The Quartermaster Corps
Organization, Supply, and Services

Volume II
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The Technical Services

THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS:
ORGANIZATION,
SUPPLY, AND SERVICES

Volume II

by

Erna Risch

and

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... to Those Who Served
Foreword

This volume is the second in a series which records the experiences of the Quartermaster Corps in World War II. Instead of the single theme of supply, emphasized in Volume I, a variety of activities are discussed, some of which—conservation, reclamation, and salvage operations, and industrial demobilization—are related to supply. Others such as laundry operations, training of dogs, and care of the dead, are wholly unrelated to the Quartermaster supply function but are nevertheless important to the Army. The volume stresses the multiplicity of the Corps’ duties and, in the complexities of modern warfare, the Army’s need for trained Quartermaster specialists and units to support combat troops. The narrative sets forth the policies and problems involved in procuring and training Quartermaster personnel and the manner in which the Quartermaster Corps operated in the zone of interior.

The authors of this volume are both members of the Historical Section of the Office of The Quartermaster General. Erna Risch, who joined the section in 1943, has written a number of monographs published by the Quartermaster Corps, as well as Volume I of this series. She holds the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Chicago. Chester L. Kieffer, coauthor, who is a graduate of the University of Illinois and a former journalist, worked on the historical program of the War Production Board before joining the staff of the Historical Section.

Washington, D. C.  
23 January 1953

ORLANDO WARD  
Maj. Gen., U.S.A.  
Chief of Military History
Preface

This volume continues and rounds out the narrative of Quartermaster operations in the zone of interior during World War II that was begun in Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I. The variety of Quartermaster activities made desirable a functional treatment discussing first supply operations, then personnel and training duties, and finally the special services performed by the Corps for the Army. Each function was dealt with chronologically as possible. Volume I, after discussing administrative activities, related the story of supply operations, the major function of the Quartermaster Corps. The account of supply operations, because of its length, was arbitrarily concluded in Volume I with the discussion of stock control operations.

The first four chapters in this volume complete the supply story, describing such operations as salvage, reclamation, and conservation; analyzing industrial demobilization, which might appropriately be called “procurement in reverse”; and summarizing Quartermaster supply during World War II. The next five chapters present a discussion of the policies and problems involved in the procurement and training of enlisted men and officers as specialists for the widely varying duties of the Corps, as well as the origin and development of Quartermaster units to carry out these activities in the field. The last three chapters of the book are devoted to the special services provided by the Corps—the procurement of animals, particularly mules and dogs, the operation of laundry and dry cleaning establishments, and the care of the dead.

As in Volume I, primary emphasis is placed upon developments during the period when the United States was actually involved in the war—from December 1941 through August 1945. However, a history of Quartermaster activities in World War II could not begin with the attack upon Pearl Harbor or even with the declaration of the limited national emergency in 1939, for many of the Corps' policies had their roots in an earlier period. Those pertaining to the care of the dead, for example, dated back to the Civil War, and it was necessary to explain their origins and to discuss the trend of developments during the intervening years.

Several aids to the reader have been added at the end of the volume. These include a list of the numerous abbreviations appearing in the text, and a bibliographical note to direct the reader to the published works available as well as to the unpublished materials.

The manuscript for this volume was circulated before final editing and was greatly benefited by the frank criticism accorded it by Lt. Gen. Edmund B.
Gregory (Ret.), The Quartermaster General during the war years, and by various administrators and technical experts in the OQMG. They were most generous in reading relevant portions of the text and in commenting by letter or in personal interview. Their assistance enabled the authors to correct inadvertent errors of fact and omission and to make such revisions as were warranted by re-examination of the record.

Throughout the preparation of this volume the authors relied heavily upon the scholarly advice and assistance offered by the Chief of the Historical Section, Dr. Thomas M. Pitkin. Under his general direction work has been in progress since 1947, not only on this volume and its companion, which cover Quartermaster activities in the zone of interior, but also on two other volumes on Quartermaster operations overseas. Throughout their years of association with the program, the authors have been indebted to their colleagues for their unfailing co-operation and help in problems relevant to their specialized fields. The authors also appreciate the work of the innumerable assistants who made available the records in the OQMG central files as well as those in storage at the Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office. Final editing was carried out by Helen McShane Bailey and copy editing by Loretto Carroll Stevens. Margaret E. Tackley, photographic editor, selected the pictures, and Anne Blair Mewha typed the copy for the printer.

Washington, D. C. 1 February 1954

ERNA RISCH
CHESTER L. KIEFFER
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All illustrations in this volume are from U.S. Department of Defense files.
PART ONE

SUPPLY
CHAPTER I

Salvage Policies and Procedures

Salvage activities constituted an important factor in the effort to maintain sustained combat operations during World War II. Since these activities involved the repair and return to supply channels of discarded, damaged, or partially destroyed military equipment and of captured or abandoned enemy property, they were an essential part of the supply function of the Quartermaster Corps (QMC). Salvage also included the disposal by sale of scrap and waste materials for further industrial use. In the Army the term “salvage” became associated with the disposal of waste by sale because the latter was the principal duty of those concerned with salvage during the years following World War I. This narrow meaning was perpetuated by its use in Army Regulations. When World War II began, however, the old concept gave way to a broader one and salvage came to mean “saving for further use everything which comes into our hands, insofar as that is possible.” ¹ This goal was achieved for the most part by the process of reclamation. Only after no further usefulness for an item could be found in the Army was it disposed of by sale, for use by the civilian population or as waste for reconversion to raw material for industry. To Quartermaster personnel directing salvage operations during World War II, the line of demarcation between conservation and salvage was a very indefinite one, and the two procedures merged inseparably into each other.

In modern war, which has been described as “a conflict of industry, resources, and transportation as much, if not more, than it is of arms,” conservation of military materials and supplies is vital to the achievement of victory.² World War II differed from other wars in which the United States had been involved in that the country lost its principal sources of supply for many critical items. Its supply lines were extended around the globe, and transportation became extremely critical. Every pound of material recovered and reused in theaters of operations made that much more shipping space available for other needed supplies. Systematic salvaging in the zone of interior was equally important since it permitted direct savings of critical materials for industrial use and helped alleviate shortages of goods in the civilian economy by making available usable articles no longer suitable for military training and combat purposes.

The QMC made such savings at different stages in the process of procurement and distribution of supplies. For example, the consumption of critical and strategic

materials was held to a minimum by the use of substitutes in the research and development of suitable military equipment, and conservation purposes also were served by the elimination of excess stockages through inventory control. Economy in the care and disposition of matériel, however, provided the most effective means of limiting total military requirements and conserving resources.

Unfortunately, the average American soldier was convinced that the capacity of the nation to produce commodities was unlimited. He was accustomed to relative carelessness and extravagance rather than frugality in his handling of material goods. In fact, a lack of discipline in supply matters had always characterized the Army. Confronted by evidence of the unavoidable waste inherent in war and surrounded by mountains of equipment from seemingly inexhaustible stores, the soldier did not readily acquire an active concern and respect for military property. Indoctrination and training were therefore fundamental in obtaining his co-operation in the proper care and use of matériel. At the same time, Quartermaster conservation efforts also required the development

3 For QMC activities in this field, see Erna Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Vol. I, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953), Ch. II.
4 Ibid., Ch. X.
of a program of specific activities, such as the operation of repair shops, to keep military property in working order.

Although the Army had always maintained a program for the repair and rehabilitation of equipment and for the disposition of unserviceable articles, not until World War I was the first systematic effort made to utilize the waste of armies in the field. In August 1917 the Office of The Quartermaster General (OQMG) formed a special unit of eleven officers that was sent to France to study the salvage methods of the French and British and to devise and install a complete salvage system for the American Expeditionary Forces. Partly as a result of the studies of this unit, the first comprehensive orders on salvage were issued in January 1918. Earlier in the month an organization to handle all salvage functions had been set up under the direction of the chief quartermaster of the American Expeditionary Forces.

When the United States entered World War II, there was forced upon the country for the first time in its history the necessity of conserving and reclaiming not only war materials but practically every other item of ordinary use. Scrap metal was needed to produce steel; waste materials were essential in the manufacture of woolen cloth and paper; and greases and fats were in demand for the production not only of munitions but also of soap. A heterogenous mass of other items became valuable in the crisis. In total war salvage was essential to military success, and the civilian at home as well as the soldier in the zone of interior and in the theater of operations participated in the program.

The expansion of maintenance and salvage activities, however, took place relatively late in the war. It naturally occurred in direct proportion to the quantities of used and unserviceable articles accumulated in the course of training and combat operations. Early in the emergency period the need for conserving Quartermaster items of supply was minimized because they were mainly commercial in type. As military requirements pyramided and demands were made upon the United States for the relief of populations overseas, the strain upon the production of civilian-type goods became greater. Because it handled commodities basic to the support of the civilian economy, the QMC was particularly vulnerable to criticism. When shortages increased and rationing was tightened, actual or alleged waste of clothing and food by the Army drew immediate and vehement protests. In order to maintain civilian morale and secure the cooperation essential to the prosecution of an "all-out" war, an expanded and increasingly effective program of conservation was needed.

**Administrative Organization**

At the time of Pearl Harbor, the QMC had broad responsibility for salvage activities, which included the salvage and disposal of most of the worn-out items of matériel originally procured by the many supply agencies of the War Department and of all waste products, except so-called industrial scrap from manufacturing operations in arsenals, depots, or commercial

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5 For discussion of QMC responsibility for repair and reclamation of Quartermaster items, see below, Chapter II.

6 (1) WD GO 9, 29 Jan 18. (2) The concise term "salvage" was adopted to replace the words "conservation" and "reclamation." See WD GO 106, 15 Nov 18.
THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS

plants. Responsibility for industrial scrap had only recently been transferred from the QMC to the chiefs of the individual supply services because such scrap was being produced in large quantities and technical personnel of the particular installation involved were best qualified to handle it. Furthermore, while the proceeds from sales of general salvage were returned to the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury Department, those from the sale of industrial scrap were returned to the appropriation from which funds for procurement of the material had come.

In the years following the OQMG reorganization in 1920, a salvage unit in the Supply Division had been responsible for the disposition of unserviceable property and waste material. On the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor this unit, known as the Salvage, Reclamation, and Surplus Property Branch, was supervising Quartermaster conservation and reclamation activities. It was transferred to the newly created Service Installations Division when the OQMG was reorganized along functional lines early in 1942. The salvage function, however, was not completely centralized in this division, for certain of the major commodity units, notably those in charge of subsistence and of fuels, assumed and retained full responsibility for the conservation of their respective classes of supply. During World War II, important responsibilities were therefore carried out by commodity divisions as integral phases of their activities, while others were necessarily discharged by collaboration of two or more units under executive supervision.

The organization of conservation activities and programs remained relatively loose throughout the war, not merely because the definition of conservation was broad but because the activities of the Corps were organized primarily for the performance of supply duties that were more immediately pressing. As conservation activities expanded and as the formulation of aggressive indoctrination programs emphasized their growing significance, two noticeable organizational trends developed. On the one hand, a marked degree of centralization and expansion of pertinent functional activities occurred within the Service Installations Division. On the other, where the attainment of conservation objectives was incidental to the operation of broader programs, as in the administration of food service, the organization of the division concerned frequently was reshaped to adapt it to these objectives and to enable it to sponsor special programs of conservation. The result was a considerable reorientation of the OQMG organization to the purposes of conservation.

Relations With the Services of Supply

Before March 1942 The Quartermaster General had dealt directly with the field and had issued directions on both policy and procedure, particularly in reference to matters of general salvage. His responsibilities and authority were changed when

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9 (1) OQMG OO 25–F, 15 May 41, sub: Orgn of Sup Div. (2) This unit had also handled laundry activities, but in July 1941 a separate Laundry Branch was established. OQMG OO 153, 15 Jul 41.
10 OQMG OO 84, 31 Mar 42, sub: Orgn of QMC.
11 Chief of Salv, Reclm, and Surplus Prop Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 25 Jun 43, sub: Conf Regarding Conserv Program.
the Services of Supply (SOS) was established. A salvage unit within the Distribution Division, SOS, became responsible for formulating policies pertaining to salvage operations, for co-ordinating and supervising all salvage operations involving more than one military agency, for consulting and co-ordinating with the various salvage sections of the War Production Board (WPB) on Army salvage problems, and for conducting inspections of salvage operations at large scrap-generating installations under Army jurisdiction. From March 1942 until the summer of 1943, The Quartermaster General functioned as a staff officer of the SOS in supervising salvage activities, and clearly defined relationships with the SOS and with the field were only gradually attained.

Although in the spring of 1942 a regulation had reaffirmed the traditional responsibility of The Quartermaster General for the handling of all Army salvage with the exception of exchangeable property and of scrap resulting directly from manufacturing operations, difficulties soon developed. On 8 June Headquarters, SOS, directed each of the corps area commanders to designate and report to the Salvage Section, SOS, the name of one officer who would be directly responsible for salvage operations in his corps area. They were also ordered to establish at each post and station under their jurisdiction a suitable organization to insure close supervision of the collection and disposal of salvageable material and scrap. Each supply service was likewise directed to formulate a plan and to establish an organization to handle salvage operations in the zone of interior. These directions caused immediate confusion, both in the field and in Washington, since they apparently ignored the existing Quartermaster salvage organization.

The chief of the Service Installations Division, OQMG, reminded Headquarters, SOS, that no change had been made in Quartermaster responsibility for handling salvage and that the QMC, as required by Army Regulations, had had for many years a completely functioning organization, plan, and procedure for the handling of salvage, which included a salvage officer in every post, camp, and station and a corps area salvage officer as assistant to the corps area quartermaster. The latter was charged with the supervision of all salvage activities throughout the corps area. He went on to add that it was generally understood at a conference held in the SOS on 28 May that salvage officers were to be appointed in each supply service only for the purpose of maintaining liaison with Quartermaster officers in order to facilitate the flow of dormant scrap to them, and for supervising the handling of industrial scrap. It seemed to him that SOS instructions tended "to create multiple authority as to salvage between the Quartermaster Corps and other services and to provide for the formulation of entirely independent plans and procedures for the handling and disposition of salvage in the Zone of Interior." Headquarters, SOS, confirmed the interpretation made by the OQMG of the in-
tent of the conference on 28 May and re-
quested that all necessary co-operation
and liaison be established by The Quar-
termaster General with other supply ser-
vices and field agencies of the QMC in
order that salvage might move promptly
into productive channels.\textsuperscript{17}

To eliminate the confusion that had re-
sulted from the 8 June order, a new direc-
tive clarified the division of responsibility
between the SOS Salvage Section and the
supply services.

Only matters affecting policy, controver-
sial matters that involve more than one mil-
tary agency, and matters that should be
brought to the attention of the Commanding
General, Services of Supply, will be referred
to the Salvage Section, Distribution Branch,
Procurement and Distribution Division,
Services of Supply. Matters pertaining to
technical advice will be referred to the War
Production Board, or to salvage technicians
employed by the Supply Services.\textsuperscript{18}

While technical advice was to be pro-
vided by the QMC and the other supply
services, the SOS Salvage Section began
at this time to employ its own staff of sal-
vage technicians to assist field salvage
officers where unusual difficulty was en-
countered in moving scrap.\textsuperscript{19} The section
took legitimate measures to co-ordinate
the action of the supply services and that
of the service commands. In addition it
had authority to deal directly with field
units, and in an increasing number of
cases the SOS Salvage Section issued di-
rectives to these agencies on its own initia-
tive, without consulting The Quartermaster
General. Since these instructions
were often in conflict with those of the
OQMG, confusion was created in the
field. Throughout this period Maj. Gen.
Edmund B. Gregory, The Quartermaster
General, insisted that specific directives,
except for broad general policies an-
nounced by the SOS, should issue from his
office and that the actual direction of field
salvage was an operating function that
should be handled at the supply service
level. As a result of his complaint, Head-
quarters, SOS, agreed that salvage direc-
tives to the Army as a whole would be
published only after the concurrences of the
General Staff and the commanding
generals of the Army Air Forces (AAF)
and the Army Ground Forces (AGF) had
been obtained, and after consultation with
the chief of the supply service concerned.\textsuperscript{20}

At the same time, the division of respon-
sibilities for salvage operations was
restated. The SOS Salvage Section, oper-
ating as a policy and control unit of the
Commanding General, SOS, was to for-
mulate policies pertaining to salvage oper-
ations, co-ordinate and supervise salvage
activities of the supply services, and, when
necessary, deal directly with the com-
manding generals of all service commands
on salvage matters, keeping the appro-
priate chief of supply service informed.
The Quartermaster General remained re-
ponsible for all general salvage at posts,
camps, and stations, while the chiefs of the
supply services continued to supervise the
salvaging of industrial scrap resulting
from manufacturing operations. The
Quartermaster General and the other
chiefs of the supply services were author-

\textsuperscript{17} Ist Ind, Chief of Distr Br, SOS, to TQMG, 18
Jun 42, on memo cited above.\textsuperscript{[16]}

\textsuperscript{18} Ltr, TAG to CGs of All CAs, 27 Jun 42, sub:
Info on Salv Procedure, SPX 400.7 (6-23-42) MO-
SPPD-TS-M.

\textsuperscript{19} Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, p. 6, remarks of
Lt Col Don B. Kates, SOS.

\textsuperscript{20} (1) Dir of Sv Instls Div to Chief of OP&C Div,
OQMG, 24 Jul 42, sub: Request for Certain Info
Relating to QMC Opsns. (2) Memo, Dir of Control
Div, SOS, for TQMG, 17 Sep 42, no sub, 400.93.
(3) Memo, TAG for Chiefs of Sup Svs, 26 Sep 42,
sub: Responsibility and Authority Regarding Salv
Activities, SPX 400.74 (9-23-42) SPDDM-MP-R-M.
ized to prepare all technical and training manuals dealing with salvage procedure and operations and to issue directives based on policies of the SOS. Until the summer of 1943, complete staff responsibility was transferred to Headquarters, SOS, which by that time had been renamed Army Service Forces (ASF), this division of authority governed the relationship between the SOS and the QMC.

Relations With Civilian Agencies

During World War II certain civilian as well as military agencies had important responsibilities for directing unserviceable supplies and scrap into the proper channels of civilian and industrial consumption. It was some time before the need for central governmental co-ordination became acute, and not until the Bureau of Industrial Conservation was organized in the Office of Production Management (OPM), later transferred to the WPB, was there a central agency definitely charged with the development of national programs of conservation. Although the bureau had developed plans for civilian participation in salvage activities by the fall of 1941, it did not establish regional machinery to supervise the scrap industry and co-operate with military field agencies until the summer of 1942.

The direct concern of the WPB and the Office of Price Administration (OPA) with problems of allocations to consumers, prices, and other matters having a bearing on salvage activities, led to close cooperation between these agencies and the QMC. Moreover, the early arrangements made by Headquarters, SOS, with the WPB were an important factor in developments leading to the reorganization of the War Department administrative machinery for handling salvage matters in 1943.

The Army-WPB administrative system for handling salvage, as well as many basic policies, stemmed from decisions made at a general conference held late in May 1942 and attended by representatives of the WPB and its Bureau of Industrial Conservation, of SOS headquarters, and of the chiefs of the Army supply services. The directive issued by the Army following this conference not only provided for the installation of an integrated administrative system throughout the Army but also defined the services that the WPB would furnish. The WPB was to provide technical assistance to Army salvage officers, follow up Army salvage in the hands of civilian dealers to see that it was not hoarded, and control by allocation the flow of material into proper industrial channels.

In general, dormant scrap was to be handled by the Bureau of Industrial Conservation, which at the time of these arrangements was establishing regional offices and making their consultatory services available to all corps areas and supply services. Since dormant scrap was usually sold to scrap dealers rather than consumers and the WPB expected to complete the licensing of such dealers by June, SOS ordered sales to be made only

21 Memo cited above, n. 20(3).
22 The sponsorship of organized conservation by the government had its beginning in the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense. Later a number of special corporations—the Rubber Reserve Company, the Metals Reserve Company, the Defense Supplies Corporation, and War Materials Incorporated—under the direction of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation rendered invaluable assistance to the Army in utilizing and disposing of certain salvage materials.
23 Ltr, TAG to TQMG et al., 8 Jun 42, sub: Salv Procedure, SPX 400.7 (6-1-42) MO-SPPD-D.
to licensed dealers. Where any considerable accumulation of miscellaneous scrap or dormant scrap of one classification was to be sold, SOS directed Army salvage officers to report it to the bureau or its nearest regional office before disposal. In the case of industrial scrap, SOS directed that contacts be made with pertinent scrap units of the Materials Division, WPB, in Washington, D. C., prior to disposal of ferrous materials of carload lot, or greater quantities of nonferrous and other materials important for war production.\textsuperscript{24} Actual control of the movement of scrap from dealers to industrial consumers was the responsibility of the Allocation Section of the Materials Division, WPB.

The original arrangement with the WPB also produced a tentative statement of policy regarding co-operation by the Army with the WPB drive for collection of civilian scrap. Initially, Army salvage operations were to be directed toward utilization of materials accumulated by military agencies, but accumulations of materials discovered away from military reservations were to be reported to the Bureau of Industrial Conservation or its regional representatives. On 27 June 1942, SOS directed The Quartermaster General to publish instructions to all salvage officers outlining the procedure for reporting.

\textsuperscript{24} Chiefs of supply services and the WPB were to determine these amounts by agreement. When sale of either dormant or industrial scrap was made to any dealer, mill, foundry, or other consumer, the WPB scrap units were to be informed of the name of the purchaser, the type and tonnage of material, and the date of transaction in order to enable the WPB to follow up on disposition. This information was vital to the WPB in allocating materials to consumers.
such large accumulations of civilian scrap.\textsuperscript{25} It was further agreed that Army salvage installations would be governed solely by policies, directives, and operational instructions announced by the War Department rather than by those issued directly from the WPB, but a clear statement of policy on this matter was not circulated until April 1943.\textsuperscript{26}

When the WPB was established, the OPA relinquished its regulatory functions relating to civilian supply. The OPA continued, nevertheless, to administer and expand its advisory and regulatory functions pertaining to price control of salvage materials. Its salvage division and regional offices were increasingly helpful to the QMC on problems relating to price ceilings and other aspects of OPA regulations affecting specific scrap and salvage items, and the OQMG co-operated closely with this agency during the war.

**Relations With the Field**

The conservation of Army matériel was a field activity carried out largely in lower echelons of the War Department and the Army in many and widely dispersed geographical locations. The success of the Quartermaster program depended upon effective supervision, but this was difficult to achieve because in the conduct of conservation programs through supply and command channels The Quartermaster General acted as a special staff agent of the SOS, with varying powers of supervision.

**Command Agencies**

The Quartermaster conservation program was promoted in two ways. First, efforts were concentrated on fostering the proper upkeep, care, and use of Quartermaster matériel by troops. For this purpose the OQMG formulated the doctrine and provided the technical media to be used by the AGF and the AAF. The cooperation of these command agencies in applying Quartermaster conservation policies was necessary because they were responsible for promulgating and supervising indoctrination programs in troop units. In this instance, where troop commanders had full responsibility for the conduct of conservation programs, relationships were relatively clear-cut. Second, the OQMG supervised specific conservation activities conducted by field establishments in the zone of interior. These activities involved primarily the receipt of used and unserviceable matériel from troops, the determination of its disposition by renovation, reuse, or disposal, the repair of suitable articles, and the distribution and reissue of renovated property.

It was at this point that interdependence of action between troop unit commanders and Quartermaster supply agencies was greatest, and divergent responsibilities produced conflicting points of view. Army Regulations prescribed that articles of unserviceable property were to be turned over by using organizations to the QMC for salvage.\textsuperscript{27} In the process, officers receiving the property were empowered to return to the using unit any articles considered fit for continued use, to stipu-
late that property in need of repair be returned to the unit after processing by the nearest available repair shop, or to recommend that an individual be assessed for damage or loss of property resulting from negligence or more culpable action.

On the other hand, troop unit commanders were concerned with obtaining the best possible and most presentable equipment for their men. In the past, in fact, their reputations, as well as those of their supply officers and sergeants, had been enhanced by their ability to obtain suitable supplies and replacements. Quartermaster responsibility for conservation encountered directly the insistence of many commanders upon independence with regard to supply of their troop units. Attempts by Quartermaster representatives through vigorous and conscientious administration of inspection to bring pressure upon unwilling commanders to retain usable equipment often caused them to resort to various subterfuges, such as mutilation of equipment to insure its condemnation or to prevent its repair and return to the user. This area of intermingling responsibilities was later to be thoroughly examined and modified so as to encourage command responsibility and respect for property.

Service Commands

The most important contribution of the Quartermaster program lay in promoting conservation among the troops, who used the great bulk of matériel, but the success of the program depended on the effectiveness with which the corps administered its salvage activities in installations of the SOS (later ASF). Its responsibilities here included the organization of facilities to process the large quantities of matériel becoming unserviceable in all echelons of the Army, other than that actually consumed or maintained in combat areas. The QMC arranged for local repair of Quartermaster items used by troops stationed in the zone of interior, and for the renovation, reissue, and disposal of vast quantities of articles turned in by them in the course of their training and on their departure for overseas duty. It also made arrangements for handling the ever-increasing volume of matériel returned from theaters in the form of usable goods and salvage.

Although subject to the supervision of The Quartermaster General, such salvage and reclamation activities were carried on in the post, camp, and station installations of the service commands, which had replaced the corps areas in the summer of 1942.\(^28\) The corps areas had long exercised general supervision over these activities, although commanders were responsible only for “the collection of all salvageable property and material at each post, camp, and station under their jurisdiction.” Such salvage was turned over to the QMC for disposal by procedures determined by The Quartermaster General, but corps area commanders were responsible for “prompt disposal” by agencies under their supervision.\(^29\)

New and broader control, however, was vested in the commanding generals of the service commands. Under policies promulgated by SOS and directives on procedure issued by The Quartermaster General, they exercised “supervision and control of all salvage activities (including

\(^{28}\) WD GO 35, 22 Jul 42, sub: Redesignation of WD CAs to Sv-Cs.

\(^{29}\) Ltr, TAG to CGs of All CAs et al., 27 Jun 42, sub: Info on Salv Procedure, SPX 400.7 (6-23-42) MO-SPPD-TS-M.
reclamation shops of the Quartermaster Corps) at posts, camps, and stations; at stations not under the command of the service commander, including arsenals, depots, ports of embarkation, and staging areas; and installations of the Army Air Forces. Special repair installations under the control of chiefs of technical services were specifically excluded from the supervision of the commanding generals of the service commands.

The chief of the OQMG Salvage Branch felt that the QMC would benefit from the establishment of service commands. Although the effect was to remove local quartermasters from the direct jurisdiction of The Quartermaster General, the fact that he could now issue instructions to the service commanders in his capacity as a staff officer of the SOS seemed to strengthen and improve his position in relation to the field. In practice, the interposition of another echelon of supervision between The Quartermaster General and station officials proved an obstacle to the speedy delivery of directives that were issued to the field through channels of command. The OQMG received many complaints from field salvage officers and repeatedly called the attention of the service commands to the fact that directives were not reaching the operating agencies where they were needed. This was particularly serious when local officers received binding regulations of WPB, OPA, and other government agencies only after infractions had already occurred. To eliminate this difficulty it was necessary for the OQMG to secure authorization for, and make extensive use of, a direct mailing list of local offices to which it could send government regulations and other important instructional material.

Divided staff responsibility in the supervision of field activities in itself raised problems. The Quartermaster General was solely responsible for technical supervision of these activities, while the Commanding General, SOS, through his immediate staff agencies was responsible for general operating supervision of activities in the service commands. Co-operation between the service commands and the OQMG and the general quality of supervision were not improved where disagreements arose over staff responsibilities, and particularly where SOS agencies issued directives without co-ordination and sometimes in conflict with instructions of the OQMG. When the ASF assumed full staff responsibility for salvage activities in the summer of 1943, this trend in the supervision of field activities was reversed. Then full responsibility for field programs was vested in The Quartermaster General.

In the meantime, regardless of what the final salvage responsibilities of the QMC and other agencies were to be, the conservation program was of vital importance in the immediate conduct of field activities. The OQMG was concerned with the development of effective procedures and techniques, but these meant nothing unless adequate supervision was provided. Efforts were therefore made to bring service command activities under more effective supervision. The OQMG became

30 AGO Memo W30-3-42, 15 Sep 42, sub: Authority and Responsibility of CGs of SvCs on Salv Matters.
31 Col Falkenau to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 27 Jul 42, sub: Manual for SvCs.
32 (1) Chief of Salv and Surplus Prop Br to DQMG, 13 Aug 42, no sub. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen Frank F. Scowden, OQMG, to CGs of All SvCs, 18 Aug 42, sub: Cir and Docs of Instruction.
33 (1) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Hq SOS, 13 Oct 42, sub: Proposed Mailing List. (2) Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, p. 44.
preoccupied with this problem soon after Pearl Harbor when field inspections emphasized the need for adequate regional supervision. In May 1942 the chief of the Personnel Division, OQMG, asked the General Staff to authorize an additional officer, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, in each corps area headquarters as salvage and reclamation officer, to devote his full time and energies to the duties of salvage and reclamation. The emphasis placed upon rank was deliberate in order that the officers might have enough prestige to impress upon others the importance of the salvage work. Although several of these officers were on duty by early summer, the program did not get fully under way until October. Then an orientation conference was held in Washington, D. C., for the salvage and reclamation officers of the service commands. Comprehensive instruction was given on various subjects, questions of policy were cleared up, and particular emphasis was placed on the necessity of securing qualified assistants for the service command staffs.

These salvage and reclamation officers were responsible for supervising and inspecting the salvage and reclamation activities of post, camp, and station officers. This meant that they disposed of scrap, a salvage activity that was Army-wide in scope, and that they also supervised Quartermaster repair shops. While these officers were chosen ostensibly to represent the QMC, many of them envisioned for themselves a broad mission of supervising the salvage and conservation activities of all the technical services. Because of this seemingly dual position, the Chief of Staff, SOS, was later to characterize such an officer as a "peculiar individual." Regional responsibilities obviously needed clarification.

Service command progress in exercising close supervision of local activities was discouraging. During the first year or more after the institution of the salvage and reclamation program, none of the service commands had sufficient supervisory personnel to handle the many vital functions at headquarters and at the same time conduct regular and frequent inspections of activities at posts. The OQMG made repeated efforts to obtain more personnel, but as late as July 1943—immediately before the transfer of salvage responsibility to the ASF—no action had been taken to fill the desired personnel quotas in any service command.

Upon the development of adequate means of supervision under the direction of the commanding generals of the service commands depended much of the program for decentralization of administrative authority advocated by Headquarters, SOS. The concentration of operating supervision at the service command level was part of the theory underlying SOS organization, and early in 1943 the Control Division, SOS, brought pressure on The Quartermaster General to decentralize to the service commands all possible routine supervision of Quartermaster activities.

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35 Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, passim.
36 Memo, Maj Gen Wilhelm D. Styer for ACofS for Opns, SOS, 21 Nov 42, sub: Salv Activities.
38 (1) Memo, ACofS for Opns, SOS, for TQMG, 30 Jan 43, sub: Elimination of Unnecessary Overlapping and Duplications of Functions. (2) Brig Gen Harold A. Barnes, DQMG, to Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 10 Feb 43, sub: Decentralization of Action.
While several specific salvage controls had already been delegated to the service commands, The Quartermaster General felt that others should be retained because of the lack of personnel in the service commands. In particular, he objected to delegating authority to approve indefinite-quantity contracts for the disposal of certain waste materials, the supervision and approval of which required knowledge of fluctuating market conditions. Supervision by the OQMG of these long-term contracts had increased the revenue from them by many thousands of dollars per month, and he argued that delegation of this authority could not be justified on the basis of economy to the government. Headquarters, ASF, agreed to his retention of this control, but only until such time as sufficient qualified salvage personnel became available to the service commands.

A similar problem arose in the summer of 1943. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, ASF, proposed that technical maintenance inspectors attached to the OQMG be assigned to the service commands to conduct “continuing inspections” from that level. The Quartermaster General objected to this proposal because he had not been able to find enough qualified inspectors for service in all areas under the projected decentralization. More fundamentally, he opposed the move on the ground that, as long as directives charged him with insuring the effectiveness of Quartermaster operations, central inspections by the OQMG and other legitimate working contacts with local activities were necessary. A small group for supervision and inspection was retained in the OQMG, but General Gregory agreed to eliminate certain sources of irritation to service commanders by instructing all OQMG representatives visiting service commands to advise commanders of the purpose and nature of their visits and to confine their activities to those arranged for unless otherwise requested by commanders.

Most service commanders were considered co-operative in administering Quartermaster programs, and many salvage and reclamation officers rendered outstanding service under Quartermaster direction despite being handicapped by lack of personnel. On the other hand, those service commanders who were skeptical of the value of salvage work or who were not disposed to be helpful were able at times to rely upon a literal interpretation of the command prerogative to obstruct the exercise of necessary supervision by The Quartermaster General.

Although the need for closer supervision of Quartermaster conservation activities was clear, little could be done to clarify the responsibilities of the QMC and the service commands until the established regulations and procedures covering the disposition of unserviceable property, usually referred to simply as the “salvage procedure,” were revised.

Clarification of Procedures

An attack upon the inherited salvage system materialized in the fall of 1942.
Late in November the Chief of Staff, SOS, expressed the developing concern in staff circles:

The salvage activities of the Army are in a confused and disorganized state. Terms have not been assigned definite meanings. A large number of agencies are involved. Paper work is excessive. A great mass of Army Regulations, War Department Circulars and memoranda have been issued.\(^{13}\)

He went on to add that "the importance of salvage activities increases in direct proportion to the increasing difficulty in meeting the requirements of the Army." Furthermore, while many of the War Department circulars and memoranda emphasized the importance of conservation, they continued to require actions inconsistent with the existing stringency of raw materials because they had been written before the war.

He directed the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SOS, to assume responsibility for simplifying and co-ordinating the various organizations and activities affecting salvage. He ordered that terms be clearly defined; that salvage and reclamation activities be co-ordinated; that paperwork be reduced and classification of property for disposal purposes be simplified; that peacetime standards of "economical repair" be eliminated; and that regulations, circulars, and memoranda affecting salvage activities be consolidated into a single, compact manual. Of special significance for the future administration of salvage disposal was his directive that authority and responsibility of staff divisions, supply and administrative services, the Inspector General's Department, and field operating agencies for salvage activities be established clearly and that operating functions be decentralized to the field, assigning to SOS agencies only such supervisory functions as were required.

To initiate the necessary changes, Headquarters, SOS, arranged a conference of representatives of the interested agencies on 2 December.\(^{14}\) In preparation for this meeting, the head of the Salvage Branch, OQMG, drafted an analysis of the chief of staff's directive, which was defensive of the existing salvage system. His analysis was obviously influenced by the direct and implied criticisms of the work of the QMC and the suggestion of reorganization. He felt that the confusion and abuses had been greatly overemphasized, and that "considering the rapid expansion of the Army and the tremendous influx of inexperienced officers and enlisted personnel, an organization job on salvage has been done which compares favorably with anything which would have been accomplished in an industrial organization or elsewhere under parallel conditions."\(^{15}\) This reference to achievement under difficulties failed, of course, to offer a solution to the recognized need for clarification of supervisory responsibilities. Later, representatives of the OQMG took a leading part in clarifying procedure and responsibilities.

Before this could be accomplished, however, a careful analysis had to be made of the existing regulatory system governing the disposition of unserviceable property. That system had been set forth in certain basic Army Regulations that had been formulated as a result of varied and conflicting experience over the long, peacetime period following World War I, when

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\(^{13}\) Memo, Gen Styer for ACofS for Opns, SOS, 21 Nov 42, sub: Salv Activities

\(^{14}\) Memo, Chief of Maint, Repair and Salv Br, SOS, for TQMG et al., 28 Nov 42, sub: Conf on Activities and Regulations Pertaining to Salv.

\(^{15}\) Col Falkenau to Dir of Sv Insls Div, OQMG, 1 Dec 42, sub: Analysis of 21 Nov Memo.
accountability and "regularity" in the handling of military property were of primary interest. Enforcement of these regulations was generally deemed sufficient to accomplish such conservation as was needed. In the course of time, numerous amendments had been added to the regulations on the theory that, while property accountability and liability should be enforced and property disposition controlled by the survey officers and inspectors, their actions should be so circumscribed and defined that the barrier against malpractices would be "air-tight" and the observance of official policies automatically insured. The resulting regulations were so complex as to be almost impossible of interpretation and administration.

At the same time, these regulations called for practices not adapted to an emergency and wartime situation in which the emphasis had shifted from the maintenance of property accountability to an expeditious processing of matériel for further military and industrial uses. Probably the most important and controversial of these practices was the one requiring mutilation or destruction of property submitted for condemnation, in order to prevent its being resubmitted to an inspector to make up shortages in accounts or in order to secure unauthorized replacement issues. Although this practice had been adopted to combat commonly encountered methods of evading the regulations on property accountability and responsibility, the mutilation or destruction of property useful for war purposes or for essential civilian needs was open to particular criticism.

These regulations also covered in detail not only the functions of local officers who were permitted to act upon instruments of property disposition, but also those of the overhead agencies having responsibilities for the clearing of papers and the approval of applicable policies and procedures. Both the Chief of Finance and The Inspector General, in addition to The Quartermaster General, had important and often controlling responsibilities in the disposition procedure. This fact alone prevented The Quartermaster Corps from exercising real control over the conservation of most of its supplies in the field and tended to hinder the speedy and efficient salvaging for which The Quartermaster General was held responsible. Because of the many agencies involved and because of the time-consuming process required to amend Army Regulations, a simple procedure, useful for wartime purposes, did not emerge until two years after Pearl Harbor.

When military property became unserviceable at any time, it could be retired from property accounts only by an inventory and inspection report or a report of survey, the procedures for which involved a "long, complicated, burdensome series of steps." The surveying officer or inspector had to decide upon the method for the disposal of the unserviceable property, and no less than eight alternatives had been added to the regulations in the years following World War I. The formality of the screening procedure and the necessity for the clearing of papers and the approval of applicable policies and procedures. Both the Chief of Finance and The Inspector General, in addition to The Quartermaster General, had important and often controlling responsibilities in the disposition procedure. This fact alone prevented The Quartermaster Corps from exercising real control over the conservation of most of its supplies in the field and tended to hinder the speedy and efficient salvaging for which The Quartermaster General was held responsible. Because of the many agencies involved and because of the time-consuming process required to amend Army Regulations, a simple procedure, useful for wartime purposes, did not emerge until two years after Pearl Harbor.

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46 (1) AR 35–6640, sub: Finance Dept—Lost, Destroyed, Damaged, or Unserviceable Prop. (2) AR 20–35, sub: IGD—Insp of Prop for Condemnation.
47 The Chief of Finance prescribed procedures for the conduct of surveys and approved all reports of survey, since these were considered fiscal instruments. The Inspector General's Department handled most inventory and inspection reports and prepared regulations covering them.
48 Separate regulations covered the disposition of clothing and equipage issued to the enlisted man. See AR 615–40.
49 Memo, Gen Styer for ACoS for Opns, SOS, 21 Nov 42, sub: Salv Activities.
50 (1) AR 20–35, par. 7. (2) AR 35–6640, par. 10.
of clearances from higher authority caused delays and tied up great quantities of equipment awaiting disposition. Moreover, the physical disposition of unserviceable articles usually awaited the full consummation and approval of formal proceedings.

The established procedures were also inadequate in that technically competent individuals were not necessarily appointed to act in the disposition of various classes of equipment. Numerous communications to the field urged competent inspection of technical supplies, but it was difficult to obtain qualified personnel. Moreover, apparently no effective steps could be taken to counteract the tendency of commanders to assign "miscellaneous" duties of this kind to transients or to already busy officers to be accomplished on a part-time basis.51

The establishment of an organization staffed by interested personnel trained to handle property turned in for disposal would afford the most effective means of promoting conservation. From a technical standpoint, at least, such an organization was already available in repair shops. Even when unserviceable property was not shipped to shops for processing, all but the simplest questions of reparability and disposition had to be determined by representatives of repair shops or by personnel with comparable experience. With the possible exception of salvage officers and specialists, personnel managing repair and reclamation activities were as a group probably the most "conservation minded" among technical service representatives. Another necessary phase of their duty was to decide whether the condition of equipment turned in was the result of normal wear, negligence, or more culpable action. The repair shop systems were the logical means whereby the technical services could exert a real and systematic control over the utilization and disposal of property.

Instead of making use of repair shops, which would have strengthened the responsibilities of the chiefs of the technical services, Headquarters, SOS, proposed to expedite the processing and disposal of equipment by establishing in the service commands special salvage and reclamation centers located "along the line of flow of property requiring repair" and of salvage material.52 This proposal was apparently influenced by the movement then under way at Headquarters, SOS, to concentrate the administration of all field activities on a functional basis under the service commands.

The OQMG objected to the establishment of such centers because it believed that there was no such thing in the various service commands as a general line of flow of property requiring repair or of salvage material. Furthermore, it felt that the plan would result in a great deal of unnecessary transportation and rehandling of material. These considerations dictated against the plan's adoption, but one of its features was utilized. The original plan had suggested that the proposed centers process both salvage generated domestically and that received from overseas bases and theaters. With the first major expansion of combat operations, the necessity of planning for the latter became critical. Salvage centers, located near ports and receiving for segregation all salvage material returned from overseas, were established and became

51 See Min of Salv and Recim Conf, p. 3, remarks of Col Falkenau.
52 Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Chief, Distr Div, SOS, 14 Dec 42, sub: Disp of Unserviceable Prop and Salv Opns, and appended plan submitted by SOS at 10 December conference.
permanent features of wartime salvage operations.

In the early spring of 1943 procedures for declaring equipment unserviceable were simplified by revoking most of the authority of inspectors and surveying officers. Instead, responsibility was placed on the using unit. The inventory and inspection report was eliminated entirely, except for use in the disposition of government-owned animals. A report of survey was substituted as the one means of clearing unserviceable items from the property accounts of the accountable officers, but many troublesome procedural provisions were eliminated since alternatives for disposition that might be recommended by the surveying officers were now reduced from eight to four.

The War Department further directed:

It will be axiomatic that disposition of unserviceable property, that is, whether it shall be repaired and continued in service, or turned over to a salvage officer after the spare parts and other components have been removed, will be determined by repair shops of various echelons operating under technical instructions furnished by the chief of service to which the property pertains.

In furtherance of this principle standard arrangements were established for the shipment of equipment to repair shops for inspection and processing, or for the on-site inspection of equipment by shop officers in appropriate cases. Thus the repair shops became actual administrators, rather than mere adjuncts, of the inspection and disposition process.

But if the principle of technical control through repair echelons was now clearly established, neither the simplification of this control nor the clarification of responsibilities for supply discipline and property accountability was yet fully accomplished. The War Department directive of March 1943 did include a provision that definitely forbade the mutilation or destruction of property, except in those instances where it was patently necessary and appropriate as, for example, the destruction of unsafe subsistence and medical stores or the mutilation of "distinctive" articles of the uniform. Considerable controversy had arisen over the tendency of certain inspectors arbitrarily to order the destruction of "worthless" articles out of ignorance of the market potentialities of the items or their further use within the Army. Actually official policy had provided that inspectors, where feasible, mark items "IC" (inspected and condemned) rather than order mutilation or destruction. Attention had repeatedly been given to formulating instructions for the marking of goods. Inspectors, however, had justified their course of action on the ground that it prevented abuse and protected the government against fraud, despite the fact that it interfered with economical repair and salvaging. Many months had been required even to secure agreement on the necessity of forbidding the practice of mutilation, let alone actually stopping it. The elimination of all unnecessary marking and mutilation had been first agreed upon in July 1942 in a conference between The Quartermaster General and The Inspector General. The OQMG Salvage Branch had thereupon issued instructions to the field, but the practice had continued. It was late in 1942 before mutilation was absolutely forbidden.

53 WD Cir 75, 16 Mar 43.
54 (1) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Chief of Dist Div, SOS, 14 Dec 42, sub: Disp of Unserviceable Prop and Salv Opsns. (2) Memo, Col Falkenau, OQMG, for Col Hamilton, 18 Dec 42, sub: Disp of Unserviceable Prop, 400.93.
55 WD Cir 75, 16 Mar 43.
tion was prohibited, and March 1943 before instructions were formally published.\textsuperscript{57}

Under the procedure promulgated in March 1943, full control and streamlining of the system for disposition of property were retarded by the War Department's effort to continue the use of the survey in a shortened form as the universal instrument for disposition of equipment, and to provide a medium of protection against improper disposal practices. Although articles rendered unserviceable by normal use or deterioration in service were turned in to the supply officer by means of a simple certificate executed by the unit commander or responsible officer, the procedure from that point on remained cumbersome. Property could also be submitted to repair echelons and returned after processing without undue red tape or delay, but the authority that at any stage condemned articles was required in all cases to execute a report of survey. A semblance of the former control procedure was preserved in the requirement that each survey be submitted to a "disinterested" officer, who would examine the articles and ascertain that they had not been improperly disposed of as a result of pressure from troop units or because of other reasons.

Experience soon demonstrated that in most localities the volume of property accumulating to be processed was so great that not even this bottleneck could be tolerated. As a result, the use of the survey was restricted, and formal investigations were reserved for occasions when any of the receiving or processing agencies might have cause to suspect irregularity.\textsuperscript{58} In all routine cases thereafter, either a brief "turn-in slip" or an exchange document,\textsuperscript{59} on which the responsible officer had executed his accustomed certificate of "fair wear and tear," served as the formal instrument both for submission of property by troop echelons and final disposal of items by salvaging. With one comparatively minor exception,\textsuperscript{60} responsibility for property was thus finally placed squarely upon using and processing echelons, with decisions as to disposition being made by agencies presumably best qualified to do so. Although a number of refinements were later introduced, this general restriction on the use of surveys virtually completed the separation of accountability and control of the disposition of property.

\textit{Transfer of Responsibility to the Army Service Forces}

Although no change was made in the assignment of responsibility for various conservation functions in March 1943, simplification of procedures helped to prepare the way for a final settlement of responsibility for salvage as a matter of staff supervision. Many special factors, however, affected the actual decision that was made.

Under broad, general policies established by the Distribution Division, ASF,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} (1) WD Cir 393, Sec. I, 4 Dec 42, sub: Mutilation and Marking of Salvageable Materials. (2) WD Cir 75, 16 Mar 43. This circular rescinded AR 20-33, which had previously provided inspectors with directions on mutilation.
\item \textsuperscript{58} WD Cir 7, 5 Jan 44, sub: Repl for and Disp of Unserviceable Prop. This circular served throughout the remainder of the war as the basic regulation for the disposition of property.
\item \textsuperscript{59} These forms were used for clothing and equipage. The procedure was later changed.
\item \textsuperscript{60} In those instances where the salvage officer was also an accountable officer, the station commander was required to appoint a disinterested officer to receive property and determine by physical check that the number and description of articles to be salvaged were as listed.
\end{itemize}
The Quartermaster General was "charged with the determination of policies, plans, and procedures to be executed by the service commands with reference to the disposition or sale of scrap and waste materials." Although his responsibility for disposing of general salvage was Army-wide, individual chiefs of the technical services were charged with the disposal of industrial or "current production" scrap at arsenals and manufacturing establishments under their jurisdiction.

On several occasions conflicts had arisen out of this division of operating responsibilities. In October 1942, the Chief of Ordnance had recommended that consideration be given to changing current instructions governing the disposal of scrap materials in Ordnance establishments in order to eliminate the dual responsibility of the Chief of Ordnance and The Quartermaster General for handling scrap materials. Headquarters, SOS, rejected this proposal on the strong objection of The Quartermaster General, who emphasized that the return of critical materials to war production channels could best be accomplished by a unified program for all Army installations developed by one responsible office. He insisted, moreover, that such confusion as might have existed was due primarily to the failure of the Ordnance Department to adhere to the regulations. Directives of that agency designated as industrial scrap many items, such as packaging materials, rags, paper, and rubber, that should have been handled under procedures established for dormant scrap.

Conflict had also developed over the conduct of salvage activities at ports. The Chief of Transportation had insisted upon keeping the ports of embarkation entirely independent of corps areas and any local activities in relation to supply. On the other hand, the OQMG Salvage Branch had maintained that in matters relating to salvage the same policy should apply to ports of embarkation as applied to other exempted stations within the corps areas, namely, "that the supervision of salvage matters and the issuance of directives should be handled through the Corps Area Quartermaster." Insofar as the disposal of scrap and reparable property returned from overseas was involved, many special administrative problems arose. In general, service commanders and port commanders determined detailed operating procedures in conjunction with both the OQMG and Headquarters, SOS.

When in November 1942 the Chief of Staff, SOS, had first suggested a transfer of staff responsibilities for salvage, the chief of the OQMG Salvage Branch had proposed consolidating responsibility for supervising the disposal of all types of scrap in the QMC under a single set of regulations. He had pointed out that the responsibility for the supervision of industrial scrap had originally been transferred from The Quartermaster General to other supply services in order to facilitate so-called toll contracts. Since WPB regula-
tions had eliminated such contracts, it was unnecessary to continue this confusing division of responsibility.

This proposal was officially advanced by The Quartermaster General six months later, but at that time Headquarters, ASF, saw no reason to disturb the existing arrangements on salvage responsibilities since studies concerning the entire salvage system were in progress. These studies covered not only the disposal of scrap and surplus property, but also the redistribution and utilization of materials and equipment. In order to tighten controls in these fields, ASF had vested authority for staff supervision of the disposition of scrap and surplus property in a new Redistribution Branch, organized in the Production Division of the Office of the Director of Matériel in May 1943. The Director of Operations, ASF, as before, continued to exercise staff supervision over reclamation and maintenance activities.

These developments culminated in a final proposal to eliminate overlapping and duplication of responsibility and to provide for more effective staff supervision of salvage activities by transferring all such responsibility from The Quartermaster General to the Production Division, ASF. Despite the objections of General Gregory, who expressed concern both over the possible loss of co-ordination between Quartermaster reclamation and salvage activities and over the establishment of a precedent for assumption of operating supervision by agencies on the headquarters level, this proposal was put into effect in August.

The decision of Headquarters, ASF, was based on the need to consolidate responsibility for supervision in one agency and on the view that the salvage function was one properly charged to the service commands under direct, but minimum, supervision by the ASF Salvage and Redistribution Branch. Back of it, too, was the record of difficulties encountered in distinguishing between staff and operating responsibilities for salvage and the emergence of new problems that pressed for settlement. Thus, when General Gregory had suggested clarification of service command responsibilities in regard to the flow of salvage returned from overseas, Headquarters, ASF, had undertaken the development of administrative procedures for that purpose on the ground that other considerations in addition to those of technical control were involved and that the operations of many agencies, including the ports of embarkation and theater organizations, were affected. The Quartermaster General, on the other hand, had steadily maintained that the matter was entirely one of operations rather than general policy.

The desire of Headquarters, ASF, to reorganize the arrangements for supervising salvage activities seems to have been stimulated also by the reports critical of Quartermaster administration submitted by ASF representatives who had made inspection trips through the service com-

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68 (1) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Chief of Redistr Br, Production Div, ASF, 26 Jun 43, sub: Consolidation of Authority for Salv Activities. (2) Memo, Chief of Redistr Br, ASF, for TQMG, 30 Jun 43, same sub.
69 ASF Cir 35, 28 May 43, sub: Staff Supervision of Salv and Surplus Prop.
70 Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 28 Jul 43, sub: Transfer of Staff Supervision of Salv Activities.
71 (1) ASF Cir 58, 7 Aug 43, sub: Transfer of Staff Supervision of Salv Activities. (2) This action, of course, necessitated the formulation of a new regulation, AR 700–25, which was published on 26 April 1944.
72 1st Ind, Hq ASF to TQMG, 31 Jul 43, on Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 28 Jul 43, sub: Transfer of Staff Supervision of Salv Activities.
mands during the spring and summer of 1943. Although these inspections were often conducted hurriedly and without adequate attention to the causes of conditions observed, they invariably resulted in vigorous indictment of the activities surveyed.\textsuperscript{73} Many of these criticisms reflected conditions that had been aggravated by inadequate supervision of local activities. While the criticisms did not take into account either the inability of The Quartermaster General to secure the authorization of necessary supervisory personnel for the service commands or the limitations placed upon direct Quartermaster supervision of activities, this omission served merely to emphasize the dilemma that had confronted The Quartermaster General in supervising an activity over which he had no adequate means of control but for which, nevertheless, he had full responsibility. Whether or not the basic difficulties were resolvable under Quartermaster auspices, it was clear that these, and especially the duplications and conflicts that had tended to prevent a solution of any sort, could no longer be tolerated. From this standpoint at least, the decision to simplify organization by consolidating staff responsibilities came as a long overdue measure of improvement.

When General Gregory expressed apprehension that the transfer of operating responsibilities for salvage, which were so closely related to those of reclamation, would "retard the supply objectives within the Army, and more especially within the Army Service Forces," he was anticipating problems that might arise.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, the study and improvement of the interrelated activities of conservation and salvage held special interest for the QMC. Studies made by the Quartermaster Board of articles received in salvage furnished increasingly valuable clues to conditions in maintenance and supply, along with the utility of equipment designs, and served as a basis for corrective action by various agencies.\textsuperscript{75} In addition, the analysis of data on quantities and potentialities of salvage was to assume increasing importance in supply computation. For the Corps, moreover, there was to develop a special need for close contact with the administration of salvage activities because of Quartermaster responsibility for civilian supply procurements in support of theater operations. A large part of these procurements were estimated and secured from salvage stocks of clothing and other articles. The QMC still had vital interests in salvage, though as a service it had perhaps no particular claim to responsibility for the activity other than through the variety of its commodity interests and the special experience of its organization.

\textit{Conservation Programs and Command Responsibilities}

A by-product of the clarification and revision of basic procedures accomplished during 1943 and 1944 was the clear recognition of, and the stimulus given to, the vital program for indoctrination of troops and the implementation of the responsibilities of unit commanders. Early in the war the OQMG had given consideration to the development of a broad program of indoctrination. The Quartermaster General had

\textsuperscript{73} (1) See for example, Memo, ACoS for Opns, ASF, for TQMG, 15 Apr 43, sub: Insp Rpt of Salv and Reclm Activities in Third SvC. (2) [1st Ind], Col Rudolf W. Riefkohl, Third SvC, to TQMG, 14 May 43.

\textsuperscript{74} Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 28 Jul 43, sub: Transfer of Staff Supervision of Salv Activities.

\textsuperscript{75} Rpt, Dir of QM Bd to TQMG, Rpt of the Quartermaster Board, Camp Lee, Va., 1 Feb 42–30 Jun 44, pp. 110–18.
called attention to the difficulty that an unfavorable Army record in the conservation of essential items, such as food, clothing, and gasoline, might create in securing the co-operation of the civilian population in the prosecution of the war.\footnote{Memo, 1st Lt John S. Hayes, OQMG, for WD Dir of Bureau of Public Relations, 14 Feb 42, sub: Proposed Campaign for Waste Prevention.}

He had suggested initiation throughout the Army of a “public relations” campaign to impress upon every individual the need for conservation. To achieve this end, slogans, publicity in camp newspapers, and competitive awards granted to organizations with good conservation records might be used. He had further proposed the establishment of a single agency with comprehensive responsibility for carrying out this program. Although a broad program did not materialize, the OQMG Salvage Branch had continued to urge the use of educational programs and publicity through established channels as the most effective means of promoting conservation among the troops.\footnote{(1) Ltr, Chief of Salv and Surplus Prop Br, OQMG, to Chief of Public Relations Bureau, 13 Apr 42, sub: Tng Films, Posters, Etc. for Salv Indoctrination. (2) Charles R. Van Etten, Salv Specialist, to Chief of Salv and Surplus Prop Br, OQMG, 21 Feb 42, same sub.} At the same time, it had recognized the limitations of direct enforcement methods.

Early in the war unit commanders were generally dilatory in pursuing their responsibilities for promoting conservation activities among their troops and for cooperating with the supply agencies. At the same time, local salvage activities were especially hampered by unclarified administrative responsibilities, as well as by a lack of experience and a shortage of manpower. Neither the quality nor the efficiency of service in local repair shops had improved sufficiently to bring about a maximum recovery of articles or the full co-operation of unit commanders in the reuse of these items and the enforcement of conservation policies. For the OQMG, the most complex and difficult problems were encountered in the issue and utilization of items of clothing and equipage, the announced policies for which called for priority to be accorded to the consumption of used, renovated, and limited-standard articles.\footnote{See below, Ch. II.}

Soon after Pearl Harbor basic procedures were modified to the extent that troop commanders were relieved of the duty of preparing surveys in the disposition of equipment. Each station commander was instructed to appoint one or more local boards of property adjustment, composed of officers of suitable experience from the station complement.\footnote{(1) WD Cir 105, 10 Apr 42, sub: Simplified Accounting Procedure for Orgn Prop. (2) WD Cir 405, 15 Dec 42, same sub. (3) WD Cir 170, 24 Jul 43, same sub.} They were authorized to act as surveying officers and inspectors for all property submitted by units, to prepare papers at the request of units, and to take final action for the station commander on all papers. At the same time, the War Department directed that the amount of evidence supporting surveys, and all other red tape incident to this procedure, be reduced to the minimum absolutely necessary to establish facts in each case.

These modifications led to a simplification that was much needed, but many criticized them because they fostered a neglect of the investigative function of the surveying officer, and, by relieving unit commanders of the duty of preparing surveys, resulted in deterioration of supply discipline among troops. Relieving the troop commanders of a feeling of property...
responsibility was deemed a primary cause of excess consumption and loss of supplies by troops in training.  

As the difficulties in supply-command administration of conservation were studied, increasing emphasis was placed upon the development of an adequate sense of property responsibility or "supply consciousness" among troops. No real solution to the problem of relations between troop commanders and supply agencies could be found as long as command indoctrination remained inadequate. To foster supply consciousness among the troops, the ASF initiated an Army Conservation Program late in 1943 following the redefinition and reorganization of salvage and conservation activities.

It employed the same techniques as the earlier Quartermaster conservation program. The ASF directed the technical services to provide field commanders with various materials or projects to be used for educating and indoctrinating the troops in the need for and the objectives of conservation. It further directed them to engage in extensive publicity efforts in installations directly under their jurisdiction. While the objectives were phrased mainly in terms of action within troop organizations, the program also called for maximum participation by the technical services and improvement of their functions in assisting troops in the conservation of equipment.

A proposal in the summer of 1944 to return to troop commanders the processing of survey reports in order to emphasize supply discipline was rejected as unsound and inconsistent with the purpose underlying the formation of the ASF—that of providing service to free the other two commands from as much of the administrative and supply burden as possible. Nevertheless, the full responsibility of commanders for control of their units did receive more and more recognition. As a result, advocates of the development of command consciousness and supply discipline through the use of surveys eventually won their point. Supply officers and classification officers receiving unserviceable property from troop units were instructed to "accept as correct" the basis of turn-in on all occasions, regardless of the circumstances or the condition of property in question. Thenceforth the proper procedure, in cases where certification of "fair wear and tear" was suspect or when issue of new articles was not considered to be justified, was for the local quartermaster, through the station commander, to bring pertinent facts to the attention of the organization commander, who had full responsibility for initiating surveys or other necessary measures.

Some divisions of the OQMG were critical of this major change in policy, fearing that it would "provide a means for promiscuous turning in of property by units" in the zone of interior in the same manner that supplies were turned in by alerted organizations. The OQMG concurred in the change nonetheless, for it believed that this policy, based on the integ-

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81 (1) Memo, Deputy Dir of Opns, ASF, for TQMG, 18 Aug 43, sub: SOP for Promulgation of Army Conserv Indoctrination Program. (2) The program was not officially initiated until October. WD Cir 240, Sec. V, 4 Oct 43, sub: Army Conserv Program.
83 TM 38-403, 1 Aug 44, sub: Station Sup Procedure.
rity and honesty of all officers of the Army, was a rational approach to the problem of accountability and responsibility. The importance of this policy trend on command responsibility is emphasized by the fact that the new procedure was adopted in conjunction with a general review of procedures for handling separations of personnel from the Army and in anticipation of the problems incident to processing property turn-ins and personnel separations during demobilization.

Quartermaster Salvage Program

By the time Headquarters, ASF, assumed the supervision of general Army salvage in the summer of 1943, the QMC, which had administered a salvage program since World War I, had developed a system that compared favorably with similar civilian efforts in preserving and salvaging materials for essential uses. As early as July 1941, The Quartermaster General inaugurated a broad program of conservation and reclamation of vitally needed materials. Communications to the field issued by the Salvage, Reclamation, and Surplus Property Branch of the OQMG or by higher authority at its instigation emphasized the contribution that the Army could make to its own supply efforts by the reuse of materials, and the savings that would result from salvaging materials for industrial use. Regular collection of certain materials, ordinarily discarded in peacetime, was initiated. These included waste paper, glass, greases, containers, burlap, and other materials that early showed signs of becoming critical. The problem of salvaging tin cans for detinning purposes was also studied in order to overcome certain obstacles, such as unfavorable freight rates. When the Japa-

nese struck in December 1941, the salvage of most basic materials was well under way.

In addition to collection of scrap accumulating from the training and maintenance of troops and from operations at the various manufacturing establishments, a clean-up campaign was undertaken. All metal items that were no longer of use on posts were turned in to salvage and sent through channels of industry to mills for remelting and refabrication. Such accumulations of "junk" on Army reservations had been augmented by the prewar lack of markets for scrap materials and the ban placed upon its sale to avoid glutting available markets. These accumulations had also grown larger through the processing of nonstandard, used, and otherwise deteriorated stocks available from war reserves or received from military and government agencies, such as the National Guard, the Citizens' Military Training Camps (CMTC), and the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), whose activities were suspended or discontinued because of the war. The largest transfers of material were made by the CCC. As a result of the

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85 [1st Ind], Brig Gen Herman Feldman, DQMG for Sup Plng and Opns, to CG ASF, 29 Aug 44. See also attached memo for record.
86 [3d Ind], Dir of Control Div, ASF, to TQMG, 15 Jul 44, sub: Changes to AR 35-6560 and AR 615-40. (2) [5th Ind], Dir of Control Div, ASF, to TQMG, 10 Aug 44, same sub. (3) [7th Ind], Dir of Control Div, ASF, to TQMG, 28 Aug 44, same sub.
87 (1) OQMG Cir Ltr 204, 13 Aug 41, sub: Conserv of Metal Parts of Personal Equip. (2) OQMG Cir Ltr 253, 29 Sep 41, sub: Conserv of Packing Materials. (3) Ltr, Col Falkenau, OQMG, to QM Third CA, 21 Jul 41, sub: Sale of Tin Cans. (4) Ltr, Falkenau to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 3 Aug 42, sub: Annual Rpt.
clean-up campaign, old guns, war relics of all types, old rails, and many other items found their way from Army posts to the scrap heap for conversion into modern weapons of war.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor the first of several comprehensive directives was issued, calling attention to the tremendous production burden being placed upon the country's industries and the resultant shortage of scrap metal and other material. Post commanders were ordered to take immediate steps to survey their installations for material and to speed the processing and sale of material to civilian scrap dealers. Particular reference was made to the salvaging of scrap metals and scrap rubber, which was then and continued for some time to be of special interest to the public.

While carrying out its own collection program for scrap metals, the Army also co-operated in the civilian scrap drive. Before Pearl Harbor there had been no pressure for a national campaign to collect salvage materials. Once it was revealed that a real scrap famine threatened unless extraordinary measures were taken, such a campaign was instituted by the WPB early in January 1942. Several months were required for the program to get into

89 Ltr, TAG to all WD Agencies and Army Commands, 7 Jan 42, sub: Handling of Salv Activities, AG 400.74 Ft. Knox (12-10-41) MO-D-M.
full swing and for special arrangements to be concluded for Army installations to handle civilian scrap. In many remote areas where transportation was not available and there were no local scrap dealers, Army facilities provided the only means by which accumulations of civilian scrap could be returned to industry. As a general rule, delivery of civilian scrap to military installations from concentration points was undertaken by the Army only in those cases where local committees were unable to consummate sales to dealers or to make delivery to the nearest military establishment.\[^{90}\] A procedure was developed whereby Army officers inspected reported accumulations that could not be disposed of through regular channels to insure that their movement to an Army installation was necessary or advantageous. Representatives of the OQMG Salvage Branch worked closely with WPB officials, who eventually adopted and applied to their civilian drive several features of the Army salvage system, particularly those in reference to the segregation and preparation of materials.\[^{91}\]

The effect of the national program was to intensify the Army's own house-cleaning drive at all posts and abandoned stations. Not only had very few stations been put in order, but the constant accumulation of current scrap threatened to swamp local salvage facilities unless this and the backlog were cleaned up rapidly. Late in the summer of 1942, the Secretary of War ordered that "immediate and positive action be taken by all concerned to intensify the salvage and conservation program."\[^{92}\] This order resulted in the segregation of an enormous amount of scrap, surplus, and salvage materials at posts, camps, and stations. Inspectors general were instructed to pay particular attention to getting these materials into industrial channels quickly and efficiently.\[^{93}\]

Facilities and Labor

The increased activity caused by the clean-up campaign and co-operation with civilian programs aggravated difficulties experienced in the acquisition of suitable storage facilities, equipment, and labor for salvage operations. While open storage space was satisfactory for many materials, regular warehouse space was needed for those which deteriorated if exposed to the weather. The segregation and proper storage of salvage involved problems similar to those in the warehousing of regular merchandise. Adequate space for salvage had to be provided at camps, unsatisfactory storage conditions had to be corrected, and information had to be furnished on the best methods of warehousing salvage materials.\[^{94}\] Furthermore, a certain amount of equipment for handling salvage was needed at most Army installations. The Salvage Branch, OQMG, authorized the supply of all baling and other

\[^{90}\] For policy see (1) AGO Memo S30-4-42, 18 Sep 42, sub: Co-operation with Civilian Scrap Collecting Agencies. (2) AGO Memo S30-14-43, 6 Apr 43, sub: Policy Relating to Domestic Salv.


\[^{94}\] (1) TQMG to Chief of Constr Div, OQMG, 30 Jun 41, no sub. (2) Col Falkenau to Lt Col Kenney J. Brunsvold, OQMG, 28 Jul 42, sub: Draft of Salv Procedure.
special equipment, such as bulldozers, power shears, platform scales, crane magnets, and conveyors, only when the volume of materials handled justified the outlay and service could not be secured otherwise. It was the fixed policy of the branch to require contractors, where feasible, to install their own handling equipment or to move the material to their yards for preparation.

By keeping preparation of materials at Army installations to the minimum consistent with the realization of adequate returns from sales and the efficient, industrial utilization of materials, the Salvage Branch was able to minimize the labor problem in salvage operations. As the campaign to clean up Army reservations was intensified, special measures were needed to insure a supply of labor to installations, but a proposal to draw up Tables of Organization for salvage companies to be used at posts, camps, and stations to gather, collect, and dispose of waste materials was rejected upon the insistence of the Salvage Branch. According to the branch their use "would offer no substantial advantage over the existing system of handling salvage at posts largely with civilian employees" and would "sacrifice the great flexibility and adaptability of personnel to local requirements afforded by the present system." As shortages of civilian labor became acute, however, many installations had to assign enlisted men attached to the overhead organizations at posts, camps, and stations to salvage duties, and in a few instances the use of special organizations was approved. In time, more and more prisoner-of-war labor was used for sorting large accumulations of unserviceable clothing, shoes, and other Quartermaster equipment before its reclamation or disposal.

Reclamation and Utilization

One of the functions of salvage operations was to insure the maximum utilization within the Army not only of equipment no longer serviceable in its designed form, although valuable for other purposes, but also of scrap and waste materials useful in its machine shops and other installations. No brief discussion can give an adequate or comprehensive description of the Army's conversion of salvaged items to substitute uses and within-service utilization of scrap and waste products.

Regulations required the salvage officer to examine all material received to determine whether it could be repaired, reclaimed, and returned to stock, or could be utilized in some other form or for some other purpose by the QMC or other supply services. Wiping rags, for example, were in constant demand at machine shops and garages. Torn flour sacks could be used in kitchens and scrap lumber in packing, crating, and for dunnage. Before disposing of accumulations of such materials, the salvage officer was further required to notify local representatives of other supply services in order to afford them an opportunity to examine and make application for the transfer of any materials they could utilize. Like other supply services, the QMC reprocessed a part of its industrial scrap salvaged at posts, camps, and stations in its own manufacturing installations, as, for example, at the Jeffersonville Depot where

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95 See Ltr, Col Falkenau, OQMG, to Seventh CA, 27 Oct 41, no sub.
96 (1) TQMG to Brig Gen Clifford L. Corbin, OQMG, 25 Nov 41, no sub. (2) Memo, TQMG for TAG, 10 Dec 41, sub: Salv.
97 AR 30–2145, par. 16, 2 Sep 42, sub: QMC—Unserviceable Prop Including Waste Materials.
scrap metals were used for the production of hardware and similar items.

The OQMG Salvage Branch encouraged local salvage and shop officers to use ingenuity in devising methods of utilizing materials. Many specific proposals were circularized, such as the suggestions that 5-gallon oil cans and other metal containers turned in to salvage be converted into metal pails for fire protection and other purposes, and that unserviceable blankets, pads, and mattresses be used on rifle ranges. In some cases field installations developed methods of converting materials that promised to become permanent, profitable enterprises. For example, the Jeffersonville Depot, which had been accumulating great quantities of corrugated board from old cartons in the course of repacking operations, developed a method for shredding it. The resultant product, it was claimed, possessed considerable superiority over excelsior, since it contained little moisture and was very resilient.

Disposal of Salvage Other Than by Sale

The salvage officer had other alternatives in disposing of articles besides that of sale to regular commercial and industrial agencies. The shipment to manufacturers of old articles to be exchanged for new ones of identical or like design, under the direction and supervision of the chief of service concerned, continued to be permissible under certain conditions. Exchange had long been used, under specific authorization by Congress, not only to effect the familiar trade-in of motor vehicles, engines, parts, and similar items, but also from time to time to secure replacement of typewriters and other office equipment, sewing machines and other machinery in factories, and fired cartridge and shell cases for which manufacturers had an established practice permitting exchange. In the QMC this practice was confined to the exchange of old typewriters for new, but this became inconsequential during the war because of the restrictions imposed upon their manufacture.

Another alternative open to the salvage officer was that of donating property for use in vocational training. During its existence, the National Youth Administration (NYA) was the principal agency with which the OQMG collaborated in making its salvage available for this purpose. When the ASF assumed responsibility for the supervision of salvage, it continued the program of donating such property, without reimbursement except for the costs of packing, handling, and transportation, to schools for use in vocational training. The policy was further broadened to permit the transfer of any type of salvage to a charitable or tax-supported institution upon the approval of the Commanding General, ASF.

Disposal of Salvage by Sale

In addition to the reclamation and utilization of equipment no longer serviceable in its original form but valuable nonetheless, the function of salvage involved

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98 Col Hamilton, Chief of Sv Insls Div, to GAS Div, OQMG, 4 Jul 42, sub: Ltr of Info.
99 Rpt, Col Falkenau to TQMG, Mar 43, sub: Insp of Activities at JQMD.
100 AR 30–2145, par. 17, 2 Sep 42, sub: QMC—Unserviceable Prop, Including Waste Materials.
101 1st Ind, Col Francis H. Pope, OQMG, to OUSW, 9 Jul 41, on Memo, OUSW for TQMG, 1 Jul 41, sub: Filing with GAO Contracts Involving Exchange.
102 (1) Ltr, TAG to Chiefs of Sup Arms and Svs et al., 10 Nov 38, sub: Transfer of Supplies and Equip to NYA, AG 400.703 (11-9-38) (Misc) D–M. (2) PR 7, par. 743.
two other phases. Strictly speaking, these comprised the disposal process and involved installing controls for segregating and making available for absorption by the war-starved civilian economy items that had utility for nonmilitary purposes. It also involved the disposal of scrap and waste materials for reprocessing by industrial agencies that had priority in essential uses. This disposal process required the application of many special techniques in the preparation and marketing of materials. The industrial utility of scrap and waste and financial returns from their sale were in general determined by careful preparation and segregation of materials according to a list prepared by the OQMG, which conformed as nearly as possible to OPA classifications and those used in the waste material industry. The Army usually accomplished only primary segregation, leaving the final preparation to qualified and equipped trade agencies. Marketing of both second-hand and waste materials was a complex undertaking for the salvage officer, requiring dealings with an industry characterized by the operations of large numbers of dealers, including numerous small and marginal firms, many of whom engaged in competitive and sharp trade practices.

Procedures for the sale of salvage materials at Army field installations underwent some changes analogous to those that occurred in procurement operations. There was a gradual move toward negotiation of sales in lieu of the formal, sealed bid procedure of peacetime. This was necessitated not only by the need for dispatch in processing salvage but also by the advent of WPB allocations, the automatic sale of many materials at ceiling prices, and the special, fixed methods and machinery for disposing of certain critical materials. Negotiation contributed to the successful prosecution of the war because it permitted awards to be made to those producers of war materials who were in the greatest need of scrap, and also—in the interest of conserving transportation and gasoline, oil, and rubber—it allowed contracts covering entire lots of materials to be made to single bidders who were the highest bidders on a majority of items although low on a few of them.

The general use of negotiation was authorized in the spring of 1942, based on the assumption that the First War Powers Act of 1941 gave the Secretary of War full power to authorize the use of negotiation in making war contracts. Later, it was decided that reference to this act was inappropriate, since it affected only contracts for procurement of supplies and services whereas other statutes governed disposal of property. As a result of this misunderstanding with respect to the legal basis for sales of property, there was some disagreement as to whether various contract provisions required by public contract law were applicable to sales. The Salvage Branch, OQMG, believed that procurement regulations should not be applied to sales, although some provisions could be used, when appropriate, as a matter of policy. This view prevailed and a provision was inserted in the Quartermaster Supplement to the Procurement Regulations that these regulations would not apply to sales except

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103 OQMG Cir 1–8, 22 Feb 40, sub: Condemned Prop and Waste Material. This circular was revised on 10 December 1942.
104 (1) Ltr, Col Hamilton, OQMG, to Dir of Procurement and Distr Div, SOS, 17 Apr 42, sub: Authority for Negotiated Sale of Salv Prop. (2) PR 18-T, 19 May 42. (3) AR 30-2145, par. 21, 2 Sep 42, sub: QMC—Unserviceable Prop, Including Waste Material.
105 Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, p. 71.
where specific reference was made to sales contracts.\textsuperscript{106}

The negotiation of sales required a fifteen-day advertising period to permit waste-material dealers who served posts in outlying areas to determine current market conditions and market values of materials before submitting bids. This policy, which was designed to meet the over-all requirements, was modified by the increasingly extensive use of spot negotiation. By the fall of 1942 the demand of steel mills for scrap iron and steel had become so pressing as to require the immediate movement of all large accumulations of such scrap. The use of spot negotiation was therefore first authorized in the sale of these materials.\textsuperscript{107} The OQMG delegated power to the service commands to authorize sales of scrap iron and steel by spot negotiation in specific instances at posts where substantial quantities had been collected. Such sales were consummated without the normal fifteen-day waiting period, either by negotiation with a responsible dealer at the ceiling price or after competitive bids had been obtained from not less than three scrap metal dealers on an informal, oral basis. Shortly after the OQMG took this action, it broadened the authority to include all salvage material in view of the increasing demand for it.\textsuperscript{108} This expanded authority was not intended as a blanket authorization but was only for use in specific instances when conditions rendered such negotiation absolutely necessary. In all other cases, the Salvage Branch felt that the normal procedure of negotiation would furnish the most rapid return of materials to industry through established channels of trade.

In disposing of waste materials, the Army entered into two kinds of contracts—an agreement covering the sale of definite quantities of materials marketed at a specific time, and indefinite-quantity contracts calling for the successful bidder to purchase and usually remove all of one or more categories of waste made available by the Army at its installations over a considerable period of time. During peacetime the average post had used only one type of indefinite-quantity contract, which provided for the removal of all kitchen waste and of dead animals. After 1940 the variety of materials that could be disposed of by this method increased rapidly. They included—besides food waste suitable for animal feeding—bones, fat, grease, egg crates, waste paper, wooden fruit containers, tin cans, glassware, and other containers.\textsuperscript{109} In addition, there were many special situations in which the indefinite-quantity contract was used. Such contracts were made whenever agreements were concluded with government agencies or private concerns for the absorption of the total or area output of the Army in certain materials. They were also entered into when dealers refused to negotiate for small quantities of scrap metals that were relatively inaccessible or that could be reclaimed only at great expense, or they were used to cover the removal of scrap from such large, inaccessible areas as Alaska.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{106} This problem was discussed at the salvage and reclamation conference in the fall of 1942, at which time the chief of the Salvage Branch indicated that Procurement Regulation 7 was in the process of being rewritten. Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, p. 76, remarks of Col Falkenau.

\textsuperscript{107} Ltr, Col Falkenau, OQMG, to CG First SvC, 8 Sep 42, sub: Expediting of Sales of Scrap Metal.

\textsuperscript{108} Ltr, Col Falkenau to CG First SvC, 27 Oct 42, sub: Expediting of Salv Sales.

\textsuperscript{109} (1) WD Cir 116, Sec. III, 18 Jun 41, sub: Disposal of Waste. (2) AR 30-2145, par. 6.

\textsuperscript{110} (1st Ind), Col Falkenau, OQMG, to Seattle POE, 26 Mar 42, no sub.
Since indefinite-quantity contracts were made on a yearly basis or for shorter periods of time, they created a governmental obligation that lasted for many months. The control exercised by the OQMG over these contracts was therefore a matter of considerable importance and ran counter to the decentralization advocated by the ASF. When, in the spring of 1942, the Salvage Branch, OQMG, found that indefinite-quantity contracts were being closed at figures far below those which should have been obtained, it instructed the field to submit all such contracts covering a period of more than three months, together with an abstract of bids, to the OQMG for approval before execution.\textsuperscript{111}

In answer to ASF criticism of this policy, The Quartermaster General pointed out that the disposal of waste materials was in no sense parallel to the procurement of Army supplies, which was decentralized to the field. Disposal was carried on by a relatively large number of installations, and, unlike procuring depots, they were not under the direct supervision of the OQMG. In contrast to the procurement of supplies of standard quality on more or less rigid specifications, the disposal of waste materials involved dealing with a mass of materials far from uniform in quality, constantly changing in character, and marketed under conditions that fluctuated and varied widely from area to area. Under these conditions, the average post salvage officer had neither the information nor the experience to make proper term contracts, nor was it possible for the Salvage Branch to follow the normal procedure of issuing instructions sufficiently applicable to all situations to guide the exercise of local discretion.\textsuperscript{112}

Headquarters, ASF, was willing to admit the existence of conditions justifying expert review of contracts, but it took issue with arguments against the feasibility of decentralization. Until qualified personnel became available in the field, however, it permitted OQMG instructions to remain in effect.\textsuperscript{111} In the meantime, the Salvage Branch modified its policy to the extent of exempting certain indefinite-quantity contracts from OQMG approval.\textsuperscript{111} Greater decentralization occurred after the transfer of salvage responsibility to Headquarters, ASF.

In order to promote co-operation with dealers and to expedite the sale of materials, local salvage officers were allowed in many cases to mitigate the rigid legal requirements of both the bidding and contractual procedure. In response to pressure to discontinue altogether the requirement of deposit or bond, the Salvage Branch indicated that, even though a sale was usually viewed as a purchase in reverse, procurement regulations did not apply. If deposits were not required, it could be assumed that some waste dealers, because of their manner of operating, would bid on materials in order to secure supplies for

\textsuperscript{111} (1) Ltr, Col Falkenau to QM Second CA, 15 May 42, sub: Indefinite Quantity Contracts for Sale of Salv and Waste Materials. (2) Ltr, Falkenau to CG First SvC, 8 Mar 43, same sub.

\textsuperscript{112} (1) Memo, Chief of Salv and Reclm Br, SOS, for TQMG, 18 Mar 42, sub: Indefinite Quantity Contracts for Sale of Salv and Waste Materials. (2) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for ACofS for Opns, ASF, 24 Mar 43, same sub.

\textsuperscript{114} These contracts covered arrangements for the disposal of tin cans, egg crates, and agricultural containers, and, later, for the disposal of food waste and waste paper if sold at prices within prescribed limits, and scrap lumber, glass and glassware, and any other item when sold at the maximum price permitted by OPA. Ltr, Col Falkenau, OQMG, to CG Second SvC, 21 May 43, sub: Indefinite Quantity Contracts for Sale of Salv and Waste Materials.
sale but would remove only that portion for which they could find a ready market or which they could sell at a profit. This would result in a high ratio of nonperformance on contracts. In most respects the Salvage Branch endeavored to secure full compliance with and performance under contracts.

The necessity of using marginal outlets for salvage created a problem of preventing irregularities in the administration of local sales. Ignorance of marketing conditions and methods on the part of untrained salvage officers in specific instances resulted in the sale of considerable quantities of goods that should not have been salvaged, and in loss to the government through marketing of articles in improper classifications and at low prices. During the early emergency and first year of war especially, there were serious difficulties of this sort to be overcome.

The general policies with respect to disposal of usable articles as distinct from scrap and waste were open to various interpretations, for there was an element of contradiction present. While urging that full use be extracted from every article of supply and equipment before its discard in salvage, official publications at the same time required that, as an aid to the civilian economy, articles be sold in their original form whenever possible under the description “unserviceable for Army use.” The interplay of these two policies had mixed effects. In some cases of critical shortage, it resulted in articles being used or worn beyond possible reclamation, but in other cases, it resulted in the availability of relatively large quantities of usable items for sale, as for example, when combat standards prevented the use of deteriorated equipment. Before the demands of overseas civilian relief absorbed a large part of the discard of the Army, substantial quantities of salvaged clothing and other articles were sold intact to dealers, who showed great ingenuity in reclaiming them for sale on the civilian market. However, the misleading advertisements of some second-hand dealers brought unfavorable publicity to the Army by claiming that articles were “new” or “perfect” when in fact they were specially fabricated garments similar to but not Army goods.

Regulations urged the exercise of special caution to prevent the placing of new articles in salvage, either through fraud and collusion or inadvertence. The possibility of collusion was to be guarded against particularly where abnormally low bids were made in salvage sales, but collusion among bidders was naturally hard to detect. Low prices bid and received were most often due to the inexperience of salvage officers, who were ignorant of market possibilities and who were, in some cases, imposed upon by dealers though not necessarily under circumstances of collusion. Eventually salvage officers were given standard instructions to suspend sales when prices offered were not in line with market conditions or when evidence of collusion existed, and to forward a statement of reasons for the action to the OQMG.

Special precautions were taken against other dishonest practices of contractors,
and spot checks of contract performance were urged, especially for dealers in food waste. The most common practices encountered were the use of trucks with false bottoms or weighted trucks used only on first runs, and the removal of containers of cooked grease topped with trap grease, which was of lesser value. When dealers were discovered engaging in such practices, they were penalized by being placed on the official list of debarred bidders, but for such action to be taken it was necessary that there be evidence of fraud or attempted fraud against the government.120

Impact of WPB and OPA Controls

WPB allocation and limitation orders and OPA price ceilings had their impact on the QMC salvage program just as they did on Quartermaster procurement of supplies. It was Army policy to sell materials through regular trade channels as the most economical and efficient method of securing the proper utilization of scrap and waste. The great mass of unprepared materials could be handled only by dealers. In the case of iron and steel scrap, most large consumers placed their orders for scrap through scrap brokers who were able to arrange for the necessary preparation of the scrap as well as to guarantee its supply by dealers and broker-dealers.

Not all waste materials, however, were handled by regular dealers. Materials offered for sale could be bid for by any responsible dealer or consumer, and materials suitable for direct consumption were frequently sold to mills and other consumers. For the most part only large quantities of industrial scrap and completely segregated dormant scrap were suitable for direct consumption. More and more of these materials became subject to direct allocation orders as the WPB extended its controls over the consumption of scrap and waste in 1942. Under these orders, sales directly to the designated consumer or his agent were automatically negotiated by the salvage officer, usually at ceiling prices.121

Salvage officers were directed to report large accumulations of scrap to the WPB, or the nearest regional office, to enable it to control the movement of scrap by allocations. The original intention was to arrange formal clearances with the WPB only in respect to materials suitable for direct allocation to consumers, with the local salvage officer specifically required to request the issue of an allocation order. Because of the ambiguity of early directives, many officers were under the impression that they were required to secure clearance from WPB regional offices for all sales of scrap. In the case of allocated sales this caused particular confusion and delay, since allocation orders were issued only by the central office of WPB. Later directives to salvage officers emphasized that the WPB regional offices functioned only to render advice and assistance to Army installations, although they were available for consultation on any sale. Large accumulations of waste were reported to the service command headquarters, which transmitted the report through the OQMG to the WPB in Washington.122 Consultation between the QMC and the WPB on mutual problems in regard to the marketing of materials was necessarily frequent and close.

It was the policy of the War Depart-

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120 [7th Ind], Col Falkenau to CG Eighth SvC, 25 Sep 42, no sub.
121 Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, p. 75.
122 (1) Ibid., p. 71. (2) OQMG Cir Ltr 412, 18 Nov 42, sub: Salv Procedure.
ment to co-operate with the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPACS), later the OPA, in its price stabilization program. Because shortages of certain materials necessitated the imposition of ceilings, the impact of pricing problems on sales of scrap and waste was felt very early in the emergency. By April 1941 Army installations had been instructed to reject bids in excess of ceiling prices.\(^{123}\)

The administration of price policies and regulations was a difficult matter for salvage officers and continued to be so even after the Army was relieved of part of its burden. The large number of items that were sold and the numerous maximum price regulations that were applicable imposed an undue and unwarranted administrative burden on salvage officers. This would have been true even if the salvage personnel at Army installations had remained more or less constant instead of undergoing a rapid turnover. The necessity of applying price ceilings complicated and slowed the work of local salvage officers. They were apt to hold up sales until satisfied by higher authority that the ceiling price was being correctly applied. But any delay in sales meant a delay in the flow of salvaged property into civilian channels. The OQMG therefore sought to simplify the problems of the salvage officer by seeking agreements with the OPA that would relieve him of the necessity of studying and digesting OPA’s various price regulations.

Early difficulties centered around the application of ceilings in the sale of unprepared mixed iron and steel scrap, which involved an extremely intricate computation. To alleviate this situation an agreement was made with OPACS permitting the sale of iron and steel scrap without reference to established price ceilings, but the successful bidder had to execute an affidavit of adherence to the OPACS schedule of maximum prices for such scrap.\(^{124}\)

This trend was continued when the General Maximum Price Regulation was issued early in 1942, for OPA amended the regulation to exempt from its application all used, damaged, and waste materials sold by the War and Navy Departments.\(^{125}\) While this action freed salvage officers from price restrictions in the sale of most miscellaneous materials, the exemption did not extend to specific price schedules OPA had issued in the case of the most important scrap materials. This left the situation with respect to Army enforcement of the regulations precisely where it had been before the General Maximum Price Regulation was issued. As a result of conferences between representatives of the OQMG and the OPA, policy was modified to the extent of relieving the Army of the responsibility of policing OPA price ceilings in salvage sales. Salvage officers were no longer required even to check price ceilings except in the case of sales to consumers. This was accomplished by extending the use of the dealers’ and consumers’ affidavits to the sale of all scrap and waste materials except industrial scrap.\(^{126}\) In order that OPA might itself police the application of these ceilings, copies of Army salvage contracts were made available to that agency.

The QMC viewed these arrangements

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\(^{123}\) Procurement Cir 27, 10 Apr 41.

\(^{124}\) (1) Ltr, Col Falkenau to OPACS, 7 Jul 41, sub: Sale of Iron and Steel Scrap. (2) OQMG Cir Ltr 141, 9 Jul 41, sub: Sale of Waste Materials.

\(^{125}\) Amendment 8 to OPA Supplementary Regulation I.

\(^{126}\) (1) Chief of Sv Instls Div to Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, 8 Jul 42, sub: OPA Ltr 2262: FW. (2) Ltr, Leon Henderson, OPA Administrator, to TQMG, n. d., no sub. (3) OQMG Cir Ltr 316, 31 Jul 41, sub: Sale of Waste Materials.
as granting it full administrative relief except for the necessity of checking sales to consumers. Several months later the OPA took exception to the broad interpretation that the War Department was applying, and a lengthy discussion ensued. No change in military policy resulted, since by amendment the OPA extended the use of affidavits to sales of industrial scrap as well as to most used, damaged, and waste materials.\textsuperscript{127} The cumulative effect of these exemptions was to relieve the War Department of compliance with all price controls, except in certain minor instances, in its sale of scrap and waste materials.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{127} (1) Memo, Col Kates, Chief of Salv and Reclm Br, Distr Div, SOS, for TQMG, 23 Jan 43, sub: Amendment to OQMG Cir Ltr 316. (2) 1st Ind, Col Falkenau, OQMG, to Distr Div, SOS, 2 Feb 43, on same memo. (3) Ltr, Falkenau to J. Phillip Wernette, OPA, 21 May 43, sub: Exemption of Salv Sales to Dealers. (4) Ltr, OPA to Falkenau, OQMG, 28 Jun 43, no sub.
CHAPTER II

Reclamation and Conservation Activities

At the time of Pearl Harbor, salvage operations of the Quartermaster Corps embraced much more than the collection and disposal of scrap and waste materials for the Army. They also included the operation of shops for the repair of Quartermaster items of clothing and equipment for reissue to the troops. The OQMG not only supervised the technical operations of Quartermaster repair shops but also formulated the policies and procedures under which they operated.

In 1941 the QMC, as well as each interested agency of the War Department, arranged maintenance activities to meet its individual needs. As a consequence, no definite co-ordinated plan existed for maintenance of matériel throughout the Army. When the Services of Supply (later the Army Service Forces) was established in March 1942, an attempt was made to establish centralized control over maintenance operations. The Distribution Division, SOS, was made responsible for co-ordinating plans for maintenance, repair, and salvage of supplies and equipment of all types. During the first year of the war, however, its attention was largely centered on the problem of scrap disposal with the eventual result that OQMG responsibility for staff supervision of salvage activities was transferred to the ASF. Maintenance operations continued to be directed by the individual technical services. It was not until April 1943 that this neglect by headquarters of a field vital to the success of the war effort was corrected. Then a Maintenance Division was established and charged with the responsibility of developing broad policies, methods, and standard operating procedures for the maintenance of equipment procured and issued by the ASF. It exercised staff supervision over reclamation activities, conducted field inspections to insure full use of all facilities for reclamation purposes, and co-ordinated such activities between the technical services and the service commands. From then until the end of the war it was actively engaged in directing and supervising Army maintenance, although much of the systematic reclamation program it developed did not come to fruition before the war ended.

1 SOS Orgn Manual, 30 Sep 42, p. 302.11.
2 (1) ASF Cir 140, 6 Dec 43, sub: Reclm. (2) ASF Cir 275, 18 Jul 45, same sub.
3 For an account of the activities of the Maintenance Division, see Hist Rpt, Maintenance Problems, A History of the Maintenance Division, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, April 1943–1 September 1945, OCMH. (Hereafter cited as Hist Rpt, Maintenance Problems.)
Money Allowances Versus Issues in Kind

The operation of shops, when necessary, for the purpose of altering and fitting uniforms at the time of issue and for the repair and upkeep of equipment had been a responsibility of the QMC since World War I, but the Corps operated no repair shops in the fall of 1940. No reclamation problem existed at the time because before the national emergency enlisted men were responsible for the maintenance of their clothing under a system of money allowances. This arrangement, which had been in effect since shortly after World War I, allowed the War Department to allot to each enlisted man initial and maintenance quotas expressed in monetary values, within the limits of which he was permitted to draw clothing from government stocks. Each man's clothing account was settled periodically and at the end of his enlistment. On discharge he received in cash any balance that had not been drawn in clothing. His ability to stay well within his money allowance and yet care for his clothing and equipment was deemed the mark of a good soldier. In the event the enlisted man exceeded his allowance, he had to reimburse the government for the excess. Although articles in stock and the trickle of reclaimable articles turned in by men at the end of their enlistment period or on earlier discharge might require renovation, no reclamation problem arose under this system. Each enlisted man was required to arrange and pay for the cleaning and upkeep of all clothing issued to him under his money allowance, except for necessary alterations made at the time of issue.

This peacetime system could not be applied during war, however, for the clerical work of administering money accounts for an expanding army would have been prohibitive. Furthermore, the additional wear and tear on clothing resulting from battle training and maneuvers would have made the existing money allowances unfair to the soldier and would have allowed no early basis for the calculation of a fair money allowance. Early in the emergency, there was unanimous agreement that a system based on issues in kind, similar to that used in World War I, would have to be adopted in the event of war, and that in theaters of operations, where formal property accounting would have to be held to a minimum, a system of money accounts would be completely unworkable. Nevertheless, when the expansion of training operations during the months before Pearl Harbor forced consideration of extensive revisions to the peacetime method of issue, numerous misgivings were voiced. It was anticipated that when clothing was issued in kind all restraints would be removed from overzealous commanders who could hardly be expected to be cost conscious. Since great emphasis was placed on the physical appearance of troops in evaluating the efficiency of commanding officers, it was argued that issues in kind would lead to replacement of partially worn garments that should have been retained in service, and would result in conflict with conservation measures. The purposes of official policies would thereby be defeated. Various suggestions were made for coping with these prob-

4 AR 615-40, 30 Jun 25, sub: EM Clo—Allowances, Accounts and Disp. For the official list of clothing allowances and established prices of clothing, see AR 30-3000.
5 Memo, TQMG for Gen Corbin, OQMG, 1 Jul 40, sub: Change in System of Clo Allowances.
6 Memo, Col Edward B. McKinley, Chief of Fiscal Div, for TQMG, 12 Aug 40, sub: Cost Rpts on Clo Issued in Kind.
lems, but late in the summer of 1940 the Quartermaster General appointed a board of officers to draft regulations for changing to a simple system of issues in kind, retaining only those checks on extravagance or dishonesty that could be enforced through command relationships, or, in individual cases, through the medium of reports of survey and other disciplinary action. The new system was promulgated early in September. The change involved the assumption by the government of responsibility for the repair and reclamation of clothing issued to the enlisted man and consequently resulted in the initiation of a repair shop program.

