers and trained gunners."\(^{16}\) On 24 May the IV Interceptor Command reported that nearly half of its assigned pilots were not qualified to fly the planes with which its four groups were equipped—one of the four having more planes than qualified pilots. This report concluded with the observation, "Considering the handicaps imposed by lack of sufficient suitable airdromes, inadequate housing facilities, unsuitable aircraft radio equipment, [and] mass replacement of fighter units by new units with less than two weeks training, the efficiency of the Command is excellent."\(^{17}\) The continued preoccupation of the Fourth Air Force with training was both inevitable and proper under the circumstances, but it certainly reduced its efficiency as a defense force.

As in the cases of Hawaii and Panama, one of the most puzzling problems in air defense along the west coast was how to provide enough forces to detect an enemy carrier force many hundred miles from the coast and to attack it before it could launch its planes. The problem on the Pacific coast was complicated by much fog, and by the prospect of a Japanese carrier force sailing in behind one of the normal succession of storm fronts that moved from the northern Pacific toward the west coast. The best defense against carriers was to find and strike at them within a belt 700 to 1,100 miles offshore. The only planes that could do this were Army heavy bombers and Navy patrol bombers. The Fourth Air Force in January estimated that it would require 162 Army and 180 Navy planes of these types to perform this mission, but usually in the first five months of 1942 neither service had more than a tenth of these strengths available.\(^{18}\) The improvement of air-

\(^{14}\) Memo, DCofS for Air for CofS, 20 Dec 41, OPD Exec 8, bk. 1; Incl 1 to Memo, CG Fourth Air Force for CG WDC, 15 Jan 42, WDC 381 RAINBOW 5/54.

\(^{15}\) Incl 1 to Memo, CG Fourth Air Force for CG WDC, 15 Jan 42, WDC 381 RAINBOW 5/54.

\(^{16}\) Ltr, CG Fourth Air Force to Comdr Western Sea Frontier, 12 Mar 42, WDC 370.26/35.

\(^{17}\) 2d Ind, Hq IV Interceptor Comd to CG Fourth Air Force, 24 May 42, OPD 381 WDC/45.

\(^{18}\) Memo, CG Fourth Air Force for CG WDC, 15 Jan 42, and Incl 3 to this Memo, WDC 381 RAINBOW 5/54 Pers Ltr, Gen DeWitt to Gen Marshall, 16 Jan 42, AG 452.1 (7-24-41).
borne radar eventually helped to solve the problem, but not during the period in which a Japanese strike remained a serious potential threat. In the first half of 1942 the protection of the Pacific coast against carrier action had to depend very largely upon the capabilities of the interceptor and antiaircraft commands for close-in detecting and defense.

How effective the close-in air defense of the west coast would have been against a determined attack such as the Japanese had launched against Oahu remained very doubtful during early 1942. The Army Air Forces was inclined to accept the wholesale strictures that the British radar expert, Mr. Robert A. Watson-Watt, leveled against the west coast’s radar defenses in January 1942. Antiaircraft units along the coast continued to be short of guns and ammunition until summer, and they were filled with new men who had had a minimum of training. The Army Air Forces admitted in April that “even a light enemy force should be successful in pressing home an attack on our two big bomber plants if our air defenses were the only security provided,” and pointed out that the best assurance against attack was Japan’s continued preoccupation with expansion in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

The only combat activity in which the Japanese actually engaged along the west coast during the months immediately succeeding Pearl Harbor was submarine operations. In its prewar basic operations order of 5 November 1941, the Japanese Navy had directed its 6th Fleet of submarines to “make reconnaissance of [the] American Fleet in Hawaii and West Coast area, and, by surprise attacks on shipping, destroy lines of communication.” After its participation in the Hawaiian operations, the 6th Fleet organized a detachment of nine modern submarines to attack shipping along the west coast of the United States. Seven of them were equipped to carry patrol planes, but there is no evidence that they launched planes during their December operations off the Pacific coast. These submarines, arriving off the coast about 17 December, were dispersed to nine stations from Cape Flattery in the north to San Diego in the south. They remained for about one week. Only four of the nine engaged in any known attacks on coastal shipping, and in eight or nine attacks, these four sank two tankers and damaged one freighter. All of the attacks took place along the California

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19 Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 292–93.
20 MS, History of the 4th Antiaircraft Command, 9 January 1942 to 1 July 1945, copy in OCMH, (hereafter cited as Hist of 4th AA Comd), I, ch. IV.
21 D/F, AAF to OPD, 21 Apr 42, OPD 319.1 (Rpts—Visits).
coast. Claims were made at the time that an Army B-24 bomber sank an enemy submarine on 24 December at a point fifty miles off the mouth of the Columbia River, but the Japanese submarine then assigned to this station (the I-25) was the one that returned eight months later to wind up enemy submarine operations off the Pacific coast. The submarine detachment had planned to engage in a simultaneous shelling of coastal cities on Christmas Eve, 24 December 1941, but at the last moment Japanese Fleet headquarters ordered the force to abandon the plan and to withdraw immediately to its base at Kwajalein.  

Two Japanese submarines reached the west coast during February 1942. The first to arrive, the I-8, patrolled northward from off San Francisco to the Washington coast "without encountering any enemy vessels," and then returned to Japan. The second was the I-17, which had accounted for one of the tankers sunk during December, and which also was one of the plane-carrying submarines. The I-17 arrived off San Diego about 19 February. On 23 February, just as President Roosevelt was beginning one of his "fireside" radio addresses, it surfaced off the California coast near Santa Barbara and from a range of 2,500 yards fired thirteen rounds of 5½-inch shells at oil installations. The damage was negligible. The I-17 reported that after this attack it sailed northward and sank two vessels off Cape Mendocino in northern California before returning to Japan, but there is no record of any such sinkings.

The night after the I-17 engaged in its haphazard shelling of oil installations there occurred what became known as the "Battle of Los Angeles." A month of mounting agitation for the removal of the resident Japanese population from coastal California had preceded this event, and by the night of 24-25 February both the military defenders and the civilian population of the Los Angeles area were expecting the worst to happen at any time. About two o'clock in the morning a series of reports of suspicious activities was capped by word that coastal radars had picked up an unidentified plane winging its way in from the ocean toward Los Angeles. Within the next half hour a blackout was ordered and all antiaircraft guns were alerted for in-
stant fire. The guns began to fire shortly after three o’clock, the first shot being aimed at a balloon (probably a meteorological balloon) over Santa Monica on the coast. During the next hour they expended some 1,400 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition against a variety of “targets” in the Los Angeles area. Exhaustive inquiries on 25 February accumulated a mass of conflicting evidence as to what these targets were. The Army finally concluded that there had been from one to five unidentified planes that touched off the “battle” whereas the Navy decided that there had been no excuse for the firing. It is at least possible that the I–17 launched the plane it carried to spark the confusion, although it is very unlikely that this plane flew inland over the coast line. In any event, the episode gave the military defenders of Los Angeles a realistic practice session and showed how much remained to be done to make the air defense system adequate against a serious attack.27

After the Halsey-Doolittle raid on Tokyo in April 1942, a more ambitious Japanese attack on the west coast appeared much more probable to authorities in Washington. G–2 pointed out that eight Japanese carriers had returned from their operations around southeastern Asia and that the Japanese could release at least three of the eight for a retaliatory attack on the west coast without jeopardizing successes already achieved.28 Secretary Stimson “called in General Marshall and had a few earnest words with him about the danger of a Jap attack on the West Coast,” and confessed to himself that he was “very much impressed with the danger that the Japanese, having terribly lost face by this recent attack on them . . . , will make a counterattack on us with carriers.”29 General DeWitt was warned to be on his guard against a carrier attack at any time after 10 May and was told that two more antiaircraft regiments were being sent to bolster the Los Angeles and San Francisco defenses.30

The Japanese had decided upon an offensive in the north Pacific two days before the Tokyo raid, and the raid strengthened their resolve rather than determined it. Although they did not plan to attack either the west coast or Hawaii proper, both might have been put in a perilous situation if the stated objectives of the offensive had been attained.31 On 16 May the Army learned

27 Memo, CofS for President Roosevelt, 26 Feb 42, OCS 21347–86; Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 283–86. History of the 4th Antiaircraft Command, I, 115–25, and IV, Docs 28 and 29, has the greatest detail on the episode.
28 Memo, Lt Col Kenneth N. Walker for Brig Gen St. Clair Streett, OPD, 19 Apr 42; Memo, G–2 for OPD, 20 Apr 42. Both in OPD 381 Japan/6.
29 Stimson Diary, entry of 21 Apr 42.
30 Memo, OPD for WDCMC, 23 Apr 42, OPD 381 WDC/5.
from its Hawaiian commander that the Navy, on the basis of deciphered
Japanese messages, had concluded that the Japanese would attack Midway
and Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians, probably on the last two days of May.\footnote{Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 224-26; Memo, Brig Gen Thomas T. Handy, OPD, for Gen Marshall, 17 May 42, OPD Exec 8, bk. 5.}
On 16 May, also, General Marshall informed General DeWitt that a Japa-
nese attack using gas might be expected in the eastern Pacific in the near
future. During the next two days 350,000 gas masks (all that were avail-
able), protective clothing, and decontamination supplies were hurriedly
shipped to the west coast.\footnote{Two Rads, CofS to DeWitt, 16 May 42, OPD Exec 14; Min, War Council Mtg, 18 May 42, SW Conf, binder 2.}
The Army's Intelligence Division on 17 May concurred in the Navy estimate that a strong Japanese attack on American
territory was in the offing before the end of the month, but it forecast that the "first priority" target of the attack would be "hit and run raids on West
Coast cities of the continental United States supported by heavy naval forces." Army intelligence held that such action was entirely within Japanese capabilities,
considering the weakness of American naval power, and urged the
concentration on the west coast of all available continental air power to meet
Further interceptions enabled the Navy by 21 May to forecast
with almost exact precision the timing of the Japanese attacks on Midway
and Dutch Harbor, but until after the Midway naval battle the Army con-
tinued to be apprehensive of at least a raid on the west coast.\footnote{Rad, COMINCH to CINCPAC (Info copy to CofS), 21 May 42, OPD Exec 8, bk. 5; Telg, CofS to CG WDC, 29 May 42, OPD 381 WDC/10; Min, WD Gen Council Mtg, 2 Jun 42.}
The known Japanese threat led the War Department to do everything it
could during the last two weeks of May to strengthen the west coast defenses.
General Marshall himself paid a hurried visit to California on the weekend
of 23-24 May and personally directed the adoption of additional air defense
measures and the reinforcement of defense forces in the Los Angeles-San
Diego area. On his orders, for example, finished aircraft that he found lined
up in rows around the various factories were either moved inland or dis-
persed so that a bomb could not damage more than one.\footnote{Min, War Council Mtg, 25 May and 1 Jun 42, SW Conf, Binder 2; Memos, Col John R. Deane for DCoS and CofS, 24 and 31 May 42, OCS file, Notes on War Council; Testimony of Gen DeWitt, 12 Dec 46, Report of War Department Civil Defense Board, an. 1, p. 110.}
While the numerical increase in west coast Army ground force strength during these weeks was
small (about 20,000), the means for air attack as well as for air defense
were greatly strengthened. By flying two full groups to the coast, the Army
CAMOUFLAGED AIRPLANE FACTORY. Section of Boeing Aircraft Plant 2, Seattle (top). Aerial view of the 26-acre camouflage town on the factory roof (bottom).
increased heavy bomber strength from 13 to 60, and it held another group of 28 planes ready as a reserve. In addition, it flew three pursuit groups and one medium bombardment group into the area, so that the total Army pursuit and bomber strength actually present rose from about 290 to about 550 planes. Another antiaircraft regiment was added to the defenses, raising the total in position to the equivalent of seventeen almost completely equipped regiments. Three new barrage balloon battalions were added to the three that had been employed in the Seattle and San Francisco areas since January, in order to provide additional air defense protection to the Los Angeles and San Diego aircraft factories. By the end of May, too, the Army Engineers had nearly completed a thorough camouflaging of aircraft factories as well as military installations.  

At the beginning of this emergency period the Western Defense Command had a strength of about 172,000 officers and enlisted men, of whom 121,000 were in its ground combat forces. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard added about 75,000 men to the armed forces' strength present along the west coast. On 25 May the Chief of Staff ordered the Army Ground Forces to make all of its troops within the territorial limits of the Western Defense Command available for emergency use and specifically directed that four additional combat teams be made ready to supplement Western Defense Command forces on receipt of orders from General DeWitt. This gave his command two infantry divisions and seven infantry regimental combat teams ready for immediate use. The War Department made every effort to cover ammunition shortages reported by General DeWitt, and by 1 June the Operations Division judged his ammunition situation "in general, good." On 27 May General DeWitt placed the Western Defense Command on special alert, and three days later the Operations Division notified him "of War Department conviction that surprise attacks on the West Coast are a possibility from now on." Despite the continued paucity of means for an adequate long-range patrol, at the end of May there was little likelihood of a carrier or other serious attack being launched without

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37 Memo, OPD for TAG, 22 May 42, and other papers, OPD 370.5 WDC/18; Memo, OPD for CoS, 3 Jun 42, OPD 320.2 WDC/111. On camouflage: Hist of WDC, vol. III, ch. XIV; and Min, War Council Mtg, 11 May 42, SW Conf, binder 2. On barrage balloons, see Hist of 4th AA Comd, ch. VI.

38 Memo, OPD for OASW, 28 Apr 42, OPD 320.2 WDC/64.

39 Memo, OPD for CG AGF, 25 May 42, OPD 320.2 WDC/69; Memo, OPD for CoS, 3 Jun 42, OPD 320.2 WDC/111.

40 OPD Diary, entries of 24 and 25 May 42; Memo, OPD for SOS, 1 Jun 42, OPD 471 WDC/18.

41 OPD Diary, entries of 27 and 30 May 42; OPD Routing Form, 7 Jun 42, OPD 381 WDC/38.
warning, in view of the accurate and detailed information being obtained about the movements of the Japanese Fleet.

The United States Navy virtually ended the threat of a serious attack on the west coast when it knocked out the Japanese advance carrier force north of Midway on 4 June 1942. Thereupon, the Japanese main fleet and the Midway occupation force withdrew, although the northern wing of the Japanese forces, after bombing Dutch Harbor, proceeded to occupy Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians. In effect, the Battle of Midway restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific. Although it continued for many months to be possible for the Japanese to make a carrier raid in the eastern Pacific, they could no longer do so without taking the grave risk of losing the naval strength they needed to defend their earlier conquests.

The Japanese occupation of outer Aleutian islands nevertheless introduced apprehensions of a renewed Japanese offensive toward the Alaskan mainland and continental west coast, and Japanese submarine operations helped to keep these apprehensions alive. The first of the latter operations was a by-product of the Aleutian invasion. The Japanese had given two of their plane-carrying submarines, the I-25 and the I-26, the mission of conducting an advanced reconnaissance of the southern Alaskan coast. At the end of May the I-26 left the vicinity of Kodiak Island and sailed toward the "Washington coast. One Japanese source claims that the reconnaissance plane of the I-26 "scouted Seattle Harbor and reported no heavy men-of-war, particularly carriers, there." If true, this probably happened some time after the Midway and Dutch Harbor actions; and the flight was not detected. The Japanese made their presence definitely known on 20 June, first by torpedoing a Canadian lumber schooner southwest of Cape Flattery and then by shelling the Canadian radio compass station at Estevan Point on Vancouver Island. The next night (21-22 June), a submarine fired six to nine 5½-inch shells at the Fort Stevens military reservation in Oregon at the mouth of the Columbia River, doing no damage. This shelling, insignificant in itself, is notable as the first foreign attack on a continental military installation since the War of 1812. Finally, on 23 June, two torpedoes missed a tanker off the southern coast of Oregon.

Morison, Coral Sea, and Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 451-70, describe these operations in detail.


Idem; Japanese Monograph 110, pp. 21-23; Hist of WDC, IV, app. 5. It is not clear from
The final Japanese submarine operation off the west coast during the war was undertaken expressly as a reprisal for the American bombardment of Tokyo in April. The I-25, with its plane fitted for bombing, reached the Oregon coast late in August 1942. On 9 September, this plane dropped an incendiary bomb on a forested mountain slope near the coast at Brookings, Ore. The bomb started a small forest fire, but this was quickly extinguished. Attempts to locate and destroy the I-25 failed. After nearly a month of discreet hiding, the I-25 on 4 and 6 October torpedoed and sank two tankers off the southern coast of Oregon. These attacks marked an end to direct enemy activity off the west coast of the continental United States, although the Japanese were to plague it with their "free balloon" operations before the end of the war.

In the meantime, as soon as the extent and significance of the Japanese defeat at Midway became clear, the Army had begun to reduce its defense forces on the west coast. General DeWitt ended the special alert along the coast on the morning of 8 June, and by that date the War Department had started to recall the air reinforcements that it had rushed to the Western Defense Command during the pre-Midway period. By 24 June the bomber strength of the Fourth Air Force had been reduced to 3 heavy and 60 medium bombardment planes, far fewer than it had had before the May emergency. Both the local naval command and General DeWitt continued to urge the allocation of more heavy bombers for long-range offshore patrols, but the War Department turned them down. The combat teams of the Army Ground Forces' divisions within the Western Defense Command remained on an "on-call" status for emergency defense use, but under a new arrangement that did not seriously interfere with their training. During the summer of 1942 the Western Defense Command lost two of its antiaircraft regiments, but otherwise its assigned ground combat strength was not materially changed until the end of the year.

The west coast theater had a final touch of excitement toward the end of 1942 when, on the evening of 2 December, a Navy patrol yacht reported...
an unidentified group of ten to twenty vessels about 500 miles off California and between San Francisco and Los Angeles. The War Department immediately reinforced the Fourth Air Force with two heavy bombardment groups containing 61 planes, and alerted a third group to act as a reserve. By the time the two bomber groups reached their California bases and were readied for action—early afternoon, 3 December—the vessels had been identified as those of an American convoy. Although the Air Forces carried out this reinforcement with utmost dispatch, it was recognized at the time that if this had been a Japanese carrier force as suspected it could have executed its mission and been out of bombardment range before any of the reinforcing planes were ready to attack it. It is therefore evident that from June 1942 on, the west coast lacked the air power to forestall a carrier raid, although its close-in air defenses for combating one were in good shape. In practice, the Army had already begun to apply the policy of "calculated risk" that it was presently to extend more generally to the continental defenses.\(^{50}\)

**Defense Measures on the East and Gulf Coasts, 1941–42**

The Eastern Theater of Operations, activated on 24 December 1941 under the command of General Drum, contained at the outset a far larger strength in Army forces than was ever assigned to the Western Theater. During the last week of December its ground units included four army corps, eleven infantry and two armored divisions, fifteen antiaircraft regiments, numerous harbor defense forces along the northeast coast, and a large miscellany of other forces. Yet this strength was deceptive, not only because a large proportion of the units were unready for action but also and more significantly because the War Department never intended to bottle up such large forces in defense of the Atlantic front.

Before the activation of the Eastern theater, the War Department General Staff and GHQ had concluded that the most the Germans could do against the coast would be to launch nuisance air or naval attacks against exposed objectives, and even these were considered improbable. A land invasion in any strength they believed impossible as long as the American and British navies controlled the North Atlantic.\(^{51}\)

\(^{50}\) On the December 1942 alert, various papers, dated 3–8 December 1942, OPD 381 WDC/45, 57, and 58; and Min, WD Gen Council Mtg, 7 Dec 42. See the last section of this chapter for the reduction of continental defenses.

\(^{51}\) Memo, WPD for CofS, 13 Dec 41, WPD 3774–37; Memo, GHQ for CofS, 18 Dec 41, WPD 4627.
The Army Air Forces nevertheless planned during December to allocate as much air strength to the Eastern theater as it did to the Western. In practice, the War Department stripped the eastern air defenses in favor of the more exposed west coast and of overseas bases. As examples, the Army temporarily closed down eight of its eleven long-range radar stations along the east coast in order to provide personnel to operate similar stations along the Pacific front; and General Drum estimated that the effective strength of the Eastern theater’s combat air forces declined by three-fourths during the month following the activation of his new command. During this same period the Eastern theater also lost one-third of its antiaircraft regiments and half of its antiaircraft gun strength.

The above examples illustrate that what the War Department had actually done in December had been to assign units to the Eastern Theater on a “tentative, tactical loan basis, pending the development and shaking down of the war situation.” During January and February units were removed from the Eastern theater’s command with increasing rapidity, either for shipment overseas or for further training in the zone of the interior. Finally, when the Eastern Theater of Operations became the Eastern Defense Command on 20 March 1942, it lost not only its theater status but most of its larger field force units as well. The Eastern Defense Command kept only the 26th Division during 1942. This division, with two additional regimental combat teams, provided the means for supplying each of the four coastal sectors with a regimental combat team for defense against external attack, one regiment being held in reserve. The First Air Force also remained under the Eastern Defense Command, although its principal activity—overwater operations against German submarines—came under Navy command on 25 March. In actual numbers the Eastern Defense Command after March 1942 had about one fourth of the strength originally assigned to the Eastern theater in December 1941.

The defense of the Gulf coast from Florida westward came under the tactical direction of the Southern Defense Command on 24 December 1941. On that date the commander of the Third Army and Southern Defense Command, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, established a small separate defense

52 Memo, AAF for CofS, 20 Dec 41, OPD Exec 8, bk. 1; Memo, DCoS for Air for CofS, 26 Dec 41, WPD 3807–107.
53 Rpt of Air Officer at GHQ Staff Conf, 15 Jan 42, GHQ 337 Staff Conf, binder 2; Ltr and Incls, CG ETO to CG FF, 2 Feb 42, AG 320.2 (2–2–42) (5).
54 Hist of EDC, p. 58.
55 Hist of EDC, ch. IV; Memo, OPD for TAG, 29 Apr 42, OPD 320.2 EDC/26, listing the units assigned to the EDC after the March “shakedown.”
command staff, and through it controlled the Army forces specifically allo-
cated to the defense of the Gulf coast and Southern Land Frontier. The
strength of the forces allocated to coastal defense remained nominal from
the beginning and did not include any combat air forces. As was the case in
the other defense commands, General Krueger could use his Third Army
troops to reinforce the coastal forces in an emergency. But the Southern
Defense Command was virtually helpless to deal with the only real enemy
threat that developed in its area—the German submarines that began to
operate off the Gulf coast during May 1942.

It was America's good fortune that Germany did not know when or how
the Japanese were going to attack in the Pacific, and therefore that the
Germans did not plan the extension of their submarine operations against
commerce into the hitherto restricted areas of the western Atlantic until
after Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, even after the Japanese attack, Adolf Hitler
and the German Naval Staff directed most of the German submarine fleet
to operate during the winter of 1941–42 in the Mediterranean area and off
the coast of Norway, and therefore the German U-boat command could
spare only 3 submarines for the initial foray off the coast of the United States
in mid-January 1942, and only 6 for its February operations there. Even so,
these forays began to wreak tremendous havoc. With an average of 5 and
a total of never more than 9 or 10 German submarines operating along the
east and Gulf coasts, the Germans in six months managed to sink some 185
ships, totaling about 965,000 gross tons, in these waters alone.

The German slaughter of merchant shipping off the east coast continued
almost unchecked from mid-January until the latter part of April 1942.
During this period German submarines sank about 80 ships off this coast,
and, according to their commanders, bad weather offered the chief obstacle
to operations. From the beginning of April onward they noted a marked

56 See the MS History of the Southern Defense Command, OCMH (hereafter cited as Hist of
SDC), especially for the Army's activities in land frontier defense, not treated in this chapter.
57 Ltr and Incls, SW to SN, 11 Apr 42, OCS 21078-70.
58 See exchanges in WPD 4647, reference the alleged appearance of a German submarine off
Corpus Christi, Tex., on 28 January 1942, and the futile efforts of General Krueger to obtain any
effective means for attack. According to the German records, none of their submarines approached
the Gulf coast until May 1942.
59 Notes and Incls, Confs of 12 and 29 Dec 41, United States Department of the Navy, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941,
2 vols. (Washington, 1947) (hereafter cited as ONI, Fuehrer Conferences), II, 80, 92–96. For
the number of submarines operating, see United States Navy Department translation of Befehlshaber
der Unterseeboote War Logs for Period 1 January 1941 to 31 December 1943 (the German U-boat
command, and hereafter cited as B.d.U. War Logs), Jan–Jul 42. For shipping losses, see
Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, app. I, p. 413.
increase in American antisubmarine activities, but they reported that at first these activities were almost wholly ineffective. The Germans lost their first submarine off the American coast on the night of 13 April; then, about 21 April, enemy submarine commanders began to report a sudden dropping off of favorable targets, and after that date the easy pickings off the east coast came to an end.\textsuperscript{60}

The armed forces of the United States had in fact been almost wholly unprepared for submarine attacks off the coasts. Ignoring World War I experience and World War II practice, before Pearl Harbor they had not even planned on how they might check a submarine offensive off the American coast line.\textsuperscript{61} The defenses set up in January along the east coast were scanty and improvised. Until the end of the month, I Bomber Command and the I Air Support Command of the Army's First Air Force conducted all of the oversea air patrols along the coast. By 15 January these Army commands were managing to cover the offshore area from Hatteras northward with fifteen patrols daily, but their personnel and equipment were woefully untrained and inadequate for effective antisubmarine operations.\textsuperscript{62} Army planes continued to provide most of the regular offshore patrols throughout the period of intense enemy activity off the East Coast, operating at first informally and then (after 25 March) formally under Navy command. From the outset these Army operations stripped the east coast air forces of all offensive striking power against any other form of enemy attack, although an enemy surface attack during this period was admittedly a remote possibility. Beginning on 5 March the civilian Civil Air Patrol began to fly patrols under the auspices of the I Air Support Command, and its operations helped to frighten submarines away from shallow waters near the coast. Beginning in April the installation of airborne radar on Army bombers greatly increased their effectiveness and made it possible to patrol and to escort vessels at night.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{60} B.d.U War Logs, entries for various dates, especially the Situation Summaries of 13 Mar and 12, 15, and 30 Apr 42; Rpt of Commanding Admiral, Submarines, to Hitler, 14 May 42, ONI, Fuehrer Conferences, 1942, pp. 82–85.

\textsuperscript{61} Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 200–201; Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 518–19.

\textsuperscript{62} Rpt of Air Officer, GHQ Staff Conf, 15 Jan 42, GHQ 337 Staff Conf, binder 2; Hist of EDC, p. 41; Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 522ff.

\textsuperscript{63} Rpt to OPD on Visit to First Bomber and Interceptor Comd, 17–18 Mar 42, OPD 319.1 (Rpts—Visits), On Civil Air Patrol, Memo, WPD for SW, 10 Mar 42, and other papers in AG 381 (3-5-42); Min, WD Gen Council Mtg, 21 Jul 42. On radar equipment, Memo, AAF for CoS, 10 Apr 42, WDCSA 452.1; Min, War Council Mtg, 11 and 18 May 42, SW Conf, binder 2; and Min, WD Gen Council Mtg, 19 May 42. Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, chapter XV, describes the Army's antisubmarine operations of 1942 in some detail.
In the early days of the German submarine offensive, the most effective antisubmarine measures had been movements by night and insistence that ships hug the shore line by day. After some initial misgivings, the Army finally ordered a stringent coastal blackout to prevent submarines from attacking ships silhouetted by lights on shore. But, as the Navy insisted, the best defense against the sort of commerce raiding the Germans were undertaking off the American coast was the organization of all coastal shipping into convoys escorted by surface vessels and aircraft. By mid-May the Navy was able to convoy most east coast shipping. Within two months this system, abetted by the enlarged activity and improved techniques and equipment of the Army's I Bomber Command, brought an end to sinkings off this coast for the rest of 1942. Within these two months also the Germans lost six more submarines along the east coast, a factor that helped them to decide on 19 July to withdraw their two remaining submarines, which had been operating in the Hatteras area.

After launching an attack in the Caribbean in February, German submarines in May 1942 began striking at traffic along the Gulf coast of the United States. The first U-boat to appear off this coast, on 6 May, met a warm reception from United States naval craft and had to limp back to its base in France after slim success. But the next two, arriving off the Mississippi Delta on 12 May, found rich and easy pickings. Thereafter, during May, the losses in the Gulf Sea Frontier (which included the Florida east coast) exceeded any single month's loss along the Atlantic front to the north. Late in May the Army shifted twenty-five planes of the I Bomber Command to the Gulf coast area to combat this new menace. Within the next two months the Navy and these Army bombers put a virtual end to German submarine operations in the Gulf, but not before the Germans had destroyed almost as many ships there as they had sunk in the preceding three months along the east coast.

Except for a few mine-laying operations, German submarines avoided the American coastal areas from September 1942 until the following spring, and their operations thereafter were of nuisance proportions only. But in

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64 D/F, G–3 to TAG, 20 Feb 42, OCS 21349–17; Min, War Council Mtg, 2 and 16 Mar 42, SW Conf, binder 2; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 129–30.

65 Memo, Adm King for Gen Marshall, 21 Jun 42, WDCSA 560, presents a comprehensive statement of the Navy's position on antisubmarine warfare; the same file also contains many of the basic papers on the Army-Navy controversy of 1942–43 on antisubmarine operations.

66 B.d.U. War Logs, entry of 19 Jul 42.

67 For the Caribbean operations, see ch. XVI below; B.d.U. War Logs, various entries, May–Jul 42; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 135–44; Min, WD Gen Council Mtg, 27 May 42.

68 Check of daily submarine positions as given in B.d.U. War Logs, Sep 42–Dec 43.
the Caribbean and in the wide stretches of the Atlantic, a steadily mounting number of German submarines continued their devastating war on shipping. To combat them the Army put its east coast bomber strength into a new Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, activated on 15 October 1942. The story of this command, and of the issue between the Army and Navy over how the submarine menace might best be curbed, has already been related elsewhere.69

As soon as the number of ship sinkings off the east coast slackened, the Germans decided to use some of their submarines to plant mines off the entrances of New York Harbor, Delaware Bay, and Chesapeake Bay. Three submarines planted mines about 12 June 1942, Boston being substituted for New York at the last moment. Only the Chesapeake operation proved profitable. There three ships were sunk and two damaged before the mines could be swept. The mine laying off Boston, and a similar operation at the mouth of the Mississippi on 25 July, went undetected until the opening of German records after the war disclosed these actions. Five more mine-laying operations along the east coast during 1942 did no harm except to bring brief halts to shipping while the Navy disposed of the mines.70

A third type of enemy submarine activity created much excitement at the time and had much to do with keeping some Army mobile combat forces deployed along the coast during 1942 and 1943. On 13 June 1942 the German submarine U-202 landed four enemy agents on a beach at Amagansett, Long Island; and on 17 June the U-584 landed four more on Ponte Vedra Beach near Jacksonville, Fla. The plans for this operation stated that the principal objectives were to engage in "sabotage attacks on targets of economic importance for the war" and "to stir up discontent and lower fighting resistance." 71 Both groups carried ashore small quantities of TNT and incendiary bomb material; in addition, the agents had $150,000 in cash when arrested. A Coast Guardsman on beach patrol intercepted the Amagansett group as it landed, but faulty transmission of his report permitted both the submarine (which was grounded for several hours) and the saboteurs to escape. The Florida landing was disclosed the following day by fishermen who found the cache of sabotage materials. The Federal Bureau of Investi-

70 B.d.U. War Logs, entry of 19 May 42 and various entries thereafter; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 136-37 and app. IV, p. 417.
71 B.d.U. War Logs, entry of 26 May 42, and accompanying directives for operation, dated 23 May 42.
infantrymen on beach patrol study incoming vessel.

Although these landings were the only proven instances of contacts between German submarines and the shores of the United States before 1944, they stimulated both the Army and the United States Coast Guard to undertake a much more active “beach defense” during 1942 and 1943.  

The directive of 25 July started a rather heated jurisdictional conflict between the Army and the Coast Guard. Beach defense against invasion, 


73 J. Edgar Hoover, “New Tricks of Nazi Spies,” American (October 1943), p. 110. A submarine landed two German spies at Hancock Point, Me., on 29 November 1944. They were quickly caught by the FBI (Facts on File, 1945, p. 4).  

74 Memo, CNO for CofS, 7 Feb 42, AG 381 (1–27–42).  

75 Min, War Council Mtg, 6 and 13 Apr 42, SW Conf, binder 2; Memo, Capt John L. McCrea, USN, Naval Aide to the President, for Adm King, 6 Apr 42, and subsequent corresp on Eastern Defense Command, EDC 008/555. (This Eastern Defense Command file contains most of the basic correspondence with respect to the Army–Navy–Coast Guard argument over beach defense responsibilities, April–December 1942.)
however minute, was a recognized Army mission, and it appeared to General Drum in particular that if not challenged the new Coast Guard mission might be an opening wedge for the Navy to take over "the whole coast defense." 76 After much argument among subordinates, General Marshall and Admiral King issued a joint directive on 29 December 1942 recognizing beach defense as a primary mission of the Army, but also allowing the Coast Guard to continue its beach patrol activities in close collaboration with the Army—although not under Army command, as General Drum had wanted.77

The Army's means for beach defense in the summer of 1942 consisted of scattered detachments of the infantry regimental combat teams assigned to the sectors. After the Amagansett incident Army units engaged more actively in beach patrol, in some instances duplicating the Coast Guard's efforts. The joint directive of 29 December 1942 helped to eliminate local instances of friction and overlapping activity, and during late 1942 and 1943 Army units and Coast Guard stations divided up the task of coastal surveillance. The Army generally patrolled the more open stretches of beach, while the Coast Guard handled the more difficult ones that needed the support of its inshore picket patrol vessels. The Army retained small mobile forces behind the coast line that could be rushed to any threatened point. This system continued until late 1943, when both Army and Coast Guard began a rapid reduction of their beach defense forces.78

Even as this system of beach defense was being substantially improved in the winter of 1942-43, the chances of any sort of enemy attack on the coast line were growing increasingly slimmer. An Army intelligence estimate of 8 December 1942, although acknowledging the possibility of submarine, surface, and air attacks on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, nevertheless held that such attacks were highly improbable and in any event incapable of doing any great harm unless the course of the war underwent a significant change.79 Actually, the Germans still had some schemes for attacking the east coast by air, but after the invasion of North Africa it looked to the War Department as if it could safely begin a steady reduction of the Army's forces guarding the Atlantic front of the continental United States.

76 Memo, Gen Drum for Brig Gen Kenneth P. Lord, 29 Jul 42, EDC 008/555.
77 Memo, COMINCH for CofS, 9 Dec 42, WDCSA 660.2; Jt Ltr, Acting CofS and COMINCH to CG's and Commandants, 29 Dec 42, EDC 008/555.
78 Hist of NE Sector, EDC, pp. 9, 12-13; Hist of EDC, p. 53; "The Coast Guard at War," XVII, Beach Patrol (1945).
79 Memo, G-2 for OPD, 8 Dec 42, OPD 660.2/33.
The only activity in the Central Defense Command during World War II that involved the use of Army combat units was the protection of the Sault Ste. Marie Canal and the St. Marys River waterway, which connect Lakes Superior and Huron. On the eve of the war nearly nine-tenths of the iron ore consumed in the United States passed through the Sault locks during the eight months' navigation season between March and November, and all of this traffic moved through the American locks of the Sault Canal system, located between the American and Canadian cities of Sault Ste. Marie. Since there was no other way in which most of the iron ore could be moved, the success of the American war effort was vitally dependent on continuing its flow through the Sault locks (See Map I.).

At the outbreak of the European war the War Department ordered the commander of the Sixth Corps Area to take all necessary steps to safeguard the Sault waterway. Fort Brady, an old Army post located on a hill overlooking the St. Marys River valley about half a mile south of the Sault locks, had a garrison at this time of four companies of the 2d Infantry; troops were therefore readily available for carrying out the War Department's directive. On 7 September 1939 the Sixth Corps Area commander reported that the Coast Guard was patrolling the canal approaches under Army direction, that machine guns and searchlights were being emplaced above the locks, that Army guards were patrolling the lock area and the river channel below, and that military guards were being placed on all passenger and pleasure craft transiting the canal.

These were the only protective measures in effect at the Sault until 1942. The War Department studied the possibility of an external attack by air as early as the summer of 1940 but decided that the chance of it was too remote to justify any form of antiaircraft defense. In fact, during that summer the Army reduced the Fort Brady force to one infantry company, since that was all that was needed for guard purposes.

A Federal Bureau of Investigation survey in the fall of 1940 led to a re-examination of the Sault's defense needs during the following winter and spring. In January 1941 the Army presented the problem of co-ordinating American and Canadian defense measures to the Permanent Joint

80 Telg, TAG to CG Sixth Corps Area, 2 Sep 39, Ltr, CG Sixth Corps Area to TAG, 7 Sep 39, and other papers, AG 821 (9-1-39).

81 Memo, ACofS WPD for DCoFS, 22 Aug 40, WPD 4078-30; Ltr, CG Sixth Corps Area to TAG, 17 Jul 40, and Inds, AG 821 (9-1-39); Notes on Conf in OCoFS, 22 May 41, OCS Conf, binder 15.
Board on Defense, and the board recommended that each country establish a central authority over the local defenses. The Sixth Corps Area commander had submitted a similar recommendation. In consequence, the War Department obtained President Roosevelt’s approval to an Executive order that established the Military District of Sault Ste. Marie, effective 15 March 1941. To command the district the Army chose Col. Fred T. Cruse, who previously had been in charge of the security guard for the Panama Canal. In April Colonel Cruse met with the officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who had been appointed as his opposite number, and this visit began a close collaboration between local Canadian and American military authorities that continued until 1944. In May 1941 the Army replaced the remaining infantry company with the 702d Battalion, Military Police.

After the United States entered the war the Army was urged from many directions to provide the Sault area with troops and equipment that could defend it against external attack. As a result of this agitation, the War Department during January and February 1942 instituted a thorough restudy of the problem among its own staff agencies, and again put the subject before the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. The Army’s Intelligence Division and the Army Air Forces agreed that, while no form of external attack seemed likely, several forms of German operations against the Sault installations were possible: the Germans might send submarines or surface ships into Hudson Bay and from its nearest arm—four hundred miles away—launch a bombing attack, or they might fly long-range bombers all the way from Norway along the Great Circle route, or they might attempt a parachute attack from planes flown from Norway, the paratroops carrying out sabotage after they landed.

In response, therefore, both to outside pressures and to its own conviction that it was at least possible for the Germans to make a suicidal attack against the canal, the Army decided to add sizable increments to the Sault defenses. It planned to provide the area with an aircraft warning system, a regiment of antiaircraft artillery, and a barrage balloon battalion, and, finally, to replace the military police battalion with an infantry regiment that would be equipped and qualified to fight parachutists as well as to

82 Ltr, CG Sixth Corps Area to TAG, 6 Jan 41, Memo, ACoFS G-2 for CoFS, 12 Feb 41, and other papers, AG 821 (9-1-39); various papers, dated Feb–Apr 41, in WPD 1398–4, 5, 6, and 7; Notes on Conf in OCoFS, 22 May 41, OCS Conf, binder 15; Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, pp. 193–98.
83 Various papers, dated Dec 41–Feb 42, AG 821 (9-1-39) and WPD 1398–8, 11, and 13.
84 Memo, G-2 for CoFS, 11 Feb 42; Memo, AAF for WPD, 12 Feb 42. Both in WPD 1398–12.
perform routine antisabotage duties. By April 1942 elements of the 131st Infantry, the 100th Coast Artillery (AA), and the 39th Barrage Balloon Battalion were at the Sault, and by midsummer the Sault Military District contained a mixed combat force of about 7,000 officers and men.85

In the meantime the Permanent Joint Board had recommended that Canada as well as the United States undertake a more extensive system of defenses in the Sault area. The Canadians supplied an antiaircraft battalion for their side of the locks area and put it under the operational control of the Sault District commander. This Canadian battalion used American guns until the fall of 1942. In May Canada agreed to organize a ground observer aircraft warning system to cover the region between Sault Ste. Marie and Hudson Bay, and 266 observation posts were functioning in the Ontario wilderness by 1 September 1942. Canada also allowed United States Army troops to install and operate a string of five radar stations across northern Ontario, and it provided housing facilities and defense sites on its side of the Sault for about 2,000 of the American antiaircraft and barrage balloon troops.86

The one defense element that the War Department did not feel it could afford to provide for the Sault area was a squadron or more of pursuit planes. In May 1942 it ordered the preparation of three emergency landing fields in the vicinity of the canal, and it subsequently directed that local defense plans provide for planes of the First Air Force to use these fields in an emergency. Actually, the planners themselves appear to have realized that it was very unlikely that planes could reach these fields in time to participate in fighting off an air attack.87

To enhance the effectiveness of the ground defenses against hostile aircraft, the War Department in April 1942 authorized the establishment of a Vital Defense Area that included most of Chippewa County, Mich. On 29 September this area was enlarged into a Central Air Defense Zone which extended to a depth of up to 150 miles on the American side of the waterway. Canada established a similar zone to the north of the Sault Canal in early 1943. Only controlled flights approved in advance were permitted within these zones. Finally, to facilitate security measures on the ground,
the Secretary of War authorized the establishment of the Sault Ste. Marie Military Area on 22 March 1943. By the end of 1942 the Operations Division acknowledged that the 7,300-man garrison guarding the Sault Canal area was excessive, particularly in view of other measures taken during the year—such as the sandbagging of installations and provision of spare lock gates and other parts—that made any extended interruption of canal traffic unlikely even if the installations were successfully attacked. But it doubted that a contemplated 2,000-man saving would be worth the political repercussions that would probably follow any reduction, and therefore postponed a decision until the following summer. Then, as an aspect of the general reduction of continental defenses, the War Department ordered that the Sault garrison be cut to about 2,500 officers and men by 1 September 1943. Four months later the United States and Canada abandoned all of their aircraft warning installations and services and removed all of the local antiaircraft equipment. After January 1944 the United States Army garrison consisted, as it had before the United States entered the war, of a single battalion of military police, and even this was reduced to a single company before the end of 1944.

The Period of Reduction, 1942–45

The Army made its first moves toward a significant reduction in the strength of ground forces assigned to continental defense in the fall of 1942. At the beginning of September, the Army Ground Forces urged that the three divisions remaining with the Eastern and Western Defense Commands be removed from them, as a step toward making available as many combat units as possible for overseas duty. The War Department merged this proposal with a plan to fix the permanent requirements of the defense commands for combat ground forces, and to fill these permanent forces with limited-service and overage men and officers—the course already followed during 1942 in mobilizing military police battalions for use in the zone of the interior. General DeWitt readily agreed to return his two divisions to

88 Memo, OPD for TAG, 16 Apr 42, WD CSA 821; Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, p. 197.
89 Memo, OPD for CoFS, 2 Jan 43, and subsequent papers, WD CSA 42–43, Central Def Comd.
the control of Army Ground Forces and to rely thereafter on infantry regimental combat teams, cavalry, and coast artillery 155-mm. gun regiments for his mobile force requirements. But when he learned about the War Department’s proposal to substitute limited-service for general-service troops in these remaining mobile forces, he protested most vigorously. Subsequently, the War Department decided to confine limited-service conversions in the defense commands to harbor defense and antiaircraft units. Then it ordered the Eastern and Western Defense Commands to release their infantry divisions, less one regimental combat team from each. With other remaining forces this change left each coast with four regimental combat teams as the principal elements of its mobile force. The War Department also directed the Army Ground Forces to maintain a reserve for the Eastern and Western Commands by keeping one regimental combat team of each division stationed within the confines of these commands ready for prompt movement and tactical employment on receipt of orders from the defense commander.\(^91\)

The application of these measures during the first half of 1943 made a large proportion of the general-service men and younger officers in the defense commands available for immediate or eventual overseas employment. But the troop strength of the Eastern and Western Defense Commands actually grew instead of contracting in the first few months of the year, primarily because the War Department allowed large overstrengths in units being transformed from general to limited service, and these units made up nearly three-fourths of the ground combat strength of the continental commands.\(^92\)

Before it could cut continental combat-unit strength much further, the Army had to change the missions of the commands as prescribed under Category C, which, it will be recalled, had been assigned to the east and west coast forces soon after Pearl Harbor. Estimates of Japanese capabilities made from December 1942 onward indicated that, while the enemy still had the means to launch a carrier-based air raid against the west coast, such a raid was unlikely, and serious attacks against the east coast were

\(^91\) Memo, OPD for WDCMC, 8 Sep 42, OPD 320.2 WDC/186; OPD Diary, entries of 11, 13, 16 Sep and 18 Oct 42; Ltrs, CG WDC to CoS, 1 Oct 42, OPD 320.2 WDC/194; Min, WD Gen Council Mtg, 19 Oct, 30 Nov, and 14 Dec 42; Min, War Council Mtg, 21 Oct and 4 Nov 42, SW Conf, binder 2; Memo, OPD for AGF, 7 Dec 42; Ltr, TAG to CG’s, 15 Dec 42. Last two in OPD 320.2 WDC/69.

\(^92\) Remarks about strengths are based here and elsewhere, unless otherwise indicated, on the monthly report, STM-30 (Strength of the Army), and the authorized ground force strengths given in the OPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 061 (9-4-45).
even less likely.\textsuperscript{98} It was also evident by early 1943 that the United States had passed from the defensive to the offensive stage of the war and that the Army must concentrate everything it could on the offensive.\textsuperscript{94} The Deputy Chief of Staff voiced a growing opinion about the continental defenses in rather blunt terms when he remarked:

The basic factors in the defense of the Atlantic and Caribbean are adequate air bases linked together by an efficient communications system. The Loran navigation system, radar, direction finding stations, and intercept units are needed. . . . These installations, plus medium and heavy bombardment, will constitute all the defense that is needed and should replace to a large extent our present outmoded system of coast artillery defense and large ground force installations. Unless the Army realizes this and organizes accordingly, the Navy will gradually take over all responsibilities except interior guard.\textsuperscript{95}

The Navy agreed with the Army that reductions were in order, but it did not feel the existing description of Category B in \textit{Joint Action} adequately covered the current situation. Therefore, after two months of joint consideration, the service chiefs, meeting on 13 April 1943 as the Joint Board, approved a new definition of Category B and directed a reduction in the continental defense Category from C to the new B.\textsuperscript{96}

Two months later the Army asked President Roosevelt to approve a policy of calculated risk that would permit a more general reduction of the continental forces. The Army Air Forces, in sponsoring this policy, contended:

The greatest danger we have to face from air attack under the present strategic situation is that moderately successful nuisance raids might influence an uninformed Congress and an uninformed press to divert a substantial portion of our offensive force to the protection of the continental United States.\textsuperscript{97}

The Air Forces and G–2 both acknowledged that the Germans could launch a transatlantic air attack against objectives along the east coast, but the small number of planes they could spare and the light bomb loads these planes could carry would make such an attack no more than a token effort that ought not to justify a continued diversion of American strength from

\textsuperscript{98} Various papers, dated 30 Nov 42–22 Jan 43, in relation to CCS 127 and CCS 127/1, and Memo, G–2 for OPD, 16 Dec 42, all in ABC 384 North America (11–29–42); G–2 Estimate of Enemy Capabilities Against the Cont U.S., 30 Apr 43, OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./38.


\textsuperscript{95} Min, WD Gen Council Mtg, 29 Mar 43.

\textsuperscript{96} Various papers, dated Feb–Apr 43, ABC 384 North America (11–29–42).

\textsuperscript{97} Memo, CG AAF for CofS (Through: OPD), 10 Jun 43, WDCSA 381 Nat Def.
offensive preparations. In late June President Roosevelt approved the statement of policy submitted to him by Secretary of War Stimson, but he let Mr. Stimson announce it to the public.

In mid-1943 the numerical strength of the forces assigned to the continental defense commands still amounted to about 379,000 officers and men. This figure—almost the peak strength of these forces after March 1942—was actually very deceptive as an index of their combat effectiveness. The First and Fourth Air Forces contained almost one-third of this strength, and their activity had long since been devoted principally to training units for overseas service. Ground combat troops within the commands numbered about 185,000 officers and men, of whom about 140,000 were in antiaircraft and coast defense units. These units and their higher headquarters had a large proportion of overage and limited-service officers and men. Thus, when the War Department began its further reductions of continental strengths in July 1943, the number of ground combat units and men within the defense commands that could be sent overseas was actually much smaller than a glance at their paper strengths might have indicated.

The impetus for new reductions came not only from the President's approval of a policy of calculated risk but also from the War Manpower Board, which in a report of 12 June 1943 recommended the abolition of the defense commands and the transfer of their functions to the Army Ground Forces. It recommended also that only harbor defense forces and military police battalions remain specifically assigned to defense missions; all other responsibility for ground defense should be allotted to the combat units being trained by the Army Ground Forces. The Operations Division rejected these recommendations, but as an alternative it proposed various measures that, when approved, were to cut the continental ground strength by about 70,000 men between July and November. During June, also, a report of the Special Army Committee of the Operations Division, which had been chosen to consider a revision of the whole military program, recommended a more searching examination of the defensive needs of the continental United States and its outposts. Approving this report, the Chief of Staff on 3 July directed the Operations Division to base its calculations in the new examination on the assumption that the only remaining dangers to North

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98 D/F, AAF to OPD, 15 Jul 43; D/F, G-2 to OPD, 17 Jul 43. Both in OPD 381 EDC/22.
99 Ltr, SW to President Roosevelt, 22 Jun 43, SW file, White House. This copy bears the notation: "HLS—Okay, you do it, FDR." Mr. Stimson announced the new policy at his press conference on 1 July 1943.
100 Memo, OPD for CofS, 3 Jul 43; Memo, Chief, North American Theater, OPD, for ACofS OPD, 4 Nov 43. Both in OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./38.
American land areas besides the Aleutians were sporadic shell fire from submarines, the landing of small raiding parties or saboteurs from submarines, and token air raids. Although the Operations Division thought a further reduction amply justified by the military situation under these assumptions, it concluded that there were already so many combat units in the United States which could not be moved overseas for another year that for the time being there was no point in removing any more from the defense commands than already authorized.\(^{101}\)

Another step toward a demobilization of the continental defense commands stemmed from a new estimate of capabilities originating with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by them on 16 September 1943. This estimate, essentially similar to the one stipulated in the Chief of Staff’s directive of 3 July, became the basis for putting the continental frontiers in defense Category A, a change approved by the Joint Board on 27 October. As previously defined in *Joint Action*, Category A applied to "coastal frontiers that probably will be free from attack, but for which a nominal defense must be provided for political reasons." Before making the new change in category, the Joint Board approved a redefinition that added to this the phrase, "in sufficient strength to repel raids by submarines, by surface vessels operating by stealth or stratagem, or isolated raids by aircraft operating chiefly for morale effect."\(^{102}\)

In November both The Inspector General and G–3 recommended a more rapid and radical change in the continental defense structure. G–3’s comment was very much to the point:

The provisions under which the defense commands are now established are unsound. The capabilities of our enemies to strike against the Continental United States are limited, at most, to nuisance raids. To withhold from offensive action a sufficient force to prevent such raids would render far greater assistance to the enemy than he could expect from the most effective raids. The existing instructions to the defense commanders place on those officers a responsibility without providing definitely defined missions or adequate means. The existence of the defense commands creates in the public mind a false sense of security. If nuisance raids are undertaken, they will, in all probability, succeed to approximately the maximum extent of their capabilities. The people of the Nation will believe that the enemy’s successes were made possible by military inefficiency. The Army will lose highly valuable public confidence. The measures which we are about to put into effect for political reasons are thus likely to prove unsound politically. . . . The hostile situation and our own critical personnel situation

\(^{101}\) Memo, ADCofS for ACoFS OPD, 3 Jul 43; Memo, OPD for DCoFS, 18 Aug 43. Both in OPD 320.2/930.

no longer justify the retention in the defense commands of any units that are not continuously prepared and available for employment in our overseas offensive effort.\textsuperscript{103}

G-3 also repeated the earlier recommendation that the Army Ground Forces take over the ground defense mission in the continental United States, but both the Army Ground Forces and the Operations Division rejected this idea and instead agreed on a much more rapid reduction of defense command forces. On 3 December the Chief of Staff approved a reduction from the current actual strength of about 165,000 to an over-all strength of 65,000, to be attained by 30 June 1944. The actual strength remaining on that date was even less; in fact, the continental defense commands by mid-1944 had been put on a strictly "nominal" defense basis.\textsuperscript{104}

The disintegration of the air defense system in the continental United States during 1943 and early 1944 was more a product of the extent and character of the air training program than of a revised estimate of enemy capabilities. From mid-1943 onward, the First and Fourth Air Forces had far more pursuit strength than they ever had earlier in the war, but the planes were being used for training and they had to share the training areas along the coasts with Navy and Marine units. The result was that by August and September 1943 the coastal areas were so saturated by training flights that the aircraft warning system could not function.\textsuperscript{105} An Air Forces memorandum of November 1943 pointed out this truth and the consequences when it stated:

The amount of flying training being conducted in vital defense areas makes accurate identification of aircraft, a prerequisite to any effective air defense system, an impossibility, particularly with respect to single or small formations of aircraft.

From the political viewpoint it does not appear sound to maintain an air system which is costly in manpower and money and which, in the event of a sporadic raid, would be ineffective. Certainly the public, in such an event, would want to know why we were maintaining the system when we knew or should have known that it was ineffective. A statement that we assume the risk of sporadic raids to release manpower and materials for offensive operations would be far better than explanations as to why expensive preparations to repel such raids did not work.\textsuperscript{106}

After some discussion the Joint Staff Planners also concluded that "an

\textsuperscript{103} Memo, G-3 for CofS, 14 Nov 43, OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./30.

\textsuperscript{104} Memo, CG AGF for CofS, 27 Nov 43; Memo, ACoS OPD for CofS, 1 Dec 43; Memo, Chief, North American Theater, OPD, for ACoS OPD, 6 Jan 44. All in OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./39. This reduction was completed by May 1944. It left the two remaining defense commands with about 25,000 harbor defense troops, about 24,000 troops in twelve antiaircraft groups, and about 11,000 in mechanized cavalry regiments.

\textsuperscript{105} Ltr, CG WDC to CofS, 30 Aug 43; D/F, AAF to OPD, 23 Sep 43; Memo, Col James K. Tully for Chief, North American Theater, OPD, 29 Sep 43. All in OPD 384 WDC/23.

\textsuperscript{106} Incl to JPS 333, 1 Dec 43, ABC 384 North America (11-29-42).
effective aircraft warning service cannot be maintained in coastal areas of the Continental United States (even if personnel were available) because of the volume of essential flight training in such areas."  

In April 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally adopted a new statement of policy that in effect made the War and Navy Departments rather than the regional commanders responsible for the success or failure of the remnants of the air defense system.

During the war the Germans actually engaged in preparations for a token air raid against the east coast of the United States such as American intelligence had contemplated since the summer of 1943. Long before the United States became a belligerent, the German Air Force had undertaken to develop a long-range bomber that could make a two-way flight across the ocean. In May 1942 the Germans settled upon a model that they hoped to be able to fly from the Brittany Peninsula to New York City and back. Technical difficulties and the distractions of the Russian campaign frustrated this hope, and in June 1944 they abandoned work on a round-trip bomber. The possibility of a one-way flight, with submarines to be used to pick up the crews after the bombing, offered a better prospect of success, and the Germans were working on a plan of this sort in August 1944.

In September German technical experts termed practicable a scheme that would have had even more startling results if successful. They had installed a launching device on a barge so that a V-2 rocket bomb could be fired from 100 miles offshore, apparently with the thought of having a submarine tow one or more barges across the ocean.

This last scheme was probably the basis for an intelligence report that reached Washington on 1 November 1944 to the effect that the Germans were fitting out submarines to be used for a robot bombing of New York City. Both Army and Navy intelligence officers evaluated this report as "a possibility," but Navy headquarters in Washington took it more seriously. On 3 November the Eastern Sea Frontier commander was directed to institute an immediate saturation air search against submarines within a 250-mile arc to the seaward from New York and to secure the help of Army planes in doing so. Coincidentally the War Department advised its defense

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107 JPS 333/3, 5 Feb 44, ABC 384 North America (11-29-42).
108 JCS 807, 5 Apr 44.
109 For example, Memo, ACoFAS (Intelligence) for CofAS, 4 Aug 43, copy in AG 381 (3-2-42).
110 Werner Baumbach, Zu Spät? (München: Richard Pflaum Verlag, 1949), pp. 157-61; MS # P-069, The Kreipe Diary (Werner Kreipe), entry of 21 Aug 44.
and air commanders that the Army’s evaluation of the report did not warrant any positive action. The Navy put its search into effect with its own planes as best it could on 4 November, but it took three more days to straighten out the tangle of conflicting instructions from Washington so that an alert with full Army participation could be put into effect. The alert and search operations continued until 10 November, when they were called off. Nothing that the air defense system of 1944 could have done would have stopped this kind of bomb, but the episode illustrated the existing paucity of defense means and inability of the local service commanders to take rapid co-ordinated action.\textsuperscript{112}

Although the Army rejected a Navy proposal for a new over-all command arrangement to be applied in emergencies of this sort, General Marshall did correct the Army’s command system by issuing a new prescription: “In the event of imminent emergency as determined by the Commanding General of the Defense Command [he is authorized] to assume command of all U.S. Army Forces physically located within the boundaries of the Defense Command and to notify the War Department of measures which have been taken.”\textsuperscript{113} One alarm in December received prompt and efficient handling. On the other hand, the service chiefs were not deterred from their offensive course by these reports, and a joint memorandum to the President on 11 December stated that the “diversion of troops or effort from present missions to meet the air defense aspect of the robot bomb threat is altogether unjustified.”\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} A large sheaf of papers in OPD 384/82 deals with this episode; the account in History of the Eastern Defense Command, pages 61–62, is somewhat garbled; Lt. Gen. George Grunert, Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command, in 1944, recalled the incident in testimony given on 15 December 1946, in Report of War Department Civil Defense Board, An. 1, p. 222.

\textsuperscript{113} OPD Memo for Rcd, 3 Dec 44, OPD 320 Def of Cont U.S./49.

\textsuperscript{114} OPD Summary Sheet, 16 Dec 44, OPD 384/82.
Three days after Washington received its initial warning of a robot bomb attack, the first of the Japanese "free balloons" was recovered from the sea off San Pedro, California. About ninety of these balloons—almost all of them having bags constructed of paper—were recovered in the continental United States between November 1944 and August 1945. None is known to have arrived after mid-April. The Japanese launched the balloons from the Sendai area of northern Honshu Island. The bags of the balloons were 33½ feet in diameter and lifted various mechanisms and a load of from 25 to 65 pounds of incendiary and antipersonnel bombs. The balloons were carried across the north Pacific by high air currents in as little as four days. About 9,300 were launched, and some drifted as far east as Michigan and south into Mexico. Many landed in Alaska and Canada, and a few in Hawaii. They did almost no damage, and there is no proven instance of a balloon igniting a forest fire. The only casualties traceable to them occurred at Bly, Ore., on 5 May 1945, when a woman and five children on a Sunday School picnic were killed when they tried to take a bomb apart. The press co-operated in keeping balloon sightings and recoveries a secret, and the lack of news about them may have helped persuade the Japanese to discontinue the operation in the spring of 1945.

Why the Japanese undertook the free balloon operation is not known. A press story from Tokyo after the war stated that "the balloon bomb was Japan's V-1 weapon in efforts to get revenge for the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in April 1942." Japanese preparations for the operation actually began in 1942, but they may have been undertaken more as an encouragement to Japanese war morale than as a method of undermining American morale or of inflicting damage. This seems to be the import of the following bit of testimony given by a captured Japanese officer: "The bag part of the balloons which were being sent to America consisted of hundreds of small pieces of paper. . . . These pieces were made by school children all over Japan, gathered up village by village, and shipped to a central assembly place for reshipment to the factory where the balloons were finally completed." In practice, the free balloon operation was so innocuous that

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115 The number that actually reached American shores is indeterminable, since the balloons carried a timed self-destroying mechanism and recoveries occurred only when this mechanism failed to work.

116 MID Rpts, especially Rpt 8, 1 Sep 45, sub: Japanese Free Balloons and Related Incidents, ABC 452.4 Japan (1-29-45); Hist of WDC, vol. I, ch. 5, and vol. V (which contains the detailed WDC Intelligence Studies 1 and 2, and the Jt WSF-WDC Plan BD-1, 15 Aug 45, for dealing with Japanese balloon operations); Craven and Cate, eds., Men and Planes, pp. 116-18.


118 Quoted in MID Rpt 8, 1 Sep 45, ABC 452.4 Japan (1-29-45).
American military and civilian officials naturally suspected a more sinister ultimate purpose. The Army and Navy collaborated with civilian agencies in taking such immediate protective measures as were possible and drafted plans for combating any kind of warfare that the balloon operations might presage.

The enemy threats of the last year of the war had no real influence on the reduction and virtual disbandment of the continental defenses begun in 1942. Very few Army aircraft were actually used for defense purposes after the summer of 1942 except in the war against the submarine. The ground defenses reached their peak strength in effectiveness about a year after Pearl Harbor, and thereafter their actual strength declined much more rapidly than their numerical strength. After June 1943 the ground defenses were reduced as rapidly as possible under the policy of calculated risk. Hind-sight may judge that this reduction should have begun much earlier, but the services had always to take political considerations into account as well as their own considered estimates of enemy capabilities. After January 1944 the continental United States had only token Army forces assigned to its defense, and even these forces underwent nearly a tenfold decrease in strength between then and the end of the war. In August 1945 the Eastern and Western Defense Commands still had a complement of about 17,000 officers and men on duty, but their active defense function had all but vanished.
CHAPTER V

Japanese Evacuation
From the West Coast

One of the Army's largest undertakings in the name of defense during World War II was the evacuation of almost all persons of Japanese ancestry from California, from the western halves of Oregon and Washington, and from southern Arizona. The Army also removed persons of Japanese descent from Alaska and began what was initially intended to be a substantial transfer of such persons from Hawaii to the mainland. Many facets of the story of the Japanese evacuation from the west coast have already been related in published works. Here the discussion is limited to the plans and decisions for evacuation and to the nature of the military necessity that lay behind them.

Initial plans for evacuation of suspected persons from strategic areas along the Pacific front concerned enemy aliens of all three Axis nations—Germany, Italy, and Japan—rather than persons of Japanese ancestry alone. Of the latter, the census of 1940 showed that, out of a total of 126,947 in the continental United States, 112,353 were living in the three Pacific states. California alone had 93,717 Japanese, or nearly three-fourths of the national total. Of the west coast Japanese, 40,869 were aliens ineligible for

1 On Hawaii, see ch. VIII below.
3 A substantially similar account of the decision to evacuate the Japanese appeared as study 4 in the collection of studies prepared by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Command Decisions (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), and as study 5 in the publicly printed edition of this work (Washington, 1960).
citizenship, and 71,484 were American-born citizens. In early 1942 there were about 58,000 Italian and 22,000 German aliens in the Pacific states. Most of the Germans, and a large proportion of the Japanese and Italians, lived in or near the principal cities and adjacent strategic areas. A good many of the German aliens were recent refugees from Nazi Germany. In contrast to the Germans and Italians, the Japanese in the Pacific states, and especially in California, had been the target of hostility and restrictive action for several decades, a factor that unquestionably colored the measures taken against these people after Pearl Harbor.4

The Background of Evacuation Planning

A prewar agreement made the Department of Justice responsible for controlling enemy aliens in the continental United States in the event of war. During 1941 this department (primarily, through its Federal Bureau of Investigation) scrutinized the records of prospective enemy aliens and compiled lists of those against whom there were grounds for suspicion of disloyalty. Presidential proclamations of 7 and 8 December 1941, dealing with the control of Japanese and of German and Italian aliens, respectively, provided the basis for immediate action against those so suspected. On 7 December President Roosevelt authorized the Army to cooperate with the FBI in rounding up individual enemy aliens considered actually or potentially dangerous. By 13 December the Department of Justice had interned a total of 831 alien residents of the Pacific states, including 595 Japanese and 187 Germans, and by 16 February 1942 the number of alien Japanese apprehended had increased to 1,266. By specifically authorizing the exclusion of enemy aliens “from any locality in which residence by an alien enemy shall be found to constitute a danger to the public peace and safety of the United States,” the Presidential proclamations also provided a basis for evacuation on a larger scale.5

During the first few days after the Pearl Harbor attack the west coast was greatly alarmed by a number of reports—all false—of enemy ships offshore, and it was in this atmosphere that the first proposal for a mass
evacuation of the Japanese developed. On 10 December an agent of the Treasury Department reported to Army authorities that “an estimated 20,000 Japanese in the San Francisco metropolitan area were ready for organized action.” Without checking the authenticity of the report, the Ninth Corps Area staff hurriedly completed a plan for their evacuation that was approved by the corps area commander. The next morning the Army called the local FBI chief, who “scoffed at the whole affair as the wild imaginings of a discharged former FBI man.” This stopped any further local action for the moment, but the corps area commander duly reported the incident to Washington and expressed the hope that “it may have the effect of arousing the War Department to some action looking to the establishment of an area or areas for the detention of aliens.”

His recommendation that “plans be made for large-scale internment” was forwarded by the Chief of Staff’s office to G-2 and to the Provost Marshal General. On 19 December, and apparently as one consequence of this initial flurry, General DeWitt, as commander of the Western Defense Command, recommended to GHQ “that action be initiated at the earliest practicable date to collect all alien subjects fourteen years of age and over, of enemy nations and remove them to the Zone of the Interior.”

However General DeWitt may have felt during December about the treatment of enemy aliens, he was then firmly opposed to any evacuation of citizens. In a telephone conversation he had on 26 December with Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion, the Provost Marshal General, the latter remarked that he had just been visited by a representative of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, who had asked for a roundup of all Japanese in the Los Angeles area. In response, General DeWitt said (and General Gullion expressed agreement with what he said):

I thought that thing out to my satisfaction. . . . if we go ahead and arrest the 93,000 Japanese, native born and foreign born, we are going to have an awful job on our hands and are very liable to alienate the loyal Japanese from disloyal. . . . I’m very doubtful that it would be common sense procedure to try and intern or to intern 117,000 Japanese in this theater. . . . I told the governors of all the states that those people should be watched better if they were watched by the police and people of the community in which they live and have been living for years. . . . and then inform the F.B.I. or the military authorities of any suspicious action so we could take necessary steps to handle it . . . rather than try to intern all those people, men, women and children, and hold them under military control and under guard. I don’t think it’s a sensible

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6 Memo, G-2 Fourth Army for CofS Fourth Army, 11 Dec 41, WDC-CAD 014.31 Enemy Aliens.
7 OCS Index, 11 Dec 41, Tally Card info re OCS 21227-38 and 39.
8 Ltr, CG WDC to CG GHQ, 19 Dec 41, WDC-CAD 014.31.
thing to do... I'd rather go along the way we are now... rather than attempt any such wholesale internment... An American citizen, after all, is an American citizen. And while they all may not be loyal, I think we can weed the disloyal out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary.9

What General DeWitt wanted at this time was the prompt issuance of clear instructions to FBI agents on the west coast that would enable them to take more positive steps to prevent sabotage and espionage. At his urging Secretary of War Stimson had conferred with Attorney General Francis Biddle, and thereafter Mr. Biddle speeded up the preparation of regulations to implement the Presidential proclamations of 7 and 8 December. Late in the month the Department of Justice announced regulations requiring enemy aliens in the Western Defense Command to surrender radio transmitters, short-wave radio receivers, and certain types of cameras, by 5 January 1942. On 30 December General DeWitt was informed that the Attorney General had also authorized the issuance of warrants for search and arrest in any house where an enemy alien lived upon representation by an FBI agent that there was reasonable cause to believe that there was contraband on the premises.10 In addition, the Department of Justice and the Provost Marshal General had arranged to send representatives to San Francisco to confer with General DeWitt in order to work out more specific arrangements for controlling enemy aliens. To centralize and expedite Army action in Washington, General Gullion also arranged for General DeWitt to deal directly with the Provost Marshal General’s office on west coast alien problems, and for the latter to keep GHQ informed of developments.11

The San Francisco conference took place on 4 and 5 January 1942. Before the meetings the War Department’s representative, Maj. Karl R. Bendetsen, Chief of the Aliens Division, Provost Marshal General’s office, recommended that General DeWitt insist on several measures beyond those already ordered by the Attorney General. In particular he urged the definition of strategic areas from which all enemy aliens were to be excluded and that authority to prescribe such areas be vested in the Army. He also insisted that there must be a new and complete registration of enemy aliens and a “pass and permit” system similar to the one prevalent in prewar Europe. The Justice representative, Assistant Attorney General James Rowe, Jr., also

9 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Gullion, 26 Dec 41, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Conv (DeWitt, 42-43).
10 tenBrock et al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution, p. 102; Memo, Col Archer L. Lerch for TAG, 30 Dec 41, PMG 014.311 WDC.
11 Memo, PMG for ACoS G–1 GHQ, 1 Jan 42, and inclosed copy of Ltr, PMG to Gen DeWitt, 1 Jan 42, GHQ G–1 file, Subversive Activities, WDC.
presented broader plans for action than the Attorney General had hitherto approved. In opening the conference, General DeWitt emphatically declared his serious concern over the alien situation and his distrust in particular of the Japanese population—both aliens and citizens. But, according to the later recollections of Mr. Rowe, the general during the meetings opposed a mass evacuation of the Japanese. What he wanted was a full implementation of the President's proclamations. The conference ended with agreement on a plan of action providing for an alien registration with the least practicable delay, for FBI searches of suspected premises under regulations that subsequently proved satisfactory to General DeWitt, and for the designation of strategic areas from which enemy aliens could be barred by the Attorney General, who would "entertain" Army recommendations on this score if they were accompanied by an exact description of each area.¹²

The arrangements agreed upon at San Francisco took longer to put into effect than either General DeWitt or the Justice representatives had anticipated. The registration of enemy aliens was finally undertaken between 2 and 9 February, and the large-scale "spot" raids that General DeWitt was especially anxious to have launched did not get under way until the same week, so that both operations took place in the period when agitation against the Japanese was rapidly mounting. General DeWitt had anticipated that he could fix the boundaries of restricted areas by 9 January, but it was 21 January before he sent the first of his lists to Washington for transmission to the Attorney General. One of his principal difficulties was to reconcile the recommendations of the Navy, which by agreement were to be made through him, with the position of the Department of Justice. Navy commanders wanted to exclude not only enemy aliens but also all American-born Japanese who could not show "actual severance of all allegiance to the Japanese Government."¹³

General DeWitt's recommendation of 21 January, for California, called for the exclusion of enemy aliens from eighty-six Category A zones and

¹² Memo, Maj Bendetsen for Gen DeWitt, 3 Jan 42; Notes on Conf in Office of Gen DeWitt, 4 Jan 42. Both in WDC-CAD 014.31 Aliens, War Department, Final Report, pp. 4–6, 19–24. Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Col Raymond R. Tourtillott, 5 Jan 42, WDC–CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42–43). tenBrock et al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution, pp. 104–05, citing notes on interv with Mr. Rowe, 15 Oct 42.

¹³ The Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval District commanders made recommendations in identical language on this score. Memo, Adm John W. Greenslade, Commandant Twelfth Naval District, for CG Northern California Sector, 8 Jan 42; Ltr, CG IX Army Corps to CG WDC, 8 Jan 42. Both in WDC–CAD 014.31 Aliens. Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Maj Gen Kenyon A. Joyce, 8 Jan 42, WDC–CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42–43).
their close control by a pass and permit system in eight Category B zones. Many of the Category A areas were uninhabited or had no alien population, but the execution of this recommendation nevertheless would have required the evacuation of more than 7,000 persons. Only 40 percent of these would have been Japanese aliens, and the majority would have been Italians.\textsuperscript{14} The Secretary of War's letter (drafted in the Provost Marshal General's office) forwarding this recommendation to Mr. Biddle added the following comments:

In recent conferences with General DeWitt, he has expressed great apprehension because of the presence on the Pacific coast of many thousand alien enemies. As late as yesterday, 24 January, he stated over the telephone that shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore radio communications, undoubtedly coordinated by intelligent enemy control were continually operating. A few days ago it was reported by military observers on the Pacific coast that not a single ship had sailed from our Pacific ports without being subsequently attacked. General DeWitt's apprehensions have been confirmed by recent visits of military observers from the War Department to the Pacific coast.

The alarming and dangerous situation just described, in my opinion, calls for immediate and stringent action.\textsuperscript{15}

Actually there had been no Japanese submarine or surface vessels anywhere near the west coast during the preceding month, and careful investigation subsequently indicated that all claims of hostile shore-to-ship and ship-to-shore communication lacked any foundation whatsoever.\textsuperscript{16} Similar recommendations for restricted areas in Arizona, Oregon, and Washington followed, and were forwarded to Justice by 3 February.\textsuperscript{17} By then the position of the Japanese population was under heavy attack, and in consequence the alien exclusion program was being eclipsed by a drive to evacuate all people of Japanese descent from the west coast states.

Agitation for a mass evacuation of the Japanese did not reach significant dimensions until more than a month after the outbreak of war. Then,

\textsuperscript{14} Ltr and Incl, CG WDC to Atty Gen (through PMG), 21 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 (California) General. The initial Category B recommendation would have affected an estimated 28,672 Italian, 13,305 Japanese, and 8,404 German aliens.
\textsuperscript{15} Ltr, SW to Atty Gen, 25 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 (California) General. The transcript of General DeWitt's telephone remarks reads "... we know there are radios along the coast; and we know they are communicating at sea. They may be communicating with each other..." Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Gullion, 24 Jan 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Conv (DeWitt 42-43).
\textsuperscript{17} Ltr, SW to Atty Gen, 3 Feb 42, AG 014.311 (1-13-41), sec. 1, forwarded the Oregon-Washington recommendation and reviewed the earlier ones. General DeWitt's final recommendation in this series, with respect to Utah, dated 16 February 1942 (copy in PMG 384.4 WDC), lists and describes the seven preceding ones.
beginning in mid-January 1942, public and private demands for federal and state action increased rapidly in tempo and volume. Among the first of these were letters of 16 January addressed by Representative Leland M. Ford of Santa Monica, California, to the Secretary of War and to other members of the Cabinet, urging that all Japanese—citizens as well as aliens—be moved inland from the coast and put in concentration camps for the duration of the war. Behind this and similar suggestions lay a profound suspicion of the Japanese population, fanned, of course, by the nature and scope of Japan’s early military successes in the Pacific. A GHQ intelligence bulletin of 21 January, for example, concluded that there was an “espionage net containing Japanese aliens, first and second generation Japanese and other nations . . . thoroughly organized and working underground.” In conversations with General Clark of GHQ on 20 and 21 January, General DeWitt expressed his apprehension that any enemy raid on the west coast would probably be accompanied by “a violent outburst of coordinated and controlled sabotage” among the Japanese population. In talking with General Gullion on 24 January, General DeWitt stated what was to become one of the principal arguments for mass evacuation. “The fact that nothing has happened so far is more or less . . . ominous,” he said, “in that I feel that in view of the fact that we have had no sporadic attempts at sabotage that there is a control being exercised and when we have it it will be on a mass basis.”

The publication of the report of the Roberts Commission, which had investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, on 25 January had a large and immediate effect both on public opinion and on government action. The report concluded that there had been widespread espionage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, both by Japanese consular agents and by Japanese residents of Oahu who had “no open relations with the Japanese foreign service.” The latter

28 Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, contains the most detailed analysis of the pressures that developed during January and February for Japanese evacuation. Most of the large number of communications addressed to the War Department on this subject, and its responses, are in AG 014.311 files. The first written communication of this sort received by the War Department was dated 6 January 1942.
29 Ltr, Representative Ford to SW, 16 Jan 42; Ltr, SW to Representative Ford, 26 Jan 42. Both in AG 014.311 (1-16-42).
30 GHQ G–2 Infor Bull 6, 21 Jan 42, copy in ASW 014.311 WDC Gen.
32 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Gullion, 24 Jan 42, WDC–CAD 311.3 Tel Conv (DeWitt, 42–43).
charge, though proven false after the war was over, was especially inflammatory at the time it was made. On 27 January General DeWitt had a long talk with Governor Culbert L. Olson of California and afterward reported:

There's a tremendous volume of public opinion now developing against the Japanese of all classes, that is aliens and non-aliens, to get them off the land, and in Southern California around Los Angeles—in that area too—they want and they are bringing pressure on the government to move all the Japanese out. As a matter of fact, it's not being instigated or developed by people who are not thinking but by the best people of California. Since the publication of the Roberts Report they feel that they are living in the midst of a lot of enemies. They don't trust the Japanese, none of them.24

After another talk two days later with the Attorney General of California, Mr. Earl Warren, General DeWitt reported that Mr. Warren was in thorough agreement with Governor Olson that the Japanese population should be removed from the state of California, and the Army commander now expressed his own unqualified concurrence in this proposal and also his willingness to accept responsibility for the enemy alien program if it were transferred to him.25

In Washington, as Major Bendetsen told General DeWitt on the same day, 29 January, the California Congressional delegation was "beginning to get up in arms" and its representatives had scheduled an informal meeting for the following afternoon to formulate recommendations for action. Some Washington state Congressmen also attended this meeting, to which representatives of the Justice and War Departments were invited. Major Bendetsen reported General DeWitt's views to the assembled Congressmen and, though denying that he was authorized to speak for the War Department, nevertheless expressed the opinion that the Army would be entirely willing to take over from Justice, "provided they accorded the Army, and the Secretary of War, and the military commander under him, full authority to require the services of any other federal agency, and provided that federal agency was required to respond."26 The Congressmen unanimously approved a suggested program for action, which called for an evacuation of enemy aliens and "dual" citizens from critical areas, but which made no specific mention of the Japanese. In presenting the Congressional program to his chief, Major

24 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Maj Bendetsen, 28 Jan 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43).
25 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Maj Bendetsen, 29 Jan 42, as recorded both in WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43) and in PMG 384.4 WDC; PMG daily Rec of Operations, 29 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 WDC.
26 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Maj Bendetsen, 30 Jan 42; PMG Daily Rec of Operations, 29 and 30 Jan 42. Both in PMG 384.4 WDC.
Bendetsen described it as actually "calling for the immediate evacuation of all Japanese from the Pacific coastal strip including Japanese citizens of the age of 21 and under, and calling for an Executive order of the President, imposing full responsibility and authority (with power to requisition the services of other Federal agencies) upon the War Department." He also reported the recommendations as adopted to General DeWitt, who expressed general approval of them despite some technical objections. After the Congressional meeting its chairman, Representative Clarence F. Lea, formally presented the recommendations to the War Department.

The next day, in reflecting on these recommendations, General DeWitt recorded this opinion:

As a matter of fact, the steps now being taken by the Attorney General through the F.B.I. will do nothing more than exercise a controlling influence and preventive action against sabotage; it will not, in my opinion, be able to stop it. The only positive answer to this question is evacuation of all enemy aliens from the West Coast and resettlement or internment under positive control, military or otherwise. What he wanted, he told Major Bendetsen, was the removal of German and Italian aliens as well as all Japanese residents and he wanted all evacuees from any one particular area to be moved at the same time.

The Department of Justice in the meantime had agreed informally to accept General DeWitt's initial recommendation for restricted areas in California, and it was preparing to carry out this and other aspects of the alien control program. On 28 January it announced the appointment of Thomas C. Clark as Co-ordinator of the Alien Enemy Control Program within the Western Defense Command, and Mr. Clark arrived on the scene of action on the following day. On 29 January Justice made its first public announcement about the restricted Category A areas that were to be cleared of enemy aliens by 24 February.

As a result of the Congressional recommendations and other developments, Attorney General Biddle asked War Department representatives to attend a meeting in his office on Saturday afternoon, 1 February. There he presented them with the draft of a press release to be issued jointly by the Justice and War Departments, indicating agreement on all alien control

27 Memo, Maj Bendetsen for PMG, 31 Jan 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. The Congressional recommendations were a verbatim copy of a draft submitted by a representative of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce. See Grodzins, *Japanese Evacuation*, pages 67–69.

28 Ltr, Representative Lea to SW, 30 Jan 42, AG 014.311 (1-30-42).

29 Memo for Rcd, 31 Jan 42, dictated but not signed by Gen DeWitt, WDC-CAD 014.31.

30 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Maj Bendetsen, 31 Jan 42, AG 014.311 (1-30-42), sec. 10.

measures taken to date and including the statement: "The Department of War and the Department of Justice are in agreement that the present military situation does not at this time require the removal of American citizens of the Japanese race." In opening the meeting Mr. Biddle stated that Justice would have nothing whatever to do with any interference with citizens or with a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The War Department representatives—Assistant Secretary of War McCloy, General Gullion, and Major Bendetsen—agreed to the wording of the press release except for the sentence quoted. The meeting then adjourned, the War Department representatives withholding approval of any press release until General DeWitt's views could be obtained, and until they learned the outcome of a conference at Sacramento that had been arranged for 2 February between General DeWitt, Mr. Clark, Governor Olsen, and other federal and state officials. Major Bendetsen informed the Chief of Staff's office that the Justice Department's proposal had been held up also because General DeWitt in telephone conversations had been provisionally recommending the evacuation of the whole Japanese population from the Pacific coastal frontier. In the meantime the Provost Marshal General's office had been formulating plans for mass evacuation and had already located sufficient nontroop shelter for substantially all of the west coast Japanese. In a telephone conversation immediately after the meeting with Justice representatives, Major Bendetsen reported, General DeWitt agreed to submit a recommendation for mass evacuation in writing.32

Before General DeWitt could report the outcome of the Sacramento meeting, Secretary Stimson met on 3 February with Mr. McCloy, General Gullion, and Major Bendetsen to confer about the proposed press release and the Japanese problem in general. They discussed a proposal under which military reservations would be established around the big aircraft factories and some port and harbor installations, and from which everyone could be excluded at the outset and until they were licensed to return. In practice licenses would not be issued to Japanese residents or to other groups or individuals under suspicion. It appeared that under this plan citizens as well as aliens could be excluded legally without obvious discrimination.33

32 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Maj Bendetsen, 1 Feb 42; Tel Conv, Gen Gullion with Gen Clark, 4 Feb 42. Both in PMG 384.4 WDC. Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Gullion, 1 Feb 42, GHQ G-1 file, Subversive Activities, WDC: Enemy Aliens; Memo, Maj Bendetsen for SGS; 2 Feb 42, AG 014.311 (1-13-41), sec. 10.
33 Stimson Diary, entry of 3 Feb 42. Mr. Stimson jotted down some rough notes of this meeting in an undated pencil memorandum, in SW file, Aliens. The press release as issued on 5 February 1942 is quoted in Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, 258.
During the discussion, Mr. Stimson was handed a record of a telephone conversation between General Marshall and General DeWitt, who had called just as the Secretary of War's meeting was getting under way. In it, General DeWitt said:

I had a conference yesterday with the Governor and several representatives from the Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture, with a view to removal of the Japanese from where they are now living to other portions of the state. And the Governor thinks it can be satisfactorily handled without having a resettlement somewhere in the central part of the United States and removing them entirely from the state of California. As you know the people out here are very much disturbed over these aliens, the Japanese being among them, and want to get them out of the several communities. And I've agreed that if they can solve the problem by getting them out of the areas limited as the combat zone, that it would be satisfactory. That would take them 100 to 150 miles from the coast, and they're working on it. The Department of Justice has a representative here and the Department of Agriculture, and they think the plan is an excellent one. I'm only concerned with getting them away from around these aircraft factories and other places.\(^{34}\)

In other exchanges on this and succeeding days General DeWitt explained that what the California authorities proposed to do was to move both citizen and alien Japanese (voluntarily if possible, and in collaboration with American-born Japanese leaders) from urban areas and from along the coast to agricultural areas within the state. They wanted to do this in particular in order to avoid having to replace the Japanese with Mexican and Negro laborers who might otherwise have to be brought into California in considerable numbers. The California officials felt they needed about ten days to study the problem and come up with a workable plan. By 4 February it appeared to General DeWitt that they could produce a plan that would be satisfactory from a defense standpoint.\(^{35}\)

After the meeting with Secretary Stimson, Mr. McCloy called General DeWitt to tell him about the licensing plan and to caution him against taking any position in favor of mass Japanese evacuation.\(^{36}\) The next day General Gullion told General Clark that Mr. Stimson and Mr. McCloy were against any mass evacuation of the Japanese. "They are pretty much against it," he said, "and they are also pretty much against interfering with citizens unless it can be done legally." While agreeing that the Stimson-McCloy point of view represented the War Department position for the

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\(^{34}\) Tel Conv, Gen Marshall with Gen DeWitt and accompanying notes of Col Deane, 3 Feb 42, in OCS Tel Convs, binder 2.

\(^{35}\) Memo, Gen DeWitt for ASW McCloy, 3 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC; Tel Convs, Gen DeWitt with Gen Joyce, 3 Feb 42, Gen DeWitt with Col Bendetsen, 4 Feb 42, and Gen DeWitt with Gen Gullion 5 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43).

\(^{36}\) Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Mr. McCloy, 3 Feb 42, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens.
moment, General Gullion also said that personally he did not think the licensing action proposed was going to cure the situation. On this same day, 4 February, Lieutenant Colonel Bendetsen (just promoted to that rank) in talking with General DeWitt remarked that he was sure that American citizens of Japanese extraction would have to be excluded from some areas at least. General DeWitt made no direct comment on this remark, but later said:

You see, the situation is this: I have never on my own initiative recommended a mass evacuation, or the removal of any man, any Jap, other than an alien. In other words, I have made no distinction between an alien as to whether he is Jap, Italian, or German—that they must all get out of Area A, that is the Category A area. The agitation to move all the Japanese away from the coast, and some suggestions, out of California entirely—is within the State, the population of the State, which has been espoused by the Governor. I have never been a body [sic] to that, but I have said, if you do that, and can solve that problem, it will be a positive step toward the protection of the coast . . . But I have never said, "You've got to do it, in order to protect the coast"; . . . I can take such measures as are necessary from a military standpoint to control the American Jap if he is going to cause trouble within those restricted areas.

Two days earlier, on 2 February, members of Congress from the Pacific states had organized informally under the leadership of their senior Senator, Hiram Johnson. He had appointed two subcommittees, one headed by Senator Rufus C. Holman of Oregon to consider plans for increased military strength along the Pacific coast, and the other by Senator Mon C. Wallgren of Washington to deal with the questions of enemy aliens and the prevention of sabotage. On 4 February General Clark of GHQ and Admiral Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, offered testimony on the west coast military outlook at a meeting of the first of these subcommittees. Before they spoke, Senator Holman summed up the situation by saying that the people there were alarmed and horrified as to their persons, their employment, and their homes. General Clark said that he thought the Pacific states were unduly alarmed. While both he and Admiral Stark agreed the west coast defenses were not adequate to prevent the enemy from attacking, they also agreed that the chance of any sustained attack or of an invasion was—as General Clark put it—nil. They recognized that sporadic air raids on key installations were a distinct possibility, but they also held that the west coast military defenses were considerable and in fairly good shape; and, as Admiral Stark said, from the military point of view the Pacific coast necessarily had a low priority as compared with Hawaii and the far Pacific. These

37 Tel Conv, Gen Gullion with Gen Clark, 4 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC.
38 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Col Bendetsen, 4 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42–43).
authoritative Army and Navy views were passed on to the Wallgren sub-committee, but they do not seem to have made much impression. 39

On this same day, 4 February, the federal government's Office of Facts and Figures completed an analysis of a hasty survey of public opinion in California and concluded: "Even with such a small sample, ... one can infer the situation in California is serious; that it is loaded with potential dynamite; but that it is not as desperate as some people believe." 40 A contemporary Navy report described what was happening to the Japanese population in the Los Angeles area in these words: "... loss of employment and income due to anti-Japanese agitation by and among Caucasian Americans, continued personal attacks by Filipinos and other racial groups, denial of relief funds to desperately needy cases, cancellation of licenses for markets, produce houses, stores, etc., by California State authorities, discharges from jobs by the wholesale, [and] unnecessarily harsh restrictions on travel including discriminatory regulations against all Nisei preventing them from engaging in commercial fishing." While expressing opposition to any mass evacuation of the Japanese, the report concluded that if practices such as those described continued there would "most certainly be outbreaks of sabotage, riots, and other civil strife in the not too distant future." 41

The Decision for Mass Evacuation

It was within this setting that Colonel Bendetsen on 4 February addressed a long memorandum to General Gullion which concluded that an enemy alien evacuation "would accomplish little as a measure of safety," since the alien Japanese were mostly elderly people who could do little harm if they would. Furthermore, their removal would inevitably antagonize large numbers of their relatives among the American-born Japanese. After considering the various alternatives that had been suggested for dealing with citizens, Colonel Bendetsen recommended the designation of military areas

40 Memo, Bur of Intelligence for Dir OFF, 4 Feb 42, copy in ASW 014.311 Enemy Aliens on the West Coast (EAWC).
41 Rpt, Lt Comdr K.D. Ringle, Eleventh Naval District, through Commandant to CNO, no date, copy in ASW 014.311 EAWC. From the contents of this report, the author concludes that it was written about 1 February 1942, rather than ten days later as indicated in Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, p. 146, note 46. The substance of this report, the most detailed and sympathetic military analysis of the Japanese problem in early 1942, was anonymously published in Harper's Magazine, October 1942, pp. 489-97.
from which all persons who did not have permission to enter and remain would be excluded as a measure of military necessity. In his opinion, this plan was clearly legal and he recommended that it be executed by three steps: first, the issuance of an Executive order by the President authorizing the Secretary of War to designate military areas; second, the designation of military areas upon the recommendation of General DeWitt; and, third, the immediate evacuation from areas so designated of all persons to whom it was not proposed to issue licenses to re-enter or remain. Colonel Bendetsen assumed that, if military areas were established on the west coast in place of all Category A areas thus far recommended by General DeWitt, about 30,000 people would have to be evacuated. On the same day, Colonel Bendetsen’s division drafted a proposal for applying the military area scheme to the entire nation.  

The Deputy Provost Marshal General, Col. Archer L. Lerch, indorsed Colonel Bendetsen’s proposals, and in doing so commented on what he called the “deciding weakening of General DeWitt” on the question of Japanese evacuation, which he considered “most unfortunate.” He also thought the plan for resettlement within California being worked out between General DeWitt and the state authorities savored “too much of the spirit of Rotary” and overlooked “the necessary cold-bloodedness of war.” General Gullion presented a condensed version of Colonel Bendetsen’s observations and recommendations to Mr. McCloy on 5 February. He also noted that General DeWitt had changed his position and now appeared to favor a more lenient treatment of the American-born Japanese to be worked out in cooperation with their leaders; in General Gullion’s opinion, such cooperation was dangerous and the delay involved was “extremely dangerous.” A revision of his memorandum, with all reference to General DeWitt deleted, became the Provost Marshal General’s recommendation of 6 February to Mr. McCloy that steps be taken immediately to eliminate what General Gullion described as the great danger of Japanese-inspired sabotage on the west coast. He advised that these steps should include the internment by the Army of all alien Japanese east of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, together with as many citizen members of their families as would voluntarily

\[42\] Memo, Col Bendetsen for PMG, 4 Feb 42, PMG 014.311 Gen P/W; Memo, PMG for CofS, 4 Feb 42, and inclosed draft of TAG letter to corps area commanders, submitted to CCS at 3:00 p.m., 11 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 Gen. On the outcome of the proposal to extend the military area scheme throughout the continental United States, see [Chapter II], above, and this chapter, pp. 144-46 below.

\[43\] Memo, Deputy PMG for PMG, 4 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC.

\[44\] Memo, PMG for ASW, 5 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC.
accompany them, and the exclusion of all citizen Japanese from restricted zones and their resettlement with the assistance of various federal agencies.\textsuperscript{45}

On the following day, 7 February, Colonel Bendetsen read General Gullion’s memorandum to General DeWitt, who expressed some enthusiasm for its recommendations but who did not want to indorse them without further study.\textsuperscript{46} On the same day Colonel Bendetsen drafted an acknowledgment to the Congressional letter of 30 January, which affirmed that "an adequate solution" for the west coast situation would be "formulated and recommended in the very near future."\textsuperscript{47} By 7 February, also, Mr. McCloy had decided to send Colonel Bendetsen to the west coast "to confer with General DeWitt in connection with mass evacuation of all Japanese,"\textsuperscript{48} a mission that was presently to produce new and detailed recommendations from the west coast commander.\textsuperscript{49}

In the meantime, the War and Justice Departments had been approaching an impasse over the area evacuations contemplated under the enemy alien control program. After agreeing informally to accept General DeWitt’s initial California recommendation, Justice officials balked at accepting the very large Category A areas he recommended for Washington and Oregon, since they included the entire cities of Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland. The

\textsuperscript{45} Memo, PMG for ASW, 6 Feb 42, ASW 014.511 EAWC. After Secretary Stimson’s conversation with President Roosevelt on 11 February (see below), General Gullion sent a copy of this memorandum to General Marshall, who initialed it and circulated it to the War Plans Division and GHQ (copy in AG 014.511 (1-13-41), sec. 1). The author has been unable to find evidence that General Marshall took any part in or was informed of developments in the planning of Japanese evacuation between 3 and 11 February.

\textsuperscript{46} Two Tel Convs, Gen DeWitt with Col Bendetsen, 7 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43).

\textsuperscript{47} Sent as Ltr, SW to Representative Lea, 10 Feb 42, AG 014.311 (1-30-42).

\textsuperscript{48} This quotation is from an OCS condensation (on Tally Card 31 in re OCS 21227-88) of information in the PMG daily Record of Operations of 7 February 1942 (an item that General Marshall did not see). The file of this daily PMG compilation, if it could be found, would be a valuable additional source for the story of Japanese evacuation planning but it was probably destroyed.

\textsuperscript{49} During the midst of their drafting, on 11 February, General DeWitt referred to them collectively as "the plan that Mr. McCloy wanted me to submit." Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt and Col Bendetsen with Gen Gullion, 11 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43). No direct evidence of the nature of the Assistant Secretary’s instructions to Colonel Bendetsen has been found, but in ASW 014.311 EAWC there is a Memo for Record, 8 February 1942, unsigned and with no indication of authorship, that reads in part as follows:

\textit{Japanese Evacuation, West Coast}

Prepare definite instructions for DeWitt on following basis:

Select key points where danger is great and size not too large.

Put them in order of importance.

Evacuate everybody, aliens and citizens.

Institute system of permits.

Whole matter to be handled by Army authorities.

Then, as matter progresses, we will soon find out how far we can go.
execution of this recommendation would have required the evacuation of about 10,700 additional enemy aliens and, as in the case of California, only about 40 percent of these would have been Japanese. As a practical matter the Department of Justice would have found it extremely difficult to supply either the manpower or the internment facilities that a compulsory evacuation of 17,000 or 18,000 enemy aliens would have required, and by 4 February its representatives were intimating that, if there were any further Category A recommendations or if the evacuation of any citizens were to be involved, Justice would have to bow out and turn its evacuation responsibilities over to the War Department. General DeWitt on 4 February was considering putting the whole Los Angeles area into Category A, because his Air commander had recommended Category A zones around 220 different installations that, when plotted on the map, almost blanketed the area anyway. For the same reason, General DeWitt believed he might have to put all of San Diego in Category A also. He finally recommended the blanket Category A coverage of these two cities on 7 February, and five days later he recommended that almost all of the San Francisco Bay area be put in Category A. If all of General DeWitt's recommendations for Category A areas through 12 February had been accepted, it would have made necessary the evacuation of nearly 89,000 enemy aliens from areas along the Pacific coast—only 25,000 of whom would have been Japanese. Additionally, of course, General DeWitt was counting upon the California state authorities to persuade the citizen Japanese to evacuate California's urban areas and other sensitive points along the coast.

On 9 February Attorney General Biddle formally agreed to announce the Category A areas initially recommended for Arizona, California, Oregon,
and Washington as prohibited to enemy aliens by 15 or 24 February—with the latter date applicable to those areas that had a considerable alien population. But Mr. Biddle questioned the necessity of forcibly excluding German and Italian aliens from all of these areas and wondered why whole cities had been included in Washington and Oregon and none in California. He added that if, as he had been informally advised, all of Los Angeles County was going to be recommended as a Category A area, the Department of Justice would have to step out of the picture because it did not have the physical means to carry out a mass evacuation of this scope. In conclusion, he stated that the Department of Justice was not authorized under any circumstances to evacuate American citizens; if the Army for reasons of military necessity wanted that done in particular areas, the Army itself would have to do it.\(^52\)

The Attorney General's stand led naturally to the drafting of a War Department memorandum summarizing the "questions to be determined re Japanese exclusion" that needed to be presented to President Roosevelt for decision. These questions were:

1. Is the President willing to authorize us to move Japanese citizens as well as aliens from restricted areas?
2. Should we undertake withdrawal from the entire strip DeWitt originally recommended, which involves a number of over 100,000 people, if we included both aliens and Japanese citizens?
3. Should we undertake the intermediate step involving, say, 70,000, which includes large communities such as Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle?
4. Should we take any lesser step such as the establishment of restricted areas around airplane plants and critical installations, even though General DeWitt states that in several, at least, of the large communities this would be wasteful, involve difficult administrative problems, and might be a source of more continuous irritation and trouble than 100 percent withdrawal from the area? \(^53\)

After a morning conference with Mr. McCloy and General Clark about the alternative courses proposed, Mr. Stimson tried to see the President to discuss them with him. Mr. Roosevelt was too busy for an interview, but in a telephone call at 1:30 p.m. the Secretary after describing the situation to the President "fortunantly found that he was very vigorous about it and

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\(^{52}\) Ltr, Atty Gen to SW, 9 Feb 42, quoted verbatim in Tel Conv, Col Bryan with Col Bendetsen, 11 Feb 42. WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (Bendetsen, Feb-Mar 42).

\(^{53}\) Memo for Rcd (unsigned), 11 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EASC. The figures given in (2) and (3) are about equal to the population of Japanese descent that these steps would affect. It is also evident from Mr. Stimson's diary entries of 10 and 11 February that these proposals did not contemplate any mass evacuation of German or Italian aliens. A re-examination of the diary has resulted in a significant alteration in the account previously published in Command Decisions about what happened on 11 February.
[he] told me to go ahead on the line that I had myself thought the best." 54

What Mr. Stimson thought best at this time, according to his Diary, was to begin as quickly as possible with the evacuation of both citizen and alien Japanese from the vicinity of "the most vital places of army and navy production." 55

In reporting Mr. Stimson's conversation with the President to San Francisco, Mr. McCloy told Colonel Bendetsen that "we have carte blanche to do what we want to as far as the President's concerned," and that Mr. Roosevelt had specifically authorized the evacuation of citizens. Mr. McCloy said that the President had recognized that there probably would be some repercussions to the evacuation of citizens, but that what was to be done had to be dictated by the military necessity of the situation, subject only to the qualification, "Be as reasonable as you can." The Assistant Secretary also told Colonel Bendetsen that he thought the President was prepared to sign an Executive order giving the War Department the authority to carry out whatever action it decided upon.56

The President's decisions as reported by Mr. McCloy gave understandable impetus to the preparation of new written recommendations by General DeWitt, which with the assistance of Colonel Bendetsen he had begun to draft on the evening of 10 February. These were embodied in a formal memorandum for the Secretary of War of 13 February, which was forwarded with a covering memorandum for GHQ via air mail.57 General DeWitt's new recommendations differed from those he had already submitted under the enemy alien control program in only one important particular: he recommended the enforced evacuation by federal authority of the American-born Japanese from the Category A areas already recommended by him in previous letters to the Secretary of War.58 His memorandum

54 Stimson Diary, entry of 11 Feb 42.
55 Ibid.
56 Tel Conv, Mr. McCloy with Col Bendetsen, 11 Feb 42, 11:15 a.m. Pacific Time, WDC–CAD 312.3 Tel Convs (Bendetsen, Feb–Mar 42).
57 Memo, CG WDC for SW (through CG FF), 13 Feb 42, and covering Memo, CG WDC for CG FF GHQ, 14 Feb 42, originals in PMG 014.311 WDC. The basic memorandum is published in War Department, Final Report, pages 33–38, where it is erroneously dated 14 February. As of 11 February, General DeWitt was planning to have Colonel Bendetsen carry his recommendations back to Washington, but on 12 February, because of the general's doubt that GHQ and General Marshall had been "thoroughly informed" of developments, he decided to submit them through the normal channels of communication. Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Clark, 12 Feb 42; Tel Conv, Gen Gullion with Col Bendetsen, 14 Feb 42. Both in WDC–CAD 312.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42–43).
58 The recommendations of the 13 February memorandum are described below at greater length in connection with the discussion of the War Department's directives of 20 February.
reached GHQ at 5:00 p.m., 18 February. On 19 February it was decided at a GHQ staff conference not to concur in General DeWitt's recommendations, and instead to recommend to General Clark that only enemy alien leaders be arrested and interned. General Clark, being aware of developments in the War Department, must have realized the futility of a GHQ nonconcurrence. On 20 February GHQ sent General DeWitt's memoranda to the War Department through normal channels, with an indorsement that they were being "transmitted in view of the proposed action already decided upon by the War Department." They finally reached the Provost Marshal General's office "for remark and recommendation" on 24 February, the day after General DeWitt received new instructions from the War Department that differed in many particulars from the recommendations he had submitted.

In the meantime, on 13 February, the Pacific coast Congressional subcommittee on aliens and sabotage had adopted the following recommendations:

We recommend the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States from all strategic areas.

In defining said strategic areas we recommend that such areas include all military installations, war industries, water and power installations, oil fields, and refineries, transportation and other essential facilities as well as adequate protective areas adjacent thereto.

We further recommend that such areas be enlarged as expeditiously as possible until they shall encompass the entire strategic area of the states of California, Oregon and Washington, and Territory of Alaska.

These recommendations were forwarded to President Roosevelt with a covering letter of the same date signed on behalf of the entire west coast Congressional delegation. On 16 February the President sent the letter and its inclosed recommendations to Secretary Stimson, with a memorandum

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50 Both the original and carbon of General DeWitt's recommendations in AG 014,311 (1-13-41), sec. 10, are stamped to indicate receipt in GHQ on the date and at the hour indicated. As Colonel Bendetsen said on 19 February, the DeWitt recommendations "must have hit the wrong air line." Tel Conv, Col Bendetsen with Col Donald A. Stroh, 19 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. The GHQ action is recorded in GHQ 337 Staff Conf, binder 2, entry of 19 Feb 42; and in Memo, G-5 Sec GHQ for Gen Clark, 19 Feb 42, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens.

60 1st Ind, GHQ for TAG, 20 Feb 42, on Memo, CG WDC for CG FF, 14 Feb 42, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens.

61 2d Ind, TAG for PMG, 22 Feb 42, on Memo, CG WDC for CG FF, 14 Feb 42, PMG 014,311 WDC. Stamped RECEIVED IN PMG, 11:00 A.M. 24 Feb 42.

62 Recommendations inclosed in Ltr, Senator Holman, Senator Wallgren, Representatives Lea, etc., to President Roosevelt, 13 Feb 42, AG 014,311 (2-16-42).
On the same day, 16 February, Colonel Bendetsen boarded an airplane in San Francisco, and he reached the War Department's offices in Washington about noon on 17 February.64 Before his arrival the Provost Marshal General's office initiated a telegraphic survey among the corps area commanders with the following message:

Probable that orders for very large evacuation of enemy aliens of all nationalities predominantly Japanese from Pacific Coast will issue within 48 hours. Internment facilities will be taxed to utmost. Report at once maximum you can care for, including housing, feeding, medical care, and supply. Your breakdown should include number of men, women, and children. Very important to keep this a closely guarded secret.65

A follow-up letter explained that 100,000 enemy aliens would be involved, 60,000 of whom would be women and children, and that all were to be interned east of the Western Defense Command, "50 percent in the Eighth Corps Area, 30 percent in the Seventh, and 10 percent each in the Fourth and Sixth."66 There were three reasons for the intention (as of 17 February) for removing the Pacific coast Japanese to areas east of the Western Defense Command. Since mid-December General DeWitt had insisted that internment of enemy aliens ought to be outside his theater of operations; some of the governments of the intermountain states had already indicated that they would not countenance any free settlement of the west coast Japanese within their borders; and, lastly, an Army survey of existing facilities for intern-

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63 Memo, President Roosevelt for SW, 16 Feb 42, AG 014.311 (2-16-42), received in Secretary's office at 9:11 a.m., 17 Feb 42.
64 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Gullion, 17 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC. In its Final Report, the War Department stated (page 25): "The War Department representative [Colonel Bendetsen] carried back to the Secretary the recommendation of the Commanding General that some method be developed empowering the Federal Government to provide for the evacuation from sensitive areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry, and any other persons individually or collectively regarded as potentially dangerous. The Commanding General's proposal was reduced to writing in a memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated February 14, 1942. . . . This recommendation was presented to the Secretary of War on or about February 16th." No other evidence was found that the recommendations contained in General DeWitt's memorandum to the Secretary of War were considered or referred to in the preparation of new War Department directives on the subject between 17 and 20 February. After these directives were drafted and after talking with General DeWitt on 20 February, Colonel Bendetsen wrote to the Secretary of War: "It was I who misunderstood General DeWitt's plan.—he has no mass movement in mind." Memo, Col Bendetsen for SW, 21 Feb 42, and attached transcript of Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Col Bendetsen, 20 Feb 42, in SW file, Aliens.
65 Memo, PMG for TAG, 17 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. The copy bears the notation: "Gen Gullion took this up in person with Mr. McCloy who approves."
66 Ltr, TAG to CG's, Corps Areas, 17 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC. The reference to all Japanese residents as aliens was rather frequent practice in Army exchanges on the subject during February 1942.
The War Department’s plan for mass evacuation took definite shape in an afternoon conference on 17 February of Secretary Stimson with Mr. McCloy, General Gullion, General Clark, and Colonel Bendetsen. Despite General Clark’s protest that any mass evacuation would involve the use of too many troops, Mr. Stimson decided that General DeWitt should be instructed to commence an evacuation immediately and to the extent he deemed necessary for the protection of vital installations. After the meeting General Clark consulted his GHQ chief, General McNair, who decided that General DeWitt should not be allotted any additional troops for evacuation purposes.

On the evening of 17 February, Mr. McCloy, General Gullion, and Colonel Bendetsen met with Justice representatives at the home of Attorney General Biddle. After some preliminary discussion, General Gullion pulled from his pocket and proceeded to read the draft of a proposed Presidential Executive order that would authorize the Secretary of War to remove both citizens and aliens from areas that he might designate. Mr. Biddle accepted the draft without further argument, because the President had already indicated to him that this was a matter for military decision. After several more meetings between Justice and Army officials during the next two days, the Executive order was presented to the President and signed by him late on 19 February. Between 18 and 20 February Mr. McCloy, General Gullion, and Colonel Bendetsen drafted the instructions for General DeWitt to guide his execution of the evacuation plan, and embodied them in two letter directives, both dated 20 February.

On 21 February the Secretary of War, in accordance with the President’s request, answered the Congressional letter of 13 February by assuring the

67 This last point was already fully appreciated in Washington but was confirmed by Rad, CG Ninth Corps Area to TAG, 18 Feb 42, PMG 014.311 Corps Area Rpts on Housing Facilities.
68 Stimson Diary, entry of 17 Feb 42; Memo for Rcd, Gen Clark, 17 Feb 42, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens. General Clark also told General Marshall about the meeting and the decision about troops, but a search of Army records fails to disclose evidence that the advice of the Chief of Staff was sought in the formulation of the War Department plan for Japanese evacuation.
69 Stimson Diary, entry of 18 Feb 42; Memo, PMG for CofS, 20 Feb 42, OCS 21227-113; Ltr, Mr. Biddle to the author, 31 Aug 56; Grodzins, Japanese Evacuation, pp. 266-67; ten Brock et al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution, pp. 111-12.
70 Ltrs, SW to CG WDC, 20 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC; Notes on Conf in ODCofS, 20 Feb 42, OCS Conf, Binder 32; Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Joyce, 23 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 371.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt 42-43). The longer of the Secretary of War’s letters is the Outline Memorandum published in part in War Department, Final Report, pp. 28-29, and attached to Ltr, ASW to Gen DeWitt, 20 Feb 42, ibid., p. 27. Executive Order 9066, 19 Feb 42, and the shorter SW Ltr of 20 Feb, are also published in Final Report, pp. 25-27.
west coast delegation that plans for the partial or complete evacuation of the Japanese from the Pacific coast were being formulated.\textsuperscript{71} In consultation with the Department of Justice, War Department officials at this time also prepared a draft of legislation that would put teeth into the enforcement of the new evacuation program, but did not submit it to Congress until 9 March. This draft as a bill became Public Law 503 after brief debate; it was passed by a voice vote in both houses on 19 March and signed by the President on 21 March. Three days later, the Western Defense Command issued its first compulsory exclusion order.\textsuperscript{72}

As already noted, the plan for evacuation embodied in the War Department’s directives of 20 February differed materially from the plan recommended by General DeWitt in his memorandum of 13 February. The central objective of the DeWitt plan was to move all enemy aliens and American-born Japanese out of all Category A areas in California, Oregon, and Washington that the general had recommended through 12 February. Although General DeWitt had repeatedly described the Japanese as the most dangerous element of the west coast population, he also made it clear as late as 17 February that he was “opposed to any preferential treatment to any alien irrespective of race,” and therefore that he wanted German and Italian aliens as well as all Japanese evacuated from Category A areas.\textsuperscript{73} His plan assumed that all enemy aliens would be interned under guard outside the Western Defense Command, at least until arrangements could be made for their resettlement. Citizen evacuees would either accept internment voluntarily or relocate themselves with such assistance as state and federal agencies might offer. Although this group would be permitted to resettle in Category B areas within the coastal zone, General DeWitt clearly preferred that they move inland.

The central objective of the War Department plan was to move all Japanese out of the California Category A areas first, and they were not to be permitted to resettle within Category B areas or within a larger Military Area No. 1 to be established along the coast.\textsuperscript{74} There was to be no evacuation of Italians without the express permission of the Secretary of

\textsuperscript{71} Ltr, SW to Representative Lea, 21 Feb 42, AG 014.311 (2-16-42).
\textsuperscript{73} Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Gullion, 17 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC.
\textsuperscript{74} The central objective of the War Department plan is clearly outlined in paragraphs 1–6 of the Outline Memorandum of 20 February, paragraphs omitted in the publication of the memorandum in War Department, \textit{Final Report}, pages 28–29.
War except on an individual basis. Although the War Department plan ostensibly provided that German aliens were to be treated in the same manner as the Japanese, it qualified this intention by providing for the exemption of "bona fide" German refugees. This qualification automatically stayed the evacuation of German aliens until General DeWitt could discover who among them were genuine refugees. The War Department plan contemplated voluntary relocation by all types of evacuees to the maximum extent possible, with internment as necessary outside the Western Defense Command. Another major difference between the two plans was related to General DeWitt's recommendation of a licensing system for Category A areas; the President's Executive order of 19 February did not require the application of the licensing plan, and licensing was not embodied in the War Department's directives of 20 February.

There were other lesser differences between the two plans. General DeWitt had recommended that before any evacuation all preparations should be complete, including the "selection and establishment of internment facilities in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas." As already noted, the War Department at this time was also planning to put all internees east of the Ninth Corps Area, but its directives did not contemplate any postponement of evacuation until internment facilities were ready. General DeWitt had also recommended the initial and separate internment of all enemy alien males over 14 years of age, until family units could be established in internment camps. The War Department plan had no such provision. As for the number of people to be involved, General DeWitt's memorandum contained an estimate that 133,000 people would have to be evacuated either voluntarily or by compulsion. A breakdown of this figure (based on his previous Category A recommendations) discloses that his plan would have involved about 69,000 Japanese (25,000 aliens and 44,000 American citizens), about 44,000 Italians, and about 20,000 Germans. The War Department planners apparently made no estimate of the numbers that their directives would involve, but eventually they did involve more than 110,000 Japanese residents—citizens and aliens—of the west coast states.

The Evacuation of the Japanese

How the Army would handle Japanese evacuation remained uncertain for a month or so after General DeWitt received his new instructions. That it would have to act, and quickly, was certain by late February. In effect President Roosevelt with the unanimous backing of the Pacific coast Con-
gressional delegation had directed the War Department to evacuate the Japanese, and the War Department now detailed its most industrious advocate of mass evacuation to help General DeWitt execute the mandate. And, although there was no threat of an enemy invasion of the west coast that might have stirred disloyalty among some of its Japanese residents, a condition had developed that made some solution of the Japanese problem mandatory.\footnote{On 20 February, the date of the War Department’s instructions to General DeWitt, General Marshall concurred unreservedly in a British Chiefs of Staff estimate that, “so long as the United States maintain a battle fleet in the Pacific, large-scale seaborne expeditions against the western seaboard of North America and the employment of capital ships in this area are considered impracticable.” (Ltr, Field Marshall Sir John Dill to Gen Marshall, 20 Feb 42 and Memo, Brig Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower to Sir John Dill, 20 Feb 42 both in OCS 21347–7.) In a general estimate of the situation a month later, on 19 March 1942, G–2 held that the maximum foreseeable threat to the Pacific coast was that from carrier-borne air raids against aircraft factories and naval bases. (MIS WD Estimate 2, 19 Mar 42, OPD Exec 10, item 29)}

This condition had been forecast in a careful survey of Pacific coast public opinion made during the week of 7–13 February (and analyzed too late to influence the course of events), which indicated a state of affairs needing “prompt and careful attention,” because of the very widely held belief along the coast that the Japanese population was disloyal and a menace to the national security. The report of this survey concluded that “racial or national antagonism seems to account in large part for the unfavorable attitude toward the Japanese” and that the factor of economic competition was relatively minor. It also indicated a much more pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment in southern California than elsewhere along the coast; outside of southern California, less than one-half of those interviewed favored the internment of Japanese aliens, and only 14 percent the internment of Japanese citizens.\footnote{Confidential Rpt of OFF, 9 Mar 42, recorded in Tel Conv, Col Bendetsen with Mr. Carrington Gill, 9 Mar 42, WDC–CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (Bendetsen, Feb–Mar 42).}

By late February a stream of pleas for action was flowing into the War and Justice Departments from California. On 22 February, for example, the Commandant, Eleventh Naval District, sent the following dispatch to Washington:

Situation of Japanese in Southern California very critical. Many are forced to move with no provision as to subsequent housing or means of livelihood. Many families already destitute. All localities object to movement of evacuees into their area. Recommend that the Departments concerned make immediate plans for the evacuation and reestablishment of aliens removed from areas designated by military authorities.\footnote{Quoted in Ltr, SN to Atty Gen, 22 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 FAWC.}

On the succeeding two days the shelling of the Santa Barbara oil installations...
and the “Battle of Los Angeles” added a strong fillip to the local temper of opinion. Even after General DeWitt’s public announcement of evacuation plans at the beginning of March, the San Francisco representative of the Office of Government Reports held there was a “serious possibility of mob violence and vigilante committees if the Army does not work fast enough.”

On 23 February Colonel Bendetsen arrived in San Francisco to serve as a liaison officer between General DeWitt and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and to help in the execution of the War Department directives. With his assistance, General DeWitt drafted and obtained War Department approval of his first public proclamation of the new program and of an explanatory press release, both of which were issued on 2 March. The proclamation established two military areas, a Military Area No. 1, which encompassed the western halves of the three Pacific states and southern Arizona and a Military Area No. 2, which covered the eastern halves of the Pacific states and northern Arizona. The press release forecast the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1, and the subsequent exclusion of German and Italian aliens at least from the prohibited zones within Area No. 1.

Apparently, in late February and early March both the War Department and General DeWitt hoped that the mere announcement of prohibited and restricted zones would induce a voluntary migration out of these zones, as had been the case in the California prohibited zones previously announced by the Department of Justice. General DeWitt estimated that 15,000 persons (of whom many must have been Japanese citizens) had moved out of these zones by midnight, 24 February. Most of them had moved into adjacent restricted zones in urban areas. In his press release of 2 March, General DeWitt urged the Japanese to move voluntarily into the interior from Military Area No. 1 and stated that those who did so would “in all probability not again be disturbed.” But only about 2,000 Japanese residents actually moved out of Area No. 1 before it was announced that voluntary migration would soon cease. Although large numbers of Japanese appear to have been willing before 1 March to migrate voluntarily into the interior, most of them

78 Stimson Diary, entry of 26 Feb 42. See above, pp. 87-88.
79 Telg, W. L. Wheeler to Phillip C. Hamblet, Exec Officer, Office of Govt Rpts, 5 Mar 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC.
80 Public Proclamation 1, and accompanying press release, 2 Mar 42, AG 014.311 (1-13-41), sec. 10; Memo, GHQ, unsigned and undated, summarizing Gen DeWitt’s new plan of action, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens.
81 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Clark, 26 Feb 42, WDC–CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42–43).
82 War Department, Final Report, p. 107.
could not do so thereafter for two reasons: first, almost nothing had been
done to help evacuees solve the many personal problems inevitable in a quick
removal; and second, there was a very open and rapidly spreading hostility
among governments and populations of interior areas to the free settlement
of Japanese in their midst.  

That the first of these reasons for the failure of voluntary migration was
the fault of the federal government as a whole seems evident from Secretary
Stimson's record of a Cabinet discussion on 27 February concerning Japanese
evacuation:

The President brought this up first of all and showed that thus far he has given
very little attention to the principal task of the transportation and resettlement of the
evacuees. I outlined what DeWitt's plan was and his proclamation so far as I could
without having the paper there. Biddle supported us loyally, saying that he had the
proclamation already in his hands. I enumerated the five classes in the order which
are being affected and tried to make clear that the process was necessarily gradual,
DeWitt being limited by the size of the task and the limitations of his own force.
The President seized upon the idea that the work should be taken off the shoulders of
the Army so far as possible after the evacuees had been selected and removed from
places where they were dangerous. There was general confusion around the table
arising from the fact that nobody had realized how big it was, nobody wanted to take
care of the evacuees, and the general weight and complication of the project. Biddle
suggested that a single head should be chosen to handle the resettlement instead of
the pulling and hauling of all the different agencies, and the President seemed to
accept this; the single person to be of course a civilian and not the Army. . . .

The person chosen for this assignment was Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower of
the Department of Agriculture. Mr. Eisenhower worked informally on the
evacuation problem from the end of February until 18 March, when Presi-
dent Roosevelt named him director of the newly created War Relocation
Authority. Before its establishment, General DeWitt had acquired a civil
affairs organization of his own to handle evacuation problems. The directives
of 20 February in effect put the Western Defense Command's evacuation
operations under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War, and, as
noted, Colonel Bendetsen had been chosen as co-ordinator of matters be-
tween Washington and San Francisco. During a visit of Mr. McCloy to

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83 War Department, Final Report, pp. 41-43; H. Doc. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 19 Mar 42,
pp. 27-30; Memo, SW for President Roosevelt, 15 Apr 42, ASW 014.311 West Coast-WDC,
Apr-May 42; Ltr and Incl, Dir WRA to ASW, 8 Jun 42; Ltr, Dir WRA to ASW, 11 Mar 43.
Last two in ASW 014.311 WDC Gen.
84 SW's Notes after Cabinet Mtg, 27 Feb 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs. The DeWitt plan
referred to in this quotation was the plan proposed to Washington in drafts of Public Proclama-
tion 1 and the accompanying press release.
85 tenBroek et al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution, pp. 118-22; Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt
with Gen Clark, 26 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43); G-4 Memo for
Rcd, 1 Mar 42, G-4 file 32860. The last two items reflect the War Department's own confusion
the west coast, General DeWitt, on 10 March, established a Civil Affairs Division in his general staff, and, on the following day, a Wartime Civil Control Administration to act as his operations agency for carrying out the evacuation program. At Mr. McCloy's urging, and with General Marshall's approval, Colonel Bendetsen was formally transferred from the War Department staff and made chief of both agencies. These agencies and the War Relocation Authority provided the administrative means for handling a controlled rather than voluntary evacuation.

By early March the Army had selected two sites—one in the Owens Valley of California and the other along the Colorado River in Arizona—for relocating as many as 20,000 to 30,000 Japanese who could not or would not locate anywhere else. When, by mid-March, most of the interior states west of the Mississippi River had made it known officially that they would not permit free settlement of citizen or alien Japanese within their borders, it became obvious that if the Japanese were to be evacuated en masse they would have to be put in government-operated camps under armed guard. On 21 March (the same day that President Roosevelt signed the enforcement act) Colonel Bendetsen recommended the termination of voluntary migration, and four days later General DeWitt and Mr. Eisenhower agreed that it would have to end. In consequence, General DeWitt stopped voluntary migration on 29 March and prepared to carry out a program of enforced evacuation, initially to Army-operated assembly centers. The large-scale movement of Japanese under Army supervision actually began on a voluntary basis from the Los Angeles area on 21 March; after the end of March all evacuations (beginning with Bainbridge Island) were compulsory. Until a meeting with the governors and other officials of the intermountain states at Salt Lake City on 7 April, the War Relocation Authority continued to hope that it could arrange the free settlement of a substantial number of the evacuated Japanese in the interior. But the intransi-

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about the arrangements for supervision from Washington, which in part was due to the imminent transfer of responsibilities under the impending general reorganization of Army headquarters. After the reorganization of 9 March the Washington military staff agencies almost disappear from the picture, except for the planning and direction of construction by the Corps of Engineers with staff supervision by the Services of Supply.

66 War Department, Final Report, p. 41; Memo, ASGS for CoS, 11 Mar 42, OCS Conf, Binder 34; Ltr, SW to Prof. William E. Hocking, 16 Mar 42, SW file, Aliens. Coincidentally with his new assignments, Colonel Bendetsen was promoted to the rank of full colonel.

67 Ltr, SW to Secy Interior, 13 Mar 42, and related papers, ASW 014.311 EAWC; Memo, Gen Gullion for Maj Gen Brehon B. Somervell, 26 Mar 42, PMG 014.311 Gen P/W.

68 The Army had nothing directly to do with the first compulsory evacuation from Terminal Island, executed by the Navy in late February 1942. See Hist of WDC, I, ch. 4, 8–9.
gent attitudes exhibited at that meeting persuaded all concerned that the Japanese, whether aliens or citizens, would have to be kept indefinitely in large government-operated camps, called relocation centers, which were built by the Army Engineers in the spring and summer of 1942.  

The term "relocation" was used first (and was still so used when the War Relocation Authority was established) to mean voluntary resettlement by the Japanese; after voluntary migration failed, it was used to describe the permanent camps to which the Japanese were sent from the Army's assembly centers. In the Supreme Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of evacuation, in the case of *Korematsu v. United States* decided on 18 December 1944, the majority opinion, in referring to the relocation centers, stated: "We deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies." In his dissenting opinion, Justice Owen J. Roberts referred to "the so-called Relocation Centers, a euphemism for concentration camps." *United States Reports*, pp. 223, 230.

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80 War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 43ff; Ltr, Dir WRA to ASW, 9 Apr 42; Memo, SW for President Roosevelt, 15 Apr 42. Last two in SW 014.311 West Coast–WDC, Apr–May 42. Ltr, Dir WRA to ASW, 11 Mar 43, ASW 014.311 WDC Gen; War Relocation Authority, *WRA*, pp.26–30.
North of the Pacific states, the Canadian Government carried out an evacuation of Japanese residents from British Columbia that closely paralleled that from the west coast of the United States in time and circumstance. The agitation against the Japanese appears to have developed more quickly in British Columbia than in California, and as a consequence the commander of the Canadian Army's Pacific forces recommended on 30 December 1941 that the Japanese be removed from the coastal area, primarily because he thought there was a definite danger of interracial riots and bloodshed. On 14 January 1942 the Canadian Government announced plans for a partial evacuation of British Columbia's 22,000 Japanese, and on 26 February it authorized a complete evacuation from a wide area inland from the coast. As a result, 21,000 Japanese residents (three-fourths of them Canadian-born) were evacuated between February and October to interior camps similar to the relocation centers in the United States.

Further north, in Alaska, the Army had been made responsible for controlling enemy aliens soon after the Pearl Harbor attack, and it had promptly interned those considered dangerous. On 6 March 1942 the Secretary of War extended his authority under Executive Order 9066 to the Army commander in Alaska. By the end of May, he had evacuated not only his alien internees but also the whole Japanese population of Alaska—230, of whom more than half were United States citizens.

It was General DeWitt's intention in early May not only to complete the evacuation of Japanese from Military Area No. 1, but also to move all of the other 16,000 Japanese living within an eight-state area "so there won't be any Japanese in the Western Defense Command who are not in resettlement projects." Thereafter, General DeWitt intended also to carry out an evacuation of German and Italian aliens from all prohibited zones within the Western Defense Command. There were more than one thousand of these zones after mid-March when he extended the scope of the enemy alien program to the four interior states of his command not previously covered by it. But his plans for a collective evacuation of German and Italian aliens faced...

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92 tenBrock et al., Prejudice, War and the Constitution, pp. 134-35; Memo, CG ADC for CG WDC, 5 May 42, WDC-CAD 014.3 Alien.
93 Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Adm Greenslade, 9 May 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43).
strong opposition. In General DeWitt's own San Francisco headquarters, the assistant chief of the Civil Affairs Division concluded:

So far as concerns the mission [of the Western Defense Command] of protecting against sabotage and the evacuation of German and Italian aliens, the accomplishment of the mission should be started by a different approach. In the case of the Japanese, their oriental habits of life, their and our inability to assimilate biologically, and, what is more important, our inability to distinguish the subverters and saboteurs from the rest of the mass made necessary their class evacuation on a horizontal basis. In the case of the Germans and the Italians, such mass evacuation is neither necessary nor desirable.

He went on to urge instead a policy of individual exclusion for the Germans and Italians, rather than mass evacuation. In Washington, as Colonel Bendetsen subsequently explained, "there was much opposition in the War Department to the evacuation of Italian aliens and considerable opposition, as well, to the collective evacuation of German aliens."

The Washington opposition to German and Italian evacuation developed in part as a consequence of the Provost Marshal's February proposal to extend the military area scheme to the entire continental United States. On 13 February the War Department had asked eight of the corps area commanders to submit recommendations for areas within which the Army should control the residence or presence of civilians to a greater or lesser degree. Each of them responded with recommendations, which, if adopted, would have required a fairly sizable alien exclusion program throughout the nation. For example, the Second Corps Area commander recommended a prohibited zone ten miles wide along the seacoast from the Delaware-Maryland state line northward to the eastern tip of Long Island (and including all of Suffolk County, N.Y.) from which all enemy alien residents were to be evacuated. Within this area he thought that it would probably be necessary to regulate the residence and movement of all other civilians by a permit and pass system. He also recommended a prohibition against enemy aliens approaching or being found within one hundred yards of any waterfront installation in the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area. Collectively the corps area recommendations seemed to reflect an early wartime attitude

94 Memo, Lt Col William A. Boekel, Asst ACoS CAD, for Col Bendetsen, 4 May 42, WDC-CAD 014.31 Aliens.
95 Ltr, Col Bendetsen to Col Gustaf J. Braun, Special Troops, Fort Ord, Calif., 31 Dec 42, WDC-CAD Final Rpt.
96 See p. V-28 above.
97 Ltr, TAG to CG's Corps Areas (Except Ninth), 13 Feb 42, AG 384 (2-4-42).
98 Ltr, Maj Gen Irving J. Phillipson, CG Second Corps Area, to CG SOS, 18 Apr 42, PMG 384.4 Gen.
toward aliens expressed immediately after the war by an officer of the Provost Marshal General's office in these words:

In connection with subversive warfare, during the last war, I would like to make this observation. In the fall of 1941 and the winter of 1942, we expected that subversive elements would be found mainly in the alien population. To our amazement by 1943 we discovered such was not the case at all. Most aliens were scared to death. So most of our disloyal individuals were old-line families in this country. That was amazing to us, and we had to face the facts and recognize it.99

By early March the War Department had come to appreciate that any general evacuation of German and Italian aliens from the west coast (even with broad exemptions) would be bound to produce repercussions throughout the nation.100 When Attorney General Biddle heard about conferences on alien restrictions being held in New York City, he sent a vigorous protest to President Roosevelt, in which he contended that any German or Italian evacuation on the east coast would have the gravest consequences to the nation’s economic structure and war morale since it would be bound to produce confusion and disaffection among persons of those nationalities throughout the country. The President was in thorough agreement with the seriousness of this prospect, and Mr. Stimson hastened to assure him that "no such mass evacuation of aliens on the East Coast as is suggested by Mr. Biddle’s memorandum . . . is either under way or contemplated," although he admitted that limited evacuations from particularly critical areas were being studied. As a consequence, General Drum was informed that there must be no evacuation of aliens within the Eastern Defense Command except with the knowledge and approval of the War and Justice Departments.101 With Presidential approval the War Department on 22 April did extend the military area system authorized by Executive Order 9066 to all of the continental defense commands, but only after it had been explained to the President that this extension was necessary to enforce dim-out and air defense regulations, and so forth, and not for the purpose of controlling enemy aliens. “The control of alien enemies,” the President informed Mr. Stimson, “seems to me to be primarily a civilian matter except of course in the case of the Japanese mass evacuation on the Pacific Coast.”102

99 Hearings before WD Civilian Def Bd, 5 Dec 46, Report of War Department Civil Defense Board, an. 1, p. 81.
100 Memo, Alfred Jaretzki, Jr., Special Asst to ASW, for Col Ralph H. Tate, 4 Jun 42, ASW 014.311 Gen. This memorandum presents a good detailed résumé of the German-Italian evacuation question as it developed between February and May 1942.
101 Memo, Atty Gen for President 9 Apr 42, Memo; President for SW, 14 Apr 42; Memo, SW for President 15 Apr 42. All in ASW 014.311 West Coast–WDC, Apr–May 42. Stimson Diary, entry of 15 Apr 42. Memo, OPD for TAG, 24 Apr 42, OPD 014.311 (3–1–42)/7.
102 Memo, President for SW, 5 May 42, ASW 014.311 Gen.
It was this background of related developments that determined the fate of General DeWitt's recommendation, submitted through Colonel Bendetsen on 10 May 1942, for a limited collective evacuation of German and Italian aliens from Military Area No. 1. When General DeWitt was told on the following day that Mr. Stimson and Mr. McCloy were not inclined to agree with his recommendation, he insisted that the removal of German and Italian aliens as recommended by him was an essential war measure; and he insisted, too, that, if the War Department refused to adopt his recommendation, then he must be given definite instructions to the contrary that would exempt him from all responsibility for the consequences. Before General DeWitt's recommendation could be discussed with the President, the Congressional committee that had been studying the west coast evacuation of the Japanese issued its second report, which, among other observations, labeled any mass evacuation of German and Italian aliens "out of the question if we intend to win this war." On 15 May the President approved an alternative to General DeWitt's recommendation upon which the War Department secretaries had already agreed. Instead of a collective evacuation of German and Italian aliens from the west coast or from anywhere else in the United States, the War Department would authorize the defense commanders to issue individual exclusion orders against both aliens and citizens under the authority of Executive Order 9066. Instructions to this effect, including a caution enjoining strict secrecy, went to General DeWitt on 22 May and, although they did not contain the waiver of responsibility he had requested, apparently they gave him a broad enough grant of authority to satisfy his concern over the problem of German and Italian aliens. The rejection of General DeWitt's May recommendation concerning the removal of German and Italian aliens, which he explicitly justified on grounds of military necessity and at a time when the Pacific outlook was considerably grimmer than it had been in February (see Chapter IV above), certainly weakens the theory, advanced in the War Department, Final Report and elsewhere after 1942, that the War Department acted on evacuation in accordance with recommendations of the commanding general that in turn were based on the general's estimate of the military necessity of the situation. There is no more than a trace of this theory in War Department records that antedate the preparation of the Final Report by the Western Defense Command in early 1943.
As for General DeWitt's intention of interning all of the other Japanese residents of the Western Defense Command, the War Department approved the evacuation of those in the eastern half of California only and left undisturbed those in eastern Oregon and Washington, in northern Arizona, and in the other states of the Western Defense Command—except, of course, as General DeWitt applied to them his new authority to exclude suspected individuals from sensitive areas. The final mass evacuation measure nevertheless affected about 10,000 persons and was carried out by direct movements from places of residence to relocation centers.