**Utilization of Obsolete and Class B Clothing**

The procedures of the repair shop program were greatly influenced by the early need to conserve clothing and equipage. In June 1940 stocks of practically all items of clothing were very low. Furthermore, since approximately nine months were required to convert dollars into appreciable quantities of clothing and equipage, enough time had not elapsed by fall for stocks to be procured in sufficient quantities under new appropriations to meet requirements resulting from the mobilization of the National Guard and the induction of large numbers of selectees. During the initial period of mobilization, it was absolutely essential to utilize so-called contingent stocks, that is, stocks held in storage as war reserves and for the National Guard and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). These were further supplemented by transfers of excess stocks from the Civilian Conservation Corps. A large proportion of this clothing was of limited standard, substitute standard, and obsolete classification, including, for example, large quantities of World War I spiral leggings, knee breeches, and coats with standing collars, as well as web equipment and tentage of various designs, textures, and shades. Much of this matériel had long been in closed storage under improper conditions and was consequently in various stages of disrepair. The QMC placed in service considerable amounts of deteriorated and nondescript clothing and equipment, and it authorized various special uses for obsolete articles.

By March 1941, production of clothing had reached a point where most articles of obsolete clothing could be withdrawn from the troops, and stocks of these articles could be returned to regional and central storage pending disposition to meet various special needs or as salvage. During the eight months when these substandard stocks were issued, comparatively small inroads had been made on the total resources of this kind, and the utilization and disposal of obsolete items became at once a major problem.

In the meantime, there had been repercussions from field commanders who not unnaturally resented being obliged to sup-

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7 See, for example, Chief of Sup Div to Chief of Adm Div, OQMG, 27 Jun 40, sub: Change in System of Clo Allowances.
8 WD Cir 97, 7 Sep 40.
9 (1) Memo, Gen Corbin, OQMG, for ACofS G-1, 5 Sep 40, sub: Use of Substitute Items of Clo for Tng Program. (2) WD Cir 98, 9 Sep 40. sub: Issues of Substitute Items of Clo.
10 For example, olive drab cotton breeches, of which there were large quantities on hand, were authorized for issue as work garments, in addition to denim trousers. WD Cir 11, 16 Jan 41. Sec. II, sub: Issue of Cotton Breeches.
11 Exceptions were obsolete overcoats, which were not replaced until the fall of 1941, and the remainder of some 2,000,000 pairs of trousers, manufactured from melton cloth and acquired from the CCC, which were issued until stocks were exhausted.
ply their units with a motley array of garments and equipment. Although the OQMG viewed the use of such articles as an emergency measure to be discontinued as soon as the status of supply permitted, the consistent and determined objection on the part of the troops to the use of obsolete clothing was so strong that the QMC and other War Department agencies had to take definite and continued action to see that such clothing was actually issued to the soldiers.\(^{12}\)

The policy of enforcing the consumption of stocks of renovated clothing and equipment, designated as Class B, prior to the issue of new items, Class A, was by no means new and had been a source of controversy under peacetime conditions. After World War I, efforts to issue renovated clothing had produced unsatisfactory results. At that time the problem had been partially solved by the return to the money-allowance system.\(^{13}\) Since the beginning of the national emergency all directives on procedure had reiterated the responsibility of commanding officers for the utilization of renovated clothing, when available, before the issue of new clothing.\(^{14}\)

A serious related problem was the extremely rapid turnover and high mortality rate of substandard articles that were put into service, even if the low wear expectancy of these items was taken into consideration. This was especially noticeable as new equipment became increasingly available and various units hastened to have their obsolete equipment condemned and turned in for salvage in order to secure replacements.\(^{15}\) The special uses later found for substandard articles of all types undoubtedly were more effective in conserving resources of this kind than the type of issue for general purposes enforced as a result of the early pressure of hasty mobilization.

Early difficulties in utilization of obsolete and substandard articles were hardly overcome and a system outlined for issues in kind and renovation of articles, when a special problem loomed that promised to test many related policies. Toward the close of the first year of national selective service, the Army faced the prospect of reusing or disposing of relatively large quantities of clothing and equipage to be turned in by men discharged after the designated year of service. Although this problem never materialized on a large scale since most of the men were actually retained in the Army following Congressional extension of their term of service, the anticipation of it caused a general examination, in the light of early experience, of existing basic policies that called for the utilization of renovated clothing.

The seriousness of the agitation\(^{16}\) for a reversal of conservation policy was re-

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\(^{12}\) (1) Ltr, Gen Corbin, OQMG, to IG, 25 Oct 40, sub: Issue and Renovation of Obsolete Clo.  (2) Ltr, TAG to CGs of All Armies et al., 4 Nov 40, same sub.  (3) Memo, Col Robert M. Littlejohn, OQMG, for ACofS G-4, 18 Jan 41, sub: Utilization of Obsolete and Renovated Clo.

\(^{13}\) Rpt of TQMG for FY 1928. pp. 21-22.

\(^{14}\) See, for example (1) WD Cir 97, 7 Sep 40, and (2) WD Cir 8, 8 Jan 41.

\(^{15}\) (1) Memo, Col Littlejohn, OQMG, for ACofS G-4, 18 Jan 41, sub: Utilization of Obsolete and Renovated Clo. This practice was widespread, as in the case of obsolete coats and of pyramidal tents of the old model that were usable with standard tent frames.  (2) See also, Memo, Gen Corbin, OQMG, for ACofS G-4, 17 Sep 41, sub: Conserving C&E.

\(^{16}\) Objections from the field were based primarily upon the adverse effect of renovated clothing on troop morale and consequently upon discipline and efficiency. See, for example (1) Ltr, Maj Gen Kenyon A. Joyce, Hq Ninth Army Corps, to TAG, 9 Sep 41, sub: Issue of Reconditioned Clo; (2) 1st Ind, Lt Gen John L. De Witt, CG Fourth Army, to TAG, 9 Sep 41, on same ltr; and (3) Ltr, Col John G. Tyndall, IGD, to CG Fourth Army, 25 Sep 41, sub: Adequacy of Authorized Clo and Use of Class B.
revealed by several alternative proposals made for the disposal of accumulations of unserviceable and used clothing expected to be turned in by discharged selectees and from other sources.\textsuperscript{17} One suggestion would have allowed the enlisted man upon discharge or transfer to a reserve component to retain permanently, with a few exceptions, all articles of individual clothing issued to him under Tables of Basic Allowances. Other proposals called for him to turn in such clothing, which was then either to be renovated and held in depots as a reserve or to be disposed of by sale as salvage.

All of these proposals were immediately attacked on the general ground that none of them supported adequately a long-range plan of conservation necessitated by the scarcity of critical materials and the strain imposed upon production facilities.\textsuperscript{18} The outcome of this controversy was the vindication of the existing conservation policy. However, efforts were made to alleviate the shortcomings of the system of renovation and reuse of property. The policy of allowing the discharged enlisted man to retain a few designated items of clothing was continued, though the number of articles retained was later reduced.\textsuperscript{19} Commanding officers of all echelons were required to exercise the utmost economy in requisitioning clothing and equipage and to make certain that serviceable articles were not salvaged and that new items were not issued when reclaimed ones were available. One concession was made to the critics of renovated clothing. Each enlisted man was to have at all times one presentable outfit of wool and one of cotton outer clothing, suitable for wear at ceremonies and on pass or furlough. Since only one wool coat, one overcoat, and one garrison cap were authorized for each enlisted man, suitability of a renovated article for issue to meet this requirement became the governing factor in determining whether or not such articles of outer clothing would be renovated and reissued. In all other cases, appearance was to be subordinated to actual serviceability in determining whether an item was to be used. Although provision was thus made for the use of renovated clothing, whenever practicable all clothing after renovation was to be returned to the original wearer.\textsuperscript{20}

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the issue of available Class B clothing and equipage was made mandatory under all conditions at reception centers, replacement training centers, posts, camps, and stations, and even at ports and staging areas.\textsuperscript{21} Later modification of this policy requiring the re-equipping and reclothing of organizations alerted for shipment to ports of embarkation with Class A clothing and equipment was an exceedingly significant development. It not only resulted in a tremendous influx of unserviceable items from staging areas and ports of embarkation that placed a burden on repair facilities, but it also necessitated the maintenance of considerable station and depot stocks throughout the United States to meet this particular demand. Moreover, since overseas movement orders for particular organizations were frequently

\textsuperscript{17} Ltr, Maj Ewing H. France to Col Littlejohn, Chief of C&E Branch, OQMG, 7 Jul 41, sub: Disp of Clo Turned In (study on same sub enclosed).

\textsuperscript{18} (1) Ibid. (2) See earlier comments, Chief of Salv Br to Chief of C&E Br, OQMG, 24 Jun 41, sub: Disp of Clo Turned In.

\textsuperscript{19} WD Cir 74, 13 Mar 42, sub: Instructions Governing Issue, Conserv, and Disp of C&E.

\textsuperscript{20} WD Cir 241, 21 Nov 41, sub: C&E.

\textsuperscript{21} (1) Rad, TAG to CG First CA et al., 23 Jan 42, AG 246.5 (1–21–42) MO–D. (2) WD Cir 74, 13 Mar 42, sub: Instructions Governing Issue, Conserv, and Disp of C&E.
changed to later dates, it became necessary to re-equip them with additional Class A items at such subsequent times. In the meantime, the re-enunciation of policy on the use of renovated clothing increased the pressure for improvement of local repair services and laid the groundwork for such early refinements of procedures, including serviceability standards, as were accomplished.

**Repair Shop System**

The substitution of issues in kind for the clothing money allowance, the difficulties of procurement and distribution, and considerations of economy and conservation, all made it necessary for the government to provide for the repair and reclamation of items of clothing and equipage issued to enlisted personnel. As a consequence, the War Department in the fall of 1940 directed that all repairs to shoes and all major repairs to clothing were to be accomplished at government expense, although enlisted men would continue to pay for laundry and dry-cleaning service as they had in the past and would also be responsible for minor repairs to clothing, such as mending rips and replacing buttons.\(^2\)

At that time there were no Army clothing repair shops in existence. Alteration of uniforms at the time of issue as well as shoe repair had been accomplished since World War I by local commercial contract, though experience had demonstrated the impossibility of obtaining satisfactory results by this method. Specifications had prescribed the quality of materials and workmanship in all contracts for repair services, but, in general, workmanship had been poor, materials inferior, and return of repaired articles had been unduly delayed.\(^3\) In contrast, CCC operation of reclamation plants at the Columbus and the Schenectady General Depots had revealed that a better shoe repair job was usually obtained in government renovating plants and that considerable money was saved.\(^4\) The OQMG drew upon this experience, as well as that of World War I, in inaugurating its program.

**Clothing and Equipment Repair Shops**

To provide repair services the OQMG established clothing and equipment repair shops (later called reclamation shops) at Army camps. The type selected depended upon the strength of the station to be served. Thus a two-unit shop served 40,000 men; a one-unit shop made repairs for 20,000; and a one-quarter-unit shop provided repair service for 5,000 men. In areas where greater numbers of troops required services, a two-unit shop was operated on a two-shift basis or, if necessary, facilities were added to provide the needed capacity.\(^5\) For the most part these shops were established in existing structures at Army camps in order to hold new construction to a minimum. Floor layout plans therefore varied considerably, since only a small portion of reclamation activities in the field was housed in buildings specifically constructed for reclamation purposes.

\(^2\) WD Cir 107, Sec. II, 24 Sep 40, sub: Laundry, Dry Cleaning, and Shoe Repair.  
\(^3\) Chief of Sup Div to Chief of Constr Div, OQMG, 22 Apr 41, sub: QM C&E Repair Shops.  
\(^4\) Memo, Maj Frederick H. Koerbel for Col Edmund B. Gregory, OQMG, 24 Apr 39, sub: Insp of CCC Reclm and Salv Plants.  
\(^5\) (1) Chief of Sup Div to Chief of Adm Div, OQMG, 6 Nov 40, sub: Activation of QM Units. (2) Ltr, Gen Corbin, OQMG, to QM First CA, 20 Nov 40, sub: Establishment of C&E Repair Shops. (3) Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, OQMG, 5–9 Oct 42, p. 11.
Clothing and equipment repair shops were organized into various sections according to the type of work to be done. A complete reclamation shop included a clothing and textile repair section, a shoe repair section, a canvas and webbing repair section, a mattress and pillow renovating section, and a miscellaneous repair section designed to accomplish repair of metal goods and other items that could not be repaired in the other sections. Complete reclamation shops were intended to be established only at installations requiring one-unit or larger shops. Shops serving 5,000 troops or less originally contained only shoe repair sections. A clothing and textile repair section as well as a shoe repair section was usually found at stations serving 10,000 to 20,000 men. Later a miscellaneous repair section was also deemed necessary. Any combinations of sections could be established to furnish stations with all necessary facilities.

It was the policy of the OQMG to repair and reclaim clothing and equipment in all instances possible in government-operated shops, but the accomplishment of this work was not limited to the use of reclamation shops. If existing government-operated facilities were insufficient, the use of additional facilities might be obtained by means of commercial contract. This method was used particularly for the repair of shoes and tentage and was adopted
primarily to take care of peak loads that could not be handled in the reclamation shops.

The repair and reclamation of clothing and equipage by commercial contract, however, was not recommended. Additional facilities for this work were available in Work Projects Administration (WPA) sewing rooms, located in every area, which were intended to be used as "subsidiary facilities to take care of the overflow from reclamation shops." These arrangements were the result of a plan of operation worked out by agreement between representatives of the OQMG and the WPA in the summer of 1942. As the year drew to a close, the Deputy Commissioner of the WPA notified the OQMG that "the increasing demand for manpower and the consequent decrease in persons for whom WPA needs to find employment makes it appear impracticable to continue assistance to other Federal agencies as a part of the WPA program beyond February 1, 1943." The President ordered liquidation of the agency by 30 June. The WPA sought an orderly termination of its projects, and in conferences with OQMG representatives considered the disposition of WPA sewing equipment, its transfer to Army reclamation shops, and the possibility of finding suitable experienced personnel for these shops among operators released by the WPA. Similar action to acquire equipment that could be utilized in reclamation activities was taken later when Congress liquidated the National Youth Administration in the summer of 1943.

Post quartermasters directed the operation of reclamation shops, whose personnel was largely civilian, secured from local civil service registers. It was the primary function of these shops to repair shoes and clothing for return to the original wearer, to repair and reclaim clothing (except shoes) and equipment for return to stock, and to alter clothing to provide proper fit whenever necessary.

The OQMG in the fall of 1940 had proposed establishing some forty reclamation shops and had called upon the corps area quartermasters for reports on available space and personnel that could be utilized for the purpose. By the end of June 1941, it had established only twenty-five reclamation shops at cantonments throughout the Army. The delay in swinging the program into high gear was attributable largely to the lack of funds for construction. Shoe repair shops could be established only where existing space was made available, and in the beginning "there was a general lack of interest locally and a disinclination to make existing space available." After some months of experience with repair service obtained by commercial contract, local quartermasters indicated that they wanted repair shops and made the necessary space arrangements for them, even though the Army repair

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\[26\] Min of Salv and Reclm Conf, p. 13.
\[27\] (1) Ltr, Gen Corbin, OQMG, to Actg Commissioner, WPA, 27 Feb 42, no sub. (2) Ltr, Florence Kerr, Asst Commissioner, WPA, to OQMG, 4 Jun 42, no sub. (3) Ltr, Col Hamilton, OQMG, to Florence Kerr, WPA, 11 Aug 42, no sub, and reply 14 Aug 42.
\[28\] Ltr. George H. Field to OQMG, 5 Dec 42, no sub.
\[30\] (1) Memo, Dir of Production Div, ASF, for TQMG, 10 Jul 43, sub: Liquidation of NYA. (2) [1st Ind], Hq Eighth SvC to TQMG, 18 Aug 43.
\[31\] Chief of Salv Br to Public Relations Off, Sup Div, OQMG, 8 Jul 41, sub: Summary of Accomplishments During Past Year.
\[32\] Gen Corbin to DQMG, 24 Jun 41, sub: QM C&E Repair Shops.
shops could not be opened until existing commercial contracts had expired. After Pearl Harbor the repair shop program expanded rapidly. This development was stimulated by a reduction in the clothing allowances to enlisted men, a move designed to enable the War Department to meet requirements for initial issue created by the accelerated induction program. As a result it was estimated that 3,000,000 cotton khaki shirts, 3,000,000 cotton khaki trousers, 1,000,000 each of denim or herringbone twill jackets and trousers, 500,000 overcoats, 1,500,000 pairs of service shoes, as well as wool underclothing and handkerchiefs, would be turned in as excess. It was extremely important that all these items, except the underclothing and handkerchiefs, be renovated and reissued without delay.

The chief of the Salvage Branch, OQMG, reported that the facilities of only twenty-six complete clothing and equipment repair shops, with thirty-one additional shoe repair sections at smaller camps, were immediately available. Several other shops had been authorized and were under construction, but these were not sufficient to take care of all local requirements and would have to be supplemented by commercial contracts. By the use of both government and commercial facilities, the backlog of used garments awaiting renovation could be handled.

Expansion of the repair shop program was further stimulated early in 1942 by another change in policy. Immediately after Pearl Harbor the War Department had announced that without exception renovated clothing and equipment would be issued prior to Class A clothing and individual equipment as replacements for troops alerted for overseas movement. The effect was to increase tremendously the work load of clothing and equipment repair shops. The inspection of items in the hands of troops alerted for overseas movement was expected to lead to the replacement of only those “unsuitable for extended field service” rather than to a complete re-equipment of alerted units with new articles. This directive, however, was subject to different interpretations. Unit commanders naturally applied it in such a way as to enable them to obtain new equipment. Quartermasters, on the other hand, bound by conservation policies, were inclined to keep equipment in the hands of the units if the items possessed serviceability or could be repaired for extended field use. Later, efforts were made to define more precisely standards of serviceability for equipment retained by alerted units. Repair service for alerted units had priority over all other work in repair shops, and the OQMG took action to see that such shops were established at all staging areas as they were activated.

Originally repair of shoes and clothing was directed toward keeping these items in the hands of the user. As the war pro-

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33 WD Cir 74, 13 Mar 42, sub: Instructions Governing Issue, Conserv, and Disp of C&E.
34 Maj France, C&E Br, to Chief of Salv Br, OQMG, 11 Feb 42, sub: Renovation of Clo to be Turned in by EM.
35 Chief of Salv Br to Chief of C&E Br, OQMG, 13 Feb 42, sub: Renovation of Clo to be Turned in by EM.
36 (1) WD Cir 74, 13 Mar 42, sub: Instructions Governing Issue, Conserv, and Disp of C&E. (2) WD Cir 115, Sec. II, 20 Apr 42, same sub.
37 Ltr, Gen Corbin, OQMG, to ACoS G-4, 29 Jan 42, sub: C&E Repair Shops for Staging Areas.
gressed and as troops moved to overseas theaters, requirements for initial issue and replacements of Quartermaster clothing and equipment reached tremendous proportions. The necessity of repairing Quartermaster property for return to stock for reissue became increasingly obvious. The number of clothing and equipment repair shops at posts, camps, and stations expanded from the 25 in operation by July 1941 to 368 shops by the end of the war.\(^{38}\) They repaired millions of items of clothing, shoes, and equipment, and, together with other Quartermaster repair facilities, contributed effectively to the reduction of new procurements of Quartermaster items.

**Shoe Rebuilding Program**

The reduction in the clothing allowance early in 1942 posed a special problem with reference to the shoes that were to be turned in. It had been Quartermaster policy to repair shoes only when they could be returned to the original wearer.\(^{39}\) Otherwise they were disposed of without repair by sale as salvage. This policy was abandoned in January 1942 when the issue of Class B clothing, including shoes, was made mandatory under all conditions. In order to avoid any possibility of disease or injury to the new wearer's feet, shoes could not be reissued without sterilization, complete rebuilding, and refinishing. As a consequence, the OQMG decided to establish one or more fully equipped shoe rebuilding factories to take care of the immediate accumulation of excess shoes caused by the revision of Table of Basic Allowances 21 and to continue their operation as a permanent part of the program in order to conserve shoes and leather.\(^{40}\)

The first of these factories was established at Buford, Ga., where on 19 March 1942 the War Department entered into a contract with Bona Allen, Inc., for the rental of certain lands, buildings, and equipment. Actual operations did not begin until June, but from then until 31 August 1943 the QMC operated this plant, which was attached to the Atlanta Quartermaster Depot under the immediate command of the Quartermaster supply officer.\(^{41}\)

It was estimated that when the Buford plant reached its maximum operating capacity (about 1 December 1942), it would produce 5,000 pairs of rebuilt service shoes per eight-hour shift. The shop could not accomplish the rebuilding of 1,500,000 pairs of shoes within a year, let alone within the three months suggested by the Clothing and Equipage Branch. Since it was also considered desirable to provide for the rebuilding of shoes in salvage and shoes that could not be repaired by the facilities available in the clothing and equipment repair shops, the War Department negotiated a contract with the International Shoe Co. of St. Louis for the rebuilding of Army service shoes in its Bluff City factory at Hannibal, Mo.\(^{42}\) This factory would also have a maximum capacity of 5,000 pairs per eight-hour shift.

In the summer of 1943 the War Department made another contract with the International Shoe Co., effective 1 September, which transferred the operation at the

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39. WD Cir 126, 28 Jun 41, sub: Insp of Shoes for Repair.
40. Ltr, Col Falkenau, OQMG, to QM First CA, 6 Apr 42, sub: Renovation of Class B Shoes.
41. For a detailed account of operations at Buford, see T. E. Downey, *U.S. Army Shop, Buford, Georgia* (hist rpt, Atlanta QMD, Aug 43), Hist Br, OQMG.
42. Salv Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, 18 Jul 42, sub: Rebuilding of Sv Shoes.
Buford factory to that company. By that time the volume of shoes to be rebuilt warranted the addition of another plant, and a supplemental agreement was made with the company for the operation of a third shoe rebuilding factory at Quincy, Ill.  

As a result of the 1 February 1944 downward revision of the Army Supply Program, which necessitated a cutback in production of rebuilt shoes, it became necessary to terminate the contract for the operation of the Buford factory, effective 30 April, but the other two plants continued to function until the end of the war. During the period of QMC operation of the Buford plant (fourteen-months) 1,505,589 pairs of shoes were rebuilt, while under direction of the International Shoe Co., (eight months) 1,118,652 pairs of repaired shoes were produced.  

Regional Repair Shops

Repair shops at posts, camps, and stations functioned as reclamation centers for clothing and equipage intended for return

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13 Sv Instls Div to Procurement Div, 24 Nov 43, sub: Expansion of Shoe Rebuilding Facilities.
14 (1) Memo, Col Hamilton, OQMG, for Readj Div, ASF, 21 Mar 44, sub: Cutback in Production of Rebuilt Sv Shoes. (2) Audit Rpt, Chief of Cost and Price Analysis Br to TQMG, 26 Jun 44, sub: Final Audit Rpt. This report showed that a total of 2,624,241 pairs of service shoes were rebuilt at a total cost of $7,366,825.51, which included cost of materials, labor, equipment, contractor's fees, depreciation, and amortization.
to the original user or for return to stock for reissue at the same post, camp, or station. They were not concerned with the processing of large quantities of repairable property turned in by troops alerted for overseas movement or with the volume of unserviceable clothing and equipment returned from overseas theaters, where reclamation equipment was often too limited to allow for major repair activities. The accumulation of such unserviceable property represented a proportionate requirement for replacement issue and therefore for the procurement of items, the raw materials for which were in critical supply.

The increasing volume of Quartermaster property requiring repair soon exceeded the capacity of reclamation facilities in service commands, although they had been continually expanded and a secondary function of repair for reissue anywhere within the service command had been added. Beginning in early 1943, a number of regional repair shops were established at central points in certain of the service commands to relieve station shops of the burden of repairing clothing and equipage for return to stock and reissue. Originally it had been proposed that centralized facilities be established or that existing facilities be designated to perform this type of work in each service command, with station shops repairing items for return to stock only to the extent necessary to keep personnel and equipment producing when there was a shortage of work for return to the original wearer. This program, however, was temporarily held in abeyance when the growing volume of material returned from overseas and receipts of articles from domestic sources, such as staging areas, influenced the initiation of plans for the establishment of a number of repair subdepots.

### Repair Subdepots

Regional shops and clothing and equipment repair shops at posts, camps, and stations were under the supervision and control of the commanding generals of the service commands. As the volume of Quartermaster matériel accumulating in this country and returned from overseas mounted, the necessity of supervising local activities closely in order to achieve conservation goals became acute. With repair work decentralized to hundreds of small shops scattered throughout the service commands, it was difficult to establish and maintain uniform standards of work. Service command progress in supervision of these shops, moreover, was handicapped by lack of personnel available for the purpose.

The Quartermaster General felt that the problem could best be solved by an expansion of centrally controlled activities. After studying the question, the OQMG late in 1942 decided to concentrate repair of Quartermaster articles for return to stock, as distinct from local repair service for troop units, in special subdepot installations of the Corps. It was motivated partially by the desire to bring these activities under its immediate supervision, particularly since this seemed to be the only feasible way to concentrate them where needed and to promote the desired uniformity and efficiency of operation. In these subdepots conservation was treated as an operating function of the QMC.

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2. Ltr, Hq Eighth SvC to All Posts, Camps, Stations, 8 Mar 43, no sub.

Early in 1943 The Quartermaster General was given verbal authorization by the Distribution Division, SOS, for the establishment of reclamation depots as subdepots of existing Quartermaster installations. Accordingly, the California Quartermaster Repair Subdepot was activated on 15 February and the Jersey City Quartermaster Repair Subdepot on 19 May. Establishment of other repair subdepots followed, and at the end of the war six of them were in operation.

It was the function of these subdepots to repair for return to depot stock both matériel shipped from overseas theaters and that accumulating in the several service commands served by such subdepots. Two principal reasons determined the adoption of the policy of authorizing regional and central shops to repair for return to depot stock and limiting reclamations to subdepots: first, a large installation operating with production-line methods could produce much more work per employee than a number of small shops that were forced to interrupt their production for special jobs for individual wearers. This resulted in the conservation of critical manpower. Second, quality control of the product and development of uniform repair standards for Class B issue could not be attained when such reclamations were done by hundreds of shops, many of which were unable to provide the kind of supervision that large installations used effectively.

As the need to promote technical uniformity and effective management of all repair shops increased, the OQMG created new regional agencies to supervise the work of the many central and local facilities operating within large areas. These field reclamation and field maintenance offices—directly responsible to The Quartermaster General, and established at or near depots and functioning for one or more service command areas—exercised technical supervision and control over operations in repair subdepots and in regional post, camp, and station repair installations. By decentralizing supervision to these offices, the OQMG made certain that standards of repair, classification, and procedures for shop operation established by it were properly carried out.

By mid-1943 the repair shop system had thus been expanded to take care of the tremendous volume of clothing and equipment that needed repair. It consisted of reclamations at posts, camps, and stations, engaged primarily in repairing articles for return to the original user or the using organization, and, to a limited extent, in making minor repairs in quantities that could be issued locally at the post. Regional repair shops, established within the service commands, repaired for return to stock at the nearest distributing depot, while repair subdepots handled any excesses that could not be repaired at other shops. In addition, there were a number of repair shops at Quartermaster depots and Quartermaster sections of ASF depots that were engaged in the maintenance of specific items. For example, it was decided early that while tentage issued to organ-

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47 Ltr, Col Thomas E. Whitehead, OQMG, to CG SOS, 18 Feb 43, sub: Allotment of Offs.

48 (1) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 24 Sep 43, no sub. (2) [1st Ind], Col Hamilton, OQMG, to Hq ASF, 21 Jan 44. For a detailed account, see C. Gregory Compton, History of the Quartermaster Repair Subdepot (hist monograph, CFQMD, Jul 45), Hist Br, OQMG.

49 (1) OQMG Cir 41, 14 Aug 44, sub: Establishment of Fld Reclm Offices. (2) OQMG Cir 54, 25 Sep 44, sub: Establishment of Fld Maint Offices.
izations would be repaired by reclamation shops and by means of local contract when necessary, tentage repair shops at the Philadelphia and Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depots would continue to repair tentage that could not be handled by these means and to take care of all tentage issued for maneuvers. Similarly, band instruments were repaired at designated depots, as were typewriters and other office equipment. In 1944 a program was initiated to establish a base maintenance shop at the Jeffersonville Depot to handle fifth echelon maintenance and reclamation on all materials-handling equipment within the zone of interior, while another base shop was established at Camp Lee to recondition all Quartermaster special-purpose and mobile equipment.

**Combined Shops**

In the fall of 1943 a number of clothing and equipment repair shops became parts of combined shops that were established in the service commands. This development grew out of action taken by the Maintenance Division, ASF, to integrate maintenance activities. When the division was established in April, it found that over 650 repair shops were being operated by the technical services for the repair of Army equipment. It concluded that this wholesale establishment of repair facilities throughout the zone of interior needed a co-ordinated system of centralized operation. The division immediately prohibited the activation of any new shops without the prior authorization of the Commanding General, ASF, and required full justification for expansion of any existing shops.

The Maintenance Division then sought to determine whether this large number of shops was necessary and ended by formulating a plan for consolidating repair facilities in the zone of interior that broke down technical service differentiations in favor of a functional shop organization. The plan provided for a combined shop—consisting of an automotive shop, an armament and instrument shop, a clothing and equipment shop, an electrical equipment shop, a machine shop, and a paint shop—co-ordinated under the supervision of a maintenance shop officer for operation, to receive, inspect, and repair all Army matériel of all technical services. This combined shop, the ASF urged, would offer "unification of command, the interchangeability of skilled and versatile personnel, the supply of replacement parts through controlled supply point and the uninterrupted control of the entire activity by a central office." Tried out first at Fort Knox in July, the plan was then sent to the commanding generals of the service commands in September with instructions to put it into effect as expeditiously as possible. Later it was extended to integrate maintenance activities at ASF depots and ports of embarkation.

The plan was not received enthusiast-
cally by either the technical services or the service commands. Until it was rescinded in July 1945, it met with considerable re-
sentment and numerous objections. The technical services felt that since they were responsible for the development and pro-
curement of designated equipment and the supply of spare parts for it, they should also be charged with its maintenance. They predicted that the integrated shop plan, under which one technical service officer was responsible for directing the maintenance functions of the other tech-
nical services, would result in lowering the standards and quality of workmanship. At the end of the war, however, the Maintenance Division, ASF, sweepingly conclud-
ed that “all these expectations proved to be erroneous predictions.”56 Since the heaviest maintenance loads were handled during the war through integrated main-
tenance operations, it adjudged the plan satisfactory. Actually, the combined shop plan was not the complete success claimed by the Maintenance Division, ASF.

On the other hand, the plan was not the complete failure claimed by the OQMG. Possibly it might have been more successful had the technical services generally been more receptive to it. At any rate, Quartermaster objections to the plan were not dissipated even after the war was over. The attitude of maintenance personnel was summarized in the following com-
ment:

None of the shops were successful and were, to an experienced supervisor inade-
quate, confused, and required to operate under quickly conceived staff policies, plan-
ning and with arbitrary restrictions. The shops were unwieldy, over-manned, and in-
adequately supplied and generally lacking in the required skills, in space and implementa-
tion. It was impossible to find commissioned management personnel with the required ad-
ministrative strength to properly co-ordinate this type of shop. Thus the combined shops were wasteful with, respect to supplies, and with respect to the return to serviceability of the various items repaired, against the overall expenditures, and thus failed to fulfill the mission intended.57

The lack of sufficient facilities and the fact that the technical service controlling the operation of a combined shop inevitably secured preference for the repair of its equipment entailed consequences that were apparent long after the war ended. It was only in the postwar years that the backlog of unserviceable Quartermaster items—refrigeration equipment, furniture, and typewriters—“generated during World War II, which could not be main-
tained in combined shops, were finally re-
paired in Quartermaster depot main-
tenance shops and returned to stock.”58

Return of Unserviceable Matériel to Supply Channels

Property Exchanges and Turn-Ins

At the beginning of the emergency there was no elaborate, restrictive procedure in use for the disposition of clothing and equipage comparable to that applied to most classes of nonexpendable Army sup-
plies. As a matter of fact, under the money allowance system there was no particular inducement for the enlisted man to seek unnecessary replacements, since such ac-
tion led to additional charges against his allowance. In the years following World War I, therefore, clothing issued on the money allowance was turned in to salvage

56 Hist Rpt, Maintenance Problems, p. 133.
57 Maint Br, Fld Sv Div, to Plng Br, Mil Plng Div, OQMG, 17 Jan 51, sub: Staff Study: Combined and Consolidated Shop Management.
58 Ibid.
by essentially the same method as that provided for expendable articles, that is, with a list and simple certificate of the organization commander to the effect that the unserviceable condition of articles was due to fair wear and tear.\(^{59}\)

Problems related to the disposal of the clothing that was turned in were responsible for certain restrictions in procedure. Provisions were inserted in the regulations to insure the maintenance of accountability in the process of turning in to the post quartermaster serviceable articles that had been issued on the money allowance. Provision was also made for inspection of worn-out clothing by a commissioned officer before credit was allowed on the clothing account, and by a disinterested officer after its receipt in salvage. Moreover, the requirement that property be marked and mutilated to preclude various improper practices applied especially to clothing. These provisions, only slightly changed, were retained even after the suspension of money accounts in 1940 as a relatively convenient means of controlling irregularity.

As in the case of the regular survey and inspection procedures, the advent of the emergency made proper technical control of property disposition the primary aim to be achieved by inspection of property by officers. Considerable responsibility for directing the flow of unserviceable property through repair and other processes was soon given to a disinterested officer, appointed by the local commanding officer. He inspected and classified clothing as reparable or nonreparable and furnished the quartermaster with a certificate covering nonreparable clothing worn out through fair wear and tear. The latter was disposed of in salvage; the reparable clothing was renovated and prepared for reissue.\(^{60}\)

Insofar as it went, this function was identical with that later charged to the classification officer.

In the summer of 1942 a new basic procedure was installed. Except for items definitely intended for repair and return to the original wearer, all unserviceable clothing and equipage was turned in to the post quartermaster through a newly designated classification officer.\(^{61}\) The post quartermaster then issued other items in exchange\(^{62}\) for those that had become unserviceable through fair wear and tear.\(^{63}\) The classification officer classified all items as reparable or irreparable, with the exception of certain technical items—band instruments, typewriters, 55-gallon drums, and M1937 field ranges—for which special disposition instructions were issued.\(^{64}\) Irreparable items were turned in to salvage; reparable items, except shoes, which were sent to the rebuilding factories, were repaired in the clothing and equipment repair shops or by such other means as the service command quartermaster directed.

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59 AR 30-2145, par. 4c.
60 WD Cir 97, 7 Sep 40.
61 (1) WD Cir 185, 12 Jun 42. (2) AR 615-40, par. 10c, 1 Sep 42.
62 The practice of direct exchange was later discontinued, and a simplified turn-in procedure was made entirely separate from that of replacement issues. (1) TM 38-403, par. 48, 25 Aug 44, sub: Station Sup Procedure. (2) [1st Ind], Dir of Control to Dir of Sup, ASF, 4 Aug 44.
63 Clothing and equipage rendered unserviceable by means other than fair wear and tear had, of course, to be acted on by survey as in the case of other classes of equipment. The classification officer was originally authorized to direct that surveys be made on items that in his opinion were not worn out by fair wear and tear. Later he was given the powers of a surveying officer (AR 615-40, par. 14b, 24 Apr 43). These powers were subsequently adjusted to recognize command responsibility for turn-ins.
64 (1) WD Pamphlet 38-1, 1 Mar 43, sub: SOP for Disp of Unserviceable Prop. (2) WD SB 10-156, 31 Oct 44, sub: Return of Unserviceable QM Prop to Sup Channels.
It was the primary mission of these shops to repair clothing for return to the original wearer. In time, they were also authorized to make minor repairs in quantities that could be utilized at the post as Class B (used) items. Since storage facilities were not available at clothing and equipment repair shops, such Class B items were promptly transferred to the post property officer for inclusion in station stock. He assumed accountability for them and reissued these items in exchange for unserviceable clothing and equipment. If, owing to changes in troop strength, clothing and equipment in stock at stations accumulated in excess of the amount that could be utilized by the local garrison, the quantities and the nature of this excess were reported to the proper distributing depot for disposition instructions. When a Class X category (reparable but not suitable for issue as Class B) was later established, such items were also transferred to the post property officer, but they were issued without accountability.

As the facilities of the clothing and equipment repair shops became taxed to their utmost, a maintenance policy was formulated that permitted regional and central shops to repair items beyond the capacity of the local shops to handle. Such unserviceable property was shipped by the supply officer to the next higher repair echelon. Each echelon operated under standing operating procedures prescribed by The Quartermaster General. Property repaired at a regional repair shop was returned to stock at the nearest distributing depot, except that Class X clothing was disposed of by the shop to troops in the area served by it as directed by the commander. By the fall of 1944 provision had been made for automatic shipment of property repaired at regional shops to the Quartermaster depot or Quartermaster supply section of an ASF depot normally supplying the area in which the shop was located. Property repaired at Quartermaster repair subdepots was shipped to the parent depot, although the latter might, prior to shipment, give instructions for routing to alternate storage points.

**Separation of Classification and Shop Activities**

Unlike the practice applying to Army property generally, the process of initial screening of unserviceable articles of clothing and equipage was made separate from that of classification and disposition of repaired articles, and was placed in the hands of an agency potentially independent of repair echelons. The function of classification and disposition of repaired articles, which was comparatively technical and involved the application of important standards of serviceability that were constantly being refined, was assigned to repair shops. Classification officers in various localities acted without authorization, however, to classify garments for issue prior to their submission to a shop for repair, a practice not firmly controlled for many months. Until early in 1944 the association of classification officers with repair shops was generally very close, but at that time the classification...
position was made entirely independent, and any officer associated with shop or maintenance activities could not be assigned to the position.\textsuperscript{70}

This step was taken primarily to avoid impeding the operations of shops unnecessarily with segregation and salvage functions, and especially to avoid the expense and congestion that would result from hauling nonreparable property to and from shops.\textsuperscript{71} A considerable amount of segregation and salvage activities was necessarily carried on in shops, particularly in subdeposits processing property returned from overseas. Failure of local classification officers to segregate articles properly or in accordance with shop standards remained a source of criticism and of some disagreement between shops and local supply officers. The move to separate the classification position from shop activities was also influenced by the emphasis being placed upon command responsibility for conservation activities in all units. At the same time, station supply procedure was being changed to require classification officers to accept property turned in by troop units regardless of its condition.\textsuperscript{72}

The establishment of a separate local organization for segregation and classification of unserviceable property inevitably raised the question of the qualifications of individuals handling this function.\textsuperscript{73} For some time the classification function was taken rather lightly by station commanders, and transient officers were frequently assigned to that duty. As classification position the officer in charge of the local shop, the salvage officer, or an assistant of one of the foregoing officers, unless a Quartermaster officer was especially appointed to devote his entire time to the duty. WD Cir 185, 12 Jun 42. (2) Later the choice of appointments at stations where repair shops were located was limited to a representative of the repair shop or a specially appointed full-time officer, with the latter operating under the direction of the repair shop officer. AR 615-40, par 14, 24 Apr 43.

mand responsibility was stressed and special training programs were developed, the local classification officer emerged as a control point for the disposition and utilization of clothing and individual equipment. He was given authority not only to inspect and segregate articles but also to classify all clothing and equipment turned in or to supervise these operations.\textsuperscript{74} As a result, the classification officer assumed important responsibilities in the Quartermaster conservation program. Moreover,
the expansion of his duties reflected the increasing attention being given to the interrelation of repair, classification, and salvage standards and the need for some agency to co-ordinate the development of these standards in operation.

Classification and Serviceability Standards

Prescribed standards for the classification of used and reclaimed articles became indispensable guides for the activities of the expanded classification organization, as well as for shops and other agencies participating in or actually handling this function. From the beginning the standards of serviceability that were established affected the acceptability to troop units of renovated clothing, and therefore in large measure the conservation of these articles. The early criticism of established conservation policies and the reluctance of troop commanders to comply with the regulations on priority issue of renovated articles resulted partly from the total absence of standards to govern the issue of these articles.

Until some time after Pearl Harbor, regulations merely directed the classification of property as new (Class A) and used (Class B) and enunciated the principle of priority in issue. The quality of renovated articles available for issue was controlled almost entirely by repair shops. For a time after the beginning of the emergency, shortages of equipment even intensified the problem of Class B issues, since, as a result, repairs made were more extensive and appearance of the renovated articles that were issued was fully subordinated to serviceability.

The OQMG Salvage Branch, recognizing the challenge to management and the need to improve this system, reaffirmed its policy, which had been announced earlier, of requiring the highest standards of workmanship. Attainment of this objective was conditioned by many operating difficulties and was especially dependent upon a degree of standardization in shop operations that was most difficult to achieve in the case of clothing repairs and virtually impossible, generally, until repairs for stock were centralized. In the meantime, the quality of the output of the shops varied greatly, and many shops returned inferior articles to troop units or to stock.

It soon became clear that control of shop repair methods was by no means enough. When the criteria, on the basis of which worn or damaged items were selected for repair, were broadened, it became much more difficult to produce in the shops a uniform quality in articles to be issued for all purposes. More exact classification of the produce of shops and more realistic policies for the utilization of this produce were needed. When these were established, shop output and methods could be planned systematically.

Establishment of Class X

As originally conceived, repair of clothing was simply confined to repairs for return to the original wearer and repairs for return to stock. Except in the case of work clothing, where surface darning was permitted, repairs were limited to those that would not detract unduly from the appearance of the garment. Since at times the rapid expansion of the Army outstripped the production of clothing, the OQMG had to take a broader attitude

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with regard to the type and extent of repairs permitted in order to conserve and use garments then being discarded in salvage under existing standards. This movement for refinement of standards developed immediately out of the desire to find some way of avoiding the use of new clothing in training activities, where it was subjected to excessive wear and tear. To prolong the wear of uniforms, the War Department at first instructed troop commanders to use fatigue clothing for drill, work, and for all duties where the wearing of the uniform was not necessary.\(^\text{76}\)

Various alternatives were proposed for the further differentiation of issues, and in August 1942 the OQMG established an additional classification for repaired clothing.\(^\text{77}\) Known as Class X, this category was defined simply as "clothing and equipage which is reparable but not suitable for issue as class B."\(^\text{78}\) It was issued without charge to authorized allowances and without accountability for use in special field exercises, maneuvers, landing operations, or other training, and for such fatigue duties as were destructive to clothing and equipment. The War Department directed that Class X clothing be repaired repeatedly until beyond serviceability, the materials required for its renovation to be secured where practicable from salvaged garments. To prevent misuse by exchange or turn-in, all such garments were to be marked with the letter "X" in nonremovable ink in places not in evidence when worn.

The savings accomplished through issue of worn clothing for these purposes were incalculable, despite early difficulties in distributing Class X clothing and in familiarizing troops with its use. Conversely, however, as turn-ins and accumulations of renovated property increased, a need developed for bringing the use of this category of articles under control. With basic allowances of clothing and equipage reduced, the availability of a special form of gratuitous issue without accountability and without allowances being affected was a source of temptation to many commanders. More serious than excessive use of such special issues was a general trend toward misclassification that resulted from placing large quantities of high-quality garments in Class X. Reports from service commands in 1943 particularly revealed misuse of Class X issues in this way.\(^\text{79}\) This practice resulted partly from the general difficulty experienced in establishing efficient classification activities at stations, and particularly from the classification of garments by inexperienced personnel outside local repair shops and subdepots.

For many months stocks of Class X clothing remained inadequate for Army needs. Eventually they accumulated until the distribution and utilization of these garments caused concern. Quartermaster depots were then permitted to establish stock levels for Class X clothing in order to meet sudden demands from the International Division, ASF. Co-ordination between the depots and the service com-

\(^{76}\) WD Cir 257, Sec. IV, 31 Jul 42, sub: Conserv of Wool and Cotton Uniform Clo.

\(^{77}\) (1) Ltr, Hq First SvC to TQMG, 23 Jul 42, sub: Classification of Reclaimed C&E. (2) C&E Br to Salv and SurplusProp Br, OQMG, 31 Jul 42, same sub. (3) Salv and Surplus Prop Br to C&E Br, OQMG, 5 Aug 42, same sub.

\(^{78}\) WD Cir 287, Sec. VI, 27 Aug 42, sub: Instructions Governing Exchange of Class C and Class D C&E.

mands also enabled the reclamation shops to curtail their repairs of Class X clothing when excesses of these items existed. The OQMG found a convenient outlet for excesses through issues to prisoners of war and for overseas relief.

**Class CS (Combat Serviceable)**

Until the impact of accumulations of renovated stocks forced attention to further differentiation of issues, particularly with reference to issues to troops going overseas, instructions for classification of clothing and equipage remained relatively general. As a result of reports of misclassification and continued complaints from commanders receiving inferior Class B issues, the Salvage Branch formulated tentative instructions for the classification of clothing in the spring of 1943.80 These instructions emphasized that Class B garments should be serviceable in point of wear, in complete state of repair, clean, with no noticeable spots of paint or grease, approximately of the original shade, not darned or patched conspicuously except in the case of herringbone twill garments, and with buttons of matching shade and in correct position if these bore distinctive markings. Class X garments were required only to be serviceable, clean, and in complete state of repair. Further instructions limited the repair of Class X by cannibalization of parts from other garments. These instructions revealed an effort to maintain the high standards of repair that the Salvage Branch had established as its objective at the beginning of the repair program. They made no attempt, however, to define the expression "serviceable in point of wear," a matter fundamental to all classification and particularly to the equipment of embarking troops. The failure to clarify the expression "in complete state of repair," caused difficulties and variations in repair methods. The shortcomings of classification were increasingly apparent as troops were moved rapidly overseas in preparation for the invasion of Europe, and as used articles poured from the staging areas and other sources. It became evident that the problems of classification, serviceability, and standardization of repair methods would have to be treated as an integrated whole.

During the summer of 1943 inspectors from the Maintenance Division, ASF, reported that unserviceable clothing and equipage were being accumulated in large quantities at repair shops, that troops departing for overseas were turning in large quantities of used clothing and equipage, that there was a lack of competent personnel to identify, classify, and repair this matériel, and that more standardized methods of processing it were needed.81 As troop units were alerted for overseas movement, particular difficulties were experienced with commanders who insisted on turning in combat serviceable equipment in order to replace it with new, or later model, items. In many cases such replacements were effected without an inspection to determine combat serviceability, despite regulations to the contrary.82 This resulted in the publication of new instructions that made such inspection mandatory. The War Department further directed that nothing short of a complete physical inspection of each item would constitute compliance. The instructions

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80 Ltr, Falkenau to CG First SvC, 22 May 43, sub: Classes B and X Clo.
82 WD Cir 267, Sec. II, 25 Oct 43, sub: C&E.
prescribed the standards to be applied in determining the combat unserviceability of items of clothing and equipage. In general, clothing was to be inspected for holes, tears, frayed edges and facings, abrasion or thinness of fabric, and excessive fading and staining.\textsuperscript{83}

In order that clothing and equipment might be conserved, the problem of classification demanded a broader attack. Headquarters, ASF, directed The Quartermaster General to prepare more detailed instructions for the classification of clothing and equipment and recommended more careful training of all classification personnel.\textsuperscript{84} The OQMG undertook a thorough study of the whole problem, sending representatives to posts, camps, stations, and staging areas. Its efforts to correct the unsatisfactory standards of classification resulted in the publication of more precise rules for classifying and utilizing different classes of equipment. In addition to Classes A, B, and X, Class CS (combat serviceable) was added to identify property that was used but that was of such appearance and of such serviceability as to justify its issue to troops moving overseas and its shipment to overseas theaters for issue. If, for example, the basic material of a garment was durable enough to provide 75 percent of the wear expectancy of a similar new item, and if the garment was completely repaired, had no stains, darns, or patches to cause an unsightly appearance, and was not excessively faded, it was classed as combat serviceable.\textsuperscript{85} However, the question of acceptability to the troops remained. This was a never-ending problem, for, regardless of instructions, "the subject of combat serviceability is and always will be a matter of personal opinion."\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{Training Program for Classification}

The publication of standards of serviceability for clothing and equipment was important, but standards could not be put to effective use until personnel engaged in classification activities at repair shops, staging areas, personnel replacement depots, ports of embarkation, depots, and posts, camps, and stations were trained in the interpretation and uniform application of these standards. The OQMG inaugurated a program for such training late in June 1944 with a course given at Camp Lee for a small number of officers drawn from repair subdepots and depots. These officers were to become the nucleus for teaching other classification personnel. This original group was to prepare a plan that could be used within service commands and central and regional repair shops and that would provide for training of supervisory civilian personnel engaged in classification. Emphasis was to be placed upon the development of standard

\textsuperscript{83} WD Cir 277, 2 Nov 43, sub: C&E—Insp. in POM.
\textsuperscript{84} Memo, Dir of Sup, ASF, for TQMG, 22 Mar 44, sub: Classification of C&E.
\textsuperscript{85} (1) 1st Ind. TQMG to CG ASF, 16 May 44, on memo cited n. 84. (2) WD Cir 296, 14 Jul 44, sub: Establishment of Standards of Classification of C&E.
\textsuperscript{86} (1) 2d Ind, Deputy Dir of Sup, ASF, to TQMG, 15 Sep 44, on Ltr, Col C. W. Woodward, CO Charlotte QMD, to OQMG, 4 Sep 44, sub: Equipping of Certain Units. (2) No matter how carefully the QMC defined its standards on clothing, there were bound to be differences of opinion. Until agreement was reached with the ground troops and the air troops who had to accept the garments, the problem remained. "You can classify a garment combat serviceable, but if the man who has to take the garment doesn’t agree, what’s the use?" What was needed was a standard approved and accepted by all elements of the War Department. Extracts of Min of Sixth Semi-Annual SvC Conf, 1–3 Feb 45, p. A10.
procedures for classification as well as illustrative material for inclusion in a manual.\textsuperscript{87}

The second phase of the training program was initiated when these officers were assigned in groups of three to teach at three central repair shops operated by the Jersey City, Kansas City, and California Quartermaster Depots.\textsuperscript{88} The instruction was offered for the benefit of classification officers from the headquarters of the service commands, the AAF commands, and the ports of embarkation; from Quartermaster regional supply depots; from central repair shops and service command regional repair shops; and from those posts, camps, and stations where staging areas, personnel replacement depots, and aerial ports of embarkation were operated. The Quartermaster General had been made responsible for the training of key personnel assigned to clothing and equipage classification duties at these installations. The commanders of such installations were responsible for instructing all other personnel engaged in classification duties.\textsuperscript{89}

The third phase of the training program rested with the headquarters of the service commands and of the AAF commands. When their representatives returned from attending the central repair shop course in classification, they in turn gave instruction in the classification of used clothing and equipage to post, camp, and station personnel within their commands.\textsuperscript{90}

In its program of training, the OQMG centered immediate attention upon the problem of classifying clothing. Equipage and general supplies also required repair, and by the fall of 1944 training had been extended to include instruction in the classification of these items.\textsuperscript{91}

\textit{Improvement of Repair Shop Production}

\textbf{Backlogs}

From the beginning, the OQMG emphasized the importance of capacity operations in Quartermaster repair shops. Until troops were sent overseas in large numbers, reducing the over-all troop strength in service commands and thus producing excess capacity in various clothing and equipment repair shops, the immediate problem was the elimination of backlogs of repairs. These backlogs accumulated as a result of fluctuations in troop strength, personnel shortages, and other factors. As the facilities of the clothing and equipment repair shops became overtaxed, a system of transferring excess reparable equipment to the next higher echelon of repair was instituted. In turn, excesses beyond the capacity of the regional shops to handle were shipped to repair subdepots.\textsuperscript{92}

In the fall of 1944 this procedure was further clarified by directions that reparable equipment which had accumulated at a post, beyond the capacity of the cloth-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[87] Ltr, Gen Feldman, OQMG, to Dir of QM Bd, Camp Lee, Va., 6 Jun 44, sub: Tng Plan for Instruction in Classification of Used C&E.
\item[88] Ltr, TAG to AAF Commands et al., 23 Jun 44, sub: Instruction in Classification of Used C&E.
\item[89] (1) WD Cir 296, 14 Jul 44, sub: Establishment of Standards of Classification of C&E. (2) The Quartermaster General was also responsible for training classification officers at Quartermaster depots and Quartermaster sections of ASF depots, and, accordingly, instruction was provided at those installations. Ltr, Brig Gen Wilbur R. McReynolds, OQMG, to CO Atlanta ASFD et al., 26 Jul 44, sub: Tng of Depot Pers in Classification.
\item[90] See, for example, Ltr, Hq Eighth SvC to TQMG, 14 Aug 44, sub: Conf on Classification of C&E.
\item[91] Ltr, Gen McReynolds, OQMG, to CG CFQMD, 7 Sep 44, sub: Course in Classification of General Sup Items.
\item[92] WD Cir 329, Sec. IV, 20 Dec 43, sub: C&E.
\end{footnotes}
Reclamation and Conservation Activities

ing and equipment repair shop to repair within sixty days, was to be reported to the commanding general of the service command for redistribution to other facilities under his control. A sixty-day limit was also established for the shop production capacity of all repair installations under his control. Backlogs in excess of this capacity were reported to The Quartermaster General for shipment to central repair shops. In order to expedite the repair of items in short supply, The Quartermaster General might require service commands to report backlogs of such items amounting to less than sixty days' shop production capacity of all service command repair installations.93

On the other hand, by the fall of 1944 the sharp reductions in troop strength within certain service commands made excess capacity available in clothing and equipment repair shops. It was therefore directed that when backlogs at such shops dropped below forty-five days' capacity, the commanding general of the service command was to be informed in order that he might allocate additional items to the shops for repair. Similarly, he advised The Quartermaster General when the backlog of all clothing and equipment repair installations under his control fell below forty-five days' production capacity.94

To reduce the backlogs that accumulated rapidly in 1944, the service commands took prompt and energetic action. In addition to shipping excess repairs to central repair shops,95 production in repair shops was increased by establishing second shifts when it was possible to employ additional civilians. Furthermore, use was made of prisoners of war who were trained for repair shop work. It was possible in some instances to increase machine capacity. Action was also taken to speed up classification by increasing both the number of shifts in operation and the number of personnel engaged in classifying unserviceable property.96

Production Scheduling

A series of conferences conducted by the Maintenance Division, ASF, with repair shop personnel early in March 1944 developed suggestions for improving production in repair shops and curtailing over-all procurement by establishing for each central repair shop production schedules of required clothing and equipment as set forth in the Army Supply Program. These facilities could then concentrate on their quotas in order to reduce over-all requirements for designated items.

The Salvage Branch, OQMG, took steps to make practical application of the suggestions offered by the repair subdepot personnel. It was anticipated that production scheduling, when fully effected, would permit a closer tie between repair activities and new procurements in the development of the Army Supply Program. The OQMG hoped to reduce new procurements of tex-

93 WD Cir 411, Sec. I, 20 Oct 44, sub: C&E.
94 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Col William J. Gainey, OQMG, to CG Seventh SvC, 1 May 44, sub: Rpt of Insp of C&E Repair Shops. (3) Memo, Dir of Sup, ASF, for TQMG, 13 Jun 44, sub: Utilization of C&E Shops.
95 The Fourth Service Command, for example, reported that during July and August it was shipping excess clothing and equipment repairs at the rate of two carloads of clothing per week to fifth echelon repair shops, and two carloads of canvas and webbing per month to the Memphis Repair Subdepot. 1st Ind, QM, Hq Fourth SvC, to TQMG, 8 Sep 44, on Ltr, TQMG to CG Fourth SvC, 4 Sep 44, sub: Backlog of C&E.
96 (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, TQMG to CG Eighth SvC, 4 Sep 44, sub: Backlog of C&E, and 1st Ind, Hq Eighth SvC to TQMG, 12 Sep 44.
tile items during the next twelve months by about $200,000,000 through the use of items returned by repair installations to stock for reissue. Production schedules that included the major items processed by depots were forwarded to repair subde- pots. The latter were advised each month with regard to items on which to concen- trate their efforts.

By the spring of 1944 the Quartermas- ter repair activities, carried on in its sub- depots, service command regional shops, and clothing and equipment sections of combined maintenance shops, had reached such proportions that the production of Class B items had to be considered in the preparation of the Quartermaster section of the Army Supply Program. The OQMG complained, however, that it was receiv- ing inadequate data for the purpose of estimating requirements. It indicated that many of the figures reported for repairs on hand, for example, included only matériel physically located in the shop and gave no consideration to the backlog of reparable items held by the quartermasters at posts, camps, and stations. By way of illustrating the discrepancies that existed, the OQMG pointed out that Headquarters, Ninth Service Command, reported that as of 29 February 1944 there were 2,678,743 pieces of clothing and equipment awaiting repair in that service command. On the other hand, the figures obtained by consolidating reports sent in to the office from individual stations showed a backlog of 517,433 pieces. Such data were useless in determining requirements, and more ade- quate reports were needed.

Meanwhile the Maintenance Division, ASF, was at work upon the general prob- lem of control reports. By July the Supply Control System had replaced the Army Supply Program, and, since it had ac- quired responsibility under this system for estimating the amounts of matériel to be returned to stock through repair channels, the division was more than ever concerned with the development of an adequate sys- tem of reports.

Estimating the amounts of matériel that would be reclaimed in Quartermaster re- pair facilities in turn necessitated the preparation of forecasts of the quantities that would be repaired and returned to stock. These quotas for repairing items for return to stock were prepared for Quar- termaster repair installations on the basis of information developed by field reclama- tion offices, data assembled on capacities, schedules, work loads, and output of shops, machine capacities, and the quan- tities of articles that would become avail- able for repair. These quantities consti- tuted a backlog for production and consist- ed of the items on hand in repair shops, those awaiting repair but not yet located at the shops, and those, not yet classified, which it was estimated would become available for repair. Based on the pre-scribed quotas established by the OQMG, the QMC took maximum credit in supply control for such repairs, thereby decreasing the amount of new procurement estimated to be necessary.

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97 Address, Maj Jacob Haas, OQMG, to Conf of Key Pers, Kansas City QM Repair Subdepot, 1 Sep 44.
98 See, for example, Ltr, Col Hamilton, OQMG, to CG Calif QM Repair Subdepot, 29 Aug 44, sub: Pro- duction Schedules for Sep, Oct, Nov, and Dec 44.
99 Memo, Col Georges F. Doriot, OQMG, for CG ASF, 3 Apr 44, sub: Relation of Repair Activities and the ASP.
100 (1) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 15 May 45, sub: ASF Cir 156, 1 May 45. (2) Memo, Dir of Sup, ASF, for TQMG et al., 2 Nov 44, sub: Returned Stock Included in Sup Control Rpts. (3) The responsibility for preparing these estimates was assigned to the Service Installations Division by OQMG OO 25-115, 26 Jan 45.
Production-Line Method of Repair

The production-line method of repair had been adopted at repair subdepots when they were established by the OQMG early in 1943 as a means of conserving critical manpower and increasing the amount of work per employee. At a conference in May 1944, commanding officers of the subdepots suggested that key personnel from both regional and station clothing and equipment repair shops be sent to the central repair shops to study their repair methods. The ultimate objective was to extend, where practicable, the production-line method of repair as another means of improving production. The OQMG initiated the program by sending technically qualified personnel to assist the regional repair shops in installing this method of operation. By the first week in June, it had completed such action in the First and Ninth Service Commands.101

In the meantime the Maintenance Division, ASF, directed the OQMG to widen the application of the production-line method of operation by developing a plan for training key civilian personnel of the clothing and equipment repair shops in its use.102 The OQMG prepared and put into operation by September a training program to acquaint both operating and training personnel with the standard of procedures for the repair of clothing and equipment, to give them additional information on classification, and to assist them in developing a sound training program so that the individual worker at each repair installation might be thoroughly trained in the proper performance of his job. "Quality control of the training program in each repair installation" constituted the final phase of this program and insured by continuous follow-up that proper training methods had been instituted.103

Specialized Shops

Improving classification, decreasing backlogs, and applying production-line repair methods as widely as possible were all a part of the effort being made during 1944 to increase the production rate of repaired items and return them quickly to supply channels for further use. While improvements were made, inspections and investigations disclosed that procedures being followed by the technical services in repairing equipment for return to stock lacked systematic control and entailed a large amount of duplication in the work performed by repair shops. This duplication had arisen from the changed conditions developing in the zone of interior. As military organizations and personnel moved to overseas theaters in 1944, huge amounts of matériel were turned in to supply channels for repair. At the same time, the departure of the troops reduced the workload at clothing and equipment repair shops that repaired for return to the original user. As a result, these shops repaired unserviceable matériel for return to stock, but since their facilities were not always adequate and their personnel were not thoroughly trained in procedures and

101 (1) DQMG for Sup Plng to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 15 May 44, sub: QM C&E Repair Subdepots. (2) Col Hamilton to DQMG for Sup Plng, OQMG, 8 Jun 44, same sub.

102 (1) Memo, Dir of Maint Div, ASF, for TQMG, 20 May 44, sub: Tng of Key C&E Repair Pers. (2) 1st Ind, Col Hamilton, OQMG, to Hq ASF, 12 Jun 44, on above memo.

103 (1) Memo, Gen Barnes, OQMG, for Maint Div, ASF, 31 Jul 44, sub: Tng Plan for Instruction of Key Pers. (2) Address, Maj Jacob Haas, OQMG, at Conf of Key Pers, Kansas City QM Repair Subdepot, 1 Sep 44.
methods, the repaired items returned to stock did not always meet established standards and the depots felt compelled to reinspect and reclassify the matériel sent to them before reissuing it.

At the request of the Commanding General, ASF, and on the basis of experimental repair programs tried out in the Third and Fourth Service Commands, the Control Division, ASF, developed a program to expedite the return of matériel to supply channels. The ASF proposed designating certain maintenance shops as specialized shops on the basis of selection by the chiefs of the technical services and the commanding generals of the service commands. These specialized shops, and no other station shops, were to repair for return to depot stock. They were to be responsible for identifying, classifying, and repairing equipment as well as inspecting and packaging it prior to shipment to the depots. The inspection was to be performed by inspectors representing and responsible to the chief of the technical service concerned, and acceptance by these inspectors was to be final. The ASF maintained that it had no intention of designating specialized shops for repair of specific items for which adequate facilities already existed.

In addition, the ASF provided for the automatic evacuation of matériel, but this was soon found to be in conflict with other instructions governing the disposition of excess stocks. The confusion was eliminated the following month by new instructions that met the objections voiced by the OQMG. The OQMG had been disturbed by the procedure prescribing automatic shipment to the specialized shops of excess serviceable property on hand at stations that did not constitute a standard pack or that had been removed from the original container. In the case of Quartermaster items, many of which would not normally be found at stations in standard packs, the shipment to specialized shops would be wasteful of transportation since the shops in many instances were far removed from the supply depot. The revised instructions provided that such serviceable property could be automatically shipped to the depot supplying the item to the post, camp, or station or to points designated by the chief of the technical service concerned. When doubt existed as to an item's serviceability, it was to be sent to the designated specialized shop.

The Quartermaster General and the other technical service chiefs were called upon to designate specialized shops and to prepare plans for the organizations necessary to carry out the responsibilities assigned to them under the new directive covering the ASF program. The OQMG felt that these responsibilities were identical with those it had been discharging for the past year and no new organization was necessary for the purpose. It had developed a system of automatic evacuation to specialized technical service shops and had published instructions in War Department Supply Bulletin 10–156 for automatic disposition of approximately 115 items or categories of items of specialized types that lent themselves to production-line repair on a national scale. It had also established repair subdepots for quantity production of clothing and equipment items of types requiring less specialized techniques, but for which volume production was most economical. The OQMG

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104 (1) ASF Cir 156, 1 May 45, sub: Mat. (2) Hist Rpt, Maintenance Problems, pp. 33–38.
105 ASF Cir 234, Sec. I, 22 Jun 45, sub: Excess Station Stock.
106 Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 15 May 45, sub: ASF Cir 156, 1 May 45.
called attention to the fact that any system of specialized shops devised within the fourth echelon would have to give consideration to the continued operations of these repair subdepos, which employed over 8,000 people and had a production capacity of 4,000,000 garments per month. Furthermore, such shops would have to retain flexibility of operations in order to meet the changing demands of supply "as is evidenced by the concentration on woolen clothing during the short supply period last winter and the current concentration for maximum repair machine assignment to the production of cotton khaki clothing." \(^{107}\) The Quartermaster General designated these installations as specialized shops with the approval of Headquarters, ASF. \(^{108}\)

**Value of the Repair Program**

Reclamation was no minor activity in terms of the war effort. While complete statistics are not available for all repairs made by Quartermaster installations during the emergency and war periods, the tremendous growth in the value of the items repaired disclosed an activity of "big business" proportions. In the six-month period from July to December 1942, the total value of shoes and clothing, canvas and webbing, and the miscellaneous items repaired in shops at posts, camps, and stations amounted to $22,213,000. For the year 1943 this had increased to $93,718,000. \(^{109}\) The total value of items repaired in Quartermaster fifth echelon maintenance during 1945 amounted to $161,699,000. Clothing and textiles represented the largest part of the total value of items repaired, with petroleum containers and equipment, and metal and woodworking items constituting the second and third largest groups. \(^{110}\)

**Conservation of Food**

In the broad conservation program directed by the QMC, saving food was as important as repairing and reclaiming clothing and equipment, or using substitutes in lieu of critical raw materials in the development of military items. A plentiful food supply existed early in the emergency period, and the primary mission of the Subsistence Branch (later Division) then was not to save food but to feed the soldier. As the Army expanded and demands were made upon the United States to supply food to the occupied countries as well as to the Allied nations, the necessity to conserve food grew increasingly important. With high prices and the introduction of rationing, many people became extremely critical of Army food practices, and suspicions of food wastage were voiced more vigorously than suspicions of negligence in the use of any other item.

While the Corps had always been aware of the importance of conserving food, the need was not so acute in peace as it became in war. It was possible for the Army to secure its subsistence through a thoroughly decentralized system of food procurement. Posts, camps, and stations operated on a garrison ration and found it convenient to purchase their perishable foods from local sources and to obtain their nonperishable foods from depots that bought and delivered them directly in regular quantities. The War Department

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\(^{107}\) (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Brig Gen Alexander M. Owens, OQMG, for CG ASF, 5 May 45, sub: Adequate Backlog for Fifth Echelons.  
\(^{108}\) (1) Memo, Col Joseph H. Burgheim, OQMG, for CG ASF, 13 Jul 45, sub: ASF Cir 156, 1 May 45. (2) 1st Ind, Hq ASF to TQMG, 18 Jul 45, on above memo.  
\(^{109}\) Statistical Handbook of the QMC, 1943, p. 29.  
\(^{110}\) Statistical Yearbook of the QMC, 1945, p. 140.
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considered conservation a normal concomitant of Army feeding, and there were various rules and regulations aimed at enforcing moderation in the purchase and preparation of food. Responsibility for eliminating waste was vested in the commanders of the corps areas.

It was not until the summer of 1943 that centralized control of food conservation was established. In the meantime the rapid expansion of the Army after the passage of the Selective Service Act and the impact of military procurement on the food supply of the country caused the War Department and the QMC to take steps to conserve food. In the spring of 1941 the War Department substituted the field ration for the garrison ration, and the QMC, which procured all food for the Army, established a centralized system for food purchase and distribution. Army units thereafter acquired their nonperishable foods through the three Quartermaster depots where this procurement was centralized. They obtained their perishable foods by means of a market center system that the Corps established in March. By the end of 1941 some thirty Quartermaster market centers had been planned, or were already in operation on a small scale.

These developments had broad implications for conservation. For example, the Field Headquarters of the market center system, as the central purchasing agency for perishable foods, was in the best position to discover what perishables could and ought to be used at the posts, camps, and stations. Yet in the beginning, the market centers were hampered in procurement by the lack of uniformity in the amounts of perishable foods requisitioned by individual messes. This resulted from the fact that in the fall of 1941 menus were being prepared in each corps area and sent to the Subsistence Branch in the OQMG. The menus showed great variation in the amounts of food issued for each 100 men at different posts. For effective conservation, menus at posts, camps, and stations had to be standardized in order that menu planning could be coordinated with procurement of perishables, large-scale carlot purchases could be arranged, and advantage could be taken of seasonal production and price differences.

These ends were promoted by close cooperation between the market center system and the menu-planning section of the OQMG. The latter developed a master menu by means of which similar meals could be served to all Army organizations. The master menu was intended as a guide to bring about more uniformity in the amounts of food components issued per 100 men, to demonstrate a menu that was adequate for good nutrition, to offer a pattern for conserving critical food items, and to suggest menus that did not include any food more times than the national supply would permit.

Further advantages beneficial to the conservation program in general accrued from the establishment of the market cen-

111 The field ration is an issue of food in kind, while the garrison ration is a monetary credit. See the discussion of these rations in Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services.

112 WD Cir 195, 18 Sep 41, sub: Sales Commissaries, Fld Commissaries, and Rations.


114 The master menu, a monthly publication, contained a complete menu for each day of the month and a list of the items that comprised each menu. See Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services.

115 Rpt, ASF Food Sv Conf, 11-14 Aug 43, Chicago, Ill., pp. 34-35, address by Miss Mary I. Barber, OQMG food consultant.
ter system. Large savings were effected in transportation, while the use of fresh fruits and vegetables, so desirable in the soldier’s diet, reduced the quantity of canned goods required and thereby furthered the conservation of tin.

Soon after the United States entered the war, General Gregory declared that the use of the field ration by nearly all major Army units had not only proved economical but had also simplified accounting procedure and the problem of post storage and issue. Furthermore, the system of food procurement, storage, and distribution that had been placed in operation was assuring to all organizations a continuous supply of a “wide variety of fine quality food.”

On the other hand, he found the preparation of food and the supervision of mess operations unsatisfactory. Skillful preparation of food that was palatable to the soldier as well as nutritious was even more important in the promotion of conservation than centralized purchase of subsistence. This could be accomplished only by training competent cooks, bakers, mess sergeants, and mess officers. But there were not nearly enough trained mess personnel early in 1941 to keep pace with the augmented requirements of the rapidly expanding Army. This was true even though training programs conducted in the nine corps area schools for bakers and cooks had been expanded by establishing some forty-nine subschools under their jurisdiction and curtailing the regular four months’ course of instruction to two months’ intensive training in an effort to furnish even partially trained personnel. The OQMG sought to provide technical assistance and co-ordination in the organization, operation, and training activities of these schools and their subschools.

Despite the steps taken, The Quartermaster General early in 1942 found that a great deal of food was being wasted either through lack of planning or because of improper preparation. Food was being prepared by partially trained cooks under the supervision of inexperienced mess sergeants, and since the Army was increasing in strength this condition would only grow worse. Furthermore, under the stress of wartime expansion, organization commanders could not devote time to mess supervision although they were charged with responsibility for it by regulations.

The solution, proposed by The Quartermaster General in a staff study submitted to G-3 early in 1942, was “a system of supervision by trained personnel.” This anticipated in many respects the later Food Service Program. His proposal emphasized continuous training for cooks, mess sergeants, and mess officers within their own organizations, but it did not go as far as the later provision for centrally controlled training, subject to periodic investigation. The plan called for the development of a heightened sense of responsibility—which became the basis of the Food Service Program—and aimed to create a regular source of information on the best methods of food preparation and to “assure continuous good mess operation whether the organization happens to be located in camp or in the field, in the Zone of the Interior or the Theater of Operations.”

117 (1) Rogers W. Young, Inspection of Military Training by The Quartermaster General, QMC Historical Studies, 15 (Washington, 1946), pp. 17-18. (2) See below, Ch. VIII.
119 Ibid.
No immediate action was taken by the General Staff to strengthen controls over food distribution and use. In the meantime, The Quartermaster General was taking other steps designed to provide the necessary information for a food conservation program. Late in December 1941 General Gregory directed the Quartermaster Board to initiate a field study at Camp Lee to determine the adequacy of the authorized ration and the existence or nonexistence of food wastage. This study, begun in February 1942, was widened into a field survey at other posts and produced a vast amount of valuable information that enabled the Corps to save millions of pounds of food and to divert millions of dollars to other war uses.\(^{120}\)

Investigation revealed that one fifth of the food prepared at the Quartermaster Replacement Training Center at Camp Lee, Va., was not consumed by the soldiers but was actually thrown into the garbage. The same tremendous wastage, resulting from four specific causes, was shown to exist at other posts. The first of these causes, and the most easily corrected, was absenteeism. In compliance with a War Department directive, one ration was drawn for each man appearing on the morning report of ration strength, even though he might be at home, on pass, eating a meal in town, or absent from one or more meals for other reasons.\(^{121}\) Because of the absence from table of what was estimated to be 13 percent of the reported number, much more food was ordered and prepared than there were men to eat it. In addition, the ration itself was found to be unduly large; soldiers’ preferences were such that they would bypass unpopular items; and finally, mess management was far from being all it should have been.

The first remedial action, devised to eliminate the effects of absenteeism, was a fundamental change in the basis of ration issue. After 1 February 1943 daily ration allowance returns were to be based on “the average number expected to be present for the three daily meals.” It was recognized that more persons would be present for some meals than the number estimated, but “experience has proved that the diet will be adequate.”\(^{122}\) The responsibility of commanders for supervising the cooking, serving, and conserving of food for their commands was again emphasized.

About the same time, the chiefs of the supply services and the commanding generals of the service commands were directed to appoint mess supervisors at all posts, camps, and stations under their jurisdiction. This marked a sharp change in policy.\(^{123}\) Within the framework of decentralized administration, the War Department was taking steps to enforce conservation.

During the first six months of 1943 the efforts made by the War Department to clarify and implement conservation measures and make them more effective added up to a full-bodied but loosely controlled conservation program that laid the groundwork for the Food Service Program established in July. The measures taken included poster campaigns, educational courses, and lectures to sharpen understanding of conservation objectives. Regulations revised distribution and accounting procedures and provided for turning in

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\(^{120}\) Rpt, Dir of QM Bd to TQMG, sub: Rpt on the Quartermaster Board, Camp Lee, Va., 1 Feb 42 to 30 Jun 44, pp. 89-101.

\(^{121}\) (1) WD Cir 195, 18 Sep 41, sub: Sales Commissaries, Fld Commissaries, and Rations. (2) WD Cir 297, 2 Sep 42, same sub.

\(^{122}\) WD Cir 16, 11 Jan 43, sub: Revised Procedure for Distr and Accounting for Fld Rations.

\(^{123}\) AGO Memo S30-3-43, 15 Jan 43, sub: Supervision of Messes and Elimination of Waste.
excess supplies and keeping spoilage at a minimum. New courses were added to those already given by the bakers' and cooks' schools. Master menus were revised to permit a more adroit use of leftovers. The Quartermaster Board continued its studies, and the first of a series of food conservation conferences was held at Camp Lee in May 1943. Attended by officers from the bakers' and cooks' schools and representatives of the AAF, the AGF, and the OQMG, the conference covered all the problems of waste, its cause and control.

As a result of the remedial steps taken, waste was considerably reduced, but something was still lacking. As expressed by a representative of the Subsistence Branch, OQMG, "It was evident, that unless close supervision was introduced, our effort in conserving the food supply of the nation was inadequate." The fullest conservation, then, was dependent not so much on regulations as upon trained personnel adequately supervised and kept alive to the value of food-saving devices.

The stepped-up tempo of conservation in the Army coincided with the increased civilian interest in food conservation resulting from developing food shortages. Rumors and accusations of waste aroused a noticeably adverse public reaction. The QMC was conscientious in trying to track down and ascertain the basis for these rumors, which reached a high point early in the spring of 1943. Investigations by the Inspector General's Department disclosed that there was a startling number of misconceptions and baseless rumors and that Army officials were far from willing to countenance wanton misuse of food supplies. The strong defense and clarifying rebuttal of Army authorities succeeded in turning a serious misunderstanding into an opportunity for educating the public.

Army explanations favorably impressed the Truman Committee investigating the national defense program, but the agitation brought home to all agencies concerned how seriously the food situation was regarded by civilians. Public charges of waste undoubtedly hastened the organization of the Food Service Program and to that extent had positive results.

On 1 June 1943, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, ASF, declared that more adequate provision for mess supervision should be made in the ASF, and directed The Quartermaster General to prepare a plan that would designate the OQMG as the staff agency for mess management at ASF headquarters level. General Gregory promptly submitted a plan that was put into effect on 3 July by ASF Circular 45. The Food Service Program was thereby established, but the mere enunciation of a new policy was not sufficient; it was imperative that the objectives of the new program be brought home to the service commands. For this purpose a conference, carefully planned and well attended, was held in Chicago in mid-August. It covered all topics pertinent to mess management and food conservation and demonstrated the

124 Rpt, ASF Food Sv Conf, 11–14 Aug 43, Chicago, Ill., p. 17, address by Lt Col Charles F. Kearney, Subsistence Br, OQMG.
126 (1) Memo, Gen Somervell for TQMG, 1 Jun 43, sub: Mess Supervision. (2) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 26 Jun 43, sub: QM Food Sv. (3) For administrative developments, see Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services [1, Ch. 1].
work that would have to be carried on by service commanders and their directors of food service if the program was to succeed.

Theoretically all administrative elements of the Food Service Program were in existence before its creation. The difference between early messing operations and those instituted by the program lay in the fact that food service activities were now co-ordinated and centralized, with a staff authority set up in Washington. New emphasis was placed on providing trained mess personnel, standardizing proceedings, and popularizing methods of saving food. An educational program was instituted in which conferences became the vehicles for transmitting the data developed by the Food Service Section (later Branch) of the OQMG, and studies of messing procedure and continuing reports of operations provided the basis for conservation doctrine. The Army program for preventing food wastage was centered on careful training in food conservation for every Army cook and baker. This was accomplished through the system of bakers' and cooks' schools, which was expanded until it reached a peak of ninety-nine schools. In addition to this training, demonstration teams gave refresher courses to show the latest and most efficient methods of preparing and handling foods.

Within a year after its establishment the Food Service Program had accomplished considerable improvement in food preparation and service and a reduction of food waste. This had been achieved as a result of the many projects conducted by the Food Service Branch. Among these was the introduction of the "Cooks' Worksheet," which contained complete instructions to cooks on methods of preparation and the amounts of food to prepare. It also required them to report whether the correct amount had been prepared, to list edible and over-all waste, and to show the disposition of leftovers. For an eight-month period beginning in October 1943, the figures on the reduction of edible waste revealed a saving of 10,709,510 pounds of edible food in ASF installations alone.

Weekly drives, of great importance in the education of mess sergeants and cooks, were conducted to improve certain phases of mess operations, among them the storage and care of meats, the use of leftovers, the making of coffee, the preparation of vegetables, and the elimination of bread waste. The drive conducted on meat cooking alone demonstrated that it was possible to save as much as $20,000,000 a year by roasting meats at proper temperatures. Furthermore, conservation efforts reduced the issue of shortening in most service commands by at least 50 percent.

The Food Service Program also effected other savings. The food service directors in the service commands and the personnel of the Food Service Branch, OQMG, carefully screened requisitions submitted for the construction of new mess halls and the acquisition of new equipment at designated installations. They surveyed feeding operations at the installations and proposed plans for the reorganization and expansion of existing serving facilities that saved the government not only money but also critical materials.

Although much had been accomplished, the QMC had to continue and even broaden its efforts to save food, for the need to conserve food increased

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127 A Review of Activities and Accomplishments, Food Service Branch, Office of The Quartermaster General, address by Maj John W. Ebersole, OQMG, 3d Annual Wartime Conf, National Restaurant Assoc, Chicago, Ill. (circa August 1944), pp. 16ff.
128 Ibid.
rather than decreased. In March 1945 the food supply was found to be “more critical than at any time during the present war.”\textsuperscript{129} New conditions, such as the growing demands of hospitals, compelled fresh investigations and new recommendations. In any event, the tendency toward waste was constant; it could not be eliminated entirely but could only be held in check. When the war ended, food conservation overseas had to receive greater attention, and at home and overseas messing operations had to be evaluated from the point of view of economy and conservation. The activities of the Food Service Program were thus carried over into the postwar period.

The Army’s food conservation program was a relatively novel activity. To be sure posters had urged food conservation in World War I, and the doughboy of that war had participated in a “clean-plate” campaign, but this was fundamentally different from the practical steps taken by the Food Service Branch to assure conservation during World War II and after. Controls had had to be developed, extended, strengthened, and implemented against waste, unsanitary conditions, poor food preparation, and other undesirable conditions, and these controls, in many cases, had been vestigial or nonexistent before the war. Long before the end of the war, food service had become a major operation of the QMC.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{129} Memo, Gen Barnes, OQMG, for CG ASF, 29 Mar 45, sub: Food Sv Program.
\textsuperscript{130} For a more detailed analysis of the Food Service Program see Louis Filler, The Food Service Program, draft of typed monograph in Hist Br, OQMG.
CHAPTER III

Problems of Industrial Demobilization

In the midst of mobilizing the country’s resources for war, various government agencies, including the War Department, had to give thought to the problems of industrial demobilization. The need to anticipate the economic impact of peace upon the country had been amply demonstrated by the industrial dislocations that followed World War I. Only by advance planning could an orderly transition from a war to a peacetime economy be assured. Hence, even as the Quartermaster Corps directed its efforts toward streamlining procurement procedures, maintaining an even and adequate flow of matériel from manufacturers, and distributing and issuing food, clothing, equipment, and general supplies expeditiously, the Corps and all other supply agencies of the War Department had to plan for the time when production programs would be revised downward, when contracts would be terminated, and when facilities and matériel would become surplus to the needs of the Army.

The cumulative economic effects of World War II were greater and the resulting problems of demobilization more numerous and difficult than in World War I when industrial production did not reach its potential peak because of the war’s brevity. More than three times as many contractors were involved in manufacturing supplies for the War Department during World War II. Cancellations on V-J Day of the undelivered balances on contracts were more than ten times the value of such balances at the end of World War I. The far-flung operations of World War II necessitated longer supply lines and many more installations to maintain them. The increased size and complexity of the military organization for this war and its supporting industry made imperative the development of demobilization plans that could be put into effect immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. Although the demobilization task was more complex than in 1918–19, the government was better able to handle the problems because of the greater centralization of governmental control, the possibility of drawing on earlier experience, and the awareness of the need for advance demobilization planning.¹

Planning for Demobilization

As early as December 1942 the War Department gave formal consideration to

¹ For a detailed account of planning, see Erna Risch, Demobilization Planning and Operation in the Quartermaster Corps, QMC Historical Studies, 19 (Washington, 1948).
the question of demobilization, and it in-
agurated an official program of demo-
bilization planning in the spring of 1943
when the Chief of Staff directed the Com-
manding General, Army Service Forces,
to “initiate preliminary studies exploring
the field of basic policy and broad plan-
ning for demobilization of our military
organization after the cessation of hos-
tilities.”  

Demobilization Planning Organization

A thoroughly integrated organization
for demobilization planning took shape in
the War Department during 1943. At its
head was the Special Planning Division,
which was established in July as a special
staff division of the General Staff, replac-
ing the Project Planning Division created
in April by the Commanding General,
ASF, in the office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Service Commands. The Special
Planning Division supervised and co-ordi-
nated all postwar planning activities in the
War Department and maintained liaison
with other governmental agencies engaged
in similar planning. In carrying out its
duties, the division called upon existing
War Department staff and operating agen-
cies for exhaustive study and solution of
specific demobilization problems it as-
signed to them.

Early demobilization plans were made
in secrecy lest the public be misled into
thinking that the end of the war was im-
minent and that production levels did not
need to be maintained. As a consequence,
the QMC and the other technical services
were not brought into active participation
in the program until late in the summer of
1943 when it became apparent that indus-
trial demobilization would have to be
highly decentralized for execution in the

technical services and that various phases
would have to be discussed with represen-
tatives of industry. At that point the
ASF advised the chiefs of the technical
services to establish demobilization units
and arranged a meeting for 31 August, at
which time it reviewed the organization
for demobilization planning at head-
quarters and the work accomplished by
that date.

The Quartermaster General had already
established a committee composed princi-
pally of the chiefs of the divisions within
the OQMG in order that complete co-
ordination might be effected throughout
the Corps in exploring the field of demobi-
лизацию planning. A formal organization
was not set up in the OQMG until the fall
when Headquarters, ASF, impressed with
the complexity and scope of the demobili-
zation problems, directed The Quar-
tmaster General to establish a demobiliza-
tion planning unit. Although experience
had shown that it was best to assign for de-
mobilization planning personnel who were
employed on the current duties of their
offices, the ASF felt that supervision and
direction of such planning in each staff
echelon required “the undivided attention
of competent personnel.”

As a consequence, the OQMG estab-
lished a Demobilization Planning Branch

2 Memo, CoS for CG ASF, 14 Apr 43, sub: Demob
Plng. (File numbers for documents referred to in this
chapter are omitted since all can be found in the 370.1
and the 380 series.)
3 Memo, Actg SW for Dir of Special Plng Div, 22
Jul 43, sub: Orgn and Functions.
4 (1) Memo, Dir of Industrial Demob, ASF, for
TQMG, 23 Aug 43, sub: Plng for Industrial Demob.
(2) Memo for File, Col Lawrence Westbrook, Exec
Secy, Special Committee on Mat Demob Plng, ASF,
31 Aug 43, no sub.
5 OQMG OO 40-4, 31 Jul 43, sub: Demob Plng.
6 Memo, CoS ASF, for TQMG et al., 16 Nov 43,
sub: Demob Plng.
in the Organization Planning and Control Division in November. It functioned in a staff capacity to supervise, co-ordinate, and control all demobilization planning within the QMC. The branch also acted as the liaison office for contact with all other echelons on matters pertaining to demobilization. At the same time, a demobilization planning unit was set up in each of three staff and six operating divisions within the OQMG. These units were responsible for specific phases of planning assigned to them and for co-ordinating all planning within their respective divisions.

The demobilization planning units in the divisions and the Demobilization Planning Branch constituted the two higher echelons of planning within the QMC. A third echelon existed in the depots, for at the direction of The Quartermaster General a demobilization planning unit was established at each of the Quartermaster depots and Quartermaster sections of ASF depots. These units initiated, supervised, and co-ordinated all planning within the depots.

The operating units accomplished the detailed planning required to implement demobilization plans, while the higher echelons of authority in the War Department General Staff developed over-all policies and procedures. The Special Planning Division reviewed the reports or studies made by the operating units on specific demobilization problems and, when necessary, forwarded them to appropriate General Staff divisions for clearance and then to higher authority for approval. Once approved, these reports became part of the final demobilization plan after the implementing regulations or legislation, where indicated, had been drafted and approved.

Matériel Demobilization Plans

When the Project Planning Division, ASF, first analyzed the problems of demobilization in April 1943, it divided them into two broad categories: manpower and industry. The latter included a wide range of problems, such as contract termination, disposition of government-owned and sponsored plants, and disposal of surplus matériel.

As the problems of matériel demobilization became clearly defined, they were assigned to appropriate War Department agencies for study and solution, and a statement of the premises and assumptions to be used as the basis for planning accompanied each assignment. The Project Planning Division assumed that existing agencies and machinery would be used as much as possible; that demobilization would be decentralized to the greatest extent practicable; that plans would be flexible and subject to constant review; and that curtailment of wartime production
and release of facilities for conversion to peacetime production would be accomplished as rapidly as the military and economic situation would permit. At the same time, demobilization plans were to be phased by periods, with Period I covering the interval from the defeat of Germany to the cessation of all hostilities; Period II, from the cessation of all hostilities, which was assumed to be upon the defeat of Japan, until the completion of final demobilization; and Period III, postwar planning.

Until 1945, demobilization planning was concerned for the most part with those problems that pertained to Period I and specifically with matériel demobilization. This planning was centered on developing procedures for dismantling the war machinery for the procurement and distribution of military supplies and redirecting production into civilian channels. The Matériel Demobilization Plan, Period I, required detailed provisions for action by subordinate units in Washington and by field installations. At the same time extensive co-ordination was necessary to insure successful and speedy operation. To promote this purpose, the Matériel Demobilization Plan for each echelon was based upon and co-ordinated with the plan of the next higher echelon; for example, the OQMG plan was based on that of the ASF and the plan of a Quartermaster depot was based on that of the OQMG. Each plan included the assignment, within the echelon, of responsibility for carrying out specific actions designed to accomplish the operations for matériel demobilization prescribed for that echelon.

The major portion of the Matériel Demobilization Plan dealt with the termination and settlement of contracts, the clearance of contractors' plants to allow rapid reconversion to civilian industry, and the disposal of property, including raw materials, partially completed articles, and finished end items. The plan was intended to be so comprehensive and so workable that, with its accompanying drafts of directives, it could be applied without modification on V Day to the execution of actual matériel demobilization operations. Continuous refinement of planning, of proper assembling and recording of information, and of procedures and records established in advance throughout subordinate echelons was necessary to achieve this end.

Furthermore, in order that all echelons might develop plans based on the same criteria, the Special Planning Division, in co-operation with the G-3 and G-4 Divisions of the War Department General Staff, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces, formulated a statement of policies and assumptions governing industrial demobilization for the guidance of all concerned. The objective of industrial demobilization planning was to speed reconversion from war to civilian production, while still maintaining maximum war production needed for current military requirements, by releasing promptly those manufacturers whose services became sur-

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11 The first premises, which were in accord with those contained in a report by the Special Army Committee entitled Survey of Current Military Program, 15 March 1943, revised 28 April, were set forth in the report of the Project Planning Division of 18 June. Rpt, Project Plng Div, Office of DCoS for SvCs, to CG ASF, 18 Jun 43, sub: Survey of Demob Plng.

12 Special Plng Div, 19 Mar 45, sub: WD Policies and Assumptions Governing Industrial and Mat Demob. This third revision of policies first formulated in the fall of 1943 was approved by the Under Secretary of War on 7 April 1945 and by the Deputy Chief of Staff on 10 April.
plus to the war effort. Achievement of this end necessitated immediate termination of the maximum quantity of war production consistent with continuing military requirements and sound economic practice. It also required early and equitable settlement of claims of both prime contractors and subcontractors under terminated war contracts, adequate interim financing until such settlement could be achieved, and prompt removal of termination inventories and government-owned machine tools and equipment from plants of war contractors in accordance with the provisions of the Contract Settlement Act. It was further necessary to redistribute efficiently between manufacturing plants with excesses and those in short supply, materials, supplies, tools, industrial equipment, and other facilities, and not only to declare as surplus but also to report promptly to the disposal agency such of these as were no longer required by the War Department. Finally, it was essential to retain in pilot production or in stand-by reserve such government-owned facilities and equipment as might be necessary to provide for continuing research and development and for the availability of adequate production capacity to insure military security in the postwar period.

Probably the most important single factor shaping matériel demobilization planning was the question of timing—the great unknown element in all the plans. From the beginning the planners were aware of an ever increasing possibility that they might be faced with a sudden collapse of the enemy and a demand for immediate demobilization action. Although the pressure to achieve a high state of readiness for V-E Day was greatest in 1944 and 1945, planning was always conducted on the assumption that “tomorrow is V Day.”

The use of this formula was of great importance since it not only required workable plans but also insured their being kept up to date through constant revision. After the Project Planning Division had assigned the broad problems of matériel demobilization as a group to the Office of the Director of Matériel, ASF, in June 1943, and study had revealed that action to implement industrial demobilization would have to be decentralized to the technical services, the Director of Industrial Demobilization, ASF, instructed the QMC and the other technical services to prepare minimum skeleton plans for matériel demobilization by 20 December. Incorporating the information requested, the OQMG submitted a plan that the director felt reflected a sound approach to the problems presented and gave “promise of excellent ultimate development.”

The OQMG indicated that the small amount of War Department equipment and machine tools used in the manufacture of Quartermaster supplies would be removed on V Day from the contractor’s plants and shipped to, and stored in, the nearest Quartermaster depot. It was therefore not desirable to designate points of storage and procedure for storage. Materials to be cleared from contractors’ plants fell into two categories, for each of which the plan indicated the disposition. (1) Uniform cloth, canvas, duck, webbing, minor findings, and minor items of metal and hardware, which were the property of the

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13 Rpt, Lt Col Robert W. Chasteney, Jr., Résumé of the Activities of the Office of Director of Industrial Demobilization and its Predecessors, 1943-45, p. 8, OCMIL.
14 Memo, Dir of Industrial Demob, ASF, for TQMG et al., 23 Nov 43, sub: Skeleton Plan for Mat Demob.
15 Memo, Dir of Industrial Demob, ASF, for TQMG, 1 Feb 44, sub: Mat Demob Plng for QMC.
United States and supplied to the contractors from Army stock, would be returned to the nearest Quartermaster depot. 

(2) Materials and supplies of all kinds procured by contractors directly from other commercial concerns and used in producing Quartermaster equipment would be retained by the contractors when such supplies were suitable for use in future production of commercial products. Those supplies that could not be so used would be turned over to the QMG and removed to the nearest Quartermaster depot. The plan also established procedures that could be put into effect in the event an emergency developed. In addition, as a part of its planning, the OQMG directed each major procurement depot to maintain a running inventory—to be corrected monthly—showing War Department equipment, machine tools, and materials in contractors' plants, and indicating the storage depots that must be prepared to receive them.

Insofar as industrial plants owned by the War Department were concerned, the QMC had none to place in stand-by reserve; it declared one—the Searchlight Mirror Corp., Cincinnati, Ohio—surplus; and it retained for indefinite operation the factories located at the Jeffersonville and the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depots. The Corps had no plants sponsored by the Defense Plant Corporation that were to be retained, and The Quartermaster General recommended disposal of two such projects—the expansion of the Towmeter Co., Cleveland, Ohio, and the Rhoem Manufacturing Co., Stockton, Calif. The Corps had no industrial or expansion projects for the production of Quartermaster equipment or supplies that were to be stopped immediately on V Day.  