The Western Defense Command completed the evacuation of more than 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 on 7 June, and the removals from Military Area No. 2 in California were virtually complete by early August. The Army kept control of the evacuees until 3 November 1942 when, with the last movement from an assembly center to a relocation center, the War Relocation Authority took over general responsibility for the care and disposition of relocated Japanese.

What were the reasons that impelled the Army to carry out the mass evacuation of Japanese residents from the west coast beginning in March 1942? The general answer to this question is that the President and Congress had approved mass evacuation and the Secretary of War and his principal civilian assistant in this matter themselves thought it necessary to carry it out. Mr. Stimson on 16 March (and before the evacuation had begun) referred to the prospect as a "tragedy" that seemed "to be a military necessity" because very large numbers of the Japanese were "located in close proximity to installations of vital importance to the war effort." A week later Mr. McCloy reported, after his west coast visit, that there had been no cases of sabotage traceable to the Japanese population, but that "there was much evidence of espionage."

The most damaging tangible evidence against the Japanese was that produced by the intensive searches of their premises by the FBI from early February onward. By May it had seized 2,592 guns of various kinds, 199,000...
rounds of ammunitions, 1,652 sticks of dynamite, 1,458 radio receivers, 2,914 cameras, 37 motion picture cameras, and numerous other articles that the alien Japanese had been ordered to turn in at the beginning of January. Nonetheless, after assessing this evidence, Department of Justice officials concluded:

We have not, however, uncovered through these searches any dangerous persons that we could not otherwise know about. We have not found among all the sticks of dynamite and gun powder any evidence that any of it was to be used in bombs. We have not found a single machine gun nor have we found any gun in any circumstances indicating that it was to be used in a manner helpful to our enemies. We have not found a camera which we have reason to believe was for use in espionage.¹¹²

There were better if less tangible grounds for suspecting that some of the Japanese people—citizens as well as aliens—would become disloyal in the event of a Japanese invasion. The Navy report of early February 1942 previously cited concluded that a very small minority (less than 3 percent) of alien and citizen Japanese were so fanatically loyal to Japan that they could be expected to act as saboteurs or enemy agents, and a somewhat larger minority might be passively disloyal, if given the opportunity.¹¹³ On similar grounds the War Relocation Authority concluded that “a selective evacuation of people of Japanese descent from the west coast military area was justified and administratively feasible in the spring of 1942,” although it concluded also that a mass evacuation such as was actually carried out was never justified.¹¹⁴ But no military estimate after December 1941 forecast even the possibility of an invasion of the west coast by the Japanese in strength, and all disloyalty among the Japanese remained passive until after their removal to relocation centers.

Although little support for the argument that military necessity required a mass evacuation of the Japanese can be found in contemporary evidence, it might be contended that the co-operation of the white population of the Pacific states in the national defense effort could not have been otherwise assured. By March 1942 a large segment of that population along the coast was determined to be rid of the Japanese, at least for the duration of the war. Prewar antipathies combined with wartime fears into a formidable pressure for removal. Writing in June, Mr. McCloy explained that the nature of the

¹¹² Draft of Memo, early May 42, Atty Gen for President Roosevelt, as quoted in Grodzins, *Japanese Evacuation*, pp. 134–36. A major portion of the first two items listed above was picked up in a raid on a sporting goods shop.

¹¹³ Rpt of Comdr Ringle, no date, copy in ASW 104.311 EAWC.

¹¹⁴ War Relocation Authority *WRA*, p. 182.
attack on Pearl Harbor and the apparent exposure of the west coast to enemy action left its "American populations . . . in a condition of great excitement and apprehension," which "tended greatly to inflame our people against all persons of Japanese ancestry." Shortly after the evacuation had been completed, the Assistant Secretary commented to General Drum:

As you know, the Japanese were removed from the West Coast, first, because of the proximity of the West Coast to the Japanese theater of operations and, second, because of the very large number of Japanese concentrated in that area, and thirdly, because of the fear that direct action might be taken against the Japanese as a result of the rather antagonistic attitude of the local population.

Yet in Hawaii, with a considerably greater concentration of Japanese much closer to the arena of operations, no similar removal occurred despite very similar evacuation planning after Oahu's baptism of fire in December 1941.

115 Ltr, ASW to Mrs. Edwin H. Kinney, 27 Jun 42, ASW 014.311 WDC Gen.
116 Ltr, ASW to CG EDC, 16 Nov 42, ASW 014.311 WDC Gen.
117 See below, ch. VIII.
CHAPTER VI

The Reinforcement of Oahu

The Hawaiian island of Oahu held a position of the first importance in the military structure of the United States before and during World War II. During the prewar years Oahu and the Panama Canal Zone were the two great outposts of continental defense, and, after Japan plunged the United States into a Pacific war, Oahu became an essential springboard for the offensive that was finally to crush the Japanese Empire.

What gave Oahu its military importance was the great naval base of Pearl Harbor. The Army had primary responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor and, to fulfill this responsibility, before the war it maintained on Oahu its largest and, in many respects, its best equipped overseas garrison. The Army’s objective was to make Oahu impregnable, and in April 1941 the War Department confidently described the island as the strongest fortress in the world.1 Seven months later this confidence was rudely shaken by Japan’s amazingly successful attack on a major portion of the Pacific Fleet berthed and moored in Pearl Harbor, and on the Army’s surrounding air installations and aircraft on the ground. The background of this Japanese venture has been one of the most intensively studied and related episodes in modern history, and this volume can add only some detail about what the Army did before and during the attack.2

The Hawaiian Department Before 1941

The Army had established its first post on Oahu more than forty years

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1 Aide-mémoire on the Defense of Hawaii, 24 Apr 41, WPD 3672-32.
earlier, immediately after the United States annexed the Hawaiian Islands in August 1898. Increasing Japanese-American friction in the following decade led to a decision by the Army and Navy in 1908 to make Pearl Harbor the principal American naval bastion in the Pacific. To protect Pearl Harbor, the Army greatly expanded its Oahu garrison and in 1913 established the Hawaiian Department as an independent command under direct War Department control. In the two decades after World War I the Army kept about 11 percent of its manpower on Oahu, built up formidable coastal defenses on its south shore to protect Pearl and Honolulu harbors, and installed air defenses to guard vital installations against this new element of warfare that developed so rapidly between world wars.

The Army's mission in Hawaii was defined in 1920 as the defense of the Pearl Harbor naval base against "damage from naval or aerial bombardment or by enemy sympathizers" and against "attack by enemy expeditionary force or forces, supported or unsupported by an enemy fleet or fleets." The mission remained essentially unchanged until 1941, and until that year the Army did almost nothing to guard the other major islands of the Hawaiian chain against attack. In February 1941, General Marshall broadened the stated mission informally by emphasizing the responsibility of the Army for protecting the fleet as well as the Pearl Harbor naval installations. In practice, as events were to prove, the impact of this new instruction was blunted by the common assumption in Washington and Hawaii that no serious attack on Oahu was at all likely if the bulk of the fleet was present in Hawaiian waters.

The eight major islands of the Hawaiian chain are situated about 2,400 statute miles southwest of the California coast, and about 3,900 miles from the principal Japanese island of Honshu. The main island group extends nearly 400 miles from Hawaii—the large island which has nearly two-thirds of the total land area—northwestward to Kauai and Ni'ihau. [Map II] Hawaii, Maui, Oahu, and Kauai are the principal islands, and the latter three are roughly of the same size. All are mountainous islands of volcanic origin, possessed of a subtropical climate that is pleasant and healthful. Oahu, the third largest island with an area of 604 square miles, owes its pre-eminence to two harbors along its southern shore: that of Honolulu, and the shallow lagoon seven miles to the west that after intensive development became the Navy's largest overseas base. Oahu, with less than one-tenth of the archipe-

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9 Ltr, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 3 Jan 20, copy in OPD Résumé, Pearl Harbor Attack.

5 Pers Ltr, Gen Marshall to Maj Gen Walter C. Short, 7 Feb 41, WPD 4449-1.
lago's area, had 60 percent of its population in 1940, and nearly 70 percent by the end of the Pacific war. The population of all the islands is something of a racial kaleidoscope. The largest single element in 1940 was of Japanese descent—roughly, 37 percent of the total of 423,000. On both Hawaii and Kauai those of Japanese descent outnumbered those of Caucasian descent by three to one, and on Oahu the two groups were about equal in number. Although more than three-fourths of the people of Japanese descent were American-born citizens, their preponderance in the total population had a profound influence on military thinking about what might happen in a war with Japan. Most Army and Navy officers assumed that in the absence of close military control there would be widespread attempts at sabotage, and therefore they planned for a wartime establishment under martial law. The existing Hawaiian government was that of a fully incorporated territory, with an elected legislature and a nonvoting delegate to Congress, and executive and judicial officers appointed by the President. It had jurisdiction over the main archipelago, the chain of minuscule reefs extending a thousand miles from Kauai to Midway, and two distant coral islands to the southwest.

Oahu is a diamond-shaped island having two parallel mountain ranges, which have precipitous slopes to the seaward and a broad plateau in between that spreads out as a coastal plain in the south. Before World War II Oahu's Army and Navy installations were mostly on this plateau and plain. There they were so closely intermingled and integrated with the civilian population and general economic activity of the island that military secrecy on any large scale was impossible. The Army had its headquarters at Fort Shafter in the western outskirts of Honolulu, but the main body of its troops was stationed at Schofield Barracks in the center of the plateau about ten miles inland from Pearl Harbor. The principal Army unit was the Hawaiian Division, activated in 1921; and its station at Schofield covered the Pearl Harbor base against an enemy landing on the northwest coast. It was only along this coast that the Army believed a hostile landing in force even remotely feasible. The principal Army air installations were Hickam Field, the base for bombardment aviation, adjacent to Pearl Harbor on the Honolulu side, and Wheeler Field, the pursuit and fighter base located in the interior next to Schofield Barracks.

On the day war began in Europe in September 1939, the Army commander in Hawaii, Maj. Gen. Charles D. Herron, after “taking stock” of his local outlook, informally commented to General Marshall that he would not “want to be given the job of cracking the nut” which Oahu presented to any would-be invader, because of its “encircling reefs and two coasts pro-
tected by very difficult small mountain ranges and the south shore very heavily armed [and therefore with the] prospect of fighting an entrenched division all the way across after a landing on the north shore." He admitted that Oahu was difficult to defend against "air attacks coming in from the sea." But he expressed the belief that airplane carriers could "not live in these waters as long as we have left any bombers at all;" and anyway he felt "that naval air forces, like the cavalry of old, always has in its mind, the get-away." General Herron’s optimism about Oahu’s relative invulnerability to invasion appears to have been well founded, but two years later the Japanese certainly belied his observation about carriers.

The possibility of war with Japan had led the Army and Navy in 1924 to draft a new joint ORANGE plan to govern the conduct of such a war. Since the Limitations of Armament Treaty of 1921 barred the building of any new military defenses to the westward of Hawaii, the Pearl Harbor base and its Army defenses assumed an ever-increasing importance in Pacific war plans during the twenties and thirties. By 1938 the Navy had expended about $75,000,000 on this base, and the Army more than twice that amount on military installations to protect it. Navy plans for a Japanese war visualized the launching of a transpacific offensive from Oahu through Japanese-held islands toward the Philippines; but by 1935 the Army was convinced that such an offensive was impracticable, at least at the beginning of a war with Japan, and therefore that American strategy in the Pacific should be essentially defensive and should concentrate on holding the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama line. The last ORANGE plan revision of 1938 represented an unsatisfactory compromise of the Army and Navy positions. In any event, because of the increasing threat of war with Japan, the Army from 1935 until the autumn of 1939 accorded the Hawaiian Department top priority in the supply of equipment, and it increased the strength of the garrison by more than 50 percent, from 14,821 to 21,289 between the summers of 1935 and 1938.7

In September 1935 General Herron’s predecessor in Hawaii, Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, had expressed himself as far from satisfied with either the peacetime or planned wartime allotments of men and material to his department, and he also wanted to broaden the Army’s mission. General Drum proposed that the mission include defense of all the main Hawaiian islands and participation in the air defense of the eastern Pacific area. He asked for

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6 Pers Ltr, Gen Herron to Gen Marshall, 1 Sep 30, CoFS file, Herron, Gen C. D.
7 Rpt of Col Edward M. Markham to CoFS, 10 Jan 38, sub: Rpt on Def Features of the Hawaiian Islands, WPD 3878-9; Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, 1945-40.
twenty-six of the new "flying fortress" heavy bombers then under development, and he proposed to construct operating fields for them on Hawaii and Kauai islands. This measure in turn would require some deployment of Army ground forces to the outer islands to protect the new airfields. The War Department rejected these proposals on the ground that the defense of ocean areas was the Navy's business and that the dissipation of Hawaii's forces would weaken the defense of Pearl Harbor, which must remain the overriding mission of the Army in Hawaii. Army plans of 1935 called for a war garrison on Oahu of more than 100,000 officers and men, and the Army planners in Washington rejected General Drum's proposal that 23,000 of these troops be put on the outer islands in wartime. The Joint Board confirmed these actions and held that the mission of United States forces in Hawaii was only "to hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base" and the Army’s specific mission was "to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers." After a lengthy maritime strike in the winter of 1936–37 General Drum resubmitted his recommendations with the argument that the Army must extend its protection to the outer islands if it wished to assure an adequate supply of food for Oahu in time of war. Oahu produced only 15 percent of its own requirements in food, but the other islands could readily make up the deficiency in an emergency if communication was maintained with them. Again the War Department objected. In both 1935 and 1937, its basic argument against broadening the Army mission in Hawaii was the following: "If the Fleet is in the Pacific and free to act, Oahu will be, with the completion of the existing defense project, secure against any attacks that may be launched against it. It is only in the case that the Fleet is not present or free to act that the security of the Hawaiian Islands can be seriously threatened." That the presence of the fleet in or near Hawaiian waters provided a more or less automatic guarantee against any serious attack on Oahu continued to be a widely held conviction both in Washington and Hawaii until the Japanese demonstration to the contrary in December 1941.

A fresh survey of Oahu's defenses, conducted in late 1937 by Col. Edward M. Markham on oral instruction of the President and Secretary of War, produced conclusions similar to those of General Drum. Colonel

8 WPD Study, 9 Dec 35, sub: Defense Mission—Hawaiian Dept, and other papers in WPD 3878; Memo, Col Sherman Miles for ACofS WPD, 28 Dec 35, WPD 3672-7.
9 Memo, JB to SW, 19 May 36, WPD 3878-1.
10 Memo, ACofS WPD for Col Miles, WPD, 29 Jul 37, and other papers in WPD 3878-3.
11 Colonel Markham had just completed a four-year tour of duty as Chief of Engineers, with rank of major general; and he retired with that rank in February 1938.
Markham stressed the need for making the Pearl Harbor base as nearly impregnable as possible. He pointed out that despite their recent strengthening, the Army's installations for defending it were considerably less than impregnable, principally because of "the astounding advance in aircraft design and range over the past twenty years." He emphasized as "a corollary of the first order" the importance of preventing an enemy from seizing and using Oahu and its Pearl Harbor base "as a springboard of attack against our west coast territory and shipping, and the Panama Canal." Colonel Markham agreed with General Drum that substantial peacetime Regular Army garrisons should be installed on Hawaii and Kauai to operate and support new air bases and to assure Oahu of food in an emergency. Finally, he included among the basic assumptions of his report one of the more prophetic forecasts of the prewar years:

War with Japan will be precipitated without notice. One of the most obvious and vital lessons of history is that Japan will pick her own time for conflict. The very form of its government lends itself to such action in that its military and naval forces can, under the pretext of an emergency, initiate and prosecute military and naval operations independently of civil control.... If and when hostilities develop between the United States and Japan, there can be little doubt that the Hawaiian Islands will be the initial scene of action, and that Japan will apply her available man-power and resources in powerful and determined attacks against these islands.\textsuperscript{12}

The slight impact of the Drum and Markham recommendations can be credited in good measure to the rising threat of Hitler's Germany and the increasing prospect of war in Europe, which from 1938 onward absorbed the major attention of the Roosevelt administration and of the War Department in particular. Although the United States Government considered that the Hawaiian Islands lay within the Western Hemisphere, new plans for hemisphere defense developed after 1938 emphasized the strengthening of the American military position in Atlantic and Latin American areas. The War Department's stand also reflected the fact that Oahu, in comparison with other overseas bases or with the continental United States itself, was already well provided with defenses, and especially with the means for resisting invasion. It had a full infantry division, a heavy concentration of coast defense guns, and from 1938 onward the more or less constant protection of the United States Fleet. But, until 1941, it had no modern Army combat planes.

One factor that altered the military security of Oahu in the years immediately preceding the Pearl Harbor attack was the increasing capabilities of

\textsuperscript{12} Rpt of Col Markham to CofS, 10 Jan 38.
carrier-based air power. With the nearest Japanese airfield 2,100 miles away, military authorities correctly calculated that Oahu was beyond the range of land-based air power; but it could be reached by carriers, of which Japan had six in operation by August 1939, and two more under construction. In January 1938 Colonel Markham had pointed out how easy it would be for carrier-based planes to approach Pearl Harbor from the northeast. Screened by the heavy cloud cap almost continuously present over the main Koolau Range, they could cross Oahu and deliver a surprise attack on the naval base and its surrounding installations almost without warning. Since local ground defenses and unwarned pursuit planes could not hope to cope with such an attack, Colonel Markham assumed that the Army in order to fulfill its mission would have to conduct long-range aerial reconnaissance, and he recommended an Army air strength of 350 planes, to match an estimated 379 planes that Japan might possibly bring to bear in an initial all-out attack.\footnote{Rpt of Col Markham to CofS, 10 Jan 38. On 7 Dec 1941 the six Japanese carriers engaged used 355 planes against Oahu. See below, p. VII-28.}

The first War Department plans of 1939 for expanding the Air Corps proposed to increase the authorized number of Army combat planes in Hawaii from 124 to 256, and to include in the new allotment 140 bombers and 100 pursuit ships. In its report of June 1939 the Army Air Board explained the large number of bombers by pointing out the need for Army reconnaissance as well as striking forces to operate within a 1,000-mile radius of Oahu. Since the Air Board report like all similar prewar studies recognized that a carrier attack once launched would inevitably inflict some damage, it pointed out that the only sure means of preventing successful carrier attacks was to locate the carriers outside a 600- to 700-mile radius (the range of their attack planes plus one night’s sailing) and bomb them before they could launch their planes. With strength enough to do this, Army aircraft in Hawaii could also interdict any attempt by the enemy to establish airfields on any of the other major islands.\footnote{Memo, ACofS WPD for Chief, Budget and Planning Br, WDGS, 6 May 39, WPD 3807-31; Tabs Y and Y² to Army Air Bd Rpt, 26 Jun 39, WPD 3748-17.}

Under the production circumstances of 1939 any plans for strengthening Army air power in Hawaii were bound to take a long time to carry into effect, but the initial plans were further limited at the end of 1939 by general assumptions of the War Plans Division in Washington that Japan would not risk more than two of its carriers in a surprise attack and that long-range aerial reconnaissance was properly a Navy and not an Army mission. In the light of these assumptions the Army planners recalculated Hawaiian needs
for Army aircraft and allotted the Department 122 pursuit planes and 68 medium bombers. The bombers were to be used for reconnaissance only if the Navy was absent or if it asked for reinforcement.\textsuperscript{15} These two assumptions, that the Japanese would never employ more than two carriers in a surprise attack in the eastern Pacific and that Army bombers should not be used for long-range offshore reconnaissance, remained constants in Washington and Hawaiian defense thinking and planning for the next two years, and contributed substantially to Japanese success in December 1941.\textsuperscript{16}

Under the revised 54-group air program of June 1940, Hawaii was allotted some additional pursuit and light bomber strength for close-in defense purposes and was scheduled to receive 68 heavy bombers—B-17's—instead of mediums. But the premises behind the new allotments were still a maximum 2-carrier threat and performance by the Navy of all long-range reconnaissance.\textsuperscript{17} During the same month General Marshall suggested sending 5 or 10 B-17's to Oahu immediately, but his G-3 (an Air officer) objected on the ground that so few would have no restraining influence on the Japanese and would inevitably be destroyed by hostile pursuit before they could help in fighting off an attack—comments which throw light on the utility of the 12 heavy bombers (only 6 of which were in commission) on Oahu on the morning of 7 December 1941.\textsuperscript{18} What the Hawaiian Air Force actually had at the beginning of 1941 was a heterogeneous collection of 115 combat planes, all of them obsolete or obsolescent. They were useful almost exclusively for training and not for fighting.\textsuperscript{19}

A second factor affecting the Hawaiian defense picture was the decision to base the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor. With Anglo-French naval power seemingly in control of the Atlantic, the United States continued after August 1939 to keep the bulk of its naval strength in the eastern Pacific. Until 1940 the principal bases for the United States Fleet were on the continental west coast, with Pearl Harbor serving as an advance base and concentration point during maneuvers. But after annual maneuvers in April 1940 the fleet, under command of Admiral James O. Richardson, was

\textsuperscript{15} Tab C to Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 39, WPD 3807-41. See also above, ch. III, pp. 55–56.

\textsuperscript{16} The tenacity of the first of these assumptions is reflected in the underestimates of Japanese carrier strength by both Washington and Hawaiian authorities immediately after the December 1941 attack. They knew Oahu must have been hit by planes from more than two carriers, but they guessed that no more than three or four had been used.

\textsuperscript{17} Memo, Lt Col Jonathan W. Anderson for Brig Gen George V. Strong, WPD, 24 Jun 40, WPD 3807-41.


\textsuperscript{19} Table showing Army airplane strength in Hawaii, January 1941, in OPD Exec 4, item 5.
ordered on 7 May to stay at Pearl Harbor, as a warning and deterrent to Japan. Almost immediately thereafter Hitler's smashing land victory in western Europe threatened to cripple or destroy Anglo-French naval power in the Atlantic. To retrieve the situation it appeared by mid-June to Army and Navy leaders in Washington that the United States would have to transfer the bulk of its naval strength to Atlantic waters.20

It was this prospect that led General Marshall on 17 June to alert the Panama and Hawaiian Departments to the danger of a transpacific raid, following the departure of the United States Fleet. The Chief of Staff and his advisers reasoned that, as collaborators with Nazi Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union might launch such a raid in an effort either to keep the United States Fleet in the Pacific or to block the Panama Canal after its passage into the Caribbean. They feared a raid against Hawaii only if the fleet had departed, and when President Roosevelt decided in early July to keep the fleet at Pearl Harbor their apprehensions about Oahu faded.21

The alert message to Oahu was plain spoken:

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible transpacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers and alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further notice. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished shortly. Acknowledge.22

General Herron reacted with vigor. He ordered a 24-hour manning of all observation posts and antiaircraft batteries, and for the first time the antiaircraft gun crews received live ammunition and instructions to fire on any foreign planes sighted over restricted areas. Airplanes at Hickam and Wheeler Fields were dispersed, and on 21 June Army planes took over the task of inshore dawn patrols from the Navy. Although not similarly alerted, Admiral Richardson's forces co-operated wholeheartedly, instituting both inshore patrols and a limited amount of longer range aerial reconnaissance—the limiting factor being the small number of Navy planes available for the purpose. On inquiry, the Chief of Naval Operations confirmed that the Army's alert had been issued after consultation with the Navy and requested Admiral Richardson to continue his co-operation. On 19 June the War

22 Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 40, WPD 4322.
Department authorized a gradual modification of the alert, and a month later its relaxation at General Herron's discretion, except for continued precautions against sabotage and local air patrols on a training basis. The Navy maintained some distant patrolling by Oahu-based sea planes for most of the time until 30 December 1940, when Admiral Richardson discontinued such reconnaissance after being advised by the Chief of Naval Operations that only naval operating areas needed reconnoitering. In the meantime, the alert measures had fostered closer cooperation between Army and Navy forces, and in General Herron's opinion had had a wholly salutary effect on the morale of Army troops. In a personal letter of 6 September he told General Marshall that "the position of this place on the Army priority lists is still all right," and assured him that "as things now are, I feel that you need not have this place on your mind at all." But on the preceding day he had officially asked for a good many more antiaircraft troops to man guns already on hand.

The request of Hawaii for more antiaircraft troops reached Washington in the same month that the United States Government openly shifted its course from neutrality to nonbelligerency and determination to support Great Britain in the Atlantic war. To be effective the new course required peace in the Pacific area, outside of China. But President Roosevelt and his advisers believed that the United States must also do what it could, short of war, to show Japan that its open alignment of 27 September with Germany and Italy was not going to stop American aid to Britain. As one gesture the President directed that Hawaii be reinforced by a National Guard infantry division, and Secretary Stimson had some difficulty in persuading the President that under existing circumstances such a move would really weaken and not strengthen the military security of Oahu. Partly to satisfy the President's wishes for some sort of reinforcement, as well as General Herron's plea for more men, General Marshall decided to send a National Guard antiaircraft regiment from California to Hawaii as soon as possible. The 251st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, which moved to Oahu during the winter, was the first National Guard unit to leave the continental United States for overseas duty in World War II.

24 Pers Ltr, Gen Herron to Gen Marshall, 6 Sep 40, in CofS file, Herron, Gen C. D.
With strength to man existing ground defense equipment in the offing, General Herron appears to have been reasonably well satisfied with the Army’s posture of defense on Oahu in late 1940. During November he sent to Washington a paper entitled Draft Surmises on Insular Operations, his opening surmise being that fleets could not operate more than 2,000 miles from a major base, although a small raiding force could range much farther. The implication for Hawaii was that a small raiding force was all that need be anticipated. The general recognized the need to detect a carrier raid as far off as possible and acknowledged that a shore-based aerial patrol was a necessary adjunct to insular defense. But long-range reconnaissance was the Navy’s business, as Admiral Richardson had informally acknowledged in August. And the discontinuance of Navy long-range patrolling by shore-based planes at the end of the year appears to have passed unnoticed by the Army.

The absence of an effective shore-based aerial patrol seems to have concerned General Herron much less than the prospective congestion of the air and of airfields when the Army and Navy obtained the full quota of planes that had been allotted to Oahu. The general wondered whether it might not be better to keep most of the heavy planes allotted to Hawaii on the west coast, on the assumption that the time had come when the Hawaiian Islands could be largely defended by bombers based on the mainland. The War Department thought differently, considering the 68 Army heavy bombers allotted the minimum needed on the spot; and it also took note of and advised General Herron about the Navy’s new plan to station 180 long-range patrol planes in the islands, including 108 that were to remain permanently to patrol coastal waters and sea lanes. This last increment, when it arrived, could presumably provide all of the long-range reconnaissance needed. According to his later recollections, what worried General Herron most at the end of 1940 was the inadequacy of his antiaircraft defenses, not the present or prospective means of locating and bombing carriers. He told the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944 that he and his air commander had known “that an air force could come in and do some damage.” Continuing, he said:

We hoped to be able to follow them out and destroy the carriers. But I do not think we had any idea that we could turn back an aerial attack entirely, for this reason: that

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26 Gen Herron, Draft Surmises on Insular Operations, 12 Nov 40, WPD 3878-8; Pers Ltr, Gen Herron to Gen Marshall, 13 Aug 40, and Incls, in CofS file, Herron, Gen C. D.
the only antiaircraft we had was that which was prepared against high-altitude bombing. We did not have the small-caliber stuff which you need to do anything about dive bombings. So we felt they could come in; that they would not come in there unless they had enough planes to overcome what planes we had.28

**Defense Preparations During 1941**

From available evidence it appears that as the year 1940 ended the Navy was more concerned than the Army about the state of the Army's defenses in Hawaii. After Admiral Richardson discovered on a Washington visit during October that the President was determined to keep the fleet at Pearl Harbor, he arranged with General Herron to inspect the Army's defenses and review their adequacy to protect the fleet and naval installations. His findings became the basis for a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War on 24 January 1941, which stressed that Japan might initiate hostilities by a surprise attack on the fleet and on the base installations at Pearl Harbor, and envisaged an air attack by bombers and torpedo planes as more probable than threats of sabotage, submarine attack, the sowing of mines, and bombardment by naval gun fire. The Navy's estimate did not even mention invasion as a danger, though that was the preoccupation of a large portion of the Army defenders. The Navy urged "that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii." 29

The Navy's letter arrived on the heels of a forecast by President Roosevelt that Japan might even then be preparing to strike at the United States, and his decision that if that happened the United States must "stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the fleet based on Hawaii" and continue aid to Britain.30 The War Plans Division recommended that a few B-17's be sent to Oahu at once and that Hawaii (as well as Alaska and Panama) be put on a war basis as soon as possible.31 Even so, the War Department had drafted a routine response to the Navy's letter, stating in effect that nothing more could be sent to Hawaii for some time to come. General Marshall stopped this draft, and arranged to have eighty-one pursuit planes, fifty of them of the P-40B type, shipped by carriers to Oahu as soon as possible.32

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28 Testimony of Gen Herron, 8 Jan 44, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 27, p. 128.
29 Ltr, SN to SW, 24 Jan 41, WPD 3583-1.
30 Memo, CoFS for WPD, 17 Jan 41, WPD 4175-18.
31 Memo, WPD for CoFS, 21 Jan 41, WPD 4175-18.
32 Notes on Conf in OCoFS, 6 Feb 41; OCS Conf, binder 10; Memo, Gen Marshall for ACofS WPD, 6 Feb 41; Ltr, SW to SN, 7 Feb 41. Last two in WPD 3583-1; Memo for Rcd of Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy, 1 Aug 44, in OPD Résumé, Pearl Harbor Attack.
TROOPS ON MANEUVERS IN HAWAII, 1941, PREPARE TO RESIST INVASION.
Guarding a beach (top). Loading a 75-mm. gun (bottom).
The Army answered the Navy's letter on 7 February 1941, the same day that General Herron relinquished command of the Hawaiian Department to Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short. A week earlier the Navy had reshuffled its forces, redesignating the fleet at Pearl Harbor as the Pacific Fleet and giving it a new commander, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. The Army command went to General Short because of his reputation as an effective training man, and he threw himself into the work of his new post with great energy. General Marshall pointed out to him in a personal letter of 7 February that "the fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration" for the Army in Hawaii, and observed further:

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

He also stressed the need for the closest co-operation with the Navy and with the new Navy commander, Admiral Kimmel.33

For various reasons, concern in Washington over the possible imminence of war with Japan subsided after February 1941, and worries over recognized deficiencies in the Army's defense equipment faded once more into the background.

By April, it looked as if the United States was on the brink of open participation in the Atlantic war, and plans were afoot to reinforce the Atlantic Fleet by withdrawing a substantial part of the Pacific Fleet from Hawaiian waters. In the eyes of Washington, Oahu looked more secure than ever, now that it was protected by some modern Army pursuit craft and was about to be reinforced further by fifty-five more P-40's and thirty-five B-17's. General Marshall assured Secretary Stimson that he thought Oahu was impregnable whether any fleet was there or not, because "with our heavy bombers and our fine pursuit planes, the land force could put up such a defense that the Japs wouldn't dare attack Hawaii, particularly such a long distance from home." 34

To assist Mr. Stimson in convincing the President it was safe to shift American naval power to the Atlantic, General Marshall had the War Plans Division prepare an estimate, the draft of which read:

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

33 Pers Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Short, 7 Feb 41, WPD 4449-1.
34 Stimson Diary, entry of 23 Apr 41.
It has been carefully fortified against naval attack and its antiaircraft defense is relatively complete.

Its total garrison is at present approximately 31,000 men, and is in process of augmentation by 6,000 men.

Including the movement of aviation now in process, it is defended by 35 of our longest range bombers, 35 medium range bombers, 105 of our high speed pursuit ships, 65 fighters, and 13 light bombers.

The Hawaiian Islands are subject to (a) sabotage, (b) carrier raids, (c) an attack in force.

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.

Carrier raids by the Japanese involve jeopardizing naval units that will not be lightly undertaken. To meet these carrier raids our bombardment, protected by pursuit aviation, the latter operating from advanced fields on the Islands of Hawaii and Kauai, can cover a radius from Oahu of approximately 400 miles and beyond suitable points for the establishment of hostile land-based aviation.

An attack in force against Oahu necessitates an air superiority that can only be had by the establishment of land-based air within striking distance of Oahu. This can only be accomplished successfully within the Hawaiian group and with the defense indicated above it is not believed that such establishment can be accomplished.

Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air.35

A note (by the President's military aide) on a revised version handed to Mr. Roosevelt summed up the War Department's optimistic view: "Modern planes have completely changed situation as to defensibility." 36 The principal effect of these arguments seems to have been to plant a new legacy of confidence among Washington leaders in the immunity of Hawaii from serious attack, since the President decided then and thereafter that the bulk of the Pacific Fleet must remain in the western Pacific as a deterrent to Japanese aggression.37

When General Short surveyed his new command in February 1941, he recognized a good many more flaws in its armor than the War Department in Washington did two months later. Although he appears never to have been greatly concerned during 1941 about the number of Army aircraft on hand and ready for action, he did take an intense interest in other matters related to air defense. Prompted by General Marshall's personal letter of 7 February and an official War Department communication of the same date, General Short turned his attention at once to improving co-operation

35 WPD Draft of Aide-mémoire on Oahu, n.d. but probably 23 Apr 41, WPD 3672–32.
36 Notation on Aide-mémoire, Def of Hawaii, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 15, p. 1635. The original of the revised version, dated 24 Apr 1941, is in WPD 3672–32.
37 See Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, chs. V and VI.
between Army and Navy forces and in particular to clarifying the respective responsibilities of their air forces in defensive operations.\(^{38}\)

At the beginning of 1941 Army and Navy forces in Hawaii, as everywhere else in the field, operated more or less independently of each other, with co-ordination as circumstances required under the principle of mutual co-operation. On paper responsibility for local naval defense measures except aboard ship rested with the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, and it was with Admiral Bloch’s organization that the Army command proceeded to negotiate on a number of matters pertaining to air defense. Actually the Fourteenth Naval District had no defense forces of its own during 1941, and the contribution that the Navy could make to local defense depended upon what could be spared from the fleet and its Marine Corps attachments. It therefore depended also on the maintenance of a close personal relationship and understandings between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, the fleet commander.

Their predecessors, General Herron and Admiral Richardson, had succeeded in overcoming some of the characteristic resistance to effective Army-Navy co-operation in the field. An aftermath of the spring maneuvers and subsequent alert of 1940 had been an informal joint agreement on air operations under which the Navy assumed exclusive responsibility for distant reconnaissance, both services retained the right to conduct close-in reconnaissance for their own protection, and each might engage independently in air attacks against a hostile fleet.\(^{39}\) The new formal agreement signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch on 28 March 1941 left responsibility for distant reconnaissance with the Navy, but if Army planes helped out they were to operate under Navy command; if Navy planes helped in the defense of Oahu’s land area, they were to operate under Army command; and any Army bombardment planes engaging in offensive operations at sea were to be under Navy command.\(^{40}\) In joint exercises during 1941 the new agreement worked well enough; but the prejudice in both services against unity of command offered fair assurance that except in such exercises the agreement would not be invoked unless a compelling and clearly recognized emergency was at hand.

In another joint paper signed three days later, the Army and Navy air commanders in Hawaii acknowledged how difficult it might be to foresee


\(^{39}\) Ltrs, Gen Herron to Gen Marshall, 13 Aug 40–28 Jan 41, in CofS file, Herron, Gen C. D.

\(^{40}\) An. 7 to Jt Coastal Frontier Def Plan, 1939, signed 28 Mar 41, in AG 381 (1–24–41) (1).
such an emergency. Their estimate of the outlook emphasized the possibility of a sudden Japanese attack on Oahu prior to a formal declaration of war, and they noted the likelihood under existing circumstances that a dawn air attack launched from carriers might hit at the fleet and naval installations at Pearl Harbor with such complete surprise that defending pursuit could do little to soften the blow. They recognized that distant air reconnaissance was the best defense against surprise. Pointing out that it would be impossible with the equipment at hand to maintain such reconnaissance except for a short period, they emphasized the necessity of obtaining intelligence that a raid on Oahu was imminent before undertaking a systematic long-range reconnaissance of its sea approaches.\(^{41}\)

In addition to pushing toward agreement on other matters of mutual concern to the two services, General Short made a point of cultivating the personal friendship of Admirals Kimmel and Bloch. In forwarding the items described above to General Marshall, he stated that he had found both admirals most co-operative and that they all felt that steps had already been taken to make it possible for Army and Navy forces to act together and with the unity of command that the situation might require. Somewhat later Admiral Kimmel reported to Washington in the same vein, but noted the serious need for a great many more Army heavy bombardment planes.\(^{42}\)

Instead of receiving 35 B-17's as planned in April, only 21 made an historic mass flight from California to Oahu in mid-May. The critical outlook of affairs in the Atlantic area induced General Marshall to withhold the other 14.\(^{43}\) Early in July the War Department was wondering whether more than one 35-plane group of heavies was really needed in Hawaii before the outbreak of a war, and even the Hawaiian Air Force commander optimistically estimated in August that one such group would be strong enough to finish off six enemy carriers. The real need, he felt, was for long-range reconnaissance; and, ignoring the Navy's responsibility for this function and plans for undertaking it eventually, he asked for a total of 180 heavy Army bombers so that the Army could do it. His request, warmly endorsed by General Short, reached Washington in the midst of new War Department planning that allotted from 136 to 204 heavy Army bombers to the Hawaiian

\(^{41}\) Jt Estimate Covering Jt Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian Area, 31 Mar 41, Incl to Pers Ltr, Gen Short to Gen Marshall, 14 Apr 41, AG 601.5 (4-14-41).

\(^{42}\) Pers Ltr, Gen Short to Gen Marshall, 14 Apr 41, AG 601.5 (4-14-41); Memo, Adm Kimmel for Adm Stark, 4 Jun 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 16, pp. 2238–39.

\(^{43}\) Craven and Cate, Plans and Early Operations, pp. 172–73; Memo, Office Chief of Air Corps for TAG, 7 May 41, AG 452 (3–3–41); Notes on Conf in OSW, 19 May 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 15, p. 1631.
THE REINFORCEMENT OF OAHU

Department by mid-1942, and this planning had to suffice as an answer for the time being. These plans also coincided with the new Washington decision to reinforce the Philippines, and the net result was that Oahu lost 9 of its 21 heavies to the Philippines in early September and kept the remaining 12 only because they could be employed most usefully at Hickam as sources of spare parts and in training new combat and ferry crews.

Superficially, Oahu's needs for pursuit craft appeared much better met. During most of the time between May and December 1941 it had about 150 Army pursuit and fighter planes, two-thirds of them modern P-40's. But a chronic shortage of spare parts kept many of these planes out of commission, and the ones available had to be used intensively for training. The greatest qualification was that pursuit planes, however modern, were all but worthless as defense equipment in the absence of an effective warning system, and Oahu had none before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In early December 1941 the Army did have an aircraft warning system nearing completion in Hawaii, but it was not yet in operation. This system depended for its information on the long-range radar machines developed by the Signal Corps in the late 1930's, the SCR-270 (mobile) and SCR-271 (fixed). The Signal Corps in Washington drafted the first plan for installing some of this equipment in Hawaii in November 1939, but before 1941 not much actually was done to prepare for its installation. As of February 1941 the War Department expected to deliver radars to Hawaii in June and hoped they could be operated as soon as they were delivered. The first mobile sets actually reached Hawaii in July, delivery having been delayed by about a month because of a temporary diversion of equipment to an emergency force being prepared for occupation of the Azores. In September five mobile sets began operating at temporary locations around Oahu, and a sixth, the Opana station at the northern tip of Oahu, joined the circuit on 27 November. Three fixed sets also arrived during November, but their mountain-top sites were not ready to receive them.


45 This last point had been fully appreciated by the Chief Signal Officer and the commander of the GHQ Air Force back in February, before any of the new planes had been sent out to Hawaii (Notes on Confs in OCoS, 19 and 25 Feb 41, OCS Conf, binder 10); but the mere presence of the planes appears to have had a satisfying effect both in Washington and Hawaii.


47 1st Ind, OCSigO to ASF, 31 Jul 44, on Memo, ASF for CSigO, 27 Jul 44, in OPD Résumé, Pearl Harbor Attack.
The radars in operation on Oahu in late 1941 had a dependable range of from 75 to 125 miles seaward. An exercise in early November demonstrated their ability to detect a group of carrier planes before daylight 80 miles away, far enough out to alert Army pursuit planes in time for the latter to intercept incoming “enemy” bombers about 30 miles from Pearl Harbor. But this test in no way indicated the readiness of radar to do its job a month later. The sets were being operated solely for training; a shortage of spare parts and of a dependable power supply made it impracticable to operate them for more than three or four hours a day; the organization for using their information was a partly manned makeshift operating for training only; and defending pursuit, even if they could have been informed, would have had to keep warmed up and ready to take off in order to intercept enemy planes before they reached their targets.

The radars were not supposed to function except for training purposes until the Signal Corps turned them over to an air defense or interceptor command, to be operated by the Army pursuit commander through an information center which would receive data from the radar stations, warn the defending pursuit, control the movement of friendly planes, and control the firing of all antiaircraft guns. In March 1941 General Short had agreed that Hawaii needed such a command, and he arranged for his pursuit commander and his Signal Corps officer to visit the continental United States in the late fall of 1941 to witness operations and exercises of interceptor commands, preparatory to installing the system in Hawaii. They did not get back to Oahu until 4 December, much too late to get a local interceptor organization and information center into operation before the Japanese attacked.

The Army generally had more confidence in late 1941 in a much older weapon, the antiaircraft gun, as a means of air defense. Antiaircraft artillery had played an important part in the defense planning and preparation of the Hawaiian Department since 1921, when it organized the first antiaircraft artillery regiment in the United States Army. Twenty years later the latest revision of the Hawaiian defense project, approved by the War Department in September 1941, prescribed an impressive allotment of antiaircraft artillery weapons: 84 mobile and 26 fixed 3-inch guns for high altitude firing, and provision for replacing some of them as soon as possible with more modern weapons; 144 of the newer 37-mm. automatic weapons; and 516 caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns for action against low-flying aircraft. By then also the department had four antiaircraft regiments, and it was scheduled to receive a fifth before the end of the year. Actually three
of the four regiments present were at little more than half strength, and the equipment on hand was considerably less than that allotted, amounting to 60 mobile and 26 fixed 3-inch guns, only 109 antiaircraft machine guns, and only 20 of the 37-mm. automatic weapons.\(^{48}\)

With the strength available, Army antiaircraft on Oahu had the ability when deployed to give some protection against high-flying horizontal bombing planes along the south coast (from Diamond Head to west of Pearl Harbor) and around Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field. The 37-mm. guns had been in Hawaii for almost ten months before ammunition for them arrived on 5 December 1941, and there had been very little for the antiaircraft machine guns, so that firing practice for even the small number of guns available for defense against dive or torpedo bombers or other low-flying planes had been more or less out of the question. About half the mobile 3-inch guns were assigned action stations on private property, and in practice sessions during the months before the Japanese attack the gun crews kept to nearby roads and carefully refrained from trespassing.\(^{49}\) Except during practice sessions the guns and the regiments that manned them were concentrated in three areas some distance from their battle stations, and at all times after May 1941 ammunition for the guns remained in the Ordnance depot. Only the fixed 3-inch guns, with ammunition boxed but close at hand, were ready for near immediate action. The rest depended on getting several hours’ advance warning of an impending attack.

When General Short assumed command in February 1941 he immediately recognized the need for giving greater protection to Army aircraft on the ground by constructing dispersal runways and bunkers at existing airfields, and by building new airfields on Oahu and on other islands to relieve the congestion and close concentration of planes at Hickam and Wheeler Fields. By May the War Department had given formal approval to the construction to 253 bunkers, but it failed to provide any funds or to approve plans for them before the Japanese attacked in December. During the summer General Short by using troop labor managed to construct 85 bunkers at Wheeler Field; but under the alert of 27 November planes were ordered to be bunched not dispersed, and the bunkers therefore were not put to use.\(^{50}\)

\(^{48}\) Lt Col Willard L. Jones, History of the Organization of United States Antiaircraft Artillery, draft MS in OCMH; Memo, WPD for CoS, 2 Dec 41, WPD 1305–24; statistical data in OPD file, Pearl Harbor Misc Corresp.

\(^{49}\) Testimony of Maj Gen Henry T. Burgin before Army Pearl Harbor Bd, 8 Sep 44, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 28, p. 1379.

\(^{50}\) Résumé on Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, WPD 4483.
On Oahu during 1941 the Army completed and opened the new Bellows Field on the coast east of Honolulu, and it was being used in the fall by pursuit and light bomber planes. General Short wanted to build another pursuit field on the plateau about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks, but the War Department insisted that it be located on the northern tip of Oahu, at Kahuku Point, instead. Because of this argument, and the fact that the Kahuku site was being used by the Navy as a bombing range, a new major pursuit field on Oahu remained no more than an idea before December. A small training field, near Haleiwa in the same area, was unknown to the Japanese and almost untouched by them in the Pearl Harbor attack. The Army also made arrangements with the Navy for the practice use of each other's airfields on Oahu and on other islands of the Hawaiian group, and for the extension of runways on Navy fields to accommodate Army heavy bombers.

The development of military airfields in the outer islands harked back to plans of the 1920's and 1930's for the establishment of air bases on Hawaii and Kauai. Fields on these and other islands were begun in June 1940 by the Works Progress Administration in accordance with priorities established by the Army. A year later the War Department approved new construction that would allow the operation of heavy bombers from two fields on Kauai and three on Hawaii and would permit pursuit planes to operate from fields on Molokai and Lanai. Completion of these projects would make possible the distant dispersion of bombers from Hickam, and pursuit ships could be flown to the nearest islands. But no Army aircraft had occupied the new fields before 7 December.

The beginnings of military airfield construction on other major islands, together with General Short's concern about the possibilities of sabotage or other hostile action by residents of Japanese descent, prompted the first garrisoning of the Hawaiian group as a whole by active Army forces. In May 1941 General Short detached the 299th Infantry Regiment from the Hawaiian Division and sent one battalion to Hawaii, another to Kauai, and divided a third between Maui and Molokai. These detachments and other Army forces sent to the outer islands were put under the local command of

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53 Memo, WPD for TAG, 19 Jun 40, WPD 2550–14, and other papers in this same file.
54 The 299th was a National Guard regiment organized and recruited in the outer islands, so in effect this move represented a return of its component parts to their home stations, after six months' duty and training on Oahu.
military districts (of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai), which in turn reported directly to the commander of the Hawaiian Department. Trained combat troops on the outer islands numbered about 1,300 at the beginning of December 1941.\textsuperscript{55}

About the same time that General Short decided to garrison the outer islands he asked the War Department to approve the reorganization of the Hawaiian Division by distributing its four infantry regiments between two new triangular divisions. The actual reorganization, into the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, did not become effective until 1 October 1941. The new divisions had an authorized strength of about 11,000 officers and men each, but their actual strength was considerably less at the outset, and the 24th Division had no control over the battalions of the 299th Infantry scattered among the outer islands.\textsuperscript{56}

In the year preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, the Army's officer and enlisted strength in the Hawaiian Department grew from 28,798 to 43,177, and Hawaii remained the largest of the overseas garrisons.\textsuperscript{57} Nearly half the increase represented increments, including a good many men of Japanese descent, drawn from the local population through the induction of the National Guard and the operation of the selective service system.\textsuperscript{58} Since most of the new men received from the mainland also needed more training, the Hawaiian Department of necessity became a training establishment on a large scale during 1941, resembling in many respects the ground and air training commands then so active in the continental United States.

Until 28 May 1941 the RAINBOW plans contemplated an Army wartime garrison of 79,000 for Hawaii, substantially less than had been scheduled for it in war plans of the mid-1930's.\textsuperscript{59} On that date the War Department ordered a further reduction of 21,000 and lessened the decrease only slightly to accommodate General Short's plan for additional units to guard the Navy's new air station at Kaneohe Bay on the northeast coast of Oahu.\textsuperscript{60} By 22 September 1941, when Secretary Stimson and General Marshall went

\textsuperscript{55} History of Army in Hawaii before 7 Dec 1941, in Bulky Package 2 of supporting documents to USAFMDPAC History in OCMH; Testimony of Gen Short before Roberts Commission, 23 Dec 41 and 8 Jan 42, in Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 22, p. 68, and pt. 23, p. 991.


\textsuperscript{57} Tabulations of Machine Rcds Br, AGO, 30 Nov 45, in OPD file, Pearl Harbor Misc Corresp.

\textsuperscript{58} Gwenfread Allen, Hawaii's War Years (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1950), pp. 264-66.

\textsuperscript{59} Incl to Memo, WPD for CofS, 15 May 41, WPD 3493-11.

\textsuperscript{60} Rad, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 28 May 41, WPD 4175-18; various papers, dated 1937-41, in WPD 3835.
over the strengths of all overseas garrisons with President Roosevelt, Hawaii had its full authorized peacetime strength of about 42,000. They agreed that any further reinforcement of the Hawaiian garrison could be deferred as long as the fleet remained in the Pacific, since the presence of the fleet reduced the threat of major attack.\footnote{Memo, CofS for President Roosevelt, 22 Sep 41, with annotations, in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.} The revised RAINBOW 5 plan of November 1941 called for 17,300 more troops to be sent as war reinforcements as soon as possible, and an ultimate war garrison of about 68,000.\footnote{Study, Comparison of RAINBOW 5 and Its Revision #1 of Nov 41, in OPD Pearl Harbor file; Tab A to Memo, G-3 for CofS, 19 Nov 41, AG 381 (11-19-41).} Behind all these figures appears a confidence in Washington during 1941 that Hawaii by comparison with other overseas outposts was well manned, and that in the event of war Hawaii would not be on the front line of conflict as forecast by the larger war garrisons planned for it by the Army during the 1930’s.

The same confidence can be deduced from war plans drafted and approved by the War Department during late 1941. Back in August 1937 Army and Navy planners had put the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier into Category of Defense D, which indicated an area that might be subject to major attack and within which all elements for defense should be approximately ready for action or in action, including an active antiaircraft gun defense of important areas and long-range aerial reconnaissance as required. Actually this provision meant very little either before or after the Pearl Harbor attack, since even after the attack the Category D description remained unchanged until October 1943, and at no time did it reflect with any accuracy the current status of defense operations. The War Department’s RAINBOW 5 Operations Plan, approved 19 August 1941, confirmed Category of Defense D, and stated the Army’s mission to be: “Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.”\footnote{WD Operations Plan, RAINBOW 5, par. 30, copy in OPD Résumé, Pearl Harbor Attack.} The provision for the support of naval forces was inapplicable until the Navy put its operating plans based on RAINBOW 5 into effect, an action which it did not take except in areas many thousands of miles from Hawaii until after the Japanese attacked. A month later, on 17 September, the War Department approved the latest revision of the
Hawaiian Defense Project, which listed the forms of possible enemy attack in the following order of probability:

(a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.
(b) Sabotage.
(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.
(d) Air raids, carrier based.
(e) Surface ship raids.
(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U.S. [sic] Fleet.64

Thus, sabotage was again confirmed as the principal and immediate concern of Army defense forces. Finally, in the revision of RAINBOW 5 completed in November, the Washington planners limited the sea area required for the defense of Oahu to a 500-mile radius from land, a limitation which if it had been applied would have confined long-range reconnaissance to bounds that all previous studies had considered ineffective for detecting the approach of carrier forces before they could launch their planes.65

Thus, though extensively reinforced, the Army defenses of Oahu were not ready by 7 December 1941 to detect the approach of a carrier attack or to cope with an air attack as powerful as that launched by the Japanese.

64 Revision 1940, sec. II, par. 1. d.(1), copy in OPD Résumé, Pearl Harbor Attack.
CHAPTER VII

The Pearl Harbor Attack

For the first half of 1941 the military strategy and preparations of the United States were aimed toward belligerent participation in the Atlantic war and maintenance in the Pacific of a defensive posture based on Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. Then, during July, Pacific strategy and preparations began a rapid shift that profoundly affected the outlook and thinking of American commanders both in Washington and in Hawaii. Through decoded intercepts, Washington knew early in the month that Japan had decided upon further aggression to the south. In the light of this knowledge, during the last week of July the United States decided to try to defend the Philippines in the event of war with Japan, and at the same time it applied stringent economic sanctions against Japan which were intended to deter the Japanese but which actually had the opposite effect. During August and September, the War Department developed an entirely new concept for defending the Philippines and checking a Japanese sweep southward. It now planned to station large numbers of Army heavy bombers (B-17's) in the Philippines. This plan in turn required the quick preparation of intermediate supporting bases at Midway and Wake Islands along the direct air route from Hawaii to Manila and similar preparations as soon as possible along a secondary route to the southwest toward Australia.¹

Everyone recognized that these plans and preparations of late 1941 for projecting American military power toward and into the Far East could not become effective before early 1942, but no one either in Washington or in Hawaii gave much thought to calculating what should be done in case the Japanese chose to strike before then. In particular, the danger of a Japanese carrier-based air raid on Oahu, which had been recognized as very real in early 1941, all but ceased to be a matter of immediate concern; whereas, with the increasing likelihood of war with Japan, the danger of sabotage on Oahu loomed ever larger, not only in the thinking of the local Army and Navy commanders and their staffs, but also in Washington. As General

¹ See Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, chs. IV–VI; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941–42, ch. IV; and Morton, Strategy and Command, ch. IV.
THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Marshall put it, in testimony soon after the event, "I fully anticipated a terrific effort to cripple everything out there by sabotage"; and at the same time he acknowledged that to him the carrier attack had been an almost totally unexpected blow.\(^2\)

The Approach to War

The first warning to the Hawaiian Department that Japan had determined upon a new course of aggressive action went out from the War Department on 7 July 1941, though in milder language than the alerts flashed to Alaska and Panama four days earlier.\(^3\) Later in the month, and six hours before the new economic sanctions against Japan became effective, General Short received his second warning, this time with advice that, while no immediate military retaliation by Japan was anticipated, the Hawaiian commander should take "appropriate precautionary measures."\(^4\) The general did so by ordering a full alert of his forces, in marked contrast to the lesser action taken by him four months later. His chief of staff explained to the local press that Army forces were "taking to the field for a ten-day maneuver period." After several days the general called off the "maneuvers," but he left Army guards on 24-hour watch at military and public utility installations, highway bridges, and along the Honolulu waterfront.\(^5\)

The first warning to Hawaii that Japan might soon resort to military action against the United States was sent by the Navy to its fleet commanders, including Admiral Kimmel, on 16 October. Because the Army staff in Washington disagreed with the Navy's alarm, the War Department sent a supplementary message to the Far East commander, General Douglas MacArthur, and to General Short, advising them that although "tension between United States and Japan remains strained . . . no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." In short, the War Department did not think that Japan might be on the verge of attacking the United States.\(^6\) Under the circumstances General Short saw no need to do any more than what he was already doing. Vital installations had remained under guard against

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\(^3\) Rad, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 7 Jul 41, WPD 4544; see chs IX and XIII below.
\(^4\) Rad, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 25 Jul 41, WPD 4544-3.
\(^6\) Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Oct 41, WPD 4544-5.
sabotage since July, and he "simply cautioned people who were responsible for that guarding to be unusually careful."\(^7\) No further official word about the prospects of war with Japan reached General Short directly from the War Department until 27 November, and it came then only after action by the Japanese and American Governments that made an early outbreak of war all but certain. Of course the general by reading the local newspapers could and presumably did learn unofficially a good deal about the tense negotiations with Japanese envoys in Washington, since the local press reported these negotiations very fully; and by 27 November this reporting included an accurate prediction of an impending rupture and of Japanese warlike moves in the offing.

On the eve of conflict the Honolulu press also reflected the opinion widely held in Washington that Japan was too weak to pose a really serious threat to the United States. As of 21 November the Secretary of the Interior, for one, was urging President Roosevelt to launch an immediate attack on Japan's naval forces in their home waters, in order to destroy them and thus release American naval strength for full duty in the Atlantic at an early date.\(^8\) In September a War Department G–2 estimate of the Japanese Navy had paid it much higher respect; but of Japanese aircraft performance in China it rather condescendingly noted: "Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undisputed air superiority."\(^9\) A similar assumption lay behind General Arnold's remark on 26 November that the Japanese had no seaborne aircraft that could catch one of the new Army B–24 heavy bombers, which with light loads could fly 290 miles per hour at 15,000 feet.\(^10\) He was wrong, as the Japanese Zeros that appeared over Pearl Harbor two weeks later were soon to prove. About 28 November G–2 estimated that Japan was then "completely extended militarily and economically" and thus was "momentarily unable to concentrate anywhere a military striking force sufficient to ensure victory"; and G–2 followed this estimate with a prediction on 5 December 1941 that for the next four months Germany would "remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives."\(^11\)

\(^7\) Testimony of Gen Short before Army Pearl Harbor Bd, 11 Aug 44, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 27, p. 219.
\(^9\) Memo, G–2 for WPD, 17 Sep 41, WPD 4344–4.
\(^10\) Notes on Conf in OCoF5, 26 Nov 41, WDGSA 381 Philippines (12–4–41).
If not reflecting informed opinion, the Honolulu Advertiser appears at least to have been in tune with it in stating in a lead editorial of 3 December 1941:

...Unless there is an immediate and complete reversal of Tokyo policy, the die is cast. Japan and America will travel down the road to war.

Such a course should be sad for Japan to contemplate. She is the most vulnerable nation in the world to attack and blockade. She is without natural resources. Four years of war have already left deep scars. She has a navy, but no air arm to support it... In fact Japan had ten aircraft carriers, to match the three then available in Pacific waters to the United States Navy and its associates.

As late as Friday, 21 November, President Roosevelt appears still to have been very doubtful about the intention of the Japanese to go to war, and reluctant to press matters with Japan. After lunching with the President, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes recorded Mr. Roosevelt's remarks, "he wished he knew whether Japan was playing poker or not," and "he was not sure whether or not Japan had a gun up its sleeve." In fact, Japan had several guns, and the one that would soon go off with the biggest bang was the Japanese Navy's Striking Force then completing its assembly in Tankan Bay in the southern Kurils, preparatory to a dash across the Pacific toward Hawaii.

By Monday afternoon, 24 November, the President and Secretary of State Hull had come to the conclusion that there was little remaining hope for a fruitful outcome of the negotiations. With Mr. Roosevelt's approval Admiral Stark and General Marshall thereupon drafted a joint dispatch to the senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines, which went out as a Navy message not only to the Philippine but also to other Navy commanders, including Admiral Kimmel. The message warned of "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction" by Japanese forces, "including an attack on the Philippines or Guam;" and it requested its action addressees (among them, Admiral Kimmel) to inform the senior Army officer in their respective areas.

When the next and better known warnings of 27 November went out, the Army and Navy chiefs in Washington knew that war was all but certain, and probably imminent, although they had not been consulted about, nor even shown, the answer given to the Japanese envoys the preceding

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13 Rad, CNO to CINCAF, CINCPAC, etc., 24 Nov 41, WPD 4544-12. Subsequently, General Short could not remember having seen this message, and no copy of it could be found in Army files.
afternoon. Their concern and that of their staffs remained the Philippines; the War Department drafted its message of 27 November as a warning to General Douglas MacArthur, and phrased it to fit his peculiar circumstances. Unfortunately, only slightly modified versions that did not take local circumstances so carefully into account were sent to the other principal Army commanders in the Pacific area, in Panama, on the west coast, and in Hawaii.

General Short's version read:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Whereas the directive of General MacArthur to undertake reconnaissance was a sensible one, since that was at least partially his responsibility, it was not applicable to General Short's situation, for seaward reconnaissance to any meaningful distance was recognized in Hawaii as strictly the Navy's business. Furthermore, the clear instruction for action to General MacArthur, "you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary," was qualified in the other messages by the added phrase, "but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." But almost anything that General Short might do on Oahu was bound to be observed; as his predecessor, General Herron, subsequently remarked, "Hawaii, or Pearl Harbor, is a goldfish bowl." The first draft of the Hawaiian message had also included a specific warning about subversion; but after argument this warning went out as a separate and almost simultaneous G-2 message, in these terms: "Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Sub-

14 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 900.
15 Clear evidence on this point is contained in the Notes on Conf in OCoS, 26 Nov 41, WDCSA 381 Philippines (12-4-41); and in Memo, ACoS WPD for CoS, 27 Nov 41, WPD 4544-13.
17 Testimony before Army Pearl Harbor Bd, 9 Aug 44, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 27, p. 129.
versive activities may be expected. Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only."\(^\text{18}\)

Within half an hour after receiving the first message, and before he saw the second, General Short (after consulting with his Chief of Staff only) sent his report of action taken: "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy."\(^\text{19}\)

The parallel Navy Department message of 27 November to Admiral Kimmel, more definite in its warning than the War Department’s, reached Hawaii some time later in the day. Subsequently, General Short remembered seeing it (or at least a paraphrase of it), although he could not remember that it had in any way influenced his own course of action, despite its clear opening phrases: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan . . . have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." Possibly the edge of these phrases was blunted for the Hawaiian commanders by the last sentence of the message, which implied that sabotage was now the worst that need be expected as far east as Guam and Samoa.\(^\text{20}\)

The next day, 28 November, the Hawaiian Department received two more messages from Washington, one addressed to General Short and the other through him to his air commander, both of them emphasizing the need for the most careful precautions against sabotage and other subversive activities.\(^\text{21}\) The general assumed these messages were follow-up replies to his terse report of the 27th.\(^\text{22}\) He answered the first of the new messages promptly and in detail, and this reply reached General Marshall’s office on 1 December.\(^\text{23}\) Since Washington made no comment on either of his reports, and gave him no further guidance about the impending crisis before the great blow fell, the general assumed also that the War Department approved his course of action.

General Short’s action had been to order an Alert No. 1, as defined in a new Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941. This alert assumed increased danger of sabotage and internal unrest, but no threat from without. Under it the Army, in General Short’s words, “put out a lot of additional guards and checked on everything,” and for the two in-

\(^{19}\) Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to CofS, 28 Nov 41, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 14, p. 1330
\(^{20}\) Rad, OPNAV to Fleet Comdrs, 27 Nov 41, WPD 4544-16.
\(^{23}\) Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 29 Nov 41, AG 381 (11-27-41) Gen.
fantry divisions this meant keeping thirty officers and 1,012 enlisted men on guard and patrol duty. The Hawaiian Air Force was ordered to concentrate planes so that they could be guarded more easily, and these orders were as easily executed since that was the usual practice at Hickam and Wheeler Fields anyway. The only deviation from procedures prescribed under Alert No. 1 was an order directing the operation of the new Army radar machines between four and seven each morning—the most likely period for a carrier strike, according to previous studies. On 28 November the local press explained, "The entire Hawaiian Department was ordered on a 'routine training alert' last night." Why General Short did not alert his command more fully was to become the subject of long questioning after the Japanese attacked. The new Standard Operating Procedure had prescribed two higher alerts: under No. 2, against a threat of air and surface bombardment, all coastal and air defenses, including antiaircraft guns, were to be ready for action; under No. 3, against a threat of invasion as well, all Army defenders were to occupy battle positions. When first questioned, General Short said he ordered Alert No. 1 for three reasons: first, he thought there was a "strong possibility" of sabotage, and he feared sabotage more than anything else; second, he had no information about any danger of external attack; and third, either No. 2 or No. 3 would interfere very seriously with training—"it was impossible to do any orderly training with them on." Before the warnings from Washington came in on 27 November, General Short had been in conference for three hours during the morning with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and members of their staffs, discussing a Washington plan for reinforcing Midway and Wake Islands by sending out fifty of the most modern Army pursuit planes then on Oahu. A proposal that the Hawaiian Department should part with half of its effective pursuit strength for even a limited period must itself have been an indication to General Short, as it was to Admiral Kimmel, that Washington had no inkling of any Japanese plan to attack Oahu. For local warning of such an attack the general was completely dependent on the Navy. During the conference on the 27th Admiral Kimmel turned to his War Plans officer, Capt.

26 Honolulu Advertiser, Nov 28, 1941, p. 1.
Charles H. McMorris, and asked specifically what the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu were, and the answer was "none." No one of the other Navy officials present challenged this judgment, and General Short saw no reason to question it. Both he and his naval colleagues were also heavily influenced by the knowledge that Japan could not attack Oahu with land-based planes, and by the continuing assumption that the Japanese would not risk a carrier strike as long as the bulk of the Pacific Fleet was in or west of Hawaiian waters. 28

The proposal to send Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake was only one of several measures planned or in preparation for sending Army reinforcements out of Oahu to the westward and southwestward, in anticipation of Japanese action. On 27 November General Short informed Admiral Bloch that the Army could not spare any 500-pound bombs with which to stock Midway and Wake; and even if that had been possible, the Army had no heavy bombers available to operate from them in an emergency—while the Hawaiian Department had six B-17's in commission, all available and trained B-17 crews were engaged in ferrying heavy bombers to the Philippines. On 29 November the War Department notified the general that it had assumed responsibility for defending Christmas and Canton Islands on the new air ferry route to Australia and directed him to prepare small task forces for dispatch to these islands as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the flow of B-17's from California through Hawaii to the Philippines continued; all of them came into Oahu unarmed, and it was General Short's responsibility to see to it that they were made combat-ready before flying westward. 29

All these factors helped to influence General Short's decision to order and maintain a No. 1 alert only; and he must also have been influenced by knowledge that his air defense system was not ready to operate and that he could not spot many of the Army's antiaircraft guns in their assigned field positions without provoking protests from powerful civilian interests on Oahu. 30

The Navy commanders had no more prescience than General Short in


29 Starting on 23 Dec 1941, the testimony on these various points before the several Pearl Harbor investigating committees was very voluminous, and all in Pearl Harbor Attack, War Department proposals and action can be followed in WPD 3878-12, WPD 4544-9, AG 381 (11-27-43), AG 381 (12-5-41), and WDCSA 381 Philippines (12-4-41).

30 On this last point, see testimony of Gen Burgin before Pearl Harbor Bd, 8 Sep 44, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 28, p. 1370.
foreseeing what was about to happen. The Navy was already operating under procedures similar to those under the Army's No. 1 alert; and the only new precaution ordered locally after the warning of the 27th was a careful surface patrol of Hawaiian waters against submarine attack. The Navy had about fifty long-range patrol planes with which it could have instituted distant reconnaissance from Oahu; but after careful reflection Admiral Kimmel decided his best course was "to bend every effort towards getting the patrol planes ready for unlimited war operations" rather than "to expend their efforts in partial and ineffective peace-time searches." In consequence, when the attack came, the Navy had only three of its Oahu-based patrol planes in the air. And these were fleet planes, since none of the 108 aircraft specifically allotted by the Navy to Hawaii for distant reconnaissance was due to arrive for another year.

Between 27 November and 7 December 1941 neither the Army nor the Navy made an effort to invoke any of the plans for unity of command and joint operations so carefully drawn earlier in the year. Despite General Short's personal conferences with Navy opposites on 27 November and on several other occasions during the succeeding ten days, an almost perfect insulation continued to exist between the local defense preparations of the two services (the conferences being about new defense measures to the westward). On this score, there can be no exception to what the majority of the Congressional Pearl Harbor Joint Committee had to say in 1946: "It can fairly be concluded that there was a complete failure in Hawaii of effective Army-Navy liaison during the critical period and no integration of Army and Navy facilities and efforts for defense. Neither of the responsible commanders really knew what the other was doing with respect to essential military activities." Perhaps the most significant explanation of the almost complete absence of effective co-operation between the Army and Navy in local defense matters is the one pointed out by the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor investigating boards, that in Hawaii "no one in authority appreciated the danger to which Pearl Harbor was exposed and consequently the Army and Navy commanders... were preoccupied with training activities to the exclusion of adequate alertness against attack."

In any event Army and Navy business on Oahu proceeded almost as

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usual in the ten days before the Japanese attacked. Probably it was chance rather than design that brought all eight battleships of the Pacific Fleet into Pearl Harbor at one time on and after 2 December. At any rate they made a fine showing for the newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Maxim Litvinoff, who arrived from the Orient en route to the United States on Thursday afternoon, 4 December—and became an unofficial overnight guest of the Governor and his naval aide. The three most valuable properties of the Pacific Fleet, the aircraft carriers Lexington, Enterprise, and Saratoga, were all away. The battleship crews undoubtedly provided many of the 24,000 spectators who witnessed the annual Shrine-sponsored football game on Saturday afternoon, 6 December, from which the University of Hawaii emerged victorious over Willamette University by a score of 20 to 6.

Three days earlier, a plea for more field repair and maintenance equipment had been sent by the Hickman commander to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which opened: "Due to the unsettled world conditions, it is believed that there is a probability of there being a necessity in the near future of repairing and defending this and other airdromes of this Department." But the official Army outlook, as presented in a reconstructed G–2 estimate of the situation, was less alarming. This estimate noted that the Hawaiian Department had no knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther east than the China Sea and no information to indicate operations by Japanese aircraft except on the Asiatic mainland and in adjacent areas. Locally, there had been plenty of warnings about sabotage, but no action by a resident of the Territory of Hawaii had indicated that subversive acts would be committed. The conclusions were:

1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines, or other similar acts.
2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

In other words Hawaii, preparing for war, as yet had no need itself to be ready for large-scale attack.

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85 Honolulu Advertiser, Dec 1, 2, 5, and 6, 1941.
86 Ibid., Dec 7, 1941 (preattack edition).
87 Ltr, CO Hickam Field to CG Hawaiian Air Force, 3 Dec 41, copy in notes used in preparation of USAFMIDPAC Hist.
88 Summary of Situation, by ACoFS G–2 Hawaiian Dept, written on 22 Dec 41 but depicting outlook as of 7 Dec 41, in Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 22, p. 25.
The Plan and Launching of the Attack

The Japanese Navy had a very different idea, although the surprise carrier attack on Oahu on the morning of 7 December 1941 did not become an integral part of Japanese war plans until almost the last moment. For several years before 1941, Japanese naval plans had contemplated a possible submarine attack on the United States Fleet in Hawaiian waters, but it was only in January of that year that a scheme was proposed for a surprise air attack on the fleet while berthed and anchored in Pearl Harbor. Japanese sources are unanimous in crediting authorship of the idea to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet. Its feasibility may have been suggested by United States Fleet exercises of 1938, during which the carrier Saratoga demonstrated that such a surprise attack could be successfully launched. Yamamoto’s proposal, and its subsequent highly secret study, coincided with a rumor reported by Ambassador Joseph C. Grew from Tokyo on 27 January 1941 that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was being planned by the Japanese.

In May 1941 Admiral Yamamoto presented his idea to the Japanese Naval General Staff. Without rejecting it outright that body remained, at least until late August, generally opposed to including a risky carrier operation in Japanese plans for naval action in the event of war with the United States; and it was not until 20 October that the Naval General Staff formally approved the plan. In the meantime, it appears that during the spring and summer of 1941 the 1st Air Fleet under Yamamoto’s direction undertook some preliminary detailed planning and training for an attack such as the admiral had projected; and between 2 and 13 September his plan was wargamed in Tokyo by Combined Fleet and Naval General Staff officers. In the midst of these table-top maneuvers, on 6 September, the Japanese Government made its decision to go to war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, unless its minimum demands for control of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were met by late October.

The best and most detailed account of the Japanese plans and preparations for the Pearl Harbor attack is that by Robert E. Ward, “The Inside Story of the Pearl Harbor Plan,” in United States Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1951), vol. 77, pp. 1271–83. The operation is best described in Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 80ff.

Grew’s report was duly though not quite accurately passed on to the War Department, as indicated by Memo, Lt Col Rufus S. Bratton, G–2, for Col Charles H. Mason, G–2, 28 Jan 41, in OPD Pearl Harbor Résumé.

THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

War-gaming convinced the Japanese Navy that the Pearl Harbor plan was feasible, although it might cost two carriers and one-third the attacking force of planes. Some serious technical difficulties remained to be overcome: one was the problem of a mid-Pacific mass refueling; another, not solved until early October, involved fixing wooden fins to naval torpedoes in order to stabilize them enough to be effective in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor; another required the last-minute conversion of a large number of 16-inch armor-piercing shells into 1,760-pound aerial bombs for the high altitude horizontal bombers to be employed. In late October the project was allotted top priority and maximum strength when the Japanese Army agreed to release aircraft from Manchuria for southern operations, and six carriers—including two new ones just commissioned—became available for the Hawaiian attack, instead of four as previously planned. On 5 November the Japanese Navy issued its detailed operational orders for action, on 7 November it tentatively announced 8 December (7 December in Hawaii) as "opening day," and by 17 November the approved detailed plan for the Pearl Harbor attack had been delivered to the Strike Force.42 Sailing from a desolate harbor in the Kurils on 27 November, its ships moved silently and undetected across the North Pacific, but with orders to return if the United States and Japan reached agreement before the fatal day.

The Carrier Strike Task Force, or 1st Air Fleet, that was headed for Oahu, was a power-packed combination of 6 fast carriers supported and escorted by 2 fast battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 3 submarines. Aboard the carriers were more than 360 airplanes. Information passed through Tokyo kept the Strike Force supplied with precise last-minute information about the ships actually in Pearl Harbor, although the maps and some of the information available to the force were distinctly out of date. After reaching a point 500 miles due north of Oahu during the evening of 6 December (Hawaiian dating), the ships raced southward and prepared their planes for launching at a point about 200 miles from the island.

In the meantime another Japanese force of twenty-five submarines had deployed south of Oahu. These long-range and modern submarines belonged to the Advance Expeditionary Force of the 6th Fleet, and five of them carried two-man midget submarines "piggy-back," for launching and penetration of Pearl Harbor to abet the air attack. And, if the Pacific Fleet got wind of the approaching carrier force and sortied, the 6th Fleet submarines were to attack en masse.43

43 Japanese Monograph No. 102.
The Japanese planned to fly the first wave of planes from the carriers at 6:00 a.m. and begin their bombing two hours later, one-half hour after the United States had been formally notified by Japan that it would seek recourse to arms to attain its ends. Thus did Japan plan to avoid a charge of "attack without warning," but the plan cut the time element too fine to allow for human error (in this case, slow decoding and typing of the Japanese message at the Washington Embassy) and the bombs were falling before Japanese diplomats arrived at the State Department to deliver the news of war. From intercepts American officials had already obtained a full translation of the Japanese message hours earlier, but they did not appreciate the full significance of its 1:00 p.m. deadline (7:30 a.m., Oahu time). Even General Marshall, who sent a last-minute warning about the deadline to Pacific commanders, went home to lunch instead of waiting in his office to find out what might be going to happen at that hour. And his warning did not reach General Short until hours after the event.44

On Oahu the military forces did obtain other warnings of impending action. More than four hours before the air attack began, one of the midget submarines was sighted less than two miles outside the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy, and either this submarine or another like it was sunk near the harbor entrance at a quarter to seven. According to standing orders, the presence of any unidentified submarine in restricted waters was to be considered a warning of imminent attack on a larger scale; but the Navy was still in process of checking the authenticity of reports of these submarine actions when the big attack came. No one thought to tell the Army about them.45

On Oahu's north shore, three Army mobile SCR-270 radar sets were in operation this Sunday morning, from 4:00 to 7:00 a.m., in accordance with the schedule established under Alert No. 1. (See Map II.) All three (Kawailoa, Opana, and Kaaawa) recorded the approach of two Japanese reconnaissance planes, launched from cruisers, when they were about fifty miles away, beginning at 6:45 a.m. One of the stations (but not Opana) reported this flight to a Navy lieutenant on duty at the Army information center at Fort Shafter about 6:52 a.m., who reported it to another Navy lieutenant

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44 On General Marshall's movements and actions this day, see especially Memo for Rcd, Col Walter B. Smith, SGS, 15 Dec 41, and Memo, Col John R. Deane, ASGS, for Brig Gen Walter B. Smith, 8 Jun 42, both in WDCSA Hawaii 1940-43. For a more detailed account in this series, see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 512-19.

45 Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 95-97; Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), contains a detailed and authentic blow-by-blow account of the whole Pearl Harbor action, including these midget submarine operations.
who responded that the Navy "had a reconnaissance flight out and that's what this flight was." 46 Much better known is the report by the Opana station at 7:20 a.m. of a mass flight of planes approaching from a northerly direction. This was the first wave of Japanese bombers and fighters, which had been spotted by the Opana radar just after seven while still some 130 miles from Oahu. By the time the Opana report came in the information center had officially closed down, and an Army lieutenant who happened to be still on duty decided that nothing need be done about the call—he knew that American carriers were out and assumed that Opana had picked up a reconnaissance flight from one of them.47

The Attack and the Response

An exact account of the Japanese air attack on the Pearl Harbor area and on Army airfields elsewhere on Oahu is impossible, partly because the commander of the first wave of planes gave a signal that was partially misinterpreted, so that the action did not proceed exactly according to a calculated plan. The first wave consisted of 49 high-level bombers, 51 dive bombers, 43 fighters, and 40 torpedo planes, a total of 183 planes. After approaching the north shore of Oahu about 7:40 a.m., some of the planes circled the island in order to swing in from the sea against south shore targets, while others flew over and between the mountain ranges to attack Wheeler Field and then other targets beyond. The attack began in the Pearl Harbor area at 7:55 a.m.—or five minutes early by the schedule so nicely timed in relation to the Japanese notification to Washington. All types of Japanese planes attacked more or less simultaneously. The torpedo planes did the greatest havoc to the battleships and other naval vessels afloat. All together, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 other naval vessels were destroyed or severely damaged, and most of this damage was done by the first wave. The greatest loss of life (almost half the total) occurred early in the attack after one of the converted 16-inch shell bombs crashed into the battleship Arizona and exploded in a forward magazine, with awesome consequences. Within five minutes or so the Navy's ships, whether hit or not,

46 Rpt as stated by Rear Adm R. B. Ingles, Dir, Naval Intel, in Tel Conv with Lt Gen Thomas T. Handy, DCOFS, 8 Nov 45, extract in OPD Pearl Harbor file, Misc Corresp. See also Army Exhibit, p. 8, copy in OPD file, Documentation—Pearl Harbor Brief; Morison, op. cit., p. 138 and n. 84; and Testimony of Lt Col William E. G. Taylor before Roberts Commission, 3 Jan 42, in Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 23, p. 757. This incident escaped the attention of all the Pearl Harbor investigating committees.

47 Thompson, et al., The Test, pp 3-4.
began putting up a tremendous antiaircraft barrage. The ships had 353 large-caliber and 427 short-range weapons aboard—or several times the Army's antiaircraft strength on Oahu. Nonetheless, while many Japanese planes were riddled, only 9 were lost from the first wave as a result of American combat action.

The second wave of Japanese planes consisted of 54 high-level and 80 dive bombers and 36 fighters, making the total number of Japanese planes participating in the attack 353, plus the 2 reconnaissance planes that came in earlier. Launched one hour and fifteen minutes after the first wave, the planes of the second began to arrive on target shortly before 9:00 a.m. and continued the mass attack until about 9:45. The second wave, meeting stiffer antiaircraft resistance (mostly from Navy guns) and from a few Army fighter planes, lost 20 planes in action. The loss in combat of 29 planes represented 8 percent of those engaged, a proportion close to the average loss then being sustained by attacking forces in similar-sized air raids in Europe against alerted defenses. Some other Japanese planes were smashed up as they returned to their carriers, and of these at least 20 were a total loss. By about 1:00 p.m. all returning Japanese planes were back on the carriers, and the Striking Force raced away to the northwest.48

Although damage to the Pacific Fleet was the primary objective, the Japanese assigned 199 of the attacking planes, or nearly 60 percent of the total force, to missions against Army and Navy airfields on Oahu. The results for the Navy and the Marine Corps on this account were even more devastating than for the Army: at the Kaneohe Seaplane Base on the northeast shore, every one of the 33 patrol planes present was destroyed or damaged; nearly as great loss was sustained at the Ewa Marine Air Station west of Pearl Harbor, where not a single plane was left in condition to fly during or immediately after the attack; and the same fate overtook all of the patrol planes at the Ford Island Naval Air Station. In all, the Navy and Marine Corps had 87 planes destroyed and 31 damaged, and these figures included almost all of the fighters, bombers, and patrol planes on hand. In addition, during and after the attack the carrier Enterprise lost a number of planes flown into

the battle area, at least five of which were shot down by naval antiaircraft fire.\textsuperscript{49}

At Hickam Field, where the Army had its usable bombers lined up in close formation in front of the hangars, the first Japanese planes flew over at 7:55 a.m. These were torpedo planes headed for Pearl Harbor, but they were followed almost immediately by four flights of dive bombers coming in from the south, southeast, and north almost simultaneously for bombing and strafing attacks on the supply depot, repair shops, and hangars. This opening attack lasted about ten minutes. A second one came at 8:25, this time from more low-flying dive bombers and one or more flights of high-altitude bombers. The third and final attack, by dive bombers and strafing fighters of the second wave, struck around 9:00 a.m. These strikes left the Hawaiian Air Depot completely destroyed, three of the five hangars burned, the barracks and other post installations badly damaged, and more than half the bombers present destroyed or damaged seriously. Casualties at Hickam were also heavy, particularly among men who had taken refuge in the hangars after the first attack. But the most vital facilities—the repair shops and machinery, and gasoline storage tanks—remained largely untouched.\textsuperscript{50}

In the midst of the Hickam action twelve unarmed B-17’s being ferried from the mainland arrived over Oahu. Eight of them managed to land at Hickam, and of the other four two came down at Haleiwa, one at Bellows, and one on a golf course near the northern tip of Oahu. Enemy action destroyed one of the planes and badly damaged three others.\textsuperscript{51}

A few minutes after the initial attack on Hickam, about twenty-five dive bombers hit at the hangars at Wheeler Field, and heavy casualties occurred when one bomb exploded in an adjoining barracks. After the bombing, the Japanese planes circled back at very low altitudes to machine-gun the pursuit craft parked (as at Hickam) in close formation in front of the hangars, and, as they circled, some of the enemy strafed nearby Schofield Barracks. After an extended lull another machine gun attack struck Wheeler, shortly after 9:00 a.m., and caught a number of pursuit ships being taxied to the runways for launching. Wheeler lost two hangars, and more than two-thirds of its planes were destroyed or badly damaged. The first attack effectively prevented any large-scale response by Wheeler’s fighter planes.


\textsuperscript{50} Ltr, CG Hawaiian Dept to CofS, 12 Dec 41, and rpts in AG 381 (12 Dec 41).

\textsuperscript{51} Craven and Cate, eds., \textit{Plans and Early Operations}, pp. 199–200.
On the eve of Pearl Harbor the Army had two of its pursuit squadrons dispersed to Bellows and Haleiwa Fields for gunnery practice, and the planes of these squadrons were armed and needed only fuel and warming up to be ready for action. Apparently the Japanese did not plan to attack either of these outlying fields. A single fighter strafed Bellows about 8:30 a.m., and the flight of nine planes that attacked the same field about a half-hour later seems to have been attracted by the B-17 which landed there. Material damage at Bellows was slight, and was even less at Haleiwa Field, strafed by a single plane that followed in the two B-17's which landed there. The second attack on Bellows caught the Army pursuits just as they were taking off. Two of them were shot down before they could gain altitude, and one pilot was killed as he climbed into his plane.\(^5\)

At all Army installations attacked by the Japanese, enemy dive bombers and fighters strafed individuals promiscuously, and in return Army men

fired back with machine guns and lesser weapons. But the only effective action came from the planes at Haleiwa. Two young lieutenants at Wheeler were sufficiently alert after an all-night poker game to phone Haleiwa to have their planes fueled and warmed up and then to race over there and get off in P-40's at or soon after 8:15 a.m. One of them is credited with shooting down four Japanese planes. Another flight from Haleiwa had a less happy result when one of its planes, a P-36, was shot down by machine-gun fire from Schofield Barracks. Six P-36's managed to get into the air from Wheeler Field during the attack, and four of them engaged the nine enemy planes which attacked Bellows Field. American pilots claimed two of the Japanese, and one of their own number was shot down.53

Including the B-17's arriving from the mainland, some 249 Army planes were involved in the Pearl Harbor attack, and of these about 74 were destroyed and 71 seriously damaged.54 Among bombers the B-18's, which were expendable, sustained the greatest loss; 14 of 24 B-17 heavies and 10 of 12 modern light A-20 bombers came through comparatively unscathed. The fighters took a heavier beating, but by 10 December the Army had 44 of them ready for action.55

Most of the Army's antiaircraft guns were unable to function during the attack. None of the mobile 3-inch batteries was at its assigned field position, and ammunition for all of them had to be fetched from the Ordnance Depot. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command alerted the units of the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (Antiaircraft Artillery) at 8:10 a.m., and within three or four minutes antiaircraft batteries at Fort Kamehameha (next to Hickam) and at Fort Weaver (on the other side of the Pearl Harbor entrance) opened fire with small arms. At 8:30 a fixed 3-inch battery at Weaver began to fire, and similar batteries at Kamehameha and on Sand Island in Honolulu harbor opened up against Japanese planes, the Sand Island battery claiming two of them. Other antiaircraft units at Camp Molekoli and Schofield Barracks fired small arms only at the enemy, the Schofield unit claiming one plane (in addi-

53 The most reliable contemporary account of Army fighter activity appears to be that in the letter of the Post Operations Officer, Wheeler Field, cited in the preceding footnote. See also Lord, Day of Infamy, pp. 59ff.

54 The Hawaiian Air Force had an assigned strength of 231 planes on 7 December, but the number actually on hand appears to have been somewhat greater. The figures given on planes involved and losses have been calculated from divergent figures contained in Army Exhibit, p. 9; Incl to Ltr., Post Operations Officer, Wheeler Field, to CG Hawaiian Air Force, 18 Dec 41, cited, reporting aircraft status and losses at Wheeler and its satellite fields as of 9 December 1941; and Memo, CoFS Hawaiian Air Force to CG Hawaiian Air Force, 20 Dec 41, copy in USAFIMIDPAC Hist notes, reporting aircraft status and losses at all fields as of 20 Dec 41.

55 Tel Conv, Gen Short and DCoS Bryden, 10 Dec 41, in OCS Tel Conv, binder 1; Testimony of Gen Short before Army Pearl Harbor Bd, 11 Aug 44, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 27, p. 172.
tion to the American one). But, with only a small fraction of the Army's antiaircraft potential brought into play, its effort on this score was insignificant in comparison with the barrage thrown up by the guns of the Pacific Fleet.\footnote{Details of Army antiaircraft action are set forth in Ltr, CO 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) to CG Hawaiian Dept, 20 Dec 41, in \textit{Pearl Harbor Attack}, pt. 7, pp. 3002-004, and in War Diary, Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, 7 to 31 Dec 41, in AG 381 (12 Dec 41) (Bulky Package). In all, the Army claimed 11 Japanese planes shot down, the Navy 28; on the other hand the Japanese claimed all but 29 planes returned to the carriers. See \textit{Pearl Harbor Report}, p. 65.}

Within minutes after the first torpedoes and bombs struck at Pearl Harbor, General Short issued orders that put the Hawaiian Department on a full war footing. By 8:45 a.m. his headquarters had begun to operate a forward command post located in tunnels at the Allamanu Crater, three miles west of Fort Shafter. Between 8:10 and 9:00 a.m. the major ground commands—the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command and the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions—received word to deploy and take the actions required under a No. 3 Alert. Actually, all three had begun so to act before they got the formal word. The 24th Division had a battalion of infantry on the road from Schofield Barracks to its assigned battle position by 9:00 a.m., and thereafter other divisional units left Schofield as soon as they had drawn and loaded their ammunition and otherwise prepared for action. By late afternoon, all divisional elements were digging in at their assigned field positions, with all weapons except heavy howitzers at hand and ready to fire. As General Short put it, in the deployment "everything clicked," one of his junior officers explaining: "We had gone so many times to our war positions that it just seemed like drill when they were firing at us." \footnote{Testimony of Gen Short before Army Pearl Harbor Bd, 11 Aug 44, \textit{Pearl Harbor Attack}, pt. 27, p. 231, and of Capt Frank W. Ebey before Roberts Commission, 26 Dec 41, \textit{Pearl Harbor Attack}, pt. 22, p. 264.} The deployment showed clearly enough that the Hawaiian Department was thoroughly prepared to resist invasion, however unready it was against the peril of surprise air attack.

After the attack was over the Army defenders, still anticipating invasion, gave credence to a host of rumors and reports that enemy forces were still at hand. Throughout 7 December reports that parachute troops had landed poured in from all over Oahu, and sightings of hostile ships off shore were almost as numerous. With darkness the situation became even more tense, and General Short ordered all forces to be ready to resist another air attack or attempted landing at dawn. Throughout the night Army troops fired small weapons rather freely all over the island—with some ground patrols firing at
THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

each other. The following entries from the War Diary of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command for 8 December indicate the tension as the new dawn approached:

0428—All units notified to be on alert for landing attack at dawn.
0438—Flash. 30 Enemy planes approaching from Kauai.
0507—Enemy planes dive bombing Wheeler Field. (Some firing by batteries in Wheeler Field took place.)
0525—Schofield AA group reports barrage fire (searchlights useless because of low ceiling) against planes, later reported as friendly.
0608—53d Brigade reports small arms firing on friendly aircraft definitely established as from Marines or Navy.88

By afternoon on 8 December a more normal outlook began to prevail. During the second night the firing tapered off, and orders similar to the following, issued by the commander of the 25th Division, helped to stop it:

Promiscuous firing at friendly airplanes has been prevalent during preceding 36-hour period. Such firing will be stopped at once. Under no circumstances will any person in this division take up fire against any airplanes hostile or friendly until he or his unit has been definitely attacked by bombing or machine gun fire.89

The last stray planes of the enemy had in fact departed from their rendezvous point west of Oahu about 11:00 a.m. on the morning of 7 December, although enemy submarines were still around.

Except for some strafing, the Japanese confined their attack on 7 December to military installations. The “bombs” which fell on Honolulu and other civilian parts of the island were Navy 5-inch antiaircraft shells which had failed to detonate in the air. Explosions in Honolulu started three major fires, and at least 57 civilians were killed and nearly as many seriously injured.90

Casualties among American service personnel were of course much higher. The Navy and Marine Corps have counted 2,117 killed or died of wounds, and 779 others wounded in action.91 The far smaller Army casualties are difficult to determine with exactitude. General Short, in his report on the battle, listed 228 Army men dead or died of wounds, 110 seriously wounded, and 358 slightly wounded, a total of 696 Army battle casualties, as of midnight, 10 December. These appear to be about as accurate as any

88 War Diary in AG 381 (12 Dec 41) (Bulky Package).
89 Staff Journal, 25th Inf Div, 7 to 31 Dec 41, in AG 381 (12 Dec 41) (Bulky Package).
90 Allen, Hawaii’s War Years, pp. 5-9; Testimony of Col Webster A. Capron, 30 Aug 44, and of Gen Burgin, 8 Sep 44, before Army Pearl Harbor Bd, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 28, pp. 1059, 1372.
91 Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 126.
figures compiled and published since.\(^2\) The enemy acknowledged a loss of 55 men in planes; 9 of the 10 men aboard midget submarines were lost, the other one being America's first prisoner of war in World War II; and on 10 December the Japanese also lost one of their large submarines (the I-70) and its crew.\(^3\)

When General Short submitted his report of the action to the War Department on 12 December, he had not yet heard of the drama being acted out on the isolated island of Niihau, west of Kauai. A crippled Japanese plane landed on Niihau on Sunday afternoon, about 2:00 p.m. After first being disarmed by a native Hawaiian, the Japanese pilot persuaded one of the two men of Japanese descent on the island—an American citizen—to free him, return his weapons, and join him on a rampage. The affair ended on Saturday morning, 13 December, and before help summoned from Kauai had arrived. Another Hawaiian, Benhakaka Kanahele, and his wife were captured by the two Japanese; but they jumped their captors and, after Kanahele was fully aroused by bullets in his stomach, groin, and leg, he picked up the Japanese pilot and smashed his head against a stone wall. The Nisei took one look, shot himself, and the "Battle of Niihau" was over.\(^4\)

\(62\) Ltr, CG Hawaiian Dept to CofS, 12 Dec 41, AG 381 (12 Dec 41). The History of the Office of the Surgeon General, Hawaiian Department, in the USAFMDPAC Hist, compiled later from similar sources, lists 229 known Army dead or died of wounds, 113 seriously wounded, and 346 slightly wounded. See also the Pearl Harbor Report, p. 65 and note 29, which list 194 killed in action, 22 missing in action, 21 died of wounds, 3 other dead (nonbattle) or declared dead, and 360 wounded.


\(64\) Allen, Hawaii's War Years, pp. 44-46; Lord, Day of Infamy, pp. 195-200; Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 15 Dec 41, AG 381 (11-27-41) (Gen).
THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

attack. None of them developed the position of the Hawaiian commanders any better than Secretary Knox did in his report:

There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General Short to alibi the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted they did not expect it, and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would have to travel to make the attack and the consequent exposure of such a task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the Far East.65

There was likewise plenty of evidence of what happened on 7 December to substantiate Mr. Knox's conclusion that "once action was joined the courage, determination, and the resourcefulness of the armed services and of the civilian employees left nothing to be desired."66

Despite the devastation wrought by the Japanese, service chiefs both in Washington and in Hawaii underestimated the weight of the Japanese attack. The consensus in the days immediately following the action was that Japan had used no more than three carriers and 180 planes.67 This underestimate persisted during December and January through the investigation of the commission headed by Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court, and it lent a good deal more color than justifiable to charges that the Hawaiian Department could have put up a much more effective defense if its forces had been properly alerted. Undoubtedly, if there had been plenty of warning, there could and would have been a more effective defense, but the Japanese struck with such overwhelming force that there would have been little difference in the damage done—except, of course, to Japanese planes and possibly to the carriers. Certainly the unheeded warnings of the last hour or so before the attack could have made little difference in the Army's defense. It would have required (and actually did require) several hours' effort to get most of the Army's antiaircraft guns into position and ready to fire, and in any event the Army had very few guns that could have dealt with the low-flying torpedo planes and dive bombers. As for the Army's pursuit ships, the well-known warning by the Opana radar might have provided enough time

66 Ibid., p. 1756.
67 Naval Intelligence in Washington estimated that, of eight carriers in operation, Japan had used no more than three in the Oahu raid, Min, JB Mtg, 8 Dec 41. Ltr, G-2 Hawaiian Dept to G-2 War Dept, 20 Dec 41, and other papers in AG 381 (12 Dec 41), estimate 160-180 planes and "at least three carriers."
to disperse them to bunkers at Wheeler Field, but not enough to get them into the air against the first wave of Japanese planes.\(^6^8\)

As Admiral King observed three years after the event, the basic reason the attack succeeded so well was the general blindness of the United States Army and Navy to Japanese potentialities in the central Pacific.\(^6^9\) The Roberts Commission and later investigations found much to criticize about the organization and operation of defense forces in Hawaii, but General Short and his Navy colleagues stoutly defended the "system." Said General Short: "I think the system is all right. I think that we made a very serious mistake when we didn't go to an alert against an all out attack. I think that our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not."\(^7^0\)

Whether Washington gave the Hawaiian commanders enough information to make a correct estimate of the situation remains a much argued question. But on the central issue of responsibility, no one has improved on the judgment of Secretary of War Stimson, recorded in his diary the day that the report of the Roberts Commission was made public:

The printed report does not and could not go into what is the real underlying basis of the trouble, namely, that both services had not fully learned the lessons of the development of air power in respect to the defense of a navy and of a naval base. This failure and shortcoming pervaded the services and the nation. We had grown to rely on the impregnability of Pearl Harbor and nobody had anticipated that the Japs could make an attack by air as thoroughly as they did. Crete and Greece had taught us the vulnerability of a fleet in narrow seas against attacks by shore-based aircraft. It was the Japs who carried out this lesson of attacks upon a fleet from carriers in the high seas. I doubt if anybody in the Navy or the Army believed that they could successfully do it or would try it. Certainly nobody in the responsible positions. And it was only through such a disaster that we could all in the nation learn what modern air power can do even in the high seas.\(^7^1\)

\(^{6^8}\) See Testimony of Gen Short before Congressional Jt Comm, 23 Jan 46, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 7, p. 2995.

\(^{6^9}\) Memo, COMINCH to SN, 3 Dec 44, par. 11, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 39, p. 385.

\(^{7^0}\) Testimony before Roberts Commission, 8 Jan 42, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 23, p. 987.

\(^{7^1}\) Stimson Diary, entry of 25 Jan 42.
CHAPTER VIII

The Hawaiian Defenses
After Pearl Harbor

When General Marshall and his principal subordinates met in Washington on the morning of 8 December 1941, their greatest immediate concern was to discover ways and means of putting the Hawaiian garrison back on its feet. They agreed that the Hawaiian Air Force must be reconstituted as soon as possible, and General Marshall directed the Army Air Forces to give highest priority to the movement of enough planes to Hawaii to build up Army air strength there to one full group of heavy bombardment and two full groups of pursuit. Hawaii's own most urgent plea was for "all possible heavy bombardment fully equipped," and fortunately this was the easiest of its requirements to meet quickly. War had interrupted the prepared flow of heavy bombers to the Philippines, and it was a simple matter for the Army Air Forces to continue it to Hawaii. By 21 December enough B-17's had been flown out from California to bring the heavy bomber force on Oahu to a full-group strength of forty-three planes. To get other army reinforcements to Hawaii in similar quick order was a much more vexing problem.1

The Navy, which at once ordered the transfer of three battleships and an aircraft carrier from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific, was insistent that the Army send everything it could to bolster the defenses of Hawaii. On the other hand, the Navy did not want any ships to leave the west coast without escort, and Army reinforcements for Hawaii that had sailed just before the Japanese attacked were turned back to San Francisco. As of 9 December, the Army and Navy were agreed on a move that would have reinforced Hawaii from another direction, by the return of a sizable Philippine-bound convoy to Honolulu. But President Roosevelt overruled the services, and

1 Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to CofAAF, 7 Dec 41, copy in USAFMIDPAC Hist, Bulky File; Notes on Conf in OCoS, 8 Dec 41, OCS Conf, binder 29; Memo, Lt Col Clayton L. Bissell for ACoS WPD, 9 Dec 41, WPD 3807-105; AAF Monograph 41, Operational History of the Seventh Air Force, p. 105.
198 GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS

the convoy was therefore ordered to proceed to Australia. Help for Hawaii would have to come from the mainland.²

For the first few days after Pearl Harbor both the War and the Navy Departments thought that the Japanese might have strong naval forces including carriers between Hawaii and the west coast, and the Navy objected to any ship movements from California until the situation east of Hawaii was clarified. The general underestimation of Japanese strength in the Pearl Harbor attack underlay this thinking, the Navy assuming that the Japanese had other carriers free for an attack on the Pacific coast. In turn, apprehensions of attacks on the American continent helped to modify the Army's initial position of giving first priority to Hawaii. More vital still than Pearl Harbor, from the Army's point of view, were the west coast bomber factories and the Panama Canal; and by 12 December the Army position was "to take all possible steps short of jeopardizing the security of the Continental United States and the Panama Canal to reinforce the defenses of Oahu."³

Another reason for the Army's more cautious stand may be found in doubts expressed by Secretary Stimson and others about the reliability of Pearl Harbor as the major Pacific naval base.⁴ Naval officers on the spot shared these doubts.⁵ They took their ships out of Pearl Harbor as fast as they could after the attack, and kept them at sea. As late as 20 January 1942 Secretary Stimson noted his agreement with Mr. Justice Roberts (just back from Hawaii) that Pearl Harbor was "no longer a safe advance base for the Navy under the conditions of modern air and sea warfare."⁶ But three weeks earlier Admiral William S. Pye, the acting fleet commander, had struck a more realistic chord when he testified before the Roberts Commission: "I do not believe that there is any other base in this area, and if we intend to conduct war in this area this base must be held and used."⁷

By the time of Admiral Pye's testimony the Navy knew that President Roosevelt was determined to push limited offensive operations against Japan, and such operations could only be pushed from Hawaii. During December

² Notes of Min, JB Mtgs, 8, 9, and 10 Dec 41, in OCMH files. See also, in this series, Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42 pp. 78ff; and Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), pp. 143ff.
³ Memo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4622-37.
⁴ On 10 Dec Mr. Stimson is reported to have said "that he thought Hawaii was still good as an outpost and a port of temporary call, but he did not consider it a full defensive area." Notes on Conf with SW, 10 Dec 41, OCS Conf, binder 29.
⁵ See, for example, Testimony of Capt Walter S. DeLany, USN, Operations Officer, CINCPAC, before Roberts Commission, 30 Dec 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 22, pp. 520-21.
⁶ Stimson Diary, entry of 20 Jan 42.
the Navy of necessity recast its Pacific war plans, making the sure control of the Oahu-Midway line the task of first priority for the Pacific Fleet, and giving second priority to that of holding the line from Hawaii to Samoa. The necessary corollary of the new strategy outlined for the Pacific Fleet was a much surer defense of Oahu by the United States Army.8

The Impact of War

In Hawaii, under the impetus of attack and the ensuing excitement, the Army had moved quickly on 7 December 1941 to control almost every facet of public and private life. One of its first steps was to round up all still and motion pictures made of the attack itself, except those taken by the Navy. By 10:30 a.m., in cooperation with the Navy, the Army G–2 organization had begun to apply a tight censorship to prevent the transmission from Hawaii of any unauthorized information about the attack or about the condition of Oahu’s defense forces after it was over. A few minutes later, as Governor Joseph B. Poindexter was announcing over the radio that he had ordered Hawaii’s emergency M-day act in effect, the Army shut him off because it thought Japanese attackers were using radio beams to guide their navigation. During the morning General Short also undertook to evacuate all civilian dependents from Hickam, Fort Kamehameha, and other damaged military installations, and his G–2 staff began a quick roundup of “enemy agents and suspicious characters.” By 10 December the Army had interned 482 Japanese, Germans, and Italians, 43 of them American citizens.9

The establishment of full martial law under the Army commander as military governor made this internment and the other actions taken not only possible but unchallengeable. Since the summer of 1940 the Army had planned for military rule of the Territory of Hawaii if it was seriously threatened by invasion, and in March 1941 General Short had earnestly advocated a legal foundation that would empower the President to authorize martial law in an emergency.10 The Hawaiian legislature sought to forestall Congressional action in Washington by passing its own M-day act on 3 October 1941. The Governor’s action in declaring this act in force at 10:00 a.m. on 7 December did not satisfy General Short, who was more than ever concerned about the dangers of sabotage and espionage among the large population of Japanese

8 Notes on Conf at White House (President and American advisers only), 28 Dec 41, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confis (1-28-42). See also Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, ch. XI.
9 Ltr, CG Hawaiian Dept to CofS, 12 Dec 41, and other papers in AG 370.6 Hawaiian Dept (11-20-40).
10 3d Ind, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 19 Mar 41, and Ltr, TAG to JAG, 25 Nov 40, AG 381.6 Hawaiian Dept (11-20-40).
descent on Oahu, particularly if Japanese forces followed up the air attack with an invasion as the general thought they might do on the following morning. Therefore, he called on Governor Poindexter and discussed with him the need for martial law. After the general left the Governor telephoned President Roosevelt, who approved its establishment. During the afternoon the Governor signed proclamations (prepared by the Army's Judge Advocate months before) authorizing the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department to exercise all of the Governor's normal powers, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus until further notice, and conferring full judicial as well as executive power on the Army in the person of its commanding general. The President formally approved these actions on 9 December. General Short announced them in effect at 3:45 p.m. on the 7th, and gave actual charge of government under martial law to the Hawaiian Department's Judge Advocate General, Lt. Col. Thomas H. Green.  

Under its new authority the Army ordered a complete blackout beginning at 6:00 p.m. on 7 December and continuing every night until further notice, and for the first few weeks it barred all private cars from the highways and maintained a strict curfew after the same hour. At 6:04 p.m. on 7 December the police radio broadcast: "From now on nobody allowed out of their homes." Before the day was over the Army had issued orders closing all saloons and prohibiting the sale of liquor; suspending civil courts and instituting provost courts in their place; closing all schools for an indefinite period; suspending all food sales to permit a complete inventory of island food stocks; and rationing gasoline. By and large, at the outset, civilians accepted these and other measures with understanding and good spirit. Later, both Hawaiians and agencies of the federal government other than the War and Navy Departments registered a good many complaints about the continuation of martial law; but the Army kept a tight control of civilian and civilian affairs until after the Battle of Midway in June 1942 erased any threat of invasion.  

13 Temporarily, with the establishment of unity of command on 17 Dec 1941 (see below), the Navy acquired control of the military governorship and its machinery. See Testimony of General Short before Roberts Commission, 23 Dec 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 22, p. 90. A month later, and apparently after President Roosevelt made it clear that he intended control to remain with the Army, the commanding general was again in full charge; and to avoid further confusion he set up a separate organization for military government that was exempt from the Navy's over-all command of tactical forces.
of habeas corpus and some degree of martial law continued in effect until 24 October 1944. 14

The institution and maintenance of martial law in Hawaii clearly had as a major if not central purpose the control of the large minority of the population that was of Japanese descent, American citizens as well as aliens. Immediately after the enemy attack there were a host of rumors and reports of sabotage and other subversive activity by residents of Oahu. The most careful investigation by the Army and other federal agencies failed to find any support for these allegations. Before the attack there had been espionage, that is, an extensive collection of military information, by the Japanese consular staff, and espionage of sorts by one other person, a German national named Otto Kuehn. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that anyone on the consular staff knew of the impending attack. During and after the Pearl Harbor raid, and for the remainder of the war period, no sabotage, espionage, or any other sort of subversive activity is known to have occurred in Hawaii. But there were many who credited this record to the close controls that martial law allowed, and the services were especially anxious to keep it in effect after the early drive for a mass evacuation of Japanese residents from Oahu petered out. 15

The inventory of food ordered by the Army on 7 December reflected a long-standing concern with the problem of feeding Oahu's civilian population in an emergency. With the island's agriculture devoted almost exclusively to pineapples and sugar, most foodstuffs had to be imported from the mainland. The Army's prewar plans and tentative moves toward encouraging the production of other foods on an experimental and educational scale, and toward stocking seed, had been ineffective. Another plan for stocking nonperishable foods for emergency use received the blessing of the War Department but no appropriations from Congress. 16 When war came Oahu had about a normal supply of food on hand for its 250,000 civilians, and no means of increasing local production significantly. The inventory disclosed a 37-day supply of most staples, but serious shortages of potatoes, rice, and onions. To maintain this supply and feed Army forces would require prompt shipment and a continuing flow of about 32,000 tons of food a month from

14 Notes on WD War Council Mtgs, 13 Jul, 21 Oct, 16 Dec 42. Ltr, SW to Atty Gen Biddle, 2 Nov 43, OPD 370.5 Hawaiian Dept/8; Allen, Hawaii's War Years, p. 176. For a detailed account of the organization and operation of martial law in Hawaii during World War II, see USAFIMIDPAC History, Part VIII, Civil Affairs and Military Government.
15 Allen, Hawaii's War Years, pp. 47ff; Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 2 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-41) sec. 1; WDC Interoffice Memo, 16 Mar 42, WDC 38x vol. II/4.
16 Memo, Acting ACofS WPD for CoFS, 7 Apr 41, and other papers in WPD 3915.
the mainland. In addition, General Short asked the War Department to
arrange for a six-month emergency reserve of 48,000 tons of food, and he
placed orders with the division engineer in San Francisco for 40,000 tons of
seed, insecticides, fertilizer, and farm implements in order to boost local food
production.\(^{17}\)

Filling these orders on the mainland was no problem, but in the first
couple of weeks after the attack the presence of Japanese submarines and a critical
shortage of shipping made the food outlook an alarming one. Congress
hastily approved a revolving fund of $35,000,000 to finance shipments, and
the first emergency cargo of food began to load in San Francisco on 20 De-
cember. By mid-February 1942 the food situation was sufficiently in hand to
permit the War Department to turn over responsibility for supplying civilian
needs to the Department of Agriculture, and by June there was an ample
supply of food on hand. The effort to stimulate the production of food crops
locally met with indifferent success, partly because the federal government
decided that maximum production of sugar and pineapples was more im-
portant to the war effort.\(^{18}\)

Immediately after the Japanese attack, the Army requested authority
to evacuate the families of servicemen to the mainland at government ex-
 pense, and this evacuation was broadened to include other civilian women
and children who wanted to go as well as tourists stranded in Hawaii when
the war started. Although the primary consideration for evacuation was the
exposed position of Oahu, it also alleviated the housing shortage and left
fewer mouths to feed. By 1 March 1942 some 20,000 had left, and 20,000
more followed before the end of the year. An incidental but very significant
result of this evacuation was that it helped block the proposed mass evacu-
ation of residents of Japanese descent to the mainland.\(^{19}\)

Under martial law the Army could and did impose a strict censorship on
all information media in Hawaii and to all civilian letters and messages sent
from Hawaii after 7 December. The latter measure prevented the enemy
from finding out about the weaknesses as well as the strengths of island
defenses. On 8 December the War Department authorized censorship of all
communications to and from personnel under military control outside the
United States, and the Hawaiian Department was in a position to take full

\(^{17}\) Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 14 Dec 41, OPD Exec 8, bk. 1.
\(^{18}\) Allen, Hawaii's War Years, pp. 151–54; Memo, ASGS for CofS, 19 Feb 42, in OCS Conf,
binder 33.
\(^{19}\) Tel Conv, CofS Hawaiian Dept with ASGS WD, 8 Dec 41, OPD 381 Hawaiian Dept/55;
paraphrase of Navy Rad, 1 Mar 42, AG 370.5 (11–6–41) sec. 2; Allen, Hawaii's War Years,
pp. 107–09.
advantage of this authority. In addition to postal censorship, radio stations came under Army control on 8 December, and English language newspapers were censored beginning on 9 December. Three days later the Army suspended the publication of foreign language newspapers and of "weekly labor and communistic papers and other uncertain publications." Although the Army gave up its direct control of civilian censorship to the federal Office of Censorship in February 1942, thereafter throughout the war the Army and Navy continued to exert a much closer indirect control of information than existed on the mainland.

As soon as the air attack was over, the Hawaiian Department plunged into a reconstruction and new construction effort of unprecedented scale and pace. General Short and his District Engineer, Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., took full advantage of a War Department authorization of 9 December to incur obligations for any purpose to meet urgent requirements. On 10 December the general reported that his engineer officer had "all the contractors in town working" and doing "marvelous work." The repair and expansion of air fields had top priority, and to get the work done quickly the district engineer commandeered civilian stocks of construction material and equipment, absorbed the quartermaster construction organization, ordered building equipment from the mainland in such quantities that it could not be delivered for many months to come, and (by 23 December) employed a civilian working force of 20,000 men. Unfortunately for Colonel Wyman, in numerous instances he neglected to maintain the "record of over-obligations so incurred" which the authorization of 9 December had required. However effective he was in getting the repair job done and new construction under way, his failure to keep accounts and his high-handed tactics led to his relief in March and the consolidation of all Army construction activity under the department engineer.

The principal immediate change in Hawaii's defense structure came about on 17 December 1941, when the top Army and Navy commanders...
were replaced and all Army forces in the Hawaiian area were put under command of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. President Roosevelt ordered the replacements after he read Secretary Knox’s report on what had happened. General Short’s successor was Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, an Air Corps officer, and he reached Hawaii in time to take over the Army command on 17 December. Admiral Kimmel’s replacement was to be Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, but for the two weeks before he took over on 31 December unity of command was exercised by the acting fleet commander, Admiral Pye. General Emmons and Admiral Pye got together immediately, and five days after his arrival the general could report to General Marshall: “Unity of command here is essential, is working well, and will so continue.”

Although subsequently much criticism arose over the lack of a united command and over effective interservice co-operation in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, the establishment of unity of command there was immediately inspired by similar action directed by the President on 12 December for the Panama Coastal Frontier. In any event General Marshall had long believed that Hawaii should be under Navy command, whenever the major portion of the Pacific Fleet was present or was using Pearl Harbor as its major base; and on 16 December he took the initiative in proposing to Admiral Stark that all Army forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier be put under naval command, and with no strings attached. In practice, this meant that henceforth during the war the Army kept responsibility for the administration and discipline of its forces in the Hawaiian area, but the Navy commanded their operations except (after the first month) those associated with military government. The organization worked out by the Navy put all defense forces specifically allocated to the coastal frontier (the major islands and adjacent sea areas within a 20-mile limit) under Army command, and all defense forces allotted to the Hawaiian Sea Frontier (extending outward from the islands for 500 miles) under Navy command. Under this arrangement Army pursuit aviation and the other elements of the interceptor system remained under Army control, but Army heavy bombardment planes were put under the Navy’s sea frontier command. From the Army’s viewpoint, this division of command over Army air units was a step in the wrong direction; but the efforts of the Hawaiian Air Force (Seventh Air Force from March 1942 onward) to recover operational control of its heavy bombers were unsuccessful. Except for the heavy bomber units, the

25 Telg, Gen Emmons to CofS, 22 Dec 41, AG 381 (12–17–41).
26 Stimson Diary, entry of 12 Dec 41; Memo, CofS for CNO, 16 Dec 41, and other papers in WPD 2917–38.
actual control of Army forces in Hawaii continued to be exercised by the Hawaiian Department and successor commands, under missions assigned by the Navy. There would undoubtedly have been a closer integration of command if the local Army and Navy commanders had complied with a Washington order of 19 December 1941 to establish a joint command post; but it took them a year to agree on its location, and after another year spent in construction they agreed that a joint command post was no longer needed. The separate Army and Navy command headquarters continued to coordinate their work through liaison officers, as they had done before Pearl Harbor, albeit more effectively. Nothing like a unified force evolved in Hawaii, and indeed for the first few months there was much rivalry and friction between the services. But at the top General Emmons and Admiral Nimitz worked in close accord from the beginning, and by May 1942, when the enemy again threatened in force, the Hawaiian defense forces were fairly joined if not united.27

The most obvious joint enterprise of the Army and Navy in the period immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack was the conduct of long-range reconnaissance. The improvised and unsuccessful attempts of 7 December to locate the Japanese Striking Force were succeeded as rapidly as possible by an organized daily search under the command of the Navy’s Patrol Wing Two using as many Army and Navy planes as could be made available, to a distance of 700 nautical miles in all directions. To make this patrol possible the Navy transferred three squadrons of reconnaissance craft from the Atlantic as quickly as it could. The Navy’s reconnaissance plan that became effective during December called for a daily search by 46 planes, but in practice only 37 were normally used—12 B–17’s and 25 Navy PBY’s. The Army managed to hold back 18 of its heavy bombers as a striking force ready for action on 30-minute notice. The reconnaissance, though far superior to anything attempted before Pearl Harbor, was admittedly a good deal less than perfect—low visibility in the patrolled lanes could cut its effectiveness to near zero, and about one-fifth of the circle surrounding the islands had to be left virtually unpatrolled each day. To make the patrol fully effective would not only require a good many more planes but also radar to eliminate the hazards of visual observation.28

27 The establishment and workings of unity of command are described at length though not completely in USAFMIDPAC History, pt IV, Joint Army-Navy Action, pp. 794ff.
The Japanese were still around during December 1941, but not on carriers. They kept a group of about nine submarines in the vicinity of Hawaii until mid January, to do what damage they could. As commerce destroyers Japanese submarines in Hawaiian waters proved as ineffective as they did on the west coast. Another reason for their remaining was to find out just how much damage had been done to the American Navy in Pearl Harbor. Fliers returning to the carriers on 7 December had reported as best they could on what they had seen and photographed through flame and smoke, but the Japanese wanted a better picture. To get one, a plane launched from submarine I-7 flew over Pearl Harbor at dawn on 18 December. The next day a Japanese Navy communique announced that 8 battleships, 4 cruisers, and 2 destroyers had been sunk or heavily damaged, and lesser damage had been done to another battleship and 4 more cruisers. The communique also claimed 450 planes destroyed on the ground and 14 shot down—a claim more closely related to enemy prewar overestimates of Hawaiian air strength than to the damage actually done; bad as it was. Apparently neither the 18 December flight nor a similar one during the night of 6-7 January was detected.

Before December was over Japanese submarines had brought war home to the outer islands, though in almost innocuous fashion. Just before dusk on 15 December a submarine lobbed about ten shells into the harbor area of Kahului on Maui, and three that hit a pineapple cannery caused about $700 worth of damage. During the night of 30-31 December, submarines engaged in similar and nearly simultaneous shellings of Hilo on Hawaii, Nawiliwili on Kauai, and again on Kahului. At the last-named point Army coast artillery guns returned the fire. Damage at all three points was slight, and no one was hurt. The principal result of these shellings was to stir up the war consciousness of all the Hawaiian Islands.

The Question of Japanese Evacuation

Simultaneously with planning for a mass evacuation of Japanese residents from the west coast of the United States, Army authorities in Hawaii and Washington proposed a similar mass evacuation from Hawaii, as a

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29 See ch. IV above.
31 The latter flight is recorded in List of Sub-Carried Plane Strikes, prepared by the Japanese Navy, in Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 13, pp. 650-51.
32 Rads, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 16 and 31 Dec 41, and 1 Jan 42, all in AG 381 (11-27-41) Gen; Japanese Monograph 108; Allen, Hawaii's War Years, p. 59.
measure of defense. In Hawaii a prewar allocation of responsibility for controlling enemy aliens in the event of war, the establishment of martial law, and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus gave the Army almost plenary authority over both citizens and aliens. There were, therefore, no legal barriers to prevent the Army from handling the large Japanese minority in the islands as it wished, but there were other factors—among them the Hawaiian climate of racial tolerance, the fact that most of the pressure for mass evacuation came from outside the Army, and the vital position of the Japanese in the civilian labor force—which operated as powerful checks on proposals to move a large part of the Japanese population from Oahu to another island or the mainland.33

In prewar preparations for dealing with the Japanese problem, the military services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had used two tactics in Hawaii. As in the continental United States, they had compiled lists of individual aliens who they assumed might be disloyal in wartime. They had also launched a campaign in the summer of 1941 to assure the Japanese population that if it remained loyal to the United States in a war with Japan it would be accorded fair treatment. On 21 December General Emmons publicly renewed this pledge—after careful investigation had disclosed that there had been no sabotage and (with one exception) no other hostile act committed by either alien or citizen Japanese either during or after the Pearl Harbor Attack.34

When General Emmons made this pledge he of course did not know that two days before it had been decided at a Cabinet meeting in Washington that all Japanese aliens in the Hawaiian Islands were to be interned by the Army on other islands than Oahu.35 Thereafter the most ardent official advocate of restrictive action of this sort was Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Specifically at his request, the War Department on 10 January 1942 asked the Hawaiian commander whether it would be practicable to move the Japanese population from Oahu to some other island. General Emmons


34 Telg, G-2 GHQ to CG WDC, 19 Dec 41, WDC-CAD 01431; Honolulu Advertiser, Dec 22, 1941, pp. 1, 6; Lind, Hawaii's Japanese, pp. 70-71; Allen, Hawaii's War Years, pp. 83-84. The exception was the Niihau incident, mentioned in Chapter VII above.

35 Stimson Diary, entries of 19 and 20 Dec 41.
answered that such a move would be highly dangerous and impractical. It would require a large amount of additional construction and building materials at a time when construction and shipping facilities were already taxed to their utmost; it would require many additional troops to guard the island at a time when the Hawaiian garrison had less than half the troops needed for missions already assigned; and it would gravely disrupt the economy of Oahu which, General Emmons estimated, had a Japanese population of 118,000 (20,000 aliens and 98,000 citizens) that provided the bulk of the island's skilled labor. Although General Emmons expressed little faith in the loyalty of the majority of the Japanese population in the event of an invasion, he believed the Japanese indispensable unless they could be replaced by an equivalent labor force from the mainland. The general strongly recommended that, if the War Department decided that any or all of the Japanese had to be evacuated, they be moved to the continental United States.36

The report of the Roberts Commission and the mounting west coast agitation against the Japanese led to another Cabinet discussion on 30 January about the "dangerous" Hawaiian Japanese and about the many Army troops of Japanese descent still in service in Hawaii. After the meeting Secretary Stimson told General Marshall of his concern over the situation, and the Chief of Staff instructed the War Plans Division to look into the matter and make recommendations.37 When General Emmons was again asked for his views, he recommended as "desirable" the evacuation to the mainland of as many Japanese aliens and citizens as possible at the earliest practicable date but stated that he did not want to evacuate more than a few hundred internees until after some 20,000 Caucasian women and children had been transported to the mainland. He also assured the War Department that "if an assault were made on Oahu before transfer of sufficient number of Nipponese, we have ready plans to immobilize the Japanese." 38 In response to further questioning, the Hawaiian commander stated that, while all Japanese against whom there were specific grounds for suspicion were already in custody, in order to make certain that no Japanese of potential disloyalty remained in Hawaii it would probably be necessary to evacuate 100,000 of

36 Rad, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 10 Jan 42; Rad, Gen Emmons to TAG, 11 Jan 42. Both in AG 014.311 (1-13-41), sec. 11.
37 Stimson Diary, entry of 30 Jan 42; Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 Feb 42, and accompanying Memos of 30 and 31 Jan, AG 014.311 (1-13-41), sec. 11.
38 Rad, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 2 Feb 42, Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 4 Feb 42. Both in WPD 4259-5.
them. On the same day that he made this estimate, General Emmons was somewhat startled to receive a War Department order directing him to suspend all Japanese civilians employed by the Army. He again pointed out that the bulk of skilled labor on Oahu was of Japanese descent and could not possibly be replaced by civilians or soldiers already there. "The Japanese question," he added, was both "delicate and dangerous" and it "should be handled by those in direct contact with the situation." The War Department promptly canceled its order, but proceeded with its evacuation planning.

On 14 February the War Plans Division prepared a recommendation that the Hawaiian commander "be authorized to evacuate all enemy aliens and all citizens of Japanese extraction selected by him with their families, subject to the availability of shipping and facilities for their internment or surveillance on the mainland," and subject to the prior evacuation of 20,000 "women and children other than Japanese" as General Emmons had requested. While this recommendation was still being circulated among Army staff agencies for comment, the Navy took the Hawaiian Japanese question before both the newly constituted Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Roosevelt. The President responded to Secretary Knox as follows:

Like you, I have long felt that most of the Japanese should be removed from Oahu to one of the other Islands. This involves much planning, much temporary construction and careful supervision of them when they get to the new location.

I do not worry about the constitutional question—first, because of my recent order [Executive Order 9066] and, second, because Hawaii is under martial law. The whole matter is one of immediate and present war emergency.

I think you and Stimson can agree and then go ahead and do it as a military project.

The War Plans Division, hurriedly revising its study to take into account the President's declared position, held with General Emmons that a concentration of the Oahu Japanese on one of the outlying islands was wholly impracticable and concluded by reiterating the recommendation it had made in preliminary form a fortnight earlier. Both General Marshall and Secretary Stimson approved the War Plans proposal, which contemplated the eventual transfer of about 100,000 Japanese aliens and citizens from Hawaii to the mainland for internment or resettlement, and Secretary Stimson carried a

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39 Rad, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 8 Feb 42; Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 9 Feb 42. Both in WPD 4250-5.
40 Rad, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 9 Feb 42; Rad, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 12 Feb 42; Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 10 Feb 42. All in WPD 4072-9.
41 Memo, WPD for CoS, 14 Feb 42, WPD 4250-5.
42 Memo, President Roosevelt for SN, 26 Feb 42, OPD 570.05 Hawaii (3-4-42).
brief of the Army’s plan to a Cabinet meeting on 27 February. Mr. Stimson recorded the Cabinet discussions as follows:

Removal of Japs from Oahu. Knox brought this up and urged vigorously the remedy of the situation out there. I told them that the Army concurred in this but that for the reasons given in Marshall’s memorandum [that is, the latest War Plans recommendation] it would probably be necessary to send them to the United States. The President was staggered by this and was rather plainly in favor of placing them on the Island of Malikou [Molokai] in a big cantonment guarded by the Army. This was the plan urged by Knox. I pointed out the difficulties of this so far as I could. The matter was left unsettled.

After considering the conflicting views of the Army on the one hand and of President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox on the other, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the concentration of the Hawaiian Japanese on an island such as Molokai was impracticable, and they unanimously recommended a large-scale evacuation of Japanese aliens and citizens to the mainland, to begin with “the most dangerous group” of 20,000 persons as soon as possible. As presented by Admiral Stark to the President, the recommendation read: “That such Japanese (either U.S. citizens or aliens) as are considered by appropriate authority in the Hawaiian Islands to constitute a source of danger be transported to the U.S. mainland and placed under guard in concentration camps.” The President approved this recommendation on 13 March 1942, “on the basis of an explanation made to him which pointed out that evacuation would necessarily be a slow process and that what was intended, first, was to get rid of about 20,000 potentially dangerous Japanese.”

The principal obstacle to the execution of this recommendation was the growing disinclination of Army officials to carry it out. On 27 March, after the Hawaiian commander had been formally notified about the evacuation plan that the President had approved and after a visit of Assistant Secretary of War McCloy to Hawaii, General Emmons made a “present estimate” of 1,550 as the number of dangerous Japanese aliens and citizens that should be evacuated and interned on the mainland, although he added that future circumstances might make it “advisable to raise this estimate to much larger figures.” During his trip Mr. McCloy had learned that Army and Navy offi-

43 Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 Feb 42, annotations thereon, and accompanying notes, WPD 4250-5.
44 SW Notes after Cabinet Mtg, 27 Feb 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs.
45 Notes, JCS Mtg, 9 Mar 42, and Addendum, 11 Mar 42, to JCS 11, 12 Feb 42, sub: Hawaiian Def Forces, ABC 381 Hawaii (2-12-42).
46 Ltr, CNO to President Roosevelt, 11 Mar 42 (photostat copy, with pen notations indicating President Roosevelt’s approval.), PMG 383.01 Hawaii.
47 Memo, Gen Eisenhower, OPD, for CofS, 27 Mar 42, OPD Exec 8, bk. 4.
48 Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to CG SOS, 27 Mar 42, PMG 383.01 Hawaii.
cials in Hawaii were opposed to any large-scale evacuation to the mainland or
to one of the outlying islands. The Army and Navy preferred, he reported, "to
treat the Japanese in Hawaii as citizens of an occupied foreign country." 49
The Assistant Secretary agreed that the outlying island scheme was completely
impracticable. He believed a mass evacuation to the mainland almost as im-
practicable, because of the lack of shipping, the necessity of replacing the
Japanese labor force, the difficulty of providing enough suitable facilities for
relocating the Japanese on the mainland, and "the political repercussions on
the West Coast and in the United States generally to the introduction of
150,000 more Japanese." Dispatches in Honolulu newspapers published on 27
and 28 March quoted Mr. McCloy as stating that a mass evacuation of the
Japanese from Hawaii was impractical and was not contemplated. By the
beginning of April 1942, both Mr. McCloy and the Army's Operations Divi-
sion appear to have assumed that the evacuation would be confined to the
1,550 "dangerous" Japanese specified in General Emmons' latest recom-
men
dation.50

This might very well have been the answer to the question of Hawaiian
evacuation if it had not been for the continued concern of the Secretary of the
Navy and the President for the security of Oahu. On 20 April Mr. Knox re-
newed his plea for "taking all of the Japs out of Oahu and putting them in
a concentration camp on some other island"; and the President himself con-
tinued to favor the same solution.51 In a conference of the War and Navy
Secretaries and their military advisers on 28 April, all present—except Mr.
Knox—agreed that it was impracticable to move the Oahu Japanese to an-
other island, and that instead General Emmons should be authorized to
evacuate ten or fifteen thousand adult male Japanese to the mainland. This
idea had been suggested much earlier by Admiral Bloch, the commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District, who attended the meeting, and who was as
strongly opposed as General Emmons to the outlying island proposal.52 Presi-
dent Roosevelt, nevertheless, continued during May to favor a general
Japanese evacuation from Oahu to one of the smaller Hawaiian islands and
in consequence Mr. McCloy advised General Emmons that he had better work

49 Notes, War Council Mtg, 23 Mar 42, SW Conf, binder 2.
50 Memo, Mr. McCloy for Gen Eisenhower, 28 Mar 42; Memo, OPD for ASW, 3 Apr 42.
Both in WPD 4250-5. Honolulu Advertiser, Mar. 28, 1942, p. 3; Lind, Hawaii's Japanese,
51 Memo, SN for President Roosevelt, 20 Apr 42; Memo, President Roosevelt for SN, 23
Apr 42. Both in ASW 014, 311 Hawaii. SW Notes after Cabinet Mtg, 24 Apr 42, WDCSA 334
Mtgs and Conf.
52 Two OPD Memos for Rcd, 28 Apr and 27 Jun 42, OPD 370.05 Hawaii (3-4-42); Memo,
SN for SW, 3 Mar 42, WPD 4250-5.
out some alternative evacuation plan, perhaps similar to that proposed by Admiral Bloch, in order to satisfy the President and Mr. Knox.53

Before the Hawaiian commander came up with a new general evacuation plan, he carried out one type of evacuation that he had proposed much earlier. For more than a year the task of guarding the islands had been shared by the 298th and 299th Infantry Regiments, Hawaiian National Guard units that had been called into federal service in 1940. By late 1941 many of their enlisted men and some of their officers were of Japanese ancestry. When sufficient replacements from the mainland finally arrived in May, the Hawaiian Department withdrew the Japanese troops from the 298th and 299th Regiments, organized them into a provisional battalion, and on 5 June shipped them to the mainland. This group of 29 officers and 1,277 enlisted men thereafter became the 100th Infantry Battalion, which eventually landed on the Salerno beachhead in Italy on 22 September 1943.54

As for Japanese civilians, General Emmons on 20 June proposed a voluntary movement to the mainland of the families of internees and of individuals of low income who were more of a drain than a benefit to the Hawaiian economy and war effort. The War Department thereupon arranged with the War Relocation Authority to provide relocation facilities for 15,000 Hawaiian Japanese. The Hawaiian Department, which by 1 July considered the position and conduct of the bulk of the Japanese population "highly satisfactory," wanted to evacuate "as soon as practicable" only 5,000, not 15,000; but the figure of 15,000 was used in a new Joint Chiefs of Staff and Presidential directive of 17 July.55

In view of the previously approved policy of evacuating military dependents and other non-Japanese civilians first, General Emmons was not able to present a program for Japanese evacuation in accordance with his new directive until early October. His plan then was substantially the one he had proposed in June except that evacuation would be compulsory rather than voluntary; it proposed to remove initially about 3,000 people who would

53 SW notes for Cabinet Mtg, 1 May 42, WDCSA 354 Mtgs and Conf; Ltr, ASW to Gen Emmons, 18 May 42, ASW 014.311 Hawaii.
54 Memo, G-1 for TAG, 16 Dec 41, OCS 16418-97; Memo, OPD for COMINCH, 29 May 42, OPD 370.5 Hawaii/11; Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to WD, 29 May 42; OPD Memo for Rad, 21 Jun 42. Last two in OPD 320.2 Hawaii/64, 94. OPD Routing Form, 26 Jun 42, OPD 370.5 Hawaii/13. For details of the military service and gallant combat record of these and other Hawaiian troops of Japanese ancestry, see Thomas D. Murphy, *Ambassadors in Arms* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1954); Allen, *Hawaii's War Years*, chs. 16 and 17; and Rademaker, *These are Americans*, ch. 5.
55 Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to WD, 20 Jun 42; Rad, WD to CG Hawaiian Dept, 23 Jun 42, and related exchanges through 7 Oct 42. All in OPD 370.05 Hawaii (3-4-42). JCS 71, 24 Jul 42 (as approved by President Roosevelt on 17 July), ABC 381 Hawaii (2-12-42).
otherwise remain a drain on Hawaii's war resources, rather than "dangerous" Japanese as contemplated in the approved policy. Although the War Department continued its planning and arranging for an eventual reception of 15,000 Japanese, Army officials in Washington realized that a movement of that size was now unlikely. Secretary Knox and the President continued to be dissatisfied with the Army's slow progress toward evacuation, but the War Department decided that it ought to adhere in practice to the latest plan of General Emmons.

56 Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to WD, 2 Oct 42, AG 370.05 (11-6-41), sec. 2; various papers, dated 7-12 Oct 42, OPD 370.05 Hawaii (3-4-42); Ltr, Gen Emmons to SW, 2 Nov 42, ASW 014.311.
57 Ltr, SN to President Roosevelt, 17 Oct 42; Memo, President Roosevelt for SW and CofS, 2 Nov 42. Both in WD CSA 42-43 Hawaii.
In accordance with this plan about 1,000 Hawaiian Japanese—most of them citizens—were moved to the mainland between November 1942 and March 1943. By the latter month everyone had agreed that this movement should cease, and on 2 April 1943 the War Department instructed General Emmons to suspend evacuation to the mainland until and unless the number of his internees exceeded the capacity of the Hawaiian Department's own facilities for internment, which never happened. Before the evacuation ended a total of 1,875 Hawaiian residents of Japanese ancestry had been removed to internment and relocation camps in the continental United States. When it ended an Army spokesman informed the Honolulu press: "The shipping situation and the labor shortage make it a matter of military necessity to keep most of the people of Japanese blood on the island."

Reinforcement

The initial military reinforcement of Hawaii following the Pearl Harbor attack was guided by a lengthy list submitted by General Short on 8 December 1941, of the troops and equipment most urgently needed for the defense of Oahu and by several supplementary lists sent by him during the next few days. By 12 December the War Department had arranged to ship from San Francisco some 7,000 men, more than 100 crated pursuit ships, 3,000,000 rounds of the scarce caliber .50 ammunition, more than 8,000 aircraft bombs of assorted sizes, and a variety of other munitions. On the evening of 13 December the Army had 2 fast transports loaded and ready to go, but the Navy refused to let them leave without escort. They finally sailed with 3 slower ships on the 16th, and reached Honolulu five days later—but only a fortnight after the Pearl Harbor attack. A second and larger convoy of 11 ships departed from San Francisco on 27 December and arrived in Hawaiian waters on 7 and 8 January 1942. Together these convoys brought about 15,000 more troops to Oahu, and the unit reinforcements included two regiments of infantry, one regiment each of field artillery and coast artillery, and light tank, signal, and railway artillery battalions. With their arrival the strength of the Hawaiian Department was increased to about 58,500 officers and enlisted men, and it now had most of the heavy bombardment and pursuit strength allotted a month earlier. Despite a continued serious shortage of

58 Rad, ASW to CG Hawaiian Dept, 2 Apr 43; Rad, ASW to CG Hawaiian Dept, 15 Apr 43; Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to ASW, 8 Apr 43. All in ASW 014.311 Hawaii.
60 Quoted in Lind, Hawaii's Japanese, p. 79.
antiaircraft weapons, the second week of January found Oahu generally well secured against invasion.\footnote{The Army records relating to this initial movement of reinforcements to Hawaii are voluminous; see, among other files, AG 381 (11-27-41), WPD 3444-14, WPD 4622-37, and 43; and OPD Exec 4, item 4. See also Leighton and Coakley, \textit{Global Logistics and Strategy}, 1940-43, pp. 146-49.}

Two arguments won the approval of the War Department during December of a much larger reinforcement of Hawaii. The Navy contended that the sure defense of the Hawaiian area depended primarily on Army air power and that the security and effectiveness of that air power required its dispersion among the major islands of the Hawaiian group. Secondly, while the immediate reinforcement of December 1941 might ensure against a direct attempt by the enemy to invade Oahu, the Japanese had the naval strength to cover an invasion of one or more of the almost undefended outer islands. From bases on these islands the enemy could attack and possibly starve out Oahu. These arguments led to an inquiry to General Short about his plans for garrisoning the other islands of the Hawaiian group. As of mid-December, all he planned to do was to distribute another National Guard infantry regiment among them and add to their defenses a few more second-class weapons (the best being kept for Oahu).\footnote{Notes on Min, of JB Mtg, 13 Dec 41, in OCMH files; Rad, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 13 Dec 41, copy in USAFMIDPAC Hist, Bulky File.}

When General Emmons assumed command he asked for nearly 50,000 additional troops, including two infantry square divisions, to garrison the outer islands. He also wanted fillers to bring Oahu’s units up to war strength as soon as possible—the combined strength of the 24th and 25th Divisions then being no more than 15,000 men. And he wanted to build up the Hawaiian Air Force to a strength of 200 heavy bombardment planes and 325 pursuit ships. On 23 December General Marshall orally approved the immediate dispatch of one square division, two more antiaircraft regiments, and 10,000 additional service troops to Hawaii, and by the end of the month the War Department had established an eventual strength of 100,000 ground and 16,000 air troops for the Hawaiian Department, exclusive of its distant appendages.\footnote{Memo, WPD for G-3 and G-4, 24 Dec 41, WPD 3444-20; Memo for Rcd, WPD, (about 3 Jan 42), WPD 3444-16.} Other more critical needs in the Pacific delayed the movement of the bulk of the approved troop reinforcements, and Army strength in Hawaii actually declined during early 1942. But with the arrival of the 27th Infantry Division in March and April and its deployment with supporting forces among the outer islands, the invasion threat to them really ended, and it ended before the enemy again approached the Hawaiian area in force.
Two factors inspired a more formal review and assessment of Hawaiian defense needs by the Washington high command during February and March. One was the reiterated request of General Emmons, strongly backed by Admiral Nimitz, for a much higher heavy bomber strength than Washington had allotted. The Navy wanted as many Army heavy bombers as possible stationed in the Hawaiian Islands in order to free the fleet for limited offensive action to the southwestward, and it also wanted to be able to draw on a reservoir of Army bombers to support its offensives. General Emmons wanted enough heavy bombers to maintain a striking force equipped to deal effectively with an enemy attack by six carriers, this force to be over and above the number of heavies needed for continued Army participation in long-range reconnaissance. The other factor was the open distrust of a large segment of the Hawaiian population of Japanese descent, which, as already related, had led to demands in Washington that the Army cleanse the Hawaiian Department of its soldiers of Japanese descent and take other actions to put the Japanese population under close control.64

These fresh demands led General Marshall to submit the question of the strength of Army forces to be established and maintained in Hawaii to the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. As this was being done General Emmons was further disturbed by the detachment in early February of twelve of his heavy bombers for duty in the southern Pacific—and thereafter until late in May his bomber command remained at no more than one-third its allotted strength in heavies.65 In Washington the Chief of Naval Operations supported General Marshall's contention that the forces already allocated to the Hawaiian Department would be strong enough, when delivered, to ensure retention of the main islands, prevent serious damage by a Japanese raid, and give freedom of action to the Pacific Fleet. As a seemingly necessary corollary to this assurance, the Joint Chiefs had simultaneously recommended to the President that the bulk of the Japanese population of the Hawaiian Islands be evacuated to the United States mainland.66 On 13 March the President approved these recommendations, although, as already indicated, the Army was rapidly losing interest in a mass evacuation of the Japanese. On the other hand, his approval of the planned strengths of Hawaiian ground and air forces constituted the

64 Memo, WPD for CofS, 6 Feb 42, Navy Memo re Hawaiian Def Force, 16 Feb 42, and other papers, in WPD 3444-25; Memo, Gen Marshall for Gen Gerow, 30 Jan 42, AG 014.311 (1-13-41).
65 Rads, TAG to CG Hawaiian Dept, 8 Feb 42, and CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 16 Feb 42, AG 381 (11-27-41), secs. 2-A, 2-B; Tab I, Memo, Col John L. McKee, OPD, for ACofS OPD, 26 May 42, sub: Visit to Hawaii and Central Pacific Theater Bases, OPD 333.1 Hawaii.
66 JCS 11 and Addendum, 11 Mar 42, and other papers in ABC 381 Hawaii (2-12-42).
strongest kind of backing for completing the Army reinforcement that had been projected.

The garrison of the Hawaiian Department as approved by the Joint Chiefs and the President was to consist of 74,000 ground troops on Oahu, 13,000 on Hawaii, and 12,800 distributed among five other islands. With small additions during March, the authorized strength of the department became at the beginning of April 106,000 ground and 16,000 air troops, including replacements for all soldiers of Japanese descent; and the department reached these strengths before the end of June 1942. The Army air units to be retained in the islands for local defense were to contain 96 heavy and 24 medium and light bombers and 225 pursuit planes, and the Navy was obliged to keep 67 patrol planes on hand for long-range and local reconnaissance. Because Army officials in Washington were wary of Navy claims on heavy bombers that might be present in Hawaii, it took the impetus of a new and grave Japanese threat to get the planned increment of them out to the islands; and their number was quickly reduced after the Japanese challenge had been met.67

After December 1941 the movement of Army reinforcements and supplies to Hawaii had a lower priority than shipments to Australia and the new island bases being developed along the way to it. Only the slower ships were used on the Hawaiian run to carry supplies for the Army and the local civilian population, and for several months a shortage of them led to a pile-up of supplies in San Francisco. In contrast, the Navy got its supplies to Hawaii during the first months of the war with little or no difficulty.68 The War Department had arranged for requisitions for military and civilian supplies submitted by the Hawaiian Department to be filled by the Army's San Francisco Port of Embarkation, in accordance with priorities established by General Emmons. By April this system was working smoothly, and the backlog of Army supplies awaiting shipment in San Francisco had been substantially reduced. After March General Emmons was more concerned about the continued shortage of civilian labor in Hawaii, including dock workers, than about the shipping shortage. In any event his early exasperation over shipping difficulties had already dissolved when the War Production Board in Washington circulated a colorful but not very well informed report on the situation. For the record, in a note to Admiral Nimitz, General Emmons cate-

67 Rad, CofS to CG Hawaiian Dept, 1 Apr 42, OPD 452.1 Hawaii/26; OPD Weekly Status Map, Mar–June 42, OPD Exec file.
68 Navy Memo for CofS CINCPAC, 18 Apr 42, copy in USAFIMDPAC History, Bulky File, reviews both Army and Navy shipping and supply systems and problems with clarity.
gorically denied most of the charges contained in this report, and he assured both the admiral and the War Department that he was well satisfied with the way his supply problems were being solved.  

When Assistant Secretary of War McCloy visited Oahu in mid-March he found its Army defenses generally strong and well laid out. He was particularly impressed by the intensive improvement of Army airfields since the Pearl Harbor attack. But he noted that the Army clearly lacked enough bombers to constitute an effective striking force against enemy carriers and that the long-range reconnaissance patrol was far from being air tight. In Mr. McCloy's judgment the Pearl Harbor–Honolulu area still presented a "terribly congested" and "most vulnerable" target.

The Japanese made a very ineffectual swipe at this target during the early morning of 4 March 1942. Two Japanese flying boats starting from Jaluit Island in the Marshalls had refueled in a rendezvous with three submarines at French Frigate Shoals and then flown on to Oahu, about 500 miles to the southeast. Army radar spotted them 90 miles off Kauai; and the Interceptor Command sent up four pursuit planes to find them, but without success because of their high altitude and a heavy overcast. One Japanese plane merely skirted the west coast of Oahu. The other followed the north coast to Kaneohe, then turned south and at 2:15 a.m. dropped four 500-pound bombs which landed in woods on the slopes of Mount Tantalus, about 2 miles from downtown Honolulu. They caused no casualties, and no damage other than a few broken window panes. Because of the high altitude of the planes and the overcast, antiaircraft guns did not fire, and no general air raid alarm was sounded. Both planes returned to their starting point safely; but as a "night reconnaissance" of Pearl Harbor the flight was a failure, and a second "K Operation," as the Japanese called the feat, scheduled for 7 March, was canceled. Hawaiian authorities deduced that the Japanese planes must have staged through French Frigate Shoals, and the Navy thereupon took steps to deny them to enemy submarines.


Notes, War Council Mtg, 23 Mar 42, in SW Conf, Binder 2; Memo, ASW McCloy for SW, 1 Apr 42, WDCSA 42–43 Hawaii.

Memo and Incls, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 34 Mar 42, AG 381 (3–14–42); Honolulu *Advertiser*, March 4 and 5, 1942; Japanese Monograph 102, p. 18; AAF Monograph 41, Operational Hist of the Seventh Air Force, p. 12; Morison, *Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions*, p. 69.
A tight blackout had helped Army defenders pass the test of an isolated enemy air operation, but how well they were now prepared to defend Oahu against a large-scale carrier-based attack remained an unanswered question. The elements of the interceptor system were functioning day and night, and as efficiently as they could with the equipment at hand. American planes in Hawaii still lacked equipment for their ready identification as friendly, and the bulk of the pursuit planes, though modern P-40's, still could probably not have climbed rapidly enough after radar warning to fend off a high-level bombing attack. The antiaircraft situation was much better than at the time of Pearl Harbor, but antiaircraft guns could only make a heavy air raid more costly to the enemy, not stop it. The dispersal, bunkering, and camouflaging of Army aircraft made them relatively immune to heavy loss, but the naval base and Honolulu could not be hidden. As earlier, the Army was best prepared to fight off an invasion of Oahu. Combat troops were dug in in battle positions all over the island, and a Washington inspection at the end of April found the morale of the troops "excellent," and that "all understood that this is a real war."  

Midway

A month later real war again approached the Hawaiian Islands in the shape of a formidable Japanese fleet bent on capturing Midway and drawing out the Pacific Fleet for a decisive engagement. The Japanese were executing the second step of the "second phase" operations projected in their Combined Fleet's operational order of 5 November 1941—the order that had set in motion the Pearl Harbor attack and the conquest of the Philippines, southeast Asia, and Indonesia. Winning their first round of victories in only half the calculated time, the Japanese in mid-January had begun planning what to do next. The first proposal, advanced by the chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, was for an invasion of the main Hawaiian Islands, but by early February caution had modified it into a plan for occupying strategic points in the outer Aleutians, Midway Island, and points on the Hawaii-Australia line of communication. The Midway operation in particular was expected to force a fleet engagement, and, if victorious, the Japanese would then have undisputed control of the central and western Pacific.  

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72 Par 9, Incl to Memo, CG SOS for ACoS OPD, 8 May 42, OPD 333.1 Hawaiian Dept/1.  
73 This paragraph and the two following are based on: Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, ch. VI; Japanese Monographs 93, Midway Operations, May–June 1942; 45, History of Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section (1941–1945); 46, Aleutians Operations Record, June 1942–July 1943; 88, Aleutian Naval Operations, Mar 1942–Feb 1943; 110; Far East History, II, pp. 124-25; Fuchida and Okumiya, Midway, chs. I–VII.
By 16 April 1942 the Japanese high command had agreed that the Midway-Aleutian occupations should take place early in June and that the main body of the Combined Fleet would cover the Midway operation and be in a position for the anticipated fleet action. The spearhead of the Japanese Fleet was to be a striking force built around four fast carriers. Continuing arguments for delay in order to make more adequate preparations for the new offensive were silenced by the Halsey-Doolittle air raid on Japan on 18 April. A Combined Fleet order of 5 May set the new offensive in motion, and the striking force began to move out of its home waters on 26 May. The invasion of Midway was to take place on 7 June.74

The Japanese reckoned that their fleet could reach the vicinity of Midway without being discovered, that they could capture Midway before the Pacific Fleet would swing into action, and that they would then have to deal with only two (though possibly three) American carriers. One of the Pacific Fleet’s four carriers was tied up in San Diego until 1 June, but the Navy managed to rush the other three from the southern Pacific to Pearl Harbor and to repair the wounds that one of them had sustained in the Battle of the Coral Sea (7–8 May) in time for it to join in the coming battle. Undetected by the Japanese, the American carriers and their escorts left Pearl Harbor on 30 and 31 May to take up a waiting position on the flank of the approaching Japanese armada. To check on American fleet positions and movements, the enemy had sent out submarines and made preparations to reconnoiter Pearl Harbor by air. For the latter purpose the Japanese tried to execute a new "K Operation" similar to the one carried out three months earlier. It was frustrated when Japanese submarines found French Frigate Shoals occupied and actively patrolled by the United States Navy. Reconnaissance of mid-Pacific waters by submarine also failed, so that as the Japanese Fleet approached Midway it had no knowledge of where the units of the Pacific Fleet were.

The Americans, on the other hand, knew well in advance almost precisely what the Japanese were up to, thanks to their prewar breaking of the communications code used by the Japanese Navy. This knowledge and the fortunes of battle tipped the scales in the Battle of Midway, the most decisive engagement of the Pacific war.

The United States had expected that Japan would retaliate as soon as it could after the air raid on Japan, and at first the Army was most apprehensive

74 6 June, Hawaiian dating. Hereafter, west longitude dating will be used in this section.
of a carrier-based air attack on the continental west coast.\textsuperscript{75} This apprehension lingered even after intercepts clearly indicated Midway and the Aleutians as the Japanese targets. The intercepts had become sufficiently meaningful by 14 May to warrant the declaration of a state of fleet-opposed invasion for the Hawaiian area by General Marshall and Admiral King, in accordance with the plan they had agreed upon the preceding month.\textsuperscript{76} By 16 May the commanders in Hawaii knew that Midway and the Aleutians were the probable Japanese objectives, and by 21 May they had deduced that the attack on Midway would begin on or about 3 June.\textsuperscript{77}

Beginning on 18 May General Emmons kept the Army air command in Hawaii on the alert for a possible carrier attack on Oahu. Some of the B-17's on reconnaissance duty were replaced by old B-18 mediums, and a striking force of heavy bombers was kept loaded with 500- and 600-pound bombs and ready to fly. By 30 May flights from the mainland had increased heavy bomber strength from 30 to 56 planes, and 12 of them took off that day to operate from Midway. Other Army planes followed, to make a force of 17 B-17's and 4 B-26 medium bombers participating in the Midway battle. By 10 June 60 B-17 planes had reached Oahu from the West Coast, and during and after the battle the Army continued to maintain a striking force of heavy and medium bombers. But the destruction of the four enemy carriers on 4 and 5 June not only decided the issue at sea but ended the threat of another Pearl Harbor attack, at least for the time being. The best of the heavy bombers moved on in July to the South Pacific for more active operations.\textsuperscript{78}

After the Japanese lost their carriers they abandoned the invasion of Midway and, without air cover, they also avoided any further fleet engagement and turned homeward. The only fruit of their great offensive was the occupation of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians.\textsuperscript{79} Midway redressed the disparity of naval strength that Japan had temporarily enjoyed and made impracticable any more major offensives beyond the original perimeter of enemy conquest.

\textsuperscript{75} Memo, G-2 for OPD, 20 Apr 42, and other papers, in OPD 381 Japan/6; Stimson Diary, entry of 21 Apr 42. See above, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{76} Rad, COMINCH and CofS to CINCPAC (Info to CG Hawaiian Dept), 14 May 41, WDCSA 42-43 Hawaii. See above, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{77} Memo, G-2 for CofS, 17 May 42, OPD 381 WDC/42; Rad, COMINCH to CINCPAC, 21 May 42, OPD Exec 8, bk. 5.
\textsuperscript{79} See ch. X below.
With Midway, the threat that Japan might try to invade Oahu or one of the other main Hawaiian Islands was dissipated, and, although Japan retained a capability of making a carrier strike, the likelihood of one became increasingly remote. The strength of the Hawaiian Department in officers and men continued to grow after June 1942, but more and more, Hawaii became an advance training base and staging area for Army ground and air units that would do battle in the farther reaches of the Pacific. The Pacific focus of defense now shifted to the north.
CHAPTER IX

The Garrisoning of Alaska,
1939-41

The Japanese occupation of the Aleutian Islands of Kiska and Attu in June 1942 made Alaska the one theater or area in the Western Hemisphere in which Army ground and air forces met with a sizable battle test during World War II. Yet in prewar years the likelihood of military action in or near Alaska had appeared so remote that the Army had taken little more than an academic interest in America’s huge northern continental territory and its island appendages extending far out into the Pacific. In fact, the only Army tactical force in Alaska in September 1939, when the German attack on Poland precipitated a new world war, was a garrison of 400 men—two rifle companies—at Chilkoot Barracks near Skagway, a relic of the Gold Rush days. Neither the size nor the location of this token force made it particularly useful for carrying out the Army’s responsibility for defending the Alaskan mainland and the Aleutians as far westward as Unalaska Island.¹

The Navy had likewise ignored Alaska, to all intents and purposes. In 1939 it maintained a small seaplane base at Sitka and direction finder stations at Soapstone Point (Cross Sound) and at Cape Hinchinbrook (Prince William Sound). The only military establishments in the Aleutians were a naval radio station and a small Coast Guard base at Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island. The Navy had based its Alaska policy on the belief that Alaskan waters were secure as long as the Japanese abided by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, which restricted the size of Japan’s fleet and prohibited the fortification of its islands in the North Pacific. Despite the serious concern caused by Japan’s announced withdrawal from the treaty in 1934 and its subsequent plunge into a desperate race for Pacific naval supremacy, this policy remained unchanged until the Hepburn Board, appointed by the Navy to investigate and to report on the need for additional naval bases in the Uni-

¹ Army interest in Alaska, from 1934 onward, can be followed most readily by reference to WPD 3512.
ted States and its outlying territories, recommended in December 1938 that Congress appropriate nineteen million dollars for the construction of air, submarine, and destroyer bases in Alaska and the Aleurian Islands. The board proposed that this sum be used to enlarge the seaplane base at Sitka and to establish seaplane and submarine bases at Kodiak, the large island east of the Alaskan Peninsula, and at Dutch Harbor. Civilian contractors began construction of the naval bases at Sitka and Kodiak in September 1939. In July 1940 the contract was enlarged to include the development of the projected naval air station and adjacent Army defense facilities at Dutch Harbor.²

**Initial Army Plans and Preparations**

In the meantime the revision of the ORANGE plan for a Japanese war in early 1938, coupled with the adoption of a new policy of hemisphere defense toward the end of the same year, had led to new Army defense plans for Alaska that took shape during 1939. Three new elements helped to stimulate a keener War Department interest in the area. In the first place the improvement of the airplane, particularly of the long-range bomber, gave new significance to Alaska's strategic position by making it more vulnerable to air attack from Asia and by increasing the danger of air strikes against the west coast if an enemy secured bases in Alaska. In the second place the growing strain in relations between the United States and Japan caused mounting concern for the protection of national interests in the northern Pacific. Lastly, the Navy's plans to build new air and submarine bases in Alaska increased the Army's task since the Army was responsible for the local protection of naval installations.

After the outbreak of war in Europe, General Staff planning for the defense of Alaska accelerated. By early 1940 the War Department had agreed on a long-range program having five major objectives: to augment the Alaska garrison; to establish a major base for Army operations near Anchorage; to develop a network of air bases and operating fields within Alaska; to garrison the airfields with combat forces; and to provide troops to protect the naval installations at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor.

The actual build-up of Army defenses in Alaska made slow progress until mid-1941. A variety of factors both in Washington and in Alaska itself was

responsible. The War Department, laboring to produce a balanced program
for the overseas garrisons, could not suddenly expand the defenses of Alaska.
Furthermore, in the delicate task of equitably adjusting pressing needs to
limited resources, Army planners found it hard to shake their long-held con-
viction that Alaska was not a critical area. Finally, the Alaskan environment
conspired to retard a rapid expansion of Army installations.

Geography posed tremendous barriers to military construction and opera-
tions in Alaska. Nearly one-fifth as large as the main land mass of the con-
tinental United States, Alaska is not a homogeneous geographical entity but
a series of separate natural regions, each having its own distinctive physical
characteristics. The major obstacles to be overcome were isolation and the
lack of a well-developed internal transportation system. Until November
1942, when the Alaska Highway was opened for traffic, the only direct con-
nection between the continental United States and Alaska was by sea or air.
To all intents and purposes Alaska was an island, not a peninsula. Almost
all food and supplies for the military garrisons as well as for the civilian
population had to be imported by sea, a situation not changed by the opening
of the highway. Not only was access to the territory restricted, but movement
within Alaska itself was also difficult, for the rivers and mountains are so
located as to offer few paths into the vast interior. In general, the larger topo-
graphic features correspond to those of the western continental United States.
Along the coast lies the Pacific mountain system, succeeded inland by a great
plateau, then a Rocky Mountain system, and finally, in the extreme north, a
great plains region sloping to the Arctic Ocean. The mountain barrier which
skirts the long southern shore line along the Pacific is bisected by only a few
passes utilized by the main railroad and highway systems. For hundreds of
miles, with the exception of these passes, there are no feasible routes inland
on the ground.

Defense requirements dramatically emphasized Alaska's remoteness and
the urgent need for better communications within the territory. In 1940 only
two railroads were in regular operation. One was the narrow-gauge White
Pass and Yukon Railroad, which ran from Skagway to Whitehorse in
Canada's Yukon Territory. The other was the government-owned Alaska
Railroad, operated by the Department of the Interior. It extended approxi-
mately 470 miles from Seward to Fairbanks, by way of Anchorage, and
reached out over short branch lines to the Matanuska Valley and the Eska
and Suntrana coal regions. It was the only all-year surface route from the

3 Although Alaska has now become one of the continental United States, this term is still
commonly used to denote the 48 contiguous states.
coast into central Alaska, and the principal means of transportation to the large Army bases that were to be established at Anchorage and Fairbanks. This line, which had been in operation since 1923, had undergone little improvement, and both the track and rolling stock were in poor condition when the defense development in Alaska began.

The southern end of the Alaska Railroad from Seward to Anchorage posed the most serious problem. This section ran through extremely mountainous country, and operation was made difficult by heavy snow and steep grades. Fifty miles north of Seward the railroad went through a tunnel and then ran over a wooden loop trestle which was highly susceptible to damage by sabotage or bombing. The vulnerability of the southern end of the road was a matter of great concern to the Army's Alaskan commander. In 1940 the War Plans Division welcomed and approved a proposal made by the Department of the Interior to provide a new southern terminal of the road. A year later work was begun on a 12-mile cut-off from Portage to the port of Whittier at the head of Passage Canal, which would eliminate military dependence on the treacherous mountain section south of Portage and shorten the rail distance to Anchorage and points north by fifty-two miles, but difficulties in construction prevented its opening until 1 June 1943.

Rivers, airways, and a few roads supplemented the very limited railroad facilities. The principal Alaskan road net was the Richardson Highway which ran from Valdez to Fairbanks, and the connecting Steeze Highway from Fairbanks to Circle. No east-west road system existed. Although river transportation was used to a limited extent in the central plain area, only the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers had scheduled carriers, and they are open to navigation only four or five months each year. A rapid growth of airways in Alaska during the 1930's had helped to solve its transportation problems. By 1940 plane service linked together many communities which formerly had been almost completely isolated, and in that year Pan American Airways inaugurated regular scheduled flights between Seattle and Ketchikan and Juneau. The success of commercial aviation presaged the important role military aviation would play in Alaska's defense. But air transportation alone could handle only a small fraction of the military supplies that would be needed.

The principal communication facility in Alaska before the war was the radio network of the Alaska Communication System operated by the Army Signal Corps. Established in 1900 to build and operate cable and telegraph

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4 Memo, WPD for G-4, 21 Mar 40, and subsequent papers, in WPD 3512-57; Bykofsky and Larson, Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, p. 54.
lines to and within Alaska, this system by 1934 had abandoned all its wire facilities and operated exclusively by radio. The only remaining wire communication within Alaska after 1934 was the telephone line along the Alaska Railroad. Military traffic accounted for only a very small fraction of the business handled by the Army’s radio network until 1940; and for this reason the War Department in the 1930’s had favored either selling the system or turning it over to the Department of the Interior. With the expansion of Alaskan defenses the Army quickly changed its mind; and, after the alert of July 1941 disclosed the inadequacies of existing Army communication facilities, the War Department approved a rehabilitation and expansion of the Alaska Communication System and the repair of the disused cable between Seattle and Seward in order to provide a secure means of military communication with the continental United States. At the same time the War Department decided to use the existing system instead of establishing a new and separate tactical command radio network, and to operate it henceforth in such a manner that it could be used exclusively for military needs if necessary.\(^5\)

Geographical factors were basic to the assumptions on which Army plans for Alaska were built, although Army planners sometimes forgot that the obstacles posed by geography and climate were as formidable to any would-be invader as they were to defenders. They did recognize that the Alaskan terrain precluded a major ground invasion. They assumed that the most likely forms of attack would be small-scale air or ground raids made by an enemy who would strike without warning. By 1940 they assumed it would be necessary to station troops in Alaska before the outbreak of hostilities. The key to Alaskan defense, according to a consensus of those responsible for its security, lay in denying to an enemy actual or potential bases from which air or naval operations could be conducted.\(^6\) The strategic problem was to work out a system that could cope with the transportation difficulties without unduly dispersing the forces. At the outset the planners formulated two possible solutions to the problem. One proposed that a strong mobile force be stationed in the Anchorage area. In the event of an attack, this force

\(^5\) Memo, Lt Col Guy W. Chipman for ACofS WPD, 23 Jan 35, and subsequent papers, in WPD 3512-8, 9, and 24; Memo, G-4 for CofS, 3 Sep 41, OCS 18263-54; Memo, G-3 for CofS, 9 Oct 41, OCS 18263-57. See also Terrett, The Emergency, chs. III and XI.

\(^6\) Inc to Ltr, CG Fourth Army to CofS, 22 Aug 39, WPD 3512-46; Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 May 40, WPD 4207; Memo, CG Fourth Army for WPD, 31 May 40, WPD 4207; JB 312, ser 650, 15 Aug 40; Ltr, Hq ADF to CG Ninth Corps Area, 3 Sep 40, AG 320.2 (9-3-40); Ltr, Brig Gen Simon B. Buckner, Jr., to CG Fourth Army, 9 Oct 40, WDC–ADC 381 Def of Alaska, Gen, vol. II.
would be moved as quickly as possible to the threatened area to repel the enemy. As the alternate solution, they proposed that the Army maintain virtually autonomous garrisons of air-ground teams at strategic positions along the southern coast and in the Aleutian Islands. These garrisons should be sufficiently strong to be able to act alone in defending the local area. The former plan was attractive in theory; the latter was possible in practice. It was adopted and guided the subsequent expansion of garrisons throughout the territory and into the Aleutian chain during the war.\(^7\)

A defense system made up of a series of isolated semiautonomous garrisons could be a practicable one only to the extent that military aviation was provided in the territory. For many years the Air Corps had urged the War Department to develop airfields and air power in Alaska, but it was not until the general reassessment of air needs for hemisphere defense in 1939 that the Army began to plan for the deployment of tactical planes to the territory. As of May 1939 the Army proposed to garrison Alaska with one composite group comprising 8 long-range bombers, 17 medium-range attack bombers, and 27 pursuit planes, together with suitable auxiliary aircraft.\(^8\)

In June the Army Air Board concluded that a main air base should be established in the Anchorage-Fairbanks area, and that operating airdromes should be built in the Anchorage-Kodiak, Juneau-Sitka, and Dutch Harbor regions.\(^9\)

In revised estimates of airplane needs after the outbreak of war in Europe, the Army proposed that Alaska be garrisoned eventually with 80 pursuit, 26 bombardment, and 4 amphibian planes.\(^10\)

During the 1939 planning it had been hoped at first that both tactical requirements for air defense and technical needs for experimental cold weather flying could be met in the same major air base. The choice for such a base site lay between Fairbanks and Anchorage, each location presenting both assets and liabilities.\(^11\) Initially, Fairbanks was the more favored site. Its tactical advantages included a central location on the Alaskan mainland and a network of railroad, highway, river, and air connections. The wide range of temperature at Fairbanks—90°F in summer to −60°F in winter—made it ideally suited for experimental cold weather flying. But the disadvantages of Fairbanks as a site for the principal air garrison were manifold. Most troops and supplies would have to be transported overland nearly

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\(^7\) Official Hist of the Alaskan Dept, ch. I, pp. 5–6.
\(^8\) Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, p. 125; Memo, WPD for Budget and Planning Br., WDGS, 6 May 39, WPD 3807–31.
\(^10\) Tab C to Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Dec 39, WPD 3807–41.
500 miles from Seward, the main port of entry. It was remote from the Navy's projected bases at Sitka and on Kodiak and Unalaska. The climatic conditions, while ideal for experimental flying, would make tactical air operations extremely difficult. The planners therefore reluctantly concluded that a single station combining both tactical and technical needs would not be feasible, and chose Anchorage as the site for the main tactical air base as well as for the principal ground garrison. It could be supplied much more readily, it was surrounded by extensive level ground for the encampment of troops or the construction of buildings, and it was strategically located to protect the vital southern Alaskan coast. A more equable climate than that of Fairbanks reduced the risks involved in air operations. By the latter part of 1939 all agencies responsible for Alaskan defense planning had agreed that both a major tactical air base and a cold weather experimental station were necessary, and that the former should be located near Anchorage and the latter near Fairbanks.12

In the 1939 planning it had also been agreed that, if the Army were to fulfill its air mission of assisting in the defense of the new military establishments to be developed along the southern Alaskan coast and of supporting the Navy in resisting hostile attempts to gain lodgment in Alaskan territory, the Army Air Corps must be able to conduct operations as far west as Kiska and as far south as Ketchikan. Accordingly, plans were made to build a series of staging fields north from Puget Sound and out to the Aleutians that would tie in with the new Anchorage base and with the Navy's fields (which the Army proposed to use also) at Sitka, Kodiak, and Unalaska. The Army proposed to build these staging fields at Metlakatla (near Ketchikan), Yakutat, and Cordova, and at Naknek, Port Heiden, and Sand Point on or near the Alaska Peninsula. The Army also planned to develop subsidiary operating and emergency fields in interior and western Alaska near Tanana Crossing, Bethel, and Nome.13 By 1939, also, the Civil Aeronautics Authority had begun to build additional airports and airway facilities in Alaska; and, at the request of the Army, these airports were planned to conform to military standards. By February 1940 the Army and the Civil Aeronautics Authority had effectively co-ordinated their construction programs.14

13 Memos, WPD for CofS, 25 Aug 39, WPD 3512-38; Ltr, Hq ADF to CG Ninth Corps Area, 3 Sep 40, AG 320.2 (9-3-40); Official Hist of Alaskan Dept, ch. XXI.
The Army took the first step toward implementing its long-range defense program for Alaska in August 1939 when construction began on the air base at Fairbanks, to be known as Ladd Field. Four months earlier President Roosevelt by Executive order had set aside land near Anchorage for a projected ground base. The Army had hoped construction of ground and air installations near Anchorage could begin in the spring of 1940, but initially the House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations eliminated the request for funds for the Anchorage development from the 1941 budget. Ultimately the entire amount asked for was appropriated, but it was German conquest of the Low Countries and France and the threatened invasion of England rather than Army pleas that moved Congress to prepare hastily a revised appropriations bill which included funds for the Anchorage project.

Without waiting for final legislative action, General Marshall approved a policy to govern the expansion of Alaskan defenses which provided for a permanent ground garrison of about 2,000 men and a temporary emergency garrison of about 3,100 men. The temporary garrison was to consist of one regiment of infantry, one composite battalion of field artillery, one regiment of antiaircraft artillery, and essential service elements (at peacetime strengths); and Anchorage was also to have a permanent air garrison of one composite group. General Marshall directed that the first increment of these forces—one battalion of infantry and one battalion of field artillery—be sent to Anchorage not later than 30 June 1940. He recommended that this force be followed as soon as possible by elements of the 28th Composite Group (Air Corps) and the remainder of the temporary ground garrison. Temporary construction of the mobilization type, designed to fit in with the permanent facilities to be built later, was to be completed as rapidly as possible.

Congress in the meantime tentatively approved the establishment of Fort Richardson at Anchorage as the principal Army headquarters, and construction of ground and air facilities began on 8 June 1940. The first increment of combat troops, 21 officers and 732 enlisted men under the command of Lt. Col. Earl Landreth, arrived at Anchorage on 27 June. On 19 September

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17 Ltr, CG Fourth Army to CofS, 28 Jun 40, OCS 14943–24.
1940 construction of the Metlakatla (subsequently known as Annette Island) airfield began, and a month later construction of Yakutat airfield was started.18

Until July 1940 the Army's Alaskan posts were directly under the Ninth Corps Area, commanded by General DeWitt. As a result of the extensive construction then planned, the projected expansion of both air and ground garrisons, and the development of naval facilities, General DeWitt, with the support of the War Plans Division, recommended that a special commander for troops in Alaska be appointed to supervise directly the expansion of Alaskan defenses. The War Department accepted his proposal, and on 9 July 1940, Col. Simon B. Buckner, Jr., was appointed commander of United States troops in Alaska.19 Two weeks later the new Army garrison was redesignated the Alaska Defense Force, and on 1 September 1940 its commander was promoted to brigadier general. Further evidence of the expansion of defense activities in Alaska during 1940 was the establishment by the Navy in mid-summer of the Alaskan Sector as a subordinate command within the Thirteenth Naval District.20 The Fourth Army, also commanded by General DeWitt, assumed the Ninth Corps Area's tactical responsibilities in October 1940. In February 1941 the War Department created the Alaska Defense Command. Like its predecessor, the Alaska Defense Command was a subordinate command of the Fourth Army, and it also came under the newly established Western Defense Command.21

In April 1941 the General Staff raised the question of whether it would be desirable to make Alaska a separate overseas department, because of the greatly increased size of the garrison, its distance from the continental United States, and the mission of the forces stationed there.22 Two sharply divergent views were expressed in response to this inquiry. This difference of opinion stemmed as much from disagreement over who was to command the air defense as it did from the intrinsic merits of establishing Alaska as an independent command. General DeWitt objected strongly to separating Alaska from the Western Defense Command. He argued that if Alaska were made a separate department it would make the Army defense of the Pacific coast including Alaska more difficult. He recommended that all

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19 Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Jun 40; Ltr, CG Fourth Army to Col Buckner, 9 Jul 40. Both in WPD 3512-62.
20 Telg, CNO to Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, 1 Aug 40, WPD 4156-4.
21 See ch. 11.
22 Memo, WPD for TAG, 16 Apr 41, WPD 4480.
air and ground units in the Alaska Defense Command and the Western Defense Command be integrated under him. To facilitate this integration, he proposed that an air force command with headquarters adjacent to the headquarters of the Western Defense Command and operating under his authority be established to control all air forces on the Pacific coast. Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, opposed General DeWitt and favored the creation of an Alaskan Department. He argued that it was as illogical to have Alaska under the Western Defense Command as it would be to have Hawaii under General DeWitt's authority. He recommended instead that the War Department divide the north Pacific triangle into three sections—the Pacific coast of the United States, Alaska, and Hawaii—and make each section a separate theater of operations. He thought that since it was impossible to integrate the ground defense plans for the three areas, each theater commander should have complete responsibility for the ground defense of his section. But, he argued, since it was not only possible but necessary to co-ordinate air plans for operations from the three areas, air defense of all three theaters should be placed under a single commander responsible to the Army Air Forces and independent of the theater commanders. In mid-August the War Plans Division and GHQ, both initially in favor of a separate Alaskan department, swung over to General DeWitt's point of view. Alaska was not to become a separate Army command until late 1943.

Making Ready To Defend the Navy's Bases

As the Navy launched its construction of air and submarine bases at Sitka, Kodiak Island, and Dutch Harbor, the Army embarked on preliminary planning for the defense of these bases. Since the problems involved were essentially interservice ones and not the province of the Army alone, the Joint Board referred the subject to the Joint Planning Committee in February 1940 and instructed it to study the problems of construction, financing, site selection, and garrisoning at the naval bases as a part of the whole Alaskan defense problem. While waiting for the Joint Planning Committee to act the Army grew increasingly concerned over the security of the naval bases, for without adequate protection from ground troops they would

23 Ltr, Gen DeWitt to TAG, 16 May 41, AG 320.2 (4-16-41).
24 Memo, CofAS for WPD, 4 Aug 41, AG 320.2 (4-16-41).
26 See ch. XI
become tempting prizes for an enemy.\textsuperscript{27} In May 1940 General DeWitt proposed that the force about to depart for Anchorage should be ready at all times to dispatch combat teams for the protection of Dutch Harbor and Kodiak in an emergency.\textsuperscript{28} This proposal, reflecting the lingering notion that a reserve force in the Anchorage area could be rushed to the defense of a threatened outlying base, found some support in the War Department; but difficulties of transportation and lack of shipping made it unworkable. After an inspection trip to Alaska in June, General DeWitt abandoned the idea of a mobile force, proposing instead that a garrison be sent to Kodiak as soon as housing was ready.\textsuperscript{29}

In August 1940 the Joint Planning Committee finally completed and submitted to the Joint Board a basic directive for the defense of naval bases in Alaska. The Joint Planners recognized the possibility of "surprise aggression against Alaska by either Japan or Russia," but assumed that major land

\textsuperscript{27} Memo, WPD for CofS, 20 Apr 40, WPD 3512-59.
\textsuperscript{28} 1st Ind, CG Fourth Army to WPD, 31 May 40, WPD 4297.
\textsuperscript{29} Ltr, CG Fourth Army to CofS, 28 Jun 40, OCS 14943-24.
operations in the Alaskan area were unlikely. They concluded that control of the important strategic locations of Anchorage, Fairbanks, Kodiak, Sitka, and Dutch Harbor would meet the principal requirements for the defense of Alaska as a whole. The Joint Board placed responsibility for the defense of the naval bases squarely on the Army, emphasizing that the "local defense of Kodiak, Sitka, and Unalaska is but an element of the defense of Alaska as a whole, which is a responsibility of the Army." It approved the establishment of Army garrisons at each of the naval bases, and proposed that these consist of an infantry battalion with artillery attachments at Kodiak and Dutch Harbor, and of an infantry company with similar artillery support at Sitka. The Board recommended that marines be used to guard the naval installations until Army facilities could be completed and troops moved to their stations. It further recommended that, in addition to ground troops, the Army eventually should provide defensive pursuit aviation at Kodiak and possibly at Dutch Harbor. The Joint Board's action, approved on 15 August, provided that details were to be worked out by the Commanding Officer, Alaska Defense Force, in direct collaboration with the Commander, Alaskan Sector, Thirteenth Naval District.30

During the following six months, Army and Navy officers worked together on the common problems of locating the sites for the Army garrisons, constructing facilities for the Army's use, and financing the projects. They soon decided that both services should use the same facilities as much as possible. They further agreed that if additional construction were needed for the Army, it should follow the Navy's pattern and be done by Navy contractors with funds provided by the War Department. Ultimately all Army construction at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor was performed under contracts let by the Navy Department. A naval officer was directly in charge of each project, but General DeWitt exercised supervisory control.31 Although the Army and Navy quickly agreed on these general matters, they found that it took much longer to thresh out the specific problems involved in selecting sites for Army posts. Each location presented special problems requiring independent study, and conflicts between Army and Navy plans had to be adjusted before construction could begin.

The Army program for defending the Alaskan naval bases gave priority to Kodiak Island because of its strategic position, but disagreement between

30 JB 312, ser 650, 15 Aug 40.
31 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 17 Sep 40, and subsequent papers in AG 600.12 (8-24-39); Memo, Col Stephen J. Chamberlin, Chief, Construction Br, for ACoFS G-4, 18 Oct 41, WDC-ADC 686, vol. II.
the services delayed the start of Army construction there for several months. In June 1940 General DeWitt had disapproved of the site initially proposed by the Navy for the Army post, north of the Buskin River, because it contained swampy ground which would require a great deal of filling and grading before it could be used and because it was too far removed from the Navy's installations for economical construction. His recommendation that the Army garrison be located on a site south of the Buskin River, one-half mile from its mouth, was opposed by the Navy since an Army post south of the river would interfere with the construction of a naval airfield on which work had already begun. Finally, at a conference held on 19 November, General DeWitt and Rear Adm. Charles S. Freeman, the commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District, agreed that the Navy's contractors should undertake new surveys for an Army post north of the Buskin River. Construction of the Army's Fort Greeley, with facilities adequate to accommodate 236 officers and 5,592 enlisted men, was at last begun on 1 February 1941.

At Sitka, the most southeasterly of the naval stations, there was no room for an Army post on Japonski Island in Sitka Sound where the Navy was building its installations. After surveying the Sitka area, General Buckner recommended in October that the shoals connecting Japonski Island with three smaller islands adjacent to it—Charcoal, Alice, and Harbor—be filled in and the Army garrison built on Charcoal Island and the surrounding filled-in land. His recommendation received the approval of the commander of the Alaskan Sector, General DeWitt, and Admiral Freeman. In November the War Department authorized Navy contractors to survey Charcoal Island. Congress appropriated $625,000 for the fill, and construction was started on 9 January 1941.

Within a month the Sitka project was subjected to a complete re-examination. The crowding of the Army garrison on two tiny islands—one, 200 by 100 yards, and the other still smaller—aroused sharp criticism. General DeWitt returned from an inspection of Sitka in May 1941 convinced that

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32 Ltr, CG Fourth Army to CofS, 28 Jun 40, OCS 14943–24; Ltr, CG Fourth Army to TAG, 2 Jul 40; Rad, TAG to CG Fourth Army, 7 Sep 40; Memo, CNO for CofS, 22 Oct 40; Last three in AG 600.12 (8–24–39).
33 Memo of Conf, 19 Nov 40, WDC–ADC 381 Def of Alaska, vol. III; Ltr, CG WDC to TAG, 8 Sep 41, AG 600.12 (8–24–39); Memo, Col Chamberlin for ACoFS G–4, 18 Oct 41, WDC–ADC 686, vol. II.
construction of housing on the fill would result in dangerous congestion. He sought authorization to abandon the fill project and to substitute instead the construction of an 8,100-foot causeway connecting the southernmost tip of Japonski Island and Makhnati Island by way of eight intermediate islands. He argued that the causeway could be completed sooner than the fill, that it would facilitate communications, permit the dispersion of housing and of tactical units, provide all-weather accessibility to gun batteries and searchlight positions, and generally give greater elasticity to the defense. Bidding for Navy support for the change, he added that the causeway would make Whiting Harbor secure and thus permit the establishment of a section base for naval patrol craft nearby. His recommendation received naval support and was approved by the Chief of Staff. On 7 June 1941 the War Department directed the Chief of Engineers to proceed with the causeway project utilizing funds available for the previously authorized fill. Although the principal Army post at Sitka, Fort Ray, remained on Charcoal Island, the congestion and crowding in the Japonski Island area was relieved by housing the additional elements of the garrison on the small islands between Japonski and Makhnati.35

At Dutch Harbor, where the Navy began construction of a combined air and submarine station in 1940, the Navy’s original plans left no room for an Army post on Amaknak Island where naval construction was concentrated. The Army rejected proposals to place its garrison on a nearby island since reconnaissance of the area revealed that the only feasible location for a ground garrison was on Amaknak. After many months of discussion, the Navy agreed in November 1940 to survey land on an adjacent area near Margaret Bay on Amaknak for an Army installation. The result was the construction of the Army’s Fort Mears at Dutch Harbor, begun on 25 January 1941. There, as at Sitka and Kodiak, the Army post was placed as close to Navy facilities as possible without being immediately adjacent to or combined with naval construction.36

The Army’s responsibility for the local air defense of the Navy’s new bases was a more difficult problem to solve. Local air protection for Sitka was provided by building a concrete runway similar to the deck of an aircraft
carrier and with the same devices for arresting planes. This was used by carrier and not Army planes. After protracted debate the Navy agreed to extend the runways of its fields at Kodiak to 6,000 feet in order to permit the operation of Army bombardment as well as pursuit aviation in the area.\textsuperscript{37} A solution of the even more complex problem of the air defense of the naval station at Dutch Harbor was not found until November 1941.\textsuperscript{38}

Although plans for sending troops to Sitka, Kodiak, and Unalaska had been drafted before construction started—indeed, before the Joint Board had issued its directive—the War Department as well as General DeWitt and General Buckner had agreed that no troops should be sent until housing at the naval bases was ready. The Navy estimated that this housing would not be ready until mid-summer 1941. Nevertheless, in early 1941 the War Department, responding to the increasing tension in American-Japanese relations, partially reversed its policy and directed General DeWitt to arrange for the immediate, but piecemeal, deployment of troops to the naval bases.\textsuperscript{39} Naval authorities concurred in the decision, and General DeWitt acted promptly. In March 1941 he had forces for Kodiak, Sitka, and Dutch Harbor concentrated on the west coast, and at the end of the month these troops began moving toward Alaska. By June elements of the garrisons were at all three stations. Then, on 26 June, G-2 informed the War Plans Division that Japan might well take advantage of the new conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany to move against Alaska and urged the War Department to increase the Alaska Defense Command to its full strength as soon as possible. Washington, convinced that the threat was real, agreed to strengthen the command. Accordingly, throughout the summer troops in great numbers and at an accelerated rate continued to move to the naval bases, to Seward in order to protect the southern terminus of the Alaska Railroad, and to Anchorage, despite the fact that housing was not ready. By the end of July the movement of the authorized emergency garrisons for the Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor areas—approximately 70 officers and 1,950 enlisted men for Sitka, 235 officers and 5,600 enlisted men for Kodiak, and 225 officers and 5,200 enlisted men for Dutch Harbor—was nearing completion.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} Memo, WPD for G-4, 27 Jun 41, WPD 3512–100.

\textsuperscript{38} See below, p. 244.


\textsuperscript{40} Ltr, CG Fourth Army to TAG, 28 Feb 41, WDC–ADC 381/32, pt. 1; Memo, SGS for CoFS, 11 Mar 41, OCS Conf, binder 11; Ltr, CG WDC to CG ADC, 22 Mar 41, WDC–ADC 381/32, pt. 1; Memo, G-2 for WPD, 26 Jun 41, OPD Exec 8, bk. A; Rad, CG Fourth Army to Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District, 8 Jul 41, WDC–ADC 381 Def of Alaska, Gen, vol. IV; Ltr, TAG to CG’s, 15 Jul 41, AG 320.2 (5–6–41).
The rapid increase in the size of the Alaska garrison during the summer of 1941 made it necessary to house several thousand of the newly arrived soldiers in tents at the Kodiak, Anchorage, and Seward bases. This development led to sharp criticism by Senator Ralph Owen Brewster, a member of the Special Committee Investigating Defense Contracts (the Truman Committee) who toured the principal Alaskan bases during August, and subsequently by a number of other congressmen as well. Senator Brewster in his report noted that the Army planned to house a good many troops in tents during the fall and winter months, particularly at Kodiak; and he commented that "this seems in flat contravention of the legislative provision that the soldiers should be adequately housed." Admiral Stark and General Marshall took personal note of this criticism, and the Chief of Staff called upon General DeWitt to give his "immediate and personal attention" to seeing that everything possible was done toward making the troops housed in tent camps comfortable. General DeWitt reported that Army tent camps were being fully winterized and were well heated, and that troops would be removed from them as rapidly as new barracks became available. As the War Department pointed out to Senator Harley M. Kilgore, the word "Alaska" tended to make the situation sound worse than it actually was, since the average winter temperatures on Kodiak, where the largest number of troops were in tents, were approximately the same as those at Wheeling in the Senator's own state of West Virginia. The dispatch of protective forces for the naval bases was the principal factor in the threefold increase in the strength of the Alaska Defense Command between the end of June and the end of September 1941—from 7,263 to 21,565. The original authorization of May 1940 for an emergency garrison of 3,100 had grown by July 1941 to one of 24,000 so that (by September) the actual strength in Alaska was not far short of that contemplated as long as the United States remained at peace in the Pacific. The ground combat elements that had been sent were generally well equipped, and included four infantry regiments, three and one-half antiaircraft regiments, a 155-mm. gun mobile coast artillery regiment, and a tank company. In ground defenses Alaska was no longer the exposed and undefended continental salient that it had been in 1939.

41 Rpt of Senator Brewster to Senator Harry S. Truman, 5 Sep 41, copy in AG 600.12 (8-24-39).
42 Various papers, dated Sep and Oct 41, in AG 600.12 (8-24-39).
43 Ltr, TAG to CGs, 15 Jul 41, AG 320.2 (5-6-41); Memo, G-3 for SGS, 9 Sep 41, OCS 1825-63. The actual strength figures cited are those compiled by the Machine Records Branch, AGO, 30 Nov 45, in OPD file, Pearl Harbor Misc Corresp.
The Air Defense Problems

In contrast to the rapid increase in Army ground force strength, the Alaska Defense Command's air strength remained notably weak in the fall of 1941. To a certain extent the lack of aircraft controlled Washington's policy toward Alaska. Throughout 1941, but particularly in the three months before Pearl Harbor, increasing tension in many parts of the world, the demands of the lend-lease program, and inadequate plane production forced the War Department to adhere to a rigid system of priorities in allocating the limited number of aircraft at its disposal, and Alaska held a priority for aircraft far below those of Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines. But the unresolved question of what part Army Air Forces were to play in the total scheme of Alaskan defense also governed the allotment of planes. This question in turn was linked to an even more fundamental controversy within the War Department itself between the initial prewar theory of Alaskan defense and a new concept of the Army's mission in Alaska.

The initial theory had emphasized a defense of the Seward-Anchorage area, supplemented by a joint Army-Navy defense of Kodiak. According to its premises, the Aleutians were primarily a Navy sphere of operations. This theory was adequate so long as a serious attack on Alaska seemed unlikely and the problem was merely one of local defense. By the beginning of 1941 the relative weakening of the American naval position in the Pacific, and the increasingly hostile attitude of Japan, indicated the need for consideration of offensive action. As a result, a new theory of Alaskan defense, based on a concept of an aggressive defense, gradually developed. Since ground force garrisons were virtually tied to their stations, aggressive defense, under Alaskan conditions, would depend on the striking power of ground-based aviation. In view of the possibility of using Alaska as a base for an attack against Japan if it were to go on a rampage in the Pacific, it was now considered vital to keep control of the Aleutians at least as far west as Dutch Harbor, and preferably in their entirety.44 The growing importance of retaining control over the Aleutians was reflected in revised war plans which stated the mission of Army forces in Alaska as follows: "To defend United States military and naval installations in Alaska, including Unalaska, against sea, land and air attacks and against sabotage; to deny use by the enemy of sea and land bases in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands; to support the Navy."45

45 Memo, WPD for TAG, 16 Jan 41, AG 320.2 (9-3-40).
The new theory of an aggressive defensive for Alaska had appeared first in an analysis by General Buckner which he submitted to General DeWitt on 3 September 1940. Some facets of this analysis conformed to earlier assessments. General Buckner agreed that an enemy could seriously threaten Alaska only if the United States Fleet lost control of the North Pacific. He agreed, too, that the difficult terrain and lack of overland transportation virtually precluded a major land invasion. He recognized the need for a large measure of local autonomy for the isolated garrisons in the interior and at the widely separate strategic spots along the coast. But, despite these similarities, General Buckner's estimate of the situation differed significantly from previous ones of War Department planners in two respects. First, he gave greater emphasis to the threat which air power posed to the security of the territory, accepting it as axiomatic that an attack against Alaska would probably be launched without warning—a sudden air strike against the vulnerable coastal area. Second, he thought in terms of an aggressive concept of defense under which Alaska would be used as a base for the projection of American military power into the western Pacific. He concluded that not only the successful defense of Alaska but also any value it might have as a staging area for Pacific warfare would depend on superiority in the air, backed by adequate land bases strongly protected by ground troops. In other words General Buckner, although a ground officer, visualized Alaska as an air theater. Consequently, without minimizing the need for strong ground forces, he gave the air arm a place of primary importance and outlined a program which emphasized strengthening the air defenses of the territory.46

General Buckner's plan called for building advanced operating bases for bomber planes in western Alaska, including the Aleutian chain; constructing auxiliary fields near the existing main bases to prevent the undue massing of aircraft with consequent danger from bombing attack; connecting the United States and Alaska by a chain of landing fields; developing intermediate bases to facilitate the movement of aircraft to and within the territory; establishing an aircraft warning service; and maintaining in the United States a reserve of both combat and transport aircraft equipped for cold weather flying for the prompt reinforcement of Alaska in an emergency. It followed that the remainder of his program was designed primarily to protect and support the air arm. He recommended stationing a balanced defensive garrison at each main base, advanced base, and important link in the chain

46 Ltr. Hq ADF to CG Ninth Corps Area, 3 Sep 40, and 2d Ind, CG Fourth Army to TAG, 27 Sep 40, AG 320.2 (9-3-40).
of fields from Seattle; storing sufficient supplies at each base to last at least three months; constructing bombproof storage space for all vital supplies and, where possible, planes; bombproofing the installations of the Alaska Communication System and furnishing each station with generators which would make it independent of local power plants; arranging for the movement of ground troops, properly outfitted with cold weather clothing and equipment, to Alaskan garrisons in an emergency; building a military road connecting Anchorage with the Richardson Highway; and constructing the railroad cut-off from Portage to the Passage Canal to eliminate dependence on the most vulnerable portion of the Alaskan Railroad.\textsuperscript{47}

General Buckner's recommendation in October 1940 that an Army air base be established in the vicinity of Dutch Harbor was the first step toward the projection of Army air power into the Aleutians. In submitting this recommendation, he observed that a limited reconnaissance had not revealed a good site for an Army airfield in the immediate vicinity of the naval base, but that a suitable site for an emergency field for pursuit planes existed at Chernofski Bay on Unalaska.\textsuperscript{48} The Navy objected to his proposal, arguing that construction costs would be unduly high because of the rugged terrain; that there would be no economy, since the Army and Navy air bases at Unalaska could not possibly be located close enough to use any of the same facilities or defenses; and that an Army air base on Chernofski Bay would be exposed to the same danger as Dutch Harbor, that is, quick raids from the sea.\textsuperscript{49}

At the beginning of 1941 the War Plans Division was equally opposed to the Unalaska project, maintaining that "aerial patrol along the Aleutian chain can best be accomplished by tender-based aircraft and that, for the present at least, responsibility for aerial surveillance of that area should remain a Navy function."\textsuperscript{50} And three months later the Army Air Corps also agreed that under existing circumstances it was inadvisable to build an air base near Unalaska.\textsuperscript{51}

General Buckner and General DeWitt refused to acknowledge defeat. They clung tenaciously to their position that air power based on Unalaska was necessary for the Army to fulfill its mission. Since surveys revealed that the terrain at Unalaska was not suitable for a landing field for the Army's

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Memo, CG ADF for CG Fourth Army, 9 Oct 40, WDC–ADC 381, Def of Alaska, Gen vol. II.
\textsuperscript{49} Ltr, COMALSEC Thirteenth Naval District to CNO, 29 Oct 40, WDC–ADC 381 Def of Alaska, Gen, sec. II.
\textsuperscript{50} Memo, WPD for TAG, 8 Jan 41, WPD 4239–21.
\textsuperscript{51} 5th Ind, OCofAC for TAG, 8 Apr 41, on Memo, WPD for TAG, 8 Jan 41, WPD 4239–21.
heavy bombers, they proposed that an all-purpose Army air base be built at Otter Point on Unnak Island, sixty-five miles west of Dutch Harbor, to be supported by intermediate fields for fighter planes at Port Heiden and Cold Bay on the Alaska Peninsula.\textsuperscript{52} General DeWitt, who had just returned from an inspection trip to Alaska, informed the Chief of Staff that he felt "if possible, stronger than ever that we must have our air field in the vicinity of Dutch Harbor, and intermediate fields between Dutch Harbor and Kodiak." He continued:

I am sorry that there is unanimity of opinion in the War Department against such action, but I am quite sure that if those opposed would visit the area as I did and visualize the conditions that can easily, and I feel sure will exist in case of war, that they will come to the same conclusion. The recent operations in the Mediterranean area, particularly Crete, involving the use of parachute and airborne troops, would seem to clinch the argument.\textsuperscript{53}

After additional surveys of the area, General Buckner submitted a request for all-purpose air bases at both Otter Point and Cold Bay, with staging fields at Port Heiden and Sand Point.\textsuperscript{54} General DeWitt indorsed General Buckner's recommendation (except as to the Sand Point field), and in doing so noted: "I look upon this paper as the most important paper I now have to act upon in connection with the defense of Alaska."\textsuperscript{55}

The urgency of General DeWitt's request arose from an acute concern for the security of Alaska following Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and the attendant uncertainty of Japan's future moves as an Axis partner. Japan itself appeared to be caught in a vise of conflicting interests and incompatible objectives. On the one hand, a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union bound Japan to remain neutral under the existing circumstances. On the other hand, the Tripartite Pact might be used by Germany to persuade Japan to furnish active aid to the Axis. And it was not inconceivable that Japan in self-interest would construe the pact as a mandate for launching an attack on its own. Although intelligence reports indicated that Japanese forces were being deployed southward, away from Siberia, the moment might seem propitious to the Japanese for realizing their long-standing ambition to acquire the Russian maritime provinces. G–2 urged the War Plans Division to make provision for a long-range air patrol over the waters north

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Ltr, Gen DeWitt to CofS, 2 Jun 41, WDC 381 Dutch Harbor, Unalaska.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Ltr, Gen DeWitt to Gen Marshall, 4 Jun 41, WDC-ADC 381 Def of Alaska, Gen, vol. IV.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Exhibits B, C, and F, ltr, Hq ADC to CG ADC, 5 Jul 41, WDC-ADC 686, vol. III; Rad, CG ADC to CG Fourth Army, 9 Jul 41, WDC-ADC 381 Def of Alaska, Gen, vol. IV.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Memo, Gen DeWitt for DCofS WDC, 18 Jul 41, WDC–ADC 686, vol. III.
\end{itemize}
of the Bering Strait, and also recommended that, if possible, arrangements be made with the Soviet Union for the joint use of naval and air bases at Petropavlovsk, the Komandorski Islands, and Anadyr Bay.\(^56\) Pending a clarification of the new situation as it might affect the Pacific area, General Marshall, after conferences with his principal staff officers, limited immediate War Department action to an alert of the Alaska and Panama commands on 3 July. General DeWitt passed on word to General Buckner to alert all of his garrisons against the "increasing danger of total Russian collapse and subsequent possibility of Axis operations in direction of Alaska"; and, as already noted, the Army built up its ground force strengths as rapidly as it could during the summer.\(^57\)

One step taken by General Buckner after he received the alert was an offshore patrol by Army planes from Bristol Bay to Point Barrow, and he asked the Navy to perform a similar mission from Ketchikan to Dutch Harbor. When informed that the means for a naval patrol was lacking—at the time the Navy had only three patrol planes in Alaskan waters—General Buckner decided to maintain a patrol himself insofar as his means permitted.\(^58\) His actions were contrary to current doctrine for the employment of air power by the services, which delegated the mission of offshore reconnaissance to the Navy. Even though the Navy was unable to fulfill its mission and the local naval commander raised no objections to General Buckner's course of action, it aroused some criticisms in Washington.\(^59\) General DeWitt vigorously defended the establishment of an Army offshore patrol as "not only a proper military precautionary measure but a necessary one," and added that "the action demonstrated the pressing need for additional Army air units and modern planes (which have been repeatedly requested) and for adequate Naval forces (which are not now assigned to Alaska) for offshore and inshore patrol."\(^60\)

One consequence of the July alert and of General Buckner's decision to patrol the waters north of Bering Strait was the development and garrisoning of an air base on the Seward Peninsula at Nome much earlier than had

\(^{56}\) Memo, G-2 for WPD, 26 Jun 41, OPD Exec 8, bk. A.

\(^{57}\) Gerow Diary, entry of 3 Jul 41, OPD Exec 10, item 1; Rad, TAG to Fourth Army, 3 Jul 41, and Rad, CG Fourth Army to CG ADC, 4 Jul 41, both in AG 580.81 (7–30–41). For the Panama alert, see [ch. XIII] below.

\(^{58}\) Rad, CG ADC to CG WDC, 11 Jul 41, and Rad, CG WDC to CG ADC, 14 Jul 41, both in WDC–ADC 381 Gen, vol. IV.


\(^{60}\) 2d Ind, CG WDC to TAG, 11 Sep 41, on ltr, TAG to CG Fourth Army, 4 Sep 41, AG 580.81 (7–30–41).
previously been planned. The Nome airfield was scheduled to be built by the Civil Aeronautics Authority, but on orders from Washington the Army Engineers moved in and began construction on 23 July. A ground garrison of 9 officers and 221 enlisted men arrived on 3 September to protect the Nome base.61

The July alert exposed the weakness of Alaska’s air defenses, and three months later General DeWitt found them in no better shape. The authorized airfields were not ready, none of the units of the approved aircraft warning system was in operation, and not a single modern Army plane had been sent to Alaska. General DeWitt summarized the situation very bluntly when he wrote: “Our mere establishment of Army garrisons in Alaska with no means for them to know what may lie just over the horizon, does not conform to any known principle of strategy, military or naval.”62

In October General Buckner submitted to General DeWitt a general plan for the employment of aviation in Alaska which contained another strong plea for “a chain of advanced air bases, generally south along the coast of Alaska from Nome to Naknek, thence westward on the Alaskan Peninsula to Umnak Island and from Kodiak generally east to Annette Island.”63 The Army Air Forces and the War Department General Staff finally agreed on 21 November to go ahead with the Aleutian airfield project, and on their recommendation, the Joint Planning Committee proposed to the Joint Board that the Army “proceed with the construction of port facilities, airdromes and defenses at Umnak, Port Heiden, and Cold Bay.” The Joint Board approved this recommendation on 26 November, and on 11 December, four days after the Pearl Harbor attack, General DeWitt was directed to build the Umnak field and related facilities as quickly as possible.64

Airfields, Radar, and the Construction Program

While the question of extending Army airfields into the Aleutian Islands was under consideration, the remainder of the airfield construction program went forward as planned, though more slowly than anticipated. The Army

61 Memo, TAG to CG Fourth Army, 18 Jul 41, AG 600.12 (8–24–39); Memo, WPD for CofAAF, 19 Jul 41, WPD 4297–5; Official Hist of the Alaskan Dept, ch. XXI.
63 Ltr, CG ADC to CG WDC, 1 Oct 41, WDC 381/32 ADC, pt. I.
was concerned during 1941 over progress at the supplementary airfields being constructed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. This organization shared responsibility for the military development of these airfields with the Army, and this division of responsibility did not work out entirely satisfactorily. As a result, the Corps of Engineers was asked to investigate the possibility of taking over the supplementary airfield construction program.

In conjunction with the investigation Mr. Marshall Hoppin, the administration's local superintendent of airways, stated that contracts had been let for Boundary, Big Delta, Cordova, Juneau, Ruby, and Nome and that completion of these fields was expected prior to 1 January 1942. Plans and specifications had been prepared for Bethel, Gulkana, McGrath, and Naknek. He anticipated that these fields would be well along toward completion by 1 January 1942, if fiscal year 1942 funds were made available immediately. He added that single runways 300 by 3,500 feet were under construction, or would be under construction shortly, at Farewell, Kenai, Lake Minchumina, Seward, Homer, Nenana, and one or two other locations. He believed that all of these runways, except Homer, would be completed by the fall of 1941. Engineer officers who were studying the merits of the proposed change concluded that, since all Army first priority fields were either under construction or would soon be under contract, sufficiently good progress had been made to warrant continuing civilian control of the program.

The Army had intended to develop an aircraft warning system in Alaska as soon as it could. Signal Corps and Engineer officers began planning for such a system during the summer of 1940. Well aware of the fact that both equipment and funds were limited, the planners proposed that it be completed in two stages. They recommended that initially detector stations be established to warn of the approach of hostile planes toward the naval bases at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor and either by land or sea toward Anchorage. They suggested that at a later date the War Department provide means for the protection of Fairbanks and to detect the approach of hostile planes over Norton Sound and up the Yukon and the Kuskokwim River valleys.

The initial aircraft warning plan called for the construction of 8 detector stations and one information center in Alaska at locations to be proposed by General DeWitt, and on 2 August General Marshall approved the over-
all project. Only 3 of the 8 specific locations for detectors originally proposed proved acceptable, and additional surveys had to be made to determine the best location for the other 5 stations. In the course of this study, it became evident that 8 stations would not provide adequate coverage for Alaska, since the original recommendation had been based on an overoptimistic estimate of the capacity of the early radar sets which experience did not substantiate. General DeWitt accordingly submitted a revised aircraft warning project to the Chief of Staff which called for at least 10 and preferably 14 detector stations. On 28 January 1941 the Secretary of War approved a project for the establishment of 12 such stations in Alaska, all south of Cape Prince of Wales. Subsequently, in October, the Alaskan commander recommended and the War Department approved an enlargement of this project to 20 stations. None of them was complete or in operation before the outbreak of war, principally because of equipment shortages and construction difficulties.

There was widespread criticism during 1941 of the whole military construction program in Alaska. This criticism was only partially justified. While it is true that a number of projects were not completed on schedule, unusually difficult and highly complex problems were involved. The undeveloped state of Alaskan resources, the small civilian labor force, and the poor interior transportation system meant that almost all supplies and most workmen had to be brought in from the United States. The job of transporting material from the ports to inland construction projects was prodigious. The Alaska Defense Command also suffered from a chronic lack of strategic materials and construction equipment. The priorities system established by the War Department early in 1941 benefited Alaska little since it held a very low priority until September 1941. Furthermore, in many places construction had to be confined to the short summer season. Varying and harsh weather lessened the efficiency of both men and machines.

A cumbersome and unwieldy administrative system also hampered construction. Design and procurement were carried on thousands of miles from the site of the work. Local commanders lacked the authority to make changes in these plans, and all field requests for modifications had to be referred to headquarters for approval. Initially the area engineer and the Alaskan com-

68 Memo, WPD for CofS, 31 Jul 40, AG 660.2 AA.
69 Note for Rec on Memo, WPD for TAG, 28 Jan 41, WPD 3640-6.
70 Memo, WPD for TAG, 28 Jan 41, WPD 3640-6.
71 Ltr, TAG to CG WDC, 7 Jan 42, and other papers, in WDC-ADC 660.2 AWS-46.
mander at Anchorage, the district engineer at Seattle, and the Ninth Corps Area commander at San Francisco had to approve all plans. In an effort to simplify this procedure, the War Department in December 1940 placed all Alaskan military construction directly under the supervision of General DeWitt. Nevertheless, the construction program remained bogged down in administrative red tape. On 28 November 1941 General Buckner, replying to an inquiry from the Chief of Staff as to how best the War Department could facilitate construction in Alaska, wrote as follows:

The most effective measure of assistance which you can render us in our building program is a greater degree of decentralization. In many cases it takes a great deal longer to get a construction measure approved after the appropriations are made than it does to do the actual building. Our Area Engineer here put it very aptly when he said that quick-drying cement did him very little good in speeding up construction unless some quick-drying ink was used on the approval of his plans.

General Marshall referred General Buckner’s comment to G–4 for study and review. War gave new urgency to the construction program, and in late December the Chief of Staff informed the Alaskan commander that “both the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, and the Chief of Engineers have been instructed to take such steps as may be necessary to decentralize control of all construction matters to the greatest possible extent.” The Chief of Staff added that “construction directives are also specifying [that the] greatest possible latitude should be given to local commanders in the matter of layouts and type of structure, compatible with procurement and shipping dictates.”

Reinforcing the Air Defenses

Alaska was the last of the overseas departments to receive Army combat planes. As late as August 1940 General Arnold said that there was no prospect of sending any planes at all to Alaska during that year. Subsequently, Generals Buckner and DeWitt argued vehemently for deployment of some defensive air power to Alaska. On 5 September General Arnold agreed to send one pursuit squadron, one bombardment squadron, and one-half of the base group of the 28th Composite Group to Alaska. This force was scheduled to arrive at Elmendorf Field about 15 November.
General Arnold made this decision he was obliged to announce that, because the planes he proposed to send were not ready, "he had arranged with the GHQ Air Force to send two groups from the GHQ Air Forces, and the Alaska squadrons, when ready, would be assigned to the GHQ Air Forces."  

Actually, no Army combat planes reached Alaska until after the decision by President Roosevelt in January 1941 to stand on the defensive in the Pacific with the fleet based on Hawaii. In February Secretary Stimson publicly announced some of the measures being taken by the United States to strengthen the Panama-Hawaii-Alaska defense line, and stressed preparations under way to send three new units of Army aircraft to Alaska. And, Mr. Stimson added, "from my knowledge of what is going on in Japan, I think this reinforcement of the northwest frontier will be of interest to the Japs." 

As a result the Alaska Defense Command received its first combat aircraft. At the end of February the 23d Air Base Group, the 18th Pursuit Squadron equipped with 20 P-36's, and the headquarters squadron of the 28th Composite Group reached Elmendorf Field. This force was followed in March by the 73d Bombardment Squadron, Medium, and the 36th Bombardment Squadron, Heavy, equipped with a total of 12 B-18A's. On 29 May the Air Field Forces, Alaska Defense Command, was formed from these units. This was a token force, wholly inadequate to perform its assigned mission, a fact duly noted at the time of the July alert. The entire Army air force in Alaska then consisted of 38 planes, and all of its combat planes were obsolescent or obsolete.

During the July emergency General Buckner argued vehemently, but unsuccessfully, for air reinforcements, writing:

My immediate concern is to build up an air force sufficiently strong to make any hostile expedition against Alaskan shores so hazardous a venture as to remove it from the realm of probability. This accomplished, our Navy can be released from the task of furnishing us with constant protection and will be free to operate elsewhere. At the present time, all of our coastal stations can be taken one by one by hostile expeditions outnumbering them, since there is no way of reinforcing them during an attack except by air. Our air strength is at present negligible and the prospects for prompt reinforcement somewhat scant. I am informed that we are soon to be reinforced by ground troops but that Air Corps reinforcements are not contemplated in the near future. Under present conditions, I would rather have an additional heavy bombardment
squadron than a division of ground troops. The time to strike hostile expeditions is when their troops are crowded in transports and their planes on the decks of carriers. I have communicated this desire to General DeWitt and he is of similar opinion.\footnote{Ltr, Gen Buckner to Gen Marshall, 24 Jul 41, AG 452.1 (7-24-41).}

Although General Buckner’s request received the sympathetic approval of the Air Staff, the War Department, for a variety of reasons, was unable to take action. The continuously expanding Army air program was making heavy demands on existing forces for training purposes. Army air units stationed in Newfoundland and Iceland competed with the Alaskan air force for the few winterized planes on hand. Neither the Air Staff nor the other sections of the War Department considered the threat to Alaskan security in July 1941 sufficiently acute to deploy air units earmarked for other overseas outposts to the Alaska Defense Command. The War Department’s point of view was expressed in a letter from General Marshall to General Buckner in which the Chief of Staff said:

The War Department is appreciative of the importance of your problem and is doing everything, consistent with the general situation, to meet your needs. Your command has been given a high priority for aircraft and we are trying to find ways and means to meet your needs in this respect. Deliveries to Alaska have been delayed because of more pressing demands in the Philippines, which, due to the critical situation in the Orient, have been placed in a higher priority than Alaska. I am advised today of the following proposed schedule of deliveries of aircraft to Alaska:

- **Bombardment (M) B-26 Series**
  - Sep 1941—18
  - Mar 1942—3
  - May 1942—5

- **Bombardment (H) B-17 Series**
  - Feb 1942—8
  - Jun 1942—5
  - Oct 1942—3

- **Pursuit Interceptor P-40 Series**
  - Sep 1941—4
  - Oct 1941—21
  - Aug 1942—6

I am sorry that existing circumstances prohibit some expeditious actions on your requests.\footnote{Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Buckner, 23 Sep 41, OCS 14943-60.}

Nor were the planes scheduled for delivery in 1941 actually sent before the war began.

In the fall of 1941, the Navy’s air power in the Alaskan area was even more meager than the Army’s. At the end of October 1941 General DeWitt reported that “there is an OS2U-2 plane at Sitka, a J2F at Kodiak, and an
OS2U-1 awaiting transportation to Dutch Harbor. From time to time a squadron of five or six patrol planes have been based in Alaska for training purposes, but these are not permanent. . . ."  

Capt. Ralph C. Parker, commander of the Alaskan Sector, appealed to the Navy Department for dive bombers to reinforce his air component. Since the Army could not secure air reinforcements, General Buckner endorsed the request with the admission "We swallow our pride . . . and like it." The Navy Department, as short of planes as the Army, had to reject Captain Parker's request. Throughout 1941 naval air forces in Alaska remained wholly inadequate to perform their mission of long-range offshore patrol.

As the prospect of war between the United States and Japan increased in November 1941, all agencies responsible for Alaskan defense stepped up their request for air reinforcements, but the War Department was unable to take any action. As General Arnold said: "... we are doing everything possible we can to increase the number of trained squadrons and groups available for these missions. At the present time we have just about hit bottom."  

On the Alert

The Joint Board's decision on the extension of Army air power into the Aleutians came on the very eve of the War Department's warning that Japan was likely to begin hostilities soon. General DeWitt promptly ordered General Buckner to put the Alaska Defense Command on a full alert.

Thanks to what had been done in the preceding year and a half, General Buckner now had available a sizable ground force of approximately 20,000 men. Fort Richardson, the main Army base, had been completed. The four major airfields in southeastern and central Alaska—Annette Island (Mel-lakatla), Yakutat, Elmendorf, and Ladd—were in operation. Army posts had been established for the protection of the naval installations at Sitka, Kodiak, and Dutch Harbor. There were garrisons at Seward and Nome, and a small force still remained at Chilkoot Barracks near Skagway. A beginning, at least, had been made in improving communications both within and to Alaska. Improvements to the Alaska Railroad were being pushed. The Can-

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84 1st Ind, HQ ADC to COMALSEC, Seventeenth Naval District, 14 Nov 41, on Memo, COMALSEC, Thirteenth Naval District, for CG ADC, 14 Nov 41, ADC 452.2.
85 Memo, DCofS for Air for WPD, 1 Dec 41, WPD 4464-7.
adian Government, as part of its collaboration in the defense of North America, had undertaken to provide aircraft staging facilities between Alaska and the continental United States; by December 1941 five airfields along this Northwest Staging Route, as it was called, were usable under optimum conditions.\(^{87}\)

The most serious weakness of the Alaskan defenses was the lack of air power. Alaska still had only the 12 B–18 bombers and 20 P–36 pursuit planes provided in the spring of 1941, and only 6 of these planes were ready for combat action on 7 December 1941.\(^{88}\) The aircraft warning system, also, was far from complete. Although the program had been under way for almost a year, the original goal had been too optimistic. No one had realized what a tremendous job it would be to install and maintain detector sets in the rugged, isolated locations which had been selected for most of them.\(^{89}\) Other major flaws in the defenses, noted by two representatives of War Plans Divi-

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\(^{87}\) See Conn and Fairchild, *Framework of Hemisphere Defense*, ch. XIV.

\(^{88}\) Craven and Cate, eds., *Plans and Operations*, pp. 170, 276.

\(^{89}\) Hist of WDC vol. III, ch. 10, Incl. 8, pp. 1–2.
sion only three days before the Pearl Harbor raid, were the vulnerability of housing to aerial bombing, the inadequacy of antiaircraft artillery, insufficient access roads, shortages of certain types of ammunition, and the lack of adequate local storage facilities. The War Plans Division inspectors recommended that the War Department review Alaskan defense projects with a view towardremedying these deficiencies as soon as possible.90

When the assault on Pearl Harbor brought war to the United States, the Alaska Defense Command was ready for a minor enemy attack, though not for a surprise raid. It would have been unable to resist a major enemy assault, but a major assault was not to be expected.

CHAPTER X

Alaska in the War, 1942

The slashing Japanese attack in the western and central Pacific in December 1941 opened the prospect of a more active military role for Alaska, especially if the Soviet Union became involved in the new Pacific war. Even before the Japanese struck, the United States had been hoping to obtain the use of Soviet air bases in the Vladivostok area, and, if Japan now attacked the maritime provinces of Siberia, the military collaboration of American and Soviet forces in the North Pacific appeared inevitable.

The Soviet Union, desperately involved against Germany in Europe, had neither the desire nor the resources for a two-front war if it could be avoided, although Marshal Joseph Stalin at first indicated that the Russians might be ready for some sort of positive action against Japan by the spring of 1942. As the new year opened, both General Buckner in Alaska and the military planners in Washington wanted to push the development of an air route through Alaska that would permit the operation of American aircraft from Russian bases against Japan, and President Roosevelt himself was keenly interested in the proposal. The President was also concerned about the danger of a Japanese raid on the new military installations in Alaska, more concerned, indeed, than were his military advisers. In mid-February he indicated his desire for a "complete plan" for establishing a striking force in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and in pushing the execution of this plan as far as possible by midsummer.

Taking into account the military situation in the western Pacific at the end of January 1942, the Army and Navy commanders in Alaska recommended a more specific plan for attacking Japan by way of the North Pacific. Noting that the other approaches to Japan were already protected by land-

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1 Notes on Conf in OCoS, 10 Dec 41, OCS Conf, binder 29; Memo, G-2 for CofS, 20 Dec 41, WPD 4357-35. See also Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 142-46.
2 Notes on Conf at White House, 28 Dec 41 and 28 Jan 42, in WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Conf (1-28-42); Memo, CG ADC for CG WDC and Fourth Army, 3 Jan 42, AG 381 (12-5-41) (2); various papers, dated 9-27 Jan 42, in WPD 4557-43.
3 Memo, CofS for President Roosevelt, 21 Jan 42, WPD 3512-151; Memo of Harry Hopkins, 16 Feb 42, Calendar of Hopkins Papers, bk V, item 7.
based aviation, they advocated the establishment as soon as possible of striking bases on the Siberian mainland and Sakhalin Island, and the development of a secure convoy route to the Russian naval base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Their plan would involve rushing work on the airfields already under construction in Alaska, improving the air route via Nome and across Bering Strait, and establishing a string of seaplane bases, to be protected by Army garrisons, in the Aleutians beyond Dutch Harbor and Umnak. It would also require a large air and ground reinforcement of Alaska, and immediate negotiation with the Russians to permit the development and use of Siberian bases.4

General DeWitt, in forwarding this proposal to Washington, concurred in its general concept, but he noted that the better part of a year would be needed to construct the facilities necessary for executing the plan and that, before Alaska could become a useful base for offensive operations, its successful defense must be assured. In Washington, Admiral King observed that the development of aviation facilities in Alaska was already well ahead of the ability of the War and Navy Departments to supply them with aircraft and that new and undefended air bases would be more of a liability than an asset. For the time being he was firmly opposed to the extension of aviation facilities in the Aleutians beyond Umnak, and indeed to any other preparations for offensive operations from Alaska until the Russians indicated a willingness to permit the operation of American planes from Siberian bases.5

While the plan of the Alaskan commanders for an offensive from Alaska was still under review, the President in early March asked for further study of the feasibility of opening the Aleutian route to Siberia, so that it could be used if Japan attacked the Soviet Union.6 By March it was fairly evident that the Russians were not going to enter the Pacific war on their own initiative as long as they were heavily engaged in Europe, and therefore that they were very unlikely to give the Japanese cause for attack by opening their Far Eastern bases to American ships and planes, or even by letting Americans reconnoiter these bases as a step toward future offensive action from them. By the end of the month the Army and Navy had concluded, and so advised the President, that while the Alaskan air route via Nome might be used to deliver planes and other supplies to the Soviet Union, or to reinforce Russian air forces in Siberia if the Japanese attacked, it would be futile to do any more

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4 Paper, prepared by CG ADC and COMALSEC Thirteenth Naval District, 31 Jan 42, title: Joint Army-Navy Plans for Alaska, WDCSA 381 War Plans.
5 Memo, CG WDC for CG FF, 21 Feb 42; Memo, COMINCH for CNO, 21 Feb 42. Both in OPD 381.
6 Memo, President Roosevelt to Adm Stark and Gen Marshall, 4 Mar 42, ABC 381 (1–23–42).
planning toward these ends until the President was able to conclude an agreement with Marshal Stalin for military collaboration. General Buckner was informed that for the present his forces would have to remain on the strategic defensive and that he could expect only a modest augmentation of these forces and for defensive purposes only.7

**Reinforcement**

Alaska became part of a designated theater of operations with the activation of the Western Defense Command on 11 December 1941, although under the restriction that General DeWitt as theater commander could not move major ground or air units from the west coast to Alaska without War Department consent. Before the month was over General Buckner had recommended that he be given unity of command over all military forces in Alaska, and the Army Air Forces had proposed that General Buckner be replaced by an Air Forces general officer since the Alaskan Defense Command area would be predominately an air theater so far as the Army was concerned. Neither proposal was approved, and the command of Alaskan forces remained unchanged until an active enemy threat developed in May 1942.8

At the outbreak of war the Army garrison in Alaska numbered about 21,500 officers and enlisted men. During the next five months this total nearly doubled, to a strength of 40,424 by the end of April 1942, considerably more than had been planned in the first wartime troop basis for the Alaska Defense Command.9 A considerable proportion of this total was accounted for by engineer troops needed to rush construction work at the new Alaskan air bases. Getting combat planes to these bases was a more difficult matter.

As noted in the preceding chapter, Alaska had no Army planes fit for combat when the Pacific war began. By 11 December a squadron each of modern pursuit and medium bombardment planes was being winterized for flight to Alaska, and the planes began to move at the beginning of January by way of the Northwest Staging Route of airfields built by the Canadians from Alberta northward. A number of these planes crashed en route, princi-

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7 Incl A, JCS 16/2, 19 Jun 42, and other papers in ABC 381 (1-23-42); Memo, WPD for TAG, 24 Mar 42, WDCSA 381 War Plans.
8 Memo, OCofS for TAG, 11 Dec 41, AG 320.2 (12-11-41), (2); Rad, CG ADC to CG WDC, 22 Dec 41, ADC 381, vol. II; Memo, AGofAS for CoFS, 27 Dec 41, and other papers in AGF 320.2 Alaska, binder 1.
9 Strength of the Army, 1 Nov 47, p. 42; Troop Basis Chart, ADC, 26 Jan 42, AG 320.2 (2-3-42).
pally because of the inexperience of the pilots who flew them, and in early
March only half the pursuits and a quarter of the bombers that had been
sent were in shape for combat duty. The losses sustained in this emergency
movement were primarily responsible for President Roosevelt's decision in
early February to build a highway to Alaska by way of the airfields of the
Northwest Staging Route.\footnote{1st Ind, CG WDC to TAG, 11 Dec 41, on Ltr, TAG to CG WDC, 4 Sep 41, ADC 381
Def Plans, bk. 3; Memo, CG WDC for CG FF, 4 Mar 42, AG 452.1 (7-24-41) ; Conn and
Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 394.}

In response to General DeWitt's pleas for a much larger air reinforce-
ment, the War Department in March announced plans for providing Alaska
as soon as possible with five combat squadrons equipped with modern planes,
two each of pursuit and medium bombardment and one of heavy bombard-
ment planes. The actual strength in Alaska by the end of April was about
a squadron each of pursuit and medium bombardment, and one B-17 heavy
bombardment plane. These planes were all stationed at the Anchorage and
Kodiak airfields and could not be moved westward to the new Alaska Pe-
ninsula and Umnak air bases then nearing completion without stripping the
heart of the Alaskan military establishment of its means of air defense.\footnote{Memo, WPD for TAG, 5 Mar 42, WPD 4464-7; OCoS Interoffice Memo, 27 Apr 42,
WDCSA 452.1. See also Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 303ff.}

The relative weakness of Army air forces in Alaska was compounded by
slow progress in installing an aircraft warning service. In late 1941 the War
Department had approved a plan calling for 20 radar sets so arranged as to
guard all vital military installations in Alaska, but commitments to other
areas after the fighting started made it necessary to reduce this number at
first to 10 and in March to 5 sets. Brig. Gen. William C. Butler, command-
ing the newly designated Eleventh Air Force, was then called upon to sub-
mit a more modest air defense plan to match this allotment. General Butler
pointed out that an integrated air defense of Alaska controlled from one
headquarters was not feasible because of the large area to be protected, the
many mountain ranges which form natural barriers and divide Alaska into
isolated areas, and the lack of roads and internal communication networks.
He proposed therefore to organize a series of self-sufficient local air defense
areas for the protection of the more important airfields and bases. Air de-
fense for other Alaskan installations would be provided after the defense
of the three primary areas—Anchorage-Kodiak, Umnak-Dutch Harbor,
Dixon Entrance-Sitka—and been insured. He therefore proposed to install
the three detector sets en route at Sitka, at Lazy Bay on Kodiak Island, and
at Cape Wislow, Unalaska Island. One SCR–270 (mobile) was in operation at Anchorage and an SCR–271 was in operation at Cape Chiniak, Kodiak Island, at the time he made this proposal.\textsuperscript{12}

A month later the War Department again increased the number of long-range radar sets to be allocated to Alaska to ten for planning purposes, and at the beginning of May General DeWitt reported a revised air defense plan for locating the detectors and establishing a central information center at Anchorage and ten regional filter centers to co-ordinate radar and pursuit aircraft operations. This was little more than a plan when the Japanese attacked in early June, and apparently the only radar operating at that moment was the one at Cape Chiniak on Kodiak Island.\textsuperscript{13} The arrival in May of four radar-equipped heavy bombers made offshore aerial patrols more efficient and gave the Army an alternate means of detecting enemy movements on the eve of the Japanese approach to the Aleutians.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{The Attack on the Aleutians}

The Aleutian Islands extend in a long, sweeping curve for more than a thousand miles westward from the tip of the Alaska Peninsula. All of the islands are mountainous with no trees and little level ground suitable for the construction of airfields. From the shore line jagged peaks rise abruptly to an elevation of several thousand feet. The empty trough-shaped valleys are covered by tundra, a spongy mat of dead grass, on top of a layer of volcanic ash which when wet quickly churns into mud. Aleutian weather is notorious. Although the islands are not excessively cold, since they lie well below the Arctic Circle, rain, snow, and mist are the rule rather than the exception. These bare and almost unpopulated islands are also battered by violent winds and are hidden for much of the time in swirling fog.

On the globe the Aleutian chain appears to provide a natural route of approach toward either the continental United States or Japan. But the forbidding weather and wretched terrain made this seemingly natural route all but impracticable in 1942. Nevertheless, neither the United States nor Japan could afford to assume that the other would reject it as impracticable.

It will be recalled that the Joint Board in late November 1941 had approved the construction of an Army airfield on Umnak Island, not only to

\textsuperscript{13} Memo, CG WDC for TAG, 1 May 42, and other papers in WDC–ADC 381/32, pt. 1. The Anchorage set was being reinstalled at Cape Cleare on Montague Island.
\textsuperscript{14} Craven and Cate, eds., \textit{Plans and Early Operations}, p. 309.
provide local air protection for the naval base at Dutch Harbor, but also for the broader purposes of blocking a Japanese advance toward the mainland and permitting the projection of Army air power into the more distant Aleutians. Army Engineers under the command of Col. Benjamin B. Talley began the construction of a runway at Otter Point on the northeastern end of Umnak in mid-January 1942 and soon thereafter undertook similar work on an intermediate base at Cold Bay near the tip of the Alaska Peninsula, where construction of an airfield had been started in 1941 by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The Umnak base became the Army's Fort Glenn, and the Cold Bay base Fort Randall, with Fort Mears, the Army garrison for Dutch Harbor, in between. Both of the new fields were usable by 1 April, although just barely so. When the enemy approached two months later, Umnak had a garrison of about 4,000, Fort Mears of over 6,000, and Cold Bay of about 2,500, including engineer troops, but also including balanced complements of infantry and of field and antiaircraft artillery units. Generals Buckner and DeWitt had wanted a much larger combat force for the forward base on Umnak but had to be content with the 2,300 or so combat troops that the War Department had authorized.\textsuperscript{15}

While the Umnak and Cold Bay airfields were being rushed to completion, the Japanese High Command was planning to attack and occupy points in the Aleutian Islands as part of their "second phase" offensive. By April Japanese planners had agreed on the main features of the operation. Japanese task forces were to undertake a two-pronged drive against Midway and the Aleutian Islands in the early part of June. Aside from its diversionary aspect to cover the Midway strike, the Aleutian phase of the operations was to be purely defensive. After capturing Midway and Kiska, the Japanese intended to use them as bases for an aerial patrol of North Pacific waters. The islands would also be outposts in a new defense perimeter that would be extended in due course to the Samoan and Fiji Islands and New Caledonia.\textsuperscript{16}

The enemy knew little of American activities in the Aleutians since the war's beginning. The Japanese planners thought the United States had extensive military installations at Dutch Harbor and smaller garrisons on Adak, Kiska, and Attu. They also believed that there were one or two small air-

\textsuperscript{15} Ltr, CG ADC to CG WDC, 22 Dec 41, and 2d Ind to same, GHQ to TAG, 19 Feb 42, AGF 320.2 Alaska, binder 2; Memo, WPD for SW, 3 Jun 42, WDCSA 000.7 Alaska; Dod, "Operations in the War Against Japan," ch. VI, p. 8.

craft carriers as well as cruisers and destroyers operating in Aleutian waters. But they knew nothing of the new airfields east and west of Dutch Harbor then nearing completion.\(^{17}\) The Japanese plan for operations issued on 5 May 1942 reflected this faulty knowledge. Under the plan the Northern Area Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Boshiro Hosogaya, was to contain three separate task forces to carry out the operation. Leading the attack would be the Second Mobile Force, Rear Adm. Kakuji Kakuta commanding, built around the two small carriers *Junyo* and *Ryujo*, and including two heavy cruisers and three destroyers, with the mission of bombing shipping, planes, and shore installations at Dutch Harbor and on Adak. It would also provide cover for the landing forces, the *Adak-Attu Occupation Force* consisting of an Army detachment of approximately 1,200 troops with naval escort, which was first to occupy Adak and destroy United States forces found there, and then to withdraw and assist in the occupation of Kiska and Attu, and a second group, a special naval landing force of 550 combat and 700 labor troops, which was to occupy Kiska. By destroying American bases and occupying islands in the outer Aleutians, the Japanese hoped to prevent the Americans from launching a sea and air offensive by way of the North Pacific and to obstruct military collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union.\(^{18}\)

From the beginning of hostilities the War Department had recognized the vulnerability of the new bases in southern Alaska and particularly of the exposed installations in the Dutch Harbor area. Temporarily, Japan’s uninterrupted drive into southwestern Pacific and Indian Ocean areas eased concern over Alaska, but it soon revived. In mid-March G–2 warned that a Japanese attempt to seize the Aleutians or raid the mainland of Alaska in order to prevent the United States from using the northern approach to Japan and to obstruct communication between the United States and the Soviet Union could be expected at any time.\(^{19}\) After the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in April, it was generally expected in Washington that the Japanese would retaliate by raiding the west coast or Alaska.

The first definite indication that Alaska would be among the targets in a new Japanese offensive eastward was obtained from intercepts in late April. These revealed that the Japanese were concentrating striking forces at Truk.


\(^{19}\) MIS, WD Estimate 2, 19 Mar 42, OPD Exec 10, item 29.
and in home waters, and that the admiral in command at Truk "had just requested information and charts from Tokyo on the close-in waters along the Aleutians and as far eastward as Kodiak Island and to the north a little short of Nome." While Washington interpreted this information as a definite threat to Alaska, it also concluded that at least another month would pass before the Japanese could attack. On 3 May General DeWitt relayed the information to General Buckner and renewed his plea for the assignment of a pursuit squadron to the airfield at Umnak, which was now operational. More intercepts in May pinpointed the Japanese objectives as Midway Island and Dutch Harbor, and by 21 May the United States knew fairly accurately what the strength of the Japanese Northern Area Force would be and when it would strike—1 June, or shortly thereafter.

The Army and Navy took quick steps to counter the anticipated Japanese blow. As a precaution the War Department directed that the Umnak field and other facilities in danger of capture be prepared for demolition, but in transmitting this order General DeWitt assured General Buckner that additional means for defending Fort Glenn would be provided. The Navy prepared to reinforce its existing minuscule "Alaskan Navy" by establishing a new Task Force 8, under the command of Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald, and assembling its principal components (five cruisers, fourteen destroyers, six submarines, and auxiliaries) off Kodiak as rapidly as possible. On 21 May General Marshall and Admiral King declared a state of fleet-opposed invasion prospectively in effect "until and if invasion in force of Kodiak or Continental Alaska become imminent." At the same time they directed that all Army and Navy air units then in Alaska should be put into a task force to be commanded by the Army's General Butler, who in turn would report to the new Task Force 8 commander on his arrival in Alaska. Army ground forces were kept under Army command, and General Buckner was to coordinate their employment with those of naval forces by mutual co-operation.

When Admiral Theobald reached Kodiak on 27 May, he and General Buckner agreed to maintain these command relationships unless the

20 Pers Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen DeWitt, 29 Apr 42, WDC-ADC 384-7 Separate Envelope.
21 Rad, CG WDC to CG ADC, 3 May 42; Pers Ltr, Gen DeWitt to Gen Marshall, 3 May 42. Both in WDC-ADC 384-7 Separate Envelope.
22 Memo, G-2 for CoS, 17 May 42, OPD 387-42 WDC; Rad, COMINCH to CINCPAC (Info copy to CoS), 21 May 42, OPD Exec 8, bk. 5.
23 Rad, CG WDC to CG ADC, 20 May 42, ADC 581 Def Plans, bk. 4.
24 Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, pp. 165-74.
25 Rad, COMINCH to CINCPAC, 21 May 42; Rad, CINCPAC to COMALSEC, et al., 23 May 42. Both in WDCSA 000.7 Alaska.
Japanese captured a base in the Umnak–Dutch Harbor–Cold Bay area, in
which event an invasion of the mainland might be deemed imminent and
unity of command over land and shore-based defense forces might therefore
be vested in the Army. These preparations and command arrangements
reflected a widespread belief among American planners and commanders
that the Japanese were bent on capturing Dutch Harbor.

Before Admiral Theobald reached Kodiak, General Butler had begun to
move Army planes forward to the new Cold Bay and Umnak air bases, where
adequate supplies of gasoline and bombs had already been stockpiled. By
1 June 1 heavy and 6 medium bombers and 17 pursuits (now called fighters)
had reached Fort Glenn on Umnak, and 6 medium bombers and 16 fighters
were at Cold Bay—all the planes their unfinished airfields were believed
able to accommodate. On the same day the Navy had 8 radar-equipped patrol
planes operating from Dutch Harbor. Air reinforcements, including extra
pilots, were being rushed from the continental west coast to Alaska, to bring
its strength in modern Army combat planes to 10 heavy and 34 medium
bombers and 95 fighters. All these planes were for use at Elmendorf Field
and beyond, since by this time the Royal Canadian Air Force had two squad-
rons of fighter planes at the Annette Island base in southeastern Alaska (and
near the British Columbia port of Prince Rupert) and the intermediate
Yakutat base had no planes assigned. The total Army strength in Alaska
by 1 June was about 45,000 officers and enlisted men, of whom about 13,000
were at Fort Randall and the Aleutian bases.

On 25 May the enemy carrier force for the Dutch Harbor assault sortied
from Ominato in northern Honshu, and thick weather protected its approach
to the target. A naval patrol plane spotted the enemy about 400 miles south
of Kiska in the early afternoon of 2 June, and unusual radio activity later on
the same day also helped to alert the defenders. In the early morning hours
of 3 June, Admiral Kakuta’s Second Mobile Force was in launching position
south of Dutch Harbor, but less than half the planes launched reached their
objective. Starting about 0545, seventeen bombers and fighters from Ryujo
attacked Fort Mears and naval installations at Dutch Harbor, inflicting some
damage on barracks and other facilities and killing about twenty-five soldiers
and sailors. The Japanese lost two planes to antiaircraft fire. At 0900 the
every launched a second strike aimed at a group of five American destroyers

26 Rad, CTF 8 to CINCPAC, 28 May 42, OPD Exec 8, bk. 5.
27 Memo, Col Sherrill, OPD, for CofS, 1 Jun 42, WDCSA 000.7 Alaska; Memo, Admiral
Willson, OCNO, for Gen Marshall, 2 Jun 42, OPD Exec 8, bk. 5; Memo, WPD for SW, 3 Jun 42,
WDCSA 000.7 Alaska; Strength of the Army, 1 Nov 47, p. 42.
sighted by one of the planes of the first attack force, but the weather closed in and concealed the American ships and the enemy could not find them. Four Japanese seaplanes that were launched from cruisers flew over Umnak. P–40 fighters from the new Otter Point airfield attacked them and destroyed two. Overcast hid the field, and not until the following day did the Japanese discover the existence of the new American forward air base.\(^{28}\)

After recovering its planes, the enemy task force moved off in a south-westerly direction. During the night Admiral Kakuta changed course for Adak, which he had been ordered to soften up. But the weather was so bad that Kakuta decided to cancel the Adak attack and return for a second assault on Dutch Harbor. Late on 4 June Japanese planes struck again and destroyed four oil storage tanks, demolished a wing of the naval hospital, and partially destroyed the beached barracks ship *Northwestern*. Army and Navy casualties at Dutch Harbor for the two days were forty-three killed (thirty-three of them Army) and about fifty wounded. Both Dutch Harbor attacks were opposed by intense antiaircraft fire from land artillery supported by the naval guns fired from ships in the harbor. And, however startling they were, the attacks had little effect on the use of Dutch Harbor as a forward naval base.

While Army planes based on Umnak and at Cold Bay were not able to prevent the enemy from bombing and strafing Dutch Harbor, planes from Umnak did intercept 8 of the *Junyo* planes returning from the second day's attack and shot down 4 of them while losing 2 of their own. Army and Navy efforts on 3 June to locate and attack the enemy carrier force were fruitless. The next morning a Navy patrol plane spotted the enemy, and several flights of Army planes attacked during the day. In the early afternoon a medium bomber dropped a torpedo on or beside one of the carriers, but it failed to explode. Six heavy bombers were flown forward from Kodiak on 4 June, and 2 of them succeeded in locating and bombing the enemy force. Before the day was over, other medium bombers from Umnak fired two torpedoes at an enemy cruiser. Contemporary claims by flight crews of explosions and hits were all denied by the Japanese after the war, and apparently the enemy surface ships escaped unscathed. During the whole action the Japanese lost about 10 planes, the Army 5 (and at least fifteen airmen), and 6 Navy patrol planes were put out of action.

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\(^{28}\) This paragraph and the two following are based principally on: Ltr, Hq Eleventh Air Force to CG ADC (about 10 Jun 42), sub: Summary of Operations to June 10th, WDC-ADC 384-7, vol. II; Morison, *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Operations*, pp. 175–78; Craven and Cate, eds., *Plans and Early Operations*, pp. 462–69.
In the much larger action off Midway to the south, the Japanese suffered a severe setback, and momentarily they suspended their plans for landings in the western Aleutians and turned the Northern Area Force task forces homeward. Then, on 5 June, with the Adak landing abandoned for the time being, Admiral Hosogaya ordered the Adak-Attu Occupation Force to proceed to Attu, where its 1,200 troops began to land on 7 June, the day before the special naval force landed on Kiska. At the time of the landings the enemy intention was to stay only temporarily, and to withdraw before winter. Kiska without Midway no longer had any value as a base for patrolling the ocean between the Aleutian and Hawaiian chains; but Kiska and Attu in Japanese hands did block the Americans from using the Aleutians as a route for launching an offensive on Japan, and holding them had at least a distinct nuisance value. Before the end of June, therefore, the Japanese decided to stay and to build airfields on both islands.29

**The Army’s Reaction**

After the Dutch Harbor raid the Navy sent the patrol tender *Gillis* forward to Atka Island, and a Navy plane operating from Atka discovered the Japanese occupation of Kiska on the afternoon of 10 June. During the next three days Army bombers from Cold Bay and Umnak and Navy planes from Atka bombed the Kiska landing area as best they could through heavy overcast, but without much visible effect. A threatened counterattack by Japanese flying boats against Atka led to the withdrawal of the *Gillis*, and thereafter the bombing of Kiska was left to Army planes. Only about half the missions flown by them during June and July were able even to locate the target, and those that did inflicted comparatively minor damage. Weather was the great enemy in Aleutian air operations during the summer and fall of 1942; only nine of the seventy-two planes lost by the Eleventh Air Force through 31 October were destroyed in combat. The evident impossibility of bombing the enemy out of Kiska from the air persuaded the Navy to attempt a surface bombardment. After two tries in late July had been frustrated by dense fog, a naval force headed by four cruisers succeeded in bombing Kiska for half an hour on 7 August and inflicting considerable damage, but not enough to budge the Japanese. It became evident that only a joint and fairly large-scale

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operation to recapture the enemy-held islands would get the Japanese out of the Aleutians.\textsuperscript{30}

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided as much on 15 June, in their first discussion of the enemy occupation of Attu and Kiska. They also agreed that the sooner a determined effort was made to oust the Japanese from the Aleutians, the lesser the means that would be required to do it. At this time they considered it likely that the Aleutian attack and occupation was part of a holding action designed to screen a northward thrust by Japanese forces into Siberia’s maritime provinces and the Kamchatka Peninsula. Following this discussion Admiral King and General Marshall sent warnings to the theater commanders that a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union might also include the occupation of St. Lawrence Island and of Nome and its adjacent airfields on the Seward Peninsula.\textsuperscript{31}

The Chief of Staff took a personal hand in ordering the rush movement of reinforcements to Nome, then guarded by a single infantry company. He directed General Buckner to transfer twenty antiaircraft guns with their crews by air from Anchorage to Nome, where they had arrived by 21 June. During the succeeding two weeks 140 additional planeloads of men and equipment were flown in. Supplementing the air movement, ships from Seward carried troops, guns, ammunition, and vehicles to Nome, and by early July it had a garrison of more than 2,000 men. Far to the south of Nome, the Army on 17 June established a garrison of 1,400 officers and enlisted men at Port Heiden on the north side of the Alaska Peninsula, with the mission of developing and holding an air base intermediate between the Kodiak and Cold Bay fields, this new garrison becoming the Army’s Fort Morrow. By mid-July the Army was also maintaining intelligence detachments on St. Lawrence Island and in the Pribilofs to keep track of enemy movements.\textsuperscript{32}

The striking power of the Eleventh Air Force substantially increased following the enemy attack in early June, which occurred as air reinforcements were being rushed to Alaska and its forward bases. On 30 June the War


\textsuperscript{31} Min, JCS 20th Mtg, 15 Jun 42, ABC 370.2 Alaska (5-19-42); paraphrase of Rad, COMINCH to CINCPAC, 15 Jun 42, sent by CoFS to CG WDC, 16 Jun 42, OPD 381 Japan (3-7-42), sec. 1.

\textsuperscript{32} Various messages, dated 15-18 Jun 42, in OPD 381 ADC and AG 381 (12-5-41) (2); Gen Council Min, 23 Jun 42; Memo, Maj Joe E. Golden, OPD, for ACofS G-2, 15 Jul 42, OPD 384 WDC (3-17-42); Official Hist of Alaskan Dept, chs. III and XXI.
Department allotted the Alaskan air forces 2 heavy and 2 medium bombardment squadrons and one fighter group of 4 squadrons, all equipped with modern planes suitable for the Alaskan environment, and with substantial overstrengths in planes and crews to take care of operational losses. During the summer and fall of 1942 this strength was fairly well maintained. The new tactical air units sent to Alaska also had the support of a greatly increased flow of service units and supplies, including much more adequate radar equipment, and they were reinforced by the forward movement in June of 2 squadrons of Royal Canadian Air Force planes to Anchorage and beyond. Thereafter, air operations in the Aleutians became an Allied effort. The ground strength of the Alaska Defense Command was also substantially increased during the summer of 1942, and by the end of August its forces numbered about 71,500 officers and enlisted men.  

Both General DeWitt and General Buckner interpreted the Japanese occupation of Attu and Kiska and especially the enemy build-up on the latter island as preparation for an offensive eastward with the capture of Dutch Harbor as the initial objective. Both wanted to use Army and Marine Corps forces available in Alaska and on the west coast to mount an expedition against Kiska as soon as possible, and they wanted to cover this operation and perhaps draw the enemy into a decisive naval engagement by using American naval power in Hawaiian waters as well as that in Task Force 8. General Buckner’s more specific plan called for an initial occupation of Tanaga Island and the quick construction of an airfield there to provide close support by land-based aviation during the Kiska operation.  

As the theater commanders were preparing these recommendations, they were disturbed by a visit from Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, who rather bluntly informed them that the War Department considered the Aleutian situation of little consequence and Alaska a minor theater of operations that should be kept strictly on the defensive with no further Army air reinforcements. The Chief of Staff promptly disavowed General Kuter as a spokesman for the War Department on such matters as these, but the latter’s views did reflect a growing disinclination in Washington to commit large forces in an Aleutian offensive. Instead, the Army and Navy decided, as stated in a joint directive of 2 July, to undertake limited offensive
operations in the southern Pacific, a decision that virtually ruled out the use of major Pacific Fleet forces, including the Amphibious Force, in North Pacific operations, at least during 1942. Admiral King personally communicated this decision to General DeWitt on 6 July. In effect, it meant that any Aleutian offensive would have to be confined to what could be done with Army and Navy forces already in Alaska, bolstered by such units as General DeWitt could spare from west coast ground forces already under his command.\footnote{Rad, CG WDC for CofS, 23 Jun 42; Ltr, CG ADC to CG WDC, 23 Jun 42. Both in WDCSA 000.7 Alaska. Memo, CG WDC for CofS, 16 Jul 42, ADC 381 Def Plans, bk. 4; Matloff and Snell, \textit{Strategic Planning}, 1941-42, pp. 258-62.}

\textit{Command Problems}

Operations in Alaska during and after the Japanese attack and landings revealed a certain amount of interservice discord. The lack of co-ordination between the services can in part be attributed to the physical separation of the Army and Navy headquarters. Navy headquarters were located on Kodiak Island, and Army headquarters were at Fort Richardson near Anchorage, nearly three hundred miles away. The joint operations center previously set up by the Army at Anchorage proved practically worthless and had to be replaced by a similar establishment at Kodiak. Until the new center began functioning in August, the exchange of intelligence information between Navy and Army was slow and faulty.\footnote{Memo, Maj Golden, OPD, for ACofS G-2, 15 Jul 42; Memo, Col Francis G. Brink, MIS, for Chief, Intelligence Group G-2, 25 Jul 42; and Memo, OPD for DCOFS, 8 Aug 42. All in OPD 384 WDC (3-17-42), sec. 1.}

The control and conduct of air operations provided another source of friction. General Buckner was highly incensed by a complaint, attributed to a naval officer in Alaska and transmitted to the general by the War Department, that Army air units had been slow in responding to Navy requests for air support during the Dutch Harbor raid because of the Army's lack of understanding of command arrangements. He informed General DeWitt that the delays had been caused by limited communications, lack of sufficient bombardment aviation, and the exhaustion of pilots and crews who had been forced to fly in fog and the almost continuous daylight then prevalent, rather than any misunderstanding about command.\footnote{Memo, OPD for WDCMS, 6 Jun 42; Rad 072140, CG ADC to COMALSEC, 7 Jun 42. Both in OPD 384 WDC (3-17-42), sec. 1. Rad 583, Gen DeWitt to Gen Marshall, 8 Jun 42, OPD Log File; paraphrase of Rad, Adm Theobald to Gen Buckner (about 12 Jun 42), WDCSA 42-43 Alaska.} In fact, the directive to place
both Army and Navy air units under the command of the senior Army air officer in Alaska, General Butler, was not put into full effect until peremptory orders from Washington required that it be done.\(^{38}\) The situation was aggravated by a lively personality clash among the senior Alaskan commanders, which tended to undermine the formal command arrangements that had been made.\(^{39}\)

War Department officials were cognizant of the discord in Alaska and endeavored to rectify the situation without fanfare. In June, when General Kuter visited Alaska, he investigated the controversial air command question and was authorized to take such remedial action on the spot as he could. And when, in August, Col. Carl Russell of the Operations Division set out for Alaska as the military representative on a Senate investigating committee, he was asked "to unofficially familiarize himself with the relations between the Army and Navy in Alaska."\(^{40}\) Governor Ernest Gruening, the Alaska War Council, and the Senate's Chandler Committee were less patient. They urged the War Department to establish a unified command in Alaska at once in order to meet the potential threat of an enemy invasion. As a result the matter was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. After careful study, they decided against any change in the command arrangements in Alaska. Ultimately, as a result of a discreet transfer of personnel, interservice friction and discord largely disappeared.\(^{41}\)

Until these transfers had been effected, command relationships were an important factor in reopening for discussion two proposals argued during 1941. The one was whether the commanding general in Alaska ought to be an air officer. The other was the closely related question of whether the Alaska Defense Command ought to be detached from the Western Defense Command and established as a separate theater of operations.

The Chief of Staff informed General DeWitt in September 1942 that the War Department contemplated replacing General Buckner by a senior air officer and establishing an Alaskan Department in the near future. The

\(^{38}\) Rad, Gen Buckner to Gen Marshall, 20 Jun 42, OPD Log File; Memo, Col Deane, SGS, for CoFS, 21 Jun 42, WDCSA binder, Notes on War Council; Min, War Council Mtg, 22 Jun 42, SW Conf, binder 2.


\(^{40}\) Memo, ASGS for CoFS, 21 Jun 42, WDCSA binder, Notes on War Council; Memo, OPD for DCofS, 8 Aug 42, OPD 384 WDC (3-17-42).

\(^{41}\) Rad 212455, Gov Gruening et al. to Secy Interior, 20 Jun 42, OPD Log File; various papers, dated 9-28 Sep 42, in ABC 686 Alaska (9-7-42); Memo, Col Henry A. Barber, Chief, North American Theater Group, OPD for Brig Gen Wilton B. Persons, 19 Apr 43, OPD 384 WDC (3-17-42).
professed reason for the change was that Army planners had "always had in mind that after the ground forces were well established in the Aleutians the command should pass to an air man as that would be the principal arm of operation." It is far more likely that the real reason General Marshall proposed to make the change in command was to permit a quiet shift in personnel that would eliminate one basic cause of friction between the services. At any rate, after the Alaskan naval commander had been replaced, and after a close and harmonious working relationship developed between his successor and the commanding general of the Alaska Defense Command, the matter was not pressed.

Once again General DeWitt argued vigorously against the proposal to separate Alaska from the Western Defense Command, reviewing in detail the reasons he had given in the spring of 1941. He maintained that the Alaska and Western Defense Commands were strategically interlocked by a single mission. He also argued that supply and administrative matters could be more effectively administered by a single command than otherwise. Washington staff planners, on the contrary, favored an independent Alaskan command. They felt that from the strategic point of view there was no more reason for Alaska to remain under the Western Defense Command than for Hawaii to be in the same subordinate relationship. They argued that because of the improvement in supply procedures and communication facilities a separate Alaskan theater was entirely feasible. They believed that the size of Army forces in Alaska and the possibility of major operations in the area justified the establishment of a separate command. For the time being nothing was done to alter the chain of command, although the matter remained a subject of staff study throughout the winter of 1942 and for most of 1943.

**Aid to the Soviet Union**

As noted above, Japanese action against the Aleutians immediately renewed American anticipation of Soviet involvement in the Pacific war, and as late as 11 July Army intelligence was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in the near future as a virtual certainty. During May, Soviet interest in the Alaskan air route to Siberia had also revived, and on 8 June Ambassador Maxim M. Litvinov told Mr. Harry Hopkins that the Soviet Government

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42 Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen DeWitt, 3 Sep 42, WDCA 42–43 Alaska.
43 Ltr, Gen DeWitt to Gen Marshall, 11 Sep 42; Memos, OPD for CofS, 5 and 7 Oct 42. All in OPD 384 WDCA (3–17–42), sec. 1.
44 Memo, G–2 for CofS, 11 Jul 42, OPD Exec 10, item 7c.
"had agreed to our flying bombers to Russia via Alaska and Siberia." Mr. Hopkins guessed that the real reason behind this Soviet agreement was to prepare the way for the flight of American bombers to the Vladivostok area in the event Japan attacked. After the discussion of the North Pacific situation by the Joint Chiefs on 15 June, they drafted a message to be sent by President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin, expressing the President’s pleasure with Soviet agreement to use the Alaska-Siberia air route for ferrying lend-lease planes to Europe, and proposing the immediate exchange of detailed military information and staff conversations to prepare the way for collaboration against Japan in the North Pacific. Marshal Stalin’s response suggested that American planes being sent to the western front be taken over by Soviet flyers at Nome or elsewhere in Alaska, and, while agreeing to staff conversations in Moscow he was very noncommittal about military collaboration in the Far East.

Following this exchange the United States sent Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley to Moscow for staff conversations, and the Army Air Forces began to prepare Ladd Field at Fairbanks (rather than Nome) as the delivery point for lend-lease planes destined to the Soviet Union. When General Bradley reached Moscow at the end of July, he found Russian officials primarily interested in the ferrying project. They professed no alarm over a Japanese threat to Siberia and were evidently as determined as ever to avoid a two-front war as long as they were hard-pressed by the Germans in Europe.

The planes for the Soviet Union were flown by way of the Northwest Staging Route to Ladd Field at Fairbanks, which was designated an exempt station under Army Air Forces’ control, although support of the ferrying operation became one of the principal missions of the Alaska Defense Command. The first planes from the continental United States reached Fairbanks in September 1942 and, after inspection and acceptance by the Russians, were flown off by them before the end of the month. For the first six months many difficulties plagued the operation, but eventually the Alaskan air route became the principal means for delivering aircraft to the Soviet Union. The

46 Min, JCS 20th Mtg, 15 Jun 42, ABC 370.2 (5–19–42); Draft message, Roosevelt to Stalin, 16 Jun 42, and Rad 227, Ambassador William H. Standley to Dept of State, 2 Jul 42. Both in WDCSA 42-43 Russia. The Soviet response states the President’s message was delivered on 26 June.
route to Fairbanks also provided a means for delivering planes to the Eleventh Air Force, and transport service along the route gave some essential support to military operations in the Aleutians and beyond. But the air route operated by the Army through northwestern Canada and across Alaska served principally and very largely the purpose of delivering airplanes to the Russians, an activity which continued unabated until the summer of 1945.48

The Advance Westward

With the decisions on Pacific strategy that Admiral King had communicated to him in mind, General DeWitt on 16 July submitted a more modest plan for a joint offensive in the Aleutians. Engineer reconnaissance in late June had indicated the feasibility of constructing an airfield quickly on Tanaga Island, located about 400 miles west of Umnak and 200 miles from Kiska, and it was this survey that had prompted General Buckner to recommend the occupation of Tanaga as the first step in a drive on Kiska. General DeWitt now proposed it as "the next best step to the occupation of Kiska to thwart the enemy's eastward movement," and as an essential move toward the capture of Kiska eventually. He planned to send an initial garrison of 3,200 Army troops to Tanaga, including infantry and artillery elements from the west coast, and to do so during August if the Navy's Alaskan forces were prepared to cover the landing.49

In Washington, discussion of this proposal developed a preference of the Navy for a landing on Adak Island, about sixty miles east of Tanaga. Adak, the Navy believed, had a better and less exposed harbor; on the other hand, the information then available to the Army indicated it would take much longer to build an airfield there. A directive of the Joint Chiefs, announced on 5 August and confirmed five days later, apparently settled the argument in favor of Tanaga. But, on 15 August, Admiral Theobald reported that his survey board had advised that an occupation of Tanaga would present the Navy with serious navigational hazards, and Admiral King thereupon withdrew his approval of the Tanaga operation. Confronted with the choice of Adak or no forward advance, General DeWitt agreed to go along with the Navy and occupy Adak. The revised joint directive for this operation, dispatched on 22 August, suggested a supporting occupation of Atka Island to the east of Adak to provide an intermediate emergency landing field for

48 For details, see Craven and Cate, eds., Services Around the World, ch. VI.
49 Memo, CG WDC for CofS, 16 Jul 42, ADC 381 Def Plans, bk. 4.
Construction on Adak. Airport and harbor (top). Dredging sand from an inlet to fill in the airfield (bottom).
fighter planes, and a skeleton movement of Army troops to Tanaga at the
time of the Adak landing to deceive the enemy. The theater commanders
considered the Tanaga suggestion impracticable, but the Atka occupation
was carried out by an Army force of 800 men on 16 September.50

In the meantime, preliminary reconnaissance landings on Adak on 26 and
27 August had failed to discover any enemy forces on the island, and three
days later an Army force of about 4,500 began to come ashore. The fortuitous
discovery that a tidal basin near the landing area could be used as an airfield
site solved anticipated construction problems on that score. Army engineers
installed an ingenious drainage system which with fills provided a usable
airfield in less than two weeks, instead of the two or three months that had
been forecast. The Army planned to increase the Adak garrison to more than
10,000 men by mid-October, and thus to make it the strongest as well as the
most advanced of the Alaskan bases.51

A few days after the Adak landing General DeWitt ordered the Alaska
Defense Command to send an Army detachment to St. Paul and St. George
Islands in the Pribilofs, from which the native population had been evacuated
in June. A Joint Chiefs directive of 6 September confirmed this move, which
in transmission crossed a vigorous message of protest from Admiral Theobald.
At his insistence the operation was briefly deferred, an Army force of
800 finally landing on St. Paul on 19 September, where it was housed in the
abandoned civilian dwellings and where it built a fighter strip that was
ready for use by the end of October.52

The new base at Adak soon proved its worth. On 14 September a force
of twelve B-24 heavy bombers accompanied by twenty-eight fighters from
Adak delivered a strong attack on Kiska. The planes encountered intense
fire from Japanese antiaircraft guns whose numbers had been increased by
the withdrawal of antiaircraft forces from Attu only four days before.
Nevertheless, the attack was highly successful. While fighters of the 42d
and 54th Squadrons strafed installations, shelled three small submarines, and
left a large four-motor flying boat burning in the harbor, the B-24's were

50 Rads, COMINCH to CINCPAC, 5 and 22 Aug 42, both in WDC–ADC 384–7, vol. IV,
contain the JCS Dirs on Tanaga and Adak; Rad, CTF 8 to CINCPAC, 15 Aug 42, WDCSA
42–43 Alaska; Memo, COMINCH for CoS, 18 Aug 42, OPD Exec 10, item 67a; Ltr, Gen
DeWitt to Gen Marshall, 7 Sep 42, WDCSA 42–43 WDC; Official Hist of the Alaskan Dept,
chs. XXI.
51 Rad 3616, CG WDC to CoS, 8 Sep 42, WDC–ADC 384–7, vol. IV; OPD interoffice
Memo, 9 Sep 42, OPD 381 Alaska, sec. I.
52 OPD Diary, 4 Sep 42; Memo, CoS for OPD, 8 Sep 42, and attachments, OPD Exec 10,
item 67b; Official Hist of the Alaskan Dept, chs. III, XXI.
chalking up hits on enemy shipping and on base installations. Two mine sweepers and three cargo vessels were considered sunk or badly damaged, several other seaplanes were destroyed, and fires set on shore. Losses among the attackers were limited to two P-38 fighters that collided in midair while chasing the same enemy fighter. Then a long spell of bad weather intervened. The attack was resumed on 25 September, when a combined United States–Canadian force struck another hard blow against Kiska. Nearly every day for the next three weeks, and sometimes twice a day, American and Canadian planes shot up the Japanese installations or bombed shipping in Kiska Harbor. During September slightly more than 116 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy, almost twice as much as in the entire period up to 1 September; and in the following month, October, 200 tons of bombs were dropped. On 14 October a particularly strong formation exploded a supply dump on Kiska and started large fires in the Japanese camp area. Two days later a flight of six medium bombers sank one Japanese destroyer and damaged another. Then, beginning in November, bad weather and the withdrawal of heavy bombers from action restricted air operations until February to reconnaissance and occasional bombings.53

The repeated bombings of Kiska during the summer had persuaded the enemy that the Americans aimed to recapture it, and in order to strengthen Kiska the Japanese on 24 August put all of their Aleutian forces under naval command and ordered the Army garrison on Attu to move to Kiska. The movement was completed by 16 September, after destruction of the defense installations so laboriously undertaken on Attu. Following a second reorganization of the enemy’s North Pacific forces in late October, the Japanese Army increased its garrison in the Kuril Islands and reoccupied Attu. By early November enemy forces on Kiska numbered about 4,000 and those on Attu about 1,000. The Japanese counted on darkness and the weather to protect them from any serious American attack before the following March, and in the meantime they hoped to complete airfields for land-based planes on Kiska and on Shemya Island near Attu, something they were never able to do. Throughout the Aleutian Campaign the Japanese had to depend either on carriers, which made their last visit in July 1942, or on planes that could be floated; and weak air attacks on Adak during October did little more than illustrate the ineffectiveness of enemy air power. The Japanese also hoped to occupy Amchitka Island, about eighty miles southeast of Kiska, to bar another

American move westward. While enemy orders referred to Kiska as "the key position on the northern attacking route against the United States in the future," it is fairly evident that the Japanese had no such design and were attempting only to block the American advance.54

United States Army and Navy leaders were in agreement by October that the only satisfactory solution of the Aleutian situation would be to launch an amphibious assault on Kiska. They assumed that the core of the assault force would have to be an infantry division or its equivalent and that this division would need at least three months of special training. The division and its supporting forces could not be made ready for the operation before March 1943 at the earliest, and in any event the Aleutian environment during the intervening months would be at its worst. These considerations, coupled with a crisis in the Guadalcanal operation in the South Pacific, led in November to the stripping of Task Force 8, and it would not be able to command and cover an assault on Kiska until its strength was restored. In the meantime, the most the Army and Navy could do in the Aleutians would be to expand and strengthen their forward bases.55

As soon as the airfield on Adak was in operation, General Buckner and Admiral Theobald began preparations for the occupation of Tanaga, which they planned to do by the end of October.56 As originally conceived, this was to be a defensive measure intended to thwart a Japanese move in the direction of Adak. For the purpose of supporting an assault on Kiska, Tanaga offered no particular advantage over Adak.

In Washington Army and Navy planners since August had been considering an occupation of Amchitka, and at the War Department's suggestion a reconnaissance of Amchitka was carried out at the end of September to determine how long it would take to construct an airfield there. The reconnaissance indicated that the construction would be difficult, and therefore General DeWitt strongly objected when General Marshall asked him whether Amchitka could be substituted for Tanaga, especially since the Chief of Staff in the same message warned that Alaskan naval strength might be drastically reduced in the near future. When General Marshall

54 The quotation is from a paraphrase of the Army Imperial GHQ order of 25 Aug 42 (24 August, Alaskan dating), in Japanese Monograph No. 46. This monograph, and Nos. 45 and 88, are the principal sources for the above summary.
56 Memo, OPD for CoFS, 28 Sep 42, OPD 381 Alaska, sec I; Memo, Gen Marshall for Adm King, 1 Oct 42, WDCSA 42-43 Alaska.
ALASKA IN THE WAR, 1942

repeated the Amchitka proposal at the end of October, General DeWitt postponed the Tanaga operation, which was to have started on 1 November, and directed General Buckner to arrange with Admiral Theobald for a new survey of Amchitka. The appointed survey party remained at Fort Glenn for more than a month, with General DeWitt’s concurrence, because Admiral Theobald thought its transport by Navy plane to Amchitka too risky in view of the increased enemy strength on Kiska and enemy patrol activity in its vicinity.57

Then, on 13 December, General DeWitt discussed the situation in the Aleutians with Rear Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, who was on his way to Alaska to relieve Admiral Theobald as commander of Task Force 8. Admiral Kinkaid, who had recently commanded a carrier group in the Solomons, was fully acquainted with Japanese capabilities as well as the course of the war in the South Pacific. Having been briefed by Admiral Nimitz on the Aleutians, he had reached the conclusion that an airfield had to be built on Amchitka to prevent the Japanese from building one there. In a discussion with Admiral Kinkaid, General DeWitt agreed to call off the occupation of Tanaga and to substitute the Amchitka operation. Admiral King, who was also in San Francisco conferring with Admiral Nimitz, immediately concurred. The reports from San Francisco led to the prompt dispatch of the Amchitka reconnaissance party, which visited the island on 17–19 December.58

On his return to Washington Admiral King submitted the draft of a joint directive to General Marshall, calling not only for the occupation of Amchitka immediately if the new survey proved to be favorable, but also for the selection of Army forces for the Kiska assault and initiation of their training. General Marshall agreed, on condition that the reconnaissance of Amchitka indicated that an airfield could be built there within a reasonable time and provided, further, that no definite target date was set for the invasion of Kiska. These conditions were acceptable to Admiral King, and on 18 December the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to this effect. Two days later General DeWitt reported that the reconnaissance party had returned with news that a fighter strip could be built on Amchitka in two or three weeks and a main airfield with a 5,000-foot runway in three or four

57 Memo, CofS for SW, 12 Jan 43, WDCSA 42–43 Alaska (a review of the proposals and actions leading up to the occupation of Amchitka); Rad 2062, CofS to Gen DeWitt, 15 Oct 42, WDCSA 42–43 Alaska; Rad, Gen DeWitt to Gen Marshall, 17 Oct 42, OPD Exec 10, item 67b; Rad, CG WDC to CG ADC, 1 Nov 42, ADC 3513 Def Plans, bk. 5.
58 Rad 223, CG WDC to CofS, 18 Dec 42, OPD Log File; Memo, CofS for SW, 12 Jan 43, WDCSA 42–43 Alaska.
Bad weather frustrated the first attempt to land troops on Amchitka on 9 January 1943, but during the night of 11 January a small security detachment was put ashore from the destroyer Worden. The next morning a combat team of nearly 2,000 men, under the command of Brig. Gen. Lloyd E. Jones, disembarked without opposition. The only enemies were the weather, the unpredictable current, and the rock-studded waters through which the landing was made. The Worden, after landing the security party, ran onto a rock pinnacle and sank with the loss of fourteen men. The first night the main body of troops were on shore a gale blew up that smashed a considerable number of the landing boats and swept the transport Arthur Middleton aground. The second day brought a blizzard. And so it went for almost two weeks. When the weather cleared, the Japanese discovered what was happening on Amchitka. Beginning on 24 January, Japanese planes made a number of light bombing and strafing attacks on the island but failed to halt work on an airfield. By 16 February, the fighter strip was ready for limited operation. On that day eight P-40's arrived on Amchitka, and within a week they were running patrols over Kiska.