Early in 1944 the Director of Industrial Demobilization, ASF, instructed The Quartermaster General to refine this skeleton plan into a concrete Matériel Demobilization Plan, Period I, and to carry out its preparatory operations, integrating pertinent parts of the plan with current operating procedures. This directive initiated the first of many revisions of the OQMG plan during 1944. Some were the result of efforts to make the plan conform to changes introduced into the ASF plan. Others were the product of planning by the divisions within the OQMG. As planning proceeded, more and more provisions of the plan were converted into standing operating procedures so that, when V-E Day actually did arrive, many of the eighty-six actions provided for in the plan were carried out under these procedures, the plan serving merely as a check list.

**Supply Plans**

While matériel demobilization plans were being developed, the War Department was exploring other aspects of supply logistics, among them the disposal of property, supplies, and equipment of a military nature or their retention as war reserves; the selection of storage depots for such supplies; and the adoption of a supply plan for the peacetime Military Establishment.

In the summer of 1943 the Project Planning Division requested the Director of Operations, ASF, to undertake a study of four possible plans of supply for the Army,

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16 Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 20 Dec 43, sub: Skeleton Plan for Mat Demob.

17 Preparatory operations included, for example, the computation of requirements for end items for Period I and of the required production of such items during the period, as well as the preparation of detailed procurement plans for those items.

18 Memo, Dir of Industrial Demob, ASF, for TQMG, 1 Feb 44, sub: Mat Demob Plng for QMC.
and he, in turn, directed the chiefs of the technical services to submit their recommendations by 1 August. In his report General Gregory, after reviewing the supply system of the preceding forty years, emphasized the need for elasticity and flexibility in any peacetime supply system and recommended that it be “patterned upon the present direct system of supply, which has, to date, stood the test for wartime supply in the Theater of Operations and the Zone of the Interior.”

Under the direct system of supply the chiefs of the technical services were responsible for adequately stocking depots, and station commanders were authorized to deal directly with depot commanders on all supply matters. The basic plan of supply for the peacetime Military Establishment, approved by the Secretary of War on 1 December 1943, continued the use of the direct system of supply for the continental United States but provided for a territorial system of supply for all overseas bases. Under the territorial system the commander of a given area controlled all supply installations and was responsible for the supply of troops located within the limits of his command. Requisitions for supplies required in these supply installations were submitted to a designated port of embarkation, which secured the supplies from depots under the control of the chiefs of the technical services, who were responsible for maintaining adequate stocks to support the overseas forces.

Other aspects of supply required attention, particularly the disposition on V Day and thereafter of ASF supplies and equipment at, or en route to, ports in this country and the repair and disposition of supplies and equipment in the theaters involved in the war with Germany. To implement a War Department plan, agencies under the control of the Director of Supply, ASF, drafted a tentative plan, which, in anticipation of a conference on 15 June 1944, was submitted to the technical services for study.

The conference revealed the need for revising the ASF plan to effect greater coordination with the planning in the Office of the Chief of Transportation and for incorporating more specific details. During the summer a number of other conferences were held, and the plan was further revised. Data submitted by the OQMG for inclusion in the plan designated the Quartermaster depots that would receive supplies diverted from overseas shipment and the standards of repair and disposition.

On 4 September copies of the ASF Basic Supply Plan, Period I, and Implementation of ASF Supply Plan for Period I were sent to the chiefs of the technical services with instructions for each to prepare the necessary detailed plans required by his agency to carry out the directive. The QMC plan was ready by 25 September, and it was sent, together with the ASF plan and its implementation, to the commanding officers of the Quartermaster depots and the Quartermaster supply officers at ASF depots. They were directed to re-

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19 (1) Memo, Brig Gen William F. Tompkins for Dir of Opns, ASF, 22 Jun 43, sub: Demob Ping. (2) Memo, Gen Lutes, Dir of Opns, ASF, for TQMG et al., 7 Jul 43, same sub.
20 Memo, Gen Gregory for CG ASF [circa 1 Aug 43], no sub.
21 Memo, Actg Dir of Plng Div, ASF, for TQMG et al., 9 Dec 43, sub: Plan of Sup for Peacetime Mil Establishment.
22 Memo, Brig Gen Frank A. Heileman, Dir of Sup ASF, for TQMG et al., 9 Jun 44, sub: Draft of Directive to Implement WD Plan for Disp of ASF-Supplied Mat.
23 Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, for CG ASF, 14 Jul 44, sub: ASF Sup Demob Plan for Period I.
24 Memo, Gen Heileman, Dir of Sup, ASF, for TQMG et al., 4 Sep 44, sub: ASF Basic Sup Plan, Period I.
view it and take action to insure compliance with the provisions of the Quartermaster plan.\textsuperscript{25}

The keynote of the supply plan for Period I was simplicity, and accordingly existing policies and procedures in reference to levels of supply and supply procedures were to be used to the maximum. On V Day, unless specifically directed by appropriate authority, all supplies at sea en route to the European and North African theaters and to the Middle East including the Persian Gulf Command were to be delivered as scheduled. All supplies in the United States en route to these areas were to be directed to the designated depots and returned to the jurisdiction of the chief of the technical service of origin, except subsistence, Quartermaster individual clothing and equipment, medical supplies and equipment, all supplies and equipment distributed by the Morale Services and the Special Services Divisions, and supplies for civilians in the liberated areas. All edited requisitions and shipping orders covering the above exceptions were to be honored, but all others were to be canceled.

Later the OQMG requested so many exceptions—such as coal, maintenance and operating supplies for overseas can and drum plants, spare parts, repair supplies and equipment, and the like—from the V Day embargo provisions that Headquarters, ASF, instead of repeatedly changing the plan, called attention to the fact that upon request of the theater commanders shipment of additional items might be specially authorized.\textsuperscript{26} In the absence of such requests by the theater commanders, shipments could be made when, in the opinion of a chief of a technical service, an exception to the V Day embargo would be desirable. In that case, a recommendation was to be made to the responsible port commander for clearance with the theater concerned.\textsuperscript{27} This policy was to cover all subsequent requests for exceptions.

To implement the supply plan, provision was made for the advance marking of overseas shipments. Overseas requisitions edited in the zone of interior and requisitions initiated there, directing shipment of supplies and equipment to the European and North African theaters, the United States Army Forces in the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf Command, were to be marked “STO” for stop, to indicate the embargo was to apply to these shipments, or “SHP” for ship, to indicate that the excepted items were to proceed to their overseas destination. On the day the embargo was put into effect, the “STO” marking was to be discontinued inasmuch as only requisitions for items to be marked “SHP” would be processed.\textsuperscript{28} Later revisions of the supply plan refined its details and widened its application by including shipments to other command areas.

By the fall of 1944 considerable progress had been made in planning, and all plans had been consolidated under the broader title of Plans for Period I (Redeployment, Readjustment, and Demobilization). Quartermaster Corps matériel demobilization and supply plans were similarly

\textsuperscript{25} Ltr, TQMG to COs QM Depots et al., 25 Sep 44, sub: V-E Day Sup Demob Plans.

\textsuperscript{26} (1) Memo, Col Oliver E. Cound, OQMG, for CG ASF, 30 Sep 44, sub: Basic Sup Plan and Implementation. (2) Memo, Cound for CG ASF, 16 Nov 44, sub: Exception of Repair Supplies and Equip. (3) Memo, Gen Barnes, OQMG, for CG ASF, 22 Nov 44, sub: Exception of Certain Spare Parts, Tools, and Supplies.

\textsuperscript{27} 1st Ind, Dir of Plans and Ops, ASF, 21 Nov 44, on Memo, Col Cound, OQMG, for CG ASF, 16 Nov 44, sub: Exception of Repair Supplies and Equip.

\textsuperscript{28} Ltr, TAG to CG ASF et al., 12 Oct 44, sub: Advance Marking of Overseas Shpmts, AG 400.161 (30 Sep 44) OB-S-SPMOT-M.
consolidated and published in March 1945. 29

Although it had been assumed in planning that preparations would have to be made for the initiation of action to meet the sudden impact of V-E Day, in reality the whole transition to Period I was accomplished gradually over a period of several weeks, beginning early in April 1945. When V-E Day occurred, many of the actions for which provision had been made in the Matériel Demobilization Plan had either been placed in effect so gradually or were so well established as standing operating procedures that to have activated them formally on V-E Day would have been an anticlimax. Actually numerous actions were canceled because they were covered by standing operating procedures. The transition that occurred on V-E Day, while definitely the result of two years of intensive planning, was nonetheless of a different type than might have been anticipated from the general trend of the early planning.

Planning for Period II

In planning for Period II, emphasis continued to be placed upon matériel demobilization, and the pattern of planning developed for Period I was utilized, though modified to some extent since planning in the second period was based on occupation rather than active hostilities. According to the time schedule set up when demobilization planning was initiated, Period I (covering the interval from the defeat of Germany to the cessation of all hostilities) would be of eighteen months' duration. It was assumed that the redeployment of troops from the European to the Pacific theater would be completed in that period before any large-scale demobilization of the armed forces occurred. Period II, lasting from twelve to eighteen months would start with the cessation of hostilities, upon the defeat of Japan, and end with the completion of final demobilization.

In actuality, Period I was to be abruptly telescoped, and intimations of that fact caused the Commanding General, ASF, on 9 May 1945, to direct the preparation of a Period II demobilization plan for use in the event of the sudden surrender of Japan. Because of the rapidity with which events moved toward V-J Day, the ASF interim plan became the final plan for Period II. This plan consisted of three parts: the first set forth strategic concepts, policies, and assumptions; the second, logistical data revised periodically; and the third, the plans of the functional staff directors.

By 25 July, the OQMG had published its implementing plan. 30 V-J Day occurred before a depot plan could be drafted, but in anticipation of this development, The Quartermaster General teletyped instructions on 10 August to commanding officers at Quartermaster installations, directing them to take all necessary action in preparation for the possible early activation of the OQMG Interim Plan. Unless otherwise specified, each action listed in the plan was to be put into effect upon notification to The Quartermaster General by the ASF functional staff director having responsibility for it. The Director of the Organization Planning and Control Division...

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sion, OQMG, would then transmit this notice of activation to all OQMG divisions and field installations. Certain actions became effective automatically while others needed no formal implementation inasmuch as they required continuous operations prior to Period II or were standing operating procedures.

The OQMG Interim Plan for Period II, like that for Period I, placed primary emphasis upon supply and matériel demobilization, and the implementing procedures were carried over from the earlier planning. The readjustment of production was the heart of matériel demobilization planning in both periods. Requirements had been revised downward following the defeat of Germany, and, in anticipation of the defeat of Japan, the ASF initiated a computation of a supply program for Period II. Procurement programs were reviewed, and the ASF directed the chiefs of the technical services to review and submit a list of all items, both principal and secondary, for which continued procurement after V-J Day would be necessary. As a consequence, it was possible to reduce requirements to zero for practically all secondary and most principal items, except such items as subsistence, petroleum, spare parts, medical supplies, and housekeeping items necessary to sustain the Army during the period of occupation and demobilization. These advance preparations, including the preparation of telegrams that could be dispatched to war contractors in a matter of hours, permitted production, immediately upon the President’s announcement of Japan’s surrender, to be cut back to levels needed for Period II operations. Thus the detailed planning engaged in during the war years in anticipation of V-E Day and V-J Day promoted orderly demobilization.

**Downward Revision of the Production Program**

**Special Army Supply Program**

Planning for the downward revision of production, the core of the matériel demobilization problem, was based on the Special Army Supply Program. In this program, requirements personnel estimated the amounts of matériel needed by the Army in accordance with troop bases projected by higher authority to show the size and distribution of the Army during Periods I, II, and III. For planning purposes they compared the Special Army Supply Program with current procurement plans to determine the approximate effect of V-E Day on current operations, that is, the extent of decreases or increases in the procurement of individual items as of a particular date. Planners then estimated from this comparison the work load to be expected, the personnel required to handle it, the items affected, and the number of contractors to be released by terminations. In turn, the contractors could be advised of the expected effect of V-E Day on their operations so that they could make their own reconversion plans. The basic objective was to permit reconversion to normal, peacetime operations with the minimum amount of shock to the civilian economy and at the same time provide adequate protection for the government’s interests.

The ASF called for the first Special Army Supply Program in the fall of 1943. Utilizing a troop basis furnished by the Special Planning Division, the OQMG

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31 Memo, Dir of Reqmts and Stock Control Div, ASF, for TQMG et al., 11 Aug 45, sub: Preparation for Activation of Period II Procurement Program—Ground.
and other supply agencies estimated requirements hurriedly and without benefit of decisions from higher authority on many basic rules. In the course of computing the program, the OQMG called attention to a number of problems.32

One of these was the use of an over-all on-hand figure as assets applied against gross requirements in the Special Army Supply Program. This procedure assumed that all equipment in the hands of troops as of 1 January 1944 could be considered as full assets, and all equipment obtained from demobilized troops could be reissued. This assumption was unrealistic since full repossession was impossible. The OQMG therefore recommended that a percentage, such as 25 percent, reflecting the amount of reissuable equipment after salvage and repair, be applied to authorized initial issues outstanding, in order to obtain an estimate of stocks in the hands of troops that could be considered as assets.33 Furthermore, in this first Special Army Supply Program of 7 November 1943 all stocks estimated to be overseas had been considered as a full asset, the assumption being made that inventories in one area on 1 January 1944 were immediately transferable without loss to another area. The OQMG argued that perfect mobility of stocks without loss between various theaters was not possible and recommended that overseas stocks be adjusted by a percentage, such as 50 percent, in order to estimate stocks in the theaters that were available for issue.

Although Headquarters, ASF, agreed that a percentage of the equipment in the hands of troops who were to be demobilized should be discounted as an asset to allow for salvage and repair losses, it did not concur in the Quartermaster suggestions and particularly rejected the 50 percent adjustment proposed on stocks to be reissued or transferred. Headquarters, ASF, called attention to the fact that it was assumed, although not yet approved as policy, that Quartermaster subsistence, clothing, and bakery equipment in the European and African theaters would not be transferred. This covered the major items of interest to The Quartermaster General with respect to transfer.34

The OQMG also questioned the two criteria used in selecting items for which war reserves had been established in the program of 7 November—that items should be of a noncommercial type, and that they should not deteriorate in storage within a ten-year period. These criteria were inadequate for Quartermaster items. Later the ASF decided that the war reserve was to consist of those items of military supply and equipment of commercial or noncommercial type which were essential to equip, supply, and maintain the armed forces either in training or in active operations and which could not be obtained commercially in sufficient quantities immediately upon mobilization or during the period required for industry to make sufficient deliveries.35

32 Memo, Col Roy C. Moore, OQMG, for Special Committee on Mat Demob Plng, ASF, 14 Oct 43, sub: Potential Recovery of Surplus Stocks Overseas.
33 (1) Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, for Dir of Mat, ASF, 17 Feb 44, sub: Computation of Special ASP for Demob Plng. (2) See also Chief of Reqmts Br, Mil Plng Div, to Chief of Demob Plng Br, OP&C Div, OQMG, 10 Feb 44, sub: Directive on Computation of Special ASP for Demob Plng.
34 Memo, Dir of Reqmts Div, ASF, for Dir of Industrial Demob, 25 Feb 44, sub: Conf with OQMG Representatives on Demob Plng.
35 (1) Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, for Dir of Mat, ASF, 17 Feb 44; Computation of Special ASP for Demob Plng. (2) Memo, Dir of Reqmts Div, ASF, for TQMG et al., 15 Apr 44, sub: Special ASP for Demob Plng, Sec. I, Period I, 15 Jul 44.
This first Special Army Supply Program was revised as policy decisions were made by higher echelons. Even while the Requirements Branch, OQMG, was revising the program, it was also considering methods which late in the summer of 1944 resulted in the establishment of a procedure whereby that program could be kept up to date to reflect major influences, such as factors and allowances and latest available on-hand figures, in order that a current revised Special Army Supply Program requirement could be reviewed continuously in the light of the regular Army Supply Program. With such comparison as a basis, items could be classified in one of four categories, giving the Requirements Branch an indication at any time of those items which required various types of action in the event that the Special Army Supply Program was activated. The Special Army Supply Program thereupon was revised to account for major changes in factors for selected items and adjustments of net requirements to reflect latest available stocks actually on hand.

With the introduction of the supply control system, the Requirements Branch, OQMG, began to prepare revised Period I requirements on a supply control basis for all Quartermaster principal items. These computations in the form of Supply Control Reports served the purpose of and superseded the Special Army Supply Program. Collectively they were referred to as MPR-20X. When the end of the war in Europe was in sight, the ASF issued instructions covering the implementation of MPR-20X. If V-E Day occurred before the latest revision had been completed, the existing Supply Control Reports would be used, subject to certain prescribed adjustments. If this procedure resulted in any significant change in the amount of any item to be procured, approval for the proposed changes had to be obtained from Headquarters, ASF, within forty-eight hours after V-E Day was announced.

** Facilities Plans **

One of the most useful ends served by adequate estimates of requirements was the development of facilities plans forecasting the economic impact of V Day on the production facilities of the United States. Such plans were based on the assumption that designated sections of the Special Army Supply Program were to become the basis for procurement as of a given date. This assumption enabled the planners to determine the effect of large cutbacks on facilities that could not be absorbed immediately into civilian production. While production scheduling was important to the QMC, practically all of its items were produced by facilities that could be converted quickly and with little effort to the production of civilian items. This fact was partially recognized by eliminating items of clothing, subsistence, and fuels and lubricants from the analysis made in the first facilities plan. Later the QMC was permitted to omit textiles, paper products, and post-exchange (PX) items in the preparation of new facilities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage No.</th>
<th>Stop-Work Stages</th>
<th>Instructions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Raw material</td>
<td>a. Unopened bales not to be opened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Open bales on which no grading or sorting has been done to be rebaled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Raw wool on which grading or sorting has been started to be completely sorted and graded, and rebaled and weighed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Tops (undyed)</td>
<td>Wool and/or other fibers that actually have started in the process of top making (dusting, scouring, carding, backwashing, gilling, combing, gilling, finishing) shall be completed into tops (undyed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tops (dyed)</td>
<td>a. Tops that have been wound on spools or forms or inserted on spindles but not yet started in the process of dyeing will be returned to the original undyed “top” state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b. Tops to which dye has actually been applied shall be completed into dyed tops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Colored and/or undyed tops shall not be blended for shade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Recombed tops (undyed and dyed)</td>
<td>Tops that actually have started in the process of being recombed shall be completed into recombed tops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yarn</td>
<td>Tops (undyed or dyed) that actually have started in the process of being made into yarn, shall be completed into single ply. The machinery and bobbins may be cleared by winding the yarn onto tubes, cones, or into skeins.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>b. Open bales on which no grading or sorting has been done to be rebaled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c. Raw wool on which grading or sorting has been started to be completely sorted and graded, and rebaled and weighed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Stock in preparatory processes</td>
<td>Wool and/or other fibers that actually have started in the process of being garnetted or picked shall be completed into garnetted or picked stock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pickered wool</td>
<td>Rags and/or other stock in the process of being garnetted or picked shall be completed into garnetted or picked stock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Wool (dyed)</td>
<td>Wool and/or other stock to which dye has actually been applied shall be dried and weighed. Wool and/or other stock to which dye has not been applied shall be packed and weighed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Blending and emulsifying</td>
<td>No further wool will be blended and oiled; wool actually being blended and oiled will be completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Yarn</td>
<td>Wool that actually has started in the process of being made into yarn, shall be completed into single ply. The machinery and bobbins may be cleared by winding the yarn onto tubes, cones, or into skeins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yarn (plied)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   | Yarn that actually has started in the process of being doubled or twisted shall be completed into plied yarn. The machinery and bobbins may be cleared by winding the yarn onto tubes, cones, or into skeins. | Work on yarn that actually has started in the preparation for weaving shall be stopped at the following stages:  
   a. Jack spools or dresser spools that have been started, may be completely wound.  
   b. Warper beams that have been started, may be completely wound.  
   c. Loom beams in the process of being slashed or dressed, may be completely slashed or dressed. | Loom beams, on looms, actually in the process of weaving may continue in process until the warp is woven out and the loom is cleared. | A piece of cloth that actually has started in the process of burling and mending shall continue in process until the piece has been completely mended. | Cloth that actually has started in the first process of finishing, after burling and mending, shall be completed into finished cloth except that work on cloth that is to be piece dyed shall be stopped at the completion of the operation immediately preceding dyeing and the cloth shall be dried.  
   Cloth that actually has entered the dye kettle in the process of piece dyeing, shall be dyed and completed into finished cloth. | Cloth that actually has started in the first process of finishing, after burling and mending, shall be completed into finished cloth, except that work on cloth that is to be piece dyed shall be stopped at the completion of the operation immediately preceding dyeing and the cloth shall be dried.  
   Cloth that actually has entered the dye kettle in the process of piece dyeing, shall be dyed and completed into finished cloth. |
## Chart 2—Stop-Work Stages for Clearing Machinery Under JTR 241.3, on the Combed and Carded Systems of the Cotton Textile Manufacturing Industry

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Stage No.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Raw cotton*</td>
<td>a. Unopened bales shall not be opened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Open cotton, to and including roving</td>
<td>a. All opened cotton, picker laps, card sliver in cans, sliver laps, ribbon laps, combed sliver in cans, drawing sliver in cans, and roving shall be deemed &quot;common items,&quot; reverting to the contractor unless satisfactory evidence to the contrary is presented by the contractor. (Where cotton acquired for the terminated contract is of a grade or staple which is foreign to the contractor's regular production, the contracting officer will recognize as equitable reimbursement, apart from the reimbursement also due because of a downward change in the cotton market, a separate reimbursement to the extent of the difference between the price for the contract cotton and the contractor's regular grade and staple. Contractor shall take inventory at each of the stages mentioned above, in accordance with his normal inventory methods.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yarn</td>
<td>a. The spinning operation under way shall be continued only to a complete doff, and the yarn packaged and weighed.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Warp yarn in preparation for weaving</td>
<td>a. Yarn in the process of warping onto section beams shall be continued only to the extent necessary to complete the particular section beams then in process, and the yarn shall then be packaged and weighed.** Yarn remaining on creels shall be taken off, and then packaged and weighed.**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Grey cloth</td>
<td>a. Loom beams, on looms, in the process of weaving shall continue in process until the warp is woven out, and the loom is cleared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Grey cloth at finishing plant</td>
<td>a. Grey cloth, unopened, at finishing plant shall not be opened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cloth, dyed and finished</td>
<td>a. Cloth on to which dyestuff has actually been applied shall be completed into the specification fabric, measured and packaged.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Special instructions relative to stock-dyed cotton: (1) unopened bales shall not be opened; (2) all open stock and stock in process in openers shall be continued through openers, and then packaged and weighed; (3) all stock actually in process of being dyed shall be completed, dried, packaged, and weighed; and (4) all dyed stock in process in pickers (or in form of picker laps), or in cards (or in form of card sliver), or in sliver lap, ribbon lap, or comers shall be completed into combed sliver, packaged and weighed, where combed sliver is the specified item, or shall be spun into single yarn, where yarn is the specified item, and then packaged and weighed.**

** Where the contractor is required under these regulations to package yarns, by reason of his nonretention of same for his own use, such packaging shall be in a form and manner most conducive to ready transfer and disposition, in accordance with his available facilities.
plans. These plans were modified as the Special Army Supply Program was revised.

The last revision of the facilities plans was most fortuitous for the War Department since it was made so shortly before V-E Day. In the spring of 1945 the QMC had no facilities plans, for they were required only in those instances where cutbacks of $500,000 or more were indicated for any one month in 1945 for clothing, textiles, and paper items. No cutbacks of that size were indicated in the MPR-20X. The OQMG, however, was making a review to ascertain those items of procurement for which prime contractors should be informed as to tentative plans following V-E Day. Revised Master Production Schedules were being prepared, and, where necessary, contracts were to be terminated or rescheduled, thereby putting into effect the procurement program of Period I.38

Work-Stoppage Points

In any revision of the production program, one of the most important problems was the determination of the point at which work in process of manufacture on V Day ought to be stopped. This problem had engaged the attention of the OQMG quite early. In its first skeleton plan for matériel demobilization of 20 December 1943, the OQMG had laid down general principles for determining when it would be most economical and feasible to terminate work in process in reference to certain broad categories of Quartermaster items.

On the other hand, War Department policy required that all work in process, except as authorized by Headquarters, ASF, should be stopped immediately upon notice of termination of contract, regardless of the state of completion of the items concerned. The OQMG deemed this policy too rigid for application to Quartermaster items, though it conceded that the policy was probably a suitable one to apply to military supplies, the continued production of which would result in an excess of unusable items.

Despite the arguments that the OQMG advanced, War Department policy was modified only to the extent that work in process might be carried to the next stage of production if its removal would be destructive to machinery and if the cost to remove would be greater than the cost to continue. Work in process might also be continued to a stage at which it could be handled, and at which immediate spoilage could be prevented, providing it had a definite commercial value.40

Most Quartermaster production was of such nature that exceptions permitted by the ASF to complete stoppage upon termination did not apply. Nevertheless, even under this restricted policy the OQMG found it advantageous to undertake certain advance planning, particularly the development of stop-work plans that were

37 (1) Memo, Dir of Production Div, ASF, for Chiefs of Tech Svcs, 2 Mar 44, sub: Preliminary Procurement Plng—Special ASP for Mat Demob Plng. (2) 1st Ind, Dir of Production Div, ASF, 25 Jul 44, on Memo, Col Cound, OQMG, for CG ASF, 22 Jul 44, sub: Comments on Draft for Completion of Rpt from Mat Demob Plng, Production Facilities Plan, Period I.
38 (1) Memo, Actg Dir of Mat for TQMG et al., 29 Mar 45, sub: Mat Demob Plng, Facilities Plan, Period I. (2) Memo, Gen Barnes, OQMG, TQMG et al., 4 Apr 45, same sub. (3) Memo, Gen Corbin, OQMG, TQMG et al., 10 May 45, sub: Advice to Prime Contractors as to Tentative Procurement Plans Following V-E Day.
39 Memo, Dir of Production Div, ASF, for Chiefs of Tech Svcs et al., 1 Apr 44, sub: Mat Demob Plan, Period I, Production Div, ASF.
40 Gen Corbin to Deputy Dir of Purchases et al., OQMG, 11 Jul 44, sub: Contract Term Policy to be Followed on V Day.
needed to permit proper clearance of machinery. As the OQMG had pointed out "when cotton or wool is being spun or yarn is being woven, the only practicable way of clearing the mills is to complete the spinning or weaving of the material in process." Such plans for stages at which work in process might be stopped—there were eleven, for example, in the woolen industry—were developed by the Corps in co-operation with the War Production Board and manufacturers in the woolen and worsted, the combed and carded cotton textile, and the leather footwear industries. These agreements constituted a major portion of the preplanning accomplished by the QMC in its termination activities.

*Development of Contract Termination Policy*

Possibly the most important single problem of matériel demobilization was that of contract termination. In its importance to the economic welfare of the nation the settlement of terminated war contracts was second only to war procurement. The very magnitude of the contract termination task confronting the War Department was indicative of the impact it would have. At the end of World War I undelivered balances on contracts totaling about $4,000,000,000 were canceled. Eight months before World War II ended the War Department had already terminated contracts involving over $15,000,000,000. This amount was twice the value of the total production of World War I, and the real job of contract termination had not yet begun. By V-J Day the War Department had initiated contract terminations with a commitment value of over $43,000,000,000.

Obviously, contract termination was an ever-present operation during the entire procurement program of World War II. Curtailment of production either by terminating outstanding prime contracts or by reducing the rate of deliveries under such contracts might be caused by any one of a variety of reasons. Strategic considerations frequently reduced the need for some military items, while the cessation of hostilities in any given area was reflected in changes in the Army Supply Program. New technical developments, such as a shrinkproof treatment for cushion-sole socks, caused the cancellation of contracts for obsolete items. The scarcity of materials, the reallocation of critical materials, and the use of substitutes, with the concomitant changes in specifications, also contributed to the termination of contracts during the course of the war.

Demobilization planning was recognized early as the key to expeditious settlement of terminated war contracts and the disposition of termination inventory, but the solution of the problem of matériel demobilization was initially handicapped by the lack of an over-all government policy, either legislative or administrative. It was mid-1944 before the problem was considerably clarified by the centralization of authority for the direction of demobilization in the Office of War Mobilization.
(OWM), by the publication of the Baruch-Hancock report, and by the enactment of legislation providing for contract termination.

Initially, the basic authority for contract termination was found in the First War Powers Act, approved by the President ten days after Pearl Harbor. This authority was redelegated through the various echelons of the War Department until, by means of the Quartermaster Supplement to Procurement Regulation 15, it reached the procuring depots where actual Quartermaster contract terminations occurred. Even before Pearl Harbor, War Department contracts had carried a termination clause, and by 1943 enough contracts had been terminated for one reason or another to emphasize the need for scrutinizing the government's policy on termination to be used at the end of the war.\(^4\) The War Department had been gaining experience in termination procedures since 1941, but when it came to the final contract settlement in which payments were made, the department became cautious. It preferred to seek legislation to back up specific operations, since too much uncertainty existed about the legality of negotiated settlements, and termination personnel feared liability in settling contracts and disposing of the property involved.

The first major administrative move to unify the government's policy came on 12 November 1943 with the creation of the Joint Contract Termination Board in the OWM under the chairmanship of John M. Hancock. The board's work consisted chiefly of the development, based largely upon the experience of the War and Navy Departments, of a uniform contract termination article for fixed-price, prime supply contracts and a statement of the principles to be observed in the determination of costs. The OWM made the board's decisions effective by issuing directives, and early in 1944 it authorized the use of an approved termination article, which had been agreed to by all the agencies concerned.\(^4\) Industry, however, did not consider an administrative directive on such an important matter sufficiently authoritative.

In the meantime, Bernard M. Baruch, chairman of the War Industries Board in World War I, had been added to the staff of the OWM as an adviser on postwar problems. He and Hancock prepared a report embodying the ideas, which had been developing since 1918, of both industry and the procurement agencies of the government.\(^4\) This report, together with the experience of the War and Navy Departments, became the basis for the enactment of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, which codified or placed Congressional sanction on existing War Department methods of contract termination settlement.\(^4\)

**Organization for Handling Terminations**

The over-all supervision of contract termination operations in the QMC was directed by a Contract Termination Branch established early in 1944 in the

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\(^4\) The old War Department Supply Contract 1 of September 1941 had a termination article. Subsequently, after some experience with terminations had been gained, changes were made, and the Standard War Department Termination for Convenience Article was adopted in October 1942. Under it thousands of contracts were terminated.

\(^4\) Directive 1, 8 Jan 44.

\(^4\) Rpt. Baruch and Hancock to James F. Byrnes, Dir of OWM, 15 Feb 44, sub: War and Postwar Adjustment Policy.

\(^4\) U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 58, p. 649.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Boston</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Jeffersonville</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>All Other Depots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Termination activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number initiated (net)</td>
<td>18,265</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>2,298</td>
<td>5,332</td>
<td>3,078</td>
<td>5,613</td>
<td>1,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number completed</td>
<td>17,995</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>2,205</td>
<td>5,228</td>
<td>3,026</td>
<td>5,602</td>
<td>1,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without claims</td>
<td>7,998</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>2,749</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>741</td>
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<tr>
<td>With claims</td>
<td>9,997</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>2,479</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>3,263</td>
<td>467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in process, end of month</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 2 months</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 to 4 months</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 to 6 months</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 6 months</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suspended</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Processing time—average days</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All terminations</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without claims</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With claims</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filing time</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settling time</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partial payments</td>
<td>$11,875,143</td>
<td>$180,384</td>
<td>$12,279,949</td>
<td>$7,690,448</td>
<td>$1,071,468</td>
<td>$648,894</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime contractors</td>
<td>$11,094,273</td>
<td>$175,384</td>
<td>$12,119,578</td>
<td>$7,571,104</td>
<td>$1,002,569</td>
<td>$635,636</td>
<td>$4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontractors</td>
<td>780,870</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>160,371</td>
<td>533,342</td>
<td>68,899</td>
<td>13,258</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of partial payments</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime contractors</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontractors</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contract price of items canceled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiated (net)</th>
<th>$1,390,334,592</th>
<th>$83,252,625</th>
<th>$287,824,953</th>
<th>$372,660,433</th>
<th>$189,416,694</th>
<th>$382,907,859</th>
<th>$74,272,028</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>1,293,939,544</td>
<td>82,668,464</td>
<td>260,728,282</td>
<td>314,407,977</td>
<td>184,845,944</td>
<td>381,721,562</td>
<td>69,569,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In process, end of month</td>
<td>96,395,048</td>
<td>584,161</td>
<td>27,096,671</td>
<td>58,252,456</td>
<td>4,572,750</td>
<td>1,186,297</td>
<td>4,702,713</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Claims settled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value of gross claims</th>
<th>$190,781,848</th>
<th>$89,339,826</th>
<th>$55,932,113</th>
<th>$38,590,842</th>
<th>$20,783,819</th>
<th>$61,270,814</th>
<th>$6,864,434</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime contractors</td>
<td>$173,974,321</td>
<td>$87,007,396</td>
<td>$49,904,713</td>
<td>$34,321,085</td>
<td>$19,199,964</td>
<td>$55,835,443</td>
<td>$6,705,720</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subcontractors</td>
<td>16,807,527</td>
<td>1,332,430</td>
<td>4,027,400</td>
<td>4,269,757</td>
<td>1,583,855</td>
<td>5,435,371</td>
<td>158,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of gross settlements</td>
<td>$179,679,606</td>
<td>$88,730,113</td>
<td>$50,534,210</td>
<td>$35,555,721</td>
<td>$18,511,580</td>
<td>$59,907,811</td>
<td>$6,440,171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prime contractors</td>
<td>$164,341,519</td>
<td>$87,543,300</td>
<td>$47,003,787</td>
<td>$31,566,846</td>
<td>$17,200,397</td>
<td>$54,671,605</td>
<td>$6,355,584</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subcontractors</td>
<td>15,338,087</td>
<td>1,186,813</td>
<td>3,530,423</td>
<td>3,988,875</td>
<td>1,311,183</td>
<td>5,236,206</td>
<td>84,587</td>
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<tr>
<td>Value of inventory disposal credits</td>
<td>$64,962,762</td>
<td>$41,716,442</td>
<td>$89,223,009</td>
<td>$87,352,282</td>
<td>$28,700,314</td>
<td>$35,939,967</td>
<td>$1,576,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of settlements, less inventory disposal credits</td>
<td>114,716,844</td>
<td>4,013,671</td>
<td>41,311,201</td>
<td>28,203,439</td>
<td>11,811,266</td>
<td>24,513,844</td>
<td>4,863,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount allowed for property acquired by government</td>
<td>17,558,268</td>
<td>664,496</td>
<td>12,473,520</td>
<td>3,618,684</td>
<td>237,926</td>
<td>343,563</td>
<td>219,079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gross settlement as percent of gross claims 94 93 94 92 89 98 94
Inventory disposal credits as percent of gross settlements 36 54 18 21 36 59 24
Amount allowed for property acquired by government as percent of gross settlements 10 8 25 10 1 .06 3

Procurement Division, OQMG. It carried out the policies and procedures developed by the Readjustment Division in the Office of the Director of Matériel, ASF. It made monthly reports to that division, periodically checked the progress of terminations and settlements to eliminate unreasonable delays, and issued instructions to the depots on procedures and interpretation of general policies prescribed by The Quartermaster General and higher authority. In addition, the branch assisted in arranging training programs for depot personnel and contractors on contract termination policy.

From an organization of three officers and three civilians the branch was expanded into a staff of twelve officers and fifteen civilians that assumed responsibility for directing and administering the termination of about 20,000 contracts, involving almost $1,500,000,000 commitment value of the terminated portion of the contracts and $300,000,000 worth of termination inventory. Attorneys, accountants, persons with administrative experience in various fields, and individuals who had previously been engaged in the textile, steel, or other industries were selected so that their varied business experience might be drawn upon to carry out the functions of the Contract Termination Branch. By the end of the first fiscal year after V-J Day, with its mission for the most part accomplished, the organization had lost its status as a branch and its personnel had dwindled to two civilians responsible for the supervision of the remaining termination activities.

Of the seventeen depots involved in procurement operations, five major depots—Boston, Chicago, Jeffersonville, Jersey City, and Philadelphia—carried the bulk of contract termination work. Contract termination branches were later set up in the other twelve smaller procuring depots. Since curtailment of industrial production of Quartermaster items was their first concern in demobilization planning, the depots had concentrated on contract termination activities. To promote the maximum efficiency in termination operations, the OQMG early in 1944 effected the greatest possible standardization in depot organization and procedures for contract termination. Significantly, termination organizations were set up as separate entities, and purchasing contracting officers in the depots were not responsible for performing dual functions, that is, buying and terminating, which required different points of view that might conflict with each other. Termination activities necessitated an increase in personnel at the five procuring depots from about 400 at the beginning of the program to a peak of 3,200 by V-J Day when mass terminations occurred. A year later the number of personnel had been reduced to about 200.

**Termination Procedure**

The Contract Settlement Act imposed no new procedures in contract termination and enunciated no new objectives. Termination branches were later set up in the other twelve smaller procuring depots. Since curtailment of industrial production of Quartermaster items was their first concern in demobilization planning, the depots had concentrated on contract termination activities. To promote the maximum efficiency in termination operations, the OQMG early in 1944 effected the greatest possible standardization in depot organization and procedures for contract termination. Significantly, termination organizations were set up as separate entities, and purchasing contracting officers in the depots were not responsible for performing dual functions, that is, buying and terminating, which required different points of view that might conflict with each other. Termination activities necessitated an increase in personnel at the five procuring depots from about 400 at the beginning of the program to a peak of 3,200 by V-J Day when mass terminations occurred. A year later the number of personnel had been reduced to about 200.

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48 OQMG 25-43B, 11 Jan 44, sub: Contract Termination. The Contract Termination Branch was activated on 1 February, taking over functions performed previously by the Contract Modification Branch.

49 (1) Procurement Policy Br, Sup Div, OQMG, Summary Rpt of Contract Termination Activities 1943-46, p. 1. (Hereafter cited as Summary Rpt.) (2) See [Table 1].

50 (1) Dir of Procurement Div to Deputy Dirs for TQMG, 2 Mar 44, sub: Orgn and Procedure for Handling Contract Termination Within OQMG and at Depot Level. (2) Ltr, TQMG to CG PQMD, 23 Mar 44, sub: Standard Orgn and Procedures for Contract Termination Br.

nation claims were still to be settled fairly and quickly; termination inventory was to be cleared from war plants promptly; and adequate interim financing was to be provided for war contractors pending settlements. The Joint Termination Regulation (JTR) issued by the War and Navy Departments provided the instrumentality through which speedy and equitable settlements might be reached, while at the same time the government's interests were safeguarded.52

In accordance with the provisions of the JTR, The Quartermaster General could terminate any prime contract under his administration. The uniform contract termination article developed by the Joint Contract Termination Board was included in every fixed-price contract—the type most widely used by the QMC. It was not used in contracts of less than $50,000, in those of less than $500,000 providing for delivery within six months, nor in service contracts. A different article was used in cost-plus-fixed fee contracts. The termination article provided for the discontinuance of all work upon notification by the contracting officer, both on the part of contractors and subcontractors, and immediate transfer to the government of title to all partially completed and completed supplies, work in process, materials, fabricated parts, plans, drawings, and any information acquired or produced by the contractor for the performance of the contract. The contractors could retain any accrued supplies at an agreed price or sell them upon direction of the contracting officer, crediting the government for their value. The article also provided for payment as well as for disposal of inventories involved.53

When, during the course of the war, cutbacks were necessitated by changes in the Army Supply Program, The Quartermaster General sent a teletype to the depot directing that a given number of units of an item be terminated, an action that later was confirmed by a change in the procurement directive. In deciding which contracts to terminate, the depot contracting officer took into consideration various factors governing the distribution of cutbacks. A primary consideration was the retention of facilities with capacity to produce known and contingent future requirements. Where other factors were equal, those contracts affording lower unit costs to the government were retained. Facilities that could be used for other war production or for essential civilian production were released in preference to terminating war contracts at plants not readily adaptable to such production. Upon the defeat of Germany the contracting officer had to consider giving first priority of release from war production to privately owned plants not normally engaged in production of a military character in order to facilitate their reconversion to civilian production. These factors and many others had from the beginning been considered by Quartermaster depot contracting officers in the selection of contracts to be terminated.54

Once the decision had been made, a telegram, followed by a registered letter, was sent to the contractor, constituting his official notice to stop work. This letter notice of termination was given wide distribution within the depot since every branch of the depot was affected. The fiscal division, for example, was required to

52 First issued on 1 November 1944, the JTR was subsequently amended comprehensively and issued as JTR—Revision 1 on 20 April 1945.
53 JTR—Revision 1, par. 931, 20 Apr 45.
54 (1) Memo, CG SOS for TQMG et al., 26 Oct 42, sub: Revision in Sup Contracts. (2) Memo, TQMG for Production Div, SOS, 6 Nov 42, same sub.
revise its estimates of funds; the inspection branch had to see that the contractor stopped work; the government-furnished materials branch had to supervise the recall of all government-furnished materials; and the commercial warehouse officer had to provide the necessary storage space.

Since War Department policy called for settlement of a terminated contract within sixty days, the work involved had to be done at high speed. Within a few days after the letter had been sent, a negotiator assigned to the case arranged for an initial conference with the contractor. As many technical people as the negotiator thought necessary participated, and such matters as the reasons for termination, the contractor's rights under the termination article, the nature and status of each subcontract, and the need for interim financing were covered in detail. Interim financing was the financial aid the government gave to a contractor during the period between the date of termination and the date of final settlement of a terminated contract. Interim financing, however, was not a matter of major concern to Quartermaster suppliers at any time during the war. By V-E Day there had been almost no applications for advance payments. Not until after V-J Day did these payments become appreciable in amount. Then, in August 1945, partial payments of approximately $500,000 were made against contracts totaling about a billion dollars.55

In the course of the conference with the contractor, the negotiator and his assistants established a schedule that the contractor could meet for taking an inventory, and they discussed clearance of plant, disposal of inventory, claims from subcontractors, preparation of a settlement proposal, and final settlement. To a large extent the termination of a contract depended on the prompt removal and disposal of completed articles, component parts, work in process, raw materials, and equipment in the possession of the contractor at the time of cancellations. The clearance of his plant was of immediate concern to the contractor whether he wanted to convert to other war work or essential civilian production during the war or return to civilian production after the war. At the time his contract was terminated the contractor was compelled to stop all work under the contract. His production line was stopped, his labor was idle, his machines were cluttered with work in process, and, in many instances, all of his available factory space was occupied by raw materials and purchased parts allocable to the contract. Conversion was impossible until the plant had been cleared of termination inventory. Clearance was equally important from the government's point of view because during the war materials no longer required to fulfill one particular contract had to be diverted to other war production.

The preparation of an inventory by the contractor was the first step in property disposal. It was the policy of the government to encourage contractors to retain termination inventory or dispose of it themselves, providing the government had no specific requirement for the property. The QMC disposed of government-furnished materials unless it had specifically authorized their retention. Even then, such materials might be sold to a contractor if he needed them to complete work in process that he intended to retain. While an inspector made a spot check to deter-

55 (1) Contract Termination Br, Procurement Div, OQMG, Monthly Rpt of Contract Termination Activities, August 1945. (2) See JTR—Revision 1, Sec. III, Pts. 2-6, 20 Apr 45.
mine the accuracy of the contractor's inventory, personnel of the depot property disposal section, who were merchandisers and salesmen experienced in particular items, assisted the contractor in making plans for disposal. They were expected to use ingenuity in devising methods that could be suggested to prospective buyers for converting to civilian uses materials developed exclusively for military use. If after these steps had been taken termination inventory remained at the plants, a list of materials was to be sent to the OQMG for determination of its possible use elsewhere in the Corps. In the event no such need existed, the availability of the inventory was supposed to be brought to the attention of other War Department agencies, but in actual practice the sixty-day clearance period allowed by the Contract Settlement Act permitted little time for such efforts.

If at the end of thirty days, termination inventory had not been disposed of by the contractor, the OQMG initiated steps to remove the property from the contractor's plant or otherwise take title. An agreement might be made with the contractor to extend the removal period in order to allow the depot time for further attempts to dispose of the material. If no agreement could be made, the Corps had to provide for removal or storage. Some items in termination inventory, such as stockpile and war reserve materials, required special treatment and plans had to be made for their proper handling. All other materials, however, were declared surplus to the regional office of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) having jurisdiction over the area in which the materials to be stored were located, and the OQMG asked the RFC for shipping instructions. If that agency could not provide shipping instructions within the sixty-day disposal period fixed for plant clearance, then the OQMG became responsible for providing them.

When it became apparent that prolonged storage would be necessary before final disposition and that space was not available in government facilities, the OQMG negotiated a storage agreement with the war contractor or provided storage in commercial warehouses. Accountability for such stored property was vested in accountable property officers appointed at the procuring depots.

There was no set time in the procedure when the proposal for settlement had to be prepared. It might be sent in when the inventory was filed or, depending upon the complexity of the case, it might be made up in the period between the submission of the inventory and its disposal. The contractor was responsible for preparing the proposal for settlement, but he could call upon the contracting officer's staff for aid in determining what costs to include in submitting the claims for payment due him because of cancellation. When his proposal was received in the depot, accountants of the cost and price analysis branch examined it and determined whether an office review would be sufficient or whether a field examination would be necessary. In either case they prepared a report that was submitted with the proposal to the negotiator. He could then negotiate the proposed final settlement, which was tentative until reviewed. Depending on the amount of the payment involved, the settlement agreement was subject to review and recommendations by the depot review board, the OQMG Settlement Review Committee, or the review board of the ASF.

The objective was to provide war contractors with fair compensation for their termination claims as expeditiously as pos-
sible in order to facilitate maximum war production during the war and later to expedite reconversion from war to civilian production. Settlement might be accomplished by means of a negotiated agreement, by use of a formula method, or by any combination of the two methods. The OQMG preferred the negotiated settlement, a method favored by industry and the procuring agencies of the government generally. It was the only way in which settlements could be expedited, since this method permitted the use of independent judgment by the contracting officer and considerably more flexibility in adaptation to specific problems. Only where a negotiated agreement was impossible did the contracting officer resort to settling a claim by determining by formula the amount due the contractor. If dissatisfied, the contractor had the legal right to appeal to the Appeal Board of the Office of Contract Settlement, or he could bring suit against the government in the Court of Claims or in a United States District Court.

Since a settlement was made in accordance with the terms of a contract, the agreement was a legal document that provided for the payment of the agreed amount. Hence the legal branch of the depot prepared all such supplemental agreements, which were signed by the contractor and the contracting officer, thereby becoming the authority for actual payment. The final step in termination settlement was taken when the contractor forwarded invoices to the depot. These, together with the supplemental agreement, were sent to the fiscal division, and the voucher for payment was prepared. When this voucher was given priority, payment could be made within four days after receipt of the invoice. To all intents and purposes, the case was then closed.

While current terminations furnished Quartermaster contracting officers with practical experience, one of the most urgent tasks of the OQMG in preparing for demobilization was planning in advance for the wholesale terminations that would inevitably follow the defeat of Japan. The Contract Termination Branch was responsible for such advance planning. It made every effort to anticipate the problems that would occur and "to arrive at some workable formula for terminating the contracts for all the major commodities purchased by the Quartermaster Corps."

Certain advantages accrued from pre-planning. It speeded the transition from terminated war production to other war production on V-E Day and to civilian production upon the final cessation of hostilities. It made for prompt diversion of personnel, inventory, and facilities to other war production or civilian production, and it also facilitated interim financing, plant clearance, and prompt settlement of termination claims, thereby lessening the likelihood of unemployment. In working out preliminary agreements, contractors became more familiar with the information requirements of the government and frequently were able to improve their organizations, records, and facilities for termination. In the meantime, the OQMG profited by the development of more accurate field information, which could be used in over-all planning. Even when it did not eventuate in formal, final agree-
ment, pretermination planning was highly valuable in itself as training.

Preplanning included three types of preparations: (1) discussion with contractors regarding anticipated terminations and the preparation by contractors of internal termination plans and procedures; (2) tentative understandings or informal arrangements embodied in memoranda not binding upon the government or the contractor; and (3) formal, binding pretermination-settlement agreements covering elements of the termination settlement. Various specific matters—stop-work points, methods of taking inventory, factory overhead and general and administrative expenses, starting-load costs, and tooling expenses—could be made the subject of either informal arrangements or binding settlement agreements.

In one sense, almost all the activities of contract termination, until V-E Day at least, consisted of planning, but until the middle of 1944 such planning did not involve a program to settle many points in advance of termination. Then, based on the broader latitude permitted by the Contract Settlement Act, a pretermination planning program was initiated in the QMC, reaching its peak in November and December. The plan proposed by Headquarters, ASF, in July called for “predetermination of some part or the whole of the price to be paid by the Government for the right to cancel the contract at any given stage of completion” and offered suggestions as to the methods of determining fixed charges according to the general type of costs to be taken into account. It was anticipated that this attempt to simplify procedure by predetermining termination allowances in the original contract at the time it was awarded or immediately thereafter by supplemental agreement would afford the government relief from some of the burden of taking title to materials allocable to a contract and, at the same time, relieve both the government and the contractor of the necessity for extensive posttermination accounting, audits, and negotiations.

The program began in a tentative and experimental way. Among the early agreements presented for approval by the OQMG and the first consummated by the War Department was that negotiated between the Botany Worsted Mills, Inc., and the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot on a current contract for 18-ounce wool serge. This agreement, acceptable to both the contractor and the depot, was established on a unit-cost basis, with an inventory to be taken upon termination—a procedure which it was estimated would take only two days, would protect both the government and the contractor, and would eliminate the necessity for any options.

Using this agreement as a test case, Headquarters, ASF, submitted it to the Director of Contract Settlement and to the Surplus War Property Administrator for approval of the principles used. Certain adjustments were made and by mid-September the OQMG forwarded information concerning this agreement to other depots, authorizing the extension of the principles involved to similar contracts. Whenever available data permitted a reasonable business forecast, the same type of agreement was authorized for use in the textile,

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58 Memo, Asst Dir of Mat, ASF, for TQMG, 24 Jul 44, sub: Experimental Program for Simplifying Termination Procedures and Predetermining Termination Allowances.
59 Memo, Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, for CG ASF, 31 Aug 44, sub cited n. 58.
clothing, and related fields. By the end of September, enough experience had been gained so that a general policy could be laid down officially covering many aspects of pretermination agreements.

Co-ordination of Pretermination Planning Activities

As pretermination planning progressed, duplication of effort among depots became apparent. To eliminate this duplication, when more than one depot dealt with the same contractor, the OQMG assigned all pretermination activity to the depot having the principal contract with the contractor and, therefore, chief interest in his production. Similarly, where two or more technical services were purchasing a portion of a contractor’s production it was desirable to have the contractor do his termination planning with the service having the primary interest. The OQMG directed its depot personnel to determine this fact on first approaching the contractor and to utilize data compiled for another service.

Efforts were also made to co-ordinate the contract termination activities of the War and Navy Departments. These had at first been concentrated on developing a uniform termination article, but with the passage of the Contract Settlement Act and the issue of the JTR on 1 November 1944, the two departments undertook a closer degree of collaboration. Co-ordination was vigorously pressed through the consolidated termination program, company-wide settlements, and local termination co-ordination committees.

The consolidated termination program was established by the War and Navy Departments for selected contractors, who were assigned to a particular service of the War Department or office of the Navy Department in order to eliminate duplications in field accounting reviews of settlement proposals or in disposition of termination inventory. The special feature of the program was the acceptance by the department of the accounting reports and property disposal decisions of the other, and the reliance by contractors upon the work of government personnel representing both departments. Illustrative of consolidated termination was the settlement by the Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot of contracts involving materials-handling equipment and spare parts manufactured for both the Army and the Navy. The depot made the settlement agreement and handled disposal of inventory, although payments were made individually by the War and Navy Departments.

Company-wide settlements contemplated settlement by the service with the predominant interest of all termination claims of selected contractors whether of the Army or the Navy and whether under prime contracts or subcontracts. A study of such activity had been initiated by the Joint Contract Termination Board at the

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60 (1) [1st Ind], Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, to CG PQMD, 14 Sep 44. (2) Ltr, Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, to CG JQMD, 16 Sep 44, sub cited n. 58.
61 ASF Cir 325, Sec. IV, 28 Sep 44, sub: PR 15—Amendments.
62 (1) Ltr, Chief of Contract Termination Br, OQMG, to CG BQMD et al., 16 Nov 44, sub: Assignment of QM Contractors to Specific QM Depots for Pretermination Activities. (2) Ltr, Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, to CG BQMD et al., 7 Sep 44, sub: Plng Termination Procedures with Large Prime Contractors.
63 (1) JTR—Revision 1, Sec. VIII, Pt. 2, 20 Apr 45. (2) See also ASF Cir 375, Sec. VI, 4 Oct 45, sub: Contract Termination.
64 (1) Ltr, Chief of BuSandA, Navy Dept, to TQMG, 15 Feb 46, sub: Administration of Termination Proceedings with Clark Equipment Co. (2) Ltr, JQMD to TQMG, 9 Aug 46, sub: Final Agreement with Clark Equipment Co.
beginning of 1944.\textsuperscript{65} The OQMG felt that the resulting plan would have only limited application in the Corps and that it would be “the exception and not the rule,” since the problems involved were far less acute in the QMC than in other services. Quartermaster items, for example, either were, or closely approached, standard commercial items and could be readily disposed of in the civilian trade, while subcontracting was a relatively small problem in the procurement of clothing, equipage, and general supplies. Termination of subsistence contracts was omitted entirely from consideration since, according to the Director of Procurement, there would be virtually no contract termination problem “for reasons too obvious to enumerate.” In fact, in the course of conducting its contract termination activities after the war ended, the QMC was involved in only two company-wide settlements, both of which were handled for the Corps by the AAF.\textsuperscript{66}

Where it was not feasible or desirable to pool personnel under the consolidated termination program or the company-wide settlement plan, a certain measure of coordination by the field representatives of the War and Navy Departments was obtained through the establishment of local termination co-ordination committees in major war production centers. Twenty of them were established with offices in twenty-seven large cities, covering all areas of the United States. They acted as clearing houses for local termination activities and made possible a free interchange of information between members. They coordinated the activities of the services in training contractors in termination matters, in disseminating public information on termination procedures, and in making advance preparations with contractors for termination. These committees also recommended to the War and Navy Departments the designation of contractors for the consolidated termination program. The QMC was represented on eleven of these committees and held the chairmanship of the Philadelphia committee.\textsuperscript{67}

\section*{Impact of Developments in the ETO}

Stimulated by the conviction that the war in Europe would end shortly, the major Quartermaster procuring depots made strenuous efforts in 1944 to accomplish as much of the preplanning program as possible. By the end of 1944 many contractors had been interviewed, a few informal understandings had been reached, and one pretermination settlement agreement had been approved. This activity was just beginning to gain momentum when the Battle of the Bulge in December called for renewed procurement to refill supply pipelines. Personnel who were being trained for termination activities were suddenly reassigned to other branches of depot procurement divisions, with the result that, in some instances, the termination organization was almost completely

\textsuperscript{65} Memo, Dir of Readj Div, ASF, for TQMG, 15 Jan 44, sub: Proposal for Over-all Company Settlement.

\textsuperscript{66} (1) Memo, Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, for CG ASF, 29 Jan 44, sub: Proposal for Over-all Company Settlement. (2) Memo, Col E. De Treville Ellis, OQMG, for Readj Div, ASF, 25 Mar 44, sub: Over-all Settlement of Terminated Contracts. (3) Ltr, ATSC, Eastern District, Office of Resident Adjustment Off, to TQMG, 28 Jan 46, sub: Supplemental Settlement Agreement with Aluminum Co. of America. (4) Ltr, Same to TQMG, 30 Jan 46, sub: Transmittal of Supplemental Agreement with Reynolds Metals Co.

\textsuperscript{67} (1) Memo, Dir of Readj Div, ASF, for TQMG et al., 25 Sep 44, sub: Co-ordinated Termination Program. (2) JTR—Revision 1, Sec. VIII, Pt. 3, 20 Apr 45. (3) Contract Termination Br, Procurement Div, OQMG, Progress Rpt of Contract Termination Activities, 1944, p. 9.
dispersed. Although in the spring of 1945 there was a general resumption of the program, the progress in pretermination planning was temporarily halted.68

Not only were personnel arrangements dislocated but also the nature of agreements into which contractors were willing to enter was shaped by developments in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The experience of the Boston Depot offers one example. When the depot first surveyed its termination problems, it anticipated that the transition from a war to a peacetime economy could easily be made since, for the most part, shoe contractors had continued to handle a large volume of civilian business concurrently with their military contracts.69 Initially in preplanning, most contractors were interested in a guarantee from The Quartermaster General that all work in process would be completed, and this problem seemed to be solved by a system of rescheduling and projecting deliveries further into the future. Later, when processing beyond immediate military requirements was forbidden, the emphasis in developing pretermination agreements was placed on establishing stop-work points and obtaining offers for all inventory from contractors as an aid to quick property disposal. Contractors were disinclined to make offers for termination inventory, however, since they were still interested only in assurances that work in process would be completed. Early in 1945 this attitude changed, for during the closing months of 1944 the depot procured the largest quantities of shoes of all kinds ever requisitioned in any comparable period of the entire war. As a result, shoe contractors were not longer satisfied with assurance of completion of work in process nor with mere advance notice of termination. With their entire plants tied up with military production, they wanted some provision made for a conversion period, some assurance of continuance of production under Army contracts for a sufficient period to assure orderly rearrangement of the productive processes from wartime to peacetime orders. The preplanning program at the Boston Depot, the greater part of which was accomplished during April and May 1945, failed to develop any pretermination settlement agreements that were applied on V-J Day, although it did make informal arrangements with twelve firms participating in the depot footwear procurement program, all of which covered stop-work points that helped ease termination proceedings.

**Preplanning Program in Operation**

While the preplanning program did not result in final settlement agreements on most Quartermaster contracts and, in fact, was never even applied to subsistence contracts, nevertheless such agreements and informal arrangements as were made did facilitate contract settlements after V-J Day. Depot planning covered a wide variety of Quartermaster commodities procured by contracts with many manufacturers, but one illustration is sufficient to show the effectiveness of sound preplanning.

The case in point concerns action taken by the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot

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68 (1) Deputy Dir for Contract Adjustments to Fld Progress Br, OP&G Div, OQMG, 13 Feb 45, sub: Pretermination Plng Program Conf. (2) Ltr, Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, to CG JQMD, 16 Apr 45, sub: Pretermination Plng Activity.

69 For a more detailed discussion see Helen R. Brooks, Problems of Shoe Procurement: A Study in Procurement at the Boston Quartermaster Depot During World War II (BQMD hist monograph, 10 May 45), pp. 397ff, Hist Br, OQMG.
to ease the termination of contracts with the textile industry. It was definitely to the advantage of the depot that reconversion in the textile industry involved no major problems of retooling or other radical changes in the shift from wartime to peacetime production. There were few unusual or special types of termination charges and only negligible charges for special facilities. Production costs were generally well established in the textile industry, and therefore no particular costing problems were encountered. Pretermination agreements could be made to cover numerous points, such as retention offers for termination inventory, rates of general and administrative overhead costs, and similar problems.

The point of departure for all pretermination planning at the Philadelphia Depot was the agreement with the Botany Worsted Mills, Inc. From that point depot planning progressed through retention offers to the development of agreements on stop-work points that were industry-wide in their application to the woolen, worsted, and cotton textile industries. The question of retention sales of termination inventory was the biggest problem in the depot's planning program. When manufacturers made retention offers, the distribution of end items was the main consideration. The large woolen and cotton houses had potential sales outlets that the smaller manufacturers did not possess. The larger the organization, therefore, the better the retention offers made. To get all mills, both small and large, in line on certain retention values was a tremendous problem involving many factors, among them the degree of integration of the mills. Agreement on retention values was the goal toward which the depot worked in its preplanning program.

The stop-work plan proved of great value both to the Army and to industry. It was timesaving and enabled the mills to proceed to a given point without the necessity of working out further agreements with the QMC. The flexibility of the plan also permitted the OQMG to direct processing of certain standard items beyond the designated stopping points, either because these were still needed in considerable volume by the armies of occupation or because the QMC found it desirable to anticipate requirements rather than stop all production and place new contracts later when the mills had returned to civilian production.

Once stop-work stages were established for the woolen and cotton industries, the QMC had to determine the cost at each stop-work stage. This required a knowledge of the contractor's commitments. Costs could be arrived at more easily in the woolen than in the cotton industry, for wool was less speculative in nature than cotton, a commodity that is traded in daily on the exchange. Cotton manufacturers customarily traded in futures, agreeing to take delivery at a later date on a certain number of bales of cotton, and they obtained a large measure of protection by hedging. To protect the cotton manufacturer from loss on termination, the Philadelphia Depot worked out an agreement

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70 1st Ind, Donnell K. Wolverton, Chief of Legal Br, PQMD, 17 Dec 46, on Ltr, Harold W. Thatcher, Chief of Hist Sec, OQMG, to CG PQMD, 26 Nov 46, sub: Preparation of Hist Account of Demob Period.

71 An integrated mill is one that starts with the raw material and runs its production through to the finished fabric. A partially integrated mill might begin with the yarn and carry its production to the finished cloth.

72 Hedging is the practice of buying or selling commodity futures to counterbalance an existing position in the trade market, thus avoiding the risk of unforeseen fluctuations in price.
whereby the contractor was allowed to select the date after termination that he wished to use as the determining date in the price of cotton. The depot then gave him the difference between the average 10-spot-market price the day after the date of the award of the contract and the date after the termination on which he wanted to settle his cotton commitments. In other words, he was reimbursed on the basis of the difference between the value of cotton on the date of the contract and on the date of termination.

The textile industry was covered by stop-work agreements that went into effect automatically when V-J Day brought mass terminations at the Philadelphia Depot. During the course of its planning program the depot had prepared 260 approved pretermination settlement agreements with wool manufacturers and contractors in other textiles and in the clothing industry; of these, 98 were applied after V-J Day. Under these agreements termination claims were settled promptly.

The failure to include subsistence in the preplanning program at the Chicago Quartermaster Depot had unfortunate results. Although the negotiators at the depot were called upon to handle the termination settlement of subsistence contracts for both perishable and nonperishable foods, they found it difficult to appraise the changes that might occur because subsistence was not included in the Special Army Supply Program. Furthermore, aside from a few dehydrated products and special rations, the Subsistence Division, OQMG, did not anticipate any termination of contracts for nonperishable foods. They found it difficult to appraise the changes that might occur because subsistence was not included in the Special Army Supply Program. Consequently, the Subsistence Division, OQMG, did not anticipate any termination of contracts for nonperishable foods. Generally speaking, it was assumed that the Army “could eat its way out” of subsistence stocks. Since the subsistence personnel both at the OQMG and at the depot felt that there would be no particular problem in terminating food contracts, efforts to promote a pretermination program for subsistence met with resistance. No preplanning was therefore accomplished.

The end of the war in Europe resulted in no large-scale termination of subsistence contracts, partly because of the lack of information about stocks on hand, and partly because of the anticipated requirements for a long campaign against the Japanese. During May and June of 1945 the OQMG did stress the need for preparing for mass terminations, and the Contract Termination Branch became extremely critical of the lack of advance planning in the subsistence field by the depot. The latter justified its course of action by pointing to its heavy work load for procurement, which was not appreciably slowed after V-E Day, and the consequent temporary reallocation of termination personnel to buying activity.

V-J Day occurred before any planning could be accomplished, and the Chicago Depot was ill prepared for the avalanche of terminations of subsistence contracts that followed. Little contractor education and no pretermination settlements had been accomplished, nor were the depot’s personnel versed in the problems involved.
in the termination of subsistence contracts. Consequently they were not ready to assist and advise contractors. Even if the depot had received advance notices of approaching terminations, difficulties would have developed, for the JTR did not make adequate provisions for terminating subsistence contracts, especially those covering perishable foods. As a result, negotiators were required to interpret the JTR on the basis of their judgment and business experience. The termination of contracts for dehydrated foods, for example, involved thousands of acres of crops and hundreds of farmers who were unfamiliar with the JTR and their rights under the Contract Settlement Act.

Subsistence contractors were unprepared to handle problems pertaining to raw materials, or to finance themselves. Many dehydrators incurred delays in the handling of the raw materials claimed under their terminated contracts because of the inexperience of growers in the proper packing of fresh vegetables for sale through commercial channels. Dehydrators and growers were not familiar with the proper storage of certain types of raw materials, a situation made more acute by the general inadequacy of the facilities for storing perishable items until arrangements could be made for their disposition. Contractors also experienced difficulty in financing farmers. The latter made deliveries of raw materials during the harvesting season when the depot was restricted from making shipments into commercial channels. Financial difficulties developed when storage could not be furnished promptly. The JTR made provision for partial payments, but unfortunately the delay in receiving funds under this regulation made it inapplicable in this situation. As a result of depot efforts, banking institutions offered credit and assistance to prime contractors to enable them to harvest and store the crops. The lack of knowledge on the part of the contractors, combined with the inadequacy of the JTR in reference to subsistence, contributed to the difficulties of settling subsistence contracts. Subsistence, then, was a field in which planning for termination activities was inadequate.

Development of Training Programs

A program of education and training in termination procedures for both Quartermaster personnel and Quartermaster contractors supplemented the Corps' efforts to reduce the work load on V-E and V-J Days by negotiation of pretermination agreements. The immediate task was to acquire and train the additional civilians, enlisted men, and officers needed by the procuring depots and to make certain that personnel so allotted were used to administer contract termination. They were, first of all, to handle actual contract termination cases, and secondly, to engage in pretermination planning activities. They could be assigned to other jobs in a depot's procurement division if these tasks provided experience beneficial to termination work, but in any case training took precedence over any immediate assignment to jobs.\(^7\) Some five hundred QMC officers and civilians were trained in termination work at the Army Industrial College, the Army Finance School at Fort Benjamin Harrison, and the Judge Advocate General's School at Ann Arbor, Mich.\(^8\) The courses at these schools emphasized the
broad regulatory and policy basis of termination and its legal and financial aspects. The objective was to provide a qualified officer or civilian trained in contract termination procedures at each Quartermaster depot or Quartermaster supply section of an ASF depot.

The OQMG used regional conferences as well as Army schools to train its field personnel, while the depots organized their own courses and schools where the great bulk of the personnel was trained. As V-J Day approached, the necessity of continuing such training was emphasized, particularly the advisability of informing all personnel of depot procurement divisions of contract termination policies and procedures.\(^{79}\) Keeping procurement personnel abreast of termination developments was in line with the OQMG policy of utilizing such personnel wherever possible in termination work since they had a background of relevant experience, and after V-J Day many buyers and production experts were diverted into termination activities to help carry the tremendous burden of mass terminations.

From the beginning the OQMG was aware of the need to train Quartermaster contractors in termination procedures though this presented difficulties. Under the centralized purchase policies of the Corps, each of the five major procuring depots had contracts in many states, thereby making it impracticable for each depot to train its own contractors. In addition, the Corps dealt with many small contractors who could not be brought together easily for training and in any event were not especially concerned with advance technical information on termination.\(^{80}\)

The solution of the problem was approached in a number of ways. In co-operation with representatives of other technical services, the depots participated in organizing courses for contractors at universities in key locations throughout the country. Manufacturers, while approving this method, thought that small contractors could best be reached through meetings held in key cities throughout a state under the auspices of manufacturers' associations. This method of training was also widely used.

To further the training program for both contractors and Quartermaster personnel, the OQMG prepared guides, pamphlets, and manuals. It also devised and utilized a series of about forty visual aids for this purpose, including films and dramatizations of contract termination activities.

**Disposal of Termination Inventory**

A depot could not settle a terminated contract until termination inventories and facilities, both contractor-owned and government-owned, were cleared from the contractor's plant. Such termination inventory was primarily disposed of by retention at cost by the contractor, by transferral to government agencies, or by sale to commercial buyers. Usually because of his operating needs, the contractor was given the option of retaining any or all of the inventory he wanted, thereby eliminating it from termination proceedings in exchange for a no-cost settlement, which relieved the government of any termination charges for such inventory.

\(^{79}\) Ltr, Dir of Procurement Div, OQMG, to CO BQMD et al., 27 Jul 45, sub: Contract Termination Tng for Procurement Pers.

\(^{80}\) Memo, TQMG for Dir of Readj Div, ASF, 23 May 44, sub: Tng for Contract Termination. In May 1944 the QMC had approximately 10,000 active contracts with 5,100 prime contractors located in forty-eight states. These contracts had been awarded mainly by the five Quartermaster procurement depots.
Government-Furnished Materials

Possibly the most complicated aspect of Quartermaster contract terminations related to accountability for government-furnished material (GFM) that was used in the production of Quartermaster items. The increase of terminations during 1943 suggested the desirability of reducing credit transactions to a minimum and of keeping records with contractors in order. Furthermore, the shortages of raw materials impelled the QMC to make all possible savings. Investigation had shown that GFM was being released to contractors in excess of needs for current production and had raised doubts of the protection being afforded the government against the misuse of GFM in the hands of contractors.

Out of a survey of this problem by the Organization Planning and Control Division, OQMG, there developed in the summer of 1944 the GFM plan, containing a framework of policies, principles, and procedures. At the same time, the depots were directed to review contracts involving GFM and establish audit sections to audit contracts involving GFM. A GFM branch was established in the procurement division at each depot, the officer in charge being designated as the accountable property officer responsible for maintaining the required property accounting records.

Government-furnished material ranged from raw material, processed material, fabricated material, finished parts, and assemblies to complete items ready for use. The details covering the furnishing, use, and final disposition of GFM were written into the procurement contract, which specified the quantity and methods of delivery of GFM, the use of the material in the item under contract, the allowance for loss or spoilage, and the means by which the contractor would pay for or replace any material for which he could not account.

Government-furnished material in termination inventory included bulk or unprocessed GFM, work in process, and clippings, as in the case of textiles, which had only a poundage value. The OQMG prepared a current list of essential industrial materials that it retained in the disposal of termination inventory. All others it sold or disposed of, and even material marked for Quartermaster retention could be sold to the contractor provided the quantity so released would be required by him to complete work in process that he wanted to retain for his own account. Without this provision, many contractors, especially those producing clothing and equipage items, would have been unable to convert promptly to civilian production since they had little, if any, materials of their own on hand at the time their contracts were terminated. This procedure raised some questions on pricing policy, but a ruling of the Surplus War Property Administration was interpreted to exempt from pricing policies the sale of GFM accomplished in a predetermined settlement. The GFM in termination inventories sold after termination had taken effect could

81 See Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, I, Ch. VIII
82 (1) OQMG OO 25-89, 8 Jul 44, sub: Industrial Materials and GFM Plan. (2) OQMG Cir 34, 12 Jul 44, same sub.
84 (1) OQMG Cir 34, Supplement 3, 2 Nov 44, sub: Industrial Materials and GFM Plan. (2) Ibid., Supplement 16, 12 Oct 45, same sub.
not be exempted from the pricing policies established by the Surplus War Property Administration.\textsuperscript{85}

The QMC did not retain GFM being processed in items under manufacture. Such materials were disposed of as termination inventory in the same manner as contractor-owned material contained in work in process. In the case of unprocessed GFM sold to the contractor, the sale price was treated as a disposal credit in reduction of the amount of the final settlement payment to the contractor. The GFM inventory not otherwise sold or disposed of was cleared from the contractor's plant and declared surplus to the RFC regional office in the same manner as contractor-owned property.\textsuperscript{86}

Since GFM, on the whole, represented critical materials for which a ready market existed, few special problems were encountered in their disposal.\textsuperscript{87} Difficulties did arise in accounting for GFM as a prerequisite to contract termination settlement. All depots experienced considerable trouble in obtaining from the contractors satisfactory inventory schedules of GFM on hand. Inventories submitted were usually inaccurate. In part, inaccuracy resulted from the fact that, although the government demanded that such inventories specify sizes, types, and quantities of GFM, the contractor frequently neglected to give complete information. Discrepancies also developed from the failure of the contractor to keep a perpetual inventory, for in the rush of production, records were neglected. Then, too, although GFM was issued for the production of a given item on a contract, it did not necessarily follow that the contractor observed this rule. He could and did apply GFM to any of a number of contracts that he had running simultaneously. In his plant a contractor might, for example, have production going on duffel bags, leggings, and shelter-half tents at the same time, to which he diverted GFM intended for any one of the items. Such diversion was common and resulted in confusion in recording GFM. Whether it was GFM fabrics supplied for the production of Army clothing, duck for tents, webbing for equipage, or GFM components supplied to the assemblers of special rations, discrepancies occurred and accounting difficulties hampered the settlement of claims.\textsuperscript{88}

Possibly no claims were more troublesome to settle than those at the Chicago Depot involving special rations. The number of contracts involving GFM was fewer for special rations than for other supplies at the depot, but the problem of accounting was complicated by the fact that as many as fifty ration components might be supplied to one contractor.\textsuperscript{89} These components tended to be more difficult to handle than the GFM furnished for clothing and equipage items, because, consisting of foodstuffs, they were subject to

\textsuperscript{85}(1) Memo, Gen Corbin, OQMG, for CG ASF, 30 Sep 44, sub: Sale of GFM to Contractors. (2) 1st Ind, Office of Dir of Mat, ASF, to OQMG, 6 Oct 44, on above memo. (3) Chief of Contract Termination Br to Legal Br, Procurement Div, OQMG, 23 Oct 44, sub: Sale of GFM to Contractors. (4) Legal Br to Contract Termination Br, OQMG, 9 Nov 44, same sub.

\textsuperscript{86}OQMG Cir 76, Sec. III, par. 15c, 21 Dec 44, sub: Contract Termination.

\textsuperscript{87}See Risch, Demobilization Planning and Operation in the Quartermaster Corps, pp. 61–64.

\textsuperscript{88}(1) Intervs, OQMG historian with John O'Neil, GFM Br, and William Lawson, procurement specialist, JQMD, 6–7 Feb 47. (2) Interv, OQMG historian with Hyman Reinstein, accountable property off, PQMD, 17 Jan 47.

\textsuperscript{89}Included in the various menus of the ten-in-one ration were 17 meat items, 5 different canned vegetables, 7 types of candy bars, 4 kinds of puddings, 4 types of beverage powders, and numerous separate items, such as canned Army spread, biscuits, evaporated milk, sugar, salt, cigarettes, chewing gum, toilet soap and paper, and water purification tablets.
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spoilage and pilferage. Packaging materials, such as cellophane and aluminum foil, which were in very critical supply during most of the war, were also provided by the Chicago Depot for component manufacturers who could not obtain them. Packing materials were likewise secured when necessary. Because there was almost always a shortage of these materials and components and because special rations menus were undergoing almost constant change in an effort to provide the most palatable substitutes for real meals that could be found, both the contractor and the depot tended more or less to relegate record keeping to the background. At the same time it undoubtedly seemed unimportant to the contractor assembling ration components to account for cigarettes, gum, and candy bars, which disappeared because of the temptation to employees when these items were scarce, or to the jam manufacturer to show claim for loss that occurred in the partial thawing of frozen fruits transferred from storage. Reconciling the resultant discrepancies later proved exceedingly troublesome. Ultimately, to expedite contract termination settlement, the Chicago Depot worked out a procedure for closing 1945 GFM accounts according to a plan agreed to by the OQMG, providing for reconciliation of the discrepancies between contractor inventories and government charges of GFM.90

Government-Furnished Equipment and Facilities

Contractors were also furnished government-owned equipment and facilities—the term GFE was loosely used to cover both—in order to expedite the production of war goods.91 Such equipment was considered as potential termination inventory. To allow the contractor to make claims for special facilities as termination charges, however, it had to be shown that the facility was acquired by him solely for the performance of the government contract that was terminated, or for that contract and other war production contracts. In addition, it had to be determined that the contractor had been required to install such facilities in order to perform the contract. No facility could be considered special nor would reimbursement be made if only minor changes in physical condition or location were necessary to make the facility useful in the peacetime business of the contractor. The claims in termination settlement were made only for the unamortized portion of the cost of the facilities applicable to the terminated contract. Contracts might, with the approval of The Quartermaster General, include a provision granting an option to the contractor to buy the equipment after the completion of the contract if this action was to the interest of the government. All the equipment specified in the contract had to be purchased as a unit except when items were withdrawn by contracting officers because they were needed for other war work.

Government-furnished equipment was acquired by the contractor under a War Department facilities contract. This was a lease or rental agreement governing the use, retention, storage, maintenance, or disposition of GFE provided for or acquired by the war contractor for use in war production. It was the policy of the War Department to clear idle plant equip-

90 Massen, Central Procurement Operations, pp. 164ff.
91 Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services I, Ch. VIII.
ment from war contractors' plants as quickly as possible and to have the government bear the cost of dismantling plant equipment, preparing and preserving it for storage, and preparing it for shipment and removal from the plant, except insofar as the facilities contract required the contractor to bear such expense. On the other hand, the government, except in a few instances, did not bear any part of the cost of reconverting the contractor's plant to commercial production.92

Subsistence contracts accounted for the largest part of the GFE used in the Corps. For example, canners and some independent procoaters were encouraged to build and install procoating equipment under GFE arrangements. Procoating was used to inhibit rust on Army canned goods under long and exposed storage overseas and to camouflage cans in open storage dumps or in discard. After V-J Day all procoating operations were ordered stopped as soon as supplies of paint and thinner had been used up. The Army then returned to the use of plain cans in all export pack. Disposing of procoating equipment posed quite a problem since there was little or no commercial demand for procoating cans. After disposal agents had exhausted the possibility of adapting the equipment to other uses, the Chicago Depot submitted a typical case to the Chicago Regional Office of the RFC to determine the "unserviceability" of the machine so that all procoating equipment could, if necessary, be disposed of as scrap or salvage. The Chicago Regional Office decided that the procoating machinery was "one-purpose" and so could be declared unserviceable. The depot then directed that parts of the machinery, such as electric motors, gears, fans, and the like, might be salvaged and the remainder sold for junk. The average offer for the salvaged parts was $150 a machine, and in most cases, the contractor was the buyer. At both the Jersey City and the Chicago Quartermaster Depots about ten cents on the dollar was realized in the disposal of equipment that ranged in value from $1,500 to $10,000.93

The settlement of special facilities claims became one of the outstanding problems in terminating contracts for dehydrated products. In part this problem arose because there had been numerous verbal authorizations by the procurement specialists to permit special facilities for dehydrated vegetables in connection with the awarding of 1945-46 contracts. There had been considerable experimentation on dehydrated vegetables during the 1944 production season with the result that depot field supervisors instructed dehydrators that new kinds of equipment to improve the final product would be necessary. Thus, drying bins were recommended to make possible lower moisture content and so improve the storage life of a product; the use of chlorinators was encouraged as a sanitary measure; and preconditioning equipment for treating raw material to improve color in storage was required for sweet potatoes and its use encouraged for white potatoes.

These special facilities had been installed by dehydrators in some cases toward the end of the 1944-45 season and in others after this producing season had ended. To keep the special facility claims within the bounds of the termination regulation, the depot determined to reimburse

92 (1) JTR—Revision 1, par. 861.1, 20 Apr 45. (2) PR 10, par. 1003. (3) For the few exceptions to the general rule, see PR 10, par. 1003-A.
93 (1) Masen, Central Procurement Operations, p. 197. (2) Interv, OQMG historian with Roger Merrill, property disposal agent, JCQMD at NYPO, 2 Jan 47.
the dehydrators whose contracts were terminated for only those facility expenditures made for the 1945–46 producing season. Expenditures made before 1 July 1945 were generally to be considered as operating costs of the contracts for the previous year's operations. The special equipment on which the depot paid claims was varied, including a steam boiler purchased for the dehydration of rutabagas, drying bins, sulfiting equipment, and cytron feeding screeners.

The fact that most of the dehydrating plants had operated only three years, whereas the certificate of necessity under which they were built was for five years, led some of the contractors to seek allowance in termination settlements for amortization that normally would have occurred over the remaining two years. Although contractors felt they should be reimbursed for the expenditures made, these claims could be paid only if, according to the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, contractors supplied the name of the Army agent with whom they dealt to support the validity of their claims. Such information could not always be furnished, and consequently in the long run only two or three such claims were filed on dehydrated vegetable contracts. One, for example, covered the erection of a plant to produce dehydrated potatoes for the duration of the war only. The dehydration plant, financed by a company already in existence, was built in July 1942 and fulfilled its first contract in the following month. When the contract for the previous year had been completed in May 1945, the company, in order to prepare the plant for operation in the 1946 producing season, made extensive repairs upon the advice of the OQMG. At the end of August 1945, when a contract for 1,500,000 pounds of dehydrated potatoes for the 1945 season was canceled, the firm claimed that over the entire period of operations an operating loss had been assumed in excess of $63,700 and that the unamortized special facility was worth $71,882. A claim for a total of $87,003 related to emergency facilities was filed under the Contract Settlement Act, and the net settlement paid to the contractor totaled $40,114.

Wherever the depots disposed of GFE, it was sold under the Clayton formula, which provided a method of selling GFE based on depreciation of a certain percentage for each month's usage. Facilities sold under this formula brought from 50 to 75 percent of cost. Equipment not sold to war contractors was declared surplus by the War Department and turned over to the War Assets Administration (WAA). The Clayton formula furnished a guide for the disposal of equipment, but disposing of special facilities provided to leaseholds, such as installing an elevator in a building, or adding a new floor or new windows, proved troublesome when it came to the settlement of claims. Few contracts made provisions for the disposition of such facilities, and it was difficult to secure the residual value of them. The most involved cases for settlement were those wherein expansion had been forced on the contractor

94 Massen, Central Procurement Operations, pp. 176, 178.
95 The vegetable dehydration industry was so limited in size before the war that it did not begin to meet expanded wartime demands. At the beginning of World War II, therefore, numerous dehydrating firms sprang up, financing building by loans granted either by the government or by private banks under "certificates of necessity," which entitled them to amortization over a five-year period, or a shorter period if the emergency ended sooner. Massen, Central Procurement Operations, p. 179.
96 Ibid., pp. 180–81. For other cases of subsistence claims see Risch, Demobilization Planning and Operation in the Quartermaster Corps, pp. 67–68.
since they involved starting load costs. Because of the huge procurement orders many plants were compelled to expand. They were also required to produce items, such as the intrenching shovel, that were foreign to the commercial market. The critical supply of certain materials forced the use of substitutes, which, in turn, compelled the contractor to work with an unknown quantity and raised anew the question of starting load costs. When terminations occurred, the depots had to take cognizance of new equipment and new assembly lines established as well as additional plant space acquired. Making allowance for such new equipment and facilities always involved controversial elements, but the greatest problem was ferreting out starting load costs.\(^{97}\)

**Contractor-Owned Termination Inventory**

The disposal of contractor-owned termination inventory, in most cases, posed no special problems. In some instances where the depot had to dispose of surplus standard items, such as Gillette razor blades or Squibb toothpaste, when contracts were terminated, it had to take precautions against glutting the market. Otherwise one of the policies underlying the JTR would have been defeated.

On the other hand, the disposition of termination inventory in subsistence contracts was not without its difficulties. The most unusual and unexpected problems occurred in disposing of raw materials when contracts for dehydrated vegetables were terminated. A large part of these difficulties were attributable to the inadequacy of the JTR in making provision for the disposition of perishable items. The time of year when terminations occurred also had a drastic effect upon settlement. In August and September little processing had occurred under the rather large contracts for the fiscal year 1946, and most of the fresh vegetables being grown for dehydration were still in the ground. The disposition of this inventory—vegetables in various stages of growth and harvested vegetables—constituted one of the chief problems in the termination settlement of contracts for dehydrated vegetables.

In the main, disposal of the fresh vegetables was arranged by consultation among representatives of the Field Headquarters of the Market Center Procurement Program, the OQMG, and the Department of Agriculture. Eventually a procedure for disposal was established which provided that, if no market at full cost could be found for the matured crops in commercial channels, the depot would inform the Market Center Headquarters of their availability. If the latter did not desire the items for Army menus, then the crops would be declared surplus to the Department of Agriculture.\(^{98}\) The decision as to whether crops in the growing stages should be permitted to mature or should be abandoned was made by the depot and confirmed by the OQMG.

Sweet and white potatoes, carrots, cabbages, rutabagas, beets, and onions were the principal raw materials for which disposal had to be arranged when dehydrated vegetable contracts were terminated. The difficulties encountered can best be discussed by illustration. For example, almost all of the carrots and cabbages for Army dehydrated vegetables were grown on the

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\(^{97}\) Intervs, OQMG historian with Adam Michals, procurement specialist in hardware; with Collings Downes, Legal Sec; and with William Lawson, procurement specialist, JQMD, 6 Feb 47.

\(^{98}\) Massen, Central Procurement Operations, pp. 122-23.
Pacific coast, the carrots being produced entirely in California. These crops were in various stages of growth at the time of contract termination. When stop-work notices were sent out to the dehydrators, the farmers had to cease cultivating, irrigating, and tending their crops. The problem of disposal therefore demanded immediate attention. The varieties of cabbage being grown, however, were not suited to commercial channels outside dehydration nor was commercial disposition possible for the variety of carrots grown. On the other hand, the Market Center Program could accept only a few carloads of carrots and none of cabbage, since spoilage in transportation of the latter commodity was very high. The Subsistence Division, OQMG, instructed the Chicago Depot to dispose of matured cabbage and carrots, for either animal or human consumption, at the best price obtainable. To keep the claims at a minimum, the growing crops were ordered abandoned in the field. It was also decided to pay the grower for the cost of production to whatever stage the crop had matured and for the cost of destroying the crop. Because fields had to be cleared before other crops could be planted, the question of posttermination expense arose. The cost of discing the fields where crops were abandoned was deemed a legitimate expense and was paid by the government.

A small acreage of the carrot crop was purchased by other dehydrators but the remainder was retained by the contractors at a loss to the government. One of the largest contractors, whose termination of fresh carrots amounted to 6,912 tons, disposed of 1,500 tons at no cost to the government. He offered $5.00 a ton on the remainder, of which he expected to freeze a part and to sell the rest as cattle feed. Another grower with 123 acres of unharvested carrots valued at $21,719 made a retention offer of only $1.00 an acre. Approved by the depot, this offer was accepted under protest by the Depot Property Disposal Board when it was shown that it would cost the Army $25.00 a ton to harvest the carrots and that only those desirable for commercial purposes could be sold. It was cheaper to settle this claim on a cost basis than on an abandonment basis, for in the latter case the government would also have had to pay destruction expense as well as the value of the potential harvest.\(^9\)

The cost of disposing of the cabbage crop on the west coast was not so high as that for carrots, although abandonment had been authorized for all crops that had not reached maturity at the time of contract termination. The cabbage ready for market was in some cases sold to other dehydrators at contract price. With the approval of the Depot Property Disposal Board, four contractors abandoned about 1,000 acres of unmatured cabbage. The settlements with the grower subcontractors included cultivating claims, which in some cases amounted to $95.00 an acre. Even when the profit to growers was counted in, the cost of abandonment, though sizable, would probably be less than the amount of the loss risk with sale upon harvest, since the harvest in some cases was months away. On the other hand, the Depot Property Disposal Board accepted a retention offer for twenty contracts for cabbage growing made by one of the large dehydrators. Up to termination the cost of raising the crops totaled $63,000 and the total contract price of the completed crops was $145,000. The dehydrator was willing to handle the completed crop for two-

thirds value, making a retention offer of $15,000 on the $63,000, which left a net cost to the government of $48,000. Had the offer not been accepted, the cost to the government on the basis of abandonment would have been $63,000 plus the profit allowed the contractor and abandonment costs; hence the government gained by this settlement.\textsuperscript{100}

\textit{Disposal of Surplus Property}

Military property and salvage as well as contractor termination inventory required disposal. The disposition of excess and surplus military property involved the redistribution of excess property, that is, supplies in excess of local needs in a specified area and hence available for transfer; the determination of excess property as surplus to the needs of the War Department; and the disposal of surplus property. Aware of the difficulties that had developed in surplus disposal after World War I, the War Department had given early consideration to this problem.\textsuperscript{101}

\textit{Disposal Problems}

By the fall of 1944 the War Department had made sufficient strides in estimating requirements and defining redistribution and disposal levels to eliminate some of the difficulties that the OQMG had been encountering in the disposal of surplus property, but others quickly arose from the relationships with disposal agencies outside the War Department. Between 1944 and 1946 these agencies succeeded each other with great rapidity.

Originally, the Surplus War Property Administration was established in the OWM by Executive order in February 1944. It issued a regulation, effective 15 May, for the War and Navy Departments and the United States Maritime Commission, designating the Procurement Division, Treasury Department, as the disposal agency for consumer goods; the RFC, for producer and capital goods; the War Food Administration (WFA), for food; and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) as the agency for handling the disposition of surpluses outside the United States.

Public interest in the disposal of surplus property culminated in the enactment of the Surplus Property Act of 1944, which established a Surplus Property Board to replace the Surplus War Property Administration on 3 October 1944.\textsuperscript{102} This board in turn gave way to a Surplus Property Administration, which was established in the Office of War Mobilization and Reconstruction (OWMR) under an administrator.\textsuperscript{103}

Meanwhile, the responsibility for disposing of consumer goods, assigned to the Office of Surplus Property in the Treasury Department on 19 February 1944, was transferred to the Department of Commerce, effective 1 May 1945. About six months later this office was again transferred, along with its activities and personnel, to the RFC, where it continued as the War Assets Corporation.\textsuperscript{104}

Approximately two months later, effective as of the close of business 15 January 1946, the War Assets Corporation was designated by the Surplus Property Ad-
The troubles experienced by the disposal agencies grew out of the differences between commercial and Army procedures resulting from utilization of a system of issue in the Army as compared with sales in commercial channels. In the case of issued items it was unnecessary to distinguish in great detail between items carrying substantially similar specifications. Clothing, for example, manufactured from GFM by different companies and at different costs was nonetheless carried under a single stock number. Similarly, a certain type and weight of typewriter paper was carried under a given stock number and used to fill requisitions under a standard nomenclature, although stocks might be made up of the products of several different manufacturers, and some of the paper might be of a quality varying from the specification standard. Speed, efficiency of operation, and economy were the factors that had determined the Army's adoption of this practice. Although recognition of this practice was fundamental in building disposal programs, it was largely ignored by the successive disposal agencies in the months immediately following the end of the war. Much of the difficulty experienced by the early disposal agency could be attributed to its failure to distinguish between an “issue” status and a “sales” status. The OQMG was willing to provide commercial breakdowns where feasible, but in many

105 Ibid., XI, 408, 1265, 3301.
106 Ltr, Dir of Office of Surplus Prop, Commerce Dept, to Surplus Prop Administrator, 15 Oct 45, no sub.
107 Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, for CG ASF, 26 Oct 45, sub: Commerce Rpt on Problems Encountered in Disposing of Surplus Mil Prop.
108 See Ltr, Dir of Office of Surplus Prop, Commerce Dept, to Administrator, SPA, 15 Oct 45, no sub, and Incl, sub: Nation-wide Sales Program Difficulties Chargeable to Reliance on Army Info and Sv.
instances obtaining such information involved prohibitive costs. The speed with which essential declarations were processed beginning on 15 August 1945 also contributed to inaccuracies, as did the constant and increasingly heavy turnover in depot personnel, which led to the use of many inexperienced employees.

The lack of co-ordination between the OQMG and the disposal agencies that had existed during the formative stages of the disposal program contributed to the difficulties experienced in the disposal of surplus property. Because liaison had not been established, the OQMG failed to advise the disposal agencies concerning the type of information available so that sales programs could be built accordingly and methods developed to dispose of products in the most economical manner permitted under the Surplus Property Act. This situation was remedied in September 1945 by the appointment of liaison officers by each technical service.

Withdrawals from Quartermaster property that had already been declared surplus also caused persistent difficulties and became one of the biggest problems confronting the OQMG. If the depots had assumed originally that they were free to take whatever action they wanted in regard to property declared surplus until it was taken over by the disposal agencies, these agencies, on the other hand, tended in the beginning to oppose any withdrawals. The OQMG agreed that withdrawals of declarations were undesirable and were to be avoided as much as possible. The over-all objective of the disposal program was to serve the public interest by diverting to civilian channels items not required by the Army. The disposing agency had to recognize, however, that errors in declarations were possible or that changes in requirements might occur necessitating withdrawals that should receive priority over any disposal program. The OQMG urged that under no circumstances should the Army be put in the position of entering the open market to procure items in order to "make good" on a surplus declaration, which, as a result of subsequent study or changed conditions was revealed to be no longer surplus.110

It became established Quartermaster policy that the Stock Control Branch of the OQMG controlled all requests for withdrawals of surplus Quartermaster property at the depot level.111 Such withdrawals could be effected only as specifically directed by the OQMG and with the concurrence of the disposal agency. The withdrawals were directed only after studies had been made within the OQMG and it had been definitely determined that such items were needed to meet immediate and future War Department requirements. In the spring of 1946 an excessive number of withdrawals from surplus property of small quantities of items, however, necessitated reiteration of War Department policy—that withdrawals should be initiated or approved only if it could be shown that a withdrawal would prevent procurement.112

As the months passed requests for withdrawal of many surplus items nevertheless became quite numerous, a situation read-
ily understandable when viewed against the background of conditions immediately after V-J Day. Then every effort was being exerted to make available items that were needed in civilian markets, and to this end drastic reductions were made in Army disposal levels. On many items levels were established as of 31 December 1947 and in some cases, 30 June 1947. The presumption was that such items would be disposed of immediately. In such cases, where the Army had only enough stocks to meet its needs until these dates and consequently would have to initiate procurement action making allowance for the necessary lead time, the OQMG felt that surplus items should be returned to obviate the expenditure of funds if the items had not been committed by the disposal agency. Where entire quantities of items had not been sold, the OQMG thought the undisposed portion should also be released for withdrawal. There was no question of recapturing items that had been committed or advertised for sale. In view of the drastic cuts in appropriations and the fact that commercial firms were indifferent to and unable to produce for military needs, it was deemed essential that every item needed by the Army be recaptured regardless of the circumstances under which it was declared surplus.113

In addition, the War Department was called upon to assist in foreign aid programs. As a consequence, surplus property of many classifications and involving large operations was withdrawn for use in the Surplus Incentive Materials and other foreign aid projects. Such withdrawals not only helped in the rehabilitation efforts in occupied areas but also enabled the disposal agency to rid itself of property for which disposal outlets were limited.