The stage was now set for the next phase of operations, amphibious attacks to eject the Japanese from their Aleutian footholds.

59 Memo, Adm King for CofS, 15 Dec 42; Memo, Gen Marshall for Adm King, 16 Dec 42; and Memo, CofS for SW, 12 Jan 43. All in WDCSA 42-43 Alaska. Rad 244, CG WDC to CofS, 20 Dec 42, OPD Log File.

60 Official Hist of the Alaskan Dept, ch. III; Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 18; Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 374-76.
CHAPTER XI

Clearing the Aleutians

As soon as the decision to occupy Amchitka was taken in December 1942, preliminary planning to drive the Japanese out of the Aleutians was set in motion. Initially Kiska, the nearer, more strongly fortified of the enemy-held islands, and offering a more satisfactory harbor and better airfield sites, was the objective of the counterassault. As a starting point, General DeWitt proposed to organize and train a task force built around one infantry division and totaling 25,000 men. For commander and assistant commander he recommended Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett and Brig. Gen. Eugene M. Landrum, both of whom had participated in joint amphibious exercises and were familiar with conditions in the Aleutians. Although Admiral Nimitz, estimating Japanese strength on Kiska at 10,000 men, suggested that two divisions might be required, the War Department concurred in the outline plan presented by General DeWitt. In place of the 35th Division, originally recommended, the War Department proposed, and General DeWitt agreed, to employ the 7th Division, since it was in a better state of training and readiness, was scheduled for early “demotorization” and could be brought up to full strength more readily, was stationed near Fort Ord, where the amphibious training was to be conducted, and was more ably led and staffed.1

A joint Army-Navy planning staff was set up at San Diego under Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell, commander of the Amphibious Force, North Pacific, who was designated to command the assault force for the actual operation. Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, commanding general of the 7th Division, was named commander of the landing force. While Admiral Rockwell and a group of officers from the Western Defense Command were making plans, with the help of several Alaskan experts from General Buckner’s headquarters, General Brown was leading his troops through the

amphibious training course directed by Maj. Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC. By the beginning of February the forces training at Fort Ord for the descent on Kiska included, in addition to the 7th Division, the 184th Infantry Regiment, the 78th Coast Artillery (AA) (less one battalion), and the 2d Battalion, 501st Coast Artillery (AA).²

Meanwhile, in the Aleutians the Eleventh Air Force had been sending its planes over Kiska whenever the weather permitted, which in December and January was not often. Fog and foul weather held the planes to the ground during most of January, and the few missions that were flown proved more costly to the Eleventh Air Force than damaging to the enemy. Only about 10½ tons of bombs were dropped—the lightest since the beginning of the air assault—and at least ten planes were lost, none of them by enemy action. Partly because the weather improved, and partly because P–38 and P–40 fighter-bombers were now based on Amchitka, February and March were much better months. In February Army planes attacked Kiska on nine separate days, flying twenty-four missions (not including twenty weather and reconnaissance missions), and dropping about 150 tons of bombs. The attacks continued with equal vigor and intensity during March.³ There was, to be sure, no comparison between the air assault on Kiska and the huge raids taking place against German-occupied Europe, but it is to be noted that in the South Pacific the Allied air forces loosed 197 tons of bombs on Rabaul during the month of December.

On 26 March a solid opportunity came to the Eleventh Air Force to strike a major blow, when a naval task group cruising off the Komandorski Islands under Rear Adm. Charles H. McMorris intercepted a strong Japanese force that was attempting to run reinforcements into Kiska and Attu. But the opportunity was lost. When Admiral McMorris' report of contact reached Adak, the bombers loaded with antipersonnel bombs were poised for an attack on Kiska. Although General Butler estimated that it would take at least an hour or so to unload the light bombs and replace them with heavy, armor-piercing ones, it seemed logical to accept the delay and make the change.⁴ Admiral Kinkaid therefore sent a message to McMorris suggesting that he fight a retiring action to the eastward in order to get under cover of

² Capt Nelson L. Drummond, The Attu Operation (2 vols.), I, 30, MS in OCMH. Drummond, a historical officer, prepared this account from official records and interviews with participants.
³ Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 375–76; Official Hist of the Alaskan Dept, app. B, Summary of Air Operations; Navy Dept Communiques for Jan and Feb 43, in G–2 Study on Aleutians, by Maj G. Dorrance, copy in OCMH.
⁴ Ltr, Adm Kinkaid to Actg Chief of Military History, 11 Apr 59, OCMH files.
the bombers, but McMorris at that point was completely cut off by an enemy force twice the strength of his own. Furthermore, the shift of bomb loads took much longer than anticipated, and by the time the planes were ready a snow storm had closed in the field. When they finally took to the air, they were unable to reach the scene of action before the Japanese had retreated beyond range. Although Admiral McMorris succeeded in thwarting the enemy attempt at reinforcement, the support of Army bombers might have enabled him to turn the engagement, brilliant as it was, into an unmistakable disaster for the Japanese.5

*Attu Retaken*

By this time the plans and preparations in motion on the west coast had been given a new objective. Realizing that not enough shipping would be available for the Kiska operation, Admiral Kinkaid had recommended early in March that Attu be substituted as the target, for, in comparison with Kiska, Attu appeared to be weakly defended. Estimates based on air photographs placed the Japanese strength on Attu at only 500 men, of which three rifle companies constituted the effective tactical strength, the remainder being antiaircraft and labor troops. Instead of the reinforced division called for in the Kiska plans, one infantry regiment plus the 7th Division's mountain artillery was considered by Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner as probably sufficient for the capture of Attu. Only four attack transports (APA's) and two or three cargo ships (AKA's) would be required.6 Also in capturing Attu and with an airfield in operation there, American forces would be astride the Japanese line of communications between the home islands and Kiska. The latter, cut off from supply and reinforcements, would "wither on the vine." On 10 March Admiral King notified Admiral Nimitz and General DeWitt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the projected change of plan, provided the operation could be carried out with only those means that Admiral Nimitz could spare and those already on hand for the assault on Kiska, which was now deferred. The approval of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral King made clear, extended only to planning and training; it was not to be considered as a directive to execute the operation.7 This would hinge upon the outcome of the discussions on Pacific strategy

5 See Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls*, ch. II.
6 Rad, CTF 8 to CINCPAC, 7 Mar 43, OPD 381/39. ONI Combat Narrative, Aleutians Campaign, pp. 69-70.
7 Rad, COMINCH to CINCPAC and CG WDC, 10 Mar 43, OPD 381/39.
about to begin in Washington. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 March agreed to postpone any major offensive in the South Pacific, the way was cleared for the reduction of Attu. Information received by the Navy that the Japanese were establishing an airfield on Attu offered an additional reason for putting the plans into execution. Therefore, on 22 March, General Marshall and Admiral King decided that the operation should proceed “as soon as practicable.”

The shift of objective did not upset the training program or make an appreciable difference in the preliminary planning activity of Admiral Rockwell’s joint staff in San Diego. A new estimate of the situation, including a study of the shipping that would be available and the forces required, was necessary. This was prepared by the joint planning staff; and, after the decision to go ahead with the operation was reached, General Brown’s staff, in co-operation with Admiral Rockwell’s joint planners, began drawing up the detailed tactical plans.

Seldom has an operation been planned with less knowledge of the conditions the troops would have to face. From Cape Wrangell in the west to Chirikof Point in the east, the fog-surrounded island of Attu is about forty statute miles in length. Its greatest width is about twenty miles. At the head of the deep coastal indentations lie narrow beaches, from which small, snow-fed streams lead back into the jumbled, barren mountain-mass of the interior, a desolate region of twisted, precipitous crags, whose snow-capped peaks mount upwards to heights of two and three thousand feet. The valley floors are carpeted with tundra: the black muck, covered with a dense growth of lichens and moss, which is characteristic of the far North. On the northern mainland, in Alaska and northern Canada, the tundra is frozen solid during most of the year; but in the outermost Aleutians the Japan Current has a moderating effect on temperatures and much of the time the tundra is barely firm enough for a man to cross it on foot. The same Japan Current accounts for the pea-soup fogs, the constant pervading wetness, and the frequent storms that help to make the outer Aleutians so in-

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8 Memo, Adm King for CofS, 22 Mar 43, with proposed dir COMINCH to CINCPAC, and Memo, OPD for COMINCH, 22 Mar 43, OPD 381/54. For accounts of the Pacific Military Conf in Washington, see Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 91–99, and, in the same series, John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul (Washington, 1959), ch. II.

CLEARING THE ALEUTIANS

hospitable. To the soldiers who had to fight not only the Japanese but the weather and terrain of the island, it must have seemed that the Creator of the universe was an unskilled apprentice when He brought Attu into existence.

The eastern end of Attu, indented by four bays, is roughly shaped in the form of a trefoil: the northern lobe lies between Holtz Bay and Sarana Bay; the elongated midsection, terminating in Chirikof Point, is shaped by Sarana and Massacre Bays; and the southern lobe lies between Massacre Bay and Temnac Cove. (Map III) From Holtz Bay in the north and Temnac Cove in the south, steep-walled valleys run back in a generally westward direction until they disappear in the mountainous maze of the interior. The Massacre Bay valley, about a mile and a quarter wide at the beach, is soon divided into two by a hogback, which, although rather steep on the sides, slopes gradually along its length to an elevation of about 550 feet at the upper end. At Holtz Bay, likewise, a ridge divides the valley into two; but here the central ridge projects into the bay for a distance of nearly a mile, and its highest, steepest sides face the water. About a mile and a half up the west arm of the valley a low pass crosses this ridge into the eastern Holtz Bay valley, from which, at this point, over a 600-foot saddle, it is possible to cross into the head of West Massacre Valley. A slightly lower saddle separates the head of East Massacre Valley from the valley leading out of Sarana Bay.10

Only the bare details of the topography were known to those planning the assault. The only available map of Attu was a Coast and Geodetic Survey chart showing the terrain back to approximately one thousand yards from the shore line, and warning all shipping not to approach closer than two and one-half to three miles. Very little was known about the harbors. Oblique aerial photographs filled in a few gaps, but, because of the prevailing fog, the coverage was far from complete. A terrain model was constructed of the eastern portion of the island, east of a line running from Temnac Cove to the ridge north and west of Holtz Bay, but the model did not clearly delineate the key passes or the areas behind Henderson Ridge (the southwestern wall of Massacre Valley) and in the interior, west of Holtz Bay.11

The American planning staff had only scant information concerning the Japanese defenses. During late fall and early winter the Attu garrison had

10 The following maps of Attu have been used: AMSQ 831, Type C (AMS–2) 1947, Scale 1:25,000; and AMSQ 501, First Edition 1953, Scale 1:250,000.
11 Drummond, Attu Operation, I, 43–44; Smith, Preliminary Rpt on Attu Landing, p. 2.
THE CAPTURE OF ATTU
7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
11-30 May 1943

- Axis of main U.S. attack
- Secondary U.S. movements
- Japanese counterattack

ELEVATIONS IN FEET

0 200 1000 2000 AND ABOVE

4 MILES

MAP III
been gradually reinforced. A redeployment of naval forces ordered by Admiral Kinkaid shortly after he took command and the subsequent battle off the Komandorskiis put an end to the process, but in the meantime the Japanese strength had been increased to a total of approximately 2,400 men. The nucleus of combat troops included about one and a half battalions of infantry, three antiaircraft batteries armed with 75-mm. dual-purpose guns and lighter weapons, and two platoons of a mountain gun battery armed with 75-mm. pack howitzers. In addition to medical and other service detachments there were several engineer units whose primary mission was to construct an airfield at the head of the East Arm of Holtz Bay. The whole force was commanded by Col. Yasuyo Yamazaki, with headquarters at Chichagof Harbor, a small bay midway between Holtz and Sarana Bays. The bulk of the garrison was concentrated in the vicinity of Holtz Bay and around Chichagof Harbor, where the strongest positions had been installed. One of the antiaircraft batteries, consisting of four guns, commanded the West Arm of Holtz Bay; another was placed at the head of the East Arm of the bay; and the third was part of the Chichagof Harbor defenses. The pass between Holtz Bay and Massacre Valley was guarded by the mountain artillery, one platoon of which was in position to enfilade Massacre Valley itself. Along the ridges flanking Massacre Valley and overlooking Sarana Bay the Japanese had built machine gun and mortar positions.

The plans being developed in California took note of the fact that Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor were the most heavily defended of the possible landing places. Reconnaissance planes had noted signs of Japanese activity in the vicinity of Temnac Cove, Sarana Bay, and at the head of Massacre Valley, but it was almost impossible to spot the cleverly concealed emplacements along the ridges. Additional details kept coming to light with the result that the original estimate of Japanese strength was progressively raised. By the time General Brown and his staff had completed the operational planning, it was estimated that the enemy garrison amounted to something between 1,600 and 1,800 men, of whom one battalion or its equivalent was composed of infantry and troops available for infantry service. Aerial photographs received from the planning staffs in early April indicated that a number of Japanese positions existed in the lower part of Massacre Valley commanding the beaches and the bay, but, because there was no sign that these

12 Drummond, Attu Operation, I, 8–9, 12–15; Japanese Monograph 46, pp. 111 ff., and Map 3, Disposition of Troops (Japanese) on Attu.
Clearing the Aleutians: 283

Positions were occupied, the assumption was that they had been built and abandoned the year before.¹³

As soon as it was clear that the Japanese garrison exceeded the first estimate of 500 men, General Brown's landing force was increased by an additional battalion combat team. Thus, for the initial attack, the following troops would be available: one regimental combat team built around the 17th Infantry and a field artillery battalion; one battalion combat team from the 32d Infantry and including a battery of field artillery; the 7th Division Reconnaissance Troop; one battalion of antiaircraft artillery; and one battalion of combat engineers. The remainder of the 32d Infantry, with reinforcements similar to those of the 17th Infantry combat team, was to be held at Adak as a floating reserve and was expected to be available at Attu on D plus 1. The total strength of the assault force and floating reserve amounted to approximately 11,000 men.¹⁴ Admiral Kinkaid, as commander, North Pacific, was in command of the entire operation. Under his direct command were the shore-based air group, the naval escort, cover, supply, and service groups, the floating Army reserve, and a force consisting of the 4th Infantry and one engineer regiment which, after Attu had been taken, was to occupy Shemya Island and construct an airfield there. Under the direct command of Admiral Rockwell was the assault force, which consisted of the naval air and fire support group, the transport group, a mine sweeper group, and the landing force under General Brown, who was to assume tactical command ashore from the time of landing.¹⁵

The lack of information on topography and offshore hazards made it necessary to prepare several optional plans. By the time the main assault force sailed from San Francisco on 24 April five different plans of operation had been worked out. Under Plan A the major landing was to take place in Massacre Bay and a secondary one was to be made at a small beach (Beach Red) 600 yards west of the entrance to Holtz Bay. Under Plan B the major assault was to be launched from Sarana Bay. Plan C was based on landing the entire force in Massacre Bay. In Plan D as in Plans A and B, two landings were to take place: the major one in the West Arm of Holtz Bay and the other at Beach Red. Plan E provided for three landings: one at either

¹³ Hq Landing Force (TF 51.4) FO 1, 17 Apr 43, with Intelligence an. 3 and app. 1 to an. 3, (Study of Jackboot as known 15 April 1943).
¹⁴ Rad, CINCPAC to CG WDC and COMINCH, 25 Mar 43, OPD 381/54; Attu Operations (Gen Brown's account), p. 9; ONI Combat Narrative, Aleutians Campaign, p. 76.
¹⁵ Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, app. 1; Ltr, Adm Nimitz to Gen DeWitt, 22 Mar 43, OCMH files.
Beach Red or the West Arm of Holtz Bay, another in Massacre Bay, and a third in Sarana Bay. Final decision as to which plan to adopt was postponed until the arrival of the force at its rendezvous at Cold Bay, where it was hoped more reliable information as to navigable waters could be obtained from Aleutian pilots. Admiral Rockwell was inclined to view Plans B and D with disfavor, and General Brown preferred not to depend on a single effort, as in plan C. At Cold Bay, a revised Plan E was, after considerable discussion and study, adopted as the plan of attack. Sarana Bay was ruled out entirely. The major landing was to take place at Massacre Bay, and a landing on the north side of the island was to be made wherever it proved most feasible by a reconnaissance on the morning of D-day. The main force, landing at Massacre Bay, was to "advance rapidly" up the valley, seize the passes leading to Holtz and Sarana Bays, and then move into the Holtz Bay area where it was to join the northern force in destroying the enemy in that vicinity. As soon as this had been done, the main force was to advance against Chichagof Harbor, while the northern force secured the valley running west from Holtz Bay. The assumption apparently continued to be that not more than three days would be required to take the island.

Delayed twenty-four hours because of weather, the attack force headed out of Cold Bay on 4 May and turned westward through chill rain and a stormy sea toward Attu. D-day was set for 8 May. As the force drew near the run-in point 115 miles off the north shore of Attu, the weather grew even worse. Admiral Kinkaid ordered Admiral Rockwell to postpone the landing a day. While Admiral Rockwell took his battleships off to the west on the strength of a rumor that a strong Japanese force was approaching from that direction, the transports and a destroyer screen circled eastward in the dense fog, rain, and rough seas. With the weather continuing foul and reconnaissance planes reporting that a heavy surf was running on the landing beaches, Admiral Kinkaid again postponed D-day. Finally, as there

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16 Hq Landing Force, FO No. 1, 17 Apr 43, incorporates all five plans. The plan E included in the field orders is, however, a later, although not the final version. The original Plan E, to judge from its Engineer Annex, dated 17 April, was in general as given above.

17 Memo, Adm Rockwell for Gen Brown, 29 Apr 43, sub: FO 1, in OCMH files; undated summary of the operation by General Brown in same file; Attu Operations (Gen Brown's account), pp. 16-17.

18 Hq Landing Force (TF 51.4), FO 1, Plan E (corrected copy), 2 May 43; and G-3 Journal Vouchers, 16 Apr-10 May 43. The Journal Voucher file was the daily message and memoranda file, usually designated "journal file" as distinct from the bare record of incoming and outgoing messages and memorandums usually designated the "journal," but which in the case of TF 51.4 was termed the "journal file."

CLEARING THE ALEUTIANS 285

seemed to be no prospect of the weather clearing, he ordered the attack to proceed, on 11 May. In the midst of the fog the battleships made rendezvous with the transports on the evening of 10 May, and the force split into two groups for the approach. General Brown, who had his headquarters on board the transport Zeilin, accompanied the group heading for Massacre Bay. Admiral Rockwell, in Pennsylvania, remained off the northern coast.

The weather had helped to frustrate plans of the Eleventh Air Force for softening up Attu before the assault. The Army had concentrated about two dozen of its most efficient fighter-bombers on Amchitka for preinvasion bombings of the island, and during the ten days preceding the landings Army planes dropped 95 tons of bombs on Attu. But the foul weather that forced the postponement of the landings for four days stopped all attack missions against Attu during the same period, and also most of the more elaborate air support measures planned for D-day.

The assault opened according to plan, quietly, like a commando raid, when the 7th Scout Company paddled ashore from submarines in the predawn darkness on a small beach (Beach Scarlet) about four miles northwest of Beach Red, on the north shore of the island. This unit, the 7th Scout Company, was part of a Provisional Battalion commanded by Capt. William H. Willoughby, the remainder of which consisted of the 7th Division's Reconnaissance Troop (minus one platoon). The Reconnaissance Troop, on board the destroyer Kane, was scheduled to follow the Scout Company ashore immediately, but a blanket of fog had again descended on the entire eastern end of the island and the Kane lost its bearing. As a result, the Reconnaissance Troop did not land until nearly noon. By then, the Scout Company had moved well up a steep valley that led south from the beach. At the head of the valley was a pass which gave access to one of the valleys leading back from Holtz Bay, and from which it was hoped the Scout

20 Hq TF 51.4, G–3 Journal Vouchers, 16 Apr–10 May 43 (entries for 4–10 May); Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 40–41; ONI Combat Narrative, Aleutians Campaign, pp. 76–77.

21 Experience during the North African landings, six months earlier, had demonstrated the ill-advisedness of establishing force headquarters on a vessel that might be called away on tactical missions. (See Morison, Operations in North African Waters, pp. 104–105.) Before leaving San Francisco, Admiral Rockwell had urged General Brown to establish himself aboard the battleship Pennsylvania, but General Brown had rightly insisted that to do so might prevent him from going ashore at the proper time, if for any reason the battleship had to leave the actual scene of landing. One solution, adopted at Guadalcanal, was to establish force headquarters on a transport. The Zeilin, however, according to Admiral Rockwell, was not large enough to accommodate both headquarters. Later a special class of amphibious command ships (AGC), designed before the war but not yet in service in 1943, was used for this very purpose.

22 Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 380–83.
ATTU LANDINGS. Massacre Bay, as the 4th Infantry moved inland (top). The west arm of Holtz Bay viewed from the ridge over which the troops advanced (bottom). Note crashed Japanese Zero.
Company could attack the enemy in the rear. Meanwhile a reconnaissance party of Alaskan Scouts and Company A, 17th Infantry, had groped its way through the pea-soup fog to a landing on Beach Red. Its mission was to explore the feasibility of using this beach to land the entire northern force, a combat team (BCT 17–1) built around the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry. Two obstacles presented themselves: a rock-studded approach that prevented more than two or three boats from unloading at one time; and a steep escarpment that began about 75 yards from the water’s edge and rose to a height of 200 or 250 feet above the beach. From the top of this bluff, a fairly level, but broken, tableland stretched south along the coast to the heights overlooking Holtz Bay. The Navy beachmaster and Col. Frank L. Cullin, commanding officer of the 32d Infantry who had gone ashore with the reconnaissance party, reported that a landing on Beach Red was feasible, and at 1230 Lt. Col. Albert E. Hartl, commanding officer of BCT 17–1, requested General Brown's permission to land the rest of his troops. On board the Zeilin off Massacre Bay, General Brown had been waiting impatiently for the fog to lift enough to permit the main landings to take place. The first assault waves had been on the water since shortly after 0800, awaiting better visibility and a signal to proceed, while H-hour was twice postponed. Finally, at about the same time that he received Colonel Hartl's request, General Brown received a message from Admiral Rockwell advising him that, since the weather now promised to improve, the boats should be sent off as soon as they could feel their way into Massacre Bay. When General Brown was assured that the landing craft could return to the transports for a second trip, he recommended that the Massacre Bay assault begin at 1530 and that Colonel Hartl land his force on Beach Red as soon as he was ready. At 1615, Company B, 17th Infantry, set foot on Beach Red. Minutes later, advance elements of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 17th Infantry, landed on Beaches Blue and Yellow, in Massacre Bay.23

No enemy opposition was encountered at any of the landing beaches. The fog, which hampered the landings, likewise concealed them from the enemy. For several weeks the Japanese had known that an attack on their Aleutian outposts was in the offing, although until the end of April they thought Kiska would be the target. Their first intimation of the American approach to Attu came at 0200 on 11 May, when planes from the carrier

23 The foregoing is based on messages recorded in Hq TF 51.4, G–3 Journal File, and G–3 Journal Vouchers (entries for 11 May); on Smith, Preliminary Rpt on Attu Landing, pp. 6–7; ONI Combat Narrative, Aleutians Campaign, pp. 79–81; Attu Operations (Gen Brown's account), p. 20.
**Nassau** combined a bombing and strafing run over Chichagof Harbor with the dropping of leaflets demanding surrender. At 1000, Colonel Yamazaki was informed of American shipping offshore and he ordered combat positions strengthened. Shortly thereafter, battleships *Pennsylvania* and *Idaho* engaged in a radar-controlled bombardment of the Chichagof area. The enemy responded by strengthening the defensive positions that guarded the passes leading out of Massacre Valley.\(^{24}\)

By 2130, five hours after the main landings commenced, a total of 3,500 men had gone ashore; 400 at Beach Scarlet, 1,100 at Beach Red, and 2,000 at Massacre Bay. The Northern Landing Force, BCT 17-1, had made contact with the enemy at about 1800, when a patrol party that was moving along the beach at the foot of the escarpment encountered four unsuspecting Japanese about a mile southwest of Goltsov Point. Two of the Japanese were killed; the other two escaped. Soon afterward the beach patrol came under the fire of the dual-purpose guns at the head of Holtz Bay, and its advance slowed. The main body of BCT 17-1, on the tableland above the escarpment, had continued on apparently undetected. Its objective was Hill X, an 800-foot camel back about two miles south of Beach Red, which dominated the Japanese positions at the head of Holtz Bay. By 2230 the gathering darkness merged with the thick fog to disguise the lay of the land completely. BCT 17-1 dug in for the night, not quite sure where it was, but hoping that the hill on which its outpost positions were placed was Hill X.\(^{25}\)

The Provisional Battalion, which had landed on Beach Scarlet, had been climbing most of the day up a steep watercourse. By midafternoon the advance unit, the 7th Scout Company, had reached an elevation of nearly 2,500 feet, at what appeared to be the summit of the pass. But from here on the only maps the men had were blank. Rather than risk getting thoroughly lost in the uncharted jumble of peaks, ridges, and canyons that lay beyond, Captain Willoughby ordered his men to bivouac for the night.\(^{26}\)

The Southern Landing Force, advancing in Massacre Valley, had come under enemy fire shortly after 1800. BCT 17-2, which was moving up along

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\(^{24}\) Japanese Monograph 46, pp. 111-18; Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls*, p. 43.

\(^{25}\) BCT 17-1, Unit Journal for 11 May; Smith, Preliminary Rpt on Attu Landing, pp. 6-7; ONI Combat Narrative, Aleutians Campaign, p. 81. The Smith report places the first encounter with the Japanese at 1900, which does not quite correspond with the unit journal.

the right side of the hogback and along the floor of the valley to the east,
had advanced approximately 2,500 yards when it was stopped by rifle and
machine gun fire coming from the high ridge, later named Gilbert Ridge,
that formed the east rim of the Massacre Valley. After being pinned down
for about forty-five minutes, the battalion began working forward, although
it was still under scattered rifle fire. Immediately the enemy fire became
more intense, mortars and light artillery joined in, and BCT 17-2 was again
stopped. Unable to move in any direction, at 2100 the battalion dug in for
the night along the east slope of the hogback about 3,000 yards from the
beach which it had left almost five hours earlier. On the left flank, west
of the hogback, BCT 17-3 had made about the same progress. Somewhat be-
hind in the early stages of the advance, BCT 17-3 caught up with BCT 17-2
when the latter was stopped. It was now 2030. The two battalions, BCT 17-2
on the right side of the hogback and BCT 17-3 in the west arm of the val-
ley, were abreast of each other, with the enemy in front of them firing from
the heights that guarded the passes to Holtz Bay and Sarana Bay and from
the ridges on both sides of the valley. At the request of BCT 17-3 the 105-
mm. guns back at the beachhead delivered a concentrated fire against the
high ground at the head of the valley, and the battalion then attempted to
resume its advance. But as soon as the artillery fire ended and the troops
began to move forward, the Japanese again opened up. BCT 17-3 again
halted and dug in somewhat ahead of BCT 17-2 on the other side of the
hogback.

While the two battalions had been moving up Massacre Valley, two
small detachments had been sent out on each flank to secure the ridges, Gil-
bert Ridge on the right and Henderson Ridge on the left. One of these
detachments, a platoon of the 7th Reconnaissance Troop, landed on Alexai
Point about four miles east of Massacre Bay Beach and halfway out the
peninsula toward Chirikof Point. It was assigned the mission of establish-
ing an outpost line across the peninsula from Alexai Point to Sarana Bay, of
reconnoitering "to the west to include area between Lake Nicholas and
Massacre Bay," and of afterwards reconnoitering the peninsula to the east,
in the direction of Chirikof Point. It was to "make contact and co-ordinate
efforts" with a platoon of the 17th Infantry in the pass between Sarana Bay
and Massacre Bay. After landing on Alexai Point, the platoon from the 7th
Reconnaissance Troop was out of contact with the main landing force for

27 BCT 17-2, Action Rpt, and Unit Journal (11 May); RLG 17, Action Rpt (11 May).
two days. During this time it encountered none of the enemy and played no
direct part in the battle. Had the Japanese attempted to infiltrate across Gil-
bert Ridge, the platoon might have played a more active role, even though
its position was far to the east of any probable point of counterattack. The
other platoon was from Company F, 17th Infantry. Reinforced with a light
machine gun section and a 60-mm. mortar squad, this platoon had moved
east along the shore of Massacre Bay and up into a steep pass leading over
Gilbert Ridge to Sarana Beach. Its mission was to seize this pass and the
"high ground along right flank" (i. e., Gilbert Ridge), to establish defensive
positions in the Sarana end of the pass from which Sarana Beach and Lake
Nicholas could be fired upon, and to "clear the ridge of enemy." It was to
assist BCT 17-2, "if practicable," in the capture of the important pass at the
head of Massacre Valley by firing on enemy installations at the western end
of Gilbert Ridge. The platoon climbed all night and on the morning after
D-day it was on the Sarana Beach side of the mountains. There it was dis-
covered by the Japanese. For two days the men fought off strong enemy
patrols, while they struggled westward along Gilbert Ridge. They finally
managed to rejoin the main force in Massacre Valley near the point where
BCT 17-2 had established itself on the night of D-day. The full story of
their experience is one of the minor epics of Attu. Meanwhile, the detach-
ments which had been sent out on the left flank of the Southern Landing
Force to secure Henderson Ridge and the country beyond had likewise run
into difficulty. A platoon of Company I, 17th Infantry, which on landing
at Massacre Beach had been dispatched to secure the valley side of the ridge,
found rough going along the lower slopes. When fog and darkness finally
halted the platoon, it had reached a point approximately 700 yards short of
the position where BCT 17-3 had established itself in the valley. A week
later, on 18 May, the platoon was only some 500 yards beyond its original
positions. Further out on the left flank, behind Henderson Ridge, Company
F of the 32d Infantry ran into several blind alleys after reaching its first ob-
jective, Temnac Cove. Although delayed by having landed farther to the
east than it should have, Company F reached Temnac Cove by nightfall of
D-day. There an enemy outpost was discovered and destroyed before the
defenders were aware of the approaching Americans. Company F reported
that its first mission, that of clearing the Temnac Cove area, was accom-

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29 RLG 17 Action Rpt, Overlay 11-14 May; Personal Narratives by Lt Charles K. Paulson,
Cpl Mike M. Brusuelas, and Cpl Paul H. Doty, in The Capture of Attu, pp. 27-31. The quotations
are from Field Order No. 1, Plan E (corrected copy), 2 May 43, in Landing Force (Task Force 51.4)
G-3 Journal Vouchers (2 May).
plished. The next morning the company proceeded on its second mission, to move northeast toward Holtz Bay, under orders to clear, as it went, all enemy installations from the flank of the main landing force advancing up Massacre Valley. It made no progress, however. Everywhere it turned it found itself in a cul-de-sac, and finally General Brown ordered the company to retrace its steps to Massacre Beach.\textsuperscript{30}

When General Brown went ashore toward the end of D-day the tactical situation was far from clear, but what information was available would not have indicated that a long drawn-out struggle was in prospect. The Southern Landing Force appeared to be close to its immediate objective—the passes leading from the head of Massacre Valley to Holtz Bay and Sarana Bay. BCT 17–3 reported that its position was about 600 yards short of the Holtz Bay pass, and BCT 17–2 was believed to be within 1,000 yards of the pass leading to Sarana Bay. There was a possibility that, on the northern front, BCT 17–1 had reached its first objective, Hill X. BCT 32–2, except for Company F, had not yet been committed, and the other two battalions of the 32d Infantry were due to arrive from Adak within twenty-four hours. If additional reinforcements were needed, General Buckner was willing to release for this purpose the 4th Infantry, which was being held in readiness to occupy Shemya Island as soon as Attu was secured.\textsuperscript{31} Everything considered, it would not have been unreasonable to suppose that within a few days the island would be taken.

Unfortunately, things were not entirely as they seemed. When the situation began to unfold on the morning of D plus 1, it became apparent that a long, hard fight was in store. In Massacre Valley, BCT 17–2 was at least 500 yards further from its objective than it had supposed, and BCT 17–3, apparently having mistaken a blind valley (Zwinge Valley) for the Holtz Bay pass, was a good 2,000 yards south of its immediate objective. Since neither Gilbert Ridge nor Henderson Ridge had been cleared, both battalions came under fire from each flank as well as from the front. BCT 17–2, which had been ordered to consolidate and hold its position with mission of blocking the Sarana-Massacre pass, thus found it necessary to move forward over very rough terrain in the face of heavy fire. Among the casualties was the regimental commander, Col. Edward P. Earle, killed by machine gun fire while with one of the forward elements. His death was a severe blow

\textsuperscript{30} RLG 17, Action Rpt, and Overlay (11 May); Hq Landing Force (TF 51.4), G–3 Journal File and Journal Vouchers (11–12 May); Attu Operations (Gen Brown’s account), pp. 22, 27, 28.
\textsuperscript{31} On the eve of the Attu landing, on 4 May, Buckner was promoted to lieutenant general.
to the 17th Infantry, and, in appointing Col. Wayne L. Zimmerman to take his place, General Brown deprived himself of the services of an extremely able chief of staff. At the end of D plus 1 the battalion was in position to block the pass, but the Japanese defenses were still intact. To the left of the hogback, BCT 17-3 managed to move forward to the rising ground at the mouth of the Holtz Bay-Massacre (Jarmin) pass, where it was pinned down. Frontal attacks against the mouth of the pass failed completely on each of the two days following, although BCT 17-3 now had the support of BCT 32-2 (minus Company F). By the middle of D plus 3 (14 May), it appeared that the Massacre Valley assault was stalemated. On the north side of the island, BCT 17-1 was faring no better in its attack against Holtz Bay. The height reached by the battalion on the night of D-day turned out to be some 900 yards short of Hill X, which the Japanese had occupied during the night. After bitter day-long fighting, BCT 17-1 won its objective during the early evening of D plus 1, but another two days passed before it could force the stubbornly resisting Japanese off the reverse slope and the shoulders of the hill. At the end of D plus 3, the battalion, now joined by BCT 32-3, was only 300 yards nearer Holtz Bay, while the Provisional Battalion, which had moved down into the canyon leading to the rear of the Holtz Bay positions, had been bottled up in the same position for nearly three days, about a mile from the mouth of the canyon. In a memorandum for Admiral Rockwell, General Brown summed up these first days of the battle in the following words:

Reconnaissance and experience of four days fighting indicates Japanese tactics comprise fighting with machine guns and snipers concealed in rain washes or in holes or trenches dug in each side and at varying heights of hill along narrow passes leading through mountain masses. These positions are difficult to locate and almost impossible to shoot out with artillery. They produce casualties in excess of casualties which can be returned. Number of machine gun positions out of proportion to estimated enemy strength. In addition, small infantry groups are dug in high up on sides of pass parallel to axis of approach through pass as well as all commanding terrain features in passes. Impossible to approach positions on sides of pass from above due to precipitous slopes more or less snow covered and extremely slippery footing. Progress through passes will, unless we are extremely lucky, be slow and costly, and will require troops in excess to those now available to my command.

32 RLG 17, Action Rpt and Overlays (11-14 May); BCT 17-2, Unit Journal; and BCT 17-3, Unit Journal.
33 BCT 17-1 Unit Journal and Overlays; Smith, Preliminary Rpt on Attu Landing.
34 Memo, Gen Brown for CTF 51 (Adm Rockwell), 14 May 43, Hq TF 51.4, G-3 Journal Vouchers (item 35, 14 May).
After repeated inquiries on the part of General Brown, the two battalions of the 32d Infantry (BCT 32-3 and BCT 32-1) that constituted the force reserve had arrived at Attu on 13 May (D plus 2). Although their arrival greatly eased the solution, General Brown and his staff were of the opinion that further reinforcements were necessary, specifically, part of the 501st AA Battalion, and a few miscellaneous units of the 7th Division, which were at Adak, and the 4th Infantry, which General Buckner had promised to make available for tactical employment on Attu if needed. At a conference on board the Pennsylvania, on 15 May, Admiral Rockwell was not at first convinced that these additional troops were necessary, but he finally agreed to forward General Brown's recommendations to Admiral Kinkaid with his concurrence. Upon his return from the conference aboard Admiral Rockwell's flagship, General Brown drafted a message for General DeWitt, who was then at Adak, informing him that he had “made frequent attempts to . . . procure additional troops but without success,” and requesting General DeWitt’s assistance in the matter.

Both Admiral Kinkaid and Admiral Rockwell were becoming increasingly concerned over the exposed position of the naval support forces. Japanese submarines were in the area. A torpedo had just missed the Pennsylvania on D plus 1 and on the morning of 15 May, soon after General Brown had returned on shore from his conference with Admiral Rockwell, four torpedoes narrowly missed one of the transports near the flagship. The other two battleships, Nevada and Idaho, had expended all their 14-inch high-capacity ammunition and, with their screen, had withdrawn to the northward to await orders. In view of the submarine threat, Admiral Kinkaid thought that the naval support group had tarried long enough in the dangerous waters of Attu. Accordingly, Admiral Rockwell had informed General Brown during the conference of 15 May that the ships would withdraw the next day, or in any event no later than the 17th. The continued requests for reinforcements, a long dispatch requesting large quantities of engineering and road building equipment, and the lack of any positive indications of a speedy breakthrough ashore persuaded Admiral Kinkaid that General Brown was bogged down. General DeWitt and General Buckner, whom Kinkaid consulted, agreed with him that it was necessary to relieve General Brown. Upon their recommendation, Admiral Kinkaid appointed General Landrum to take over the command of Attu. The new commander arrived on the scene during the afternoon.

35 Attu Operations (General Brown's account), pp. 35-36.
36 A handwritten draft message, Gen Brown to CG WDC, in Hq TF 51.4, G-3 Journal Vouchers (item 12, 15 May). The G-3 Journal File lists this message as dated and “IN” at 1020.
of 16 May and assumed command of the landing force at 1700, just as the fighting for Holtz Bay was reaching its final stage.\textsuperscript{37}

General Brown's relief coincided with an advance of the Northern Force that broke the deadlock on Attu. Intense shelling by naval guns and bombardment from the air persuaded the enemy to start withdrawing from the West Arm area at Holtz Bay on 14 May, and on the next two days the Northern Force after making contact with the Provisional Battalion moved into the West Arm area and, against hot resistance, on to the high ridge that separated the two arms of the bay. The ridge itself was won during the night of 16 May. This placed the Northern Force (BCT 17–1 and BCT 32–3) directly in the rear of the Japanese defending the Massacre Valley pass, and on the morning of 17 May the Japanese began to withdraw toward Chichagof Harbor. The junction of the Northern and Southern Forces took place during the early morning hours of 18 May (D plus 7), when a patrol from K Company of BCT 17–3 met the 7th Reconnaissance Company on the western slope of the Holtz Bay–Massacre Pass.\textsuperscript{38}

The Japanese withdrawal and the junction of forces marked the turning point of the campaign. Although nearly two weeks more of hard, costly fighting remained, the uncertainty and frustration of the first few days on Attu never recurred. It was a slow business taking the machine gun and mortar nests left on the heights by the retreating Japanese, but eventually the combined American force, reinforced with a battalion of the 4th Infantry, drew a net around Chichagof Harbor.\textsuperscript{39} The end came on one phrenetic night when most of the surviving Japanese, from about seven hundred to a thousand strong, charged madly through the American lines, screaming, killing, and being killed. The next day, 30 May, the enemy announced the loss of Attu, and units of the 32d, 17th, and 4th Infantry cleared out pockets of surviving Japanese.


General Brown has contended, with much justification, that the assumptions of conditions on Attu upon which his relief was premised were not in fact correct, and he also believes that these assumptions should have been checked before such an irrevocable step was taken. Before his new appointment, General Landrum commanded the Adak base. He had been promoted to the rank of major general in March.

\textsuperscript{38} BCT 17–3, Action Rpt and Unit Journal (17–18 May); RLG 17, Action Rpt (17 May).

\textsuperscript{39} For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty on 26 May, Pvt. Joe P. Martinez of Company K, 32d Infantry, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. For extraordinary heroism and inspiring leadership in a series of actions beginning on 16 May, the commander of the 17th Infantry, Colonel Zimmerman, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Twelve distinguished unit citations were also awarded after the Attu operation, nine of them for unit actions after 17 May.
enemy troops as they advanced to occupy the Chichagof installations. Although
mopping-up operations continued for several days, organized resistance ended
with the wild charge of 29 May, and Attu was once more in American hands.\(^{40}\)

Out of a force that totaled more than 15,000 men before the campaign
ended, 549 Americans had given their lives on Attu, 1,148 had been wounded,
and about 2,100 had been taken out of action by disease and nonbattle injuries.
Most of the nonbattle casualties were exposure cases, victims of the climate
and weather and of inadequate clothing. Trench foot was the most common
affliction.\(^{41}\) The Japanese lost their entire force: approximately 2,350 enemy
dead were counted and 29 taken prisoner.\(^{42}\) The price of victory was high.
In terms of numbers engaged, Attu ranks as one of the most costly assaults
in the Pacific. In terms of Japanese destroyed, the cost of taking Attu was
second only to Iwo Jima: for every hundred of the enemy on the island, about
seventy-one Americans were killed or wounded.

**Kiska—Grand Anticlimax**

Before the guns had ceased firing on Attu, preparations got under way
for the next moves against the Japanese in the Aleutians. An airfield was
begun on Alexai Point, scene of one of the Attu landings, and on 30 May
garrison troops and engineers landed on Shemya Island, thirty-five miles east
of Attu, to begin construction of a bomber field there. Fighter strips were
completed at both places before June ended, and in mid-July bombers from
the new Alexai Point field made their first strike against Japan, a raid against
the northern Kurils.

Even before the Attu landings took place preparations had been started
for assaulting Kiska.\(^{43}\) For this purpose on 4 May 1943 General DeWitt’s
headquarters had authorized the activation of an amphibious training force
under General Corlett. Preliminary training was to be conducted at Fort Ord
and San Diego by the Joint Staff that had planned the Attu operation, but ad-
vanced training at Adak was also to be provided. As a result of the Attu

\(^{40}\) RLG 17, Action Rpt (29–31 May) and overlays, and Rpt of Operations—Attu (Gen

\(^{41}\) Control Div, Surgeon General’s Office, Medical Report of Attu Campaign, 6 Dec 44, in
OCMH.

\(^{42}\) Official Hist of the Alaskan Dept, ch. IV.

\(^{43}\) Unless otherwise noted, the sources of the following account of the Kiska operation are:
Official Hist of the Alaskan Dept, ch. V, and a draft narrative by Capt Nelson L. Drummond,
entitled History of Kiska Occupation, in OCMH. The two sources for the most part duplicate
each other.
experience and of revised estimates of the Japanese strength on Kiska, the assault force was doubled in size over that originally planned and among the additions were a mountain combat team, a regimental combat team from the Alaska Defense Command, and the hard-bitten First Special Service Force, all of them trained in the type of fighting that had developed on Attu. It was decided also, after the Attu campaign ended, to substitute the battle-tested 17th Regiment for one of the infantry units from California. By the end of July, about 34,000 Allied troops were assembled at Adak and Amchitka for final training in preparation for the assault on Kiska. Included among them was a Canadian brigade group numbering 4,800 officers and enlisted men, and about 700 men of the First Special Service Force were Canadians.  

The enemy’s strength on Kiska was estimated at from 9,000 to 10,000 men. Although some of the War Department planners favored postponing the operation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, upon the recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners, gave their formal approval on 22 June. General DeWitt and Admiral Nimitz designated 15 August as the target date. The force commanders, in conference at Adak on 30 July, decided that D-day ought to be postponed until 24 August to permit further training and regrouping of the battalion combat teams; but Admiral Nimitz was opposed to the delay, and D-day was definitely set for 15 August.

Unlike Attu, Kiska was subjected to a heavy preinvasion bombardment. Reinforced during June and operating from the new airfields, the Eleventh Air Force dropped a total of 424 tons of bombs on Kiska during the month of July. On 6 July and 22 July, strong naval task groups blasted the island with an additional 330 tons of explosives. On 2 August a strong force consisting of two battleships, two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and nine destroyers carried out another bombardment, supported by seventeen bombers and eight fighters of the Eleventh Air Force. Over 200 tons of shells and bombs fell on Kiska on that day. Two days later, on 4 August, the Eleventh Air Force dropped a record-breaking 152 tons of bombs. Returning fliers claimed excellent results and reported “only meager and inaccurate” flak and small arms fire. Then, for several days while bad weather grounded

45 Memo, Brig Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer for Gen Hull, 31 May 43; Memo, Col John C. Blizzard, Jr., for Gen Handy, 10 Jun 43. Both in OPD 381/132.
47 OPD Diary, entry of 4 Aug 43; Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan, pp. 387-88; ONI Combat Narrative, Aleutians Campaign, pp. 94-97.
the Army bombers, destroyers of the naval blockading force continued the
attack. On 10 August the Eleventh Air Force came back into the picture with
another hard blow, and between then and D-day it dropped 335 tons of
bombs on Kiska.\(^{48}\)

Surprisingly enough, most pilots saw no signs of activity on the island;
a few reported that they had encountered light antiaircraft fire. Earlier, there
had been considerable success against Japanese submarines going to and
from Kiska; then the enemy submarine traffic seemed to stop. The reports
were the cause of considerable speculation at Admiral Kinkaid’s head-
quarters. On one occasion, when someone raised the question whether the
Japanese might not have been evacuating troops by submarine, Admiral
Kinkaid, with a laugh, said he’d be glad to provide free transportation to
Japan for half their garrison. His serious opinion was that the enemy had
taken to the hills, as they had on Attu, and after wrecking all installations
not already destroyed by the air and sea bombardment, were digging in for
a last stand back from the beaches. The possibility of evacuation was not
ignored, however. Shortly before D-day the suggestion was made that a
small reconnaissance party be landed on Kiska by submarine in order to
clear up the situation, but it was vetoed by Admiral Kinkaid. His position
was that if the Japanese were still on the island the assault force was ready
for them, but a reconnaissance party might be wiped out; that if the Japanese
were not there, a landing would be a “super dress rehearsal, good for train-
ing purposes,” and the only foreseeable loss would be merely the let-down
experienced by the highly keyed troops.\(^{49}\) With D-day only a few days away,
Admiral Kinkaid decided to let the assault proceed as planned, without
sending in a reconnaissance party.

Early on the morning of 15 August General Corlett’s forces made a feint
toward the south shore of Kiska and then landed on the north and west sides
of the island. Not a shot was fired as the troops came ashore and moved
up into the mist-shrouded interior. As on Attu, complete surprise seemed
to have been achieved. All through the first night and the next day, and for
several days afterward, American and Canadian patrols probed deeper into
the island, occasionally hearing the noise of gunfire, but never encountering
any Japanese. Kiska was an uninhabited island. The only guns that fired
were those of friend against friend, and partly on that account casualties
ashore during the first four days of the operation numbered 21 dead and

\(^{48}\) Craven and Cate, eds., *The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan*, pp. 390–92.

\(^{49}\) Ltr, Adm Kinkaid to Acting Chief of Military History, 11 Apr 59, in OCMH files.
sick or wounded. The Navy lost 70 dead or missing and 47 wounded when destroyer *Abner Read* struck a mine on 18 August.\(^{50}\)

The entire enemy garrison had slipped away unseen, as the remnants of the Japanese Army on Guadalcanal had done six months earlier. To make the embarrassment complete, the Kiska evacuation had been carried out as early as 28 July, almost three weeks before the Allied landings. The original plan of the Japanese *Imperial General Headquarters* had been to withdraw the garrison gradually, by submarine, but this scheme had been given up late in June because of the loss or damaging of most of the submarines assigned to the operation and because of some anxiety that, by weakening the garrison over a prolonged period, the operation might fail. It was then decided to evacuate the entire force at one time, in one movement, using cruisers and destroyers as transports. The date, at first fixed for early July, was postponed until 28 July.\(^{51}\) Between then and D-day Kiska had been under attack and close surveillance by American naval units and the Eleventh Air Force, but the reports of flak and Japanese activity when there was none, which inexperienced observers brought back, obscured all the evidence from which the proper deduction might have been drawn.\(^{52}\) Surprise was achieved, but it was not the Japanese who were surprised.

The retaking of Attu was the high point of the war, as far as it concerned Alaska. Kiska was anticlimactic, and what happened afterward was chiefly a matter of tying up the loose threads of unfinished business: of deciding upon the role that Alaska and the Aleutians could play in defeating Japan, and of making the organizational changes that the situation seemed to require.

In ridding the Aleutians of Japanese invaders, the objective had been partly to eliminate a potential military threat, but mostly to eradicate a psychological blot. As for using the western Aleutians as steppingstones to Japan, that idea had still to receive official imprimatur. General DeWitt and others had from time to time urged an assault by this route, but commitments to other theaters, and the desire of the Soviet Union not to have its neutrality

\(^{50}\) Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls*, pp. 63–64.


\(^{52}\) Japanese sources cited in the preceding footnote lend no support whatsoever to the suppositions in ONI Combat Narrative, *Aleutians Campaign* (page 104), and in Craven and Cate, eds., *The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan*, p. 392, that a small rear guard was left behind to man light AA weapons and was evacuated by submarine just before the Allied landings.
with Japan compromised, had precluded acceptance of the idea. With the Aleutians cleared, and about 144,000 American and Canadian troops in the Alaska-Aleutians area, a reconsideration of the strategic role of that area seemed to be in order.

An invasion of Shumushu and Paramushiro, the northernmost of the Kuril Islands, was the substance of a plan that General DeWitt submitted to General Marshall early in August. This plan contemplated using the combined forces that had been engaged in the Attu and Kiska operations, after they had been raised to a strength of approximately 54,000 men. It proposed a reinforcement of the Eleventh Air Force in heavy and medium bombers in order to provide the necessary long-range air support, and recommended organizing a North American theater to carry out the invasion in April or May 1944. Neither the Army's Operations Division, nor the Navy as represented by Admiral King and Admiral Nimitz, nor the Joint Staff Planners saw any immediate possibility of implementing the plan. Pacific Fleet forces were fully committed to operations in the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas; the creation of a North American theater in the North Pacific was not acceptable to Admiral King; and the seizure of the two northern Kurils without immediately pressing on toward Japan proper would, according to the Operations Division, place the forces in a position as hazardous as that of the Japanese in Kiska had been.

In deciding against an invasion of the northern Kurils in early 1944, the Joint Chiefs nevertheless held the door open to the possibility of the situation in the North Pacific being altered, perhaps in favor of invading the Kurils, by the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. The War Department accordingly directed General Buckner to co-operate with Admiral Kinkaid in planning an assault on Paramushiro with the target date, for planning purposes only, set for the spring of 1945. By the time the target date rolled around, the
American forces on Iwo Jima and Okinawa were only half as far away from Tokyo as Paramushiro was.\textsuperscript{57}

After August 1943, whatever plans were discussed or even drawn up for assaulting the Kurils or Japan proper, Alaska like the Caribbean area and the Atlantic bases, was actually called upon to retrench, to reduce the strength of its garrison and curtail facilities. Within two weeks after the reoccupation of Kiska, four bomber squadrons of the Eleventh Air Force were designated for withdrawal, a reduction of the garrison strength to 80,000 by July 1944 was planned, the question of reducing the category of defense was brought up, and the reorganization of the Alaska Defense Command into a separate department was proposed. The cutback of bomber strength was carried out in September. In the following month, October, the separation of the Alaska Defense Command from the Western Defense Command and its redesignation as the Alaskan Department was announced, effective 1 November.\textsuperscript{58} Both the proposed cut in garrison strength and the lowering of the category of defense were approved by the Joint Chiefs before the end of October.\textsuperscript{59} By the end of 1943 Army forces in Alaska had been reduced to about 113,000 men and General Buckner was notified to prepare for a further cut—to a total strength of 50,000.\textsuperscript{60} This figure was approximately reached by the end of 1944. In spite of the fact that at this time the possibility of staging an offensive via the Aleutians began to revive, the process of retrenchment continued, and no serious consideration of reversing the trend was entertained. Any danger to Alaska and the Western Hemisphere had long since disappeared.

\textsuperscript{57} For further details about planning for offensive operations against Japan via the North Pacific from summer 1943 onward see Louis Morton, \textit{Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II} (Washington, 1962), ch. XXVI, and Matloff, \textit{Strategic Planning, 1943-44}, pp. 316ff. For air plans, preparations, and operations, see Craven and Cate, eds., \textit{The Pacific—Guadalcanal to Saipan}, pp. 392-401.

\textsuperscript{58} Memo, OPD for TAG, 7 Oct 43; Memo, OPD for COMINCH, 11 Nov 43. Both in OPD 384.

\textsuperscript{59} The Adak subsector of the Aleutians was reduced from category D to C, the Unalaska subsector from D to B, and the rest of Alaska from B to "modified A." Rad, COMINCH to CINCPOA, 21 Oct 43, OPD Log file for October 43. For definitions of the categories of defense, see ch. IV above.

\textsuperscript{60} OPD Diary. Entries of 24 Jan 44 and 28 Jan 44. The first of these items gives the garrison strength as of 31 Dec 43.
Forging the Defenses of the Canal

For many years the Western Hemisphere's outstanding characteristic from the standpoint of defensive strategy had been the narrow inter-American Isthmus that stretches from Mexico to Colombia. Even after the bulge of Brazil caught the eye of Army planners the "wasp waist" of the hemisphere continued to be the more important object of attention. Its strategic importance came, however, not from its geographical position as a link between the two continents but rather from the man-made ditch that cuts across the Isthmus and links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The mobility given to the fleet by the Panama Canal is too obvious to require more than mention of the fact and the observation that a sea-minded President considered it sufficient reason for acquiring the land and building the Canal. Keeping the Canal open was a major aim of American military planners ever after.

The Prewar Defenses

During the 1930's, events and technological developments began to challenge the old axioms on which the defense of the Canal had been based. A crippling attack aimed at the locks and dams, and delivered either by an act of sabotage or by naval bombardment, had always been considered the only real danger to be guarded against. The possibility of hostile forces establishing a beachhead and moving overland to the Canal was not entirely discounted, but the absence of suitable landing places on the Atlantic side and the thick jungle of the Pacific lowlands were counted on to discourage any attack of this sort. The Army had disposed its defenses accordingly. Each terminus of the Canal was heavily protected by a concentration of seacoast armament that at one time was regarded as the most powerful and effective of any in the world. In addition, the lock areas—at Gatun, Pedro Miguel, and Miraflores—were provided with field fortifications. The few planes that constituted the air defenses of the Canal were based, until 1931, on France Field, on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus. Then Albrook Field, at the Pacific terminus, was opened; but it proved to be usable only during
the short dry season.\textsuperscript{1} Coast artillery continued to provide the principal defense. Then, during the 1930's new instruments for delivering an attack emerged in the shape of the naval aircraft carrier and long-range bomber. Potential air bases from which an attack against the Canal might be launched came into being as a result of the growth of commercial aviation in South and Central America. Experience in jungle maneuvers was beginning to make a myth of the impenetrability of tropical forests. Finally, the Army's ability to move outside the Canal Zone and take defensive measures within the territory of the Republic of Panama was sharply curtailed by the changing relationship between the two countries. Although sabotage remained the most likely danger, air strikes by either land-based or carrier-based planes came to be regarded as the most serious threat because of the wider holes in the defense against them.

At the beginning of 1939 the bulk of the garrison defending the Canal was divided between two separate sectors that were about as far apart organizationally as they were geographically. The Pacific Sector had a slight preponderance of force. Assigned to it were the 4th Coast Artillery Regiment, the 33d Infantry, and a battalion of the 2d Field Artillery. At the opposite end of the Canal, in the Atlantic Sector, were the 1st Coast Artillery Regiment and the 14th Infantry. Antiaircraft units made up part of both coast artillery regiments. In addition to these troops assigned to the sectors, certain units were directly under the commanding general of the Panama Canal Department. These department troops included air units—the 19th Wing (composite), with about 28 medium bombers, 14 light bombers, 24 pursuit planes, and a few trainers and utility planes—plus a regiment of combat engineers, together with Signal Corps, quartermaster, and ordnance units, and other service and administrative detachments. The total strength of the garrison—sector as well as department troops—came to approximately 13,500 men.\textsuperscript{2} To the Army garrison had been given the mission of protecting the Canal against sabotage and of defending it from positions within the Canal Zone. Close-in defense was thus an Army responsibility except for two specific tasks: that of providing an armed guard on vessels passing

\textsuperscript{1} AG Hist Sec, Panama Canal Dept, MS, History of the Panama Canal Department, I, 39–40, 67–69.
\textsuperscript{2} Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939, Table C; Hist of PCD, II, 207; Hq PCD (Caribbean Defense Command), MS, Organization and Reorganization, p. 99; Hist Div, CDC, MS, The Caribbean Theater in the Defense of the Americas (hereafter cited as Hist Div, CDC, Hist of Caribbean Theater) OCMH, I, 66–70; USAF Hist Study 42, Air Defense of the Panama Canal, 1 Jan 1939–7 Dec 1941, OCMH, pp. 11–12.
through the Canal, and that of maintaining a harbor patrol at the entrances to the Canal. Both of these tasks were entrusted to the Navy, along with its primary responsibility for offshore defense. The Army air forces in Panama were to be prepared to assist the Navy in its major task of detecting and repelling enemy forces at sea, but only so far as air bases within the Canal Zone would permit—and only to an extent agreed upon by the local Army commander. At the top of the military hierarchy was the commanding general of the Panama Canal Department. Directly under him were the commanders of the 19th Air Wing and of the two sectors, each one of which was independent of the other.

The recurrent crises in Europe during 1938 made the weak spots in the defenses of the Canal seem glaring indeed. With respect to antiaircraft, coast artillery, and air forces, the situation was particularly acute. The actual strength of the two coast artillery regiments was inadequate for the proper manning of the seacoast defenses, and as a result the infantry troops had to be given double assignments and dual training. The existing system of fixed antiaircraft batteries lacked, it was believed, sufficient depth and mobility to offer an effective defense against high speed, high altitude bombers. The air force was equipped with obsolete planes. France Field had been outgrown for some time, and room for expansion was lacking. The main runway of Albrook Field was still under construction. Moreover, it had become increasingly clear that by the time hostile planes came within range of the existing Army defenses it would be too late to prevent them from delivering an attack on the Canal. Effective air interception would require long-range patrols, radar installations, and a screen of outlying bases. Not one of these requirements was available. Potential bases existed in the Antilles, the island chain guarding the Atlantic approaches. The Pacific approaches to the Canal had no similar cover.

During 1939 plans and measures for reinforcing the defenses began to overtake the circumstances that had set the plans on foot. In early January, as soon as it appeared that Congress would authorize an increase in the garrison and provide the necessary funds, the War Department moved to reinforce the coast artillery and air defenses. The War Plans Division calculated at that time that approximately 6,580 coast artillery troops, divided almost equally between antiaircraft and harbor defense, would become avail-

3 Hq PCD, MS, Defense Plans, pp. 8, 35; Hist of PCD, II, 5.
4 Hist of PCD, I, 60–61; Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1938, pp. 5–6; USAF Hist Study 42, Air Def of the Panama Canal, pp. 11–12.
able. This would make possible a reorganization of the coast artillery garrison into two antiaircraft and two harbor defense regiments, one of each type to be assigned to each of the two sectors. Maj. Gen. David L. Stone, in command of the Panama Canal Department, indorsed the proposal but urged that no troops be sent until housing was available.\(^5\) In the meantime his headquarters prepared a plan for organizing a separate coast artillery brigade as soon as the reinforcements arrived. As for the air defenses, the problem was primarily one of replacing the obsolete planes. But modern planes could not use the old airfields. On 17 April the main runway and radio control tower at Albrook Field were put in operation, and by mid-June the old, outmoded B-10's had been replaced by thirty new B-18 bombers.

Early in January General Stone formally recommended extending the defenses of the Canal westward into the Pacific. Only three possibilities offered. The Galápagos Islands, belonging to Ecuador, were the most favorably placed. A group of five good-sized islands and ten small ones lying about 1,000 miles southwest of Balboa, the Galápagos could be developed as an advanced base and radar station. About 500 miles westward from Balboa was Cocos Island, a possession of Costa Rica. Less than half the size of the District of Columbia and lacking a good harbor, Cocos Island could have but limited utility, chiefly as an advanced station for the Aircraft Warning Service (AWS). Of even less potential usefulness was the tiny rock belonging to France and known as Clipperton Island, which jutted up out of the open Pacific 2,000 miles to the northwest of Panama; but the fact that it was a European possession made it of interest. Proposals that the United States acquire Cocos Island and the Galápagos group had cropped up periodically ever since 1917. Although not unfavorably disposed toward the idea, the War Department during the early 1930's refrained from urging or even recommending it, no doubt because the matter rested within the Navy's sphere of primary interest. The delivery in 1937 of the Army's first B-17's spurred advocates of a long-range bomber program to greater efforts toward enlarging the role of the Air Corps in coastal defense to an extent commensurate to the range of its planes.\(^6\) The airmen made little headway, and Army officers in Panama continued to chafe under the necessity of depending upon naval aviation for offshore reconnaissance. A survey party sent out by

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\(^5\) Memo, Lt Col Walton H. Walker for CG PCD, 5 Jan 39; Memo, Gen Stone for Col Walker, 16 Jan 39; Memo, Col Walker for WPD, 10 Feb 39. All in WPD 4124. Rad 161, WPD to CG PCD, 11 Jan 39, AG 320.2 PCD (12-30-38), sec. 1.

\(^6\) Hist of PCD, I, 59; Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, pp. 68–71.
General Stone at the end of 1938, after rumors had circulated that the government of Ecuador was considering selling the Galápagos, found sites for airfields, seaplane bases, and AWS stations and reported suitable seaplane anchorages and radar sites on Cocos Island. This was the basis for General Stone's recommendations of 5 January 1939 that steps be taken to acquire the islands either by purchase or by an "exclusive" lease "for the purpose of establishing thereon such advanced naval air bases and AWS stations as may be necessary."7 He set forth his position as follows:

In order to take full advantage of the increase in our air power and enable it to develop its full offensive and defensive strength, we must have outlying bases located at a distance from the Canal in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Such bases will enable our defensive air forces to engage an attacking air force before it can arrive within effective bombing range of the Canal, and will also serve as advance AWS stations and furnish the necessary warning to all components of our defense forces. . . .8

He was aware, General Stone continued, that his recommendations involved . . . a strategic matter for which the Navy is primarily responsible, yet it is obvious that the Army, which is primarily responsible for the close-in (tactical) defense of the Panama Canal, is vitally interested in any measure which will strengthen the defense of the Canal against air attack and, for this reason, I deem it incumbent upon me to submit this matter for the earnest consideration of higher authority.9

General Stone's views were strongly reinforced by the fact that two resolutions were before Congress calling for the acquisition of the islands. Both the War Department and the Navy began to take a more positive attitude. The Navy Department, although not inclined to appear as sponsor of the proposed measures, was willing to recommend their passage. The Army War Plans Division got as far as preparing a statement for the Chief of Staff recommending that the War Department indorse the proposals. But in the meantime President Roosevelt had decided that the acquisition of any territory belonging to the other American Republics would not be in the public interest, and on 2 June the War Department informed General Stone of the President's decision.10 The question of whether or not to acquire the islands thus passed beyond the province of the War Department, but it was not a matter that the authorities in the Canal Zone were in haste to drop.

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7 Ltr, CG PCD to TAG, 5 Jan 39, WPD 3782-3. The italicizing is the author's.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Memo, WPD for CoS, 13 Apr 39, AG 621.1 (10-4-34) and copy, stamped Not Used, WPD 3782-11; Ltr, Under Secy State Sumner Welles to SW, 12 May 39; Ltr, TAG to CG PCD, 2 Jun 39. Last two in AG 621.1 (10-4-34). Copies of Under Secy State Welles' letter in WPD 3977, are dated 12 March 1939.
In a report to Washington in mid-June, General Stone referred to his letter of 5 January and ended with the following:

Any plan of air defense . . . which fails to make provision for destroying the carrier before its bombers are launched . . . is a defective plan. It is apparent therefore that, until our Government obtains the use of the Galápagos and Cocos Islands as advanced stations for both aircraft warning service stations and operating bases, the Panama Canal will continue to be exposed to surprise raids from carrier-based aircraft on the Pacific side. His suggestion that 999-year leases be negotiated for this purpose was considered by the War Department to be “tantamount to purchase,” and therefore contrary to national policy, and to be inconsistent with the joint defense plan drawn up by the local commanders in Panama. Operating airdromes in the Galápagos Islands or on Cocos Island were not essential to the accomplishment of the Army’s mission, the War Department now held; and as for the new radar equipment for which funds had been appropriated, none of it was to be installed in any foreign territory except the Republic of Panama. Since overwater search was considered a Navy function, the War Department decided that “provision of Army installations for that purpose will not be considered at this time.” Less than a month afterward the Germans invaded Poland and World War II had begun.

In the extension of the Canal’s defenses into Panamanian territory just as in the matter of acquiring the Galápagos Islands and Cocos Island, defense needs as viewed from Army headquarters in the Canal Zone ran into the complications of national policy as laid down in Washington. In both cases, the ends sought by General Stone were eventually achieved, but not by the exact course he recommended.

By the beginning of 1939 the need of additional airfields in the vicinity of the Canal had centered on a privately owned field at the beach and ranch resort of Rio Hato, some fifty-five or sixty miles from the Canal Zone, on the northwestern shore of the Gulf of Panama. As early as 1932 flyers from the Canal Zone had discovered that the Rio Hato field offered a good opportunity for them to put in flying time while enjoying some pleasant recreation too, and the place was soon leased by the Army for the nominal sum of one dollar per annum. The increase in rental to $2,400 in 1937, and then to

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11 Ltr, CG PCD to TAG, 16 Jun 39, AG 660.2 (8–26–37), sec. 4.
13 Hist of PCD, I, 71–75; CDC PCD, MS, Acquisition of Land, OCMH, pp. 106–09.
$4,800, no doubt reflected the conversion of the field to more serious purposes, so that by the fall of 1938 General Stone could write as follows:

We see in Rio Hato all the basic requirements for operations of planes of all types under any conditions of weather that we may expect. Its potentiality for expansion into a very large field is such that I consider it indispensable to the contemplated Air Corps expansion program in this Department. General Stone urged, as he had on previous occasions, that the field be purchased outright and developed as an operating base. Early in January 1939 he informed the War Department that, if the Rio Hato field were obtained, no other operating airfields would be needed outside the Canal Zone. An official visitor from the War Plans Division concurred in General Stone's estimate of the importance of the Rio Hato field, but the War Department took no action except to ask the general for a priority list of sites that might be acquired if the Air Corps augmentation program received Congressional approval. As was to be expected, Rio Hato headed the list, followed by nine other possible sites of lesser importance. It was also to be expected that as soon as the Army became interested in using Rio Hato for official purposes the Panamanian Government would enter the picture. As long as the tactical use of the field was merely incidental, the arrangements could be made informally, directly with the owner of the property; but as the field became more important to the Army and the possibility of buying it was raised, the negotiations became a matter of public, rather than private, concern.

This particular point was one on which the treaty of 1936 made important concessions to Panamanian sovereignty. Under the old Hay-Varilla Treaty of 1903 the United States had enjoyed plenary authority within the Canal Zone and the right to acquire, control, and use any lands outside the Canal Zone that might be required for the operation and protection of the Canal. The procedures were entirely unilateral. In the case of public lands the American authorities merely notified the Panamanian Government that the land was being taken over; in the case of privately owned lands the United States was given the right of eminent domain and the privilege of acquiring the land at pre-1903 values. The new treaty, signed on 2 March 1936 but not yet ratified by the beginning of 1939, proposed to change the old relationship to one of co-operation and partnership. Both countries recog-

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14 Ltr, Gen Stone to Gen Malin Craig, CofS, 19 Oct 38, quoted in CDC PCD, Acquisition of Land, pp. 111-15.
15 Ltr, CG PCD to WPD, 1 Feb 39, WPD 2674-22; Memo, Exec WPD for ACofS WPD, 10 Feb 39, WPD 4124.
ized "the maintenance, sanitation, efficient operation and effective protection of the canal" to be a joint obligation; and if, for this common purpose, "some new unforeseen contingency" should make the use of additional lands necessary, the two countries agreed to agree on the requisite measures. In the economic and commercial field also, and in the matter of the Canal annuity, the United States deferred to the sovereign rights and material interests of the Republic of Panama. Consultation between the two countries, through the normal channels of diplomacy, was provided for on questions of general security. Under the old treaty, the United States had claimed the right to employ its armed forces anywhere within Panamanian territory at any time and in any way that seemed necessary. Article X of the new treaty, which provided that in case of war or threat of aggression the two governments would take action to protect their common interests and would consult each other regarding any measure deemed necessary by either one but affecting the territory of the other, was considered by the Army as setting aside the old treaty prescription. Whatever might be permitted in an emergency, it was not at all clear that, under the new treaty, maneuvers and training exercises could be held outside the Canal Zone in time of peace. The Army objected to these various limitations on its freedom of action, especially when aviation developments and what a predecessor of General Stone called "other possible long range instrumentalities of offensive warfare" were making necessary an outward thrust of the Canal's defenses. Reluctance on the part of the United States Senate to accept the limitations of the treaty was at least partly responsible for the delay in ratifying it; and General Stone's desire to take advantage of the delay was chiefly responsible for the urgency with which he pressed the acquisition of the Rio Hato airfields.\footnote{A good summary of the treaty is in Norman Judson Padelford, \textit{The Panama Canal in Peace and War} (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942), pp. 64–81. Pertinent documents include Ltr, Brig Gen Lawrence Halstead to TAG, 10 Dec 35, AG 388.1 Panama (1–1–26), sec. 3; Ltr, Gen Stone to Gen Craig, 19 Oct 38, and Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 Jun 39, WPD 1652–31.}

Although Secretary Cordell Hull had assured the War Department in the spring of 1938 that the new treaty "in no way modified" the right of the United States to employ its troops or acquire additional lands outside the Canal Zone, the War Department made no effort to test Mr. Hull's interpretation until the treaty had been formally accepted by Panama through an exchange of notes dated 1 February 1939.\footnote{Ltr, Secy State to SW, 11 May 39, WPD 1652–29. Padelford, \textit{Panama Canal in Peace and War}, p. 77, gives the text of the note from the Panamanian Government.} On 23 February the War Department notified General Stone of its intention to request the State Department "to initiate action tending toward acquisition . . . of lands in
Republic of Panama needed for the defense of Panama Canal. These lands include Rio Hato and outlying emergency landing fields, stations for aircraft warning service, trunk roads, searchlight positions and access roads, Harbor Defense items and cable rights of way. . . .” At the same time a request for the necessary funds was included in Air Corps estimates for the next fiscal year. General Stone asked for and received authority to negotiate directly with the Panamanian Government, which he found willing to co-operate but only on the basis of a 999-year lease, not a sale, of the land. Almost four months afterward, on 17 June, the War Plans Division, noting the request for funds and calling attention to General Stone’s negotiations, recommended that the approval of the State Department be sought for any proposed lease; and the State Department, although seeing no bar to a 999-year lease in any provision of the new treaty, believed it best to defer action until Congress ratified the treaty. This Congress did on 27 July, after appropriating $400,000 for acquiring the defense sites in Panama.

Although arrangements for pushing the defenses out into Panamanian territory were further advanced than General Stone’s proposals regarding the Pacific islands, nothing concrete had been accomplished in either case except an allocation of funds for the former. The question of acquiring island bases in the Pacific seemed to be definitely buried. As for the defense sites in the Republic of Panama the War Department was awaiting the signal from the State Department with desks cleared for action.

Only a small start had been made to provide the housing for the additional Coast Artillery troops authorized the previous January. The general program of expansion depended on Congressional approval in the shape of appropriations and, until this was forthcoming in June, when the sum of $50,000,000 was made available, only a limited amount of construction could be undertaken.

All this time events in Europe had been rushing headlong toward their climax. After breaking up the Republic of Czechoslovakia and establishing a German protectorate over most of its former territories, after re-incorporating Memel into the Reich and demanding the return of Danzig, after tearing up the naval treaty with Britain, abrogating the nonaggression pact with Poland, and signing a pact of peace with Russia, Hitler in the early morning hours of 1 September 1939 flung his armies across the Polish frontier. Bound
to Poland by treaty, Britain and France mobilized, and on Sunday, 3 September, both countries came to the aid of their hard-pressed ally.

Emergency Measures, August 1939–January 1940

Throughout the August crisis the United States Government had carefully followed the course of events in Europe; and while it cherished the hope that the crisis might pass, at the same time it recognized the necessity of preparing for the worst. On 22 August the War Department notified General Stone that "if war breaks out in Europe" two regiments of infantry, totaling 2,678 men, with full field equipment, would be sent to Panama "immediately." The War Department also proposed to send 898 filler replacements for the antiaircraft troops, to double the pursuit plane strength, and to speed up the authorized construction.\(^{20}\) On the next day, 23 August, the announcement came of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Personal appeals from President Roosevelt to Hitler, to the King of Italy, and to President Ignace Moscicki of Poland failed to halt the march of events.

Plans for protecting the Canal against sabotage during an international crisis of this sort had been drawn up in Panama and given constant study ever since the spring of 1936. Now, steps to put them into effect were quickly taken. Three basic measures had been provided for: first, the installation and operation of special equipment in the lock chambers, designed to detect underwater mines and bombs and to prevent damage from this cause; second, the restriction of commercial traffic to one side of the dual locks; and third, the inspection of all ships before they entered the Canal and the placing of an armed guard on vessels while in transit through it.\(^{21}\) These measures were instituted between 26 August, when the President gave Secretary Harry H. Woodring the signal to go ahead, and 1 September. At first the Canal authorities exempted from the inspection and guard requirements all American flag vessels, foreign passenger liners on regular runs and carrying more than twenty-five passengers, and British or French cargo ships that were "known to the Canal" and on a regularly scheduled voyage; but the War Department immediately insisted on the regulations being applied without

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\(^{21}\) Ltr, Governor Julian Larcombe Schley, Panama Canal, to SW, 14 Jul 36; Ltr, Governor Clarence Self Ridley, Panama Canal, to SW, 16 Aug 37; Memo, WPD for CorS, 13 Jul 38. All in AG 660.2 Panama Canal (7–14–36).
distinction, without regard to the "nationality, size or character" of the vessel. Ships of war "of foreign powers with whom we are on diplomatically friendly relations" were the only exceptions the War Department recognized.\textsuperscript{22}

The only discretion the War Department permitted was in the size of the armed guard; but this alone gave the Canal authorities considerable latitude in applying the regulations. Vessels were grouped in several categories on the basis of their size, nationality, and potentiality for mischief, and a corresponding transit guard was provided that varied in numbers from two to twenty-five men. The plan had been for the Navy to furnish the men for the guard; but when it was put into effect the Fifteenth Naval District was so short of manpower that the Army had to take over this function temporarily. The 18th Infantry Brigade, consisting of the 5th and 13th Regiments and numbering 2,678 officers and enlisted men, had been earmarked for Panama should some emergency require that the garrison be reinforced. As soon as it was decided to institute transit guards, the War Plans Division asked General Stone whether in view of the decision he would like to have the brigade or any part of it sent to Panama immediately. The reply was prompt: "For security and guarding of canal desire 18th Brigade be sent to Canal Zone with full field equipment including peace allowances, motor transport and heavy tentage."\textsuperscript{23} Preliminary steps to start the brigade on its way were taken at once. Sometime between the end of October and the middle of November the troops arrived. They were a welcome addition to the garrison.

Not all of them seem to have been required for transit guard duty. In February 1940 the commander of the Pacific Sector, in submitting a plan for reorganizing the garrison, recommended a strength of 376 for the transit guard. Some months later, after the guard system had been tightened, departmental headquarters figured that this duty would require the services of 16 officers and 248 enlisted men; in June 1941 when the guard was further increased, 450 men were considered necessary; and later in 1941 a full battalion was employed to furnish the transit guard details, although, according to an official headquarters historian, "this number was in excess of the actual needs. . . ."\textsuperscript{24} The number of men needed depended, of course, on the

\textsuperscript{22} WPD Draft Memo, SW for President, 26 Aug 39, sub: Def of the Panama Canal Against Sabotage; Memo, SW for TAG, 28 Aug 39; Telg, SW to Governor Ridley, Panama Canal, 28 Aug 39; Memo, WPD for CofS, 30 Aug 39; Telg, SW to Governor Ridley, Canal Zone, 30 Aug 39. All in WPD 3730-13.

\textsuperscript{23} Rad, CG PCD to TAG, 1 Sep 39, AG 320.2 (8–19–39), sec. 3.

\textsuperscript{24} Hq PCD, MS, Panama Mobile Force and Security Command, OCMH pt. III, pp. 12–13 and passim, and pt. I, p. 10.
amount of traffic, the stringency of the system, and the rate of rotation. In August and September 1939 an average of fifteen or sixteen vessels were passing through the Canal each day; but of these about 68 percent were vessels of American, British, French, or Dutch registry, which took a transit guard of only ten or fifteen men or less.

Other reinforcements, in addition to the 18th Infantry Brigade, were sent off to Panama immediately. Two antiaircraft detachments, totaling about 30 officers and 868 enlisted men, were dispatched early in September in order to bring the units in Panama up to their allotted strength. At the same time, after hurried arrangements were made with Mexico and the Central American Republics, thirty new P-36 fighters were flown down to reinforce the air garrison. The coast artillery reinforcements, which had been held back pending completion of the housing program, were now sent forward, although the construction program had barely started.\(^{25}\)

In conjunction with the antisabotage measures and the dispatch of reinforcements a third step was taken to meet the emergency occasioned by the outbreak of the European war. This was an administrative step taken on 5 September when the President by virtue of his authority under the Canal Zone Code directed the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, to assume exclusive control and jurisdiction over the Canal and all its adjuncts and appurtenances, including the government of the Canal Zone. In normal times the commanding general and the Governor shared responsibility for the safety of the Canal; but in time of war, or whenever the President considered war to be imminent, the intention was that the commanding general would assume full responsibility. This was done in 1917, four days after the proclamation of war with Germany. In 1939, at the end of August the War Plans Division urged that the law be invoked as soon as the President issued a proclamation of neutrality or emergency; and only to this extent was there a departure from the 1917 precedent.\(^{26}\)

While these emergency measures were in progress, they and defenses at Panama were being subjected to further continuing study. The air commander in Panama, Brig. Gen. Herbert A. Dargue, reported to General Arnold that he could see no sign of construction activity at either France

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\(^{25}\) Memo, G-3 for TAG, 26 Aug 39, sub: Movement of Reinforcements to Panama; Ltr CG PCD to TAG, 26 Aug 39; Memo, G-3 for G-1, G-2, G-4, and WPD, 3 Sep 39; WPD Office Memo for Gen Strong, 7 Sep 39, sub: Rpt... on Air Corps Pursuit Flight... All in WPD 4191-3.

\(^{26}\) Memo, WPD for CofS, 26 Aug 39, AG 320.2 (8-19-39), sec. 4. A copy of President Roosevelt’s Executive order (8232, 5 September 1939) and the official notification to the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, are in the same file. See also, Padelford, Panama Canal in Peace and War, p. 139.
or Albrook Fields and that he was "a little impatient" about it. But he did not want the flow of reinforcements stopped on this account. Both the Chief of Coast Artillery and the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, formally called attention to the inadequacy of the antiaircraft armament. The former urged that an extra gun be provided for each 3-inch battery, which would be an increase of twenty-five guns; the latter forwarded to the War Department, almost simultaneously, a report that came to just about the same conclusion. The question of installing long-range radar stations, which had been under consideration since midsummer, was brought to a decision when the Chief Signal Officer and the Chief of Engineers agreed with the War Plans Division that two sets should be installed immediately and three others when FY 1941 funds became available. The Federal Bureau of Investigation entered the picture with a memorandum for the President that offered a critical view of the situation in Panama, based, so it seemed to the War Department, on conditions existing before the recent emergency measures were taken. One voice of protest—that of the governor—was raised. Although the commanding general, as soon as he took over the government of the Canal Zone, had seen to it that all the existing regulations and administrative machinery continued, the Governor, after two months of military control, was convinced that a return to something like his former position was desirable. The Governor argued that the Neutrality Act of 4 November 1939 and President Roosevelt's reassurances that the United States did not "intend" to get involved in the war

27 Memo, CofAC for WPD, 16 Oct 39, WPD 4191-3.
made inapplicable the legal provision on which military control was based. In any event, the Governor continued, "military control" was unnecessary since he and his chief assistant were Army officers themselves. But the Governor's arguments did not move the War Department. The War Plans Division disposed of them flatly and concisely by stating that the existing system was "working satisfactorily" and that to change it "might have the undesirable effect of creating the impression that safeguarding the Panama Canal has become less important." 29

Reorganization and Expansion

The arrival of reinforcements in the fall of 1939 and the certainty that more were on the way permitted a reorganization of the old pyramidal command structure. Discussion and study at General Stone's headquarters in September and early October revealed dissatisfaction with the two-sector system and produced a plan abolishing the sectors and organizing all the ground forces and defensive installations into a permanent mobile force, with a sector organization of its own. The first step was to remove the antiaircraft troops from the sector commands, which was done on 16 October by the creation of the Panama Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade (AA). 30 Possibly because a change of commanding generals was scheduled for the beginning of the year nothing further in the way of reorganization was attempted for the time being.

In January 1940 General Stone completed almost three years of duty as Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, and was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Daniel Van Voorhis, who came to his new post from command of the Fifth Corps Area. One of the first tasks the new commanding general undertook was to complete the reorganization.

The immediate impetus was a letter from the War Department instructing the commanders in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone to submit, for the consideration of the newly created Air Defense Board, a complete study of the problem of defense against air attack, including the role of antiaircraft artillery, Aircraft Warning Service, and "the proper types, numbers and organizations and coordination of means and agencies required." 31 The

29 Memo, Governor Panama Canal, CofS, 9 Nov 39; Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Nov 39; Ltr, CofS to Governor Panama Canal, 17 Dec 39. All in AG 320.2 (8-19-39), sec. 4.
30 Hq PCD (CDC), Organization and Reorganization, p. 98; Hq PCD, Mobile Force and Security Comd, pt. I, pp. 5-6.
31 Memo, WPD for TAG, 2 Jan 40, WPD 4247-1.
case for abolishing the sector commands, forcefully presented by both General Dargue and Maj. Gen. Ben Lear, commander of the Pacific Sector, and for immediately creating a mobile force, impressed General Van Voorhis and received the blessing of General Marshall. The latter, who at the time happened to be inspecting the defenses of the Canal, seems to have given his informal approval to the plan early in February, after a conference with General Van Voorhis on Monday, 5 February. The harbor defense units, which had remained under the sector commands after the creation of the antiaircraft brigade, were now merged with the antiaircraft units into the Panama Separate Coast Artillery Brigade (Provisional). The infantry and field artillery, with some of the Quartermaster and Signal Corps troops, were grouped into the Panama Mobile Force (Provisional). Command of the mobile force was given to General Lear, and the Coast Artillery Brigade, which was reported by the New York Times to be the largest and most heavily armed artillery unit in the Army, was placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Sanderford Jarman. These changes and the abolition of the Atlantic and Pacific Sectors were put into effect by General Order No. 5, issued by General Van Voorhis on 16 February 1940. Formal approval by the War Department followed, two months later.  

General Lear’s headquarters and the bulk of the mobile force remained on the Pacific side of the Isthmus. On the Atlantic side, within an area that corresponded roughly to the old Atlantic Sector, the mobile forces were commanded by General Lear’s representative—Brig. Gen. Joseph M. Cummins, former commander of the Atlantic Sector. The new organization may well have been a more centralized and functional structure than the old; that it provided a more uniform distribution of staff work was clear and unquestionable.

Reinforcements had been arriving in Panama in a steady stream. At the end of January 1940 the strength of the garrison stood not quite at 19,500 men; by the end of April it had risen to approximately 21,100. General Van Voorhis was assured that his recommendations for an orderly and balanced augmentation would be for the most part carried out. Funds to complete the Aircraft Warning Service project would be obtained “at the earliest opportunity,” the War Department notified him. Additional antiaircraft guns would be sent. A third infantry regiment was approved, as

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33 Hist of PCD, II, 56.
well as a mechanized reconnaissance company (minus 3 platoons) and another field artillery battalion "subject to the availability of personnel."  

The new arrivals had so far outdistanced construction that a serious shortage of housing existed. At Albrook Field enlisted men were sleeping in the hangars, and at other stations the troops were quartered under canvas. Indecision in Washington about the type of contract delayed the arrival of contractors' forces until July 1940—one year after construction funds were made available. Until then all the construction work was done by the troops themselves. Tropical rains, the continued influx of troops, and frequent tangles of red tape between the different branches of the garrison added to the difficulties.

The Panama experience, how plans for deferring reinforcements until housing was ready could give way under the pressure of emergency, set a pattern that was to recur again and again at the newer bases in the Caribbean and the North Atlantic.

Among the legacies inherited by General Van Voorhis was the question of defensive positions outside the Canal Zone—particularly the Rio Hato airfield and the emergency landing strips that had been the subject of so much discussion with the Republic of Panama. In September 1939 the conduct of negotiations had been taken over by the State Department in collaboration with the War Department. No word of their progress was received by the Panama Canal Department until late in February 1940 when a draft of the proposed form of lease was sent to General Van Voorhis who objected to the article defining American jurisdiction within the leased areas.

The Rio Hato field had been put to use constantly under the terms of the agreement made with the owner of the place. In April 1940 General Van Voorhis designated the area as a "Department Training Center" over the objections of General Dargue who wished to develop Rio Hato as a subpost of Albrook Field, under control of the 19th Wing.

Midsummer of 1940 brought to bud a project that had existed as an idea for decades, and one which, in 1940, had been halfway to completion for at least ten years. Even before the Canal was officially opened, some interest had been shown in a transisthmian highway as an adjunct to military communications across the Canal Zone. No active steps in furtherance of the idea were taken until 1928 when work on the Madden Dam was started. Then, in order to give access to the dam site on the Chagres River, a road was built

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84 Memo, WPD for TAG, 25 Apr 40, WPD 4270.
87 USAF Hist Study 42, Def of the Panama Canal, pp. 75-81.
that connected with the highway system of the Canal Zone. Thus a through road from Balboa halfway across the Isthmus was provided. The Madden Dam road was so constructed as to be suitable for inclusion in a transisthmian highway, but further action on closing the 24-mile gap between the dam and Colon was deferred by questions of jurisdiction, cost, and utility. From time to time during the early thirties, the commanding generals of the Panama Canal Department urged the completion of the highway. For purposes of defense they preferred a route either within the Canal Zone or under military control, but the highway convention which formed part of the Treaty of 1936 specified a road from Madden Dam through Panamanian territory to the Canal Zone boundary at Cativa, near Colón. In July 1940, a year after the convention went into effect, the G–4 Division and the War Plans Division of the General Staff were giving serious study to the question. Although the Chief of Engineers likewise objected to building the highway outside the Canal Zone, the consensus of the War Department was that work should get under way immediately, over the route outlined by the convention, and that the entire expense should be borne by the United States. The President gave his approval on 15 August; the Budget Bureau on 4 September allocated $4,000,000 from the President's Emergency Fund; the Panamanian Ambassador approved the arrangements on 6 September; and in October the actual construction began, under the supervision of the United States Public Roads Administration. It was hoped that a 20-foot wide, concrete highway would be completed by September 1941. Not long after construction of the highway was started, negotiations with the Panamanian Government were entered into for the purpose of acquiring a right of way for an access road from Panama City to the new searchlight and antiaircraft positions obtained outside the Canal Zone, between Panama City and Madden Lake. The War Department soon decided that this road, known as the P–8 road, would serve better than the existing Canal Zone highways as a link in the transisthmian highway. If the P–8 road were extended to Madden Dam, transisthmian traffic could be diverted away from the vicinity of the canal and the security problem thereby lightened. The additional funds required for building the P–8 road according to the specifications of the transisthmian highway were obtained in the spring of 1941, and at the same time plans for building a

38 PCD, MS, The Boyd-Roosevelt Highway and the Inter-American Highway, OCMH, pp. 1–8.
PANAMA AIRFIELDS. Balboa and Albrook Field (top). Rio Hato (bottom).
bypass around Madden Dam were adopted. Construction of the expanded P–8 project was transferred from the Army Engineers to the Public Roads Administration in September 1941.\textsuperscript{40}

Meanwhile, the scarcity of labor and delays in obtaining delivery of materials had slowed down construction of the Madden Dam–Colón highway. After the United States was thrust into the war, Army Engineers and their equipment joined the contractor's forces in opening up the last section of the road. On 22 April 1942 a battalion of field artillery with one hundred vehicles traveled the road from ocean to ocean, although it was not completely paved. By the end of May the paving was finished and an all-weather transisthmian highway was at last a reality, but traffic was restricted to military and other official vehicles until the P–8 road and the Madden Dam bypass were completed in April 1943.\textsuperscript{41}

The year 1940 also saw the beginning of another project, which, like the transisthmian highway, had been "in the cards" for some time past. Concern over the possibility that the Canal might be put out of operation by sabotage or aerial attack against the lock system had on various occasions given rise to proposals to construct another canal either in Nicaragua or across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, to convert the Panama Canal into a sea-level waterway, or to build an additional set of locks. Of these several proposals, the War Department favored the third on grounds that it would be the quickest and least expensive, and that in any case it would be a prerequisite for building a sea-level canal. Indorsed by the Governor of the Panama Canal, by the Secretary of War, and by the President, the project received Congressional approval on 11 August 1939; but funds to begin the work were not forthcoming until the following spring. Congress, seeing that at least six years would be required for the project, was not to be hurried, and there were those in the House of Representatives who believed that the $277,000,000 which the project would cost could be spent to better advantage for munitions and matériel. Finally on 30 May 1940 the House voted to accept a Senate amendment to the War Department Civil Functions Bill (approved 24 June 1940) which provided for an initial appropriation of $15,000,000 and authorized the letting of construction contracts to an amount not exceeding $99,000,000. Work was begun on 1 July 1940, when the dredge \textit{Cascades}
started excavating at the Pacific end of the channel leading to the New Miraflores lock site.\footnote{Ltr, President to Representative Adolph Joachim Sabath, 19 Jun 39; Ltr, SW to President, 19 Jun 39; Telg, Stephen T. Early to President, 28 Feb 40; Telg, President to Representative Sam Rayburn, 28 Feb 40. All in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. New York Times, May 31, 1940, p. 13; Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, 1940, pp. 78-79.}

Construction and planning were placed in the hands of the Canal administration, not of the Army, although the War Department controlled the purse strings. The plans called for a series of single locks paralleling, but at some distance from, the existing double chambers. The new locks were to be two hundred feet longer and thirty feet wider than the old, in order to accommodate the 58,000-ton \textit{Montana}-class battleships that the Navy placed on order in September 1940. This feature soon began to override the security consideration as the principal reason for the project.

The entry of the United States into the war brought into question the future of the third locks project; the Navy's interest in it gave it high priority. On 23 December 1941 the Governor of the Panama Canal reported by letter to the Secretary of War that the schedule, which called for completing the project by 30 June 1946, could be met only by assigning high priority to, and by vigorously prosecuting, the construction. Since the first of the new super-battleships was scheduled to be completed late in 1945, it would appear essential, continued the governor, that the locks program be completed as soon as possible.\footnote{Ltr, Governor Glen E. Edgerton to SW, 23 Dec 41, AG 821.1 Panama Canal (1-20-39).} Discussing the question at a War Council meeting on 5 January 1942, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, took a somewhat different view. "The only necessity for this lock [sic]," the minutes read, "is to permit larger battleships, now under construction, to pass through the canal. General Moore felt that there was some question as to whether or not, with shipping and material so short at this time, the construction of this lock should have such a high priority."\footnote{Min, War Council Mtg, 5 Jan 42, SW Conf, binder 2.} Since the matter was of primary interest to the Navy, the War Department accepted the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations, who recommended "that every effort be made" to complete the project "at the earliest date practicable, and not later than Jan 1, 1946."\footnote{Memo, CNO for CofS, 14 Jan 42, AG 821.1 Panama Canal (1-20-39); see also, Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 Jan 42; Memo, CofS for CNO. Last two in OCS 21260-3.} The Army and Navy Munitions Board agreed to assign the priorities necessary for completing the work on the schedule the Navy desired, and the governor of the Canal was instructed to push con-
struction as rapidly as he could.\(^\text{46}\) Four months later there was a radical change of plan.

As far as the defense of the canal was concerned, Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, considered the third locks project a hindrance rather than a help. "The greatest danger to the Canal today," he wrote in May 1942, "is an air raid which would damage the lake level gates to the extent that would result in the loss of water in Gatun Lake... The construction of a third set of lake level locks would present to the enemy an additional means of accomplishing its objective and would consequently render the local defense problem more complex."\(^\text{47}\) Therefore, when the Navy in the spring of 1942 indefinitely postponed the battleship construction program, which had become the principal reason for the additional locks, General Andrews recommended that the locks project be deferred also. Both the War Department and the Navy concurred in General Andrews' recommendation, and, having received the approval of the President, Secretary Stimson on 23 May 1942 directed the Governor of the Canal to modify the program drastically. Except for some of the dredging and excavating work that had already been started and the Miraflores bridge construction, all construction work was halted. During the following months, contracts were renegotiated and canceled, and a large amount of equipment and material was diverted to more immediate war needs.\(^\text{48}\)

The labor demand created by the various construction projects considerably overtaxed the local supply and made it necessary to import workers from neighboring countries and from the West Indies. Surveys made during the winter 1939–40 disclosed that the local labor supply was "practically exhausted" and that about 12,000 workers would have to be recruited outside the Republic of Panama if the requirements anticipated for midsummer of 1940 were to be met. Nevertheless, the Panamanian Government was loath to permit a widespread importation of foreign laborers, except from Spain or Puerto Rico, neither of which was considered a suitable source by the Canal administration and Army authorities. Early in 1940 the Panamanian Government agreed to the entry of one shipload of workers from Jamaica, where a labor recruiting office had been opened in February. President

\(^{46}\) Ltr, SW to Governor Panama Canal, 22 Jan 42, OCS 21260–3.
\(^{47}\) Memo, CG CDC for CofS, 18 May 42, WDCSA 42–43 CDC.
\(^{48}\) Memo, CofS and COMINCH for President, 21 May 42; Ltr, SW to President, 21 May 42, with undated indorsement by the President. Both in AG 821.1 Panama Canal (5–21–42). Annual Report of the Governor of the Panama Canal, 1942, p. 57, 1943, p. 49, 1944, p. 48; see also, Memo, CG CDC for CofS, 18 May 42.
Roosevelt, who had been anxious to have the wishes of the Panamanian Government carefully followed, gave his approval on 19 April to the importation of 600 Jamaicans to meet immediate requirements. At the same time he instructed the War Department that future importations should be made in accordance with the racial requirements desired by the Panamanian Government and that an attempt be made to fill needs by recruiting workers in Spain, Puerto Rico, and Colombia. By 30 June 1940 about 150 Jamaican workers had been brought into the Canal Zone. During the next twelve months employment recruiting offices were opened in Costa Rica and Colombia and from these sources, as well as Jamaica, 4,278 workmen were recruited. The peak was reached during the spring of 1942. On 30 June 1942 the Governor of the Canal reported that in the preceding twelve months 11,331 workmen had been brought into the Canal Zone, half of them from El Salvador.

By this time, in June 1942, the total of unskilled and semiskilled workmen, the so-called "Silver" employees, numbered 65,786. Although the workmen recruited on contract in neighboring countries were thus only a small percentage of the total employed, without them the labor situation would have been most critical. As it was, labor always had to be carefully allocated and some projects, the transisthmian highway for example, occasionally felt the pinch.

The Puerto Rican Outpost, 1939-1940

The aviation developments of the 1930's that produced the long-range bomber and which were primarily responsible for the new theories of defense in Panama were the principal factor in the establishment of a major Army base in Puerto Rico. First developed as an independent outpost of the Panama defenses, Puerto Rico became one of the strongpoints around the Caribbean perimeter. Prior to 1939 the Navy, whose job it was to guard the gaps in the Antilles screen, had only the base at Guantánamo Bay, a radio station at San Juan, Puerto Rico, and a small Marine Corps airfield on St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands. During 1938 the Army began to show glimmers of interest in Puerto Rico. The commanding general of the Second Corps Area, to which the island was attached for administrative purposes,
proposed in July 1938 that a Puerto Rican defense force be organized: "Keeping the enemy out of Caribbean waters is essentially a Navy problem," he wrote, "but, if need be, the Army can lend substantial support to the Navy through the use of aircraft based on Puerto Rico, when and if more important missions do not demand their use elsewhere at the time. A logical solution of the problem," he continued, "is this: construct a suitable air base and landing fields in Puerto Rico, but keep the Air Corps garrison to the minimum required for maintenance; ..." 51 As part of the evolution of hemisphere defense in October and November 1938 the Joint Planning Committee undertook a study of this and similar proposals, which by the following February had progressed to the point where the War Plans Division thought an independent headquarters in Puerto Rico was necessary. It recommended, therefore, that Puerto Rico be taken out of the jurisdiction of the Second Corps Area and be made a separate overseas department and that a general officer with a small staff be assigned to command the department and to develop a defense project and plan. The Chief of Staff approved the recommendation of the War Plans Division on 10 February 1939. 52 At this time the only troops on the island were two battalions of the 65th Infantry, a local Puerto Rican unit.

During the first half of 1939, five different surveys were made of possible airfield sites. Point Borinquen, at the extreme northwest corner of the island, was the choice of three of the survey parties and was approved by the Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig, on 22 June. Two other possible sites, recommended by a party headed by General Marshall, then Deputy Chief of Staff, were considered and rejected principally on engineering grounds. 53 At the same time General Craig forwarded the Joint Board's recommendations to the Secretary of War for his approval. These recommendations, fruit of the joint planning studies made during the spring, defined Puerto Rico's role as that of an outlying base for supporting the naval forces whose task it was to control the Caribbean Sea. The Army mission recommended by the Joint Board was as follows:

To hold Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to install and operate required Army base facilities; to support the naval forces in controlling the Caribbean Sea and adjacent waters; and to support operations against shore objectives. 54

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51 Ltr, CG Second Corps Area to TAG, 28 Jul 38, AG 320.2 (7–28–38).
54 Memo, JB for SW, 15 Jun 39, WPD 4159.
The principal policy recommendation of the board, namely, that a separate local command be established over the Puerto Rico–Virgin Islands area, had been adopted by the War Department on 5 May, when the Puerto Rican Department was established effective 1 July 1939. Brig. Gen. Edmund L. Daley was appointed commanding general with headquarters at San Juan. Although there had been some talk at one time of placing Puerto Rico under the Panama Canal Department, this idea had long since gone by the board and the chain of command was run direct from the Chief of Staff.

In mid-August General Daley and his Staff were working on the preparations that were preliminary to drawing up the defense project and the coastal frontier and operations plans. A thorough reconnaissance of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands had been made. An acquaintance with all the military forces that might become available—the 65th Infantry, the National Guard, and Reserve groups—had been forged. Counterespionage measures had been organized, and a revision of the internal security plan was undertaken. In the course of planning, General Marshall raised the question whether the National Guard and Regular Army units could not be mixed. His idea was to use Regular Army troops for the headquarters of the company or battalion and National Guardsmen for the rest of the unit. The chief of the War Plans Division thought this was more of a mixture than was necessary but that it might be possible to use National Guard battalions to fill out Regular Army regiments. Then the ramification whether to use Puerto Rican soldiers in the same unit with continental Americans developed. Before any policy on this question was established and while the defenses were still being plotted, the European crisis made emergency measures necessary.

The War Department decided to send immediate reinforcements to Puerto Rico. Toward the end of August General Daley was notified that if war broke out in Europe he would be sent one antiaircraft battalion, one coast artillery battalion (155-mm. gun), and a company of engineers, totaling about 1,050 officers and men. As the fighting in Europe developed, the strength of the proposed reinforcement was increased. On 3 September a battalion of field artillery was added to the list, and a few days later an additional antiaircraft battery and service units were added. This brought the

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55 WDGO 2, 5 May 39.
56 Ltr, Gen Daley to Gen Strong, WPD, 17 Aug 39, WPD 4159–1.
promised reinforcements to more than 1,500 officers and men. The first arrivals, Battery D of the 69th Coast Artillery (AA), landed at San Juan on 25 September. By the end of October all the troops except the company of engineers had arrived. Their arrival late in November brought the total strength of the Puerto Rico garrison, including the 65th Infantry, to just under 3,000 officers and men.

Highest priority had been given by the War Department to the preparation of an emergency airfield suitable for B-17 operations. On 6 September, Puerto Rico Air Base No. 1 was established in a cow pasture near Point Borinquen. Work on a temporary landing strip was immediately started. In November, the 28 officers and 228 enlisted men of the 27th Reconnaissance Squadron arrived at the air base, and as soon as the runway was completed the planes of the squadron—nine B-18 bombers—were flown in. This was on 5 December 1939. With the arrival of the planes the emergency measures were completed, and the Puerto Rican Department could look forward to a more orderly development.

These first steps had been directed primarily toward eliminating the source of weakness to the Panama Canal defenses that the Antilles seemed to present, namely, the danger that an enemy might take possession of one of the islands and use it as a base from which to launch an attack on the Canal, the continental United States, or the sea lanes. For this reason, to deny Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands to the enemy was, according to the War Plans Division, “of paramount importance.” On the other hand, the Antilles were also a source of strength. In the first place, they limited the sea approaches of the Canal to a few narrow passages, “thereby simplifying the problem of the location and attack of hostile vessels,” and in the second place, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands afforded potential bases from which long-range air operations could be conducted either to exert control over the Caribbean Sea, in support of the fleet, or to provide air protection to the land areas bordering the Caribbean, in direct defense of the Canal. But it was not until well into 1940 that the concept of a Caribbean theater

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58 Rad 5, TAG to CG PRD, 22 Aug 39; Memo, CofS for SW, 3 Sep 39; Memo, G-3 for G-1, G-2, G-4, and WPD, 5 Sep 39. All in WPD 4191-4. See also, CDC, MS, A Preliminary Study of Garrisons of the Puerto Rican Department, pt. I, p. 12.
even began to take shape. The limits of the Puerto Rican Department had been officially defined as "the Island of Puerto Rico, including all keys and islands adjacent thereto, and all islands belonging to the United States within the Virgin Island group." The Joint Board, however, in its recommendations earlier in 1939 had delineated a somewhat larger area of responsibility—a rectangle bounded north and south by the 17th and 20th parallels, on the east by a line just off Cape Engaño, the easternmost tip of the Dominican Republic, and on the west by the 63rd meridian. This was probably the broadest expanse within which the defenses established in Puerto Rico in 1939 could be used effectively. Nevertheless, by ensuring against the establishment of an enemy foothold in this area, the defenses of Puerto Rico were indirectly a protection to the Panama Canal.

During the first six months of 1940 the build-up in Puerto Rico proceeded at a somewhat slower pace than that in Panama. In this period the Puerto Rico garrison grew from 2,980 to 3,281 officers and men, an increase of 10 percent, while the garrison in Panama rose from about 19,400 to 22,375, an increase of about 15 percent. The explanation was undoubtedly in the fact that when plans for building up the Puerto Rican defenses were put in motion in the preceding year the process had to be started from scratch, and it was a process that always gathered momentum very slowly. In the second place, the War Department was deliberately keeping the air garrison at a low level primarily because of the rapidity with which it believed reinforcements could be sent from the United States. General Arnold cited this same policy in disapproving a request from the Panama Canal Department for additional transport and reconnaissance planes. "The principle that all aircraft necessary for the defense of the Panama Canal must be available in the immediate area of the Canal Zone at all times," he wrote "... is in direct opposition to the approved Air Board Report, which adheres to the principle that the aviation complement of overseas garrisons should be held to the minimum required before reinforcement by air can arrive..." General Arnold then continued, "from a realistic viewpoint it seems inconceivable that an air attack on the Panama Canal of such proportions as to be beyond defensive capabilities of the normal garrison could be launched without the forty-eight hours warning required to permit reinforcement by air."
Then the war in Europe erupted into a blitzkrieg. Turning against the neighboring neutrals, the German armies outflanked the major French and British defenses. By mid-June practically all of western Europe was in the clutches of Hitler. On 17 June General Marshall ordered the Panama Canal Department, the Hawaiian Department, and the west coast to alert themselves against a surprise attack. The directive sent to General Van Voorhis required him to take "every possible precaution" against any sort of action, "naval, air or sabotage," aimed at putting the Canal out of commission and it specified that the "air component and antiaircraft forces must be in state of preparedness for action at any hour." General Herron deployed his entire antiaircraft and security forces into defensive positions, with live ammunition, and made arrangements with the local naval commander for a complete air patrol, which the Navy immediately put into operation. But neither the official histories of the Panama Canal Department nor the more likely files of the War Department reveal specifically what measures General Van Voorhis took in Panama.

Looking backward and in the glare of the Pearl Harbor attack a number of points seem to stand out conspicuously: First, the alert in Panama dwindled off into controversy on the subject of "unity of command"; second, there was no standard measure, no precise definition, of what constituted an alert or the synonymous phrase "preparedness for action"; and third, a follow-up message from General Marshall, which mentioned only the "possibility of attempt at sabotage," by this less inclusive phraseology could have limited the scope of the War Plans Division's original directive without intending to do so. Since it is easier to look back than to see ahead in time, only the first of these—the command issue—was recognized as a matter that required attention.

Not long after the alert of June 1940 the whole complexion of the Canal's defenses changed as a result of Britain's offer of base sites in Bermuda, Newfoundland, and the West Indies. With the acquisition of bases in Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana, the possibility of making the Caribbean a *mare clausum* presented itself.

65 See above, p. 158.
66 Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 40, WPD 4326.
67 The Panama alert itself is dealt with as thoroughly as the records permit in Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, pages 108, 460-61.
CHAPTER XIII

Out From the Canal Zone

The fall of France and the subsequent siege of Britain created a situation that was in effect the one for which the newest of the American strategic plans had been designed. Based on the assumption of a complete German victory in Europe, which would burden the United States with most of the weight of defending the Western Hemisphere, this new plan—the RAINBOW 4 plan—provided for taking into protective custody the Old World possessions in the New World on the ground that Hitler would otherwise grab them up as spoils of war.\(^1\) The plan contemplated the organizing of a Caribbean theater of operations as a major measure of defense, one that would in fact serve the dual purpose of furthering the southerly orientation of RAINBOW 4 and of protecting the Atlantic approaches to the Panama Canal. While subsidiary RAINBOW 4 plans were being laid, the President and his advisers were arranging the details of the destroyer-base exchange with the British Government. As soon as the exchange took place a survey of the prospective base sites in the Caribbean area—British Guiana on the southern periphery, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, and Jamaica—was undertaken by an Army-Navy board and preparations for developing the bases were begun.

Another important element in the making of a Caribbean theater was the precarious position of the French and Dutch colonies. Immediately upon the invasion of the Low Countries in early May 1940, British troops landed in Curaçao and a French unit went to Aruba for the purpose of guarding the large and valuable oil refineries there. The Dutch Government acquiesced, even though reluctantly, and the United States protested, for fear of a Japanese reaction on the other side of the world. When France fell, the troops on Aruba were brought back to Martinique, where they joined the forces under the command of Admiral Georges Robert, the French High Commissioner. A British guard replaced them. Meanwhile, Admiral Robert had affirmed his allegiance to the Vichy regime, had become custodian of about $250,000,000 in gold that had been sent from France before the collapse,

and had gathered together at Martinique a small force of naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier *Bearn* with 106 American-built planes on board. The dangers in the situation were apparent and were not greatly eased by the presence of a British naval force in West Indian waters. To keep watch over the state of affairs the Navy Department based a destroyer squadron and twelve PBY'S (twin-engine patrol bombers) at San Juan.\(^2\)

*Organizing the Caribbean Theater*

When plans for developing the newly acquired Caribbean bases were drawn up, the need arose of creating a new command structure since only one of the new base sites, Jamaica, was within the limits of an existing command. Also, according to General Arnold, some arrangement under which all Army air units in the Caribbean would be under a single command was necessary, while at the same time General Marshall raised the question of "unity of command" over all forces—Army and Navy—in the area. A staff study that was started through the mill in October or November 1940 became, in December, a recommendation by the War Plans Division that a theater command be established over all the Army forces in the Panama Canal Department, the Puerto Rican Department, and the base sites leased from the British. The War Plans Division suggested that the various local commands be organized into three groups as follows: one, the Puerto Rican Department with the projected bases in Antigua, St. Lucia, and the Bahama Islands; two, the Panama Canal Department and Jamaica; and three, Trinidad and British Guiana.\(^3\) Perhaps more important than these intrinsic elements in producing a new command organization in the Caribbean was the fact that the War Department at the same time was considering organizing the defenses of the continental United States into four theaters, or defense commands.\(^4\)

On 9 January 1941, three weeks after the War Plans Division had submitted its recommendations to the Chief of Staff, the War Department notified General Van Voorhis that a Caribbean defense command had been

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\(^3\) Memo, for file, Col Anderson, WPD, 13 Nov 40, WPD 2917-27; Memo, CoAC for CoS, 20 Nov 40, AG 320.2 (1-8-41); Hist Sec, CDC, MS, Army and Navy Boundaries of the Caribbean Defense Command, OCMH, pp. 7-8; Hist Div, CDC, Hist of Caribbean Theater, I, 158-60.

\(^4\) See above, pp. 23-24.
authorized and that he was to command it in addition to his other duties. On 10 February the Caribbean Defense Command was officially activated; ten days later General Van Voorhis assumed command; and on 29 May the organization was completed.\(^5\)

The structure was not built without disagreement. The controversial questions were principally the co-ordination of operations with the Navy, the precise grouping of local commands, and the organization of a Caribbean air force. Although official policy held that "operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation," it was the standard and accepted Army doctrine that only unity of command would provide the "unity of effort which is essential to the decisive application of the full combat power of the available forces."\(^6\) The contretemps that had occurred at the time of the June 1940 alert, when by error the Panama Canal Department sent a "directive" to the Fifteenth Naval District, demonstrated what ought not to happen. It must have immeasurably strengthened General Marshall’s conviction that unity of command was required without further delay, but General Van Voorhis, perhaps because of his close personal relations with the local naval commander, preferred the old official policy of mutual co-operation. "A gradual approach along cooperative lines," he wrote to General Marshall, "will result in joint effort without raising the question of command. Personally I feel that the question of coordinating all activities under a single head will have to be determined," he concluded, "when the emergency arises."\(^7\) He had raised the question in June, when, during what appeared to be an emergency, he thought that the means for carrying out his mission were lacking and could be most easily provided by the Navy. Every time the same issue was raised elsewhere—in Bermuda, Newfoundland, Alaska, and Iceland—the circumstances were the same: one commander was looking with longing eyes at the means under the control of another. Since the question was essentially one of policy, discussion of it most of the time took place beyond the range of the local commanders. No solution was reached in Washington until the Pearl Harbor attack, when unity of command was established at Panama and Hawaii by fiat. The problem then was transferred to the operating levels.

The question of how to group the local area commands within a Carib-

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\(^5\) Hist Sec, CDC, MS, Caribbean Defense Command, Organization, Development and Reorganization, OCMH, pp. 1–4.

\(^6\) For the one quotation see Joint Action, ch. II, par. 9, and for the other, FM 100–5, par. 114, 22 May 41.

\(^7\) Ltr, Gen Van Voorhis to Gen Marshall, 10 Jan 41, AG 320.2 (1–8–41).
bean theater was at the very beginning a matter of difference between General Van Voorhis on the one hand and the War Plans Division and the commanding general of the Puerto Rican Department on the other. It was more open to compromise, however, than the issue of unity of command. In notifying General Van Voorhis on 9 January that the Caribbean Defense Command was authorized, the War Department directed him to recommend an appropriate organization. His views on this subject differed from those of the War Plans Division. Instead of placing Antigua and St. Lucia with the Puerto Rican Department and Jamaica with the Panama Canal Department, General Van Voorhis recommended that Jamaica be grouped with Puerto Rico, to make for easier administration, and that Antigua and St. Lucia be grouped with Trinidad, which would become a territorial department.\(^8\)

The commanding general of the Puerto Rican Department, Maj. Gen. James L. Collins, objected to this grouping on the score that the Anegada Passage, between the Virgin Islands and the Leewards, could not be effectively closed unless the Puerto Rican defenses extended beyond it. He also believed it more desirable to have Antigua and St. Lucia supplied from Puerto Rico. A compromise was adopted. On 3 May the War Department notified General Van Voorhis that after considering the matter it had approved the new scheme of organization. (Chart 1) On 29 May 1941, General Van Voorhis organized the Caribbean Defense Command in accordance with the directive of the War Department.\(^9\)

The same problem that had faced the Panama Canal Department now confronted the larger theater. Whether the tactical defenses should be organized along lines similar to those of the administrative organization and assigned to the sectors or be placed in a theater-wide functional grouping under a single commander was the question. The specific issue concerned the air units. On opposite sides of the question were ranged General Van Voorhis and the commander of his air forces, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews.

Based on enthusiastic reports of British air defense brought back by General Chaney and other American observers, a theater-type organization of air defense was set up in the continental United States in the early spring of 1941. To such builders of air power as General Andrews this seemed to offer the ideal system. It was essentially a task force organization, as far as the air units themselves were concerned, which would go into action when

\(^8\) Hist Sec, CDC, Organization, Development and Reorganization, p. 13; Hist Sec, CDC, Army and Navy Boundaries of CDC, pp. 11–12.

\(^9\) Hq CDC, GO 8, 29 May 41, in Hist Sec, CDC, Organization, Development and Reorganization, app. B.
Chart 1—Organization Approved 3 May 1941

Caribbean Defense Command

Puerto Rican Sector
  - Puerto Rican Department
  - Bahama Base Command
  - Jamaica Base Command
  - Antigua Base Command

Panama Sector
  - Panama Canal Department

Trinidad Sector
  - Trinidad Base Command
  - St. Lucia Base Command
  - British Guiana Base Command
alerted by the elaborate ground warning network. Ideally, as the air forces saw it, the antiaircraft artillery would be closely tied in with the interceptor forces, and the whole would be commanded by the air commander.

General Marshall, in a personal letter to General Van Voorhis on 4 January, referred to the question of co-ordinating the air forces as being "exceedingly important" and requiring "very special treatment." He had sent General Andrews to Panama, General Marshall wrote, so that "a very competent man" would be available for this purpose; and "as soon as the new air units begin to arrive in the Caribbean region," he continued, "the matter of coordination of air affairs will demand immediate treatment." But then General Marshall went on to say that he felt that current plans provided for too many air units to be accumulated on permanent station in the Caribbean, since air units could be deployed rapidly when needed, if airfields and facilities were available. He suggested that, after the minimum garrisons were decided upon, air units located in the southeastern United States be tagged as reinforcements and that, instead of being stationed in the Caribbean, they might make a swing around the region three or four times a year. He admitted, however, that "the Staff" in Washington did "not seem to agree" with him on this. General Marshall then proceeded to discuss command between Army and Navy, in the midst of which he added, "but there can be no question but what all of the Air activities must be coordinated by a single head."

General Van Voorhis agreed that for the time being the outpost bases in the Antilles should be lightly manned but developed so they could take care of reinforcements that might be flown in from the United States. He took the position that the Panama Canal air forces "should not go beyond the immediate sphere of their operations in . . . defense of the canal, for which they were initially provided." And they should not, General Van Voorhis continued, "be looked upon by the War Department as constituting a force available for operations throughout the theater." He was firm and emphatic in his insistence that means had to come before co-ordination. Both General Andrews and his predecessor General Dargue had vigorously agitated this matter of "coordinating all means available," without explaining to the satisfaction of General Van Voorhis what the Air Corps meant by co-ordination. General Van Voorhis considered it synonymous with command, and it seemed to him obvious that the acquisition of means, and

10 Pers Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Van Voorhis, 4 Jan 41, WPD 4440-1.
11 Ltr, Gen Van Voorhis to Gen Marshall, 10 Jan 41; Ltr, Gen Van Voorhis to TAG, 19 Feb 41. Both in AG 520.2 (1-8-41).
training, should come first. He pointed out, furthermore, that air defense
plans for the continental United States could rely upon a comprehensive
communications network, the lack of which in the Panama-Caribbean area
militated against the adoption of a similar defense system. When the War
Department kept urging him to "effect coordination in the Caribbean area" by
charging General Andrews "with functions . . . corresponding to those
of the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force in the continental United
States," and when, according to General Van Voorhis, the War Department
questioned the organization of the Panama air defenses before he had
organized them, General Van Voorhis lost his last shred of patience. He
could not understand, he wrote, how the War Department could criticize
something on which he had never even expressed himself officially.  
A few
days later, when he announced the organization of the Caribbean Air Force,
with General Andrews as commanding general, it could be seen that the
structural details did not markedly differ from those recommended by the
Air Corps and modeled after the organization in the continental United
States.  

Part, at least, of the War Department's attitude had been inspired by
letters from General Andrews. On 11 January, about a month after his ap-
pointment as commander of the Panama Canal air forces, General Andrews
submitted a lengthy report to General Van Voorhis in which he recom-
mended a program for improving the air defenses along lines advocated by
the Air Corps. Four days later, on 15 January, he wrote to Maj. Gen. George
H. Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, describing the Panama air defenses as
"worth little" and the communications system as "lousy." In March he
wrote to General Marshall criticizing plans for the air warning service in
Panama and charging that too many nonessential things were being done
in the name of defense. He set forth his views on the organization of a
Caribbean air force, including the need for unity of command over local
naval defenses and the desirability of bases in the Republic of Panama and
the west coast of Africa. Before General Marshall could dispatch a reply,
another letter from General Andrews arrived reiterating the latter's dissatis-
faction with the slow progress he had made in "selling" General Van Voor-

32 Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Van Voorhis, 5 Mar 41; Memo, WPD for CofS, 1 Apr 41; Ltr
(drafted in WPD), Gen Marshall to Gen Van Voorhis, 9 Apr 41. All in WPD 4440-3. Ltr, Gen
Van Voorhis to Gen Marshall, 12 Mar 41, AG 320.2 (1-8-41); 1st Ind, CG PCD to TAG,
7 May 41, on TAG Ltr, 28 Apr 41, AG 320.2 (4-15-41).
13 Hq CDC GO 2, 8 May 41; Hq Caribbean Air Force GO 1, 9 May 41. Both in AG 320.2
14 USAF Hist Study 42, Air Def of the Panama Canal, pp. 128-32.
his ideas on the organization and operation of a Caribbean air force. He attributed this fact to his failure to gain the complete confidence of General Van Voorhis.\(^\text{15}\) But only a few weeks later the Caribbean Air Force was organized as a "task force, complete within itself, capable of independent action, and commanded only by air officers."\(^\text{16}\)

The next step in giving effect to the task force—defense command idea was to authorize GHQ to act as a command headquarters. This was done early in July. Given command of the Army garrisons in Greenland, Bermuda, and Newfoundland, GHQ sought to have the Caribbean Defense Command similarly "activated," because from the GHQ point of view the command situation within the Caribbean theater was "unsatisfactory . . . as regards training, supply and administration."\(^\text{17}\) Two weeks after GHQ reopened the question of command in the Caribbean, orders were issued for General Van Voorhis to take over command of the Fifth Corps Area. His successor was General Andrews.\(^\text{18}\)

**The Alert of July 1941**

Although the command was now organized along theater lines, the safety of the Panama Canal was still the chief concern.\(^\text{19}\) Rumors and fears of a Japanese attempt against the Canal had developed at the beginning of July when affairs in the Far East began to edge toward a crisis. The Navy Department's bulletin to the President on 3 July reported the probability of a Japanese move against Russia "about 20 July" and the fact that the Japanese Government was beginning to divert shipping out of the Atlantic. One shipping company, it was stated, had ordered its vessels to be west of the Panama Canal by 25 July regardless of passengers or cargo; another had instructed its ships to discharge all their cargo at west coast ports. Among numerous other memorabilia, the bulletin further reported the following: "Possible torpedo attack on Panama Canal between 1st and 15th of July is reported from a reliable source . . . ."\(^\text{20}\) This information was sent to the War Department at once and was immediately relayed to General Van

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\(^{15}\) Pers Ltr, Gen Andrews to Gen Marshall, 12 Mar 41; Pers Ltr, Gen Andrews to Gen Marshall, 5 Apr 41. Both in AG 320.2 (1-8-41).

\(^{16}\) USAF Hist Study 42, Air Def of the Panama Canal, p. 187.

\(^{17}\) Memo, GHQ for CofS WD, 25 Jul 41, referred to in Memo, DCofS GHQ for G-3 WD, 12 Aug 41, GHQ G-3 file, Corresp from CDC.

\(^{18}\) Memo, DCofS Bryden for TAG, 7 Aug 41, OCS 20241-192.

\(^{19}\) The question of a supply organization for the Caribbean area was not yet resolved. On this matter, see below, p. 402.

\(^{20}\) Navy Dept, Bulletin to the President, 3 Jul 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 20, pp. 4352–53.
Voorhis as follows: "Report from questionable source indicates torpedo attack on Canal between July 1 and 15." In Washington, much more significance was attached to the news of Japanese shipping diversions. General Van Voorhis was directed to take added measures of protection against sabotage and to tighten up the surveillance of ships in transit. He was to delay all Japanese ships, ostensibly for the purpose of searching them, until he received further instructions from the War Department. General Van Voorhis tended to discount much of what had been reported. Japanese ship movements were normal, he radioed Washington, and in fact on 3 July a large Japanese freighter had passed through the Canal into the Atlantic, bound for Baltimore. As for a torpedo attack, he had been given a similar report by the military attache at Bogota, and it was clear he did not put much stock in it. However, he immediately placed a series of defensive measures into effect. War channels through the mine fields at both ends of the Canal were put in use instead of the usual straight channels; antisubmarine and torpedo nets were placed in operation in front of the locks; and a vigilant guard was maintained. The only unusual activity was a concentration of small boats on the Pacific side of the Isthmus, possibly fishing craft, reported General Van Voorhis, and in order to maintain surveillance over them he requested that he be provided with two high-powered speed boats. Meanwhile, someone in Washington had figured out that Japanese shipping movements were scheduled so as to place one or more vessels in the Canal each day during the period 16–22 July. Although the War Department was unaware of its purpose, the schedule looked definitely suspicious and countermeasures were considered imperative. The result was that General Marshall and Secretary Stimson decided to restrict Canal traffic for an indefinite period "for the purpose of effecting repairs." What this amounted to was an exclusion of Japanese shipping; all other vessels were permitted to pass through. When the Japanese Ambassador inquired about the seeming discrimination, he received a very noncommittal reply from Acting Secretary of State Welles, who had been informed by the War Department of its intentions and who was in complete accord with them. Several of the vessels that had aroused the suspicions of G–2, and a number

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21 Rad, WD to Gen Van Voorhis, 3 Jul 41, OPD Exec 4, bk. 5.
22 Ibid; Diary of Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow, entry for 3 Jul 41, OPD Exec 10, item 1.
23 Rad, CG to PCD to CofS, 4 Jul 41, OPD Exec 4, bk. 5.
24 Min, War Council Mtg, 7 Jul 41, SW Conf, binder 1; Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 and 10 Jul 41, sub: Restrictions on Traffic, Panama Canal, WPD 3730–22.
of other Japanese ships, arrived at Cristobal during the next few days, but, when the ban was continued, they were rerouted either via Capetown or by way of Cape Horn. By 22 July no Japanese vessels remained at the Canal Zone. The few ships that had been inspected in United States ports had proved to be free of any threat. Before the month ended, the Japanese move into Indochina provided a clue to the activity that had aroused American suspicions, and the subsequent freezing of Japanese funds in the United States brought a cessation of trade between the two countries that made the Canal restrictions superfluous.

**The Outposts in the Dutch West Indies**

The strategic importance of the Caribbean area itself had meanwhile increased. Among other basic commodities, American shipping was now carrying two million tons of bauxite per year from Surinam to the United States. This represented 60 or 65 percent of the American aluminum industry's total supply, and any threat to the mines or the sea lanes would imperil American production. On 18 August, in the midst of its Iceland preparations and Brazil and Azores planning, GHQ was instructed to prepare plans for the relief of the British troops in Aruba and Curaçao and for the establishment of an American garrison in Surinam. As in the case of all plans involving the forces or territory of another country, there were certain complications. Diplomatic discussions aimed at clarifying the status of the Dutch colonies were in progress and made a military reconnaissance impractical. Furthermore, the protection of the bauxite mines had been taken under study by a joint Anglo-American staff committee. Brazil, too, came into the picture when Mr. Jefferson Caffery, the American Ambassador, informed the State Department that Brazil might be willing to join in the defense of Surinam. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles favored Brazilian participation on the ground that it might lead the way to Brazilian permission for the establishment of American defense forces in northeast Brazil. A final complication was President Roosevelt's desire to postpone any action until he could discuss the subject with Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, who was expected to visit the United States later in the summer.

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26 Memo, Lt Col Le Count H. Slocum, WPD, for Gen Gerow, 23 Jul 41, and related papers, WPD 3730-23.
27 Entry of 18 Aug 41, GHQ 314.81 Diary; Memo, Lt Col Matthew B. Ridgway for Gen Gerow, 26 Aug 41, sub: Conf with Mr. Welles re Dutch Guiana; Note for Rd, Col Ridgway, 27 Aug 41, on Memo, ASW McCloy for Gen Miles, 26 Aug 41. Last two in WPD 4580.
The War Plans Division took the position that any force sent to Surinam should have a broader mission than guarding the bauxite mines. Instead of merely a guard company, the force, according to the chief of the Plans Group, should be "adequate to the task of (1) maintaining United States authority, (2) protecting our vital interests, . . . and (3) upholding the prestige and dignity of our armed services." The result was a recommendation by the War Plans Division, approved by General Marshall on 29 August, that a reinforced infantry battalion be immediately sent to Trinidad, where it would be held in readiness to move into Surinam. Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, head of the War Plans Division, went to Hyde Park on 31 August to present the situation to the President, who had just learned that Queen Wilhelmina's visit was to be postponed. A convenient opportunity to press for Dutch permission to send a force to Surinam offered itself on this same day, when the Governor of the colony, alarmed at reports that a German cruiser was in the vicinity, appealed to British authorities in Trinidad for aid. Brig. Gen. Ralph Talbot, Jr., commanding the American troops in Trinidad, requested authority to send 20,000 rounds of .30 caliber ammunition to the local Dutch forces in Surinam. The War Department at first granted the request but later in the day rescinded its authorization in favor of organizing a special force to be sent to Surinam. Force A, as it was designated, consisted of three composite companies of the 33d Infantry, a bomber squadron, and three platoons of Coast Artillery. It totaled 990 officers and enlisted men. On 9 September, just a week after the first steps had been taken to organize it, Force A sailed from the Canal Zone to Trinidad. There it stayed, awaiting the signal to proceed, until 25 November.

Although the Dutch Government had agreed in principle to accept American aid, the negotiations were protracted, and the departure of Force A from Trinidad was delayed by the pressure of other matters of higher priority to the State Department and by the need of arranging details of the Brazilian participation. Reluctant to admit Brazilian troops into Surinam since the aid of Venezuela had not been sought for Curaçao and Aruba, the Netherlands Government proposed as a solution to invite Brazil to send a

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28 Covering Memo of Lt Col Lee S. Gerow, 29 Aug 41, on Memo, Maj Edward H. McDaniel for Col Gerow, 28 Aug 41, WP D4580-1. 29 Informal Memo, Gen Gerow, WPD, 29 Aug 41, WPD 4580-1; Gerow Diary, entries of 29 Aug and 31 Aug 41, OPD Exec 10, item 1; Memo, WPD for CoS, 2 Sep 41, quoting rads: Talbot to G-2, 31 Aug 41; CoS to CG Trinidad, 1 Sep 41, and WD to CG CDC, 1 Sep 41, WPD 4580-8; Memo, W.B.S. [Col Walter B. Smith, SGS] for SW, 16 Sep 41, OCS Conf File (9-23-41); Trinidad Base Command, Hist Sec, CDC, MS, History of Trinidad Sector and Base Command (hereafter cited as TBC, Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC), 1, 125-25.
OUT FROM THE CANAL ZONE

military mission to Surinam for the purpose of co-ordinating defense measures and discussing the security of their common boundary. This formula was accepted by the Brazilian Government, and the War Department began making arrangements to send the troops about 9 November. But because of dissidence on the part of one or two members of the Netherlands Cabinet, the start of the operation was delayed another two weeks. On 25 November a headquarters party flew into Surinam, and three days later the first echelon of the force arrived off the harbor of Paramaribo. On 3 December 1941 the remainder of the ground troops landed, and on 8 December the air unit arrived with three B-18's and seven P-40 fighter planes.

The dispatch of troops to Aruba and Curaçao seems to have been a less urgent matter, although it had been under consideration fully as long as the Surinam operation. In the Anglo-American staff conversations early in 1941 (the ABC meetings) it had been agreed that, if and when the United States entered the war, American forces would relieve the British garrisons in Iceland and in Aruba and Curaçao. During the summer the first American troops had gone to Iceland. But it was not until February 1942, after the United States had entered the war, that American troops arrived at the Dutch islands. Until then, two British infantry battalions (one on each island) provided security for the oil refineries and port installations. Seacoast defenses consisted of three 7.5-inch guns on each island, manned by Dutch troops. During September, October, and November both GHQ and the War Plans Division made studies of the troop requirements, but there was apparently no intention of sending the troops immediately. The original calculation of 1,433 officers and men, which approximated the British strength on the two islands, was increased in the course of the three months of planning to 2,434 men, which was more than the combined British-Dutch forces. But the matter was still hanging fire when the attack on Pearl Harbor came.