If repeated withdrawal was a sore point with disposal agencies, the OQMG complained of the delays experienced in obtaining approval by regional offices of the WAA of requests for withdrawals submitted by Quartermaster field installations.114 The OQMG felt that such approval or disapproval should be furnished within ten days, a time limit that was subsequently established by regulation of the WAA. In the main, these delays did not arise from existing withdrawal policies or procedures but from the failure of regional offices to implement them in accordance with existing regulations and supplementary instructions issued by the WAA. Early in 1947 the OQMG called the attention of the WAA to certain specific problems. It noted that freeze orders of the WAA were not always honored in the field; that requests for withdrawals were frequently disapproved by regional offices on arbitrary grounds; that disapprovals of withdrawals were not rescinded on property that remained unsold after it had been advertised and unsuccessfully offered to the public; and that requests for withdrawals were not always acted upon within the period specified by regulations. The OQMG therefore requested that steps be taken to clarify policies on withdrawals in order to eliminate arbitrary bases for the disapproval of withdrawal requests and that certain daily bulletins of the WAA be re-emphasized to prevent future delays.115 The problem of withdrawals continued to be studied by the OQMG, and with-

113 Address, Lt Col W. C. Strum to Liaison Offs, WDGS, 13 Jan 47, sub: Problems and Plans of QM Surplus Disposal, p. 6.
114 (1) Ltr, Col Strum, OQMG, to Office of Surplus Prop, WAA, 8 Aug 46, no sub. (2) Ltr, Col Cound, OQMG, to Office of Surplus Prop, 24 Sep 46, no sub. (3) Ltr, Cound to same, 6 Nov 46, no sub.
115 Ltr, Col Cound, OQMG, to Office of Surplus Prop, WAA, 20 Jan 47, no sub.
drawals were effected only as necessary.

At the end of the war the OQMG became concerned with releasing commercial warehouses and leased storage facilities. During the war, because of inadequate space at government installations, it was necessary to store items in leased facilities under contract arrangements. The agreements made with the owners of these storage facilities provided for an in-and-out handling charge on a lot basis. Most of these agreements had terminated about 30 June 1946, and thereafter the OQMG stored and handled surplus property in such facilities on the basis of a monthly verbal agreement.

In the course of disposing of surplus property stored in these commercial facilities difficulties developed. In all cases the lessors were not only eager to regain their storage space and to be relieved of the responsibility of storing and handling surplus property, but they were also reluctant to perform any duties other than those agreed to at the time of storage. The regional offices of the WAA, however, attempted to handle surplus property stored at these leased facilities in the same manner as that stored at government installations. The WAA, for example, sent prospective purchasers to the commercial warehouses to inspect surplus property, but provision for inspection was not a service agreed to previously by the lessors. Inspection required the lessor to detail personnel not only to act as guides but also to segregate, open, display, reseal, and return the surplus property to storage. No existing contracts covered such activities.

The WAA also requested shipment of insignificant quantities of surplus property to regional offices for use as samples. In one case a single yard of cloth was requested, which necessitated unpacking a bolt, cutting off the required yardage, and then repacking and remarking the bolt. This action, too, involved labor costs to the warehouse not covered by existing contracts. Although the original agreements had provided for in-and-out handling on a lot basis, most firms agreed to waive this provision to ship by lot, the latter usually meaning a carload. They refused, however, to ship less than an original container. In addition, some regional offices of the WAA furnished disposal documents direct to the lessors, but the latter refused to ship except on receipt of a War Department shipping document inasmuch as payment for their services was made only on the basis of that shipping document. This situation resulted in confusion and delay in shipment. The OQMG, therefore, urged the WAA to co-operate with the accountable depot regarding surplus property stored in commercial warehouses.

Release of Civilian-Type Items

In addition to giving preference to the disposition of surplus property stored in commercial and leased storage facilities, the OQMG also gave top priority to the disposal of surplus civilian-type items. Until V-J Day emphasis was placed primarily on the transfer of excess stocks and on the disposal of obsolete and nonstandard items, with only limited disposal of standard Quartermaster items. With the end of the war, however, attention was concentrated on studies of those items that would be most needed by the civilian economy during the reconversion period.

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116 Ltr, Col Cound, OQMG, to Office of Surplus Prop, WAA, 24 Oct 46, no sub.
117 (1) Ibid. (2) Address, Col Strum, OQMG, to Liaison Offs, WDGS, 13 Jan 47, sub: Problems and Plans of QM Surplus Disposal.
In anticipation of V-J Day Headquarters, ASF, made its plans, assuming that issue demand for Periods II and III would be one third that for Period I. The disposal level for civilian-type items was to be reduced to one third of that established for such items in Supply Control MPR-20, 30 June 1945. Quantities of stock on hand in excess of the reduced redistribution and disposal levels were to be declared surplus immediately without approval of Headquarters, ASF. Furthermore, circularization to other components of the War Department and to the Navy was to be discontinued immediately in order to make such items available as quickly as possible for the civilian market.\textsuperscript{118}

The OQMG did not acquiesce in the disposal level established, inasmuch as Army demands for some items, as, for example, clothing, would not be reduced by two thirds as of V-J Day. In any event, Quartermaster clothing items were applicable to civilian requirements only as substitutes for normal civilian-type items when these were unobtainable or obtainable only at inflated prices. They did not represent generally satisfactory civilian-type supplies. The OQMG requested exceptions to the disposal level for various items, such as nurses’ clothing, laundry items, and barracks equipment, because the requirements for them would not be reduced by two thirds if authorized for the use of occupational troops.\textsuperscript{119} The release of surplus items that would have immediate acceptance in the civilian economy, however, continued to be of primary importance in the program of surplus disposal in the months immediately following the end of the war.\textsuperscript{120}

The QMC was particularly vulnerable to criticism for delays in disposal because such a large proportion of its surplus property was consumer goods. Prompt dispositions could fill civilian shortages, whereas delays would throw supplies on the market in competition with normal civilian production. At the end of the war, therefore, the OQMG attacked this problem energetically. In the first week after Japan’s surrender the OQMG cleared for disposal 146 items, having a total value of $94,000,000.\textsuperscript{121} After an initial spurt of $83,000,000 in the first three days, the rate of clearance averaged only $2,000,000 per day, partly because a policy was adopted of holding some actions in suspense until firm requirements could be fixed for Period II, an objective that was accomplished by 25 August. Subsequently the use of special procedures establishing priorities by the disposal agencies for the declaration of unauthorized items became the major factor retarding declarations. As the backlog of goods determined to be surplus but not yet declared to the disposal agencies mounted, these special procedures were abandoned, and the OQMG returned to its practice of declaring unauthorized items for disposal without awaiting the request of disposal agencies. By the end of 1945 the OQMG had declared surplus goods to the disposal agencies to the value of $281,000,000.\textsuperscript{122}

To speed the disposal of surplus prop-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Memo, Dir of Reqmts and Stock Control Div, ASF, for TQMG \textit{et al.}, 14 Aug 45, sub: Redistr and Disposal Levels and Disposal Action for Civilian-Type Items on V-J Day.
\item \textsuperscript{119} (1) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 15 Aug 45, sub: Civilian-Type Items for Immediate Declaration as Surplus. (2) Approval was granted in Memo, Dir of Reqmts and Stock Control Div, ASF, for TQMG, 18 Aug 45, same sub.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Memo, Asst Dir of Plans and Ops for Reqmts and Surplus Prop, for TQMG \textit{et al.}, 10 Sep 45, sub: Disp of Surplus Civilian-Type ASF Mil Prop in the Continental U.S.
\item \textsuperscript{121} SR 99, 23 Aug 45.
\item \textsuperscript{122} SR 205, 17 Jan 46.
\end{itemize}
erty, after V-J Day the QMC divided its property into three major categories, namely, unauthorized items, authorized items, and items received at classification depots from posts, camps, and stations and from overseas theaters. Unauthorized items consisted of obsolete articles and those items which were no longer authorized for issue or considered as reasonable substitutes for authorized items. Policies established at an earlier date were continued. Thus through an electric accounting machine (EAM) listing the OQMG designated items within this category, controlling periodical changes in the listing and sending it to the depots. The depots were instructed to report all stocks of items on the unauthorized list as surplus to the disposal agency without reference to higher authority. Regional depots furnished the information concerning items on the unauthorized list to posts, camps, and stations in their distribution areas. This served as authority for the stations to dispose of such items as surplus without reference to higher authority as soon as the items became excess to their needs.

Authorized Quartermaster items at the depot level were reported as surplus only upon specific instructions from the OQMG. Such instructions resulted from continuous studies of requirements and stock positions. Upon completion of the studies, accountable depots were notified of the quantities and the condition of the stock to be retained for the future needs of the War Department as well as of the proportion to be reported as surplus. In the declaration of surplus, preference was always given to the disposition of used property, while new property, as far as possible, was retained for future Army use. In addition, although the choice of the location of surpluses to be disposed of was usually left to the discretion of the accountable depot, preference was given to property (1) in commercial storage, (2) in leased facilities, (3) in storage at posts, camps, and stations on depot accountability, (4) in depots other than those assigned a distribution area, and (5) in depots assigned a distribution area.

Posts, camps, and stations were also furnished through regional depots with a list of authorized items that, if excess to the station level, were required to be returned to designated depots to meet War Department requirements. Authorized items that were not listed in this publication, however, could be disposed of as surplus by the stations if excess to the stations’ needs. Like the unauthorized list, this list was revised to meet changes in requirements. The basic plans of the OQMG therefore remained unchanged. Items not needed for future War Department requirements were disposed of as surplus at the place of storage, and only those needed to meet future anticipated requirements were returned to depots.

Posts, camps, and stations returned their excess items included in the authorized list to classification depots. There the articles were inspected to determine whether they met standards for return to stock or could be repaired to meet such standards. If standards could be met, the items were processed for return to stock on a priority basis established by the OQMG; if standards could not be met, the items were automatically reported as surplus. These steps expedited action to make items available for civilian needs.

Elimination of Surplus Property Backlog

By the end of 1946 the bulk of Quartermaster declarations of surplus at the depot level had been made. Most Quartermaster declarations during the last half of 1946 came from one source, namely, surplus authorized items that did not meet the standards for Army stocks. It was anticipated that future declarations would continue to come from this source.\(^{124}\)

Quartermaster declarations of surplus from the beginning of disposal activity had exceeded removal or delivery orders issued by the disposing agencies. The failure to remove surplus property promptly caused a huge backlog to accumulate in Quartermaster depots, posing problems not only of space but also of care and handling. Each installation having custody of surplus property was required to submit monthly reports to the Chief of Finance on the costs of the care and handling of such property in order that reimbursement might be secured from the disposal agencies. Approximately one year after the end of the war, surplus property occupied 14 percent of QMC net usable warehouse and shed space and 11 percent of net usable open space.\(^{125}\)

The backlog of Quartermaster property awaiting removal by disposal agencies was valued at $341,000,000 on 31 January 1947. It constituted one of the largest backlogs among the technical services, representing one fourth of the total amount. By that date the disposal agencies had removed $541,000,000 of the $882,000,000 in surplus property made available to them by the QMC since June 1944.\(^{126}\) They were beginning to make an appreciable dent in this backlog and by the end of the year had reduced it to $50,400,000. By the close of 1948 it was virtually eliminated.\(^{127}\)

During the years 1941–45 such factors as changes in the strategic situation, technological improvements, blind buying early in the war, and the difficulties in determining precise needs months in advance were responsible for the creation of surplus property. After V-J Day the difficulty of estimating precise requirements for an Army whose size was subject to change as a result of the shifting political and international developments, as well as the effect of future technological improvements, assured a continuing trickle of surplus property. Thus it could never be eliminated entirely, although for all practical purposes the disposal of surplus property had been reduced to normal operating status three years after World War II had ended.

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\(^{124}\) Address, Col Strum, OQMG, to Liaison Offs, WDGS, 13 Jan 47, sub: Problems and Plans of QM Surplus Disposal, p. 7.

\(^{125}\) SR 350, 19 Aug 46.

\(^{126}\) SR 466, 20 Feb 47.

\(^{127}\) Statistical Yearbook of the Quartermaster Corps, 1948, pp. 81–82. The backlog amounted to $1,400,000.
CHAPTER IV

Statistical Review of Quartermaster Supply Operations

The importance of the supply function of the Quartermaster Corps is indicated by the fact that of the seven technical services under the jurisdiction of the Army Service Forces, the Corps ranked second only to the Ordnance Department in the dollar value of supplies procured for and delivered to the Army in World War II. Procurement deliveries represented a major part of the expenditures by ASF agencies, whose chief task was to provide and maintain the matériel required by the Army. The estimated value of these supplies, exclusive of petroleum products, totaled $69,248,874,000 for the period from January 1942 through December 1945. The value of QMC deliveries amounted to $21,711,572,000, or nearly one third of the Army supply program.¹

Procurement activities were centered largely in the Ordnance Department and the QMC, and these two technical services delivered more than 80 percent of the supplies required by the Army. That the Ordnance Department procured the larger dollar volume is accounted for primarily by the fact that it supplied such large and costly munitions items as tanks, artillery, self-propelled guns, and motor vehicles, as well as ammunition of all kinds. In contrast, the QMC was called upon to provide in enormous quantities thousands of types of small and relatively inexpensive articles, such as socks, shirts, shoes, undergarments, canned goods, perishable foods, shaving brushes, sleeping bags, knives, canteen cups, soap, and paper. At the same time the QMC did procure many kinds of expensive service and warehouse equipment—mobile repair units, fumigation chambers, mobile bath units, tractors, cranes, and fork-lift trucks—but their total cost of $351,136,000 amounted to only a fraction of the aggregate value of Quartermaster procurement.²

The provision of food for the Army was the most costly of all the supply functions performed by the QMC, subsistence procurement amounting to $11,392,689,000, or more than 52 percent of the total Quartermaster deliveries shown in Table 3. The cost of clothing the Army was less than half that of feeding the men, procurement deliveries of all clothing items aggregating $5,452,286,000. The value of clothing, in

¹ See Table 2.
² See Table 3.
TABLE 2—Estimated Value of ASF Procurement Deliveries: January 1942—December 1945 *

[In Thousands of Dollars]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Service</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Percentage Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$69,248,874</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Department</td>
<td>34,163,063</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Corps</td>
<td>21,711,572</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps of Engineers</td>
<td>4,853,759</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>3,962,487</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Corps</td>
<td>2,072,523</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Warfare Service</td>
<td>1,699,352</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Department</td>
<td>786,121</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes petroleum and petroleum products, coal and other fuels, and building and construction materials.

Source: Statistics, April 1952 draft, Procurement Sec., MS in OCMH.

TABLE 3—Value of QMC Procurement Deliveries by Major-Item Group: 1942–1945 *

[In Thousands of Dollars]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Subsistence</th>
<th>Clothing</th>
<th>Equipage</th>
<th>General Supplies</th>
<th>Service and Warehouse Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$21,711,572</td>
<td>$11,392,689</td>
<td>$5,452,286</td>
<td>$2,809,936</td>
<td>$1,705,525</td>
<td>$351,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>4,322,954</td>
<td>1,570,962</td>
<td>1,420,051</td>
<td>940,107</td>
<td>361,759</td>
<td>30,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>5,260,405</td>
<td>2,300,269</td>
<td>1,605,855</td>
<td>772,003</td>
<td>460,168</td>
<td>122,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>6,554,042</td>
<td>4,106,924</td>
<td>1,197,256</td>
<td>514,666</td>
<td>593,280</td>
<td>141,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>5,574,171</td>
<td>3,414,534</td>
<td>1,229,144</td>
<td>583,160</td>
<td>290,318</td>
<td>57,015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Exclusive of petroleum products.

Source: Statistics, April 1952 draft, Procurement Sec., Table PR-3, p. 17, MS in OCMH.

turn, exceeded the combined value of all the other major item groups.

With the huge expansion of the Army in 1942, requirements for subsistence and clothing, and to a certain extent equipage, were immediate. While the issue of many types of supplies needed by the soldiers could be temporarily deferred, the men had to be clothed and fed from the moment they entered the service. Consequently Quartermaster purchases and deliveries had to be stepped up at once to meet the unprecedented demands placed upon the Corps, which at the same time was faced with the task of providing housing and transportation for the rapidly growing Army. The increase in procurement of Quartermaster items after Pearl Harbor was phenomenal. Total deliveries by the agency in the calendar year 1942 amounted to $4,322,954,000. This was in sharp contrast to the total QMC expendi-
tures of only $200,000,000, including operating costs, for the fiscal year 1940—the last complete fiscal year before the United States undertook extensive mobilization under the Selective Service Act of September 1940.\(^3\)

The first year after Pearl Harbor was a period when the procurement efforts of the Corps were thoroughly absorbed in providing the Army with initial equipment, in supplying similar equipment for the Allies, and in filling the distribution pipeline, building reserves, and furnishing the operational requirements for the troops engaged in defensive actions in the Pacific, and for the landing operations in North Africa in 1942 and in Sicily and on the Italian mainland in 1943.

In the calendar year 1943 the total value of Quartermaster procurement deliveries, exclusive of petroleum products, increased to $5,260,405,000. It reached a peak of $6,554,042,000 in 1944—the year the Allies invaded France and launched their all-out drive against Germany. The monthly rate of expenditures in 1945 was higher than in 1944, and had the war not ended in August total procurement deliveries for 1945 would have far exceeded those for the preceding year. As it was, the total for the first eight months of 1945 amounted to slightly more than $5,000,000,000.

Despite the sharp rise in total procurement volume as the war progressed, the trend in deliveries of clothing and equipage, after the early period of hurried mobilization, was downward during 1943 and the first half of 1944. Both of these groups of major items followed the same procurement-delivery pattern. They started to decline simultaneously early in 1943 after reaching their wartime peaks in the fourth quarter of 1942, but eighteen months later, in the second half of 1944, they both began to climb again, as illustrated in the following quarterly breakdown of deliveries:\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Clothing (Thousands of Dollars)</th>
<th>Equipage (Thousands of Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>$215,553</td>
<td>$100,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>304,254</td>
<td>174,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>417,601</td>
<td>314,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>482,643</td>
<td>351,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>481,714</td>
<td>283,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>402,222</td>
<td>192,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>385,620</td>
<td>155,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>336,279</td>
<td>140,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>289,699</td>
<td>102,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>283,283</td>
<td>92,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>293,700</td>
<td>133,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>330,575</td>
<td>186,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>370,242</td>
<td>193,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>459,067</td>
<td>226,497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The downward trend resulted largely from a re-examination of the supply program of the War Department in terms of the changed logistical situation. The Army’s most pressing needs for initial equipment had been met by late 1942; the pipeline had been stocked to meet the bulk of current demands; and the pressure for immediate delivery of goods had been eased. The second phase of war production, in which procurement had to be

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\(^3\) The Budget of the United States for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1942 (Washington, 1941), p. A-74. Actual expenditures of the QMC for the fiscal year 1940 are listed at $197,998,828. Procurement deliveries on a calendar-year basis before 1942 are not obtainable with reasonable effort and research.

\(^4\) Statistics, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, April 1952 draft, Procurement Sec., MS in OCMH.
scheduled to meet estimated replacements and operational requirements, was beginning. The higher echelons of the War Department became more aware of the serious repercussions that could arise from the accumulation of excess goods, particularly when it was at the expense of civilian production, and they placed greater emphasis on minimum inventories. Increasingly, they felt the need to correlate procurement more closely with consumption. To promote this correlation, the OQMG initiated studies that resulted in a more realistic estimation of requirements as well as a more accurate establishment of stock levels. These developments culminated in a more effective stock control system.

In effect, the OQMG took steps to schedule deliveries to correspond more closely with actual requirements. For this purpose it established a Master Production Schedule that set an upper limit on purchases and controlled the rate at which required production was to take place. Furthermore, the Quartermaster depots made efforts to reduce buying not controlled by such schedules.

The net result of all this was a downward revision of requirements and a cutback in the procurement of most Quartermaster items, particularly clothing and equipage items. For example, War Department apprehension over the size of the duck and webbing inventory—textiles used in the production of tents and various items of personal equipage—resulted in a sharp curtailment and cancellation of duck and webbing contracts late in 1943. From approximately 72 million yards in the fourth quarter of 1942, the duck and webbing pool “pulled down the duck deliveries for the second, third and fourth quarters of 1943 to 37 million, 8 million and 2 million yards respectively.” The decline in the deliveries of all types of tents “slipped off to the vanishing point by the end of the year.”

Similarly, production of worsted and woolen fabrics for the Army was cut in half by the spring of 1944.

This downward trend was further stimulated in the summer of 1944 by the generally accepted belief that the war in Europe would end shortly. In terms of this shortened-war thinking, stock levels were considered adequate and the accumulation of surplus stocks was deemed undesirable. The pressure for smaller inventories was thereby increased.

Contributing to the downward trend was the introduction of new items of clothing and equipment developed to replace old items—for example, the use of the wool sleeping bag in lieu of two woolen blankets. Procurement deliveries declined because, on the one hand, old items were cut back sharply in production, while, on the other, the shift to the manufacture of new items required time to build up deliveries. Thus the introduction of the wool sleeping bag resulted in very small requirements for woolen blankets, and deliveries dropped abruptly during the summer of 1944. Depot stocks, however, were considered adequate to meet all requirements from the field, but a precarious stock-level position developed by mid-September when a huge requisition, soon to be supplemented by others, was received from the ETO as a result of the slow shipments of wool sleeping bags and the necessity for conducting a strenuous winter campaign.

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5 Rpt, Col. Robert T. Stevens and Ralph A. Butland, 20 Aug 45, sub: Supplement to QMC Duck and Webbing Pool Rpt of 1 Feb 44, p. 3.
6 Memo, Col Stevens, Deputy Dir of Purch, Procurement Div, OQMG, for CG ASF, 10 May 44, sub: Brief Picture of Worsted and Woolen Industry.
### Table 4—Deliveries of Selected Clothing, Equipment, and Supply Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clothing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt, waist web, M1937</td>
<td>4,008</td>
<td>8,477</td>
<td>16,052</td>
<td>5,487</td>
<td>7,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coat, wool serge, o. d.</td>
<td>4,696</td>
<td>8,031</td>
<td>3,811</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawers, cotton shorts</td>
<td>22,128</td>
<td>36,121</td>
<td>32,940</td>
<td>46,658</td>
<td>43,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacket, field, M1943</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>7,470</td>
<td>9,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacket, field, wool, o. d.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirt, flannel, o. d., coat style</td>
<td>8,532</td>
<td>16,922</td>
<td>20,176</td>
<td>5,107</td>
<td>11,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes, service, all types, men (pair)</td>
<td>13,029</td>
<td>26,907</td>
<td>21,836</td>
<td>6,365</td>
<td>5,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweater, high neck</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>6,937</td>
<td>6,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers, cotton, khaki</td>
<td>12,322</td>
<td>19,686</td>
<td>20,749</td>
<td>6,592</td>
<td>10,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers, herringbone twill</td>
<td>7,927</td>
<td>11,037</td>
<td>22,647</td>
<td>33,050</td>
<td>14,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers, field, wool serge</td>
<td>6,891</td>
<td>14,457</td>
<td>13,669</td>
<td>8,673</td>
<td>12,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undershirt, wool</td>
<td>8,731</td>
<td>13,336</td>
<td>16,765</td>
<td>7,815</td>
<td>9,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag, barracks</td>
<td>3,871</td>
<td>18,273</td>
<td>6,610</td>
<td>4,154</td>
<td>1,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag, duffle</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,168</td>
<td>7,316</td>
<td>3,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bag, sleeping, wool</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>5,333</td>
<td>2,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt, cartridge, .30-cal., dismounted, M1923</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>3,777</td>
<td>3,486</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belt, pistol or revolver, M1923</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>5,428</td>
<td>3,573</td>
<td>2,127</td>
<td>3,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanket, wool, o. d., M1934</td>
<td>6,628</td>
<td>13,706</td>
<td>15,265</td>
<td>5,976</td>
<td>9,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteen (all types)</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>4,776</td>
<td>8,099</td>
<td>6,508</td>
<td>8,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shovel, intrenching, M1910; M1943</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>6,744</td>
<td>5,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tent, shelter-half</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>11,299</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>3,803</td>
<td>6,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tent, squad, M1942; M1945</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Supplies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can, water, 5-gallon</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>2,951</td>
<td>598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDT, 100% Technical Grade (lb.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,239</td>
<td>9,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drum, inflammable, 5-gallon</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>14,291</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>3,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecticide, freon aerosol, 1-lb. dispenser (lb.)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4,438</td>
<td>12,847</td>
<td>15,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecticide, powder, loose, 2-oz. can (can)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12,138</td>
<td>27,343</td>
<td>20,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methyl Bromide, 20-cc. ampules</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17,542</td>
<td>12,446</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repellent, insect, 2-oz. (bottle)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>70,482</td>
<td>129,018</td>
<td>37,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap, laundry, ordinary issue (lb.)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>57,583</td>
<td>265,228</td>
<td>299,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stove, gasoline, M1941; M1942</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service Equipment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bath unit, field, mobile (each)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry, mobile, 2-wheel, trailer-type (each)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, 2-wheel, shoe repair (each)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer, warehouse (each)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>30,738</td>
<td>32,687</td>
<td>17,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, fork-lift, 2,000-lb. (each)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, fork-lift, 3,000-lb. (each)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>1,286</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, fork-lift, 6,000-lb. (each)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>(*)</td>
<td>3,989</td>
<td>4,403</td>
<td>3,791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes deliveries for Army, Air Forces, and civilian components.
* Except when designated each.
* Data not available.
* Not procured by QMC prior to 1943.

Deliveries of woolen blankets had to be stepped up sharply at that time, and they continued at a high rate to the end of the war in order to provide for the increasing numbers of displaced persons and prisoners of war as well as to meet the needs of the armed forces.7

Still another factor influencing the downward trend was the effect of the greatly expanded program of conservation and reclamation on procurement. Once initial issue had been accomplished, clothing and equipage items could be reclaimed, repaired, and returned to use, thus saving millions of dollars that otherwise would have had to be spent for the purchase of replacement items. In contrast, the reclamation program had no application to food and other expendable items, such as soap, paper, insecticides, or repellents. Their consumption necessitated new purchases to meet Army demands.

Procurement deliveries of clothing and equipage began to rise sharply in the fourth quarter of 1944. It had become obvious by then that the war in Europe was not going to end in 1944, and that not only would supply lines have to be maintained but requisitions would have to be revised upward in the light of the tactical situation. For example, on the assumption that housing on the Continent would be practically nonexistent for American troops as a result of bombings and the need to provide shelter for displaced persons, the Chief Quartermaster, ETO, increased tentage requirements enormously in the fall. The schedule for squad tents alone jumped from a monthly requirement of approximately 28,000 in October to 44,000 in December and up to 100,000 per month in April 1945.8

The most influential factor contributing to the rise in procurement deliveries of clothing and equipage, however, was the higher rate of replacements necessitated by the commitment of a much larger proportion of the armed forces to battle following the invasion of Normandy. The greater attrition of clothing and equipage items in battle—that is, the more extensive wear and tear and losses—resulted in an increased rate of replacements that was reflected in larger requisitions. The ETO demands for woolens and worsteds brought a sharp rise in the delivery of these textiles and the end items manufactured from them.9 At the same time, experience revealed that cotton fabrics did not have as long a life in the damp and heat of the tropics as they did in other areas occupied by American troops, and the rate of issue in the Pacific also had to be increased.

It was primarily the ever-increasing demand for subsistence that accounted for the steady rise in total Quartermaster procurement deliveries through the war years. Deliveries of general supplies also contributed in part to this trend. While both of these major groups of commodities were affected in the first half of 1943 by the cutbacks that resulted from War Department efforts to correlate procurement more closely with consumption, the upswing in deliveries was halted for only a brief period. After mid-1943 deliveries of both began to rise sharply again, a full

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7 (1) Special Rpt, Statistics Br, OP&C Div, to TQMG, Nov 45, sub: Wool Blankets: Supply Summary, World War II, pp. 4A, 6, 21. (2) For annual deliveries of blankets and wool sleeping bags, see Table 4.


9 For example, note deliveries of wool field jackets and wool trousers in Table 4.
year in advance of the increases in the clothing and equipage groups. Deliveries of general supplies, although rising steadily during 1944, never quite reached the peak attained in the fourth quarter of 1942. Subsistence deliveries, however, showed a consistent and enormous expansion throughout the period ending with the second quarter of 1945, when the dollar volume was almost double that of the fourth quarter of 1942, as shown in the following quarterly analysis:\textsuperscript{10}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Subsistence Supplies (Thousands of Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>$151,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>$316,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>474,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>627,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>506,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>486,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>623,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>684,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>914,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>1,006,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>1,014,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>1,170,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>1,113,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>1,172,486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially the volume of subsistence procurement increased in relative proportion to the growth of the Army, that is, to the number of men to be fed every day. Once the armed forces reached their full growth, it could be anticipated that subsistence procurement would tend to level off. Even before that, however, the Army was saddled with a new burden—that of feeding prisoners of war and great numbers of civilians in occupied areas. Provision of food for the Italian people, for example, became a serious problem first in Sicily and then on the Italian mainland where it was found that the destructive effects of war had reduced the Fascist economy to a chaotic state and had left the country unable to feed itself. The food shortage reached such an acute stage late in 1943 that steps had to be taken to ship large quantities of basic foods, especially wheat and flour, to Italy. In November of that year responsibility for feeding the civilians in Italy and other liberated areas was assigned to the War Department with the result that procurement deliveries of subsistence increased radically, beginning in 1944 and continuing to the end of the war. For instance, nearly two billion pounds of flour were delivered to the Army, civilian aid, and other government agencies in 1944, in contrast to only three quarters of a billion pounds in 1943. In 1945 upwards of three and a half billion pounds were delivered.\textsuperscript{11}

Although total procurement deliveries in the commodity group comprising service and warehousing equipment were relatively small, the $30,000,000 expended for items delivered in 1942 was particularly insignificant when compared with expenditures for items in other major groups that year, or for that matter when compared with those in its own group in 1943 and 1944.\textsuperscript{12} One of the reasons for this was that many new items of service equipment, such as mobile repair, laundry, and bath units, were developed and procured fairly late in the war. Another factor was the difficulties experienced in obtaining...
Table 5—Deliveries of a Few Selected Subsistence Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nonperishable Subsistence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples, canned</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon, canned</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>120.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans, dry, white</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>107.9</td>
<td>153.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef, corned, canned</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter, stabilized, canned</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabbage, dehydrated</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken and turkey, boned, canned</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee, green basis</td>
<td>331.2</td>
<td>211.4</td>
<td>381.3</td>
<td>598.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs, whole, dried</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour, wheat, white</td>
<td>492.4</td>
<td>767.5</td>
<td>1,956.3</td>
<td>3,338.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juice, citrus (all kinds)</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>196.1</td>
<td>301.9</td>
<td>335.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk, evaporated</td>
<td>350.2</td>
<td>562.1</td>
<td>902.1</td>
<td>999.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas, green, canned</td>
<td>337.5</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>325.1</td>
<td>103.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork and gravy, canned</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes, white, dehydrated</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmon, canned</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sausage, pork, canned</td>
<td>187.8</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stew, meat and vegetables, canned</td>
<td>128.1</td>
<td>108.8</td>
<td>158.5</td>
<td>78.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes, canned</td>
<td>472.7</td>
<td>175.5</td>
<td>207.7</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perishable Subsistence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>902.5</td>
<td>1,038.0</td>
<td>1,135.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter, fresh</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>204.2</td>
<td>263.0</td>
<td>313.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese, cheddar</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>150.2</td>
<td>112.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs, fresh</td>
<td>128.4</td>
<td>339.0</td>
<td>392.5</td>
<td>374.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ham, cured</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>221.4</td>
<td>155.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork, fresh</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>363.4</td>
<td>451.8</td>
<td>276.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry (all kinds)</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>152.3</td>
<td>437.4</td>
<td>283.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sausage (all kinds)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>257.8</td>
<td>240.4</td>
<td>179.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables, frozen</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes deliveries for Army, civilian aid, foreign aid, and other government agencies.
* Data not available.
* Includes receipts from procurement and direct shipments (Army only).
* Total purchases of smoked bacon and smoked ham were 328 million pounds.

Source: 1949 Statistical Yearbook of the Quartermaster Corps, pp. 28-29.

ing deliveries of the warehousing equipment needed to handle the increasing volume of Quartermaster tonnage. These difficulties were caused by the lack of adequate facilities at first to produce this equipment as well as the shortages of steel and other materials and the low priorities placed on these materials for the manufac-
TABLE 6—PURCHASES DIRECTED BY OFFICE, QUARTERMASTER GENERAL OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS BY MAJOR COMMODITIES: 1 JUNE 1943–31 AUGUST 1945 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value, Quantity, and Commodities</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Jun–Dec 1943</th>
<th>Jan–Dec 1944</th>
<th>Jan–Aug 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$337,579,573</td>
<td>$80,265,463</td>
<td>$127,872,445</td>
<td>$129,441,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline for Internal Combustion Engines</td>
<td>212,500,251</td>
<td>40,286,403</td>
<td>87,335,600</td>
<td>84,878,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burning Fuels</td>
<td>11,718,919</td>
<td>932,157</td>
<td>4,765,393</td>
<td>6,021,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Fuels</td>
<td>9,745,194</td>
<td>2,626,669</td>
<td>4,539,594</td>
<td>2,578,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive Engine Oils</td>
<td>73,291,722</td>
<td>30,795,733</td>
<td>20,248,880</td>
<td>22,247,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gear Lubricants</td>
<td>11,836,511</td>
<td>2,791,176</td>
<td>3,982,352</td>
<td>5,062,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvent, Dry Cleaning</td>
<td>1,878,955</td>
<td>125,109</td>
<td>1,550,676</td>
<td>203,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Oils</td>
<td>622,698</td>
<td>172,311</td>
<td>442,605</td>
<td>7,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Lubricating Oils and Specialties</td>
<td>6,823,803</td>
<td>330,659</td>
<td>1,749,950</td>
<td>4,743,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive Greases</td>
<td>6,338,377</td>
<td>1,459,342</td>
<td>2,508,301</td>
<td>2,370,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Lubricating Greases and Specialties</td>
<td>2,823,093</td>
<td>745,904</td>
<td>749,094</td>
<td>1,328,095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Quantity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value, Quantity, and Commodities</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Jun–Dec 1943</th>
<th>Jan–Dec 1944</th>
<th>Jan–Aug 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline for Internal Combustion Engines, gallons</td>
<td>2,427,550,953</td>
<td>485,616,210</td>
<td>954,309,338</td>
<td>987,625,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burning Fuels, gallons</td>
<td>173,819,015</td>
<td>17,015,487</td>
<td>70,077,445</td>
<td>86,726,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel Fuels, gallons</td>
<td>187,203,291</td>
<td>49,583,075</td>
<td>97,481,833</td>
<td>40,138,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive Engine Oils, gallons</td>
<td>149,044,551</td>
<td>52,447,426</td>
<td>45,822,996</td>
<td>50,774,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gear Lubricants, gallons</td>
<td>22,258,530</td>
<td>4,431,959</td>
<td>8,127,102</td>
<td>9,699,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvent, Dry Cleaning, gallons</td>
<td>16,650,096</td>
<td>861,661</td>
<td>14,144,654</td>
<td>1,643,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Oils, gallons</td>
<td>14,307,576</td>
<td>2,586,354</td>
<td>11,636,218</td>
<td>85,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Lubricating Oils and Specialties, gallons</td>
<td>35,719,257</td>
<td>1,104,982</td>
<td>10,159,752</td>
<td>24,454,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive Greases, pounds</td>
<td>89,050,299</td>
<td>23,095,221</td>
<td>32,677,177</td>
<td>33,277,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Lubricating Greases and Specialties, pounds</td>
<td>41,128,339</td>
<td>12,842,395</td>
<td>11,309,135</td>
<td>16,976,809</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Represents purchases for overseas shipments only; does not include those of posts, camps, and stations in zone of interior.

Source: Compiled from data submitted to Hist Sec by Statistical Sv Sec, Purchase Br, Fuels and Lubricants Div, OQMG, 3 Dec 45.

The urgency for higher priorities that resulted in increased production of such mechanical handling equipment as fork-lift trucks, cranes, warehouse trailers, and conveyors of various types. More than 75 percent of the deliveries of service and warehousing equipment were made in the two years 1943 and 1944. By 1945 the requirements for items in this major group had largely been met.

Petroleum products, while constituting another major commodity group in wartime expenditures, are omitted from Quartermaster procurement deliveries shown in Table 3, primarily because complete and adequate statistics are not available. It was the spring of 1943 before the QMC became responsible for the purchase of most petroleum products used by the Army, with the notable exception of fuels and lubricants for aircraft. Before that time each supply service purchased its own petroleum products, a procedure that re-

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12 Other exceptions were recoil and hydraulic oils, purchased by the Ordnance Department, and asphalt, procured by the Corps of Engineers.
resulted in chaotic procurement conditions. Even within the QMC no central control of petroleum purchases existed and no adequate system of records was developed. In short, procurement of petroleum products was completely decentralized and unco-ordinated.

Efforts to centralize procurement of petroleum products for the Army culminated in the establishment of the Fuels and Lubricants Division in the OQMG on 1 June 1943. Thereafter statistics on overseas shipments were compiled. From that date until the end of the war the value of purchases directed by the division for overseas shipments amounted to approximately $337,580,000, of which gasoline for internal combustion engines accounted for about $213,000,000, or nearly two thirds of the total.\(^{14}\)

Unfortunately, statistics are not readily available for deliveries of petroleum products to the posts, camps, and stations in the zone of interior because such purchases were not handled by the OQMG. Instead, the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department executed consolidated contracts for gasoline, fuel oil, and diesel fuel for the Army upon which the posts, camps, and stations drew to meet their requirements. Moreover, lubricating oil for the Army was purchased on Navy Department contracts when a station needed ten gallons or more for a three-month period. In addition, a certain amount of local procurement was permitted in emergencies. Under these circumstances compilation of total procurement deliveries in the zone of interior proved a hopeless task.

Included in procurement deliveries shown in Table 3 are purchases of certain Quartermaster items made by the Corps to meet requirements for lend-lease and direct aid to civilians in occupied and liberated areas through the period ending 31 August 1945. During the four and a half years of lend-lease operations the QMC shipped supplies valued at $867,000,000 to Allied countries.\(^{15}\) This was exclusive of the Quartermaster supplies that were transferred from Army stocks within the various theaters and for which no statistics are available. Inasmuch as lend-lease shipments were utilized largely for the

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**Table 7—Value of Quartermaster Lend-Lease Shipments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Clothing and Textiles</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Other Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>299,000</td>
<td>236,000</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>231,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945 (Jan-Aug)(^{c})</td>
<td>176,000</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes transfers made in theaters of operation.
\(^{b}\) Excludes petroleum, oils and lubricants.
\(^{c}\) Includes shipments amounting to approximately $6,000,000 made subsequent to August 1945 in closing out the lend-lease program.

Source: Compiled for Hist Sec by Office of Management, OQMG, Oct 51.
outfitting of Allied troops, clothing and textiles and equipage constituted the bulk of the QMC purchases for the lend-lease program. Shipments of clothing and textiles alone amounted to $634,000,000, while those for equipage totaled $132,000,000, and all other Quartermaster items only $101,000,000.

Of all the countries participating in the lend-lease program, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics received by far the largest share of Quartermaster shipments. Supplies valued at $430,000,000, or approximately half of the QMC dollar volume of lend-lease procurement, were consigned to that country, the principal items shipped being bulk leather, Russian-type shoes, and overcoating. Shipments to the United Kingdom amounted to $295,000,000, or about one third of the QMC total, and were comprised largely of suiting, cotton textiles, and battle-dress uniforms for British troops. The cost of outfitting French forces, beginning with the Tunisia Campaign and accelerating to the end of the war in Europe, accounted for a large portion of the $142,000,000 in Quartermaster supplies distributed among numerous other countries.

Shipments of Quartermaster supplies for civilians in occupied and liberated areas were valued at approximately $878,156,000 for the period 1 July 1943 through 31 August 1945. This amount was slightly larger than the dollar volume of Quartermaster lend-lease shipments despite the fact that the civilian-aid program did not begin until mid-1943. The feeding of civilians was the most serious problem faced by the Allies in the occupied countries, and shipments of foodstuffs alone amounted to $669,251,000, or more than 75 percent of the QMC civilian supply shipments. Clothing, shoes, and textiles, which constituted the bulk of Quartermaster lend-lease shipments, were a relatively small part of the civilian-aid program, though they were valued at $131,000,000.

On a tonnage basis, shipments of wheat and flour were far ahead of all other Quartermaster major-item groups, with coal ranking second. In the cases of both lend-lease and civilian aid, liquid fuels and

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**Table 8—Distribution of Quartermaster Lend-Lease Shipments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Total (Thousands of Dollars)</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Other Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>$867,000</td>
<td>$430,000</td>
<td>$295,000</td>
<td>$142,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>299,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945 (Jan-Aug)</td>
<td>321,000</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes petroleum, oils and lubricants and also transfers made in theaters of operation.

Includes shipments amounting to approximately $6,000,000 made subsequent to August 1945 in closing out the lend-lease program.

Source: Compiled for Hist Sec by Office of Management, OQMG, Oct 51.
lubricants were supplied by theater commanders from military stocks overseas and consequently were not included in the shipments.

The storage and distribution of the billions of dollars worth of Quartermaster supplies procured in the United States for use of troops in the zone of interior and for the Army, Allies, and civilians in occupied and liberated areas overseas was a responsibility of the Quartermaster depot system. To meet this task the system was greatly expanded and vastly improved during the war. Not only were the existing depots enlarged and many new ones added, but millions of square feet of commercial warehouse space were utilized to supplement the Quartermaster facilities. Much of this space was leased and operated by the QMC itself, though a considerable portion was merely rented by the Corps and continued under private management.

In 1940, before the big expansion program began, there were seven Quartermaster depots and five general depots that the Corps occupied jointly with the other supply services. Most of the depots were relatively small, the total permanent warehouse space under control of or in use by the QMC amounting to only 7,700,000 square feet. At that time the depots were concentrated largely in the northeastern part of the country, with only two west of the Mississippi River and one in the South.

The depot expansion program was virtually completed by 1943. To meet the needs of a global war, the system had been radically reshuffled to provide storage facilities at strategic locations throughout the United States. Most of the new depots were established in the general vicinity of ports of embarkation or near important manufacturing centers. In all, eleven Quartermaster depots, seven subdepots, and eleven Quartermaster sections in general (later ASF) depots were handling

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**Table 9—Quartermaster Civilian Supply Shipments to All Liberated Areas: 1 July 1943 Through 31 August 1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Group</th>
<th>Value *</th>
<th>Weight *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$878,156,000</td>
<td>6,310,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat and Flour</td>
<td>309,934,000</td>
<td>2,985,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Foodstuffs</td>
<td>359,317,000</td>
<td>1,086,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary Supplies</td>
<td>1,621,000</td>
<td>2,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>4,954,000</td>
<td>26,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>50,740,000</td>
<td>2,101,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, Shoes, and Textiles</td>
<td>131,020,000</td>
<td>50,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Supplies and Equipment</td>
<td>7,705,000</td>
<td>14,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Manufactured Products</td>
<td>12,865,000</td>
<td>42,165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dollar values are stated as "landed cost," which covers cost of merchandise, packing, inland freight, storage and handling charges en route to port, ocean transportation, insurance, and other expenses incurred in delivery of goods at end of ship's tackle at port of final debarkation.

* Gross long tons.

Source: Compiled by International Br, Supply Div, Office of ACoS G-4, Oct 51.

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Quartermaster supplies. As a result of this expansion program, the total net usable storage space operated by the Corps amounted to approximately 30,000,000 square feet. By the time the Army had reached the peak of its strength this space had grown to 35,000,000 square feet, primarily through the leasing of commercial storage space, including cold-storage and dry-storage facilities for perishable and nonperishable foods. Net usable space operated by the QMC was further increased to more than 52,000,000 square feet late in 1945, when, with the war at an end, shipments declined and surpluses began piling up in the depots.\footnote{See Table 10.}

Storage space is of two distinct types—covered and open. Covered, which includes warehouse and shed space, was in greatest demand during the war and naturally was the most critical. Open hard-standing areas could be constructed cheaply and quickly but did not afford adequate protection for many kinds of Quartermaster supplies. Occupancy of open unimproved areas increased during the latter part of 1943 and most of 1944, yet they represented a comparatively small part of the total QMC storage space, averaging less than 2,500,000 square feet in 1944 and approximately 1,500,000 square feet in the first half of 1945.\footnote{ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec. 2H, 30 Sep 42–31 Dec 45, sub: Supplement, Storage Operations, p. 36.} Covered space, as indicated in Table 10, comprised approximately three fourths of the net usable space operated by the Corps during the war period. Most of the big increase in storage space after V-J Day, however, was in open hard-standing areas.

---

**Table 10—Net Usable Storage Space Operated by the Quartermaster Corps in the Continental United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1942 Covered</th>
<th>1942 Open</th>
<th>1943 Covered</th>
<th>1943 Open</th>
<th>1944 Covered</th>
<th>1944 Open</th>
<th>1945 Covered</th>
<th>1945 Open</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>24,735</td>
<td>7,714</td>
<td>27,701</td>
<td>6,357</td>
<td>27,931</td>
<td>7,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>24,424</td>
<td>6,107</td>
<td>27,778</td>
<td>6,824</td>
<td>27,933</td>
<td>6,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>25,475</td>
<td>7,432</td>
<td>28,077</td>
<td>7,254</td>
<td>27,828</td>
<td>7,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>25,776</td>
<td>6,710</td>
<td>28,195</td>
<td>6,575</td>
<td>27,724</td>
<td>7,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>25,835</td>
<td>7,378</td>
<td>27,838</td>
<td>6,677</td>
<td>27,759</td>
<td>6,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>25,813</td>
<td>8,020</td>
<td>27,819</td>
<td>6,763</td>
<td>27,646</td>
<td>6,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>26,128</td>
<td>7,991</td>
<td>27,597</td>
<td>6,558</td>
<td>27,646</td>
<td>6,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>26,602</td>
<td>7,321</td>
<td>27,693</td>
<td>6,669</td>
<td>27,533</td>
<td>6,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>19,815</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>27,588</td>
<td>5,010</td>
<td>27,580</td>
<td>6,470</td>
<td>28,216</td>
<td>7,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>23,007</td>
<td>2,581</td>
<td>27,654</td>
<td>6,464</td>
<td>27,672</td>
<td>6,858</td>
<td>30,887</td>
<td>17,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>24,190</td>
<td>5,359</td>
<td>27,358</td>
<td>7,106</td>
<td>27,578</td>
<td>6,324</td>
<td>31,345</td>
<td>20,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>23,934</td>
<td>5,896</td>
<td>27,565</td>
<td>7,214</td>
<td>27,856</td>
<td>7,095</td>
<td>31,389</td>
<td>20,963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* Includes Quartermaster depots and Quartermaster sections of general depots.\footnote{Includes warehouse and shed space available for bulk storage; excludes sales, receiving and shipping areas, and bin storage area. Prior to September 1943 bin storage area is included.}

\* Includes high grade and semifinished hardstanding plus unimproved open area actually occupied.\footnote{Data not available.}

Source: 1949 Statistical Yearbook of the Quartermaster Corps, p. 41.
Table 11—Tonnage Received and Shipped by Depots: September 1942–August 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Month</th>
<th>Total Tonnage Received and Shipped</th>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>Shipments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Short Tons]</td>
<td>[Short Tons]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,549,785</td>
<td>19,037,485</td>
<td>9,774,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39,587,270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942 (Last 4 months)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>3,817,023</td>
<td>2,057,886</td>
<td>1,759,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>838,457</td>
<td>471,964</td>
<td>366,493</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| November      | 927,830                           | 588,823   | 385,007   | (*)
| December      | 1,024,296                         | 604,351   | 419,945   | (*)
|               | 10,501,964                        | 5,412,194 | 5,089,770 | 1,881,393 |
| January       | 927,510                           | 475,287   | 452,223   | 99,592    |
| February      | 834,622                           | 432,634   | 401,988   | 101,952   |
| March         | 913,375                           | 506,780   | 406,595   | 95,001    |
| April         | 858,770                           | 446,919   | 411,851   | 94,571    |
| May           | 779,106                           | 401,414   | 377,692   | 112,531   |
| June          | 847,432                           | 399,499   | 447,933   | 177,494   |
| July          | 937,052                           | 446,972   | 490,080   | 208,711   |
| August        | 868,355                           | 448,228   | 420,127   | 197,229   |
| September     | 861,660                           | 439,554   | 422,026   | 201,267   |
| October       | 871,518                           | 433,554   | 437,964   | 211,123   |
| November      | 924,221                           | 508,069   | 416,152   | 194,858   |
| December      | 878,343                           | 473,284   | 405,059   | 187,064   |
|               | 14,048,415                        | 7,238,675 | 6,809,740 | 4,276,099 |
| January       | 905,807                           | 467,159   | 438,648   | 232,935   |
| February      | 866,582                           | 465,714   | 400,868   | 201,144   |
| March         | 1,026,272                         | 536,664   | 489,608   | 295,388   |
| April         | 1,056,581                         | 543,163   | 513,418   | 306,038   |
| May           | 1,163,655                         | 611,977   | 551,678   | 341,950   |
| June          | 1,265,206                         | 641,612   | 623,594   | 415,734   |
| July          | 1,249,330                         | 638,732   | 610,598   | 387,387   |
| August        | 1,307,028                         | 651,323   | 655,705   | 427,681   |
| September     | 1,248,268                         | 618,256   | 630,012   | 415,609   |
| October       | 1,252,429                         | 732,712   | 519,717   | 312,096   |
| November      | 1,390,223                         | 689,726   | 700,499   | 472,155   |
| December      | 1,317,032                         | 641,637   | 675,395   | 467,990   |
| 1945 (First 8 months) |                                  |           |           |
| January       | 1,382,457                         | 650,054   | 732,403   | 505,475   |
| February      | 1,359,696                         | 695,431   | 664,265   | 463,381   |
| March         | 1,592,472                         | 847,812   | 744,660   | 548,117   |
| April         | 1,574,825                         | 802,601   | 772,224   | 549,781   |
| May           | 1,626,098                         | 878,324   | 747,774   | 511,368   |
| June          | 1,414,029                         | 735,770   | 678,259   | 437,038   |
| July          | 1,254,990                         | 619,476   | 635,514   | 400,172   |
| August        | 1,015,301                         | 611,562   | 403,739   | 201,880   |

* Includes QM Depots and QM sections of general depots only. Excludes rewarehousing and intra-depot tonnage.

+ Data not available.

+ Includes shipments to ports of embarkation, depots, and other places.

Source: (1) 1949 Statistical Yearbook of the OMC, p. 44. (2) ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec. 2H, 30 Sep 42–31 Aug 45, sub: Supplement, Storage Operations, p. 18.
hurriedly constructed or acquired to meet the emergency need for storing surpluses. Statistics on the trend of receipts and shipments of Quartermaster supplies at depots are not available before September 1942. In the thirty-six-month period from that date to the end of August 1945, Quartermaster depots and Quartermaster sections of general depots handled nearly 40,000,000 tons, excluding supplies re-warehoused within the depots and those transferred from one depot to another. The greatest volume during the war years was recorded in 1944 when the depots received and shipped a combined total of more than 14,000,000 tons. The average monthly tonnage handled in the fourth quarter of 1942 was larger than the monthly average in 1943. Beginning in March 1944, however, the trend was sharply upward; from approximately 867,000 tons in February 1944 the volume had nearly doubled by May 1945, when a peak of more than 1,626,000 tons was reached.

Depot receipts followed a generally upward trend during the war, but the progress from month to month was quite erratic, particularly in 1942 and 1943. Thereafter they rose more steadily, reaching a peak of approximately 878,000 tons in May 1945. Depot shipments followed a somewhat more uniform course, climbing to a high of more than 772,000 tons in April 1945, a month ahead of the peak in receipts. Shipments exceeded receipts in only ten of the thirty-six months. These temporary net declines in depot stocks occurred generally at scattered intervals—November 1942; June, July, and October 1943; August, November, and December 1944; and January and July 1945.

Depot shipments to ports of embarkation reached a peak of approximately 550,000 tons in April 1945, shortly before V-E Day. These did not comprise, of course, all shipments to ports, since large quantities of Quartermaster supplies went directly from manufacturing plants to ports of embarkation. Statistics on these direct shipments are not available. It was early in 1944 before supplies shipped to ports by the depots began to exceed in tonnage the volume furnished to troops in the zone of interior. Shipments to ports averaged about 500,000 tons per month during the eight-month period from November 1944 through June 1945, accounting for nearly two thirds of the total tonnage shipped by the depots during that interval.

The development of mechanical materials-handling equipment and the improvement in warehousing techniques enabled the depots to accomplish two highly important objectives. One of these was a better utilization of existing storage space. The most significant factor here was the greatly increased use of fork-lift trucks and the palletization of supplies. During the early part of the war, when the depots had to depend largely upon manual labor and hand-operated equipment, the height to which supplies could be piled was severely restricted. The situation changed about the third quarter of 1943, when production of fork-lift trucks began to match demand. By mechanizing storage operations and using palletized loads, it became possible to pile supplies all the way up to the roof beams and trusses in the warehouses, and thus make use of what formerly had been enormous quantities of waste space. Depot operations were revolutionized and cubic space rather than

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21 See Table 11.
22 Ibid.
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS

### Table 12—Quartermaster Personnel and Work Load Per Employee in Storage Operations: September 1942–June 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Month</th>
<th>Storage Division Employees *</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Receiving and Shipping</th>
<th>QMC +</th>
<th>All Services *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>20,903</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>24,175</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>26,268</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>28,587</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>29,246</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>28,632</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>25,216</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>23,579</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>23,008</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>20,574</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>19,059</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17,985</td>
<td>8,686</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>20,844</td>
<td>9,259</td>
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<td>4.10</td>
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<td>November</td>
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<td>8,876</td>
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<td>4.52</td>
<td>3.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>19,323</td>
<td>8,318</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>18,488</td>
<td>7,245</td>
<td>5.45</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6,665</td>
<td>5.95</td>
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<td>6.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>17,388</td>
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<td>3.65</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
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<td>6,876</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.00</td>
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<td>July</td>
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<td>6,724</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>17,168</td>
<td>6,313</td>
<td>8.63</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>16,995</td>
<td>6,275</td>
<td>8.76</td>
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<td>4.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>17,042</td>
<td>6,433</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.97</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.68</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7,102</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>18,775</td>
<td>7,196</td>
<td>8.47</td>
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<td>4.81</td>
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<td>8.82</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.98</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19,179</td>
<td>6,784</td>
<td>9.76</td>
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<td>5.38</td>
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<td>April</td>
<td>18,615</td>
<td>7,130</td>
<td>9.65</td>
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<td>5.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>18,376</td>
<td>7,167</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.14</td>
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<td>June</td>
<td>18,080</td>
<td>6,925</td>
<td>8.58</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes employees at QM depots and QM sections of general depots.
+ Tonnage received and shipped (See Table 11) per man-days expended by receiving and shipping employees in QM depots and QM sections at general depots.
+ Total tonnage received and shipped in all ASF depots per man-days expended by all receiving and shipping employees in all ASF depots.
+ Data not available.

square footage became the basis for computing capacities of warehouses. Moreover, the rapidity with which Quartermaster items could be moved in and out of depots by the use of labor-saving devices resulted in a much faster turnover of supplies and contributed to more effective utilization of storage space.

Of perhaps even greater importance was the conservation of manpower achieved through the use of mechanical equipment, which enabled the depots to handle the huge increase in tonnage with fewer employees. At first, when fork-lift trucks and other labor-saving devices were difficult to procure, the number of personnel engaged in storage operations at Quartermaster depots and Quartermaster sections of general depots mounted steadily—from about 21,000 in September 1942 to a peak of nearly 30,000 in February 1943. After mechanical equipment finally became available in sizable quantities, the number of storage personnel dropped sharply to less than 17,000 by September 1944. The big increase in tonnage that occurred in the late months of the war resulted in a slight upward trend in storage personnel, but the total never exceeded 19,200 despite the fact that the monthly volume of tonnage was nearly 100 percent greater than it had been when there were approximately 30,000 storage employees.

Except for a small increase toward the end of the war, the number of personnel engaged in actual shipping and receiving activities at the Quartermaster depots and Quartermaster sections of general depots was reduced while the total tonnage handled was increasing. There were nearly 9,300 shipping and receiving employees in October 1943, when the depots handled approximately 872,000 tons. In the peak month of May 1945, when the depots handled 1,626,000 tons of supplies, the number of shipping and receiving employees had been reduced to fewer than 7,200. During that interval the number of tons handled per man-day of shipping and receiving employees more than doubled. The figure was 4.1 tons per man-day in October 1943 and 9.19 tons per man per day in May 1945. The record of the QMC for tonnage handled per man-day was consistently higher than for the technical services as a whole, which handled only 2.9 tons per man-day in October 1943 and 6.14 tons per man per day in May 1945.

23 See Table 12.
24 Ibid.
PART TWO

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING
CHAPTER V

The Procurement of Quartermaster Enlisted Personnel

Although the Quartermaster Corps expanded in relatively the same proportion as the entire Army during World War II, the expansion was not parallel because of the nature of the functions performed by the Corps. Its troop units increased as the Army increased, but its activities pertaining to construction, transportation, and procurement and storage of supplies expanded well in advance of the general increase in the Army. The peak of the Quartermaster load “comes at the beginning of mobilization when food, clothing, housing and transportation must be provided immediately.” 1 Consequently, Quartermaster personnel constituted between 7 and 8 percent of the Army during the early months of the war, but only 6 percent by March 1945. Likewise, the peak in QMC strength came nine months ahead of that of the Army as a whole, which was not reached until May 1945.2

When the German Army invaded Poland in 1939, the QMC consisted of 718 professional Army officers and 10,545 enlisted men, exclusive of Philippine Scouts.3 From this normal peacetime strength the number of Quartermaster personnel multiplied forty-five fold during the war to reach a peak strength in August 1944 of 502,265. This was more than double the Corps’ World War I peak strength of 240,000 and nearly triple the size of the entire Army in August 1939.4 Of the Army’s seven technical services, only the Corps of Engineers and the Medical Department were larger than the QMC. The others—Signal Corps, Ordnance Department, Transportation Corps, and Chemical Warfare Service—were considerably smaller.

During the emergency period the QMC was responsible for a wider range of duties than it had performed in World War I or was to exercise after the United States entered World War II. The National Defense Act of 1920 had restored to the Corps the functions of construction, transportation, and real estate service, which had been transferred elsewhere in the Army in World War I. These activities, however,

1 Lecture, AIC, Brig Gen Frank F. Scowden, Deputy QM Gen, 14 Feb 41, sub: The QMC.
2 See Table 13.
3 Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1940 (Washington, 1940), App. B, Table D.
Table 13—Growth of the QMC and the Army: Actual Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>QMC</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Percent QMC to Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Aug 1939</td>
<td>11,267</td>
<td>176,487</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 1940</td>
<td>17,788</td>
<td>264,118</td>
<td>6.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep 1940</td>
<td>31,104</td>
<td>438,254</td>
<td>7.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 1940</td>
<td>43,239</td>
<td>620,774</td>
<td>6.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 1941</td>
<td>101,442</td>
<td>1,460,998</td>
<td>6.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 1941</td>
<td>124,483</td>
<td>1,686,403</td>
<td>7.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 1942</td>
<td>226,146</td>
<td>3,074,184</td>
<td>7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 1942</td>
<td>327,794</td>
<td>5,397,674</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 1943</td>
<td>436,641</td>
<td>6,993,102</td>
<td>6.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 1943</td>
<td>453,419</td>
<td>7,482,434</td>
<td>6.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Aug 1944</td>
<td>502,265</td>
<td>8,102,545</td>
<td>6.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 1944</td>
<td>498,010</td>
<td>8,052,693</td>
<td>6.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 1945</td>
<td>491,301</td>
<td>8,157,386</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 1945</td>
<td>472,853</td>
<td>8,291,336</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec 1945</td>
<td>268,964</td>
<td>4,228,936</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures for QMC strength represent personnel who wore QMC insignia or were accounted for as QMC on Machine Records Unit status cards. They do not necessarily represent military personnel performing Quartermaster duties, nor personnel under QMC commanders.

* Peak.


were only routine in nature in periods of peace. Thus the declaration of the limited national emergency and the passage of the country's first peacetime draft act in 1940 placed the QMC in a unique position: it suddenly was faced with the task of providing shelter, hospitals, and other facilities, and transportation by motor, rail, and water, for a sizable Army not at war. The performance of these duties, in addition to that of supplying sharply increased quantities of food, clothing, and personal equipment, required the hurried transformation of the Corps from a small organization to one of tremendous proportions.

The Corps retained all of these functions throughout the emergency period when the Army grew from less than 200,000 men to over 1,500,000. During that time Quartermaster military personnel increased to more than 124,000, a large proportion of whom were required to carry on the functions of Army construction and transportation. The War Department late in 1941 took steps to ease the growing burden of the QMC and prevailed upon Congress to pass the law that transferred construction, real estate, and utilities functions to the Corps of Engineers, effective 16 December 1941. This transfer eventually involved about 2,100 officers, although some were not transferred until early in 1942.

5 Data obtained from unpublished report of the Secretary of War, FY 1942, in Strength Accounting Br, AGO.

6 Data obtained from Statistics and Rpts Sec, Pers and Tng Div, OQMG, 9 Dec 48.
The QMC was relieved of another major function—rail and water transportation—in the general reorganization of the War Department in March 1942, when the Transportation Division was separated from the OQMG and established as a division in the SOS, later the Transportation Corps. In August, five months later, motor transport activities were assigned to the Ordnance Department. These reorganizations brought about the transfer of about 3,800 Quartermaster officers and more than 66,000 enlisted men to the Transportation Corps and the Ordnance Department. The bulk of these transfers occurred during the last six months of 1942 and slowed down the expansion of the Corps, although there was still a net increase of about 101,000 in total military personnel in the QMC during that period.

The most rapid growth of the QMC occurred in the first six months of 1942. This was due primarily to the fact that the Combined Chiefs of Staff early in 1942 initiated plans for the invasion of Europe either in the fall of that year or in the spring of 1943. These plans called for the early activation of large numbers of Quartermaster units to handle the vast quantities of food, clothing, and equipment that were to be stored in the British Isles in preparation for the landings on the Continent. The average monthly rate of Quartermaster personnel expansion from January through June was 18,650, as compared with 9,665 in the first half of 1941 and only 3,705 in the last half of that

7 (1) Ibid. (2) Data obtained from Enlisted Sec, Pers and Tng Div, OQMG, 9 Dec 48.
The rate of expansion slackened to an average of 15,165 a month late in the summer of 1942, after it was decided to postpone the invasion of western Europe and to confine immediate ground operations against Germany to an invasion of North Africa. A large requirement for Quartermaster troops still existed, however, both for the North African campaign and for the build-up in the British Isles for the eventual invasion of the Continent.

The monthly expansion rate rose to 18,175 during the first half of 1943 when plans began to take shape for the main Allied offensive in Europe. It leveled off, however, in the second half of that year and never increased substantially thereafter. The succession of Allied victories had turned the tide of war and overseas requirements had begun to ease. The strength of the Corps declined steadily after November 1944 and was down to about 440,000 in August 1945 when the war ended.

Administrative Organization

The tremendous expansion of the Corps between 1939 and 1944 brought corresponding increases in the scope and complexity of the problems of the administrative organization in the OQMG responsible for the supervision of personnel functions. At the beginning of the period of limited national emergency in September 1939, requirements for personnel were sufficiently limited and routine that supervision of both procurement and training of personnel was handled by the Administrative Division. Its Personnel Branch supervised procurement and other activities relating to personnel, both military and civilian, while its War Plans and Training Branch established and directed policies and plans pertaining to the organization of Quartermaster units, to the mobilization and movement of troops, and to all phases of training. This same organization had been in effect since 1937.

The Personnel Branch was transferred from the Administrative Division and raised to the status of a division with the spurt in the growth of the Corps during the latter half of 1940—the grave period following the fall of France. This was the first of a series of administrative changes affecting personnel activities that were made within a period of five months. In October, after the passage of the Selective Service Act, the personnel training functions of the War Plans and Training Branch were grouped in a separate Training Branch and transferred to the Personnel Division. Then, late in December 1940, civilian and military personnel functions were separated. The Personnel Division was redesignated the Military Personnel and Training Division and placed under the direction of Brig. Gen. Henry D. F. Munnikhuysen. The Civilian Personnel Branch of the former Personnel Division became the Civilian Personnel Division, with Lt. Col. Henry Hockwald as chief.

The Military Personnel and Training Division directed all activities relating to officers and enlisted men, including training, throughout 1941 and the early months of the war. The initial reorganization of the OQMG along functional lines in

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8 Computed by author from Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1941, (Washington, 1941), and from Monthly Rpts, AGO to WDGS, Strength of the Army, 1942-44. See also Chart 3.
9 See Table 13 and Chart 3.
10 OQMG OO 4, 7 Jan 37, sub: Office Orgn.
11 (1) OQMG OO 49, 26 Jul 40, no sub. (2) OQMG OO 97, 4 Oct 40, no sub. (3) OQMG OO 144, 27 Dec 40, sub: Office Orgn.
March 1942, following the creation of the SOS, did not alter the basic structure of the division, but the second major reorganization of the Corps in July 1942 reunited civilian and military personnel functions under the same jurisdiction, this time in the Personnel and Training Division. The final major change affecting personnel functions took place a month later. Personnel and training activities had grown to such proportions that they were separated and placed in two divisions—the Personnel Division and the Military Training Division.\textsuperscript{12}

Both the Personnel Division and the Military Training Division continued in existence throughout the remainder of the war. General Munnikhuysen, who had headed the Military Personnel and Training Division, became director of the Personnel Division, a post he held until after V-J Day. Col. Wilbur R. McReynolds was appointed director of the Military Training Division and served in that capacity until November 1944, when he was succeeded by Col. Lloyd R. Wolfe.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Qualifications of Enlisted Men in the QMC}

Quartermaster troops had to possess the same general qualifications and be given the same basic military training as other soldiers in the Army. In addition, they had to have—or be taught—some trade or specialty that would make them useful to the Corps. They were soldiers first, suppliers second. The supplies they handled were the lifeblood of the Army, and Quartermaster troops had to learn to protect them. The supply lines, because of the world-wide scope of the war, were many times longer than they had ever been in any previous conflict, and were much more vulnerable as a result of the development of aerial bombing. Furthermore, Quartermaster troops were subject to attack from fast-moving mechanized forces, and endangered by mines and booby traps. They had to be mentally stable to withstand the shock of battle and capable of defending themselves.

The basic mission of the QMC was to procure, store, and distribute food, clothing, and individual and organizational equipment, as well as general supplies and all fuels and lubricants—except aviation gasoline—used by all of the armed forces. Moreover, the QMC procured and trained horses, mules, and dogs for the Army. In addition to all of this, it provided special services to all troops in the field. For example, it operated field bakeries; provided laundry, bathing, and related sanitary facilities; collected and disposed of salvage; operated repair shops for the maintenance of shoes, clothing, and equipment issued by the Corps; and cared for the dead.

These functions, highly diversified in nature, created the need for a wide variety of specialists. Cooks, bakers, meat cutters, mess sergeants, oven firemen, laundymen, tailors, shoe repairmen, coopers, packers, warehousemen, longshoremen, mechanics of various kinds, chemical engineers, refrigeration experts, and many other specialists were required to carry on Quartermaster supply services. Plumbers, pipefitters, electricians, steam engineers, carpenters, and painters were needed to maintain installations. Truck drivers, electrician, etc.
trical and motor mechanics, sheet-metal workers, and body repairmen were necessary in the operation and maintenance of motor vehicles.

Enlisted personnel at Quartermaster depots included not only truck drivers, motor mechanics, and clerks, but also supervisors of warehouse and salvage-repair activities, and procurement personnel trained for contract negotiation, renegotiation, and termination. All of these men had to be skilled technicians. The supervisors, for example, had to be capable of instructing, training, and supervising large numbers of personnel, and qualified by long training and experience to judge commodity values, or skilled in reclaiming salvage. Other personnel assigned to depots were dog trainers and handlers, photographic laboratory personnel, and subsistence and laboratory technicians. At remount depots, personnel had to be capable of breaking horses and mules and training them for field duty.

The QMC, in expanding its organization to care for the needs of an Army of more than 8,000,000 men, had to rely heavily upon the occupational experience that the inductees assigned to it had acquired in civilian life. Although most men without any particular skills could be readily taught to perform most housekeeping duties or to work in service units that did the manual labor jobs for the Army, the other services that comprised the bulk of Quartermaster responsibilities generally required tradesmen and skilled technicians.

The requirements for specialists were so extensive that the Corps had to conduct courses in which more than seventy different trades were taught. Many of the men assigned to schools, however, had had civilian experience in similar vocations and needed only to learn military methods and requirements. Otherwise, the Corps would have faced a hopeless task in attempting to train wholly inexperienced men in the many required military occupational specialties. Certain types of Quartermaster technicians, such as the highly skilled mechanics and chemical engineers needed to operate petroleum laboratories, could not be taught in the time that was available. For these the Corps had to depend entirely upon civilian-trained men. As General Munnikhuysen declared in a speech, not to be taken too literally: “The Army can teach a man to handle a gun and make a fairly decent shot out of him in 13 weeks, but it takes from 4 to 6 years to really produce a top-notch mechanic.”

Most of the major difficulties encountered by the QMC in procuring adequate military personnel can be traced to certain fundamental factors. One of these was that all of the arms and services were in competition for men, and their requirements for many types of specialists overlapped. Moreover, civilians who possessed the occupational skills the QMC could utilize with only a minimum of additional training were not inducted into the Army and assigned to the Corps in proportion to and simultaneously with its need for them.

Another factor was that a large percentage of the inductees were improperly classified at reception centers in regard to their occupational experience or potentialities, and thus the QMC failed to receive the various types of specialists in the proportions called for in quotas established by the War Department. Furthermore, the Corps had no priority on inductees in the higher brackets of intelligence and aptitude, as rated by Army tests, and was allotted an unusually large

14 Speech, PQMD, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, 28 Aug 41, sub: Roll Up Your Sleeves.
proportion of men with inferior intellectual capacities.

The extensive competition that existed between the QMC and the other branches of the Army for the inductees who possessed skills is indicated by a classification procedure published by the War Department in the fall of 1942. This publication listed the 420 occupational skills that were considered most useful to the Army, and, as a guide to classification officers at reception centers, suggested the most appropriate arm or service to which inductees with specific civilian occupational experience should be assigned. An analysis of the guide reveals that the QMC could utilize 190 of the 420 skills. Of these, however, 78 could also be used by all of the arms and services, and only 11 were suggested specifically for the QMC alone. These eleven were chain-store managers, coopers, laundry-machine operators, longshoremen, office-machine servicemen, oven firemen, refrigeration mechanics, sales clerks, shoe repairmen, tire rebuilders, and traffic-rate clerks. The QMC was in competition with nearly all of the other branches of the Army for experienced cooks, general clerks, shipping clerks, stock clerks, machinists, stewards, and utility repairmen. It had to compete with at least one and usually more of the arms and services for such specialists as accountants, buyers, economists, packers, labor foremen, salvage engineers, warehouse foremen, and many others who conformed to the types urgently needed by the QMC.

The Army Classification System and the QMC

From the time the Army began to expand in 1939 until the Selective Service Act became effective in November 1940, all recruits were volunteers who signed up for three years in the branch of service they selected. Thus the 30,000 enlisted men who were in the QMC at the end of that period were there by their own choice.

The Army continued until the end of 1942 to accept men of draft age as volunteers and permitted them to choose their own branch of service, but the great majority signed up for the Air Corps, and comparatively few for the QMC. Consequently the personnel composition of the Corps began to change rapidly after November 1940, when the first selectees were inducted. By the end of June 1941 selectees comprised more than half of the enlisted men in the QMC, and by 30 June 1942 they represented about two thirds, as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>30 June 1941</th>
<th>30 June 1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Enlisted Men in QMC</td>
<td>94,928</td>
<td>214,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Enlistees:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Army</td>
<td>37,423</td>
<td>42,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of the United States</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Corps</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guardsmen</td>
<td>8,582</td>
<td>6,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selectees</td>
<td>48,969</td>
<td>141,706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Selective Service System brought a marked change in the method of personnel procurement. It operated on the theory that military authorities could best determine where a man might serve most effectively. In contrast to volunteers, selectees had little choice as to where they would serve. The Army classified them in three

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15 AR 615-26, 15 Sep 42, sub: Index and Specs for Civ and Mil Occupational Specialties.
16 (1) Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941, p. 95. (2) Data for 1942 were obtained from strength records in Strength Accounting Br, AGO. (3) The Army of the United States (AUS) was the temporary military organization in the war period. The Regular Army and other components were incorporated into the AUS during the war.
ways—by occupational skill, by physical capacity, and by intellectual capacity—and then assigned them to the branch of service that it determined could make the greatest use of their particular capabilities.

The initial classification took place at the reception center and was the basic factor in determining where the selectee would begin his Army career. Classification, though, was a continuing process throughout the military life of the selectee. It changed when he had acquired additional skills through training, as well as when successive classifiers placed different evaluations upon his qualifications.

Occupational skill was the primary basis for classification during the emergency period and the greater part of the war. Although inductees were also classified as to their physical and intellectual capacities, these qualifications were given only secondary consideration in assigning men to the various arms and services. The reason was that the Army needed a vast number of specialists of all types for the huge military organization that was being created, and the problem of making a trained specialist and soldier out of a civilian in thirteen weeks made it almost mandatory, at least in instances of highly skilled trades, that the inductee have some civilian background in the specialty in which he was to be trained. Moreover, by utilizing to a maximum the skills the men had acquired in civilian life, the time required to train the Army could be shortened immeasurably.

About the middle of 1944, the classification emphasis shifted from occupational skill to physical capacity in an effort to provide more men of good physique for the Infantry and the other combat arms. By then the QMC was near its peak strength.

Jobs to which inductees were assigned in the Army were termed military occupational specialties (MOS’s). The various specialties were arranged in numerical order, each having a specification serial number (SSN), starting with 001 (aerial cameraman). Military specialties that corresponded to civilian occupations were designated by numbers below 500, such as baker, 017; cook, 060; and laundry foreman, 102. All numbers above 500, with two exceptions, represented jobs that were distinctly military in character and had no civilian counterpart, such as rifleman, 745; mess sergeant, 824; and supply clerk, 835. One of the exceptions was laborer, 590. The other was basic, 521, which signified a basic private who had no particular skills and might be trained for any Army job.

An inductee who was classified according to his civilian vocation was, of course, inevitably given an SSN below 500. Inasmuch as inductees rarely qualified for an SSN above 500, the classifiers sought men with related trades who could be readily trained to fill the needs. For example, a man classified as steward, 124, was a logical candidate for training as a mess sergeant, 824.

The QMC and the other technical services naturally had greater requirements for personnel to fill jobs for which there were civilian counterparts than the arms, which, by reason of their combat mission, required a higher ratio of men for strictly military pursuits. In the Infantry in 1943, for example, 732 out of each 1,000 men filled distinctly military jobs, in contrast to 145 out of each 1,000 men in the QMC, and 63 in the Transportation Corps. At the same time, however, only 466 out of each 1,000 men in the QMC had civilian-type jobs, as compared with

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17 AR 615-25, 3 Sep 40, sub: EM—Classification.
18 AGO Memo W615-12-43, 28 Jan 43, sub: Reqmt and Repl Rates, Mil Specialists (1943 TrB).
788 in the Transportation Corps, 725 in the Corps of Engineers, 641 in the Ordnance Department, and 579 in the Signal Corps. This disparity was due to the fact that the QMC had far greater need for laborers than any other service—268 out of each 1,000 men—as contrasted with 182 for Chemical Warfare Service, which ranked second in these requirements, and none for the Signal Corps and the Medical Department. 19

From the beginning of selective service until about the middle of 1943, The Adjutant General’s Office (AGO) distributed trainees, as directed by the War Department General Staff, from reception centers to replacement training centers and directly to units. From then until the end of the war, the AGO allotted trainees, as instructed by the War Department General Staff and Headquarters, Army Service Forces (which acquired responsibility for the administration of Army-wide functions pertaining to personnel in the March 1942 reorganization of the War Department), to the three major commands—Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. Each command became responsible for the redistribution of these allotments to its replacement training centers and units. The distribution of personnel from reception centers was made primarily in accordance with MOS classification until May 1944, when physical qualifications rather than occupational specialties became the basis for assignment from these centers. 20

The AGO, as the operating agency for assigning personnel to training centers, schools, and units, published schedules of the personnel requirements of the various arms and services and transmitted them to the service commands. Each service command then converted these requirements into requisitions upon the reception centers within its jurisdiction. These schedules or quotas were established in such a way that each training center and unit received personnel from several service commands in an effort to insure an equitable distribution of the skills and abilities of the trainees. The requisitions informed the reception centers of the number, color (white or Negro), and military requirements of the men needed, the organization to which they were to go, and the time they were to be sent.

Trainees for units were requisitioned on the basis of Table of Organization (T/O) requirements. As a guide to the composition of shipments to replacement training centers, the War Department published requirement and replacement rate tables, which specified the number and types of specialists needed per thousand men for each arm and service. These tables were formulated from an analysis and consolidation of Tables of Organization, indicating the types of jobs required for each military unit, and from the Troop Basis, showing the proposed total number of each type of unit. The requirement and replacement rate tables were revised periodically as the Army grew and conditions and requirements changed. Actually, because of the constantly changing requirements, recurrent personnel shortages, competition among the major commands for personnel with the same occupational specialties, and other factors, the number and types of specialists sent to the replacement training centers rarely coincided with the requirement and replacement rate tables.

Requirements during the emergency

19 (1) Ibid. (2) For a general discussion of manpower in relation to the Army, see Jonathan Grossman, Industrial Manpower Policies and Problems of the War Department, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
20 WD Memo W40-44, 18 May 44, sub: Physical Profile Plan.
period and the early part of the war were based on normal attrition—losses incurred from such causes as death, accident, sickness, transfer, and discharge—in each arm and service. Later on, when casualty data for each type of occupational specialty became available from theaters of operations in sufficient quantity for reasonably accurate calculations, battle casualties plus normal attrition became the basis for computing requirements and quotas.

The Quartermaster requirement and replacement rate table of October 1940 listed 45 different types of occupational specialists, but the number of each type needed per thousand men varied from 1 warehouseman and 2 mail clerks, to 219 truck drivers and 22 automobile mechanics. In addition to truck drivers and automobile mechanics, the most-needed types per thousand men at that time were receiving and shipping clerks, 37; bakers, 35; general clerks, 34; cooks, 25; and motorcycle mechanics, 22.

Quartermaster requirements for specialists shifted sharply after construction and transportation functions were transferred from the QMC. For example, the Corps no longer needed such a large proportion of automobile and motorcycle mechanics. At the same time, the number of types of specialists required by the QMC continued to grow as new needs developed. By April 1942 the requirement and replacement rate table listed more than 100 different types.

Classification by Occupational Skill

While the QMC computed its requirements for specialists and notified the AGO of the specific types it wanted, it had little control over the kinds of men it actually received from the reception centers. The requirements were taken into consideration, of course, but the quotas established by the AGO had to be based on the types of specialists being inducted and the needs of the AGF and the AAF as determined by the G-3 Division, War Department General Staff. The fact was that the occurrence of skills among the inductees simply did not conform to Army requirements for specialists, which meant, for one thing, that men possessing scarce skills had to be apportioned among the ASF, the AGF, and the AAF according to the most urgent need.

There were other reasons, too, why the personnel requirements of the QMC and the other branches of the Army could not be met in the assignments from reception centers. Many of the inductees possessed common skills that could be used by the Army, but the supply of these men usually exceeded the demand, and the surplus had to be assigned to training for other jobs. Included in this category were carpenters, painters, and clerks. On the other hand, some of the men, such as farmers, lawyers, and salesmen, had occupational experience for which the Army had little or no use. Then, too, many men, especially those in the younger age groups, had no specialized training at all, and unless their aptitude tests indicated special potential talents they were classified as basics.

Furthermore, all inductees were potential candidates for combat service. Basics, of course, were more likely to be given such assignments than were men with occupational specialties. At the same time, however, men with skills needed by the
technical services often were designated for combat training when requirements of the arms were particularly urgent or serious shortages existed. Officers in charge of classification at reception centers could change the recommendations of classifiers when it was necessary to meet current shortages. The crux of the situation was that reception centers had to meet the quotas for the AGF, the AAF, and the ASF with whatever types of men they had on hand at the time assignments were made, regardless of whether their qualifications conformed to the specifications. The steady flow of inductees and the shortage of housing facilities prevented the reception centers from retaining men in an attempt to adjust supply to requirements. Consequently, when the supply of specialists did not meet MOS requirements, the only alternative was to substitute other personnel. Army regulations specified that the men who were substituted should have the required "potential aptitude" to meet the needs, but such men were not necessarily available either.

The QMC could never be sure that the qualifications of the men received from reception centers would even approach conformity to the ratios established in its requirement and replacement rate table. The Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers (QMRTC's) at Camp Lee and Fort Francis E. Warren reported in 1941 that they received too many men in certain categories and too few in others, while as many as half of the men had been classified as basic, indicating that they had no classifiable skills.

During the second training cycle at Camp Lee, 14 July–11 October 1941, a comparison of the number of trainees received with the number set up in the War Department quota in the clerical, administrative, and supply group revealed a 25-percent overload in this group that had to be trained under their second occupational specialty number or some other SSN in which a full quota had not been received, such as bakers, automobile mechanics, or truck drivers. The number of butchers, carpenters, plumbers, and painters received ran far in excess of quotas, while only 7 percent of the mess sergeants, 20 percent of the bakers, 45 percent of the truck drivers, and 87 percent of the cooks called for in the quotas had been assigned to Camp Lee. These conditions forced the reclassification of many men from skilled specialists in certain fields to semiskilled specialists in others.

The adjutant at the Quartermaster Replacement Training Center at Fort Warren stated that 400 out of 1,400 selectees received there in October 1941 were improperly classified, and that the situation had been growing progressively worse. "In our first group we found 85% correctly classified. That was pretty high. The second group ran about 75% correctly classified. Now it is getting worse. It is going up to 30 and 40% erroneously classified."

Brig. Gen. John A. Warden, commanding general at the Fort Warren QMRTC, pointed out that the improper classification of selectees created training problems. He criticized the War Department for its...

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23 AR 615–25, Sec. III, par. 10, 3 Sep 40, sub: EM—Classification.
24 Ltr, AGO to CG SOS, et al., 3 Aug 42, sub: Reqmt and Repl Rates for Occupational Specialists, AG 201.5 (9–3–42) UP–PS–M.
25 Ltr, Brig Gen Charles D. Hartman, CG Camp Lee QMRTC, to TQMG, 24 Sep 41, sub: Occupational Specialists for QMRTCs, 353 (Camp Lee).
26 Min of Conf, Ft. Warren QMRTC, 6 Nov 41, 353.
classification procedure at reception centers.

One . . . question which I think is one that needs quite a bit of study is the classification in reception centers. It seems to me that the War Department has gotten the cart before the horse. It is quite true that men are rushed through but I think that is where the classification should be made. The minute they get here we have to start reclassifying them. We get a great many improperly classified and too many classified as basic who, when you get down to their second or third qualification, we can get a classification that would fit into our training. We get other men who are classified [as specialists] which we do not train here—horse trainers, radio technicians, embalmers, etc. We have no facilities for training them.27

The policy of assigning men from reception centers who did not fulfill requirements not only increased the training problem, but was also wasteful of skills and tended to lower morale. For example, if a QMRTC had need on a certain day for 100 shoe repairmen, but the reception center on that day had no men with such qualifications on hand, the latter might substitute 100 basics. This meant that 100 inexperienced men had to be trained for a trade for which they might not have any particular talent or any desire to learn. Yet a few days later the reception center might induct 100 shoe repairmen for which no requirement then existed. These men, excellently qualified as shoe repairmen, would thus be assigned to service units or to training for other jobs for which they were not especially qualified. The result could be that 200 men would be square pegs in round holes, and most of them probably discontented at their lot. Situations similar to this actually occurred.28

Contributing to the difficulties encountered by the QMC in obtaining the types of men it needed was an apparent misconception on the part of interviewers at reception centers as to Quartermaster requirements. The fact that the QMRTC at Camp Lee in 1941 was receiving a large surplus of men with clerical aptitudes, while at the same time experiencing a shortage of men with mechanical background, led the classification officer at that center to declare: “Reception centers have the idea that the Quartermaster Corps needs more clerks than any other kind of specialist.” He pointed out that requirements at the Camp Lee QMRTC at that time called for the training of 25 percent of the men as mechanics, another 25 percent of the men as truck drivers, and only 10 percent as clerks.29

Brig. Gen. Charles D. Hartman, the commanding general of the Camp Lee QMRTC, blamed the surplus of clerical workers and the shortage of men with mechanical background upon the geographical locations of the reception centers from which the selectees were assigned.30 Camp Lee obtained the bulk of its personnel from reception centers along the eastern seaboard and adjoining areas, while the reception centers farther west normally supplied the men for the other QMRTC at Fort Warren. The contention of the Camp Lee QMRTC commander was that the inability of Camp Lee to draw men from the industrial regions of the Middle West re-

27 Ibid.
28 Memo, Lt Col Wilbur R. McReynolds, OQMG, for ACoS G-3, 20 Oct 41, sub: Selection and Assignment of Selectees to RTCs, 327.02.
30 Ltr, Gen Hartman, CG QMRC, Camp Lee, to TQMG, 24 Sep 41, sub: Occupational Specialist Rate for QMRCs, 353 (Camp Lee).
resulted in his center getting a disproportionately small number of civilian-trained mechanics, while the preponderance of selectees from cities along the east coast gave Camp Lee a high proportion of men with "white collar" backgrounds. He recommended that the location of reception centers sending personnel to Camp Lee be shifted to industrial centers of the automotive industry, and that the QMC be given high priority in the assignment of mechanics and other specialists in the motors field.

General Hartman's recommendations were forwarded to the War Department General Staff, which rejected them. The General Staff pointed out that reception centers had to fill allotments for all arms and services, and declared that the skills required by the QMC would be found in all geographic areas. It stated further that nearly 100 percent more clerical workers were being inducted than were needed by the Army, and the excess had to be trained in other fields. The request that the Corps be given high priority on men in the motors group was turned down "because of the tremendous shortage existing for this specialty in all Arms and Services." Although the General Staff admitted that the QMC was "undoubtedly losing the proper service of many men with potential skills," it declared that the discrepancy was not the fault of the initial classification at reception centers "but rather the lack of a properly co-ordinated assignment procedure." It also felt that the proper place for picking up men with many of these potential skills was in the classification and assignment sections of the replacement training centers.

The Fort Warren QMRTC also was experiencing a severe shortage of mechanics in 1941, an indication that the situation was general rather than geographical. For example, it received only 100 automobile mechanics against a requirement of 1,872, and 5 motorcycle mechanics as compared with the required 193. Similar shortages of specialists existed throughout the mechanical and automotive fields. About 65 percent of all selectees received at Fort Warren were being trained as motor operators or mechanics. Furthermore, officers at Fort Warren had the same complaint as those at Camp Lee that they were receiving "far too many clerks."

Inasmuch as there was a large general surplus of clerical workers, reception centers apparently were not at fault in sending more of them to the QMC than were needed. Neither could they be blamed for the shortage of men with mechanical background. The difficulty was that the Army's need for mechanics was much greater than the supply of civilian-trained mechanics being inducted. General Somervell, commanding general of the SOS, pointed out in 1942 that in the field of automobile mechanics alone there was a shortage of 34,790 in each 1,000,000 men being taken into the Army. Out of 47,148 white men received at the Camp Lee QMRTC between 1 September 1941 and 31 August 1942, only 1,412, or 3 percent, had a background of mechanical work, yet during that period the center was required to train 35 percent of all incoming selectees for mechanical and allied occupations. The problem was complicated further by the fact that more than one third of the

31 2d Ind, AGO to TQMG, 10 Dec 41, on Memo, ACoS G-1, for TQMG, 12 Nov 41, sub: Occupational Specialist Rate for QMRCs, 353 (Camp Lee).
32 Capt George A. Berger, Jr., to Maj Albert N. Stubblebine, Jr., Hq Ft. Warren QMRTC, 5 Nov 41, no sub.
33 Min of Conf, Ft. Warren QMRTC, 6 Nov 41, 353.
34 Address, Gen Somervell, American Institute of Education, Washington, D. C., 28 Aug 42.
men being received at the QMRTC at that time were classified as basics, indicating that they had no special training as mechanics. During the first six months of 1942, approximately 82 percent of the trainees enrolled in the motor mechanics courses at the Camp Lee QMRTC were men who had no previous experience in mechanical work.

The QMC could not hope, of course, to make skilled mechanics in thirteen weeks out of men who had had no civilian experience in that field of work. It had to do the next best thing: teach the trainees the fundamentals so that they could be assigned as helpers and gradually become sufficiently skilled to perform their duties adequately.

Despite the scarcity of men with mechanical background, the QMC during the emergency period and the early part of the war was able to obtain a fair percentage of civilian-trained skilled mechanics, who, when given additional technical training, could perform efficiently in units. The supply of civilian-trained mechanics dwindled, however, as the war progressed and was virtually nonexistent as early as April 1943. By then, though, transportation functions had been transferred from the QMC and there no longer was a demand for the Corps to supply automobile mechanics except for the maintenance of its own vehicles.

The principal remaining requirements for mechanics within the QMC were for maintenance and repair of laundry and refrigeration equipment and shoe-repair stitching machines. Laundry mechanics, for example, were needed for servicing mobile laundry equipment. The QMC had 240 mobile laundry units in September 1942, and plans called for adding them at the rate of 191 per month until the end of 1943. Inasmuch as mobile laundries were new to the Army, no MOS had been set up for men trained as laundry mechanics. They were classified merely as utility repairmen, SSN 121, thereby creating considerable confusion, and many of the men were assigned in fields other than laundry, thus tending to increase the shortage. Candidates for training as laundry mechanics were required to have a background of laundry repair experience, pass an aptitude test, possess at least a fifth-grade education, and show an interest in the work. The Camp Lee QMRTC reported that between 1 September 1941 and 31 August 1943 it received only 938 men with any experience in the maintenance of laundry equipment, while it was called upon to supply many times that number of laundry specialists. Similarly, mechanics were in demand for maintaining and repairing all mobile and fixed refrigeration units except those at permanent installations, which were under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers, and for servicing the heavy-duty stitching machines used by mobile shoe repair units.

In addition to mechanics and automotive specialists, other types of Quartermaster specialists whose skills were high on the list of classifications in which there were

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35 1st Ind, Lt Col James L. Whelchel, Hq QMRTC, Camp Lee, to TQMG, 9 Jan 43, on Ltr, Lt Col Ross W. Mayer, OQMG, to CG QMRTC, Camp Lee, 1 Jan 43, sub: Qualifications of Students, 000.8.
37 Min of Conf, Ft. Warren QMRTC, 6 Nov 41, 353.
38 Memo, Col Mayer, Deputy Dir of Mil Tng Div, OQMG, for ASF, 2 Apr 43, sub: Renewal of Contract, 000.8 (Mid-West Motive Trades Institute.)
serious shortages during the emergency period and the early part of the war included bakers, cooks, crane operators, labor foremen, longshoremen, mess sergeants, receiving and shipping clerks, shoe repairmen, tool makers, utility repairmen, and warehousemen. Many such shortages were overcome through the intensive training program carried on as the war progressed. The supply of cooks, for example, caught up with requirements as early as October 1942, when the number of trainees was reduced by 50 percent. By the middle of 1943 the supply of shoe repairmen far exceeded the requirements, and the surplus was used to fill requisitions for other specialists.

On the other hand, new shortages developed. One of the most important was that of petroleum technicians needed for Quartermaster petroleum laboratories. These laboratories were specialized troop units organized in the latter part of 1943 and in 1944 to test and analyze gasoline, fuel oil, and lubricants in theaters of operations. Assignment to these units required qualifications of experience in the petroleum industry and a knowledge of chemistry. Although fewer than 300 enlisted men were needed, the background requirements were such that even that number could not be found within the QMC and a large percentage of the personnel needed had to be transferred from other branches of the Army. Furthermore, those who possessed the necessary background had to be given additional training before they could be assigned to the laboratory units.

The reason for the shortage of petroleum technicians and mechanics at the QMRTC's was simply that induction of men with these skills did not occur in proportion to military requirements. There were other valid reasons why men were shipped to QMRTC's in quantities highly disproportionate to needs. It is apparent, however, that the procedure at reception centers was at fault in some measure, and that a more careful classification at the centers could have produced a more adequate distribution of skills. For example, one of the reasons for the improper distribution was the short time allotted at the reception centers for ascertaining the qualifications of the men. Selectees were kept at the centers an average of only seventy-two hours because of the rapid rate of induction and the limited housing facilities, and only a small portion of each man's processing time—usually from fifteen to eighteen minutes—was allotted to an interview. The information that could be obtained from the men in this short time concerning their work histories often was insufficient to establish an accurate basis for assignment. Consequently many of the men were assigned to types of work for which they were not suited, instead of to the jobs for which they might have been better qualified.