Securing the Pacific Approaches

During 1941, while the Caribbean theater was being organized, the Pacific approaches to the Canal were likewise being secured. Before the year

80 Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Sep 41, WPD 4580-20; Rads, Ambassador Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., to State Dept, 25 Sep and 6 Nov 41, OPD Exec 8, bk. A; Rad, Ambassador Biddle to Secy State, 10 Oct 41; Rad, TAG to CG CDC, 25 Oct 41. Last two in AG 370.5 (8-7-41).
81 GHQ Staff Confcs, 9 Sep and 11 Sep 41, GHQ 337 Staff Confcs, binder 1; Memo, WPD for TAG, 23 Sep 41; Memo, Lt Col George P. Hays, G-3 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 10 Sep 41, and related papers. Last two in WPD 4577-2. Ltr, William Joseph Donovan to Under Secy Navy James V. Forrestal, 23 Oct 41; Memo (not used), WPD for CofS, 31 Oct 41, sub: Minimum Requirements for Def of Curaçao and Aruba. Last two in WPD 4577-3.
was out, permission to build bases in the Galápagos Islands had been obtained from the government of Ecuador, negotiations for similar bases at Salinas, Ecuador, and Talara, Peru, were under way, and a squadron of Army bombers had begun operating from airfields in Guatemala. Thus a semicircle of defense similar to that provided by the Antilles was constructed in the Pacific.

The question of acquiring bases on the Galápagos Islands had made one of its periodic appearances at the beginning of the year. At that time the War Plans Division had taken the position that nothing should be done unless the President expressly directed it and unless an outright lease was obtained from the government of Ecuador. If these conditions were met, the War Plans Division agreed that assistance should be offered the Ecuador air force in return for use of a base in the Galápagos Islands. During the following weeks reports filtered in from South America that the government of Ecuador would not be averse to ceding a base on the islands to the United States. At this point, in the spring of 1941, the question was still considered primarily a matter for the Navy Department to act upon, just as it had been three years earlier. Although definitely related to the defense of Panama, a base in the Galápagos fell within the Navy's responsibility for offshore patrol. The Army was officially concerned only to the extent that the base would have to be defended.

Meanwhile, the question was being approached at a more oblique angle than naval or military, or even diplomatic, channels permitted. President Roosevelt knew the Galápagos Islands and recognized their strategic importance; but he was also alive to the undesirable repercussions that would follow any attempt of the United States to establish a base there. He made various proposals aimed at setting up some sort of collective protectorate over the islands, but nothing came of them. More promising were the activities of the Pacific Development Company. This was a corporation organized and headed by a retired naval officer and chartered in Delaware for the purpose of developing a concession on the largest of the Galápagos Islands. Having received a sweeping grant of authority from the Ecuadorian Government and a large loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Pacific Development Company entered into negotiations with the private owner of the island. President Roosevelt, who had been introduced to the project by his naval aide, Capt. Daniel J. Callaghan, apparently intended to

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32 Memo, WPD for G-2, 31 Jan 41, WPD 3732-10.
33 Ltr, Military Attaché, Quito, to Col Harris, G-2, 26 Mar 41; Memo, Col Ridgway for Chief, Plans Sec, WPD, 3 Apr 41. Both in WPD 4225-11.
use the company much as the Pan American Airways Corporation was being employed in the airport development program. The Navy Department, somewhat to the annoyance of Admiral Stark, thus had to deal with the Pacific Development Company for the facilities it desired. Then a hitch occurred. The man with whom the development company was negotiating owned only 10 percent of the necessary property, it now transpired, so that the lease for most of the land would have to be obtained from the Ecuadoran Government. At about the same time an account of the Pacific Development Company and its activities appeared in the column of a Washington journalist. Although the story was far from complete, it nevertheless served to draw aside the curtain of secrecy that was essential to the success of the company’s negotiations.

While the matter of acquiring the land and providing the physical plant had been occupying the attention of the Pacific Development Company, the business of obtaining permission to make use of the islands and the territorial waters of Ecuador had been the subject of independent and direct negotiation between the State and Navy Departments on the one hand and the Ecuadoran Government on the other. More progress was made in this respect than by the development company. Before the company’s negotiations reached a standstill, the Navy obtained permission to use the Galápagos Islands as a patrol base. The State Department thereupon began negotiating a formal agreement providing for the establishment of naval facilities and installations on the islands and a base on the mainland as well, in the vicinity of Salinas. Colonel Ridgway of the War Plans Division was informed of these developments by Capt. W. O. Spears, USN, on 16 October, during discussion of an Army staff study recommending that the War Department take active steps to acquire Aircraft Warning Service and land-plane bases in the Galápagos. This study, advocating what was for the War Department a reversal of policy, had been drawn up in the War Plans Division and submitted to Captain Spears for comment. Now, informing Colonel Ridgway of the progress made in the negotiations for naval bases, Captain Spears offered the opinion that the Navy Department would be “very reluctant to consent to the diversion of any more materials . . . re-

34 Notes made by Lt Col Paul McD. Robinett, Min, SLC Mtgs, 21 May and 21 Apr 41. Both in SLC Min, II, items 20 and 26. Tab C (Article from Washington Times-Herald, September 19, 1941) and Tab D (General Information on Galápagos), Memo, Maj McDaniel, WPD, for Col Gerow, 5 Oct 41, WPD 3782-11.
quired by the establishment of additional bases." The naval bases, he thought, would suffice.  

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor intensified Ecuadoran fears for the safety of the islands and put an end to earlier objections by the State Department that a base agreement with Ecuador might offend Peru. Less than a week after the attack, an advance unit of the Navy's base force was on its way to the Galápagos on a British steamer. The War Department on 20 December informed Under Secretary of State Welles that it desired to obtain from Ecuador "the right to construct landing fields on those islands at U.S. expense and to station necessary defensive forces there for protection of the fields. Without the latter, it does not wish the former." At a meeting of the Standing Liaison Committee, later the same day, Mr. Welles voiced his assurance that, in view of previous statements by the government of Ecuador, the War Department could proceed with its plans before the signing of a formal agreement, which was expected to take place the following week. A similar request by the War Department with respect to Peruvian airfields would, according to Mr. Welles, have to await the reply of the Peruvian Government. Although Talara, Peru, had apparently been preferred by War Department planners as the southern terminus of the patrol arc, when no reply came from the Peruvian Government, the War Department switched to Salinas, Ecuador, which had already been designated as the site of the naval patrol base. The first Army planes reached Salinas on 16 January 1942, when a flight of heavy bombers (four B-17's) arrived from Panama. Toward the end of the month construction of a joint Army-Navy base at the Salinas airfield was begun. In the Galápagos everything started from scratch, since there were no existing facilities, as there were at

36 Note for Rcd, M.B.R. (Col Ridgway), 16 Oct 41; Memo, Maj McDaniel for Col Gerow, 3 Oct 41; Memo, Col Gerow for Gen Gerow, 8 Oct 41. All in WPD 3782-11.
39 Min, SLC Mtg, 20 Dec 41, SLC Min, II item 40.
40 The greater interest in Talara was the result not of its more strategic location for the defense of the Panama Canal but because of its important petroleum installations, which were totally undefended and which were a source of fuel for the Chilean copper industry. See Rad 105, GHQ to CG CDC, 16 Dec 41, WPD 4380-8. It should be noted that a reinforced Coast Artillery battery was stationed at Talara in March 1942 and by September an American air base was in operation; but by July 1943 the American air units and ground garrison were withdrawn.
41 It is of interest that in sending detachments of the Caribbean Air Force to operate from and defend outlying bases, General Andrews was doing what he had cautioned against as a subordinate of General Van Voorhis.
Salinas, that could be used until the base was completed. As a result it was early May before the first Army combat unit reached the islands and began operations.42

Thanks to the airport development program carried out by Pan American Airways and to the prompt co-operation of the Guatemalan Government, air facilities at the northern end of the patrol arc were usable several weeks before operations began at the Salinas airfield. Throughout 1941 construction work on two existing airfields in Guatemala—one at Guatemala City and the other at San José—had been under way. The idea had been to have the fields available so that, if the Guatemalan Government should request the support of American arms against aggression by a non-American power, help would be forthcoming quickly; but during 1941 the question was raised whether it might not be advisable to send security and communications detachments to the airfields immediately. GHQ and the Caribbean Defense Command seem to have been inclined toward sending the detachments; the War Plans Division of the General Staff and the State Department appear to have been opposed. There had been no decision on the matter when the Japanese attacked Hawaii.43

A week after the attack the American Chargé d’Affaires at Guatemala City transmitted to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister a note requesting permission for American military planes to fly over and land on Guatemalan territory without formal notification through diplomatic channels, to make whatever photographs might be necessary for tactical or navigational purposes, and to make use of Guatemalan airports and their facilities. Permission was also sought to station a bombardment squadron of 700 men and 10 planes at San José and small service detachments at both fields. On 16 December, the day following the receipt of the American request, the Guatemalan Government signified its consent, and on 25 December General Andrews notified GHQ that six B–18's were operating out of Guatemala City, which had been chosen for the main base. The bulk of the force, including a reinforced infantry platoon, arrived in Guatemala on 7 January 1942 and brought the strength up to about 425 officers and men.44

42 Air Bases in the Galápagos, pp. 43–44.
43 Memo, WPD for TAG, 2 Dec 41, WPD 4413-4; Hist Sec, CDC, MS, History of Procurement, Occupation and Use of Air Bases in Guatemala (hereafter cited as Hist Sec, CDC, Air Bases in Guatemala), p. 12. For a discussion of the Pan American Airways airport development program, see Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, ch. X.
44 Rads, CG CDC to GHQ, 25 Dec 41 and 5 Jan 42, WPD 4372–10; Hist Sec, CDC, Air Bases in Guatemala, pp. 14–17.
Expansion in the Republic of Panama

When the question of developing a base in the Galápagos and of building up an outer ring of defense around the Pacific approaches to the Canal had been raised, in January 1941, the inner defenses were still concentrated in the Canal Zone. Negotiations with the Panamanian Government for defense sites outside the Zone had reached a standstill. In the year and a half since the ratification of the Panama treaty, the number of defense sites of one sort or another that the Army wanted to acquire in the Republic of Panama had risen from ten or so to more than seventy-five. The principal reasons for the delay in the negotiations were the term of the leasehold and the question of jurisdiction. A new administration which had taken office in Panama was inclined to grant a lease for such bases only for the duration of the emergency, while the United States desired to negotiate a long-term lease with an option to renewal, using the Rio Hato lease as a model. On the question of jurisdiction, the United States took the position that for the period of the lease it should have exclusive jurisdiction and police authority over all persons within the leased areas. In London, at this same time, the commissioners who were negotiating a base agreement with the British Government were facing a similar situation.

With General Van Voorhis urging the War Department to press for a settlement, and with General Marshall voicing his concern over the air forces being “entrapped in the Canal Zone,” Secretary Stimson laid the matter before the President and Cabinet at a meeting on 9 January. President Roosevelt, informed of the danger in having all the Panama Air Force planes crowded together on three small airfields, directed Secretary of State Hull to take a stronger stand with the Panamanian Government. The result was a new tack. Instead of continuing what promised to be endless negotiations, the State Department informed the Panamanian Government that further discussion would be of no value until the lands in question were actually occupied. This had been the procedure with respect to the base sites acquired from Britain in the destroyer-base exchange, when it was agreed not to let the discussion of controversial questions delay the acquisition of the base sites. The Panamanian Government expressed its willingness to

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46 The quotation is from notes on General Marshall’s remarks at the Standing Liaison Committee meeting on 3 January 1941 (SLC Min, II, item 1). See also, Ltr, Gen Van Voorhis to CofS, 3 Jan 41, WPD 2674–31.
47 Stimson Diary, entry of 9 Jan 41.
permit the military authorities to occupy the various defense areas and to begin construction pending the conclusion of a formal agreement. A joint board was to be set up for arranging details of the transfer. Although General Van Voorhis was reluctant to take over any sites unless he could do it unconditionally and with full authority, a decision to go ahead was made on 24 March. During the following week instructions to this effect were sent to General Van Voorhis and the American Ambassador in Panama, and a schedule of dates for taking over the sites, which General Van Voorhis had drawn up, was given to the Panamanian Government.48 By 12 April 8 of the 12 airfield sites that had been considered necessary were taken over and occupied, and two of the seven AWS stations had been transferred but not occupied. During the next five weeks 1 or 2 additional landing field sites were acquired, and apparently no request was made for the transfer of any other sites. To the State Department, which all along had been urged to make haste in obtaining an agreement with Panama, it seemed that now an agreement had been reached the War Department was dragging its heels. However, an exchange of messages with General Van Voorhis convinced the War Plans Division that “every effort” was being made “to take over and occupy defense sites expeditiously.”49 By the end of 1941 about 40 defense sites had been occupied by American troops, and eventually the number rose to more than a hundred. A lack of roads and other facilities rather than any procrastination on the part of the Army or the Panamanian Government made the process slower at times than it might have been.

The procedure by which defense sites were acquired had been worked out by July 1941. It consisted of a preliminary study and consideration of each site by a joint Panamanian–United States Army board. If the site met with the approval of the board and the Panamanian Government raised no objections, the Army would move in and begin developing the place. While this was going forward, surveys and the assessment of damages were being carried out under the general supervision of a second joint board that was responsible for giving final, formal approval to the transfer. The system had apparently been functioning smoothly for some time, when President Arnulfo

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48 Min, SLC Mtg, 24 Mar 41, SLC Min, II, item 13; Rad, State Dept to Amer Ambassador, Panama, 31 Mar 41, WPD 2674-37. A brief of the aide-mémoire from the Panamanian Govt, 5 Mar 41, and letter of transmittal, Ambassador William Dawson to the Secretary of State, 5 Mar 41, are in OCS Conf. binder 11. See also, Min, SLC Mtg, 4 Feb 41, SLC Min, II, item 5; and Memo, Col Orlando Ward for CofS, 10 Jan 41, OCS Conf. binder 8.

49 The quotation is from Memo, WPD for CofS, 9 Jun 41, WPD 2674-41. See also, Rad 1995, Gen Van Voorhis to TAG, 12 Apr 41, WPD 2674-34; Min, SLC Mtg, 21 May 41, SLC Min, II, item 26; and Memo, Col Robinett for CofS, 21 Apr 41, SLC Min, II, item 19.
Arias of Panama was suddenly thrust out of office. With the President went the Panamanian members of both joint boards, and in the confusion the records disappeared. By the time new members were appointed and new records compiled, circumstances seemed to require a change in procedure.\textsuperscript{50}

Except for the entry of the United States into the war, the change most pregnant with consequences was the signing of the formal agreement on defense bases, which took place on 18 May 1942. Although progress had been made in actually acquiring the sites, a formal agreement setting forth the rights and privileges to be enjoyed by the United States had been avoided by the Arias regime. Negotiations had continued during the summer and early fall without much progress being made. At the end of September the draft of an agreement, which offered no substantial concessions to the Panamanian point of view, was sent to the American Ambassador for submission to the Panamanian Government on 8 October, the very day on which the Arias government was overthrown. The draft reached General Andrews' headquarters on 1 November, but by then it was becoming clear that the new Panamanian administration could not retreat far from the position taken by the Arias government.\textsuperscript{51} Discussions, counterproposals, and more study finally produced on 27 March 1942 a second draft that incorporated certain compromises. This draft formed the basis of the approved agreement signed in Panama on 18 May. As finally accepted, the agreement was to terminate within one year after "the definitive treaty of peace" was signed, and if the situation at that time was such as to require the continued occupancy of any of the defense bases, a new agreement would be concluded. The United States was given exclusive and full jurisdiction over its own civilian and military personnel within the leased areas and the right to arrest, try, and punish anyone committing crimes against the safety of the installations, except that Panamanian citizens arrested on any charge had to be turned over to Panamanian authorities for trial and punishment. For all lands leased as defense sites the United States agreed to pay to private owners an annual rental of $50.00 a hectare and for public lands $1.00 a year for all of them except the Rio Hato area, for which the annual rental was to be $10,000. The United States also agreed to assume the expense of completing the Pina–Rio Providencia highway and the Madden Dam bypass into Panama City.

\textsuperscript{50} Hist Div, CDC, Hist of Caribbean Theater, II, 337, 339; AG Hist Sec, PCD, Hist of PCD, III, 91; CDC PCD, Acquisition of Land, pp. 58, 67, 70–71.

Antiaircraft Defenses of the Panama Canal. Barrage balloons along the canal (top). A 40-mm. antiaircraft gun in position (bottom).
One-third of the annual maintenance cost of all highways used frequently by American forces would be carried by the United States.\(^5\)

Simultaneously with the signing of the lease agreement in Panama, an exchange of notes took place in Washington between Secretary Hull and the Panamanian Ambassador. Ever since January 1941 the Panamanian Government had insisted on certain concessions, twelve in number, as conditions of a lease agreement, but the United States Government had objected to a conditional lease agreement, and at least one of the provisions was considered by the War Department to be detrimental to the security of the Canal. The result of the negotiations conducted by the State Department was a separate agreement embodying the twelve concessions, which was signed on the same day as the lease agreement but independently of it.\(^6\)

As a result of the two agreements a new procedure for acquiring defense sites came into being. Since the lease agreement authorized occupancy and specified the sites to be occupied, there was no longer need for both of the joint land boards. The Panamanian Foreign Minister therefore proposed, soon after the lease agreement was signed, that a new procedure for transferring the lands be adopted. The second of the two land boards was accordingly abolished, and its supervisory and survey functions were transferred to the other board.\(^7\)

**Strength and Readiness of the Defenses, 1941**

One of the reasons why additional base sites were necessary was the rapid increase in the Panama garrison in the last three months of 1940. During this period the strength had risen from about 21,500 officers and men to approximately 28,000, an increase of slightly more than 30 percent. During most of the following year, 1941, there was only a gradual rise. In January the garrison stood at about 28,700; in November it totaled approximately 31,400. This was where it stood at the end of the month when the situation in the Pacific began to cloud over.

Since midsummer of 1941 the harbor defense troops, the Aircraft Warn-

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\(^5\) The text of the agreement is in Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Canal Dept, MS, Acquisition of Land, Appendix A.

\(^6\) The terms of the general agreement have been published as Executive Agreement Series 452, State Department Publication 2433. The article by A. R. Wright, cited note 51 above, describes the negotiations.

\(^7\) Details of the procedure are described in Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Canal Dept, MS, Acquisition of Land, pp. 91–95.
ing Service stations, and the antiaircraft defenses of the Panama Canal had been on a continuous round-the-clock alert. Locks and other sensitive areas were under constant guard against sabotage. Transit guards were being placed on all vessels passing through the Canal. The bomber command and some of the pursuit squadrons were on a 24-hour alert. Plans had been worked out for Army support of "the various naval commanders in the Caribbean Theater." In the Fifteenth Naval District, which included the waters immediately near Panama, the Navy was conducting a continuous surface patrol supplemented, to the extent the availability of planes permitted, by an air patrol. These measures were fully reported by General Andrews to the War Department in response to a warning sent to the commanding generals on the west coast and in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama on 27 November. The only additional measure that General Andrews considered it necessary to take was to increase inspections in order to insure the alertness of the troops.

He did, however, call to the attention of the War Department certain deficiencies in the defenses of the Canal. In General Andrews' opinion, the commandant of the naval district did not have enough planes or vessels under his control to conduct an adequate reconnaissance. The Aircraft Warning Service in the Caribbean theater, he reported, was totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand as well as to man the equipment when installed. Only two detectors were installed and in operation in the Panama Canal Department. The harbor defenses had less than one complete manning detail available. The antiaircraft artillery had insufficient personnel to man the armament being installed in the Canal Zone and only enough ammunition for one minute of fire per gun for the 37-mm. guns. There were no barrage balloons. The Caribbean Air Force, General Andrews continued, was totally lacking in night pursuit planes and in very-high-frequency radio equipment with which to direct pursuit in air. Only eight modern long-range bombers and twelve modern light bombers were available, and there were no 37-mm. cannons for the P-39's. "The situations in Puerto Rico and the Base Commands are so new, and their major deficiencies so well known," General Andrews wrote, "that no attempt has been made to enumerate them."
There had been little change in the size of the Puerto Rican garrison in 1941 since April, when heavy selective service inductions and large reinforcements had pushed the strength up to slightly more than 21,000 officers and enlisted men. This was an increase of about 60 percent over the December 1940 strength of 13,280 men and was almost exactly what the Panama garrison had been only seven months earlier. After the April augmentation the Puerto Rican garrison remained between 20,000 and 22,000 until March 1942, three months after the United States entered the war. Most of the troops were stationed at three posts: Borinquen Field, at the far northwestern point of the island; Camp Tortuguero, about twenty miles west of San Juan; and Fort Buchanan, midway between Camp Tortuguero and San Juan. Perhaps 66 percent of the total garrison was made up of native Puerto Ricans, distributed among the 65th Infantry and the several National Guard units that had been inducted on 15 October 1940. About 6,000 troops of the garrison belonged to the air component, the 13th Composite Wing. This was the striking force of the Puerto Rican coastal frontier. It was equipped, at the end of 1941, with twenty-one medium bombers and ninety-two pursuit planes.

In addition to the Panama and Puerto Rican garrisons there were approximately 4,800 men in the new bases acquired from the British—in Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana—and in Surinam. The largest of the outlying garrisons was the one in Trinidad, which totaled about 2,000 men.

Thus, when the Japanese attack on Hawaii came, there were nearly 58,000 troops on guard in the Canal Zone, in the Republic of Panama, and along the vast arc that stretched from Surinam, north along the Antilles screen, to the Yucatan Channel. Their mission was not simply to keep the Canal open but to defend the entire area. It was a task shared with the Navy.

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59 OPD Weekly Status Maps, AG 067 (9–4–45); CDC, Preliminary Study of Garrisons of the Puerto Rican Dept, pt. II, p. 2.
60 The above figures are the officially accepted figures, from the Table, Tentative Strength of the Army Based on Progress Reports as of Dec. 7, 1941, which was compiled some time afterward by The Adjutant General’s Office, Miscellaneous Division, Returns Section, a copy of which is in GHQ Secret Papers, binder 7. A summary of the reports received by GHQ from the several commands during the week of 2–9 Dec 1941 gives the following: Jamaica—876 officers and men; Antigua—309; St. Lucia—351; British Guiana—353; Trinidad—2945. The Surinam force of approximately 900 men is perhaps included in the Trinidad strength. Total strength of the Caribbean Defense Command is shown as 58,487. The foregoing summary is in Memo, DCoS GHQ for CG FF, 10 Dec 41, GHQ Theater Studies file, Policy bk.
Naval Factors in Area Defense

The officially promulgated doctrine of joint Army and Navy action specified the administrative machinery by which the joint defense of an area like the Caribbean was to be organized. When this doctrine had been last revised, in 1935, the only areas for which a joint organization had been provided were the eastern seaboard, the Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific coast, and the Great Lakes region, each of which was designated a coastal frontier. Although originally nothing more than a geographical expression, the name coastal frontier by 1941 had also come to mean the organizations by which the local naval commanders co-ordinated their activities with those of the appropriate Army commanders and by which operational command was exercised over the forces of two or more component naval districts.\(^{61}\)

The obvious necessity of extending local naval defense beyond the existing limits of the Tenth Naval District (Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) and the Fifteenth (the Panama Canal Zone and adjacent waters) and the need of co-ordinating activities with the Army on a broader basis than that afforded by the naval districts led Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, to propose the addition of two new coastal frontiers to the four already provided in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. He suggested that a Caribbean coastal frontier be organized to include the southernmost of the Bahamas, the eastern half of Cuba and all the rest of the Antilles, and the northeastern coast of South America between Colombia and Brazil; and that a Panama coastal frontier be organized which would include both the Caribbean and the Pacific coasts of Central America, both coasts of Colombia, and the coast of Ecuador. The Galápagos Islands, Cocos, and all the other islands off the Pacific coast were to be included also. This much of Admiral Stark's proposal was far from revolutionary. The Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee, then engaged in revising the *RAINBOW* 5 plan, accepted the two coastal frontiers as geographical definitions, and the Navy organized them as naval commands.

As part of his proposal, Admiral Stark had further recommended that each of the coastal frontiers be a unified command: the Caribbean to be under command of a naval officer, since it was primarily a naval strategic area; and the Panama Coastal Frontier to be an Army command, since the chief concern of forces there was the defense of the Canal. This ran counter to the single-theater point of view being developed by the Army, and, accord-

ing to General Andrews, it ignored the primary defense problems of the area, namely, the problem of air defense. If the Navy proposals were accepted, two Army air forces would be required in the Caribbean area, he predicted, and the organizations for maintenance, supply, and communications would become complicated and duplicating. The proposal, General Andrews commented, assumed that the two major threats were from the west and the east and overlooked the likelihood of an attack from the south along the Trinidad-Panama line. For the all-around defense of the area against any threat from any direction, the existing organization, namely, the Caribbean Defense Command, was sound and logical, General Andrews contended. He "agreed in principle with the desire of the Chief of Naval Operations to achieve a unity of command, but he believed that the method proposed was foreign to the problem at hand...." His conclusion was therefore that "naval support must be regarded as an adjunct to the existing army organization and should pass to army control when assigned or requested" and also that the naval districts in the Caribbean area should be so organized and commanded as "to permit coordination of naval supporting forces by the Caribbean Defense Commander through the principle of unity of command." The situation offered some proof that when an irresistible force meets an immovable object the result could be a transmutation of both into gaseous nebulae.

Seeking to improve the defense of the Panama Canal, the Army had extended the defense system and organized it so as to embrace the whole Caribbean area. This area itself thereupon became an object of special attention on the part of the Army, although it was predominantly a water area. Viewed strictly as a matter of defending an area, the problem was how to disinfect that area completely and who should do it. A task of this type had not been the Navy's principal interest since the days of Thomas Jefferson. On the other hand, the protection of shipping, by means of convoys and the destruction of enemy sea power wherever encountered, was one of the primary missions of the Navy. Viewed as a sea lane along which American shipping had to be protected, the Caribbean was principally a naval strategic area, although the Army believed that within the boundaries of the area the task of protecting shipping could be done equally well by the Army's long-range bombers and patrol planes. Regardless of these considera-

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62 Hist Sec, CDC, Organization, Development and Reorganization, pp. 54-57; CDC, MS, Developments Regarding Unity of Command in the Caribbean Area, OCMH, (hereafter cited as CDC, Unity of Command), pp. 24-25; Ltr, Gen Andrews to Gen Marshall, 14 Oct 41, AG 580 (10-14-41).
63 Hist Sec, Unity of Comd, p. 12.
64 Hist Sec, CDC, Organization, Development and Reorganization, p. 58.
tions the Caribbean side of the Isthmus gave Army authorities in the Canal Zone less concern than the exposed position on the Pacific side. In Panama, only a bare beginning had been made to provide the eventual bases for air coverage over the Salinas-Galápagos-Guatemala patrol arc. In order to fill the gaps in the arc, additional airdromes at Tehuantepec, Mexico, and Talara, Peru, were considered desirable; but, except for limited improvements to the existing field at Talara, which the Peruvian Government had been persuaded to undertake and which were started in the late fall of 1941, nothing had been done to establish these additional bases by the time the United States was drawn into the war. In contrast, the defensive screen in the Caribbean had been tightened by the acquisition of the new base sites in British territory. Whereas the Army commanders in Panama had repeatedly, but without avail, urged the extension of the defenses in the Pacific, the authorities in Washington were more interested in developing and fortifying the new Caribbean bases. This interest stemmed in part from considerations other than the direct defense of the Canal.

65 Hist Sec, CDC, MS, Procurement, Occupation and Use of Peruvian Bases, OCMH, pp. 9–10.
CHAPTER XIV

The New Bases Acquired for Old Destroyers

During the 1930's the occupation by the United States of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere had become a favorite political tom-tom for Anglophobes and isolationists. Generally presented in the guise of a necessity for national defense, the several proposals of this nature were invariably stripped of their pretensions by the War Department, which, as late as April 1940, insisted that the potential military value of the European colonies remaining in the New World was not sufficient to justify their acquisition by the United States. But the rapid advance of German armies through northern France completely changed the perspective in which the strategic value of Atlantic bases had hitherto been viewed. What had been laid aside, in April, as of no pressing military importance had become, a few months later, a part of the basic plan for hemisphere defense. And yet, to take over the European colonies in America would have been to acquire also a host of unwanted problems. All the military advantages of such a step, without most of the liabilities, were gained on 2 September 1940 as a result of the history-making Destroyer-Base Agreement, by which the United States acquired from Great Britain the right to lease naval and air base sites in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad, and British Guiana for a period of ninety-nine years.¹

Not much preparation had been made for the problems of construction, defense, and administration or for the action and reaction of the local setting—physical, political, economic, and social—upon the new tasks that suddenly confronted the War Department.

¹ For a discussion of the critical turn of events that shaped American strategic plans in the summer of 1940 and of the negotiations leading to the Destroyer-Base Agreement, see Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, ch. II, and Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning 1941-42, chs. I-II.
The Local Setting

The bare facts of geography were known or easily accessible to Army planners. Foremost were the fifty degrees of latitude, with all the consequent differences of climate and geography, that separated Newfoundland in the north from British Guiana in the south. One of the more obvious facts was the size of Newfoundland. With an area of 42,734 square miles, it was one of the larger islands of the world, larger than Iceland or Ireland or any of the Philippines, and about the same size as Cuba. Any plan had to take into account its rugged, fog-swept coasts, the bleak tundra-like plateau dotted with numberless ponds and lakes that made up the interior of the island, and the lack of communications. The only link between the coasts was a narrow-gauge railroad that snaked north and eastward from Port-aux-Basques on the Cabot Strait through the wilderness past the few, small settlements in the interior to the Newfoundland airport at Gander Lake and then down to Argentia and St. John's on the Avalon Peninsula. Here the climate is only somewhat colder and slightly wetter than that of northeastern Maine, and the harbor at St. John's, the capital and only fair-sized city on the island, is generally free of ice.

At the other extreme were British Guiana and Trinidad, where rain and heat and tropic humidity took the place of Newfoundland's snow, cold, and fog. Trinidad, it was observed, had a more uniform climate than most of the other islands of the Antilles, because it lay directly in the track of the moderating northeast trade winds, but even so there was considerable variation. The western coast, where the majority of the people live, is the leeward side, and as a result Port of Spain—the capital city—and all the towns facing the Gulf of Paria become unpleasantly hot during the long wet season. Seasonal variations are more pronounced on the other Caribbean islands and in the coastal lowlands of British Guiana, where, when the trade winds shift in August and September, the heat becomes oppressive. In Jamaica, the largest of the British West Indies, regional variation is the rule. Between the coast and the mountainous interior of Jamaica the temperature range drops twenty degrees and the average rainfall increases from about thirty-three inches on the coast to as much as two hundred inches a year in the interior.

In contrast, prewar Bermuda had long been a delightful vacation haven for many Americans. And in particular contrast to Newfoundland, where streams and lakes make up one-third of the area, tiny Bermuda had no source of fresh water other than rainfall. A fishhook-shaped cluster of low-
lying islands and islets connected by causeways and bridges and with a total land area of only twenty square miles, Bermuda is the world’s northernmost coral atoll. It has the mild, equable climate characteristic of Atlantic islands in the middle latitudes. Except for an occasional wayward hurricane that strikes with severe force, the tropical storms that blow north from the West Indies generally pass by. From the Royal Naval Station on the point of the fishhook, a railroad equipped for only the lightest traffic curved around the Great Sound through Hamilton, the capital, and then proceeded along the length of the islands to St. George on the eastern tip. A long-standing prohibition against automobiles gave, in 1940, an anachronistic shape to transportation. Roads and lanes were narrow and sharply curved, adequate only for the carts and bicycles for which they were intended.

In Bermuda, as well as in the Caribbean colonies, the white inhabitants were only a minority of the total population. Some 30,000 people, only one-third of whom were white, made up Bermuda’s permanent population in 1940. In most of the Caribbean colonies the white inhabitants were an even smaller fraction of the whole. Jamaica, with about a million and a quarter inhabitants, had a white population of only about 15,000. Possibly a third of the people of Trinidad, and a somewhat larger part of those in British Guiana, were of Asiatic extraction. Their turbans and jangling bracelets, the Hindu temples, and Mohammedan mosques added an oriental atmosphere to Port of Spain and to San Fernando, the principal port for the Trinidad oil fields. Local dialects made a complicated language pattern. In the country districts of Trinidad and St. Lucia, a French patois was still in use. Everywhere among the masses illiteracy was high.

The extent of self-government varied from colony to colony; in all of them, popular participation was extremely limited. Newfoundland, which had enjoyed dominion rank after the first World War, had fallen into financial difficulties and relinquished its status in 1933. After that date, a governor and commission appointed by the British Government had exercised all the powers formerly held by the Colonial Assembly. Among the islanders, some dissatisfaction with the arrangement could be found. Both in Newfoundland and Canada there were those who believed that the island’s problems were a matter of Canadian, and not primarily of British, concern. Bermuda, British Guiana, and the four West Indian islands were crown colonies. Of these, only Bermuda had a local legislature that was chosen completely by ballot. In fact, Bermuda’s House of Assembly, dating back to 1620, was the oldest English legislature outside Britain itself. The legislative councils of the five other crown colonies were only in part elected by popular vote. In
all the crown colonies, even in Bermuda, property qualifications restricted the franchise to a very small segment of the total population. The Governor, as the sole and personal representative of the King, dominated the government. His was the voice of authority. In him was centered complete responsibility for the government, and bearing the title Captain-General or Commander-in-Chief, he had certain, rather ill-defined responsibilities for the defense of the colony.

During the 1930's, a blend of economic distress, political discontent, and racial animosity had produced a bitter brew of strikes and riots throughout the Caribbean area. By 1940 a militant labor movement with definite political aims had taken shape. But, except in Jamaica, where a new constitution was granted in 1943, the coming of the war temporarily blocked the political aspirations of the people. In Trinidad and British Guiana local elections were suspended for the duration of hostilities, and one of the Negro leaders in Trinidad, Uriah Butler, was arbitrarily interned because he had taken a prominent part in the 1937 riots.

In August 1940, local defense forces in all eight colonies were extremely weak. In the Bahamas, British Guiana, Antigua, and St. Lucia they were nonexistent. In Trinidad, some two hundred lightly armed volunteers stood guard over the oil fields. A few small coast defense guns partially covered the northern approaches to the Gulf of Paria. The southern entrance to the gulf was undefended. In Jamaica, a battalion of Canadian infantry, with a strength of about 680 men, was stationed in Kingston, and four coast artillery guns, manned by native troops, guarded Kingston Harbor. Bermuda was defended by one British infantry company and two artillery batteries composed of militia. In Newfoundland, the defense of which had been assumed by Canada, there were, in addition to the local militia, a flight of RCAF bombers and a battalion of Canadian infantry. By the end of 1940 reinforcements had raised the strength of the Canadian garrison to about a thousand men at the Gander airfield and to about four hundred at St. John's. Although Newfoundland was thus better guarded than any of the other colonies, its defenses were weak in heavy antiaircraft and coast artillery guns. It was clear that in all the colonies, including Newfoundland, part of the burden of local defense would fall on whatever American garrisons were sent to the leased bases.

2 Greenslade Board: Outline of Local Defense for Bases . . . in the Caribbean Area and British Guiana, 8 Nov 40 AG 580 (g-4-40), sec. i, pt. i. The strength of the Bermuda and Newfoundland forces is given in Memos, G-2 for ACoFS WPD, 24 and 31 Jan 41, WPD 4300-6; Memo, WPD for CoFS, 5 Apr 41, WPD 4351-92, sec. 6; and in Min, Conf in ODCoFS, 24 Sep 40, OCS Conf, binder 3.
Planning the Garrisons

The War Department had taken no very active part in the preliminary negotiations leading to the Destroyer-Base Agreement and had made no attempt to anticipate the outcome by setting to work on plans for the bases. Until 20 August, when Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill revealed Britain’s intention to offer the base sites to the United States, there was nothing tangible to work on. But on the very day that Mr. Churchill made his announcement the Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee was directed to begin an investigation of possible base sites.

The committee, reporting eight days later, on 28 August, gave top place to Trinidad, Newfoundland, and Bermuda for strategic reasons and to Jamaica as a base of supply. Trinidad’s importance rested not only on its relation to the sea lanes, but also upon its suitability both as a staging area for moving aircraft to eastern South America and as an advanced base if ground operations were to be carried out in the southern continent. Newfoundland, squarely on the great circle route between New York and the British Isles, almost equidistant from Bermuda, New York, and the Azores, and only a little farther from Ireland, could control the North Atlantic air and sea lanes. In hostile hands it would have presented the same menace that two centuries before had impelled the New England colonies to oust the French from Louisbourg, just across the Cabot Strait from Newfoundland.3 Bermuda, lying midway between Newfoundland and the West Indies, would complete the line of Atlantic outposts; and Jamaica, the committee reported, would be valuable as a central supply base for the entire Caribbean. The remaining base sites—on St. Lucia, Antigua, one of the Bahamas, and in British Guiana—would be useful as emergency landing fields.4

The Joint Planning Committee took care to point out that the data on which its report was based were not complete and that any decision must rest on a thorough firsthand survey of the prospective base sites. In fact, the committee had scarcely begun work on its study when the Navy Department organized a board of officers to investigate the proposed sites. Within a few days steps had been taken to ensure Army participation, and, by the time

3 In recognition of this exploit, the principal U.S. Army base in Newfoundland was named, in May 1941, for the commander of the Louisbourg Expedition of 1745, Sir William Pepperrell of Kittery, Me.
4 Rpt of Jt Planning Comm to CNO and CofS, 28 Aug 40, WPD 4351–5. The report on Antigua, an appendix to the original report, is dated 3 September 1940. See also, Memo, WPD for CofS, 29 Mar 40, sub: Acquisition of Foreign Possessions in the Western Hemisphere, WPD 3977–2.
the President announced the exchange of destroyers for bases, the Board of Experts, as it was designated, was ready to function. Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade, USN, was at its head. The War Department was represented by Brig. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, former Chief of Staff of the Panama Canal Department and at this time commander of the Washington Provisional Brigade, by Lt. Col. Harry J. Malony, a member of the committee that had drawn up the detailed RAINBOW 4 plans, and by Maj. Townsend Griffiss, AC, who acted as General Devers' technical adviser on air matters. They were to determine, in agreement with experts to be designated by the British Government, "the exact location and bounds, the necessary . . . defenses, the location of sufficient military garrisons, stores, and other necessary facilities, etc.," of the bases contemplated in the eight colonies.\(^5\) Public announcement of the destroyer-base arrangement was made on 3 September 1940, and on the same day the Greenslade Board left for Bermuda to launch its first base survey.

While the Board of Experts was making its investigation in Bermuda, the War Plans Division was placed in general charge of developing all the base sites. Similar projects in the past, according to the War Plans Division, had bogged down for lack of a central agency that would not only plan the projects but push them through to completion. Consequently, when the War Plans Division was requested to draft plans on which construction estimates could be based, Col. Frank S. Clark, acting chief of the division, recommended that it be charged with the direction and co-ordination of all the base development programs.\(^6\) The Chief of Staff approved and on 6 September the War Plans Division was so notified. At the same time the division was instructed to draw up preliminary plans that would include a rough estimate of the funds required.\(^7\)

The Board of Experts returned from Bermuda on 10 September and submitted its report. Four days later the board left Boston for Newfoundland, returned and made its report on 24 September, and on 2 October set out again. In the next three weeks the board visited all the remaining base sites and made a second trip to Bermuda. During its first visit to Bermuda early in September, the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, had suggested that a British naval officer from the staff of the Commander in Chief, Amer-

\(^5\) Ltr, SN to Admiral Greenslade, 3 Sep 40; Ltr, President to Adm Greenslade, [1] Sep 40. Both in OPD Exec 13, item 22.
\(^6\) Memo, SGS for ACofS WPD, 4 Sep 40, OCS 21760-1; Memo, WPD for Gen Moore, DCofS WPD, 5 Sep 40, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 1 pt. 1. The WPD recommendation was drafted by Colonel Crawford, head of the Supply and Projects Section.
\(^7\) Memo, SGS for ACofS WPD, 6 Sep 40, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 1, pt. 1.
### TABLE 1—Recommended and Approved

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<tr>
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<td>Greenslade Board</td>
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#### NEWFOUNDLAND

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#### BERMUDA

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<th>Argentia</th>
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<th>Argentia</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hqrs &amp; hq sqn</td>
<td>Hqrs &amp; hq sqn</td>
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<td>667</td>
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(3) WPD memo for TAG, 24 Sep 40, AG 580 (9–4–40), sec I, pt I.
(4) Table attchd to WPD memo for TAG, 7 Feb 41, AG 580 (9–4–40), sec I–B.
## Strengths for Atlantic Bases, 1940-41

### Newfoundland—Continued

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Add, 2 plts MP</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>Air units:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 pur sq (I), 25 a/c</td>
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<tr>
<td>Det, Air base gp</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weather &amp; comm dets</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 plat, ord co (Avn)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Corps services (Stephenville)</td>
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### Bermuda—Continued

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<td>1 Comp grp: (11 bmb, 25 ptf):</td>
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<td>Pursuit sq (I)</td>
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<td>1,288</td>
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### Bases Acquired for Old Destroyers

1. **Strengths for Atlantic Bases, 1940-41**

   - **Newfoundland**
     - Revised table (Bermuda) (approved)
     - Permanent garrisons for mil. bases (approved)
     - Approved garrisons overseas bases

   - **Bermuda**
     - Ground garrison same as 19 Feb, except:
     - Add, 1 plat MP
     - Total ground
     - 1 Comp grp: (11 bmb, 25 ptf):
     - Grp, bmb & bmb sq (HB)
     - Bomb sq (H)
     - Pursuit sq (I)
     - Air base det
     - Weather & comm dets
     - Air Corps services
     - Total air & AC services

2. **Notes**
   - (5) Revised table, attached to WPD memo for TAG, 25 Feb 41, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. I-B.
   - (6) Table of permanent garrison, 1 Apr 41, OPD Exec #13, item 13, Gen. Malony Bdr #1.
   - (7) Table of approved garrisons, 9 Oct 41, WPD 4351-176.
## Table 1—Recommended and Approved

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<th>(1)</th>
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<td>29 Jan 1941</td>
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<td>Joint Planning Committee</td>
<td>Greenslade Board</td>
<td>WPD recommendation</td>
<td>Table of Army garrisons (approved)</td>
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<td><strong>TRINIDAD</strong></td>
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<td>1 det sig &amp; med</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Airways det (AC services)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(3) WPD memo for TAG, 24 Sep 40, AG 580 (9–4–40), sec I, pt I.
(4) Table attchd to WPD memo for TAG, 7 Feb 41, AG 580 (9–4–40), sec I-B.
# Strengths for Atlantic Bases, 1940–41—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(5) Revised table (Bermuda) (approved)</th>
<th>(6) Permanent garrisons for mil. bases (approved)</th>
<th>(7) Approved garrisons overseas bases</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb 1941</td>
<td>1 Apr 1941</td>
<td>9 Oct 1941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Trinidad—Continued**

- Ground garrison same as 29 Jan, except:
  - 1 regt engr (combat) (−1 bn)...... 770
  - Add. 1 comp (−1 plat −1 sqd)...... 169
  - Total ground:..................... 12,059
- Air units same as 29 Jan, except:
  - Change AC services to............. 781
  - Total air:......................... 4,529

**Jamaica—Continued**

- Ground garrison same as 29 Jan, except:
  - [Add] 1 plat MP (−1 sq)........... 58
  - [Change] services.................. 215
  - Total ground:..................... 1,780
- AC services same as 29 Jan........... 54

**Antigua, St. Lucia, British Guiana—Continued**

- Same as 29 Jan.

**Bahamas—Continued**

- Same as 29 Jan.

- None

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(5) Revised table, attached to WPD memo for TAG, 25 Feb #1, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. I-B.
(6) Table of permanent garrison, 1 Apr #1, OPD Exec #13, item 13, Gen. Malony Bdr #1.
(7) Table of approved garrisons, 9 Oct #1, WPD 4351-176.
ica and West Indies Station, accompany the board on its visits to each site.\(^8\) This proposal, as in the case of the President's suggestion that a corresponding British Board of Experts would be designated, was never formally acted upon, but there was constant informal contact and co-operation. Capt. J. S. Bethel, commanding H.M.S. *Caradoc*, accompanied the board as the personal representative of the British admiral, while the board upheld the spirit of the President's suggestion by conferring with the colonial officials and the British military and naval representatives in the various colonies.

Meanwhile, independently of the Board of Experts, the Army Air Corps had instituted its own study of the prospective base sites. An inspection of the airfield projects being developed by Pan American Airways was broadened to include the newly acquired base sites in the West Indies, and on 14 October the Air Corps submitted its report to the Chief of Staff.\(^9\)

Another interested party was introduced by the peculiar status of Newfoundland, which for years had occupied the same strategic position relative to Canada that it now held in 1940 with respect to the United States as well. Coinciding with the destroyer-base negotiations in August 1940, the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States and Canada, had come into being. A cautious recommendation that the United States participate in the defense of Newfoundland was included in the first report of the Permanent Joint Board. And the Greenslade Board in turn submitted its recommendations concerning Newfoundland to Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, senior Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, for his concurrence.

As long as the British remained in general control of the Atlantic, no heavier attacks on the bases were to be expected than raids by lone submarines or surface vessels and perhaps a few planes. At each base, the garrison, both ground and air, had to be sufficient to guard the installations and naval anchorage against an attack on this scale. The American forces would be further required to keep open all lines of communication within the colony. But the weakness of the colonial defenses meant that the American garrisons would have to supplement the local forces in defending the colony. These considerations, as well as those of strategy, were basic to the plans for manning the bases.\(^10\)

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8 Rpt, WPD to CofS, 13 Jan 41, title: Present Status ... of Army Bases ..., WPD 4351-48; Memo, "Betty" [Admiral H. R. Stark] for President, 6 Sep 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
9 Min, Conf in ODCofS, 6 Sep 40, OCS Misc Conf, binder 6; Memo, CofAC for CofS, 14 Oct 40, sub: Caribbean Familiarization Flight, WPD 4351-14, sec. 7.
10 Outline of Local Defenses for Bases Acquired From Great Britain ..., transmitted by Memo, Adm Greenslade for CNO and CofS, 12 Nov 40 AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 1, pt. 1.
The Greenslade Board, as well as the Joint Planning Committee in August, recommended fairly small permanent garrisons that could be readily expanded in an emergency. Subsequent discussion and decisions turned not only on the size of the permanent garrison and on that of the emergency garrison, but also on whether to build permanent facilities for the expanded emergency garrison or only for the smaller permanent garrison. As the reports of the Greenslade Board became available, during the fall of 1940, the War Plans Division revised the tentative schedules it had already drawn up on the basis of the Joint Planning Committee’s report and brought them more into accord with the recommendations of the Board of Experts. With only slight changes, the ground forces recommended by the board in the fall of 1940 still stood as the approved garrisons on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Jamaica was the only real exception. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the role the Jamaica base was to play, the Greenslade Board’s recommendations were whittled down over the course of the following year until the planned strength of the ground garrison on 7 December 1941 was about 8 percent of the original figure. As for the air garrisons, the War Plans Division at first accepted as the basis of its recommendations the report of the Air Corps survey rather than the smaller figures recommended by the Greenslade Board, but the War Plans Division almost immediately scaled down its recommendations to bring them, at the behest of the Chief of Staff, more into conformity with the Greenslade Board reports.\[11\][Table 1]

The garrisons, as established on paper in the fall of 1940 and periodically reviewed throughout 1941, represented the authorized strength, which at some indefinite time in the future might be sent to man the bases. They were to be the peacetime garrisons, not necessarily the forces that would be adequate in time of war or emergency. Yet there was no assurance that a garrison shaped to the requirements of peace would be adequate, even under those requirements, by the time construction was well enough advanced to permit sending it. At the same time it was clearly pointless to send troops to the bases until there were bases to defend. The solution adopted was to attack all aspects of the problem simultaneously. While War Plans Division was setting up the peacetime garrisons, negotiations with the British were proceeding toward a final agreement; while the negotiations were in pro-
gress, construction work was started; and while construction was barely getting under way, a few troops were sent to some of the major bases.

Negotiating the Base Agreement

The Destroyer-Base Agreement of 2 September 1940 had been a striking example of confidence on the part of each nation in the good faith of the other. The agreement itself was not hedged with conditions of any sort. None was acceded to beforehand that placed definite bounds to the areas that might be leased or limited the rights and privileges that the United States as lessee might enjoy. The grant was made and accepted on the understanding that issues of this kind would be solved later, by mutual agreement.

Certain questions of procedure and interpretation arose almost immediately. Was permission to be sought, for example, each time it was desired to send a survey party to one of the base sites, or could a blanket request be made? Should the acquisition of lands wait upon the settlement of claims, and was the United States to be a party to the settlement with individual land-owners? There were differences, too, over the locations proposed for the bases, as the experience of the Greenslade Board had indicated there would be. The administration of justice posed another problem full of thorns. And as soon as American survey and construction parties began arriving at the base sites, the applicability of local regulations came into question. These were but a few of the myriad issues that if not resolved would certainly contravene the spirit and might even nullify the practical value of the original agreement.

It was soon apparent that these issues could not be settled without referring them to the colonial governments. Not having been consulted before the Destroyer-Base Agreement was consummated, the colonies, not unreasonably perhaps, made an effort afterward to assert what they felt were their rights. Local conditions, the temperament of the people, and the constitutional role of the governor made inevitable a closer scrutiny by the colonial governments of the measures proposed by the United States; and as the situation differed among the colonies, so their reaction to specific proposals varied. In Newfoundland and Bermuda, where the base sites were a free grant and not an exchange for the destroyers, the local governments felt they had more at stake than the other colonies. It became evident that rapid progress could not in every case be expected.

This came to light as soon as the War Department made preparations
for sending out survey parties to the base sites. Immediately after the Greenslade Board returned from Bermuda in mid-September 1940, the State Department asked the British Government for permission to undertake preliminary surveys in Bermuda. Soon afterward a similar request was made concerning Newfoundland. A reply to the Newfoundland request was received in about two weeks, and on 13 October the survey parties arrived at St. John’s.\(^12\) But in Bermuda, there was a local assembly to be considered, whose wishes the Governor could ill afford to ignore. It was therefore not until five and six telegrams had passed between Washington and London that the British Government, late in October, finally granted authority for a survey party to visit Bermuda. When members of the advance party reached the islands on 3 November, they found the Governor surprised at the failure of the British Embassy to notify him of their coming and emphatic in his insistence that there would be no preliminary surveys until a definite agreement on the site of the air base was announced. Although it was contrary to the Governor’s “forceful” suggestion, the rest of the party soon followed; but no field surveys were permitted until 19 November, the day after the location of the base was publicly announced and more than a month after the War Department was ready to start.\(^13\)

To avert similar delays in the future, the Navy Department had suggested that a single blanket arrangement be worked out for all the remaining bases, and on 1 November the State Department addressed an appropriate note on the subject to the British Government. The authorities in London were obviously unable to obtain the colonies’ assent and unwilling to impose an agreement upon them, since the British reply, when it came a month afterward on 2 December, merely offered the suggestion that the United States handle the question directly with the Governors of the colonies concerned, through the American consuls and not by way of London. A blanket permission for such visits could not be given by the home government, the British note continued, for, unless the surveys were arranged through the Governor, they might be undertaken at some inopportune time.\(^14\) The colonial officials having established their point, no further delay appeared neces-

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\(^{12}\) Ltr, SN to Secy State, 7 Oct 40, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 1, pt. 1; Rpt WPD to CofS, 13 Jan 41, title: Present Status of . . . Army Bases . . . , WPD 4351-48.

\(^{13}\) SGS Memo for Rcd, 5 Nov 40, OCS Misc, binder 6; Jt Memo, SW and SN for President, 8 Oct 40, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 1, pt. 1; Telg 6, American Consul, Bermuda, to (Dept of State), 4 Nov 40, WPD 4351-3; North Atlantic Div, CE, MS, U.S. Army Bases: Bermuda, OCMH, p. IV-1.

sary, and by 1 January 1941 survey parties had arrived at all the base sites.

In Bermuda, the governor's reluctance to grant authority for the preliminary survey had come for the most part from a failure to agree on the location of the base. In Trinidad, the Greenslade Board's choice of sites was a similar source of annoyance and delay, and in Jamaica the same issue was only slightly less troublesome. In Newfoundland, no objections on this score were interposed until later, when the United States decided that facilities at Gander would be necessary.

Bermuda, more than the other colonies, was outspoken in its concern over the social and economic dislocations that might be expected from the establishment of American air and naval bases. No matter where the base might be located, the scale of development planned by the United States would, it was argued, seriously threaten the "peace, charm and amenities" that drew thousands of tourists to the islands each year. Real estate values would decline. The resettlement of families living on the sites chosen for the bases would add to the congestion of areas already overcrowded; while the presence of a permanent garrison would, it was feared, still further enhance the serious social problems. When the Greenslade Board, after its first visit, recommended the setting aside of a wide corridor across one of the most desirable parts of the main island as the site of the base, a surge of opposition developed that brought the board back to Bermuda on 24 October. On this second visit, the board considered an alternative proposal presented by the governor and found it to be feasible. It was accordingly agreed that both the Army and Navy would concentrate their activities in the Castle Harbour area, at the eastern end of the islands, and that only minor seaplane facilities, for emergency operations, would be installed in Great Sound. The controversy again flared up toward the end of November when the Navy Department decided to shift all its installations to Morgan's Island and Tucker's Island on Great Sound, where a permanent base would be built. The proposed shift aroused almost as much criticism as the original choice, and for more than a month the British withheld their approval. In the end the Navy obtained the two islands; the Army base stayed on the eastern side of Castle Harbour.

Draft of Lease of Certain Areas in Bermuda, (Ltr of transmittal to the President dated 26 Sep 40) and Supplementary Rpt of Bd of Experts—Bermuda, 26 Oct 40, in North Atlantic Div, CE, U.S. Army Bases: Bermuda, Supps. 2–3.

Ltr, Nevile Montagu Butler (British Chargé d'Affaires) to Actg Secy State Welles, 22 Nov 40; Memo, Col Crawford, WPD, for John Hickerson, State Department, 3 Dec 40. Both in OPD Exec 13 item 23. Memo, H.R.S. (Admiral Stark) for President, 26 Dec 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
Similar objections were raised in Trinidad, but economic and social conditions there differed sufficiently from those in Bermuda to deprive the argument of much of its validity. The alternative choice offered by the Governor—a large, miasmic swamp south of Port of Spain—was most unimpressive. The improvement of this area, the Caroni Swamp, as it was known, was an old reclamation project, which the War Department suspected of being presented anew in the guise of co-operation. The Governor flew to Washington early in December to urge acceptance of his views, but he failed to convince even the officials of the British Embassy. The site proposed by the Governor was rejected in favor of that chosen by the Greenslade Board in the north-central part of the island, the so-called Cumuto Reserve just south of the northern mountains. From his discussions in Washington and with the Greenslade Board during its visit to Trinidad, it seems clear that the Governor was endeavoring to placate public opinion on the island, that he was especially interested in having as many matters as possible settled precisely and definitely, and that, while wanting to restrict the leased areas to as narrow limits as possible, he feared that American estimates were inadequate and would be revised upward from time to time. Despite the lack of agreement, the Governor authorized the United States to undertake preliminary surveys, and on 28 December 1940 a party of engineers arrived at Port of Spain ready to begin operations.

Formal leases had not yet been executed, and in their absence a number of questions remained unsolved. The whole question of taxes and customs duties, the matter of military control, and in general the reluctance of the British to accept safeguards considered necessary to secure the United States in its use and enjoyment of the bases were the stumbling blocks. Until they were removed and the land actually acquired, construction work could scarcely be started; and both Admiral Stark and General Marshall feared that the antiadministration wing of Congress would create embarrassment if the situation dragged on.

During the next few days the President decided to send a commission to London to negotiate a formal agreement. Colonel Malony and Comdr. Harold Biesemeier, USN, who had been recent associates on the Greenslade Board, and Mr. Charles Fahy, Assistant Solicitor General, were designated for the task. They arrived in London on 25 January 1941 with hopes of re-

17 Memo, H.R.S. for President, 26 Dec 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Memo, Col Crawford for Gen Gerow, 10 Dec 40; Rpt on Trinidad, Bd of Experts to SN, 23 Oct 40. Last two in WPD 4351-20, sec. 1.

18 Rpt, WPD to CofS, 13 Jan 41, title: Present Status of . . . Army Bases . . ., WPD 4351-48; Min, SLC Mtg, 3 Jan 41, SLC Min, vol. II; Memo, WPD for CofS, 9 Jan 41, WPD 4351-44.
turning home in a fortnight; but before the job was done the two weeks had
stretched into eight, and with some of the issues there had been a struggle
all the way.\textsuperscript{19} An address of welcome by Lord Cranborne, Secretary of State
for the Dominions, brought together the American commissioners and their
colleagues.

The discussions that followed placed them immediately on opposite
sides of a wide gulf. The agenda presented by the British chairman com-
prised twenty-three items ranging widely in scope. The American commis-
sioners wanted to discuss the general problems first, in the belief that, once
agreement was reached on such fundamentals as the boundaries of the base
sites and the extent of American jurisdiction, then the incidental questions
would solve themselves. The British, on the other hand, insisted on approach-
ing the general by way of the particular.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, the American commis-
sioners had not come to England to treat with the colonial governments,
but representatives of the colonies insisted on taking part in the negotia-
tions. The formal, plenary sessions soon reached an impasse. Consideration
of most of the agenda drawn up by the British was postponed or referred
to a subcommittee, and as soon as the draft leases representing the American
position were presented, the opposing points of view were seen to be at such
variance that the discussion was at once adjourned. When the first draft of
an agreement was finally completed on 18 February, only twelve of twenty-
eight articles were fully agreed upon. The next day’s conference, the tenth
that had been held, was the last, for at this point it was decided that faster
progress could be made by holding small, informal meetings between mem-
bers of the commission and officials of the colonial office.\textsuperscript{21}

In weighing the American proposals, the officials of the home govern-
ment tended to differ somewhat from the representatives of the colonies. To
the British officials, such problems as the exercise of criminal jurisdiction,
the conduct and control of military operations, censorship, and the use of
the bases by powers other than the United States were the more significant;
while to the colonial representatives, the question of post offices, of customs
duties, and of anything involving financial sacrifices were the weightier. But
the difference was one of emphasis only.

\textsuperscript{19} Rad, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 25 Jan 41, WPD 4351–54; Rad 1207, John
Gilbert Winant to Secy State, 27 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 15.
\textsuperscript{20} Ltr, Rear Adm Harold Biesemeier (Ret) to Actg Chief of Military History, 28 May 59,
in OCMH files.
\textsuperscript{21} No verbatim record of the discussions was kept, but the minutes of the meetings as well
as the daily messages that passed between the commission and the State Department can be found
in OPD Exec 13.
How much authority and military control the United States should have in order to defend the bases had been one of the points of contention on which the discussion of the draft leases had broken down. The draft presented by the commissioners would have given the United States "exclusive rights, power, authority and control" not only within the leased areas, but in the adjacent waters and air spaces as well. It reserved to the United States also the "right, power and authority to assume military control and conduct military operations" in any part of the colony outside the leased areas, in the surrounding waters, and in the air above to whatever extent the protection of American activities and national interest might require. This was far too sweeping to be agreeable to the British, mindful of the 99-year duration of the leases and of the fact that the United States was still a neutral. The grants were too extensive for peacetime, the British held, although in emergencies they might not be inappropriate; and the implications in the word "control" were unpleasant. Turning an old American argument to an unfamiliar use, the British pointed out that one of the effects would be to restrict the colonies' freedom of navigation. A compromise was discussed that would have deleted the particularly objectionable word "control." It would also have added an assurance that the powers granted to the United States in the air and waters adjacent to the leased areas would not be used unreasonably or so as to interfere with navigation, and it would have limited to time of war and actual emergency the extensive military authority granted to the United States. But the representatives of the colonies insisted on an amendment defining defense as a mutual problem and giving the colonial Governors the right to approve the detailed application of the powers reserved to the United States. This raised the whole question of the policy and measures of defense and command, which the United States was extremely anxious to avoid. Nothing of this sort, it was hoped, would be included in the final agreement, for it was to be made public as soon as it was signed. The commissioners, on instructions from Washington, rejected the proposition put forward by the colonies and substituted a provision for "consultation between the governments concerned" as the occasion might require. A suggestion, which the British were willing to present, that

22 The Trinidad draft lease, a part of the Greenslade Board Report, is in WPD 4351–20, sec. 1. The draft of the Bermuda lease, in WPD 4351–8, sec. 1, is identical in the description of rights.
23 Rad 383, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 31 Jan 41, OPD Exec 13, item 16; Rad 764, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 27 Feb 41, OPD Exec 13, item 28.
24 Rad 419, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 3 Feb 41; Rad 443, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 5 Feb 41. Both in OPD Exec 13, item 16.
25 Rads 502 and 503, Secy State to Base Lease Commission, 15 Feb 41, OPD Exec 13, item 19.
staff talks be held on the subject or that a joint board be set up similar to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States and Canada, was quickly scotched.\textsuperscript{26} The commission stood firm on the compromise proposed earlier in the month. Finally, during the first days of March, the American position was tentatively accepted and submitted to higher authority, after minor changes in phraseology were made and the provision for consultation clarified by specifying the United States and the United Kingdom as the two governments concerned.

In the meantime, more rapid progress had been made on the question of post offices and censorship and on the use of the bases by other nations. It was agreed, during mid-February, that United States post offices would be established within the leased areas for mail to or from other United States post offices, that domestic mail originating within the bases would be sent out under frank, and that no mention of censorship would be made in the agreement. And as soon as it was ascertained, on rather specious reasoning, that the War Department could as an administrative matter examine domestic mail without violating the laws, the United States by a separate exchange of notes undertook to examine all such mail moving to and from the bases. It was likewise agreed, fairly early in the negotiations, that the United States would not assign or part with any of the leased areas or any of the rights and powers granted to it. To meet a point raised by the commission, the Trinidad representatives suggested adding a clause that nothing in this provision would "be construed so as to prevent effective cooperation between the United States and other nations of the Americas in defense of the Western Hemisphere." This was agreeable to all except Bermuda, Newfoundland, and the Air Ministry; but, the commission not pressing its adoption, the clause was omitted from the final agreement.\textsuperscript{27} By the beginning of March there was a substantial measure of agreement on most of the remaining questions.

A deadlock, however, had been reached on customs duties and court jurisdiction. The colonies, for obvious reasons, objected strenuously to the free importation of goods consigned to the bases, but by the end of February

\textsuperscript{26} Rad 432, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 4 Feb 41; Rad 619, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 18 Feb 41. Both in OPD Exec 13, item 16. Rad 555, Secy State to Base Lease Commission, 20 Feb 41, OPD Exec 13, item 10.

\textsuperscript{27} Rad 515, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 10 Feb 41; Rad 632, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 19 Feb 41; Rad 672, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 27 Feb 41. All in OPD Exec 13, item 16. Rad 853, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 5 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 18; Rad 1154, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 24 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 15; Rad 579, Secy State to Base Lease Commission, 27 Feb 41, OPD Exec 13, item 19.
the American commissioners had obtained exemption for practically everything except supplies for ship's service stores, post exchanges, and commissaries. Beyond this, the British negotiators would not go. The question of court jurisdiction was more complicated. The United States was reluctant to set up civil courts and unwilling to yield jurisdiction within the leased areas. The British could not be swerved from their insistence that British subjects must be excluded from United States jurisdiction. The problem was susceptible to compromise, but as the negotiations proceeded compromise seemed more remote.

At this juncture, Mr. John G. Winant arrived in London to take up his duties as Ambassador. Although the American Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, had assisted the commission most ably, Mr. Winant brought with him the prestige of personal friendship with the President. He immediately carried the deadlock directly to Mr. Churchill. The story was told to the American Commissioners after their return to Washington that President Roosevelt, expressing great displeasure at the delays in transferring the base sites, had pointed out to the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, that, if the American press ever got hold of the story, the result might be defeat of the lend-lease bill, then pending in Congress. Lord Halifax, according to the story, hastened to inform Prime Minister Churchill by telephone of the conversation he had had with the President. At any event, the Prime Minister, in the words of Ambassador Winant, at once "swept away as immaterial three-quarters of the objections raised by his negotiators, but at the same time he questioned the military clauses which, because of General Malony's skillful insistence, had been agreed upon." The "military clauses" to which Ambassador Winant referred were the first two articles—the general grant of rights and the special military powers—over which there had already been so much discussion. The failure to extend to the emergency military powers the provision for consultation adopted in connection with the general rights and powers seems to have been the principal cause of the Prime Minister's concern. As a remedy Mr. Churchill suggested adding a clause to the preamble that would embody a

28 Rad 384, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 31 Jan 41; Rad 672, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 21 Feb 41. Both in OPD Exec 13, item 16.
29 Rad 555, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 13 Feb 41; Rad 672, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 21 Feb 41. Both in OPD 13, item 16.
30 Ltr, Adm Biesemeier to Acting Chief of Military History, 28 May 50.
31 John Gilbert Winant, Letter from Grosvenor Square (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), pp. 36-37. Soon after the negotiations began, Colonel Malony had been promoted to brigadier general.
pledge of co-operation. The American commissioners immediately agreed to this solution, and after some study of the precise wording of the clause suggested by the Prime Minister, the following, presented as a substitute by the American commissioners, was decided upon:

. . . that this agreement shall be fulfilled in a spirit of good neighborliness between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America, and that details of its practical application shall be arranged by friendly cooperation.\(^\text{32}\)

The Prime Minister attached great importance to this, the fourth clause of the preamble, for to him it represented the spirit of the entire transaction. It set the tone of the whole agreement, which without this clause would be more of a "capitulation," he said, than a friendly arrangement between two great powers.\(^\text{33}\) He thereupon proposed a rewording of the article covering the special military powers to have it read, in part, as follows:

. . . without raising any question of naval or military compacts or assurance it is recognized that the various schemes of defense shall be concerted and adjusted at any moment to provide in the highest degree the security of each of the two contracting parties. For this purpose there will be consultation in accordance with the spirit of the preamble. . . .

In time of war or other emergency, Mr. Churchill continued, the United States should have whatever rights were necessary for the conduct of military operations, but in exercising them "full regard shall be paid to the said preamble."\(^\text{34}\) This was on Saturday, 8 March. In the evening, Ambassador Winant sent a long message to the President and Secretary Hull in which he explained that the commission had declined, as unnecessary and unduly restrictive, the draft proposed by the Prime Minister. The next morning it became known in London that the Lend-Lease bill had passed the Senate the night before. The pressure on the commissioners eased perceptibly.\(^\text{35}\) On Tuesday, 11 March, President Roosevelt signed the bill that gave substance to his promise that America would be the "arsenal of democracy," and on the same day, in London, a complete settlement of the base agreement was reached. The troublesome grant of emergency powers was relegated to a simple declaration:

When the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergency His Majesty's Government agree that the United States may exercise . . . all such rights, powers and authority as may be necessary for conducting any military operations deemed desirable

\(^{32}\) Rad 853, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 5 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 18.
\(^{33}\) Rad 942, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 12 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 18.
\(^{34}\) Rad 908, Winant to President and Secy State, 8 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 18.
\(^{35}\) Rad 910, Winant to Secy State, 9 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 18.
by the United States, but these rights will be exercised with all possible regard to the spirit of the fourth clause of the preamble.\footnote{Rad 939, Base Lease Commission to Secy State, 11 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 18.}

No mention was made of joint or "concerted" defense schemes or of consultation. At the same time, reference to the preamble was included, as Mr. Churchill had wished, but in terms that would not limit American freedom of action.

During the next two weeks, the draft of the agreement was put into final form and a separate protocol with Canada concerning the defense of Newfoundland was agreed upon. On 27 March 1941, Ambassador Winant, Mr. Fahy, General Malony, and Commander Biesemeier placed their names to the base agreement on behalf of the United States. Prime Minister Churchill, Lord Cranborne, and Lord Moyne, Secretary of State for Colonies, signed for the United Kingdom.

The commissioners had done their job well. They had obtained the authority considered necessary for the operation of the bases; they had, with equal success, kept out of the agreement any military commitments and other provisions that might have placed American defense forces under the control of the British Governors; and while doing so, they had won the respect and friendship of the British negotiators.\footnote{For an appraisal of the negotiations, see Rad 1207, Winant to Secy State, 27 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 15; and Min, SLC Mtg, 24 Mar 41, SLC Min, vol. II, p. 5.}

\textit{Launching the Construction Program}

By the time the agreement was signed, almost seven months after the sites were acquired, most of the preliminaries of establishing the bases had been disposed of. To supervise construction, the Eastern Division, Corps of Engineers, had been organized, under the command of Col. Joseph D. Arthur, Jr., who had accompanied the Greenslade Board on its surveys and participated in the early planning. District engineer offices were set up in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, and Trinidad.\footnote{On 1 Aug 1941 the Eastern Division was superseded by the North Atlantic Division for Newfoundland and the Caribbean Division for all the other bases. On 23 Feb 1942 the Bermuda District was transferred from the Caribbean to the North Atlantic Division.} By mid-February, contracts had been negotiated (except for Jamaica) with the firms that were to do the actual construction. The British had hoped that colonial and British contractors might participate, but in this they were disappointed. All the contracts went to firms in the United States on a negotiated cost-plus-fixed-
Table 2—Estimated Cost of Army and Air Bases, 1940
(Except as noted, does not include cost of land)

<table>
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<th>WPD Estimates 18 Sep 40</th>
<th>C/E Estimate 25 Sep 40</th>
<th>C/E Estimate 8 Oct 40</th>
<th>C/E Estimate 20 Nov 40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$200,000,000</td>
<td>$215,000,000</td>
<td>$200,000,000</td>
<td>$200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>28,167,000</td>
<td>34,030,600</td>
<td>25,907,000</td>
<td>27,683,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>20,379,500</td>
<td>23,689,100</td>
<td>26,849,000</td>
<td>31,765,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>89,024,000</td>
<td>95,660,100</td>
<td>94,930,000</td>
<td>67,840,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>37,583,000</td>
<td>41,552,600</td>
<td>41,337,000</td>
<td>39,627,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua</td>
<td>1,706,000</td>
<td>2,409,500</td>
<td>2,377,000</td>
<td>3,785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>1,706,000</td>
<td>2,409,500</td>
<td>2,377,000</td>
<td>3,785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana</td>
<td>1,406,000</td>
<td>2,409,500</td>
<td>2,377,000</td>
<td>3,785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>1,714,000</td>
<td>2,409,500</td>
<td>2,377,000</td>
<td>3,785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhead, contingencies, etc.</td>
<td>18,314,500</td>
<td>10,429,600</td>
<td>11,469,000</td>
<td>17,967,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Estimated cost of land.
2 Includes $1,676,000 estimated cost of land.

Sources: Memo, WPD for CoFS, 18 Sep 40; Lt Col W. F. Tompkins, CE, for TAG, 25 Sep 40, with Tabs A–H dated 8 Oct 40; Tompkins for ACofS, WPD, 20 Nov 40. All in AG 580 (9–4–40), Sec. 1, Pt. 1.

In March, the contractors for the Trinidad base sent a few men to Port of Spain. They were apparently the first in the field.

Funds to begin construction had been obtained after considerable effort. Only two weeks after the destroyers-for-bases exchange had taken place in September 1940, and long before the plans for the bases had begun to mature, the War Plans Division drew up a statement of estimated costs. This first estimate, which included an item of $18,314,500 for overhead and contingencies, totaled an even $200,000,000. (Table 2) It was based on the August report of the Joint Planning Committee and on the cost of permanent construction in the United States plus an arbitrary differential of 30 percent. The figures were admittedly tentative, subject to revision, and intended to serve only until the reports of the Greenslade Board became available. It was soon evident that an upward revision would be necessary. Between September 1940 and the following November, reductions were made in the estimates for Newfoundland, where the Greenslade Board at first made no provision for an air garrison, and in those for Trinidad, where the ground
THE NEW BASES ACQUIRED FOR OLD DESTROYERS

Table 3—Estimated Cost of Army and Air Bases—1941
(Including cost of land)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>$200,000,000</td>
<td>$204,170,000</td>
<td>$210,714,700</td>
<td>$244,253,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
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<td>39,927,500</td>
<td>46,472,200</td>
<td>46,928,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>41,162,000</td>
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<td>29,570,500</td>
<td>32,949,500</td>
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<td>Jamaica</td>
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<td>80,648,500</td>
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<td>Antigua</td>
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<td>18,965,500</td>
<td>22,866,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>4,321,000</td>
<td>9,165,500</td>
<td>9,165,500</td>
<td>13,982,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Guiana</td>
<td>4,321,000</td>
<td>8,856,500</td>
<td>8,856,500</td>
<td>12,514,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4,235,000</td>
<td>8,369,500</td>
<td>8,369,500</td>
<td>1,273,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overhead, contingencies, etc. 11,844,000

Sources: Memo, Col A. E. Brown, Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, for CofS, 17 Feb 41, OCS Conf binder 10; Estimates of Funds for Army Air Bases . . . (2d Supplement), 7 May 41, OPD Misc File 41; Monthly Progress Reports (Engr), Atlantic Bases, 30 Sep 41, 31 Oct 41, AG 580 (9-4-40), Sec 1-D (Bulky Pkg).

garrison was drastically cut by the Greenslade Board; but the upward swing of all the others more than balanced these two reductions. Nevertheless the $200,000,000 total of the first estimate became a ceiling for all the estimates during these first few months. The difference was taken out of the item for contingent expenses. (Table 3) By the end of the following year, 1941, all the estimates, except the Bermuda figures, had risen still further, with the three secondary bases—Antigua, St. Lucia, and British Guiana—accounting for a disproportionate share of the increase. As of 27 December 1941 the total estimated cost of construction had reached $260,605,000.

By this same date, 27 December 1941, a total of $207,913,000 had been either appropriated or included in FY 1943 budget estimates. At the beginning President Roosevelt had not been satisfied with the War Department estimates nor was he convinced of the need for such large initial funds. It was his opinion that immediate expenses should be limited to acquiring the

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41 Estimates of the fall of 1940 are in Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Sep 40; Memo, ColEngrs (Lt Col William F. Tompkins) for TAG, 25 Sep 40, with Tabs A–H dated 8 Oct 40; and Memo, Col Tompkins for WPD, 20 Nov 40. All in AG 580 (9–4–40), sec. 1, pt. 1.

42 Estimates made in 1941 are in Memo, Col Albert E. Brown, Budget & Legislative Planning Br, for CofS, 17 Feb 41, OCS Conf, binder 10; Estimates of Funds for Army Air Bases . . . (2d Supp), 7 May 41, OPD Misc File 41; Eastern Div, CE, Report of Progress, Atlantic Bases, September 1941 and October 1941, AG 580 (9–4–40), sec. 1-D, Bulky Package; Routing Sheet, G-4 to TAG, 27 Dec 41, sub: Estimates for Construction . . ., OCS 21160–123, bk. 20.
TABLE 4—ACTUAL COST OF ARMY AND AIR BASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Antigua</th>
<th>British Guiana</th>
<th>Bahamas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>62,470,513</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11,250,360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>40,634,773</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,149,759</td>
<td>14,969,448</td>
<td>273,583</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>81,913,399</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>288,292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes the cost of leasing the Castle Harbour and St. George’s Hotels.

Sources: CofEngr, Historical Monograph, Newfoundland, pp. IX-6, X-1, Fo X-3, OCMH HIS MS 4-9 NE; CofEngr, Historical Monograph, Bermuda, pp. IX-3, X-4, OCMH HIS MS 4-9 BE; Caribbean Defense Command, Historical Manuscript, Construction and Real Estate Activities, II, pp. 182-235 (Trinidad); 242-58 (Jamaica); 267-73 (British Guiana); 276 (Antigua); 288, 292 (St. Lucia); 302 (Bahamas); OCMH HIS MS 8-2.8 CC.

land, to providing some sort of docks and landing fields, and to purchasing the sites where the garrisons were to be housed. He wished ground troops to be quartered in tents wherever health conditions allowed and the bases to be occupied for some time before permanent construction was decided upon. When the Army in November 1940 presented a request for an additional emergency allotment, he is reported to have said that “if the Army thought they were going to get $200,000,000 for these bases they had another think coming.”43 But by the following spring the President was urging haste in establishing the bases, and by early May 1941 a total of $163,825,000 had been authorized for the Army’s use. The actual final cost of the bases turned out to be somewhere between the estimate of 27 December and the available funds of that date; but the final figures do not stand too close a comparison with the early estimates, for, among other things, after the attack on Pearl Harbor most of the permanent building construction was deferred. (Table 4)

Beginning in January and February 1941, before the contractors’ people arrived at the bases, a certain amount of work was accomplished by local labor under the direct supervision of the district engineers. In spite of the season, temporary housing was beginning to go up along the frozen shores of Quidi Vidi Lake, on the outskirts of St. John’s, Newfoundland. In British Guiana, the first assault was launched against the jungle growth that blocked the way to the site of the base. As soon as construction forces arrived, the work was turned over to them: in Bermuda, dredging operations were started; in Trinidad, temporary construction was begun in the “Dock Site” area at Port of Spain. By mid-May the contractors had assumed respon-

43 Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Oct 40, WPD 4351-9, sec. 1.; Memo, Lt Col Edward H. Brooks, Chief, Statistics Br, for Col Ward, SGS, 5 Oct 40, WPD 4351-8, sec. 1; Memo, CofS for Admiral Stark, 8 Nov 40, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 1, pt. 1; Memo, Col Ward for CofS, 22 Nov 40, OCS Conf, binder 6.
sibility at most of the base sites, where construction now, if not in full swing, was at least well under way.\textsuperscript{44}

Priority was given to the airfields. In order to provide usable fields at the earliest possible date and with least disturbance to construction activities, temporary landing strips were rushed to completion in Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana. In Bermuda, where space was at a premium, the same result was sought by building the permanent field in two stages. Three short runways, the longest of which was 3,500 feet, were to be completed in five or six months. Then they were to be extended, while in use, and the rest of the field completed. This second state, it was estimated, would require another twelve months.\textsuperscript{45} Before construction had gone very far, it was decided to lengthen the 3,500-foot runway to 5,000 feet, and with this change the work was pushed forward. In Newfoundland, one of the largest airports in the world was already available for emergency operations. By the end of June 1941 the temporary runways in St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana were in limited use, and in Trinidad, where seasonal rains had delayed construction, the temporary runway at Waller Field was in use by the end of October. By this time, the 5,000-foot runway at Kindley Field, Bermuda, was ready, and one of the other runways was about half finished.\textsuperscript{46}

Most of the materials for construction came from the United States. To be sure, Canadian lumber went into buildings at Fort Pepperrell, Newfoundland; Bermuda stone and coral block were used at Kindley Field; and a most ingenious and probably unique application of local materials was to be found in St. Lucia, where molasses was used as a stabilizing agent for the surface of the temporary runway. But for the most part, local materials were employed only as a substitute for goods unavailable in the United States or delayed in transit. Of the 430,000 tons of construction material used in Newfoundland, 75 percent was imported from the United States. The dependence upon imports was reflected in the concern with which transportation matters were regarded in every base.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{44} The figures in the Monthly Progress Reports purporting to show the percent of completed construction are in reality the percent of estimated cost actually expended. Since accuracy in estimating the final cost was almost impossible and revision inevitable, the figures are of little value as an indication of the true rate of progress.

\textsuperscript{45} Memo, Col Ward, SGS, for ACofS WPD, 8 Apr 41; Memo, WPD for CoFS, 8 Apr 41; Memo, WPD for CoEgeRs, 9 Apr 41; Memo, Gen Bryden, Acting CoFS, for SW, 9 Apr 41. All in WPD 4351-8, sec. 1.

\textsuperscript{46} Memo, WPD for CoFS, 18 Jun 41, WPD 4351-140; Eastern Div, CE, Rpts of Progress, Atlantic Bases June 1941 and October 1941, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 1-D, Bulky Package.

\textsuperscript{47} Eastern Div, CE, Rpt of Progress, Atlantic Bases, October 1941, AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 1-D, Bulky Package; Div North Atlantic Div, CE, MS, U.S. Army Bases: Newfoundland, OCMH, pp.
THE NEW BASES ACQUIRED FOR OLD DESTROYERS

On the other hand, most of the construction, especially the unskilled labor, was done by local workmen. Of the total of 44,899 men employed on the bases at the end of October 1941, only 7,400 were Americans. In Jamaica, 93 percent of the workmen were local people; in Antigua, 81 percent. At all the other bases, except Bermuda, the proportion fell somewhere between these two extremes. In Bermuda, where dredging and filling operations were the chief activities at this time and where much of the available labor supply was already employed on the British navy yard, the figures were reversed: 14 percent of the workmen were Bermudians, 86 percent were brought in from the United States.

Wages paid the local people were, in general, based upon the prevailing local rate; but American workmen received the same wages paid in the United States plus an added differential. The disparity was a major source of trouble. It was no coincidence that at Bermuda, where most of the labor was done by American workmen, there were fewer labor disturbances and a higher turnover than at the other bases. On the other hand, in British Guiana, where an American tractor driver received $10.00 a day for the same work for which a native received $2.80, the local workmen went on strike, and to put down the ensuing disorder required the use of American troops. Labor troubles and impending riots, and not the threat of external attack were what brought the first units of the garrison to Jamaica.

One of the elements in the situation was the effort put forth by labor unions to consolidate and maintain their control of local labor. Union leaders in Jamaica resented the refusal of American authorities to deal with the Trades Union Council or to admit union representatives to the negotiations dealing with the employment of local labor. When their complaint was brought to the attention of the War Department, the War Plans Division pointed out that the Department’s policy of not recognizing any union as the sole bargaining agency for local labor did not bar a consultative committee on which the unions had representatives, such as the Jamaica Trades Union Council had proposed, so long as it was clearly understood that the union represented only those workers affiliated with it. The same issue had been
raised in Trinidad six months before. There, the local workers striking for the right to bargain directly and collectively had invoked the National Labor Relations Act and appealed to American labor leaders for help. The question of the applicability of American labor legislation, if pressed, might have produced a rather awkward situation; but the strike was short-lived. Later, after the men returned to work, representatives of the unions participated in negotiating a local labor agreement. A pattern for co-operation existed in Bermuda, where the district engineer and a representative of the contractors had been invited by the governor to join in the deliberations of the local labor board.\textsuperscript{51} There was no attempt, however, either by the British Colonial Office or by the War Department to formulate a uniform policy and establish a standard procedure. Probably local conditions varied too widely to permit it.

At most of the bases, temporary housing had to be put up for the local workers. In Trinidad, however, it was more convenient to provide rail and truck transportation from Port of Spain than to erect housing at the construction site. The consequent overcrowding in Port of Spain was unwelcome to the local authorities; the travel to and from work was objectionable to the workers. The upshot was another strike. Like the others it was of short duration, more annoying than disrupting, and corrective measures followed. The transportation system was improved, but nothing was done about housing. The district engineer and the War Department agreed that it was unnecessary so long as there was no need of importing workers from other islands.\textsuperscript{52}

American military authorities in Trinidad were convinced that the shadow of the swastika lay over the labor disturbances. There were, the commanding general of the Trinidad Sector reported, "a large number of Nazi sympathizers and Fifth Columnists in the Guianas," who might have "inspired and incited these ignorant laborers to strike." Nazi agents, he continued, were becoming more active, and the "incitation of local labor to strikes, violence, and serious sabotage must be anticipated with constantly increasing frequency."\textsuperscript{53} A few weeks later he stressed his "growing conviction that radical and antagonistic agents and influence are increasing in energy and

\textsuperscript{51} Min of Conf in OSW, 10 Jun 41, SW Conf, binder 1; Memo, WPD for CofS, 13 Jun 41, WPD 4351-20; Memo for Rcd, D/F, WPD to G-4, 25 Aug 41, WPD 4351-8, sec. 2; Ltr, British Embassy to State Dept, 16 Dec 41, WPD 4351-11, sec. 6.

\textsuperscript{52} Memo, WPD for Hickerson, State Dept, 17 Sep 41, WPD 4351-20, sec. 1; Ltr, Governor Hubert Young, Trinidad, to Gen Talbot, CG TS, 29 Jul 41; D/F, WPD to G-4, 10 Oct 41; Memo, WPD for Hickerson, 14 Dec 41. All in WPD 4351-20, sec. 2.

\textsuperscript{53} Ltr, CG TS to CG CDC, 15 Aug 41, WPD 4351-20, sec. 1.
boldness and are making an increasing effort to incite the native population to acts of violence and sabotage." According to the commanding general it all pointed to the desirability of immediately reinforcing the garrison. In truer perspective, the intervention of Nazi agents or the influence of Nazi sympathy appeared to have been a mirage. By the time World War II had ended, no evidence could be discerned that the labor troubles were anything more than attempts by the workers to better their lot by methods not entirely foreign to the United States.

In Newfoundland, the labor situation took a slightly different twist. The problem there was more a matter of long weekends, a fishing season that lasted through the summer, and an unwillingness to work during the winter. It was complicated by an early misunderstanding on the part of the Newfoundland Government. Although the contractors intended to employ local workmen as common laborers, the colonial government issued a communiqué to the contrary, to the effect that what the contractors wanted were skilled workers, and the result was that for a time the recruitment of ordinary laborers was discouraged.

Early in 1942, after war came to America, German submarines succeeded at times in slowing down construction activities. Workmen recruited in the United States flinched at the hazards, real and rumored, of travelling to the bases by sea. A few essential cargoes of supplies and equipment were lost, but more serious than the actual sinkings were the delays and uncertainty that a newly instituted convoy system and the rerouting of shipments brought.

By this time the airfields at the bases were all in operating condition, and housing, hospitals, and storage and other facilities were adequate, although in temporary form, even for somewhat larger garrisons than those now stationed there. Not much permanent construction had been finished. But to proceed with the permanent structures as originally planned would add little to the immediate strength of the bases, would draw shipping away from more urgent commitments, and would require the continued presence of more than 10,000 American civilians whose wives and children were in wartime a source of military weakness. On these grounds it was decided in April 1942 to recast the program and to defer all permanent construction that would not contribute to immediate strength.

54 Ltr, CG TS to CG CDC, 28 Aug 41, WPD 4351-20, sec. 1.
56 Dispatch, American Consul General, St. John's, to Secy State, 30 Jun 41, WPD 4351-9, sec. 4; ASF, Off Div Engr, Atlantic Div, U.S. Army Bases: Newfoundland, p. VI-4.
57 Memo, USW Patterson for SW, 8 Apr 42; Memo, CofS for Gen Somervell, 23 Apr 42. Both in WDCSA 42-43 CDC.
CHAPTER XV

Manning and Organizing the New Atlantic Bases

Newfoundland on the northern flank, Trinidad on the southern, and Bermuda in the center were the first of the new Atlantic bases to be garrisoned. The first contingent arrived in Newfoundland in January 1941, ahead of the construction forces, and in April the first garrison troops arrived in Trinidad and Bermuda, only a few weeks after the advance party of construction people.

The timing was not exactly what the War Department had at first envisaged. In spite of the pessimism over the chances of Britain's winning the war which in September 1940 still colored the War Department's estimate of the situation, General Marshall laid down the dictum that garrisons would not be sent to the Atlantic bases until construction was well advanced. Some definite threat to the base sites might require the dispatch of a garrison prematurely, but this was a possibility that could apparently be waited for.¹

The Garrisons and Their Mission

It was at the suggestion of General Embick, senior U.S. Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States and Canada, that a garrison was sent to Newfoundland before the bases there were scarcely under construction. The board, recognizing Newfoundland as an especially vital area, had assumed that the United States would send forces for its defense "at the earliest practicable date."² When the subject came up for discussion during a conference in the Chief of Staff's office on 12 September, General Embick urged that they be sent without waiting for the bases to be completed, and on the next day G-3 was directed to consider the matter.³

¹ Notes of Mtg in OCS, 11 Sep 40, OCS Misc Conf, binder 3; Informal Rpt from Gen Devers to CofS . . . , 24 Sep 40, OCS Conf, binder 6.
² Joint Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan, 1940 (First Draft), WPD 4352-5.
³ Notes on Conf in OCS, 12 Sep 40, OCS Conf, OPD binder; Memo, Col Ward for G-3, 13 Sep 40, OCS 20955-6.
The principal consideration, apart from factors of strategy and available forces and of immediate deployment as opposed to training for the future, was the question of housing. When reinforcements had been sent to Anchorage, Alaska, in June 1940, it had been necessary to house them in tents for a month or so until barracks were available. But Anchorage in midsummer was very different from Newfoundland in winter, and it would be many months before suitable accommodations could be erected in Newfoundland. The enactment of the Selective Service law was bringing this question of Army housing into the glare of public interest, which would have flamed quickly into public criticism, loud and widespread, had American soldiers been sent to Newfoundland with nothing but tents as shelter against the rigors of winter. An alternative to housing the troops in tents lay apparently unnoticed among the pages of the Greenslade Board Report: that a vessel be chartered and used as a floating barracks at St. John's until accommodations were provided on shore. Col. Douglas C. Cordiner, chief of the Water Transport Branch in the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster Corps, seems to have had the same thought quite independently. This solution was finally adopted. The large but antiquated ocean liner America, taken over from Germany during the first World War, was refitted and renamed the Edmund B. Alexander. After a longer delay than had been expected, she finally left New York on 20 January 1941 and made her way slowly north-eastward with the first contingent of the Newfoundland garrison: 58 officers and 919 enlisted men principally of the 3d Infantry, 62d Coast Artillery (AA), and 57th Coast Artillery under the command of Col. Maurice D. Welty. Their task was to defend, in co-operation with the Canadian and Newfoundland troops, the city and harbor of St. John's.

No further steps toward manning the Atlantic defenses were taken until April 1941, when the first units went to Bermuda and Trinidad and reinforcements were dispatched to Newfoundland. The impetus then came from the President.

During the intervening months the focus of American military plan-

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4 Memo, Col Cordiner for Col Crawford, WPD, 30 Sep 40, WPD 4351–9, sec. 3.
5 Memo, WPD for CoFS, 5 Apr 41, WPD 4351–92, sec. 6. The strength of the force given in TAG Ltr to CG's, Corps Areas et al., 22 Oct 40 (as amended, 12 Nov, 22 Nov, 23 Nov, 30 Dec 40, 7 Jan 41), filed in WPD 4351–9, varies slightly from the above figures, which were compiled from the roster of passengers on board USAT Edmund B. Alexander, filed in AG 580 (9–4–40), sec. 2, pt. 2. More specifically, the contingent comprised: Hq, Newfoundland Base Command (NBC); 3d Battalion, 3d Infantry, with band and attached medical detachment; Detachment 6th Engr Battalion; 1 Battery, Gun, 62d (AA), with 1 Platoon, Search Light; 1 Battery, 155-mm. gun, Towed, 57th CA; plus service units.
ning had shifted. The probability now was that England and the British Fleet could withstand the German war machine, that if the United States were forced into the war (and there was a tendency to substitute "when" for "if") it could be as an ally of an undefeated Britain. With this the probability, the ABC-1 agreement had been concerted to the end that American power might be brought to bear against the Axis in Europe. The Atlantic islands, already considered essential as outlying bastions of defense in the event of a British collapse, could serve equally well the interests of attack, as bases for the projection of American power eastward or for the protection of this eastward advance. But the architects of Army strategy were not yet ready to blueprint the course of the eventual offensive by garrisoning the islands as advance bases; and the more convinced they were that Britain and the British Fleet would hold out, the less urgent it seemed to man the bases as outlying bastions of hemisphere defense. As late as 31 March they had no expectation of sending reinforcements to Newfoundland or any forces to any of the other
bases before the first of July. Furthermore, however one viewed the Atlantic bases, the Army's strength in trained men and in ammunition was still limited. To disperse the available forces at this time would, it was feared, disrupt the training of the larger army that would some day be needed.

While the Anglo-American staff conferences were going on in Washington, the Battle of the Atlantic had taken an extremely critical turn. In Admiral Stark's opinion it had become, in fact, "hopeless except as we take strong measures to save it." Four of the most powerful surface vessels of the German Navy—the pocket battleship Scheer, the heavy battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the 8-inch cruiser Admiral Hipper—were on the loose, prowling the Atlantic sea lanes and adding serious destruction to the mounting toll of the U-boat packs. Submarine attacks could be countered by light escort vessels; but the German surface raiders, whether in refuge or at sea, presented a different threat, one that only capital ships or strong cruiser and carrier forces could meet. Admiral Stark had not at all exaggerated the seriousness of the situation. By March it seemed to him only a matter of at most two months before the United States would be at war, "possibly undeclared," with Germany and Italy; although the Army at this time was counting on at least five months' grace. Admiral Stark discussed his analysis with the President on 2 April and again the next day, thrashed out the steps to be taken, and was told to adopt the strong measures he thought were required: to draw up plans for escort of convoy west of longitude 30° west and issue orders for the transfer into the Atlantic of a heavy striking force, including three battleships, from the Pacific. The destructive forays of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had given President Roosevelt an understandable concern for the safety of the American bases, particularly those which were most exposed or of most value to the Navy—Bermuda, Trinidad,

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7 Quoted in Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 56.  
9 Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 105. The transfer orders for the Pacific Fleet units were rescinded on 15 April as a result of the signing of the Russo-Japanese pact of 13 April. Without these units, the convoy plan would have been unworkable and it was therefore rejected in favor of a less forceful extension of patrol activities. On 12 May Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura laid before Secretary Hull a draft of proposals which the Japanese Government thought might serve as the basis for an understanding between the two governments. On the very next day, the orders for the transfer of the Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic were reissued and the movement got under way. See Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 11, pp. 5502-04, and pt. 16, pp. 2160-64.
and Newfoundland. On 7 April he directed the Secretary of War to have Newfoundland reinforced and to send garrisons to Bermuda and Trinidad immediately.\textsuperscript{10}

In quick succession, two other steps followed. On 9 April Secretary of State Hull and the Danish Minister in Washington signed an agreement under which the United States undertook the defense of Greenland and was granted the right to establish any facilities considered necessary for that purpose or for the defense of the North American continent. Then, on 14 April, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins and Under Secretary of State Welles met with the Icelandic consul general in Washington and reopened the question of defending Iceland, a question which both the State and War Departments had hitherto regarded with a noncommittal attitude.\textsuperscript{11} In the meantime, Mr. Hopkins had been casting about for some way of using the Atlantic bases for delivering lend-lease materials to the British. He had discussed with his chief legal assistant, Mr. Oscar Sydney Cox, the possibility of convoys, of transshipping goods within the western hemisphere, even of transporting goods in public vessels. Although their discussions reached no firm conclusion, they were closely tied in with the developments of April, if only by reason of their contemporaneousness.

The War Department had immediately set about making the preliminary arrangements for sending the garrisons. Heavy coast artillery, bombers, and sufficient infantry to repel landing parties appeared to be the answer to the particular threat seen by the President. His special concern for the safety of Bermuda gave that base the highest priority and evoked an admonition to the War Department to "get planes there as soon as any place can be prepared."\textsuperscript{12} There were as yet no facilities, however, for land plane operations and no housing at the base site. Fortunately, one of Bermuda's large, modern resort hotels, the Castle Harbour, was available for lease. Conveniently situated about two miles across the harbor from the site of the Army base, it could accommodate approximately 1,000 men. But for the time being, air defense would have to be limited to the three patrol bombers stationed at Great Sound, which the Navy agreed to make available for purposes of local de-
MANNING AND ORGANIZING THE NEW ATLANTIC BASES

fense, assisted, whenever their ship was in port, by the dive bombers of the Atlantic Fleet carrier that was to be based there. The situation was somewhat better in Trinidad. There too the Army base would not be ready for occupancy for several weeks at the earliest, but a camp site suitable for troops was available in Queens Park, on the outskirts of Port of Spain; and a limited number of bombers could be accommodated at Piarco Field, the commercial airport. In Newfoundland, thanks to the airport at Gander and the fact that an American garrison was already at St. John’s, less improvisation would be necessary. Operating facilities for a bomber squadron together with quarters for the men were to be ready at Gander by 19 April, and additional ground troops to the number of about one thousand could be housed on board the *Edmund B. Alexander*. Reinforcements thus presented no great problem. Transports were to be available during the month on the dates set for each move. The consent of the British Government to the stationing of troops outside the leased areas was given without delay. By 8 April only one detail remained to be worked out, the choice of officers to command the Bermuda and Trinidad forces, and this was taken care of the next day.

The recommendations of the War Plans Division as to the strength and composition of the respective forces were not accepted in their entirety. The infantry units for Bermuda and Trinidad were scaled down to one company each, and no B-17’s were available for Newfoundland. Furthermore, owing to the President’s desire to speed the defenses of Bermuda, the sailing dates of the Newfoundland and Bermuda contingents were interchanged.

The Bermuda force of some 860 men, comprising Company G, 11th Infantry, Battery F, 52d Coast Artillery, and Battery B, 57th Coast Artillery, and commanded by Col. Alden G. Strong, landed in Bermuda on Sunday, 20 April. It had been preceded, a week before, by Brig. Gen. Francis B. Wilby, chief of staff of the First Army, and Lt. Col. Harold F. Loomis of the War Plans Division, who had been surveying the general situation and choosing sites for the coast defense guns and who now were among those on hand to

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13 Memo, Acting CofS for CNO, 9 Apr 41; and, in reply, Memo, CNO for CofS, 14 Apr 41, sub: Def of Bermuda. Both in AG 580 (9-4-40), sec. 4. Memo, “F.K.” [Frank Knox] for President, 12 Apr 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
16 Memo, SW for President, 7 Apr 41, AG 320.2 (4-5-41), sec. 1; Memo, Gen Bryden, Acting CofS, for SW, 9 Apr 41, WPD 4351-8, sec. 1.
welcome Colonel Strong and his men. Within a few hours after he arrived, Colonel Strong had drawn up in collaboration with Capt. Jules James, USN, commandant of the naval base, a joint plan for the defense of the islands, for which he disposed his troops as follows: one 2-gun battery of the 8-inch coast defense guns was to be placed at Fort Victoria, on St. George’s Island, and another on Somerset Island, not far from the U.S. naval base; a like-sized battery of 155-mm. guns was to be placed on Cooper’s Island, near the Army base, and another on Hamilton Island, in the vicinity of Riddle’s Bay; and the infantry company, quartered in the Castle Harbour Hotel, was to be the mobile reserve.\(^{17}\)

The air unit of the Trinidad garrison was the next to reach its destination. On 24 April some 432 men of the 1st Bomber Squadron arrived from Panama on board the USAT *Chateau Thierry*. They set up a tent camp at Piarco Field, where the planes arrived on 28 April, about the time the ground units were leaving New York. The arrival of the latter at Port of Spain on 5 May brought the total garrison to about 1,487 men, under the command of General Talbot. The principal ground elements were one battalion, 252d Coast Artillery, 155-mm., and a rifle company of the 11th Infantry. A site was chosen for the artillery on Chacachacare Island, at the northern entrance to the Gulf of Paria, but for the time being most of the men were housed in a tent camp on recently reclaimed land near the Port of Spain docks.\(^{18}\)

Meanwhile, on 1 May the Newfoundland force consisting of some 646 officers and enlisted men had arrived at St. John’s. Six B-18’s of the 21st Reconnaissance Squadron were flown from Miami to Gander, and the remainder of the force sailed from New York on board the USAT *Leonard Wood*. Apart from the air unit, the principal component was the coastal defense battery, a unit of the 52d Coast Artillery, whose 8-inch railway guns were to be the backbone of the harbor defenses.\(^{19}\)

Much valuable planning experience that would have been useful when the Iceland occupation was undertaken later in the year could have been gained had the Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad movements been

\(^{17}\) Rpt, Gen Wilby to Gen Drum, 29 Apr 41, title: Inspection Trip to Bermuda, AG 580 (9-4-40)), sec. 4; app. A to Jt Army-Navy Plan 1, 20 Apr 41, WPD 4517; Daily Rpt of
\(^{18}\) Ltr, TAG to Chiefs of Arms and Services, 9 Apr 41, sub: Immediate Garrisons for Certain Atlantic Bases . . . , AG 320.2 (4-9-41); TBC Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, I, 55-58, 68.
\(^{19}\) Progress . . . Bases in British Possessions, 21 Apr 41, WPD 4351-133, sec. 6.
carried out as task forces. As it was, the preparations resembled those made for a routine change of station. Instead of an operations plan, the commanding officers were given a Defense Project, drawn up by the War Plans Division, in which the mission of the Army forces, the available strength, and other pertinent military and geographical data were set forth.

The primary mission—to defend the United States military and naval installations—was clear. The corollary—to deny hostile forces an approach to the eastern seaboard or the Caribbean—was almost equally clear, whether expressly stated, as in the case of Bermuda and Trinidad, or implicit, as in the case of Newfoundland.20 The perplexing element was the question of the steps to be taken at the appearance of German warships or planes. Secretary Stimson, on 24 April, proposed to instruct the base commanders that any such forces approaching within twenty-five miles of a British possession in which an American base was located must be warned, and that, if the warning went unheeded, the vessel or plane should be "immediately attacked with all available means." 21 Although the President put his "O.K." on the proposed instructions, he directed Secretary Stimson to show them to the Navy. As a result the formal directive drafted for The Adjutant General by the War Plans Division on 1 May was withheld by the Chief of Staff for discussion with Admiral Stark and Under Secretary of State Welles. After an attempt to put through a revised draft which omitted reference to the 25-mile zone, the War Plans Division learned that the President wanted all mention of American forces opening fire eliminated also. Secretary of State Hull thought the President’s views would be best followed by having the base commanders report by radio and ask for instructions when "hostile" forces appeared; but from a military point of view such a procedure would have been unrealistic. 22 Finally, Lt. Col. Robert W. Crawford, head of the War Plans Division Projects Group, and Mr. Green Haywood Hackworth, of the State Department’s legal staff, agreed on a draft which they thought would meet the views of the President and Secretary Hull, but which Secretary Stimson apparently found too ambiguous. He changed it to read as follows:

In case any force of belligerent powers other than those powers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere territory attacks or threatens to attack any British

20 The missions are defined in the Newfoundland Defense Project, 20 Dec 40, WPD 4390; in the Bermuda Defense Project, 16 Apr 41, WPD 4481-3; and in the Trinidad Defense Project, 28 Apr 41, WPD 4485-1.
21 Memo, SW for President, 24 Apr 41, sub: Directive to Army Base Commdrs . . . , WPD 4351-98, sec. 6.
22 Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 May 41, WPD 4351-98, sec. 6.
possession on which any United States air or naval base is located, the commanding officer of the Army Base Force shall resist such attack, using all means at his disposal.\textsuperscript{23}

And in this form, the instructions went out from the War Department on 10 May.\textsuperscript{24}

The question of what constituted a threatened attack remained vague until midsummer. Then, during the planning for the Iceland movements, the President revived the idea of an interdicted zone, of fifty miles, within which the presence of Axis forces would be considered as evidence of hostile intentions and justification for attack. This was a "shoot on sight" policy in all but name, and on 11 September the President announced it as such. By the end of October 1941 American forces were committed to the task of destroying all German and Italian vessels or planes encountered anywhere in the western Atlantic.\textsuperscript{25}

Added responsibility had fallen on the Newfoundland garrison in early June when the Air Corps Ferrying Command was created and a military air transport service was begun across the North Atlantic. General Embick, who in the past had not been entirely in sympathy with the Air Corps' expanding conception of its role, and who as the Army representative on the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States and Canada, had participated in drafting the mission of the Newfoundland force, was of the opinion that the security of the ferry route and the protection of transport operations were purely incidental. Both General Drum and General Arnold insisted that this mission was of equal importance to that of defending the base installations.\textsuperscript{26}

The matter was discussed by General Arnold and members of the Air Staff and of the War Plans Division on 21 August; and the conclusion was reached that no change in the mission need be made for the time being. It was, it seemed, sufficiently comprehensive to cover the situation.

\textit{Problems of Organization and Command}

At the beginning of 1940, before the Atlantic bases were acquired and before the Alaska defenses were built up, the Army's overseas garrisons were organized into the four departments: the Panama Canal Department and

\textsuperscript{23} The original text and Secretary Stimson's revision are both given in his letter to the Secretary of State of 16 May 1941, in WPD 4351–98, sec. 6. Other papers on the subject are in the same file.

\textsuperscript{24} Memo, WPD for TAG, 10 May 41, WPD 4351–98, sec. 6.

\textsuperscript{25} Memo, WPD for TAG, 31 Oct 41, OCS 21174–57.

\textsuperscript{26} Memo, Gen Embick for CofS, 7 Jul 41, Sub: Comments on Ltr of General Drum; Memo, Gen Arnold for WPD, 18 Aug 47. Both in WPD 4351–9, sec. 4.
the Puerto Rican Department in the Caribbean, the Hawaiian Department in the Pacific, and the Philippine Department in the Far East. They were primarily designed to provide local defense. The wider operations that would be necessary in time of war were to be conducted by theater commanders under the direct control of GHQ, and into this chain of organization and command the various base forces would be linked. No provision, however, had yet been made for the twilight time between war and peace which the United States was about to enter. When the first reinforcements went to Alaska in mid-1940, they were kept under the tactical commander most interested in that area, General DeWitt, the commanding general of the Fourth Army and Ninth Corps Area.\(^{27}\) Alaska served as a precedent for Newfoundland and Bermuda.

Both Newfoundland and Bermuda were intimately tied in with the defense of the northeastern seaboard, the responsibility for which rested with the Commanding General, First Army. Both garrisons, except troops engaged in construction work under the immediate supervision of the Chief of Engineers, were therefore attached to the First Army. Each was responsible for its own supply, which was to be provided by the Second Corps area to the same extent as for units of the field forces within the corps area.\(^{28}\)

After some discussion by one of General Marshall's deputies with the heads of the several staff divisions, it had been decided that the only designation that would not be a source of confusion with the Navy was the rather unwieldy one, U.S. Troops in Newfoundland (or Bermuda, as the case might be).\(^{29}\) But the official orders, a week later, designated the Newfoundland force as the Newfoundland Base Command, U.S. Army, and the same terminology was used later for the Bermuda and Trinidad garrisons.

In the Caribbean, the need of an integrated regional command as well as unity of command was obvious if the new bases were to play a part in the defense of that area. A "defense command," with the organizational features of a theater of operations, was the answer to the regional side of the problem, and on 10 February 1941 the Caribbean Defense Command officially came into being. It became the foster parent of the Trinidad garrison on 18 April when the latter, now formally designated the Trinidad Base Command, was assigned to the Caribbean Defense Command. All the

\(^{27}\) See ch. IX.

\(^{28}\) TAG Ltr to CG First Army, et al., 18 Dec 40, WPD 4351–9, sec. 3; TAG Ltr to CG First Army, et al., 25 Jan 41, WPD 4351–8, sec. 1; Ltr, CofS First Army to CO NBC, 11 Jan 41, WPD 4390–3.

\(^{29}\) Min of Conf in ODCofS, 10 Dec 40, OCS Conf, binder 6.
Antilles south of Martinique, the Dutch islands off the Venezuelan coast, together with Venezuela itself and British Guiana, Surinam, and French Guiana were grouped together into a Trinidad Sector of the Caribbean Defense Command under General Talbot, who thus occupied a dual position.\textsuperscript{30}

The other side of the problem—unity of command—was a perennial troublemaker, one which involved the arrangements not only for the entire region but within the respective base commands as well. The authority of the commanding officers of the various bases over the air units assigned to them was, in the Caribbean, limited by the regional air command, and the bounds of authority were not always distinct. It was therefore a source of misunderstanding and frustration for the local commanding officers.\textsuperscript{31}

In Newfoundland, on the other hand, where a unit of the First Air Force was placed under the direct command of an infantry colonel and, on a higher level, of the Commanding General, First Army, the command arrangements in their entirety were not to the liking of the Air Corps. General Spaatz, chief of Air Corps Plans Division, argued that these arrangements would make it difficult to co-ordinate activities with those of the Royal Canadian Air Force, that they would hamper the control of transient plane movements, and complicate joint operations with the air units that might be sent to Greenland.\textsuperscript{32}

They were an obvious setback to the Air Corps' drive for centralized control of its striking forces. According to General Spaatz, the solution would be to place all air units in Newfoundland under the Commanding General, First Air Force, and to leave only routine supply and administration to the Commanding General, First Army. Neither the War Plans Division nor G–3 concurred. Although they were agreeable to making the Air Corps responsible for technical supply and the supervision of training activities, both the War Plans Division and G–3 opposed any further change in the command arrangements. General Arnold's views were an exact reiteration of the position taken by General Spaatz. A new element, the question of air reinforcements, was injected into the problem when the War Plans Division suggested that in the event of an attack or the threat of one the base commander be authorized to call directly on the Commanding General, First Air Force, for air reinforcements. But this likewise failed to meet the approval of General Arnold, who in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff on 23 May proposed that in case of an attack all units, ground as

\textsuperscript{30} TAG Ltr to CG's CDC and PCD, 18 Apr 41, WPD 4351–20, sec. 1; TBC Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, I, 9–20.

\textsuperscript{31} See ch. XIII for an account of the organization of the CDC.

\textsuperscript{32} Memo, Gen Spaatz for CofS, 28 Apr 41, WPD 4351–9, sec. 4.
well as air, become a task force commanded by the senior officer present and operating under the theater commander.\(^\text{33}\) Part of the problem was thus shunted over to the procedural level where more likelihood of reaching a compromise was to be expected.

When General Arnold advocated unity of command over combat operations, he was resting on a principle on which General Marshall himself placed the utmost reliance, but which had conventionally involved only Army or Navy command. Nevertheless, in view of the Chief of Staff's partiality toward a functional allocation, the Air Corps believed it could be fairly certain of obtaining command where operations were principally air.

During these last days of May 1941 there were signs that the North Atlantic area might soon take on greater significance. Plans for sending a garrison to Greenland were completed. There was the possibility of a move into the Azores. Then, at a conference on 4 June, General Marshall informed his staff that the President had resolved to send American forces to Iceland.

The Newfoundland problem was taken up during the same conference, and the decision was reached to organize the Newfoundland Base Command as a task force under the direct control of GHQ as soon as GHQ took on its normal command functions. A general officer of the Air Corps, it was decided, would be given command of the force.\(^\text{34}\) The steps to put the decision into effect were taken in July. On the first of the month, Brig. Gen. Henry W. Harms, who had been commandant of the Air Corps training center at Moffett Field, Calif., was designated Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command. Two days later GHQ was given command of Army task forces and the control of military operations. On 8 July, the Newfoundland Base Command was designated a task force, to operate directly under GHQ, and The Adjutant General was directed to notify GHQ to assume command, relieving the Commanding General, First Army, as of 10 July. Similar instructions were also issued placing the Bermuda Base Command under GHQ.\(^\text{35}\)

Neither the Air Corps nor GHQ was completely satisfied with the arrangement, and a number of changes were proposed. General McNair,
chief of staff of GHQ, recommended a North Atlantic Defense Command consisting of Newfoundland, Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland and with logistics as well as operations under the control of GHQ. The Air Corps promoted a Northeastern Air Theater, with the Newfoundland air units placed directly under the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command. As for Bermuda, the Supply Division of the General Staff (G–4) recommended that it be included in the Caribbean Defense Command. The War Plans Division favored leaving things as they were.

No agreement was reached on any one of the proposed changes. Falling back instead on the War Plans Division suggestion of the previous May, General Marshall authorized the Newfoundland Base commander to bypass the normal channel, which ran through GHQ, and to call directly on the First Air Force when, in an emergency, air reinforcements were urgently needed. Otherwise the command situation remained as it was when GHQ had first called attention to it. The War Plans Division, the Second Corps Area, Middletown Depot, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of Army Air Forces were all linked in some fashion to the chain of command and supply; and the United States–Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense had a measure of responsibility for the defense plan. What was left for GHQ, General McNair pointed out, was merely "such inspection and coordination as is practicable under the circumstances." A fouled chain of command was not, however, the major difficulty. Regardless of the palliatives that had been recommended, the fact remained that GHQ had been given a job to do without all the means it considered necessary for accomplishing the task. The remedy was either to "streamline" the War Department and establish a "command post" within the General Staff or to enlarge the authority of GHQ, but a difference of opinion involving the very nature of GHQ’s mission brought on further complications. That GHQ had been called into being presupposed the existence of an

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36 On the North Atlantic Def Comd, see Memo, DCoFS GHQ for WPD, 11 Aug 41, WPD 4175-18; Memo, Col Hays for Gen Maloney, 10 Sep 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO, Binder 2. On the Northeastern Air Theater, see Draft Memo (prepared in WPD and not used), CoFS for Gen Arnold, n.d., WPD 4351-9, sec. 6; Draft Memo (not used), CoFS for Gen Arnold, 13 Nov 41, GHQ 381, binder 1; Memo, CoFS for Gen Arnold, 19 Nov 41; Memo, SGS for WPD, 1 Dec 41; Memo, WPD for CoFS, 4 Dec 41. Last three in WPD 4351-9, sec. 6. On the Bermuda proposal, see Memo, Col Hays for DCoFS GHQ, 2 Sep 41; Memo, DCoFS GHQ for WPD, 3 Sep 41. Both in WPD 4351-8, sec. 2. See below, pp. 486–88, for data showing the relationship between this question and Iceland.

37 Memo, CoFS for Gen Arnold, 19 Nov 41, WPD 4351-9, sec. 6.

38 Memo, CoFS GHQ for WPD, 2 Sep 41, WPD 4351-9. Further discussion of the command problem, including the relationship of the Canadian and American forces in Newfoundland, will be found in chapter XX.
emergency and more than suggested the imminence of combat operations. Proceeding on this basis, and recognizing the significance of the North Atlantic area, GHQ was attempting to have theaters of operations established well in advance of actual hostilities. Its efforts were thwarted, it believed, by procrastination and myopia in the General Staff. An investigation of the basic problem was begun in the War Department, and in order to provide "a better understanding of the prospective development of command" the Caribbean Defense Command was placed under GHQ control, effective 1 December 1941. What actually developed thereafter was a drastic reorganization of the War Department.

In the meantime, during the summer and fall of 1941, garrisons were being sent out to British Guiana, Antigua, St. Lucia, and Jamaica, for construction had progressed to the point where some protection seemed to be required either against external attack or, as in the case of Jamaica, against strike and riot damage.

**Early Administrative Problems**

Many of the "housekeeping" chores and administrative problems that arose in the Atlantic bases had also plagued the commanders of all the new and rapidly mushrooming Army camps in the continental United States. Overcrowded, inadequate housing, dust and mud, isolated surroundings, and shortages of equipment slowed down activities, depressed the spirits of the men, and frayed the tempers of commanding officers in Massachusetts or New Jersey as well as in Trinidad or Bermuda, and in Georgia as in Newfoundland. But circumstances of geography and politics magnified the more familiar problems and gave rise to new ones that had no recent precedent in Army experience.

Throughout 1941 housing was an object of careful study in the War Department and a source of frequent communications with the base commanders, none of whom wished to keep his men in tents for any length of time. The War Department, which was keeping its eye on accommodations for the authorized garrisons, seems to have been particularly concerned over the reduction the President made in the permanent housing planned for

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40 Memo, CofS for Gen Arnold, 19 Nov 41, WPD 4351-9, sec. 6.
First Troops in Trinidad. Tent camp at Fort Read (top). Machine gunners wearing mosquito nets during maneuvers (bottom).
INSTALLATIONS IN NEWFOUNDLAND. Barracks at Fort Pepperrell (top). U.S. Army supply dock, St. John's harbor (bottom).
Bermuda. Tents were entirely unsuitable, reported Colonel Strong, the commanding officer, for severe hurricanes could be expected about once a year and there would be long periods of wet, windy weather which, if the men were in tents, would raise the rate of illness. Consequently, in July the district engineer was authorized to divert a part of the construction effort to erecting temporary barracks. In Trinidad, the construction of temporary barracks at Fort Read began a few weeks after the arrival of the troops. At the same time, General Talbot on his own initiative negotiated an arrangement with the British governor which gave the base command a temporary cantonment area on the outskirts of Port of Spain. Early in June the garrison at St. John's, Newfoundland, was evicted from its quarters on board the Edmund B. Alexander and went into a tent camp outside the city. No temporary housing was authorized for the Newfoundland garrison, but its permanent quarters at Fort Pepperrell were expected to be ready before winter set in. In spite of reinforcements during the second half of the year, the housing situation was under fair control by December. Perhaps 150 men were still in tents at the temporary coast defense sites in Bermuda, while in Newfoundland about half the St. John's garrison had moved into permanent quarters. About 500 men were in temporary barracks that had apparently been taken over from the construction people. Housing for the remainder was promised during December. About half the Trinidad garrison were in barracks by 1 November, and each week saw sizable numbers transferred out of the tent camp. At the secondary bases temporary housing was available for two or three times the number of troops that were there.

Uncertain port conditions in Newfoundland, inadequate rail communications with Gander airport, the lack of shipping for local transportation between Panama and Trinidad and between Trinidad and the outlying bases, and restrictions on the purchase of local commodities served to complicate the supply problem. The rehabilitation of the Newfoundland Railway, first taken under study by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense as early as January 1941, was of interest to several agencies, and some duplication of effort occurred when both the Newfoundland Base Command and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation made a survey of the physical needs.
of the railroad. New rolling stock, financed by the United States, began to ease the situation late in 1941. Harbor improvements at St. John's and Argentia were a much-needed and welcome supplement. In Trinidad, General Talbot was concerned from the start about the storage space provided for perishable supplies. It would have to be increased, he reported, unless a better shipping schedule could be worked out. In any event, the existing space would be inadequate, he continued, for any reinforcements that might be added to his command. As temporary remedies, the Office of The Quartermaster General considered obtaining a refrigerated ship to be used for storage and allocating funds for the purchase of local products, but apparently the cold storage plant under construction by the Engineers was completed before these measures were taken. All the same, the refrigeration problem was still unsolved, according to Talbot, at the end of August.

In reporting the supply situation to The Quartermaster General in May, General Talbot pointed out with some understatement that the local gasoline supply was "adequate" and shipments from the United States should be immediately discontinued. It would have been no exaggeration had he said that shipping gasoline to Trinidad was a far more wasteful and senseless effort than carrying coals to Newcastle, which in fact had sometimes been a profitable venture. But the restrictive provisions of the "Buy American" Act of 3 March 1933 had been interpreted by the War Department as applying to products used in the leased bases. Although the Secretary of War could authorize the purchase, without regard to country of origin, of goods not produced in the United States of satisfactory quality or in sufficient and reasonably available quantities, nevertheless not many products had been certified as coming in this category.

When the problem of supplying air bases in the Philippines, in Hawaii, in Alaska, in the West Indies, and in the North Atlantic began to assume tremendous proportions in the summer of 1941, both War Plans Division and the Air Corps raised the question of lifting the provisions of the law as far as the overseas bases were concerned. This step was not taken until after the United States entered the war; but for the meantime a long

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43 Documents bearing on the Newfoundland Railway are in WPD 4351-9, sec. 3. Most important are: Rpt of Conf with RCAF in Ottawa, 26 Jan–1 Feb 41; Lt Col Harold L. Clark to WPD, n.d.; Memo, Gen Spaatz for WPD, 25 Mar 41; Memo, WPD for Senior Army Member, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 26 Apr 41; Memo, WPD for TAG, 26 Apr 41. See also Memo, WPD for G-4, 23 Jun 41; and unsigned Memo of 5 Sep 41 stcd to Memo, Col Bissell for ACoS WPD, 5 Sep 41. Last two in WPD 4351-9, sec. 4.

44 Rad, Talbot to QMC, 10 May 41, AG 320.2 (4-5-41), sec. 4.

45 Memo, DQMG for G-4, 17 May 41, TAG 320.2 (4-5-41), sec. 4; Ltr, Talbot to CG CDC, 28 Aug 41, WPD 4351-20, sec. 1.

46 See AR 5-340, 10 Aug 36.
list of commodities, including aviation gasoline and petroleum products in general, was exempted by authority of the Secretary of War on 30 July 1941.47

In October, General Andrews, the new commanding general of the Caribbean Defense Command, recommended a change in supply procedure. Consideration of the question whether the commanding officers of the various base commands should deal with the Second Corps Area directly or through the headquarters of the Caribbean Defense Command had resulted in GHQ’s suggesting that the Caribbean Defense Command take over the responsibilities originally entrusted to the Second Corps Area and build up a supply depot at Panama for the entire area. Just as unwilling as his predecessor had been to make Panama the hub of a Caribbean theater, General Andrews disagreed with GHQ’s suggestion and recommended instead that depots be established in Puerto Rico and Trinidad for supplying all bases in the respective sectors.48 His proposal circulated within the War Department for six weeks, receiving the concurrence of the interested staff divisions and also of GHQ and finally the official approval of the Chief of Staff. On 23 December 1941, GHQ was informed that the Second Corps Area would be relieved of the administration and supply of the Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana Base Commands at a time to be designated later. St. Lucia and British Guiana were to be placed under the Trinidad Base Command, as Andrews had suggested; Antigua and Jamaica were to come under the Puerto Rican Department for supply. Six months later, in June 1942, the commanding general of the Caribbean Defense Command was authorized to establish general depots in Trinidad and Puerto Rico within the limits of existing or already authorized facilities.49

One of the burdens that fell hard on the staff officers of the base commands, and chiefly on the chaplains and medical officers, was the censoring of mail. By midsummer 1941, some 39,000 letters and nearly 1,000 packages were passing through the post office of the Bermuda Base Command each month. In Trinidad the volume was only slightly less. The mail of the construction people as well as that of the military was examined by the

47 D/F, WPD to Co/S AAF, 9 Jul 41, sub: Material for . . . British Guiana Base, WPD 4351–21; Procurement Cir 59, 30 Jul 41, and 92, 30 Dec 41.
49 Memo, G–4 for Co/S, 12 Nov 41, OCS 21160–119; Rpt of DCofS GHQ, 28 Nov 41, GHQ 337 Staff Confs, binder 2; TAG Ltr to CG FF, 23 Dec 41, sub: Supply Plans for CDC; 8th Ind, Requirements Div SOS to CG CDC, 9 Jun 42, sub: Supply Plans for CDC, on TAG Ltr of 6 Oct 41, with Memo for Rcd attached. Last two in AG 320.2 (1–8–41).
MANNING AND ORGANIZING THE NEW ATLANTIC BASES 403

base censors in Bermuda; but in Trinidad the civilian mail was censored by employees of the contractors under the immediate supervision of the district engineer. In the one case, mails were delayed as much as five days; and in the other, there were complaints among the contractors' people against the integrity of their fellow employees in the censorship office. During the fall of 1941 the base censors were authorized to employ civilian examiners. The Bermuda censorship office came to be staffed principally by the wives of men stationed there, which posed a special problem after the attack on Pearl Harbor when the evacuation of dependents was undertaken. Censorship caught the usual careless disclosure of restricted information and, perhaps more important, gave the commanding officer a steadier finger on the pulse of his men. On the other side of the picture, the historical officer of the Trinidad Sector has criticized censorship operations in his sector on grounds that they were inflexible and overly meticulous and gave rise to "considerable resentment" among the troops. But such is the lot of a censor.

No troops had ever had more thought devoted to their physical welfare than the American Army of 1940-41. So much importance was attached to it that comfortable housing, a plentiful supply of good food and equipment, recreation facilities, and the like, took on an intrinsic worth, in pursuit of which other factors were sometimes lost to sight. The Army made every effort to ease the physical hardships of service in the jungles of Trinidad and British Guiana or on the fog-swept coasts of Newfoundland; but its failure to provide for the emotional needs of men surrounded by a wholly strange environment was as dismal as the situations that often resulted. Too little cognizance was taken of the incapacity of Americans generally to adapt their ways to those of strangers or to take comfort and serious interest in unfamiliar surroundings. Too little attention was given to preparing the men for the antipathy of a local populace, however friendly, toward any foreign garrison, however well-intentioned. By any test of physical comfort, Bermuda should have had no "morale" problems, but as time went on complaints were made and incidents took place that paralleled those elsewhere. Wherever the men sought recreation among the townspeople, as they were accustomed to doing in the United States, brawls and similar unpleasantness

50 Report of Special Inspection of Bermuda Base Command, Maj Hunt to TIG, 26 Jul 41, WPD 4351-8, sec. 1; Ltr, CG TBC to CG CDC, 30 Sep 41, AG 000.73 (5-16-41), sec. 11.
51 GHQ Staff ConfS (Dec 41), GHQ 337 Staff ConfS, binder 2; Memo, SW for President, 24 Dec 41, sub: Evacuation of Dependents . . . , OCS 21098-56.
52 TBC, Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, IV, 100, 112.
53 See Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 231-36.
were bound to occur. Off-post recreation facilities operated by local committees varied in the service they performed. In Jamaica, the local effort was received enthusiastically; in Bermuda, the local service club was charged with price-gouging and discrimination.

During the fall of 1941 the United Service Organizations (USO) extended its operations to the Atlantic bases.\(^5^4\) The USO recreation centers helped to allay the tediousness and boredom of the men's leisure time but had less effect on the attitude of townsfolk and garrison toward each other. For its solution, this, like most of the problems, required the closest cooperation between the commanding officers and the local authorities.

The conduct of official relations rested on the base agreement of 27 March 1941; but, not being a treaty, the base agreement was inferior to local legislation, and any laws that failed to conform to the agreement stood until repealed by act of the colonial authorities. The objections raised by representatives of the colonies during the negotiations foreshadowed, and the lack of enthusiasm with which the colonies received the agreement further indicated, that any conflict of law would not easily be corrected. Instead of enacting a general nullifying ordinance, the colonies preferred to deal with specific conflicts as they arose. The remission of customs duties and local taxes under Articles XIV and XVII of the base agreement was not enacted by the Bermuda legislature until 27 June, exactly three months after the agreement came into effect. Even then there was only a partial conformity. Bermuda continued to levy duties on bulk petroleum products not consigned direct to the Army and Navy and on household effects and personal belongings. Various wharfage charges were assessed on goods destined for the bases, and a stamp tax was levied on bank checks and steamship tickets. At the end of 1941 the State Department was still pressing for determination of a few of the matters.\(^5^5\) In Trinidad a similar stamp tax was one of a number of controversial questions still outstanding at the end of September. Among these, the failure of the Trinidad Government to grant the right of audience in local courts to United States counsel took on urgent importance when an American soldier was charged with the murder of a

\(^{54}\) The extension of USO activities precipitated a feud between the USO and the American Red Cross over their respective spheres of operation, a controversy that caught the War Department in the middle and which may have sped the construction of the recreation centers.

\(^{55}\) Memo for Red by Col Crawford, 16 Aug 41, sub: Bermuda—Passage of the U.S. Bases Act, 27 June 1941; Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 41. Both in WPD 4351–8, sec. 1. Ltr, Mr. Thomas W. Palmer, Standard Oil Co. of N.J., to Mr. Ray Atherton, State Dept, 5 Nov 41; Memo, Col Crawford, WPD, for Mr. Hickerson, State Dept, 12 Dec 41; Note for Red, WPD to G–4, 2 Oct 41, sub: Payment of Taxes . . . in Bermuda. Last three in WPD 4351–8, sec. 2.
Trinidad civilian. But, as it turned out, the question of audience was submerged in that of jurisdiction.

This affair concerned a shooting that had taken place in the town of Arima, outside the leased area in Trinidad, and involved a jurisdictional issue that was not specifically covered by the base agreement. In a similar case that had arisen in Antigua a few weeks earlier, both the United States and the British Government recognized the right of the other to try the alleged offender, a U.S. marine. If the precedent established in that instance were to be followed, the representative of the State Department would ask the local authorities whether they objected to a trial by court-martial and would inform them at the same time that the United States had no objection to their making a public statement to the effect that in recognizing American jurisdiction they were not renouncing the concurrent jurisdiction of the local court. But the precedent was not closely followed. The Secretary of the colony, acting as Governor of Trinidad in the temporary absence of Sir Hubert Young, was reluctant to raise the question of jurisdiction, although he was pressed by the Legislative Council to do so. When he asked General Talbot for a letter that would quiet any public agitation, the general responded readily enough, but he too preferred to let the issue lie. Instead of acknowledging the fact of dual jurisdiction, General Talbot replied with assurances that the prisoner would be given a public trial, by a military court, to which representatives of the colonial government would be invited. Whether this would have had the effect the acting governor hoped was never put to test, for the letter had not been made public when Governor Young returned and immediately brought the jurisdictional issue before the American consul. The Governor suggested that he make a statement with the approval of the United States Government similar to the one issued by the Antigua authorities. The consul, having received no instructions, referred the matter to the State Department. Meanwhile, the preliminaries to the trial had already begun. Three or four days before the military court convened the Governor agreed that it was now too late to do anything except issue a formal press release waiving jurisdiction, which he would do provided the consul repeated General Talbot's announcement of the court-martial.