The War Department realized that the
reception center system of distributing personnel was not infallible, and that the initial classification, because of the speed necessary in processing inductees, amounted to only a coarse screening of the skills and potentialities of the men. Therefore it had made provision to extend the Army classification system beyond the reception centers. Replacement training centers were directed "to assign each enlisted man to that type of training which he can readily absorb and thereby be of greatest value to the service." Thus the first function of the QMRTC's was to reclassify personnel received from reception centers. The QMRTC's then had an opportunity to correct mistakes in the initial classification at reception centers and to make any additions necessary to the soldier's classification card. This opportunity was lost when men were assigned directly to units from reception centers, as was done frequently in 1942.

Classification procedure at the QMRTC's was rather rudimentary in the first few months of their operation. Selectees were merely allocated to either supply training or motor training, and the assignment to specialist training within these broad fields was left largely to the commanders of the training regiments. Later on, after the centers had become better organized, the work was centralized with the establishment at each of the two QMRTC's of a Classification and Assignment Section, which became responsible for the co-ordination of all reclassification.

Interviewing became a regular part of the process of receiving selectees. Classification cards that had been filled out at the reception centers were carefully examined. Formal written examinations were employed to test the knowledge of trainees on theoretical subjects, and performance tests were given to determine the proficiency of men in their civilian trades. Much needless repetition of training could be avoided if a man was designated to pursue in the Army the same trade he had followed in civilian life. A cobbler, for instance, would not require as much training as a salesman if both were assigned to repair shoes. The cobbler could forego much of the technical training and thus become available for duty earlier than if he had to take the full training course. This procedure saved much time and effort.

Although QMRTC interviewers sought to conserve training time through the utilization of civilian skills wherever possible, they also had to take into account the capacities and requirements of the various technical schools. The fact that the skills of the men varied so greatly from specialist requirements made it highly important to discover and take advantage of potential aptitudes for MOS's in which shortages existed. Thus while the civilian experience of the man, his occupational preference, and his educational background were usually primary considerations, aptitude as demonstrated by aptitude tests was often a vital criterion for the interviewer in making his recommendations for assignment.

Even after a man had been assigned to a QMRTC training unit he could be reclassified if found unfit for the type of training he was undergoing, or if it was de-

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45 AR 615–28, Sec. I, 28 May 42, sub: Classification, Reclassification, Assignment, and Reassignment.
47 For a detailed account of classification procedure at the Camp Lee QMRTC, see Rpt, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and Cadres, Pt. I, App. 4.
determined that he might be employed to better advantage in another kind of work. This reclassification could be requested by the man himself, his company commander, his technical instructor, or by the Classification and Assignment Section. A regimental reclassification officer was placed in control of classification and assignment within each regiment in an effort to expedite the process of reassigning personnel when necessary.

Classification of selectees according to their civilian skills did not necessarily mean that they would become technicians in QMC units. The men possessing skills were usually those with greater general ability who normally were earmarked to fill other highly essential needs. One of the most pressing needs was for commissioned officers. More than 5 percent of all Quartermaster personnel had to be trained as officers. Commanding officers of QMC units were reluctant to release valuable men for training as officers, and consequently the burden of supplying officer material fell upon the QMRTC's. During the summer of 1942 the demand was so great that virtually every man at the Camp Lee QMRTC who could qualify was sent to the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School.48

The great need for instructors in technical training was another drain on skilled personnel. Most of these instructors were enlisted men. They had been trained specialists in civilian life and possessed the qualifications that could be utilized in training others, in view of the scarcity of officer and civilian instructors. Similarly, men who demonstrated exceptional aptitude in motor mechanics were often assigned to Quartermaster regional motor schools for advanced training, while personnel with outstanding leadership qualities were designated for training as noncommissioned officers.

An additional drain on high-grade personnel came with the establishment near the end of 1942 of the Army Specialized Training Program, under which selected enlisted men with outstanding qualifications for commissions were permitted to continue their studies, under military discipline, in civilian institutions of higher learning. Engineering courses, for example, usually absorbed men with a combination of mechanical aptitude and high general ability.

This competition within the QMC for men of high quality, at a time when the Army was expanding rapidly and a general shortage of personnel existed, tended to make men of lower caliber available for the technical schools. Considerable criticism was directed at the QMRTC's by these schools concerning the background of students selected for their courses. The complaint was made that courses were being wasted on personnel "which never possessed the basic qualifications upon which to start."49 One of the schools, the Midwest Motive Trades Institute, which was training laundry machinists and mechanical technicians, reported that the majority of the trainees had little mechanical experience and only a few had had any contact with laundry equipment. Furthermore, it declared that nearly half of the men were past thirty years of age, about 20 percent were past thirty-eight, and 25 percent could not assimilate the training and should never have been assigned to the school.50

48 Ibid., p. 6.
50 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Enlisted Pers, Pt. 1, Midwest Motive Trades Institute Sec., p. 3.
This criticism led to an analysis by the Camp Lee QMRTC early in 1943 of the availability and qualifications of students for the technical schools. The conclusion reached was that the men chosen were as well qualified as possible; that they were a "select group" as compared to the average trainee; and that, because of the extensive requirements for cadres during 1943, "the quality of men going to these schools will become worse instead of better." 51

Classification by Physical Capacity

Two important developments late in 1943 and early in 1944 altered classification objectives and methods. One was the decline in the caliber of men received from reception centers. 52 Most of the younger, better-qualified men were already in the armed forces, with the result that draft boards had to lower induction standards and accept older men in the face of the growing manpower shortage. The other development was a change in the mission of the QMRTC's. Requirements for fillers and cadres—the first consideration during the period of rapid expansion when so many new units were being activated—became of secondary importance to the requirements for individual replacements overseas. The mobilization of the QMC was almost complete, and fewer men were passing through the QMRTC's. The Camp Lee QMRTC could train sufficient replacements alone, and the QMRTC at Fort Warren was therefore discontinued. 53

The War Department specified that men going overseas as individual replacements had to meet rigid physical standards. Consequently the Camp Lee QMRTC, which formerly had been concerned primarily with the occupational skills of its trainees, found it necessary to shift the emphasis to their physical capacities. Reversing its former procedure, the QMRTC sought to bring to light any physical defects in the men before they began their training rather than after they had completed it and were ready for shipment overseas. Inasmuch as many defects could be corrected during training, this change facilitated the preparation of individual replacements.

The previous lack of attention by the QMRTC's to the physical soundness of their trainees can be traced in part to the weakness in the Army system of physical classification. This classification had been extremely broad and proved far from adequate when it came to screening the men for those who could meet the physical requirements for overseas service. From the beginning of the emergency period until the middle of 1943, men were simply classified either as fit for general service or capable only of limited service, with no distinction within these categories as to varying degrees of physical capacity. Men classified for limited service were restricted to noncombatant duties, and were to be utilized only in the zone of interior. All others were considered capable of performing any kind of military service and were placed in the general-service category. The Army specified that men in this

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51 1st Ind, Col Whelchel, Camp Lee QMRTC, to TQMG, 9 Jan 43, on Ltr, Col Mayer, Deputy Dir of Mil Tng Div, to CG Camp Lee QMRTC, 1 Jan 43, sub: Qualifications of Students, 000.8.
53 The Fort Francis E. Warren QMRTC was inactivated in October 1943, its personnel being assigned to the Quartermaster Unit Training Center transferred the previous month from Vancouver Barracks to Fort Warren. The Unit Training Center continued there until April 1944, when it was redesignated an ASF Training Center.
group were to be conserved for the theaters of operations.

**Limited-Service Personnel**

During the first eighteen months the Selective Service System was in operation, the manpower supply was considered plentiful and the great majority of selectees who had physical defects were rejected. Early in 1943, when the Army began to induct limited-service men in sizable numbers, it specified that they should be used to full advantage “without retarding the training of combat troops.” Inasmuch as Quartermaster troops were classed as noncombatant, the QMC apparently made little distinction at first among limited-service men for many positions in the zone of interior and, for a four-month period, 20 June–4 November 1942, it could even send them overseas for duty in port battalions, base hospitals, and communication zone units. After that brief period, however, shipment of limited-service men overseas for any type of duty was, in principle, prohibited.

In the fall of 1942 the War Department established the policy that limited-service men “will be assigned initially to noncombatant organizations,” but specified that it was the duty of all unit commanders to attempt to fit them through training and remedial measures for general service. The early correction of dental defects and fitting of glasses will be a matter of routine in all organizations. Commanders will utilize to the fullest extent those who have noncorrectible defects in positions which are predominately noncombatant; an individual with defective hearing may function well as a cook, and one unable to march because of flat feet may be fully qualified as a chauffeur.

All of the theaters were extremely short of Quartermaster and other service personnel because the 1942 Troop Basis had underestimated overseas personnel requirements for them, and many combat troops were required to perform supply duties. In its efforts to make more men available for overseas duty, the QMC assigned many limited-service men to units being trained during the first half of 1943 for service in the theaters. While it was common for a unit as large as a regiment to include between 100 and 200 such men, the roster of the 475th Quartermaster Truck Regiment at Camp Blanding, Fla., listed 1,209 limited-service personnel. Of this number, 453 men, classified as chauffeurs, were found to be unfit and had to be transferred from the unit. The QMC had to gamble on whether the limited-service personnel assigned to units could overcome their defects and be reclassified as general service so that they could accompany their organizations abroad. Those who failed to qualify had to be replaced, and this delayed shipping dates of the affected units.

Many general-service men were being utilized as operating personnel in the zone of interior despite the severe shortage of men physically qualified to serve overseas. As an illustration, QMC operating personnel on 30 June 1943 comprised 7,055 general-service men in contrast to only 1,416

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54 AR 615–28, Sec. I, par. 2a, 28 May 42, sub: EM—Classification and Assignment. Conscientious objectors were classified for limited service.
55 (1) WD Cir 198, Sec. III, 20 Jun 42, sub: Shipment of EM Overseas. (2) WD Cir 363, Sec. I, 4 Nov 42, same sub.
58 Insp Rpt, Lt Col Edgar A. Hendershot and Mr. J. A. Grey to TQMG, 10 May 43, sub: Insp of QM Activities.
limited-service enlisted men. In a concerted move to make more men available for the theaters, ASF directed the service commands in June 1943 to replace general-service personnel in zone of interior installations with limited-service men. The replacement was to take place at the rate of at least 5 percent a month, and by 31 August 1943 instructor staffs and overhead at replacement training centers, unit training centers, and schools were to comprise a minimum of 80 percent limited-service men. This replacement program was expected to release 21,000 general-service men for overseas duty.

The program had been in operation only a little more than a month when the War Department ordered limited service abolished as a classification category. In that brief period the number of limited-service men in the QMC operating strength had increased to 1,586—a gain of 170—while the number of general-service men had declined to 6,956—a loss of only 99. This release of general-service men fell far short of the projected replacement rate, but still could be considered moderately successful in the light of the fact that Headquarters, ASF, had allowed forty-five days to train each limited-service man as a replacement, and there had as yet been little time for this training.

War Department Circular 161, which eliminated limited service effective 1 August 1943, did not ban physically limited men from serving in the Army. It merely provided that assignments were to be made on the basis of individual capacity rather than by type. Men who did not meet physical standards for general military service were still to be accepted for induction in controlled numbers, acceptance being predicated on their ability, skill, intelligence, and aptitude. The circular emphasized that men already in the service who failed to meet minimum physical standards were to be discharged. Shortly before, the Army had lowered its personnel requirements for 1943 and thus lessened the need for limited-service men. Furthermore, the War Department in August published a list of defects that were to disqualify men for service overseas. These defects included such common ailments as hernia, perforated eardrums, and missing teeth, as well as neuropsychiatric conditions of any kind.

The directives appear to have been interpreted generally as a desire on the part of the War Department to get rid of physically limited men. The net result, at any rate, was a flood of discharges. The QMC during the three-month period, September through November 1943, released because of physical and mental defects more than 17,000 men as compared with only 14,000 for the entire previous fiscal year. Alarmed by the many discharges, the War Department rescinded Circular 161 in November and replaced it with Circular 293, which formulated the basic policy for the remainder of the war. This revised policy prohibited, "as a waste of military manpower," the discharge of a man for physical reasons because he was "incapa-

59 ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec. 5, 30 Jun 43, sub: Pers, p. 12. Quartermaster Corps operating personnel included instructors and other personnel assisting The Quartermaster General in carrying out his mission.
60 (1) Rpt, conf conducted by Brig Gen Walter L. Weible, Dir of Mil Tng Div, ASF, Pentagon, 7 Apr 43. (2) ASF Cir 39, par. 17, 11 Jun 43, sub: Method of Authorizing, Reporting, and Controlling Pers.
61 (1) Cir cited n. 60(2). (2) ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec. 5, 31 Aug 43, p. 12.
62 WD Cir 161, Sec. III, 14 Jul 43, sub: Elimination of the Term "Limited Service" with Reference to EM.
63 WD Cir 189, Sec. II, 21 Aug 43, sub: Disqualifying Defects for Oversea Service.
64 (1) ASF Monthly Progress Rpts, Sec. 5, Sep, Oct, and Nov 43. (2) See Table 14.
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Table 14—Separations of Enlisted Men From the QMC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Years</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946 (First Two Months Only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Net Loss *</td>
<td>10,862</td>
<td>54,878</td>
<td>47,903</td>
<td>41,765</td>
<td>16,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Deaths</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonbattle Deaths</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Casualties *</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undesirable Character *</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical and Mental Disqualifications *</td>
<td>2,959</td>
<td>14,287</td>
<td>34,188</td>
<td>25,543</td>
<td>3,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Accept Commissions</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>18,400</td>
<td>4,358</td>
<td>3,207</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Become Warrant Officers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expiration of Service</td>
<td>2,715</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-age (Mostly over 38)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17,250</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>1,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demobilization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,369</td>
<td>10,567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures in this table include enlisted men who were in the QMC at the time of their separation, regardless of other branches of the Army in which they may have served previously.

a Minor causes for separations are not included. Consequently, columns do not add up to total net losses.

* Includes missing, captured, interned, and unaccounted for.

* Includes those discharged for reasons other than honorable, involving moral turpitude.

* Includes those discharged for all types of disability, from those not adaptable to military service for physical or mental reasons to those who were assigned to QMC but later were found to be unable to meet minimum physical induction standards.

Source: Compiled from records on file in Strength Accounting Br, AGO.

The table above shows the separations of enlisted men from the QMC from 1942 to 1946, categorized by principal causes. The total net loss varies across the years, with a peak in 1945 and a sharp decline after the publication of Circular 293 in 1943. The reasons for separations include battle deaths, nonbattle deaths, other casualties, undesirable character, physical and mental disqualifications, and so on. The table also highlights the increasing number of men released due to physical and mental reasons, which clogged up the available housing.

Despite these discharges, men with physical or mental limitations accumulated in the QMC to such an extent in 1944 that their utilization and training became a serious problem. Their number was increasing daily with no outlet through requisitions or orders, according to a report by Brig. Gen. Wilbur R. McReynolds, director of the Military Training Division, OQMG, following an inspection tour of installations in July of that year. "They cannot," he stated, "be placed in replacements for overseas, in units for activation, in Zone of Interior because of lack of allowed overhead, and thus are clogging up the available housing." It also lowered the physical standards for overseas duty, permitting men with "mild psychoneurosis, transient in character," and men with missing teeth, provided "they have been able to follow a gainful occupation in civil life," to be sent abroad. Discharges from the QMC declined rather sharply after the publication of Circular 293, but the Corps released a total of more than 34,000 men for physical and mental reasons between 30 June 1943 and 1 July 1944, as compared with 14,000 in the similar period of 1942-43, and 25,000 in the fiscal year 1945.

Despite these discharges, men with physical or mental limitations accumulated in the QMC to such an extent in 1944 that their utilization and training became a serious problem. Their number was increasing daily with no outlet through requisitions or orders, according to a report by Brig. Gen. Wilbur R. McReynolds, director of the Military Training Division, OQMG, following an inspection tour of installations in July of that year. "They cannot," he stated, "be placed in replacements for overseas, in units for activation, in Zone of Interior because of lack of allowed overhead, and thus are clogging up the available housing."
also reported that individuals with mental abnormalities who had been designated by Army psychiatrists for light duty were handicapping the training program. Personnel of this type, he declared, "grow by leaps and bounds, as they learn that they can be excused from training, or discharged by 'having' some eccentricity." This situation resulted in an increased rate of discharge of men from the QMC for physical and mental defects in the latter part of 1944.

Physically and mentally limited men accumulated in the QMC in various ways. Many were newly inducted men directly from reception centers; some were debilitated personnel returned from overseas; others were men who failed to meet physical and mental requirements when their units were assigned to theaters; and still others were from units cannibalized to fill vacancies in other units. Considerable shifting of personnel was taking place among the various branches of the Army in the attempt to get all physically fit men overseas. Many general-service men who had been trained specifically for Quartermaster duties had to be reassigned to combat units to fill vacancies. Likewise, many were transferred to the QMC, particularly from combat units, and these generally were men unqualified to serve overseas. 

Quartermaster Corps efforts to release general-service enlisted personnel from operating jobs for overseas assignments encountered considerable difficulty early in 1944. This difficulty was not due to any scarcity of physically limited men to replace them but rather to the fact that such a large portion of the men were key technicians who were considered by their commanders as irreplaceable in their zone of interior jobs and therefore temporarily disqualified for overseas duty. At the end of April 1944 the number of these men in the QMC totaled 3,098, or nearly 35 percent of its 8,884 enlisted operating strength. About the same number were either permanently or temporarily disqualified for service in the theaters because they were physically or mentally limited, were over thirty-eight years of age, or had been in the service less than twelve months. Thus only 2,692, or 30 percent, of the QMC enlisted operating personnel were available immediately for overseas assignments. This was a rather poor showing, as five of the six other technical services were sending proportionately large numbers of their operating personnel abroad, as shown in the table on page 161.

The QMC, however, overcame this difficulty rapidly in the next few months. By training physically limited men, including debilitated personnel returned from overseas, to fill jobs held by men formerly considered "irreplaceable," the Corps reduced the number of key technicians temporarily disqualified for overseas duty from 3,098 in April to about 1,700 by the end of May. A month later it had trimmed the number to approximately 1,200 and, by the end of October, to a mere 77. During the same period the QMC eliminated many unnecessary jobs and combined others in its efforts to conserve manpower, with the result that it reduced its enlisted operating personnel from 8,884 to approximately 6,000, about 99 percent of which were men who either were permanently disqualified for overseas assignment or had already served abroad. Thus the QMC had accomplished its objective of

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68 Address, Col Kester L. Hastings, QM Conf, Camp Lee, 2-4 Oct 44, sub: Current Pers Problems of the QMC.
69 Compiled from ASF Monthly Progress Rpt, Sec. 5, 30 Apr 44, sub: Pers, p. 29.
Relative Availability of Enlisted Operating Strength for Overseas Duty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Service</th>
<th>Total Enlisted Operating Strength</th>
<th>Available for Overseas Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Warfare Service</td>
<td>2,957</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Corps</td>
<td>58,029</td>
<td>28,058</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordnance Department</td>
<td>12,755</td>
<td>5,257</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical Department</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>8,670</td>
<td>2,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Corps</td>
<td>8,884</td>
<td>2,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps of Engineers</td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

making virtually all of its general-service personnel available for duty in the theaters.\(^70\)

The Physical Profile Plan and the QMC

In the meantime the Army classification and assignment system had been revised radically by the introduction of the physical profile plan. This plan was adopted formally about the middle of May 1944, after having been tried out experimentally earlier in the year. It provided that all men, except critically needed specialists, were to be assigned from reception centers to the three major commands on the basis of their physical capacities rather than their occupational skills.

The procedure was highly complex, but the essence of the plan was that an estimate of each inductee’s physique, stamina, and emotional stability was to be made at the reception center by means of a physical examination. He then was to be assigned a physical profile serial to denote the degree of his physical fitness and on that basis placed in one of four categories, or profiles, designated by the letters, A, B, C, and D.

Profile A signified men who were qualified for rigorous combat duty. Inductees who were placed in Profile B qualified for less strenuous combat duty and for service in or near battle areas, while those in Profile C were restricted to duty in base positions either in this country or overseas. Profile D designated men who were below minimum standards for induction.\(^71\)

The objective of the plan was to channel inductees possessing the best physical qualifications to the AGF, which had been protesting for many months that the men available for its combat units were below the Army average physically and mentally. The shortage of men qualified for combat duty had become critical by the middle of 1944. At the same time, with mobilization in its final phases, the demand for occupational specialists had subsided. The net result was that the War Department finally yielded to the wishes of the AGF and installed the system that the latter had devised.

The profile plan was adopted over the objections of General Somervell, commanding general of the ASF, who took issue with the AGF, declaring that “except

\(^70\) ASF Monthly Progress Rpts, Sec. 5, May, Jun, and Oct, 44.

\(^71\) WD Memo W40-44, 18 May 44, sub: Physical Profile Plan.
for individuals possessing critical skills, the
best physically qualified men are being as-
signed to the Army Ground Forces.” He
expressed the conviction that the plan was
so complex that it would “destroy the pur-
pose for which it is designed,” and recom-
mended the adoption of a “workable sys-
tem” that “will accomplish the results for
which the profile system is proposed in a
simple and efficient manner.” He went on
to say:

No matter what system of marking men is
devised, the using services will still receive
what is available in accordance with allotted
quotas. The labeling of a man by a profile
system will not improve his physical ability.
The application of the profile system in the
manner that has been proposed will result in
overloading the people charged with assign-
ment with a mass of unwieldy and unman-
ageable details. The end result of such a com-
plex system will be wastage rather than con-
servation of our military manpower.72

Under the profile system the War De-
partment established the quotas of induc-
tees to be assigned to the three major com-
mands on the basis of reports from recep-
tion centers showing the number of men
available for assignment in each profile.
The ASF and the AAF quotas were to be
filled from the residue of men left after the
reception centers had skimmed the best
physically qualified individuals for the
AGF. At least 80 percent of the men allo-
cated to the AGF were to be in Profile A,
and 10 percent each in Profiles B and C.
In contrast, only 40 percent of the men as-
signed to the ASF were to be in Profile A,
while 40 percent were to be in Profile B,
and 20 percent in Profile C.

Aside from the fact that the AGF had
first choice, the contrast was not as sharp
as it might first appear because 80 percent
of the ASF men were to be in the two top
categories, as compared with 90 percent of
the AGF assignments. The ASF fared bet-
ter than the AAF, which was to receive
only 10 percent of its men in Profile A, 50
percent in Profile B, and 40 percent in
Profile C.

Within these percentage distributions
by profile, reception centers were directed
to assign the men insofar as possible in ac-
cordance with their Army General Classi-
fication Test scores, occupational experi-
ence, education, and previous military
training, as they formerly had done. Thus
the only major change in classification and
assignment procedure brought about by
the profile plan was at the reception cen-
ter level in classifying and distributing
men to the three major commands accord-
ing to their degree of physical fitness.

The preference given the AGF in the as-
signment of the best physically qualified
men occurred at a time when the country’s
manpower supply was running low and
the general quality of inductees was de-
clining. This situation doubly restricted
the quality of men available to the ASF
for distribution to the QMC and the other
six technical services.

Requirements of the ASF for the first
six months of operation under the profile
plan were listed at 110,000 men, of whom
the QMC was to receive 15,000. The
OQMG proposed that ASF headquarters
assign 31 percent of these men in Profile
A, 54 percent in Profile B, and only 15
percent in Profile C.73 The distribution es-
Shipped by the ASF, however, placed a
slightly larger portion in Profile A, but a
considerably greater percentage in Profile
C than the OQMG had suggested. More-

72 Memo, Gen Somervell for ACoS G-1, 21 Mar
44, sub: Physical Profile Plan for EM.
73 (1) DF, G-1, WDGS, to MPD, ASF, 5 May 44,
sub: Physical Profile Plan. (2) Ops Br, Mil Plng Div,
to Conf Control Off, OQMG, 10 May 44, sub: Rpt of
Conf.
over, the distribution was broken down into whites and Negroes, and the percentages of these varied extensively. Only 25 percent of the whites were to be in Profile A, 25 percent in Profile B, and 50 percent in Profile C, compared with 55 percent, 15 percent, and 30 percent, respectively, of the Negroes. Thus only half of the QMC whites were to be in the two top categories, in contrast to three fourths in the Corps of Engineers, the Chemical Warfare Service, and the Signal Corps. In the case of Negroes, the QMC was to get 70 percent in the two top profiles, but even in this regard it fared little if any better than most of the other services, except for the Ordnance Department, which was to get only 10 percent in these two categories, and 90 percent in Profile C, as shown in the table at the top of the page.\footnote{Based on ASF Cir 175, Sec. VIII, 10 Jun 44, sub: Physical Profile Plan.}

Owing to the fact that its peak strength was attained nine months ahead of that of the Army as a whole, the QMC probably was the least affected of all the arms and services by the profile plan. When the plan went into operation the Corps already had more than 496,000 personnel, which was within 6,000 of its top strength. Thus most of the men assigned to it by profile were for replacements, and, since the trend in the strength of the Corps was downward after the fall of 1944, these requirements were comparatively small. Moreover, any specialists critically needed by the Corps could be obtained outside the profile plan.

**Classification by Intellectual Capacity**

The QMC was more directly concerned with the intelligence of its personnel than it was with their physical capacity. Occupational skill, of course, was of first importance since every man in the Corps, unless assigned to perform manual labor, had to be a specialist of some sort. A large proportion of the men received from reception centers, however, either possessed no skill at all or no skills that could be utilized. Both kinds had to be trained for jobs that would make them useful to the QMC, and it was necessary that the men have sufficient intelligence to absorb this training in the time that could be devoted to it.

An index of a man’s intellectual capacity or ability to learn was provided by the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) given at the reception center. Through this test, devised in collaboration with experts in psychology and personnel man-
agement, the Army sought to determine a man’s native intellectual endowment and the effects of education and social experience upon his practical intelligence. Selectees were grouped into five grades on the basis of their AGCT scores. Grade I designated men in the highest bracket of intellectual capacity, while Grade V indicated those in the lowest group. Men rated as having average intelligence were placed in Grade III. Only men in Grades I or II were eligible to become officer candidates.\textsuperscript{75}

Despite an Army Regulation that no unit was to be “unduly burdened with the training of a disproportionate number of men in the lower brackets of mental ability,”\textsuperscript{76} the QMC did receive an unusually large percentage of men in Grades IV and V, a situation that handicapped training and operations. Records compiled at the Camp Lee QMRTC revealed that 36 percent of the 87,325 white selectees received there between 1 September 1941 and 28 February 1943 were below average in intelligence as rated by the AGCT. White selectees constituted 72 percent of the total number of trainees sent to the QMRTC during this period. Similar records are not available on Negro trainees. The fact that the proportion of Negroes falling in these two lower grades was normally greater than that of whites would indicate that the over-all average was probably higher than 36 percent.\textsuperscript{77}

The situation became worse as the war progressed and the caliber of selectees declined. During the six-month period March through August 1942, men classified in the two lower brackets accounted for 42 percent of all personnel received by the two QMRTC’s. The proportion increased still further in 1943 when more than 87,000 out of a total of about 165,000 men sent to the QMC from reception centers were in Grades IV and V. This figure represented nearly 53 percent for the QMC as contrasted with an average of about 32 percent for the other six technical services and only 27 percent for the AAF.\textsuperscript{78}

Conversely, the QMC received a smaller proportion of men of above-average intelligence than any other arm or service except the Transportation Corps. Only 21 percent of the selectees assigned to the QMC during 1943 were in Grades I and II, as compared with 42 percent to the AAF, 58 percent to the Signal Corps, and an average of about 30 percent to the other five technical services.\textsuperscript{79} This allocation imposed another severe handicap on the QMC, inasmuch as these two top categories were the source of its officer candidates, the majority of its noncommissioned officers, most of its highly skilled technicians, and many of its enlisted instructors.

The commanding general of the Camp Lee QMRTC protested as early as September 1941 that too many men with low intellectual capacities were being received from reception centers. He reported that half of the men in the two lower grades had been classified as basic, meaning that they did not possess usable skills, and that their limited mental abilities made it unlikely that they could become specialists in the normal time allotted to training. Many of these men, he pointed out, “were outstanding physical specimens and could

\textsuperscript{75} AR 615–25, Sec. VII, 3 Sep 40, sub: EM—Classification.
\textsuperscript{76} AR 615–28, Sec. I, par. 2, 29 May 42, sub: EM—Classification and Assignment.
\textsuperscript{77} Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and Cadres, Pt. 1, App. 4, pp. 2–3.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
have readily been trained as soldiers in one of the arms.” He recommended that fewer men in Grades IV and V be assigned to the QMC. The General Staff rejected this proposal. Ignoring the fact that the QMC actually was getting more than its representative portion of such personnel, G-1 declared that all arms and services should receive their “proportionate share” of Grade IV and V men, and predicted that in view of the contemplated expansion of the Army “it may become increasingly necessary to absorb larger numbers of these men.”

Apparently the QMC received an unusually large number of men in Grades IV and V on the assumption that most of them could be absorbed in service units. It was true that a sizable number of men in the lower grades could be so used. Personnel requirements for the service units, however, accounted for only about one fourth of the total QMC needs, whereas more than half of its assigned personnel were in the two lower categories. Thus the Corps was confronted with the necessity of training the major share of its Grade IV and V men for specialized occupations that normally called for a higher degree of intellectual capacity.

The Problem of Illiterates

While below-average intellectual capacity in itself presented a training problem, the most serious difficulty stemmed from illiterates, non-English-speaking personnel, and Grade V men. Personnel in these categories were not immediately capable of undergoing normal QMRTC training. They had to be assigned to special training units and given elementary schooling in such subjects as reading, writing, spelling, English, and arithmetic to enable them to comprehend and follow instructions so that they could participate in the regular training courses.

The men in these categories possessed widely varying potentialities. Foreign-born, for instance, might be educated in their native language and have only to learn to read and write English, or they might be illiterate in both languages. Even American-born illiterates differed extensively in aptitude. Many could absorb instruction quickly and advance rapidly to the point where they could be reclassified and reassigned to training as specialists. Some could qualify only for manual labor tasks, while others were so mentally inept or unstable that they had to be discharged as useless to the Army.

This problem was only a minor one during the emergency period and the early months of the war. Mobilization Regulations then in effect authorized the Army to reject men who did not have “the capacity of reading and writing the English language as commonly prescribed in the fourth grade in grammar school.” Nevertheless, the two QMRTC’s were giving or had given special schooling and training to a total of approximately 500 inductees by January 1942. The bulk of these were in the illiterate, non-English-speaking, and Grade V categories, but also included were some men with physical limitations who were unable to undergo normal training.

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80 Ltr, Gen Hartman, CG QMRC, Camp Lee, to TQMG, 24 Sep 41, sub: Occupational Specialists Rate for QMRTCs.
81 2d Ind, AGO to TQMG, 10 Dec 41, on Memo, ACoS G-1 for TQMG, 12 Nov 41, sub: Occupational Specialists Rate for QMRTCs.
82 MR 1-7, Change 9, 18 Apr 41, sub: Reception of Selective Sv Men.
83 (1) Rpt, Camp Lee QMRTC to TQMG, 23 Jan 42, sub: Special Tng Units. (2) Rpt, Ft. Warren QMRTC to TQMG, 29 Jan 42, sub: Special Tng Co, 353.
training. The number of illiterates and non-English-speaking personnel in the QMC increased rapidly after the summer of 1942 when the War Department adopted new induction standards based on intelligence rather than literacy. Induction stations were authorized to accept 10 percent each of the white and Negro selectees processed daily who were unable to read or write English at a fourth-grade standard, provided they were able to understand simple orders given in English and possessed "sufficient intelligence to absorb military training rapidly." Within three months, however, the greatly increased influx of inductees of this type was overtaxing the capacities of the training centers of all the technical services. The result was that SOS headquarters reduced to 3½ percent the ratio of illiterates who could be assigned to the QMC and most of the other technical services.

Despite this restriction, enrollment in QMC special training units continued to show a marked increase. The number of men requiring special training at the Camp Lee QMRTC, for example, averaged nearly 1,100 a month during the first half of 1943, in contrast to less than 450 a month in the second half of 1942. The QMC was relieved of the responsibility for the initial training of such personnel after the middle of 1943, when the War Department transferred the special training units of all of the arms and services to the reception centers. Thereafter "unteachables" were weeded out at the reception center level and only men believed to be capable of pursuing normal training were assigned to the QMC.

Although this eased the training load it did not reduce the proportion of Grade V personnel assigned to the QMC nor the problem of fitting them into useful jobs. For example, an inspection late in 1943 of the 558th Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, and four attached companies in training at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., revealed that 580 of the 813 enlisted men in these units were in Grade V.

Similarly, the personnel consultant at the ASF Unit Training Center at Fort Devens, Mass., estimated that during the period March through June 1944 about 25 percent of all incoming QMC troops and 50 percent of the men received from special training units were below the minimum literacy standards of the Army. The low state of morale and mental adjustment of these men constituted a serious training problem, as illustrated by the fact that there were more than 175 court-martial cases in less than four months. The situation at Fort Devens, however, was an extreme example inasmuch as the majority of the units trained there were service companies and were comprised of Negro personnel whose educational background and intelligence were far below average. Furthermore, a large portion of the men had been transferred from the AGF and represented the least desirable element in that command.

Upon completion of instruction in a special training unit the trainees were in-
interviewed by classification officers who determined whether the men had advanced sufficiently to begin normal training for specific jobs in the QMC. Personnel who had progressed satisfactorily were reassigned to either basic or technical training. Men who had learned to read and write to such an extent that they could understand and follow instructions but who showed no aptitude for other than manual-labor jobs were assigned to service units. Illiterates and men with mental handicaps who had not reached the desired level of proficiency within three months were subject to discharge.

Disposition records at the Camp Lee QMRTC during the period from the activation of special training units there in May 1942 until 15 January 1943 show that 60 percent of the enrolled personnel were sent to technical schools for training as specialists and 31 percent to service units, while 5 percent were discharged and 4 percent were given jobs as furnace tenders.89

**Preferential Assignment to the Navy and the Army Air Forces**

There were several reasons why most of the men available to the QMC were of relatively low intellectual caliber. One was the lack of a central classification and assignment system whereby men from civilian life could be distributed more equitably between the Army and the Navy. The Navy, including the Marine Corps, obtained all of its personnel from volunteers or were commissioned in the Navy or Marine Corps, remained outside selective-service operations and were never available to the Army for distribution to the arms and services. The AAF, too, until 1943, was able to operate pretty much outside of selective service as a result of the Army policy in effect at the time, which permitted men of draft age to volunteer for a specific branch of service. The glamorous aspects of the air service plus the higher pay attracted the great majority of the volunteers to the AAF. These volunteers had to meet exceptionally high intellectual and physical standards on the assumption that they were to be trained as pilots. Not all of the men, of course, qualified for flying positions. Most of them, nevertheless, remained in the AAF, and many were assigned to menial tasks far below their capabilities, despite the fact that they might have been utilized for higher-grade jobs in the QMC or elsewhere in the Army. The net result was that the Navy, Marine Corps, and the AAF had their pick of men from civilian life throughout most of the mobilization period at the expense of the QMC, the other technical services, and the AGF.

The availability to the QMC of men with above-average and even average intellectual capacity was restricted still further by the War Department's priority system of distributing personnel to the arms and services. In the favored position again was the AAF, which had top priority on assignment of men by intellectual capacity from early in 1942 until 1944, when the AGF finally was given first call on men of high intelligence because of the increasing difficulty experienced by combat units in obtaining high-grade men.

The QMC was virtually at the bottom of this priority list, primarily because one

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of its functions was to operate the service units that could utilize men of low intelligence. Inasmuch as the Army's supply of Grade I and II men was limited to begin with, it was inevitable that comparatively few top-quality men would still be available when the War Department got around to filling the requirements of the QMC.

The Number and Quality of Negro Troops in the QMC

While the general quality of Negro soldiers in the QMC did not vary to any significant extent from that of those in the Army as a whole, their training and utilization presented a special problem primarily because the Corps had far more of them than any other arm or service. The peak Negro strength of the Corps was slightly more than 221,000 on 31 December 1944. The number of Negroes in the entire Army at that time was approximately 692,000. Thus the QMC, although comprising only a little more than 6 percent of the total personnel of the Army, had nearly 32 percent of all the Negroes.90

The only other arm or service with a Negro strength even approaching that of the QMC was the Corps of Engineers. Yet the Engineers had fewer than 137,000 Negroes out of a total personnel of nearly 700,000, while the QMC had more than 221,000 out of a total strength of approximately 500,000. Although the Transportation Corps was third with 85,000 Negroes, it ranked second in percentage of Negro personnel because it was only half as large as the QMC. The ratios in the arms were considerably smaller. For example, the AAF, with approximately five times the total strength of the QMC, had only one third as many Negroes; the Infantry had less than one fourth as many.91

This heavy concentration of Negroes in the QMC was inconsistent with the policy laid down by Mobilization Regulations and a War Department directive that all arms and services absorb Negro personnel generally on the basis of the proportion of Negroes in the population of the country, which was 10.6 percent.92 It created a serious difficulty for several basic reasons. One of these was that while some of the Negroes possessed outstanding ability, most of them were in the two lowest AGCT grades because of limited educational opportunities and deficiencies in environmental background. Approximately 85 percent of all Negroes sent to the QMC by reception centers between September 1941 and May 1944 were classified in AGCT Grades IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arm or Service</th>
<th>Negro Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>221,211</td>
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<td>Engineers</td>
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<td>11,136</td>
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<td>Chemical Warfare</td>
<td>5,092</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

90 (1) Monthly Rpt, AGO to WDGS, Strength of the Army, 1 Aug 45, sub: Monthly and Quarterly Negro Strength of the Army, p. 53. (2) For a general discussion of the utilization of Negroes in the Army, see Ulysses G. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, a volume in preparation for UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.  
91 Rpt cited n. 90(1), 1 Jan 45, pp. 38-39. The following table shows how the Negro strength of the other technical services and the principal combat arms compared with that of the QMC on 31 Dec 44:

92 (1) MR 1–2, Sec. 1, par. 2, 15 Jul 39, sub: Balancing White and Negro Manpower. (2) WD Ltr to TQMG et al., 16 Oct 40, sub: WD Policy in Regard to Negroes, AG 291.21 (10–9–40) N–A–M.
A total of 36.5 percent were in Grade V, which meant that an average of 365 out of each 1,000 Negroes allocated to the QMC needed special instruction before they could undertake regular training. It usually required about twice as long to prepare Grade V men for service in units as it did those who were capable immediately of undergoing normal training. The fact that a man was classified in Grade V did not necessarily mean that he lacked native intelligence; rather, it sometimes indicated the lack of an opportunity to develop latent ability. Many of the Grade V men were able to assimilate training after preliminary instruction in the special units and eventually became efficient soldiers. At the same time, there was always a sizable number of Grade V men in each special training unit—white as well as Negro—who did not have the mental capacity to learn and had to be discharged. The significant difference was that among the whites the proportion of Grade V men was small enough that the problem could be solved without too much difficulty, but among the Negroes the percentage was so high that it presented a serious obstacle in organizing effective units.

Another reason for the seriousness of the problem was that the work of Negroes in civilian life had been generally of a less skilled nature than that of whites, and comparatively fewer of them had acquired occupational specialties—even the more commonplace ones. For instance while the supply of white clerks far exceeded QMC requirements, among the Negroes there was even a shortage of men with clerical aptitudes. The civilian background of a large portion of the Negroes fitted them for classification only as laborers. The majority of the others were classified by reception centers as basics. This created a particularly acute problem since there were shortages of so many skills among the Negro trainees and such a large proportion of the men were of below-average intelligence that it was difficult to convert them into skilled technicians. Negroes with mechanical experience or aptitude were in shortest supply, and this was a handicap in organizing Negro mobile units that required mechanics.

An additional reason for the difficulty stemmed from the fact that relatively few of the Negroes possessed the qualities necessary for assuming leadership. Only 15 percent of the Negroes shipped to the QMC from reception centers between September 1941 and May 1944 were in the three upper brackets of the AGCT. Less than 3 percent were in Grades I and II and therefore eligible to become officer candidates. The QMC had to rely primarily upon the other 12 percent for its noncommissioned officers, instructors, and supervisors. Thus there was a critical shortage of Negroes with the leadership qualifications necessary for establishing the large number of Negro units required to utilize Negro personnel in separate organizations.

The OQMG considered this problem so serious early in 1943 that it declared in a memorandum to the Commanding General, SOS, that the situation would impede the QMC in carrying out its functions in the field.

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93 [1st Ind]. AGO to CG USASOS, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, Cal., 16 Oct 44, no sub, enclosing a statistical rpt, sub: Percentage Distribution of AGCT Scores of Negro EM Forwarded from RCs to RTCs and Units, AG 220.01 (26 Jul 44).
94 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and Cadres, Pt. 1, App. x, p. 5.
95 Ind and rpt cited n. 93.
Difficulty is being experienced in obtaining sufficient colored personnel of the required ability and leadership qualifications. A high percentage of inductees having classifications [grades] of 1 and 2 are being assigned to the Army Air Forces. The qualifications of the personnel being assigned to the Quartermaster Corps are such that they cannot be used as superintendents, foremen, or in very many positions except positions of unskilled labor. In all Quartermaster Corps organizations such as laundry companies, bakery companies, salvage supply and railhead operations there are many positions in all grades which require a higher degree of intelligence, schooling, education, and skill than is found among the colored selectees being assigned to the Quartermaster Corps. By requiring the Quartermaster Corps to absorb this high percentage [of Negroes] the result will be that the Quartermaster Service will not be able to maintain its place in the team with other Services, and the accomplishment of the Service’s mission on the field of battle will be impeded.96

This problem never was resolved satisfactorily, but it was alleviated to some extent in several ways. One of these was to put white officers in charge of Negro units and then replace them as extensively as possible by Negro officers as soon as the latter could qualify. Another remedial measure consisted of concentrating the bulk of Negroes into a relatively few types of units.97

Despite the steps taken to solve the problem, considerable difficulty was experienced in finding qualified personnel for the many Negro units, in maintaining the units at T/O strength, in training the required number of specialists, and in getting the units to the theaters of operations on schedule. Overseas shipment dates of units with a disproportionate percentage of low AGCT grades frequently had to be deferred because the units could not complete training and pass the required inspection in the allotted time.98

During the emergency period and the early months of the war, the Army fell far short of taking its prescribed quota of Negroes, primarily because of the shortage of Negro housing and training cadres. In spite of this, the Negro strength of the QMC increased at a relatively faster rate than did the white strength. The peacetime organization of the Corps in mid-1939 included only 89 Negroes out of a total enlisted personnel of about 10,500, yet by June 1940 the number had grown to more than 14,000 and represented nearly 22 percent of the enlisted personnel in QMC units.99

Taking cognizance of this situation, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, declared: “It is apparent that an undue proportion of Negro personnel is assigned to units of the Engineers and the Quartermaster Corps, while other arms and services either have no colored units or have a disproportionately small number of them.” He recommended that all arms and services, with the exception of the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, be required “to accept for assignment in appropriate units a reasonable proportion of Negro personnel.” Both the Personnel and the War Plans Divisions of the General Staff objected to

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97 The Protective Mobilization Plan of 1940 restricted the utilization of Negroes in the QMC to service, remount, and truck regiments; service and port battalions; railhead and salvage companies; and pack trains. This 1940 plan was soon abandoned, and the Troop Bases of the war period called for Negroes in almost every type of unit, but the QMC restricted their use to a comparatively few types.
98 Memo, Gen Feldman, DQMG for Sup Plng, for CG ASF, 28 Jan 44, sub: Current and Anticipated Problems Confronting the QMC.
99 Strength records, EM Sec, Pers and Tag Div, OQMG. The 89 Negroes constituted one truck unit and one detachment.
100 Memo, ACoS G–3 for CoS, 3 Jun 40, sub: Employment of Negro Manpower, AG 322.97.
exempting the Air Corps and the Signal Corps. They insisted that both of these branches should also employ Negro personnel. Their objection was sustained and the War Department policy, adopted in October 1940, provided that “Negro organizations will be established in each major branch of the service, combatant as well as non-combatant,” and that Negroes “will be utilized on a fair and equitable basis.”  

This policy led to a somewhat more equitable distribution of Negro personnel among the other branches of the Army, but the proportion of Negroes to total strength in the QMC continued to grow and remained far greater than that for any other arm or service. By the end of 1942 they represented more than 28 percent of the Corps’ strength.

This growing concentration of Negroes in the QMC had already become a matter of concern to its top-ranking officers, but they became alarmed late in 1942 when the War Department made known its plans for 1943. The 1943 Troop Basis, which called for a sharp increase in the number of Negro inductees in an attempt to bring the proportion up to the specified 10.6 percent of total Army personnel, provided that Negroes were to comprise 60 percent of the men assigned to the QMC during 1943. Brig. Gen. James L. Frink, the Deputy Quartermaster General for Supply Planning and Operations, sent a memorandum on 30 November 1942 to the Plans Division, SOS, urging strongly that the Troop Basis figures be revised to include fewer Negroes.

When this request failed to bring any action, Maj. Gen. Clifford L. Corbin, Acting The Quartermaster General, sent a protest in January 1943 directly to the Commanding General, SOS:

This office is in receipt of an advance copy of the 1943 Troop Basis for Quartermaster Units, comprising a strength of 56,456 of which 33,619 are colored enlisted personnel. Your attention is invited to the fact that this allocation requires 60% of this year’s Troop Basis to be colored personnel, with Quartermaster troops in the entire Army totaling only approximately 6%; and places upon the Quartermaster Corps the responsibility for activating Quartermaster Units destined for operation with the armed forces in the field with a higher percentage of Negro troops than allocated to any other service in the Army. This is more striking when we consider that Negro personnel in Quartermaster Units (111,962) will represent 14.83% of all Negro enlisted personnel in the entire Army, and again the Quartermaster Corps is required to operate its highly specialized and technical units with 33.39% of its personnel Negro enlisted men. . . . It is therefore urgently recommended that the 1943 Troop Basis be revised accordingly and that allotments and percentage of colored Quartermaster Corps personnel be in keeping with that assigned to other Arms and Services.

General Corbin’s recommendation was forwarded to the General Staff for a decision. The prompt reply was that the QMC request for a decrease in allotment of Negroes “cannot be favorably considered at this time due to the fact that personnel so rendered surplus would have to be absorbed by combat units.” The General Staff admitted that the proportion of Negroes assigned to the Corps was high, but stated that “the type of units to which it has been allocated are those wherein Negro personnel may be expected to func-

101 Ltr, AGO to TQMG et al., 16 Oct 40, sub: WD Policy in Regard to Negroes, AG 291.21 (10-9-40) M-A-M.
102 Memo, Brig Gen James L. Frink, OQMG, for Lt Col Lester D. Flory, Plans Div, SOS, 30 Nov 42, sub: Proposed Activation of QM Units, 1943, 320.2.
103 Ibid.
tion with reasonable efficiency.”

It was becoming evident that the War Department—contrary to its declared policy of equitable distribution—had determined to allot a large proportion of the Negro inductees to the QMC for the simple reason that it believed that the Corps, presumably because of its service units, was in a better position to absorb Negro personnel than any other branch of the Army. This policy prevailed throughout the remainder of the war, and the OQMG was forced to resign itself to making the best of the situation. The policy led to a steady increase in the ratio of enlisted Negro personnel to total enlisted personnel in the Corps. The proportion rose to more than 33 percent by reason of the 1943 Troop Basis allocations, and before the end of the war it had reached approximately 49 percent.

The net result was that Negroes accumulated in the QMC faster than they could be utilized. General McReynolds, director of the Military Training Division, OQMG, reported in January 1944 that Negro personnel were being sent to the QMC in excess of theater requirements. He complained that, while new units were being activated which might absorb this surplus personnel, no authority could be obtained from the War Department to transfer these men to the new units for the reason that the units had been directed to obtain their personnel directly from reception centers.

Shipments of Negroes to the QMC continued to run ahead of requirements in 1945. During March, April, and May, for example, arrivals at the Camp Lee ASF Training Center of Negro inductees assigned to the QMC exceeded quotas by approximately 200 percent. An inspection made in June of that year at the Camp Lee center revealed that there were nearly 600 Negroes at this one installation alone for whom no suitable assignments existed, and that it had become necessary to discharge a large portion of them.

Utilization of Negroes in the QMC varied from utilization of whites primarily in that the ratio of Negroes used as laborers was much larger; that the proportion trained for motor-maintenance work was smaller; and that no Negroes were utilized in certain types of units, notably remount, war dog, petroleum laboratories, sales, and graves registration. Approximately 25 percent of all the Negroes received at the Camp Lee QMRTC during the five-year period June 1939 through June 1944 were trained as laborers, in contrast to only 7 percent of the whites. The difference was less marked in motor-maintenance instruction, with 11 percent of the Negroes and 15 percent of the whites trained for this type of work.

More Negroes were trained as truck drivers—27 percent—than for any other job, though the proportion was only slightly higher than for laborers. Clerks, cooks, mess sergeants, laundry operators, and salvage collectors as a group accounted for another 25 percent. Relatively few were trained as bakers, carpenters, shoe repairmen, machinists, operators of fumigation and bath units, blacksmiths, weld-
THE PROCUREMENT OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL IN QMC UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QMC Units: 31 December 1944</th>
<th>Total Units</th>
<th>White Units</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
<th>Negro Units</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,502</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>162,384</td>
<td>1,687</td>
<td>201,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground force type</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>74,699</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>83,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service force type</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>71,158</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>105,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air force type</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>26,527</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>11,965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ers, electricians, draftsmen, and plumbers.

Although the number of Negro units never quite equaled that of white units in the QMC, Negro enlisted personnel outnumbered white enlisted personnel in the units by a considerable margin during the latter part of the war. As of 31 December 1944, for example, the Corps had 1,815 white units and 1,687 Negro units, yet the enlisted Negroes in the units totaled more than 201,000 as compared with approximately 162,000 enlisted whites. This situation is accounted for by the fact that the whites were spread out over a much wider variety of units, many of which were quite small, whereas the Negroes were concentrated in relatively few types, most of which were large.

An analysis of the status on 31 December 1944, as shown in the 1945 Troop Basis, reveals the extent to which Negroes were concentrated in specific types of QMC units. Of the 841 Negro units of the ground force type, 620 were truck companies and 17 were salvage collection companies. Similarly, of the 713 QMC Negro units of the service force type, 394 were service units, 60 were hospital laundry platoons, 31 were semimobile bakery companies, 21 were mobile fumigation and bath companies, and 18 were salvage repair companies. The concentration was even more pronounced in the air force type units, where, of the 133 QMC Negro units, 130 were truck companies, 2 were truck platoons, and 1 was a labor outfit.

At that time, nearly half of the Corps' Negro units were of the ground force type—the only type in which there were more Negro than white Quartermaster units. Despite this, however, the number of Negro enlisted men in the service force type units was considerably greater than in the ground force type, as shown in the above table, which indicates that the service force type Negro units were larger than the ground force type.

Summary

The experience of the QMC in procuring enlisted men in World War II exemplified the need for establishing and maintaining throughout any future emergency a more equitable system of distributing

\[\text{Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and Cadres, Pt. 1, Camp Lee Sec., pp. 103-04.}\]

\[\text{See 1945 Troop Basis, 1 January 1945, showing actual status of units on 31 December 1944.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
men from civilian life among the various branches of the armed forces. As it was, many thousands of the better qualified men volunteered for service in the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the AAF. Hence they remained outside the Selective Service System and were never available to the Army for distribution. The result was that the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the AAF, in effect, had the head seat at the manpower table. The Army, in turn, operated its own priority system in which the QMC usually had the lowest rating. Thus the QMC was placed more or less in the role of a stepchild who sat at the foot of the second table and was forced to take the leavings after the other branches of the armed forces had been treated to the more choice helpings.

This policy no doubt was based on the belief that more Quartermaster functions could be performed by personnel who were inferior physically, mentally, or by reason of an underprivileged background, and that incidental failures would not imperil, to any serious degree, the success of American arms. The Quartermaster General and his staff, keenly aware of actual needs in the way of specially skilled, physically able, and intelligent personnel, protested against this policy, for the most part to little avail.
In the earlier American wars, Quartermaster officers generally were line officers detailed to Quartermaster duties. They rarely had any special instruction for the particular type of work they were expected to do, and usually became qualified for their tasks through experience gained on the job. It was not until World War I—when the Army increased enormously in size and Quartermaster activities expanded proportionately—that officers began to be trained as Quartermaster specialists. It was then that the Corps, for the first time, was permitted to organize units to carry out its increasing variety of specialized activities in the field such as salvage collection, graves registration, and provision of bathing and delousing facilities. Moreover, larger-scale operations, extended supply lines, and the trend toward mechanization and motorization had made warfare itself more complex. As a consequence, the QMC not only required many more officers but also had to establish a program for training them as Quartermaster specialists. Furthermore, its operations became so highly specialized and diversified that the Corps had to turn to private industry for men with valuable civilian experience who could help to direct its activities and train other specialists. This led to the inauguration in World War I of the policy of commissioning civilians when they possessed the technical skills needed by the QMC.¹

The problem of procuring Quartermaster officers was far greater in World War II than it had been in 1917–18. In the first place, operations were on a much larger scale and a greater number of officers was needed. More important, however, was the fact that the increasing complexity of activities—due to such factors as the complete motorization and mechanization of the Army and the development of new types of Quartermaster units—had created the need for a much wider variety of specialists. Another reason for the increased difficulty in procurement was that the Quartermaster officer in World War II had to be a combat leader as well as a technical specialist. Modern warfare on a global scale accounted for this development. In World War I the action had been concentrated on a single front that remained fairly stable, with the result that the Quartermaster officer was generally able to direct supply and service activities in rear areas protected by combat troops. In World War II, however, the fighting took

¹See Maj Claude M. Fuess and Capt Hardin Craig, A History of Camp Joseph E. Johnston, Jacksonville, Florida (2 vols., typescript, 1919), pp. 210-12, Hist Br, OQMG.
place on many fronts and the lines were frequently quite fluid. The rear could become the front within a few hours, and supply lines were often endangered and sometimes destroyed by bombers or tanks. The Quartermaster officer therefore had to be trained in the use of weapons and had to possess a knowledge of tactics that would enable him to defend his supply points. Moreover, he had to possess the qualities of leadership needed to direct troops in the field.

At the beginning of the emergency in 1939 the QMC had approximately 700 officers, all of whom were professional soldiers. During the war the officer strength of the Corps increased by about 30,000 to a peak of 30,744 at the end of December 1944. The QMC acquired additional Regular Army officers through transfers from other branches, allocations of graduates from the U.S. Military Academy, and the recall of a few officers who had resigned or retired, but the total number of Regular Army officers in the Corps never increased to any sizable extent. About one fourth of the officers obtained from other sources had had some training in peacetime military organizations, primarily the Officers’ Reserve Corps (ORC). Thus approximately three fourths of the Quartermaster officers procured after 1939 had been civilians with no previous military training. The great majority of these were graduates of the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School (OCS), which was established late in 1941 to train qualified enlisted men. The others were commissioned directly from civilian life because they possessed technical or administrative skills that could be utilized even though the men had no military experience.

One of the major procurement problems was the difficulty encountered in determining requirements for officers of all types sufficiently in advance to keep the supply in balance with the demand. The requirements were changing constantly, sometimes quickly, with the result that there usually was either a shortage or a surplus of officers. The most acute shortage occurred early in the war when new units were being activated so rapidly that it was impossible to produce officers fast enough to meet the pressing needs for all components of the Corps. This phenomenal expansion continued throughout 1942, and the OCS operated at full capacity while the OQMG resorted to every other expedient to procure new officers. In 1943 the supply finally caught up with requirements during the first half of the year, and by September there was even a surplus of officers in the QMC. The result was that the training of officer candidates, which had been tapering off during the last six months of 1943, stopped completely for a brief interval in December. Unanticipated heavy demands for officers arose almost immediately, however, and another critical shortage developed before the OCS operations could be resumed and a sufficient quantity of new officers could be trained to meet the increased requirements. Thereafter the OQMG was more successful in gearing its OCS output to the fluctuating needs.

Another major problem was the persistent shortage of officers in the middle grades. Requirements for the top grades—generals and colonels—were compara-

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2 Monthly Rpt, AGO to WDGS, Strength of the Army, 1 Jan 48, p. 16.
3 See Table 15.
4 Ltr, TQMG to CG Camp Lee QMRTC, 28 Sep 43, sub: Detail of 800 QM Offs to Corps of Engineers.
5 Memo, Gen Feldman, OQMG, to CG ASF, 28 Jan 44, sub: Current and Anticipated Problems Confronting the QMC.
THE PROCUREMENT OF QUARTERMASTER OFFICERS

Table 15—Accessions of QMC Officers During World War II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Calendar Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers' Reserve Corps</td>
<td>2,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Candidate School</td>
<td>23,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
<td>1,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Cadets</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant or Flight Officers</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Life and Others</td>
<td>1,921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Accessions indicate men who were commissioned in the QMC but who did not necessarily remain there throughout the war. They do not include Regular Army officers assigned to the QMC.

This tabulation does not tell the whole story since two thirds of the ORC and 95 percent of the National Guard had been called into federal service by 1942. As of 31 December 1941, the QMC officer strength included 829 Regular Army officers, 738 National Guard officers, 6,050 Reserve officers, and 134 AUS officers. See Monthly Rpt, AGO to WDGS, Strength of the Army, 31 Dec 41.

Commissioned directly in the field.

Others include former officers of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Philippine Army; Naval officers; other ROTC officers; and members of the Army Specialist Corps, Citizen's Military Training Camps, and U. S. citizens transferring from the Canadian Army.

Source: Rpt, Strength Acctg Br, AGO, to Hist Sec, QMGM, 6 Jul 48, sub: Statistical Data on QMC Commissioned Male Offs.

Procurement Problems in the Emergency Period

It became apparent to the staff of the QMGM early in the emergency period that the policy laid down by the War Department Mobilization Regulations for the procurement of Quartermaster officers was entirely inadequate for any sizable expansion of the Corps. This policy was based on the assumption that the ORC would be able to supply the bulk of officers required by the QMC during the early stages of mobilization, and that any additional officers needed could be obtained through transfer from other branches of the Army or through the commissioning of civilians possessing the required technical qualifications.

The system for procuring Quartermaster officers proved inadequate from the beginning because, on the one hand, require-
ments had been estimated far too low, and on the other, the prescribed sources failed to produce as many qualified officers as had been anticipated. The estimated requirements fell far short of actual needs because they were based primarily on World War I experience and failed to take into account either the increased complexity of activities, which created the need for more kinds of specialists, or the added functions and resultant abnormal load that was to be placed upon the QMC during the extended emergency period.

A shortage of Quartermaster officers began to develop as early as the fall of 1939, soon after the President declared the limited national emergency, and became serious after the passage of the Selective Service Act in 1940. The nature of the Corps' functions, which at that time included both construction and transportation in addition to supply and service responsibilities, caused it to expand faster than the Army as a whole. Hundreds of new officers were needed quickly to supervise the immense construction program, to plan and direct transportation for the growing Army, to supervise the handling of tremendous stores of food and other supplies, to direct and train the many truck companies and new types of mobile units required for a motorized Army, and to perform many other Quartermaster activities.

The original difficulty experienced by the QMC in procuring the officers it needed arose from the fact that while it had more than 6,000 officers in its Reserve Corps, many of them were either unqualified or not immediately available. Some of them had been in the ORC since World War I and were no longer physically capable of full-time duty, others lacked the necessary training, and many who had been given their commissions in peacetime proved to be misfits.

The Quartermaster Corps has long suffered from the fact that many of the Reserve officers now commissioned in this Corps are totally unfit for the duties they will be called upon to perform in mobilization. The requirements for initial appointments have recently been raised, and the process of weeding out the undesirable officers which is underway will still further increase their shortage of available officers. Moreover, Reserve officers could be utilized only when they volunteered. Throughout the first year of the emergency they could not be called to extended active duty without their consent, and many were unwilling to leave civilian jobs. This difficulty was overcome to a large extent after Congress in August 1940 authorized the President to order any component of the Reserve Corps into active military service for twelve consecutive months, and a year later extended the period another eighteen months. Even then, however, the call of some of the Reserve officers was deferred because they were engaged in essential jobs in defense industries.

The need for Reserve officers in the QMC developed so quickly that it was apparent from the beginning that the supply of those who were qualified would be far from adequate. In contrast, most of the other branches of the Army still had a surplus of Reserve officers because their need for additional officers was not so immediate. Consequently the War Department on 1 November 1939 approved the recommendation of The Quartermaster General

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6 The strength of the QM ORC on 30 June 1940 was 6,249. See *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940*, p. 41.

that initial appointments in the Quartermaster Reserve Corps be suspended and that vacancies be filled by the transfer of qualified officers from other branches in which surpluses existed.\textsuperscript{8}

This procedure was adopted because the QMC had no ROTC or Citizens' Military Training Camp units to provide good officer material for its Reserve Corps, and the transfer of officers from the Reserve units of the other Army branches would help to reduce their surpluses as well as make available to the QMC a source of procurement that would produce many competent officers. Thus the QMC, in its procurement of Reserve officers, had to depend to a considerable extent upon commissioned personnel trained originally for other arms and services. This helped to ease but did not eliminate the shortage of officers in the QMC because requirements were increasing steadily and other branches of the Army later began to experience shortages of their own.

The number of Regular Army officers in the QMC was relatively small at the beginning of the emergency primarily because for a number of years the Corps had not been receiving its proportionate share of graduates of the U.S. Military Academy. Since 1933 none of the graduates had been assigned directly to the QMC. War Department policy required that they spend at least two years in one of the arms to gain experience in the line before they became eligible for transfer or detail to the QMC. Even then these officers could be transferred only upon their own request, and, after two years of indoctrination in a particular arm, they were generally reluctant to make a change.\textsuperscript{9}

Moreover, when the Army began to expand, the chiefs of the arms also became hard-pressed for commissioned personnel and objected to the transfer of officers from their branches. Thus the QMC experienced difficulty in obtaining its full quota of professional officers, particularly desirable ones, since nearly all who requested transfer did so not because of interest in the QMC but rather because of dissatisfaction with their own branches. The result was that the number of Regular Army officers in the QMC usually was inadequate to meet requirements. Furthermore, since a great many of the officers allotted to the QMC had been commissioned in other branches they had no Quartermaster training. On 30 June 1940, for example, of the 830 officers allotted to the QMC, more than 230 were on detail from other arms and services.\textsuperscript{10}

Col. Edmund B. Gregory, Acting The Quartermaster General, protested early in 1940 that the policy of assigning West Point graduates was, in effect, barring from the QMC “suitable young men who are anxious to join it,” because “when officers are assigned directly to a combatant arm they acquire acquaintanceships and knowledge which makes them loath to leave their surroundings for another branch of the service.” Although he admitted the desirability of assigning prospective Quartermaster officers to preliminary duty with line troops, he contended that it was “illogical and wasteful to train officers for a number of years as Infantrymen, Cavalrymen and Field Artillerymen if the remainder of their service is to be in the Quartermaster Corps.”\textsuperscript{11} The shortage of officers in the QMC, he said, had created a grave situation, and he urged

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{9} Memo, ACofS G-1 for CoS, 6 Feb 40, sub: Procurement of QM and Ord Offs.

\textsuperscript{10} Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1940, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{11} Ltr, Actg TQMG to AGO, 24 Jan 40, sub: Shortage of Offs in the QMC.
that the policy be revised to permit West Point graduates, who so desired, to be assigned directly to the Corps.

The War Department expressed opposition at first but finally agreed to the proposal and announced that, beginning with the class of 1940, the QMC would receive its pro rata share of the graduates, provided they “express a desire for such assignment.” Only thirty members of the class did so. A year later the War Department eliminated this restriction and authorized the QMC to receive its full pro rata share of the graduates regardless of their individual preferences. As a result the Corps received sixty-five members, or 13.41 percent, of the 1941 graduating class.\textsuperscript{12}

Another handicap faced by the QMC in its officer procurement program was that the Corps had no ROTC units until the fall of 1941. The plan of procuring officers through ROTC units in universities had been utilized by most of the other branches of the Army for many years. The War Department, however, had considered it unnecessary for the QMC to have such units of its own. Instead, corps area commanders had been authorized since 1937 to allot to the QMC up to 5 percent of the graduates from units of other branches.\textsuperscript{13}

This procedure proved far from satisfactory because graduates who had been trained in another ROTC branch rarely volunteered to transfer to the QMC, and the War Department had instructed corps area commanders to make no “extraordinary effort” to encourage them to do so. Consequently the number commissioned in the QMC fell far short of the specified 5 percent, and those who did transfer had had no training in Quartermaster functions. The situation failed to improve to any marked degree even after the War Department modified its policy late in December 1940 to the extent of requesting that the various ROTC units be canvassed for qualified officers willing to accept commissions in the QMC rather than in the branch in which they had been trained.\textsuperscript{14}

Although earlier attempts to secure approval for a Quartermaster ROTC unit had been unsuccessful, The Quartermaster General revived these efforts in February 1941 in the belief that the emergency warranted a change in policy. The War Department promptly rejected his application. Four months later, however, it reversed its decision and authorized the establishment of a unit at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, provided at least fifty students were willing to enroll.\textsuperscript{15} Membership was restricted to graduate students under twenty-six years of age who had completed ROTC senior division basic courses or the equivalent. The number of applications far exceeded the maximum quota of 50, making it possible to select those with the better qualifications, and since all of the applicants were graduate students the men selected were of exceptionally high caliber.

The Harvard ROTC Unit was organized at the beginning of the school’s fall

\textsuperscript{12} (1) Ltr, AGO to TQMG \textit{et al.}, 13 Apr 40, sub: Procurement of QM and Ord Offs, AG 210.1 (11-27-39) M-A. (2) Memo, ACofS G-1 for CofS, 31 Mar 41, sub: Distr and Allotment of RA Offs to Brs, FY 1942. This revision was approved by the Chief of Staff on 14 April 1941.

\textsuperscript{13} Ltr, AGO to TQMG \textit{et al.}, 22 Jul 37, sub: Procurement of QMC Reserve Offs, AG 062.12 ORC (4-5-37) Res A.

\textsuperscript{14} Ltr, AGO to TQMG \textit{et al.}, 23 Dec 40, sub: Procurement of QMC Reserve Offs, AG 062.12 ORC (12-5-40) R-A.

\textsuperscript{15} (1) Ltr, AGO to TQMG, 27 Feb 41, sub: ROTC—Harvard University. (2) Ltr, AGO to First CA, 12 Jun 41, same sub.
term in 1941 and had been in operation only about three months when the United States entered the war. Thus the only officers obtained by the QMC through the ROTC during the emergency period were those assigned to it from units of other branches. They were commissioned in the Quartermaster Reserve Corps immediately following their graduation from college, without ever having had any actual Army experience or Quartermaster training, and it was necessary to give them special instruction in QMC functions before they were assigned to duty.

The ROTC officers commissioned in the QMC from 1937 through 1940 had been so few in number that they had presented no serious problem. The situation changed in the spring of 1941 when the Corps received its first big allotment of graduates, approximately 350, all of whom were detailed to the Quartermaster School at Philadelphia for a special three months’ course of training. The results of this course brought into sharp focus the fallacy of commissioning ROTC graduates directly from college. Their lack of military seasoning proved an initial handicap to them in embarking upon careers as officers, and, more important, it was discovered too late that some of them were entirely unqualified for Quartermaster service.

As a group, according to the commanding officer of the Quartermaster School in a letter to The Quartermaster General on 21 October 1941, they still had an inherent civilian outlook and suffered a definite shock and temporary maladjustment upon entering actual military service.

The experience of this school had been that very few of the ROTC graduates, commissioned directly from college, know anything whatsoever about military life, customs or procedure. Many are too poor in this respect that they do not even know how to dress in a military uniform. It has been amazing to all of the faculty members of the school to note how prevalent is the thought that the act of commissioning is the end, not the beginning, of their training, and how strong is the conception that they should immediately step into important administrative, executive, and research direction positions. It is believed most emphatically by all faculty members that the present idea of rotating these young men through centers where they will learn military fundamentals, team play, and obtain contacts with real military life is correct, advisable and most necessary. Nearly all are strongly individualistic, lack comprehension of moral responsibilities to others, and a sense of cooperation and team play. They regard formations as something to be "cut" like a college class, and orders are something to be analyzed, dissected, criticized and obeyed only after discussion and final individual approval.

Most of the ROTC graduates, largely by reason of their educational background, were able to overcome their early deficiencies as they acquired additional training and experience, and, when finally oriented, often proved superior to many officers obtained from other sources—particularly those who had had less education.

When the Army construction program was launched in July 1940, the QMC needed a large number of officers experienced in construction work. The Quartermaster General requested an immediate allotment of 300 Reserve officers to get the program under way, but by the time construction activities were transferred to the Corps of Engineers in December 1941 this...
number had increased to include more than 1,800 Reserve officers and 150 Regular Army officers. To fill this need the Corps drew upon its supply of Reserve officers, requested and obtained authority from the War Department to select qualified officers from other branches of the Army to be detailed to the Corps, and in addition found it necessary to commission a large number of construction specialists directly from civilian life.

During 1941 the most acute shortage experienced by the QMC was in officers technically trained in various phases of motor transportation. Late in October of that year the number of officers assigned to motor transport activities totaled fewer than 950, while requirements called for about 1,500 in field organizations alone. Furthermore, less than one third of the 950 were considered fully qualified. The others had to be sent to school for further training, thereby increasing the shortage of officers available for active duty. The big need was for specialists in motor management, fleet operations, automotive repair, maintenance, and inspection, as well as supply and distribution of spare parts. A survey made by the QMC revealed that Reserve officers with qualifications in these fields were not available in sufficient numbers in other branches of the Army to alleviate the situation, nor was there time to train them. The one source from which fully qualified men could be obtained was the automotive industry, and The Quartermaster General took steps to obtain them by offering commissions in the Army of the United States (AUS). His request for authority to do this was made to the War Department just two days before Pearl Harbor.

Commissioning of civilians in the AUS had been authorized by the War Department only a month earlier, on 7 November 1941. Before that time all civilians appointed as officers in the QMC directly from civilian life had been commissioned in the Reserve Corps. The total number was 875. Thus one out of about every nine officers procured by the QMC during the emergency period was appointed directly from civilian life. Although civilians had been commissioned for many different types of Quartermaster duties, particularly construction, it was 1942 before they were appointed in any sizable number for motor transport activities. The ban on passenger-car production early in that year resulted in unemployment for thousands of specialists of all kinds in the automotive industry and simplified the problem of procuring qualified officers in that field. Procurement of motor transport officers, however, ceased to be a responsibility of the QMC soon after, for the function was transferred to the Ordnance Department on 1 August 1942.

The QMC experienced considerable difficulty in finding a sufficient number of officers qualified to command the hundreds of field units being organized under the emergency expansion program. For years the Corps had trained most of its young officers for duty as post quartermasters, and only a few had had any field training. Participation of Quartermaster units in the Army maneuvers in the summer of 1941 revealed the omission of field training as one of the major weaknesses of

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18 (1) Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 18 Jul 40, sub: Allotment of Reserve Offs to the QMC, 326.21. (2) Rpt, Chief of Constr Div to TQMG, 21 Nov 41, sub: Activities of Constr Div During Period 1 Jul 40–1 Nov 41, 600.914.
19 Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 5 Dec 41, sub: Allotment of Offs for Appointment in the AUS.
20 Data obtained by OQMG historian from Offs Sec, Pers Div, OQMG, circa Dec 42.
the QMC training program. Consequently, steps were taken to revise the courses of instruction and to devote more attention to field training, but it was months before the full effects of the new training program were felt in the units. Another limiting factor was that many of the officers were over-age for duty with units.\textsuperscript{21}

War Department policy required The Quartermaster General to assign as many of his Regular Army officers as possible to units. It was then the responsibility of the corps area commanders to provide the remainder of the officer complement for the units from their allotments of Reserve officers. The number who qualified for such assignment, however, was so small that the War Department in the fall of 1941 established a rotation system whereby all Quartermaster Reserve officers of company grade were to complete a course of instruction at the Quartermaster School and another at one of the QMRTC's before being assigned to units. The objectives were to provide better-trained officers for units and to replace troop-age officers on duty at permanent installations with those who were over-age or otherwise unqualified for field service.\textsuperscript{22}

The summer of 1941 was a critical period in Quartermaster officer procurement. The need for commissioned personnel was increasing while the supply of qualified Reserve officers was running low, with more than 4,000 already on extended active duty in the QMC. Reserves of the other branches of the Army had been quite thoroughly combed for specialists who could be utilized to carry out Quartermaster functions. Moreover, the federalization of the National Guard had begun in September 1940, and by the summer of 1941 this additional source of Quartermaster officers was about exhausted. The Corps faced a grave situation, even though its officer strength had grown to 5,675 by 30 June 1941, as shown in the following table:\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{center}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Component & QMC Officers \\
\hline
Total & 5,675 \\
Regular Army & 904 \\
Reserve & 4,013 \\
National Guard & 758 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Adding to the seriousness of the situation was the fact that the twelve-month period of service authorized by Congress for National Guard and Reserve officers was nearing an end, and at that time there had been no assurance that the period would be extended. The procurement objective late in July 1941 called for approximately 11,800 officers in the QMC, whereas the allotment of Regular Army officers was only 945, and the available supply of Reserve officers was estimated at about 7,000, leaving a potential over-all shortage of nearly 4,000 officers. In an attempt to help fill this big gap, The Quartermaster General appealed to the War Department to raise the allotment of Regular Army officers to 1,371, an increase of more than 45 percent. He proposed that the additional 426 officers be detailed from the other arms and services \textsuperscript{24}in grades of Major, Captain, and First Lieutenant . . . to fill the vacancies of one grade higher in


\textsuperscript{22} (1) \textit{Lt}, AGO to CGs of All CAs \textit{et al.}, 17 Feb 41, sub: Reserve Off Overstrength for Existing RA Units, AG 320.2 (1-16-41) M–A–M. (2) \textit{Lt}, AGO to CGs of QMRTC\textit{s}, Comdt of the QM School \textit{et al.}, 14 Oct 41, sub: Attendance of Reserve Offs at the QM School to Provide Loss Repls, FY 1942, AG 320.2 (9–26-41) MT–A.

\textsuperscript{23} Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1941, p. 95.
each case and thus allow for promotion.”

His recommendation was rejected on the grounds that this action would grant “preferential treatment” to the QMC at the expense of the other arms and services, particularly the arms, and because the War Department considered that the Corps, “by nature of its duties, is better able to utilize the service of Reserve officers, whose training in civil life more nearly approximates the duties in that service, than can combat units.”

Meanwhile, with the principal sources of officers threatening to run dry, The Quartermaster General finally gained permission to operate an officer candidate school for the training of selected enlisted men. Early in January 1941 the War Department had announced that it would set up OCS programs in the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery, but that it did not contemplate any such training program in the QMC because it still believed that officer requirements of the Corps could be met through the utilization of Reserve officers, transfers of unassigned officers from other branches, and the commissioning of civilians. About three months later, when the general shortage of officers throughout the Army convinced the War Department of the need for extending the training program, it announced that OCS plans were being revised to include schools for the QMC and the other services.

The Quartermaster OCS was finally established on 7 July 1941. The original quota for the QMC classes was set at 150, and enrollment was restricted primarily to enlisted men and warrant officers who had been in the service at least six months. Two of these classes were begun before Pearl Harbor, but there was time to graduate only one group of 135 new officers before the country was at war.

The Critical Officer Shortage of 1942

The most critical shortage of Quartermaster officers occurred in the six-month period following the attack upon Pearl Harbor. Quartermaster recruits, who had averaged fewer than 8,000 a month in 1941, began pouring into the QMRTC’s at the rate of more than 25,000 a month. Many additional officers were needed to train them. Similarly, more officers were in demand to supervise the transportation of the rapidly expanding Army, and to direct the procurement and distribution of greatly increased quantities of food and other supplies. The most acute need was for company-grade officers of troop age to command the many new units being organized.

The heavy demand for field units and officers to command them was the most significant change brought about in the QMC by the sudden transition from peace to war:

. . . the functions of the Quartermaster Corps are fundamentally the same in peace and in war. When on maneuvers the Quartermaster Corps is the only Corps whose men do not have to simulate training. They actually perform the same functions they would in . . .
combat. The only difference Pearl Harbor and the war have made in the Quartermaster Corps was to enlarge the numbers of those engaged in field-type work. It does not change the fundamental functions which the Corps must perform and for which officers must be trained. Supply functions are basically the same, whether they are performed in a depot or in a field installation. . . . although we are at war the Quartermaster Corps has not thrown away its subsistence and its clothing and taken up a rifle. 

Difficulties encountered during the emergency period in procuring an adequate number of officers for units mounted in 1942 in proportion to the increase in the rate of mobilization. The rotation policy established late in 1941 had been designed to overcome the shortage by channeling all company-grade officers of troop age to field units, but this objective was never fully attained. One of the reasons was that there were not enough over-age and limited-service officers to take over the duties being performed by troop-age officers at permanent installations, and those holding key positions could not be relieved for field duty when no replacements were available. Another reason was that many of the troop-age officers, particularly those commissioned directly from civilian life, were found to be unsuited for assignment to troops. Because an officer was of troop age, it did not necessarily follow that he was of troop type. 

The transfer of qualified troop-age officers to field units increased the shortage of commissioned personnel at Quartermaster installations where requirements were also increasing sharply. The experience of the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot in January 1942 was typical. The depot had 70 officers, and the commander put in a request for an increase to 128, which he said was a conservative estimate of his needs. Instead of getting the additional 58 officers, however, he lost some of those he had.

We recently received a radiogram from your office that five of the seventy [officers] we now have are to be transferred immediately and five more as of February 1st; and, from all indications, we stand to lose more and more as time goes on. This Depot has received no definite assurance of any sort regarding replacements for officers already lost or for the ten we are about to lose; much less, for the difference of fifty-eight between the seventy we have and the one hundred and twenty-eight required.

The officer shortage at the depots and other Quartermaster installations was relieved to some extent after the OQMG in February 1942 requested and obtained permission to utilize 1,060 branch immaterial Reserve officers who had not yet been assigned to extended active duty in their own branches. In approving the request, the War Department restricted the selection to over-age Reserve officers of the Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery on an inactive status. Many of these over-age officers, after they had undergone training in specific Quartermaster duties, were able to replace troop-age officers and make them available for field units.

Despite frantic efforts to obtain additional officers from all other possible sources—assigning Reserve officers, commissioning enlisted men and civilians, and

27 Ltr, Col Horace L. Whittaker, Comdt QM School, to Gen Scowden, 19 Mar 42, sub: Comments on Rpt of Professors Smith and Mace, 353.
28 1st Lt William O. Antozzi to Chief of Tng Br, Mil Pers and Tng Div, OQMG, 10 Jun 42, sub: Rpt of Tng Conf, 9 Jun 42.
29 Ltr, CG PQMG to TQMG, 15 Jan 42, sub: Tng Troop-Age Offs for the Fld Forces, 353.02.
30 Branch immaterial is the term applied to commissioned officers not assigned to any particular arm or service.
31 (1) Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to TAG, 18 Feb 42, sub: Allotment of Offs. (2) Memo, ACoS G-1 for TAG, 20 Feb 42, same sub.
calling retired officers back to duty—shortages increased rather than diminished throughout the first half of 1942, when the Corps expanded more rapidly than at any other time during the war. The growth in officer strength of the QMC during those six months failed by far to keep pace with the increase in enlisted personnel. Although the latter expanded from approximately 115,000 to 215,000, the number of officers rose from 7,800 to only about 12,400, and most of that increase occurred during May and June.\(^32\)

It was obvious that the officer shortages could never be overcome until the OCS could train a sufficient number of qualified enlisted men.

The Role of the Officer Candidate School

It was from the enlisted ranks that the QMC obtained the great portion of its new officers during the war years. About 1,400 were commissioned in the field on the basis of their experience. But the bulk—more than 23,000 of the nearly 30,000 officers obtained from all sources—were graduates of the OCS who were commissioned as second lieutenants. Most of these were inductees who were enrolled in the OCS after completing their basic training. Only 5,000 new officers acquired in 1942 and thereafter came from all other sources, including the ORC, specialists commissioned directly from civilian life, and former officers recalled to duty. (See Table 15.)

Enrollment at the Quartermaster OCS early in 1942 increased as rapidly as facilities could be expanded. The first wartime class, begun late in January, comprised about 500 candidates—more than three times as many as had been enrolled in either of the two classes started in 1941. By April the quota for each new class had been established at 1,200. In all, fifteen Quartermaster OCS classes were started in 1942 and nearly 10,500 graduates were commissioned. This number was approximately equal to the total number graduated in the following three years.\(^33\)

Some difficulty was experienced at first in finding enough suitable candidates to fill the sharply increased OCS quotas. One of the major reasons was that there was a limited number of men in the QMC under the maximum age of thirty-six, who were mentally and physically qualified and had been in the service long enough to be eligible. Many more men became available after February 1942 when the War Department raised the age limit to forty-six, and reduced to three months the length of time in service required for eligibility.\(^34\)

Another reason for the difficulty was that many potential candidates who were occupying relatively important key positions in units and installations were hampered in their efforts to enroll in the OCS by the lack of co-operation on the part of their commanding officers who did not want to lose them. Reports indicated that the policy being pursued by the commanders was to let the men seek admission to the OCS on their own initiative without offering them any encouragement. This situation led to a War Department directive making commanders in all echelons responsible for seeing that every qualified enlisted man was afforded an opportunity...

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\(^{32}\) Unpublished rpt of Secretary of War, 1942, App. B, Table D, in Strength Accounting Br, AGO.


\(^{34}\) WD Cir 48, Sec. II, 19 Feb 42, sub: OCS.
and encouraged to apply for entrance to
an OCS.35

With the elimination of these early dif-
ficulties, the QMC had no further trouble
in filling its OCS quotas during the mobi-
lization period. In fact, a surplus of candi-
dates developed as early as April 1942,
and the War Department suggested that
men on the waiting list be given an oppor-
tunity to enroll in schools of other branches
that still had serious shortages.36 Conse-
quently the QMC had little if any need for
the Volunteer Officer Candidate (VOC) plan that had been adopted by the War
Department in March 1942 to open up a
new source of officer material—men de-
ferred because they had dependents. This
plan permitted any qualified man who
had been deferred from the draft for de-
pendency only to volunteer for officer
training, with the understanding that if he
was not selected at the replacement train-
ing center to which he was sent for basic
training, or if he was not commissioned at
an OCS, he could return to civilian life
and his former draft status. The Camp Lee
QMRTC reported to the War Depart-
ment in July 1942 that no more than 10
percent of the 600 VOC's it had on hand
could possibly be selected for officer train-
ing under the existing OCS quota, and re-
quested either that fewer VOC's be sent or
that the OCS quota be increased so that
more of them could be utilized. The out-
come was that the War Department issued
orders in August that no more VOC's
were to be accepted at the Quartermaster
OCS.37

Although the primary objective of the
OCS was to produce officers for field units,
not all of the graduates could qualify for
such assignments, chiefly because of age
restrictions. For example, the maximum
age at first for second lieutenants on duty
with units was twenty-eight, yet many of
the men were past thirty-five upon gradua-
tion, and some were as old as forty-five.
Many of the older graduates were so far
over-age in grade that they could never
qualify for field duty. They could, how-
ever, be assigned to zone of interior instal-
lations where they could relieve troop-age
officers for field duty. Those who were
over-age as second lieutenants but still
young enough to become eligible for troop
duty at a higher grade were given ad-
vanced training so that they could qualify
for promotion.

The time required for this additional
training and the fact that requirements
were mounting rapidly through most of
1942 were among the principal reasons
why it took so long to overcome the short-
age of officers, despite the sharply in-
creased output of the OCS. Paradoxically,
the OCS itself helped to increase the
shortage because it had to have such a
large staff to provide supervision and in-
struction for the expanded program, and
outstanding students from some of the
earlier classes had to be retained as in-
structors instead of being sent to the field.38

By the fall of 1942 the most pressing
needs for Quartermaster officers finally
were being met and the OCS began to un-
dergo drastic changes. Seeking to prevent
a surplus of officers, the War Department
reduced the quota for each new Quar-
termaster class from 1,200 to 600 beginning
in October, and then to 300 effective in

35 Ltr, AGO to CofS GHQ et al., 27 Jan 42, sub:
Selection of Candidates for OCS.
36 Ltr, AGO to All Commanders, 6 Apr 42, sub: Off
Candidates, Tech Brs.
37 (1) Rad, CG Camp Lee QMRTC to TAG, 27
Jul 42, sub: VOC. (2) AGO Memo W350-65-42, 11
Aug 42, same sub.
38 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. I,
p. 49.
Moreover, it directed in October 1942 that no enlisted men under thirty-five years of age were to be enrolled in the Quartermaster OCS unless they were disqualified for general service. The purpose of this directive was to channel more candidates to the combat arms, which were still having serious difficulty in filling their quotas. In effect, enrollment in the Quartermaster OCS was restricted to limited-service and over-age personnel. The OCS staff, which had begun to pay closer attention to the qualifications of candidates because of the sharply reduced quotas, protested to the AGO that assignment of limited-service personnel to the Quartermaster OCS was in violation of Army Regulations. The AGO acknowledged this and beginning in February 1943 specified that only candidates classified for general service could be assigned to the Quartermaster OCS.

The relaxation of pressure for new officers permitted the OCS to devote more attention to the quality of graduates. Previously, volume and speed had been of utmost importance because requirements were immediate. It had become a rather common practice to commission individuals in advance of graduation, particularly if they had had any previous military experience, in order to meet the urgent need for officers, and two entire OCS classes with a combined enrollment of more than 2,400 candidates had been commissioned two weeks ahead of schedule after only eleven weeks of training. Moreover, in the rush to produce the required number of new officers, many candidates of questionable suitability were enrolled and graduated. This situation began to change late in 1942 when standards for admission and graduation were raised.

An indication that the efforts to improve the quality of OCS graduates proved successful was the fact that the percentage of candidates who failed to win their commissions increased greatly in 1943 and thereafter. During 1941 and 1942 the number of failures had been very small—fewer than 6 percent. This number increased to more than 18 percent in 1943, while failures of from 30 to 40 percent were the rule rather than the exception in 1944 and the first half of 1945. Although the general caliber of enlisted men tended to decline as the war progressed, the fact that there was a more careful selection of candidates leads to the conclusion that the greater percentage of failures after 1942 was due more to the raising of standards than to any other factor.

Another important change in the OCS program was brought about by the decision of the War Department in March 1943 to train ROTC graduates within the quotas set for the OCS, instead of in addition to them as in the past. Summer camps had been discontinued for the duration of the war, and during 1942 Quartermaster ROTC graduates who had completed all requirements for a commission except attendance at summer camps had been given a basic course of training at the Quartermaster School before being commissioned as second lieutenants. Under the revised procedure of March 1943, the Quartermaster OCS began to train the ROTC graduates along with the regular

39 (1) AGO Memo W350–74–42, 5 Sep 42, sub: Quotas for QM OCS. (2) Ltr, AGO to All Commanders to Whom Quotas Are Allotted, 24 Mar 43, same sub, AG 352 (3–19–43) OB–D–SPGAO.
40 WD Cir 358, Sec. II, 28 Oct 42, sub: OCS.
41 (1) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. I, p. 22. (2) Ltr, AGO to All Commanders to Whom Quotas Are Allotted, 27 Feb 43, sub: Quotas for QM OCS, AG 352 (2–22–43) OB–D–SPQTA.
candidates. The ROTC graduates were much younger, of course, than the other candidates whose minimum age was thirty-five.

The QMC had obtained permission during the first half of 1942 to establish eight additional ROTC units, making a total of nine including the one at Harvard University, and the former procedure of assigning 5 percent of the graduates from ROTC units of the other arms and services had been discontinued.\(^{43}\) The Quartermaster ROTC program proved to be of rather short duration. At the end of 1942 the War Department placed the student trainees in all senior ROTC units under the control of the newly established Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP). In June 1943, at the end of the 1942-43 academic year, all ROTC units were suspended for the duration of the war.\(^{44}\)

The ASTP came into being because the lowering of the draft age from twenty to eighteen made it virtually impossible for colleges and universities to continue to supply cadets for the ROTC. The new program was designed to insure a continuous replenishment in later war years of technically trained officer material. It provided that selected enlisted men were to be assigned to civilian institutions of higher learning for academic instruction in courses of military value, such as science, engineering, or medicine, but only after they had received basic military training, which was to be continued under a cadet organization while they were in college.

The QMC participation in the ASTP was quite limited. No Quartermaster personnel—other than the ROTC students included originally—were selected for ASTP training during the first seven months that the program was in operation. Finally, however, in August 1943, the War Department made provisions whereby men assigned to the QMC “who were previously pursuing courses in business administration and allied subjects required by the ROTC-QMC program” could be recommended for ASTP training.\(^{45}\) About six months later the War Department reduced the number of ASTP trainees in the entire Army from 150,000 to 30,000, and announced that ROTC students would be eliminated from the program effective 1 April 1944.\(^{46}\)

The effect of the decision to train ROTC students within the OCS quota was that ROTC personnel began to fill the quotas to the exclusion of other candidates about the middle of 1943, when the size of the OCS classes was sharply reduced. The Quartermaster General called the attention of ASF headquarters to this situation in November 1943. He pointed out that many high-grade officer candidates, including some men returned from overseas, had been selected and were being held in pools awaiting an opportunity to get into the OCS but that there was no way to enroll them because ROTC students would fill all available quotas until July 1944. He proposed that the surplus candidates be permitted to attend the OCS inasmuch as facilities and instructors were still available. His idea was to commission them in the Reserve Corps following

\(^{43}\) (1) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. 1, pp. 1-12. (2) Rpt, Maj Ross W. Mayer to Col Wilbur R. McReynolds, OQMG, 11 Feb 42, sub: ROTC Summer Camps and Other Matters. (3) For location of the nine Quartermaster ROTC units, dates of establishment, and number of graduates from each, see below, p. 284, n. 28.

\(^{44}\) AGO Memo W145-4-42, 23 Dec 42, sub: ASTP—ROTC Instructions.

\(^{45}\) AGO Memo W145-12-43, par. 4, 4 Aug 43, sub: Disp of First-Year Advanced Course ROTC Students.

\(^{46}\) Ltr, ACoS G–1 to CG ASF, 16 Feb 44, sub: Reduction in ASTP.
graduation, place them on the inactive list, then assign them to positions of responsibility as noncommissioned officers in the theaters of operations. There they could be called to active duty as second lieutenants as the need arose. He expressed the opinion that the men deserved “the democratic chance to attain at least the opportunity for officer training.”

This proposal was rejected by the Director of Personnel, ASF, who contended that to train an individual as an officer and then force him to continue to serve in a noncommissioned status “would be inadvisable and have as harmful an effect on morale as the present limited number of opportunities to attend officer candidate school.” Moreover, he added, the capacities of the OCS had been adjusted to meet all current and future requirements for officers, and that to increase these capacities “to train additional men who will probably never have the opportunity to serve as officers during the war” could not be justified.

The assumption in January 1944 that the OCS was operating at a level sufficient to meet future requirements proved to be entirely fallacious. As a matter of fact, even before The Quartermaster General received the reply to his proposal the Corps was again faced with a critical shortage of officers. Sudden unexpected demands from overseas for more Quartermaster officers not only wiped out the surplus of officers, which had been a matter of concern in 1943, but made it necessary to expand sharply the capacity of the OCS in order to produce 3,000 more graduates than it had been geared to turn out in 1944 under the old schedule. Since fewer than 500 ROTC graduates were available toward the new goal, about 2,500 candidates would have to come from other sources. Thus the problem was no longer what to do about the men who had been crowded out of the OCS by ROTC personnel, but rather where to get the additional candidates needed to meet the increased requirements.

The difficulty in filling the suddenly increased OCS quotas in 1944 was due primarily to the fact that the number of men still in the zone of interior who were qualified to enroll was comparatively small. Most of the general-service personnel who could be made available for overseas duty had already been sent abroad. It became necessary to bring some of them back and enroll them in the OCS in order to fulfill the requirements. Before the end of 1944 the supply of qualified candidates had become so small that the quota had to be reduced, and for nearly three months beginning early in November no new classes were started because the QMC was unable to obtain a sufficient number of suitable candidates. During the first half of 1945 the situation became so acute that the QMC resorted to reviewing applications of men who had been rejected from the OCS’s of other branches of the service “on the theory that if rejected for technical reasons only, the applicants may be acceptable for the Quartermaster Corps.”

One of the serious results of the desperate search for officer candidates was that the
best sources of good noncommissioned officers for Quartermaster units were largely depleted in the attempt to fill the OCS quotas.

The acute shortage of OCS candidates led to the granting of authority to theater commanders late in 1944 to commission in the field enlisted men whose experience and leadership qualities entitled them to promotion. During 1945 approximately 800 Quartermaster enlisted men received their commissions in this manner without any formal training as officers. This was nearly as many as were graduated from the Quartermaster OCS during the same period.

Undoubtedly the operations of the OCS would have followed a different pattern had it been possible for the War Department to determine further in advance just what would be needed to win a global war. Quotas would not have been reduced so sharply as they were in 1943, and thus the officer shortage of 1944 and 1945 might have been avoided. In the light of developments as the war progressed and all of the theaters went into action, the so-called officer surplus of 1943 actually was not a surplus at all. It is true that there were more Quartermaster officers in 1943 than were called for in the Troop Basis, but, as it turned out, the Troop Basis underestimated requirements. Theater commanders complained almost constantly that they were not getting a sufficient number of Quartermaster officers or men, even when they were receiving the full quotas assigned to them. Moreover, they complained that some of the officers were not well qualified and that many had not had sufficient training.