56 Ltr, American Consul, Trinidad, to Secy State, 5 Sep 41; Memo, WPD for Mr. Hickerson, State Dept, 17 Sep 41; Memo for TAG, 30 Oct 41, sub: Implementation of Base Lease Agreement. . . . All in WPD 4351-20, sec. 2.
57 Memo, G–1 for WPD, 6 Oct 41; Memo, JAG for WPD, 15 Oct 41; Memo, WPD for CofS, 15 Nov 41. All in WPD 4351-167.
58 Ltr, Gen Talbot, to Capt John Huggins, Acting Governor, 29 Oct 41; Ltr, Talbot to TAG, 1 Nov 41. Both in WPD 4351-20, sec. 2.
rial, and this was done. Then, on 19 November, the War Department instructed Talbot to postpone the trial until the Governor issued a public statement such as he wished, to the effect that recognition of court-martial jurisdiction was not a renunciation of the concurrent jurisdiction of the local court. But the trial had started the day before.59

The result of the proceedings, which ended in the acquittal of the accused soldier, did nothing to appease the Governor's dissatisfaction. He urged, as he had in the beginning, that in future cases involving dual jurisdiction the Trinidad Government be informed in good time of the steps taken, that this be done through the American consulate, and that a definite procedure be settled upon by which requests for any waiver of jurisdiction could be given due consideration.60

A successful *modus vivendi* between the American authorities and the local government required a measure of co-operation and mutual understanding seldom achieved in Trinidad until after the United States entered the war. There was scarcely the best of teamwork between the American consulate and the headquarters of the base command. In transmitting to the War Department one of the consular dispatches relating to the shooting affair at Arima, the Secretary of State invited attention to the arrangement between the two departments under which "it was agreed that the American consul at Trinidad should be the intermediary in matters relating to the defense bases and that all communications to the Governor should be sent through him."61 This had been agreed upon early in June, and on at least five occasions thereafter General Talbot had been directed to comply with it.62 There was even less teamwork between the general and the Governor. Both were of the same cut of cloth, blunt and outspoken in their opinions; each was insistent that the prestige of his own government could best be upheld by not yielding to the other; neither believed in appeasement. When the Governor refused the right of audience to American military counsel, the general retaliated by refusing to permit the service of summonses on American military personnel.63

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59 Telg 756, American Consul, Trinidad, to Secy State, 15 Nov 41; D/F, WPD to TAG, 19 Nov 41, with Rad to CG, Trinidad, and Memo for Record. All in WPD 4351-20, sec. 2.
60 Telgs 756, 15 Nov 41, and 764, 24 Nov 41, American Consul, Trinidad, to Secy State, WPD 4351-20, sec. 2.
61 Ltr, Secy State to SW, 27 Nov 41, WPD 4351-20, sec. 2.
62 See Ltr, Col Ward to Gen Talbot, 3 Jun 41; Rad, TAG to Talbot, 12 Jun 41; Rad, TAG to CG CDC, 5 Sep 41; Ltr (drafted in WPD), G-2 to Talbot, 10 Sep 41; WPD Memo for TAG, with Rad to CG CDC, 16 Sep 41. All in WPD 4351-20, sec. 1.
63 TBC, Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, V, 28-29. A few days after the shooting at Arima a bill was introduced in the Legislative Council providing for the right of audience. Although
At the other bases temporary agreements were worked out with the local authorities in a spirit of compromise. There was close co-operation between the American consulate general and Army headquarters in Bermuda, and the vigorous efforts of the consul general, ably seconded by Colonel Strong, were successful in bringing about a satisfactory disposition of the tax and customs questions. Although the Governor was not to be hurried into removing the legislative obstacles, a working compromise was agreed upon, the final decision being left to Washington and London. In Newfoundland, the consul general seems to have taken very little active part in matters relating to the bases. Until the arrival of the new consul general in July 1941, and afterwards to a lesser extent, both the district engineer and the commanding officer of the garrison dealt directly with the Newfoundland Commissioners on many questions. They took the same approach that had been followed in Bermuda, but the situation was clouded at times by the presence of Canadian forces, by the role of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, and by changes of command, of consular officers, and in the Newfoundland Commission of Government.94

In retrospect, the 1941 experience in establishing the defense outposts in the Atlantic leaves one with the distinct impression that the greatest flaws were in the sphere of social relations. Plans for the construction and defense of the bases were drawn up with due attention to needs and resources and rested on a solid basis of firsthand information competently assembled. The construction program was fairly prompt in getting under way. If its progress was not all that the most optimistic hoped, it was perhaps because the goal had been placed too far off. In the seeming emergency of April 1941 troops reached the bases in rather quick order, and when the real crisis broke in December the airfields were ready for their part in the Battle of the Atlantic. These technical problems of engineering and defense were no less complicated, no more important, than the social problem, which deserved far more attention than it received. No attempt seems to have been made to prepare the men in advance for the social and physical environment in which

expected to pass on 28 October, it was not enacted until sometime the following month. Meanwhile, all cases pending in the local courts that involved American soldiers had to be postponed. See, Telg 745, American Consul, Trinidad to Secy State, 27 Oct 41, with copy of the proposed ordinance; Memo for Rcd on WPD Memo for TAG, 21 Oct 41; and Memo for Rcd on D/F, WPD to G-1, JAG, and TAG, 22 Nov 41. All in WPD 4351-20, sec. 2.

94 In addition to the material cited in n. 56, see: Ltr, American Vice Consul, Bermuda, to Secy State, 20 Sep 41; Ltr, Colonial Secretary, Bermuda, to American Consul General, 5 Nov 41; and Memo, WPD for Mr. Hickerson, State Dept, 12 Dec 41. All in WPD 4351-8, sec. 2. Ltr, American Consul General, St. John's to Secy State, 27 May 41, WPD 4351-9, sec. 3; Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Dec 41, sub: Status of USO in Overseas Bases, WPD 4351-9, sec. 6.
they were to live. In the selection of units the only deference to local sensibilities was the decision not to send Negro troops to the West Indian bases, a decision that was amended in April 1942 without undue disturbance. The attitude of white troops toward the colored citizens, an equally fertile source of trouble, was given little weight in choosing the original units for the Trinidad garrison. "The character of the men in command of the bases," Ambassador Winant wrote at the conclusion of the base negotiations, "is of tremendous importance especially in the beginning. If they are the right kind and ready to carry out our part of the agreement in a friendly and understanding spirit they can do much to inaugurate ninety-nine years of good neighborliness." 65 Only professional competence, however, and what might be called the exigencies of the service guided the selection of commanding officers. Dexterity in the art of diplomacy, a certain skill in getting along with people who lived differently, and the ability to follow the established channels of intercourse between nations were not considered. In the personnel files of G–1 there were scarcely any measurement data or code numbers for qualities of this sort. It was a matter of chance and not of choosing when an officer with these qualities was placed in command.

65 Rad 1207, Mr. Winant to Secy State, 27 Mar 41, OPD Exec 13, item 15.
CHAPTER XVI

The Caribbean in Wartime

The Panama and Caribbean defenses felt the initial impact of war chiefly in the shape of repercussions from Washington. At least two fields of activity were affected, namely, the problem of command and the matter of reinforcing the garrisons. The entry of the United States into the war radically and immediately altered the situation in each of these fields.

The First Effects of War

As a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the vexing problem of who should command when the forces of two or more services were involved was, as far as it concerned the North Atlantic bases, pushed farther away from a solution; but, as far as the Caribbean-Panama area was concerned, the problem was disposed of immediately. The only difficulty that remained was to make the solution work. On this general subject Secretary Stimson’s biographer has observed: “The attack at Pearl Harbor emphasized again the importance of unity of command; all the armed forces in any area must have a single commander. Stimson was ashamed that the lesson had to be so painfully learned; for months he had read it in the experience of the British in North Africa, Crete, and Greece. Incautiously he had assumed that it was equally well learned by others. . . .”1 As late as 5 December the Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee had been struggling with the task of formulating a statement of general policy governing the application of unity of command. No agreement had been reached by the time the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred. Then, out of the flood of rumors and alarms that followed the Japanese onslaught came a report that two hostile aircraft carriers had been sighted off the west coast of Mexico. General Andrews was immediately instructed to “take all necessary precautions in reconnaissance” and to notify the naval commander. In Washington, GHQ, learning that Navy patrol

planes based on Coco Solo were part of a task force under the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, raised the question of command, but on being referred to General Andrews in Panama the question became one of liaison rather than command.²

On Friday, 12 December, five days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Secretary Stimson was amazed to find that no scheme for establishing unity of command in Panama had been worked out. Aroused by the thought that the canal would probably be one of the next objectives of the Japanese, he had General Marshall draw up a proposed directive placing all Army and Navy forces in the Panama Coastal Frontier, except fleet units, under Army command, and later in the day Mr. Stimson laid the proposal before the Cabinet.³ The President approved the idea by taking a map, writing "Army" over the area of the Panama Coastal Frontier, but at the same time writing "Navy" over the Caribbean Coastal Frontier, and then adding his "O.K.—F.D.R." As presented by Secretary Stimson, the draft proposal had said nothing about the command of the Caribbean area except that "the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, within his means and other responsibilities, will support the Naval Commander of the Caribbean Coastal Frontier." During the afternoon General Gerow discussed the Panama command with Admiral Stark, without referring to the Caribbean, and after the Cabinet meeting he took the papers that had been approved by the President to a conference with Admirals Stark and King, and Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner. Admiral King, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and soon to become Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, thought Secretary Stimson's proposal might possibly be a practical solution, but Admiral Turner, head of the Navy War Plans Division, was opposed. His view was that unity of command was appropriate only for regularly organized task force operations, that once established it ought not to shift back and forth according to which service had "paramount interest," and that for general defensive operations the appropriate method of co-ordination was mutual co-operation, not unity of command.⁴ But the President's intent with respect to Panama

² Memo, WPD for TAG, 10 Dec 41, sub: Aircraft Carriers off Mexican Coast (for dispatch to CG CDC), WPD 4622–13; Memo, WPD for TAG, 10 Dec 41, sub: Reported Jap Concentration West of Canal (for dispatch to CG CDC); Memo for Red, Col Slocum (WPD), 10 Dec 41. Last two in WPD 4622–14. Rad, CG CDC to GHQ, 13 Dec 41, GHQ G–3 file, Corresp With CDC.

³ Stimson Diary, entry of 12 Dec 41; Memo, Gen Marshall for Gen Gerow, 5 Dec 41, WPD 2917–32.

⁴ Memo, WPD for Adm Stark, 12 Dec 41, with draft proposal and map attached, WPD 2917–34; Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Dec 41; Memo, CNO for CofS, (12 Dec 41). Last two in WPD 2917–35.
was clear, and at a meeting of the Joint Board held the next day Admiral Stark accepted the decision to establish unity of command under the Army. A major consideration was the view that "unless unified control was affected [effected?] by joint agreement between the Army and the Navy, the establishment of a department of National Defense, appointed by the Administration, might be considered a certainty." 5

Over the weekend, the Navy War Plans Division prepared a written statement on the subject, which Admiral Stark forwarded to General Marshall on Monday, 15 December, and which brought into the discussion the question of command in the Caribbean. The Navy’s position was that the President’s notation on the map of the Caribbean Coastal Frontier indicated that he intended unity of command to be established under the Navy in that area, as in Panama under the Army. This was what the Navy had proposed almost a year before. The Army countered with the same argument that had brought on the previous stalemate: that it was impossible to consider the Army defenses of the Panama-Caribbean area except as a unit and that, if unity of command were necessary in the Caribbean, it should, as in Panama, be under the Army. When the question came up for discussion at a further meeting of the Joint Board, on 17 December, the only agreement was that efforts to reach one would be continued. But the same consideration that helped to bring the Army and Navy into agreement on the Panama command doubtless played a similar part with respect to the Caribbean. In any event, on the morning of 18 December, General Marshall instructed the War Plans Division that in the Caribbean the Navy would exercise unity of command. Thus, within a week after Secretary Stimson became aware of the serious situation the question of who should command was solved. 6

In two or three days more, all the details of the directives to be issued were likewise settled. In order to allay any possible uneasiness on the part of the naval commander at Panama, General Marshall had first proposed a list of special restrictions and exceptions that would have limited the Army’s exercise of command, but they were soon laid aside, at Admiral Stark’s suggestion, in favor of a simple, more easily interpreted directive modeled on the one that had been adopted for Hawaii. All forces “assigned for operations” in the respective coastal frontiers came within the scope of the

5 Min., JB Mtg., 13 Dec 41.
orders, which were limited only by the provisions of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.7 The urgency of the situation had prevented the War Department from consulting General Andrews. Now the success of the decision rested on his good judgment. He promised to do his best. The decision presented him with a difficult problem of organization; but barring an immediate interruption in the shape of a serious threat to the Caribbean, the plan, he believed, could be made to work.8

While the War Plans Division, General Marshall, and Secretary Stimson had been occupied chiefly with the question of command, GHQ and General Andrews had been more concerned with reinforcing and strengthening the Caribbean garrisons. By directing the various commanders to put the RAINBOW 5 war plan into effect, the War Department brought on a veritable barrage of requests for reinforcements, since the deployment of forces provided in RAINBOW 5 was incomplete. Because the Canal seemed to be one of the objectives of the Japanese war makers, General Andrews' requests fared better than most. On 12 December GHQ noted that two infantry regiments, two barrage balloon units, one field artillery battalion, and two hospital units were to be sent to Panama in addition to some 1,800 coast artillery filler replacements. A few days later, arrangements were made to send the 53d Pursuit Group to reinforce the air garrison. Negotiations were started to acquire 72 40-mm. antiaircraft guns from the British and to dispatch one heavy bomber squadron and one flight of pursuit planes to Talara.9 The December 1941 reinforcements, both ground and air, were more than double those in the entire first eleven months of the year. By the end of December the Panama garrison had risen to about 39,000 men; and at the end of January it had reached 47,600.

Puerto Rico, unlike Panama, appeared to lie beyond reach of the Japanese. In common with all the Atlantic bases similarly situated, Puerto Rico felt the immediate effect of the Pearl Harbor attack as a temporary disruption of its defense build-up. The War Department gave careful scrutiny to requests for reinforcements submitted before the Japanese assault, and in December less than 200 men were added to the Puerto Rican garrison. The same rate of increase was maintained during the next two months, so

8 Memo, WPD for TAG, 19 Dec 41 (dispatched as Rad 9 to CG CDC); Rad, Gen Andrews to Gen Marshall, 20 Dec 41. Both in WPD 2917–37.
9 GHQ Conf Rpts, 12 Dec, 15 Dec, 19 Dec, 22 Dec, and 27 Dec, GHQ 337 Staff Confs, binder 2.
that the total strength, which at the end of November 1941 had amounted to about 21,200 men, had risen to only 22,000 at the end of February 1942.\footnote{Strength figures for both Panama and Puerto Rico are based on the statistical summary, Strength of U.S. Army Forces... , compiled by Statistical Section, OCMH.}

The naval forces available for purposes of local defense were, like the Army garrison, concentrated in the Panama area, where Rear Adm. F. H. Sadler, Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, had at his disposal a small and motley force of patrol planes, submarines, and sub-chasers. For "heavy" units, Admiral Sadler had two old destroyers and a gunboat, and the rest of his command consisted of 6 submarines, 5 subchasers, 1 mine sweeper, and 12 patrol planes with their tender. Even before General Andrews was given over-all command, his superior responsibility had been informally acknowledged by Admiral Sadler, who considered himself somewhat as a task force commander under General Andrews as well as a task group commander under the Commander in chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.\footnote{Memo, CNO for CofS GHQ, 4 Dec 41, on D/F, WPD to GHQ, 11 Dec 41, WPD 4415-15; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 148-51; Ltr, Gen Andrews to Gen Marshall, 16 Dec 41, WPD 4432-16. In February 1942 the coastal frontiers were renamed sea frontiers.}

In the Caribbean, Rear Admiral J. H. Hoover's naval forces were divided between a patrol force consisting of two old destroyers, three small submarines, two subchasers of World War I vintage, and twelve patrol planes, and smaller local surface forces at Guantánamo and Trinidad. The latter were virtually undefended; at Trinidad on 7 December 1941 there were only two converted yachts, two "Yippies" (district patrol craft, YP-63 and YP-64) and four of Admiral Hoover's patrol planes.\footnote{Memo, CNO for CofS GHQ, 4 Dec 41, on D/F, WPD to GHQ, 11 Dec 41, WPD 4415-15; Ltr, Adm J. H. Hoover (ret) to Acting Chief of Military History, 23 Apr 59, in OCMH files; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, p. 146. A local naval command was shortly established at Curaçao.}

As in the case of the Army, the Navy's first reaction was to strengthen the defenses at the Pacific end of the Canal. On 14 December the War Department learned that the Navy had sent two submarine divisions (8-12 vessels) and a patrol squadron of twelve planes to Panama with orders to establish advanced patrol bases in the Galápagos Islands and Gulf of Fonseca.\footnote{Memo, WPD for CofS GHQ, 14 Dec 41, WPD 4622-40.}

Somewhat better progress had been made in operational planning under RAINBOW 5 than in the deployment of troops. In October 1941 a group of General Andrews' staff officers headed by Brig. Gen. Harry C. Ingles, G-3 of the Caribbean Defense Command, arrived in Washington to prepare an operations plan for the Caribbean theater. A draft had been made ready...
by GHQ on the model of the Iceland plan prepared a few months earlier. When General Ingles and his group returned to Panama on 31 October, the current estimate of the situation and the intelligence plan prepared by GHQ had been brought into agreement with the views of the Caribbean Defense Command. The rest of the work was to be done in Panama and to be submitted to GHQ for approval. By the date of the Pearl Harbor attack the operations plan itself, the basic document, had been completed, but not all the seventeen annexes were finished.

Based as it was on the RAINBOW 5 war plan, the Caribbean operations plan faced toward the Atlantic and anticipated a war in which Germany and Italy would be the major opponents, the Atlantic and Europe the principal battleground, and the Caribbean relatively immune to attack. It contemplated a garrison of a little more than 112,000 men for the Caribbean theater. Considering the fact that the actual deployment of forces in November 1941 was based on the possibility of a carrier raid against the canal from the Pacific, that the total garrison of the Caribbean Defense Command amounted to less than 60,000 men at the end of November, and that the establishment of separate unified commands in Panama and the Caribbean created a different scheme of organization from that envisaged by GHQ, there might have been some question of the practicality of the operations plan. As it turned out, the canal itself was never seriously threatened from either side, nor were the outposts, except for Aruba and Curacao, ever fired upon. Nevertheless, the Caribbean Defense Command garrison was built up to a peak of 119,000 men in December 1942. More than half of them were in Panama guarding the canal from attack or sabotage.

Provisions for armed assistance to recognized governments of the Latin American republics and for the protective occupation of colonies belonging to European powers were a feature of the RAINBOW 5 war plan; but these provisions were specifically excepted when the plan was ordered into effect after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Dutch islands of Aruba and Curacao were then the principal focus of attention, but, before American troops could be sent to the islands, the approval of the Netherlands Government was desirable, arrangements with the local authorities for the arrival of the troops were necessary, and provision for the departure of the British had to be made. All this took time. It was not until the end of January that these

14 On the Caribbean theater operations plan of December 1941, see historical monograph by the Hist Sec, CDC, War Plans and Defense Measures, pp. 33-59.
15 Rad, GHQ to CG, CDC, 11 Dec 41, GHQ G-3 file, Corresp With CDC.
preliminary details were finally disposed of. On 26 January 1942 the War Department informed General Andrews that the Netherlands Government had agreed to entrust the defense of the islands to American troops. Two days later, Col. Peter C. Bullard, commanding officer of the designated forces, and his staff, arrived at Curaçao to make the necessary arrangements for the landing. Had it not been for some dissatisfaction on the part of the Dutch over command arrangements in the Far East and their unwillingness to permit Venezuelan participation in the defense of Aruba and Curaçao, and for some reluctance on the part of the United States Government to press the issue until after the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Foreign Ministers, faster progress might have been made.

Meanwhile, in mid-January six A-20 light bombers were stationed, with the permission of the Netherlands Government, on the two islands. Some question had arisen whether the islands were within the Panama Coastal Frontier and thus under General Andrews' jurisdiction or within the Caribbean Coastal Frontier and under Admiral Hoover. The 1940 Joint Army and Navy plan for the defense of the Panama Canal had included both Aruba and Curaçao in the Panama Coastal Frontier; but the boundaries established by the RAINBOW 5 plan, under which General Andrews was now operating, clearly placed them within the limits of the Caribbean Coastal Frontier. Both Admiral Hoover and General Andrews, without informing each other, made arrangements to send planes to the islands. An embarrassing situation was averted only by a narrow margin when an information copy of an order of Admiral Hoover was received by the Puerto Rican Department and forwarded by it to General Andrews' headquarters.

The ground troops, to the number of about 2,300 men, sailed from New Orleans for Aruba and Curaçao on 6 February and arrived at the islands on 11 February. The British garrison, about 1,400 strong, departed three days later. Before the American forces had their guns and searchlights ready, the enemy struck and won, as at Pearl Harbor, an initial victory.

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17 Illustrative maps are in CDC Monograph, Army and Navy Boundaries of the Caribbean Defense Command, ff. pp. 7, 8, 25, 33, 45.

18 Memo, CofS for USW, 10 Jan 42, OCS 21358-2; Ltr, Adm Hoover to Adm Stark, CNO, 7 Jan 42, AG 320.2 (9-23-41); Ltr, Gen Andrews to Gen McNair, 15 Jan 42, WPD 4452-19; Memo, G-2 for CofS, 26 Jan 42, WPD 4440-25.
Shaping the Local Commands

The dispatch of American troops to Aruba, Curaçao, and Surinam, and the entry of the United States into the war as an associate of Great Britain and the Netherlands, raised a problem of command relationships not only between the Army and the Navy, but also between the United States and its allies. A unique feature of the situation in the Caribbean was the fact that the over-all command was strictly unilateral, while several of the subsidiary commands were combined commands. In Trinidad and in Jamaica an Anglo-American headquarters was set up; in Aruba and Curaçao there was a combined Dutch-American headquarters.

Conversations between representatives of the War Department and members of the British Military Mission in Washington had been held during the late spring and early summer of 1941 on the subject of co-ordinating local defense measures in the British colonies where the new United States bases were located. Because the United States was not a belligerent, this subject had not been included in the base agreement of March 1941, but the dispatch of American garrisons during the ensuing months seemed to make some arrangement essential.19 There were a number of complicating factors, among them the special relationship between the colonial Governors and the military forces of the colony, the matter of offshore air and naval patrols, and the question of who should command. The authority of the colonial Governors was clarified by a British statement, later incorporated into the final agreement, to the effect that, although bearing the title of commander in chief, the Governor was not vested with command authority except on special appointment from the King, and thus he was not entitled to take the immediate direction of military operations.20 Agreement on the remaining points was soon reached, and the whole signed in final form on 30 August 1941.21

On the salient point, it was agreed that unity of command of the forces of both powers would be established either on instructions from the two governments in the event of an attack on the territory, or as soon as the "Associated Powers" became "mutually associated in a war against a common enemy." The nationality of the officer exercising unity of command would be determined generally by the strengths of the forces involved and

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19 Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Apr 41, WPD 4351-100.
20 Note submitted by British delegation to the Jt U.S.-British Committee on Coordination, 20 Jul 41, WPD 4351-100.
21 Memo, WPD for CofS, 31 Jul 41, WPD 4351-100; Text of the agreement in TBC, Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, III, app. A.
the tactical or strategic importance to the respective powers of the locality concerned. Specifically it was agreed that the American commander at Bermuda, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana would exercise command over the combined forces, subject to a review of the situation at any time at the request of either government.22

Co-ordination was provided for through the medium of a Local Combined Defense Committee to consist of the colonial Governor, as chairman and convening authority, the senior officers of the American and British military and naval forces, and whatever other local authorities might be necessary as advisers. The actual preparation of a co-ordinated local defense plan for all the combatant services—American and British—was to be the task of a Local Joint Military Defense Subcommittee, presided over by the commander of the Combined Local Defense Forces, i.e., the commander of the American forces. The several military defense plans prepared by the subcommittee and the civil defense plans prepared by the colonial authorities were to be co-ordinated into a combined defense plan by the Local Combined Defense Committee.23

The agreement was approved by the Joint Board on 19 September. After minor revisions were made it was approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy and sent to the President on 1 December. When the attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war, President Roosevelt, on 12 December 1941, gave his approval to the agreement.24

Meanwhile, in Trinidad the co-ordination of local defense measures had been informally explored in conversations between the British commander, Brigadier J. F. Barrington, and representatives of General Talbot’s planning staff. The Governor, Sir Hubert Young, wished to bring the discussions into the framework of existing machinery and suggested several times that a U.S. Army representative be appointed to the local defense committee through which he, as Governor, exercised his responsibility for the defense of the colony. To General Talbot these proposals seemed to involve a surrender of authority on his part, which he was unable to accept; as a result there was no formal co-ordination of defense plans until after the United States entered the war.25

22 Articles 17, 20, 21 of the agreement of 30 Aug 41, cited in preceding note.
23 Articles 5–9 of the agreement of 30 Aug 41, cited above.
25 Ltr, Gen Talbot to Gov Young, 21 Aug 41; Ltr, Gen Talbot to CG CDC, 28 Aug 41. Both in WPD 4351–20.
On 16 December Governor Young received a telegram from the Colonial Office informing him of the agreement that President Roosevelt had approved four days earlier. In accordance with the provisions of the agreement the Governor called a meeting of the Local Combined Defense Committee on 20 December, for the purpose of discussing the scale of attack for which preparations would have to be made and of deciding upon the composition of the two committees. A second meeting was held on 3 January. As for the scale of attack, it was generally agreed that the only thing to do was "to guard against the possibilities outlined by higher authority with the forces available," and that if the turn of events increased the possibilities "higher authority would decide whether or not to make further provision against them." As for the composition of the Local Combined Defense Committee, it was decided that the colonial secretary and the American consul should be members, in addition to the Governor and the military and naval commanders as provided in the basic agreement. The Local Joint Military Defense Subcommittee was to consist of General Talbot, chairman, the British military and naval commanders, the commandant of the United States Naval Base, and a representative of the Caribbean Air Force (USAAC). The question arose during the first meeting whether the Combined Defense Committee or the Joint Military Defense Subcommittee should prepare the initial draft of the co-ordinated military-civil defense plan. There was general agreement that the actual drafting should be done by the military subcommittee, that the plan should then be submitted to the Combined Defense Committee for approval, and that any points of difference arising in the military subcommittee should be referred to the Combined Defense Committee for resolution. On this last point the instructions received by General Talbot and Governor Young were perhaps none too clear. The intent, as General Andrews who was then in Trinidad pointed out, had apparently been to have a joint advisory board to which both the Combined Defense Committee and the military subcommittee would submit any differences; but General Talbot and Governor Young both agreed that any differences of opinion arising in the Joint Military Defense Committee would be submitted to the Combined Defense Committee before they were referred to higher British and United States authorities. With these organizational preliminaries out of the way, the business of preparing

26 Min, Local Combined Def Comm Mtg, 3 Jan 42; par. 11, TBC, Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, III, app. C.
27 In addition to Min, Local Combined Def Comm, Mtg, 3 Jan 42, see also Min, Mtg, 20 Dec 41; ibid., app. B.
the various joint plans—port security, air raids precaution, medical, censorship, antiaircraft defense, et cetera—was parceled out to the appropriate authorities. To General Talbot was allocated the responsibility for planning the machinery by which operational intelligence and military facilities could be mutually exchanged between the two powers.

Although the measure of co-operation between the American forces and the government of the colony in the month following the attack on Pearl Harbor was high, the previous difficulties had left a permanent scar. General Andrews, during his visit in Trinidad, had been much concerned about the situation and had come to the conclusion that it required an officer of higher rank and more diplomatic experience than General Talbot.  

But all the rank of the Archangel Michael and the wisdom of Solomon would have been of no avail to the American commander without a will to co-operate on the part of the Governor. Whether the fact of association with Great Britain in the war would have produced complete co-operation in Trinidad was not really put to test, for it was decided to make a fresh start. Early in January 1942 Maj. Gen. Henry C. Pratt assumed command of the Trinidad Base Command, and not long afterwards a change of Governors took place. By the beginning of April, when Under Secretary of War Patterson made an inspection trip to the Caribbean, the atmosphere was noticeably clearer.

Most of the machinery of collaboration set up in the weeks immediately after the entry of the United States into the war was working full blast by the first of June. The first joint defense plans had been turned out. A Joint Operations Center, the kingpin of the system, had been organized. In effect the Joint Operations Center was the command post of the commander of the Combined Local Defense Forces, the instrument by which his orders were transmitted to the subordinate commands. Through control officers representing the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, he exercised operational control and maintained liaison with the headquarters of the British forces.

The only British island, other than Trinidad, that had any sizable local defense forces was Jamaica, where a Canadian infantry battalion had been on guard since early in the war. The American garrison was outnumbered, and its commander outranked, and for this reason it had been decided in January 1942 that the brigadier commanding the Canadian and British troops should exercise command over the Combined Local Defense Forces "until such time as the strength and composition of the United States gar-

28 Corresp relating to General Pratt's appointment in OCS 21042-48/50.
29 Memo, USW for SW, 8 Apr 42, WDCSA-CDC.
30 TBC, Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, III, 49-51, app. D.
rison . . . warranted the assumption of command by an appropriate United States Army officer." The arrangement satisfied neither Admiral Hoover nor the American commander in Jamaica. By October 1942 reinforcements had raised the strength of the American garrison to a level that was perhaps slightly higher than that of the British and Canadian forces, and to Admiral Hoover it seemed time to raise the question of command. He had received a report from Col. Earl C. Ewert, the local American commander, which related difficulties in organizing combined field exercises, and which expressed a fear that the British were proposing to place the local police and the volunteer militia in the same category as regular troops. This would more than double the actual British-Canadian forces. Colonel Ewert further reported that there was a plan on foot to raise the rank of the British commander to that of major general. Colonel Ewert's and Admiral Hoover's concern about the command situation in Jamaica was not shared by the War Department, whose position was that the original circumstances had not changed sufficiently to warrant a change in command. The Navy Department agreed that a change was undesirable at this particular time in view of the possibility of labor disturbances on the island. Admiral Hoover, although not persuaded that a shift of command was unwarranted, concurred in the view that it would be impolitic to make one just then. The United States had now been at war a full year, and the American garrisons in the Caribbean were at their peak strength. After December 1942 the contraction began. It was at first almost imperceptible, and in fact a few of the smaller garrisons, including the one at Jamaica, were increased slightly in the early months of 1943; but by June 1943 the reduction of the Jamaica garrison was well under way. The command arrangements continued unchanged until the end of the war.

The formula by which the question of command in the British colonies had been decided, namely, the relative strength of the respective forces and the strategic importance of the place, was not similarly employed in the initial negotiations with the Netherlands Government over the defense of Aruba and Curaçao. That it could be used and would operate to give command of the combined defense forces to the United States was no doubt the reason why the Netherlands Government wished to set the number and com-

33 OPD D/F 3 Dec 42, sub: Unity of Commd in CDC, with Note for Red, ibid., case 17.
position of the American garrison. In transmitting his government's formal request that an American garrison be sent, the Netherlands Minister had written to Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles that "the number and the composition of the necessary troops will be communicated by the Netherlands Government in due course," and he had further pointed out that "the British troops [who were being relieved by the Americans] were present in the islands as an allied force, the costs of which were borne by the British authorities while they were placed under the command of the Dutch military commander in Curaçao acting under the supreme command of the Governor. . . ." The Netherlands Government, he concluded, presumed that the same arrangement would be kept with respect to the American forces. The only point to which the American Government took exception was that concerning the size and composition of the force. Decision in this regard was considered to be a matter for determination by consultation between the two governments and not by the Netherlands Government alone. The American forces that landed in Aruba and Curaçao on 11 February 1942 were not, however, placed under the Dutch military commander. Colonel Bullard's instructions were merely to co-operate closely with the Governor and to act under his general supervision, provided he could do so without jeopardizing the success of his mission. Then came the U-boat assault against Aruba and the tanker route from Maracaibo. Unity of command under an officer of the United States Navy was one of the first measures that Admiral Hoover suggested after the attack, but his suggestion ran afoul of General Andrews' insistence that command be vested in an Army officer. At the same time the State Department began pressing the Netherlands Government for unified command of all Dutch and American forces under an American officer. Agreement on the matter was finally reached at the end of March when the Netherlands Government accepted Rear Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf, USN, as supreme commander of all forces in the Aruba-Curaçao area. Admiral Oldendorf, who had been placed in command of all American forces in the area earlier in the month, now organized a joint staff with Captain Van Asbeck, the local Dutch commander, as his chief of staff. For purposes of operations the Dutch forces would be commanded by their own officers, under Admiral Oldendorf, who was in

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34 Ltr, Dr. A. Loudon, Netherlands Minister, to Under Secy State Welles, 6 Jan 42, WPD 4577-10.
35 Ltr, Under Secy Welles to Netherlands Minister, 7 Jan 42, WPD 4577-10.
36 Hist Sec, CDC, Bases in . . . Aruba and Curaçao, pp. 21, 33-35.
turn under Admiral Hoover, commander of the Caribbean Sea Frontier. The constitutional position of the Dutch colonial Governor was recognized and nominally upheld by considering Admiral Oldendorf’s orders as being given under the authority of the Governor. Once established, the command arrangements in Aruba and Curaçao appear to have been satisfactory to all concerned. They were maintained, apparently without friction, for the duration of the war.

In Surinam, the Dutch colony on the South American mainland, where American troops had arrived early in December 1941, no arrangement for combining all forces under one command was made. When General Talbot, immediately after the troops arrived, directed the commanding officer to assume command of all forces in the colony, the Governor, who had taken a dim view of the proceedings from the very start, was unreservedly and justifiably indignant. General Andrews and the War Department moved quickly and almost simultaneously to countermand the order. The incident seemed to point to the need for an agreement on the subject, and on 22 December Secretary Stimson asked the State Department to negotiate one by which unity of command over all forces in Surinam would be vested in the senior U.S. Army officer present. But discussions with the Government of the Netherlands over the question of sending troops to Aruba and Curaçao were now in full swing, and until an agreement on this score was reached it appeared desirable to postpone the question of command in Surinam. As soon as the American forces had landed in Aruba and Curaçao, Secretary Stimson again brought up the question of command. The ensuing negotiations resulted only in the agreement respecting the two islands.

In Surinam the relationship between the Dutch and American forces continued to rest on "mutual cooperation." The local colonial forces, which were the principal element in the command problem, played, for the most part, a very minor role in the war. Their opportunity would have come had the enemy attempted to land or perhaps attack by air; but nothing of this sort took place.

88 Hist Sec, CDC, Bases in . . . Aruba and Curaçao, p. 38.
89 Hist Sec, CDC, Entry of United States [troops] into Surinam, pp. 29–30.
90 Memo, WPD for CofS, 19 Feb 42; Memo, SW for Secy State, 19 Feb 42. Both in WPD 4580–49.
The First Blow

The battle of the Caribbean, heralded by the attack at Aruba, took the form of a sustained and extremely damaging U-boat assault against shipping. Its first victims were five tankers—four of them British ships and the other a Venezuelan—that were torpedoed and sunk during the early morning hours of 16 February 1942. Insult was added by the fact that two of the ships were sent down while lying at anchor in San Nicolas harbor, Aruba, by a U-boat that entered the anchorage, sank the two tankers, then came boldly to the surface and lobbed a few shells at the Lago oil refinery. Fifteen or twenty minutes after the attack, a guard at the airfield, about ten miles away, reported that a fire had broken out at the refinery, and the air commander immediately placed his unit on the alert. Ten minutes later a plane was sent up to reconnoiter. It reported ships on fire in the harbor and oil burning on the water, although nothing about gunfire or submarines. Shortly afterwards, the airfield received a request for an air patrol over the refinery area until daylight; but still no indication was given that hostile action had taken place or might be impending. An hour and a half after the attack the first report of U-boat activity reached the commander of the air unit. An antisubmarine patrol was instituted at once. While the planes were investigating a questionable contact forty-five miles off the island, an American tanker that was tied up at the Eagle refinery dock, only four miles from the airfield, was torpedoed and severely damaged. Reinforcements amounting to six additional planes soon arrived from Puerto Rico and Trinidad, and patrols were extended to cover the tanker route between Aruba and Maracaibo. During the next two days at least seven U-boats were reported sighted in the vicinity, one of them not more than four hundred yards off the airfield. Five of them, according to the air unit's reports, were attacked by the planes; but without radar, with crews untrained in antisubmarine warfare, and armed only with 300-lb. demolition bombs, the planes had little luck against the wily U-boats. Possibly the mere presence of the planes forced the submarines to a more cautious approach than they would otherwise have made, for General Andrews, who was making an inspection tour of the Caribbean and happened to be in Aruba during the attack, wrote to General Marshall that "it was fortunate that we had airplanes there, otherwise the oil plants would have been in for a good shelling."  

Actually only three U-boats were responsible for all the havoc, and a

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41 Quoted in Memo, CofS for Admiral Stark, 24 Feb 42, OCS 21203–45.
prematurely exploding shell in the deck gun of U-156, which seriously wounded two of the crew and forced the raider to retire, was of greater good fortune to the oil refineries of Aruba than the presence of American planes. When one of the other U-boats attempted to shell the oil installations the following night, Aruba was completely blacked out. This and the air and surface patrols during the day made further shelling of land targets impossible. Two attempts on the part of the third U-boat to shell Curaçao were frustrated by naval patrol vessels. The primary object, however, was to destroy shipping, and in this the operation was an unqualified success. Reinforced during the next two or three days by the arrival of two more U-boats, the German raiders sank 21 ships totaling about 103,000 tons in the space of two weeks. Losses to the shallow-draft Maracaibo tanker fleet seriously cut the oil production of the huge refineries on Aruba and Curaçao. The onslaught reached a new peak in May, when eight U-boats sank 35 ships totalling more than 145,000 tons in the Caribbean Sea Frontier west of the shipping control line. In June there were 14 undersea raiders operating in the entire Caribbean Sea Frontier and the adjacent waters of the Gulf and Panama Sea Frontiers. By the middle of the month, 22 percent of the bauxite fleet had been destroyed, 20 percent of the ships in the Puerto Rican run had been lost, and of 74 vessels allocated to the Army for the month of July, 17 had already been sunk. By the end of the year 1942 the enemy had sunk in the Caribbean, in the Atlantic sector of the Panama Sea Frontier, and in the nearby fringes of the Gulf Sea Frontier, a total of 270 vessels, comprising more than 1,200,000 tons of shipping.\footnote{B.d.U. War Logs, 1 Jan 42–30 Jun 42; Memo, Gen Marshall for Admiral King, 19 Jun 42, quoted in Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1952) p. 455; CDC Monograph, Antisubmarine Activities in the Caribbean Defense Command 1941–46, pp. 37–43, 52, app. B. Losses in the Gulf Sea Frontier south and east of a line from Cape Sable, Fla., to Veracruz, Mexico, have been included. Although the Caribbean Sea Frontier had actually no eastern boundary short of the midocean strategic limits, a line, for the purpose of controlling shipping, was established from 65° west, 25° north, to 50° 20' west, 4° 20' north; and all losses east of this line, as well as sailing vessels lost, are excluded from the above totals. See Table 5. Shipping Losses in the Caribbean Area, January 1942–July 1944.}

The Watch on the Canal

Although General Andrews recognized the U-boat campaign as "a definite menace to our war effort," he considered the canal to be "the one real enemy objective" and its protection to be his "paramount mission." Although he was somewhat concerned about the possibility of German surface
raiders penetrating the Caribbean, he was more than ever convinced that the principal threat was by carrier-borne aircraft from the Pacific.43

The means for detecting an enemy carrier force before it launched its planes and for sighting the enemy planes before they reached the canal were the nerve center of the Panama defenses. Patrol planes, operating at about the 900-mile radius, were depended upon for the initial warning of an enemy's approach. Long-range radar (the SCR–271 and its mobile version, the SCR–270) was relied upon for the detection of enemy planes at distances up to about 150 miles. Still closer-in, the fixed antiaircraft defenses relied upon short-range, height-finding radar (SCR–268) for searchlight and fire control.

43 Ltr, Gen Andrews to Col Deane, SGS, 8 Apr 42, WDCA 381; Memo, DCoS for Air for G–2, 10 Feb 42, OCS 21547–72; Ltr, Mr. W. Watson-Watt to Lt Col Eugene L. Harrison, 28-Mar 42, Stimson file, ASV.
At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack serious deficiencies existed in the warning and detection system. There were not enough planes and operating bases to carry out the search as planned. There were only two SCR–271 radars in operation, one at each end of the Canal. Although three additional sets arrived by the end of December and were being installed on the Pacific side of the Isthmus, the work was slowed down by a shortage of trained radar engineers and mechanics. There was as yet no airborne equipment for surface vessel detection (ASV) in use and about one-fourth of the 3-inch antiaircraft batteries were without SCR–268 sets.\footnote{44\textsuperscript{4} Rpt by ASN for Air, quoted in Memo, G–2 for GHQ and WPD, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4452–20. Hist Sec, CDC, Communications and Radar in . . . the Caribbean Defense Command, in OCMH, p. 73; see also above, pp. 345–46.} Well aware of the situation, the War Department on 22 December gave General Andrews broad authority "to sub-allot funds and take such other action as is necessary for the construction and installation of AWS Detector Stations, Filter Centers and Information Centers . . . ." to the full extent of the requirements as determined by General Andrews.\footnote{45\textsuperscript{5} Ltr, CofAAF to TAG, 22 Dec 41, OCS 21203–26.}

There were nevertheless certain deficiencies which were not entirely the result of a shortage of equipment and trained men. Tests in Panama repeatedly disclosed that low-flying planes approaching directly over the Bay of Panama were not detected by the radar system. Visiting British experts had noted this characteristic in American sets and attributed it to a basic defect of the equipment, but the Signal Corps insisted that, properly placed and operated by competent crews, the American equipment in this respect was just as good as, if not better than, the British radar. Whatever the cause, the blind spot remained. Furthermore, neither the SCR–270 nor the SCR–271 was designed to show the elevation of the approaching plane, and neither gave a continuous tracking plot. These qualities were indispensable for ground-controlled interception (GCI), which British experience had demonstrated to be the most successful method for conducting an air defense.\footnote{46\textsuperscript{6} For a detailed discussion of radar problems, see Thompson et al., Signal Corps: The Test, ch III.}

Much of the construction activity in Panama during these early months of 1942 was devoted to the preparation of sites for additional radar equipment, to the building of access roads, and the construction, at some of the sites, of landing strips. A number of SCR–268 sets were converted for use against low-flying planes, and a proposal was studied to establish picket patrol boats off the coast for visual sighting. Meanwhile, at the suggestion
of Mr. Watson-Watt of the British Air Commission, Secretary Stimson had taken steps to obtain special low-angle equipment (British CHL [Chain Home Low] radar) from Canada and had personally requested the Canadian Minister of Defense to give first priority to four sets for the defense of the Canal. This the Canadian Government promised to do. The sets were scheduled for delivery in Panama during March and early April.47 At the request of Secretary Stimson, Mr. Watson-Watt, after inspecting the radar defenses of the west coast, undertook to survey the situation in Panama.

The report submitted by Mr. Watson-Watt was as unfavorably critical as the one he had made a few weeks earlier on the west coast situation, and it aroused much the same reaction. Since he viewed things in the light of British developments in ground-controlled interception, it was inevitable that Mr. Watson-Watt should find the SCR–271 and SCR–270 to be very poor instruments, operated by untrained and apathetic crews. He recommended that both models be replaced as soon as possible with Canadian CHL sets.48 His major point, one of such importance that he reiterated it in a separate, personal memorandum for Secretary Stimson, was the necessity for equipping the long-range air patrols with ASV (air-to-surface vessel [radar]) sets. This, he stated in his note for Mr. Stimson, was "one contribution to the air defense of the Panama Canal so outstanding in importance, urgency and early practicability that it transcends all others. . . ."

Since Christmas Day 1941, Mr. Watson-Watt continued, ASV equipment had reached the United States from Canadian factories at the rate of 15 to 20 sets a day, and more than 500 officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps had been trained in its operation in Canadian schools. "In these circumstances," he concluded, "the complete absence of so much as one installation . . . can only be due to the fundamental failure to visualize the complete transformation which these equipments can work in carrier search."49 Although the actual deliveries to the Army of Canadian ASV sets were far from the figures cited by Mr. Watson-Watt, nevertheless there were indications that the full potentialities of ASV had not yet been appreciated.50

47 Ltr, SW to J. L. Ralston, Minister of National Defense, Ottawa, 13 Feb 42, OCS 21203–37; Memo, Col Sherrill for Gen Eisenhower, 24 Feb 42, WPD 4186–23.
48 Digest of Rpt in app. 1 Hist Div, CDC monograph, Communications and Radar in . . . CDC.
49 Memo, Mr. Watson-Watt for SW Stimson, by Ltr to Col Harrison, 28 Mar 42, Stimson file, ASV.
In mid-March, immediately after Mr. Watson-Watt made his report, Secretary Stimson himself went to Panama. He returned convinced that the radar defenses of the Canal, particularly ASV equipment, were of the highest priority. Persuaded that without ASV the air patrol would be of very little value and that with ASV the number of planes needed for patrol purposes could be substantially reduced, Secretary Stimson on his return gave “a considerable stimulus to the varied elements of the new defense system.”

Mr. Stimson’s prodding, the efforts of the Signal Corps and Air Forces, construction activity in Panama, and mounting production of radar equipment began to have a cumulative effect. By 1 May, ten long-range detectors (SCR-270 and SCR-271) were in operation in the vicinity of the canal, two were being installed, and another would be available after reconditioning. Six SCR-268 sets had been modified for GCI application and were in operation. Two of the Canadian CHL sets were being installed, and the other two were either on hand or en route. Two other British GCI sets were expected, but the delivery date had not been set. In addition, there was an SCR-270 in operation at Salinas and four SCR-271’s were to be shipped to the Galápagos base during the next six or eight weeks.

By the midsummer of 1942 the equipment situation had been brought fairly well under control. The production and installation of ASV sets would have been taken off the Signal Corps’ critical list except for the fact that the equipment had no sooner been placed in the hands of the Air Forces than it became obsolete as a result of the development of microwave ASV. Nevertheless, a shortage, not so much of equipment as of trained operators and maintenance crews, continued to hamper the build-up of the antiaircraft defenses in Panama; and in spite of more and better equipment and more expert, scientific placing of the sets there still remained a blind spot at low altitudes over the Bay of Panama. This blind spot was not corrected until the end of the year. Furthermore, the special equipment for ground control of interception had been slow to arrive. The first two sets were not installed until September and did not begin operating until the following month.

51 Stimson Diary, entries of 11 Mar 42 and 16 Mar 42; Memo, President Roosevelt for SW, 16 Mar 42. Stimson file, White House; Ltr, SW to Gen Andrews, 17 Mar 42. SW file, Panama 351; Gen Council Min, 24 Mar 42. The quotation is from Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 407.
52 6th Ind, Hq AAF to CG CDC, 1 May 42, to Ltr, Hq Caribbean AF to CG CDC, 30 Jan 42, AG 320.2 (3–5–41) (A).
53 Thompson et al., Signal Corps: The Test, ch. IX; Hist Sec, CDC, Communications and Radar in... CDC, p. 152.
Until then, "all interceptions were made either by air alerted patrols near the canal or by dead reckoning the fighter into the filtered radar tracks."^54

During all these months the air and naval forces had been engaged in combat with the U-boats in the Caribbean. Although ASV equipment had become available by the end of June to the planes that were seeking out and giving battle to the submarines, plans for sealing the gaps in the Antilles screen by installing ground radar on the islands progressed more slowly.^55 The inescapable conclusion is that the spotlight which fell on Panama in 1942 had its source in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, not in the U-boat assault in the Caribbean.

*The War Against the U-Boat*

The Army's unpreparedness for the submarine assault that actually materialized was not entirely owing to a shortage of long-range bombers for seeking out and destroying enemy U-boats, although this was part of the reason. Partly to blame also was the reluctance of air officers to employ their bombers in this fashion. The Navy, which was just as reluctantly coming around to the opinion that escort of convoy was the only successful way of handling the submarine menace, was equally unprepared. Both elements of an ideal escort force—ships for surface escort and planes for air coverage—were lacking; and the Army, which had the planes, was unwilling to use them for convoy escort and patrol under Navy command.

For one reason or another the air strength available at any one time for antisubmarine operations in the Caribbean, or even the total strength actually on hand, is not a matter of clear record. From War Department records it would appear that in April 1942 there were on hand in the vast region bounded by Salinas on the coast of Ecuador, the Galápagos Islands, Guatemala City, Guantánamo, the island of Puerto Rico, and Zanderij Field in Surinam, a total of 28 heavy bombers (15 of them equipped with ASV radar), 30 medium bombers, 16 light bombers, and 34 PBY patrol bombers—in addition to pursuit planes.^56 For the protection of the Atlantic Sec-

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^54 Ibid., pp. 152-53, 161, and for the quotation, p. 157.

^55 Ibid., pp. 149, 158. TBC, Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, III, 797-92; ibid., IV, 36-37; Hist Div, CDC, Antisubmarine Activities in CDC, pp. 62, 64, 109; Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, pp. 153-54.

^56 Memo, Brig Gen Thomas T. Handy (OPD) for CNO, 24 Apr 42, WPD 3558-26. Records of the Antilles Air Task Force (USAF, History of Antilles Air Command 1940-1945, OCMH, pp. 63-64, 67), which comprised all tactical air units in the Caribbean Sea Frontier, show the following deployment of units available for antisubmarine operations:
tor of the Panama Sea Frontier there were the bombers of the Sixth Air Force in Panama; but the Sixth Air Force was committed to the principle of a striking force, a principle which was not strictly consonant with the developing doctrine of antisubmarine operations. The Sixth Air Force had also taken on most of the task of patrolling the Pacific approaches to the Canal and was reluctant to spare more than a few bombers for antisubmarine operations on the Atlantic side. In mid-June, at the height of the U-boat blitz, ten Army bombers were shifted into the Atlantic sector of the frontier, where they were joined by the twenty-four Catalinas (PBY's) of Navy Patrol Wing 3; but this move took place only after all four squadrons of the 40th Bombardment Group were transferred from Puerto Rico to Panama.\(^57\)

During the summer and early fall of 1942 the antisubmarine forces received substantial reinforcements. Although the Navy withdrew some of its PBY's to buttress the defenses of Alaska when the Japanese invaded the Aleutians, sufficient air and surface craft were assembled in the Panama-Caribbean area to organize a convoy system in July. In August a Royal Air Force (RAF) squadron arrived at Trinidad and immediately proved a welcome addition. By the end of September, according to War Department calculations, there were in the whole area a total of 44 heavy bombers, 65 medium bombers, 22 light bombers, and 105 observation planes plus Navy Catalinas and RAF Hudsons.\(^58\)

After the first encounters in February 1942, there had been few contacts between bombers and U-boats until June, when planes—Army and Navy—

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\(^57\) Ibid., p. 49; Morison, *Battle of the Atlantic*, pp. 152–53.

\(^58\) OPD Weekly Status Map, 1 Oct 42.
### Table 5—Shipping Losses in the Caribbean Area

**January 1942—July 1944**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Caribbean S.F. (West)</th>
<th>Caribbean S.F. (East)</th>
<th>Panama S.F. (Atlantic Sector)</th>
<th>Gulf S.F. (South-East)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>118,354</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>103,929</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>99,481</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>82,073</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>255,143</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>145,652</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>241,368</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>136,424</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>314,562</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>136,424</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>132,110</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>82,240</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>241,368</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>161,921</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>133,450</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>103,003</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65,927</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30,459</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>149,077</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>103,508</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49,950</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24,181</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1,559,422</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>973,390</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The boundary between the western and eastern portions of the Caribbean Sea Frontier is the shipping control line from 65° W, 25°N to 50°20'W, 4°20'N.
2. Only that portion of the Gulf Sea Frontier lying south and east of a line drawn from Cape Sable, Fla., to Veracruz, Mex., is included.
3. Not shown in source document.

*Sources: CDC Hist Sect, Anti-Submarine Activities in the CDC, 1941—46, Appendix B.*
of the Panama Sea Frontier joined surface forces in a wild chase after one of the German submarines that was causing so much trouble off the Atlantic entrance to the Canal. Three other U-boats were attacked by Army planes in June. But in the same month shipping losses reached a dismal high: 29 vessels totaling 136,400 tons in the Caribbean, 13 in the Atlantic sector of the Panama Sea Frontier, and 16 in the adjacent margins of the Gulf Sea Frontier. Most of the sinkings took place in the waters around Trinidad or in the approaches to the Canal, but no air attacks against U-boats were recorded in the Trinidad area and only one in the vicinity of the Canal.\(^{59}\) In July air units in the Caribbean reported ten or a dozen attacks against U-boats. None of the attacks ended with a kill. Few of them, indeed, resulted in damage; but the number of ships lost to submarines in July was perceptibly lower. In August, Army, Navy and RAF planes delivered at least 18 at-
tacks against the marauders, and on 22 August the air forces chalked up their first score. The victim was U-654, caught and sunk off Colón by planes of the 45th Bombardment Squadron. But in August the U-boats were again taking a heavy toll of shipping, chiefly in the vicinity of Trinidad and east of the Windward Islands. In the Caribbean, west of the shipping control line, the same number of ships were lost in August as in June; in tonnage, the losses were the highest yet. East of the line, 15 ships totaling 76,800 tons were sunk. During the next month, September, losses continued to run high in the mid-Caribbean area, west of the shipping control line, and Army pilots reported only eight air attacks against U-boats in the entire Sea Frontier; but in the marginal areas shipping losses declined.

Despite their successes, the U-boats were not having things all their own way. In addition to U-654, five others had failed to return from raids in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Reports reaching Admiral Karl Doenitz from his U-boat commanders began to note the danger from fast, land-based aircraft and from numerous patrol vessels, which made it necessary for the U-boats to remain submerged during much of the day, with a consequent heavy strain on the crews. The U-boats, furthermore, did not like the convoy system; their favorite victims were lone, defenseless ships. As a result, Admiral Doenitz decided to pull most of the U-boats out of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico and to concentrate instead on the area east of Trinidad, where convoys had not yet been reported, where air activity was considerably less, and where surface patrols had been only recently observed for the first time. In October, for the first time in six months, not a single vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine in the Gulf and Panama Sea Frontiers. Losses throughout the Caribbean area were the lowest in six months; in the western portion of the Caribbean Sea Frontier they were the lowest since the beginning of the blitz in February.

The cyclical pattern of the U-boat assault had already manifested itself. That the October lull would be followed by renewed activity was expected, but it was impossible to foretell precisely how high the new peak would reach. November began inauspiciously. On the very first day of the month a ship was sunk on the extreme eastern edge of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, about six hundred miles west of the Cape Verde Islands. Then the U-boats began closing in on the eastern approaches to Trinidad, and, before the first week of November was over, eleven more ships had gone down. The indications were that the grievous blows of May and June would be repeated.

60 Situation reports in B.d.U. War Logs, Aug-Sep 42.
Meanwhile, three weeks had gone by without a single counterattack by Army airmen. At last, on 8 November, a plane of the 10th Bombardment Squadron discovered and bombed a U-boat in the vicinity of Trinidad. The pilot reported that minor damage had been done to the submarine. Several days later a bomber from Curacao spotted and attacked another U-boat. Although these were the only attacks reported by Army planes in November, Navy PBY's and the RAF bombers made five other attacks, while surface craft were responsible for an additional four.\textsuperscript{61}

The biggest event of the month, one that had an important effect on the Battle of the Caribbean, was the landing of American troops in North Africa on 8 November. German submarines began concentrating off the shores of Morocco and along the convoy routes to Africa, and the assault in the Caribbean began to subside. In December only 10 vessels totaling about 50,000 tons were sunk in the Caribbean Sea Frontier. In no subsequent month did the score ever again reach that figure.\textsuperscript{62} Looking back from the vantage point of the historian, it can be seen that November 1942 marked a real turning point, although at the time not even the most optimistic observer could have said that the end was in sight.

In no other phase of the war did the conflict of instrument employed versus the element in which it was employed and the ancient tug of theater versus function, as the basis for command, produce more sound and fury. Although the stress and strain of it primarily affected the upper levels of the War and Navy Departments, the local commanders and local operations could not entirely escape. Within two weeks after command of the Caribbean was turned over to the Navy, the matter of reinforcements and their control had become a problem, and the question later became confused when the need of air reinforcements to meet the U-boat attack arose. From time to time during 1942 elements of four different Army Air Forces organizations were dispatched to the Caribbean to reinforce the Antilles Air Command, but because of the command situation each of them was retained under the control of its parent organization.\textsuperscript{63}

It was something of a paradox that the organizational confusion resulted in the first instance from the fact that the Navy and the Army Air Forces

\textsuperscript{61} USAF, Hist of Antilles Air Comd, p. 81; Hist Div, CDC, Antisubmarine Activities in CDC, p. 69.


\textsuperscript{63} On this subject, see Memo, CofS CDC to CG FF, 30 Dec 41, GHQ G–3 file, Corresp With CDC; USAF, The Antisubmarine Command, Apr 45, OCMH, p. 139; Craven and Cate, eds., \textit{Plans and Early Operations}, p. 537.
held almost identical theories of organizing antisubmarine forces, namely, on a functional, or task, basis rather than an area basis. In order to give sea-based aviation the flexibility and mobility required for its effective employment, the Navy had made it part of the fleet instead of placing it under the control of local "area" commanders who might have been reluctant to give up forces specifically assigned to the defense of the area—whether naval district or sea frontier. To minimize the pull of local commander and fleet commander, resort was frequently had to the practice of issuing two, and sometimes three, hats to the same individual. Thus, Admiral Hoover was not only Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier, and Commandant, Tenth Naval District, but also Commander, Task Group 6.3, of the Atlantic Fleet Patrol Force. In his capacity as task group commander under the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and not as sea frontier commander, Admiral Hoover had command of the Navy patrol bombers that fought the U-boats in the Caribbean. On the other hand, it was as commander of the Caribbean Sea Frontier that he exercised unity of command in the area, and Army planes under his control in that capacity could only with extreme difficulty be moved elsewhere. Much the same situation prevailed along the eastern seaboard, where Army planes were placed under the control of the Sea Frontier commander. As a result, quite apart from reasons of tactical doctrine, the Army Air Forces carefully began to build its own antisubmarine organization. Within a framework of research and development, the First Sea-Search Attack Group was activated on 8 June and units of its Second Sea-Search Squadron later operated in the Caribbean. The First Bomber Command, under whose operational control the First Sea-Search Attack Group was placed, had been engaged in the antisubmarine war in the Eastern Sea Frontier, and, in August, units of the 40th Bombardment Squadron of the I Bomber Command were sent on detached service to Puerto Rico and Trinidad. Air Force plans now pointed toward the First Bomber Command "as the organization that would be responsible for AAF specialized antisubmarine activity wherever it might be undertaken." These plans matured in mid-October with the activation of the Army Air Forces Anti-Submarine Command, the cadre of which was the First Bomber Command. Early in December, a squadron of the Antisubmarine

64 Memo, CNO for CofS GHQ, 4 Dec 41, WPD 4415-13.
65 Craven and Cate, eds., Plans and Early Operations, p. 537. Also on this same subject, see ibid., pp. 548-50; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 237-44; King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 445-59; USAF, The Antisubmarine Comd, p. 138; USAF, Hist of Antilles Air Comd, p. 80.
Command arrived at Trinidad, on detached service from the 26th Antisubmarine Wing at Miami, Fla. It was made clear to the commanding general of the Caribbean Defense Command that this reinforcement was a temporary arrangement only. Partly on this account the new arrivals "found no very satisfactory place" in the administrative and operational structure already set up by the Army and Navy in Trinidad.

The German U-boat campaign now erupted with renewed vigor in the North Atlantic. As a result of the extremely grave situation, an inter-Allied conference was held in Washington—the Atlantic Convoy Conference—to explore all sides of the problem and decide upon an allocation of planes for antisubmarine purposes. The President was insistent "that every available weapon" be put to use "at once." But the discussions that followed, between Admiral King, General Marshall, and General Arnold, invariably reached a deadlock over the matter of command. The establishment of the Tenth Fleet in May 1943 for the purpose of centralizing and more closely integrating the Navy's antisubmarine activities clearly invalidated the argument that the Army Air Forces could offer a more flexible, functional organization. The arguments then shifted over to different grounds. The issue remained the same. Since neither side would give way, the result was an agreement by which the Navy, recognizing the Army's primary responsibility in the field of long-range strategic bombing, took over full responsibility for the conduct of antisubmarine operations. Long before this agreement was worked out and accepted, on 9 July 1943, the peak of the U-boat battle in the Caribbean had been passed and the theater was in the process of contracting.

**Passing the Peak**

After January 1943 the enemy was never again a menace in the Caribbean, only a nuisance. Never again did the toll of sinkings approach that of 1942. Never, after January 1943, were the tanker routes from Maracaibo and Trinidad, the bauxite routes from the Guianas, and the approach to the Panama Canal in serious jeopardy. Only a few more than half as many vessels were lost in the Caribbean area in the entire year of 1943 as in the one bad month

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67 USAF, The Antisubmarine Comd, p. 139.
68 Quoted in Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, p. 387.
69 Accounts of the controversy, from the points of view of the respective services, are in King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, pp. 451–71; Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, pp. 380–92, 402–11; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 510–14.
of June 1942; in tonnage, the year’s loss was less than one-third that of June 1942. This result was due partly to the increased strength, improved equipment, and better training of the antisubmarine forces. It was in part a tribute to Allied victories in more distant waters, and in part a reflection of the shift of German U-boats away from the Caribbean. From October 1942 to the end of June 1943 there was only one brief period when more than three or four U-boats ventured at any one time west of the Caribbean shipping control line. This was in early March 1943, when three of them penetrated into the margins of the Gulf Sea Frontier while three others were raiding in the Caribbean. In December, and again in May and June there was only one U-boat in the area. Then, during the last two weeks of July 1943, the U-boat offensive in the Caribbean suddenly flared up again. As a result of the success of Allied aircraft in the North Atlantic, Admiral Doenitz decided to shift operations to safer waters and ordered thirteen of his U-boats to make a concerted attack on shipping in the vicinity of Trinidad and Puerto Rico. But in contrast to the sorry toll exacted by a force of fifteen to eighteen U-boats the previous summer, only six vessels now fell victim to the marauders. Four of the U-boats never returned to their base.\footnote{B.d.U. War Logs, 1 Jan 43 et seq.}

By the middle of August all but a few submarines had withdrawn from the Caribbean, and thereafter only an occasional U-boat ventured into the area. After July 1943 Allied shipping losses amounted to three vessels in the Caribbean Sea Frontier, six small vessels in the Atlantic Sector of the Panama Sea Frontier, and one vessel in the adjacent waters of the Gulf Sea Frontier. Although shipping losses stood in direct proportion to the number of U-boats in the area, the tally of U-boats sunk by American forces in 1943 was exactly what it had been in 1942.\footnote{USAF, Hist of Antilles Air Comd, pp. 68–70, 80–82, 111–13; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 347–48; Hist Div, CDC, Antisubmarine Activities in CDC, pp. 111–16; List of Enemy Submarines Captured and Sunk by U.S. Forces . . ., CNO OPNAV P-33-100-NEW-5-46.}

The beginning of contraction and retrenchment in Panama and the Caribbean coincided with the beginning of the end of the U-boat threat, but the connection was only fortuitous. As early as February 1942 the War Plans Division had been concerned about the demands for reinforcements that were coming in from all directions. General Gerow, in rejecting a Navy suggestion that the problem of command in Bermuda could be solved by relieving the British garrison, expressed himself thus: \"I believe we should make every effort to limit further dispersion of our forces. Unless we call a halt
somewhere, we will never have forces for an offensive.”  

Against this concern there had to be weighed the desire to provide the fullest possible defense for the Canal, the need of completing and defending the air route to Brazil, and the fact that the Army garrisons were below their authorized strength. In February, the very month in which General Gerow was voicing his concern, about 3,500 troops went to Panama and the Caribbean; and in the next month, March 1942, over 9,500 reinforcements and replacements arrived from the United States. By October the straws in the wind had begun to blow in a different direction. Brazil had entered the war against the Axis in August. Preparations for the North African landings were in the final stage. In the far Pacific the Japanese Navy was so involved with the growing Allied offensive as to render completely improbable any sneak attack against the canal. The possibility of a reduction in the troop basis for the Caribbean Defense Command was accordingly discussed with General Andrews in October, and a decision was reached to place the ceiling tentatively at 110,000 men. This was approximately the actual strength as of that moment, but in the three months’ interval before the decision began to take effect nearly 10,000 additional troops arrived in Panama and the Caribbean. The peak strength of something more than 119,000 men was reached at the end of December. The build-up had taken thirteen months to complete.

Beginning in January 1943, the reduction continued throughout the remaining two and a half years of war. In April 1943, the category of defense for the Caribbean Defense Command was reduced from “D,” which considered the area as exposed to major attack, to a modified category “B,” which admitted the possibility of only minor attacks and permitted some relaxation of defense measures. By the end of June 1943 the strength of the Army forces had dropped to about 111,000 men.

Aside from the general fact that to reduce the strength of any command was always a more complicated and lengthier process than the buildup, there were two elements in the particular situation that helped to explain why the process of contraction gathered momentum as slowly as it did. These elements were, first, a recrudescence of the Martinique problem, in the spring of 1943, and second, the gradual replacement, beginning in January 1943, of continental troops by Puerto Ricans.

72 Memo, Gen Gerow for Adm Turner, 9 Feb 42, WPD 4351-8, sec. 2.
73 War Council Min, 21 Oct 42, OCS files, SW Conf, binder 2; Memo, Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy (OPD) for CofS, 4 Jan 43, CofS files, CDC (A387).
74 Memo, Brig Gen John E. Hull (OPD) for DCoFS, 13 Oct 43, CoFS files, CDC (A387); Hist Div, CDC, Hist of Caribbean Theater, II, 550-51.
The Allied landings in North Africa and the adherence of General Henri Giraud and Admiral François Darlan to the Allied cause had badly shaken the pro-Vichy regime in Martinique and French Guiana. On 17 March 1943 Admiral Robert, High Commissioner for the Vichy Government, lost his hold on French Guiana when the Governor of that colony announced his allegiance to the Giraud government and declared his intention of co-operating fully in the war against the Axis. Admiral Robert was attempting to keep Martinique in line by stern, repressive measures, and the possibility of his using force to suppress the defection of French Guiana could not be lightly dismissed. American naval and air patrols in the vicinity of Martinique were strengthened, and a military mission was hastily dispatched to Cayenne. Although Admiral Robert quickly disclaimed any intention to use force against Guiana, there remained the possibility of a de Gaullist coup and there existed the further consideration that Cayenne Airport, which had been improved by Pan American Airways under the Airport Development Program, might be useful in the antisubmarine campaign. On 20 March the first detachment of American troops entered French Guiana. Le Gallion Field at Cayenne proving unsuitable for large planes, the construction of a new airfield was begun in April, but neither field had an opportunity to prove its value.75

Meanwhile, anti-Vichy sentiment had been spreading in the French islands. In Guadeloupe street demonstrations against Admiral Robert reached such proportions that on the night of 26 April 1943 local police and soldiers were forced to fire on the crowds and several people were wounded. Martinique was on the verge of civil war. The moment was propitious, the State Department decided, for breaking relations with Admiral Robert's tottering regime. The American consul general was recalled, and a joint Army-Marine Corps task force was organized for the occupation of Martinique. The ground components of the force consisted of the 295th Infantry (minus one battalion) and the 78th Engineer Battalion, both from Puerto Rico, the 13th Defense Battalion (USMC), and the 33rd Infantry (minus one battalion), and 135th Engineer Battalion from Trinidad. With attached medical detachments, the total strength came to 5,550 officers and men. Air and naval support forces and the 551st Parachute Battalion were also assigned to the operation. Throughout the month of May the several elements of the task force underwent intensive training in landing operations, in the establishment of a beach-

head, in street fighting, and in all the various aspects of an amphibious operation such as the invasion of Martinique would require. A completed plan of operations was ready by 6 June. Perhaps Admiral Robert had some intimation of what was in motion, for at the end of June he announced his readiness to turn over control of the colonies to the French Committee of National Liberation. His offer was immediately accepted. Two weeks later a representative of the committee arrived to take up the reins, and Admiral Robert departed. Thus a long-standing, potentially dangerous trouble spot was finally removed. The troops in Trinidad and Puerto Rico settled back into their old and by now tedious role of watchful waiting.\footnote{TBC, Hist Sec, CDC, Hist of TS and BC, I, 213--26, III, 136--38; Hist Div, CDC, Hist of Caribbean Theater, II, 597--98; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1223--24.}

While the Martinique affair was approaching a crisis, the War Department had gradually changed its policy respecting the employment of Puerto Rican troops. At the beginning of the year 1943 there were approximately 17,000 Puerto Ricans under arms, including the 65th Infantry, and all of them were stationed either in Puerto Rico itself or in the Virgin Islands. The situation, according to the chief of staff of the Puerto Rican Department, was unsatisfactory from the standpoint of training, discipline, and morale; but to send Puerto Rican troops elsewhere in the Caribbean area hinged upon the willingness of the various governments to accept them. Negotiations with the Republic of Panama on this subject had offered little encouragement for approaching the others. When the War Department proposed to send the 65th Infantry to Panama as a replacement for continental troops that were to be withdrawn for service in the Pacific, the Panamanian Government insisted on a careful screening of the unit despite the fact that it was a Regular Army regiment and was to be stationed within the Canal Zone. The record of the 65th Infantry in Panama, where it arrived in mid-January, gave considerable satisfaction to the staff of the Puerto Rican Department and served as an argument for replacing continental troops elsewhere. At the urging of the Puerto Rican Department a small detachment of insular troops was sent to Cuba in late March as a guard for Batista Field, and again the experiment was successful. The War Department consequently decided upon a general replacement of continental troops not only in Panama, but in the bases on British Islands as well, to the extent permitted by the availability of trained Puerto Rican units. Eventually, it was hoped, 20,000 Puerto Rican troops could be made available. A sharp increase in the Puerto Rican induction program was immediately authorized, and arrangements for ob-
taining the approval of the British Government were begun at once.\textsuperscript{77} Although the new policy took shape precisely at the time when the plans for an invasion of Martinique were being developed, it rested on the assumption that the Caribbean was a quiescent theater.

Since the induction of Puerto Ricans into the army was accelerated more speedily than the replacement of continental troops, the immediate effect of the new policy was to hold back the reduction in over-all strength. After the summer of 1943 the movement of troops away from the theater and the general curtailment of activities began to pick up speed. By the end of the year nearly 5,000 Puerto Ricans were in Panama; Puerto Rican units had replaced some of the continental troops in Trinidad, Antigua, Jamaica, Surinam, and Curaçao, and the over-all strength in the Caribbean Defense Command had been reduced to about 91,000 officers and men.\textsuperscript{78} By VE-day, in May 1945, the strength was down to 67,500, approximately 10,000 more than on the day the United States entered the war.

\textsuperscript{77} General Council Min, 11 Jan 43, 29 Mar 43, 12 Apr 43, OCS files; Hist Div, Antilles Dept, CDC, Puerto Rican Induction Program and Use of Puerto Rican Troops, pp. 47–48, 50–61.

\textsuperscript{78} Hist Div, Antilles Dept, CDC, Puerto Rican Induction Program and Use of Puerto Rican Troops, pp. 71–75. Memo, Col Walter C. Sweeney, Jr. (OPD) for Col Kenner F. Hertford (OPD), 5 Oct 43, and Memo, Gen Hull for DCoS, 13 Oct 43; both in WDCSA 42–43, CDC.
CHAPTER XVII

Greenland: Arctic Outpost

During 1940, while the United States had been looking to its defenses in Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama, while the exchange of destroyers for a string of Atlantic bases was under negotiation, and then, while plans and preparations for developing the new bases were getting under way, Britain and Canada were consolidating their position in the North Atlantic by stationing troops in Iceland and were attempting to counter German activities in Greenland. Although the United States Government had acquiesced in the garrisoning of Iceland, it had no desire to see Britain make the same move into Greenland; for Greenland, although a Danish colony, was, unlike Iceland, definitely within the Western Hemisphere and within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. Should Canada take protective action in Greenland, it was feared that a precedent might be established which would give Japan an excuse to seize the Netherlands East Indies if the Germans invaded Holland. British, Canadian, and American diplomacy went through a good many convolutions, more fittingly described elsewhere, before the lines of policy took shape. The official American position, simply stated, rested on non-intervention, on the traditional "hands off" policy of the Monroe Doctrine, and on noninterference. The United States, for several reasons, had refused to commit itself to the defense of Greenland and at the same time had declared its objection to any military action in Greenland by Britain or Canada or to any attempt on their part to establish control over Greenland.

The War Department's interest in Greenland was not at first a very active one. Greenland figured to some extent in the RAINBOW 4 war planning, and in this connection the advice of Arctic experts was sought and studies undertaken that added considerably to the meager store of data the Army had.

1 See Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, chs. XII and XX.
2 In addition to the usual staff studies, the War Department had engaged the noted explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson to prepare a work on Greenland. His manuscript, A Guide Book for Greenland, 3 vols., is a detailed description of the climate and physical features of the country. A highly useful summary of information is Austin H. Clark, Iceland and Greenland, Smithsonian Institution, Publication 3735 (Washington, 1943).
GREENLAND: ARCTIC OUTPOST

A number of possible sites for airfields, at the head of Søndre Strømfjord, about six hundred miles up the western coast from Cape Farewell, were disclosed by an Air Corps survey flight in August 1940, but the Army made no plans for developing any of them. While this survey was in progress, the State Department hastily called to the Army's attention a Canadian proposal to establish a landing field on the southern tip of Greenland, near Julianehaab, and, doubtless thinking it a matter over which the Army should be concerned, the State Department spokesman, Assistant Secretary Adolph A. Berle, Jr., was surprised when the War Department informed him that it had no objection to the Canadian proposal.

Growth of American Interest in Greenland

During the next six months the views of the War Department changed. Strategic planning was shifting away from the dismal assumption that Britain had only a small chance of surviving. American bases were under construction in Newfoundland and American troops were there. And finally, new data indicated that it was really possible to build an airfield in the vicinity of Julianehaab. At the same time Mr. Berle was prodding the War and Navy Departments with the suggestion that further inaction on the part of the United States might result in the Canadians moving into Greenland. At a meeting in his office on 6 February 1941, representatives of the War and Navy Departments agreed that this would be less desirable than if the defense of Greenland were to be in U.S. hands. The nature of American military interests, as the War Department now viewed them, was presented at the same meeting by Lt. Col. Clayton L. Bissell of the War Plans Division. He summarized them as follows: first, the defense of the American bases in Newfoundland and of the northeastern United States would be affected by a military air base in Greenland; second, the United States should control whatever aviation facilities were constructed in Greenland, or at least insist on equal rights in the use and operation of any facilities built by anyone else; and lastly, further German efforts to obtain weather data from Greenland were to be expected. The conference ended in a general agreement and recommendation that a survey party should be sent to Greenland.

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3 Memo, CofS for SW, 28 Aug 40, WPD 4330-3; Memo, WPD for CofS, 4 Feb 41, sub: Proposed Canadian Expedition to Greenland ..., WPD 4173-2; Ltr. F. R. McCoy to Brig Gen George V. Strong, ACoSF WPD, 18 Jun 40, WPD 4300-4. An Air Plan for the Newfoundland-Greenland Theatre, 29 August 1940, is in WPD 4300; an Operations Plan and Brief Estimate of the Situation are in WPD 4590.
to investigate airfield sites and to examine the possibility of constructing the various facilities—radio, navigational aids, and the like—that would be necessary for developing the airfields. It was further agreed that it would be to the best interests of the United States if the Danish authorities in Greenland were to undertake the actual construction with the financial and technical assistance of the United States. These decisions were the springboard for all subsequent American activities in Greenland.

Presidential approval and the consent of the Danish authorities in Greenland followed the conference of 6 February without much delay. By the end of the month a Coast Guard vessel had been made available for the survey party, lists of special clothing and equipment were being compiled, and the Army members of the party were designated. Then, almost on the eve of sailing, an important decision was made, which completely changed the expedition's focus. At a meeting of Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and State Department representatives in Mr. Berle's office on 5 March it was agreed that "considerations of defense, jurisdiction, operation and maintenance" made construction of the facilities by the Danish authorities in Greenland impracticable, that the Army would therefore build the necessary landing fields, and that the State Department would negotiate an appropriate agreement with the responsible authorities. On 17 March the survey party under the command of Comdr. William Sinton, USN, boarded the Coast Guard cutter Cayuga at Boston and sailed for Greenland. A Royal Canadian Air Force observer accompanied the party.

After a difficult voyage through heavy ice the expedition arrived in southern Greenland. In this area and in the vicinity of Holsteinsborg and the Søndre Strømfjord at least a dozen possible sites were investigated, the most promising of which were at Narsarsuak, Ivigtut, and Søndre Strømfjord, on the glacial moraine at the head of the respective fjords.

Meanwhile important developments had been taking place in Washington. The ninth of April was the anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Denmark,

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4 Min, Mtg in Asst Secy State Berle's office, 6 Feb 41, WPD 4173-2; Ltr, W. H. Hobbs, Ann Arbor, Mich., to Gen Gerow, ACoS WPD, 24 Jan 41, WPD 4173; Ltr, Hobbs to Gerow, 17 Feb 41, WPD 4173-4.
5 Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Feb 41, WPD 4173-2; WPD Note for Rcd sgd LTG [Leonard T. Gerow], 14 Feb 41, sub: Air Facilities in Greenland, WPD 4173; Memo, WPD for TAG, 26-Feb 41, WPD 4173-5.
6 Summary of Points . . . Agreed Upon at a Meeting . . . , 5 Mar 41, WPD 4173-11.
7 The Coast Guard at War: Greenland Patrol, (Historical Section, Political Intelligence Division, Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, 15 July 1945), II, 10.
8 Ibid., pp. 10, 18-19; Memo, CNO for Ship Movements Div et al., 6 May 41, sub: Army and Navy Operations in Greenland, 1941, WPD 4173-45.
and on this date an agreement guaranteeing the security of Greenland with the United States as guarantor was signed by Secretary of State Hull and Mr. Henrik Kauffman, the Danish Minister. Preparations for sending a construction party and a defense force to Greenland were begun immediately. A survey of the east coast, which the Air Corps had decided was necessary, was quickly organized. The Greenland defense agreement was the culmination of the State Department’s efforts to meet the problem posed by the convergent interests in Canada, Great Britain, and the United States; while these other preparations followed both from the agreement itself and from the expanding activities of the Air Corps.

With a bow in the direction of the Act of Havana, which authorized unilateral measures of hemisphere defense in times of emergency, the Hull-Kauffman agreement gave the United States the right to construct, maintain, and operate in Greenland such airfields, seaplane facilities, and other defense facilities as were necessary to protect the sovereignty of Denmark and the territorial integrity of Greenland. The rights granted to the United States were extensive. They included, among others, the authority to deepen harbors and anchorages, to construct roads and fortifications, and, in general, “the right to do any and all things necessary to insure the efficient operation, maintenance and protection” of whatever defense facilities were established. It was agreed that the areas necessary for these purposes would be leased to the United States. A comparison with the British Base Agreement, signed only twelve days before, is unavoidable. Of the two, the Greenland defense agreement was much less comprehensive and thus permitted the United States considerably more latitude. That is to say, there was far more room for discussion and negotiation and possibly misunderstandings. Both agreements committed the respective governments to a speedy execution of formal leases and both provided that the use of the leased areas by the United States was not to be delayed pending the execution of the leases. The Greenland agreement then granted to the United States three particular rights by explicit provision: the right of exclusive jurisdiction over all persons within the leased areas except Danish citizens and native Greenlanders; the right to establish postal facilities and commissaries; and the right of exemption from

9 The agreement of 9 April 1941 has been published in Department of State Executive Agreement Series 204, Publication 1602. See also Memo, WPĐ for Gen Bryden, 10 Apr 41, sub: Greenland, WPĐ 4173-25; Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 2 Apr 41; Ltr, SW to President, 3 Apr 41. Both in WPĐ 4173-16.

10 Greenland Defense Agreement, 9 Apr 41, Article V; Agreement for the Use . . . of Certain Bases, U.S.–Great Britain, 27 Mar 41, Article XXIV.
COAST GUARD TUG AIDING FREIGHTER OFF GREENLAND
customs duties on all materials and equipment used in the defense areas and from all personal taxation on American workmen and military personnel. Only three limitations on the exercise of these rights were expressly laid down: the United States, in locating the defense areas, undertook to give the "fullest consideration consistent with military necessity . . . to the welfare, health and economic needs of the native populations"; as for the facilities to be built there, the United States promised that they would be made available to the aircraft and vessels "of all the American Nations" for purposes of hemisphere defense; and lastly the United States undertook to "respect all legitimate interests in Greenland" as well as all laws and customs pertaining to the native population and to give "sympathetic consideration to all representations" by the local authorities respecting the welfare of the inhabitants.

Greenland's Strategic Importance Reappraised

By this time the impetus that had originally turned the War Department's attentions toward Greenland was given new force by the Air Corps, which had been casting about for the best way to assist the transatlantic ferrying operations of the British. A number of proposals were considered. One of the more modest of them was presented by General Arnold himself, and this suggestion, that the United States take over the delivery of planes from the factory to some transfer point like Montreal or Presque Isle, Me., was quickly adopted. It was decided, also, to establish an air transport service between Washington and the United Kingdom. During March, April, and May, other proposals were studied and rejected. The question of whether to develop a route for short-range planes was still unsettled when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. A proposal that the United States accept responsibility over the entire transatlantic ferry route, which had been rejected in the spring, had not been accepted by the time the United States became an actual belligerent. Whether laid aside or still in question, these two proposals nevertheless provided justification for building airfields in Greenland. Even if other means for delivering short-range planes to England could be provided sooner, an air route should be developed simultaneously, argued General Arnold. And apart from this matter of ferrying short-range planes, it was sound aviation doctrine, he pointed out, to have alternate fields available for use in the transport operations already decided upon, or in patrol and reconnaissance opera-

\[11\] Greenland Defense Agreement, 9 Apr 41, Articles VI, VII, VIII.
\[12\] Ibid., Articles V, IV, and IX, respectively.
These considerations explain the Army's interest in the survey of Greenland that was planned for the early summer of 1941.

Although in General Arnold's opinion there were only two reasons for establishing bases in Greenland, namely, protecting convoys and ferrying planes, there was in actual fact another element which was becoming increasingly decisive. This was the defense of Greenland itself. The problem—for, because of the terrain, the climate and general physical features, it could not be considered otherwise—was a dual one. It involved, first, the fact that Greenland was a major source of cryolite for the aluminum industry of the United States and Canada and, second, that it was the breeding ground of western Europe's storms.

One well-directed shot from the deck gun of a German submarine or a clever act of sabotage by one of the workmen could have seriously damaged the cryolite mine at Ivigtut, might have perhaps put it out of operation and thereby disrupted the Canadian aluminum industry, on which Allied aircraft production was heavily dependent. To prevent this, the local authorities had organized a mine guard armed with rifles and a few machine guns and had obtained from the United States a 3-inch antiaircraft gun manned by former U.S. Coast Guard gunners. Then, during the first weeks of April 1941, the success of German arms in the Mediterranean aroused President Roosevelt's concern for the safety of the Atlantic outposts. At his insistence the War Department hastened to garrison Bermuda and Trinidad and to send reinforcements to Newfoundland. As soon as the Greenland defense agreement was signed, the general question of a defense plan was tossed into the lap of the Army-Navy Joint Board. As early as 16 April, on several occasions during the next three months, and particularly after the Bismarck episode, the Canadian Government expressed its doubt and solicitude about the adequacy of the defenses at Ivigtut. The War Department unhesitatingly rejected a Canadian offer to provide a garrison, although both the War and Navy Departments shared to some extent the concern of the Canadian Government. While the State Department in an aide-mémoire drawn up with the advice of the War Department was informing the Canadian Gov-


15 Memo, ASW (Air) for SW, 11 Apr 41, sub: Greenland, Stimson file, Misc Countries; Conf in ODCoS, 11 Apr 41, OCS Conf, binder 13, Apr 41; Memo, Acting CoS (Gen Bryden) for JB, 12 Apr 41, OCS 21068–21.
ernment that "the measures which have been and will be taken . . . are believed to be all that are practical both from the point of view of timeliness and of extent," the War Plans Division was at the same time informing the Chief of Staff that these measures were inadequate and that the estimated size of the garrison planned for Ivigtut should be increased from approximately 100 men to about 480. After this increase had been approved and the plans changed accordingly, the War Plans Division considered the cryolite mine to be sufficiently well protected, although the first defense force did not actually arrive at Ivigtut until well after the beginning of the new year, 1942. By that time it had been whittled down to one officer and twelve enlisted men.

The second factor in the defense problem—the value of Greenland as a base for meteorological observations—had been responsible for what turned out to be the first violations of Western Hemisphere territory by Nazi Germany. During the summer of 1940 the German Government had organized in Norway a number of expeditions for the purpose of establishing radio and weather stations in northeastern Greenland, in the neighborhood of Scoresby Sound. Although manned, it would seem, by Norwegians and Danes, and led by a Dane, these weather stations were under German control and were operated for the purpose of assisting the German naval and military effort. The British therefore undertook immediate countermeasures. A mixed British-Norwegian landing party seized a supply of aviation gasoline, dismantled several radio stations, and took into custody a number of heavily armed Danish "hunters" found on the coast. This was in late August or early September 1940. A few weeks afterward the British intercepted another vessel off the coast of Greenland with about fifty Germans, some of them meteorologists, on board. All this activity at the top of the Western Hemisphere was a source of much concern to Secretary of State Hull. The British in Iceland were maintaining close watch, attempting by means of radio direction finders to locate any clandestine weather broadcasts from Greenland; but in the absence of continuous air and naval patrols German intruders ran a fair

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16 Ltr, SN to Secy State, 8 May 41, WPD 4173-50; Aide-mémoire, State Dept to Canadian Legation, 6 Jun 41; Memo, Secy State for SW, 7 Jun 41. Both in WPD 4173-72. Memo, WPD for CoS, 9 Jun 41, WPD 4173-70.
17 Memo, WPD for CoS, 17 Jul 41, WPD 4173-99; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 30 Jan 42, WPD 4173-111; 3d Ind, CG Greenland Base Comd for CG AAF, 23 Mar 42, on Memo, CG AAF for WPD, 19 Feb 42, WPD 4173-155.
18 Ltr, Secy State to SW, 16 Jun 41, inclusing Memo written by a member of one of the 1940 expeditions, WPD 4173-100; Memo, CNO for Ship Movements Div et al., 6 May 41, sub: Army and Navy Operations in Greenland, 1941, WPD 4173-45; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 686-87.
chance of being undisturbed. By the spring of 1941 there was a strong suspi-
cion in Washington that one of the German-controlled weather stations was
still operating. Reports continued to reach the War Department of German
planes sighted over Scoresby Sound, of an unidentified vessel off Julianehaab,
of a strange plane high over Disko Bay, and of German plans to land a
force somewhere on Greenland’s eastern coast.\footnote{Memo, WPD for G–2, 4 Apr 41, sub: German Flights Over Greenland, WPD 4173–15; Cable, Brig Gen Raymond Lee, London, to WD, 22 Apr 41, WPD 4173; Memo, G–2 for CofS, 23 Apr 41, Stimson file, Misc Countries; Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 May 41, WPD 4173–49.}

The information that a German landing impended came to the War De-
partment from the Navy, but at the same time the Navy Department made
it clear that the report was of questionable reliability. In the meantime a
dispatch from the military attaché in London reported that a German detach-
ment was believed to have already established itself in the neighborhood of
Scoresby Sound. President Roosevelt, who a few days earlier had asked the
War and Navy Departments for recommendations to forestall an act of this kind, brought the matter up at a Cabinet meeting on Friday, 25 April.\textsuperscript{20} As Secretary Stimson later remembered it:

The President mentioned the rumor that had come up to the effect that the Germans already had a force landed on the east coast of Greenland. He said that the British Admiralty and the Navy were not inclined to believe the rumor but the War Department did believe it and that he was inclined to believe the War Department.\textsuperscript{21}

The President agreed with his advisers that the situation called for a well-armed naval expedition rather than an Army garrison. He approved the idea of sending one or two Navy patrol planes to Iceland for an inspection flight or two over the Scoresby Sound area, but he disagreed with the suggestion that Iceland be used as a more or less permanent base of patrol plane operations. The upshot was that the Navy proceeded to organize an east coast "survey" party for which the Coast Guard provided specially equipped vessels and experienced crews. For the time being the Army's assistance was not required.\textsuperscript{22} The War Department could therefore concentrate its attention, so far as concerned Greenland, on constructing the airfields and on garrisoning the west coast.

\textit{Establishing the BLUIE Bases}

As soon as the negotiations with the Danish Minister were sufficiently advanced, President Roosevelt authorized the War Department to go ahead with the preparations for building the airfields. For this purpose he gave his approval to the expenditure of approximately $5,000,000 from funds previously allocated for constructing the bases acquired from the British. General Arnold, who, as Chief of the Air Corps, was at once placed in charge of all matters pertaining to the Greenland airfields, was immediately directed to start assembling the necessary construction equipment, materials, and personnel, but within a week some of his responsibility had been shifted over to the War Plans Division. For the sake of conformity, Colonel Anderson, acting head of the War Plans Division, proposed on 9 April that the development program be placed under the direction and co-ordination of

\textsuperscript{21} Stimson Diary, entry for 25 Apr 41.
\textsuperscript{22} Memo, WPD for CofS, 18 Apr 41, sub: Northeast Greenland, WPD 4173-28; Memo, SW and SN for President, 22 Apr 41; Memo, President for SW and SN, 30 Apr 41; Memo, WPD for CofS, 6 May 41. Last three in WPD 4173-30.
the War Plans Division, as had been done in the case of all the other outlying bases. His recommendation, approved on 11 April, was formally adopted on 17 April.23

During the following month the several interested divisions of the General Staff worked out the various details of the construction force. A momentary hitch developed when the Navy Department decided it could not spare any of its transports because of the two months' layover that would be required at the base; but this particular problem was solved by the War Department's transferring to the Navy a recently acquired Army transport, the U.S.S. Munargo, to be fitted out and used for the movement, and in addition to the Munargo, the veteran troopship Chateau Thierry was later assigned. As decided upon in mid-April, the Greenland force consisted of one battalion (minus one company), 21st Engineers (AVN), reinforced by a composite battery, 62d Coast Artillery (AA), plus the necessary service troops. The departure, originally scheduled for 19 May, was delayed a whole month for repairs to be made to the Munargo; but on 19 June the two ships sailed out of New York Harbor with the 469 officers and men of the Greenland force on board.24 Col. Benjamin F. Giles, Air Corps, was in command.

Six days later the Munargo and the Chateau Thierry were at Argentia, Newfoundland, taking on fuel and fresh water and awaiting word of ice conditions farther North. Soon the bay became a busy place. One evening, a day or two after the Greenland force arrived, a flotilla of United States destroyers, followed by four or five Navy transports, loomed out of the heavy fog and slipped into the harbor. By next morning two battleships of the Atlantic Fleet, several more destroyers and the cruisers Nashville and Brooklyn had joined the assemblage along with four troopships loaded with marines. These new arrivals—transports, troopships, destroyers, battleships, and cruisers—were the ships of Task Force 19, the first task force organized by the Navy for foreign service in World War II.25 It was bound for Iceland. The plans

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23 Ltr, President to SW, 5 Apr 41, OCS 21068-16; Memo, WPD for CoFC, 5 Apr 41, WPD 4173-17; Ltr, TAG to CoFC, 7 Apr 41, WPD 4173-16; Memo, WPD for CoFS, 9 Apr 41; Ltr, TAG to USW, Chiefs of Arms, Services et al., 17 Apr 41. Last two in WPD 4173-21.

24 Memo, WPD for CoFS, 12 Apr 41, sub: Garrison for Construction and Def of Airfields in Greenland; Memo, WPD for CoFS, 10 May 41, same sub. Both in WPD 4173-23. Ltr, TAG to CG, 1st Army, 6 May 41, WPD 4490; Memo, CNO for CoFS, 17 Apr 41, WPD 4173-24; Rpt, The Story of the Embarkation of the BLUE WEST Force Garrison for Greenland, in OCT HB—Greenland, 1940-41.

for this movement had been going through the mill simultaneously with the Greenland preparations, for the President early in June had decided to establish an American garrison in Iceland and to set up a base there for patrol operations like those he had vetoed at the end of April. The marines were the first element of the garrison, to be followed in the course of the summer by sizable units of the Army Air Forces and of the 5th Division so that by August Iceland would bulk larger than Greenland in Army planning; but of these subsequent doings neither the marines nor Colonel Giles and his men could have had any knowledge. Leaving the Iceland convoy behind, the Greenland force resumed its voyage on 30 June and a week or so later arrived off Narsarsuak. There the major U.S. Army and Navy base in Greenland, BLUIE WEST 1, was built.26

By the end of September 1941, when the contractor's people arrived, the troops at BLUIE WEST 1 had erected 85 buildings, about two-thirds of the total needed for the initial force, and had begun to install the necessary utilities. They had built three miles of access roads, constructed a temporary dock, and started work on the airfield. By the time the civilian construction force arrived they had finished grading one of the two runways and had a metal landing mat partly laid. BLUIE WEST 1 was thus one of the earliest U.S. Army airfields, if not the first, to make actual use of steel matting in runway construction, an important engineering development that was still being tested two months later in the Carolina maneuvers and one that afterwards contributed greatly to the winning of the war, in the Pacific particularly. After the arrival of the civilian construction force the engineer battalion, reinforced by a company of the 42d Engineers (General Service), concentrated exclusively on airfield construction. They continued to do so until February 1942 when the civilian force took over this work as well. By then the first runway was ready for limited use.

Meanwhile, similar progress had been made at Søndre Strømfjord (BLUIE WEST 8), where the first construction party, a civilian force, arrived late in September. The airfield, begun during the first two weeks of November, was almost completely graded by the beginning of January 1942, when the first plane landed on the runway.27 During the following summer, when the

26 In a memorandum (WPD 4173–95), dated 8 July 1941, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Colonel Crawford, reports the Munargo as having entered the fjord that morning and being delayed there by ice. On the other hand, the arrival date is given as 6 July in U.S. Army Bases, Greenland, Section IV, pages 1, 4 (North Atlantic Division, Corps of Engineers, in OCMH). BLUIE was the code name for Greenland.

27 North Atlantic Div, CE, U.S. Army Bases, Greenland, secs. IV, V.
movement of the Eighth Air Force to England put the two Greenland airfields to their severest test, migrating aircraft had to share the runways with bulldozers and rollers and all the other paraphernalia of construction; for work was still in progress although the fields were usable.

The troops at BLUIE WEST 1 were added to from time to time during the late summer and early fall of 1941 until by mid-October they numbered about 665 men, two-thirds of whom were Engineers. A small detachment of about thirty men made up the entire Army force at BLUIE WEST 8. An even smaller party operated a radio range and direction finding station on Simiutak Island, about 45 miles from the main base at BLUIE WEST 1, and another detachment manned a weather station at Angmagssalik, on the east coast near the Arctic Circle. When war engulfed the United States in December the Army's Greenland forces altogether totaled approximately 750 men.28

From the beginning the garrison enjoyed excellent relations with the local populace. The Danish authorities in Greenland gave the American command their full co-operation and advice at all times, without which the problems of establishing the bases would have been greatly magnified. Troops and civilian workmen acquitted themselves well.29 That there were no AWOL's or desertions is perhaps not too surprising since there were no places to go, but the fact that there were likewise no courts-martial, at least during the first year, is a record of which any commanding officer can be proud.

Command arrangements followed the precedent recently worked out for the Newfoundland Base Command. Tactical control was at first vested in the Commanding General, First Army and responsibility for supply in the Commanding General, Second Corps Area. The latter's responsibility did not however extend to construction matters, all the administration and supply of which were controlled by the Chief of Engineers through the Division Engineer, Eastern Division. When Greenland, along with Newfoundland, was placed directly under GHQ in July the Commanding General, First Army, was thereby relieved of his responsibility for tactical command. The intention was that as soon as the necessary facilities were constructed the Greenland Base Command would be constituted and would operate as a task force under GHQ. Although the Greenland Base Command was not

29 Ltr, Maj Gen Benjamin F. Giles, USAF (Ret.), to Acting Chief of Military History, 26 Apr 59, OCMH files.
formally activated until 26 November 1941, the Army forces in Greenland were going by that name as early as 15 July, which was the date they had passed under the control of GHQ.\textsuperscript{30} The appointment of an Air Corps officer, Colonel Giles, to command them followed the same principle of functional allocation on which the appointment of an Air Corps officer to command at Newfoundland had been based. It was an explicit recognition of the fact that the principal operations would consist of "staging operations involved in the movement of medium range aircraft to England and air operations involved in the defense of Greenland, particularly the air base and Ivigtut."\textsuperscript{31}

The Defense of Greenland

With Greenland, as with many other outposts of the Western Hemisphere, the War Department faced the problem of passing safely between the Scylla of remote contingency and the Charybdis of immediate need. The question of what ought to be planned for and what on the other hand could be, or had to be, provided posed a dilemma that would have to be resolved if plans and preparations were to bear any relation to each other.

Throughout the summer and fall of 1941, while the construction program was being pushed forward, the War Plans Division and the Army-Navy Joint Board were drawing up the specifications for the defense of Greenland, which GHQ then converted into the actual blueprints. As the Army-Navy Joint Board viewed it, the defense of Greenland would require, first, fleet operations to deny major enemy forces access to the Greenland area, second, the local defense of vulnerable points, third, surface and air patrols of the entire coast during seasons favorable to minor enemy operations, fourth, a system of civilian observation posts, and fifth, appropriate reserve forces held in readiness to repel minor attacks and dislodge enemy units. According to the Joint Board planners the most vulnerable points, those that would require local defenses, would be any American installation in Greenland and the cryolite mine at Ivigtut. Because of the terrain and the climate these defenses could be mutually supporting only to the extent of providing small detachments of troops specially trained and equipped and serving with the principal garrisons who would be ready at all times to move by sea to the vicinity of any threat. Depending upon the state of aviation supplies at the

\textsuperscript{30} Ltr, TAG to CG, First Army, 6 May 41, WPD 4490; Memo, WPD for CoFS, 10 Jun 41, WPD 4482; Memo, WPD for TAG, 10 Jul 41, sub: Comd of U.S. Army Units in Greenland, WPD 4173–95; Ltr, TAG to CoFS GHQ, AC'sofS WD, 26 Nov 41, sub: Activation of Greenland Base Commd, WPD 4173–140.

\textsuperscript{31} Memo, WPD for CoFS, 3 Jun 41, WPD 4173–68.
airfields in Greenland, the use of air reinforcements "of minor strength" from Newfoundland would be possible. These considerations were the basis of the permanent garrisons authorized for BLUIE WEST 1 and Ivigtut. Upon the departure of the initial forces in June the approved figures stood at 181 officers, 20 nurses, and 1,849 enlisted men for BLUIE WEST 1 and 27 officers, 2 nurses, and 459 enlisted men for Ivigtut. A reduction in the Ivigtut garrison, down to 302 officers and men, was effected by eliminating the infantry unit; otherwise the authorized strength in October remained the same as it had been four months before. After orders had gone out to all the Atlantic bases in September to resist by force the intrusion of any German or Italian military planes and vessels of war there had been some thought that a garrison of 1,500 men could be established in Greenland before winter set in. But very shortly the build-up was postponed until the following spring. Until May 1942 the only combat unit in Greenland was the antiaircraft battery at BLUIE WEST 1. Meanwhile GHQ had drawn up the defense plans for Ivigtut and the cryolite mine and for air warning installations.

The problem of the defenses at Ivigtut had two sides: one, whether additional measures in protection of the cryolite mine were required at the moment; and second, what should be done after 1 April 1942, when the contract of the civilian mine guard expired. On the immediate question, GHQ and the War Plans Division, as well as the commanding officer in Greenland, Colonel Giles, were agreed that to send an Army defense force to Ivigtut was not an urgent matter. The building that would have to be done at Ivigtut, it was decided, might interrupt the more essential work at BLUIE WEST 1. Should it seem expedient for other than military reasons to replace the mine guard by American troops, as the State Department intimated it might be, the arrival of a garrison would be hastened, the War Department suggested, by putting some of the cryolite company's employees to work erecting the necessary housing, which the Army could supply in prefabricated form. Nothing came of the suggestion. The officials of the mining company, who had not concealed their misgivings over what they considered the defenseless state of the place, were agreeable to the use of their employees; but they considered the Army's proposal impracticable, while the State Department and the Office of Production Management believed that it

33 Memo, WPD for TAG, 17 Jun 41, sub: Greenland Def Forces, WPD 4173-70; List of Approved Garrisons for Overseas Bases, 9 Oct 41, WPD 4353-176.
34 GHQ Quarterly Rpt, Jul-Sep 41, Oct-Dec 41, GHQ 320.2-B, 1/r.
GREENLAND: ARCTIC OUTPOST

would, if acted upon, temporarily disrupt the mining operations. The question of what to do in the spring was more easily answered (perhaps one might say more easily avoided), since the Army expected to be able by that time to start building the housing and other facilities necessary for a garrison at Ivigtut. A naval vessel, the Greenland Government suggested, could be stationed at the cryolite port to bridge any gap between the departure of the mine guard and the arrival of an Army garrison.35 There the matter was resting when the attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war.

Immediately the War Department was made acutely aware of even the smallest chink in the nation’s armor. Within a week G–2 began calling attention to the inadequacy of the Ivigtut defenses. Officials of the State Department, of the War Production Board, of the Ivigtut mining company and of one of the two principal cryolite processing companies in the United States all expressed anxiety about the situation. Toward the end of December a naval vessel was stationed in the harbor to reinforce the mine guard, an arrangement which accorded with the Greenland Government’s suggestion and which both GHQ and the War Plans Division considered adequate for the time being.36 Conferences with the manager of the mine and the commander of the Coast Guard’s Greenland Patrol resulted in the Army’s agreeing to take over the duties of the mine guard on 1 April 1942, except those that had to do with internal protection for which the Greenland Government would provide. When the first construction forces went to Ivigtut late in March a defense unit of one officer and twelve enlisted men was sent out from BLUIE WEST 1 to replace the mine guard.37

An interesting contribution to the defense of Greenland was the Northeast Greenland dog sledge patrol organized in the summer of 1941 as a joint endeavor of the Army, the United States Coast Guard, and the Greenland Government. All the activity on the east coast the year before had demonstrated the ease with which anyone could establish a foothold in the vast Arctic wastes, the near impossibility of finding a hostile force that had established itself, and the difficulty of dislodging one, once it was discovered. An air patrol of the east coast, even after the new bases were completed,

35 Entry for 3 Sep 41, GHQ Staff Conf, 7/23/41 to 10/31/41, AGF 337; Memo, WPD for CofS, 30 Sep 41; Ltr, SW to Secy State. Last two in WPD 4173–111.
37 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 30 Jan 42, sub: Def of Ivigtut, WPD 4173–111; 3d Ind, CG Greenland Base Comd to CG AAF, 23 Mar 42, on Memo, CG AAF for WPD, 19 Feb 42, WPD 4173–155.
would be extremely difficult, since the distance that would have to be covered was as far as from Newfoundland to Key West, Fla. The naval patrol maintained by the Coast Guard was limited by ice conditions. What appeared to be the ideal solution, and the one recommended by the Coast Guard, was to organize a dog sledge patrol for reconnoitering the isolated areas of the east coast. After some hesitation the War Department agreed to bear the expense, to furnish part of the equipment, and to provide what air coverage it could. The Coast Guard, for its part, would transport the patrols and equipment to their stations and keep them supplied. The Greenland administration in turn agreed to recruit the men and provide the dogs.

The patrol had scarcely begun operations when it proved its worth by assisting in the capture of the trawler *Buskoe* on 12 September, as that vessel, a small German-controlled Norwegian ship, was attempting to establish a radio and weather station in the Mackenzie Bay area. There had been some skepticism, however, in the War Department, and by the end of the year there were those who had begun to wonder whether the results justified the expense involved.\(^{38}\) Had it been a matter of merely hiring a few Eskimos to patrol the neighborhood of their villages with their own dog sledges the $2,000 or so the Army was spending each month on the patrol might have been excessive indeed. But as it was, except on the west coast north of Holsteinsborg, dog sledding was unknown in Greenland and, except for the settlements at Angmagssalik (BLUIE EAST 2) and Scoresby Sound, the entire east coast was uninhabited. This meant that dogs, sledges, and drivers had to be brought in either from halfway up the west coast, a distance to Scoresby Sound of at least 2,400 miles, or from the continent.\(^{39}\) On one occasion a team of sledge dogs was imported from the United States by way of Iceland. The patrol, whose principal function was to report Nazis attempting to land in the guise of innocent hunters, had to be recruited from Danish and Norwegian hunters of proven loyalty. All this was expensive. The sledge patrol nevertheless survived the early doubts within the War Department, was afterward given military status as a unit of the U.S. Army, and in 1943–44, when the tempo of operations increased, the patrol found itself in the thick of combat. But that is another chapter of the story.


CHAPTER XVIII

Planning the Iceland Operation

During the first year and a half of World War II the interest and attention of the War Department had for the most part been focused in the direction of South America. But the pull on American resources, on staff planning, and on actual operations exerted by the exigencies of hemisphere defense was neither uniform in strength nor constant in direction. It swung through an arc extending northward from the bulge of Brazil, past the Azores, and beyond Newfoundland to Iceland. Nevertheless the true pole of attraction was to the south. The establishing of American bases in Newfoundland, the sending of American troops to Greenland, and an American garrison to Iceland did not result from a major shift in policy. In each case the desirability of the measure was determined by its own circumstances, which were sometimes peripheral even to hemisphere defense as a whole although the feasibility of each step was appraised in the light of what was being done elsewhere at the same time. This was particularly true of the Iceland operation.  

Early in the European conflict both the British and the Germans had recognized what the Vikings had demonstrated ten centuries before, namely, that Iceland was an important steppingstone between Europe and the New World. Hitler several times toyed with the idea of a descent upon the island and laid preliminary plans for it; but to forestall such a move British troops, soon joined by a Canadian force, had landed in Iceland on 10 May 1940. Icelandic annoyance with the British and Canadian garrison, and British losses in the war, which made a withdrawal of the Iceland garrison seem desirable, plus American concern for the Atlantic sea lanes, combined to bring Iceland within the American defense orbit.

By the early spring of 1941 the British position in the Mediterranean had become extremely precarious. Weakened by the withdrawal of some 50,000 troops to Greece and surprised by greatly reinforced German and Italian forces, Britain's Army of the Nile had been driven back, with serious

1 A substantially similar version of the first two-thirds of this chapter appeared as study 3 of the OCMH edition of Command Decisions.
losses, across the African deserts to the Egyptian border. Disaster in Greece, following hard upon the rout in North Africa, added 11,000 dead and missing to the casualties of the African campaign. The British therefore felt a pressing need for the 20,000 or so troops tied down in Iceland. Meanwhile the Battle of the Atlantic had taken a critical turn when, in March, German U-boats moved westward into the unprotected gap between the Canadian and British escort areas. Shipping losses mounted steeply. Although the Royal Navy immediately established a patrol and escort staging base in Iceland, a dangerous gap in the ocean defenses still remained.

American concern in the protection of the North Atlantic sea lanes, and in the defense of Iceland as well, had been acknowledged in the recently concluded Anglo-American staff conversations. Although Britain, in its own interest and on its own initiative, had already committed itself to both tasks, they were recognized as matters of mutual responsibility in the final staff report, the so-called ABC-1 agreement. Britain, it was decided, would provide a garrison for Iceland as long as the United States remained a nonbelligerent; should the United States be forced into the war against the Axis Powers, American troops would then relieve the British garrison. By admitting and accepting this measure of responsibility, however conditional it was, the United States laid itself open to an appeal for assistance whenever Britain should find the defense of Iceland too burdensome. If the United States, instead of awaiting formal entry into the war, were to undertake immediately the responsibility it had accepted for relieving the British troops in Iceland, then British losses in North Africa and Greece could be to some extent replaced without undue strain on British manpower.

Iceland, no less than Britain, was anxious to have the British garrison depart. Intensely nationalistic, proud of their ancient civilization, the Icelanders chafed under the "protective custody" in which they found themselves placed. They felt at first, when Canadian troops made up a large part of the total force, that a wholly British contingent would be preferable, but when the Canadians were later replaced by British troops most Icelanders seemed to find their lot no more bearable than before. As the scope of Germany’s aerial blitzkrieg widened, the people of Iceland grew more uneasy; for it to be "defended" by one of the belligerent powers, they felt, was an open invitation to attack by the other. The Icelandic Government shared the apprehensions of the people and found further annoyance in Britain’s control of Iceland’s export trade.

The Shifting Focus of American Interest

Taking a pessimistic view of England's chances of survival the Icelandic Government had, as early as mid-July of 1940, approached the Department of State concerning the possibility of Iceland's coming under the aegis of the Monroe Doctrine. Although the impetus for this idea came from concerns of the moment, a sense of affinity with the North American continent had long been part of Icelandic tradition. In September and December the question was again raised, and on one of these occasions the Icelandic consul general suggested the possibility of his country granting the United States air and naval bases in return for economic and commercial advantages.

In Iceland it was apparently expected that a simple declaration by the United States to the effect that Iceland lay within the Western Hemisphere, and therefore within range of the Monroe Doctrine, would make the presence of foreign troops unnecessary. If a garrison was required, it was thought that American troops, being those of a nonbelligerent power, would not draw German attacks. And once Iceland was accepted as part of the "Monroe Doctrine Area" it was hoped that a favorable trade agreement could be arranged with the United States.

Toward all these informal, exploratory inquiries the United States Government adopted a noncommittal attitude. Unwilling to make a definite decision until circumstances required it, the Department of State pointed to the necessity of not tying its hands with prior commitments. The War Department was in full accord with the view of the Department of State. When staff conversations with the British concerning America's future course got under way, early in 1941, both the War Plans Division and G-2 recommended that no action be taken at that time relative to any possible request by Iceland for American protection. Accordingly, on 11 February Secretary Stimson informed the Secretary of State that the War Department shared the latter's views that the United States should "neither discourage nor encourage an approach to this Government by the Government of Iceland."
Then came the British reverses in the Mediterranean and increasing German success in the North Atlantic.

After the conclusion of the ABC Conversations in March, Washington's interest in Iceland had quickened as an outgrowth of the problem of placing American planes and supplies in the hands of the British and as part of the task of making the United States Navy's "neutrality patrol" more effective. On 10 April, while picking up survivors from a Dutch vessel torpedoed off the coast of Iceland, the American destroyer *Niblack*, which earlier in the month had been given the job of reconnoitering the waters about the island, went into action against a U-boat whose approach was taken as an intention to attack. This was the first of a number of "incidents" that were to take place in the waters south of Iceland, where from this time on the safety zone of the Western Hemisphere and Germany's blockade area overlapped. On the very same day President Roosevelt decided to extend the neutrality patrol. At the end of a long conference with his chief military and naval advisers, the President took out a map and drew a line, roughly down the middle of the Atlantic, a few days later fixing it at the 26th meridian, but including the waters adjacent to the whole of Greenland and around the Azores. Also on 10 April, Mr. Harry Hopkins, the Presidential adviser on lend-lease matters, and his legal aide, Mr. Oscar S. Cox, were considering the possibility of the U.S. Navy escorting convoys within the Western Hemisphere, a step which the President was not yet prepared to take, and the feasibility of transshipping goods to Britain from ports within some defined boundary of the Western Hemisphere. This led to the further thought, expressed in a memorandum from Cox to Hopkins on 12 April, that public vessels of the United States could be used to transport men and materials to the American bases recently acquired in the Atlantic and that, in fact, nothing in the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibited public vessels from going anywhere with anything.\(^7\) Then on 13 April President Roosevelt received assurances from Prime Minister Churchill that Britain was determined to fight through to a decision in North Africa. American goods and munitions would perhaps be the deciding factor in the campaign. On the following day, Mr. Hopkins and Under Secretary of State Welles met with the Icelandic consul general and reopened the question of American protection for Iceland.\(^8\)

At the end of the month, the War Plans Division recommended that an

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\(^7\) Stimson Diary, entry of 10 Apr 41; Calendar of Hopkins Papers, bk. IV, items 3, 4. See also Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 368.

\(^8\) Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 290.
Army survey party be sent to Iceland for the specific purpose of preparing detailed plans for its defense. Merely calling attention to the plans for Iceland under the ABC–1 Agreement, the War Plans Division gave no sign of anticipating that the Army would soon be called upon to relieve the British garrison. No great haste was made in organizing the party. Although the Chief of Staff gave his approval on 2 May, it was not until some ten days later that messages went out requesting the commanding officers of the units provisionally assigned to a move into Iceland, of which the 5th Division was one, to designate officers for the survey party.\(^9\) The possibility of a German move into Spain and Portugal, which shifted attention away from the North Atlantic, and changes in the prospective assignments of two of the units designated for use in Iceland, along with a shortage and rapid turnover of officers, all contributed to a further delay.

During the early days of May, Nazi propaganda drums, in characteristic preinvasion fashion, had begun beating out a crescendo of anti-Portuguese accusations. Every omen seemed to point to Spain and Portugal as the next victims of German aggression.\(^10\) Deeply anxious, the Portuguese Government prepared to move to the Azores, of which some of the largest and most important islands lay within the bounds of the American neutrality patrol. And by one of the facts of geography, the sea and air routes from Europe to South America and the Panama Canal could be controlled from the Azores. The concern of the United States can be roughly measured by the high priority assigned to the preparation of a strategic survey of those islands. In a list of seventeen areas, arranged in order of urgency, which the War Plans Division submitted to G–2 on 7 May, the Azores were given second place. Top priority was assigned to the region around Dakar, in French West Africa, whereas Iceland, in sixteenth place, was far down the list.\(^11\) That a declaration of war by Germany would follow the landing of American troops on either the Azores or Iceland was regarded by War Department planners as almost certain; but sending troops to the Azores was considered to be more easily justified as a measure in defense of the Western Hemisphere than a move into Iceland.\(^12\)

\(^9\) Memo, Brig Gen Harry J. Malony, Acting ACofS WPD, for CofS, 30 Apr 41, WPD 4493, sec. 1; Memo, Col Orlando Ward for CofS, 2 May 41, CCS Conf, binder 15. Ltr, TAG to CG 5th Div et al., 13 May 41, and 1st Ind to foregoing from Col Bird S. Dubois, to TAG, 19 May 41. Last two in WPD 4493, sec. 1.


\(^11\) Memo, Gen Malony, Acting ACofS WPD, for ACofS G–2, 7 May 41, WPD 4300–7.

\(^12\) Memo, unsigned, undated, OPD–GHQ INDIGO “A.” A fuller account of the Army’s Azores planning appears in Conn and Fairchild, \textit{Framework of Hemisphere Defense}, ch. V.
As the month of May passed, German designs became more obscure, and American apprehension shifted from one danger spot to another. The French West Indies had been considered a potential threat ever since the fall of France, and at the first sign of skulduggery on the part of Admiral Robert, Vichy High Commissioner at Martinique, American plans contemplated an immediate landing of marines supported by the 1st Infantry Division. Meanwhile, a modus vivendi that had been presented to Admiral Robert in 1940 seemed to be successfully keeping him in line. Nevertheless, alarming reports of a West Indies crisis appeared in American newspapers on Sunday, 18 May, and the spotlight briefly pointed at Martinique. Then it swung away. Although estimates of Hitler's intentions toward Spain and Portugal were conflicting and although the actual moves the Germans made were hard to interpret, the Azores again assumed importance. On 22 May President Roosevelt directed the Army and Navy to be ready within thirty days to forestall a German attack on the Azores by getting there first. The naval balance in the Atlantic, which an Azores landing might easily swing in Britain's favor, was thrown into uncertainty just at this time by the daring foray of the powerful German battleship Bismarck and her consort Prinz Eugen. On the same day that President Roosevelt ordered the Azores preparations started, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were slipping past the British Home Fleet into the North Atlantic. Two days later, after a sharp five-minute engagement the two ships sank the British battle cruiser Hood, severely damaged the newly commissioned Prince of Wales, and then disappeared into the fog and mist of the Denmark Strait. The threat to the Azores, indeed to the entire Atlantic area, lasted until British air and naval units ran down and sank Bismarck off the coast of France on 27 May and forced Prinz Eugen into refuge in Brest.

While the chase after Bismarck was on, the target of German intentions gradually became more discernible. In the early morning of 20 May a swarm of German paratroopers descended on the island of Crete. The British garrison, without adequate air protection and naval support, was unable to beat off the invaders, and ten days later Crete fell victim to the German war machine. In defense of the island some 13,000 British and other Commonwealth troops and ten ships of the Royal Navy were lost. The

ensuing possibilities were ominous. Using Crete as a springboard, the Germans might jump either southward to meet up with Rommel’s North African army in Egypt, or eastward into Vichy-controlled Syria, thence through riot-torn Iraq and north to the Caucasus. A move in the latter direction would be in keeping with Prime Minister Churchill’s strong conviction and reports received by the Department of State to the same effect: that German armies were poised in central Europe for an imminent attack on Russia. Everything pointed to a spread of war to the eastward.

The situation in the Mediterranean lent an element of compulsion to the withdrawal of the British garrison in Iceland. The reduction of German naval strength in the Atlantic had somewhat eased the threat to the Azores, and to the Cape Verde and Canary Islands, to the extent that Britain felt capable of undertaking their defense without, at this time, any American assistance. And finally a German involvement with Russia would make less likely a declaration of war on the United States in the event of an American move into Iceland. The Azores soon lost the precedence assigned to them only a week or so before.

Meanwhile, the War Department had already taken steps to facilitate putting into effect one of the American commitments under the ABC–1 Agreement. On 18 May, General Chaney arrived in London as head of the military mission which, should the United States enter the war, was to be the command headquarters of United States Army Forces in the British Isles, but which, for the time being, went by the more euphemistic designation of Special Observer Group (SPOBS), London. Iceland was envisaged as a prospective theater of operations geographically within the sphere of the Special Observer Group. When General Chaney’s instructions were being drafted and the composition of his group was being decided upon, in early April, the indications had been that American forces would not be sent to England or Iceland before the following September at the very earliest. On this account, and no doubt to maintain as much of the fiction of neutrality as possible, General Chaney was given no specific instructions concerning Iceland or any other field of proposed Anglo-American co-operation. He was merely directed to establish the channels by which that co-operation could at some future time be carried out and to govern himself in accordance with those paragraphs of the staff agreement that provided for the exchange of missions and defined in general terms their purpose. The Special Observer

16 Ltr, CofS to Gen Chaney, 24 Apr 41, sub: Ltr of Instr, WPDT 4402–5, sec. 1.
The President’s Decision and the War Department’s Response

The decision was made by the President between 3 and 6 June, with the vigorous and enthusiastic backing of Secretaries Stimson and Knox and, according to Stimson, the indorsement of the Chief of Staff. General Gerow, head of the War Plans Division, and some of his subordinates, were opposed to it.\textsuperscript{17}

Preparations for sending an Army survey party, which had been dormant since early May, were hastily resumed. Lt. Col. Kirby Green of the 5th Division and three other officers chosen for this purpose were ordered to Washington on 3 June; but, since it was apparent that they would not be able to leave for Iceland until the end of the month, the War Plans Division requested General Chaney to send out a survey party from London and then to advise the War Department how the relief of the British garrison should be carried out. He was asked to advise what American troops would be required, what quantities of ammunition and supplies should be sent, and how much would be turned over to the American forces by the departing British.\textsuperscript{18} Discussions between General Chaney’s staff and British officers had begun on 4 June on such matters as housing the American troops, the antiaircraft defense of Iceland, and the necessary fighter plane strength; and it was decided that a joint Admiralty, Air, and War Ministry committee would collaborate with the Special Observer Group in planning the relief of the British forces.\textsuperscript{19} Apparently the stage was set for General Chaney to play a prominent role in the formulation of plans for the Iceland movement.

The War Department began its preliminary planning at once. Since only a meager body of firsthand data was available, the point of departure had to be the decision itself (that American troops would immediately and completely relieve the British garrison) and from that point planning had to proceed on the basis of the two known factors: that approximately 30,000 troops would be required, and that either the 1st or 5th Division would provide the nucleus of the force.

\textsuperscript{17} For details of this decision see Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 121-25.
\textsuperscript{18} Memo, WPD for TAG, 3 Jun 41, sub: Special Observers to Iceland; Memo, WPD for TAG, 5 Jun 41, sub: Iceland Reconnaissance. Both in WPD 4493, sec. 1.
\textsuperscript{19} SPOBS, The Special Observer Group Prior to the Activation of the ETO, Hist Monograph, OCMH.
In the absence of other data the chief consideration governing the strength and composition of the proposed Iceland garrison was that it must be comparable to the British units for the relief of which the American force was intended. The report of the reconnaissance made by USS Niblack, a copy of which had been forwarded to the War Department on 7 May, placed British ground strength in Iceland at about 25,000 men, although this, it appeared later, was an overestimate. The Royal Air Force was reported to have about 500 men, with five Sunderland flying boats and six Lockheed Hudson bombers, for antisubmarine patrol, and about a dozen Fairey-Battle seaplanes and two Moth fighters.20 The British deficiency in fighter plane strength, which the War Department soon afterward pointed out and London readily conceded, was a matter of concern from the very beginning, and the earliest War Department calculations included somewhat heavier air strength than the British garrison enjoyed. Given the size and nature of the British garrison, the War Department went ahead with plans for a relief force that would consist of one infantry division reinforced with two antiaircraft regiments, a harbor defense regiment, an engineer regiment, and the usual services. The combat aviation planned for the American force would consist of one bombardment and one headquarters squadron, totaling eighteen medium bombers, and one pursuit squadron of twenty-five planes. The troop strength of the entire force totaled 28,964.21

Since the 5th Division was scheduled to be ready for field service by midsummer, it had been provisionally assigned to the Iceland operation as long as that operation belonged to the fairly remote and indefinite future. Although the division would not be completely prepared for combat, no armed opposition to the initial landings in Iceland was expected.22 The decision to make an immediate move required, however, that an immediately available unit be substituted. As a result, in the preliminary planning and the discussions that took place during this first week in June, the 1st Division was scheduled for the job in lieu of the 5th. The shift of units apparently was made with some misgivings, for the 1st Division was the best equipped infantry division in the Army, the only one that approached a state of readiness for combat involving landings on a hostile shore.23 To tie the division down in Iceland

20 Rpt, Comdr D. L. Ryan to CNO, 2 May 41, WPD 4493-1, sec. 1; Memo, Capt R. E. Schuirmann for Gen Marshall, 7 May 41, GHQ 333.1-IBC, binder 38.
21 Tentative List of Units for Iceland (no date, filed with WPD Memo to CofS, 5 Jun 41), OPD-GHQ INDIGO "A."
22 Chart Showing Readiness of Divisions for Field Service (as of 31 March 41), WPD 4416.
would make impossible the fulfillment of the missions assigned to it by current war plans and thus give a cast of unreality to those plans.

Problems, Remote and Immediate

Two of the problems that later on were to harass the War Department planners remained in the background for the time being. Legislative restrictions on the use of selectees, of members of the Reserve, and of the National Guard did not, in these early stages of planning, seem to jeopardize the Iceland operation. And that there would be adequate shipping also seemed fairly certain.

The question of shipping, in late May and early June 1941, appears to have been not primarily whether vessels were available, but rather where they should be employed. The problem was one of allocation, which in turn depended upon decisions of strategy that were as yet unmade, on future requirements that could seldom be calculated with accuracy, on the Maritime Commission's co-operation which, as the War Department saw it, was not always assured, and upon the fullest use of commercial shipping and voyage charters, which the Army at this time was extremely reluctant to employ. The situation, as it concerned troop transports, was complicated just at this time by the transfer of six or seven of the Army's largest vessels to the Navy for operation and control. Although the immediate effect was something of a dislocation, since the Navy laid up several of the ships for conversion into attack transports, the net result was a gain to the combined transport fleets because the Maritime Commission at once turned over to the Army six fair-sized passenger liners to replace the tonnage that had been transferred to the Navy.24

As soon as the decision to relieve the British Iceland garrison had been taken, the head of the Transportation Section of G-4, Col. Charles P. Gross, discussed the matter of transportation with a representative of the Navy. The problem, simply stated, was to place in Iceland, as soon as possible, nearly 30,000 men with 231,554 ship tons of equipment, weapons, and supplies, and to provide thereafter some 25,000 tons of shipping each month for maintenance.25 The Navy Department gave assurances, however, that on five days'
notice three naval transports with a total capacity of 4,000 men could be provided for the Iceland movement; that on 20 June or thereabout four Army transports being converted by the Navy and with a capacity of about 6,000 men could be made available; and that by 28 June transportation for the entire Iceland force could be provided. In forwarding this information to the Chief of Staff on 5 June, the War Plans Division pointed out that to provide transportation for the entire Iceland force would nevertheless require the "use of all Marine transports" and would "immobilize the Marine Force for the time being." 26

At the same time, the War Plans Division raised inquiry concerning the effect of the legal restrictions that prohibited the National Guard, members of the Reserve, and men drafted under the Selective Service Act from serving outside the Western Hemisphere and that limited their terms of military service to a period of twelve months. For purposes of naval defense, the President had placed the Atlantic frontier of the western world, quite arbitrarily, along the meridian 26° west, which, to be sure, excluded the whole of Iceland. 27 The question was one of policy, not geography; and if policy for the moment dictated a course of exclusion, circumstances at any future time might well prescribe a change in policy. Whatever concern was felt during these first days in June seems to have arisen over the time limit rather than the controversial geographical restriction. On this basis it was entirely rational for the Office of the Chief of Coast Artillery to observe that selectees would have to be used in constituting the harbor defense regiment proposed as part of the Iceland garrison. 28 In any event the problems posed by the legal restrictions did not seem insuperable as long as the 1st Division was being considered for the nucleus of the force. Although 75 percent of the officers of that division had been drawn from the Reserve, it was presumed that most of them would volunteer for duty in Iceland. The problem, in this respect, was considered to be one of maintaining secrecy. As for enlisted men, only a "small percentage" of them were selectees, and only about 10 percent of the men of the two antiaircraft regiments—the 61st and 68th—were subject to the restrictions written into the Selective Service and National Defense Acts. 29

27 Ltr, TAG to CG’s, 21 May 41, sub: Navy Western Hemisphere Defense Plan 2, WPD 4414–1.
Harbor conditions and the lack of facilities at Reykjavík were recognized as the real limitation. Although Reykjavík, the capital of Iceland, was the largest town and chief port, its harbor was shallow, subject to occasional hurricanes, and had a fairly wide range of tide. Both G–2 and Naval Intelligence reported a depth of only sixteen feet alongside the piers at low water, whereas the available ships drew from twenty-five to thirty feet. As a consequence, all troops and cargo would have to be lightered ashore and the rate of discharge would therefore be slow. For this reason the Navy recommended that the movement be handled in four convoys sailing at intervals of about three weeks beginning 15 June. Each convoy would consist of four troope ships and four cargo vessels carrying approximately 7,000 men and 60,000 tons of cargo. Each would make the trip to Iceland in about ten days and require fifteen days for discharge. Since the vessels that made up the first two convoys could thus repeat their voyages, only sixteen ships would be needed, the Navy optimistically reported. With the departure of the last convoy from Iceland, about 10 September, the entire operation would be completed. On 5 June the War Plans Division submitted the Navy's neatly drawn blueprint to the Chief of Staff. The outstanding points, the War Plans Division noted, were: that the Iceland and Azores operations could not be carried out simultaneously because of the shipping situation; that the Iceland movement should be conducted in stages because of meager housing and harbor facilities; and that it would be impossible to conduct the operation in secrecy. But before further action could be taken, the course of affairs had taken a new turn as the result of Stimson's conference with the President that same day, 5 June.

In discussing with Secretary Stimson the effect the Iceland movement would have on the use of expeditionary forces for all other purposes under the basic war plans, the President expressed his opinion that a unit of marines would have to go in the first contingent to Iceland. Although this solution was not thoroughly to the liking of the Chief of Staff, he recognized that it would permit substituting the 5th Division as the basic component of the force and that thus the latter division would once more be available for the role originally assigned to it in the war plans. Accordingly, on 7 June, General Marshall informed War Plans Division that the Iceland preparations should be based upon using the 5th Division with a Marine Corps unit for the first wave of the force. The 6th Regiment

30 Memo, Gross, G–4, for ACofS WPD, 5 Jun 41, OPD–GHQ Indigo “A.”
32 Gerow Diary, entry of 7 Jun 41.
of marines, which had been ordered east from San Diego when the Azores operation was still in the air late in May, was at this moment en route to the east coast by way of the Panama Canal. It was now, with appropriate reinforcement, designated the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) and on 12 June, while the regiment was still at sea, orders were drafted for the newly created brigade to depart for Iceland ten days later under the command of Brig. Gen. John Marston, USMC.  

Simultaneously, the War Department took the initial steps required by the shift of units. Personnel of the 5th Division were “frozen” in their assignments. The commander of the division, Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Cummins, was ordered to Washington to participate in the planning. The respective divisions of the General Staff were asked to prepare embarkation plans, to make ready special clothing and equipment, and to investigate and plan the necessary housing. The required change in the convoy schedule previously recommended by the Navy was sketched out. The new timetable, submitted to the War Department on 16 June, tentatively provided for three convoys sailing at ten-day intervals, beginning 20 August, each carrying 8,500 men.  

The shift of units brought forward the problem of personnel. In contrast to the 1st Division, as many as 41 percent of the enlisted men of the 5th Division were selectees and from 75 to 88 percent of the officers were members of the Reserve. Earlier, when the 5th Division had been provisionally designated for a possible Iceland expedition under the ABC–1 Agreement, General Marshall had pointed out that volunteers and Regular Army personnel could be substituted for the selectees while the division was awaiting its ocean transportation. Now G–1 estimated that, by shifting troops within the division, one infantry regiment and one field artillery battalion could be prepared for movement within a week after orders were issued; or by transferring men from at least three other divisions, the entire 5th Division could be made ready within three weeks. The War Plans Division favored the second course of action on the ground that the alternative would lower the combat efficiency of those units of the division from which the three-year...
enlisted men were drawn. The preparation of detailed plans for shifting personnel was assigned to G–1 and G–3 on 12 June, but the execution of the plans was to be deferred until specifically ordered.\textsuperscript{36}

By mid-June at least seven different offices and agencies were to one extent or another involved in planning for the Iceland expedition, and very shortly GHQ would enter the picture. In London, General Chaney’s Special Observer Group was working out a program premised upon the relief of the British as the principal object and designed primarily to provide a satisfactory timetable. In the War Department, G–1 and G–3 were preparing the plans through which suitable, adequately trained personnel would be available. G–4 was engaged in planning the embarkation and transportation of the troops and in preparing plans for housing and equipping them. The War Plans Division had the task of working out such details as command and interservice relations and of drawing together the various plans into a comprehensive whole that would conform to broader strategy. Furthermore, the Navy was involved in the formulation of Army plans so far as they concerned convoys and shipping. Finally, the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, through its Joint Planning Committee, was responsible for the basic Army and Navy directive, which would be the definitive joint plan for the operation.

\textit{INDIGO Planning, First Phase}\textsuperscript{37}

By mid-June, American reconnaissance parties were descending upon Iceland in a flurry of activity. First to appear was Lt. William C. Asserson, USN, officer in charge of the Navy’s Greenland survey. His report on possible patrol plane bases in Iceland did not reach the War Department until the end of the month, and by then the Army’s plans had already been laid, changed, and superseded. The survey party sent out from London by General Chaney was next to arrive and spent nearly a week gathering data on housing and living conditions, on air, coast, and harbor defenses, the state of airdromes, mine fields, docking facilities, communications, and the like. On 12 June, the days after the SPOBS survey party arrived from London, two Army officers and a Marine Corps survey party arrived from the United States. The Army officers were Lt. Col. Geoffrey M. O’Connell, who had been designated a member of the group organized on 3 June, and Capt. Richard R. Arnold. After spending a total of thirty hours in Iceland and conferring briefly with

\textsuperscript{36} Memo, Lt Col Lee S. Gerow for Gen Gerow, WPD, Jun 41, sub: Readiness of the 5th Division, WPD 4416–1.

\textsuperscript{37} INDIGO was the code name used for Iceland.
Lieutenant Asserson in Argentia, Newfoundland, Colonel O'Connell and Captain Arnold returned to Washington and presented a nineteen-page report on their reconnaissance. Within three days after Colonel O'Connell and Captain Arnold returned, the War Department received two other reports on Iceland; one from General Chaney and a second from Maj. Gen. H. O. Curtis, general officer commanding the British forces in Iceland. Fearing the limitations that would affect the proposed operations were not properly understood, General Curtis had placed before the American survey parties his views on the various problems of command, housing, and transportation, which he then sent off as a long dispatch to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. In accordance with General Curtis' recommendation, the British Embassy forwarded a summary of his dispatch to the War Plans Division on the same day that Colonel O'Connell and Captain Arnold were submitting their report; and a few days later the full text was received by the War Department. General Chaney summarized his own recommendations in a lengthy cable to the War Department on 19 June; and on 24 June Lt. Col. George W. Griner, Jr., one of the members of the SPOBS survey party, arrived in Washington with General Chaney's complete plan.

All three reports highlighted these aspects of the problem: first, the lack of harbor facilities at Reykjavík and the outports, which would impose limitations on shipping; second, the availability of housing, which was conditioned upon the British evacuating their Nissen huts; and third, the onset of winter gales and snow after late September, which established a deadline for the operation. Each report differed from the others in the relative weight assigned to these factors, in the thoroughness with which they were covered, and, in some cases, in the matter of factual detail as well. As a presentation of the basic data necessary for formulating any plan, the O'Connell-Arnold report reflected the haste in which the data had been gathered. All the thirty-five topics it dealt with were, with a few exceptions, treated in superficial, far from specific fashion.

The other members of the Army survey party of 3 June were sent with the 1st Marine Brigade and therefore did not reach Iceland until 7 July.

Cable, ALABASTER to TROOPERS (Personal from Gen Curtis to Chief of the Imperial General Staff), 13 Jun 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO "A."


A copy of the report by Colonel O'Connell and Captain Arnold (9–16 June 1941) is in OPD-GHQ INDIGO "A."
General Chaney’s report was in the nature of counsel on matters of policy, on the decisions that were required, and the way they should be executed. The data on which he based his recommendations were included in nine annexes covering the various arms and services. Where General Curtis, in his dispatch, emphasized the shipping and cargo-handling difficulties that would be encountered, General Chaney, on the other hand, was inclined to stress the housing problem. In either case the conclusion was that the entire operation must be completed before the advent of winter weather late in September and that the utmost co-operation between British and Americans would be required.

The distinguishing feature of General Chaney’s plan was its bilateral approach in providing a timetable not only for the movement of American troops to Iceland but for the withdrawal of the British garrison as well. Both moves and the relief of the marines were to be accomplished in five stages. The first four contingents of American troops were to consist of about 6,000 men each. The relief of the British was to begin as soon as the second convoy completed discharge and was to proceed successively following the arrival of each American convoy thereafter. When the last American contingent, of some 4,500, had landed, the marines would return to the United States and the last of the British units would depart for England. The entire movement would be completed by the end of September. So precise was the schedule as to demand what would have been in fact a united Anglo-American effort. General Chaney in his plan provided for such an effort. None of the others did so.

Shipping requirements and the housing problem seem to have been the rocks on which the Chaney plan foundered. On both subjects, General Chaney and the War Department disagreed in several particulars.

As for housing, General Chaney’s plan was to make use of the Nissen huts vacated by the British units scheduled for relief. The total number of men who could thus be housed would come to about 22,000, but the British, he reported, would deliver enough material for huts to accommodate the remainder of the American forces. The inevitable overlapping period between the arrival of troops from America and the departure of corresponding British units for England would, according to General Chaney, present the gravest problem. During this period either the British or Americans would have to live in tents. He therefore regarded it as absolutely essential that the first American Army contingent arrive in Iceland by 1 August. When he informed

42 Rpt of Reconnaissance of Iceland, General Chaney to CofS, 19 Jun 41, WPD 4493–20, sec. 1.
the War Department that the British would deliver the material for all additional huts necessary, General Chaney had neglected to say how many this would be. War Plans Division, clearly skeptical, requested immediate confirmation that the British could furnish the 3,128 huts that War Department figures indicated would be required. General Chaney, it then transpired, had calculated that less than half this number would be necessary. Whereas the War Department estimated that accommodations for 10,000 additional men would be needed (including any British units remaining through the winter), General Chaney figured 7,000. The War Department estimate for hospital facilities and storage was three times as high as his. And finally, General Chaney took no account of space for headquarters, mess, kitchens, and day rooms, for which the War Department figured an additional 1,008 huts would be needed. What the British would provide was a total of 1,336 huts, General Chaney replied to War Plans Division, and, unable to make out how the War Department total of 3,128 had been reached, he referred the War Plans Division to Colonel Griner for complete details.

Discrepant calculations in the matter of shipping requirements were the root of further confusion. On the subject of harbor conditions, General Chaney's observations controverted a number of assumptions from which War Department planning had proceeded. Whereas the War Department was basing its preparations on lightering troops and cargo ashore, on account of the low depth of water at the Reykjavík piers, General Chaney considered this impossible. There were no lighters at Reykjavík, he pointed out, no cargo cranes on the piers, and the availability of coastal shipping for lighterage purposes was questionable. It was feasible, he continued, to dock vessels with a maximum draft of twenty-one feet. He therefore based his calculations on berthing all the cargo vessels alongside the piers and discharging them by means of the ships' booms. According to his convoy schedule the operation would require a total of thirty-one ships, nearly twice the number that the Navy had been figuring upon using. They might have been found without too much difficulty had it not been that practically all the cargo transports under Army and Navy control were larger and deeper than those called for in the Chaney plan. And even if his shipping requirements had been com-

43 Cables, SPOBS to TAG, No. 13, 18 Jun 41, WPD 4493–11, sec. 1; SPOBS to TAG, No. 15, 19 Jun 41; OPD–GHQ INDIKO "A"; TAG to SPOBS, No. 11, 23 Jun 41, AG 320.2 (6–9–41). For the breakdown of the War Department estimate, see note on copy of foregoing radiogram in OPD–GHQ INDIKO "A."

44 Rad, SPOBS to TAG, No. 19, 25 Jun 41, OPD–GHQ INDIKO "A." General Chaney was probably basing his figures on British Army housing scales, which allotted considerably less space per man than the corresponding American tables.
pletely met, the total cargo capacity of the thirty-one vessels, including repeated voyages and the use of troopships to their maximum capacity, would have been at least 43,000 tons short of the figure which two weeks earlier had been the basis of War and Navy Department shipping calculations. Anomaly was added to discrepancy when General Chaney recommended a level of supply somewhat higher than that used by the War Department to estimate the cargo requirements. Furthermore, General Chaney incorporated in his report a British request that, because of their own shipping shortage and to reduce port congestion in Iceland, certain American transports be made available for the movement back to England of British troops and equipment. This request the War Department absolutely and unconditionally rejected.

Meanwhile, the War Plans Division had been working along the lines of the convoy schedule drawn up by the Navy on 16 June. But no sooner was the schedule set up than a modification seemed necessary. Convinced that a serious lack of housing and storage was in prospect, especially in the northern and eastern outposts, the War Plans Division proposed that a construction party of 2,200 engineers precede the first regularly scheduled contingent in order to make certain that the necessary huts were in place by the end of September. This would add a fourth convoy to the schedule. Even more consequential was the change made in the level of reserve supplies. The War Department’s early plans of 5 June had been based on an initial level of 60-day supply, to be raised and maintained at a 90-day level by the time the operation was completed. But on 21 June the Chief of Staff approved a recommendation made by the War Plans Division on the same day that supply requirements (except ammunition) be increased to a 90-day level, to be raised to a 180-day level within the period scheduled for the troop movement. The effect was that cargo requirements were doubled. Instead of approximately 230,000 ship tons of cargo to be handled along with the troops, the figure now jumped to the neighborhood of 450,000 tons. By thus changing one of the basic conditions, the War Department made General Chaney’s plan entirely impracticable; for if the limitation on the draft of vessels, insisted upon by General Chaney and the British, were to be observed, the Navy noted, a total of seventy-five cargo vessels would be necessary.

45 Rad, TAG to SPOBS, No. 18, 28 Jun 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO "A."
47 Memo, Gross, G-4, for ACoFS WPD, 5 Jun 41 and accompanying Tonnage and Cubage of Equipment of Army Troops, OPD-GHQ INDIGO “A”; Memo, WPD for CofS, 21 Jun 41, sub: U.S. Forces for INDIGO, WPD 4493-15, sec. 1; Memo Capt Oscar Smith, USN, for Lt Col Leven C. Allen, WPD, 20 Jun 41, sub: Logistics Involved . . ., OPD-GHQ INDIGO.
Using troop and cargo figures furnished by the War Plans Division, the Navy Department now worked up a convoy schedule adapted to the War Department's new requirements. Four convoys, sailing 20 July, 25 August, 4 September, and 14 September, were scheduled. To transport the 29,000 or so troops and 445,200 ship tons of cargo there would be required a total of forty-one ships, including the three largest vessels in the American merchant marine. Only three cargo ships of less than twenty-one feet draft were provided, and these were intended for the northern and eastern outports. To mitigate unloading problems at Reykjavik, three steam lighters were to be taken along, under tow, in the first convoy. In submitting the schedule on 20 June, Capt. Oscar Smith of the Navy Department gave no assurance, however, that the required vessels would be available. The shipping situation, he pointed out, had become serious, and on this account it was essential, he continued, that requirements be reduced to the minimum.48

The general situation was further beclouded by growing uncertainty within the War Department. Despite the substitution of the 5th Division for the 1st Division, the War Plans Division continued to view with alarm the effect of the Iceland expedition upon the Army's readiness to put its basic war plans into execution. The selectee problem was emphasized at every opportunity. The cost of the construction program was stressed. And when the President began to express his fears that the proposed force was inadequate and intimated that it might be well for the British garrison to remain in addition to the American forces, General Gerow countered with the thought that the whole operation be called off, since it was dictated by political considerations rather than military necessity.49

G-4, the Logistics Division of the General Staff, took a similarly pessimistic view. The bottleneck, according to G-4, was not shipping but rather the inadequate wharf facilities at Reykjavik and Hvalfjordhur. And on this premise, Brig. Gen. Eugene E. Reybold, chief of the division, questioned the feasibility of all the proposals so far considered. It was evident, he asserted, that the efforts of the War Department would have to be pointed toward any one or all of the following: toward extending the relief movement beyond September in spite of the danger of stormy weather; toward cutting down the force by perhaps providing for a joint United States-British garrison; and toward reducing equipment and supplies to bare necessities.50 By recommending that the expedition be limited to a total of 200,000 ship tons of cargo, that

48 Memo, Smith for Allen, 20 Jun 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO.
49 Gerow Diary, entries of 19 and 20 Jun 41.
current planning be modified to conform to this limitation, and that even then the risk of partial failure be accepted, General Reybold helped to knock the Iceland plans into a cocked hat.

Meanwhile, the administrative change was taking shape by which some planning functions held by the War Plans Division were to be turned over to GHQ. GHQ was to have the task of drafting detailed theater plans for the operations assigned to it, while the War Plans Division would continue to draw up the strategic plans that defined and prescribed the operations. In anticipation of this step, General Malony, head of the planning section of the War Plans Division, had been transferred to GHQ on 15 June as deputy chief of staff in charge of plans and operations. His previous assignment had thrown him into the midst of the Iceland preparations, and although the formal directive authorizing the enlargement of GHQ's functions was not issued until 3 July, General Malony almost at once took up where he had left off in the War Department. He was presiding over a conference held in the War Plans Division on 24 June when Colonel Griner arrived from London with General Chaney's recommendations. Next day the two planning staffs, WPD and GHQ, met in an effort to fit General Chaney's plan into the mosaic being pieced together in the War Department, but the result, as the GHQ Diary records, was "pretty confused and obscure." 51

On the following Tuesday, 1 July, the Army-Navy Joint Planning Committee finally completed and submitted to the Joint Board the basic directive for the Iceland operation. Given the short title INDIGO, it was intended to be the definitive joint plan to which all subsequent planning should conform. 52 Unfortunately it emerged stillborn. The plan failed to survive a policy decision taken the very same day, a decision that was partly the culmination of the War Department's approach to the problem and partly the result of the President's fears that the proposed garrison was inadequate.

Heretofore the confusion and the vacillation and the irreconcilable plans had generally arisen over a question of method, of how to transport to Iceland by a definite date a specified number of men with a given amount of supplies and equipment. But the tendency to approach a solution by changing the terms of the proposition gradually developed, and the more pronounced this tendency became, the larger grew the area susceptible to dispute and revision.

51 Memo, WPD for CoS, 19 Jun 41, sub: Enlargement of the Functions of GHQ, WPD 3209-10; GHQ Diary, AGF file 314.81, 6-23-41 to 3-4-42; Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 15-20. See also, in the same series, Cline, The Operations Division, pp. 65-67.
52 Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan for the Occupation of Iceland by a Permanent Garrison of the U.S. Army (short title: INDIGO), submitted 1 Jul 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO "B"
Shuffling the supply requirements had necessitated several changes in plan before the INDIGO directive finally established a convoy schedule by cutting back the bulk of reserves to a 90-day level, and by setting a 200,000-ton limit on cargo, and making a corresponding reduction in the number of cargo transports. General Gerow, head of the War Plans Division, had privately urged that the operation be abandoned. G-4 had suggested the possibility of reducing the size of the force and had formally recommended extending the date of the movement. Now, on 1 July, the size of the American force was brought seriously into question and the whole INDIGO plan was thrown into discard.

_A New Decision: Reinforcement, Not Relief_

It was primarily President Roosevelt's doubt whether there were enough British troops in Iceland which led, paradoxically, to the reduction in size of the American force. Informed of his views, the British Foreign Office in late June gave a definite pledge that no troops would be withdrawn until both the United States and Britain were satisfied that the defenses of Iceland were secure. The Foreign Office agreed that it would not be an "over-insurance" for the American force to be increased by an additional "brigade group" (about 7,100 men) and by greater air strength. That the British garrison would be completely relieved was still the understanding of the Foreign Office, which at this moment was in fact using the withdrawal of British troops as an argument to persuade the Icelandic Government to request American protection. When it finally reached President Roosevelt, the rather lukewarm invitation voiced a concern similar to his own. The Icelanders wanted "picked troops" to be sent and, as one of several conditions on which American protection would be accepted, the Icelandic Government stated:

... it is considered obvious that if the United States undertake defense of the country it must be strong enough to meet every eventuality, and particularly in the beginning it is expected that, as far as possible, efforts will be made to prevent any special danger in connection with change-over. Iceland Government lays special stress on there being sufficient airplanes for defensive purposes, wherever they are required and [wherever] they can be used, as soon as decision is made for the United States to undertake the defense of the country.

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54 Ltr, British Ambassador Lord Halifax to Under Socy of State Welles, 28 Jun 41; Telg, Foreign Office to Halifax, 28 Jun 41; Ltr, Welles to Marshall, 20 Jun 41. All in OPD-GHQ INDIGO "A." Rpt of Conf between the British and American Ministers to Iceland and the Prime Minister (Iceland) from American Minister to Socy of State, 28 Oct 41, GHQ 320.2 Iceland—Strength.
55 _Defense of Iceland by U.S. Forces: Agreement Between the United States of America and Iceland_, Department of State Executive Agreement Series 232, No. 1703 (Washington, 1942). (In the interest of clarity, a few changes of punctuation have been made in the quoted extract.)
The War Plans Division, on the other hand, had deprecated any suggestion that the force provided in the INDIGO plan be increased.\footnote{Memo, WPD for CoS, 1 Jul 41, sub: Relief of British, INDIGO, WPD 4493–37, sec. 1.} Reinforcing the British, instead of relieving them, was the alternative; and this was the solution adopted by the President. From Hyde Park he telephoned Admiral Stark that the marines were to go to Iceland at once and that the Army was to send whatever force would be necessary for relieving the marines and for providing an adequate garrison, joined with the British.\footnote{Memo, CNO for Dir of War Plans (USN), 1 Jul 41, OPD–GHQ INDIGO “A.”} The invitation from Iceland to take over the task of defense, its acceptance by the President, the orders for the marines to resume their voyage (they had been held at Argentina for three days in expectation of the Icelandic request), and the decision that the Army would reinforce the British, not relieve them, all came on the same day, 1 July 1941.

Neither General Chaney nor the British had been forewarned; both were understandably puzzled at the new development, and the immediate response was a surprised protest from the British Admiralty. “Planning here [London] has been based on the assumption that it was the United States intention to replace British troops in Iceland,” the Admiralty expostulated. The only questions previously raised, continued the Admiralty, had concerned, first, the overlap between the arrival of American troops and the departure of the British, and second, the matter of air strength. Now came the news that the British were to remain. “Can you help to elucidate?” the Admiralty asked the Joint Staff Mission in Washington; while General Chaney sent a similar query to the War Department.\footnote{Admiralty to Jt Staff Mission, 3 Jul 41, OPD–GHQ INDIGO “A.”} No clarification was forthcoming until 5 July when the War Plans Division informed Chaney:

The following resulted from conference today. Administration plans to ask Congress at early date to remove legal restrictions on employment of Reserve Officers and Selectees. This request will provoke bitter Congressional controversy. Consequent delay will prevent total relief as originally planned. Revised plan tentatively approved at conference contemplates token relief only of relatively small number British troops and relief of Marines. This limited relief will be possible only if legislative restrictions are removed. . . .\footnote{Memo, WPD for TAG, 5 Jul 41 (with Cable 22 to SPOBS), WPD 4493–37, sec. 1.}  

The claim was not made, as it was soon afterwards, that the legal restrictions themselves caused the original INDIGO plan to be abandoned; and as for the effect of Congressional controversy over lifting them, if the President
had already made up his mind to ask their removal when he made the Iceland decision on 1 July, the War Plans Division had apparently been kept uninformed of his intentions. But the release of the Chief of Staff’s biennial report on the morning of Thursday, 3 July, opened the question to public discussion. Immediately the leaders of isolationist opinion let loose a barrage of criticism against General Marshall’s recommendation that the twelve-month limitation on the length of service be removed. Recklessly outspoken in his opposition, Senator Burton K. Wheeler was quoted by The New York Times as being “reliably informed” that “American troops will embark for Iceland. . .,” and was further reported as having announced the specific date of sailing.60 President Roosevelt, who had been at Hyde Park for the past week, suddenly changed his plans to remain there over the weekend, and took the train for Washington Friday night. His first move the next morning was to call together Secretary Stimson, Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, and Acting Secretary of State Welles, along with Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and General Marshall, for a discussion of the Iceland problem. The result of the conference was embodied in the message sent to General Chaney later in the day, but neither the President nor Secretary Stimson as yet saw fit to comment publicly on the recommendations in General Marshall’s report. Then, on the following Monday, 7 July, Presidential Secretary Stephen T. Early dropped a guarded hint to the press that a message to Congress asking an extension of the twelve-month limit of service was to be expected. It was almost completely overshadowed, however, by the announcement, simultaneously made, that American marines had landed in Iceland.61

The First American Forces Land in Iceland

With the marines were the Army officers designated for the Iceland survey in early June. Two others, Lt. Col. Clarence N. Iry, and Maj. Richard S. Whitcomb, joined the convoy at Argentia, and by taking a Navy patrol plane reached Iceland three days before the convoy arrived. This would, Whitcomb thought, give them a better opportunity to see how the convoy was unloaded.62

Thanks to unusually good weather, to the co-operation of the British, and doubtless to the fact that three of the four troop transports were com-

60 The New York Times, Friday, July 4, 1941.
61 Ibid., Saturday, July 5, Sunday, July 6, and Tuesday, July 8, 1941.
62 Memo, Maj Whitcomb for Col Dillon, 27 Jun 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO “A.”
pletely combat loaded, the vessels finished discharge sooner than Colonel Iry and Major Whitcomb expected. In four days the ships were ready to return. Perhaps most noteworthy was the fact that the two cargo ships *Hamul* and *Arcturus*, though drawing twenty-two and twenty-three feet, were able to berth at the inner harbor docks at high tide, where, by speeding up the operations as much as possible and by keeping the ships evenly trimmed so that they could rest on the bottom in safety, they were able to unload without particular difficulty in spite of the shallow depth at low water. The other vessels discharged over the beach. The most serious problem was a lack of shore transportation, as a result of which cargo piled up on the beach and docks faster than it could be removed. In the interest of speedily emptying the vessels, orderliness was sacrificed.\(^{63}\) The Icelanders were tremendously

\(^{63}\) The convoy operations are described in the following reports: U.S. Naval Observer (First Provisional Marine Brigade) to CNO, 15 Jul 41, and Ltr, Commandant, USMC, to CNO, 28 Jul 41. Both in WPD 4493–74, sec. 3; Col Iry to ColEngrs, no date, WPD 4493–57, sec. 3; Msg, COMTRANSDIV TWO to COMBATDIV FIVE, 19 Jul 41, OPD–GHQ INDIGO "A."
impressed, not, however, by the confusion and disorder, but by the vast store of supplies and equipment that the marines brought north with them.64

The next actual step toward implementing the President's decision of 1 July was the departure of the 33d Pursuit Squadron and attached units on 27 July. Although he had made it abundantly clear that the size and composition of the force was a matter for the Army to determine, the President had just as clearly expressed his opinion, as he had in the case of Bermuda and Newfoundland, that the thing to do was to get some planes on the spot at once. The War Plans Division, when the decision to reinforce the British was made, had requested General Chaney to confirm the War Department view that a force of one pursuit squadron, one infantry regiment, and a tank company, plus engineers and services—or about 6,300 men—would be adequate. But in the conference of 5 July the President, impatient perhaps at the slow-moving wheels of War Department machinery, specifically directed the Army to send the pursuit squadron without further delay.65 The Joint Planning Committee accordingly began work on a new directive, INDIGO-1. Completed five days later, it provided for the movement of the following units, organized as a task force: the 33d Pursuit Squadron (reduced); 1st Battalion (less two companies), 21st Engineers (Aviation); one composite aircraft warning company; Company A, 392d Quartermaster Battalion (Port); and a number of smaller detachments of medical, ordnance, signal, chemical, weather, and other service units.66 The entire force totaled about 1,100 men and 30 planes. Nothing was said in the directive about the eventual Army garrison, and beyond designating the force the First Echelon, Task Force 4, no provision was made for any future installment. Had all the INDIGO directives taken this approach, the Iceland planning might have been less time-consuming.

Under the command of Lt. Col. Edward M. Morris, the First Echelon, Task Force 4, sailed on 27 July in two elements; the ground component, from New York Port of Embarkation; and the planes and pilots from Norfolk on the newly commissioned carrier Wasp. After meeting at sea in the evening of 28 July, they were formed into one convoy and arrived without incident

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64 Ltr, B. Eric Kuniholm (then U.S. consul, Reykjavik) to Acting Chief of Military History, 21 Apr 59, in OCMH files.
65 Rad, 19, TAG to SPOBS, 2 Jul 41, WPD 4493-34, sec. 1; Gerow Diary, entry of 5 Jul 41.
66 Jt Army and Navy Directive . . . INDIGO-1, submitted to JB, 10 Jul 41, WPD 4493-41, sec. 2; Ltr, TAG to CG's NYPE, Langley Field, and Mitchel Field, and Chiefs, Supply Arms and Services, 15 Jul 41, sub: Task Force 4; and Rad, TAG to CG NYPE, 16 Jul 41. Both in GHQ 2860 Corresp, binder 47.
off Reykjavík on the morning of 6 August.\textsuperscript{67} As the convoy approached the coast of Iceland, the pilots of the 33d Pursuit Squadron flew their planes off the deck of the \textit{Wasp} in what was, for Army Air Corps pilots, a most unusual performance and, for the carrier, a first rehearsal for its two missions to Malta the following spring.

\textit{INDIGO Planning, Second Phase}

GHQ and the War Plans Division were, in the meantime, facing new issues. Procedural questions were no longer the primary concern. The problem, during July and early August, was the substantive issue of what to do and how many troops to do it with. Inextricably involved in this larger issue were a number of special questions brought into prominence by the new situation. The restrictions affecting the service of selectees and members of the Reserve were magnified by the conflict in Congress over the attempt to repeal them. The question of command was made more delicate by the decision to garrison Iceland jointly with the British. And there were as yet undisclosed elements of uncertainty for the marines in the new situation; for if the problem of how to relieve the British could lead to a decision not to relieve them, so might the question of how to relieve the marines.

Under its newly enlarged functions, GHQ had assembled the \textit{INDIGO-I} troops and directed the whole movement. At the same time, a Theater of Operations Plan was well on the way to completion by 10 July. Although the basic issues concerning the total Iceland force were still in doubt, GHQ continued work on the plan and attempted to make it sufficiently elastic to meet any changes in the situation.\textsuperscript{68} The plan assumed that the defense of Iceland would require the force provided in the original \textit{INDIGO} plan, which had never gone into effect; namely, a reinforced division of approximately 27,000 or 30,000 men, including aviation and service units, distributed among four sectors somewhat in accordance with the existing British scheme of defense. Details of supply, and plans covering the complete activities of the technical services, were provided in sixteen annexes. Flexibility was to be achieved by letting the commander of the force relocate the sector boundaries whenever necessary and by leaving undetermined the question of how and when the British and the marines were to be relieved. The only specific

\textsuperscript{67} \textit{INDIGO-I} Directive, 10 Jul 41, cited n. 66; Hq IBC, Rcd of Events, IBC, 14 June 1941–30 June 1942, IBC 344.7.

\textsuperscript{68} Memo, Col Hays, G-3 Sec GHQ, for Planning Sec, GHQ, 10 Jul 41, OPD Misc, Jt Plans—\textit{INDIGO}; Memo, Gen Malony DCofS GHQ for ACofS WPD, 6 Aug 41, WPD 4493–86, sec. 3.
schedule set up in the operations plan was for the movement of a combat team of some 10,000 men, which was to be the initial element of the force and was to arrive in three convoys before 1 October. The First Echelon of the combat team was the 33d Pursuit Squadron and supporting troops which had already sailed; the Second Echelon was to follow in two convoys sailing 22 August and 5 September.69

This force—a balanced combat team of 10,000 men—represented the currently accepted basis of War Department planning at the time the GHQ Operations Plan was submitted to the War Plans Division for review on 6 August. It had, however, been accepted by the War Department only at the specific direction of the President. The War Plans Division, raising its first estimate of 6,200 men at the instance of General Chaney, had set the maximum number at about 7,500 men. Any larger force, the War Department argued, would increase the shipping and supply burden and would require stationing parts of the force in remote outposts, thus complicating an "already difficult" command situation.70 The President, informed of War Department views by General Marshall, was apparently not convinced, and on 16 July he instructed the Army to send a force of 10,000 men to Iceland during 1941. To put the President's order into effect a new joint plan, INDIGO-2, was drawn up, approved by the Joint Board on 23 July, and turned over to GHQ for execution as soon as the President should direct. In forwarding INDIGO-2 to the Secretary of War the Joint Board seems to have recommended that for the attention of the President it be noted that, unless the restrictions on the length of service of selectees were removed in sufficient time to permit sending the troops before 1 September, the marines would have to stay in Iceland until the next year.71

The selectee question was one of those problems that take on a different aspect according to the point from which they are viewed. To General Gerow, who at the time considered the Iceland operation a political move, and not a military necessity, and to the War Plans Division generally, which was concerned by the possible effect of the expedition on the Army's readiness for its long-range strategic tasks, the problem was one of organization or administration and could only be solved by legislative action. The War Plans

69 Theater of Operations Plan, IBC, AG 136 file (1 Aug 41).
70 Memo, SW for the President, sub: Relief of British Troops in Iceland, no date (given to the President by Gen Marshall, 14 Jul 41), WPD 4495-44, sec. 2.
Division would have preferred not to send another additional man to Iceland and to leave the marines and the First Echelon there as the entire American garrison; but this solution, it was recognized, would undoubtedly not have met with the approval of the President. If the 5th Division had to be combed of Regular Army personnel for an expeditionary force, the War Plans Division still believed that the best that could be done was a force similar to the one indicated in the cable to General Chaney of 2 July but modified to make it a balanced combat team of some 5,000. When the First Echelon was being readied for departure it had been anticipated that the engineer detachment would be the greatest problem. As it turned out, the number of selectees in the 21st Engineers, from which the detachment was drawn, was 20 percent less than had been estimated beforehand. Likewise, the transfer of selectees out of the unit designated for the Iceland force proved to be less disruptive than had been originally feared. Before the transfer was made, the entire regiment had a ratio of thirteen Regular Army men to every twenty selectees; after the transfer, the ratio, in the units that were left behind, stood at nine to twenty. Although the reduction seriously hindered the assimilation of new selectees, it did not vitally interfere with the training or functioning of the regiment. There is no evidence that from this experience the War Plans Division derived any measure of optimism. From the point of view of the Chief of Staff the problem affected the Iceland force less directly, but even more adversely, for, to General Marshall, the major consideration was that nothing be done that might militate against the passage of the bill for removal of the selectee restrictions. Any intimation that the War Department was preparing a task force would certainly have scuttled the bill. Regardless of the practicability of shifting selectees, all such preparations as this were consequently ordered suspended by the Chief of Staff on the eve of his departure for the Argentia conference.

By this time the British had less need to transfer their Iceland troops to the Middle East. There had been a lull in the North African fighting since late June. In preparation for the renewal of the campaign, the British army in Egypt had been increased in strength from forces no longer needed in England, for, with Hitler becoming more and more involved in his Russian adventure, the likelihood of a full-scale invasion of Britain became, in pro-
portion and at an equal rate, more remote. During July, the British Government even sent reinforcements to the extent of a battalion or so to its Iceland garrison. Then the idea of using that island as a training ground for British mountain troops was born, and this was more important than reducing the British garrison, Prime Minister Churchill declared soon after his return from the Argentia conference. But by then the chances that American troops would in the near future relieve any more than a small token force of British had become exceedingly slim.

At Argentia, the Iceland question was thrashed out in the staff conferences held in conjunction with the meetings of President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister. General Marshall agreed that the marines ought not to remain in Iceland, but he feared the effect on the 5th Division of increasing the Army force to the 10,000 men necessary to relieve them. Furthermore, he was confronted with demands for troops to be sent to Brazil and the Azores. Even if the bill extending the length of service of selectees was passed, General Marshall declared, the marines could not be relieved if the Army were to meet its responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere. Then, on 12 August, the last day of the conference, news came from Washington that the bill had passed the House of Representatives by the narrowest possible margin. The Iceland preparations could now be resumed, and General Marshall immediately issued instructions to this effect. Nevertheless, the bill in no way changed the personnel situation with respect to Iceland, since the territorial restrictions on the employment of selectees and Reserve officers, which had been the major limitation, still remained. More important than the passage of the bill was the agreement that the marines would stay in Iceland for the time being. The total American force would consist of 10,000 men, General Marshall informed the War Department, but it was to include the First Echelon and also the marines. The force the Army would have to provide for the Second Echelon would need be only half as large, therefore, as that called for in the INDIGO-2 plan. It conformed very closely to what War Plans Division considered was the best that could be done whether or not the marines stayed on.

75 Prime Minister to Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Gen Ismay, 19 Aug 41, quoted in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 810.
On the day after General Marshall's message was received, there was a brief cessation of activity when it appeared uncertain that the Senate would accept the House version of the selectee bill; but with this hurdle cleared, preparations for sending the Second Echelon went on without pause until the force at last departed three weeks later, on 5 September 1941. The War Plans Division worked out a new joint directive to replace INDIGO-2. The new directive, INDIGO-3, reduced the force to some 5,000 men, provided for the retention in Iceland of the marine brigade, and made minor changes in the administration of supply; otherwise it differed little from the preceding plan. At the same time, members of the headquarters staff of the force were being assigned to duty in Washington, units were ordered to move to New York Port of Embarkation, and the operation was set in motion by GHQ, to whom control of the troops and general responsibility for carrying out the directive had been given.  

The preparations also highlighted the creaks and stresses in the machinery for high command. No precise definition of the relation between GHQ's planning activities and those of the War Plans Division had as yet been formulated, and, more to the point, GHQ's operational functions were inadequate for the performance of its assigned tasks. Tactical command and "operational control" over various outlying bases, it will be remembered, had been turned over to GHQ, but the control of administration and supply had been retained by the respective General Staff divisions and the technical branches. Thus GHQ made its recommendation that existing and proposed bases in Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, and Labrador be combined into a North Atlantic defense command, and that a base depot, transportation facilities, and a replacement pool adequate to the needs of the entire defense command be placed under the control of the commander. The idea was batted back and forth for several weeks, getting a little farther from the original recommendation at each exchange, until, as indicated above, it eventually reappeared as a far-reaching scheme for reorganizing the War Department.

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78 Gerow Diary, entry of 13 Aug 41; Jt Army and Navy Directive . . . INDIGO-3, 16 Aug 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO "B"; Memo, WPD for TAG, 18 Aug 41, WPD 4493–99, sec. 3; GHQ Diary, AGF file 514.81, 6–25–41 to 3–4–42.

79 See above [pg. 385–653].

80 Memo, Lt Col Ernest N. Harmon, G-4 GHQ, for Gen Malony, 22 Jul 41; Memo, Lt Gen Lesley J. McNair, CofS GHQ, for CofS, 25 Jul 41. Both in AGF 320.2, Strength of the Army, binder 1.

To some extent, the disagreement on the subject of a North Atlantic defense command was no more than the common, everyday divergence of opinion among professional experts. General Chaney, for example, accepted the premises on which GHQ based its proposal, but he contended that Iceland was properly a part of the United Kingdom theater and that the Army forces in Iceland should be grouped with the forces in Great Britain, not with those in Newfoundland and Greenland.82

But in a larger measure the disagreement reflected the fundamental question whether GHQ was to be subordinate or coequal to the divisions of the General Staff. The plan to create a North Atlantic defense command was not the only proposal of GHQ to meet with rebuff on this score. A suggestion of General Malony that GHQ approve in advance all instructions for the movement of supplies and personnel to Iceland was given short shrift by the War Plans Division on the ground that "a subordinate echelon should never be given power of approval or disapproval of the action of a higher echelon," and the same issue was, perhaps, implicit in the condescending reception accorded by the War Plans Division to the Operations Plan drawn up by GHQ.83 Unfortunately, nothing in Army Regulations or the War Department Mobilization Plan specified whether the staff of the Commanding General of the Field Forces or that of the Chief of Staff was the higher echelon. But in spite of the stress and strain of which all this creaking and grating was evidence, the Iceland preparations were carried on to completion.

There were elements of interservice conflict in the matter of command of the combined United States forces in Iceland. Under the INDIGO plans, the combined force was to be under the command of the senior officer present, whether of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, but the presence of a combined force beyond a brief overlapping period while the relief of the marines was in progress had not been contemplated. The possibility that Army forces would be placed under the naval or Marine Corps commander, except the First Echelon and that only briefly, was exceedingly remote. Now, with the marines scheduled for an indefinite stay in Iceland, the prospect was changed, because Brig. Gen. John L. Homer, who had been designated commander of the Army forces, was junior by some eighteen months to General Marston,

82 Ltr, Gen Chaney to Gen Malony, DCofS GHQ, 28 Aug 41, WPD 4493–126, sec. 4.
83 Memo, Gen Malony for ACofS WPD, 31 Jul 41; Memo (unused) WPD for CofS, Aug 41, sub: War Department Orders Concerning War Plans Turned Over to GHQ for Operations, WPD 4493–77, sec. 3; WPD D/F to GHQ, 3 Sep 41, sub: Operations Plan, IBC, WPD 4493–86, sec. 3.
commander of the marine brigade. The Navy Department, agreeing that the mission of the combined force was essentially an Army mission and that the Army should therefore command, suggested the appointment of a major general with General Homer and General Marston each retaining command of the Army and Marine Corps forces under them. There was much in favor of the suggestion. Since the 5th Division was to furnish most of the troops for the garrison, it would be logical for the commanding general of that division to command the force. Furthermore, the British forces in Iceland were under the command of a major general. On the other hand, GHQ and the War Plans Division pointed out, it would involve the addition of another headquarters and the insertion of "an unnecessary echelon" in the chain of command.\textsuperscript{84} These objections were overruled when the Chief of Staff returned from the Argentia conference, and on 18 August, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, who had succeeded General Cummins as commanding general of the 5th Division, was informed of his appointment to command the Iceland force.\textsuperscript{85}

There was still the question of how General Bonesteel was to exercise command. The currently prescribed method was that of "unity of command," which imposed definite restrictions, however, upon the authority of the commanding officer. Under "unity of command" General Bonesteel would have had no administrative or disciplinary control over the Navy and Marine Corps forces that were, for tactical purposes, placed under his command.\textsuperscript{86} General Marshall, who had long been concerned over the problem, and General Bonesteel both considered this limited authority inadequate to the needs of the Iceland situation. A possible solution was finally found in an act of 1916 by which the President could order Marine Corps personnel detached for duty with the Army, and which would thus give the commanding officer full command over the combined force. The Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps vigorously proffered a number of reasons why this should not be done, but with the wholehearted support of Admiral Stark the arguments of General Marshall prevailed.\textsuperscript{87

\textsuperscript{84} Ltr, AG GHQ, to Gen Homer, 15 Aug 41, sub: Assumption of Command, Second Echelon, Task Force 4, GHQ 320.2 INDIGO, binder 3; Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 Aug 41, sub: Comd of INDIGO Force, WPD 4493-95, sec. 5.
\textsuperscript{85} GHQ Diary, AGF file 314.81, 6-23-41 to 3-4-42. The official letter orders designating General Bonesteel commander of the force were sent on 20 August, effective that date (GHQ 312.1 INDIGO).
\textsuperscript{86} Jt Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 (Rev), ch. II; Memo, CofS for CNO, 5 Sep 41, WPD 4493-107, sec. 4.
\textsuperscript{87} JAG Memo for WPD, 29 Aug 41, sub: Exercise of Commd and Disciplinary Powers . . . , WPD 4493-95, sec 3; Informal Ltr, CofS to CNO, 9 Sep 41, GHQ-OPD INDIGO "B."
after General Bonesteel and the Second Echelon landed at Reykjavík, the President, in his capacity of Commander in Chief of the armed forces, ordered the marine brigade attached to the Army for the duration of its stay in Iceland. The objections of the Marine Corps, minor differences of opinion concerning phraseology, and the question whether an Executive order would be more appropriate, had delayed the President’s directive well beyond the departure of the force. As a result, General Bonesteel had carried with him two sets of instructions that were identical except that one provided for the marines to be attached to the Army.

A Backward Glance at the INDIGO Planning

The Second Echelon was ready to depart by 4 September, almost exactly three months after the decision to launch the operation had been made. During the first of the intervening months War Department planners had been occupied with the practical aspects of the problem. What the operation was to be had been agreed upon; how to carry it out was the objective of the planners during June. The decision to send the marines to Iceland, the failure of the War Department and SPOBS to agree on several particulars, the variety of data, the number of agencies involved in planning and the entrance of GHQ into the planning picture just at this time, the misgivings

88 For the marines’ own account of their duty in Iceland, including the command issue, see Frank O. Hough, Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., “History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II,” Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, (Washington, 1958), vol. 1, ch. 4. It should be noted that in subsequent operations during World War II the marines were not attached to the Army for duty. After Iceland, unity of command was employed with highly successful results using the principle of operational, but not administrative control.

89 Directive, President to SW and SN, 22 Sep 41; JAG Memo for WPD, 29 Aug 41, sub: Attachment of Troops of USMC . . . to Army; Ltr, CNO to CofS, 13 Sep 41; Ltr, CofS to CNO, 15 Sep 41. All in WPD 4493-95, sec. 3.
of G–4 and of the War Plans Division concerning the feasibility of the operation, all hampered the early efforts of the planners.

Then came a time of indecision, from early July to mid-August. The nature of the operation having once been changed, to change it still further whenever obstacles appeared in the way was the path of least resistance. Total relief of the British was discarded, first, in favor of reinforcing the British and relieving the marines, and then in favor of reinforcing the marines and relieving a small token force of the British. Between these two proposals, in point of effect as well as time, a number of choices had been considered and rejected, and a stopgap measure (the sending of the First Echelon) had been adopted. There were two elements in the situation that most contributed to the indecision of midsummer. The President continued to fear that the garrison provided would prove to be inadequate for the defense of Iceland. At the same time the War Department was obliged to move slowly and softly, even to the point of making no progress, in order not to jeopardize the enactment of the new selective service legislation. With the passage of the bill in August, plans could be pushed forward. The final three weeks prior to the departure of the force were spent in getting the movement actually under way and in clearing up details that could not be attacked until the size and nature of the force had been determined.

One of the more noticeable developments during the summer was the change in the role played by General Chaney and the Special Observer Group. SPOBS at first seemed slated for a large share of the planning. It was not long, however, before the War Department came to consider the London Observer Group as nothing more than its name implied. Although Chaney's advice on matters of policy continued to be sought from time to time, SPOBS was more often regarded as a fact-finding and liaison agency. There was an equally noticeable duplication of effort, particularly in the collection of data. It seemed to the American consul, Mr. B. Eric Kuniholm, that no sooner had he presented one survey party to Icelandic officials than another group was arriving and seeking identical information. Although specialization might justify the number and variety of surveys that were undertaken, the technicians tended to overstep the bounds of their specialties. Furthermore, not many had time for extended firsthand surveys; all of them relied heavily upon a common source for their data. The situation was summed up with a trace of understatement by Colonel Iry, one of the first official visitors, who asserted that British officers were "somewhat sur-

90 Ltr, Kuniholm to Acting Chief of Military History, 21 Apr 59, OCMH files.
prised at the number of Americans who have asked them for the same in-
formation." The various reports were, as a consequence, individually prolix
and collectively repetitious. As a further result, identical data were occasion-
ally transmitted to the War Department through several different channels.

One occasion, what seemed to be corroborative opinion, independ-
ently reached and based on British sources, proved instead to be a rehash of
the War Department’s own views. The War Plans Division, in its messages
of 2 July and 5 July, had requested General Chaney to consult with British
authorities and to forward his recommendations concerning the newly pro-
posed American force. The War Office, with whom Chaney conferred, in
turn cabled General Curtis for his opinion. As it turned out, the American
survey party to which Colonel Iry and Colonel Green belonged was then in
Iceland and General Curtis asked the American officers what they would
recommend as to the size and composition of the force. Thus, the views of
the American survey party were in actual fact the basis for General Chaney’s
recommendations to Washington.

As for the plans themselves, there was a certain lack of agreement be-
tween the INDIGO plans and the Theater of Operations Plan in the matter of
command relations, both between the Army and Navy and between the
United States and British forces. There was also an assumption of perman-
ency characterizing the INDIGO plans, as President Roosevelt pointed out,
and at the same time there was a minute attention to details. Detail was
unavoidable, because few if any of the supplies and services necessary to
maintain the garrison could be procured in Iceland. Coal, clothing, food,
engineer supplies, signal equipment, housing, laundry equipment, facilities
for hospitalization, recreation, and shoe repair, all had to be shipped in
from the United States. Everything, down to the utmost particular, had to be
provided for. As an ad hoc operational plan the original INDIGO plan was
therefore not sufficiently general to accommodate itself to changes in basic
conditions; and in its character of a directive it was so detailed as to lack
precision. But what effect these failings had, and what the effect would have
been had the planning been faultless, is a matter of conjecture; for the INDIGO
directives were drawn up in accordance with, and changed to conform to,
the projected operations. Thus GHQ was not given, for its Theater of Opera-
tions Plan, a clear-cut definition of the limits within which the operations
were to be conducted.

91 Ltr, Col Iry, Rpt on Trip to Iceland, to CofEngrs (draft copy dated 23 Jul 41),
GHQ 2860—Corresp, binder 47.
92 Memo, President for SW and SN, 28 Aug 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO “B.”
CHAPTER XIX

Establishing the Iceland Base Command

The hot and hectic summer of 1941 was drawing to a close when, toward the end of August, men and cargo for the Second Echelon of the Army's Iceland task force began arriving at the staging area of the New York Port of Embarkation. The sailing date had been set between the first and the fifth days of September. By 4 September some 5,000 troops of the 10th Infantry Regiment, the 5th Engineers, the 46th Field Artillery Battalion, and various service units had arrived and were ready to embark. Throughout that day the men moved to the port, boarded the four troopships—Heywood, William P. Biddle, Harry L. Lee, and Republic—and at 8 o'clock the next morning, 5 September 1941, the convoy got under way. Guarded through coastal waters by vessels of the First and Third Naval Districts, the transports and accompanying freighters on the following day picked up their ocean escort and destroyer screen at a meeting point off the coast of Maine.¹ On the evening of 11 September they were ploughing through the North Atlantic somewhere south of Greenland when the voice of President Roosevelt came over the radio announcing an attack on the USS Greer—he called it piracy—and declaring that German or Italian vessels of war would henceforth "at their own peril" enter waters essential to the defense of the United States. The convoy at this moment was skirting the strongest concentration of submarines the Germans had as yet assembled in the North Atlantic, which for two days past had been raising hob with a large Anglo-Canadian convoy to the northward. Although the American convoy had its route changed several times in an effort to avoid the scene of action, seven U-boats were picked up by the

destroyers' sound gear and one submarine was attacked "under favorable circumstances." Four days later, during the night of 15–16 September, the convoy reached Iceland safely.²

In Reykjavík, awaiting the convoy's arrival, were two officers of General Bonesteel's command: Lt. Col. Kirby Green, the force G-1, and Lt. Col. Matthew H. Jones, the quartermaster, who had gone on ahead to work out the landing arrangements. By coincidence, the vessel they had traveled on was the Greer. They had been on board at the time of the attack and had arrived in Iceland on the same day the Second Echelon sailed from New York.

The Movement of the Second Echelon, Task Force 4

The movement of the Second Echelon had been carefully studied and observed by officers from GHQ so that the experience gained might be preserved for the benefit of future operations. A comparison with the movement of the First Echelon revealed improvement in operational planning. During the loading of the First Echelon in July, cargo had arrived at the port in helter-skelter fashion and was stowed just as it came in. It had been, in the words of Colonel Morris, commanding officer of the First Echelon, "a remarkable piece of delirium."³ Cargo for the Second Echelon was, for the most part, assembled before the vessels were ready to load. More complete data concerning shipments were made available to the port authorities and to force headquarters before the actual loading commenced, and it was generally agreed that operations proceeded more smoothly than those of the First Echelon. Nevertheless, according to Brig. Gen. Homer M. Groninger, commander of the New York Port of Embarkation, there were still too many last-minute changes and orders from too many sources. Members of the headquarters staff arrived before loading started and stayed throughout the operations, but had they come a week earlier the ships could have been worked that much sooner. Although the delay did not postpone the scheduled sailing, it did tie up transportation facilities at the port longer than necessary.⁴

Unloading operations at Reykjavik were better planned and more closely

² Ltr, Adm Stark (signed “Betty”) to Adm T. C. Hart, 22 Sep 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 16, pp. 2209–11; Memo, Maj Charles K. Gailey, Jr., for SGS, 16 Sep 41, WPD 4493-134, sec. 4.
³ Ltr, Col Morris to Col Harmon, G-4 (GHQ), 14 Aug 41, OPD-GHQ Misc files, 093 Iceland.
⁴ Memo, Lt Col Gordon de L. Carrington, G-1 (GHQ), for CofS GHQ, 1 Sep 41, sub: Rpt on Visit to NYPE, OPD-GHQ Iceland (INDIGO, vol. 2); Memo, Lt Col Josef R. Sheetz, Acting G-4 (GHQ) for DCofS GHQ, 27 Sep 41, OPD-GHQ 093 Insular Possessions (INDIGO).
GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS

supervised than those of the First Echelon. So that the problem could be studied during the voyage, General Bonesteel’s headquarters had been provided with cargo manifests as soon as the convoy sailed; while, in Iceland, a preliminary plan of discharge was sketched out by Major Whitcomb, who had been the quartermaster representative in Iceland since early July. Major Whitcomb, a Reserve officer, whose attitude toward superior rank was at first a source of astonishment to a polished, well-schooled professional like General Bonesteel, was a man of considerable ability in his own particular field of port operations and of abundant energy in many directions. His plan was the basis for the arrangements made by Colonels Green and Jones. In summary, it provided for the following: the two vessels loaded with the most vehicles were to be berthed alongside the piers first; after them the vessels with the most nonperishable stores were to be docked; and last of all the vessels with perishable supplies. Cargo vessels that were waiting their turn to dock and the troopships, which were too large to enter the harbor, were to lighter their cargo to the piers by covered tenders and land their vehicles on nearby beaches by tank lighters. Personnel were to disembark by boats and tenders, preferably to one of the beaches, and if not there, to the Reykjavík piers. Whitcomb was insistent that the open tank lighters not be used to land general cargo, for this was before the days of waterproofed cartons.

As soon as the Second Echelon arrived, General Bonesteel called a conference at his headquarters on board the transport Republic to decide upon the details; but, when it came to carrying out the actual operations, much of the planning gave way to improvisation. Two of the cargo vessels, carrying about 60 percent of the vehicles, the lighter vehicles, were docked pretty much according to plan and discharged their cargo directly to the pier. But with the Navy insisting importunately upon a speedy turnaround, every type of craft that could be found was pressed into service to discharge the four troop transports and the other two cargo vessels that lay outside the harbor. Tank lighters and landing craft, and motor launches belonging to the naval escorts, and one of the Icelandic fishing vessels, were all employed to transfer cargo from the Norwalk, a former American coastwise vessel, small and rather shallow draft, that had arrived in Iceland with supplies about a week before the convoy, was put to use transferring cargo from the Republic. Motor vehicles were lightered ashore to the beaches, but all the other cargo and all personnel were landed at the docks. The port company

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5 G-4 Admin Order 1–41, Reykjavík, 5 Sep 41, Debarkation and Unloading Order; IBC, Transportation Corps Historical Record, Jul 1941–Oct 1943, exhibit M.
that had arrived as part of the First Echelon was too small to do the job and the troops of the Second Echelon were inexperienced. High winds, heavy seas, and pouring rain almost constantly hindered operations and at times forced a complete halt. As Whitcomb had feared, cartons that through lack of tarpaulins had been soaked by rain and spray spilled their contents on the docks, and the result was considerable loss and some pilfering. By 25 September the troop transports and the two vessels at the docks had been completely unloaded and half the vehicles on board the other two cargo vessels had been landed.\textsuperscript{6} During the nine days, 9,746 tons, by weight, of general cargo and 511 vehicles, weighing about 1,953 tons, were discharged. All troops disembarked on 24–25 September, and work was commenced on the

\textsuperscript{6} Ltr, Lt Col George Forster to Col Harmon, 25 Sep 41, OPD–GHQ Iceland 093; Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to Gen Marshall, 10 Oct 41, OPD–GHQ INDIGO "B."
two remaining cargo vessels with a much reduced labor force. On 3 October the last box came ashore. Some 5,000 men, with 15,390 dead-weight tons of general cargo and 641 vehicles weighing 2,717 tons, had landed on the island.7

General Bonesteel established his headquarters at Camp Tadcaster, soon renamed Camp Pershing, some two miles east of Reykjavik and about a mile from British headquarters at Camp Alabaster. The troops were concentrated principally in five or six camps in the neighborhood of Alafoss, eight or ten miles northeast of the force headquarters, in locations fixed primarily by the availability of land and existing facilities and featured by the lack of first-class roads. (Map IV)

Problems of Defense: Ground and Air

The whole matter of defense was complicated by Iceland's varied, never gentle topography. The island is large, roughly oval in shape, with a bare and desolate clawlike peninsula jutting out to the northwest. Its area of about 39,700 square miles is nearly that of Kentucky or Virginia and somewhat larger than that of Indiana. A rugged interior plateau, partly covered with great snow fields and glaciers and capped by a chain of volcanic mountains that rise to a height of almost 7,000 feet, dominated the tactical problem as it does the island itself. In the southwest there are two low-lying coastal plains, one at the head of Faxaflói and the other between the river Ölfusá and Mýrdalsjökull. From them, narrow river valleys lead up into the central tableland, and elsewhere around the coast deep fjords, separated by rocky promontories, penetrate some twenty miles or more into the interior. In the coastal lowlands and river valleys, comprising scarcely 7 percent of the entire area, most of the island's 120,000 inhabitants lived in scattered hamlets or on isolated farms. Reykjavík, with a population in 1941 of 39,000, was the only fair-sized city as well as the capital. Akureyri, on the northern coast, was second in size with a population of only 5,300. Communications across the barren central plateau were, in 1941, limited to one dubious road, frequently snowblocked in winter, that ran across the base of the western peninsula. Around the island there were stretches where roads were entirely lacking.8

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7 Hq IBC, Rcd of Events, Jun 41-Jun 45, IBC 314.7. Recapitulation of all Supplies Shipped to Iceland by Vessel, OPD-GHQ files. In measurement, or ship tons, the total cargo discharged amounted to 46,974 tons.
8 Clark, Iceland and Greenland, is an excellent survey of the geography of Iceland.
The British had provided for the defense of Iceland by sectors. Under the plan then current, the island was divided into five sectors, four of which contained areas of strategic importance requiring ground, antiaircraft, and coastal defenses. The Southwestern Sector, comprising the Reykjavik–Keflavik Peninsula area, was the smallest but most important. To its defense, the British had assigned some 10,500 troops. In the Western Sector, immediately adjoining, about 7,300 troops covered the land and air approaches to Reykjavik and manned the defenses of the naval anchorage in Hvalfjördur and the airfield at Kaldadharnes. Thus, about 70 percent of the entire British garrison was stationed within a thirty-mile radius of the Reykjavik docks. The Northwestern Sector was so organized as to protect the only road connection with the north coast, on a line running from Borgarnes in the south to Blönduós in the north, and for this purpose some 1,350 troops were assigned to the sector. Eastward from Blönduós a road led to the port of Akureyri. Beyond Akureyri a road of sorts extended about 60 miles to Lake Mývatn, but after that land communications became virtually nonexistent. Except for short stretches in the extreme eastern end of the island near Seyðisfjörður and Búðhreyri and equally short stretches on the southern coast, roads became mere bridle paths and even these disappeared in places. The Northeastern Sector therefore comprised two widely separated centers of defense relatively inaccessible to each other and epitomized this aspect of the defense problem of the whole island. Some 3,500 men were stationed in the neighborhood of Akureyri for the protection of the port and seaplane anchorage and for the defense of the landing field at nearby Melgerdhi. Another 1,800 troops were assigned to the Northeastern Sector and stationed in the Seyðisfjörður-Búðhreyri area, which included a potential landing place for seaplanes on Lagarfljót (Lake Logurinn). These four sectors accounted for the whole of the British garrison, approximately 24,400 men; for no troops were assigned to the Central Sector, where a descent by hostile forces upon the mountainous wastelands or on the barren coast would have been difficult and led nowhere.9

The British scheme of defense assumed that the threat to be guarded against was an invasion of the island, an operation which Hitler had considered in June 1940 as a preliminary to the invasion of Britain, but which the German naval staff had flatly and successfully opposed. Iceland was,

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9 Defense of Iceland and Other Papers (17th Airborne Division), IBC 381; Jt Army-Navy Operations Plan, 28 Oct 41, and FO 1, CG Iceland, 15 Nov 41. Both in GHQ 381 INDIGO, binder 1.
however, just within range of German bombers in Norway, and the *Bismarck*'s foray into the Atlantic had shown what might happen if Hitler transferred other units to Norwegian bases, as he constantly suggested doing.\(^\text{10}\)

If a large-scale invasion seemed hardly possible, particularly after the start of the Russian campaign, a "hit and run" assault by air or naval raiders appeared to be distinctly probable. Because of the topography, defense against this contingency required a sizable garrison; and in any event the more remote but possible contingency could not be entirely ignored. To those responsible for carrying out the mission of defense, the garrison, for this reason, seldom seemed adequate. In June, during the early planning, the question of additional air strength had been raised, and partially to fill this need the 33d Pursuit Squadron had been sent to Iceland. In the course of the summer, while plans for the relief of the British garrison were in progress in Washington, that same garrison was being reinforced with additional troops from England. In August, a Marine Corps study concluded that under existing circumstances a major landing attack on Iceland appeared to be improbable and that the combined naval forces of the United States and Great Britain available in the area, coupled with a strong air force in the same area, should be able to block any German attempt without the intervention of shore defenses; but that, should the existing military and naval situation change radically to the disadvantage of the United States and Great Britain, an adequate defense of the island would require five reinforced infantry divisions, four pursuit squadrons, two bomber squadrons, two attack squadrons (seaplanes), one patrol squadron (PBY’s), and appropriate naval defense forces.\(^\text{11}\)

The alternative to a perimeter defense with strong ground concentrations at a few obvious invasion targets was, perhaps, an overwhelming air force capable of sweeping wide off the coast to intercept an invader; but in 1941 the planes were not to be had, air base facilities in Iceland were inadequate, and the lessons of the war in the Pacific were still in the future. Considering the terrain, the poor communications, the assumption concerning the nature of the threat against the island, and the resources available for defending it, the British plan doubtless provided the most feasible defense.

GHQ took a similar approach. The most striking difference between the British plan and the Operations Plan drawn up by GHQ as a guide for the American forces lay in the disposition of the ground troops. The GHQ plan


\(^{11}\) Estimate of the Situation (Defense of Iceland), First Marine Brigade (Provisional), 5 Aug 41, WPD 4493-105, sec. 4.
assigned 21,131 troops, about 82 percent of the total planned garrison, to the Reykjavik sector; 1,372 to the Borgarnes-Bordheyri-Blönduós area; 1,555 to Akureyri; and 1,638 to the Seyðisfjörður-Reydarfjörður area. This was a much greater concentration in the Reykjavik area, compared to the British arrangements, and a much thinner spread of strength in the northern and eastern parts of the island. The explanation was doubtless to be found in the provisions concerning the air garrison. The air units provided in the GHQ Operations Plan—the 33d Pursuit Squadron, 9th Bomber Squadron (H), and 1st Observation Squadron—were not much greater in strength than those of the British; but the difference was that the American air units were to be assigned their mission by the Commanding General, Iceland Base Command, were to operate under his direction, and were specifically charged with the support of the ground troops. The primary mission of the RAF in Iceland was, on the other hand, the protection and covering of transatlantic convoys.\(^\text{12}\)

Shortly after General Bonesteel's arrival, General Curtis, commander of the British garrison, outlined his strategic and tactical views to General Bonesteel. The key to the defense of Reykjavik, as General Curtis saw it, was the Vatnseydi Ridge, five or six miles back of the city, which commanded the roads north to Alafoss and Hvalfjörður, south to the small port of Hafnarfjörður and the Keflavik Peninsula, and eastward along the road to Kaldadharnes and Selfoss. Control of the ridge, according to the British commander, would permit rapid counterattack in any of the three directions. From its position around Alafoss, the American mobile reserve was most suitably located for action in the direction of Hvalfjörður; but should the British reserve behind Vatnseydi Ridge be forced to move out to counter a threat from the eastward, the American troops, General Curtis continued, should then be prepared to take the place of the British in support of the ridge.\(^\text{13}\) The major responsibility of the American force would clearly lie, however, in the area to the north and northwest, toward Hvalfjörður.

How this responsibility was to be exercised was for General Bonesteel to decide. Neither the GHQ Operations Plan, being a guide and not a rule, nor the general's instructions specified his relationship to the British garrison and its defense arrangements, except to provide that he should act in "mutual cooperation" with them. No limits had been established within which the

\(^\text{12}\) The Theater of Operations Plan, Iceland Base Command, with annexes, is in AG 136 (1 Aug 41).

\(^\text{13}\) Rough Tactical Notes by Gen Curtis, 25 Sep 41, IBC 091:1 British Data, 1942.
two forces were to co-operate; and except for a general understanding that the American force would be initially assigned to the Reykjavík area, no definite bounds within which the American force was to operate had been laid down. These were matters to be worked out by the two generals and their staffs.

After discussions with the British, General Bonesteel defined the specific mission of the American forces as the defense of an area lying within a line that began at the small hamlet of Hvítarvellir, at the head of Borgarfjördur, and ran along the coast of Gufunes, just outside Reykjavík, thence south to a point on Vatnsendi Ridge, then generally northeast along the shore of Thingvallavatn Lake through the village of Thingvellir, north to Ok Mountain, and finally back again to the coast at Hvítarvellir. The area straddled the boundary between the Western and Northwestern Sectors of the British. Outside the American defense area, antiaircraft units of the marine brigade were stationed alongside British units for the defense of the airport and harbor at Reykjavík; within the area, British units participated in the antiaircraft defense of Hvalfjördur. The task of guarding the coast line was assigned to the marines, with the 10th Infantry held in reserve. Hvalfjördur, important as a naval base, was in the middle of the area to be defended; but there was no convenient way of stationing the mobile reserve there. The road along the coast from Reykjavík was very poor and the shores of the fjord extremely rugged. As it was, the reserve had to be stationed in the southern part of the sector twenty or thirty miles from Hvalfjördur and almost as far as that again from Hvítařvellir.¹⁴

Some 26,800 British and American ground troops, or about 80 percent of the total of the two forces, were available for the defense of the Reykjavík-Hvalfjördur area. Although this was a larger number than the ground defenses fixed by the GHQ Operations Plan for the entire island, General Bonesteel considered it inadequate. He estimated, in reply to a radio from GHQ on 21 October 1941, that in view of the war situation the defense of the Reykjavík area would require some 39,800 troops, including the general reserve to be based there, and that the total garrison necessary for defending the entire island should be about 67,000 troops.¹⁵ Whatever were the theoretical needs, the fact was, as General Bonesteel nevertheless

¹⁴ Hq IBC, Co-operation of Joint Operations, United States and British, 28 Nov 41, IBC 091.1 British Data, 1942; Jt Army-Navy Operations Plan, 28 Oct 41, GHQ 381 INDIGO, binder 1.
¹⁵ Memo, Gen Maloney for CG FF, 6 Nov 41, GHQ 320.2 (INDIGO), binder 3; Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to CofS GHQ, 14 Nov 41, GHQ 381 Defense Plans (IBC), binder 1.
recognized, that the countryside about Reykjavík was approaching the saturation point in the matter of accommodating troops; for within a dozen miles of the city there were crowded nearly a hundred camps and installations ranging upwards in size from platoon strength.  

Much the same situation prevailed with respect to the air garrison. The British had, based on Reykjavík, one squadron of 15 Wellington bombers, a flight of 8 or 9 Hurricane fighters, a Norwegian squadron of 6 Northrop reconnaissance float planes, and 30 utility planes. These had been augmented by the 33d Pursuit Squadron (U.S.) with an original combat strength of 30 planes. At Kaldadharnes, about thirty-five miles southeast of Reykjavík, there was a British squadron of 26 Hudson bombers and 2 utility planes. A detachment of the Norwegian reconnaissance squadron, consisting of 4 planes, was at Akureyri, and another of 3 planes at Búðhareyri. In addition there was a United States naval air unit operating patrol planes out of Reykjavík. The total air strength, like the ground forces, was greater than that called for in the GHQ Operations Plan, but it too seemed inadequate. Only the 33d Pursuit Squadron was under the control of the Commanding General, Iceland Base Command; and the only planes available for medium-range reconnaissance in support of ground troops were those of the Norwegian squadron, whose primary mission, like that of the other bombers and reconnaissance planes, was offshore patrol.

In September Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Tinker made an inspection of air facilities in Iceland, before assuming his duties as Commanding General, III Interceptor Command, and upon his return to the United States he recommended to GHQ that additional bomber and reconnaissance strength be allotted to General Bonesteel. The latter placed his requirements at one squadron of heavy bombers, one of light bombers (A-20 type), one long-range reconnaissance squadron, one medium-range, and the entire 8th Pursuit Group, to which the 33d Pursuit Squadron, already in Iceland, belonged. But again, as in the case of the ground defenses, tactical requirements had to give way to physical limitations as the basis for determining the strength of the garrison.

The existing airfields at Reykjavík and Kaldadharnes, jointly used by

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16 Maps, showing camp locations, to accompany G–1 Rpt 11, OPD–GHQ files; Transportation, Supplies and Public Property, OPD–GHQ 523.
17 An. 1–A, Synopsis of Requests for Tactical Aviation Units for Iceland (received GHQ 25 Jan 42), GHQ 381 Def Plans (IBC) binder 1; Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to CofS, GHQ, 11 Nov 41, OPD–GHQ 520.2 Organization (IBC), binder 1.


the RAF and Americans, were overcrowded and unsuitable for heavy bomber (B-24) operations. Dispersal areas for the planes and housing for the men were limited. Runways, hastily built in the first place, had rapidly deteriorated under constant use and heavy frosts; and on one occasion a B-24 of the Ferry Command that had parked overnight on the runway at Reykjavík was found, next morning, to have broken through the paving.19 Overcrowding was the chief problem. It was possible to develop Reykjavík airfield only to the extent of taking care of an additional light bomber squadron; by building more parking and disposal areas at Kaldadhamnes, and by providing housing, another squadron could be accommodated there.20

The solution recommended by both General Bonesteel and General Tinker, and eventually adopted, was to construct an entirely new airfield, suitable for heavy bombers, in the neighborhood of Keflavík. Tests and surveys conducted under the direction of Colonel Morris, commander of the First Echelon and of the Iceland Base Command’s air force, had already established the feasibility of constructing an additional fighter field there. The two projects would obviously complement each other. As soon as GHQ approved the idea of a bomber field early in November, the Iceland Base Command engineers began surveying the proposed site; but not until 29 December, three weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, was the Iceland Base Command authorized to go ahead with the preliminary clearing and grading. Even then the arrangements for acquiring the land had not yet been completed.21 The two fields ultimately built at Keflavík, the bomber field (Meeks Field) and its satellite (Patterson Field), became the principal American air base in the North Atlantic and an important link in the ferry route to England; but this was in the future. Meanwhile, the problem of air defense in the fall of 1941 remained.

Since accommodations could not be provided for what he considered the full requirements, General Bonesteel fixed the immediate needs at one light bomber squadron, to be based at Kaldadhamnes as soon as housing

19 Strict accuracy requires it to be noted that this was the only occurrence of this sort. After the runways were reinforced and lengthened, sometime later, heavy bombers landed and took off without incident.
20 Memo, Gen Spaatz, CofAS, for ACoS WPD, 10 Sep 41, OPD-GHQ Misc files, 093 Insular Possessions; Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to CofS GHQ, 11 Nov 41, OPD-GHQ 320.2 Organization (IBC), binder 1.
21 Notes made by Lt Col W. G. Walker at a lecture by Gen Tinker, 8 Oct 41, OPD-GHQ Iceland 3 (INDIGO); Memo, Hq IBC, sub: Proposed Keflavík Airport, Exhibit C (received by GHQ, 27 Nov 41), GHQ 387 INDIGO, binder 1; Ltr, Gen Malony to CG Iceland, 29 Dec 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO, Late Nov-Dec Reference Notes; Monthly Rpt (Nov), Base Engr to Engr GHQ, 6 Dec 41, OPD-GHQ 319.1 Iceland-Rpts.
became available, and pursuit plane replacements sufficient to bring the 33d Pursuit Squadron up to its original strength. Washington approved the delivery of spare parts to Iceland so that planes not completely wrecked could be put into commission, but made no move to send the planes. Then, in late October the War Department learned that the British were proposing to withdraw their flight of Hurricane fighters from Iceland and that the United States Navy was contemplating sending a squadron of bombers for winter operations out of Reykjavik. The one brought into question the adequacy of Iceland's fighter strength; the other posed the problem of paramount interest between Army and Navy.22

Against the possibility of determined “hit and run” bombing attacks, which was accepted as the basic assumption, Iceland's fighter defenses seemed woefully weak. Germany had from 60 to 90 long-range bombers capable of reaching Reykjavik and returning to their bases in Europe. Against this potential striking force, the 33d Pursuit Squadron, by the end of October, could send aloft only about 20 planes, and by 6 December 1941 the number had been further reduced to 12 or 15 planes. Spare parts sufficient to bring the squadron almost up to full strength were on order, but the channels of aviation supply seemed to be full of obstructions. The immediate need, enhanced by the prospective withdrawal of the RAF Hurricanes, induced GHQ to provide reinforcements.23 On 14 November General Arnold gave instructions for 10 pursuit planes to be made ready for shipment to Iceland; and the same day GHQ informed General Bonesteel that a squadron of either medium or heavy bombers would be sent at once. The bomber question was almost immediately reconsidered, however, and at the end of the year the pursuit planes were still in their crates on the New York docks.24

In view of the delay it was indeed fortunate that the dissenting opinion of Maj. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, rather than the majority view of his colleagues

22 Cable 102, SPOBS to TAG, 21 Oct 41 (paraphrased on WPD DF to TAG, 7 Nov 41), WPD 4493-153, sec. 5; Memo, GHQ for CofAAF, 27 Oct 41, sub: P-39E Airplanes, with 1st Ind from Air AG (CofAAF) to CofS GHQ, 14 Nov 41, OPD-GHQ Iceland (Aircraft) Aviation Sec.
23 Memo, Col Ralph H. Wooten, Air Officer GHQ, for CofS, 23 Oct 41, GHQ 320.2 (INDIGO), binder 3; Ltr, (Air Commodore) W. H. Primrose (RAF) to Gen Bonesteel, 15 Dec 41, GHQ 381 Def Plans, (IBC) binder 1; Memo, Gen Maloney for CofAAF, 5 Jan 42, OPD-GHQ Iceland (Aircraft) Aviation Sec.
24 Rad, GHQ to CG Iceland, 14 Nov 41, WPD 4493-172, sec. 6; An. 1-A, Synopsis of Requests for Tactical Aviation Units . . . (received in GHQ 25 Jan 42), GHQ 381 Def Plans (IBC), binder 1.
in GHQ, was borne out by subsequent events. When the question of Iceland's air defenses was under study, Major Lemnitzer had observed that, regardless of the possibilities, Germany was unlikely to launch a determined air attack against Iceland during the coming winter, the winter of 1941–42. Unfavorable weather, targets incommensurate to the risks involved, and the demands of the Russian front would, he pointed out, vitiate an argument based entirely on German potentialities.\(^{25}\) And so it happened; although there were numerous alerts, not a single German plane was sighted over Iceland from 16 December 1941 until early March 1942, when the previous pattern of air activity was resumed. For a while, no bombs were dropped. As before, enemy flights were limited to single planes on reconnaissance or weather observation missions.

There was as great a need for additional radar and aircraft spotting stations and for improved communications between the stations and the control center and between ground and plane. In September 1941 two British radar stations were in operation, one about three miles southeast of Reykjavík and the other at Grindavík. Spotting posts were set up along the coast, and by the end of 1941 three more radar stations were put into operation by the British. But it could take as long as an hour and a quarter for a report from one of the distant posts to reach American fighter headquarters. On seven occasions during July and August, and three other times during the rest of 1941, German or unidentified planes were reported over Iceland. Although patrol flights were kept in the air intermittently throughout every day and additional flights sent up when the need appeared, not one of the intruding planes was intercepted.\(^{26}\) Lack of planes and radar equipment and slow communications held the defending planes to arbitrarily established patrol lines and prevented the aggressive search that might have resulted in successful contact.

An Aircraft Warning Service detachment to set up and operate an additional RDF (Radio Detection Finder) station on Vestmannaeyjar, a small island off the southern coast, was requested by General Bonesteel for movement in November; but the matter of troop movements, of reinforcement as opposed to relief of the British, became intertwined with a web of administrative problems inherent in the occupation itself. As a result, the AWS

\(^{25}\) GHQ interoffice Memo, 24 Oct 41 (commenting on Col Wooten's Memo to CofS GHQ, 23 Oct 41) GHQ 320.2 INDIGO, binder 3.

detachment did not arrive until 23 December, when the first large-scale reinforcement was made.

Problems of Administration and Human Relations

To bring the garrison up to peak efficiency and keep it there, as well as for morale purposes, General Bonesteel instituted a thoroughgoing program of training, including basic, weapons, and winter warfare. A distinctive feature of the program was the acting officer schools. These were designed to provide continuity of leadership at the platoon and company level should an enemy assault result in heavy attrition among the company grade officers. To this end, specially chosen noncommissioned officers were designated to act as lieutenants, captains, and even field grade officers while on field exercises with the troops.

Quite apart from the problems that related directly to the matter of defense were those that were inherent in the mere presence of American troops on foreign soil. The welfare of the troops, and their relations with the Navy, Marine Corps, State Department representatives, the British, and the local populace involved fundamental questions of human intercourse. Whether in Iceland, Newfoundland, Bermuda, or Trinidad, these problems were much the same.

That the welfare of the men would present a serious problem had been recognized early. Concern over it had been responsible to a very large extent for the insistence upon the American troops being stationed in the vicinity of Reykjavík and it was an important factor in the desire of the Navy Department to bring home the marines as quickly as possible. As in the case of other bases, the principal element of the problem was considered to be the question of recreational facilities. At home the American soldier took his recreation in nearby towns and cities either at his own expense among the general public or in recreation centers operated by private organizations. Governmental responsibility had extended only to sponsoring a consolidation of the various private welfare agencies into the USO. Iceland, however, was, according to American standards, woefully lacking in places devoted to public entertainment; and since the island was held to be within a theater of operations, the USO was by policy excluded. Thus the Army found itself with the responsibility of providing recreation facilities for the troops beyond that normally provided, with what assistance the Red Cross could give. Sixty huts for post exchanges and recreational purposes were ordered within a few weeks after the arrival of the Second Echelon, and the sum of $940,000 was allotted for the construction of six service club build-
ings.\textsuperscript{27} But other construction materials were given higher priority by General Bonesteel and the problem of shipping showed no sign of diminishing, so that recreation huts were still lacking in April 1942. Efforts to obtain space in Reykjavik were likewise fruitless. The Red Cross workers who had come to Iceland expecting to set up a canteen and recreational center in the city were thus forced back upon the makeshift arrangements that had been improvised within the various camps. Furthermore, the Red Cross, as an organization, was inexperienced in operating recreational facilities; for relief, not diversion, had been its traditional role. The inevitable aftermath of the situation was, initially, a certain amount of floundering, despite which the Red Cross workers proved their worth many times over.\textsuperscript{28} Improvement appeared with the summer of 1942; but until then the rigorous training program and hard labor had to serve as a substitute for recreational facilities.

Equally important to the well-being of the troops was the question of the length of the tour of duty in Iceland, and equally long delayed was the solution. While GHQ was considering an inclusive policy applicable to all the other Atlantic bases, Iceland, because combat operations were more in prospect there and because of a more acute “morale problem,” was made the object of independent study. Transmitting its findings to G–1 of the War Department General Staff, GHQ on 4 October recommended that a complete turnover of the First and Second Echelons be carried out within fourteen months, and that individuals be relieved thereafter at the end of twelve months’ service in Iceland. The War Department was in general agreement that a one-year limit would be desirable and that a decision should be announced promptly. But the deterrent was whether or not transportation would be available. The relief of the first two echelons would require transporting about 800 replacements monthly beginning 1 April 1942; and if the garrison were increased during the spring and early summer to 30,000 men, as contemplated, the average monthly turnover would rise to approximately 2,500 by the following November.\textsuperscript{29} The Navy Department, whose responsibility it was to provide transportation, was loath to commit itself so far in

\textsuperscript{27} G–1 Memo to CofS, 6 Oct 41, sub: Recreational Facilities for Forces in Iceland, OCS 21224–71. The question of “morale” is dealt with in the reports of the various survey parties of early summer. On the question of facilities, see also: Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Bonesteel, 13 Nov 41, WPD 4493–165, sec. 5; Ltr, Lincoln MacVeagh, American Minister to Iceland, to the President, 22 Nov 41, OCS 21224–150, bk. 22.

\textsuperscript{28} Report of Field Supervisor, American Red Cross, Iceland, 17 Apr 42, IBC 080 Red Gross, Gen, 1942–46.

\textsuperscript{29} GHQ Memo for AGos, G–1 (WD), 4 Oct 41, GHQ 320.2 INDGO, binder 1; G–4 Memo to CofS, 24 Oct 41, OCS 21224–89, bk. 22; Memo, CofS for CNO, 28 Oct 41, WPD 4493–153, sec. 5.
the future. The Chief of Naval Operations willingly concurred in a general limit of one year’s service, but only “until such time as the United States is at war”; and he pointed out that no naval transports were available for transporting personnel to and from Iceland.\textsuperscript{30} The Army had recently acquired for use as a troop transport to Iceland a small passenger vessel that had been operating in an interisland service in the Caribbean, but the Stratford’s limited capacity (350 men) was far below the requirements of the proposed relief policy. More than a month had passed since GHQ called attention to the advisability of announcing a definite policy. General Bonesteel added his urgings to those of GHQ. On 17 November he recommended a flexible tour of duty—one that varied from ten to fourteen months—to ensure against anyone having to spend more than one winter in Iceland.\textsuperscript{31} But before a final decision could be made, this, like many another matter, was temporarily lost in the smoke of Pearl Harbor.

There were also certain routine services which, if efficiently administered, would conduce to the well-being of the troops. The prompt delivery of mail from home was most important. An adequate supply of palatable rations and well-handled arrangements for paying the men would likewise do as much as anything to keep spirits high and complaints down. Delays in paying dependency allotments to the families of the men were extremely destructive to morale, but this, like certain of the supply arrangements, was something over which the Iceland Base Command had very little control. Mail deliveries and the shipment of perishable foodstuffs to Iceland were, for a while, too haphazard for complete satisfaction. There was some improvement by midwinter: more experience in administering the overseas APO system had been gained; a regular destroyer run between Boston and Argentina, the transshipment point for Iceland mail, had been scheduled; and the local naval commander had become better acquainted with his supply responsibilities under the current INDIGO plan.\textsuperscript{32} Although it was many months before the troops in Iceland were assured of a reasonably prompt mail service and a supply of special foodstuffs for special occasions, their lot, in this respect, was far better than that of the men stationed in Greenland or at the Crystal outposts. What made the delays less understandable and harder to

\textsuperscript{30} Memo, CNO for CofS, 17 Nov 41, WPD 4493-153, sec. 5.
\textsuperscript{31} Rad, Gen Bonesteel to CofS GHQ, 17 Nov 41, GHQ 320.2 Iceland, Strength.
\textsuperscript{32} Memo, Gen Malony, DCOFS GHQ, for CG FF, 1 Dec 41; Memo, CofS for CNO, 2 Dec 41. Both in OCS 21224-132, bk. 22. Lt. Lincoln MacVeagh, American Minister to Iceland, to President, 22 Nov 41; Ltr, SW to President, 19 Dec 41. Last two in OCS 21224-150, bk. 32. Lt Col Aln D. Wannock to CG, Iceland Base Command, Report of Conference on Navy Co-operation With Army in Matters Relating to Rations, 23 Nov 41, IBC 387 Joint Army–Navy, 1942.
bear for the Iceland garrison was the relative frequency with which ships were arriving.

Considered as an aspect of the morale problem, the pay arrangements that prevailed in the early months of the occupation were thought to be most nearly what the men desired. Local pressure had successfully persuaded the War Department to make use of local currency at all the newly acquired bases in British possessions, but in Iceland, because of morale and administrative problems, the troops continued to receive their pay in American dollars. By February 1942 the “black market” in dollars had become the overruling consideration and the change to krónur payments was made. Although the administrative difficulties that followed were fully as great as those the finance officer had anticipated, the change to local currency had no appreciable effect on the temper of the men. The adverse effect on morale that General Bonesteel and the War Department had expected, and on which their opposition to the use of krónur had rested, failed to materialize.  

As the Newfoundland experience had clearly shown, the matter of pay arrangements was, in its broader compass, one of the ticklish, complicated problems of intragovernmental relationships and international relations. In Iceland, even more than in Newfoundland and the other bases, the attitude of the local government depended upon the commanding officer’s conduct of affairs. General Bonesteel’s tact and diplomacy, his willingness and ability to understand local problems, were factors in his success.

Early in June 1941, when it was still uncertain whether the Icelandic Government would give its approval to an American defense force, an old plan for liaison with civil governments that had been drawn up as part of the RAINBOW 4 planning in connection with Newfoundland and Greenland was dusted off and suggested by the Judge Advocate General’s Department as a directive for the proposed Iceland force. Although it was never issued as a directive, its provisions were incorporated into the G-1 Annex to the Theater of Operations Plan drawn up by GHQ. On the assumption that at least the tacit approval of the government and people would be forthcoming, the local civil government was to be “permitted to function normally”; in that case the situation confronting the American force in Iceland would, it was stated, be “similar to that of the American Expeditionary Force in

83 Memo 14, 9 Oct 41; Memo 23, 18 Oct 41. In Hq, IBC, Numbered Memos 1-86, 25 Sep–31 Dec 41. Lt, Lincoln MacVeagh to Gen Bonesteel, 9 Oct 41; MacVeagh to Bonesteel, 15 Oct 41; Bonesteel to MacVeagh, 19 Jan 42. Last three in IBC 040 Legation, IBC, binder 1 (Sep–Dec 41), binder 2 (Jan–Apr 42). Lt Col William L. Thorkelson, The Occupation of Iceland During World War II Including the Postwar Economic and Social Effects, Thesis submitted to Graduate School of Syracuse University, Sep 49, p. 62, copy in OCMH.
France” during the First World War. For the purpose of maintaining cooperation with the Icelandic Government a liaison section of the Force Headquarters was to be established and officers were to be assigned to duty with various agencies of the government. However, failure to co-operate would be taken as a desire to impede the defense and, under the proposal, would have necessitated establishing a military government.34

Fortunately, the unwisdom of the proposed course of action was speedily recognized. Supplementary instructions proposed by the State Department seem to have reflected a justifiable concern that the situation was not properly understood, for, after summarizing Iceland’s constitutional relationship to Denmark, the State Department pointedly enjoined all American military personnel to pay due respect to the local institutions, to refrain scrupulously from interfering with the prerogatives of the civil authorities, and to handle through the American consul, Mr. Kuniholm, all matters involving political questions.35 The timeliness of the State Department’s advice was confirmed by the stipulations set forth in the agreement of 1 July 1941 between President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister of Iceland. By this agreement the United States promised that its military activities in Iceland would be carried out “in consultation with Iceland authorities as far as possible” and “with the clear understanding that American military or naval forces sent to Iceland will in no wise interfere in the slightest degree with the internal and domestic affairs of the Icelandic people.”36 Although the State Department proposals were not issued as instructions to the Iceland force, the executive agreement of 1 July became a part of the subsequent INDIGO directives. The position of the United States forces vis-à-vis the local government was thus explicitly laid down, but not specifically defined.

The Icelandic Government almost immediately expressed a desire to negotiate a more complete agreement. In the matter of intercourse between troops and townspeople there was, as the local government surveyed its experience with the British garrison, an unlimited area of difficulty that had both an economic and social side. With the measures taken by the British for the defense of Reykjavík there was also considerable dissatisfaction. Garrison camps had been placed within the town limits. Storage and broadcast-

35 Ltr, Under Secy State Sumner Welles to SN Frank Knox, 20 Jun 41, OPD—GHQ, INDIGO “A.”
ing facilities had been requisitioned. Restrictions on the civilian populace were too severe, the authorities thought, and plans for evacuation in case of attack were inadequate. What the Icelandic Government wanted in particular was a declaration that Reykjavík was an open, undefended city and the preparation, by the occupying forces, of local security measures for the protection of power plants and canneries. In those, and in such matters as the court procedure in cases involving civilians and members of the United States forces, the employment of Icelandic labor, American financial assistance for road, bridge, and public utilities maintenance, and even the strength of the American force—in all these, a clearer and formal definition of policy was desired by the Icelandic Government.\footnote{Consular Dispatch, 136, Reykjavik to State Dept, 18 Jul 41, sub: Projected Negotiations Between American and Icelandic Govts . . . , IBC 014.3 Civil Status and Relations (Gen), Jul 41–Apr 44; Unsigned Memo: Navy Dept Comment on Certain Matters re Occupation of Iceland . . . , 13 Oct 41, WPD 4493–104, sec. 4.} The War and Navy Departments, on the other hand, were opposed to a general agreement along these lines. The only questions which, in the view of the War Department, could properly be the subject of a definite agreement between the two nations were the jurisdiction of American courts-martial and certain concomitant matters. The strength and composition of the American forces in Iceland were a matter for the War Department alone to decide; and all the other points brought up by the Icelandic Government fell in the field within which, according to the War Department, the commanding officer should have discretionary power.\footnote{G–1 Memo for JAG, 14 Aug 41; Ltr, SW to Secy State, 8 Oct 41, and attached Memo: War Dept Views Regarding Certain Matters re Occupation of Iceland . . . , WPD 4493–104, sec. 4; see also, Memo: Navy Dept Comment . . . , 13 Oct 41, WPD 4493–104, sec. 4.} Interdepartmental discussion continued through the fall of 1941. Meanwhile, the Second Echelon arrived in Iceland. With no formal understanding between the two governments, General Bonesteel thus not only had to organize, in collaboration with the American legation and the local authorities, the machinery through which co-operative action could be taken, but he also had to make palatable to the Icelandic authorities the unilateral decisions of policy, which, in a broad area, were his own. In the bases acquired in British possessions, the position of the American garrison was carefully and specifically defined by the agreement of 27 March 1941. No such agreement was signed with the Icelandic Government.

For more than a year the British military authorities had been coping with the problems that now faced General Bonesteel, and they had worked out fairly satisfactory procedures through which some of the more important problems were being handled. A joint Anglo-Icelandic committee had been
organized to adjudicate and settle claims against the British forces; a similar
committee handled all questions concerning the employment of Icelandic
labor, and a "Hirings Office" arranged all leases and contracts for the use
of property by the military. This machinery, already functioning, was avail-
able to the American forces, and as early as 18 July, soon after the arrival
of the marines, both the British and American consuls had urged that the
United States become a party to the existing arrangements.\textsuperscript{39}

After the Second Echelon arrived the Icelandic Government lost no time
in bringing up the question of settling claims. During a conference with
General Bonesteel on 23 September, at which Generals Marston and Homer
and Consul Kuniholm were present, Prime Minister Jonasson spoke of it as
one of the most important problems, and, to be sure, it was. He assumed
that the American forces, following the British procedure, would set up a
joint committee, which, he suggested, might consist of one member from the
American military staff, one appointed by the Icelandic Government, and a
justice of the Icelandic Supreme Court as arbitrator. A committee of this
size, the Prime Minister believed, would be less cumbersome, and no less
impartial, than the British joint committee made up of three Icelanders and
two British members.\textsuperscript{40} Pertinent Army Regulations (AR 35–7020) pro-
vided only for the appointment of a board of one or more officers to settle
claims, but the liaison plan of early June, which had been incorporated into
the GHQ Operations Plan, authorized the force liaison officer to make ar-
rangements for this purpose with the Icelandic Government, and thus
opened the way for the use of a joint committee. The plan adopted by the
American military authorities on 28 September combined the two proce-
dures. A Primary Board, consisting of one officer who would attempt to
reach an agreement with the claimant and settle the amount of compensa-
tion, was established in accordance with Army Regulations; and if the claim
were unjustifiable or agreement impossible, the matter would then go to the
Joint Claims Board, a committee of three, such as the Prime Minister had
recommended.\textsuperscript{41} On 20 October the name of the American appointee to the
board was submitted to the Icelandic Government by the American Lega-
tion; on 20 November the two Icelandic members were named, and on 12
December the board held its first meeting. Of the eight claims presented, all

\textsuperscript{39} Dispatch, 136, American Consul, Reykjavík, to State Dept, 18 Jul 41, IBC 014.3 Civil Status
and Relations (Gen) Jul 41–Apr 44.

\textsuperscript{40} Memo of Conf, 23 Sep 41, IBC 014.3 Civil Status and Relations (Gen), Jul 41–Apr 44.

\textsuperscript{41} Hq IBC, AG Ltr to All Unit and Camp Comdrs, 28 Sep 41, sub: Claims Against the United
States, IBC 014.3 Civil Status and Relations (Gen), Jul 41–Apr 44.
of them arising out of traffic accidents, two were disallowed and two de-
ferred for future consideration. The four payments that were approved were
scaled down from about $235 claimed to a total of some $105 allowed.\footnote{Note from Foreign Ministry to American Legation, 20 Nov 41; Min, Mtg Jt American-
Icelandic Claims Bd, 12 Dec 41, IBC 040 Legation, Sep-Dec 41. For the figures given above, the
official 1941 exchange rate of 6.5 krónur to one dollar has been used.}
For the payment of small claims such as these and pending the establishment
of definite procedures, General Bonesteel had been provided with special
funds, which eliminated the necessity of withholding the final payment until
remittances came from Washington.

The question was immediately raised by the Icelandic member whether
the decisions of the board were to be considered as final or merely as recom-
mendations to the commanding general. If the reply had been sent in the
form of an official note from the Legation, as had been the first intention,
the query might well have become an issue. But General Bonesteel and Mr.
Lincoln MacVeagh, the American Minister, agreed that it would be prefer-
able for the American member of the board to point out, by informal discus-
sion with the Icelandic members, that the commanding general was required
by United States law to approve all expenditures of public money allotted
to his command and for this reason alone he would have to approve all
claims allowed by the board.\footnote{Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to Minister McVeagh, 18 Dec 41, and atchd undated hq routing slip, CG
to CoS and AG; Ltr, Mr. MacVeagh to Gen Bonesteel, 29 Dec 41. Both in IBC 040 Legation,
Sep-Dec 41.}
The Joint Claims Board was, moreover, pre-
cluded by existing United States law from entertaining claims against in-
dividual members of the American forces for actions outside their official
capacity, and it was inevitable that claims of this nature would arise. By the
time this question was raised, however, the law had fortunately been
changed.\footnote{Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to Mr. M. B. Barnes, Chargé d’Affaires, 7 Feb 42, IBC 040 Legation,
Jan-Apr 42.}

The joint board or committee, employed first in settling claims, was an
obvious device for handling the questions that later arose in connection with
the acquisition of property and the employment of Icelandic labor. These in-
volved contractual relations and were, like claims, justiciable in nature. On
the other hand, the problems incident to normal intercourse between troops
and townspeople were totally different in character. Any deficiency in the
conduct of civilians and soldiers toward each other was a matter for the
respective authorities, not for a joint board. As a breach of discipline on the
part of the soldiers was a responsibility of the military alone, so a breach of
the peace on the part of the populace was solely a matter for the civil authorities.

One of the key men among the local authorities was the chief of police of Reykjavík, Mr. Kofoed-Hansen, whose friendship with Consul Kuniholm simplified the handling of these problems. The situation was further eased by recognizing the right of civilian police to arrest members of the American force; while at the same time the chief of police made an especial effort to convince the American authorities that the mistrust in which he had been held by the British was unfounded. From the very start, fair winds favored the negotiations with Mr. Kofoed-Hansen. His first discussion with General Bonesteel on 6 October was, according to Minister MacVeagh, “an outstanding success.” On this occasion, Mr. MacVeagh reported, General Bonesteel assured the chief of police that as few men as possible would be quartered within the city limits, that men on pass would be required to return to camp by 11:30 p.m., and that they would be forbidden to carry arms. Trouble spots would be declared out-of-bounds. General Bonesteel made it clear that his responsibility extended only to the conduct of his troops and that he would not impose unreasonable restrictions on the troops for the purpose of relieving the civilian police of part of their responsibility for maintaining public order. When, for example, the chief of police suggested that members of the garrison be forbidden to use taxicabs, since bickering and brawls between the troops and local cab drivers were a frequent complaint, General Bonesteel refused. Instead, a military bus service into Reykjavík was inaugurated, and regulations designed to prevent the men from defrauding cab drivers were issued. In this same general fashion, by personal, informal negotiation and the normal processes of military discipline, each problem that subsequently came up was handled. It was a method of approach that called for the utmost diplomacy on the part of the commanding general. But his ability in this difficult art was vouched for by the American Minister, who reported after the conference of 6 October with Mr. Kofoed-Hansen: “The General’s comprehension of the importance of even the most minor issues in this whole matter of the relations of our forces and the Icelanders would seem to be equalled only by his tact and promptness in dealing with each one, while standing firm at all times for the dignity of his command and the respect due to the American soldier.”

The successful relations between the military and Icelandic authorities

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45 Memo, Gen Marston for CO 5th Def Bn, CO 6th Marines, and CO Brigade Hqs Co, 30 Sep 41, IBC 014.3 Civil Status and Relations (Gen), Jul 41–Apr 44.
46 Dispatch, American Minister to State Dept, No. 11, 9 Oct 41, WPD 4493–169, sec. 6.
rested partly on General Bonesteel's practice of dealing through the appropriate nonmilitary agencies in all matters that were not primarily an Army responsibility. Thus when a question arose in October concerning measures for civilian relief in the event of an air raid, for which only the most elementary planning and a few half-hearted steps had been undertaken by the local authorities, the assistance of the Army was offered through the Legation and made available through the American Red Cross. Between the headquarters of the Iceland Base Command and the American Legation in particular there was the closest co-operation. In fact Mr. MacVeagh claimed that he was kept better informed by General Bonesteel and the American naval commander than by his own department. The same close relations prevailed between the military command and the consulate. Mr. Kuniholm, the consul, was himself a West Point graduate and both General Bonesteel and his chief of staff, General Homer, had been his tactical officers at the Academy. In Newfoundland and Trinidad, the lack of co-operation between Army headquarters and representatives of the State Department had, on the other hand, immeasurably added to the problems of the base commanders. Iceland demonstrated what teamwork could accomplish.

Much the same situation prevailed in American relations with General Curtis and the British force. The difficulties anticipated from a joint occupation did not prove to be entirely illusory, but those that materialized were, for the most part, matters of more concern to Washington and London than to Camps Pershing and Alabaster, the respective headquarters in Iceland. Differences of opinion between the War Plans Division and SPOBS over censorship in Iceland and between GHQ and the War Plans Division over the command of the joint garrison, and Congressional needling on this sensitive subject, failed to shake the friendly co-operation maintained by the two commanding generals in Iceland. On 19 April 1942, shortly before General Curtis returned to England, General Bonesteel had the pleasure of present-

47 Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to MacVeagh, 14 Oct 41, IBC 040 Legation, Sep–Dec 41; Memo, SW to President, 29 Nov 41, sub: Civilian Relief Measures in Iceland, OCS 21224–130, bk. 22; Ltr, MacVeagh to President, 22 Nov 41, OCS 21224–130, bk. 22.

48 For the censorship question, see: Cable 34, Chaney to TAG, 2 Sep 41; GHQ Memo for ACoS WPD, 3 Sep 41. Both in OPD–GHQ INDIGO "B." On the command problem see: Joint Army–Navy Directive INDIGO–5, Aug 41; GHQ Ops Plan, 1 Aug 41; Ltr of Instr (2), CofS to Gen Bonesteel, 4 Sep 41. All in OPD–GHQ INDIGO "B." Also: Ltr, Gen Marshall to Bonesteel, 23 Sep 41; Bonesteel to Marshall, 10 Oct 41. Both in OPD–GHQ INDIGO "B." GHQ Memo to Gen L. T. Gerow (WPD), 7 Nov 41; WPD Memo for CofS, 10 Nov 41; Ltr, Marshall to Bonesteel, 13 Nov 41. Last three in WPD 4493–165, sec. 5. Ltr, Marshall to Senator Francis Maloney, 10 Oct 41, WPD 4493–150, Sec. 5; Ltr from SW to Senator A. H. Vandenburg, 16 Oct 41, OCS 21224–80. Ltr, SW to Representative G. H. Tinkham, 27 Nov 41, OCS 21224–123.
ing him with the American Distinguished Service Medal. General Curtis thus has the distinction of being the first British officer to receive this award during World War II.

On the subject of his command relationship, General Bonesteel's instructions were vague: as long as the United States remained out of war he was to "coordinate" operations by "mutual cooperation" with the British. What his instructions left indefinite was spelled out, however, in the plan of joint operations agreed upon by the two commanders. Not only did the plan define the tactical responsibilities of the Iceland Base Command, but it provided, as well, for the joint use of certain facilities and services and for the free interchange of information between the two forces. The details of these and of any other topic of immediate, current interest to both commands were discussed at a formal interservice conference each month, as well as at the more frequent informal meetings of the two commanders. In this fashion a common course was decided upon in matters of policy.⁴⁹

One of the more perplexing questions arose from the material aid given by the British to the arriving Americans. Under the arrangements made during the summer between SPOBS and the War Office, Nissen huts for American use were sent from England, erected by British labor, and provided with utilities under British contracts; British Army trucks had assisted in discharging the American convoys; and supplies, weapons, and equipment of one sort or another were from time to time turned over to the Iceland Base Command. No attempt was made by the British to place a value on the goods and services received by the Americans and nothing more than an informal receipt was required for the goods that were turned over. By mid-October the American staff officers most directly concerned had become disturbed about the informality of the procedure.⁵⁰ Repeated requests that GHQ advise whether the procedure was satisfactory brought a reply, on 9 December, that the question was being considered by the War Department and in the meantime all supplies taken over from the British should be inventoried, assessed as to value, and receipted for, in conformity with the GHQ Operations Plan. If the British would not assess the value of the goods, continued GHQ, the Americans must do it alone.⁵¹ Quite unknowingly, the Iceland Base

⁴⁹ Min, Interservice Conf's and Matters for Discussion, 23 Sep 41, 28 Oct 41, 23 and 27 Dec 41, 8 Jan 42, 20 Jan 42, IBC 091.1 British Data, 1942.
⁵⁰ Memo, Lt Col George F. Forster, S-4, for CofS IBC, 17 Oct 41; Draft Ltr, CG Iceland, to CofS GHQ, drawn up by Col Iry, Base Engr, 20 Oct 41; Memo, Forster for CofS IBC, 27 Oct 41; Memo, Forster for CofS IBC, 12 Dec 41. All in IBC 400.3295 Lend-Lease, Sep 41–Dec 42.
⁵¹ Rad, Gen Bonesteel to CofS GHQ, 14 Nov 41; Rad, Bonesteel to CofS GHQ, 4 Dec 41; Rad, Gen McNair to CG INDIGO, 9 Dec 41. All in IBC 400.3295 Lend-Lease, Sep 41–Dec 42.
ARMY POSTS IN ICELAND. Nissen huts on "Main Street" of an Iceland camp (top). View of the mountains from Camp Pershing (bottom).
Command had been caught in the eddy of "Reverse Lend-Lease." The idea of reciprocal aid, which had been germinating since early summer, was intended to cover just such a situation as Iceland offered. And in Iceland the British Government made clear the position which it consistently took: that lend-lease and reciprocal aid transactions could not be balanced in terms of dollars and pounds. Discussions with British representatives in Washington during December failed to resolve the issue. On 31 December, GHQ notified the Iceland Base Command that all goods and facilities received from the British in Iceland would be included in lend-lease accounts and that, contrary to previous instructions, all inventories must bear a British assessment of value. The British force in Iceland continued to follow the policy fixed by its own government, but with lend-lease machinery now coming into operation the valuation question no longer rested in the hands of the Iceland Base Command.

Of all the administrative problems that had been anticipated, none had foretokened greater difficulty than the questions of housing and shipping. As it turned out, housing, although troublesome, proved to be less formidable than had been expected; and as to shipping, the problem became one of harbor congestion and of allocation between Icelanders, British, and Americans rather than an actual dearth of vessels. Both housing and shipping were closely tied to the continuing question of what reinforcements should be sent and to what extent the relief of the British should be carried. Troop movements to Iceland, whether reinforcements or relief, obviously depended upon accommodations for the men and berthing space for the ships. Yet troop movements were also a matter of strategy and policy. Should a reinforcement be decided upon in Washington, the problems of housing and port congestion could suddenly assume greater proportion.

When the Second Echelon moved ashore on 25 September there were enough Nissen huts available to house the entire American force, thanks to a Herculean effort on the part of the marines. They had not received word of the construction task expected of them until 19 August, but by dint of a 17-hour, 2-shift working day and by specialization of labor—one crew working on foundations, one on decking, another on tinning, and so on—the marines met the deadline. It had been touch and go, however. The last of the First Echelon had moved into their accommodations only a week or so before the Second Echelon arrived, and there were still lacking about 120 of

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52 1st Ind, TAG to CG FF, 26 Dec 41, on GHQ Memo for TAG, 26 Nov 41; 2d Ind, GHQ to CG Iceland, 31 Dec 41. In IBC 400.3295 Lend-Lease, Sep 41-Dec 42.
the total number of huts that Colonel Iry, the base engineer, had estimated would be required. After the Second Echelon had been crowded into all available quarters, Iry revised his estimates upward. Including those already in use, about 1,830 huts would, he reported, be needed to house the force adequately and to allow for contingencies. Although the Second Echelon had brought material for 200 huts along with them, an additional 280 would have to be obtained either from England or the United States to meet these requirements. Storage space was more urgently needed, but the requirements were not so readily calculated. The background of high confusion presented in the reports of the base engineer obscured what should have been clearly set forth, namely, the amount of space in use and the number of buildings on order at any one time, and the number and type of buildings needed to fill the estimated requirements. Perhaps the most that can be ventured as an observation is that one-fourth, or thereabouts, of the 200,000, or 230,000 square feet of storage space required was available when the Second Echelon completed discharge. A somewhat smaller amount was obtained by lease either then or shortly afterwards.

The Question of Reinforcements and Relief

The question of sending additional troops to Iceland had come up even before the Second Echelon was fully established on shore. In a conference with the President on 22 September on the subject of reducing the strength of the ground forces, General Marshall adverted to the plan for relieving the British with the remainder of the 5th Division in the spring of 1942. To this the President gave his characteristic "O.K."; but he also expressed the desire to have small groups sent to Iceland during the winter for the purpose of relieving corresponding British units and of permitting the return to the United States of any "misfits" among the American garrison. Marshall thought none too well of the idea, nor did General Bonesteel, to whom the Chief of Staff immediately wrote. General Marshall pointed out to the President the difficulty imposed by the territorial restrictions on the use of selectees; but he would, he assured Mr. Roosevelt, inquire into the Navy’s ability to provide transports and escorts, and if it were possible to send troops dur-
ing the winter, it would be done.\textsuperscript{55} Two weeks later the subject was explored at a meeting in the office of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Besides General Bryden and General Moore, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, there were present Generals Malony and Gerow, and representatives of the Navy Department, of the Chief of Engineers, and of G-1 and G-3. The problem of culling selectees out of the 5th Division was discussed and questions of housing, shipping, and port congestion were raised. The suggestion was made by General Gerow that perhaps the marines could be brought home and their accommodations used for housing the Army troops. As to the number of men to be sent, it was General Moore’s opinion that 8,000 was the most they should try to send before April, but on this matter the recommendations of General Bonesteel, of the Navy Department, and of the British would have to be considered.\textsuperscript{56} In WPD and GHQ the planning machinery now began to revolve in this new direction, toward a winter schedule of relief.

Since the interests of the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and the British were affected, Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner, head of the Navy War Plans Division, proposed a conference of all interested parties for the purpose of drawing up the plan of relief. As a preliminary step, he suggested that an agreement be reached by the War and Navy Departments on certain basic issues, foremost of which, from Admiral Turner’s point of view, was the question whether the marines would be withdrawn before the relief of the British was undertaken.\textsuperscript{57} Two of the other points raised by Admiral Turner—the question of providing air units “for general strategic purposes” in Iceland, and whether the United States would take over all British naval bases and services there—became increasingly important in later weeks, but the big stumbling block was the relief of the marine brigade. In spite of General Gerow’s suggestions at the staff conference of 8 October, the Navy’s proposal to withdraw the marines was coolly received by the War Plans Division. It was argued that relieving the marines would not further the President’s purpose to release British units and that a general conference such as Admiral Turner had in mind would merely lead to a long delay. As for taking over British air and naval installations, it was the understanding of the War Plans Division that the relief of British ground forces only was

\textsuperscript{55} Memo, CofS for the President (22 Sep 41), \textit{Pearl Harbor Attack}, pt. 15, pp. 1636–39. For the situation leading to General Marshall’s conference with the President, see Conn and Fairchild, \textit{Framework of Hemisphere Defense}, pp. 143–47; Ltr, Marshall to Bonesteel, 23 Sep 41, OPD-GHQ INDIgo “B.”

\textsuperscript{56} Min, DCofS Conf, 8 Oct 41, OCS Conf File, No. 25, Oct 41; Min, GHQ Special Staff Conf, 8 Oct 41, AGF 337, GHQ Staff Cons, 7-23-41 to 10-31-41.

\textsuperscript{57} Memo, Adm Turner for Gen Gerow, 9 Oct 41, WPD 4495–152, sec. 5.
contemplated. In the suggestion for a general conference Army planners saw an undesirable departure from the tried procedure by which the INDIGO plans had been formulated. The winter relief schedule could best be arranged, the War Plans Division believed, by the usual method of joint action, and this was offered as a countersuggestion to Admiral Turner on 13 October. The questions raised by Admiral Turner could be used as the starting point for the immediate preparation of a joint directive, the War Plans Division suggested. But, until some agreement on withdrawing the marines could be reached, little progress could be made in preparing the new directive. Admiral Stark laid the problem before the President at a White House conference on 16 October, only to have it handed back as a matter that he and General Marshall would have to decide themselves. Finally, toward the end of the month GHQ was told to proceed with its plans without waiting for the joint directive.

Meanwhile, General Bonesteel had no intimation that a change of plan was brewing until Marshall’s letter of 23 September arrived on 7 October. At the time it was written no definite decision had been made, but a radio message from GHQ which had been received a day or two after the Chief of Staff’s letter should have made it clear that the situation had crystallized in the meantime. The message instructed General Bonesteel to report immediately the order of priority in which he wanted troops sent during the winter. And he was asked whether a corresponding withdrawal of British troops could be arranged in order to make housing available. The size of the units and their sailing dates would be given to him later, the message concluded.

General Bonesteel’s opinion was, however, that troop movements during the winter would either force the occupation of the northern and eastern outports, which in that season was highly inadvisable, or else require a concentration of American combat troops in closer proximity to Reykjavik, which was undesirable. Housing and storage were, he believed, so uncertain that either the British would have to move out first and make their accommodations available to the incoming Americans, or hutting would have to be sent and erected before the troops arrived. The one would “hinge on the coordination of British shipping in order to make the relief synchronous,” he wrote General Marshall, and the other would mean the shipment of hut

58 Memo, Lt Col Leven C. Allen (WPD) for Gen Gerow, 11 Oct 41; Memo, WPD to Admiral Turner, 13 Oct 41. Both in WPD 4493–152, sec. 5.
60 Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Oct 41, sub: Troops to INDIGO, WPD 4493–153, sec. 5.
materials from the United States, since "the plan for hutting to come from England was not worked out." But it was most important, he thought, that nothing be done which would add to the shipping congestion at Reykjavik. Even the present schedule, he asserted, was too much for the port to handle, and consequently he and General Curtis were both going to recommend that supply levels be reduced, that priorities on shipping be set up, and that the arrival of vessels be staggered. These were the considerations which he thought should decide whether or not troops were to be sent to Iceland during the winter. And to make his position clear he strongly recommended, in his reply to GHQ's message, that until the British withdrew and the necessary facilities became available, no troops be sent to Iceland except the reinforcements he had already requested.

The only reinforcements that General Bonesteel had requested at the time the matter of winter movements came actively under consideration were some six hundred men: service troops, military police, and additions for the aircraft warning detachment. He had asked on 5 October that these troops be sent in November, when there would be sufficient housing to care for them without dependence on British withdrawals. Then, after receiving General Marshall's letter and GHQ's radiogram, General Bonesteel gave GHQ a list of Quartermaster, Engineer, and Signal Corps units, totaling about 1,500 men, that he wanted sent to Iceland when housing became available. His own immediate needs governed General Bonesteel's requests, but it seemed to GHQ that they could be fitted into a scheme for relieving British units. Accordingly, on 16 October, GHQ informed General Bonesteel that the troops he had requested on the fifth of the month would be sent about 1 December (shipping was the cause of the delay), and that further movements would await word from Iceland that the necessary facilities were available. At the same time General Bonesteel was authorized by GHQ to work out a complete plan of relief with General Curtis on the basis of relieving the British as rapidly as port facilities and housing permitted.

Meanwhile, the Special Observer Group had been keeping in touch with the War Office in London concerning the withdrawal of British units. The War Office, SPOBS reported to the War Department, was agreed on the

61 Ltr, Bonesteel to Marshall, 10 Oct 41, OPD–GHQ INDIGO "B."
62 Rad, CG IBC to CG GHQ, 12 Oct 41, OPD–GHQ INDIGO "B."
63 Rad, CG IBC to CG GHQ, 12 Oct 41, OPD–GHQ INDIGO "B."
64 Rad, Gen McNair (GHQ) to CG IBC, 16 Oct 41, GHQ 320.2 INDIGO, binder 3; Memo, Gen Maloney for CG FF, sub: Relief of British Troops in Iceland, 27 Oct 41, WPD 4493–153, sec. 5; WPD routing form to G–3, 20 Oct 41, with unsigned Memo for Rcd, WPD 4493–156, sec. 5.
practicability of relieving certain units in the Reykjavík area during the winter; but it was unwilling, because of the special winter training program in Iceland, to withdraw more than one infantry brigade before February 1942. The British nevertheless desired assurances from the War Department that the relief of the whole division would be completed by the end of April. Being of the opinion that the defense of the Reykjavík area did not require all ten infantry battalions then stationed there, the War Office had no objection to withdrawing two British battalions before the American troops arrived, which, continued SPOBS, would take care of the housing question.  

Using the report from SPOBS as his starting point, Major Lemnitzer of GHQ had worked out a tentative plan of relief which involved the withdrawal of two British battalions before December and another two battalions of British infantry, or the equivalent number of service troops and artillery, before January 1942. As for the incoming movements, the 600 service troops and military police scheduled to sail from the United States about December would be followed on 10 December by about 1,200 Quartermaster and Engineer troops; and the rest of the units on General Bonesteel’s priority lists would sail about January. When General Bonesteel apparently took the proposed withdrawal of British infantry to mean either that American combat troops would be substituted for the service troops he had requested or, if not, that the defenses of Reykjavík would be seriously weakened, a misunderstanding arose that resulted in a rather heated exchange of radiograms between the general and GHQ. The atmosphere was not long in clearing, however. It was made plain to General Bonesteel that his wishes as to troops and arrival dates would be followed, and that there was no objection to the British withdrawing noncombat troops provided the relief proceeded as rapidly as troops could be accommodated in Iceland.

On 7 November General Bonesteel reported to GHQ that two British infantry battalions plus service troops would leave during the first part of December, and that another battalion plus service troops would depart early in the next month. As a complement to this change, the 2d Battalion, 10th

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64 Cable, Gen McNarney (London) to TAG, 18 Oct 41, OPD–GHQ INDIGO “B.” The same information, obtained from General Curtis, was outlined in a radiogram from General Bonesteel to CG GHQ, 31 Oct 41, GHQ 320.2 INDIGO, binder 3.
65 Memo, GHQ for WPD, 30 Oct 41, WPD 4493–153, sec. 3; Rad, GHQ to CG Iceland, 31 Oct 41; Cable 109, TAG to SPOBS, 1 Nov 41; Rad, CG Iceland to CG GHQ, 3 Nov 41; Rad, McNair, GHQ, to CG Iceland, 4 Nov 41. Last four in GHQ 320.2 INDIGO, binder 3. Pers Ltr, Maj Lemnitzer to Col Hays, 8 Nov 41, OPD–GHQ 320.2 Organization—IBC, binder 1.
66 Rad, McNair to CG, Iceland, 4 Nov 41, OPD–GHQ 320.2 Organization—IBC, binder 1.
Infantry, was added, at the request of General Bonesteel, to the movement of American troops planned for January; and the 50th Signal Battalion was added to the December movement. At this point the arrangements in Iceland were, Bonesteel reported, going ahead very satisfactorily.\footnote{Rad, CG, INDIGO to CG GHQ, 7 Nov 42, GHQ 320.2 INDIGO, binder 3.}

Meanwhile, during November some 1,100 British troops had been returned from Iceland. Another 3,400 men were to be withdrawn during the last two weeks of December, which would bring to a little more than 6,300 the number of British troops relieved since the arrival of the Second Echelon in September.

The consensus had been that any movement of troops, either of reinforcements or for relief of the British, would depend upon housing and the ability of the port to handle the movement. Yet if the arrangements for relieving the British garrison had awaited solution of the housing and port problems, progress would have indeed been slow.
Housing requirements, not to mention the confused storage situation or the undetermined Air Force needs, would not have been met by the construction program. The base engineer estimated at the end of November that the additional huts needed to fill the present requirements and those of the planned additions to the force would number 765, which were to be erected out of materials either on hand or previously ordered. Actually, during the next two months only 268 huts were built, and the remainder of the 829 huts that became available during the period were those that were turned over to the Americans by the departing British troops. It was fortunate that no hitch appeared in the British convoy schedule.

The port construction program, designed to speed up cargo operations, had been laid down before the decision was made to undertake troop movements during the winter. The improvements along Reykjavík waterfront would, it was estimated, increase the available pier space by about 37 percent; but the earliest completion date that could be expected was 1 March 1942. A major cause of the congestion in the port was the shortage of labor; but, in this too, no improvement could be looked for until the arrival of additional port troops in January. The question, then, was what could be done with the resources available. During November about 31,000 measurement tons of cargo for the American forces were handled through the port of Reykjavík. How could this performance be bettered in order to take care of the 22,400 tons that the troops scheduled for movement in December would bring with them? Considerable thought, much discussion, and reams of paper were devoted to the problem. Several interdepartmental conferences were held in Washington to discuss the co-ordinated use of transport shipping, but no agreement could be reached as to whether the Navy, the War Department, or the Maritime Commission should be given control. Partly in recognition of the need in Iceland for closer co-operation on shipping matters, the Navy, on 8 November, announced that a naval operating base was to be established at Hvalfjördhur. But the most effectual measure perhaps was the reduction in the level of maintenance supplies from 180 to 120

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68 Rpt of Base Engr for November, 6 Dec 41, OPD–GHQ 319.1 Iceland—Rpts; Monthly Progress Rpt, Base Engr, 18 Feb 42, IBC 600.1 Construction (Gen), 1942.


days, which had been recommended by the Joint Port Committee in Iceland, approved by General Bonesteel, and which was, on 10 November, officially established by the War Department. It was to be accomplished by suspending maintenance shipments for two months, and this, according to Lt. Col. Ernest N. Harmon, of GHQ's G-4 Section, would mean a saving of 30,000 tons in each of the two months. Colonel Harmon, it should be added, viewed the saving more as an opportunity to send additional construction equipment and special supplies to Iceland than as a means of reducing the port congestion there. Nevertheless, if cargo estimates for the December and January troop movements and the tonnage figures for November were at all accurate, the congestion must have been substantially reduced; for only 28,000 or 30,000 tons of cargo were shipped to Reykjavík in December and January. The reduction was achieved, however, only at the expense of shifting the jam from Reykjavík to New York, where 45,000 tons of cargo for Iceland had accumulated by 8 February 1942.71

A New Role

The program for relieving the British during the winter was only one of several new developments. The changes made in the mission assigned to the American forces were far more pregnant than the adoption of a new schedule of relief; but, interestingly enough, they had, for all their significance, less immediate effect on the situation in Iceland.

The INDIGO-3 directive, in setting forth the joint Army and Navy tasks, had specifically interpreted the approach of Axis forces within fifty miles of Iceland to be "conclusive evidence of hostile intent" which would "justify" attack by the defending United States forces. By the end of August 1941, the President was willing to bring deeds and diction more into line. In approving the directive on 28 August he expressed himself as follows: "... I think it should be made clear that the Joint Task ... requires attack on Axis planes approaching or flying over Iceland for reconnaissance purposes."72 Here then was a "shoot on sight" order six days before the Greer incident took place on

71 Rad, Gen McNair to CG Iceland, 22 Oct 41; Memo, Col Harmon for Gen Malony, 23 Oct 41, OPD-GHQ Misc files, 093 INDIGO; Ltr, TAG to CofS GHQ and CG's sub: INDIGO (Supply Levels), 10 Nov 41, OPD-GHQ, 400 Supplies (INDIGO); Recapitulation of All Supplies Shipped to Iceland by Vessel (27 Jul 41-19 Feb 42), OPD-GHQ files; Hist Monograph: Transportation of the U.S. Forces in the Occupation of Iceland (Office, Chief of Transportation), pp. 65, 104, OCMH.

72 Jt Army-Navy Directive INDIGO-3, 16 Aug 41; Memo, the President for SW and SN, 28 Aug 41, OPD-GHQ INDIGO "B." The underlining is in the original.
4 September; but, for almost eight weeks past, the American forces in Iceland had been attempting to do by justification what the President now wanted done by injunction. The new phraseology brought no added responsibilities nor any changes in the conduct of operations.

More meaningful were the directions the President gave to Admiral Stark on 6 September to have identical tasks assigned to the Navy and to the Army Air Forces in Greenland and Iceland. As a result, the Army was given the enlarged responsibility of supporting naval operations in the waters between Iceland and America and of destroying any Axis forces met within the Western Atlantic Area. Although dispatched from GHQ on 23 September, the formal notification of this change was apparently lost en route or mislaid on arrival. For almost two months the Iceland Base Command continued to be unaware that the President's memorandum of 6 September gave the Army a new role. And of the Iceland Base Command's unawareness the War Department had no inkling until mid-November. In any event, the role could not be played without the necessary properties. The only Army planes in Iceland were the fighter planes of the 33d Pursuit Squadron; the brunt of high-seas patrolling done by the Americans had been carried by the PBY's of the naval air force. Now the War Department, to consist with its new air mission and to make possible its assistance in the Battle of the Atlantic, proposed to send heavy bomber reinforcements to Iceland. They were to be, so Secretary Stimson informed the President on 21 October, the advance unit of a team of four-engine bombers, the reserve component of which had already been sent to Newfoundland. "In other words," he declared, "we contemplate the possibility of sweeping operations by these long-range bombing planes and have planned to place them in separated bases to facilitate that purpose as well as to protect against air attack on either base." But the War Department had not reckoned either with the overcrowded and unsatisfactory state of Reykjavík airfield or with the misapprehension that ground support and interception were still the sole mission of the Iceland Base Command air force. An inquiry from GHQ as to whether housing was available and runways suitable for medium and heavy bombers brought forth the reply that light bombers were what was needed, and that the Navy proposed sending a land-based bomber squadron in December, which would com-

73 Memo, President for Adm Stark, quoted in Joint Army and Navy Basic Directive for the Defense of Iceland and Greenland, 30 Sep 41; Ltr, TAG to CofS (GHQ), CG's, et al., 17 Sep 41, with 1st Ind on Ltr, AG (GHQ), to CG IBC, 23 Sep 41; Ltr, TAG to CofS (GHQ), CG's, et al., 17 Oct 41; 1st Ind on Ltr, AG (GHQ) to CG Iceland, 25 Oct 41. All in IBC 381 INDIGO-NOAH, 1941.

74 Ltr, SW to the President, 21 Oct 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, pt. 20, pp. 4442-44.
pletely fill the accommodations at Reykjavík airfield. A second message to General Bonesteel, on 14 November, informed him that "in order to increase your defense capabilities and to further army air mission of supporting the fleet" the immediate dispatch of an Army bomber squadron, either medium or heavy, was desirable. "Either type . . .," it was stated, "will permit attack well out to sea as well as defense against land operations. . . . Light bombers are of limited use." 75 Only at this point, apparently, was it recognized that the Iceland Base Command air force had not, until now, known that "attack well out to sea" was one of its tasks. In his reply to GHQ on 16 November, General Bonesteel explained his position: "Your radio of 14 November . . . gives Army Air Force new mission of supporting the fleet, which is the object of the squadron the Navy states will arrive in early December." 76 Since Reykjavík airfield could not accommodate two additional squadrons and since the Navy was already putting up housing at the nearby seaplane base, he recommended that the Navy bombers be given priority.

The Navy had acceded to the Army's participating in a role traditionally reserved to naval aviation; now, when the Navy proposed to leave its own element and make use of land-based bombers, it was the War Department's turn to yield. It did so only with considerable misgiving, and only after an offer to place an Army squadron under Navy command was rejected by the Chief of Naval Operations. 77 On the last day of peace the United States would have for nearly four years, GHQ instructed General Bonesteel to make allowance in his air plans for the operation out of Reykjavík airfield of twenty-four Navy bombers. One squadron was scheduled to arrive by the following Wednesday, 10 December, and the rest would follow before the winter's end. But somewhere in the shock and hurly-burly of 7 December 1941 GHQ's message must have gone astray. The bombers, too, seem to have been caught up in the hurried redeployment of air strength westward, and in January General Bonesteel's headquarters was still wondering what disposition had been made of the bomber problem posed in November and of the bombers that never arrived. 78

75 Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to CofS GHQ, 11 Nov 41 (and radio Msg same date), OPD-GHQ 320.2 Organization (IBC), binder 1; Rad, GHQ to CG Iceland, 14 Nov 41, WPD 4493-172, sec. 6.
76 Rad, CG Iceland, to CG GHQ, 16 Nov 41, WPD 4493-172, sec. 6.
78 Memo, CofS for CNO, 6 Dec 41, WPD 4493-175, sec. 6; Cable, McNair to SPOBS London, 6 Dec 41, OPD-GHQ, INDIGO "B"; An. 1-A: Synopsis of Requests for Tactical Aviation Units for Iceland Base Command, received GHQ, 25 Jan 42, GHQ 381 Def Plans (IBC), binder 1.
Basic Considerations for Determining the Post-Pearl Harbor Course of Action

What had been done so far might have given a clue to what could be done in the future, and to what could be done in respect not only to Iceland but to operations farther afield. There would be, as there had been, other operations that would require moving considerable bodies of men through waters patrolled by unfriendly ships of war, operations that would require landing a force completely armed at ports inadequately equipped and exposed to the foulest weather, operations that would require maintaining large forces from supply bases two thousand miles or more distant. By December 1941 the pitfalls that might beset unwary planners of such an operation had become all too obvious. By this stage of the Iceland operation there had been, also, an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of American weapons and equipment under conditions that verged on actual combat. And by this time the weather, the terrain, and the poor roads of Iceland had thoroughly put to proof the mobility of troops depending on mechanized transport. But whether the Iceland operation would have any value as experience gained would hang on the ability of War Department planners to perceive what points of resemblance there might be in the situations later encountered. Certainly if every operation were to be approached, planned, and carried out as if it were something entirely new and unique, little would be gained. Considerations such as these were nevertheless subordinate to those of strategy.

To War Department makers of strategy the danger zone had been not the Faeroes-Iceland-Greenland line of approach but the great Bermuda-Azores-Dakar-Natal quadrilateral. The defenses provided in the RAINBOW 4 plan for the Western Hemisphere thus had a decided southern exposure. And from this point of view, the relief of the British garrison in Iceland was a diversion. But the gradual assumption on the part of the Navy of some of the tasks set out for it in the more extensive and somewhat differently oriented RAINBOW 5 placed the operation in quite a different setting. Not only would an American garrison in Iceland relieve the British ground troops there, but, what was perhaps even more important, the escort-of-convoy and other naval measures necessary to protect the flow of supplies to the American forces would assist the Navy in the execution of its duties and make possible the relief of British naval vessels in the Western Atlantic. The War Department seems to have lagged behind the German high command in recognizing the value of the Iceland operation in this respect. As the scope of American naval operations
in North Atlantic waters grew larger, Iceland became one of the vital outposts of the Atlantic Fleet, and, when Army aviation was given the mission of supporting the fleet, the island took on added importance to the War Department. As the Secretary of War had pointed out in October, if the Army Air Forces were to carry out effectively any tasks in support of the fleet, Iceland would be essential as an advanced air base. And by this time it gave promise, too, of being a serviceable way station on the air ferry route to England.

In spite of the growing recognition of Iceland’s strategic importance, the entry of the United States into the war made the Iceland operation in a sense less meaningful. The most valid reason for sending American forces had been the replacement of front-line troops with soldiers who were still non-combatants. Although this objective had not been completely achieved, it ceased to have any validity at all now that the United States itself was in the war and could move into the front line of combat.

But even then Prime Minister Churchill was on his way to America to confer with the President on the whole plan of joint defense and attack. On the decision they made would hinge the future of the Iceland operation.
CHAPTER XX

The North Atlantic Bases in Wartime

As outposts of defense, the North Atlantic bases were only imperceptibly affected by the entry of the United States into the war. More than two months before, instructions had gone out to the American garrisons to dispute actively the approach of any Axis military plane or naval vessel. Iceland had gone on the alert even earlier. The ultimate decision that would bring into action the guns of the American garrisons had thus rested with Hitler and on his view of what was expedient. It had not depended on America's status, whether of belligerency, nonbelligerency, or neutrality. In recognition of these circumstances, reinforcements had been dispatched to the Atlantic outposts throughout most of 1941. This is not to say that the bases in the Atlantic escaped, even for a time, the hard impact of war. The affirmation in the ARCADIA Conference (the Anglo-American conference in Washington, December 1941-January 1942) of the strategy of concentrating an American air force in the United Kingdom acted as a catalyst on the hitherto uncertain and somewhat nebulous proposals that the United States take over the North Atlantic air route—the shortest path between America and the European front. As way stations on this route both Greenland and Iceland now acquired a new importance, in which Newfoundland, as one of the terminal points, shared.

But the first blow had come from the far side of the world, and the demands of strategy had to be adjusted to the danger of the moment. Air reinforcements destined for the North Atlantic were hastily rerouted toward the Pacific. The B-17’s of the 49th Bomber Squadron, on the eve of their departure for Newfoundland, were diverted across country to California in spite of the fact that the squadron’s ground echelon was already in Newfoundland. The bombers intended for Iceland likewise reached a destination far from that originally planned, and for a few days there was a strong possibility that the scheduled troop movements would go the way of the planes.
THE NORTH ATLANTIC BASES IN WARTIME  533

The Build-up

Of the four outposts in the North Atlantic, Iceland alone presented a major, immediate problem. The reinforcement of Newfoundland and Bermuda would require the transportation of comparatively small numbers and the distances were not great. Greenland would be frozen in until spring. Furthermore, early plans and prior commitments and the desire of the British to transfer their garrison gave Iceland a special position in the tug of European strategy versus Pacific needs.

As matters stood, the United States had a little more than 10,000 men, including the marines, in Iceland on 7 December 1941. The two troop movements planned for December had been combined into one of about 2,100 men, which was ready to leave on 10 December, and preparations for sending approximately the same number of troops on 20 January were well under way. Tentative plans for the next four months, which would include relieving the marines, were being worked out. Now, suddenly, all these plans and preparations were thrown into jeopardy. Three or four days of uncertainty passed and then, on 11 December, the War Plans Division notified GHQ to carry out the December move according to plan. Four days later, on 15 December, the troops sailed. But the final decision on all subsequent movements was postponed.1

Twice during these weeks in December 1941 Secretary Stimson urged the President to reconsider the Iceland situation and withdraw the American garrison. The British, he argued, could do the job without the problem of leave and rotation, with all its psychological ramifications, that confronted American troops.2 In Mr. Stimson’s view, a British garrison would in no way hinder the United States from making use of Iceland as an air or naval base. But the Navy thought otherwise. The President, whose interest had been aroused in the first place by Iceland’s naval importance, agreed with Mr. Stimson that the situation ought to be restudied; but his reaction to the Pearl Harbor attack and to the removal of the last remaining restrictions on the use of selectees was that now the garrison ought to be strengthened. He

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1 Memo, Maj Lemnitzer, GHQ, for DCoS GHQ, 24 Nov 41, WPD 4493-153, sec. 5; Cable, TAG to SPOBS, London, No. 166, 29 Nov 41; Memo, Col Handy for General Gerow, 5 Dec 41. Last two in OPD-GHQ INDIGO "B." Memo, WPD for CoS GHQ, 11 Dec 41, WPD 4493-181, sec. 6.

2 Ltr, SW to the President, 25 Dec 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
would be "much happier," he wrote to Secretary Stimson, "if we had another 10,000 men in Iceland." 

The ARCADIA conferees acted promptly in accordance with the wishes of the President and Prime Minister and decided to carry through the relief of the British in Iceland, but the matter of a timetable and priority in relation to the other major operations proposed for the Atlantic theater was not so easily settled. In deference to the wishes of Admiral Stark and the Navy planners it was agreed to relieve the marines first, and on this account the troop movement scheduled for January was greatly expanded—6,000 and 8,000 men were the two figures discussed. But before the conference ended, shipping requirements for the Pacific made it necessary to abandon the idea of relieving the marines for the time being and to restore the original schedule of moving about 2,500 men to Iceland in January.

As it turned out, the relief of the marines and the relief of the British garrison were carried out simultaneously, over a period of six months. After the arrival of the December troop convoy a battalion of marines had taken over the positions of one of the British infantry battalions, which was immediately returned to the United Kingdom. Then the 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry, which arrived in the January convoy, took over from the marine battalion and it returned to the United States. No troops arrived in February. In March a small British force and the last remaining units of the marine brigade departed upon the arrival of the 2d Infantry (minus one battalion) and accompanying units. A large American convoy arrived in mid-April and another in May with a total of about 8,700 troops, and this enabled most of the remaining British troops to be withdrawn. After 11 May only the British 146 Infantry Brigade, distributed among the three outports of Akureyri, Seydisfjördhur, and Búðhreit, and some Royal Air Force units remained. The better part of the job the United States had undertaken twelve months before was accomplished. There were now, at the beginning of June 1942, about 24,000 American troops in Iceland; but in the meantime Iceland's defense requirements had risen. The building of the Keflavik airfields, air ferrying activity, and troop transport operations over the sea lanes, and the fact that the United States had become one of the belligerents all meant that the size of the garrison had to be revised upward. Shortly after Iceland's inclusion in June in the new European Theater of Operations, large additions to the American forces arrived in July, August, October, and

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3 Memo, the President for SW, 12 Dec 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Memo, G-2 for CofS, 12 Dec 41, WPD 4493-184, sec. 6.

4 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, ch. V.
December, so that by the end of 1942 the garrison in Iceland had grown to approximately 38,000 men stationed at nearly 300 camps and posts.5

Both Iceland and Greenland had been fitted into the strategy of the war within a month after the United States entered it. The unfinished air bases in Greenland, which the Air Forces had earlier sought to justify on grounds of their importance to the direct transport operations between Newfoundland and Scotland and to antisubmarine patrol and reconnaissance operations, and the projected fields at Keflavik, which GHQ and the Iceland Base Command had originally envisioned as tactical fields, were now recognized for what they could become, namely, essential to the American build-up in Britain. But before their usefulness could be realized much construction work remained to be done and adjustments had to be made to several shifts in plans.

By late spring of 1942, when open water began to appear in the Greenland fjords and construction activity could be resumed at the BLUE bases, there had been adopted the BOLERO-SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP strategy which called for a major effort from the British Isles and the movement overseas of the Eighth Air Force. In furtherance of this undertaking the North Atlantic staging route was merged into the grandiose CRIMSON project, a sweeping design for airfields and weather stations along three different trans-Canadian routes that converged in the neighborhood of Frobisher Bay. By the time the first planes of the BOLERO movement were ready to take off, at the end of June, the CRIMSON project had been sharply curtailed, lest the child swallow the parent, and by August the planning for an African landing had taken precedence over BOLERO, that is, over the preparations for a cross-Channel operation. These and later shifts in strategic planning were reflected in various adjustments and readjustments in construction plans and base development, especially in Greenland; but the changes in base plans were chiefly of degree, not of direction.6

The growth and development of the Greenland bases went hand in hand with the first rush of ferrying operations. The first BOLERO flight landed at BLUE WEST 1 on an unfinished runway ill-provided with taxiways and parking areas. Weather and communications facilities, aids to navigation, ..... 