The primary reason why many of the Quartermaster officers were inexperienced upon arrival in the theaters was that most of them were graduates of the OCS who, because the need for officers usually was urgent and immediate, frequently had to be sent overseas before they had had an opportunity for additional training. The OCS was not designed to turn out specialists. Its mission was "to equip candidates with the basic knowledge needed to begin their careers as second lieutenants." Thus the candidates merely acquired the background for specialization in the particular fields to which they were assigned after graduation. The general procedure was to send the graduates directly to the Quartermaster School or to depots for this specialized training. Often, however, the need for officers was so urgent that the OCS graduates had to get the additional training after they arrived overseas. During the rapid mobilization in 1942, when so many new units were being activated and pressure was great from all directions, there was not sufficient time to give completely adequate training to either officers or men before they were sent to the theaters. A somewhat similar situation developed on a smaller scale in 1944 when requirements for overseas replacements suddenly were found to be much greater than had been anticipated.

It could hardly be expected that all graduates of the OCS would become thoroughly qualified and competent Quartermaster officers, even after addi-

\[52\] (1) Ltr, Dir of Mil Tng Div, OQMG, to Comdt of QM School, 28 Nov 44, sub: OCS Class No. 49.
(2) See Table 15.

\[53\] For some examples of complaints see (1) Memo, CQM ETO to DQMG, 27 Jun 43, sub: Qualifications of QM Offs Assigned to ETO; (2) Ltr, CQM USASOS SWPA to TQMG, 1 Jul 43, no sub; (3) Ltr, CQM ETO to CG Advance Sec ComZ, 5 Jan 45, no sub; and (4) OCQM USASOS SWPA, Mil History, QM Sec, USASOS, 7 Dec 41–30 Jun 45 (7 vols.), V, 55–56, and VI, 53.

tional training and experience. Candidates varied widely as to their educational background, occupational experience, and mental capacity. Many who were obviously unqualified were screened out, but among those who received their commissions there was a great difference in ability and proficiency. Many of the men had been experts in their civilian occupations but had never had any military training, and while some of these could readily adapt themselves to Army life, others found it difficult to do so. A candidate such as a petroleum engineer or a certified public accountant could possess a high degree of skill and still lack leadership ability or other qualities necessary to make him a good officer. On the other hand, some of the candidates who had been non-commissioned officers with extensive Army training and good military bearing possessed no particular skills to make them useful as Quartermaster officers. Still others were just out of school and had neither civilian occupational experience nor previous military training.

As in the case of enlisted personnel, the skills possessed by the graduates did not occur in direct proportion to the needs of the QMC, which were complicated by the wide variety of functions the Corps had to perform. The problem was to try to fill all of these requirements at a given time with the particular types of officers then available. This resulted in officers being assigned to jobs for which they were not particularly qualified.

The Commissioning of Civilians

In the rapid expansion of the QMC following Pearl Harbor, a critical shortage of qualified officers developed in such fields as motor supply and maintenance, laundry, dry operations, refrigeration, salvage collection, shoe and textile repair, bakery, and sales commissary. The needs were immediate and technicians could not be trained quickly enough in sufficient numbers to meet the urgent requirements. It was necessary, therefore, to commission competent civilians who, if they were not qualified to serve with units, could at least relieve experienced officers for duty in the theaters.

Civilians up to sixty years of age could be commissioned in the Army of the United States, even though they had no previous military experience, provided they possessed the special technical, administrative, or scientific ability needed by the Army. All appointments were subject to approval by the War Department. The various arms and services were required to submit procurement objectives along with explanations of why the men were needed, and allotments were made on that basis. During most of 1942 regulations prohibited the commissioning from civilian life of men under thirty years of age without previous commissioned service, unless they possessed extraordinary professional or technical qualifications. The minimum age restriction was raised to thirty-five in November, and no men between thirty-five and forty-five without previous commissioned service could be appointed if they were in selective service Class I-A or II. The maximum age for men in these groups was lowered automatically in December from forty-five to thirty-eight when the Army stopped drafting men thirty-eight and over. Civilian appointees were assigned originally to overhead installations where they served under Regular Army officers. Regulations provided at first that they had to be in active service at least six months before they could be as-
signed to duty with field units. This provision was changed later to four months. Civilians with minor physical defects that would have disqualified them for permanent rank in the Regular Army could be commissioned in the AUS because their assignments generally were of a limited-service nature.\

Until late in 1942 the Military Personnel and Training Division, OQMG, had the responsibility for obtaining and processing applications of civilians and making recommendations for their appointment as officers in the QMC. Although the division was literally swamped by applications from civilians, it found that comparatively few of them possessed the necessary qualifications. For example, the biggest need was for men experienced in motor transport activities, such as specialists in motor repair, maintenance, inspection, and fleet operations, yet most of the men who applied from the automobile industry had been salesmen without any technical experience. Approximately 90,000 applications were received during the first six months of 1942, but only 1,832 applicants were recommended for appointment, and the number actually commissioned was 1,066, including 629 in the motor transport service. This number was far short of the QMC procurement objective, which had been set at 1,840 for the first half of 1942.\

The OQMG estimated about the middle of 1942 that it would require 1,860 officers from civilian life during the second half of the year. Actually, less than half of that number were commissioned. One of the reasons for this was that motor transport activities, for which most of the civilians were being appointed, had been transferred to the Ordnance Department. Another reason was that most of the requirements for Quartermaster officers were being met by the fall of 1942 as a result of the heavy output of the OCS, and there were fears that a surplus of officers would develop. Still another factor was the confusion over civilian appointments that grew out of the creation of the Army Specialist Corps (ASC). The ASC was established by Executive order on 26 February 1942. This new corps was created in the belief that it would be able to supply all branches of the Army and other War Department agencies with professional, scientific, and administrative personnel who could not readily qualify for commissions in the AUS, and thus relieve many additional officers for duty in the theaters. These civilian experts were to be recruited through the Civil Service Commission but would have neither civil-service status nor Army commissions. They were to wear uniforms similar to those of the Army but with distinctive insignia. They were to exercise administrative and supervisory functions only, but would have authority over any Army personnel assigned to duty under them.

The OQMG had high hopes that the ASC would provide the QMC with a large number of officers from civilian life during the second half of 1942.
number of specialists who would help to relieve the shortage of officers, but some uncertainty existed as to just how they would fit into the organization.

It is evident that the Army Specialist Corps is being organized to be able to place in uniform a great many prominent civilians who are unable, at the present time, to get by the surgeons and also to provide a corps of specialists who do not come under the Civil Service Regulations nor the present per diem method of securing experience in certain fields of endeavor. No doubt a great many civilian experts who are at the present time hired as civilians could be transferred to this organization, in which they would have administrative and supervisory control over military personnel, which fact is not always the case at present. In other words, instead of their positions being advisory in nature, their positions under the Army Specialist Corps would be, more or less, in a chain of command.59

The program got under way in May 1942 when The Adjutant General authorized the QMC to recommend the appointment of 1,493 civilians as officers in the ASC.60 In keeping with the new War Department policy, the director of the Military Personnel and Training Division, OQMG, announced that all future appointments of civilians would be made, “in practically all cases,” in the ASC rather than in the AUS.61 Despite this, considerable reluctance to make ASC appointment developed on the part of procurement officers in the QMC and throughout the Army. The fact that the ASC officers would be neither flesh nor fowl raised serious questions as to the degree of authority they could assert over Army personnel. Then, too, the QMC was allotted a specific number of officers in each grade, and any appointments made in the ASC automatically reduced the number of existing vacancies and restricted the opportunities for promoting AUS officers. Moreover, the procedure for procuring officers for the ASC was none too clear, and misunderstandings arose with the Civil Service Commission through which ASC officers had to be obtained. The upshot was that procurement machinery slowed down, and QMC procurement officers, in their eagerness to relieve the shortage of officers, continued to make the bulk of their appointments in the AUS. This tendency was so prevalent among the arms and services that the War Department in September attempted to clarify the mission of the ASC and to curb the practice.

It is apparent that many officers have been appointed in the Army of the United States who should have been appointed in the Army Specialist Corps. It is believed that this is due to a lack of understanding of the mission of the Army Specialist Corps and the procedure necessary to secure an appointment in the Corps [ASC]. Steps are now being taken to eliminate the unnecessary and objectionable processes in order that the appointments may be expedited.62

A few weeks later, however, the War Department abandoned its unsuccessful experiment with the ASC. It announced on 4 November 1942 that the ASC was being abolished, that effective immediately no more appointments were to be made in it, and that officers who had been appointed would be permitted to apply for commissions in the AUS. Those who failed to submit their applications on or before

60 Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 14 May 42, sub: Procurement Objective, ASC, AG 231.2 (5-4-42) RE-SPGA.
62 AGO Memo W900-5-42, 28 Sep 42, sub: Appointments in the ASC.
1 December 1942 would be discharged on 31 December. In the QMC only ninety-eight civilians had been appointed to commissioned grades in the ASC during the eight months that the agency had been in existence. Of these, eighty qualified for and were given commissions in the AUS.63

At the same time that it abolished the ASC, the War Department put a stop to inter-service competition among the AGF, the AAF, and the SOS by centralizing procurement in one agency. This agency—the Officer Procurement Service—was given the sole responsibility for procuring all candidates for commissions in the AUS except aviation cadets and graduates of the OCS and the ROTC. Under the old competitive system the AAF had held a decided advantage over the technical services and the AGF because it was able to offer commissions in higher grades to civilian specialists. By centralizing procurement and adopting standard procedures the War Department eliminated this practice and also improved the general quality of the appointees.64

The War Department had made an attempt late in 1941 to centralize procurement when it authorized the establishment of the Personnel Placement Agency, with branches in the corps areas, to receive, acknowledge, register, and classify information pertaining to individuals possessing skills, who might be utilized by the Army either as officers or as civilian employees. The QMC and the other arms and services, however, had already set up their own procurement organizations and made little use of the Personnel Placement Agency, primarily because the War Department had made no adequate provision for coding skills and professions and the AGO lacked specific knowledge of officer requirements.65

One of the outstanding weaknesses of the competitive procurement system in effect throughout most of 1943 was that there was no provision for an exchange of applications among the various branches of the Army. For example, a civilian specialist who could be utilized immediately by the QMC might apply for a commission in one of the other services that had no need at the time for his particular type of skill. Thus his application would be placed in the inactive file without any knowledge on the part of the QMC that he was available. The lack of centralized control resulted in confusion on the part of both the applicants and the procurement officers, inefficiency, and waste of time, effort, and manpower.

Although the original War Department effort at centralization had failed, the SOS sought to overcome the weaknesses of the competitive system within its own organization by centralizing procurement for the technical services. In May 1942 it established the Procurement Branch in the Military Personnel Division, SOS. This branch was made responsible for supervising and co-ordinating all activities relating to the commissioning of officers in the AUS, except from the OCS, and for co-ordinating procurement of personnel for appointment in the ASC. Although the Procurement Branch was transferred to

63 (1) AGO Memo W900–6–42, 4 Nov 42, sub: Appointments in the ASC. (2) Capt H. W. Druehl to Col Whitehead, OQMG, 13 Jan 43, sub: Annual Rpt. The 98 officers commissioned in the ASC included 1 colonel, 18 majors, 37 captains, 32 first lieutenants, and 10 second lieutenants.

64 (1) WD Cir 367, 7 Nov 42, sub: Off Procurement Sv. (2) Statement, Lt Col H. L. Swift, Chief of Procurement Br, Mil Pers Div, SOS, at conf, 11 Jun 42, sub: Plans for Commissioning of Specialists and Offs in the AUS.

65 Hist Rpt, Off Procurement Sv, ASF, 30 Apr 45, Off Procurement During World War II, pp. 2–3.
the AGO shortly thereafter, it continued to function as the operating agency for the SOS in all matters pertaining to procurement of officers from civilian life, and field offices were set up to assist in recruiting the types of specialists needed. Chiefs of the technical services were called upon to submit specifications covering officer requirements, and the branch consolidated these into job specifications to expedite procurement.

The final step toward centralization within the SOS was taken on 1 September 1942 when the commanding general of the SOS ordered that all officer procurement agencies operating within a service command, including those of the ASC, be combined under the commanding general of the service command. The new system, however, did not become effective immediately. The QMC and the other technical services were permitted to continue processing the applications they had on file, and the old system was integrated gradually with the new procedure. Thus the SOS centralization program was scarcely in full operation when the War Department in November created the Officer Procurement Service and made it solely responsible for the commissioning of civilians in all branches of the Army.66

Unfortunately, the Navy had a more liberal policy than did the Army in the matter of commissioning civilians, with the result that the OQMG lost many of its civilian technicians to the Navy during the early part of the war. The Quartermaster General became quite annoyed when he had to stand helplessly by while the Navy repeatedly commissioned men from his own office whose applications had been rejected by the War Department when he had attempted to appoint them to the Corps.67

During the past year [1943] the Navy has commissioned many of our technical personnel and have thus deprived the War Department of their needed services. These men of draft age are anxious to be in uniform and resent the uncertainty of renewed deferments. It has been impossible to commission them in the Army, yet the Navy has acknowledged their valuable training by giving them commissions.68

Following the establishment of the Officer Procurement Service the War Department revised its policies and tightened restrictions on appointments from civilian life. There were two reasons for this. One was that nearly all officer requirements, except in special categories, were being met through the increased output of the OCS’s. The other was that the War Department had been embarrassed by the fact that some of the civilian appointees were found to be wholly unqualified for their jobs. The new policy stipulated that future requirements would be met to the maximum extent possible by better utilization of officers already in the service, by the training of these officers for advancement to positions of greater responsibility, and by the assignment of OCS graduates. Appointments from civilian life were to be limited to the necessary procurement of officers with technical or special skills not found in the Army, OCS, or service schools.69

The number of civilians commissioned in the QMC declined sharply after this new policy became effective. Late in November 1942 the OQMG had estimated that it would require 1,378 officers from civilian life in 1943. Three months later, however, the procurement objective was lowered to 250. Actually, only about 170 civilians were commissioned during the year. A large portion of these were men with extensive industrial experience in the procurement, storage, and distribution of petroleum products. Quartermaster Corps procurement of civilians all but stopped after 1943, only forty-one being appointed in 1944, and less than a dozen in 1945. One of the reasons for the decrease in civilian appointments was that the QMC was able to find many of the specialists it needed within its own ranks or elsewhere in the Army. Beginning in 1943 and thereafter more commissions were granted by the Corps to enlisted men, warrant officers, and aviation cadets than to civilians.

Classification and Assignment

At the beginning of the war Army officers were classified into three broad categories—command, staff, and specialist. This system was not refined enough for the highly specialized positions that had to be filled, in that it merely designated the type of work for which an officer might be suited rather than the specific job for which he was best fitted. This weakness came to light early in the mobilization period when so many civilians were being converted into officers and it became imperative to take full advantage of their civilian experience and to utilize them where they could perform the greatest service with the least additional training.

The War Department adopted a more practical system for classifying commissioned personnel and warrant officers in May 1942 in an effort "to obtain the maximum use of their skills, abilities, and experience." Under this plan, the civilian occupations of the officers were converted into the nearest equivalent military jobs or specialties by means of a numerical code and titles similar to those used in classifying enlisted personnel. It was eight months after the new system was announced, however, before the job classification was published. In the meantime, officers remained unclassified as to their military specialties, although sometimes the most appropriate MOS and title of enlisted men were used. All officers below the grade of general officer were subject to classification, and commanders who had jurisdiction over assignments were responsible for classifying the officers under them. Graduates of the OCS, the ROTC, and the U.S. Military Academy were classified before being commissioned.

The officer's education, military experience, hobbies, as well as other related data were taken into consideration along with his civilian occupation in making the classification. This information was obtained in an interview, usually conducted by a commissioned personnel technician, and was recorded on the officer's qualification card. The card accompanied the officer on each change of station and was revised as he acquired additional training and experience.

On the basis of their classification, officers were assigned to jobs corresponding as
closely as possible to their civilian occupations. In order to fill requirements in scarce categories, however, it was frequently necessary to assign them to types of work in which they had had comparatively less experience. For this reason, they were classified as to both their main and their secondary occupations.

Inasmuch as the classification system was not infallible, officers were sometimes assigned to jobs for which they were not qualified and had to be reclassified. Moreover, quite a few officers who proved entirely proficient in their original assignments were later reported as unsatisfactory after being promoted and transferred to new assignments. The OQMG called attention to this situation in the spring of 1943, when it suggested that officers at the Camp Lee QMRTC be rotated in order to give them the widest experience possible while in training, and warned against promotions being “so rapid as to result in placing officers in positions of major responsibility before they are equipped by training and experience to successfully carry these responsibilities.” The OQMG also pointed out:

Frequent instances have come to the attention of this office in which an exceptionally promising officer suddenly is reported as unsatisfactory. His record shows a series of excellent or superior efficiency reports and promotions at close intervals. Then, closely following a promotion and transfer to a new assignment, an unsatisfactory report is received and even on occasion a recommendation for reclassification. Most frequently these adverse reports appear in cases where promotion to field grade has been rapid. In the typical instance, it also usually appears that the officer’s duties have been largely confined to one type assignment during his service in the junior grades. The conclusion is that an intelligent, basically well-equipped officer has been kept on one assignment in which he has become exceptionally proficient, and that his training in other types of duties has been neglected to the extent that he reaches field grade lacking in knowledge of the broader aspects of the Quartermaster Corps so essential to efficient performance of duty in the higher grades. Obviously, this practice is not only an injustice to the officer concerned but also reveals a failure to make the best use of the personnel available.\textsuperscript{73}

Officers were classified not only by their specialties, but also according to age, as troop age or over-age in grade, and according to physical capacity, as limited service or general service. Army Regulations restricted the appointment of limited-service officers to fields in which there were scarcities of professionally qualified men, and at first they could be assigned only to overhead positions in the War Department or in the corps areas. Beginning early in 1944, however, they were permitted to go overseas if their defects were “static in nature and not subject to the development of complications.”\textsuperscript{74}

The Quartermaster General had the responsibility for assigning and reassigning the officers under his control and for filling requisitions submitted by all commands to the AGO. His office checked each requisition for accuracy, made the decision as to whether all or part of it could be filled, specified the number and grades of officers to be furnished, and then redelegated authority to the commanding generals of the QMRTC’s to select the required number of qualified officers in the available grades and to issue the orders for their transfer.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{73} Ltr, Col Whitehead, OQMG, to CG Camp Lee QMRTC, 21 May 43, sub: Promotion of Offs.
\textsuperscript{74} (1) Ltr, TAG to TQMG et al., 7 Jan 42, sub: Waiving of Physical Defects for Limited Sv Offs in the Sup Arms and Svs, AG 210.31 (12-19-41) RP-A. (2) WD Cir 102, 11 Mar 44, sub: Physical Standards for Oversea Assignment of Offs.
\textsuperscript{75} Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to CG Camp Lee QMRTC, 30 Mar 42, sub: Assignment of Offs, 210.31.
Operation of the Officer Pool

Unassigned officers were placed in the Quartermaster replacement pool. An officer replacement pool had been established in each of the arms and services in December 1941 shortly after Pearl Harbor, and the system was widely used throughout the war. Officers were assigned to the pool either when no assignment was available for them or when they were not available for assignment for any reason, such as being in a hospital or awaiting discharge. Newly commissioned officers were sent to the pool unless it was necessary to assign them immediately to duty in a unit or at an installation. The purpose of the pool was to give suitable preparatory training to each officer before his permanent assignment and to serve as the primary source of officers for the activation of new units and for overseas assignments. Regulations specified that all officers in the pool were to be kept in readiness for permanent duty and that they could not be employed on operating jobs while awaiting assignment. The pool was also utilized in rotating officers qualified for troop duty who were serving in zone of interior installations and had never had any field training. Before being shipped overseas, such officers were transferred to the pool and given appropriate training for duty with a truck company, a bakery outfit, or some other field unit.\(^{76}\)

Quartermaster pools were operated at the QMRTC's, the Quartermaster School, and at the various depots and other Quartermaster installations where specialized training was conducted. Early in the war the pool was comprised primarily of Reserve officers ordered to active duty, graduates of the OCS, personnel commissioned directly from civilian life, and officers selected to attend various school services for advanced training. The composition changed considerably late in the war when many officers returned from overseas under the War Department rotation plan were sent to the pool for redeployment training and reassignment.

The size of the Quartermaster pool varied widely in accordance with the fluctuating relationship between the supply of officers and the requirements for them. During the acute officer shortage of 1942 the number in the pool usually averaged between 200 and 300. Late in 1942, however, it suddenly increased to approximately 1,000 when the supply of officers became more plentiful. During the officer surplus of 1943 the average number in the pool was about 1,500, although at one time there were more than 3,700. The size of the pool declined sharply to about 500 during the officer shortage in 1944.\(^{77}\)

Officers of all ranks up through that of colonel were assigned to the pool, but the great majority were second lieutenants, most of whom were sent there directly from the OCS. The length of stay in the pool varied greatly. Sometimes an officer could complete a particular type of training in about a month and then, before leaving the pool, could spend another week or so observing operations of a unit or installation of the kind to which he was assigned. In many instances, however, the need for officers was so urgent that they were assigned to duty before they could complete any training. On the other hand,

\(^{76}\) Ltr, TAG to TQMG et al., 19 Dec 41, sub: Off Filler and Loss Repls for Ground Arms and Svs, AG 321.2 (12-15-41) OP-A-M.

officers occasionally remained in the pool as long as six months. The average length of time spent there, however, was less than two months.\textsuperscript{78}

Graduates of the OCS generally were processed through the pool except when the shortage of officers made it necessary to assign them directly to units or installations, as was the case during much of 1942. They were assigned to training in the pool in accordance with quotas established by the OQMG, which designated the number to be given advanced training in each technical field, such as motor transport, bakers and cooks, administration, depot, laundry, salvage, refrigeration, and sterilization and bath. However, before the graduate was assigned to a specific type of training, the usual procedure was to interview him personally and permit him to express a preference, which was given as much consideration as possible in the light of his particular qualifications and the existing requirements. The personal contact established through this interview tended to give the new officer the feeling of being treated as an individual and sent him into his training with more enthusiasm than if he were simply handed an order specifying the type of training he would receive. The pool's practical training course afforded an opportunity to determine the best qualifications of each officer and thus provided a sound basis for his ultimate assignment. Consequently there was less opportunity for improper assignment than in the case of the OCS graduates, who were assigned directly to field or tactical units on the basis of their academic records alone.\textsuperscript{79}

Throughout the greater part of the war the commanding general of the Camp Lee QMRTC, who supervised the pool, was permitted to transfer officers freely back and forth between the pool and the center cadre and to fill requisitions and other requirements for officers either from the pool or from the cadre as he saw fit. He was in a position to ascertain quickly the qualifications and status of all officers available for assignment and could fill urgent requests for those with special skills by telephone. He sent copies of all transfer orders to The Quartermaster General and submitted weekly strength reports showing the status of all officers available in the pool.

This system of decentralized operation was abandoned temporarily in February 1943. The pool had grown so large that the Personnel Division, OQMG, decided that it should exercise a greater degree of control. Consequently a directive was issued prohibiting transfers to and from the pool except when approved by the division. The procedure of making all assignments from the OQMG level ran into difficulty primarily because the Personnel Division possessed no up-to-the-minute information on the status of officers in the pool. Frequently the officers who were assigned proved to be unavailable because they were in the hospital, on emergency leave, or on temporary duty elsewhere. This created much confusion, involved a considerable amount of long-distance telephoning, and required extensive substitutions. The commanding general of the Camp Lee QMRTC found the procedure highly unsatisfactory and protested "that you can't control the movements of individual officers by long distance telephone." The outcome was that the original system

\textsuperscript{78} Rpt, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Repl Pool Sec., p. 57.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., pp. 49, 52.
of operation was reinstated in the summer of 1943.\textsuperscript{80}

During the early part of the war there was a marked tendency on the part of commanders in the QMC to transfer to the pool any officers they wanted to get rid of for one reason or another, and to use the pool assignment as a punishment or as a threat of punishment. This created a rather general impression that the pool was merely a dumping ground and that an assignment there constituted a black mark on an officer’s record. Actually, of course, many excellent and superior officers were sent to the pool for additional training or in preparation for an anticipated assignment. The abuse of pool assignments by commanders was finally stopped when The Quartermaster General directed that only his headquarters would issue orders assigning officers to the pool.\textsuperscript{81}

Another shortcoming of the pool was the generally low morale among the officers assigned to it. This resulted primarily from the fact that, having no assignment, officers were inclined to feel that they were wasting their time, were contributing nothing toward winning the war, and were losing out on an opportunity for promotion. Experienced officers of higher rank often looked upon assignment to the pool as a form of degradation.

Officers assigned to the pool varied greatly as to their capabilities. Those of top quality were usually the first to get assignments and normally stayed in the pool a comparatively short time, while those of poorer quality tended to remain there. The ASF notified the OQMG early in January 1944 that The Inspector General had found the condition of the Quartermaster pool unsatisfactory. The major criticisms were that the pool was becoming filled with “the least qualified if not actually unsatisfactory officers” and that pool officers were being used on operating jobs in lieu of being assigned within existing ceilings. The ASF directed that prompt measures be taken to separate from active duty any unsatisfactory or surplus officers in the pool.\textsuperscript{82}

The OQMG, in reply, admitted that the condition of the pool “for a period of a few months during 1943” had not been “entirely satisfactory.” The difficulty, it stated, had been caused by the excessive size of the pool, which had created a housing shortage that could be resolved only by placing the pool officers in the installations where housing was obtainable, without consideration as to the appropriate number at any particular installation. The Inspector General’s investigation, the OQMG pointed out, had been made when the pool was near its peak during that period. Since then, it declared, the size of the pool had been reduced from nearly 3,800 to 1,245, the situation had “vastly changed,” and if another investigation were made it would reveal an “entirely satisfactory” condition. The OQMG stated further that the greatest care was being exercised “to prevent the accumulation of unsatisfactory, or barely satisfactory officers.”\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{80} (1) Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to CG QMRTC, 17 Feb 43, sub: Transfer of Offs from Pool to Cadre. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen Guy I. Rowe, CG Camp Lee QMRTC, to Gen Barnes, Deputy TQMG, 3 Jun 43, sub: Difficulty in Pers Control of Pool Offs. (3) Ltr, TQMG to CG Camp Lee, 10 Sep 43, sub: Commissioned Off Reqmts in the Camp Lee QMRTC, 210.21.

\textsuperscript{81} Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Repl Pool Sec., p. 8.

\textsuperscript{82} Ltr, Maj Gen Joseph N. Dalton, Dir of Pers, ASF, to TQMG, 8 Jan 44, sub: Off Repl Pools.

\textsuperscript{83} Ltr, Gen Munnikhuysen, OQMG, to CG ASF, 24 Jan 44, sub: Off Repl Pools.
The order to rid the pool of unsatisfactory and surplus officers was one of the reasons for a sharp increase in the number of officers discharged from the QMC. Another was an ASF directive issued in the fall of 1944 that only officers who could qualify for overseas service were to be kept in the pool, unless they were being trained for specific installations such as depots, or inspection agencies. More than 500 Quartermaster officers were separated from the service for physical disabilities alone in 1944. All told, 1,200 officers were discharged by the QMC in 1944, in contrast to only 500 in 1943. In 1945 about 1,300 more were discharged in addition to the 2,800 who were demobilized. (See Table 16.)

**Officers for Negro Troops**

While the total peak officer strength of the QMC was nearly 31,000, the number of Negro officers was only 700. Thus while Negroes comprised nearly half of the enlisted men in the Corps, Negro officers...
were outnumbered nearly 45 to 1. As late as 31 December 1944, when the Negro officer and enlisted strength of the Corps was at its peak, only 1 Negro out of 324 in the QMC was an officer, as compared with 1 in 47 in the Infantry, 1 in 49 in the Field Artillery, and 1 in 79 in the Air Corps. The proportions were higher also in the other technical services except the Corps of Engineers and the Transportation Corps, where the ratio was 1 in 341 and 1 in 503, respectively.\(^85\)

The primary reason why such a small percentage of Negroes in the QMC became officers was that comparatively few enlisted Negroes were in the AGCT Grades I and II. Inasmuch as the AAF had top priority on Negroes as well as whites in the higher brackets of intelligence, many of those who were eligible to become officers were drained off at the reception centers and never became available to the QMC. Moreover, the AGF had first call on all men with previous military training as well as those who displayed qualities of leadership. These priorities severely restricted the supply of good Negro officer material in the QMC. Another factor was that there were no Negro officers in the Corps during the emergency period, and after Pearl Harbor the program for enrolling enlisted Negroes in the OCS was slow in getting under way. Only four Negroes were graduated from the Quartermaster OCS during the first six months of 1942. The situation changed radically in the second half of the year when approximately 300 were enrolled and most of them received commissions.\(^86\)

When the OCS program was cut back sharply late in 1942 and early in 1943 because the over-all requirements for officers in the QMC were being met, quotas for Negroes were reduced along with those for whites. Even then considerable difficulty was experienced in finding enough suitable Negro officer candidates.\(^87\)

Virtually all of the Negro officers in the QMC were either graduates of the Quartermaster OCS, or had come to the Corps through transfer from other branches of the Army. Comparatively few of them advanced beyond the rank of captain. One of the reasons for this was that they were assigned to small units where the opportunity for promotion was quite limited. Another was that they normally were assigned directly from the OCS to units and their training and experience usually was in only one type of duty with the field forces. Thus they did not get the varied depot training that was necessary to produce well-rounded Quartermaster officers and essential for promotion to the higher grades. Moreover, the Troop Basis placed restrictions on the positions that were available to Negro officers.

Except for the small number he was permitted to assign to the permanent training regiments at the Camp Lee QMRTC, The Quartermaster General had no direct control over the assignment of Negro officers. They could be assigned only to such units and agencies and in such grades as authorized by the War Department. The OQMG notified the AGO when new officers became available for assignment and sometimes made recommendations as to their use, but the decision as to their utilization rested with the General Staff. The War Department delegated authority to The Quartermaster General early in 1944 to...
assign Negro officers to any units or installations under his control that were comprised of Negro enlisted personnel. In effect, however, this gave him control over the assignment of only ten officers, all of whom were attached to the training units at the Camp Lee QMRTC.\textsuperscript{88}

The need for Negro officers in Negro units exceeded the number available for the positions allocated in the Troop Basis by such a wide margin that few were ever assigned to jobs other than those in units and the training centers.\textsuperscript{89} During the early part of the war Negro officers in the QMC were assigned only to truck units and service companies. Later the War Department, on the recommendation of the OQMG, altered its policy to permit assignment to some other types of units, including car and railhead companies and gas supply battalions, but most of the Quartermaster Negro officers continued to be concentrated in truck and service outfits.

Throughout the emergency period and during the early months of the war before the OCS began turning out Negro officers, the Negro units in the QMC had only white officers. Although the policy was to replace white officers as rapidly as qualified Negro officers became available, the Negro officers were restricted at first to junior grades and white officers were retained as commanders of all Negro units. Subsequently some of the units were staffed entirely by Negro officers, but most of them even at the end of the war were under the supervision of white officers. By the end of November 1943 only 76 of the 468 Negro Quartermaster units in the United States, exclusive of those in the AAF and in staging areas, had Negro officers, and many of these had only one. A year later the percentage of Negro units in the zone of interior that were partially or entirely staffed by Negro officers had increased to 25 percent and by July 1945 to nearly 40 percent.\textsuperscript{90}

By the fall of 1942 the Quartermaster OCS was commissioning Negroes faster than they were being assigned by the War Department. This situation arose because no provision had been made in the existing Troop Basis for absorbing all of them without replacing white officers in well-established units and disrupting the training program. Consequently The Quartermaster General requested and obtained permission to assign a 25 percent overstrength in lieutenants to units in which Negro officers were then assigned. Under this policy he was allowed to assign an additional lieutenant to a company even though the unit previously had been authorized only two Negro officers. By October 1942 the QMC had sixty-nine truck companies with four Negro lieutenants and one white captain each, and forty service companies with three Negro lieutenants and one white captain each.\textsuperscript{91}

The overstrength of officers in units had a number of advantages. One was that Negro officers could be sent to units in-


\textsuperscript{89} Memo, TQMG to CSigO, 25 Aug 43, sub: Alleged Lack of Colored Offs in QM and SigC Depots.

\textsuperscript{90} S-93 Rpts, Strength Accounting Br, AGO, 30 Nov 43, 1 Nov 44, and 1 Jul 45, sub: Colored Pers in the Continental U.S., Exclusive of the AAF and Staging Areas.

\textsuperscript{91} (1) DF, ACoS G–3 for G–1, 28 Aug 42, sub: Assignment of Negro Offs. (2) DF, ACoS G–1 for TAG, 29 Aug 42, same sub. (3) Memo, Col Whitehead, OQMG, for ACoS G–1, 15 Oct 42, same sub. All in 210.31.
stead of to the officer pool and thus gain valuable on-the-job training and experience that would enable them eventually to relieve white officers and possibly take over the command. Another advantage was that the officer overstrength tended to overcome the ineffectiveness of Negro units, which usually were comprised predominantly of Grades IV and V enlisted men and often had weak noncommissioned officers. Moreover, the overstrength frequently prevented units from falling below authorized strength through officer attrition, which was particularly heavy among Negro units.

Although adequate provisions were made in the Troop Basis in 1943 and thereafter for the increasing number of Negro officers, the policy of assigning overstrength in officers not only was continued but was broadened to permit the assignment of additional lieutenants to units without any Negro officers, to units not yet activated, and to overhead positions. During 1943 the officers assigned to units as overstrength sometimes accompanied their units overseas, but more often were removed before the units left the country and sent to other units. This removal became mandatory in January 1944 when the assignment of an overstrength in officers to overseas units was forbidden.\[92\]

Under the general revision of policy at that time the War Department lifted some of the former restrictions on the assignment of Negro officers and made the system more flexible. Commanders were authorized to waive age-in-grade restrictions to permit the assignment of qualified overage Negro officers to troop units, and new units were given high priority in the assignment of officers in order to get the best ones available and thus lessen the need for replacement of white officers at a later date. Moreover, the War Department ordered that vacancies in units "be created for Negro officers, as they become capable of duties and responsibilities of higher grades, by the transfer of white officers to other units and installations."\[93\]

Inasmuch as Negro units usually had a preponderance of low-grade personnel, officers with strong qualities of leadership were needed to train them and maintain discipline. Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, declared in August 1942 that an investigation into incidents involving alleged undisciplined conduct on the part of Negro units had revealed that they were invariably the outgrowth of the tendency to assign officers of mediocre caliber to such units. He pointed out that Negro troops expected strong, capable leadership and were "quick to sense its absence." Accordingly he ordered corrective measures taken to insure the assignment to Negro units of "officers of especially high qualities, particularly judgment and common sense, tact, initiative and leadership."\[94\]

Difficulty was encountered in carrying out this order because officers with the desired qualities were not always available. As late as February 1944 the Commanding General, ASF, announced that violations of this order were coming to his attention and directed each commander to make a survey to determine whether the officers in Negro units under his command were fully qualified. Those who were found to be unqualified were to be replaced by qualified officers "with the least practica-

\[92\] Ltr, TAG to CG ASF et al., 7 Jan 44, sub: Policy on Promotion and Assignment of Negro Off Pers. AG 210.31 (3 Jan 44) OS-A-M.

\[93\] Ibid.

\[94\] Ltr, DCofS to CG SOS, 10 Aug 42, sub: Professional Qualities of Offs Assigned to Negro Units.
ble delay.” This directive was followed a month later by an order that no white officer with an efficiency rating lower than excellent could be assigned to a Negro unit. Such a rating did not necessarily mean that an officer possessed the proper leadership qualities. Consequently Headquarters, ASF, finally issued instructions on 1 November 1944 that the demonstrated leadership ability of an officer rather than his efficiency rating would be the requisite for assignment to Negro units undergoing training in the technical services. Other factors to be taken into consideration in making these appointments were “mature judgment and common sense, even disposition and patience, demonstrated ability under pressure and ability to handle emergency situations, and ability to organize and foster athletic and recreational programs.”

This new policy of selecting officers for Negro units on the basis of their demonstrated leadership ability was extended by the ASF to Negro noncommissioned officers insofar as it was possible to do so. The objective was to improve the effectiveness of Negro units by strengthening the quality of their noncommissioned officers. Earlier in 1944 a troop leadership training course had been established at the Camp Lee QMRTC for the purpose of training potential noncommissioned officers, both Negro and white, selected from among the outstanding trainees who had completed their basic training. The shortage of noncommissioned officers was particularly acute among the Negroes because the quotas for Negro officer candidates virtually exhausted the exceedingly limited supply of Negro enlisted men in the high AGCT grades.

The total enrollment of Negro candidates in the Quartermaster OCS between Pearl Harbor and V-J Day was approximately 850. About 650 of these were graduated. Thus the proportion of Negro candidates who failed to receive their commissions was less than 24 percent as compared with failures of more than 18 percent of the combined total enrollment of the OCS during the war. Much if not all of this difference can be accounted for by the fact that most of the Negro candidates were graduated after the standards of the school had been raised and the proportion of those who failed was much greater than it had been during the early months of the OCS when virtually all of the officer candidates were white.

The Negro officer strength in the QMC increased more rapidly during the last year of the war than in any other twelve-month period, despite the fact that the total number of Negro personnel was then declining and many officers were being separated from the service. As late as 31 August 1943 there were only 625 Negro Quartermaster officers. By 30 June 1945, after the war had ended in Europe, the number was still only 749. Yet by 31 August 1945 the number had jumped to 900, of whom nearly 700 were overseas. Thus most of the increase took place in the theaters during the redeployment period when there were extensive transfers of both officers.

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95 Ltr, Hq ASF to Chiefs of Tech Svs, 1 Feb 44, on sub cited n. 94.
96 (1) Ltr, Hq ASF to TQMG et al., 1 Nov 44, sub: Assignment of White Offs to Colored Units Undergoing Tng. (2) Ltr, Hq ASF to TQMG et al., 1 Apr 44, sub: Qualifications of Offs Assigned to Negro Units.
98 Computed by author from data obtained from Mil Tng Div, OQMG, and Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. II, pp. 21–22.
The Procurement of Quartermaster Officers

Officers and enlisted men among the various arms and services.99

Summary

The QMC was at a serious disadvantage in the procurement of officers at the beginning of mobilization for World War II because of the early restrictions that the War Department had placed upon its sources of commissioned personnel. In contrast to the arms and most of the other services, the Corps was not permitted to conduct Quartermaster ROTC classes to develop officer material, nor to participate directly in the distribution of the graduates of the U.S. Military Academy. Thus the additional officers required by the QMC to meet its expanding needs at first could be obtained only by calling Reserve officers to extended active duty, by requesting the transfer of officers from other branches of the Army, or by commissioning civilians. The difficulty was that many of the Reserve officers were either unqualified or not immediately available for duty; that officers acquired from other branches were generally unfamiliar with Quartermaster operations, and moreover the commanders of those branches frequently protested the transfers on the ground that they needed the officers themselves; and that officers commissioned directly from civilian life usually were completely lacking in military training and experience.

The restrictions on procurement of commissioned personnel in the Corps resulted, undoubtedly, from the general tendency in the early stages of mobilization to base requirements on World War I experience and from the slow awakening to the fact that the QMC would play a more important role in a modern war conducted on a global scale than it ever had in the past. It became apparent fairly early that the increased complexity of warfare had made it necessary for the Corps to have many more officers with a much wider variety of technical skills than had been previously anticipated, but it was 1943 before it was fully realized that the Quartermaster officer would have to be a combat leader as well as a technical specialist.

The extended duration of the emergency was a vital period of adjustment for the Corps during which The Quartermaster General by determined efforts gradually won approval of his program for widening the scope of officer procurement. The most important development, of course, was the establishment late in 1941 of the Officer Candidate School, which eventually furnished the great bulk of the nearly 30,000 additional officers procured by the Corps during the war.

The need for competent Quartermaster officers was particularly urgent because an unusually large percentage of the enlisted men in the QMC were rated in the lower grades on the Army General Classification Test. Upon the ability of its officers to train and lead these men effectively in the performance of their duties rested the success of the Corps in carrying out its mission.

99 Monthly Rpts, AGO to WDGS, Strength of the Army, 31 Aug 43, 30 Jun 45, and 31 Aug 45.
CHAPTER VII

The Training of Enlisted Replacements

The scope of operations in World War II and the accompanying revolutionary developments in aerial warfare as well as the motorization and mechanization of modern armies greatly broadened the range and complicated the problems of Quartermaster training. For the first time in history the United States Army was called upon to participate in large-scale operations in every conceivable climate, from the frigid Arctic to the sweltering desert and steaming jungle. Quartermaster personnel had to be trained to operate under all of these diversified conditions and to supply the men with appropriate clothing, food, and personal equipment, as well as to provide them with many other services.

The worldwide nature of the conflict multiplied the problems of supply and distribution. In World War I, for example, the United States had only 2,000,000 men overseas and they could all be supported by one supply line approximately 3,000 miles long. At the end of that line materials were unloaded at friendly ports equipped with adequate handling, storage, and transportation facilities. In sharp contrast, the Army in World War II had more than 5,000,000 men scattered all over the world, including many little-known islands, and this required the planning and filling of numerous supply lines, some of them up to 12,000 miles long. Moreover, many of the ports had to be captured from the enemy, and the only facilities for handling, storing, and transporting supplies were those which the Quartermaster and other technical service units could provide after a forced landing by combat troops.

In previous wars Quartermaster personnel had had to battle only the business and service problems involved in keeping supplies moving to the front. In this new kind of warfare, they could no longer operate in relative safety behind the front lines. They were subject to attack from coastal guns, airplanes, paratroops, and fast-moving mechanized columns. It was imperative that they be trained to withstand the shock of battle and be prepared to fight back in emergencies, for if they failed to keep their supply lines open the men who depended upon them for food, clothing, and equipment would be in grave danger.

Motorization of the Army brought marked changes in the nature of Quartermaster training, particularly during the emergency and early part of the war when the Quartermaster Corps was responsible for the transportation of the Army. During that period approximately half of all personnel assigned to the QMRTC's were
trained as truck drivers, mechanics, and for other jobs in the automotive field. Motorization also created the need for new types of Quartermaster units, such as gasoline supply companies, drum repair units, and petroleum laboratories. Moreover, the widespread use of mobile units and mechanized equipment greatly increased the need for maintenance, repair, and salvage personnel.

The magnitude of the training task is exemplified by the fact that most of the 500,000 men needed by the Corps to carry on its numerous functions had been civilians before the war and had had no previous military experience. A large proportion of them had followed entirely different types of work in civilian life, or had had no occupation at all. They had to be trained quickly and efficiently to do the specific jobs assigned to them. The training was not only difficult and highly diversified but, for the most part, it was also prosaic and utilitarian.

While the general policies for training in the various arms and services were formulated at higher echelons, the responsibility for implementing these policies within the QMC and preparing the detailed Quartermaster training doctrine rested with the Office of The Quartermaster General. During the course of the war the Quartermaster administrative agencies had staff supervision and responsibility for organizing and operating two replacement training centers, three unit training centers, six war dog training centers, courses in twenty-two civilian trade and factory schools, special training programs in three civilian educational institutions, training programs for nine Quartermaster ROTC units in colleges and universities, and numerous other special schools and courses. All of these were in addition to the regular courses for officer candidates, commissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers at the Quartermaster School.

In order to standardize Quartermaster training and to make it conform with existing War Department and Quartermaster training doctrine, the Military Training Division and its predecessors prepared nineteen separate Quartermaster mobilization training programs between July 1940 and September 1945. These programs served as general guides for all Quartermaster enlisted replacement and unit training. The many revisions that were made reflected the continuous development in fundamental doctrine and were necessary to meet the changing training requirements in the transition from peacetime and early mobilization training to realistic preparation of troops for overseas operations and for redeployment from the European to the Pacific theater in the final phase of the war.¹

The emphasis upon speed and effectiveness in training made it necessary to revamp completely the method of instructing trainees. The lecture system was virtually discarded, textbooks and training manuals were revised, and the most modern teaching techniques were adopted in order to produce the greatest number of trained Quartermaster personnel in the shortest possible time. The new method employed the widespread use of training films, film strips,² and numerous other visual aids such as miniature models, trains.

¹ For a detailed study of the genesis, content, use, and significance of the Quartermaster mobilization training programs, see Rogers W. Young, Mobilization Training Plans and Programs for the Quartermaster Soldier, 1933-1945 (QMC hist monograph, 1946). (Hereafter cited as Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Programs.)

² A film strip is a series of still photographs or other reproductions.
scribed records, charts, graphs, dramatizations, as well as practical field demonstrations, as a means of reducing the gap between theoretical classroom instruction and actual field conditions. It stressed learning by doing. The men were instructed in basic principles, shown the correct way of doing their jobs, and then given an early opportunity to perform the tasks themselves. In this way their mistakes could be pointed out, and they could gradually acquire the necessary skill through practice. Their instruction was standardized and expedited through the preparation of more than 260 manuals, bulletins, regulations, pamphlets, and other training publications, and the production of 184 motion pictures and film strips under the direction of the OQMG.³

The new training techniques were not perfected overnight. Most of them were developed and improved as the war progressed. Many problems had to be solved. For one thing, there was at first a serious shortage of competent instructors and it took time to train an adequate number. For another, modern equipment was extremely scarce during the early part of the war, and the training camps had to wait until the nation’s production lines could provide a reserve that could be used for training purposes.

³ Rpt, Mil Tng Div to TQMG, 11 Sep 45, sub: Outstanding Accomplishments in World War II.
The training mission of the Corps was to prepare its officers, enlisted personnel, and units to carry out their assigned duties in such a manner as to increase the combat efficiency of the Army as a whole.\(^4\)

The first step in the training process was to transform raw recruits into soldiers in the shortest possible time by means of a course in basic military training similar to that given other enlisted men in the Army. This training was designed to make them physically fit, indoctrinate them in Army procedure, impress upon them the value of teamwork, and teach them how to take care of themselves in the field. Upon completion of their basic military training, Quartermaster soldiers were assigned to technical schools where each man was instructed in one of the particular skills required by the Corps. Inasmuch as the majority of the men were classified as military specialists in fields related to trades they had followed in civilian life, their technical instruction could be restricted primarily to training in Army methods of handling their jobs. On the other hand, those assigned to specialized training in fields in which they had had no previous training required more elementary instruction. Since these men could learn only the fundamentals of their specialties in the allotted training time, it was usually

\(^4\) FM 10-5, p. 10, 29 Apr 43, sub: Opns.
necessary to assign them as helpers and let them gradually acquire skill through on-the-job training.

The normal procedure during World War II was to give Quartermaster recruits their basic military and technical training at one of the two QMRTC's. These centers operated as the intermediate stage in the personnel processing plan. They obtained the recruits directly from the reception centers, where the men had been classified and had received their clothing, and then turned them out as individual specialists. The bulk of these men were then assigned as filler or loss replacements to units where they received additional training. Some were assigned to installations or were selected to continue their technical training at one of the advanced schools operated by the Corps. Those who qualified as officer candidates were generally sent to the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School as soon as they had completed their basic military training at the QMRTC. After being commissioned, they were either sent to an advanced school or depot for specialized officer training or assigned directly to a unit.

The system of training recruits as enlisted replacements was analogous to the mass-production, interchangeable-parts technique widely employed in industry in that the men were trained as individual specialists in accordance with the varied requirements and then assembled elsewhere into units to perform their specific functions. This method of operation made it possible to concentrate the best training facilities and teaching personnel available and to achieve a standardization of instruction that was usually lacking when the men were given their basic training within the units.

Although most of the Quartermaster recruits were processed through the replacement training centers, thousands of them were not. Enlisted volunteers and selectees who came into the Corps before the establishment of the QMRTC's in March 1941 were trained in units. Recruits assigned to the Corps during the remainder of 1941 were usually sent to the QMRTC's, but beginning early in 1942 the Corps expanded so rapidly that the centers were unable to accommodate all of the men as fast as they were inducted. So many new units were being organized that it was frequently necessary to bypass the QMRTC's entirely by sending filler replacements to units directly from reception centers. In the fall of 1942 a definite policy was established whereby these untrained fillers were sent only to units with a low priority rating. This policy was abandoned early in 1944 with the adoption of the preactivation plan, which provided that all recruits would be given individual training before being assigned to units. This plan relieved all units of the burden, which many of the earlier ones faced, of having to convert themselves into schools for the purpose of giving elementary instruction to their enlisted personnel.

The Quartermaster General had full responsibility for preparing the training doctrine for all Quartermaster units, just as he did for enlisted men and officers in the Corps, yet he had direct control and training supervision over only a small proportion of those units. Quartermaster units

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5 The Army defines a replacement as an individual available for assignment to fill a vacancy. A filler replacement is an officer or enlisted man added to a newly organized unit to bring it up to its prescribed strength. A loss replacement is an individual who takes the place of a person killed, wounded, or lost as a result of other causes.

assigned to the AGF generally were activated and trained by various army commanders under the direction of the Commanding General, AGF. Similarly, Quartermaster units serving in the AAF were trained under the direction of the Commanding General, AAF. Even the ASF units, except those activated at installations under the control of The Quartermaster General, were trained by the commanders of the various corps areas or service commands. Yet no matter who had trained the units, any adverse criticism of them in the theaters of operations was likely to be directed at The Quartermaster General.

The Development of Administrative Controls

Responsibility for the supervision and co-ordination of all Quartermaster military training during the first year of the emergency was vested in the War Plans and Training Branch of the Administrative Division. The training functions of this branch, however, were subordinate to its planning activities, as the number of installations under the control of The Quartermaster General at which training was being conducted was quite limited. They were the Quartermaster School then located in Philadelphia, the Motor Transport School in Baltimore, and nine bakers' and cooks' schools, one in each of the nine corps areas.

Following the adoption of the Selective Service System and the calling of the National Guard into active service, the first of a series of administrative reorganizations required to meet the expanding needs of the QMC occurred early in October 1940. Training functions were transferred at that time to the Personnel Division, and then three months later, effective 2 January 1941, to the newly created Military Personnel and Training Division. The responsibilities for both training and Reserve personnel were combined in one branch, but before the end of 1941 these functions had increased to such an extent that they were divided by the creation of separate Reserve and Training Branches.7

Conflict Over Training Responsibility

In order to obtain the technical data and assistance required in carrying out the training functions, it was necessary for the Training Branch and its predecessors to work in close collaboration with the various operating divisions and branches in the OQMG. These divisions and branches, however, were not content to confine their activities solely to co-operating with the Military Personnel and Training Division, but attempted openly in 1941 to retain partial, if not full, control over Quartermaster training pertinent to their operations.

This situation resulted in much confusion, created difficulties, and seriously handicapped training activities within the Corps. Moreover, it caused embarrassment to the War Department because the various divisions and branches continued to maintain personal contact with, and to send their training plans and requests directly to, The Adjutant General or some division of the General Staff. The Quartermaster General found it necessary in October 1941 to issue a memorandum to all OQMG divisions, re-emphasizing that the Military Personnel and Training Division was charged with supervision and co-ordination of all training in the Corps for

7 (1) OQMG OO 99, 10 Oct 40, no sub. (2) OQMG OO 144, 27 Dec 40, sub: Office Orgn.
which he was responsible to higher authority. He pointed out that it was the function of this division to maintain liaison with the War Department General Staff as well as with the other arms and services, to initiate plans and obtain approval for activation or augmentation of training establishments, to provide necessary equipment, to co-ordinate the training programs with the available facilities, and to determine quotas and allotments of students and other personnel based on planning charts or records approved by G-3.8

Even with this reaffirmation of policy and persistent efforts as late as 1943 to enforce it, the Military Personnel and Training Division (later the Military Training Division) was not wholly successful in obtaining full control in the OQMG over all segments of Quartermaster training. During the course of the war the Subsistence Branch (later Division), exercised a large measure of control over the training of bakers and cooks and bakery units, as did the Remount Branch over the training of dog handlers. In both of these instances, however, the division co-ordinated and scheduled the training within the operating branches, prepared the training manuals in collaboration with them, and dealt with higher echelons. In contrast to this situation the Motor Transport Division engaged in a bitter fight to prevent the Military Personnel and Training Division from gaining any control over motor-transport training activities and finally emerged victorious in the spring of 1942. This outcome had no lasting consequences since motor transport activities were transferred to the Ordnance Department in August of that year.9

The steady increase in the training responsibilities of the Corps and the lack of an adequate organization within the OQMG to cope with them led the Commanding General, SOS, in the summer of 1942 to order The Quartermaster General to organize a training division to replace the Training Branch. He directed that the new division be established along lines similar to those of the Training Division, SOS, in order “to emphasize training to the proper degree and to make possible a more efficient cooperation in training matters” between the two divisions.10

The Military Training Division took over training activities in the Corps on 4 September 1942 and continued in existence until after the war ended. Its mission was “to establish policies, prepare plans, and to supervise and coordinate training in reception centers, replacement training centers, schools and units assigned to the Quartermaster Corps.”11 Although internal readjustments were necessary from time to time in the number and the duties of its various branches, the division’s responsibilities were not altered.

Relationships With Other Echelons

Fundamental policies for training in all of the arms and services were formulated by the G-3 Division, War Department General Staff. The Training Branch and its predecessors in the OQMG dealt directly with G-3 in carrying out these

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8 Memo, TQMG for All OQMG Divs, 14 Oct 41, no sub.
10 Memo, CG SOS for TQMG, 14 Aug 42, sub: Orgn of a Tng Div.
11 OQMG OO 25.1, 30 Aug 42, sub: Establishment of a Mil Tng Div.
policies within the Corps throughout the emergency period and the first three months of the war. After the reorganization of the War Department on 9 March 1942, The Quartermaster General and the chiefs of the other supply services became subordinates of the Commanding General, SOS. Within this new framework, the Training Branch in the OQMG—and later on the Military Training Division—was under the direct control of the Training Division in the SOS headquarters, which in turn was responsible to G-3. This same relationship existed when SOS became the ASF in March 1943.

At the beginning of the emergency period, corps area commanders were fully responsible for all training of individuals and units under their command except at installations specifically exempted by the War Department. In the case of the QMC, the exemptions were the Quartermaster School and the Motor Transport School, over which The Quartermaster General had complete control, and the nine bakers' and cooks' schools, for which he was responsible only for furnishing the personnel and conducting the training, while each corps area commander exercised the administrative supervision over the school under his command. The Quartermaster General supplied the doctrine for other Quartermaster training in the corps area, but he had no further authority, not even to conduct inspections.12

When the QMRTC's were established early in 1941, they were placed under the administrative control of the corps areas in which they were located, but The Quartermaster General was given the responsibility for conducting all training. Shortly after Pearl Harbor the administrative function was shifted to The Quartermaster General, and he retained complete control over both the Camp Lee and Fort Warren centers until August 1942. At that time the War Department redesignated the corps areas as service commands and assigned them the administrative duties at the centers. Under this change in regulations, the Commanding General, SOS, was made responsible for training at the centers, but inasmuch as he delegated this authority to The Quartermaster General, the latter's control over the training was not affected. The same relationship was established and maintained in regard to Quartermaster schools located in areas controlled by the service commands, as well as in reference to Quartermaster unit training centers when they were organized in 1943 and 1944.13

The administrative supervision at the Camp Lee QMRTC was again vested in The Quartermaster General early in May 1943, and he continued to exercise complete control over its operations until after V-J Day, even though the installation was redesignated as an ASF training center in April 1944. On the other hand, the Fort Warren center—which was inactivated as a QMRTC in the fall of 1943, designated a Quartermaster unit training center in September 1943, and redesignated an ASF training center in April 1944—continued under the administrative control of the Seventh Service Command from August 1942 through V-J Day. Throughout that period The Quartermaster General was responsible for the conduct and supervision of training, the promulgation of train-

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12 (1) AR 170–10, 10 Oct 39, sub: GAs and Deps—Adm. (2) AR 350–105, 17 Dec 40, sub: Mil Education.
13 (1) Ltr of Instruction No. 1, Dir of Mil Pers and Tng Div, OQMG, to CGs Camp Lee and Ft. Warren QMRTCs, 13 Jan 41, sub: RTCs. (2) AR 170–10, 10 Aug 42, sub: SvGs and Deps—Adm.
ing doctrine, and the scheduling of programs at Fort Warren.14

As in the case of commanding officers of all arms and services, the authority of The Quartermaster General to conduct inspections of training was limited until the middle of 1942 to the schools, training centers, and field installations under his direct control, except when temporary responsibility was delegated to him by higher authority. Although he provided the doctrine for other Quartermaster training, the determination of how that training was being conducted rested solely with the corps area commanders. During the latter half of 1942 The Quartermaster General was given more latitude in the matter of inspections. The changes in Army Regulations early in August of that year made the service commands the field agencies of the Commanding General, SOS, and inasmuch as the latter retained control over all training activities he could delegate such authority as he desired. On this basis he extended The Quartermaster General's responsibilities to include inspection of Quartermaster technical training conducted under the control of the service commands and the AGF whenever these commands considered such inspection necessary.15

Late in December 1942, however, the War Department shifted the responsibility for making inspections to the service commands. This action cast considerable doubt upon the authority of The Quartermaster General to conduct any training inspection other than at the installations under his direct control. Nevertheless, acting under instructions from the Commanding General, SOS, he continued to make inspections of technical Quartermaster training carried on in SOS units by the service commands, as well as complete inspections of Quartermaster training under his control. This period of confusion lasted throughout the first five months of 1943. Finally, early in June, the situation was clarified when Headquarters, ASF (formerly SOS), issued orders that inspections of training of ASF units conducted under the control of the service commands were to be made by The Quartermaster General and the chiefs of the other technical services only upon the direction or with the permission of the Commanding General, ASF, or upon the request of the service commanders. Such inspections were to cover only technical training. Inspections of ASF units were carried out on this basis until 1 December 1944, at which time Headquarters, ASF, transferred the full responsibility for inspections to the service commands. From then until the end of the war, inspections of Quartermaster training in ASF units in the service commands were made by The Quartermaster General only upon the request of the service commanders and they were restricted to technical training.16

The Quartermaster General had virtually no authority over the training of Quartermaster units in the AGF and the AAF, other than to supply the doctrine.

15 For a detailed account of how The Quartermaster General's inspection authority changed during the war years, see Rogers W. Young, Inspection of Military Training by The Quartermaster General, QMC Historical Studies, 15 (Washington, 1946), pp. 1–4, 38–40, 47–49, 71–99. (Hereafter cited as Young, Inspection of Military Training.)
The installations at which most of these units were trained were exempted from the control of the service commands, and consequently neither the service commanders nor the ASF headquarters could authorize The Quartermaster General to carry on inspections at them. Although The Inspector General, beginning in the spring of 1943, called upon The Quartermaster General from time to time for assistance in inspecting the steadily increasing number of units being prepared for movement overseas, it was late in September of that year before any specific provision was made for The Quartermaster General to inspect Quartermaster units in the AAF and the AGF. At that time the War Department authorized the chiefs of all the technical services to visit troops and installations of the AGF, AAF, service commands, and defense commands within the United States "in order that the Chief of Staff may obtain up-to-date information concerning the technical training of personnel and the suitability of weapons and equipment to meet the needs of the using arms and services." These visits were to be made only by arrangement with the commanding general of the major command concerned, and the inspection was to be confined to technical matters.

The Military Training Division, OQMG, anticipated that these visits would prove valuable "in developing material for changes in training doctrine, and in making detailed observations on the use and operation of Quartermaster clothing and equipment." But none of these inspection visits occurred until February 1944, and they proved highly disappointing because they did not produce any notable results. Both the AGF and the AAF displayed a marked reluctance to give The Quartermaster General permission to make such inspections and were inclined to consider them as intrusions into their responsibilities. Consequently only a few of these inspection trips actually materialized and none were made after the middle of 1944.

Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers

The general procedure followed in World War II of giving recruits their basic military and technical training at replacement centers rather than in units was not entirely new. While all infantrymen and most of the other enlisted men in 1917-18 were trained in units, the QMC and some of the other arms and services operated schools where the men were frequently given special training before being assigned to units.

In the case of the QMC, this special training during World War I took place at what came to be known as the Quartermaster University at Camp Joseph E. Johnston, Jacksonville, Fla. Although used for this purpose and to some extent also as a center for training units, Camp Johnston was primarily a mobilization center. Distinct areas were set aside for the different functions. Moreover, since the men there were sometimes organized into special companies to receive training as enlisted replacements, Camp Johnston bore some parental resemblance to the replacement training centers of World War II, though it differed in organization, method of op-

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18 Col Hendershot, Mil Tng Div, to Gen Munniikhuysen, Pers Div, OQMG, 25 Sep 43, sub: Tech Tng Teams.
19 For a more detailed account, see Young, Inspection of Military Training, pp. 90-92, 117-120.
eration, and purpose. Often the term replacement center was even used in referring to that part of the installation devoted to this special training, but officially it was called a replacement depot and was utilized principally for holding rather than training replacements.

One of the shortcomings of the World War I plan of training men in units was that no adequate provision was made for enlisted replacements. By the summer of 1918 it had become necessary to skeletonize seven divisions in order to obtain the necessary replacements for the ones already in the line. Shortly before the end of the war General John J. Pershing declared in a cable to the War Department that to "send over entire divisions, which must be broken up on their arrival in France so that we may obtain replacements that have not been sent as called for, is a wasteful method...." 21 In mobilization planning after World War I, special efforts were made to provide a sound replacement system for any future emergency.

Replacement centers, as they were originally called, became an accepted part of training plans early in 1924, but the question of how many Quartermaster centers there should be and where they should be located remained unsettled until late in 1940. At that time it was finally decided to concentrate Quartermaster training at two "replacement and training centers," one at Camp Lee, Va., and the other at Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyo. During 1941 these two installations were known officially as replacement centers, but the name was changed to replacement training centers early in 1942. 22

When The Quartermaster General learned of the decision early in November 1940 to establish the centers at Camp Lee and Fort Warren, he made a last-minute plea that the plans be modified and that he be permitted to centralize all Quartermaster training in one center, which, he pointed out, would result in a material reduction in overhead. He proposed Belton, Mo., near Kansas City, as the site because it was "very close to the geographical center of the country," and suggested that the Administration and Supply School at Philadelphia, the Motor Transport School at Baltimore, and the Subsistence School at Chicago be moved there so that all of these training activities, as well as unit training, could be consolidated at a location where there would be plenty of room for expansion. He argued that because of the "specialized and diversified nature of Quartermaster instruction, one Replacement Training Center simplified the problem of coordinated training of the many different types of Quartermaster units," and added that "officer candidate and enlisted replacement training can be utilized to the best advantage in conjunction with unit training." 23 The General Staff, however rejected his recommendation on the grounds of the additional cost involved in the purchase of the land and the possible loss of time in construction and in training. 24

Construction of the twenty-one Army replacement training centers was authorized following the enactment of the Selec-

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20 Joseph J. Mathews, *The Development of the Quartermaster Replacement Training Centers*, QMC Historical Studies, 3 (Washington, 1943), pp. 4-5. (Hereafter cited as Mathews, *Development of QMRTCs*.)
22 (1) AR 120-10, 5 Mar 24 and 20 Jul 28, sub: Mobil. (2) For a more detailed account of the origin of the replacement training centers, see Mathews, *Development of QMRTCs*, pp. 1-11.
23 Ltr, Gen Gregory, TQMG, to AGoS G-3, 8 Nov 40, sub: Repl and Tng Centers for the QMC, 353.
24 Ltr, Maj Gen R. C. Moore, DCoS, to TQMG, 20 Nov 40, sub: Repl and Tng Centers for the QMC.
tive Service Act in September 1940. The Quartermaster centers at Camp Lee and Fort Warren were placed in operation about the middle of March 1941 even though work on the installations was still in progress. Cadremen as well as military and civilian instructors were sent to the centers a month earlier to receive instructions and to prepare for the arrival of the men from the reception centers. Selectees inducted before the opening of Camp Lee and Fort Warren were trained in units, but instructions were issued that their training was to follow the methods and doctrine prepared for use in the QMRTC's.

Camp Lee was situated near Petersburg, Va., on a site that had been utilized in World War I for one of the sixteen Army cantonments, but all of the old buildings had been dismantled. When the installation was reconstructed in World War II, it was planned that it would serve not only as a QMRTC but also as a replacement center for the Medical Department and as one of twenty-nine Army reception centers. Later on, near the end of 1941, the Quartermaster School and the Officer Candidate School were moved there from Philadelphia. The portion of Camp Lee reserved at first for the QMRTC had a capacity of only 12,000 men. In the spring of 1942, however, the Medical Replacement Training Center was transferred to Camp Pickett, and the absorption of the vacated facilities, together with additional construction and the utilization of tents, increased the capacity of the Camp Lee QMRTC to 29,000 before the end of 1942. The number of trainees stationed there reached a peak of about 25,000 in October of that year and remained near that level until July 1943.

The other QMRTC was located on the large reservation attached to Fort Warren, commonly referred to as the Old Post, near Cheyenne, Wyo. The fort, originally named in honor of a Civil War hero, David A. Russell, was established in 1867 to protect workers on the first transcontinental railroad, the Union Pacific, and had been in continuous existence thereafter as an Army post. It was renamed in honor of Senator Francis E. Warren in 1929. The Fort Warren QMRTC was smaller than the one at Camp Lee, having an initially authorized capacity of 7,000. It was greatly enlarged, however, by additional construction in the latter half of 1941 and again in 1942. Moreover, the center absorbed facilities at the Old Post early in 1942 when they were vacated by Artillery units that had used the fort as a training center until after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Then in March 1942, when a branch of the OCS was established at Fort Warren to take care of the overflow at Camp Lee, still further housing was provided by the conversion of stables and gunsheds into barracks and mess halls to accommodate enlisted trainees who were moved to make room for the incoming officer candidates. As a result of these various measures to increase housing, the enlisted strength of the center rose to a peak of about 20,000 by the end of 1942, but it declined from then until the Fort Warren QMRTC was inactivated.

Provisions were made early in 1941 that, with few exceptions, Camp Lee would

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25 For a more detailed account of the background, construction, and expansion of Camp Lee, see two reports by Lt. Arthur M. Freedman, Background and Construction, Camp Lee, Va. (Camp Lee hist rpt, Apr 44), and Expansion of the Center, Camp Lee, Va. (Camp Lee hist rpt, May 44), both in Hist Br, OQMG.

26 For a more detailed discussion of the background, construction, and expansion of Fort Warren, see two reports by Lt. Arthur M. Freedman. The “Old Fort” (Ft. Warren hist rpt, Jun 43) and Construction of the Replacement Training Center (Ft. Warren hist rpt Jun 43), both in Hist Br, OQMG.
train personnel for all Quartermaster units to be activated and assigned to the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Corps Areas. Most of the installations where the units were being trained were located in these areas, which included the South-eastern, Middle Atlantic, and New England States. Enlisted replacements for Quartermaster units in the other corps areas were to be supplied by Fort Warren.27

Procedures During the Emergency Period

The original Tables of Organization for all replacement training centers were prescribed by the War Department late in 1940. They established the precedent, which was followed quite generally throughout most of the war, that recruits at these installations were to be organized into regiments for training purposes. The tables called for the establishment at each center of a headquarters, to consist of the commanding general and his staff departments, and the required number of regiments, which were to be broken down into battalions and companies. Normally a regiment was to be comprised of three battalions, and each battalion of four companies. The company was to consist of 30 cadremen and 222 selectees.28

The organizations of the staff departments at Camp Lee and Fort Warren were similar in that each was divided into four departments on the basis of the functions to be performed, which may be described generally as administration and personnel, intelligence and public relations, training, and supply. The QMRTC's varied somewhat in the way they were organized to conduct their training activities. At Fort Warren, basic military training, motor operations training, motor maintenance training, and supply training were under separate directors. Camp Lee had separate directors for basic military and supply training, but combined all motor training under one director. The training directors at each center supervised and co-ordinated the various schools that each established for technical training. They also supervised the operations of the training regiments, whose headquarters, in turn, were charged with organizing, supplying, and directing the basic military and technical instruction of the trainees.29

Negro recruits at each QMRTC were organized into separate regiments and were housed and given their basic military training in segregated areas where they had their own training and recreational facilities. In the case of technical training, the situation varied at the two centers. At Camp Lee, where most of the Negroes in the Corps were trained, Negro and white trainees generally attended the same technical schools and were given their instruction together. At Fort Warren, on the other hand, separate schools were established to give Negro trainees technical instruction in all courses except motor maintenance and courses for mess sergeants, cooks, and bakers. Negro and white schools finally were merged in 1943 to reduce the excessive instructor overhead required under the original plan.30

Fewer than a thousand Negroes were

27 Ltr of Instruction No. 1, Gen Munnikhuysen, Dir of Mil Pers and Tng Div, OQMG, to Exec Off, Camp Lee and Ft. Warren, 13 Jan 41, no sub, 352.
28 (1) Ibid. (2) Cadremen were the enlisted men assigned to a cadre to assist in establishing and training a new unit.
sent to the Fort Warren QMRTC during the first half of 1941, and the maximum number in training there at any time during its existence was below twenty-four hundred. Consequently, the center found it necessary to organize only one Negro training regiment. Camp Lee in the beginning also had only one Negro regiment, but it comprised more than two thousand trainees even during the first training cycle. By the summer of 1942 the number of Negroes undergoing replacement training at Camp Lee had more than doubled and it became necessary to establish a second Negro regiment. Although the number of these trainees continued to increase throughout 1942 and the early part of 1943, the peak at Camp Lee was under six thousand Negroes and the two regiments were adequate to accommodate them.31

Both the Camp Lee and Fort Warren QMRTC's were confronted early in their existence with problems common to most newly established emergency military training installations—construction delays, confused and embryonic administrative and training organizations, serious shortages of training facilities and equipment, inadequate instructional staffs, and

an untried program of instruction. However, the lengthy duration of the emergency period provided the opportunity to solve most of these problems and to get the QMRTC’s out of the experimental stage before the outbreak of actual hostilities.

The first training cycle or phase of replacement training, which began in March and continued through June 1941, was unique in several important respects as compared with later training operations. One of these was that most of the men trained during that thirteen-week period were present when the cycle began, were given their training simultaneously, and then were moved out in a wholesale fashion when the cycle ended. This uniformity was impossible later on because the recruits arrived at varying intervals and began their training at different times.

The first cycle was different also in that its mission was to train a definite number of filler replacements for about a hundred Quartermaster units that were scheduled to be activated at the end of the period. Moreover, the men were assembled into units at the centers before they were moved out to other stations for activation of their units. Thus the first cycle approximated unit training, even though the centers were concerned primarily with the training of individuals. Thereafter the Army expanded so rapidly and conditions changed so often and so quickly that the number of replacements for the many Quartermaster units being activated in all parts of the country could never be determined accurately.

Inasmuch as Camp Lee and Fort Warren had to train approximately a hundred different types of Quartermaster specialists, it was not practical for them to establish separate technical schools for each specific type. Consequently, the original procedure was to group the men who were to be trained in similar fields into the same company or companies.32

Shortages of facilities and instructors during the early days made it impossible to give recruits all of their basic military training before they started their technical training. Instead, the balanced system was used in which both types of training were conducted concurrently and the time was divided about equally between the two. Certain units were given their basic military instruction in the morning while others were using the technical training equipment. In the afternoon the schedule was reversed, and the company that had been on the drill field in the morning spent the afternoon in the classrooms or in the shops.33

With the completion of the first training cycle, replacement training was separated completely from unit training, and the QMRTC’s assumed the role for which they were established. That is, instead of training men already organized in units, they began to train individual specialists to serve as fillers for units that were to be assembled and trained at other posts, camps, and stations. This meant that the centers were faced with the problem of training a sufficient number of replacements of all types without knowing specifically how many of each type would be required.

The only method available at that time for determining future requirements in the various specialties was that based on the occurrence rates per thousand men that had been established for distributing selectees to the Corps from reception centers. The problem was solved temporarily by the expedient of training specialists of

32 Mathews, Development of QMRTCs. p. 19.
33 Ibid.
the various types in the same proportion as the number called for in the Quartermaster units set up in the Troop Basis for 1942. As an aid in solving the problem, The Quartermaster General prepared a table showing just how many specialists of each type there were in existing units. The table, which also showed a percentage breakdown of whites and Negroes, afforded a mathematical basis for computing replacement requirements. It was realized that these rates would not be precise guides for determining the correct ratios to be followed in training specialists, but it was obvious also that, since the centers were confronted by a growing Army with unknown requirements, they would have to operate with elasticity.\(^{34}\)

The QMRTC's encountered other problems in their efforts to balance the training of replacements with the requirements for them. It was found, for example, that the tentative classification given the trainees at reception centers was frequently in error. Inasmuch as it was highly important that the trainees be classified correctly so that training time could be conserved by utilizing the existing skills of the men to the fullest extent, it became the first function of the QMRTC's to reclassify recruits. The classification task at first was performed in the individual training regiments, but later on it was centralized in a single organization at each center.\(^{35}\)

Another problem arose from the discovery that a large number of trainees were unable to grasp even the most simple technical instruction, principally because of their inability to read or write English. Such men had to be given special schooling before they could absorb replacement training. Full-time schools for this purpose were authorized in the summer of 1941. Both Camp Lee and Fort Warren established these schools, with separate Negro and white sections. Instruction was given in reading, writing, simple arithmetic, and current events. The program called for eight weeks of this special schooling. At the end of that time most of the trainees had acquired a sufficient understanding of English to follow directions and perform their military duties.\(^{36}\)

The shift in training emphasis in the QMRTC's from units to individuals at the end of the first cycle did not result immediately in any fundamental changes in organization or procedure. The tendency, however, was to make the training a little more general since the specific assignment of the individual was less certain than it had been for the first increment of trainees. In general, the plan of conducting basic military and technical instruction concurrently, with one half of each day devoted to each type of training, was continued until after Pearl Harbor. However, it was found impractical to train some specialists, such as cooks or personnel for bakery units, in half-day periods. Special programs, therefore, were arranged for such specialists, who were permitted to complete their basic military training during the first half of their thirteen-week training period and then to devote the second half to their specialist training.\(^{37}\)

More flexible organizational arrange-
ments became possible at the centers beginning in the fall of 1941 when the War Department rescinded the original T/O and delegated authority to the chief of each arm and service to prepare his own T/O for the replacement training centers in his command. Under the new system, the General Staff allotted officers and enlisted personnel to the QMRTC’s for training overhead on the basis of their training capacities, and each center determined, subject to the approval of The Quartermaster General, how they could be utilized to the best advantage.\(^{38}\)

The fact that the arrival of recruits from the reception centers was staggered complicated the training problem and made it necessary to start new technical training classes at frequent intervals. Fort Warren adopted the procedure of starting a new training period on the first of each month. Recruits who arrived before the middle of the month were given intensified training in an effort to have them complete the course with those who had started on the first. Those arriving after the middle of the month were held over and trained in basic military subjects while awaiting the start of the next period. Camp Lee solved the problem by starting new classes at two-week intervals. The two centers also differed in regard to organization for technical training. Fort Warren continued the policy of assigning recruits with similar classifications to the same company or companies. Camp Lee, however, dropped that procedure in October 1941 and began assigning recruits to training companies without regard to their occupational specialties. Thus the training company remained the administrative unit for housing, feeding, and basic military training, but the members were assigned to technical training classes as individuals.\(^{39}\)

**Impact of the War Upon the Training Program**

The entrance of the United States into the war created many additional problems for the QMRTC’s. The most critical one concerned the question of how to meet the sharply increased requirements for replacements without materially lowering training standards. One solution, as proposed by the War Department in a planning project drawn up three months before Pearl Harbor, would have been to increase the number of replacement training centers. This would have required additional administrative and instructor personnel and would have resulted in delay until the new centers could be built. Consequently when the crisis actually arose this proposal was rejected on the grounds that it was essential to conserve overhead personnel and to keep new construction at an absolute minimum.\(^{40}\) It was decided instead to make more intensive use of the existing centers and to reduce the length of the training period from thirteen to eight weeks. Moreover, the QMRTC’s were instructed to eliminate any team training that was being carried on and to concentrate completely upon the training of individuals. All courses were ordered cut to the barest essentials.

Under the eight-week training program, the War Department specified that the centers should devote full time during the first four weeks to basic military training, and reserve the final four weeks for technical instruction. The purpose of this was

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\(^{38}\) Ltr, TAG to TQMG, et al., 2 Sep 41, sub: T/O for RTCs, AG 320.2 (8-20-41) PG-C.


\(^{40}\) For a more detailed account of the planning project, see Mathews, *Development of QMRTC’s*, pp. 31–33.
to make certain that the trainees would complete their basic military training as quickly as possible and be available, if necessary, for assignment to units. Thus they would possess the fundamental knowledge to fill in at least as basics in any unit in which they were needed. This meant that technical training was relegated to second priority for the time being. Camp Lee was able to comply with the provision immediately, but a shortage of technical training facilities compelled Fort Warren to continue the split-day training system until May 1942.

The eight-week training program was strictly an emergency measure, and in February 1942 the War Department directed the centers at Camp Lee and Fort Warren to undertake a gradual return to a thirteen-week schedule. The new program for training Quartermaster enlisted replacements varied considerably, however, from the original thirteen-week program. It provided for four weeks of basic military training followed by eight weeks of technical training and one week of basic military procedure. Training under the new schedule began for some of the men as early as March 1942. By the middle of July the new program was in full operation at both installations for training all Quartermaster replacements except motor specialists, who by special authority remained on the eight-week schedule because personnel requirements in this field were greater than the QMRTC's could supply even by housing many of the trainees in tents. Although third and fourth echelon maintenance functions had already been transferred to the Ordnance Department, the shortage of Ordnance training facilities made it necessary for the QMRTC's to continue to train large quotas of apprentice and general mechanics and other allied specialists for the remainder of the year.

The situation created by having training periods of different lengths for supply and motor trainees caused serious administrative difficulties, particularly at Camp Lee. Under the existing system of classification and assignment, men were being assigned to companies as they came, with no attention given to the types of Specialists or period they were to train. Such a system provided maximum utilization of barracks capacity, the foremost criterion at the moment. But with men remaining in the same company until completion of training, groups would be shipped from companies at various stages, leaving vacancies. Capacity requirements could be fulfilled only by filling in a new stage of training or by squeezing companies together. Both were bad from the standpoint of morale, efficiency, the supervision of training, and the maintenance of records.

The shorter period for motor training did not remain in effect long, for in November 1942 a return to the universal thirteen-week training period was directed. In the meantime, Camp Lee had solved many of its administrative problems by organizing trainees into separate military and technical training companies. Under this system, all incoming recruits were assigned to military training companies and remained with them throughout the period of basic military training.

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42 Ltr, TAG to TQMG, et al., 28 Feb 42, sub: Increase in Period of Tng at RTCs, AG 320.2 (2-3-42) EC-C-M.
43 Ltr, Gen Munnikhuyzen, OQMG, to CGs, Camp Lee and Ft. Warren QMRTCs, 16 Jul 42, sub: Tng of QM EM, 353.01.
44 Freedman, General Aspects of the Training Program, Camp Lee, p. 29.
45 Ltr, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, to CGs Camp Lee and Ft. Warren QMRTCs, 14 Nov 42, sub: Tng Directive No. 10.
The trainees then were transferred to technical training companies—either to a motor unit or a supply unit in accordance with their specialties. These companies conducted all of the training during the technical training phase. At Fort Warren, on the other hand, trainees were assigned to a particular company and remained with it through both their basic military and their technical training. This plan was followed until the spring of 1943 when Fort Warren adopted the Camp Lee system of separate military and technical training companies.46

The huge expansion at the Camp Lee QMRTC had made it necessary to add three regiments and greatly increase the size of training companies in April 1942. This created a problem in training supervision that was solved by organizing the center’s eight regiments into three brigades. Two of the brigades were comprised of three white regiments each, while the third was comprised of the two Negro regiments. Three of the center’s most experienced officers were selected as brigade commanders, and among their functions was that of conducting tests to determine the progress in training. The brigade system was adopted about a year later at Fort Warren.47

The impact of the war brought numerous other developments at the QMRTC’s in 1942. The training doctrine was revised frequently to meet the transition from emergency to actual war and to provide the type of training that would produce Quartermaster soldiers who would be prepared to fight if the need arose. The latest teaching techniques were adopted, and great strides were made in the use of films and other training aids in an effort to speed up the training process. Even the number of functions performed by the centers underwent a marked increase. Some of the additional functions originated with the introduction of new subject matter into the courses, while others grew out of the attempt to improve training methods and procedures. It was necessary, for example, to establish courses for training new instructors and improving the caliber of the teaching of older ones. Another important development was the creation at each of the centers of a technical training service. Its principal functions were to develop training methods, materials, and procedures and to co-ordinate them, with those developed at the Quartermaster School; to determine the number and types of instructors required; and to select, train, and guide the instructors.48

More emphasis was placed upon the function of training illiterates and others who required special attention. Such trainees at the beginning of the program in 1941 had constituted only a small percentage of the total personnel to be trained, and they had remained with their basic companies while receiving special instruction at the elementary schools. Later on, as their number and percentage grew they were separated from the regular trainees and organized into special training units which fed, housed, and clothed the men, and provided the elementary training necessary to remedy their defi-
ciencies. This program reached a peak during the summer of 1942, but the burden finally was lightened in August of that year when the War Department lowered the maximum percentage of trainees of this type who were to be instructed. A year later the QMRTC’s were relieved completely of the responsibility for this training when the function was transferred to the reception centers.49

The expansion of functions at the centers extended beyond those which benefited enlisted trainees participating in the general program. Both Camp Lee and Fort Warren inaugurated refresher courses for officers and ROTC graduates. At Fort Warren a branch of the OCS was opened and an officers’ replacement pool was established. Courses for cadres and for trainees who were awaiting assignment to the OCS were among the other additions made to the program of the two centers during the year. By the end of 1942 the combined capacity of the two QMRTC’s had been increased to more than 40,000.50

Throughout most of 1942 the QMRTC’s had been under extremely heavy pressure to turn out replacements for the many new units hurriedly formed to meet the critical situation resulting from the attack upon Pearl Harbor. By the beginning of 1943, however, the pressure had begun to subside. The expansion rate of the Army had decreased to a marked degree and, with mobilization nearing its final stages, requirements for replacements were declining toward the level at which they would have to be kept for strictly maintenance purposes. All training was back on the thirteen-week schedule, and the centers were able to operate under more nearly normal conditions.

The reduction in Quartermaster requirements permitted the QMRTC’s not only to continue training Ordnance personnel, but also to make their facilities available for an extensive program for training enlisted men in the AAF and the Adjutant General’s Department. Although the majority of the men trained for the Ordnance Department in 1943 were auto mechanics, for whom the QMRTC’s provided only basic military training, the centers conducted the full thirteen-week program for other Ordnance personnel, including cooks, mess stewards, clerks, carpenters, chauffeurs, packers and craters, electricians, machinists, and welders. By the end of April 1943, however, the facilities of the Ordnance Department had become adequate for its own needs and this training was discontinued at the QMRTC’s. The training for the AAF, though, continued throughout 1943 and more than 15,000 specialists were trained for that command by the Camp Lee and Fort Warren centers. These included carpenters, supply clerks, cooks, mess sergeants, motor operators, and plumbers. For the Adjutant General’s Department only basic military training was conducted, and this program continued through the first half of 1944.51

Two other major developments in 1943 were outgrowths of the lowered requirements for Quartermaster replacements. One was the discontinuance of the Fort Warren QMRTC after two and a half years of existence during which the center graduated more than 122,000 specialists trained in the diverse fields of motor and

49 (1) See above, Ch. VI, Classification by Intellectual Capacity. (2) Mathews, Development of QMRTCs, p. 41. (3) For a detailed account of this special training, see Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and Cadres, Pt. 1, App. 5.

50 Mathews, Development of QMRTCs, pp. 41–42, 57.

supply operations. Although the inactivation began on 1 July and no new trainees were received after that date, it was the middle of October before the center actually was discontinued. The other development was the lengthening of the training period, effective in August, from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks as prescribed by the ASF for the training of all enlisted men in that command because of the general reduction in requirements for trained personnel. The new program placed much greater emphasis upon basic military training and extended the period of this phase to six weeks. This was followed by the customary eight weeks of technical training, and then by an additional three weeks of team or field training. The later period was designed to allow practical application under field conditions of theoretical military and technical instruction presented in the preceding fourteen weeks and to train each man as a member of a team so that when he joined a unit in a theater he would have a better concept of his place in the organization.

The adoption of this new program made it necessary for the remaining QMRTC at Camp Lee to make several changes in its training organization. A new office, that of director of field training, was created and a new type of training organization—the pool company—was established to process the trainees and to handle the administrative details during the field training phase. Under this new schedule, trainees were assigned first to a basic military company, then moved to a technical training company, and finally transferred to the pool company.

The pool companies, in which Negro and white units were segregated, handled all field training functions and provided the final processing before the men were shipped from the center. The field training program was carried out under simulated tactical conditions. The course of instruction for the first week included such subjects as compass problems, village fighting, and camouflage. For the final two weeks the trainees were taken to the A. P. Hill Military Reservation, about seventy miles from Camp Lee, for combined training in basic military and technical activities in the field.

In many respects the fall of 1943 was one of the most successful periods in the history of Quartermaster replacement training operations. By then, all of the training was centered at one installation, more time was available for training the men, both the basic military and the technical training organizations were functioning under well-tried methods, and the program had been rounded out by the addition of three weeks of field training. Moreover, operations were not yet complicated by the more varied types of training that were required later in the war.

Revisions in Replacement Requirements

The year 1944 brought a series of new problems that resulted in sweeping changes affecting not only the organizational structure of the Camp Lee QMRTC, but also the scope and mission of its training program, the type of personnel to be trained, and even the designation of the center.

One of these problems arose from the fact that the strength of the Army at the beginning of 1944 was near its authorized

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ceiling, a situation that tended to alter the mission of the QMRTC. Considerably fewer recruits were being received from reception centers, and in order to procure personnel for the new types of units or specialists required by the shifting course of the war or changing strategy, it became necessary either to inactivate units not needed for early shipment overseas or to retrain existing specialists.

Retraining became a regular function of the QMRTC early in January. The first instructions specified that retraining at the beginning would absorb a trainee strength of 1,800 including officers and men, or about 10 percent of the total center capacity of 18,200. It was pointed out, however, that the new function would grow rapidly and eventually rival the replacement training program in importance. Personnel to be retrained included specialists returned from overseas under the Army’s rotation policy and those from inactivated units, from Quartermaster installations in the zone of interior, and from surpluses in the service commands.55

Among the other changes that became effective early in 1944 was the establishment of a unit training program for petroleum laboratory units, laundry units, service companies, headquarters and headquarters companies for base depots, and postal units. The postal units were under the jurisdiction of The Adjutant General, but The Quartermaster General was given the responsibility for their training. At the same time, the trainee capacity of the center devoted to the basic training of Adjutant General personnel was increased from 1,800 to 4,000.56

The changes in functions were accompanied by revisions in the center’s training structure. The three phases of training—supply, motor, and field—which previously had been conducted under separate direction, were integrated into one technical and field training organization under a single director in January 1944. About two months later, however, field training was again placed under a separate director, but motor and supply training remained combined under a director of technical training.57

A major reorganization began in April when the Commanding General, ASF, ordered the establishment of ASF training centers (ASFTC’s) to unify and integrate all training in the technical services.58 Although this precipitated widespread changes, including the redesignation of the QMRTC as an ASFTC, the Camp Lee center remained under the supervision of The Quartermaster General and the training continued to be predominantly for Quartermaster personnel. The Fort Warren center was also redesignated an ASFTC, and the training of replacements, which had been discontinued there seven months earlier when the installation became a unit training center, was resumed.

The reorganization called for the standardization of all basic military training within the ASF and of such technical training as was common to the technical services. Training terminology also was standardized. The seventeen-week program as a whole became known officially as basic training. The first phase of this program, generally six weeks in length, was designated as basic military training. The second phase, generally eight weeks

56 Ibid.
58 ASF Cir 104, Sec. III, 15 Apr 44, sub: Plan for Tng Certain ASF EM.
in length, was redesignated as basic technical training. The final three weeks of the program were designated in one of two ways, in accordance with the type of training conducted. When the trainees were formed into teams or groups and trained as loss replacements under field conditions the period was termed basic team training, but when they were assembled into a complete unit and trained as an official organization the period was designated as basic unit training.

One of the most important aspects of the reorganization was the introduction of the preactivation training program, which provided that all recruits were to be trained first as individuals before being assigned to units for unit training. This marked the abandonment of the old system whereby fillers for newly activated units frequently were supplied directly from reception centers. The new plan insured that enlisted men would receive a minimum of fourteen weeks of training as individuals, including six weeks of basic military training and eight weeks of basic technical training, prior to their utilization as overseas loss replacements or as fillers for newly activated units. At the conclusion of their preactivation training phase, the enlisted men selected as loss replacements received an additional three weeks of basic team training, while those assigned to new units as fillers received an additional six weeks of basic unit training.

The process for regulating the flow of trainees at the ASFTC's was quite complex under the varied training procedures. Loss replacements were ordered into the center by The Adjutant General in accordance with requirements established by G-3. The Quartermaster General drew up the quotas, based upon these requirements, and issued a directive to the center specifying the number to be trained in each type of specialty. In the case of units, ASF headquarters determined the particular types needed and the availability of personnel and equipment. These data were embodied in a preactivation order to The Quartermaster General, who set up the quotas and issued the directives to the center. The personnel required for the units was ordered into the center by The Adjutant General. Personnel for other types of training, such as retraining, was ordered into the center without quotas and the training proceeded in accordance with priority requirements.59

When the preactivation training began in mid-June, it increased to seven the different categories in which training was being conducted at the Camp Lee ASFTC. The other six were basic military, basic technical, basic military retraining, basic technical retraining, basic team training, and training of activated units. The complexity of this program was in sharp contrast with that which had existed during the earlier part of the war when the center had been confronted with the comparatively simple problem of training only filler and loss replacements. Although in the meantime it had been redesignated as an ASFTC, the Camp Lee center still was organized on a regimental basis with seven regiments—four white and two Negro regiments and one unit training regiment. Inasmuch as each regiment usually had an assortment of trainees in all seven categories of training, there was much duplication of effort and waste of overhead personnel at a time when a serious manpower shortage existed. Moreover, requirements shifted so rapidly that training loads were almost constantly fluctuating from one

category to another. It became obvious during the summer of 1944 that a more flexible organization was necessary if effective training was to be given.\textsuperscript{60}

Consequently, a complete reorganization took place on 1 September, influencing every phase of the center’s operations. The regimental training system, which had been employed since the inception of the center, was replaced by one consisting of three groups. One group was organized to instruct white troops in both basic military and basic technical training, another to perform the same function for Negroes, and a unit training group to prepare units for extended field service. This reorganization simplified operating procedures, insured more uniform standards of instruction, and resulted in a considerable saving in overhead personnel. With administrative duties controlled centrally, many officers and enlisted men who previously had been engaged in administrative work within the seven regiments were made available for training purposes or were released for duty overseas.\textsuperscript{61}

By this time, with more and more men being returned from overseas and increasing numbers from zone of interior installations being prepared for duty in the theaters, retraining had become the most pressing problem. Although retraining provided the opportunity to evaluate previous training, it also presented serious difficulties, particularly in giving instruction in basic military retraining.

At best it is a thankless task for a retrainee to begin a training cycle after he has completed one in the early stages of his army career. It is difficult for a man who has been subjected to fire, who has had active part in combat in perhaps another arm of the service, to readjust himself to take a basic course which he regards as “fundamental rookie training.” The problem is essentially a selling problem. Lack of interest on the part of retrainees, exaggerated promises that were made at other stations to mollify their shipments to our Center, failure to be paid for a considerable period of time, lack of adequate furloughs and fear of losing ratings are all problems peculiar to the retrainees. . . .\textsuperscript{62}

All of this added up to the fact that the retrainee arrived at the ASFTC in low spirits and in an antagonistic mood. The center, therefore, was confronted first with the task of building morale and changing the attitude of the men so that they would be receptive to instruction. Special efforts were made to bolster morale by giving each man an opportunity to state his grievances frankly and then attempting to resolve them quickly. A liberal policy was adopted in all dealings with these men. Furloughs were granted whenever possible, steps were taken to expedite their pay, and any clothing needed was issued promptly. The retrainees were grouped according to grade and previous experience to counteract any impression that they were being treated as rookies.

The necessity for retraining was explained in detail to the men during their orientation. Noncommissioned officers were assured that there would be no reductions in grade except for disciplinary reasons. To avoid demoralization resulting from unnecessary repetition of training, tests were given the retrainees soon after their arrival to determine whether they needed further basic military training. Those achieving a stipulated grade were transferred immediately to technical training, while those falling below this grade

\textsuperscript{60} Capt K. H. Dodd, Basic Military Training. Hq ASFTC, Camp Lee, Va., July 1944-September 1945 (Camp Lee hist rpt, Jun 46), pp. 1-2. (Hereafter cited as Dodd, Basic Mil Tng.)

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., App. A.
were shown their shortcomings and made to realize that they actually needed the training. The personal touch was emphasized, with company commanders offering to help the men solve their individual problems. The retrainees were segregated in accordance with the degree of their advancement in order to avoid bore-some repetition of elementary instruction. The same careful screening was employed in technical training, with each retrainee required to take only the portion of the course that his test showed he needed. In this way many hours of training were saved, and retrainees were made available for assignment at the earliest possible date.

Another special problem in 1944 concerned the training of limited-assignment personnel for jobs in zone of interior installations so that they could relieve general-service men for service overseas. In the face of the growing manpower shortage, the Army objective was to prepare all able-bodied men for duty in the theaters and to fill as many jobs as possible in this country with limited-assignment personnel, Wacs, and civilians. The training of limited-assignment personnel was a special problem for several reasons. One of these was that, because of their physical limitations, the men had to be placed in segregated units for their basic military training. They were transferred to technical training individually, whenever the unit commander determined that a man had completed the amount of training commensurate with his physical condition. Another reason for the difficulty was that all courses had been designed from the beginning of the war to meet the one objective of preparing men for service in the theaters, while limited-assignment personnel had to be instructed specifically for duty in zone of interior installations.