5 Memo, GHQ for WPD, 1 Jan 42, sub: Relief of Marines in Iceland, OPD-GHQ 320.2, binder 1; Ltr, CG IBC, to CG FF, 5 Jan 42, sub: Summary of Relief of British Forces ... GHQ 320.2 INDIGO (Strength), binder 4; FO 6, IBC, 21 Jan 42, GHQ 381 INDIGO, binder 1; G-1 Rpt, IBC, 5 Jun 42, OPD 320.1 IBC; Hq IBC, Rcd of Events, Jun 41-Jun 45, IBC 314.7.
6 Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941–42, chapter XII, unfolds the strategic picture of this period. The CRIMSON project is touched upon in Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, chapter XIII. For the build-up in Britain, see Leighton and Coakley, Logistics in Global Warfare, 1941–43, chapter XIV.
and billets and messing facilities for the flight crews were wanting. Ferrying Command officers noted a shortage of well-trained and experienced air base personnel. To fill these gaps without halting or greatly impeding the ferrying operations was the aim, only partly achieved during 1942. A prolonged spell of bad weather in August and September seriously hampered construction activity at BLUIE WEST 1. In September, the first of three disastrous fires completely destroyed the mess hall at Ivigtut. Meanwhile, German submarines had begun to take their toll of ships, men, supplies, and equipment. The sinking of the USAT *Chatham* on 27 August was the first American troopship loss of the war. Fortunately, almost all on board were saved; but it was a foretaste of more bitter experiences to come. Although new weather stations were opened and new airfields started, the route was far from being completed by mid-December, when ferrying operations ceased for the winter. During the six months it had been in use nearly nine hundred planes had taken the route.

During the same period the strength of the Greenland Base Command was doubled. To reinforce the garrison to any great extent during winter had been impossible, so that in April 1942 it was about the same size as it had been the previous December. Then, in May, defense forces were sent to Ivigtut and BLUIE WEST 8. This brought the strength up to 1,383 officers and enlisted men, where it stood on 30 June when the ferry traffic was beginning to come through. BLUIE WEST 1 still had the largest garrison, 731 men, compared to 238 at Ivigtut and 379 at BLUIE WEST 8, and the bulk of the garrison now consisted of antiaircraft and coast defense troops, and of Air Corps and service detachments, instead of engineers. Through the summer and fall reinforcements continued to reach Greenland. By the end of November, just before winter weather closed the route to ferrying operations, the strength had risen to approximately 2,856 men, more than half of them stationed at BLUIE WEST 1.

Most of the additional troops belonged to the infantry battalion that arrived in early November and was divided between BLUIE WEST 1 and
THE NORTH ATLANTIC BASES IN WARTIME

BLUE WEST 8. The War Department had originally planned to send the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, to Greenland, and in preparation for the move the Headquarters and Headquarters Company were dispatched at the end of April. After the troop movements of May and June got under way, Colonel Giles, the commanding officer in Greenland, recommended that the defense of the airfields be placed in the hands of strong antiaircraft and tactical air units. Specifically, he requested one pursuit squadron, one composite pursuit and bomber squadron, three batteries of 90-mm. guns, and one battery of 155-mm. guns. Lt. Col. Robert W. C. Wimsatt, who relieved Colonel Giles when the latter assumed command of the North Atlantic Wing of the Air Forces Ferrying Command, concurred in the views of his predecessor, as did General Spaatz, who had stopped in Greenland on his way to take command of the Eighth Air Force in Britain. "As a basis for planning," the War Department was willing to, and in fact did, approve an even larger air and artillery augmentation; but for the immediate present it proposed to go ahead with the plans to send an infantry battalion.11 Meanwhile, in order to take care of the increasing demands made upon his headquarters, Colonel Wimsatt requested additional Quartermaster, Ordnance, and other overhead personnel, and at the same time requested that a Headquarters and Headquarters Company for the Greenland Base Command be activated with the headquarters personnel of the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry. The War Department gave its approval, and on 18 July dispatched the appropriate directives to Army Ground Forces and the Services of Supply. Some months later, in October, Colonel Wimsatt's request for additional supply and service personnel was granted also. Meanwhile, on 1 September, after the Base Command Headquarters was activated, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, was inactivated and its personnel transferred to a newly constituted unit: the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 73d Infantry Battalion (Separate). On the same day the four companies of this battalion were activated at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, and on 11 November 1942 they arrived in Greenland.12

During the next six months all the American outposts in the North Atlantic were built up toward peak strength, while at the same time plans

were being laid to reduce the garrisons. All except Greenland reached the peak before midsummer, 1943, and then started to dwindle. Before retrenchment set in, the Iceland garrison had risen to approximately 41,000, the Newfoundland garrison to about 10,000, and Bermuda to about 4,500. The Greenland garrison continued to grow for several months after the others began their decline and finally reached its peak strength toward the end of the year, when about 5,300 men were maintaining lonely vigilance there.\textsuperscript{13} Plans for using the Greenland airfields for antisubmarine operations, the sinking in February 1943 of the transport \textit{Dorchester} with the loss of 605 men en route to Greenland, the resumption in 1943 of enemy activity on its northeast coast, and the development of plans for the invasion of Europe (for which Greenland weather reports would be of vital importance) all suggest themselves as explanations for the lag in reducing the size of the Greenland garrison.

The entry of the United States into the war not only gave new importance to the Greenland airfields, but likewise brought construction plans to full maturity in Iceland and made necessary a review or recasting of the program in Bermuda and Newfoundland. At all the bases the obvious reaction was to eliminate those items of construction that were not essential to the purposes of actual defense. In Newfoundland, such things as family quarters, theaters, and officers' and service clubs were either eliminated outright or replaced by temporary structures, and such facilities as additional gun batteries and reinforced concrete storage igloos were added instead. In Bermuda, where the ease of handling the local building stone and the availability of concrete block made permanent- or semipermanent-type construction less of a problem and more easily built, fewer temporary buildings were substituted. Nevertheless the program was revised. The runways, hangars, cantonment housing, barracks, and similar facilities were given urgent priority; certain less essential construction was placed on a deferred status.\textsuperscript{14} In Iceland, the need of an additional bomber field and the desirability of additional fighter plane facilities merged and became the Keflavík air base project.

The Army Air Forces, GHQ, and the Iceland Base Command had for some time been united in favor of an additional bomber field in Iceland. During November and December 1941 site and soil surveys, reports, and

\textsuperscript{13} Precise figures on the actual strength of any garrison at any particular time are almost unobtainable. The above approximations are based on the statistical summary, Strength of U.S. Army Forces . . . , compiled by OCMH Statistics Section, on the weekly OPD status maps, and on scattered strength summaries in OPD 320.2 files for the several base commands.

recommendations had been made, every one of them favorable, but authority to proceed with the preliminary clearing and grading had not been forthcoming until 29 December. Two weeks later, on 14 January 1942, General Somervell's office recommended, with the concurrence of the Air Forces, that the Army Engineers at once begin construction of an airfield in the vicinity of Keflavik suitable for heavy bombers and that the necessary funds be provided therefor. In the meantime, while the pros and cons of a bomber field were being studied, Colonel Morris, commander of the Iceland Base Command's air forces, had been unobtrusively getting the construction of a new fighter field under way as part of the basic defense mission. As soon as the bomber field received official approval, the fighter field was fitted into the project as a satellite field. Thus, considerable progress had already been made by the time the first civilian construction gangs arrived in May. They were set to work on Patterson Field, as the satellite airfield was soon named, and when the first planes of the Eighth Air Force began coming through on their way to England, early in July, two of its three runways were in use.

Construction work on the main airfield, Meeks Field, was started on 2 July and was taken over in August by one of the first Seabee units organized. A B-18 bomber carrying General Bonesteel and high ranking officers of his staff, and their guests, made the first landing at Meeks Field on 24 March 1943, and with appropriate ceremony General Bonesteel declared the field officially opened. By the end of November 1943 the Greenland airfields had been completely graded and surfaced. All the links in the "Snowball" route to England had been filled in. "The major problems concerned with aircraft ferrying had been largely solved," states the official history of the Air Transport Command. "Ferrying had become virtually a routine operation."

The Command Problem

One of the sharpest nettles growing out of the Pearl Harbor attack was that hardy perennial, the problem of unity of command. "Lots of paper," as General Marshall once observed, had been expended through the years on

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15 Memo, G-4 for CofS, 14 Jan 42, OCS 21224-171. The relation between Iceland and the strategic decisions made during the Anglo-American conversations (the ARCADIA Conference) is suggested by the date of the authorization and of General Somervell's recommendation.
16 Col George C. Reinhardt, Engineers, IBC, Historical Outline of Keflavik Project, 23 Mar 43 copy in OCMH; Ltr, Gen Morris, USAF (Ret.) to OCMH, 26 Jul 51; Navy Dept, BuDocks, Building the Navy's Bases in World War II, II, 56-57.
17 Rcd of Events, Hq IBC, Jun 41-Jun 45, IBC 314.7.
this esoteric question of how command should be exercised when different services were involved and who should exercise it. The question verged on the philosophic, and the points at issue—unity of command versus mutual co-operation—were absolute terms, not susceptible to compromise. It was somewhat like the conflict between "positivism" and "relativism," which, to the total indifference of most laymen, provides among professional historians a perpetual source of argument and a convenient explanation for the shortcomings of their fellows. To Secretary Stimson and the professional military men, the resounding defeat on 7 December 1941 seemed attributable in part to this long-standing disagreement over the principles of joint command, and one of the reactions to the blow was an effort on the part of the War Department to recreate each of the various overseas bases into a unified command.

In spite of all the sound and fury, the argument boiled down to the issue of which higher headquarters would have responsibility for any given operation. The answer would obviously be determined by the nature of the
operation and the particular circumstances of the case. Since the answer generally was found in this way, and since in actual practice integrated operations did not necessarily come with unity of command, nor unity of command with integrated operations, it is fairly clear that the opposing advocates were not misled by their own arguments and really saw the issue for what it was.

To the extent that it involved the Atlantic bases, the fundamental issue was whether air units would be more appropriately employed in operations in support of the fleet and under Navy command, or whether they were primarily for local defense and should be under Army command. At Bermuda and Iceland the planes in dispute were Navy patrol bombers; at Newfoundland they were Army aircraft. The roots of the problem went back, in the case of Bermuda, to the agreement of April 1941 by which the Navy undertook to provide planes for local defense purposes, and, in the case of Iceland, to President Roosevelt's directive of 6 September 1941 in which he called for the assignment of identical tasks to the Navy and the Army air forces there. There were complicating factors. In spite of, or perhaps in ignorance of, the April agreement regarding Bermuda, Captain James, naval commandant there, was convinced that the base should function primarily as an operating base for the fleet, not principally as a naval air station, and that his own proper place in the chain of command was under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT), not the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District, as his original orders seemed to indicate. But if this should be the case, his planes would then be units of the fleet and not appropriate elements of a local joint command. This question was not decided until 3 February 1942, directly after the Army forces in Bermuda were placed at the disposal of the Navy commander. The presence of RCAF, RAF, and British Navy units at Newfoundland and Iceland, the wide disparity in strength between the Army garrison and the local naval defense forces in Iceland, and, finally, the inadvertence by which the Iceland Base Command was not apprised of the extension of the Army's mission until months afterward were additional complications.

The command pattern that took shape after the attack on Pearl Harbor had been molded by these complications. When the Navy Department on 4 January formally proposed that "unity of command" be established in Bermuda under CINCLANT, an arrangement similar to the one shortly before

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20 Ibid., p. 51.
placed in effect in Hawaii, GHQ and the War Plans Division of the General Staff found themselves on opposite sides of the question. In the exchanges that followed neither GHQ nor the War Plans Division referred to the April 1941 agreement. GHQ could see no reason for the Navy’s proposal except as a means of securing the naval shore establishment more fully under the control of the fleet or of facilitating the conduct of relations with the local British authorities, and neither purpose, according to GHQ, required placing Army forces under Navy command. When the War Plans Division countered with the argument that the defense of Bermuda depended upon the Navy’s control of the seas, that the operations of all the forces in Bermuda would be primarily directed toward maintaining that control, and that for this reason the Navy should have command, GHQ replied that Bermuda had been established as an outpost to defend the continental United States against attack, that the primary aim was to deny the islands to the enemy, and that the Army was the service principally charged with this mission. The view of the War Plans Division prevailed. On 30 January the Chief of Staff notified GHQ of his concurrence in the Navy’s proposal, and GHQ grudgingly acquiesced. Four days later the intra-Navy disagreement of air station versus operating base was settled by Secretary Knox in favor of Captain James and the naval operating base. Meanwhile, the command problem had been partly laid to rest in Newfoundland also. In late October and early November 1941 Canadian naval forces on ocean escort duty, outside the coastal zone, were placed under the control of CINCLANT, and some measure of co-ordination in air patrols was worked out by the RCAF and the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command. It was reported, at a meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States–Canada, on 10 November, that orders were being issued placing the American air units under the command of CINCLANT for operations in protection of shipping on the high seas, but even for this limited purpose a completely unified command did not come into existence until after the United States was carried into the war. Not until January 1942 did the Canadian Government give its consent to a similar arrangement for the RCAF.

21 Memo, Adm Turner for Gen Gerow, 4 Jan 42, sub: Proposal for Unity of Comd, Bermuda; Memo, GHQ for WPD, 10 Jan 42; and Memo, WPD for CofS, 25 Jan 42. All in WPD 4351–8, sec. 2. Memo, CofS GHQ, for CG FF, 30 Jan 42, AGF-McNair file, Unity of Comd.
22 Memo, WPD for Adm Turner, 31 Jan 42, sub: Unity of Comd, Bermuda, WPD 4351–8, sec. 2; Ltr, Gen Embick to Col O. M. Biggar (Canadian Sec, PJBD), 11 Nov 41, Memo, Gen Embick for WPD, 13 Nov 41; Memo, Gen Embick for WPD, 28 Feb 42. Last three in WPD 4351–9, sec. 6.
In spite of the fact that the United States had now entered the war, that the Army had recognized the Navy’s “paramount interest” in the defense of Bermuda, and that Army air units in Newfoundland had been placed under Navy command for the performance of a particular task, there still remained a few ripples of disagreement. In Newfoundland part of the difficulty lay in the relationship between the American and Canadian forces there. The ABC–22 plan, which came into effect with the entrance of the United States into the war, provided for co-ordination of effort by mutual cooperation; but the United States in a protocol to the base lease agreement of March 1941 had expressly recognized the predominant interest and over-all responsibility of Canada in the defense of Newfoundland. The installing of American harbor defenses at St. John’s, in addition to existing Canadian defenses, and the stationing of American air units at the Gander airfield, in addition to RCAF units, created areas of divided responsibility. A suggestion by the Canadian Army commander in Newfoundland that Canada assume responsibility for manning the American harbor defense battery received short shrift; and a complaint by the American air commander at the Gander airfield that closer co-ordination was necessary likewise was of no effect. Nevertheless, a joint defense plan prepared by the Newfoundland Base Command in November was accepted by all the commanders concerned, with the exception of the RCAF commander. In December, after the United States entered the war, a Local Joint Defense Committee, similar to those set up in the Caribbean, was formed for the purpose of reviewing and revising the existing defense plans. The wrangle over unity of command among the American services, the autonomous position of each of the Canadian services in Newfoundland, and difficult personal relations between the several commanders prevented the Joint Defense Committee from making much progress. There continued to be pressure for giving the commanding general of the Newfoundland Base Command supreme command in Newfoundland. In February, General Drum, commanding general of the Eastern Theater of Operations, recommended that all forces in Newfoundland, Canadian as well as American, be placed under the command of an American officer, without any limitation. GHQ, which was the next higher authority above General Drum, had long favored the task force scheme of organization, an essential feature of which was the unification of forces under a single commander, and now GHQ urged that General Drum’s recommendation be adopted. General Embick, senior Army member of the United States–Canadian defense board, was not, on the other hand, favorably impressed. Considering how difficult it had been to obtain the assent
of the Canadian Government to the existing arrangement, General Embick was convinced that any effort to carry out General Drum’s recommendation would fail and only impair what co-operation there already was. The War Plans Division agreed with General Embick and replied to General Drum accordingly.\textsuperscript{23} Shortly afterwards the Canadian Government established a unified command in Newfoundland with a joint operations center for all three Canadian services. Relations between the American and Canadian commanders began to improve, and in the course of the next six months or so, there was a marked growth of co-operation between the two forces. The American command joined the Canadian joint operations center; a joint United States–Canadian local defense plan was prepared and approved; and joint field exercises were held. By 1 October 1942, a satisfactory relationship between the two forces had been established, solely on the basis of the fine spirit of co-operation that existed between the two commanding generals.\textsuperscript{24}

The command arrangements agreed upon for Bermuda had meanwhile come under the fire of GHQ. Instructions sent by CINCLANT to the Naval Operating Base, Bermuda, on 4 February, described the procedures somewhat as follows: the senior United States Navy officer afloat at Bermuda or the senior officer of the joint local defense forces eligible to command—whichever of the two might be senior—would assume command as the deputy of CINCLANT; the senior Navy officer afloat, if upon him the command devolved, was authorized to call upon local defense forces to support the fleet, as the situation required; and the senior officer of the joint local defense forces, if he were to assume command, was authorized to assign local defense tasks to units of the fleet as long as these tasks did not prevent the execution of fleet tasks.\textsuperscript{25} The arrangement was cumbersome, made so perhaps by the fact that there was still uncertainty whether the naval operating base was technically a fleet or a shore-based activity—and by the fact that Captain James was junior in rank to General Strong, commander of the Bermuda Base Command. The opinion of GHQ was that this procedure appeared “to utilize all local forces to best advantage in the support of the fleet, but does not provide a satisfactory basis for the assignment of responsibilities for the defense of Bermuda.”\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{23} Memo, Gen Embick for WPD, 28 Feb 42; Memo, WPD for CofS, 9 Mar 42; and attached papers. All in WPD 4351-9, sec. 6.
\textsuperscript{24} Memo, Mayor La Guardia, Chairman, American Sec, PJBD, for CG EDC, 1 Oct 42, cited in Dziuban, Military Relations Between United States and Canada, 1939–45, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{25} Msg, CINCLANT to NOB Bermuda, 4 Feb 42, WPD 4351-8, sec. 2.
\textsuperscript{26} Memo, DCoS GHQ, for CG FF, 12 Feb 42, WPD 4351-8, sec. 2.
had already signified to Admiral King his willingness to assign as commander of the Bermuda Base Command an officer junior to the commandant of the Naval Operating Base. But then the promotion of Captain James to Rear Admiral, on 18 February, made a change of officers unnecessary; and it placed responsibility for the defense of Bermuda squarely on the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. As to the limited authority the local defense commander could exercise over units of the fleet, and of which GHQ had also complained, it was the view of the War Plans Division that "this is considered sound."  

One outgrowth of the Bermuda command question was the extension of the same problem to Iceland. GHQ, in arguing against giving the Navy command authority over the Bermuda forces, had pointed to Iceland as an example. The situation there, according to GHQ, was similar "in principle," and if it seemed "advisable to yield to the Navy" in the case of one then it might be equally advisable in the case of the other, GHQ inferred.  

In actual fact, if not in principle, the two cases were as far apart as the islands themselves. Up to this point the Navy had not raised the question of command in Iceland, and the Army War Plans Division would have preferred to let the issue sleep; but GHQ chose this moment to inform General Bonesteel that the joint Army-Navy defense plan which he and the local naval commander had drawn up the previous fall had been scuttled by the Navy Department.  

Rear Adm J. L. Kauffman, the commandant of the naval base at Iceland, immediately asked for instructions concerning his command relationships, and General Bonesteel shortly afterwards sought clarification from GHQ, which by this time was being gradually taken out of the picture by the impending reorganization of the War Department. Fresh impetus came from the White House. Mr. Lincoln MacVeagh, the American Minister to Iceland and a personal friend of the President, arrived in Washington at this juncture with a report in which he strongly urged a
unified command. There had been no real friction, he said, but a lack of liaison which had led to misunderstanding, delays, and in one case to the fatal shooting of a Navy enlisted man. Without concerning himself with the purely military matter of operations, Mr. MacVeagh argued that a unified command would centralize responsibility for unloading cargo and moving troops and supplies, would improve the security service, and would steer into a single channel all questions having to do with the local government. More pertinently, he suggested that for reasons of rank, administrative experience, and convenience (the Army had a larger staff in Iceland) the over-all command be given to the commanding general of the Iceland Base Command rather than to the naval commander.\footnote{Notes on Iceland, Lincoln MacVeagh to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ltr, 20 Feb 42, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.} Sent over to Secretary Stimson by Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. MacVeagh’s report received the enthusiastic endorsement of the War Plans Division, which now had no hesitation about bringing the question into the open. Admiral Stark was asked for his views. He, in the meantime, had ordered Admiral Kauffman to submit a report on the situation; and the latter agreed that the lines of command in Iceland were exceedingly complicated. But the remedy, as Admiral Kauffman saw it, was greater control by the U.S. Navy.\footnote{Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Mar 42, WPD 384, Iceland (3-3-42); Administrative History, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, IV, Commandant, NOB Iceland, p. 55.}

Thus the issue, touched off by the Bermuda question and by Washington’s rejection of the Iceland defense plan, was transferred to the efforts of General Bonesteel and Admiral Kauffman to agree on a revised version of the plan. The particular point on which the controversy now focused was the tactical control of the Navy patrol planes in Iceland, of which there were ten or twelve. After long negotiation the most the two commanders could agree upon was that in the event of an enemy assault the Navy planes would be employed “in conjunction with the shore defense systems,” under the principle of mutual co-operation, when it was “clearly evident” to the commandant of the naval base that the aircraft would not be needed for fleet tasks.\footnote{Gen Bonesteel to Gen Marshall, 15 May 42, AG 381 (5-15-42) (3). The revised local joint plan (short title, ICEJANN) with the various changes and additions is in IBC 381 Local Jt Def Plans, Project ICEJANN.} Although General Bonesteel considered this provision an unsatisfactory solution he agreed to it in order to save the rest of the plan. The Operations Division, successor to the War Plans Division, advocated the same course that its predecessor had recommended: that the existing command arrangements in Iceland be left undisturbed, unless the local naval
forces were materially strengthened, and on 16 June the War Department notified General Bonesteel to this effect. The "relatively insignificant strength" of the local naval forces, and "the fact that the Navy does not consider these forces as local naval forces but rather as a part of the fleet" were, according to the Operations Division, grounds for considering further discussion of the matter inadvisable.\textsuperscript{33} The Operations Division reversed itself again on the very next day, when Admiral King proposed that aircraft of either service operating in support of the other should remain under the direct control of their own service but should have their tasks or missions assigned by the service in whose support they were operating. Discerning a similarity between this proposal and the Army-Navy agreement under which Army aircraft were operating within the coastal frontier areas, the Operations Division immediately countered with a recommendation that the language of the existing agreement in \textit{Joint Action of the Army and the Navy} be employed in the present case. In a memorandum to Admiral King the following terminology was suggested:

\begin{quote}
The Army is responsible for the assignment of tasks (missions) to all U. S. aircraft engaged in the defense of Iceland. The Navy is responsible for the assignment of tasks (missions) to all U. S. aircraft engaged in operations for the protection of sea communications and for the support of Naval forces in the sea areas around Iceland. Army aircraft are operated as part of the Iceland Base Command. Naval aircraft are operated as a part of the U. S. Fleet. When, however, aircraft of either service are made available for the support of the other service, such supporting aircraft, will operate under the principle of unity of command as set forth in Paragraph 10 of \textit{Joint Action of the Army and Navy}, 1935.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

Admiral King accepted the change, and with this the question was settled. General Bonesteel and the commandant of the naval base in Iceland were directed to revise their joint plan accordingly, which they did.

What had actually been agreed upon in Washington was little more than a reaffirmation of the general principle involved. The paragraph in \textit{Joint Action of the Army and Navy} to which reference was made only defined the responsibility and limited the authority conferred by unity of command. Recognition on the part of both services that integrated operations might be necessary and that those circumstances would require a single commander was no doubt a long step toward a solution, but the final step—making it

\textsuperscript{33} DF, OPD for TAG, 11 Jun 42, with text of reply by Ind to Ltr, Hq IBC to CofS, 16 May 42; Memo, OPD for CofS, 11 Jun 42. Both in WDCSA 330.11 Iceland (3 Dec 43). The memorandum transmitting OPD's recommendation was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff on 15 June, and the indorsement sent out 16 June.

\textsuperscript{34} Memo, DCofS for Adm King, 20 Jun 42, and atchd corresp, AG 381 (5-15-42) (3).
obligatory for either one of the commanders in Iceland to place his forces at the disposal of the other—was not taken. Who should invoke unity of command and take over the reins was left for future determination.

Command relations with the British presented a situation somewhat similar to, and in some ways closely tied in with, the Army-Navy command problem. Like the latter it involved co-ordinating the operations of two different forces; it embraced an accepted, fundamental principle; and it raised the inevitable question who should command whom. Among the factors that had to be reckoned with were political considerations, the rate of progress in reaching an adjustment of the Army-Navy problem, and—before the Pearl Harbor attack—American neutrality. In Bermuda and the West Indies the defense responsibilities of the British Governors created a special complication. In Newfoundland, the special interests of Canada were affected. In Iceland the Royal Navy claimed "paramount interest." By and large the difficulty seems to have been not that forces of different nations, but rather operations in three different elements—land, sea, and air—were involved. More particularly the operations had different aims. The Navies—Canadian, British, and American—were engaged in a wide-ranging war of movement against German U-boats; the respective ground forces in Iceland and Newfoundland—indeed at all the Atlantic bases—were employed in preparing relatively fixed defenses against air attacks and possible hostile landings. The several air forces, which were capable of serving either purpose equally well, were generally the point of conflict. As soon as the United States entered the war, British and American ground forces in Iceland came under a single commander, for purposes of local defense; the British, Canadian, and American Navies joined forces to fight the Battle of the Atlantic under common direction; but the two types of operations never did meet, in the realm of command, even to the limited extent of the American Army-Navy agreement.35

Operations Against the Enemy

The question of command, either between the United States and Britain or between the United States Navy and the Army, was one of those questions that by their very nature could be solved only by higher authority, not by

35 On this subject, see WPD 4351, secs. 2, 6; WPD 381 Iceland (2–28–42), case 14; WPD 384 Iceland (3–3–42); in addition, the material cited in the immediately preceding pages. See also Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, ch. XIII.
the individuals directly concerned. The drafting of joint plans for local operations was on the other hand a function of the local commanders, but local planning was at times hampered by the absence of firm and specific command arrangements. Defense preparations nevertheless had to be made in spite of the uncertainties of the command situation. After several weeks' respite, shipping in the western Atlantic began in January 1942 to feel the brunt of the German submarine campaign. Allied losses rose at an alarming rate. In addition, enemy air activity over the North Atlantic began to increase. The Bolero movement, during the summer, brought a corresponding reaction from the Luftwaffe. Enemy or unidentified planes were reported over Iceland on eighteen occasions during August, which was only four less than the total number reported in the preceding three months, and on forty-seven days out of the sixty-one in September and October following. During midsummer a German meteorological party had installed itself on the northeast coast of Greenland. Although not actually located until the next spring its presence was soon suspected. Certainly countermeasures against the enemy could not be deferred until the problems of inter-Allied, or of Army and Navy, command were completely solved.

Bombers of the Newfoundland Base Command had been helping to fight the U-boats ever since the day, late in October 1941, when one of the B-17's of the command dove out of a layer of low lying clouds almost onto the deck of a German submarine. The one bomb that the plane had time to release missed the sub by a close margin. Four months later, at the beginning of March, planes from Newfoundland bagged the first two submarines to be sunk from the air by American forces, although in both cases the successful planes were naval aircraft from Argentia. Another four months afterwards, on 30 June, a naval patrol bomber based on Bermuda sank the third U-boat to fall victim to an American plane. These were the rare climactic moments. Day in and day out, weather permitting, the Newfoundland and Bermuda patrols made their routine sweeps without so much as catching sight of a submarine. Many a time they were sent out on a wild goose chase, or, to put it more precisely, in search of porpoises and whales. Only four submarines were sighted and attacked off Newfoundland in the first eight months of 1942; and five attacks were made on submarines that were not

36 Compiled from list of Hostile and Unidentified Aircraft, in Hq IBC, Rcd of Events, Jun 41–Jun 45, IBC 314.7. The number of planes reported on these occasions was listed by General Bonesteel as 13 in July, 31 in August, 38 in September, and 77 in October. Ltr, Gen Bonesteel to Gen Marshall, 31 Oct 42, WDCSA 350.11 Iceland (3 Dec 43).

37 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, app. II.
visible at the time. In the neighborhood of Bermuda three U-boats were bombed on sight and six others were attacked sight unseen.\(^{38}\)

The men who in 1942 were fighting the Battle of the Atlantic from Army planes under Navy command were the real forgotten men of the war. Partly to blame was the fact that for months at a time nothing happened to break the monotony of their patrols, but also to blame were the shifting and sometimes confused lines of organization and command. After the Army Antisubmarine Command was organized in October 1942, their story became a part of the Army Air Forces’ history. Until then they were neither fish nor fowl.

At the beginning of 1943 a heavy concentration of U-boats gathered in the North Atlantic just beyond range of the Newfoundland air patrols, but within reach of the still unfinished Greenland bases. Plans were cast to send a heavy bomber squadron to Greenland and to increase the air cover from Iceland; but the weather in the region of Cape Farewell was discouraging

\(^{38}\) USAF, The Antisubmarine Comd, Chart: “Location of Aircraft Attacks on U-Boats, following p. 35.”
Coast Guardsmen Capture Twelve Germans in a raid on the last enemy weather-radio station in Greenland.

to patrol operations from Bluie West 1. As a result action did not immediately follow upon design. Then, in March, the whole strategy of the war against the U-boat was placed under discussion at the Atlantic Convoy Conference in Washington, where it was decided to increase the range of the Newfoundland patrols and to place under Canadian operational control all the antisubmarine operations from Newfoundland. During the next few weeks two squadrons of B-24's were sent to the Gander airport to join the B-17 squadron that had been carrying the full load and on 3 April Canada took over operational control. Within two weeks the first steps were taken to set up an operating base at Bluie West 1. By this time the crisis had passed; the battle had moved away, and the long-range bombers were no longer needed in the North Atlantic.29

29 OPD Diary, entries of 1 Apr, 24 Apr, 23 Jun 43; Gen Council Min, 26 Apr 43; USAF, The Antisubmarine Comd, pp. 151, 154-55; Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, pp. 392-94.
In Iceland, where the Army's main effort was against the Luftwaffe, the peak of activity was reached in the fall of 1942. The first engagement had taken place on 28 April and had been followed by a three months' lull. Then in late July three more encounters took place. Up to this point the honors had gone to the Norwegian patrol squadron, which, under RAF command, was operating off the northern and eastern coast; but it was not long before the American air forces in Iceland had their chances at the Nazis. Having missed being the first to engage the enemy, an American plane became the first to bring one down. On the morning of 14 August two American fighter pilots, Lt. E. E. Shahan and Lt. J. D. Shaffer, intercepted and destroyed a Focke-Wulf 200 about ten miles north of Reykjvík. It was the first German plane of the war to be shot down by the Army Air Forces.\footnote{IBC, Narrative Hist; Hq IBC, Rcd of Events, Jun 41-Jun 45, IBC 314.7.} During the next two months American fighter planes of the Iceland Base Command bagged two more German planes, intercepted and attacked seven, and unsuccessfully tried to intercept three others. Planes of the Norwegian squadron, meanwhile, had met and attacked three German aircraft with varying degrees of success, and during the same period the ground troops opened fire on German planes a dozen times. A few planes appeared during the winter, but none was intercepted and only two came under antiaircraft fire. The spring of 1943 promised to be just as lively. In April German planes were spotted or reported on at least ten occasions. One of the intruders, a Junkers bomber, was shot down at the end of the month by two planes of the 50th Fighter Squadron. Throughout the year the number of enemy or unidentified planes reported was about 15 percent less than in 1942. Actual contacts were considerably fewer. Apparently the German planes were successfully avoiding the antiaircraft defenses and evading the American fighters. On 5 August American planes, making their second interception of the year, shot down another German bomber, the fifth and last enemy plane to be destroyed over Iceland.

Some of this air activity over the North Atlantic was undoubtedly related to the enemy's efforts to set up weather and radio stations in Greenland. Early in the spring of 1943 three members of the Greenland Sledge Patrol discovered the German weather base that had been established on Sabine Island the preceding summer. On being discovered, the Germans immediately descended on the patrol station at Eskimonaes, about fifty miles to the south, destroyed the place, killed one of the patrol men, and captured another. A third member of the patrol escaped to Scoresby Sound with the
news of the raid, which was dramatically confirmed some time later by the arrival of the man who had been taken prisoner by the Germans. He had persuaded them to split forces; had engineered an opportunity to be alone with the leader, had seized and overpowered him, and, turning the tables completely, brought him back to Scoresby Sound, a captive. A flight of bombers led by Col. Bernt Balchen took off from Iceland for Sabine Island on 25 May and found the enemy base of operations. Bombing and strafing the three or four huts that made up the installation, as well as a small supply ship that was discovered in the harbor ice, they left the place damaged and on fire. To follow up the air attack a joint Army–Coast Guard task force was organized in Narsarsuak (Blue West 1) and was dispatched as soon as ice conditions permitted, in July, on board the two Coast Guard cutters Northland and North Star. A specially trained and equipped detachment of twenty-six men and two officers made up the Army component. After a difficult three weeks' voyage by way of Iceland, where the North Star layed over for several days for repairs, the force arrived off Sabine Island on 21 July. Plenty of signs, but no Germans, could be found. Then just as the landing party was about to return to the ship, its attention was attracted by the sound of phonograph music. A lone German was discovered waiting to surrender. He was taken on board. Further search of the coast revealed nothing else, and it was assumed that the rest of the Germans had been evacuated or had moved farther north. After almost coming to grief in the heavy pack ice, the two cutters arrived back at the Hvalfjordur (Iceland) naval base in mid-September.41

Operations in Greenland were resumed the next summer with the discovery of a well-fortified German base just north of Sabine Island. A landing party of soldiers and Coast Guardsmen went ashore from the cutters Northland and Storis, but found the place deserted. A burned-out armed trawler lay abandoned in the ice. Some days later the Northland sighted and gave chase to a strange vessel, which proved to be another Nazi trawler and which was scuttled by its crew when capture seemed unavoidable. On this occasion twenty-eight German officers and men fell into the hands of the Coast Guard. Some of the men had belonged to the Sabine Island garrison the year before. Before the summer of 1944 came to an end, a second German base was assaulted and destroyed, and a large 180-foot trawler was captured undamaged. The total score for the two summers came to three

41 OPD Diary, May-Jul 43; Hq, U.S. Coast Guard, Hist Sec, Political Intelligence Div, The Coast Guard at War: Greenland Patrol, II, 166–78.
German bases leveled, two ships destroyed, one captured, and sixty-two
enemy prisoners.\textsuperscript{42}

By the time the Greenland "campaign" reached its height in the late sum-
mer of 1944, Rome had fallen, Paris had been freed, and the Nazis were
retreating toward the Rhine. In the Pacific the winning of Saipan and Tinian
and the liberation of Guam had set the Japanese back on their haunches.
In both the Atlantic and the Pacific the war had receded beyond the point
from which it could seriously threaten the western hemisphere; but in its
backwash there were swirls and eddies such as the operations in northeastern
Greenland.

The problems that had come to the Atlantic bases with the coming of
war to America had not displaced the old, pre-Pearl Harbor problems. Supply
and transportation matters, regular mail deliveries, recreation and welfare,
relations with the local authorities and with local civilian labor—all these
were matters of almost as much importance after 7 December 1941 as before.
Quite apart from their importance, they ceased to some extent to be prob-
lems. By the summer of 1942 the machinery for dealing with them was
fairly well established. Likewise the new problems—the questions of de-
fense, of reinforcement and replacements, of command relations—were not
any of them particularly new. Active participation in the war only gave them
higher priority. But they did not long enjoy their status. After the summer
of 1943 the chief problem, except for the men engaged in routing the Nazis
out of Greenland, was one of contraction, of reduction and redeployment.
The enemy, not the Americas, was on the defensive, and the American out-
posts in the Atlantic shifted roles accordingly.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 178–204.
The authors obtained the bulk of the information used in the preparation of this volume from original records of the Army accumulated before and during American participation in World War II. These records are now in the custody of the World War II Records Division of the National Archives. The Army, Navy, and joint service records of the war are described in *Federal Records of World War II, Volume II, Military Agencies*, prepared by the General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, The National Archives (Washington, 1951), to which the interested reader is referred for more detailed information about the numerous agencies concerned and their accumulation of records.

The files of the War Plans Division (WPD) of the War Department General Staff, generally for the period 1921 to March 1942 (more or less), were the starting point for research in the preparation of this work. As war approached the War Plans Division became the principal agency of the War Department for directing as well as for planning operations. Its files have been kept physically associated with the much larger collection of papers accumulated by the Operations Division (OPD), the Army’s General Staff agency that planned military operations and served as the command post for directing them from March 1942 until the end of the war. The OPD decimal files have been used extensively. A number of special collections of OPD papers have also been of great value, notably the OPD Executive Office file (OPD Exec), the OPD collection relating to the attack on Pearl Harbor, operational files transferred to OPD from General Headquarters when it was abolished (OPD-GHQ), the OPD Diary maintained from March 1942 onward, the OPD message file (OPD Log), and a set of weekly status reports depicting the strength and projected reinforcement of all Army commands and bases from January 1942 until the autumn of 1944. A decimal file maintained by OPD’s Strategy and Policy Group (ABC) has also provided considerable assistance, including access to minutes of meetings and relevant papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). A few minutes and papers of the older Joint Army and Navy Board (JB) have also been used.

The small group of records accumulated by the Office of the Chief of Staff (referred to as OCS to March 1942 and WDCSA thereafter, in accordance with file designations), while very incomplete, contain much useful
information not readily found in other groups. Special items in this group that have been of particular assistance include the numerous binders of conference and miscellaneous notes for the 1939–42 period, two binders of notes on the Secretary of War’s War Council meetings beginning in May 1941, and four binders that represent the Army file relating to Standing Liaison Committee (SLC) meetings between 1938 and 1943.

The authors found the central decimal files maintained by The Adjutant General’s Office (AG) more valuable in the preparation of this volume than they were for its companion, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense. The theory that all official action papers would eventually reach the AG files broke down in practice to a considerable extent after 1939, but these files are nevertheless the most voluminous and comprehensive body of War Department records relating to the World War II period. The account of operations in the Aleutians to evict the Japanese depends very largely on unit reports and journals and other operational reports that form a part of The Adjutant General’s records now in the custody of the Archives’ World War II Records Division. Other departmental records used have included those of the Secretary of War (SW), of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy (ASW), and of the Supply or G–4 Division of the General Staff. For reconstructing the story of the evacuation of the American Japanese, and of its planning, the files of the Office of the Provost Marshal General (PMG) were invaluable. The minutes of meetings of the War Department General Council from March 1942 onward were of considerable help, and a fairly complete set of these minutes has been kept in the General Reference Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH). The authors have also made extensive use of the files of General Headquarters United States Army (GHQ), and limited use of the records of the Army Ground Forces (AGF), which inherited GHQ’s training function and most of its files.

To supplement the information available in the records of Army headquarters agencies, the authors drew upon the files of the operating commands and bases of the Army in the continental United States and elsewhere. Of these files, perhaps the most valuable for this work were those of the Western Defense Command (WDC). In addition to its central series of records, this command also accumulated large special collections, two of which were used extensively. For the story of Japanese evacuation, the files of the WDC’s Civil Affairs Division (WDC–CAD) were essential, and the WDC files relating to military developments in Alaska (WDC–ADC) were found to be fuller and more informative for the early war period than the records of
the Alaska Defense Command (ADC) itself. The records of the Eastern Defense Command (EDC) while voluminous were much less rewarding as source material. Of the overseas command and base records consulted, those of the Iceland Base Command (IBC) were most extensively used.

In addition to their research in Army files, the authors obtained some help from pertinent records in the papers of President Roosevelt, now preserved in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library (FDRL) at Hyde Park, N. Y. This library contains also the papers of Mr. Harry Hopkins, used by the authors through the medium of the Calendar of Hopkins Papers prepared in connection with the writing of Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*. They also used relevant portions of the lengthy diary kept by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, now accessible to scholars in the Sterling Memorial Library of Yale University. Critical and very helpful comments from reviewers of this volume, a number of whom provided additional information, are preserved in OCMH records.

For the story of enemy action toward the United States and its outposts, the authors have made extensive use, on the Pacific side, of the voluminous series of Japanese Monographs relating to World War II, prepared by former officers of the Japanese Army and Navy, and given limited distribution in the form of translated reproductions by the Office of the Chief of Military History. These monographs, the individual titles of which have been cited in footnotes, provided useful information on Japanese submarine activities along the west coast, the Pearl Harbor attack and its aftermath in Hawaii, and Japanese operations in the Aleutians. Some interrogations of former Japanese Army and Navy officers, contained in United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Interrogations of Japanese Officials*, 2 volumes (Washington, 1946) have also been used. On the Atlantic side, where German submarine operations were the most notable enemy activity, the authors used as their primary source a translation of the War Logs of the German U-boat command, *Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (B.d.U. War Logs)*, covering the years 1941 through 1943. They made occasional use of the series reproduced in translation by the Office of Naval Information, *Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy* (1947).

The service historical programs active during and after World War II, both in Washington and in field commands, left a very large number of unpublished narrative histories, many of which contain documentary appendices. Unless otherwise indicated, the historical manuscripts used in the preparation of this volume are kept in the General Reference Branch, OCMH, and these include copies of most of the narratives compiled by Army Air
Forces historians. Among the most useful have been the narrative histories dealing with the Western Defense Command, Hawaii (the AFMIDPAC history), Alaska and the Aleutian Campaign, the Caribbean Defense Command and all its appendages, and the North Atlantic bases including Greenland and Iceland. The reader is referred to footnotes of chapters dealing with these and other areas for full titles of the historical manuscripts used.

Among printed sources, the natural starting points for almost any Army history of events before and during World War II are the *Annual Reports of the Secretary of War to the President* and the *Biennial Reports* of General George C. Marshall as Chief of Staff. On what happened before 7 December 1941, the thirty-nine volumes of testimony and documents printed as *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* and accompanying *Report* (Washington, 1946) contain a wealth of data and opinion that has fascinated a good many historians and others ever since their publication. The *Report of the War Department Civil Defense Board* (Washington, 1947) has much useful information about how the Army handled civilian defense in the continental United States. The *War Department's Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942* (Washington, 1943) is an official compilation that must be used with considerable caution in the light of other evidence.


The authors have obtained much help on the air and naval aspects of the story from the series "The Army Air Forces in World War II," edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, 7 volumes (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1948–58), especially from Volumes I, II, IV, and VI; and from the series "History of United States Naval Operations in World
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE  559


Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, Queen's Printer, 1955) relates the Canadian Army's efforts on behalf of North American defense that were integrated at several points with those of the United States Army.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Antiaircraft</td>
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<td>Army Air Forces</td>
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<td>ACoFAS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Air Staff</td>
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<td>ARCADIA</td>
<td>United States–British conference in Washington,</td>
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<td>December 1941–January 1942</td>
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<td>Air-to-surface-vessel (radar)</td>
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<td>Air routes through central and northeastern Canada, part of the air ferry route to the British Isles</td>
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<td>ORANGE</td>
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<td>Secretary, General Staff</td>
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<td>Standing Liaison Committee (of State, War, and Navy Departments)</td>
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<td>Plan for limited cross-Channel attack in 1942</td>
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<td>Secretary of the Navy</td>
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<td>Trinidad Sector</td>
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<td>U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles</td>
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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department
   Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
   Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
   Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942
   Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944
   Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943
   Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
   The Army and Economic Mobilization
   The Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces
   The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
   The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service Forces
   The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western Hemisphere
   The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
   Guarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the Pacific
   The Fall of the Philippines
   Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
   Victory in Papua
   CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Robaul
   Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
   Campaign in the Marianas
   The Approach to the Philippines
   Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
   Triumph in the Philippines
   Okinawa: The Last Battle
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The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
   Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West
   Sicily and the Surrender of Italy
   Salerno to Cassino
   Cassino to the Alps

The European Theater of Operations
   Cross-Channel Attack
   Breakout and Pursuit
   The Lorraine Campaign
   The Siegfried Line Campaign
   The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
   The Last Offensive
Index

A-20's, 191, 415, 503
ABC meetings, 339, 462
ABC-1, 386, 460, 463, 465, 471
ABC-22, 7, 543
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., 72
Act of Havana, 445
Admiral Hipper, 387
Africa, 9-10, 56, 334, 434
AGC's (amphibious command ship), 285
Agriculture, Department of, 125, 202
Air Corps Ferrying Command, 392, 536-37
Air Defense Board, 20, 56, 58, 60, 314, 326
Air Defense Command, 20, 24, 26-27, 63
Air Field Forces, Alaskan Defense Command, 248
Air Force Combat Command, 29-30, 36, 56-57, 63, 96
Air power, 23
design to contain Japan by, 15
lessons in Pearl Harbor attack, 196
as threat to the United States, 3, 55, 56
Air Transport Command, 539
Air units—Continued
Bombardment Squadrons—Continued
9th (H), 501
10th, 430n, 434
12th, 430n
29th, 430n
35th, 430n
36th (H), 248
44th, 430n
45th, 430n, 433
49th, 532
59th, 430n
73d (M), 248
99th, 430n
395th, 430n
430th, 430n
Bomber Command, I, 97-98, 435
Composite Group, 28th, 230, 247-48
Fighter Squadrons
42d, 272
50th, 552
54th, 272
Interceptor Commands
III, 503
IV, 85
Observation Squadron, 1st, 501
Pursuit Groups
8th, 503
53d, 412
Pursuit Squadrons
18th, 248
33d, 483-84, 500-501, 503, 505, 528
Reconnaissance Squadrons
5th, 430n
21st, 390
27th, 325, 430n
44th, 430n
Sea-Search Attack Group, First, 435
Sea-Search Squadron, Second, 435
Aircraft, 15, 23, 42, 83, 448. See also types by model number and name.
for Alaska, 228, 234, 239, 240, 243, 247-50, 255-56, 261
bombardment, 26, 42, 55-57, 59, 80, 84-85, 89, 91, 93, 111, 152-54, 156-57, 197, 255-56, 349, 388, 412, 429-30, 503
in Canal Zone, 302, 349
factories, 38, 82, 198
for Hawaii, 156-57, 160-61, 163-64, 166-67, 197, 214, 216
for Iceland, 466-67, 503, 505
GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS

Aircraft—Continued
increasing range and threat to the United States of, 4
Japanese losses at Pearl Harbor, 188, 191
in Puerto Rico, 350
pursuit, 26, 55-57, 80, 84-85, 91, 104, 110, 156-57, 180-81, 197, 255-56, 349, 412, 503, 505
U.S. losses at Pearl Harbor, 188-91
Aircraft carriers, 92, 161, 177, 197
in Alaskan operations, 258-59, 261-62, 273, 287-88
and attack on Pearl Harbor, 184-88, 195, 195n, 196
in Battle of the Atlantic, 389
in Midway operations, 220-21
as threat to Panama Canal, 409, 425
as threat to Pan American operations, 409, 425
as threat to Panama Canal, 409, 425
Aircraft Warning Service, 304-05, 314-15, 334, 341, 345, 349, 506-07. See also Aircraft warning systems.
Aircraft warning systems, 304-05. See also Radar, development of.
in Alaska, 240, 244-46, 251, 256-57
for Greenland, 456
in Hawaii, 167-68
in Iceland, 483, 506, 523
in Panama, 348-49, 425-29
Airfields, 10, 156, 322-23, 358, 379, 407. See also by name.
in Alaska, 228, 240, 244-45, 250-51, 270, 272, 276, 295
Crimson project, 535
in French Guiana, 439
in Greenland, 443-44, 447, 453-54, 533-36, 538-39
in Hawaiian Islands, 152, 169-70
in Iceland, 499, 503-04, 528-29, 538-39
in Sault Ste. Marie area, 104
Airport Development Program, 439
AKA's (cargo ships), 279
Akureyi, 498-99, 501, 503, 534
Alafoss, 498, 501
Alaska, 9, 32, 43-44, 153, 161, 174, 223-76, 300, 330, 393, 401. See also Aleutian Islands; Attu; Kiska.
aircraft for, 14, 243-44, 261, 430
air alert communicated to, 80, 243
as base for offensive operations, 255-55
command problems in, 266-68
command relationships in, 260-61
designated a theater of operations, 44
evacuation of Japanese civilians from, 115, 133, 143
Japanese threat to, 92, 113
Alaska—Continued
organization of U.S. Army forces in, 17
physical characteristics of, 225
prewar estimate of threat to, 5
prewar military preparations in, 223-52
reduction of forces in, 300
in Western Defense Command, 33
Alaska Communication System, 226-27, 241
Alaska Defense Force, 231, 234
Alaska Highway, 223, 256
Alaska Railroad, 225-27, 237, 241, 250
Alaska War Council, 267
Alaskan Department, 300. See also Alaska Defense Command.
Alaskan Scouts, 287
Alaskan Sector, 231, 234-35, 250
Alberta, 255
Albrook Field, 301, 303-04, 313, 316
Aleutian Islands, 3, 109, 223-24, 228, 239, 244, 250, 261, 277-300, 430. See also Attu; Kiska.
as base for offensive operations, 254, 263
and defense of Alaska, 239-42, 253-54
Japanese threat to, 5, 89, 92, 219-21, 258-59
physical characteristics of, 257
plans for offensive operations in, 270-72, 274-79
Alexai Point, 289, 295
Aliamanu Crater, 192
Alice Island, 235
Alien Enemy Control Program, 123
Aliens, control of. See also Nisei.
in Alaska, 115, 133, 143
in Canada, 143
German, 115-16, 120, 120n, 123, 126, 130n, 131, 131n, 136-37, 139, 143-46, 146n, 199
in Hawaii, 115, 121-22, 148-49, 206-14, 216
Italian, 115-16, 120, 120n, 123, 126, 130n, 131, 131n, 136-37, 139, 143-46, 146n, 199
Japanese, 38n, 40, 115-49, 199-202, 206-14
Amagansett, (New York), 99, 101
Amaknak Island, 236
Amchita Island, 273-76, 285, 296
America, 385
America and West Indies Station, 359
American Legion in Iceland, 513, 516
American Legion, 66-68, 72
American Red Cross, 72, 404n, 507-08, 516
Ammunition, 214, 387, 476
shortages of, 60, 80, 85, 85-86, 91, 252, 349
Amphibious Force, North Pacific, 266, 277
Anadyr Bay, 243
Anderson, Col. Jonathan W., 25-26, 431
Anegada Passage, 331, 333-35, 352, 412-13, 421-22
and defense of Aruba and Curaçao, 415, 423
and protection of Panama Canal, 424-25
recommends against construction of additional Panama Canal locks, 321
recommends supply procedure for Caribbean, 402
Ane Santa, 251, 244, 250, 261. See also Metlakatla.
Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, 53d Coast, 101
Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments
61st Coast, 469
62d Coast, 385, 385n
68th Coast, 469
78th Coast, 278
100th Coast, 104
251st, 159
501st Coast, 278, 293
Antiaircraft defense, 282, 324
of Alaska, 230, 238, 251, 258, 261, 264
of continental U.S., 34, 36-37, 40, 45-47, 51, 54, 57-64, 81n, 83, 87-88, 93-95, 102-06, 108, 110n
of Greenland, 537
of Hawaii, 158-60, 168-69, 181, 215
of Iceland, 466-67, 502
of Panama Canal, 302-04, 312-13, 314-15, 349, 412
in Pearl Harbor attack, 188, 191-92, 195
Antigua, 327-29, 331, 350, 350n, 354, 357-58, 397, 402, 405, 430n, 441
construction of U.S. base in, 376-79, 381
unity of command, 417
Antigua Base Command, 402
Antilles, 10, 303, 325, 333, 340, 350, 351, 355, 394, 429
Antilles Air Command, 434
Antisubmarine operations, 97-99, 336, 423, 429-30, 432-37, 535, 538, 549-50
APA's (attack transports), 279
ARCADIA Conference, 532, 534
Arctic Circle, 257, 454
Arctic Ocean, 225
Arcturus, 482
Argentia, 355, 401, 452, 480, 509, 549
Argentia conference, 486-87
Arias, President Arnulfo, 345-46
Ariza, 405, 406n
Arizona, 33, 115, 120, 130, 139, 141, 147
Arizona, 187
Armies
First, 17, 19-20, 24, 26, 33-35, 37, 39, 44, 393-94, 454
Second, 26, 39-40
Third, 26, 39-40, 95-96
Fourth, 19-20, 26, 33, 37, 39, 44, 80, 83, 231
Armor, 53, 94, 214, 238, 483
Armored divisions, 94
Army, Brazilian, 10
Army, Japanese, 185, 273
Army, U.S., 10-12
and air defense, 16-17, 19-20, 22-30, 36, 42, 54-64
alert measures in Hawaii, 179-82
and antishubmarine operations, 97-98, 98n, 99-101
casualties at Pearl Harbor, 193-94, 194n
and civilian defense, 64-73
and creation of GHQ Air Force, 19
and Defense Act of 1920, 21
and evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 122, 131, 137, 140-42, 142n, 144, 147, 206-11
expansion of, 16, 21, 49
and garrisoning of Azores, 14
and garrisoning of Iceland, 14
mission in the Hawaiian Islands, 151, 153-54, 163
mobilization of, 16, 21-22, 52, 57-58
and policy of "calculated risk," 94, 107-08, 114
and preparedness in the Pacific, 14-15
prewar concern for Caribbean and South American areas, 9-10, 12-13
prewar estimate of Japanese capabilities, 4-5
and protection of naval installations, 15
and the RAINBOW plan, 10
reorganization of 17 March 1941, 28-29
reorganization of December 1941, 33-36
reorganization of 9 March 1942, 38-39
and seacoast defense, 17-18, 21-22
state of readiness of, 8, 15, 19, 23
strength of, 10, 15, 23, 57
training, 16-24, 36, 39
and unity of command, 17, 27, 29, 40-44, 182, 204-05, 410-11
unpreparedness to meet German submarine assault, 429
Army Air Board, 55, 156, 228
Army Air Corps, 29, 77, 156, 228-29, 241, 304, 309, 333-34, 392, 401. See also Army Air Forces.
and autonomy of command, 20, 23, 26, 29
and barrage balloon development, 63
and civilian defense, 68
and command arrangements in Newfoundland, 394-96
Army Air Corps—Continued
organization of, 23–24, 29
survey of destroyer-exchange base sites, 364–65
Army Air Forces, 81, 103, 269, 428, 538, 539. See also Army Air Corps.
and antisubmarine operations, 434–35
authority and responsibility, 29–30, 32, 36
and command in Alaska, 255
and continental defense, 40–42, 44, 63–64, 84, 86, 95, 107
establishment of, 29, 39
and reconstitution of Hawaiian Air Force, 197
Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command, 99, 435, 550
Army areas
establishment of, 17–18
responsibilities of commanders of, 18–21, 24–25
separation from corps areas, 25
Army Ground Forces, 39–41, 91, 93, 105–06, 108, 110
Army and Navy Munitions Board, 320
Army Service Forces, 39, 539
on air strength of overseas garrisons, 326
appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, 24
and command arrangements in Newfoundland, 394–95
on continental air defense, 42
and defense of Alaska, 247–48, 250
and Greenland base development, 447–48, 451
on Japanese aircraft performance, 176
on responsibilities for air defense, 36
on U.S. radar equipment, 62
Arnold, Capt. Richard R., 472–73
Arthur, Col. Joseph D., Jr., 375
Arthur Middleton, 276
Atlantic Ocean—Continued
U.S. Navy prewar role in defense of, 11–12
versus Pacific in U.S. defense planning, 5, 11, 14–15, 34, 47, 58, 155, 157–58
Atlantic Sector, Panama Canal Zone, 302, 315
Atlantic Sector, Panama Sea Frontier, 429–31, 437
Attu, 92, 221, 223, 258–59, 263–65, 272–73, 278–81, 298
combat operations on, 287–95
composition and disposition of enemy forces on, 282
composition of U.S. invasion force, 283
description of, 280–81
U.S. plans for assault on, 283–84
Australia, 174, 181, 198, 217, 219
Avalon Peninsula, 335
Axis Powers, 23, 81, 115, 242–43. See also Germany; Italy; Japan.
Azores, 3, 14, 167, 337, 358, 395, 462–65, 470, 530
B–10’s, 304
B–17’s, 157, 161, 163, 166, 174, 181, 189–91, 197, 205, 221, 249, 256, 304, 325, 342, 389, 532, 549, 551
B–18’s, 191, 211, 224, 251, 304, 325, 339, 343, 390, 539
B–24’s, 87, 176, 272, 504, 551
B–26’s, 221, 249
Bahama Islands, 329, 351, 354, 357–58, 376–78
Bainbridge Island, 141
Baker, Newton D., 73
Balboa, 304, 317
Balchen, Col. Bernt, 553
Balloon operations
barrage balloons, 62–63
Japanese “freedom balloons,” 113–14
Barrage Balloon Battalion, 39th, 104
Barrage Balloon Training Center, 63
Barrington, Brigadier J. F., 417
Bases and base facilities, 10, 12, 107, 254, 304, 316, 327–29, 352–53, 386. See also Destroyer Base Agreement; and by geographical location.
in Alaska, 223–24, 228–47
in Antigua, 354, 357–58, 376–79, 381, 397, 402
in Aruba, 414–16, 430n
in Bahamas, 354, 357–58, 376–78
in British Guiana, 354, 376–79, 381, 397, 402
in continental United States, 55–56, 58
in Curaçao, 414–16, 430
INDEX

Bases and base facilities—Continued
in Ecuador, 340–43
in Galapagos Islands, 340–43
in Guatemala, 343
in Iceland, 388, 461, 466–67, 481–83, 494–506, 531
in Jamaica, 354, 358, 365, 368, 375–78, 381, 397, 402
jurisdictional problems in Atlantic, 405–07
in Latin America, 7, 13
in Nova Scotia, 9
in Panama, 308–09, 344–48
for Panama Canal defense, 304–09, 316
in Peru, 340, 342
in Puerto Rico, 322–23, 325, 402
in St. Lucia, 354, 356–58, 376–79, 397, 402
Battista Field, 440
Battle of the Atlantic, 5, 387, 407, 460, 528, 548, 550
Battle of the Caribbean, 434
Battle of the Coral Sea, 220
“Battle of Los Angeles,” 87–88, 139
“Battle of Niihau,” 194
Bay of Panama, 426, 428
Beach Blue (Attu), 287
Beach Red (Attu), 283–84, 287–88
Beach Scarlet (Attu), 287
Beach Yellow (Attu), 287
Beane Field, 430
Bearn, 329
Belgium, 230
Bellows Field, 170, 189–91
Benedict Field, 430
Bering Strait, 243, 254
Berle, Adolph A., 443–44
Bermuda, 3, 8, 327, 330, 335, 354, 530, 548
administrative problems of base operation in, 397, 400, 403–04, 407
build-up after U.S. entry into war, 538
construction of U.S. base in, 375–79, 381–82
garrisoning the U.S. base in, 384–85, 387–91
negotiations for U.S. base in, 366–68, 372
planning for U.S. base establishment in, 358–59
problems facing U.S. base acquisition in, 355–57, 366
U.S. troop strength in, 538
unity of command in, 416–17, 541–42
Bermuda Base Command, 39, 393, 395, 400, 402, 544–45
Bethel (Alaska), 229, 245
Bethel, Capt. J. S., 364
Biddle, Francis, 118, 120, 123, 130–31, 135, 145
Biesemeier, Comdr. Harold, 369, 375
Big Delta, 245
Bismarck, 448, 464, 500
Bissell, Lt. Col. Clayton L., 443
Block, Rear Adm. Claude C., 165–66, 180–81, 211–12
Blönduós, 499, 501
BLUIE bases, 535
BLUIE East 2, 458
BLUIE West 1, 453, 453n, 454, 456–57, 535–36, 551, 553. See also Narsarsuaq.
BLUIE West 8, 453–54, 536–37. See also Sande Strømfjord.
Bly (Oregon), 113
Board for Civilian Protection, 68–69. See also Office of Civilian Defense.
Board of Experts. See Greenslade Board.
Bogota, 336
Bolero, 535, 549
Bordheyri, 501
Borgarfjörður, 502
Borgarnes, 502
Borinquen Field, 350, 430n
Boston, 47n, 58, 64, 99, 509
Boundary (Alaska), 245
Bradley, Maj. Gen. Follett, 269
Brazil, 9–10, 13, 56, 301, 337, 351, 438
Brett, Maj. Gen. George H., 334
Brewster, Senator Ralph Owen, 238
Bristol Bay, 243
British Admiralty, 451, 466, 480
British Air Commission, 427
British Air Ministry, 372, 466
British Chiefs of Staff, 138n
British Colonial Office, 382, 418
British Columbia, 143, 261
British Commonwealth of Nations, 4
British Empire, 13
British Foreign Office, 479
British Guiana, 327–29, 350, 350n, 354–55, 394, 397, 403, 430
construction of U.S. base in, 376–79, 381
problems facing U.S. base acquisition in, 355–58
unity of command in, 417
British Guiana Base Command, 402
British Home Fleet, 464. See also Royal Navy.
British Home Guard, 79

573
British Isles, 9, 15, 358, 535
British Military Mission, 416, 480
British War Ministry, 466
British War Office, 493, 517, 523
British West Indies, 355
Brittany Peninsula, 111
Brookings (Oregon), 93
Brooklyn, 452
Bryden, Maj. Gen. William B., 521
on air needs in Alaska, 247-49
and Aleutian operations, 270, 274, 279, 291, 293
and command relationships in Alaska, 266-67
and counteraction in the Aleutians, 265
on defense construction in Alaska, 247
Búdhareyri, 499, 503, 534
Bullard, Col. Peter C., 415, 421
Bureau of the Budget, 317
Buskin River, 235
Buskoe, 458
Butler, Uriah, 357
Butler, Brig. Gen. William C., 256, 260-61, 267, 278
"Buy American" Act of 3 March 1933, 401
Cabot Strait, 355, 358
Caffrey, Jefferson, 337
California, 33, 82, 86-87, 89, 94, 115-16, 119, 122-23, 125-31, 133, 136, 138-39, 141, 143, 147, 166
Callaghan, Capt. Daniel J., 340
Camaguey, 430n
Camp Alabaster, 498, 516
Camp Davis, 63
Camp Lee, 77
Camp Molekoli, 191
Camp Pershing, 498, 516
Camp Tadcaster, 498
Camp Tortuguero, 350
Canada, 6, 8-9, 17, 92, 250-51, 270. See also Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada-U.S.
and basis of joint war plan ABC-22, 7
close military relations with U.S., 6
and defense of Greenland, 443, 448
and defense of Iceland, 442, 459-60
and defense of Jamaica, 419-20
and defense of Newfoundland, 357, 375, 407, 543-44
and defense of Sault Canal, 102-05
and evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 143
Canada—Continued
interest in Newfoundland's affairs, 356
Japanese threat to, 113
responds to U.S. request for radar equipment, 427
troops in Kiska operation, 296
and unity of command in Newfoundland, 542-44
Canal Zone. See Panama, Republic of; Panama Canal; Panama Canal Zone.
Canal Zone Code, 312
Cana Island, 465
Canton Island, 181
Cape Chiniak, 257
Cape Engaño, 326
Cape Farewell, 443, 550
Cape Flattery, 86, 92
Cape Hatteras, 97-98
Cape Hinchinbrook, 223
Cape Horn, 337
Cape Mendocino, 87
Cape Prince of Wales, 246
Cape Sable, 424n, 433n
Cape Verde Islands, 433, 465
Cape Wisslow, 257
Cape Wrangell, 280
Capetown, 337
Caradoc, 364
Caribbean, 7-10, 12-13, 80, 98-99, 107, 323-25, 409-41
operational plan for defense of, 413-14
reinforcing the garrisons in, 412-13
unity of command in, 410-11
Caribbean Air Force, 334-35, 349, 418
Caribbean Coastal Frontier, 410-11, 415
Caribbean Defense Command, 321, 329-31, 335, 343, 350n, 352, 397, 402, 413-14, 438, 441
command problems in, 331, 333-35, 393-94, 396, 410
Caribbean Sea Frontier, 424, 424n, 430n, 431-35, 437
Canoni Swamp, 369
Cascade, 319
Castle Harbour, 368
Castle Harbour Hotel, 388, 390
Casualties
in Aleutians, 261-63, 273, 278, 295, 297-98
at Pearl Harbor, 187, 189, 193, 193n, 194
Catalinas. See PBY’s.
Cattiva, 317
Caucasus, 465
Cavalry units, 83-84, 106, 110n
Caye, 439
Caye Airport, 439
Cayuga, 444
INDEX

Censorship, 202–03, 372, 402–03, 516
Censorship, Office of, 203
Central Air Defense Zone, 104
Central America, 302, 312, 351
Central Defense Command, 28, 35–36, 40, 42, 44, 102
Central Sector (Iceland), 499
Chacachacare Island, 390
Chagres River, 316
Chandler Committee, 267
Charcoal Island, 235–36
Charleston (South Carolina), 47n
Chateau Thierry, 390, 452
Chatham, 536
Chemical Warfare Service, Chief of, 48n, 65
Chemical Warfare Service, and civilian defense planning, 65, 72
Chernoofski Bay, 241
Chesapeake Bay, 47n, 99
Chichagof Harbor, 282, 284, 288, 394–95
Chief of Naval Operations. See Stark, Adm. Harold R.
Chief of Staff. See Marshall, Gen. George C.
Chile, 342
Chilkoot Barracks, 223, 250
China, 5, 159, 176
China Sea, 183
Chippewa County (Michigan), 104
Chirikof Point, 282–83, 288, 394–95
Chief of Naval Operations. See Stark, Adm. Harold R.
Chief of Staff. See Marshall, Gen. George C.
Chile, 342
Chilkoot Barracks, 223, 250
China, 5, 159, 176
China Sea, 183
Chippewa County (Michigan), 104
Chirikof Point, 282–83, 288, 394–95
Christmas Island, 181
Churchill, Winston S., 358, 462, 531
and Destroyer-Base Agreement, 373–75
Circle (Alaska), 226
Civil Aeronautics Authority, 229, 244–45, 258
Civil Affairs Division, Western Defense Command, 141, 143
Civil Air Patrol, 97
Civil Defense Branch, G-3, 67, 69
Civil Defense Plan, 66, 74
Civilian defense, 45, 64–73
Civilian Defense Board, 70
Civilian Defense Bureau, 64
Clark, Col. Frank S., 359
Clatf, Brig. Gen. Mark W., 37–38, 42, 121, 123, 131, 133, 135
Clark, Thomas C., 123–24
Clipperton Island, 304
Coast Artillery, 135, 206, 301–02, 309, 312, 324, 342n, 390, 412, 467, 469
defense of continental United States, 45–47, 47n, 48–54, 107–08
Coast Artillery, Chief of, 47, 313, 469
Coast Artillery Batteries
F, 52d, 389
B, 57th, 389
D, 69th (AA), 325
Coast Artillery Corps assumption of barrage balloon responsibility, 63
Coast Artillery districts, 17, 22, 33
Coast Artillery Regiments. See also Antiaircraft Artillery Regiments.
1st, 302
4th, 302
52d, 390
57th, 385, 385n
252d, 390
Coast Artillery School, 51
Coast Artillery units, 214, 238, 338
Coast and Geodetic Survey, 281
Coast Guard, 223, 444, 451, 457–58, 553
Coast frontier defense system, 21–22
Coco Solo, 409
Cocos Island, 304–06, 351
Cold Bay, 242, 244, 258, 261–62, 284
Collins, Maj. Gen. James L., 331
Colombia, 301, 322, 351
Colon, 317, 319, 433
Colorado River, 141
Columbia River, 47n, 87, 92
Combined Chiefs of Staff, 109
Combined Local Defense Forces, 417, 419, 420
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINC-LANT), 541–42, 544–45
Conference of Foreign Ministers, Rio de Janeiro, 415
Congress, U.S., 78, 107, 152, 199, 201–02, 480
and bases in Alaska, 224, 230, 235, 258
and civil defense, 70–71
and command relationships in Alaska, 267
and defense of Panama Canal, 303, 308–09, 319
and evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 122–23, 129, 133, 135–38, 146–47
and induction of National Guard, 23, 75
on lack of command unity in Hawaii, 182
and Lend-Lease Act, 12, 373, 374
and restrictions on merchant ships, 14
and selective service legislation, 23, 481, 484–86, 488
Coolidge Field, 430
Cooper’s Island, 390
Cordner, Col. Douglas C., 385
Cordova, 229, 245
Corps areas, 35, 38, 74, 76–77, 144
and continental reorganization of 20 March 1942, 39–40
control assumed by Services of Supply, 40
establishment of, 17
Corps areas—Continued
responsibilities of commanders of, 17–19, 75–76
and separation from armies, 24

Corps Areas
First, 17, 35, 75
Second, 17, 19, 35, 144, 322–23, 393, 396, 402, 454
Third, 17, 35, 77
Fourth, 134
Fifth, 535
Sixth, 102–03, 134, 137
Seventh, 393, 396, 402, 454
Eighth, 134, 137
Ninth, 17, 19, 35, 38, 40, 78, 117, 135, 137, 231, 247

Corps Christi, 96n
Costa Rica, 304, 322
Cox, Oscar Sydney, 388, 462
Craig, General Malin, 323
Cranborne, Lord, 370, 375
Crawford, Lt. Col. Robert W., 391
Crete, 196, 242, 409, 464–65
Crimson, 535
Cristobal, 337
Cross Sound, 223
Cruse, Col. Fred T., 103
Crystal, 509
Cuba, 351, 355, 430, 440
Cullin, Col. Frank L., 287
Cumuto Reserve, 369
Curaçao, 328, 337–39, 430n, 441
German operations against, 424
problems of U.S. base establishment in, 414–16, 420–22
Czechoslovakia, 309

Dakar, 463, 530
Daley, Brig. Gen. Edmund L., 324
Danzig, 309
Darlan, Admiral François, 439
Defense Act of 1920, 21
Defense commands, 37–39, 44, 112, 145. See also by name.
establishment of, 28–29
organization and responsibility of, 28–29
reduction of, 105–06, 108–10
Defense Project, 391
Delaware, 144, 340

Delaware Bay, 47n, 99
Delgado, General Nicolas, 9n
Denmark, 442–43, 449, 511
agreement with the United States on defense of Greenland, 388, 444–45, 447
cooperation with the United States in Greenland, 454
U.S. plans to protect colonial possessions of, 8

Denmark Strait, 464
Deputy Chief of Staff, 24, 107

Destroyer-Base Agreement, 7–8, 10–12, 327–28, 344, 354, 404, 445
local problems and base acquisition, 355–57
negotiating for the bases, 366–75
planning for the bases, 358–65
a view in retrospect, 407–08

Devers, Brig. Gen. Jacob L., 359
on Alaska as base for offensive operations, 254, 298–99
and Aleutian operations, 265–66, 269–70, 274–75, 277, 279, 293, 295–96
commands Western Defense Command theater, 33
on continental air defense, 41, 84
and defense of Pacific Coast, 81, 83–84, 88, 91, 93
ever evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 117–26, 128–41, 143, 145–47
on preparedness of Western Defense Command, 80
and strength of Western Defense Command, 105–06
war warning received by, 80–81

Diamond Head, 169

Disko Bay, 450

Distinguished Service Cross, 294n

Distinguished Service Medal, 517

Division of Civilian Protection, 69. See also Office of Civilian Defense.

Division of State and Local Co-operation, 67


Dixon Entrance, 256

Doenitz, Admiral Karl, 433, 437

Dominican Republic, 326

Dorchester, 538
Draft Surmises on Insular Operations, 160

Dutch Harbor, 89, 92, 223-24, 228, 232-34, 236-37, 239, 241-43, 245, 250, 254-63, 265

Earle, Col. Edward P., 291

Early, Stephen T., 481

East Massacre Valley, 281


Ecuador, 304-05, 340-42, 351

Edgewood Arsenal, 72

Edmund B. Alexander, 385, 385n, 389, 400

Egypt, 465, 486

Eisenhower, Milton S., 140-41

El Salvador, 322

Eleventh Naval District, 138

Elmendorf Field, 247-48, 250, 261


Emergency Plan WHITE, 18, 75

Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C., 204-05, 207-17, 221

Enfield rifles, 76, 79

Engineer Battalions 5th, 494 6th, 385n 21st (AVN), 483, 486 42d (General Service), 453 78th, 439 135th, 459

Engineer units, 467, 483, 523

Engineers, Chief of, 48n, 236, 313, 317, 393, 396, 454, 521

Engineers, Corps of, 91, 141-42, 244-45, 401 Enterprise, 183, 188

Eska, 225

Eskimonaes, 552

Estevan Point, 92

European Theater of Operations, 534 Evacuation of aliens. See Aliens, control of.

Ewa Marine Air Station, 188

Ewert, Col. Earl C., 420

Executive Order 8972, 16 Dec 41, 78

Executive Order 9066, 19 Feb 42, 135, 143, 145-46, 209

Expeditionary forces, 9-10, 31, 55

Facts and Figures, Office of, 127

Faeroe Islands, 530

Fahy, Charles, 369, 375

Fairbanks, 225-26, 228-30, 245, 269-70

Fairey-Battle (British seaplane), 467

Falkland Islands, 3

Farewell, 245

Faxaflói, 498

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 99, 102, 116-17, 119, 123, 147, 207, 313

Field Artillery, 50, 54, 214, 230, 258, 283, 315, 324, 412

Field Artillery Battalion, 46th, 494

Field Artillery Regiment, 2d, 302

Field Forces, Commanding General of, 21-22, 31, 489

Fifteenth Naval District, 311, 330, 349, 351

Fifth column activities. See Subversive activities.

Fifth Naval District, 541

Fiji Islands, 258

First Naval District, 494

First Special Service Force, 296

Fleet, British, 9-11, 48, 386. See also Royal Navy.

Fleet, French, 48

Fleet, Japanese, 87, 92, 219-20, 223

Fleet, U.S. See U.S. Fleet.

Florida, 35, 95, 98

Focke-Wulf 200 (German fighter), 552

Force A (Surinam), 338

Ford Island Naval Air Station, 188

Ford, Representative Leland M., 121

Forrestal, James V., 481

Fort Belvoir, 72

Fort Brady, 102

Fort Buchanan, 350

Fort Glenn, 238, 260-61, 275

Fort Greeley, 235

Fort Kamehameha, 191, 199

Fort Mears, 236, 258, 261

Fort Morrow, 264

Fort Ord, 277-78, 295

Fort Pepperrell, 379, 400

Fort Randall, 258, 261

Fort Ray, 236

Fort Read, 400

Fort Richardson, 230, 250, 266

Fort Shafter, 152, 186, 192

Fort Snelling, 537

Fort Stevens, 92

Fort Victoria, 390

Fort Weaver, 191

Fourteenth Naval District, 165, 211

France, 10, 47, 98, 230, 310, 327, 464. See also Fleet, French; Vichy Government.
France—Continued

effect on the United States if defeated, 5, 56, 60
Western Hemisphere colonial possessions of, 8, 9, 328
France Field, 301, 303, 312
Freeman, Rear Adm. Charles S., 235
French Committee of National Liberation, 440
French Frigate Shoals, 218, 220
French Guiana, 394, 439
French West Africa, 463
Frobisher Bay, 535

G-1, 38, 408, 472, 508, 521
G-3, 24, 26-27, 38, 67, 109, 384, 472, 521
G-4, 247, 317, 396, 472, 477, 479, 492
Galápagos Islands, 9, 304-06, 340-42, 351, 353, 413, 428-29
Galveston (Texas), 47n
Gander Airfield, 355, 357, 368, 389-90, 400, 543
Gander Lake, 355
Gas warfare, 89
Gasoline, 401. See also POL.
Gasser, Brig. Gen. Lorenzo D., 69
Gatun Lake, 321
Gatun Locks, 301

abolished, 39
assumes control of U.S. forces in Greenland, 454
and command arrangements in Iceland, 545
and command problems in Bermuda and Newfoundland, 395-97, 543-45
and defense of Caribbean area, 414
and defense of Ivigtut, 456-57
and defense planning, 31-32, 36-38
and evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 117-18, 121, 126, 132-33
Marshall establishes operations section in, 31
operations plan for Iceland, 500-503, 510, 517, 519
participation in the Iceland operation, 478, 484, 488-91, 493
and relief of British in Iceland, 523
and unity of command in Bermuda, 542, 545

General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, 19-20, 24, 26-29, 54-55, 248, 334
General Staff. See War Department General Staff.

Georgia, 397

German Air Force. See Luftwaffe.

German Naval Staff, 96

Germany, 3-10, 55-56, 58, 63, 155, 223, 327, 414
alignment with Italy and Japan, 96, 159
and American entry into war, 11-12, 14, 81, 387
meteorological activities in Greenland, 449-51, 549, 552-53
plans for air raid on the United States, 111
residents of U.S. territory, control of, 115-16, 120, 120n, 123, 126, 130n, 131, 131n, 136-37, 139, 143-46, 146n, 199
submarine threat to the United States, 51, 96-101, 103. See also Submarines, German.
threat to Iceland, 500
as threat to U.S. security, 56, 94, 107, 176
and U.S. 'shoot on sight' policy in western Atlantic, 392
and war with USSR, 12, 111, 242, 465
"Germany first" strategy, 6


Gibraltar, 5
Gilbert Ridge, 289-91

Giles, Col. Benjamin F., 452-53, 455-56, 537

Gillies, 263

Giraud, General Henri, 439

Gneisenau, 387

Goltsov Point, 288

Good Neighbor policy, 7

Grand Coulee Dam, 77

Grant, Brig. Gen. Ulysses S., 3d, 69

Great Britain, 4-10, 13-15, 32, 63, 184, 230, 309-10, 327-28
and base exchange for U.S. destroyers. See Destroyer-Base Agreement.
civilian defense influence on the United States, 67-68, 79
and defense of Greenland, 449
and defense of Iceland, 442, 459-60, 465-67, 499-501, 503, 505
effect on the United States if defeated, 56, 60
and government of Western Hemisphere colonies, 356-57
and plans for relief of Iceland garrison, 473-80
radar equipment, 62, 426-27
relief of Iceland garrison, 520-26, 534
and survival under German onslaught, 22, 67, 386
U.S. aid to, 12, 159, 161, 388
U.S. co-ordination in defense measures in colonial possessions of, 416-21
and unity of command, 409
INDEX

Great Circle Route, 103
Great Lakes, 351
Great Lakes Coastal Frontier, 22
Great Sound, 356, 368, 388
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 14, 184
Greece, 196, 409, 459–60
Green, Lt. Col. Kirby, 466, 493, 495–96
Green, Lt. Col. Thomas H., 200
Greenland, 3, 8, 353, 394–95, 442–58, 488, 530
build-up in after U.S. entry into war, 535–38
command arrangements in, 453–54
defense considerations in, 447–49
included in U.S. “neutrality zone,” 462
operations against Germans in, 449–51, 549, 552–54
planning the U.S. defense of, 455–58
U.S.-Danish defense agreement on, 444, 447
U.S. troop strength in, 536–38
U.S. views on defense of, 442–43
Greenland Base Command, 454, 536–37
Greenland Sledge Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard, 552
Greenslade, Rear Adm. John W., 359
Griffiss, Maj. Townsend, 359
Grindavík, 506
Guadalcanal, 274, 285n, 298
Guadeloupe, 439
Guam, 179
Guatemala, 340, 343, 353
Guatemala City, 343, 429
Gulf of Fonseca, 413
Gulf of Mexico, 9, 35, 98, 351, 433
Gulf of Mexico coast, 19, 95–96, 98, 101
Gulf of Panama, 306
Gulf of Paria, 355, 357, 390
Gulf Sea Frontier, 98, 424, 424n, 431–33, 437
Gulkana, 245
Hackworth, Green Haywood, 391
Hafnarfjörður, 501
Haleiwa, 170, 189–91
Halifax, Lord, 373
Hamilton, 356
Hamilton Island, 390
Harri, 482
Harbor Defense Board, 47–48, 48n
Harbor entrance control post, mission of, 51
Harbor Island, 235
Harmon, Lt. Col. Ernest N., 527
Harms, Brig. Gen. Henry W., 395
Harrison, Lt. Col. William K., Jr., 27
Harry L. Lee, 494
Harth, Lt. Col. Albert E., 287
Hawaii, Island of, 151, 154, 164, 170, 206.
See also Hawaiian Islands.
Hawaiian Air Depot, 189
Hawaiian Air Force, 157, 166, 183, 191n, 197, 204, 215. See also Air Forces, Seventh; Air units.
Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, 191–93
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 172, 204
Hawaiian Defense Project, 173
Hawaiian Department, 151, 153, 157, 163, 168, 171, 175, 179–81, 183, 192, 195, 200, 202–03, 205, 212, 214, 216–17, 222, 393
Hawaiian Division, 152, 170–71
Hawaiian Islands, 8, 53, 150–219, 401. See also Hawaii, Island of; Maui; Oahu; Pearl Harbor.
air defense of, 15, 27, 85, 197, 204–05, 216–17
alerted to Japanese threat, 80, 175, 178–80
army postattack measures in, 199–201
control of Japanese residents in, 115, 121–22, 148–49, 206–14, 216
general description of, 151–52
Japanese threat to, 86, 88, 113, 126
martial law declared in, 199–200
prewar estimate of threat to, 5
reinforcement of, 150–73, 214–15
strength of Army forces in, 217
U.S. Army mission in, 151
Hawaiian National Guard, 212
Hawaiian Sea Frontier, 204
Hay-Varilla Treaty, 307
Headquarters, Newfoundland Base, 385n
Hemisphere defense. See Western Hemisphere, defense of.
Henderson Ridge (Attu), 281, 290–91
Hepburn Board, 223–24
Heywood, 494
Hickam Field, 152, 158, 167, 169–70, 180, 183, 189, 199
Hill X (Attu), 288, 291–92
Hilo, 206
Hitler, Adolf, 4–6, 12, 13, 96, 309–10, 459, 486, 500, 532
Holland. See Netherlands.
Holman, Senator Rufus C., 126
Holsteinborg, 444, 458
Holtz Bay, 281-85, 287-89, 291-92, 294
Home Guard, 78. See also State Guards.
Homer, 245
Homer, Brig. Gen. John L., 489, 513, 516
Honolulu, 151-52, 170, 175-76, 191, 193, 211, 214, 218-19
Honolulu Advertiser, 177
Honshu Island, 113, 151, 261
Hood, 464
Hoover, Rear Adm. J. H., 413, 415, 420, 435
Hoover Dam, 77
Hopkins, Harry, 245, 388, 462, 546
Hoppin, Marshall, 245
Hosogaya, Vice Adm. Boshiro, 259, 263
House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, 230
Hudson Bay, 103-04
Hudsons (British bombers), 430, 467, 503
Hull, Cordell, 4, 177, 194, 344, 348, 374, 387n, 406, 449, 461
and hemisphere defense, 13
and reaction of Atlantic base garrisons to enemy approach, 391
signs Greenland defense agreement, 388, 445
and U.S. treaty rights in Panama Canal Zone, 308
Hurricanes (British fighters), 430, 503, 505
Hvalfjördhur, 477, 499, 501-02, 526, 533
Hvítárvellir, 502
Hyde Park, 338
Iceland, 3, 12, 14-15, 249, 330, 338, 396, 451, 459-531
air defense of, 503-06, 528-29
as area of U.S. interest, 459-62
British defense plan for, 499-500
build-up after U.S. entry into war, 533-35, 538
command problems in, 489-91, 516-17
conditions to acceptance of U.S. protection, 479
description of, 498
duty tour length in, 508-09
establishing the U.S. garrison in, 481, 494-98
German air threat to, 505-06, 549, 552
and the Monroe Doctrine, 461
problems in defense of, 502-06
relations between U.S. garrison and, 510-16
relief of British forces in, 520-25, 534
Task Force 19 at Argentia enroute to, 452
U.S.-British relations in, 516-19, 548
Iceland—Continued
U.S. plans and preparations for garrison in, 466-81
U.S. troop strength in, 534-35, 538
Iceland Base Command, 501, 503-04, 509, 516-17, 519, 528-29, 535, 538-39, 541, 546-47, 552
Ickes, Harold L., 176-77
Idaho, 33
Idaho, 288, 293
Imperial General Headquarters, 298
Indian Ocean, 259
INDIGO, 478-80, 483-84, 489, 491-93, 511, 522
INDIGO-1, 483-84
INDIGO-2, 485, 488
INDIGO-3, 488, 527
Indochina, 337
Indonesia, 5, 14, 219
Infantry, 258, 388, 412, 483
Infantry Battalions. See also Parachute Battalion, 551st.
2d, 3d Infantry, 537
3d, 3d Infantry, 385n
2d, 10th Infantry, 524, 534
2d, 17th Infantry, 287-91
3d, 17th Infantry, 287, 289-92, 294
1st, 32d Infantry, 293
2d, 32d Infantry, 291-92
3d, 32d Infantry, 292-94
73d (Separate), 537
100th, 212
Provisional, 285, 288, 292, 294
Infantry Brigades
18th U.S., 311
146th British, 534
Infantry Companies
7th Scout, 285, 288
G, 11th Infantry, 389
A, 17th Infantry, 287
B, 17th Infantry, 287
F, 17th Infantry, 290
I, 17th Infantry, 290
K, 17th Infantry, 294
F, 32d Infantry, 290-91
K, 32d Infantry, 294
Infantry Divisions, 83-84, 91, 94, 155, 159, 274, 467
1st, 464, 466-67, 469-71, 477
3d, 83
5th, 453, 456, 466-67, 470-71, 477, 486-87, 490, 520-21
7th, 277-79
24th, 171, 192, 215
25th, 171, 192-93, 215
26th, 95
27th, 215
35th, 277
INDEX

Infantry Regiments, 214–15, 230, 238
  2d, 102, 534
  3d, 385
  4th, 291, 293–94
  5th, 311
  10th, 494, 502
  11th, 389–90
  13th, 311
  14th, 302
  17th, 283, 287–92, 294, 294n
  32d, 283, 287, 290–94, 294n
  33d, 338, 439
  131st, 104
  184th, 277
  295th, 439
  298th, 212
  299th, 170–71, 212

Ingersoll, Admiral Royal E., 481

Ingles, Brig. Gen. Harry C, 413

Inspector General, The, 109

Intelligence Division. See G-2.

Intelligence estimates of German and Japanese strategic capabilities, September–December, 1941, 176
of German attack on U.S. territory, 101
of Japanese attack on Hawaii, 183, 195
of Japanese attack on U.S. territory, 89

Interceptor Command, 77, 86, 218

Interior, Department of, 225–27

Iraq, 465

Ireland, 355, 358

Iry, Lt. Col. Clarence N., 481–82, 492–93, 520

Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 319

Italy, 55–56, 58, 81, 115, 159, 212, 310–87, 414
  residents of U.S. territory, control of, 115–16, 120, 120n, 123, 126, 130n, 131, 131n, 156–37, 139, 143–46, 146n, 199
and U.S. “shoot on sight” policy in western Atlantic, 392

Ivigtut, 444, 448–49, 454–57, 536

Iwo Jima, 295, 300

J2F, 249

Jacksonville (Florida), 99

Jaluit Island, 218

Jamaica, 321–22, 327–29, 331, 350, 350n, 354, 397, 404, 416, 430n, 441
  command problems in, 419–20
  construction of U.S. base in, 375–79, 381–82
  planning for U.S. base establishment in, 358, 365, 368
  problems facing U.S. base establishment in, 355–57
  unity of command in, 417

Jamaica Base Command, 402

James, Capt. Jules, 390, 541–42, 544–45

Japan, 3, 9–11, 33, 55, 159
  alignment with Germany and Italy, 96, 158
  casualties at Pearl Harbor, 194
  communications codes of, 89, 174, 186, 220
  and decision for war, 14, 184
  and “Germany first” strategy, 6
  and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 14, 184
  and initiation of hostilities, 80–81, 178, 186
  occupation of Aleutian Islands, 92
  operations of in Aleutian Islands. See Attu; Kiska.
  and plans for Aleutians operation, 258–59
  plans for Pearl Harbor attack, 184–86
  residents of U.S. territory, control of, 38n, 40, 115–49, 199–202, 206–14
  Stimson’s view on strategy of, 14
  threat to Alaska, 89, 92, 233, 237, 242, 248, 253
  threat to Aleutians, 92, 258
  threat to Hawaii, 151, 153, 155–59, 161, 163–64, 166, 175–81
  threat to Midway, 89, 92, 219–21
  threat to Panama Canal, 353–37, 412
  threat to the United States, 4–6, 84, 86–89
  U.S. assumptions vis-à-vis Germany and, 6

Japan Current, 280

Japanese High Command, 258

Japanese Naval General Staff, 184

Japanese units
  Adak-Attu Occupation Force, 259, 263
  Advance Expeditionary Force, 185
  Carrier Striking Task Force, 177, 185, 188, 205
  Combined Fleet, 184, 219–20
  1st Air Fleet, 184–85
  Northern Area Force, 259–60, 263
  Second Mobile Force, 259, 261
  Sixth Fleet, 86, 185

Japonski Island, 235–36

Jarman, Brig. Gen. Sanderford, 315

Jarmin Pass, 292

Johnson, Herschel V., 373

Johnson, Senator Hiram, 126

Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 21–22
  107, 109, 351, 412, 547

Joint Board, Army-Navy, 21, 107, 109, 232–34, 237, 244, 250, 257, 323, 326, 411, 417, 448, 455, 472, 478, 485

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 54, 111, 209–10, 212, 216, 264, 267, 269–70, 272, 275, 279, 296, 300
Joint Claims Board, 513–14
Joint Operations Center, 419
Joint Operations Office, 34
Joint Planning Committee, Army-Navy, 232–33, 244, 252, 351, 358, 365, 376, 409, 472, 478, 483
Joint Port Committee, Iceland, 527
Joint Staff Planners, 110, 296, 299
Jonasson, Prime Minister Hermann, of Iceland, 513
Jones, Brig. Gen. Lloyd E., 276
Jones, Lt. Col. Matthew H., 495–96
Judge Advocate General, 200, 510
Julianehaab, 443, 450
Juneau, 226, 228, 245
Junkers (German bombers), 552
Junyo, 259, 262
“K Operation,” 218, 220
Kaaawa, 186
Kahuku Point, 170
Kahului, 206
Kakuta, Rear Adm. Kakuji, 259, 261–62
Kaldadharnes, 499, 501, 503–04
Kamchatka Peninsula, 254, 264
Kanakele, Benhakaka, 194
Kane, 285
Kaneohe Bay, 171, 218
Kaneohe Seaplane Base, 188
Kauffman, Henrik, 445
Kauffman, Rear Adm. J. L., 545–46
Kawailoa radar station, 186
Keflavik, 504, 534, 539
Keflavik Peninsula, 501
Kenai, 245
Ketchikan, 226, 229, 243
Ketchikan, 226, 229, 243
Key West, 47n
Kilgore, Senator Harley M., 238
Kimmel, Admiral Husband E., 163, 165–66, 175, 177, 179–80, 182, 195, 204
Kilgore, Senator Harley M., 238
Kimmel, Admiral Husband E., 163, 165–66, 175, 177, 179–80, 182, 195, 204
Kindley Field, 379
King, Admiral Ernest J., 44, 196, 221, 260, 264, 266, 299, 410, 436, 547
and beach defense, 101
Kinkaid, Rear Adm. Thomas C., 275, 278–79, 282–84, 293, 297
Knox, Frank, 70, 161, 417, 466, 542
and control of Japanese in Hawaii, 207, 209–11, 213
report on Pearl Harbor attack, 194–95, 204
Kofoed-Hansen, Mr., 515
Korean, United States, 142n
Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter, 95
Kuehn, Otto, 201
Kuniholm, B. Eric, 492, 511, 513, 515
Kuril Islands, 177, 185, 273, 295, 299–300
Kuskokwim River, 226, 245
Kuter, Brig. Gen. Laurence S., 265, 267
Kwajalein, 87
La Guardia, Fiorello H., 68–70, 75, 78
Labor. See Local procurement.
Labrador, 396, 488
Ladd Field, 230, 250, 269
Lago, 423
Lake Huron, 102
Lake Logurinn, 499
Lake Minchumina, 243
Lake Myvatn, 499
Lake Superior, 102
Lake Thingvallavatn, 502
Kamehameha, 170
Landreth, Lt. Col. Earl, 230
Landrum, Brig. Gen. Eugene M., 277, 293, 293n
Latin America, 3, 7–8, 10, 135, 414
Lea, Leif, 256
Lea, Representative Clarence F., 123, 133
Lea, Representative Clarence F., 123, 133
League of Nations, 4
Lear, Maj. Gen. Ben, 315
Leeward Islands, 331
Leeward Islands, 331
Leeward Islands, 331
LeGallion Field, 439
LeMaitre, Maj. Lyman L., 505–06, 524
Lend-Lease Act, 11, 388
Lend-Lease Act, 12, 31, 374
Leonard Wood, 390
Lerch, Col. Archer L., 128
Lexington, 183
Limitations of Armament Treaty, 153
Litvinov, Maxim, 183, 268
Local Combined Defense Committee, 417, 418
Local Combined Defense Committee, 417, 418
Local Joint Military Defense Subcommittee, 417
in Newfoundland, 543
in Trinidad, 418
INDEX

Local procurement
of labor, 321–22, 381–83, 514–15
of supplies, 379
London, 369, 374, 465
Long Island, 144
Long Island Sound, 47n
Loomis, Lt. Col. Harold F., 389
Los Angeles, 47n, 82–83, 87–88, 91, 94, 117, 130–31, 141
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, 117, 123n
Lothian, Lord, 359
Louisbourg, 358
Lovett, Robert A., 29–30
Low Countries. See Belgium; Netherlands.
Luftwaffe, 111, 549, 552
MacArthur, General Douglas, 175, 178
McGrath, 245
Mackenzie Bay, 458
McMorris, Rear Adm. Charles H., 181, 278–79
MacVeagh, Lincoln, 514–16, 545–46
Madden Dam, 316–17, 319, 346
Maine, 35, 47n, 355, 494
Makin Island, 236
Malta, 484
Manchuria, 185
Manila, 174
Maracaibo, 421, 423, 436
Margaret Bay, 236
Marine Brigade, 1st Provisional, 471, 473n
Marine Corps, 42, 83, 91, 110, 165, 188, 193, 265, 322, 439, 489–91, 500
relief of troops in Iceland, 521, 534
troops for Iceland, 470–72, 474, 480–81, 484–85, 487–88, 491
Marine Defense Battalion, 13th, 439
Marine Regiment, 6th, 470
Maritime Commission, 468, 521, 526
Markham, Col. Edward M., 154–56
Marshall, General George C.—Continued
approves increase in Iceland force supply levels, 476
approves supply depots in Puerto Rico and Trinidad, 402
approves WPD plan on troops for Surinam, 338
and beach defense, 101
and civilian defense preparations, 67, 75
and command arrangements in Alaska, 267
and command arrangements in Newfoundland, 396
and command in Iceland, 490
and composition of the Iceland force, 470, 487
and continental defense, 34, 37, 108–10
and defense of Alaska, 230, 238, 242–43, 246–47, 264
and defense of Hawaiian Islands, 151, 157–59, 161, 163–64, 171, 175, 197, 215–16, 221
and defense of west coast, 89, 91, 138n
designates Western Defense Command as theater of operations, 33, 35n
establishes Air Defense Command, 20, 26–27
establishes operations section in GHQ, 31
and evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 124, 129n, 135, 141, 208–09
and garrisoning of the Atlantic bases, 384
on gas warfare estimate, 89
and length of service for selectees, 481, 486
on naval aspects of hemisphere defense, 9
and organization of air forces, 24, 28, 28n
and protection of nonmilitary installations, 76–78
and reaction of Atlantic base garrisons to enemy approach, 391
and reinforcement of Alaska, 264–65
and reinforcement of Iceland, 520
and restriction of Japanese use of Panama Canal, 336
and threat of Japanese invasion of Alaska, 260
and unity of command, 43–44, 204, 329–30, 395, 542, 544–45
and unity of command in Caribbean, 410–11
and war warnings to U.S. forces, 81, 177, 179, 186
Marshall Islands, 218
Marston, Brig. Gen. John, 471, 490, 513
Martial law, in Hawaii, 199–201, 207, 209
Martinez, Pvt. Joe P., 294n
Martinique, 328, 393, 438–41, 464
Maryland, 144
Massachusetts, 397
Massacre Bay, 281, 283–85, 287–90
Massacre Bay Beach, 289, 291
Massacre Valley, 281, 288–92, 294
Matanuska Valley, 225
Maui, 151, 170–71, 206
Medal of Honor, 294n
Medical officers, 402
Mediterranean Sea, 96, 242
Meeks Field, 504, 539
Melgerdhi, 499
Memel, 309
Melakatla, 229, 230. See also Annette Island.
Mexico, 17, 113, 125, 301, 353, 409
Miami, 390, 436
Michigan, 113
Middle East, 486
Midway, 89, 92, 132, 174, 180–81, 199, 219–22, 258, 260, 263
Midway, Battle of, 71, 92–93, 200, 220–21, 263
Military Area No. 1, 136, 139, 143, 146–47
Military Area No. 2, 139, 147
Military government, 200n, 204
Military Police, 75–76, 78–79, 103, 105, 108, 523
Military Police, Corps of, 75
Military Police Battalion, 702d, 103
Mines and mine fields, 45–46, 50–51, 98–99, 336
Miraflores Locks, 301, 320–21
Mississippi River, 141
Mississippi River Delta, 98–99
Mitchel Field, 27
Moffett Field, 395
Molokai, 170, 210
Monroe Doctrine, 3, 7, 442, 461
Montana, 33
Montana, 320
Montreal, 447
Moore, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 320, 521
Morale, 403–04, 404n, 440, 507, 509–10
Morgan’s Island, 368
Morocco, 434
Morris, Lt. Col. Edward M., 483, 495, 504, 539
Moscow, President Ignace, 310
Moscow, 269
Moth (British fighters), 467
Mount Tantalus, 218
Moyne, Lord, 375
Narang, 452, 453a
Nashville, 4
Nevada, 206
Nevada, Japanese, 86, 176, 184–85, 206, 220, 438
and air defense, 85, 110–12
air defense mission in Iceland, 527–29
alert measures in Hawaii, 181–82
and antisubmarine operations, 97–101, 434–36
causality at Pearl Harbor, 193
and coast defense, 51, 59, 107
and command arrangements in Iceland, 489–90, 545–48
defense of Hawaii, 151, 153, 157–61, 163, 165, 172, 197–98, 204–06
defense of Panama Canal, 303–06, 320–21, 352, 413
division of fleet between Atlantic and Pacific, 157–58, 161, 163–64, 197
division of fleet between Atlantic and
and evacuation of Japanese from Hawaii, 210–11
and Galápagos Islands base, 340–42
and German activities in Greenland, 450–51
and Japanese threat, 89, 92, 177
plans for Aleutian operations, 270, 274–75
and the RAINBOW 4 plan, 10
and relief of British in Iceland, 521, 530
role in hemisphere defense, 11–12
and shipping for Iceland force, 468–70, 472, 475–77, 508–09, 520
and unity of command, 42–44, 411, 541–42
and U.S. acquisition of British bases, 358, 367–68
unpreparedness to meet German submarine
assault, 429
voice in Army Pacific defense measures, 15
war warnings to fleet commanders, 175, 177, 179
Navy Department, U.S. See Navy, U.S.
Navy Patrol Wing Three, 430
Navy Patrol Wing Two, 205
Negro Troops, 480
Negro troops, 408
Nenana, 245
INDEX 585

Netherlands, 8, 184, 230, 442. See also Aruba; Curaçao; Surinam.

Britain and France move to protect colonial possessions of, 328
command arrangements in colonial possessions of, 421–22
U.S. steps to defend colonial possessions of, 337–39, 393–94, 414–16
Netherlands East Indies, 442
Neutrality Act, 313, 462
Neutrality patrol of U.S. Navy, 462
Nevada, 33
Nevada, 293
New Bedford, 47n
New Caledonia, 258
New England, 55, 75
New Jersey, 144, 397
New Orleans, 415
New York City, 6, 34, 111, 144–45, 390, 527
New York Harbor, 47n, 99, 452
New York Port of Embarkation, 483, 488, 494–95
New York Times, 315, 481
Newfoundland, 8, 249, 327, 330, 354, 488, 548
administrative problems of base operation in, 397, 400–401, 403, 407
construction of U.S. base in, 375–79, 383
garrisoning the U.S. base in, 384–90
mission of U.S. garrison in, 391–92
planning for U.S. base establishment in, 358, 364
problems facing U.S. base acquisition in, 355–57, 366
strategic importance of, 358
unity of command in, 342–44
U.S. command problems in, 394–96
in U.S. Eastern Theater of Operations, 35–37, 39
U.S. troop strength in, 538
Newfoundland Base Command, 35, 393, 395–96, 400, 454, 542–43, 549
Newfoundland Commission of Government, 407
Newfoundland Railway, 400
Nimlack, 462, 467
Nicaragua, 319
Niilau, 151, 194
Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 204–05, 216–17, 275, 277, 279, 296, 299
Nisei, 27, 194, 212
Nome, 229, 243–45, 250, 254, 260, 264, 269
Nomura, Kichisaburo, 387
Norfolk, 38, 483
North Africa, 101, 285n, 409, 434, 438, 460, 486
North America, 3, 108–09
North Atlantic, 8, 12, 14, 26, 31, 56, 358, 395, 397, 401, 436–37, 442, 531, 535. See also Atlantic Ocean.

GHQ proposal for defense command in, 396, 488–89
and lifeline to Great Britain, 5, 11–14
North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, 22, 26
North Star, 553
Northeast Defense Command, 28, 32, 34–35
Northeastern Air Theater, 396
Northeastern Sector, Iceland, 499
Northern Landing Force (Attu), 288, 294
Norland, 553
Northwest Africa, 5
Northwest Staging Route, 251, 255–56, 269
Northwestern, 262
Northwestern Sector, Iceland, 499, 502
Norton Sound, 245
Norwalk, 496
Norway, 96, 103, 449, 458, 500, 552
Nova Scotia, 9

Oahu, 3, 9, 14, 199, 201. See also Pearl Harbor.
danger from Japanese population on, 121–22, 201, 207–11
Japanese attack on, 186–92
organization of U.S. Army forces in, 17, 152
preparations to defend, 150–61, 163–73, 180–81
reinforcement of, 214–15
Office of Civilian Defense, 67–73, 75
Office of Government Reports, 139
Office of Production Management, 456
Ok Mountain (Iceland), 502
Okinawa, 300
Oldendorf, Rear Adm. Jesse B., 421–22
Olfus River, 498
Olson, Cuthbert L., 122, 124–25
Ominato, 261
Ontario, 104
Opana radar station, 167, 186, 195
OPD. See Operations Division.
Operations Division, 39, 54, 91, 105, 108–10, 211, 299, 546–47. See also War Plans Division.
Orange War Plan, 153, 224
Ordnance, Chief of, 48n
Oregon, 33, 92–93, 113, 120, 126, 129, 131, 133, 136, 139, 147
Organized Reserves, 58
OS2U–1, 250
OS2U–2, 249
Otter Point, 242, 258, 262
Owens Valley, 141

P–8 road project 317, 319
GUARDING THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OUTPOSTS

P–36's, 191, 248, 251, 312
P–38's, 273, 278
P–39's, 349
P–40's, 161, 163, 191, 219, 249, 262, 276, 278, 339
Pacific Coastal Frontier, 22
Pacific Development Company, 340–41
Pacific Fleet, 163–64, 181, 183, 192, 195, 197, 199, 204, 216, 266, 299. See also U.S. Fleet.
and Battle of Midway, 220
constituted, 163
losses at Pearl Harbor, 187, 206
units transferred to Atlantic, 387, 387n
Pacific Northwest, 55
Pacific Ocean, 3, 9, 11–12, 14, 19, 92, 113. See also Southwest Pacific.
joint defense plan for, 80–81
and U.S. 1940 intention to avoid war in, 10
versus Atlantic in U.S. defense planning, 5, 11, 14–15, 34, 47, 58, 157–58
Pacific Sector, Panama Canal Zone, 302, 311, 315
Pan American Airways, 10, 226, 341, 343, 364, 439
Panama, Isthmus of, 301, 316–17, 319
Panama, Republic of, 302, 306, 317, 350, 440. See also Panama Canal.
and importation of labor into Canal Zone, 321–22
and negotiations for U.S. base rights in, 344–48
U.S. treaty arrangements with, 307–09
Panama Air Force, 344
Panama Canal, 4, 9, 103, 155, 158, 198, 301–27, 335–36, 352–53, 415, 436, 438, 463. See also Panama, Republic of.
airefense of, 27, 301–05, 314–15, 326, 333–34, 349, 412
inspection of ships in transit, 310–12, 349
prewar plans and preparations to defend, 301–08, 319–21
Panama Canal Department, 302–04, 312–14, 316–17, 327, 329–31, 349, 359, 392
Panama Canal Zone, 9, 243, 302, 328–53, 402, 440
alerts communicated to, 177, 327
as defense bastion, 3, 9, 150, 174
governor of, 312–14, 319–20
importation of labor for, 321–22
organization of U.S. Army forces in, 17, 302–03
prewar estimate of threat to, 5
radar defenses of, 425–29
troop strength in, 326, 348, 413
Panama Canal Zone—Continued
U.S. control and jurisdiction over, 312
and unity of command, 204, 327, 330, 410–11
Panama City, 317, 346
Panama Coastal Frontier, 204, 351, 410, 415
Panama Mobile Force (Provisional), 315
Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, 413
Panama Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), 314
Panama Sea Frontier, 424, 430–33
Panama Separate Coast Artillery Brigade (Provisional), 315
Parachute Battalion, 551st, 439
Paramushiro, 300
Parimazibo, 339
Parker, Capt. Ralph C., 250
Passage Canal, 226, 241
Passive Defense Against Air Attack, 65
Patterson, Robert P., 76, 419
Patterson Field, 504, 539
PBY's, 205, 329, 430, 434, 500, 528
Pearl Harbor, 150, 174–96, 206. See also Hawaiian Islands; Oahu.
importance of as major Pacific base, 153, 155, 157–58, 198
Japanese plan to attack, 184–86
Japanese threat to, 161, 166, 218
Pacific Fleet activity at, 183
responsibility for U.S. failures at, 194–96
U.S. Army mission to protect, 151, 153
Pearl Harbor Board, 160
Pedro Miguel Locks, 301
Pennsylvania, 285, 285n, 288, 293
Pensacola, 47n
Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada–United States, 7, 9, 102–04, 364, 372, 384, 392, 396, 400, 407, 542
Peru, 342, 553
Petropavlovsk, 243, 254
Philippine Department, 393
Philippines, 15, 17, 80, 153, 167, 174, 177, 178, 181, 183, 197, 219, 249, 355, 401
Piacco Field, 389–90
Pina–Rio Providencia highway, 346
Poinceteter, Governor Joseph B., 199–200
Point Barrow, 243
Point Boringuen, 323, 325
POL, 402, 404
Poland, 223, 309
Ponte Vedra Beach, 99
Port-aux-Basques, 355
Port-Heiden, 229, 242, 244, 264
Port of Spain, 355–56, 369, 376, 378, 382, 389–90, 400
Portage, 226, 241
Portland (Maine), 47n
INDEX

Portland (Oregon), 82-83, 129
Portsmouth (New Hampshire), 47n
Portugal, 463
Pratt, Maj. Gen. Henry C., 419
President’s Emergency Fund, 317
Presque Isle, 447
Pribilof Islands, 264, 272
Prince Rupert, 261
Prince of Wales, 464
Prince William Sound, 223
Prinz Eugen, 464-65
Production, 79, 82, 239
Protective Mobilization Plan, 57-60
Provost Marshal General, 38, 66-67, 117-18, 128, 133, 144
Provost Marshal General, Office of, 75, 118, 124, 134, 144-45
Public Law 503, 136
Public opinion, U.S. on evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 121-22, 127, 138
Roosevelt’s appreciation of, 13-14
Puerto Rican Department, 324-26, 329, 331, 393, 402, 415, 440
Puerto Rico, 9, 321, 423-24, 430, 430n, 438, 440
developed as a U.S. base, 322-26
employment of troops of, 440-41
general supply depot authorized in, 402
organization of U.S. Army forces in, 17, 350
troop strength in, 326, 350, 413
Puerto Rico Air Base No. 1, 325
Puget Sound, 47, 82, 229
Pye, Admiral William S., 198, 204
Quartermaster Battalion (Port), 392d, Company A, 483
Quartermaster General, Office of The, 401
Quartermaster General, The, 401
Quartermaster personnel, 537
Quartermaster Replacement Center, 77
Quartermaster units, 523
Queens Park, 389
Quidi Vidi Lake, 378
Rabaul, 278
Radar, 205. See also Aircraft Warning Service; Aircraft warning systems.
development of, 61-62, 86, 428
in Iceland, 306
measures to protect Panama Canal, 425-29
operations in Hawaii, 167-68, 186-87, 195, 218-19
RAINBOW plans, 171
RAINBOW 4, 10-11, 328, 442, 510, 530
RAINBOW 5, 32, 42, 80-81, 83, 172, 178, 351, 412-15, 530
Reconnaissance Troop, 7th, 283, 285, 289, 294
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 340, 400
Regular Army, U.S., 23, 52, 57-59, 155, 324, 440, 471, 486
Republic, 494, 496
Republic of Panama. See Panama, Republic of.
Reserve personnel, 468-69, 471, 480, 484, 487
Reynold, Brig. Gen. Eugene E., 477
Reydarfjördhur, 501
Reykjavík, 470, 473, 475, 477, 495-96, 498-99, 501-07, 511-12, 522, 524, 526, 529, 552
Richardson, Admiral James O., 157-61, 165
Richardson Highway, 226, 241
Riddle’s Bay, 390
Ridgway, Col. Matthew B., 341
Rio de Janeiro, 415
Rio Hato, 306-09, 316, 344, 346
Robert, Admiral Georges, 328, 439-40, 464
Roberts, Justice Owen J., 142n, 195, 198
Roberts Commission, 121-22, 195-96, 198, 208
Rockwell, Rear Adm. Francis W., 277, 280, 283-84, 285n, 287, 292-94
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 35n, 87, 100, 103, 112, 198, 200n, 310, 322, 397
and air route to Siberia, 254-55, 268-69
and agreement for defense of British colonies, 417-18
approves “calculated risk” defense policy, 107-08
approves martial law for Hawaii, 200
approves plans for Greenland base, 444
attaches Marine brigade to Army in Iceland, 490-91
authorizes funds for Greenland base, 451
on Axis use of U.S. defense waters, 494
and base negotiations with Panama, 344
and civilian defense, 66-69, 72
on composition of the Iceland force, 470
concern over adequacy of Iceland force, 477-80, 492
and control of aliens in sensitive areas, 116, 128, 131-33, 135-38, 140-41, 145-47, 209-13, 216
decides to reinforce British in Iceland, 479-80
and defense of Alaska, 230, 248, 253, 256
and defense of Hawaiian Islands, 154, 158-59, 161, 164, 172, 197
and defense of the Panama Canal, 305
defense of South America, 10
defense of Western Hemisphere, 13-14
and Destroyer-Base Agreement, 328, 364, 369, 373-74
directs dispatch of air unit to Iceland, 483
and extension of “neutrality zone,” 462
and funding of the Atlantic bases, 377-78
Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continued  
and Galápagos Islands base acquisition, 340  
and garrisoning of Bermuda and Trinidad, 387–89  
and German activities in Greenland, 450–51  
and German submarine threat, 436  
and initiation of hostilities, 81, 176  
and Japanese intentions, 177  
and measures to counter German threat in Atlantic, 387  
moves to deny Azores to Germany, 464  
and naval operations in Atlantic, 12, 31  
orders command changes in Hawaii, 203–04  
orders U.S. control and jurisdiction over Canal Zone, 312  
and Pearl Harbor attack, 194  
and prewar concept of national security, 4–5  
and protection of Dutch colonial possessions, 337  
on protection of nonmilitary installations, 78  
and public opinion, 13–14  
and the RAINBOW 4 plan, 10  
and reaction of Atlantic base garrisons to enemy approach, 391–92, 527–28  
and reinforcement of Newfoundland garrison, 388  
on retention of the Iceland garrison, 533  
and troops for Iceland, 12, 395, 453, 466, 520–22  
and unity of command in Panama, 410–11  
ROUNDUP, 535  
Rowe, James, Jr., 118–19  
Royal Air Force, 430–32, 434, 467, 301, 304, 534, 541, 552  
Royal Canadian Air Force, 261, 265, 357, 394, 444, 541–43  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 103  
Royal Naval Station, 356  
Royal Navy, 460, 464, 541, 548  
Ruby, 245  
Russell, Col. Carl, 267  
Russia, See Soviet Union, Rygje, 259, 261  
Sabine Island, 552–53  
Sabotage, See Subversive activities.  
Sacramento, 124  
Sadler, Rear Adm. F. H., 413  
St. John's, 355, 357, 367, 385, 389–90, 400–401, 543  
St. Lawrence Island, 264  
St. Lawrence River, 9  
St. Lucia, 327–29, 331, 350, 350n, 354, 356–58, 397, 430n  
construction of U.S. base in, 376–79  
unity of command in, 416–17  
St. Lucia Base Command, 402  
St. Mary's River, 102  
St. Paul Island, 272  
St. Thomas, 322  
Sakhalin Island, 254  
Salerno beachhead, 212  
Salinas (Ecuador), 340, 342, 353, 428–29  
Salt Lake City, 141  
Samoa, 179, 199  
Samoa Islands, 258  
San Fernando (Trinidad), 356  
San Francisco Bay, 82, 130  
San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 217  
San Jose (Guatemala), 343  
San Juan (Puerto Rico), 322, 324–25, 329, 330  
San Nicolas (Aruba), 423  
San Pedro (California), 113  
Sand Island, 191  
Sand Point, 229, 242  
Santa Barbara, 87, 138  
Santa Monica, 88, 121  
Sarana Bay (Attu), 281–84, 289–91  
Sarana Beach (Attu), 290  
Saratoga, 183–84  
Sault Ste. Marie, 102  
Sault Ste. Marie, Military District of, 103–04  
Sault Ste. Marie Canal, 63, 102–05  
Sault Ste. Marie Military Area, 104  
Scharnhorst, 387  
Scheer, 387  
Schofield Barracks, 152, 169–70, 189, 191–93  
Scoresby Sound, 449–51, 458, 552  
Scotland, 535  
Seabees, 539  
Seattle Harbor, 92  
Secretary of the Interior, 77  
Secretary of the Navy, See Knox, Frank.  
Secretary of War, See Stimson, Henry L.; Woodring, Harry H.  
Selectees, 468–69, 471, 477, 480–81, 484–87  
Selective Service Act, 385, 469, 492  
Selfoss, 501  
Sendai, 113  
Service of Security Plan, 66  
Services of Supply, 39, 141n
INDEX

Seward Peninsula, 243, 264
Seydisfjördur, 499, 501, 534
Shaffer, Lt. J. D., 552
Shahan, Lt. E. E., 552
Shasta Dam, 77
Shemya Island, 273, 291, 295
Sheppard, James C., 70
Shipping, 549
losses to submarines in Caribbean, 423, 431–34, 436–37
problems in transporting and maintaining Iceland force, 468–69, 474–79, 508–09, 519, 526
Shumushu, 299
Siberia, 242, 253–54, 264, 268–69
Sierra Nevada Mountains, 128
Signal Battalion, 50th, 525
Signal Officer, Chief, 48n, 167n, 313
Simiutak Island, 454
Sinton, Cdr. William, 444
Sitka, 223–24, 228–29, 232, 234–37, 243, 250, 256
Sitka Sound, 235
Skagway, 223, 225, 250
SLEDGEHAMMER, 535
Smith, Maj. Gen. Holland M., 278
Smith, Capt. Oscar, 477
Soapstone Point, 223
Solomon Islands, 275
Somerset Island, 390
Søndre Strømfjord, 443–44, 453
South America, 3, 9–10, 12, 302, 351, 463
South Atlantic, 9–10, 56. See also Atlantic Ocean.
Southeast Asia, 86, 88, 219
Southern California Sector, 77
Southern Coastal Frontier, 22
Southern Defense Command, 28, 34–36, 40, 42, 44, 95
Southern Land Frontier, 84, 96
Southern Landing Force (Atru), 288, 290–91, 294
Southwest Pacific, 15, 86, 278, 280. See also Pacific Ocean.
Southwestern Sector (Iceland), 499
Spaatz, Brig. Gen. Carl, 232, 394, 537
Spain, 5, 321, 463
Spears, Capt. W. O., 341
Special Army Committee, OPD, 108
Special Committee Investigating Defense Contracts, 238
Stalin, Marshal Joseph, 253, 255, 269
Standing Liaison Committee, 342
Stark, Admiral Harold R., 126, 158, 204, 216, 238, 341, 369, 391, 522, 528, 545n and coastal frontier's proposal, 351–52 and evacuation of Japanese from Hawaii, 210 on need for strong measures in Atlantic, 387 and Panama Canal lock proposal, 320 and status of Marines in Iceland, 480, 490 and unity of command in Panama, 410–11 and war warning to field commanders, 177
State Guards, 75–79
Steeze Highway, 226
Stefansson, Vilhjalmur, 442n
Stilwell, Maj. Gen. Joseph W., 77

589
Stimson, Henry L.—Continued
restricts Japanese use of Panama Canal, 336
and unity of command in Caribbean, 409-11
on U.S. failures at Pearl Harbor, 196
on withdrawal of Iceland garrison, 533
Storis, 553
Stratford, 509
Submarines, 114, 413
Submarines, German, 95, 103, 387, 460, 462, 494-95, 536, 549-50
along Atlantic coast, 42, 51, 99-100, 111, 383, 437
in Caribbean, 421, 423-24, 429-34, 437
off Gulf coast, 96, 98, 437
U-156, 424
U-202, 99
U-584, 99
U-654, 433
I-7, 206
I-8, 87
I-17, 87-88
I-25, 87, 92-93
I-26, 92
I-70, 194
Subversive activities, 99-101, 103-04, 144, 147-48, 164, 173-75, 178-80, 183, 201, 382
measures to protect Panama Canal against, 310-11
Suffolk County (New York), 144
Sunderlands (British flying boats), 467
Suntrana, 225
Supreme Court, U.S., 142
Surinam, 337-39, 350, 350n, 394, 416, 422, 430, 441
Syria, 465
Tacoma, 129
Talara, 340, 342, 342n, 353, 412
Talbot, Brig. Gen. Ralph Jr., 338, 390, 394, 400-401, 405, 417-19, 422
Talley, Col. Benjamin B., 258
Tanaga Island, 265, 270-72, 274-75
Tanana Crossing, 229
Tankan Bay, 177
Tanks. See Armor.
Task Force 4
First Echelon, 483, 485-87, 492, 495, 508, 519
Second Echelon, 485, 487, 491-92, 494-95, 497, 508, 512-13, 519-20
Task Force 8, 260, 265, 274
Task Force 15, 494n
Task Force 19, 452
Task Group 6.3, 435
Tehuantepec, 353
Temnac Cove, 281-82, 290
Tenth Fleet, 436
Tenth Naval District, 351, 435
Terminal Island, 77
Territory of Hawaii, 199. See also Hawaiian Islands.
Theater of Operations Plan. See INDIGO.
Theobald, Rear Adm. Robert A., 260-61, 270, 274-75
Thingvellir, 502
Third Naval District, 494
Thirteenth Naval District, 231, 234
Tinker, Brig. Gen. Clarence L., 503-04
Tokyo, 113, 184-85, 260
Tokyo raid, 88, 93, 113, 220, 259, 300
Torpedo boats, 50-51
Trades Union Council, 381
Transportation Section, G-4, 468
Treasury Department, 117
Trinidad, 9, 327-29, 331, 338, 350, 350n, 354, 355, 416, 423, 430, 430n, 436, 440-41
administrative problems of base operation in, 397, 400-406, 408, 417-19
construction of U.S. base in, 375-79, 382
garrisoning the U.S. base in, 384-85, 388-91
general supply depot authorized for, 402
jurisdictional issue with, 404-06
negotiations for U.S. base in, 369, 372
planning for U.S. base establishment in, 358, 368
problems facing U.S. base acquisition in, 355-57
submarine operations in waters of, 432-34, 436-37
unity of command in, 417
Trinidad Base Command, 393, 400-403, 406, 419. See also Trinidad Sector.
Trinidad Sector, 382, 394. See also Trinidad; Trinidad Base Command.
Tripartite Pact, 242
Troop Basis, January 1942, 52, 60
Truk, 259-60
Tucker's Island, 368
Turner, Rear Adm. Richmond Kelly, 410, 521
U-boats. See Submarines, German.
Umnak Island, 242, 244, 254, 256-58, 260-63
Unalaska Island, 223, 229, 234, 257, 239, 241, 257
United Kingdom, 372, 447, 489
United Service Organizations (USO), 404, 404n, 507
INDEX

United States Guards, 74
Unity of Command, 22, 330, 395, 491n, 540
in air defense, 26–27, 41–43
in Alaska, 255
in Bermuda, 541–42, 544–45
in the Caribbean, 393–94, 409–10, 434–35
in coastal frontiers, 351–52
in continental defense, 41–44
in Defense Commands, 29, 40
in defense of British colonial possessions, 416–17
in Hawaii, 165–66, 182, 200n, 204–05
in Iceland, 489–91, 541
in Netherlands Antilles, 420–22
in Newfoundland, 542–44
in Panama, 204, 327, 330, 334
Secretary Stimson’s concern over, 409–10
in Surinam, 422
U.S. Army theory on, 17
University of Hawaii, 183
U.S. Coast Guard, 91, 99–102
U.S. Conference of Mayors, 68
U.S. Fleet, 43, 58, 86, 157–58, 184, 240, 547.
See also Atlantic Fleet; Pacific Fleet.
and Battle of the Atlantic, 387
and defense of Iceland, 388, 528–29
and defense of Panama Canal, 303–11, 314–17, 319–20, 335–36, 349, 426
and defense of the Philippines, 174
and defense of Sault Ste. Marie Canal, 102–05
and development of Puerto Rican base, 323–26, 412
establishes army areas, 17
establishes corps areas, 17
and evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 117, 120, 122–25, 129–33, 134n, 135–39, 141n, 144–46, 207–09, 212–14
and Galápagos Islands base acquisition, 341–42
and garrisoning of the Atlantic bases, 384, 388
and GHQ, U.S. Army, 22, 35, 397
and harbor and coast defense, 33, 46, 49, 52, 81–82, 101
and labor policy in base construction, 382
and maintenance of Iceland garrison, 508, 510, 512, 517, 521, 526
policy on use of Puerto Rican troops, 440
and protection of nonmilitary installations, 73
and reinforcement of Greenland, 537
and reorganization of air forces, 24, 28–30
and reorganization of field forces, 22
reorganization of 9 March 1942, 38
separates armies and corps areas, 24
and U.S. acquisition of base sites from allied nations, 354, 358–59, 366, 369, 377
and war warning for Hawaii, 175–76, 178–79

War Department, 21, 31, 40, 80, 91, 94–95, 194, 198, 200–201, 267, 299, 404n, 420, 422
and air defense of U.S., 20, 28, 34, 36, 41, 44, 60–62, 89, 111–12
and Aleutian operations, 277, 296
and Army command organization, 16
authorizes GHQ to supervise defense planning, 32
and Caribbean command organization, 329–31, 333–34
and civilian defense, 65–68, 71
and continental defense commands, 28, 83, 105–06, 108, 329
and defense of Greenland, 442–43
and defense of Iceland, 388, 528–29
and defense of Panama Canal, 303–11, 314–17, 319–20, 335–36, 349, 426
and defense of the Philippines, 174
and defense of Sault Ste. Marie Canal, 102–05
and development of Puerto Rican base, 323–26, 412
establishes army areas, 17
establishes corps areas, 17
and evacuation of aliens from sensitive areas, 117, 120, 122–25, 129–33, 134n, 135–39, 141n, 144–46, 207–09, 212–14
and Galápagos Islands base acquisition, 341–42
and garrisoning of the Atlantic bases, 384, 388
and GHQ, U.S. Army, 22, 35, 397
and harbor and coast defense, 33, 46, 49, 52, 81–82, 101
and labor policy in base construction, 382
and maintenance of Iceland garrison, 508, 510, 512, 517, 521, 526
policy on use of Puerto Rican troops, 440
and protection of nonmilitary installations, 73
and reinforcement of Greenland, 537
and reorganization of air forces, 24, 28–30
and reorganization of field forces, 22
reorganization of 9 March 1942, 38
separates armies and corps areas, 24
and U.S. acquisition of base sites from allied nations, 354, 358–59, 366, 369, 377
and war warning for Hawaii, 175–76, 178–79

V weapons, 111
Valdez, 226
Van Asbeck, Capt., 421
Vancouver Island, 92
Vatnsendi Ridge, 501–02
Venezuela, 338, 394, 415
Vera Cruz, 424n, 431n
Vernon Field, 430n
Vestmannaejar Island, 506
Veterans Administration, 47n
Vichy Government, 9, 328, 439, 464. See also France.
Virgin Islands, 322–26, 331, 440
Vital Defense Area, 104
Vladivostok, 253, 269
Volunteer Participation Committee, 68. See also Office of Civilian Defense.
Wake Island, 174, 180–81
Waller Field, 379, 430n
Wallgren, Senator Mon C., 126

591
War Department Civil Defense Mission, 67
War Department Civil Functions Bill, 319
War Department General Staff, 18, 38, 46, 58, 65–66, 94, 231, 244, 396, 488–89. See also G–1; G–2; G–3; G–4; Operations Division; War Plans Division.
War Department Special Staff, 38
War Department Mobilization Plan, 489
War Manpower Board, 108
absorbs operating functions of GHQ, 39
and air defense, 20, 28, 42
and antiaircraft needs, 57–58
and Army Air Forces organization, 30–31
assumes direction of Greenland base development, 451
and Caribbean command organization, 329–31, 396
and command arrangements in Newfoundland, 394, 396
and continental defense organization, 37–38
and defense of Ivigtut, 449, 456–57
and defense planning, 32
on definition of corps area and army commanders’ responsibilities, 18
estimate of Hawaiian defense capability, 164
and evacuation of Japanese from Hawaii, 208–09
and garrisoning of the Atlantic bases, 389, 391
and planning for Iceland force, 461–63, 466, 469–72, 475–81, 483, 485–90, 492–93
and protection of Surinam, 358–39
recommends department status for Puerto Rico, 323
and relief of British in Iceland, 521–22
study on continental defense organization, 25–26
and unity of command in Bermuda, 542, 545
and unity of command in Iceland, 545–46
and U.S. acquisition of base sites, 359, 376
War Plans Division, U.S. Navy, 48, 410–11
War Production Board, 217, 457
War Relocation Authority, 140–41, 142n, 147–48, 212
Warren, Earl, 122
Wartime Civil Control Administration, 141
Washington, D.C., 447
Washington (State of), 33, 47n, 87, 92, 115, 120, 122, 126, 129, 131, 133, 136, 147
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, 223
Washington Provisional Brigade, 359
Watson-Watt, Robert A., 86, 427–28
Wellens, Sunner, 336–37, 342, 388, 391, 421, 462
Wellingtons (British bombers), 503
Welty, Col. Maurice D., 385
West Indies, 321, 327, 329, 356, 364, 401, 408, 548
West Massacre Valley, 281
West Point, 516
West Virginia, 238
Western Defense Command, 35, 39–40, 77, 84, 114, 117–18, 277
and air defense, 41–42, 84, 93
area of, 33, 44
combat units of, January–February 1942, 83
commands of, 33, 44, 231–32, 255
creation of, 28
detachment of Alaska from, 44, 231–32, 267–68, 300
and evacuation of aliens from restricted areas, 117–18, 123, 134, 136–37, 140, 143–44, 146n, 146–47
preparedness of, 80, 91
reorganization of, 36–38
strength of, 83, 91, 105–06
as a theater of operations, 33, 35, 37–39, 44, 83, 94–95
Western Hemisphere, 223
and application of Monroe Doctrine, 3, 7, 461
area defined, 3
defense of, 4, 6–10, 13–15, 55–56, 155, 301, 328
distribution of U.S. Army troops in, 15–16
and German threat to, 4–6, 9–11
prewar estimate of threat to, 5
and RAINBOW 4 plan, 10–11
reaction to enemy approach of U.S. Atlantic base garrisons in, 391–92
U.S. acquisition of European colonies in. See Destroyer-Base Agreement.
Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 1, 12
Western Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5, 12
Western Sector, Iceland, 499, 502
Western Theater of Operations. See Western Defense Command.
Wheeler, Senator Burton K., 481
Wheeler Field, 152, 158, 169, 180, 187, 189, 191, 193, 196
Wheeling, 238
Whitcomb, Maj. Richard S., 481–82, 496–97
WHITE, Emergency Plan, 74–75
White Pass and Yukon Railroad, 225
Whitehorse, 225
Whiting Harbor, 236
Whittier, Alaska, 226
INDEX

Wilby, Brig. Gen. Francis B., 389
Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands, 337–38
Willamette University, 183
William P. Biddle, 494
Willoughby, Capt. William H., 285, 288
Wimsatt, Lt. Col. Robert W. C., 537
Winant, John G., 373–75, 408
Windward Islands, 435
Woodring, Harry H., 310, 319–20
Worden, 276
Works Progress Administration, 170
World War I, 3, 6, 17, 52, 68, 73–74, 97, 151, 511
Wyman, Lt. Col. Theodore, 203

Yakutat, 229, 231, 250, 261
Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku, 184
Yamazaki, Col. Yasuyo, 282, 288
Young, Sir Hubert, 405–06, 417–18
YP-63's, 413
YP-64's, 413
Yucatan Channel, 350
Yukon River, 226, 245

Zanderij Field, 430
Zeilin, 285, 285n
Zeros, (Japanese fighters), 176
Zimmerman, Col. Wayne L., 292, 294n
Zone of the Interior, 27
Zwinge Valley, 291