It is evident that the lack of officers with post quartermaster experience has a tendency to affect our courses and training because of lack of realization of what job and what type of training is needed for post, camp, and station duty. This is just the reverse of the situation three years ago in that we knew very little at that time about theaters of operation requirements and our training was faulty because we were teaching post, camp, and station duties in place of theater of operation duties.

At the time of their establishment it had been assumed that the replacement training centers through their normal training processes would produce an adequate number of potential leaders to serve as noncommissioned officers in newly activated units. This proved to be a fallacy, and by 1944 a serious shortage of qualified noncommissioned officers had developed. To overcome this shortage, insofar as the QMC was concerned, steps were taken in the spring of that year to establish a Leadership Training Course at Camp Lee. Candidates were selected from outstanding trainees who had completed their basic military and technical training and had exhibited sufficient qualities of leadership to be considered potential noncommissioned officers.

The program called for nine weeks of training. The first three weeks were devoted to instruction in teaching methods and duties of noncommissioned officers. During the final six weeks the students were appointed acting corporals and assigned to training companies in order to give them practical experience. The name of the course was changed to Noncommis-

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63 Ibid., App. A.
64 Ltr, Gen McReynolds, OQMG, to CO ASFTC, Camp Lee, 26 Apr 44, sub: General Tng Instructions, 353.
sioned Officer School in Troop Leadership in the fall of 1944 when the regimental training system of the center was replaced by a group organization. Actually, there were two of these schools at first, one for whites and the other for Negroes, but before the end of 1944 the number of Negroes had declined to such an extent that the two schools were combined and came to be known simply as the Troop Leadership School.\textsuperscript{65}

\textit{Redeployment Training}

Training programs before 1945 had been general in nature because they were designed to prepare individuals and units for operations against different enemies in widely scattered parts of the world. With victory in Europe finally assured, attention was turned to the task of adapting the programs specifically to the war against Japan. As early as October 1944 the War Department issued a directive to the ASF and the other two major commands instructing them to prepare definite plans for training new inductees and redeployed personnel and units after the defeat of Germany.

The directive specified that the term redeployment training was to be used to designate the training conducted in the United States for individuals and organizations returned from other combat areas for eventual redeployment to the Pacific theater, as distinguished from the training of new inductees and newly activated units. Further use of the term retraining was banned in recognition of the fact that it was resented by veterans returning from overseas. The directive also stipulated that the training week of redeployed personnel was to be limited to forty-four hours, in contrast to the regular forty-eight hours.\textsuperscript{66}

In compliance with this directive, the ASF instructed the chiefs of the technical services in December 1944 to revise the basic technical and basic team training phases of their replacement training programs. It was the middle of April 1945, however, before the new programs became effective. From then until V-J Day Quartermaster training at the Camp Lee and Fort Warren ASFTC's was directed primarily toward the production of highly skilled replacements for the Quartermaster organizations that were to be redeployed from the European theater and other combat areas to the Pacific for final operations against Japan.\textsuperscript{67}

The ASF instituted several innovations in its revised military training policy. One of these was a three-week refresher course, which was designed primarily to bring those with earlier training up to the standards established for the six-week basic military training phase. The program was elastic enough to meet the special needs of the individuals undergoing redeployment training in that it provided forty-eight hours of instruction each week for men with previous training who had no overseas experience, but only forty-four hours for redeployed personnel from the theaters, who were excused from Saturday afternoon schedules.

Another change in the basic military training phase was the stipulation that the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[65] (1) Ltr, Gen McReynolds, OQMG, to CG Camp Lee, 21 Mar 44, sub: Establishment of a Leadership Tng Course. (2) Dodd, Basic Mil Tng, pp. 26–50. (3) Remarks, Maj Gen Ray E. Porter, WDGS, at Tng Conf, Camp Claiborne, La., 10–12 Apr 44.

\item[66] Memo, Gen Porter, ACoS G–3, for CGs ASF, AAF, and AGF, 5 Oct 44, sub: Tng After the Defeat of Germany.

\item[67] (1) Memo, Dir of Mil Tng, ASF, for TQMG et al., 20 Dec 44, sub: Tng After the Defeat of Germany. (2) For a detailed analysis of the MTPs in 1945, see Young, Mobil Tng Plans, pp. 181–207.
\end{footnotes}
final week of the six-week program be spent in field bivouac. The men received at the ASFTC were screened by a process of interview and examination of their records to determine their physical and mental qualifications, and then each man was assigned to either six weeks of basic military training or three weeks of refresher training, or he was exempted from any further training in accordance with his new classification. In all basic military training under the redeployment program, stress was placed on subjects particularly applicable to Pacific warfare such as swimming, security against surprise attack, and Japanese weapons and tactics.\(^{68}\)

The technical training program prepared by The Quartermaster General for the redeployment period was substantially the same as that outlined in the preactivation training programs of 1944, except for special emphasis on subjects that would prepare enlisted specialists for operations in the Far East. All Quartermaster enlisted men—those with experience in the zone of interior or overseas, as well as new recruits—were required to complete eight weeks of basic technical training and three weeks of basic team training before they could be sent to the Pacific theater. Special provisions were made, however, to give specialists full credit for previous training or experience. Thus when tests and interviews indicated that individuals were qualified in a required military occupational specialty they were exempted from further training, while those who were partially qualified by reason of previous civilian or military training or by experience were required to take only the additional instruction necessary to meet the requirements.

Although this system, which came to be known as fractional training, was a significant feature of the redeployment program, it was not new. It had been followed at Camp Lee during the previous year in connection with the retraining program. One feature that was new was the introduction of such subjects as waterproofing and moisture-proofing to the technical courses in order to teach Quartermaster specialists how to take care of tools, machinery, and equipment, and how to protect supplies under the damp and extremely hot climatic conditions of the Pacific.\(^{69}\)

The need for redeployment training ended abruptly with the surrender of Japan in August 1945. At that time most of the men who were scheduled to undergo this training were still in Europe. The following month the mobilization training programs were revised once more, this time to prepare replacements for occupation duty.\(^{70}\)

**Changes in Basic Military Training**

The basic military training given Quartermaster soldiers in the latter part of the war differed widely in character and scope from that administered in the emergency period or even during the first year after Pearl Harbor. The modifications that were made were the result of the change in the status of supply troops that evolved from wartime experience. The early programs at the Camp Lee and Fort Warren QMRTC’s emphasized such peacetime training subjects as dismounted drill, military courtesy and discipline, sanitation and first aid, map reading, care of clothing

\(^{68}\) MTP 21-4, 10 Mar 45, sub: MTP for Enlisted Pers of the ASF.

\(^{69}\) MTP 10-1, 15 Apr 45, sub: QM MTPs for QM Units at Tng Centers and for Repls at Repl Centers.

\(^{70}\) MTP, 10-1, 20 Sep 45, sub: MTP for QM Enlisted Pers of the ASF.
and equipment, and physical drill. Pistol familiarization firing was included, as was rifle marksmanship, but the schedule called for only a few hours of preparatory training and range firing. These programs were notable for their lack of tactical infantry training subjects that would prepare Quartermaster personnel for service under combat conditions, such as Army orientation, bayonet training, familiarization and field firing of the carbine, cover and movement, extended order drill, hasty field fortifications, infiltration and combat course training, demolition training, mines and booby traps, defense against air and mechanized attack, and tactical scouting and patrolling.

These subjects and other features had been added by the spring of 1944, but the elaborate basic military training program, which by then was standard for all ASF enlisted personnel, had been developed gradually since 1940. The development was particularly slow at first for a number of reasons. For one thing, there had been repeated delays in preparing Quartermaster mobilization training programs during the emergency period because the Quartermaster School, with its limited number of personnel and heavy teaching load, was reluctant to undertake the task, while the OQMG lacked the experienced training personnel to assume the responsibility. Consequently, the programs were not formulated as rapidly as they might otherwise have been. During the critical period following Pearl Harbor, the first objective was to train the largest number of men possible in the shortest time possible, and there was little opportunity to make drastic changes in basic doctrine. Another reason was that it was difficult for the War Department, whose function it was to prepare the mobilization training programs upon which the various installations based their detailed training schedules, to determine in advance the exact extent of the role the Quartermaster soldier would play in a global war. It was about the middle of 1943 before any reliable experience data were available for establishing training requirements. Moreover, training facilities and equipment were extremely scarce during the early days of the war and this further handicapped the expansion of the program.

Still another factor was that the Corps, because its training for years had been devoted to producing post quartermasters, was severely lacking in personnel capable of conducting field training. This was evidenced by the caliber of the early cadres sent to the QMRTC's.

... they were for the most part unqualified for the jobs they were expected to perform. Few had any type of basic military experience, almost none had fired the various weapons, and most were considered the undesirables and castoffs of various Regular Army units.

The early deficiencies of the training program were overcome as rapidly as possible after the country entered the war. To facilitate instruction and give the trainees the most appropriate environment for practical military instruction, training was removed insofar as possible from the classroom and drill field to wooded training areas, which were equipped eventually with demonstration areas, infiltration courses, regimental theaters, practice firing ranges of various types, and virtually

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71 MTP 10-2, 25 Jul 41, sub: QM MTPs for QM Enlisted Reps at QMRTC's.
72 MTP 21-4, 10 Mar 45, sub: MTP for Enlisted Pers of the ASF.
73 Lt William H. Fickes, Basic Military Training (Camp Lee AsfTc hist rpt, Mar 45), p. 13. (Hereafter cited as Fickes, Basic Mil Tng.)
every other kind of facility for basic military training. Training films and film strips had been introduced in a small way at the QMRTC's during the first training cycle, and their use was gradually expanded until practically every subject was supplemented by this type of visual aid. Numerous other kinds of training aids also were employed in an effort to reduce theoretical instruction to a minimum. By the fall of 1943 all instruction in basic military training was being made as realistic as possible. The battle inoculation course was being utilized to condition the men mentally for combat operations by subjecting them to close overhead fire, battle sounds, and other conditions they were likely to encounter in the field.

The progress of the trainees in absorbing instruction during the basic military training phase was ascertained by means of periodic tests. These tests, originated in the summer of 1941, had to be reformulated and improved almost constantly to keep pace with revisions in training programs. During the greater part of the war, basic military testing included a battalion test at the end of the first two weeks, a regimental test at the end of the fourth week, and a brigade test at the conclusion of the basic military training period.

The brigade test was the most comprehensive and the most important of these tests because it determined whether or not the men had successfully completed this phase of training. More than fifty different mimeographed tests covering the basic military training field were developed by the brigade headquarters, and when the trainees appeared on the field they were unaware of which particular test they would face. Each test encompassed eight subjects, was conducted both verbally and by performance, and lasted for two hours.

Some portions of the test were conducted by squads, others by platoons. Individual deficiencies were reported to the company commanders, who ordered the men to remedy their weaknesses by additional training, usually conducted after normal training hours. A progress chart was instituted at Camp Lee in April 1943. Each squad leader maintained a chart showing the presence or absence of each trainee at each instructional period. Time lost by absence was required to be made up in extra instructional periods. Eventually, individual cards recording the satisfactory or unsatisfactory completion of each course were developed.

A more reliable method of testing individuals was established at Camp Lee early in 1945. It involved the use of a pictorial test consisting of 100 questions pertaining to all prescribed basic military subjects. Each question was of the best-answer type, with four possible answers depicted in picture form. The papers were graded and evaluated by the Basic Military Testing Section of the center by means of an electrical accounting machine. The results were analyzed and an applicatory test was compiled, based on subjects in which errors were committed by one third or more of the group.

Trainees whose papers on the pictorial test had been unsatisfactory were segregated into small groups for the applicatory test, during which individual performances were carefully checked. Those whose proficiency had been rated as satisfactory in the pictorial test were divided into groups of twenty to twenty-five to participate in an applicatory critique conducted by the

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74 For a complete list of films used in basic military training at Camp Lee, see Fickes, Basic Mil Tng, App. L.
75 Fickes, Basic Mil Tng, pp. 31–37.
company officers and cadre, during which stress was placed on those subjects in which the pictorial test had revealed the company to be weakest. Results in the applicatory phase of testing were consolidated with those in the pictorial phase, and personnel found deficient in part were required to make up those subjects in concurrent basic training in a technical company. The success of the method of testing developed at Camp Lee was indicated by the fact that it was adopted in whole or in part by other training centers over the country.\(^{76}\)

**Developments in Technical Training**

Technical training was handicapped even more than basic military training by the general shortage of equipment, lack of facilities, and other factors during the emergency period and the early part of the war. Any camp could construct obstacle courses, fox holes, and sand tables depicting strategic defense positions, but it was not so easy to simulate a mobile bath unit or a shoe repair shop. Consequently, most of the early technical instruction had to be of a theoretical nature and was conducted in the classroom, rather than in the workshop, with pictures, films, and diagrams taking the place of pieces of equipment. Tools and supplies also were in extremely short supply. The refrigeration school at Fort Warren, for example, started with no charts, no data books, and no equipment, while the drafting school had one stylus and a twelve-inch rule.\(^{77}\)

Courses for mechanics had to be conducted largely out of doors, or in tents, pending completion of shop buildings. Each platoon functioned as a class, and an instructor, usually inexperienced, attempted to explain by word or picture the technical operation of a complex machine.

Even when the first training equipment arrived much of it was obsolete or unsuitable. For instance, the first sterilizers made available to the sterilization and bath school at Camp Lee were mule-drawn, wood-burning or coal-burning vehicles of 1908 vintage, in sharp contrast to the modern, motorized, highly intricate, gasoline machines.\(^{78}\) Similarly, the trucks utilized at first in the training of mechanics and drivers were either civilian or World War I types, quite unlike those produced for World War II.

In addition to the early shortages of equipment, supplies, and facilities, there was also an extreme scarcity of experienced instructors. With Regular Army personnel spread thin, the burden of training recruits fell upon inexperienced Reserve officers and civilians, who were not familiar with field operations or newly developed equipment. It was a case of the trainer having to learn while he was attempting to teach the trainee.

Furthermore, technical training was hampered more than basic military training when the total replacement training period was reduced to eight weeks shortly after Pearl Harbor. It was directed that the first four weeks be given over to basic military training. As a result, although Fort Warren was unable to comply with this order immediately, the technical training period at Camp Lee was cut in half, and even eliminated entirely in the

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\(^{76}\) Dodd, Basic Mil Tng, pp. 21–25.


\(^{78}\) Lt William H. Fickes and Capt K. H. Dodd, Basic Technical Training, Camp Lee (Camp Lee ASFTC hist rpt, July 1943–January 1946), p. 119. (Hereafter cited as Fickes and Dodd, Basic Tech Tng, Camp Lee.)
These early problems were pretty well resolved by the beginning of 1943. Competent instructors had been selected and trained, technical shops and other training facilities had been constructed, and the original gap between urgent requirements on the battle fronts and production on the home front had lessened to the extent that sizable quantities of equipment were being provided for the training centers. Theoretical instruction in the classroom had been reduced to a minimum, and each man was being given the opportunity to learn his job by doing it. For example, apprentices learned to become mechanics by working on modern military trucks, bakers baked bread in mobile bakeries, and laundry operators washed clothes for the camp.

During the later years of the war the technical training program was expanded by the addition of such new courses as testing of petroleum products, office-machine repair, band training, slaughtering and the cutting of meats, and preparation of dehydrated foods. Moreover, frequent adjustments were necessary because of the constant improvement of equipment and the development of new and better training aids. Most of the training films were only in the embryonic stage by the end of 1942, and many other types of training aids were still to be developed.

Generally speaking, all technical training at the QMRTC's was divided into two
categories: motor training and supply training. During the emergency period and the early months of the war when the Corps was responsible for the transportation function, motor training represented more than half of the Quartermaster training load. This situation did not change immediately with the transfer of motor transport activities to the Ordnance Department on 1 August 1942. Facilities of that service were not yet adequate for training personnel in third and fourth echelon maintenance, so the QMRTC's were directed to instruct the necessary maintenance specialists. This policy continued into 1943, though Camp Lee and Fort Warren were required to give only basic military instruction to the majority of Ordnance trainees after December 1942.

Motor training declined sharply at the QMRTC's in 1943, as there was no longer a demand for the Corps to supply motor mechanics except for second echelon maintenance of its own vehicles. Schools for motor training were organized into two general groups: motor operation or driver training, and motor maintenance. The latter group offered instruction in many different automotive fields to train men as apprentice and general mechanics, machinists, welders, blacksmiths, engine specialists, electricity and carburetion specialists, draftsmen, and shop foremen.

Motor training, insofar as organization and program of instruction were concerned, developed a more or less definite pattern by 1943. The plan employed at Camp Lee in giving instruction to mechanics and apprentices illustrates the general procedure followed in training all of the various specialists in the motor maintenance field. The program was based on the theory that trainees learned best by doing, and to that end they received most of their training by actually meeting diagnosis and maintenance requirements on vehicles in need of repair.

The unit shop method was employed, with the shops divided into chassis and engine bays, each equipped with appropriate tools and equipment. Uniformity of instruction in the various shops was assured through the use of lesson plans for instructors and job sheets for students. A minimum amount of theoretical instruction was supplemented by an extensive program of practical conferences and demonstrations where numerous training aids were utilized, including training films, film strips, charts, and cutaway models of automotive working parts.

Students were instructed in nomenclature, mechanical operations, and the use of hand tools, and then taught how to repair and adjust various types of Army vehicles. In addition, they were instructed in methods of recovering disabled vehicles under field conditions. They were taught first the disassembly and reassembly of engine units, together with the hand-tool course consisting of soldering, filing, chipping, drilling, thread cutting, screw extracting, and flaring. The vehicle-recovery portion of the course consisted of training in field rigging and expedients, wreckers and wrecker service, and actual recovery operations.

One feature of this training was the "county fair" method of instruction.

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81 Separate engine and chassis shops were used at Fort Warren. See Fickes and Dodd, Basic Tech Tng, Camp Lee, p. 42, n. 70.
whereby small groups of trainees were able to witness various demonstrations at the same time, rotating until each group had witnessed all demonstrations. The final stages of training consisted of repairs, replacements, and adjustments to engine units with special attention to engine rebuilding, carburetion and ignition, lubrication, and vehicle inspection.82

The production shops, where the sixth and seventh weeks of the course were spent, provided the trainees with ample opportunity for practical application of their training in the servicing of the hundreds of vehicles in use at the Camp Lee QMRTC. Throughout the course the relationship between the students and instructors was similar to that between apprentices and foremen. Individual rather than group instruction was the rule. Students were graded on their aptitude and interest displayed in the workshop and their general ability to perform the tasks covered in the job sheets.

In the motor operations school, potential vehicle operators who passed preliminary mental and physical examinations were subjected to a psychophysical test.

82 Ibid., pp. 41–50, 68.
This was designed to determine visual acuity, steadiness, color perception, range of vision, and co-ordination of the trainees, and to eliminate those unfit to become Army drivers. The drivers' course during the first weeks was virtually the same as that given apprentice mechanics. The objective was to teach the nomenclature and functions of units and parts of motor vehicles as a background for training in vehicle operation as well as in preventive maintenance, including inspections, tightening, lubrication, and the use of tools and equipment furnished with Army vehicles. Brief classroom instruction was given in such subjects as hand signals, map reading, forms and records, and lubricants. Actual driving instruction was conducted on a progressive pattern, beginning with elementary training, followed by convoy operations, night and blackout driving, driving over difficult terrain, motor inspections, and decontamination of vehicles, and concluding with instruction regarding trailer units, loads, and loading. At the conclusion of the course trainees were given final written and road tests.\(^{83}\)

An additional week was added to the drivers' eight-week course in the summer of 1944 in order to train personnel in the mechanism, maintenance, and the firing of the .50-caliber machine gun from various mounts. Trainees spent the first day and a half learning the nomenclature and mechanism of the gun and then were assigned to a scaled-down range where they practiced firing a compressed-air-operated duplicate of the gun at model planes towed across a backdrop. The scale was such that the leads taken with the training gun were the same as would be taken with an actual machine gun under normal battle conditions. The last half of the week was spent at Camp Pendleton, Va., where the trainees fired actual machine guns mounted on trucks at free balloons, towed sleeve-aerial targets, and radio-controlled airplane targets along the seacoast.\(^{84}\)

Supply training covered a wider and more diversified field than motor training and presented a greater problem in grouping specialists for common courses. The groupings made at Camp Lee and Fort Warren varied from time to time but, generally speaking, plumbers, steamfitters, and sheet metal workers were given a common course, as were chief clerks, typists, clerk-typists, shipping clerks, messengers, and first sergeants. Instruction in depot supply, commissary operations, procurement, and warehousing usually was combined because depot supply and commissary operations were similar in that they dealt with items procured, while warehousing was a concomitant of each. Salvage, service, and railhead operations also provided a common ground for training. Similarly, a carpentry course was given construction specialists and general mechanics as well as carpenters. In each instance of combined training an attempt was made to accentuate the specialty training necessary for the individual.\(^{85}\)

Such groupings usually made it possible to consolidate the numerous specialists in the supply-training field into fewer than twenty technical schools at each of the QMRTC's. The most common of these were administrative and supply, depot supply, bakery, canvas repair, carpentry, clothing and textile, cooks' and mess sergeants', electrical, fumigation and bath,}

\(^{82}\) Ibid., pp. 50-57, 62-69.  
\(^{84}\) (1) Ibid., pp. 58-59. (2) MTP 21-3, Sec. VI, 1 May 44, sub: MTP for Enlisted Pers of the ASF.  
\(^{85}\) Fickes and Dodd, Basic Tech Tng, Camp Lee, pp. 79-80.
labor, laundry, plumbing, salvage and shoe repair schools.

Each school was normally headed by an officer, and his instructional staff usually comprised officers, enlisted men, and civilians. All of the schools made marked progress from meager beginnings, and although their subject matter varied widely, their instructional procedure followed a general pattern, as illustrated by the following brief description of operations at a few of the larger ones at Camp Lee.

In the school for cooks and mess sergeants, company messes were utilized as training laboratories to give students practical experience in Army cooking. It was soon discovered that more than five students overcrowded a kitchen. Consequently, it became necessary at Camp Lee to utilize all of the mess kitchens of the QMRTC as well as those of other installations in the camp, such as the Quartermaster School and the hospital. Instruction was divided about equally between theoretical classroom training and practical cooking instruction and experience in the kitchen. Advanced students who exhibited leadership were given instruction as mess sergeants, and student officers were trained in mess management.

As the war progressed, more and more emphasis was placed upon practical instruction in the field, such as the care and operation of the M1937 gasoline field range, field cooking expedients, and cook-
ing under convoy and bivouac conditions. Early in 1942 the school was allocated areas at the rifle range, where tents were pitched, field ranges were set up, and meals were served to troops. Later in the year student cooks were assigned to the daily motor training convoys and to troops ordered to bivouac overnight in areas outside the camp. A pastry class was formed in the summer of 1942 to instruct student cooks in baking pastry under field as well as garrison conditions. In September 1943, when troops sent to the A. P. Hill Military Reservation were organized into companies, student cooks were assigned to each company and completed their instruction under conditions closely paralleling those in theaters of operations.

Special subjects, too, were added to the curriculum as the need arose. In January 1944 a dehydrated food section was created and students were trained to prepare complete meals with dehydrated products. In February of the same year a butchery section was established to train butchers in the proper Army method of slaughtering animals and cutting meats. The students were placed in various meat packing plants and slaughter houses in the nearby cities of Petersburg and Richmond to gain practical experience.\(^6\)

In the depot supply school, originally known as the warehousing school, general all-round training in Army depot procedure was conducted for selected students to prepare them for duty as warehouse-
men and stock record clerks. They were given courses in property accounting, subsistence accounting, storage and issue, requisitions, field operations, procurement, and map reading. Instruction was primarily by the lecture and practical exercise method. At the same time, the students were given a working knowledge of Army Regulations pertinent to depot functions.

As in other schools, increasing emphasis was placed on practical and field training. A dummy boxcar was erected for use at the camp in illustrating the proper method of loading and unloading various types of equipment and supplies. The trainees were taken on a tour of the ASF depot and the holding and reconsignment point adjacent to it at Richmond, where a complete inspection was held, followed by a critique. In October 1943 the school was commissioned to operate a provisional depot for training purposes at the A. P. Hill Military Reservation. The trainees lived there for two weeks and experienced for the first time conditions similar to those they would find in a theater of operations. During that time they were required to move the depot several times to new locations, at least twice under blackout conditions.

In December 1943 a field training area was established within the limits of Camp Lee, where, during the eighth week of training, principles taught earlier in such subjects as camouflage and concealment, traffic control, stacking of supplies in the open, and safety precautions were applied in preparation for what was to follow at the reservation. In February 1944 arrangements were made to have trainees spend a week of their training at the cold storage warehouse at the Richmond Quartermaster Market Center and at the railhead and distributing point of the Third Service Command, where students loaded and unloaded perishable subsistence, shipped refrigerator cars to various ports and military installations, and kept the necessary records.

A depot supply training laboratory was constructed late in 1944. It contained a number of offices designed to represent various types of companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, stations, and depots. Use of this laboratory enabled instructors to detect more easily the weaknesses in student performance and gave students a better understanding of the flow of paper through the various channels of supply. About the same time the entire field training area was established as a camouflage school, one of the features of which was a camouflage course that students in all of the technical schools were required to attend one day a week.

During 1945 facilities of the field training area were increased greatly, and the depot supply training program was made more varied and functional. For example, the students were taught the correct method of preparing motor vehicles for rail shipment, and a glider was utilized to demonstrate air cargo transport. Under the guidance of instructors, the students built paulin warehouses and open-storage sheds similar to those used in the various theaters. Supplies in paulin cases were stacked in a manner illustrating proper provision for ventilation to prevent deterioration of supplies in the humid weather encountered in Pacific areas. A model beachhead was constructed to demonstrate supply operations on enemy beaches. The students were taught such things as how to use rafts to float in supplies, and how to construct temporary bridges. Every effort was made to acquaint trainees with the field expedients and improvisations
learned from personnel returned from overseas supply operations.\textsuperscript{87}

In the laundry school, as another illustration, students were instructed in the operations of mobile, portable, and permanent types of Army laundries, as well as in the methods of handling all types of fabrics, the different water temperatures required under varying conditions, and other knowledge necessary for the successful washing of clothes. The course was designed to produce four different types of specialists: skilled laundry foremen, laundry-machine operators, potential laundry mechanics, and firemen. More than half of the total training time was spent in giving the students actual experience in the operation of all types of laundry machines and boilers. The remaining portion of the period was devoted primarily to classroom instruction in such subjects as laundry units, marking and receipt of clothing, sorting and delivery, types of water, generators, boilers, and plumbing.\textsuperscript{88}

Progress of students in absorbing technical training at the QMRTC’s was tested, in general, by weekly and spot quizzes in the various schools and a final test at the end of the technical training period covering all significant phases of the requirements for the specialty involved. Originally these final tests were largely theoretical, for, while emphasis was placed on meet-

\textsuperscript{87}(1) Ibid., pp. 95-99. (2) Capt K. H. Dodd, Basic Technical Training, Hq ASFTC, Camp Lee, Va., July 1944-September 1945 (Camp Lee hist rpt, Jun 46), pp. 16-17.

\textsuperscript{88}Fickes and Dodd, Basic Tech Tng, pp. 125-27.
ing certain requirements, no uniform yardstick had been established to ascertain just when these requirements had been met. In some subjects, such as typewriting and weapons firing, the progress of students was obvious, but this was not so in many other subjects, such as salvage collection and laundry maintenance. By June 1944, however, standardized testing programs had been adopted for all specialties at both the theoretical and performance levels. Performance tests varied in duration from a two-hour test for a motor mechanic and a twelve-hour test for a clerk, to a twenty-four-hour test for a laborer or labor foreman. Trainees were graded as "skilled" or "potential," and such grades were submitted to the Classification and Assignment Section to be used as a basis for placement in outgoing assignments.

Evaluation of the Replacement Training Program

In an analysis of the replacement training program as it affected the QMC during World War II, the OQMG found that the system, for the most part, was "well fitted to the needs for training specialists" because it permitted "an advantageous concentration of the best available training facilities and teaching personnel," and promoted standardization of instruction. At the same time, the OQMG pointed out that there were some shortcomings that tended to lower the efficiency of QMC operations.

One of these was the failure to provide sufficient time for the technical training of specialists. The OQMG believed that eight weeks were entirely inadequate for this instruction and that the period should be extended to twelve weeks in any future mobilization.

Those trainees who complete their technical training in an eight week period are merely apprentices. Eight weeks is not sufficient time to train a man technically. The best that can be said for such a trainee is that he is equipped to enter a unit and be further trained until he becomes proficient in his new assignment. If trainees had the advantage of a 12 week training period in their particular skill they would be adequately trained and well qualified to move into a unit and perform the work for which they had been prepared.

The regimental form of training organization, which was employed by all of the replacement training centers throughout the greater part of the war, was deemed inefficient because it was necessary for the regimental headquarters to perform administrative and supply functions that could have been handled by the center headquarters in one consolidated organization. The duplication resulting from this system was a waste of manpower. Camp Lee effected a considerable saving in overhead personnel when it abandoned the regimental structure in the fall of 1944 and established three groups to conduct training.

Much valuable training time was lost at the replacement training centers during the war because no solution was found to the problem of how to keep the output of specialists of the various types in balance with requirements for them. The centers trained men in accordance with requirement and replacement rate tables, which specified the number and types of special-

89 (1) Ibid., pp. 30-31. (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Repls, Fillers, and Cadres, Pt. 1, p. 31.
90 Results of the analysis were embodied in a report to the War Department Replacement Board created by the General Staff to study all phases of the replacement problem. Ltr, Col Hastings, Chief of Pers and Tng Div, OQMG, to WD Repl Bd, 17 Sep 47, sub: Repl System Study, 322.
91 Ibid.
ists needed per thousand men for each arm and service. These rates varied considerably as the war progressed. In the beginning they were based on the requirements for specialists for the many types of new units of all kinds that were being activated, and upon normal attrition, that is, losses from such causes as death, transfers, and discharges. Later on, after mobilization was completed and casualty data became available from the theaters where the units had been sent, battle casualties plus normal attrition became the basis for computing requirements. Thus demands for some types of specialists increased while others declined. During the first six months of 1944, for example, requirements for specialists in such activities as depot operations, laundry, and clothing and equipage were much greater than they had been in the first six months of 1942, while demands for bakers, cooks, clerks, and motor operators declined sharply.92

Both Camp Lee and Fort Warren consistently trained too many men in some categories and too few in others, with the result that many had to be retrained in other specialties. Much of this difficulty might have been overcome if the reception centers had exercised greater care in making their shipments of trainees to replacement training centers conform more closely in numbers and qualifications to the desired ratios established by the War Department, and if they had been able to retain the more valuable types of specialists until the QMRTC's had specific requirements for them. Because of their limited capacities, however, the reception centers were unable to do this. The rapid expansion of the Army and the shortage of housing facilities forced them to keep inductees flowing to the QMRTC's or directly to units regardless of whether their occupational specialties conformed to existing requirements.

Division of control over the QMRTC's themselves was still another weakness. While The Quartermaster General had full responsibility for conducting the training, commanders of corps areas (later service commands) frequently exercised administrative control over the QMRTC's. The OQMG expressed the conviction at the conclusion of the war that the replacement training centers had functioned more efficiently when they were maintained as installations of the individual technical services and both administrative and training activities were kept entirely under their jurisdiction. It was pointed out that consolidation of the two functions eliminated duplications and thus not only relieved a substantial number of personnel for other jobs but also simplified and improved co-ordinating procedures.

Obviously there were weaknesses, too, in the overseas replacement system, for, despite the fact that more than 400,000 Quartermaster enlisted replacements were trained in nearly 100 different military specialties at Camp Lee and Fort Warren during the war, commanders in the various overseas theaters reported that they experienced considerable difficulty in getting the types of specialists they needed. They complained from time to time that the quantities of men they received fell short of the numbers requisitioned and that many of those they did get were either untrained or only partially trained.93

The situation undoubtedly was due to a combination of factors. One of the basic factors was, of course, that the replace-

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93 Address, Col Lloyd R. Wolfe, Dir of Mil Tng Div, OQMG, at Conf attended by chief QMs of areas of occupation, 17-29 Dec 45.
ment training centers trained specialists in accordance with MOS rate tables supplied by the War Department, which never was completely successful in gearing the tables to actual requirements, particularly because the requirements were changing almost constantly. As a result, fully trained men were not always available for overseas shipments in all of the categories listed in the requisitions and others had to be substituted.

The requisition system itself was at least partially to blame. In the first place, The Quartermaster General was not authorized to communicate directly with theater commanders on matters of personnel and therefore was unable to follow through on requisitions. The names and MOS numbers of the replacements who were to become available for overseas assignment were reported to The Adjutant General by the classification and assignment officer of the training center about three weeks prior to the time they were to complete their technical training. The Adjutant General, in turn, filled the theater requisitions, after they had been approved by the War Department, from the lists of potential graduates and ordered the commanding general of the center to ship the men to the appropriate personnel replacement depot in the zone of interior. There the men from the various services were consolidated by their MOS numbers and shipped overseas to the personnel depot in the theater to which they had been assigned.

It was from these depots that the commanders finally filled their requisitions through MOS numbers. It was often three to four months from the time the theater commanders submitted their requisitions before the soldiers arrived in the theaters, and a lot of things could happen in the interim. One of the most common things that did happen was that the requisitions for Quartermaster replacements were filled by men trained by other technical services, and vice versa. Another difficulty was that replacements often grew stale as a result of the long time that intervened between the completion of their training in the zone of interior and their assignment to duty in a theater.

Col. Lloyd R. Wolfe, director of the OQMG Military Training Division, who investigated the situation on a trip to the European Theater of Operations, came to the conclusion that the failure of theaters to receive the type of trained replacements they requisitioned was due to one of two things:

Either personnel responsible for the preparation of theater requisitions are not indicating thereon the MOS numbers required... or the personnel replacement depots... are filling requisitions without regard to MOS numbers.96

In effect, an indirect tug-of-war resulted between those responsible for the training of Quartermaster personnel in the zone of interior and overseas Quartermaster officers who made requisitions for replacements. The former, eager to eliminate personnel shortcomings in overseas operations, were prepared to make appropriate adjustments in the training program. At the same time, the overseas need for Quartermaster personnel was always so desperate that the theaters were actually prepared to take partially trained men on the theory that they could round out their training “on the job.” Obviously such a situation could never satisfy all parties; it could only be resolved by constant experimentation.

94 Remarks, Col Hastings and Col Wolfe, OQMG, at Conf, 17-29 Dec 45.
95 Address, Col Wolfe, OQMG, at Conf, 17-29 Dec 45.
CHAPTER VIII

Schools for Officers and Enlisted Specialists

The technical schools operated at the Quartermaster replacement training centers constituted only one phase of the extensive educational system developed by the Quartermaster Corps in World War II to train the many and varied specialists it needed. Numerous other schools and special courses had to be established to train new officers and to give advanced instruction to enlisted specialists and commissioned personnel.

Much of this training was carried on at the Quartermaster School, the principal permanent educational institution of the Corps. It was there that the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School was established in the summer of 1941 and operated throughout the war. In addition, the Quartermaster School provided refresher, specialist, and advanced Quartermaster instruction for many thousands of officers and enlisted men. Furthermore, the Corps operated special motor transport, subsistence, and bakers' and cooks' schools, and utilized the facilities of many factories, commercial trade schools, and civilian colleges and universities that were especially equipped to train officers and men for jobs requiring highly developed technical or administrative skills.

The supervision of the various schools and courses was the responsibility of the Military Training Division, OQMG, and its predecessors. Insofar as possible, the instruction was given at Army installations. In many cases, however, particularly during the early stages of the war, existing military facilities were inadequate and it became necessary for the division to coordinate its activities with, and set up courses of instruction in, civilian institutions. In order to accomplish its training task, the division not only had to establish many elaborate schools, but also had to train thousands of instructors and devise newer, more efficient instructional methods. All of this had to be done in a hurry, as large numbers of technicians were needed in overseas theaters as well as in the zone of interior to handle all phases of Quartermaster supply and service.

The Officer Candidate School

Courses of instruction at the Quartermaster OCS were designed to equip candidates from the enlisted ranks "with the basic knowledge needed to begin their careers as second lieutenants."1 Graduates

1 (1) ASF Manual M3, 25 Apr 44, sub: Courses of Instruction, p. 46. (2) For a discussion of the problems involved in procuring candidates for the Quartermaster OCS, the growth of the school, and the number of graduates, see above, Ch. VI, The Role of the Officer Candidate School.
progressed to higher commissioned grades as they acquired additional training elsewhere or experience in the field. The advanced training generally was conducted at the Quartermaster School or at the various depots.

Enrollment at the OCS was restricted originally to warrant officers and enlisted men under thirty-seven years of age who had been in active service at least six months, but early in 1942 the age limit was raised to forty-five and the length of service required for eligibility was reduced to three months. The training covered a period of three months until July 1943, when the course was lengthened to seventeen weeks.

As in the case of other Quartermaster schools, the instructional program and teaching methods changed radically at the OCS during the war. The 150 students in the first class, which was conducted at the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia in the summer of 1941, spent twenty-four hours a week for thirteen weeks in the classroom attempting to absorb instruction in technical fields from lectures. Their basic military training consisted of three hours of calisthenics each week and four hours of drill and inspection on Saturday mornings. Members of the faculty and staff, largely Reserve officers with limited experience, had to devote much of their time to preparing instructional material because War Department publications were inadequate. The only weapons available were rifles borrowed from the University of Pennsylvania ROTC.²

With the transfer of the Quartermaster School from Philadelphia to Camp Lee, Va., the second officer candidate class began there in October 1941. It had been under way two months when the attack upon Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war and forced a vast enlargement of the OCS program and facilities. The October class was approximately the same size as the first one, but the third class, which began in January 1942, enrolled 500 candidates. Within a few months the Quartermaster OCS quota had jumped to 1,200 per class, and it became necessary to establish a branch OCS at Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyo., to handle the overflow from Camp Lee. New Quartermaster OCS classes were started at the rate of one about every three weeks throughout 1942.

This mass production of new officers made it necessary to revise instructional methods and to procure many additional instructors, a large share of whom were selected from among the graduates of the early OCS classes. Manuals and other training publications were hurriedly prepared, and training aids, such as films, miniature models, charts, graphs, and dramatizations, began to be developed to supplement lectures. Training equipment was so scarce throughout the first year of the war that instructors frequently had only pictures, drawings, or replicas to show the candidates in demonstrating the operating principles of the weapons and the numerous types of machines they would use later in the field. It was 1943 before equipment was available in sufficient quantities so that the candidates could observe, and sometimes participate in, the actual operation of the machines and apparatus.

The course of instruction itself was also revised substantially following Pearl Harbor. Actual involvement in the war meant, of course, that a large proportion of the

new officers would soon be serving in the field. Additional basic military and technical subjects therefore were introduced, and efforts were exerted toward making the instruction more realistic. The program throughout the first year of the war, however, was based on the general assumption that the Quartermaster officer had to be trained only as a technician. Consequently the emphasis was upon training in the technical aspects of Quartermaster supply, with virtually no attention directed to possible participation in combat operations.

The need for a radical change in the officer training program became increasingly apparent late in 1942 and early in 1943. Information received from military observers in the North African Theater of Operations in the winter of 1942–43 revealed that supply concentrations were favorite targets of enemy planes and tanks and that there were disastrous results when supply lines were not adequately protected. This experience changed the basic requirements for Quartermaster officers since it meant in effect that they would have to be trained as combat leaders as well as technicians. They would have to be physically fit, familiar with tactics, and capable of directing Quartermaster troops in defending themselves and their equipment and supplies.

This new concept resulted in extensive revisions in the OCS program, as well as in the other courses offered at the Quartermaster School which were designed to give advanced training to officers. Physical conditioning, use of the obstacle course, and some weapons training had been introduced in 1942, but by the spring and summer of 1943 a rigorous military training program was under way, with special emphasis upon tactical field training and defense against gas, mechanized, air, and paratroop attacks.3

Tactical training exercises were given during this period in airplane loading, blackout driving, car loading, handling clothing and equipage, driving course and convoy operations, field bakery, gasoline and oil supply, kitchen car, motor march, mobile laundry, railhead and truckhead, sterilization and bath, and warehouse operations. Major technical subjects in the program included orientation on the progress of the war, classification procedure, personnel administration, commercial transportation, procurement, methods of instruction, packaging and loading of supplies, salvage, field operations, and depot supply.

By the time this more practical military training program had been developed, the most urgent requirements for officers were finally being met and the size of OCS classes began a steady decline that continued until near the end of 1943.4 With the pressure eased, the emphasis at the OCS shifted from quantity to quality, and all officer candidate training in the ASF was extended from thirteen to seventeen weeks beginning in July 1943. The additional four weeks made possible more intensive field and military training. The new course adopted at the Quartermaster OCS provided for about eleven weeks of military training and maneuvers, though academic instruction was conducted concurrently with the military training.

The belief was quite general in the closing weeks of 1943 that the Quartermaster OCS had virtually accomplished its mission and that future operations would be

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3 (1) Ibid., pp. 21–28. (2) OCS Program of Instruction, Jun-Jul 43.
4 See above, Ch. VI, The Role of the Officer Candidate School.
MINIATURE MODELS FOR TRAINING. Above, scale models of piers, camouflaged warehouses, and a cargo vessel; and below, electrically operated miniature trains.
MINIATURE MODELS FOR TRAINING. Above, reproductions of railheads for three classes of supply; and below, base depot with camouflaged warehouses.
on a very small scale. For a brief period in December of that year no classes were in session, and the one class that began that month enrolled only 103 candidates. It quickly became apparent, however, that requirements for commissioned personnel in the QMC had been underestimated, for almost immediately another serious shortage of Quartermaster officers developed and it became necessary to increase sharply the size of OCS classes. In the first six months of 1944 eight new classes were started with a combined enrollment of approximately 2,550.5

This reversed trend and sudden revival in officer candidate training stimulated interest in the program and resulted in a number of changes. One of the most important of these was the inauguration of a tactical field training program that required the candidates to live under field conditions for two of the seventeen weeks of their training period. During this phase they were called upon to solve practical problems in technical and basic military training and in this and other ways prove their ability and leadership. The field training was conducted originally at the Swift Creek Recreation Area and the Jordan’s Lake Training Area, both in the general vicinity of Camp Lee, and later at the A. P. Hill Military Reservation.

Another important change was the appointment in January 1944 of a director of officer candidate training, who occupied a staff position under the assistant commandant, Quartermaster School Department. One of the first acts of this director was to conduct a survey to determine the strong and the weak points of the OCS program. This proved helpful in correcting mistakes and in strengthening the program to insure that the new officers acquired the combination of military and technical skills necessitated by the logistics of modern global warfare. The survey led to a decision to allot more time to such subjects as weapons familiarization and firing, physical training, inspection and maintenance of motor vehicles, command of Negro troops, vehicle loading, bivouacs in theaters of operations, map exercises, stock record accounting, preparation of shipping documents, supply procedures for units ordered overseas, the command voice, troop movements by motor transport, Quartermaster administration, methods of instruction, and classification of clothing.6

Revisions made in the OCS subject matter after the middle of 1944 were of a relatively minor nature, but a reorganization of the School Department in October of that year brought changes in educational methods and procedures that resulted in a general improvement of the program. OCS instructors, who formerly had divided their time among various kinds of courses at the Quartermaster School, were assigned exclusively to the newly created Officer Candidate Division and so were able to devote their full attention to this one type of training. Moreover, the director of the officer candidate course was also made director of the Officer Candidate Division, and this gave him the responsibility for the OCS program as well as the immediate supervision over the instructional staff. Thus he was able to realign the various fields of subject matter in such a way as to eliminate duplications and provide a more logical sequence and continuity to the training.7

Reports from the theaters had indicated

5 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. II, p. 22.
6 Ibid., Pt. I, pp. 26, 33–34, and App. 21, showing program of instruction.
7 Supplementary Hist Rpt, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, for ASF, QMC Officer Candidate School, 30 Jun–31 Dec 44, pp. 1, 4–5, 9–11.
that the most common weakness among Quartermaster officers was their lack of leadership ability. Emphasis therefore was centered upon interpreting all OCS training in terms of the leadership duties and responsibilities of junior officers with troops in the field. All staff-level training was eliminated except certain phases considered essential as background for later advanced instruction.\(^8\)

Educational procedures employed between the fall of 1944 and V-J Day were characterized by the increased use of applicatory exercises, demonstrations, and group performances, including such new features as dramatic skits to illustrate military leadership, animated cartoons with recorded narrative, written "situations" or problems requiring individual solutions, and forum-type presentations in which both faculty members and students participated. A "corner book shelf" was provided in the classrooms to encourage voluntary collateral reading on the technical and tactical progress of the war.

Early in 1945 the portion of the training period devoted to field training at the A. P. Hill Military Reservation was increased to three weeks, in line with the policy of presenting all types of instruction in practical form. Beginning in the spring of that year, when the early defeat of Germany had become a certainty, all map-reading exercises and training problems in field operations and logistical planning were based on anticipated activities in the Pacific.\(^9\)

Candidates in the early OCS classes were organized into a single training company for housekeeping purposes, but later on, when their numbers increased, it became necessary to form them into regiments. The platoon, nevertheless, was always the basic organization for field and classroom work.

Each platoon had its own training officer who served as leader and field instructor. The platoon leader was the keystone of the officer-training system because he instructed the men in all military phases of Quartermaster operations, and it was upon his leadership that much of the success of the program rested. Moreover, he had the responsibility for making a careful study of each man in his platoon and eliminating all who failed to display the necessary qualifications. The platoon leader usually was a recent graduate of the OCS who had been chosen for the job because he had demonstrated superior ability in leadership.\(^10\)

The cadet system followed at the school provided a practical test of the candidates' ability to command troops. Each man was given the opportunity to command troop units ranging in size from a squad to a battalion, and to serve in the capacity of both a noncommissioned and a commissioned officer. The platoon leader had the responsibility for assigning cadet officers and maintained a roster to make certain that cadet duties were evenly distributed among the candidates. Each cadet was graded on the originality and initiative he showed in the performance of his duties and responsibilities.

Another important feature of OCS training was the Quartermaster Demonstration Battalion. This battalion, which was employed in the technical training and field operations of all divisions of the Quartermaster School, was authorized in April 1942, but it was the fall of the year before adequate equipment was available.\(^9\)

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\(^8\) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. II, p. 13.
\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 1-11.
\(^10\) (1) For a detailed discussion of the duties of the platoon leader, see Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, App. 31. (2) Insp Rpt, Maj David D. Brobnis and Capt Benton D. Brandon for TQMG, 17 Feb 44, sub: QM OCS.
to make its work effective. It comprised thoroughly trained men and officers and its function was to demonstrate the correct method of carrying on the various Quartermaster activities and the proper use of equipment.

The officer candidates not only watched but participated to some extent in these demonstrations. For example, when a field bakery unit was being demonstrated, they helped to mix the dough, operate the machinery, and eat the bread. A similar procedure was followed in demonstrations of other units. The candidates were encouraged to examine the units, ask questions, and discuss the problems connected with their use in the theaters. The value of this practical training aid was rated so highly and the program of demonstrations increased to such an extent that by the early part of 1945 the Demonstration Battalion had absorbed the Military Training Division of the Quartermaster School.

Special training platoons were established late in 1942 for candidates who appeared to possess the necessary qualifications but whose records of progress were not up to the level of the rest of the class. Those whose difficulty was traced to the fact that they had lost or had never learned the technique of efficient study were assigned to the Academic Orientation Platoon where efforts were made to help them correct their own deficiencies through expert guidance and supervision. Some of the candidates lacked sufficient basic military skills to keep up with the class, and these were placed in the Military Development Platoon where they were given intensive practice in individual and group drilling. A candidate assigned to either of these platoons was given two weeks to overcome his weakness. If successful he joined the next OCS class. When the student's ability was still in doubt he was ordered to appear before the Officer Candidate Faculty Board, which ruled upon the disposition of all weak students.

Competent instructors were scarce from the start, and the shortage became acute when the OCS enrollment began to increase sharply soon after Pearl Harbor. It was necessary at first to select outstanding students from OCS classes and commission them a week or so in advance in order that they might be ready to teach in the next scheduled class. A systematic program for selecting and training instructors was set up early in 1942 with the establishment of the Instructor Training and Guidance Section under the assistant commandant of the Quartermaster School. OCS classes remained the greatest single source of potential instructors. By 1945, however, more than 60 percent of the instructors were officers returned from overseas. Because of the constant turnover of instructors, the work of the section was important throughout the war.

At the beginning of the OCS program, each instructor specialized in certain subjects and taught them both in the OCS and in other divisions of the Quartermaster School. Early in 1942, however, in order to put the school on a stricter military basis, members of the faculty as well as the OCS candidates were organized

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11 For a more detailed account of the operations of the Quartermaster Demonstration Battalion, see: (1) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Off Candidates, Pt. I, pp. 18–19, 31; (2) Supplementary Hist Rpt, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, for ASF, n.d., sub: QM Demonstration Bn, 30 Jun–31 Dec 44, pp. 1–6; and (3) Supplementary Hist Rpt, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, for ASF, QM Demonstration Bn, 1 Jan–30 Jun 45, pp. 1–10 and App.


along regimental lines. Instructors taught only in the regiment to which they were assigned. Because this plan was uneconomical and inefficient, it was soon abandoned and the faculty was again reorganized. This time a department system was devised whereby instructors were grouped into departments in accordance with the subjects they taught. This arrangement continued until October 1944 when, as pointed out earlier, the Officer Candidate Division was created in the Quartermaster School Department and the instructors who were assigned to it devoted their full attention to teaching in the OCS.

The Quartermaster School

While various temporary schools were conducted earlier by the QMC, the Quartermaster School had its beginning as a permanent educational institution in January 1920. At that time the General Administrative School was established at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot for the purpose of training selected enlisted men of the Corps in clerical, administrative, and executive duties. The original class graduated only seventeen men, but the enrollment in subsequent classes grew steadily, and in 1921 the school moved to larger quarters in the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. The following year officers and warrant officers were enrolled for the first time, and extension courses were instituted for Reserve and National Guard officers. By 1926 the name had been changed to the Quartermaster Corps School, and finally, in 1936, to the Quartermaster School.14

The mission of the school as well as its program of instruction gradually expanded over the years preceding the outbreak of World War II. In 1925 the school was removed from the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Depot and established as an independent institution of the Corps.15 By 1936 it had become the function of the school not only to train selected officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, but “to standardize methods of quartermaster instruction” and “to prepare and revise training literature and Army extension courses.”16

During World War II the program of the Quartermaster School expanded enormously. In addition to training officer candidates, the institution conducted numerous courses of instruction in administrative, technical, and military aspects of Quartermaster activities for enlisted men and women, Reserve and National Guard officers, ROTC students, and commissioned personnel. The school also had the responsibility for preparing and revising manuals, handbooks, and similar instructional material. Moreover, it was given a new function in October 1943, when it was called upon to assist to a limited extent in the training of Quartermaster units.17

When the emergency was declared in 1939 the activities of the school were still comparatively limited in scope. The program of instruction comprised only a two-month refresher course for National Guard and Reserve officers, which would fit them primarily for garrison rather than active

15 Ltr, TQMG to Col W. S. Wood, 10 Jan 25, sub: The QMC School, 321.5 (School, QMC).
16 AR 350–900, par. 2, 14 Nov 36, sub: The QM School.
17 See below, Ch. IX, The Corps’ Limited Responsibility for Unit Training.
field duty, and a nine-month peacetime course for enlisted men.

The program was modified in July 1940, as a result of the Army augmentation, to prepare selected Quartermaster Reserve officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army for active duty with the newly formed Quartermaster units. At that time the school inaugurated the Officers’ Course (Special), a refresher course that covered the entire field of Quartermaster functions in a general way, and the Enlisted Men’s Course (Special), which was designed to train regimental, battalion, and company sergeants, first sergeants, company clerks, and rail transportation clerks. While facilities at the Schuylkill Arsenal had been adequate for peacetime instruction, they became quite cramped and unsuitable when the program began to expand to meet emergency requirements. Quarters were insufficient at the installation to accommodate all of the students and even meals had to be obtained outside from civilian sources. Moreover, most of the instructors were lacking in field experience, and equipment was inadequate for the new courses.\(^{18}\)

The steady growth of enrollment in these courses and the opening of the large ROTC graduate and officer candidate classes in the summer of 1941 forced the Quartermaster School to seek larger quarters, where technical field training could be given, and it was moved to Camp Lee in the fall of that year. Between then and the late summer of 1942 four main groups of temporary buildings were completed, along with extensive outdoor tactical field training and technical training demonstration areas.

Activities of the school expanded sharply after Pearl Harbor and by the middle of 1944 a total of 126 classes had been organized in 18 different courses in which more than 9,000 commissioned officers received advanced training. This was in addition to the classes for officer candidates, enlisted men, Army nurses, and Wacs.\(^{19}\) The increase in the size of the staff, faculty, and administrative organization is indicative of the growth of the school’s program. From a peacetime staff of about 20 members in 1940, the operating personnel increased to nearly 100 in the summer of 1941, attained a wartime peak of approximately 1,900 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel at the end of 1942, and still numbered more than 1,300 on V-J Day.\(^{20}\).

A battalion system was adopted at first for the administration of the school’s enlarged training program, but by the spring of 1942 a regimental-type organization under a commanding officer of troops was authorized. Under the system of school regiments both the students and the faculty were organized along regimental lines. The instructors taught only in the regiments to which they were assigned. They also acted as company officers and gave instruction in both basic military and technical subjects. In August 1942 all academic instructors were withdrawn from the regiments and placed in the Academic Training Division, which was created to provide for more specialization in technical subjects. The regiments retained sole responsibility for basic military training.

About a year later, in July 1943, the Academic Training Division was renamed the School Department, and assumed re-

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\(^{18}\) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, for ASF, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, QM School Sec., pp. 1-7.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 1.

\(^{20}\) E. Ramsey Richardson, History of the Quartermaster School (OQMG hist monograph, circa 1946), App. IV-B. (Hereafter cited as Richardson, Hist of QM School.)
responsibility for all instruction at the Quartermaster School, including the OCS. The School Department was one of five departments into which the school was organized during the latter part of the war, all of them directly responsible to the commandant. The commandant was assisted by an executive officer who was charged with the administration of the school and its troops, and an assistant commandant who was responsible for all instruction.

After the transfer of the school to Camp Lee the Officers' Course (Special), which had been initiated in 1940 as a basic refresher program for Reserve officers, proved too general to meet the needs of officers destined for active field service, and it was brought to an end in February 1942. In the meantime, however, the school had taken steps to provide a new type of officer training wholly different from its traditional administrative courses for post duty, and in October 1941 had inaugurated the Officers' Course (Tactical) to give instruction in the tactical operation of Quartermaster units in the theaters of operations. This course ended in April 1942 after four classes had been held and 428 officers had been graduated.  

Beginning in October 1942 the school offered a course in Quartermaster operations to small quotas of the newly formed Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (subsequently renamed Women's Army Corps). Late in 1943 the WAC Officers' Course was merged with the Officers' Basic Supply Course and the women studied the same subjects as the men but were exempted from certain basic military training activities.

Before the establishment of the ASF Depot Course, two special depot training courses were offered temporarily at the Quartermaster School during the latter half of 1942 in order to produce officers capable of staffing the new Army depots then being established at a rapid pace. The first of these was the four-week Depot Administration Course, which was conducted late in the summer and was designed to indoctrinate officers in depot theory and practice so that they could go back to their depots and train other officers and enlisted men for duty in overseas installations. It was followed in the fall by the Army Specialist Corps Depot Operation Course. The purpose of this course was to offer classes to selected civilians with commercial and industrial warehousing experience in order to procure sufficient officer personnel to staff the new installations. The course consisted of four ten-day classes that emphasized conservation of space and manpower and the efficient handling of supplies. With the abolition of the Army Specialist Corps the

[21] (1) For a detailed description of all courses conducted at the Quartermaster School and the number graduated from each, see Richardson, Hist of QM School. (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. I, QM School Sec. (3) Rpt, Mil Tng Div for TQMG, 11 Sep 45, sub: Outstanding Accomplishments in World War II. (Hereafter cited as Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Accomplishments in WW II.)
title of the course was changed to the Civilian SOS Depot Selection Course, and the 315 graduates were commissioned in the supply services instead of in the ASC as originally intended.

The ASF Depot Course, which provided technical instruction in all operational phases of Army warehousing to officers of all the technical services, was inaugurated in March 1943 and classes were in session almost constantly throughout the remainder of the war. The course was divided into three periods. The first four-week period was conducted at the Quartermaster School and the instruction was of a general nature, including such subjects as the organization of the Army for supply, the physical handling and transporting of supplies, modern warehousing methods, materials handling, property accounting, packaging and crating, open storage, and protection against enemy action. The second period covered the special phases peculiar to a particular service, while the third consisted of practical work in a jointly operated depot. The second and third phases were conducted concurrently, first at the Columbus ASF Depot and later at the Utah ASF Depot.\(^{22}\) The classes at the Quartermaster School included some military instruction, but the emphasis was upon technical instruction and practical demonstration of depot practices and procedures.

Constant efforts were made to increase the effectiveness of the ASF Depot Course, to use faculty members with actual experience in overseas depot operations, and to give practical and up-to-date instruction concerning the problems of supply in overseas theaters. Field trips to depot installations were an important part of the program. After the spring of 1944 WAC officers were regularly enrolled in this course, although the total number was comparatively small. The course was one of the most important conducted at the school and nearly 3,500 officers from various technical services were graduated.\(^{23}\) Between July 1943 and June 1944 the Quartermaster School also offered three twenty-day Special Depot Courses. Two of these were to acquaint Navy officers with Army warehousing methods and procedures. The third was for Quartermaster officers and was similar to the ASF Depot Course with the exception that field trips were omitted.

Another outstanding program conducted at the school was the Advanced Supply Officers' Course, which was established in January 1943. It was designed to train field-grade and potential field-grade officers for field duty as division quartermasters, corps quartermasters, task force quartermasters, or staging area quartermasters, and as other staff assistants. Early in the course advanced tactical military subjects and exercises were introduced, and actual field training in relation to the operation of Quartermaster units was instituted at the A. P. Hill Military Reservation. Primary emphasis, however, was upon advanced technical supply problems, which were attacked from a staff rather than an operating angle. Classes in this course were in session ten weeks and more than 2,000 officers were given the training.\(^{24}\)

Two special unit-training courses for officers, each of four weeks' duration, were conducted at the school between April 1943 and February 1944. The first was

\(^{22}\) See below, *Officer Training at Depots.*

\(^{23}\) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. 1, Addenda, ASF Depot Course Sec., p. 18.

\(^{24}\) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Accomplishments in WW II, p. 7A.
SCHOOLS FOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED SPECIALISTS

known as the Officers’ Course (Special), and seven classes were conducted during the period from April to November 1943 for Quartermaster officers who had been selected for assignment to particular units soon to be activated. This course was divided into three phases. Phase one was designed to train officers in basic Quartermaster services in theaters of operations; phase two included unit operation and command training; and phase three was devoted to specialization in a particular unit. The student officers were required to solve practical problems that might arise upon their assignment to newly activated units. A somewhat similar unit-training program, known as Officers’ Unit Training Course B, was conducted from November 1943 to February 1944 for pool officers awaiting overseas assignment. The program was made realistic by organizing provisional battalions in which the student officers performed duties in company-type units. The faculty acted as battalion headquarters, and the students, acting as company officers, had the opportunity to learn how battalions were administered in relation to subordinate companies.

In an effort to meet emergency demands for critically needed Quartermaster officer and enlisted specialists between 1943 and V-E Day, the Quartermaster School presented three other specialized courses. The Graves Registration Course was established in response to requests from theater commanders late in 1942 for officers capable of handling casualties then occurring in combat zones, and three two-week classes for officers were conducted during the first half of 1943. The course stressed practical field work and improvisation in graves registration operations. The Advanced Baking Course for officers and enlisted men was established in July 1943 to supplant the training formerly given Quartermaster personnel by the American Institute of Baking. This course dealt with all phases of Army baking and was designed to produce key personnel for post and field bakeries. The Military Fuel and Lubricants Course was developed in March 1945 when it became apparent that continued demands for qualified commissioned personnel in that field would create a critical shortage of officers trained in fuel and lubricants operations. The program was established in two phases in conjunction with the Navy. The first phase was a two-week academic course at the Quartermaster School, while the second was a three-week applicatory training course at the Naval Operations Training School at Bayonne, N. J.

Two courses designed to prepare Quartermaster officers for the unusual supply and unit activities in the Pacific area were instituted at the Quartermaster School during the closing months of the war. The Quartermaster Technical Operations Course was conducted during April and May 1945. Techniques developed in supply operations in Europe were presented in this course, which stressed the operation and maintenance of Quartermaster non-divisional units, with special attention to the peculiar supply conditions that the officers might expect to encounter in the Pacific. Between July and September 1945 a series of four-week classes in the Special Clothing and Equipment Course was presented to officers and enlisted men representing the ASF, the AGF, the AAF, and the Canadian Army. This instruction pertained to the use and conservation of Army clothing and equipment designed for employment in wet-cold climates, such as that of the Japanese home islands. The course was divided into two parts. The first
two-week period was conducted at Fort Devens, Mass., where the students became acquainted with the principles of climatology and their relationship to Army clothing and equipment and studied the new items of Quartermaster wet-cold clothing and equipment. The second two-week period was offered at the Quartermaster School, where intensive training was given the students in lesson planning, public speaking, the use of climatic maps, the proper use of clothing, techniques of teaching, fitting of wet-cold items, psychology of combat, and conservation of clothing and equipment.

Beginning in the spring of 1945 the Quartermaster School also operated a four-week Nurses’ Basic Military Training Course for the Third Service Command. The purpose was to orient newly commissioned nurses and instruct them in the principles and methods of medical field service and Army nursing before they were assigned to duty. Ten classes were held before V-J Day and more than twelve hundred nurses were given their basic military training at the school.

Two principal courses for enlisted personnel, both men and women, were offered at the Quartermaster School during the war period to prepare them for highly skilled positions as noncommissioned officers in Quartermaster organizations and installations throughout the world. The Enlisted Men’s Course (Special), which had been established in 1940 as a two-month course designed to develop Quartermaster sergeants and clerks, was reopened in the fall of 1941 after a temporary suspension in the summer of that year. Plans were made at that time to lengthen the course and broaden its scope but they were never carried out and the course ended in February 1942 primarily because the school was largely occupied with the training of officer candidates. Before the end of 1942 the progress of the war had created demands for more and better-qualified noncommissioned officers than could be supplied from the graduates of the courses in the QMRTC's. Consequently a twelve-week advanced course in administration and supply for enlisted men was inaugurated at the school in December of that year.

This new program was known at first as the Enlisted Specialist Course. It was designed to train enlisted men in administration and supply for grades up to technical sergeant. Although originally designated as basic in character, the program of instruction was so complete that in April 1943 it was redesignated the Quartermaster Noncommissioned Officers’ Administration and Supply Course (Advanced). Instruction was soon concentrated upon the training of general clerks, administrative noncommissioned officers, first sergeants, and supply noncommissioned officers. Other specialties were added as demands arose, but the main purpose was to equip noncommissioned officers to fill any positions in their units rather than to train them as specialists.

Beginning in 1943, in keeping with the general trend in the Quartermaster School, increased emphasis on military training was given in this course to prepare Quartermaster noncommissioned officers for landing operations under fire and for the protection of their supply lines and installations under combat conditions, and

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25 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. II, Nurses’ Basic Mil Tng School Sec., p. 9.
26 For a more detailed discussion of all courses for Quartermaster enlisted men see Rpt, Mil Tng Div, OQMG, for ASF, Schooling of Enlisted Pers.
to qualify them both technically and tactically for their Quartermaster duties. In the spring of that year the course, which originally had been restricted to quotas from the QMRTC's at Camp Lee and Fort Warren, was opened to men from the AGF, the AAF, and the nine service commands.

At that time, too, an inquiry from Fort Warren focused attention on the question of whether Negro enlisted men could be enrolled in the course. The question was not settled immediately, but beginning in March 1944 Negro students were admitted. Eventually, quotas were allotted to ASFTC's as well as to service commands and the arms and services.

During the spring of 1944 the course was adapted to the needs of enlisted WAC personnel and was renamed the Quartermaster Noncommissioned Officers' and WAC Administration and Supply Course (Advanced). The course was revised once more in the spring of 1945, this time to meet the needs of personnel to be redeployed to the Pacific after the defeat of Germany. The new course became effective in June 1945 and was renamed the Advanced Administration and Supply Course (Enlisted). It was an eight-week
program designed to train warehouse foremen, administrative noncommissioned officers, commissary stewards, subsistence noncommissioned officers, and Quartermaster supply technicians. By V-J Day approximately 7,000 enlisted personnel had completed the various courses of this administrative program at the Quartermaster School.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{Reserve Officers' Training Corps}

The emergency Quartermaster Reserve Officers' Training Corps program was inaugurated in mid-June 1941 with the establishment of a unit at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. This was the only Quartermaster ROTC unit organized before Pearl Harbor and the only one conducted at a graduate school. During the first eight months of 1942, however, additional Quartermaster ROTC units were opened at eight other colleges and universities.\textsuperscript{28}

Students enrolled in the Quartermaster ROTC at any of the schools were required during their junior and senior years to carry military and technical Quartermaster subjects in addition to the usual academic course. The instruction at Harvard was, of course, somewhat more advanced in nature than that given in the undergraduate institutions. In all cases, however, graduates of Quartermaster ROTC units were required to complete an additional three months of intensive basic military, technical, and tactical instruction at the Quartermaster School before they were awarded their commissions as second lieutenants in the QMC.

The first-year advanced Quartermaster ROTC course included such typical subjects as organization of the Army and the QMC, administration and functions of the Corps, Quartermaster company administration, fiscal procedures, procurement procedures, property accounting, military leadership, storage and issue of supplies, defense against chemical warfare, and salvage operations. Subjects given during the second-year advanced program included commercial transportation, subsistence, military leadership, military history and policy, military law, training management, field operations, and principles of warfare. In addition, the students were required to undergo a practical outdoor program of rigorous physical conditioning, military drill, and other basic military subjects. Each ROTC unit was organized into a battalion or regiment, according to the number of students participating, and instructions in the field and classroom were carried out on that basis.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} This figure is given as an approximation. Sources differ as to the exact total. See Richardson, Hist of QM School, App. IV-D, p. 4. Compare Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Accomplishments in WW II, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{28} The schools where Quartermaster ROTC units were located, the dates of establishment, and the number of students graduated from each are shown in the following table:
\textsuperscript{29} Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. I, App. I, ROTC Sec.
The operation of all ROTC units was suspended for the duration of the war following the establishment of the Army Specialized Training Program in December 1942. Early in 1943 The Adjutant General ordered the Quartermaster ROTC students absorbed into the current Officer Candidate School quotas of the Quartermaster School, and thereafter they were trained there.\(^{30}\)

*Motor Transport Schools*

Before the transfer of the motor transport function to the Ordnance Department in August 1942, one of the most formidable tasks confronting The Quartermaster General was that of providing adequately trained personnel to operate and maintain the countless thousands of new automotive vehicles being produced for the Army. A shortage of trained automotive mechanics and maintenance men had developed in the Army even before the emergency period began in 1939. This shortage grew when the military organization started to expand in 1940 and became acute immediately following Pearl Harbor. Moreover, a heavy demand was created for qualified motor officers and for enlisted specialists in such fields as engine rebuilding, welding, sheetmetal repair, and carburetion and ignition mechanics.

The technical training provided at the Quartermaster School and at the QMRTC's was insufficient to meet these specialized demands. Consequently, basic and advanced courses for both officers and enlisted men were established at special motor schools. The largest of these institutions was the Quartermaster Motor Transport School, a special service school at the Holabird Quartermaster Depot near Baltimore.

At the beginning of the emergency this school was offering one-month refresher courses to Reserve and National Guard officers to fit them for duty with Quartermaster motor transport units, and giving three-month courses in automotive specialist mechanics to enlisted personnel. Because of the urgent need for automotive officers and enlisted men, the refresher course for officers was broadened in scope and lengthened to two months, and a basic two-month course and an advanced three-month course in automotive mechanics were inaugurated for enlisted men.\(^{31}\)

Three other regional motor transport schools were established during the fiscal years 1941 and 1942. The first of these was the Normoye Motor Transport School at San Antonio, Tex., which had operated during the fiscal year 1941 under the full control of the Eighth Corps Area and conducted two-month courses in basic, or first and second echelon, motor mechanics for enlisted men. At the beginning of the fiscal year 1942 the instructional control over this school was shifted to The Quartermaster General and the program was broadened to include a three-month course for enlisted men in specialist, or third and fourth echelon, automotive mechanics. The Atlanta regional motor transport school was founded at Fort McPherson, Ga., in July 1941 for the purpose of training enlisted personnel in specialist mechanics. In February 1942 the school was moved to the nearby Atlanta Quartermaster Motor Base. The third regional motor transport school opened at the Stockton Quartermaster Motor Base, Stockton.
Calif., in December 1941. The Quartermaster General had both administrative and instructional control over this school and conducted courses for officers and enlisted men in specialist as well as basic automotive mechanics.\textsuperscript{32}

Upon the recommendation of The Quartermaster General, the General Staff in January 1942 redesignated these regional motor transport schools as Quartermaster special service schools and placed the Normoyle and Atlanta schools under The Quartermaster General’s complete administrative and instructional supervision in conformance with his control over the Holabird and Stockton schools. This enabled him to establish a standardized and co-ordinated program of automotive instruction before the motor transport schools were transferred to the Chief of Ordnance about six months later. The principal courses in the program included a two-month operations and maintenance course for officers, a three-month general automotive mechanics course for enlisted men, and an advanced course for enlisted men. These courses included classes of varying length for the different types of automotive specialists.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32} (1) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Enlisted Pers, Pt. 1, MT Schools Sec., pp. 1–3. (2) Young, Inspection of Military Training, pp. 13–15.

\textsuperscript{33} (1) Ltr, TAG to CGs, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth CAs, 23 Jan 42, sub: Redesignation of QM MT Schools. (2) Ltr, Col James H. Johnson to TQMG, 10 Dec 41, sub: Rpt of Committee on Preparation of Tng Directives, Courses and Programs for MT Schools and RTCs, with Incls. See Incl 3, sub: Master Schedule for MT Schools. (3) Memo, TQMG for ACofS G–3, 18 Nov 41, sub: QM MT Schools.
In the meantime, as a stopgap measure beginning in March 1941 and continuing for about eight months, The Quartermaster General operated a special training program for officers in motor vehicle maintenance through the Fort Wayne Quartermaster Supply Depot, Detroit, in which a series of four-week courses was conducted in conjunction with the plants of certain automotive manufacturers. Officers who were enrolled became familiar, by means of lectures and inspection trips, with the vehicles produced at these plants and learned the basic principles of maintenance.34

The Quartermaster General gained complete control over another type of motor transport school before the transfer of the program to the Ordnance Department. In the spring of 1942, four corps area motor transport schools that had been conducting basic and advanced automotive mechanics courses for enlisted personnel during the fiscal years 1941 and 1942 were finally placed under his administrative as well as instructional supervision. These schools were located at Fort Devens, Mass.; Miller Field, Staten Island, N. Y.; Fort Sheridan, Ill.; and Fort Crook, Nebr. This transfer of control was a further step toward the standardization and correlation of the motor transport training program.35

Civilian Trade and Factory Schools

Even though many new technical schools and courses were added, military facilities alone were inadequate during the early stages of the war for training all of the trade and mechanical specialists needed by the rapidly expanding Army. It was necessary for the QMC, as well as the other arms and services, to use the existing facilities of many civilian trade and factory schools. The Corps utilized approximately a score of such schools, which trained more than 10,000 officers and enlisted men for highly specialized Quartermaster positions.36

By the end of the fiscal year 1942, seven civilian trade schools had been placed under contract by the QMC and were being operated under the administrative and instructional control of The Quartermaster General. Six of these, in various sections of the country, were presenting eight-week to twelve-week courses for enlisted men in general automotive mechanics. The six schools were transferred eventually to the Ordnance Department.37

The seventh trade school, the American Institute of Baking in Chicago, was engaged in teaching advanced post and field baking to officers and enlisted men. This contract remained in effect until the middle of 1943.

Two additional civilian trade schools were placed under contract in the fiscal year 1943, and they continued to train Quartermaster enlisted men until early 1944. One of these was the Mid-West Motive Trades Institute, Danville, Ill., which conducted a twelve-week course in

34 (1) The plants were those of the Ford Motor Co., Chrysler Motor Corp., and the Truck and Chevrolet Divisions of General Motors Corp. (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Commissioned Offs, Pt. I, MT Schools Sec., p. 2.
35 (1) Ltr, Hq SOS to TQMG, 15 Mar 42, sub: Transfer of CA MT Schools. (2) Memo, TQMG for Dir of Tng Div, SOS, 30 Mar 42, same sub.
36 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Accomplishments in WW II, p. 12.
37 (1) These six schools were: the David Ranken, Jr., School of Mechanical Trades, St. Louis; Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va.; Mid-West Motive Trades Institute, Bloomington, Ill.; Mechanical Industries Technical Institute, Memphis; National Schools, Los Angeles; and Nashville Auto Diesel College (renamed Automotive College of Nashville), Nashville. Hampton Institute was used to give advanced technical training to Negro enlisted men. (2) Young, Inspection of Military Training, pp. 19–23, 50–53.
laundry mechanics. The other was the Commercial Trades Institute, Bloomington, Ill., which presented a twelve-week course in refrigeration mechanics.

The majority of the factory schools were operated by commercial automobile, tire, and motorcycle manufacturers who assisted the Army in meeting its greatly expanded requirements for enlisted motor specialists during the 1941 and 1942 fiscal years by offering tuition-free courses at their plants in various types of automotive mechanics. The wide experience they had gained in training their own factory representatives made it comparatively easy for the manufacturers to adapt their programs to training Army specialists. Seven of these factory-sponsored schools were under the administrative control of The Quartermaster General, and they offered three-week to eight-week courses in tire maintenance, tire recapping and retreading, battery repair, motorcycle and ignition mechanics, and diesel engine mechanics.\(^{38}\)

Four of these schools were transferred later to the Ordnance Department and the others had completed their programs before the end of the fiscal year 1942.\(^{39}\)

Facilities of five other schools were utilized by the Corps during 1943 and 1944 for the emergency training of several types of urgently needed officer and enlisted mechanical specialists. These schools conducted courses ranging in length from one to six weeks in repair and rebuilding of shoe-stitching machinery, business-machine operation, the manufacture and repair of metal petroleum containers, and dry-cleaning operations.\(^{40}\)

**Schools in Civilian Educational Institutions**

Emergency requirements for certain types of highly developed technical or administrative skills, which military schools were unprepared to teach, made it necessary for The Quartermaster General to utilize the facilities of several universities. Courses at these schools were modified to meet the special needs of the Army, and expert civilian instructors did the teaching.

The first of these specialist programs was a course in the latest methods of warehousing and handling of Quartermaster supplies, which was conducted for a six-week period between November 1941 and February 1942 by faculty members of the University of Pennsylvania at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot for a relatively small group of officers. It was also the first depot training program for Quartermaster officers during the emergency period. One half of each day was devoted to academic work and the other half to acquiring practical experience within the industrial plants and warehouses throughout the Philadelphia area.

In April 1943 a three-month course in supply operations was established at the Harvard School of Business Administration to provide advanced technical training for the many additional officers needed to meet the rapidly expanding supply de-

\(^{38}\) These schools were sponsored by the Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., Akron; Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Akron; Indian Motorcycle Co., Springfield, Mass.; Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Milwaukee; Electric Auto-Lite Co., Toledo; Winton Engine Plant, General Motors Corp., Cleveland; and National Supply Co., Philadelphia.

\(^{39}\) (1) The schools turned over to the Ordnance Department were the Firestone, Goodyear, Harley-Davidson, and Indian Companies. (2) For more detailed accounts of factory-sponsored schools see Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Enlisted Pers, MT Schools Sec., pp. 7–19, and Young, Inspection of Military Training, pp. 23–26, 53–54.

\(^{40}\) The sponsors of these schools were the Landis Machine Co., St. Louis, Mo.; International Business Machine Corp., Endicott, N. Y.; Federal Machine and Welder Co., Warren, Ohio; Petroleum Iron Works, Sharon, Pa.; and Green Dry Cleaning Co., Fort Bragg, N. C.
mands of the Army. The course was designed to prepare selected Quartermaster and other ASF officers for higher echelons of Army supply work by acquainting them with the terminology, fundamental problems, and point of view of businessmen and industrial organizations with whom the Army had to deal in obtaining supplies and equipment; to give them an opportunity to study industrial methods adaptable to supply operation; and to enlarge the administrative capacities of the officers so that they might be more effective in handling Army supply problems. Nearly 400 officers had been given this training when the course was discontinued in October 1943.

The urgent need for technically qualified personnel to test and analyze petroleum products acquired by the Army from foreign sources led to the establishment of the last of these specialized Quartermaster training programs in September 1943. At that time The Quartermaster General and the Eighth Service Command established a course at the University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Okla., to train officers and enlisted men as petroleum laboratory technicians and petroleum test-engine operators for service in Quartermaster petroleum products laboratories in overseas areas. The training began as a four-week course, which was lengthened to six weeks in the spring of 1944. By the fall of that year the requirements for these technicians had been fulfilled, and the classes were discontinued after a total of 67 officers and 260 enlisted men had been given the training.

Schools for Bakers and Cooks

The facilities for training mess personnel that existed at the beginning of the emergency were entirely inadequate to meet the requirements of the rapidly expanding Army. They consisted of nine bakers' and cooks' schools, one in each corps area, which were offering four-month courses for selected enlisted men of the Regular Army in the theory and practice of cooking, baking, mess management, and the elements of nutrition.

In order to provide intensive training over a shorter period of time, the courses were reduced from four to two months early in the summer of 1940, but the nine schools were still unable to produce a sufficient number of graduates to fill the increasing demands for cooks, bakers, and mess sergeants. Consequently in the fall of that year, the corps areas were authorized to expand facilities by establishing subschools to operate directly under the supervision of the nine parent bakers' and cooks' schools. At the peak of the program in the summer of 1943 there were ninety-five of these subschools in operation, and during that one year alone nearly 12,000 officers and more than 46,000 enlisted men were trained under the program. All of these schools were under the technical and instructional supervision of The Quartermaster General, while the administrative control was the responsibility of the corps area in which they were located, except for certain designated subschools that were placed under the administrative supervision of their post commanders.

With the number of subschools steadily
increasing, The Quartermaster General in the summer of 1941 issued a general training directive designed to make standardized adjustments in the program in order to meet efficiently and expeditiously the sharply rising requirements for officer and enlisted mess personnel. This new program provided two courses for officers. The first was the regular one-month course to train officers to perform the duties of mess officers, including mess inspection and menu planning. The other was of two weeks’ duration, and the purpose was to train Regular Army, National Guard, and Reserve officers to become instructors in mess management at troop schools. For enlisted men the program included four separate courses designed to train enlisted men to become Army cooks, graduate cooks to become mess sergeants, enlisted men to become bakers, and graduate cooks to become pastry bakers.

The introduction of new foods, improved methods of feeding an Army deployed on many fronts, and other developments in the subsistence field made it necessary to revise the old courses to some extent and to add new ones. For example, the increasing use of dehydrated products in the Army led to the addition of two new short courses in 1942. One of these was designed to train officers and qualified mess sergeants to prepare and serve all types of dehydrated foods, alone as well as in com-
bination with regular ration components. The mission of the other was to train officers and enlisted men as instructors in the preparation and serving of dehydrated foods. Three other courses were added to the regular curriculum in 1942 for the purpose of training company grade and field grade officers in such matters as changes in the handling of rations and the latest methods of conserving food.

Numerous other steps were taken to improve the training program. Early in 1941 The Quartermaster General made arrangements with the National Livestock and Meat Board to send crews of its experts to all of the schools for bakers and cooks to give lectures and practical demonstrations in the approved methods of cutting and cooking meats. Recognizing the importance of a standard and more palatable brew of coffee, The Quartermaster General inaugurated in 1942 a special two-week course in coffee roasting and brewing for officers and enlisted personnel.

One of the most notable steps to improve the training of cooks and bakers and the food program as a whole was taken in July 1943 when the Commanding General, ASF, issued a directive establishing the Food Service Program in a move to co-ordinate all food activities within his command and to foster conservation in the handling of food throughout the Army. The program provided for more rigid supervision and inspection of messes, improved methods for the preparation, distribution, and consumption of food, and more efficient technical training for mess supervisors, cooks, and bakers. While the program was placed under the general direction of The Quartermaster General, it was immediately supervised by the directors of food service, appointed by the commanding generals of the service commands, who, in turn, designated food supervisors at each installation to carry out the details of the new conservation measures. The operation of the Food Service Program resulted in a better co-ordinated training program in the schools for bakers and cooks, a more efficient utilization of mess personnel, the preparation of more palatable meals, and a marked improvement in the conservation of food.

The Quartermaster Subsistence Research Laboratory at the Chicago Quartermaster Depot participated in the program for training bakers and cooks between 1940 and 1943 by conducting special courses for officers and enlisted men in various phases of subsistence. At intervals during the emergency and the early months of the war it offered four-month courses to noncommissioned officers in subsistence inspection and allied subjects. These courses were replaced in March 1942 by two-week courses for both officers and enlisted men in cold-weather cooking designed to provide "a suitable diet for troops stationed in Alaska and other cold regions," which were continued until April 1943. The laboratory also opened a two-month course in October 1941 to train officers for service as assistant commandants of the schools for bakers and cooks, but classes were terminated in March 1942. This course included theoretical instruction at the laboratory, followed by practical training at the Fort Sheridan School of Bakers and Cooks.

The outstanding feature of the schools for bakers and cooks was the centralized control exercised by The Quartermaster General over training that enabled him to provide a uniform program of instruction.

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At the same time, the general operation of the schools was hampered by the fact that the service commands retained administrative control over the schools. The principal weakness of this division of responsibility was that The Quartermaster General had no authority to inspect the training for which he had promulgated the doctrine.\(^{46}\)

**Subsistence School**

Since procurement and storage of subsistence had been centralized in the depot and market center systems during the war and most of the key posts were occupied by civilian experts, a training problem arose in the fall of 1944 when the prospect of an early end to the war induced many of the civilians to accept jobs in private industry. Their resignations threatened to create a serious situation because of the lack of qualified officers to take their places.

The Quartermaster General pointed out that new post Quartermaster officers had acquired little knowledge or experience in the procurement of subsistence supplies, and emphasized the need for prompt action in providing facilities for training permanent officer personnel for assignment to key positions in the procurement and storage of subsistence as well as in the Food Service Program.

The dollar volume of subsistence procurement amounts to over $1,500,000,000 per year. An error of as little as one percent through the lack of skillful buying would cost the government $15,000,000. The tonnage volume of subsistence exceeds 20,000 tons per day. The loss of even as little as one percent through inefficient storage control would result in the loss of 400,000 pounds of food per day, or more than sufficient food to feed five divisions.\(^{47}\)

Headquarters, ASF, authorized The Quartermaster General late in October 1944 to re-establish and operate the Quartermaster Subsistence School at the Chicago Depot. The school had been closed in 1936 and subsequently converted into the Subsistence Research and Development Laboratory. The director of the laboratory—Col. Roland A. Isker—was named commandant of the school when it reopened on 4 December 1944.

The immediate objective was to give advanced instruction to officers in an effort to qualify them for overseas subsistence assignments. The original authorization, revised after the war ended, provided for a thirteen-week course and a schedule of four classes, each with a quota of twenty student officers. Only two of these classes had been graduated by V-J Day, and the third was in progress.\(^{48}\)

**Officer Training at Depots**

While Quartermaster depots were concerned primarily with supply operations, they contributed materially to the program of advanced training for officers. All of the depots during the war conducted courses of instruction for officers permanently assigned to them as well as for officers who were in the depot replacement pools awaiting assignment.\(^{49}\)

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\(^{46}\) For more detailed accounts of the training and inspection of schools for bakers and cooks see (1) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. I, Bakers' and Cooks' Schools Sec.; (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Enlisted Pers, Pt. I, Schools for Bakers and Cooks, Sec.; (3) Young, Inspection of Military Training, pp. 17-19, 54-56, 132-33.

\(^{47}\) Memo, Gen Gregory for CG ASF, 28 Sep 44, sub: Establishment of QM Subsistence School, 352.01.

\(^{48}\) A more detailed account of the Subsistence School appears in Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. II, QM Subsistence Course Sec.

\(^{49}\) The pool system is discussed above in Chapter VI.
The courses were designed to further the training the officers had received at the OCS and other Quartermaster installations and to provide them with the opportunity to apply and expand the knowledge previously acquired. They helped to round out the experience of the officers and lay the groundwork for future assignments either in the depots or in units.

A uniform program of instruction was attained, but this was a gradual development rather than an overnight achievement. At the outset there were twelve Quartermaster depots and their courses varied widely. Inasmuch as Reserve officers comprised the bulk of commissioned personnel assigned to the depots during the early stages of expansion and they possessed little if any experience in procurement and storage, all depots were compelled to provide on-the-job training, but each installation modeled its program to suit its own particular requirements. In the main, the training consisted of simple orientation courses, demonstrations in warehousing, informal group discussions, and lectures.

The depots acquired a new training responsibility after the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School was established and quotas of the graduates were assigned to replacement pools at the various depots. The usual practice at first was to apprentice the pool officers to permanently assigned depot officers. The instruction they received under this plan was rather haphazard and, since their OCS training had been primarily for field duty, they usually failed to acquire an understanding of depot functions and operations.

With the sharp expansion of the depot system following the United States’ entry into the war, efforts were made by the depots to overcome the weaknesses of their programs. Each installation, however, originated its own special courses with the result that wide variations continued to exist. Moreover, most of the programs, though they placed greater emphasis upon such subjects as materials-handling and warehousing, were still restricted in scope, being designed primarily to fit selected officers for duty in particular depots or warehouses.

Preliminary measures to remedy the situation and standardize depot training activities were initiated by the OQMG late in the summer of 1942. At that time control over depot training was transferred from the Storage and Distribution Division to the Military Training Branch, which soon was expanded into a division. During the fall and winter of 1942-43, the Military Training Division issued a series of directives to the various depots in an attempt to have them revise and co-ordinate their divergent training programs. It was not until the spring of 1943, however, after The Quartermaster General ordered the adoption of a uniform training program for pool and assigned depot officers, that there was any concerted effort on the part of the depots to bring their training activities into general alignment.\(^5^0\)

By then the program had become extremely urgent because the critical shortage of commissioned personnel for the rapidly growing number of Quartermaster units being shipped overseas compelled the assignment to field duty of many officers from zone of interior depots who had never been trained to serve with units, just as many officers with no depot training were forced to assume supply responsibilities in the theaters. It was to meet this situation that The Quartermaster General is-

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\(^{50}\) Young, *Inspection of Military Training*, p. 60.
sued a directive in which he outlined four-week advanced technical training programs for assigned and pool officers. The most significant features of these programs were that, in addition to uniformity, they provided for instruction in the operations of Quartermaster supply units in overseas theaters and for the rotation of students on the various types of depot jobs in order to give them well-rounded experience.

The release of these newly developed training programs did not bring complete uniformity in instruction at the depots immediately. For one thing, The Quartermaster General had stipulated that the courses were not to interfere with the normal operations at the depots. With their work loads constantly increasing, some commanding officers actually adopted only those phases of instruction that could be conducted without hindering the performance of their depots’ procurement, storage, or manufacturing missions.

Moreover, it soon developed that none of the depots were offering satisfactory programs of instruction in basic military subjects, primarily because they had neither adequate facilities nor qualified training personnel. To overcome this deficiency, The Quartermaster General, at the direction of ASF headquarters, instructed all depots in August 1943 to add a program of concurrent basic military training and physical conditioning. Many of the depots experienced difficulties in presenting this type of instruction because their lack of facilities made it necessary for them to transport the students to a nearby camp or station.

Following a tour of the depot system in January 1944, Brig. Gen. Harold A. Barnes, the Deputy Quartermaster General for Administration and Management, reported that while some of the depots were doing effective training jobs, others were offering only a minimum of instruction, and that there was still a general lack of uniformity in the programs. He proposed, therefore, that the Military Training Division make a survey of training needs and practices at the depots, develop a curriculum that would incorporate the best features observed at all depots without interruption to supply operations, and then provide close supervision over the program to see that it was carried out. The division concluded from its survey that depot training should emphasize problems of overseas supply rather than zone of interior depot operations, and accordingly, on 19 February 1944, completed and released a sixty-one-hour advanced course in overseas supply and depot operations for the guidance of all depots. Moreover, after the War Department revised its POR requirements on 15 May 1944, The Quartermaster General forwarded to the depots a personnel status record and check list to aid the installations in determining how much additional training individual officers needed to prepare them for movement overseas.

During the spring and summer of 1944,

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51 Ltr, Gen Corbin, Actg TQMG, to CGs of All QM Depots and QM Sup Offs of Jointly Occupied Depots, 4 Feb 43, sub: Mil Tng Programs, Depot Tng, QMC, 352.11.
52 These features had been incorporated earlier in the eight-week programs adopted by the Jersey City and Philadelphia Depots.
53 Young, Inspection of Military Training, p. 143.
54 Ltr, Col McReynolds, OQMG, to All QM Depots, 13 Aug 43, sub: Mil Tng Program, Depot Tng, QMC.
56 Preparation for overseas movement of individual replacements.
57 (1) Ltr, TQMG to CGs of All QM Depots and QM Sup Offs, ASF Depots, 23 Mar 44, sub: Tng of Assigned and Attached QM Pers, and Incl. (2) Young, Inspection of Military Training, p. 145.
depot-training inspections were more frequent and thorough, and the depots generally, despite their continuing difficulties in providing training facilities, were exerting greater efforts to conduct the kind of instruction that would enable their officers to meet POR standards. By the fall of 1944, overseas demands for Quartermaster officers had depleted the supply of available commissioned personnel at the depots to the point that formal training at these installations ended in October.\(^{58}\)

The most valuable feature of the training at depots for assigned and pool officers was that the student officer could actually participate in the operations he was studying. Yet while the depots offered this excellent opportunity for practical application of technical instruction, by the same token they were generally lacking in facilities and experienced personnel for conducting basic military training, and consequently that type of training often was neglected to a serious degree. Another outstanding weakness was that the training task was subordinate to the depots' primary mission of supplying troops, and the programs frequently had to be conducted at odd times and under unusual circumstances. Moreover, most of the officers assigned to the depots experienced so much difficulty in learning their own jobs and in keeping up with the increasing work loads that they had little time to devote to the training of other officers.

In addition to the training given assigned and pool officers at all of the depots, special depot courses were conducted at the Columbus ASF Depot in Ohio and at the Utah ASF Depot in Ogden for Quartermaster and other ASF officers during the latter part of the war. Included among these were the second and third phases of the ASF Depot Course, the first phase of which was presented at the Quartermaster School.\(^{59}\) This advanced training was conducted at the Columbus Depot from April 1943 until May 1944 when the program was transferred to the Utah Depot. The initial plan called for presentation of the second and third phases in successive two-week periods. However, a more practical system was adopted whereby the training was combined in a four-week course with the theoretical instruction of the second phase and the on-the-job training of the third phase given concurrently in half-day periods. In this way the student officers learned the duties of the various types of depot personnel in the morning and then watched these duties being performed in the afternoon.\(^{60}\)

The Packaging, Processing, and Packing Course was also conducted at the Columbus Depot, with classes beginning in November 1944 and continuing until 15 June 1945. The course was established to relieve the shortage of officers experienced in packing and crating, and the Columbus Depot was selected to give the training because it possessed the best-equipped facilities, including a large box shop. The objective was to give officer and enlisted personnel on-the-job training in the packaging and crating of Quartermaster supplies for both overseas and domestic shipments. The course originally ran four weeks but subsequently was condensed into three weeks. The later classes placed particular stress upon the training of officers

\(^{58}\) For more detailed discussions of the training of assigned and pool officers at depots see (1) Young, Inspection of Military Training, pp. 59-61, 142-46; (2) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. I, Depot Training Sec.; and (3) depot histories on file in Hist Br, OQMG.

\(^{59}\) See above, pp. 258-60.

\(^{60}\) Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Schooling of Commissioned Offs, Pt. I, Second and Third Phases, ASF Depot Course Sec., pp. 1-8.
to inspect supplies arriving in overseas theaters and report upon the condition of packaging, to act as consultants in problems concerning theater packaging, and to train personnel to supervise packaging activities in theater depots and other installations.\textsuperscript{61}

The shortage of qualified officers for such key positions as Quartermaster storage officer and director of storage led to the establishment of the Advanced School for Storage Officers at the Utah Depot in February 1944. The purpose was to provide selected officers from Quartermaster sections of ASF depots and Quartermaster branch depots with a working knowledge of all phases of depot warehousing and storage methods. The program covered a forty-day period of on-the-job-training, and, inasmuch as all of the officer students already had previous training and experience, the instruction was in effect a graduate course in storage techniques. Conference discussions and on-the-job observations were combined with work assignments in an effort to prepare the officers for high-level jobs.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{Summary}

Commissioned personnel as well as enlisted men in the QMC had to be trained as specialists, and the mass production of new officers made it necessary to establish numerous schools and courses to provide the specialized instruction required to prepare them to carry out the wide variety of Quartermaster activities. Some of the 30,000 new officers procured by the Corps during the war were commissioned directly from civilian life because they possessed specific technical skills needed by the QMC. Others were Reserve and National Guard officers, nearly all of whom required additional training.

But the greatest number by far—more than 23,000—were graduates of the OCS. While the OCS provided some basic training in the various Quartermaster specialties, its courses of instruction were designed primarily to give the candidates the training they needed to begin their careers as second lieutenants, rather than to turn out skilled technicians. Most of the graduates therefore were given additional training at other installations in an effort to make them experts in particular fields, such as administration, procurement, or distribution, or in one of the specific types of Quartermaster services, such as laundry operations or clothing and textile repair. Many of the graduates, nevertheless, had to be assigned directly to units, particularly during the hurried expansion in 1942, and became specialists largely as a result of practical experience gained in the field.

In contrast to the advanced training given officers, formal schooling ended for the bulk of the enlisted men when they completed their training at the QMRTC's or in units, where efforts were centered upon teaching them the fundamentals of their specialties on the assumption that they would gain proficiency while actually performing their jobs in the field. At the same time, advanced courses were conducted for a portion of the enlisted men to prepare them for highly skilled positions as noncommissioned officers in Quartermaster organizations and installations throughout the world.

Much of the advanced training for both

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., Pt. II, Quartermaster Packaging, Processing and Packing Course Sec., pp. 1–6.

enlisted men and officers was conducted at the Quartermaster School, which expanded its program enormously after the institution was moved from the Schuylkill Arsenal to Camp Lee in the fall of 1941. Numerous other military installations were established for the specialized training of Quartermaster personnel. These included motor transport schools in various parts of the country, approximately a hundred bakers' and cooks' schools, and the Quartermaster Subsistence School in Chicago—all in addition, of course, to the OCS, the QMRTC's, and the Quartermaster unit training centers. Moreover, nine Quartermaster ROTC units were organized in colleges and universities, and programs of advanced instruction for officers were set up on a full-time training schedule in all of the pools and usually on a part-time basis at the various depots.

Despite the huge expansion in the program of instruction at Army installations, military facilities alone were unable to meet all of the requirements for training Quartermaster specialists, and it became necessary for the Corps to request assistance from factories, commercial trade schools, and civilian educational institutions in training officers and enlisted men for certain jobs requiring highly developed technical or administrative skills.

Courses of instruction as well as teaching methods underwent marked changes during the war. The training program had to be changed almost constantly to meet shifting requirements and the needs arising from the development of new Quartermaster functions. Aside from the fact that the increased complexity of operations multiplied the types of specialists required, and that Quartermaster officers for the first time had to be trained as combat leaders as well as technicians, certain trends emerged in the course of the training program. One of these was the shift in emphasis from training officers for garrison duty to preparing them for assignment with the field forces, though this trend did not occur in any pronounced degree until after the United States entered the war. The tendency throughout the emergency period had been to teach peacetime subjects and to conduct instruction in an academic and theoretical manner. The trend after Pearl Harbor was suddenly toward more practical subjects and more realistic training for actual war.

Another definite trend was toward the standardization of programs within the various fields of instruction, a standardization that was designed to promote uniformity in technical instruction as well as in military training. The mass production of new officers and the necessity for hurried instruction to meet the emergency situation required the OQMG to set up an extensive program for developing better and standardized instructional techniques and training aids, and for training the many qualified instructors needed to carry out the program.
CHAPTER IX

The Activation and Training of Quartermaster Units

The general policy of the Quartermaster Corps in World War II was to train the soldier first as an individual specialist and then to teach him how to work as part of a team so that he could perform his particular task in the field with members of his own and other units. In the period 1939–45 it was necessary to activate and train more than forty different types of specialized units to carry out the varied Quartermaster functions of providing food, clothing, personal equipment, motor and pack-animal transportation, and the special services assigned to the Corps by law or regulation.

Numerous changes occurred during the war period as the War Department sought to adjust its field organization to meet the needs of a modern army fighting in all parts of the world. As a result, the types of units in existence by 1945 differed widely from those listed in the 1939 Tables of Organization. Many new types were established, while some of the old ones as well as some of the new ones were found to be outmoded or impractical and were discarded. Moreover, the service requirements of troops varied in mountains, jungles, and deserts, and theater commanders, in efforts to meet their special needs, sometimes set up supply organizations that were not listed in War Department manuals. For this reason it is virtually impossible to compile a complete list of all units that existed at any one time. Nevertheless, the most important Quartermaster units that were functioning in the final stages of the war may be classified in eight categories—divisional or organic, administrative, supply, transportation, petroleum, repair and maintenance, general service and miscellaneous, and composite.

In contrast to the great bulk of Quartermaster units, which were nondivisional types and were attached to armies, corps, divisions, or other large tactical units as needed, Quartermaster organic units were integral parts of combat organizations. Thus in all cases, except when organic to the mountain division, the pack company was a nondivisional unit.

Composite units were highly flexible organizations consisting of an assembly of small detachments or teams, each of which was set up to perform a specific function. They were designed to provide the particular Quartermaster services required by small isolated groups such as task forces, or station services at ports, depots, and fixed posts when standard units were too large or too small for the purpose. They could

1 See Table 17.
2 Ibid.
Table 17—Types of Quartermaster Units in World War II

1. DIVISIONAL OR ORGANIC
   QM company, infantry division
   QM company, airborne division
   QM pack company, mountain division
   Supply battalion, armored division
   QM squadron, cavalry division

2. ADMINISTRATIVE
   Hq & Hq detachment, QM group
   Hq & Hq detachment, QM battalion
   Hq & Hq detachment, QM battalion, mobile
   Hq & Hq detachment, QM base depot

3. SUPPLY
   QM base depot company
   QM depot company, supply
   QM base depot supply and sales company
   QM bakery company
   QM railhead company
   QM refrigeration company, fixed
   QM sales company, mobile
   QM remount troop
   QM platoon, air depot group (aviation)
   QM company, ammunition service group (aviation)
   QM company, service group (aviation)
   QM depot subsistence company (aviation)

4. TRANSPORTATION
   QM truck company
   QM truck company, heavy
   QM troop transport company
   QM car company
   QM refrigeration company, mobile
   QM troop, pack
   QM truck company (aviation)
   QM truck platoon, aviation (separate)

5. PETROLEUM
   QM truck company, petroleum
   QM base petroleum supply company
   QM gasoline supply company
   QM petroleum products laboratory
   QM depot company, class III (aviation)

6. REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE
   QM laundry company, semimobile
   QM salvage repair company; fixed
   QM salvage repair company, semimobile

7. GENERAL SERVICE AND MISCELLANEOUS
   QM service company
   QM graves registration company
   QM salvage collecting company
   QM fumigation and bath company

8. COMPOSITE

1 Both fixed and semimobile salvage repair units included shoe, clothing, and textile repair sections.
2 The labor unit of the Army.
3 Successor to the QM sterilization and bath company.

Source: Compiled from: (1) WD TM, FM 101-10, 1 Aug 45, sub: Orgn, Tech and Logistical Data, pp. 161-78; and (2) Unit Histories in Hist Br, OQMG.

also be used to augment existing units when additional platoons or companies would be too large. Composite units varied as to the number, size, and types of detachments included, in accordance with the strength of the force or installation to be assisted and the specific services required.

Origin and Development of Quartermaster Units

The work of most Quartermaster units was of a technical nature, but these units were all nevertheless military organizations. They were subject to the same field conditions as other units of the Army, and were organized along military lines for administration, discipline, and their own defense. This, however, was a modern development. It was not until 1912 that the Corps began to function as a strictly military organization. A rider to the Army Appropriations Act of that year consolidated the Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Pay Departments, thus creating the Quartermaster Corps with its own officers and troops. In all wars fought up to that

time, from the American Revolution through the war with Spain, the actual field operations of the Quartermaster's Department, though supervised by officers, had been carried on primarily by civilian employees, or by detachments of combat troops when civilians were not available.

Although Congress in 1912 had authorized the establishment of Quartermaster units, the Corps as organized in 1916, just before the United States entered World War I, provided for only four types—truck, bakery, pack, and wagon companies.⁴

Not very much was accomplished along this line of reform until the United States entered the first World War, but the change came rapidly after that. General John J. Pershing, commanding the American Expeditionary Forces in France, sent home requisitions in rapid succession calling for specialized supply troops which he found in use in the French and British armies. These units were organized, trained as far as possible, and shipped overseas. By the end of 1917 there were twenty-eight different types of Quartermaster troop units in existence, placing quartermaster functions for the first time on a thoroughly military basis.⁵

Generally speaking, the Quartermaster units in World War I were similar in name and performed about the same functions as those in World War II. However, they had been hastily organized and there was little time for training or for ironing out imperfections before they became operational. Their performance, on the whole, was creditable and contributed to the success of the American arms in the great battles of 1918, but there was much room for improvement in these pioneer organizations at the time of the Armistice. For example, the units were either fixed or of limited mobility and it was often necessary for the American soldier on the front line to "walk back 20 to 25 miles to get his 'de-lousing' or have his shoes repaired." ⁶

In the two decades following the 1918 Armistice, relatively little was done to overcome the weaknesses that the experience in France had brought to light in units of the QMC and other service organizations. Although the National Defense Act of 1920 had paved the way for modernization of the country’s military organization, sufficient funds were not appropriated because of public apathy and a lethargy settled upon the Army with the result that progress in many fields, including that of troop-unit modernization, was almost at a standstill. One development that did take place soon after the 1920 act restored the Army transportation function to the QMC, however, was the establishment of motor-transport operating, maintenance, and supply units.

A revision of all the Quartermaster T/O's finally occurred in 1935 as a result of efforts by General Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, to accomplish "an orderly program for progressive modernization of the Army" after "circumstances of the first postwar decade had compelled the Army to lag behind in adapting its organization, equipment and tactical doctrine to modern requirements." ⁷ It was under this revision of tables in the mid-thirties that Quartermaster units generally were organized on a regimental basis. For example, the Quartermaster regiment of the infantry division replaced the Quar-

⁷ Ltr, CofS to TQMG et al., 9 Jul 34, sub: Revision of Tng Methods, AG 333 (7–9–34).
master train, or supply train as it had been known in World War I.

Early in 1939, at the direction of the General Staff, The Quartermaster General requested the Quartermaster Board to make a thorough study of all Quartermaster T/O's and recommend any revisions in the tables for motor transport and supply units considered necessary to make them conform to provisions of the Protective Mobilization Plan. He urged that special attention be devoted to the problems of providing greater mobility and of standardizing the various units—company, battalion, and regiment—so that they could be employed in either combat or rear areas. 8

Reorganization was under way when the outbreak of the war in Europe, the President’s proclamation of a limited national emergency, and the introduction of the blitzkrieg type of warfare by the Germans in the campaigns of 1939 and 1940 provided a real impetus for eliminating all deficiencies and building the Army to such strength that it would be capable of meeting the modern armies of Europe in actual combat. Briefly, in addition to motorizing and mechanizing the Army, the modernization process involved converting the outmoded square divisions of World War I into smaller, more compact triangular divisions, and reorganizing supply troops so that they would be able to function more efficiently under this streamlining.

In line with the sharp trend toward motorization of the Army, the 1939–40 modernization program naturally gave greater mobility to Quartermaster units, but it had an equally profound effect upon their size and flexibility of organization. In the first place, there was a decided trend toward reduction in the size of units. For example, the T/O for the old square infantry division had provided for a Quartermaster regiment to perform the normal Quartermaster functions required by the division. Under the shift to the triangular form of organization, the division had fewer men than before, and therefore the organic Quartermaster regiment was replaced by a battalion. Later on, in the fall of 1942, when automotive maintenance was transferred from Quartermaster to Ordnance jurisdiction, the work load of the Quartermaster organic unit in the division was reduced still further, and the battalion was replaced by a company. 9

Nondivisional types of units also experienced this process. The Quartermaster regiment virtually disappeared in the 1939–40 reorganization. Quite a few battalions were retained at that time, but the search for greater flexibility through reduction in the size of units continued. By the fall of 1943 further revisions of tables had eliminated the fixed-size battalion as well as the regiment from the Quartermaster organization, and the company became the basic T/O unit as it did in most of the other supply services. 10

The company itself, normally the smallest operating unit, acquired much more flexibility in the 1939–40 reorganization.

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8 (1) Ltr, Maj Gen Henry Gibbins, TQMG, to President QM Bd, 26 Jan 39, sub: Revision of T/O of Certain QM Units. (2) Ltr, Gibbins to same, 26 Apr 39, same sub, 320.3.
10 The only fixed-size battalions in the QMC after that were in the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions, which were permitted to retain their Quartermaster supply battalions despite the fact that this organic unit was eliminated from all other armored divisions after the revision of the T/O on 15 September 1943. See Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947), p. 327.
It was re-established on an organizational basis that permitted it to be broken down into several functional groups, each designed to perform its mission independently whenever necessary. The laundry company, as an illustration, consisted of a company headquarters and four platoons, each comprised of two sections. Each platoon had its own headquarters to supervise the work of its two sections, and the section rather than the company became the smallest operating unit. This same principle of organization was followed in other Quartermaster units, such as truck, bakery, service, salvage, railhead, depot, sterilization and bath, refrigeration, graves registration, and sales commissary companies, though the platoon instead of the section usually was the smallest operating unit.

The central purpose of the program for revising the Quartermaster T/O's was to provide a more flexible system that would meet fluctuating requirements for service troops and at the same time conserve manpower. Fixed-size regiments and battalions were wasteful in that the number of men permanently assigned to them rarely coincided with the number needed to perform the jobs in a specific operation. With the elimination of these larger units and the setting up of a smaller, independent unit—the company—as the basic operating unit, requirements could be met more efficiently and economically by assembling companies in the numbers or types needed for a particular purpose. For example, Quartermaster truck companies could be grouped in accordance with specific requirements for a special transportation job, or different types of units, such as truck, refrigeration, gasoline supply, salvage repair, service, and laundry companies, could be assembled to carry out a variety of activities in a particular area.

This new plan of bringing orphan companies together in varying numbers and types made it necessary to have an equally flexible administrative setup for co-ordinating and supervising their work. Battalion and group headquarters and headquarters detachments were created for this purpose. The Quartermaster battalion headquarters detachment, as contrasted with the old-type, fixed-size battalion which it replaced, was fluid, being designed to administer from two to six companies, either assigned or attached. When large-scale operations required the services of a number of battalions, the battalions were placed under the supervision of a group headquarters and headquarters detachment—successor to the fixed-size regiment. Normally the Quartermaster group headquarters was provided in the ratio of one to three or four battalions, but it was capable of handling a greater administrative load. During the Normandy Campaign, for instance, one group headquarters directed the activities of seven battalions comprising thirty-seven companies of various types.

The group system replaced the regiment not only in the tactical organization but, by late 1944, in the supervision of training as well, and proved particularly well adapted because of its flexibility and economy in the use of overhead personnel.

For supervision of training, service units, especially quartermaster and ordnance, were primarily affected. A group headquarters which proved especially effective in the training of Negro troops could be left undisturbed.

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11 (1) OQMG Rpt, Organization and Functions of Quartermaster Units, 30 Nov 45, Sec. on QM Group Hq and Hq Detachments and QM Battalion Hq and Hq Detachments. (2) Ltr, Hq AGF to All CGs, 16 Oct 43, sub: QM Sv in the Fld.
as successive increments of units came under its supervision and passed on to a port of embarkation. In the theater the group system made it possible to attach Negro or white units to a group headquarters as needed or desired. Negro units especially gained in strength, usefulness, and experience by the operation of this plan.\textsuperscript{12}

As a means of increasing mobility, provisions were made in the 1939–40 revision of the T/O’s for various types of mobile Quartermaster units—mobile shoe repair shops, mobile laundries, mobile commissary units, mobile sterilization and bath outfits, and mobile maintenance units. Most of these organizations, however, existed only on paper for many months, primarily because no funds were available for the necessary mobile equipment.\textsuperscript{13} It was 1941 before the money had been appropriated and the equipment began rolling off assembly lines.

It was anticipated that such units would keep pace with the fast-moving motorized combat troops and be able to operate near the front lines. Actually, these so-called mobile units were only semimobile, and they failed to live up to expectations when put to the test in the North African campaign. Their equipment was too bulky and too heavy, and was installed in cumbersome vans moved by tractors. All of the equipment, therefore, was completely redesigned to be more compact, weigh less, and have greater maneuverability. It was late in the war before the new mobile equipment was in production, and comparatively little of it ever reached the front.\textsuperscript{14}

Most of the 1939–40 revisions in the T/O’s were directed toward modernizing and refining Quartermaster units already in existence, but a number of distinctly new types were created on paper to be activated and trained in the event of mobilization. Most notable among these were: (1) the depot company, supply, which was designed to provide administrative and technical personnel for a Quartermaster supply depot in a theater of operations; (2) the gasoline supply company, whose function was to break down bulk deliveries of gasoline and lubricants received at railheads, truckheads, and refilling points and distribute them to troops in the field; (3) the port headquarters, to be organized for the purpose of directing housekeeping and local transportation functions at ports established in overseas theaters of operations;\textsuperscript{15} and (4) the Quartermaster port battalion, comprised of four companies, whose function was to provide the common labor required to load and discharge vessels in theaters of operations.

Many of the depot supply and gasoline supply companies were activated and trained during the war and proved invaluable in carrying out Quartermaster functions in the theaters. On the other hand, the comparatively few Quartermaster port battalion and port headquarters units that had been activated by the summer of 1942 were redesignated and transferred to the Transportation Corps, which was created at that time to handle rail and water transportation. Similarly, hundreds of motor-repair and maintenance units of various types that had been activated and trained as Quartermaster organizations were placed under the jurisdiction of the Ord-

\textsuperscript{12} Palmer \textit{et al.}, \textit{The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops}, p. 521.

\textsuperscript{13} Memo, ACofS G–3 for CoS, 4 Jun 40, sub: Activation of Certain QM Units, 320.2.

\textsuperscript{14} See Risch, \textit{The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services}, Ch. IV.

\textsuperscript{15} It was contemplated that most of the duties at ports of embarkation and debarkation in the United States during mobilization would be performed by civilian personnel supervised by officers as they were in peacetime.
nance Department with the transfer of the motor-maintenance function to that agency in August 1942.

Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E's) were combined in mid-1943 for the convenience of field commanders, and became subject to almost constant revision as efforts were made to adjust unit organization and equipment to actual conditions encountered in the various combat areas throughout the world. Moreover, beginning with the North African campaign late in 1942, experience in the theaters forced the development of other new types of Quartermaster units to meet the needs of modern warfare. For example, the greatly multiplied requirements for oil, gasoline, and lubricants resulting from the increased mobilization and mechanization of the Army led to the creation of new types of units for handling, storing, transporting, testing, and inspecting petroleum and petroleum products. The Quartermaster base petroleum supply company was established to receive and store petroleum products at communications zone depots, tank farms, or petroleum pipeline terminals, and to supervise the distribution of bulk gasoline and lubricants to canning points where drum-cleaning and filling platoons were set up to clean, inspect, repair, and fill 55-gallon drums. The Quartermaster large-drum manufacturing company was created to provide personnel for operating a plant to manufacture the 55-gallon drums in areas where the containers were not readily available. A versatile heavy truck company was established to serve as a truck company (petroleum) when equipped with tank semitrailers for hauling bulk petroleum products, and as a truck company (heavy) when utilizing stake-and-platform trailers for hauling other cargo. Petroleum products laboratories were created to provide personnel and equipment for testing and inspecting petroleum products and equipment in the field, including the testing of captured enemy material to determine its usability.

The urgent need for an organization that could shoulder the responsibility for sorting the mountains of food, clothing, gasoline, and tentage suddenly dumped from ships on enemy soil and moving them quickly and efficiently to advancing troops after a beachhead had been established led to the development of the headquarters and headquarters company, Quartermaster base depot. The primary mission of this unit was to classify, stack, and protect from weather and insects the hundreds of different items unloaded more or less chaotically on the shore, and then to establish the necessary administrative and supervisory machinery for baking bread, washing laundry, chilling food, repairing clothing, organizing transportation, and providing other Quartermaster services for the fighting men. This company could be attached either to a base general depot or to a branch Quartermaster depot, both located in the communications zone. It consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company, and six divisions—executive, supply, petroleum, laundry, salvage, and graves registration. It was the largest of all the Quartermaster administrative units, normally comprising 34 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 118 enlisted men.

The base depot company was created to operate in conjunction with the headquarters and headquarters company, Quartermaster base depot, its function being to furnish technical personnel for the receipt, storage, and issue of subsistence, clothing, equipment, and general supplies. One company was designed to operate either
the Quartermaster section of a base depot or a branch Quartermaster depot when supplies were being provided for no more than 100,000 troops. When a base depot served in excess of 100,000 men, two or more Quartermaster depot companies were assigned to the installation and served under the supervision of the headquarters and headquarters company, Quartermaster base depot.

Just as the Quartermaster sales company, mobile, was designed to sell nonissue items on a nonprofit basis to combat troops in forward areas, so the Quartermaster depot supply and sales company was established to operate retail sales facilities for depot personnel and troops in the vicinity of a base general hospital, a branch Quartermaster depot, or a port of embarkation in order to supply such morale-maintaining items as cigarettes, tobacco, candy, writing paper, razor blades, and toilet articles, as well as officers' clothing and insignia. An additional function of the depot supply and sales company was to supervise and operate the labor and motor pool at the installation to which it was attached.

Most of the other types of Quartermaster units in World War II were modernized versions of World War I prototypes. In some instances the names were identical, as in the case of bakery companies and laundry companies. More often the nomenclature was changed, though the units performed similar but more highly developed functions. For example, the labor battalion of World War I was superseded by the service company, the ice plant company gave way to the refrigeration company, the graves registration section became the graves registration company, and the conservation and reclamation company was replaced by the salvage repair company. The latter unit was semi-mobile and carried shoemakers, tailors, and canvas repairmen directly to advanced areas to make on-the-spot repairs of critical Quartermaster items.

The railhead company, which received, broke down, and issued supplies at railheads, truckheads, navigation heads, beachheads, and other supply points and thus served as the last connecting link in the long chain of supply from the farm and factory to the fighting men, had no prototype in World War I. Usually this kind of work was performed in 1917–18 by labor units under the direction of experienced checkers.16

On the other hand, some of the units utilized in World War I were found to be outmoded. The traditional wagon companies, for example, disappeared under the motorization process. Pack-animal units, however, were still used widely in areas where mud, jungles, and mountains made motor transportation impossible. These pack outfits played an important role in keeping supply lines open in Sicily, Italy, Burma, and China.

The outstanding organizational development in Quartermaster units during World War II was the trend toward more and more flexibility that culminated in the establishment of composite units. The suggestion for creating the composite type of organization in which service troops could be grouped into flexible units designed to fit supply situations under varying conditions was made late in 1942 by General George C. Marshall, then Chief of Staff:

I don't think we have followed the most efficient and economical system in regard to the organization of service troops. Where a complete Engineer regiment is required, for example, then the present organization is satisfactory. But in the numerous cases where smaller groups are required, then I think our methods are extravagant and do not promote coordinate direction and leadership, particularly during moments of critical operations.

It seems to me that we should have these service units so set up that we can put together composite battalions, composite regiments, and composite brigades, so that they will have one directing head and we shall avoid unnecessary and complicating overhead of various higher headquarters.\footnote{Memo, CoFS for CG SOS et al., 29 Dec 42, no sub.}

General Marshall's plan, with modifications, was adopted in 1943, but it was March 1944 before "tailor-made" Quartermaster cellular units finally became available to combat forces for utilization in areas where it was not desirable or practical to use standard Quartermaster organizations. At that time the Quartermaster service organization table (T/O&E 10–500) was published setting up teams or cells of varying size, each designed to perform its particular function for a specific number of troops. From this table the theater commander could select the correct-size teams or combination of teams he needed, group them under appropriate headquarters, and organize them into composite units. However, instead of composite regiments and brigades as General Marshall had proposed, T/O&E 10–500 provided only for composite battalions, composite companies, and composite platoons, though teams could be used individually to augment standard Quartermaster companies or could even be assigned to units of fixed size in other services. A laundry team, for example, could be assigned to a hospital company of the Medical Department. When more extensive services were required than could be supplied by a composite battalion, the flexible group system made it possible to assemble two or more battalions under a group headquarters and headquarters detachment.

The available services were classified by T/O&E 10–500 in the following seven categories:

1. Administrative (headquarters, mess teams, and auto mechanic teams).
2. Supply (supply, sales, bakery, and remount sections).
3. Transportation (passenger vehicles, cargo vehicle, mobile refrigeration, and pack-animal sections).
4. Repair (shoe, textile, and equipment repair units).
5. Laundry and dry cleaning.
6. Petroleum (laboratory, can cleaning, and petroleum dispensing units).
7. Miscellaneous (graves registration, fumigation and bath, salvage collection, and labor units).

The classification was broken down further into the teams of various sizes available to perform specific types of functions, such as mess, shoe repair, or salvage collection. Each team was designated by an alphabetical symbol and the table specified its operating capacity in terms of the number of troops it was set up to serve. Thus when the strength of the troops to be served was known, it was comparatively simple to select from the approximately eighty types of teams the precise combination desired. For example, three types of bakery teams were listed. Team BF was designed to operate one shift and furnish bread for 800 troops. Team BG combined with team BF required no additional equipment but permitted the operation of a second shift, and the combined teams...
could provide bread for 1,200 troops. The third type, team BH, was set up to bake bread for 5,000 individuals. The flexibility provided by this system made it possible to select the combination of teams which could meet the requirements of an armed force of almost any given size that could not be served economically by a regular bakery company.

Despite the seeming simplicity of the way in which the service organization system was set up, it became apparent early in 1945 that the principles underlying the organization and use of cellular tables were not generally understood, and that full advantage was not being taken of the possibilities for establishing composite units. It was necessary, therefore, at that late date to launch a program for educating staff agencies in the use and background of the tables.18

Comparatively few composite units were organized and trained in the zone of interior during the war. Inasmuch as they were designed to meet the variable and often rapidly changing conditions encountered in theaters of operations composite units did not lend themselves readily to a program of training in the United States. By the time a theater commander submitted his requisition and the unit could be put together and trained it was likely that the particular need for it would no longer exist. Consequently, composite units generally were organized and trained in the theaters as needs arose.

The Corps’ Limited Responsibility for Unit Training

One of the standing grievances of Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory, The Quartermaster General in World War II, was that while he was responsible for training enlisted men and officers to serve in Quartermaster units, he had extremely limited jurisdiction over the actual training of the units themselves, and yet he had to “take the rap” for those which performed unsatisfactorily in the field. He contended that since he had to shoulder the blame for any deficiencies of the units he should have the entire responsibility for training them.19

As a matter of fact, it was eight months after Pearl Harbor before he was granted any authority to activate and train Quartermaster troop units. Even after that, the AGF and the service commands continued to exercise more control over the training of the ground units than he did, while the AAF trained all of the Quartermaster aviation units. The result was that much of the time there was little uniformity in the training given Quartermaster organizations to carry on their functions in the field.

Before March 1942, the training of all ground troop units was a function of General Headquarters, U. S. Army (GHQ), which delegated the mission to its subordinate armies. In addition, until June 1941 when the Army Air Forces was organized, GHQ was responsible for training all aviation units though it delegated this mission to the GHQ Air Force. Each corps area was responsible for organizing and training the Quartermaster units assigned to it to carry out its supply and administrative duties. The sole responsibility of The Quartermaster General in regard to units was to furnish the training doctrine, and this was followed only when the com-

19 Statement, Gen Gregory, QM Conf, Camp Lee, 2–4 Oct 44.
mander in charge of training a unit was inclined to do so. Although many new Quartermaster units were activated following the passage of the Selective Service Act in 1940, no change was made in the supervision of their training. Furthermore, regardless of whether the units were activated and trained under GHQ or corps area control, they generally were stationed at posts, camps, or stations more in accordance with the availability of housing space than with training facilities and qualified instructors. The new units received their cadres from Regular Army units and their fillers from Regular Army, Reserve, National Guard, and selectee sources.

Demands for new Quartermaster units at zone of interior and overseas defense installations were even more urgent by the spring of 1941, and the General Staff turned to the newly established replacement training centers as the best available agencies to supply the critically needed organizations. Consequently the first training cycle at the QMRTC's at Camp Lee and Fort Warren was devoted to a form of preactivation unit training in which the men were trained specifically as fillers for about a hundred Quartermaster units and were then assembled into those units at the QMRTC's before activation of the units at other installations. The demand for additional service units was so great during this cycle, which extended from March to the latter part of June 1941, that many Quartermaster units continued to be trained at scattered posts, camps, and stations under GHQ or corps area control.

Upon completion of the first training cycle the two QMRTC's assumed their intended role of training individual replacements for utilization wherever needed instead of as fillers for specific units. Thus the situation in regard to Quartermaster units was little changed from what it had been before March 1941 in that the activation and training of the units remained under the control, generally speaking, of the field armies and corps areas, and the availability of housing was still the primary factor in determining which agency would conduct the training.

Even though The Quartermaster General by then had acquired the authority to conduct all training at the QMRTC's and the various Quartermaster depots, just as he did at the Quartermaster School, the fact was that comparatively few units were ever assigned to any of these installations for training during the emergency period or the first year of the war, and therefore the training supervision of The Quartermaster General during that period was confined almost entirely to instruction of enlisted men and officers as individuals.

Meanwhile, several high-level administrative changes provided the basis for establishing the pattern that was to be followed in determining just which command would be responsible for the training of particular types of Quartermaster units. First, the establishment of the AAF, with the Air Force Combat Command replacing the GHQ Air Force, in June 1941 resulted in the transfer from GHQ to the AAF of the responsibility for activating and training Quartermaster aviation units. The effect of this development was that, since The Quartermaster General had had no jurisdiction over these units up to that time and the AAF thereafter had autonomous control, he never acquired...

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21 AR 170–10, Change 1, 31 Mar 41, sub: CAs and Depts.
22 AR 95–5, par. 3a, 21 Jun 41, sub: AAF.
any degree of authority over the training or inspection of aviation units.

Secondly, with the abolition of GHQ in the general reorganization of the War Department on 9 March 1942, the responsibility for organizing and training Quartermaster units assigned or attached to the subordinate field armies passed to the newly created AGF. At the same time, the corps areas, which had a hand in the training of nondivisional Quartermaster units, became subordinate to the SOS, as did the QMC and the other supply services.

It was not made clear immediately just what responsibility the SOS and its subordinate agencies and chiefs of services, such as The Quartermaster General, were to have in the training of nondivisional units. In fact, it was May 1942 before the War Department attempted to end the confusion that existed among the new major commands as to the extent of their responsibility for such units. At that time the General Staff laid down the principle that “in general, the using command will train a unit” and directed that the Commanding General, SOS, would be “responsible for the training of units organized to operate installations and activities controlled by him and those units organized in the United States solely for Services of Supply installations and activities in overseas garrisons, bases, and theaters.”

This ruling was helpful so far as it went, but it still left unsettled the question of whether the SOS or the AGF was to train the types of service organizations, such as Quartermaster truck, graves registration, salvage, and other units, which could be organized in the United States for operation in either the combat or the communications zones. Nevertheless the Commanding General, SOS, late in July 1942, after redesignating the corps areas as service commands, issued a general training directive in which he attempted to define the unit training responsibilities of his subordinate services and agencies. He vested in the service commands the general responsibility for training all SOS units “except for those units exempted by the Commanding General, Services of Supply.” The authority for training the units that he exempted from service command control was delegated to the “Chiefs of the appropriate Supply or Administrative Service concerned.”

This meant that The Quartermaster General at last had been granted definite authority to organize and train Quartermaster units, even though his authority was to be restricted to those units specifically assigned to him by the Commanding General, SOS. Before that his only responsibility had been to prepare the doctrine for their training, and this was purely academic since his programs served only as standardized suggestions for the training and he had no means of determining the nature of the doctrine actually employed or the results obtained.

The Quartermaster General’s opportunity to exercise his newly acquired control over unit training was quite limited during the last half of 1942 and the early part of 1943 because the SOS was able to place only a comparatively small number of units under his jurisdiction. The principal reason was that while the War Department made a further attempt to clarify jurisdiction as between the AGF and the SOS by listing periodically certain

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23 Memo, ACoS G-3 for CG SOS et al., 30 May 42, sub: Responsibility for Tng.
24 Ltr, CG SOS to TQMG et al., 28 Jul 42, sub: Unit Tng Within the SOS.
25 See Table 18.
units that were to be controlled by each of the commands, the question of training authority remained unsettled as the same types of units, namely truck and depot supply companies, continued to be found on the assignment lists of both commands, and the two commands frequently were unable to agree on the control and training of units that could be employed either in the zone of interior or in combat areas. The War Department finally ended the confusion in the spring of 1943 by ruling that the disputed units would be activated and trained by the AGF. Thus The Quartermaster General lost control over such units as truck and depot supply companies within a relatively short time after he had acquired the authority to activate and train them.26

Meanwhile, The Quartermaster General late in October 1942 expressed concern over the haphazard training being given Quartermaster units at scattered posts, camps, and stations and recommended that he be granted the authority to establish a unit training center in order that he might standardize and improve the training of Quartermaster units assigned to the SOS.

Inspections have disclosed that many Quartermaster units are not furnished cadres, do not receive their fillers and equipment, and, in many cases, are not stationed where technical training facilities are available or where there is a commander qualified or in

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**Table 18—Units Trained by the Office of The Quartermaster General**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quartermaster Units</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Detachments or Companies, QM Battalions</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakery Units</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depot Companies (Supply)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fumigation and Bath Companies</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graves Registration Companies</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; Hq Companies, QM Base Depot</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry Units</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Products Laboratories</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drum Service Units</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railhead Companies</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigeration Companies</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remount Squadron (Troops)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Companies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage Collecting Companies</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvage Repair Companies</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Companies</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Units</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Units</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dog Platoons</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>*6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actually these six were given their final unit training by the AGF.

Source: Rpt, Mil Tng Div for TQMG, 11 Sep 45, sub: Outstanding Accomplishments in World War II, p. 22.
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interested in their training. In addition, prior to completion of training, units have been employed on activities other than that for which activated and for which they should receive training prior to overseas assignment.

The establishment of a Unit Training Center wherein unit training for all types of units can be conducted is most desirable. Such a training center would be better prepared and able to conduct training than any other command. Furthermore, the Chief of Service can select and transfer men from one unit to another on determined qualifications, and by the use of a small casual detachment rearrangement specialists in the various units and furnish cadres. Officers and non-commissioned officers can be better trained with an instructor guidance program, and the use of training aids of all types including training films and charts can be employed.

Headquarters, SOS, soon to be redesignated the ASF, approved the proposal two months later, when facilities finally became available for this purpose. The first Quartermaster unit training center was established at Vancouver Barracks, Wash., on 10 January 1943. Although it was stipulated that the facilities of this installation were to be utilized by the QMC only temporarily pending the completion of the new ASF unit training center at Camp Ellis, Lewiston, Ill., and only fifty-three Quartermaster units were trained at the center before it closed in the fall of 1943, the program was significant. It marked the inauguration of a new system that did much to standardize and improve Quartermaster unit training as well as help to relieve the congestion at other posts, camps, and stations.

The experiment at Vancouver Barracks proved satisfactory from the start and steps were taken in the spring of 1943 to expand the Quartermaster unit training program. One of the first moves was to cancel the provision that the Quartermaster center be moved to Camp Ellis upon completion of that new installation. Instead, one half of the Quartermaster training staff at Vancouver Barracks was transferred to Camp Ellis in mid-April, while operations at Vancouver Barracks continued officially until the middle of September. At that time the center was transferred without personnel or equipment to Fort Warren, though the eighteen Quartermaster units that had been activated at Vancouver Barracks in July continued their training there until the end of October. The Fort Warren QMRTC had been discontinued and its personnel and facilities were utilized to operate the Wyoming installation as a Quartermaster unit training center through V-J Day.

Although their locations shifted, The Quartermaster General had two unit training centers under his jurisdiction throughout most of 1943 and the early part of 1944—the peak period for activations—and thus was able to exercise a considerable degree of control over the training of Quartermaster units that were assigned to the ASF. However, the limited housing capacities of the two centers made it impossible to train all of the new organizations as fast as they were being formed. Many Quartermaster units therefore continued to be trained at scattered service

27 Memo, TQMG for ACoS for Opns, 28 Oct 42, sub: QMC Units. A similar suggestion, extended to include unit training centers for all arms and services, had been advocated by Maj. Gen. Walter L. Weible when he was a captain in the old Training Branch of the G-3 Division of the War Department General Staff preparing mobilization plans during the emergency period. Ltr, Gen Weible to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, Chief, OCMH, 3 Apr 52, no sub.
28 Ltr, AGO to TQMG et al., 1 Jan 43, sub: Establishment of QM UTC, Vancouver Barracks, Wash.
29 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, Vancouver Barracks Sec., p. 22.
30 Ibid., pp. 15, 20.
command posts even though the facilities of both Camp Lee and the Quartermaster School were pressed into service to train certain units in an effort to meet the critical need for Quartermaster organizations.

The basic function of the Camp Lee QMRTC from its inception in 1941 had been to supply cadres for Quartermaster units to be activated elsewhere, but from time to time a few miscellaneous units had been activated and trained there. General Gregory had expressed the conviction from the early days of the war that the highly developed shops, specialized equipment, and qualified personnel at the QMRTC were particularly well suited for the training of Quartermaster units and that the center should be utilized in part for that purpose. It was December 1943, however, before he obtained authority to establish unit training as a regularly assigned function at Camp Lee. The program, which continued throughout the remainder of the war, began with the activation of thirty-four laundry platoons but was expanded later to include many other types of units.\footnote{Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, Camp Lee Sec., pp. i, 32-33 and Pt. II, Camp Lee Sec., p. 8 and App. B.}

The unit training program at the Quartermaster School, on the other hand, was of an emergency nature and limited in scope. Only eight companies, all of the same type—headquarters and headquarters company, Quartermaster base depot—were trained at the Quartermaster School in the emergency program conducted there between October 1943 and June 1944.\footnote{Ibid., Pt. I, QM School Sec., pp. 14-15.}

While the bulk of the unit training program had been completed by the spring of 1944, another Quartermaster unit training center was opened in March of that year. This center—the last established during the war—was set up at the Fort Devens ASF Unit Training Center, Ayer, Mass., primarily to train service companies and relieve the Camp Ellis Quartermaster training group of its heavy training program for Negro enlisted men. Eventually, with the inactivation of the group at Camp Ellis in mid-October 1944, Fort Devens took over the function formerly assigned to the Illinois center and continued in operation until the spring of 1945.\footnote{Ibid., Pt. I, Ft. Devens Sec., p. 1; Pt. I, Camp Ellis Sec., p. 26; and Pt. II, Ft. Devens Sec., p. 1.}

Records in the Military Training Division, OQMG, at the end of the war show that between July 1942, when the Commanding General, SOS, delegated unit training authority to him, and V-J Day, The Quartermaster General activated and trained nearly 850 Quartermaster units.\footnote{See Table 18.} Comparable statistics are not available on the number of Quartermaster units trained by all of the various other agencies that at one time or another had jurisdiction over them, but on 30 June 1945 there were 3,781 Quartermaster divisional and nondivisional units.\footnote{See Statistics, April 1952 draft, Troop Units Sec., MS in OCMH.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>QMC Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air force</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground force</td>
<td>1,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service force</td>
<td>1,760</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures indicate that while The Quartermaster General had comparatively little control at any time over the actual training of the ground force type units and none over the air force type, he did train approximately one out of four
Quartermaster units which took the field in World War II.

Principal Training Problems

Quartermaster units activated before 1943 not only were trained under widely varying conditions and interpretations of doctrine but were handicapped by many other difficulties, some of which persisted throughout the war. One of the most serious of these during the earliest stages of mobilization in 1939 and most of 1940 was the inadequacy of funds for defense purposes:

Ammunition was not available for training nor was money available to lease or purchase maneuver areas. Even the problem of purchasing enough gasoline to move a unit to a training area assumed gigantic proportions. Much of the equipment was obsolete and so badly worn that it would not provide adequate training for the troops. Too, equipment was not constructed as we know it today. Trucks were, for the most part, two-wheel-drive converted commercial models without provision for changing gear ratio in transmission. Such aids as infiltration courses, combat villages, radio-controlled aircraft targets and amphibious vehicles were unknown to the American army unit. 35

Extreme shortages of facilities and equipment continued long after Congress in the summer of 1940 began to appropriate almost limitless funds for military needs. Time had then become the limiting factor because men were being inducted into the Army and formed into units faster than labor could build the necessary housing and training facilities for them or industry could turn out the required equipment. Shortages of both housing and equipment actually increased until late in 1942 and continued to hamper training to some extent throughout much of 1943. Units had to be trained where housing was available regardless of whether satisfactory training facilities were at hand. As for equipment—weapons, ammunition, and motor vehicles were among the more important items in which scarcities persisted. For example, the 76th Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile) had so few trucks for training purposes during the winter of 1942–43 that the individual student driver “received only about one hour per week behind the wheel.” 36

Another serious obstacle to Quartermaster unit training, particularly in 1942, was the critical shortage of personnel. Original plans called for the replacement training centers to furnish the fillers for new units, but the output of the QMRTC’s fell so far short of meeting the requirements for the many new units being activated that the majority of the fillers had to be sent to the units directly from the reception centers. Allotments of personnel to the QMC were so small in proportion to needs that newly activated units frequently had to mark time for weeks and often months waiting for their fillers to arrive. More often than not when the fillers came they were completely lacking in both basic military and technical training. In many instances units “were activated with first sergeants having less than six months military service, cooks who had never cooked in an Army kitchen nor had any training in the subject, mechanics who could not even drive an Army vehicle.” 37 Moreover, new units rarely received all of their fillers at one time. Instead, fillers usually dribbled in at irregular intervals, making it necessary either to delay the training of the earlier arrivals while the new fillers

35 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, pp. 5–6.
36 Organizational History, 76th QM Battalion (Mobile), 10 Dec 42–1 May 44, Hist Br, OQMG.
37 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, p. 8.
caught up, or to carry on the training at different levels.

The early history of the 108th Bakery Company illustrates how shortages of personnel and equipment along with other difficulties handicapped unit training during the hectic days of 1942, when all branches of the Army were making frantic efforts to put together and train the organizations they had to have in a hurry. This particular company was activated on 24 March 1942 with one officer and nine enlisted men supplied as cadre by another bakery unit. The following two months were spent in trying to acquire the necessary equipment and supplies. It was June before the first fillers began to arrive, and these brought the enlisted strength of the unit up to only twenty-seven men. Since these men were far too few in number for separate training, they were detailed for the next five weeks to a truck company for instruction in such subjects as might be applicable to a bakery company.

In July the bakery company was alerted to go to a staging area to prepare for overseas movement. When the unit arrived at the staging area in August it had never baked a loaf of bread, nor even set up an oven in its five months of existence. It still lacked half of its baking equipment and needed seventy-two men to attain full strength. Most of the fillers had come from Infantry and Field Artillery replacement centers, while those from the Fort Warren QMRTC were chiefly laundry and sewing-machine operators, carpenters, plumbers, blacksmiths, undertakers, truck drivers, and cooks, with only a sprinkling of bakers. Fortunately, orders for movement overseas were canceled, and between September 1942 and April 1943, when it finally left the United States for North Africa, the unit was able to acquire additional equipment, increase its strength, and obtain a fair amount of training, but in the interim it was alerted several more times, moved to six different locations, and experienced many other difficulties.38

The shortage of qualified cadres and the lack of any practical system for supplying them to units activated at scattered posts, camps, and installations created additional training problems. Inasmuch as the QMRTC's were able to furnish only a small portion of the large number of cadres needed, the usual procedure was to transfer them from units already in training. In some instances the parent organization had been activated only a short time itself, had not yet acquired all of its own personnel, and had no qualified men to spare. Moreover, older units generally were reluctant to give up their better men and often sent along their misfits rather than their competent personnel. The net result was that unit commanders frequently received little assistance from their cadres and sometimes were even burdened with the task of providing basic training for both the cadres and the fillers.39

Another serious handicap in the activation and training of units before 1943 was the shortage of officers and their general lack of experience. The job of leading and training Quartermaster units during the emergency period and the early months of the war fell largely to Reserve officers because the number of Regular Army officers was quite small and the supply had to be spread exceedingly thin throughout the expanding Army. While most of the Re-

38 Organizational History, 108th Bakery Co, Hist Br, QM
serve officers possessed useful technical skills, comparatively few of them had had any field experience or were familiar with methods of Quartermaster operations in the modernized Army. Officers who came from civilian sources usually were completely lacking in military experience. Thus it was a formidable task to find a sufficient number of officers capable of commanding and training all of the new field units that were being activated. Many officers had so little knowledge of what they were supposed to do in the units to which they were assigned that they had to undergo training themselves while attempting to instruct the men under them. "An officer frequently would find himself teaching a subject in the afternoon that he had just learned himself that same morning."  

The greatly increased output of the OCS finally produced a surplus of officers in 1943. This, together with the fact that steps had been taken to develop leadership and other qualities that would enable new officers to command troops in the field, resulted in a marked improvement in the situation. The relief proved to be only temporary, however, for another critical shortage of officers suddenly developed early in 1944, causing a condition somewhat similar to that which had existed in 1942.

Still another obstacle, and one of the most persistent and troublesome of all, was the almost constant loss of trainee personnel suffered by the units at all stages of the training process. This personnel turnover was the result of withdrawals for cadres, transfers to the AAF or ground combat units, assignments to the OCS, as well as elimination of physically limited personnel, hospitalizations, and deaths. A turnover of 50 percent or more was not at all uncommon. For example, the 604th Graves Registration Company, which was activated in April 1943, had lost 63 percent of its original personnel by the following September.  

Such losses not only disrupted training but tended to lower morale because the personnel lost had to be replaced, and if the replacements happened to be raw recruits from reception centers, as they often were, basic training generally had to be started all over again. It was not unusual for units to undergo the morale-shattering process of having to repeat basic training several times. Moreover, when units finally were alerted for movement overseas, higher authority frequently had to strip lower-priority units in various stages of training in order to bring the alerted organizations up to full strength. This became a vicious circle since, in turn, other units had to be robbed in order to attain authorized strength for the stripped units and to qualify them for shipment overseas.

Personnel turnover continued to be one of the more serious handicaps faced by units in the later stages of the war despite measures taken to overcome it. Beginning in the fall of 1942 and continuing through 1943, for example, it was the general practice to authorize overstrength in units at the time of activation in an effort to offset losses from normal attrition. While this worked out in some instances, most units experienced difficulty in achieving even normal strength at the time of activation because of the general shortage of personnel, and the policy was discontinued early in 1944. Some Quartermaster units as late as November 1944 had more than 100 per-

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40 Organizational History, 76th QM Battalion (Mobile), 1 Dec 42-1 May 44.
41 Insp Rpt, Capt Victor A. Sharett, QMC, for TQMG, 17 Sep 43, no sub.
The Development of the Training Program

The program under which the relatively small number of Quartermaster units activated in the first year of the emergency were trained was developed late in 1939 and in 1940 by the War Plans and Training Branch, OQMG, in co-operation with the G-3 Division of the War Department General Staff as a part of mobilization planning. This program called for sixteen weeks of instruction but was extremely general in nature. It made no clear distinction between the training plan for units and that for replacements. Actually the program was not designed to control training, but rather to serve as a guide in allotting time to the various phases of training. It proposed, for example, that nearly half of the training period be set aside for service requirements, that is, for the performance of regular post and garrison duties. The unit commander was permitted to use his own judgment, primarily on the basis of local conditions, in selecting the subjects to be taught and the procedures to be followed. The result was that the training of a unit usually was good or bad, depending upon the particular whims or qualifications of the officer in charge.

... in many instances the only formal training received was a few hours close order drills weekly, calisthenics and review of basic subjects which, at times, was augmented by a short field problem somewhere on the reservation. It was not until the winter of 1939-40 that combined maneuvers were held in which a unit could have an opportunity to even approach the function it would actually perform in combat.

The original program was completely inadequate for solving the problems that arose when the Selective Service System went into operation and it became necessary to activate large numbers of units with fillers directly from civilian life. Consequently, on 1 October 1940, The Quartermaster General released a new mobilization training program. Its purpose was "to furnish a general guide for the balanced training of units so that they may be prepared to take the field on short
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notice." Though designed primarily for the training of units, the new program, like its predecessor, served also as the basis for training replacements and was the pattern used by Quartermaster units beginning in the winter of 1940-41 as well as by the QMRTC's when they opened in the spring of 1941.

The 1940 program concentrated the former sixteen weeks of training into thirteen weeks, established eight hours per day as the minimum time to be spent in training, and was more specific in that it included twenty-five separate programs with detailed instructions for training the various types of Quartermaster units. It also set aside much more time for basic military training, and specified that periods allotted to post and garrison duties "be utilized for actual training in the duties required of Quartermaster Corps personnel when serving at a post or station." Inasmuch as The Quartermaster General had no control over the actual training of Quartermaster units—then the responsibility of GHQ and the corps areas—he had no direct means of determining how widely his training doctrine was being employed or what results were being obtained. Nevertheless, the 1940 program was adopted to a large extent at the various training installations and continued to serve as a general guide for Quartermaster unit training until the fall of 1942.

In the meantime, the attack upon Pearl Harbor had created a sudden demand for many Quartermaster units with sufficient training to permit them to be assigned to defensive missions at home or abroad. In an effort to meet this emergency situation, The Quartermaster General issued a series of sixteen-week Quartermaster consoli
dated unit training programs in December 1941 to serve as standards in providing advanced technical training for Quartermaster organizations that had completed their basic unit instruction under the provisions of the 1940 program. The need for these units was so critical, however, that comparatively few of them were able to undergo any of this additional training before their hurried departure overseas or to defense stations in the zone of interior.

It became more and more apparent in the months following the United States' entry into the war that the Army’s emergency training plans and programs were outmoded, and that Quartermaster and other supply units would have to undergo training similar to that given combat troops if they were to function successfully in a modern global war. Therefore, acting upon instructions from the Director of Training, SOS, The Quartermaster General issued a separate unit training program that embodied this new concept.

The unit must be able to act alone in defense against attacks by hostile airplanes, airborne and paratroop attack, mechanized units or ground troops, including intrenching and construction of obstacles. It must be capable of maneuvering under fire and escape every observation by the use of camouflage and existing cover. The unit must be able to apply the principles of demolition to all quartermaster installations. It must be competent to provide for its security on the march and in camp by use of patrols, advance, flank and rear guard, and outposts.

45 MTP 10–1, 1 Oct 40, Sec. 1, par. 2.
46 Ibid., Sec. 1, par. 3.
47 For a detailed discussion of the 1940 program, see Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Programs, pp. 39–45.
48 Ibid., pp. 64–67.
49 MTP 10–1, Sec. 1, par. 3d, 21 Sep 42, sub: MTP's for QM Units.
The 1942 program not only placed more emphasis upon combat subjects but outlined in detail the training schedules for the various types of units as well as the enlisted specialists in each, the appropriate references to be used, and the hours to be devoted to each subject. The program allotted thirteen weeks to unit training—the same time allotted under the 1940 program—but the period was divided generally into four distinct phases. The first four weeks were to be set aside for basic military training, the second four weeks for individual specialist instruction, the third four weeks for unit training as a whole, and the final week for review and inspection. At the same time the procedure was designed to be as flexible as possible to permit some deviation when local conditions made it necessary. The training time was increased from forty-four to forty-eight hours a week, a move that reflected the critical need in 1942 for the rapid activation and training of new units. In an effort to improve the caliber of instruction, the program specified that the training was to be carried out under the direction of experienced officers and qualified cadres.

Since The Quartermaster General’s initial authority to train Quartermaster SOS units had been delegated to him only two months before the 1942 program became effective, most of the early organizations over which he gained control were trained under its provisions. Upon the direction of the SOS, the program was modified to the extent of providing more realistic basic military training. However, the program as originally adopted served as the pattern for the first thirteen weeks of mobilization instruction given all SOS and AGF Quartermaster units activated between the time it was distributed and the fall of 1943.  

Units were activated and trained at such a rapid pace during 1942 that many of them had to wait weeks or months after completing the initial thirteen-week program before being assigned to overseas duty. During the interim the men were inclined to go stale and lose morale from lack of activity. To prevent this, The Quartermaster General, at the direction of SOS, prepared and released in tentative form in January 1943 and in final form in April 1943 a supplementary Quartermaster training program to provide advanced instruction during a second thirteen-week period. The primary aim of this advanced training was “the promotion of teamwork in the application of the technique essential to each unit’s service mission during combat.”

This type of advanced training was not entirely new, but rather a refinement and expansion of the tactical training of Quartermaster units that had been undertaken after Pearl Harbor under the Quartermaster consolidated unit training programs. The program was invaluable in that it provided for the men in units awaiting orders a period of useful occupation during which they received their final conditioning for overseas service. This 1943 program remained in effect until January 1945, but the exigencies of the military situation limited its application. In many, if not most, instances the units were shipped overseas before they had an opportunity to complete the advanced training.

The year 1943 marked an important...
turning point in the training of Quartermaster units. In the first place that was the year Quartermaster unit training centers came into being and The Quartermaster General acquired a much greater degree of control over the training of Quartermaster units in the ASF. Secondly, the immediate requirements for additional troops overseas subsided sufficiently during 1943—as a result of the improved strategic position of the Allied forces—so that the various branches of the Army could finally devote more time and attention to the task not only of adjusting the training program to the needs dictated by battle experience, but also of providing more thorough instruction.

Such action had become imperative by that time since reports were coming in from the theaters that units as well as replacements were arriving overseas with serious training deficiencies and had to undergo additional instruction before they could perform their functions in the advanced areas. The War Department had been aware of this situation to some extent at least, but theater requirements had been so urgent in 1942 that many units were shipped overseas hastily even though it was realized that they did not have "the desired degree of training." 53

Moreover, so many problems arose in the hurried processing of units in the feverish days of 1942 that preparations for moving units overseas became a difficult and complicated procedure. An understanding of the problems encountered helps to make clear why units, particularly those shipped out in the early stages of the war, usually required additional training after they reached the theaters. On the surface the procedure for processing units appeared to be quite simple. The War Department computed the requirements of the various theater commanders and prepared instructions for the three major commands concerning the numbers and types of units each would have to furnish by a certain date. These commands, in turn, instructed their subordinate agencies to select the specific units to be called and to issue the necessary activation and training instructions. The units thus selected were then alerted and told how much time they would have before movement to designated staging areas where final arrangements for shipping them abroad were to be made. The port commander designated the time they were to arrive at the staging areas.

This plan was based on the assumption that when a unit arrived at a staging area it would be completely organized, manned, equipped, and trained, and that it would merely have to undergo a routine check before proceeding to a port of embarkation. It was intended that the staging areas would have to perform only such cursory functions as determining that records were in order, ascertaining whether the men in the units were physically qualified for overseas duty and had been immunized and vaccinated, and making certain that the units possessed all of their necessary equipment and supplies.

Things did not always work out as planned for numerous reasons. In the first place, personnel was in such short supply and the competition for men was so keen among the various branches of the Army that alerted units often were far below strength when they arrived at the staging areas, despite the fact that they had been given top priority. This meant that in order to obtain the full complement re-
quired for movement overseas they had to take men from units further down the priority scale. The men acquired in this eleventh-hour scramble were in various stages of training and often had to undergo hurried instruction at the staging areas in an attempt to bring them up to minimum requirements. Sometimes these men had been members of entirely different types of organizations. Thus, as a result of the hasty build-up in the staging areas, units frequently arrived overseas with a hodgepodge of personnel of varied training and experience.

Moreover, the lower-priority organizations from which the men were transferred usually were left in a badly depleted and demoralized state. Not only was their training disrupted, but they too, in turn, would have to take men from still other units when the time came for them to move overseas. Once started this procedure of robbing Peter to pay Paul became a never-ending process.

A similar situation existed in regard to equipment. Production ran so far behind requirements during 1942 that there simply was not enough to meet the needs of all of the organizations in the advanced stages of training, let alone those of the many new units being activated each month. Until late in 1943 units rarely if ever had all of their equipment even by the time they reached the staging areas, and many of them arrived with less than half of their allotments. Procurement was such a problem that the moment a unit gained priority status steps were taken to obtain the equipment in which it was deficient from any sources available. As in the case of personnel, this frequently meant robbing units lower down on the priority list. Thus another vicious circle was set in motion.

This scarcity of equipment handicapped the training of units to such an extent that it was often extremely difficult for them to qualify for movement overseas. Not only did shortages exist in the technical equipment required for their instruction and use in carrying out supply functions, but weapons and ammunition were often non-existent for training unit personnel in self defense as prescribed by the revised training programs. Even when the units had the necessary guns there frequently was no ammunition available for firing practice because combat organizations had priority on the limited supply. It was not unusual in 1942 for units to have to borrow weapons at the staging areas to meet the minimum training requirements. Often the original weapons issued for training purposes were obsolete models and replacements became available too late for firing practice. Similarly, technical equipment frequently was out of date or entirely unavailable during the training period, and when the allotments of the required types finally arrived the units had little time in which to become familiar with them before they embarked.

Among other related problems were those growing out of frequent changes in priorities, for which theater commanders were often responsible, that resulted in constant revision of movement schedules. In some instances alerted units which had been told originally that they would have two or three months in which to prepare for movement to staging areas, suddenly received orders a few days later to move within a week or so. As a result, they usually arrived long before they were actually ready. On the other hand, units were sometimes detained in staging areas for several months because the heavy movement overseas had exhausted the
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available shipping capacity. Such units lost much valuable time and were inclined to go stale because the staging areas were overcrowded and lacked the proper facilities for training during this interim.

When previous measures proved ineffective in correcting the conditions that caused these difficulties, the War Department early in 1943 took more drastic steps to insure that the units designated for overseas movement were properly organized, trained, and equipped. On 5 January it issued a directive which outlined in brief its revised policies and procedures for preparing units for service in the theaters. Among the new provisions was the stipulation that before any unit embarked it must submit a full report of its status for the approval of the Chief of Staff. The Inspector General was to inspect all units destined for overseas duty in order to determine the adequacy and efficiency of personnel, the state of technical training, and the completeness and condition of equipment. Action to correct the deficiencies disclosed was to be initiated on the spot. To meet emergency demands for additional units for overseas movement, each major command was to set up and maintain a pool of units completely organized, manned, and equipped. A new system was adopted for establishing the order of priority, and the three major commands were to be furnished each month with the monthly overseas requirements for the succeeding six-month period, broken down by quantities and types of units.54

This directive was followed on 1 February 1943 by the release of detailed instructions for the guidance of all echelons involved in bringing units to a state of readiness for shipment overseas. These instructions were published under the title of "Preparation for Overseas Movement," which came to be known as "POM," and were designed to standardize procedures and eliminate many of the conditions that had been a source of difficulties. In general, unit commanders were given the primary responsibility for making certain that units were adequate in all respects, and they were to receive earlier warning of impending movement to staging areas so that they could have more time to complete preparations.

Under POM, the unit, unless otherwise authorized by the War Department, was to move to the staging area only after it had completed its prescribed training and had reached its full authorized strength of officers and enlisted men qualified for overseas service. Actual movement to the staging area or port of embarkation was to be made as before—only upon the call of the port commander, who was to assume complete control over the units upon their arrival. Units were to be equipped as completely as possible before they moved to the staging areas. Similarly, medical requirements, including vaccinations and immunizations, were to be met prior to the departure from the home station.

The procedures and policies set forth in the original POM, and the revisions that were made in later issues of the publication, resulted in eliminating most of the conditions that had caused the major difficulties encountered earlier in preparing units for movement overseas. These measures, however, were not wholly corrective in instances where units continued to be trained under widely varying conditions.

54 (1) Ltr, AGO to CG SOS et al., 5 Jan 43, sub: Orgn, Tng, and Equip of Units for Overseas Sv, AG 320.2 (1-2-43) OB-S-C-M. (2) For a more detailed discussion see Chester Wardlow, The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply, a volume in preparation for UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
at scattered posts, camps, and stations outside the jurisdiction of The Quartermaster General. At the end of 1943 there were still some complaints that units trained under the control of the AGF were arriving at ports of embarkation with deficiencies that could have been avoided.\textsuperscript{55}

The improvement achieved in units trained under the direction of The Quartermaster General was more striking. Not a single one of these units was turned down by The Inspector General at ports of embarkation in the ten-month period between June 1943 and April 1944. This was in sharp contrast to the situation early in 1943, when in the month of April alone thirty-three Quartermaster organizations were temporarily disqualified for overseas movement and had to be detained at staging areas until their deficiencies could be corrected.\textsuperscript{56} Much of this improvement undoubtedly was due to the fact that with the establishment of Quartermaster unit training centers early in 1943 The Quartermaster General was able to initiate his own program for standardizing and improving unit training.

Another important step to insure that units would be ready for service upon reaching the theaters was taken in the fall of 1943 when the training period was extended from thirteen to seventeen weeks, and the final three weeks were set aside for intensive field training as compared with only one week under the previous schedule. The program was materially improved at that time by placing greater stress upon such essentially combat subjects as night fighting, patrolling, security, reconnaissance, dispersion, concealment, camouflage, mines, booby traps, first aid, antitank protection, discipline, and physical and mental conditioning for battle. This new program was prepared and distributed by The Quartermaster General to guide the training of all Quartermaster units activated on or after 25 September 1943. It became effective during the fall and winter of 1943–44 at Fort Warren, the Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, and the ASF Unit Training Center at Fort Devens.\textsuperscript{57}

While the new program proved satisfactory for the bulk of Quartermaster units, it soon became obvious that there were some which could not absorb all of the prescribed instruction in the regular seventeen-week training cycle. In this category were units that were substandard for one reason or another, generally because they had a preponderance of personnel in the lower AGCT grades or personnel with unusual mental attitudes. The difficulty was centered largely in service units, owing to the fact that such personnel ordinarily accumulated in them.

In an effort to solve this problem, The Quartermaster General in December 1943 prepared and distributed a special program designed to guide the instruction of units that failed to exhibit satisfactory progress in the early stages of training. This program provided for extending over a twenty-six-week period the same subjects normally covered in seventeen weeks. It also placed more emphasis upon disciplinary training and specified that officers assigned to substandard units should be selected with special care to insure that they possessed the particular qualifications.

\textsuperscript{55} See Palmer \textit{et al.}, \textit{The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops}, p. 595.

\textsuperscript{56} Statement, Col Hendershot, QMC, 11 Apr 44, Eighth SvC Conf of Tng Offs, Camp Claiborne, La.

\textsuperscript{57} (1) MTP 10–101, 25 Sep 43, sub: QM MTPs for QM Units. (2) For a detailed discussion of this program, see Young, \textit{Mobil Tng Plans and Programs}, pp. 108–09, 111–19.
required, especially the ability to enforce discipline.\textsuperscript{58}

Inasmuch as the Quartermaster seventeen-week training program of September 1943 was designed to meet the training requirements of fillers often supplied directly from reception centers, it became outmoded in the summer of 1944 when the ASF adopted the preactivation training plan. Under this new plan all recruits in the technical services were required to complete their basic military and basic technical training as individuals before they could be assigned to units. In effect, the purpose of the preactivation training plan was to enforce the same procedure which had been intended when the replacement training system was adopted by the War Department in 1940, but which had never been adhered to strictly because the replacement training centers had been unable to supply a sufficient number of trained fillers for the many new units activated during the period of hurried mobilization.

The plan was introduced primarily to cope with the critical manpower situation that had developed by 1944, but it also was intended to provide a more efficient system of training. The ASF sought to accomplish both of these objectives by standardizing instruction and eliminating the excessive travel required under the old system of giving men their basic training in units. One of the reasons why the old system had been inefficient was that the posts, camps, and stations where many of the units were trained frequently lacked facilities for technical training, and this meant that the men usually had to be sent elsewhere for such instruction. When these specialists were in attendance at schools away from their units they were not available for team training. On the other hand, if the specialists remained with the units they did not receive the benefit of school training. The old system was inefficient also in that many fillers assigned to units directly from reception centers were unable to meet the physical requirements established for overseas movement. In such instances, replacements had to be obtained and this not only disrupted the training of units but involved additional travel.

Through the preactivation plan the ASF sought to standardize all basic military training within the command and such technical training as was common to the technical services. The program required all ASF enlisted men to undergo the same training at a standard training center during their first fourteen weeks of service, regardless of whether they were to be utilized as loss replacements or filler replacements. This period was comprised of six weeks of basic military training and eight weeks of basic technical instruction. After completing their preactivation training phase, enlisted men selected as loss replacements were to get an additional three weeks of basic team training, while those who were assigned to new units as fillers were to be given an additional six weeks of basic unit training.

Acting under the direction of the ASF, The Quartermaster General prepared and released on 1 July 1944 a new mobilization training program to serve as a general guide for the six-week phase of basic unit training provided by the preactivation training plan. Although this program incorporated some new training doctrine as well as detailed instructions for training seven newly developed types of Quarter-

\textsuperscript{58} (1) Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Programs, pp. 119–28. (2) MTP 10–101A, 16 Dec 43, sub: QM MTPs for QM Sub-Standard Units of the ASF (mimeographed).
master units, it was essentially a revision and a consolidation of the best features of the September 1943 program. It was different from its predecessors, however, in that it contained no provision for separate phases of basic military and basic technical instruction. In general, the first two weeks were to be devoted to organization and familiarization with duties and equipment, the following three weeks to training in the field under simulated tactical conditions, and the remaining week to maintenance of equipment, inspections, and correction of training deficiencies. The actual implementation of the three-week field training phase was left primarily to the discretion of the individual unit commander, but it was emphasized that each unit was to perform its tactical and logistical function as an operating unit under conditions as close as possible to those it would encounter in the field. That is, if the unit was designed to operate in sections, in separate platoons, or as individuals, it was to be so divided during this phase, and every effort was to be made to carry on the training under simulated battle conditions. Standard procedures for malaria control, destruction of equipment and supplies, decontamination, and defense against air, chemical, mechanized, and ground attack were to be continually rehearsed, and frequent moves were to be made both in the daytime and at night under blackout conditions.59

It was the early fall of 1944 before the fourteen-week preactivation training plan, which had been adopted for Quartermaster enlisted personnel in mid-June, began to produce qualified filler replacements in sufficient numbers to make it possible to organize Quartermaster units under the new system. From then until the late spring of 1945 the July 1944 program provided the guidance for organizations formed in this manner. The majority of such units received their six weeks of basic unit training at Camp Lee, Fort Warren, or Fort Devens. The July 1944 program was superseded early in May 1945 when revised programs were distributed to govern the training of Quartermaster units that were being trained for the final operations against Japan.

During the winter of 1944–45 the ASF had directed the chiefs of all the technical services to undertake the preparation of revised mobilization training programs to serve as guides for basic unit training in the crucial training period following the anticipated defeat of Germany in the spring of 1945. The new program prepared by The Quartermaster General for this purpose became effective on 10 May 1945 for Quartermaster personnel beginning basic unit training for the first time, and became applicable on the next day to the personnel of units that had been transferred from the European and other theaters for redeployment against Japan.

The May 1945 program was similar to the July 1944 program in many respects, but it placed greater emphasis upon, and set aside more time for, the training of Quartermaster units in the maintenance of tools, machinery, and equipment, and in the storage and distribution of supplies in the moist and extremely hot or cold climates of the Pacific combat areas. Specialized amphibious training also was provided in the 1945 program in an effort to prepare the units for the anticipated landing operations against Japan. Another distinctive feature of the new program was that it divided the six-week basic unit training period into two phases. Normally,

59 (1) MTP 10-2, par. 142, 1 Jul 44, sub: MTP for QM Units of the ASF. (2) For a detailed discussion of this program, see Young, Mobil Tng Plans and Programs, pp. 227–34.
the first three weeks were to be devoted to instruction in the technical operations of the unit at a fixed installation, and the final three weeks to field training under actual bivouac conditions away from all military installations.

Of particular significance was the provision in the 1945 program whereby Quartermaster units receiving other than original basic unit training were to be evaluated, given credit for previous training and experience, and then required to complete only those portions of the new program that were necessary to correct deficiencies and prepare them for operations in the Pacific. The purpose was to avoid unnecessary repetition of training and to conserve time during the critical redeployment period. This provision made it possible to adapt the instruction outlined in the 1945 program to the particular training needs of redeployed Quartermaster units after the official inauguration by the War Department on 11 May 1945 of the redeployment training program that specified a forty-four-hour training week for these organizations.

Because of the sudden surrender of Japan in mid-August 1945, the period in which the 1945 program served as the general guide for basic training of Quartermaster organizations was of comparatively short duration. Most of these units—those newly activated and undergoing the full six-week phase, as well as those requiring only partial training under the redeployment program—received their training either at Camp Lee or at Fort Warren during this period.

All of the Quartermaster unit training centers followed in general the standardized pattern of instruction prescribed by The Quartermaster General in the various training programs developed in the 1943-45 period. The implementation, of course, varied in accordance with the available facilities, training staff, and initiative of the different centers. For the most part, the specialist instruction given the fillers trained in these centers was conducted at their technical schools in the same manner as that given the individual replacements trained under the QMRTC program.

The unit training phase of instruction for the organizations at these centers constituted a definite advance over the individual specialist training and stressed teamwork and functional training of combined personnel under tactical conditions. The usual basis for this training was the field exercise, in which the units were required to set up their equipment and demonstrate the skill they had acquired in its use as well as the extent to which they had absorbed basic military training.

These exercises were conducted in conjunction with other troop units of the Army whenever possible, and the Quartermaster organizations were given the opportunity to gain practical experience. For example, bakery units baked bread for the men, laundry units washed their clothes, and shoe repair companies participated in the current shoe repair work of the center or nearby installations. These practical operations produced a feeling of teamwork in the new organizations and taught them the principles of discipline and leadership. The officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel of the units also had the opportunity to learn each other's attitudes and capabilities and thus were better fitted to work together by the time they had completed training.

Summary

Much of the early difficulty encountered in the training of Quartermaster units can
be traced to the fact that, while the War Department had prepared a Protective Mobilization Plan for the Army as a whole, the detailed subordinate plans for the training of Quartermaster troops had not been developed far enough to be of practical value when the emergency was declared. This meant that plans had to be improvised on the basis of a hurried study of anticipated problems and the organization needed to meet them. Constant revision of the hastily prepared program became necessary after battle experience in the North African campaign demonstrated that the training given Quartermaster units during the emergency period and the early part of the war had been entirely inadequate. Thus it was 1943 before a satisfactory training program was developed. It continued to be modified throughout the war in the light of reports from observers in the theaters.

The inadequacy of Quartermaster training plans at the beginning of the emergency as well as the slow development of the program in the months that followed was due in large measure to the general tendency to discount the need for tactical training of Quartermaster troops. The theory persisted that such troops would be able to perform their functions in comparative safety behind the lines as they had in World War I and that their training could therefore be restricted primarily to technical operations. There was a slow awakening to the realization that the situation in World War II was different: supply lines were subject to attack at any time, and the lack of preparedness on the part of Quartermaster units to defend these lines could bring disaster to the combat troops they were supporting.

Even if there had been a greater awareness of the need for this type of training, the program would still have been retarded by the lack of funds. Money to build training centers was not available before the fiscal year 1941, and in the meantime, therefore, the General Staff could make no decision as to the number and types of Quartermaster training centers that could be established. When money was provided in the summer of 1940, the General Staff decided to construct such centers, but because of limited funds it was forced to restrict the Quartermaster training centers to two, both of which were to be used exclusively for training individual enlisted replacements. It abandoned earlier tentative plans for two Quartermaster unit training centers and was compelled to reject a spirited plea by The Quartermaster General for modification of this decision.\(^{61}\) Two years elapsed before the War Department could make facilities available for the establishment of the Quartermaster unit training centers that did so much in 1943 and thereafter to improve the preparation of units for service overseas.

The same tendency to discount the necessity for tactical training of Quartermaster troops was evident in January 1941 when the War Department ignored the needs of the QMC in its plans for establishing officer candidate schools. These plans were based on the assumption that Quartermaster requirements for officers were of secondary importance and could be met at first by utilizing Reserve officers and later by transferring excess officers from other branches of the Army and commissioning civilians on the basis of their technical skills. The General Staff revised its plans a few months later after The Quartermaster General pointed out that the QMC already was experiencing a se-

\(^{61}\) See above, Ch. VII, Training of Enlisted Replacements.
vere shortage of officers, but it was so late in 1941 when the Quartermaster OCS began operations that there was time to graduate only one small class before the country was at war. Similarly, it was only through continued insistence that The Quartermaster General was finally successful in getting a proportionate share of the graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, and in obtaining permission to conduct Quartermaster ROTC classes in colleges and universities just as most of the other arms and services had been privileged to do for years.\(^62\)

The handicaps in officer procurement that had been imposed upon the QMC by the War Department’s shortsighted policy during the emergency period helped to create the critical shortage of Quartermaster officers in 1942 and made it extremely difficult to find commissioned personnel capable of directing and training the many new Quartermaster units that were being activated under the hurried expansion program. Quartermaster officers who had been commissioned in peacetime generally lacked field experience because they had been trained to serve as post Quartermasters. Reserve officers not only had this same deficiency but frequently had not even completed their technical training, and sometimes were found to be entirely unsuited for Quartermaster duty. Furthermore, officers transferred from other branches of the Army rarely were familiar with Quartermaster functions, while those commissioned directly from civilian life usually had had no military experience or training whatsoever. It was late in 1942 before the output of the OCS began to overcome the shortage of qualified officers that had been one of the chief obstacles to unit training.

The general tendency of the War Department to underestimate the training requirements of the QMC was reflected further by the assignment to the Corps of an unusually large proportion of enlisted men in the lower AGCT grades on the theory that such personnel could be readily taught to perform certain types of Quartermaster functions.\(^63\) This created serious training and morale problems in the units, primarily because Grade IV and V men frequently outnumbered personnel in the higher AGCT brackets, and since these men were unable to absorb instruction at a normal rate they slowed down the training progress of their organizations. The result was that such units often failed to pass inspection at the end of their prescribed training period and had to undergo additional instruction.

Undoubtedly the most serious weakness of the Quartermaster training program during the emergency period and the early part of the war resulted from the War Department policy of assigning responsibility for training Quartermaster units to other branches of the Army. Under this policy, the training authority of The Quartermaster General was restricted to officers and enlisted replacements. His only responsibility in regard to units was the preparation of the training doctrine. He did not have any authority to inspect the units nor any direct means of determining the extent to which his doctrine was being followed.

Thus The Quartermaster General was placed in the position of being able to offer his early programs merely as suggested guides rather than as directives for the training of Quartermaster units. The final decision as to the subject matter to be

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\(^{62}\) See above, Ch. VI, Procurement Problems in the Emergency Period.

\(^{63}\) See above, Ch. V, Classification by Intellectual Capacity.
taught and the procedures to be followed was left to the judgment of the individual commanders in the branches to which the units were assigned for training.

These commanders frequently lacked a full understanding of the problems confronting the QMC, and many of them were inclined to depreciate the need for giving Quartermaster troops basic military training. The result was that the men in Quartermaster units undergoing training as part of larger organizations of the Army were often kept busy performing service tasks at the training installations while the commanders centered their attention upon the combat troops.

Division commanders, and even corps and army commanders, with their minds centered on the training of combat elements, . . . inevitably will let service troops be the orphans of their outfits—demanding service of them but permitting little or no time for soldierly training, discipline, and the habituation of their officers to be anything else than foremen.  

This is illustrated by the experience of an officer in charge of a Quartermaster battalion assigned to the AGF for training, who reported that nearly two years after his unit had been activated it still had been unable to complete its basic training because of constant calls to provide labor details, haul infantry troops to the range, distribute rations, and perform other operational functions. "This experience, of course, was quite valuable," he related, "but it was also necessary that these Quartermaster troops learn to fire a rifle, know something about field sanitation and first aid, understand booby traps, go through inoculation, etc." He pointed out that while this particular case was an exception to the general rule, the "exception occurs too frequently to be ignored."  

The policy of delegating to other branches the responsibility for training Quartermaster units virtually eliminated all control of The Quartermaster General over the preparation of these units for movement overseas and tended to divorce them from the parent branch. Both the enlisted men and the Quartermaster officers were inclined to feel that they were being discarded and forgotten by the Corps and that their destiny was in the hands of the officers of the branches to which they were assigned for unit training. This was true particularly in the case of the many fillers who were sent to units directly from the reception centers and frequently had no opportunity to receive any basic military or technical training under the direction of The Quartermaster General.

The extent of the general confusion resulting from the policy of divided training responsibility is illustrated by the embarrassing situation that developed in 1942 in the extreme case of two "forgotten" truck regiments:

These units had been activated in January 1942 with personnel to be added from reception centers. In June, Operations Division, War Department General Staff believing the regiments to be qualified for overseas service in view of the supposed unit training for six months, issued a movement directive ordering them to be placed under overseas movement orders. Several days later an urgent call came into Military Personnel [SOS] from headquarters of the service command to which these units were assigned reporting that these regiments had only cadres present, and that fillers had never been received. Upon investigation, the difficulty proved to have resulted from confusion over the responsibility delegated by the activation order for the requisitioning of personnel. Each command concerned thought that one of the

64 Ltr, Maj Gen James E. Edmonds, CG Camp Lee, to Col McReynolds, OQMG, 18 Aug 43, no sub.

65 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, p. 77.
others had placed the requisition and followed it up.\textsuperscript{66}

It was soon after, and largely the result of, this incident that the decision was made to delegate to the Director of Military Personnel, ASF, the responsibility for assigning enlisted men as well as officers to all units activated within that command, and to establish future activation schedules in accordance with the availability of personnel. Activation orders issued thereafter specifically designated who was to requisition fillers and who was to be responsible for their delivery.\textsuperscript{67}

In a further effort to eliminate some of the training difficulties, the Commanding General, ASF, at that time delegated authority to The Quartermaster General to train certain designated Quartermaster units. This action, followed by the establishment of Quartermaster unit training centers early in 1943, eventually gave The Quartermaster General quite extensive control over the activation and training of Quartermaster units in the ASF. But that was about as far as his jurisdiction over units extended, for he never acquired an appreciable degree of authority to train or even inspect Quartermaster units of the AGF or the AAF, despite the fact that he prepared the doctrine for their training and maintained liaison with these commands through the Ground Quartermaster and the Air Quartermaster.

With the establishment of unit training centers, The Quartermaster General was able to overcome many of the earlier training obstacles and improve the quality of Quartermaster units. He accomplished this through such measures as standardizing instructional programs and procedures; pooling resources, which made it possible to rotate scarce equipment, training aids, and the better instructors among the various units; furnishing more adequately trained specialists as fillers; regulating the flow of qualified cadres to newly activated units; forbidding the use of units on operational jobs while they were in training; and maintaining close supervision over the training progress of units to determine the particular instructional emphasis required to correct deficiencies.

The unit training centers were better organized and equipped to train Quartermaster units than were most of the scattered posts, camps, and stations where the bulk of the earlier units had been trained. Moreover, these centers for the most part were staffed by Quartermaster officers who generally had a better understanding of Quartermaster problems and methods of solving them than did the officers in other branches who were in charge of training Quartermaster units.

Aside from the greater control that The Quartermaster General was able to exercise over the training of Quartermaster units through the establishment of unit training centers, a number of other factors contributed to the marked improvement shown by Quartermaster units shipped overseas from the latter part of 1943 on to the end of the war. One of the most important of these was the development by the OQMG of an inspection system to check the training progress of units, which led to the establishment of Quartermaster technical training teams in April 1943. Each of these teams, which operated under the direction of the Military Training Division, OQMG, comprised three officers—a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a captain. The duties of these teams consisted primarily of aiding Quartermaster

\textsuperscript{66} Hist Rpt, Mil Pers Div, ASF, sub: The Distribution of Military Personnel, 1 September 1939–1 September 1945 (3 vols., 8 Feb 46), Vol. I, Ch. 1, MS in OCMH.

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
units in all phases of their technical training, inspecting Quartermaster units at the request of the service commands or the Director of Military Training, ASF, and giving assistance to officers of the Inspector General's Department in the inspection of Quartermaster units throughout the country. An indication of the value of their work is the fact that no Quartermaster units trained under the direction of The Quartermaster General during the fiscal year 1944 were turned down by the Inspector General’s Department for lack of training.

Another factor was that training equipment, which had been so scarce during the early part of the war, became available to the units in more adequate supply by 1943. Similarly, qualified instructors had been trained by then, and training aids, such as field manuals, technical manuals, and film strips, had been brought up to date, in contrast to the situation earlier when such aids were not yet abreast of the training mission and many units had been sent into the field without definite instructions as to how they were to operate. The training programs, too, had been adjusted in accordance with battle experience and made more realistic in order that the units might be better prepared to meet the actual conditions they would encounter in the field. For example, the training period was lengthened from thirteen to seventeen weeks, and the scope of instruction was expanded to include such subjects as booby traps, mine fields, hand-to-hand combat, and operation under overhead fire, subjects which had not been included in earlier programs.

The Quartermaster General had protested frequently to higher authority during the early years of the war that the Quartermaster units being trained outside his jurisdiction were not receiving their prescribed training because the men were being kept busy on operational jobs. This deficiency was overcome to a considerable extent after January 1944, when the War Department issued a directive that personnel in field force units were not to be detailed to permanent or extended special duty on station complement assignments until after they had completed their training.

The adoption by the ASF of the preactivation training plan in the summer of 1944 put an end to the practice, insofar as that command was concerned, of sending raw recruits directly to units from reception centers. Thereafter, fillers for Quartermaster ASF units were required to complete all of their individual basic military and basic technical training before being organized for six weeks of unit training. Despite its strong points, this system had its weakness. While it insured that fillers would be well trained as individuals, there was a widespread belief in the OQMG that units were not activated early enough to develop a “team spirit.” In other words, it was felt that the officers did not have sufficient time in the six weeks of unit training to learn the strong and weak points of their men, and that the men, in turn, did not have adequate time to learn just what was required of them by their officers and noncommissioned officers. Before remedial action could be taken the end of the war in Europe was approaching and attention was already centered upon the task of retraining units for redeployment against Japan.

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68 (1) ASF Cir 37, 4 Jun 43, sub: Designation of Tng Activities and Installations Under the Provisions of AR 170-10. (2) For a detailed account of the functioning of the technical training teams, see Young, Inspection of Military Training, pp. 62-70, 100-25.
69 WD Cir 36, Sec. IV, par. 2c, 28 Jan 44, sub: Pers.
70 Rpt, Mil Tng Div, Tng of Units, Pt. I, p. 78.
PART THREE

SPECIAL SERVICES
CHAPTER X

Animals for Military Use

The procurement and training of animals for military use was a function of the Quartermaster Corps in World War II just as it had been in World War I. Motorization, mechanization, and aviation had reduced Army requirements for animals to only a fraction of former needs, but these advances did not make animals obsolete in modern warfare as many military men had come to believe they would in the years following 1918. While requirements for them were relatively small, animals proved indispensable in a global conflict, especially in mountainous terrain where steep inclines and the lack of roads made motor vehicles useless. In such areas, pack combat and supply units were vital to military operations.

It was the Army mule, because of its sure-footedness and sturdy qualities, that was in demand as the pack animal. In all previous wars requirements for horses had far exceeded those for mules, but in World War II this situation was reversed; the mule became the No. 1 animal of the Army while the need for horses steadily declined. In fact, World War II marked the passing of horses from the U.S. Army as auxiliaries in combat and, except under the most unusual conditions, their complete elimination as a means of transporting supplies and equipment. Speed and mobility, which had given horses their highest military value before the age of motorization, were now better provided by airplanes, tanks, and motor vehicles. This development was a milestone in military history, for since ancient times horses had been used to carry troops and to haul supplies.

But while the horse was passing from the military scene the Army found some use for another animal—the dog. Though the U.S. Army had utilized a few dogs in minor roles earlier, it was not until World War II that they were used to any significant extent in military activities as auxiliaries to fighting men. When trained for sentry, messenger, scout, sled, and pack duties, they aided soldiers in the performance of many tasks.

Organization for Handling Remount Activities

Although the QMC had been responsible for remount activities for many years, no separate Remount Service existed in the OQMG until about six months after the United States entered World War I. This service finally was created in October 1917 to purchase, process, train, and issue the large numbers of horses and mules required by the Army at that time. In the years following the war, when all Quartermaster activities dwindled, the Remount Service was reduced to the status of a branch in the Supply Division, where

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1 WD GO 131, 5 Oct 17, sub: Rmt Sv.
it was at the beginning of the emergency in 1939. After the Army began to expand again following the passage of the Selective Service Act, the Remount Branch became a separate division in January 1941. Fourteen months later, however, when the OQMG was reorganized along functional lines and it was becoming obvious that remount activities would be quite limited in scope, the Remount Division once more was reduced to a branch and was transferred to the Service Installations Division, where it stayed throughout the remainder of World War II.\(^2\)

At the time the United States entered World War II, the Remount Division (later Branch) was responsible only for supplying horses and mules for the Army. It was late in June 1942—about seven months after Pearl Harbor—that its mission was broadened to include the procurement, handling, training, and shipment of dogs for war purposes.\(^3\)

Another function of the branch was that of supervising the Army horse breeding plan, which was designed to procure better animals for the Military Establishment by raising the quality of horses in general. The plan was an outgrowth of the experience of World War I when the Remount Service had been called upon to purchase nearly 500,000 horses and mules.\(^4\) The procurement of so large a number of animals focused attention on the fact that a serious shortage of suitable riding horses was developing in the country as a result of the general trend toward motorization in the city and on the farm.

The breeding program originated in 1919 when the War Department created the Remount Board, which recommended that a minor horse breeding program being conducted by the Department of Agriculture be taken over by the Army and expanded. Congress appropriated funds for the project beginning with the fiscal year 1921.\(^5\)

For the administration of the animal breeding and purchasing operations of the Army, the United States was divided geographically into remount areas, each with an appropriate headquarters. At the outbreak of World War II there were seven of these remount areas, corresponding roughly to the corps areas, but with the decline in remount activities the number was reduced to six late in 1944.\(^6\) Their responsibilities consisted largely of procuring animals for military use, of buying stallions for breeding purposes, and of selecting and inspecting civilian horse breeding centers.

Horses and mules procured by the Remount Branch were sent to remount depots for conditioning, initial training, and issue to using units. These tasks could not be performed adequately outside the depots because the receiving organizations, however well qualified they might be to train animals for work with the cavalry or field artillery, rarely had men sufficiently experienced to condition animals and give them preliminary training. In fact, a major reason for maintaining remount

\(^2\) (1) OQMG OO 4, 7 Jan 37, sub: Office Orgn. (2) OQMG OO 23, 31 Jan 41, no sub. (3) OQMG OO 84, 21 Mar 42, sub: Reassignment of QM Functions.
\(^3\) OQMG OO 156, 26 Jun 42, sub: Transfer of Dog Program to Rmt Div.
\(^4\) Col Fred L. Hamilton, History of the Army Remount Service, n. d., on file in Rmt Br, OQMG.
\(^5\) (1) Ibid. (2) WD GO 65, 17 May 19, sub: Army Horse Breeding Program. The Remount Board consisted of prominent civilian horsemen and Army officers.
\(^6\) (1) AR 30–430, 26 May 37, sub: Rmt Areas. (2) AR 30–430, Change 3, 5 Sep 44. The six remount area headquarters as established on 5 September 1944 were located at Front Royal, Va.; Lexington, Ky.; Sheridan, Wyo.; San Angelo, Tex.; Colorado Springs, Colo.; and Pomona Quartermaster Depot, Pomona, Calif.
ANIMALS FOR MILITARY USE

The procurement and issue of animals was different in many respects from that of other types of Quartermaster supplies. They cannot be stored like hams, trucks, shoes and pants. They must be provided for every hour of the day because they are animals of flesh, bone and blood. Moreover, animals when first purchased are not suitable articles of issue. They must be sent to our Remount Depots where they will have an opportunity to become sick, regain health, flesh and condition, and obtain a suitable degree of training so that the average soldier can handle, ride or drive them. The processing period at our depots in normal times consumes not less than 120 days because we have found by experience that to attempt to issue animals in a shorter period of time runs the risk of their becoming sick after being issued to troops.

At the beginning of the emergency there were three permanent remount depots, located at Front Royal, Va., Fort Robinson, Nebr., and Fort Reno, Okla. All of these had been in existence for years. A fourth was established in 1943 at Pomona, Calif., when W. K. Kellogg, fancier of Arabian horses, donated the Kellogg Arabian Nursery to the War Department. A number of temporary remount depots were established overseas during the war, notably in the China-Burma-India, Mediterranean, and Southwest Pacific theaters of operations. The mission of these overseas remount depots was "to receive animals from permanent remount depots or other sources in the rear and issue them in a state of excellent health, training, and fitness for immediate combat use by the mounted arms." 

Horses and Mules

Throughout the period from the end of World War I until the beginning of World War II the question of whether motorization, mechanization, and aviation had made animals obsolete in modern warfare was a matter of much discussion and serious study. As late as 1940 radical views on both sides of the question continued to be held by officers high in the Army, although by then horses and mules had been replaced completely by motor transportation in most military units. Steps had been taken in 1938 to motorize the last of the infantry regiments that were still in part animal-drawn, thus eliminating the need for draft mules in such regiments. The Army in 1940, however, still had two horse-cavalry divisions, two horse regiments, and two mixed horse and motor transport regiments, with a total authorized animal strength of 20,300—16,800 horses and 3,500 mules.

Despite the trend toward elimination of

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7 TM 10-395, pars. 9, 14, 18 Dec 41, sub: Rmt.
8 Col Edwin N. Hardy, "Remount Procurement Operations," QMR, XX (January-February 1941), 25.
9 Ltr, TQMG to CE, 30 Sep 43, sub: Kellogg Arabian Stud Farm.
10 TM 10-395, Sec. VI, 18 Dec 41, sub: Rmt.
11 Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 17 Feb 39, sub: Mules Rendered Excess by Motorization Program, AG 434 (2-16-39) (Misc)D.
animals, mobilization planning in 1939 contemplated a notable expansion in remount operations in the event of a national emergency. Procurement of more than 200,000 horses and mules was envisioned. The execution of these plans was dependent, of course, upon the development of an actual demand for more horses and mules. After the war broke out in Europe in the fall of 1939 it became increasingly uncertain whether this demand would really develop. The proponents of complete motorization gained many new adherents because of the decisive fashion in which German panzer and motorized divisions shattered organized resistance in Poland and France. To be sure the overwhelming publicity given to these units undoubtedly caused the new adherents to overlook the extensive use the Germans made of horses. At any rate plans made in the summer of 1940 for the immediate expansion of the Army provided for a much larger degree of mechanization and motorization than had been contemplated originally.

Those who advocated elimination of the horse cavalry were numerous and influential in the General Staff. They maintained that airplanes performed reconnaissance better than the cavalry had ever done, and that tanks were far superior to cavalry in fire power and in ability to ward off hostile attacks and menace the enemy’s rear and flanks. As carriers of supplies and haulers of field artillery horses were patently inferior to automotive trucks, especially since, they contended, roads existed almost everywhere in the world. It was pointed out, moreover, that an unduly large part of the time and activities of the Army necessarily would be concerned with obtaining forage and caring for horses if they were present in large numbers. Another objection to horses was the fact that transportation, both on land and sea, at best difficult to obtain in adequate quantities, would become still scarcer if trucks and ships had to carry the huge quantities of forage necessary to feed thousands of animals.

The Remount Branch and many veteran cavalrymen vigorously dissented from the contention that horses no longer had a role in modern warfare. “Battles cannot always be fought on roads,” a prominent remount officer pointed out, “and in many campaigns there will arise situations in which mechanized units cannot move at all.” He maintained that conditions would inevitably occur under which fire power could most quickly be brought to a desired point by horse cavalry. He urged that the cavalry “be considered mobile fire power and the horse and mule a means to transport men and fire power to a position where fire power could be used on the ground.” A veteran Cavalry officer declared that “erroneous pictures of horsed cavalry have developed... in recent years with too little consideration for its adaptability in actual warfare.” Many still conceived, he said, of cavalrymen riding boot to boot and recklessly charging with saber and pistol, though such tactics had proved suicidal during the Civil War. He pointed out that the cavalry could negotiate terrain that the mechanized forces could not get over, and do it much faster than the infantry. He cited the important roles that horses had played in recent years in the fighting in China, the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, the Spanish Civil War, and the German conquest of Poland.

Meanwhile, procurement activities of

13 Col Edwin N. Hardy, Horses and Mules in Modern Warfare (Chicago, 1941), p. 5.
14 Ibid., p. 7.
the Remount Branch were expanded in the fiscal year 1941, but buying fell far short of the 200,000 level that had been envisioned as possible in the prewar mobilization plans. In fact, only about 24,000 horses and 4,000 mules were obtained for the Army during that period.

Issues of animals to the using arms, however, did not keep pace even with these limited purchases. The Cavalry took but 13,500 of the 22,000 riding horses procured, the Field Artillery about 1,800, and the other branches of the Army about 250. Draft horses and pack mules went almost wholly to the Field Artillery, which took 600 horses and 2,400 mules. Army demand for animals thus fell far below what had been regarded as probable by mobilization planners, and at the end of the fiscal year 1941 the remount depots still had 28,000 horses on hand.16

At the beginning of the following fiscal year the Remount Branch estimated “that a limited number of riding horses would be required for replacements and that a small number of pack mules would be needed to provide initial issue to new units and for replacements.” 17 Procurement of riding horses, which had been brought to a standstill in the summer of 1941, began again in September but was stopped soon after when it was announced that various units were to be dehorsed and their animals returned to the remount depots. Only about 2,900 horses were purchased in the fiscal year 1942, a figure that approximated the total number of requisitions during that period.

Elimination of Horses

The procurement of horses in the fiscal year 1942, small though the number was, represented the last substantial purchases made by the Remount Branch. Only four horses were procured in the fiscal year 1943 and none from then on through V-J Day.

As a matter of fact, throughout the war period the problem of the Remount Branch, insofar as horses were concerned, was chiefly a matter of disposal rather than of procurement. This situation began to develop after Pearl Harbor when many animal-using organizations were ordered dehorsed because the units were needed overseas immediately and no shipping space was available for movement of their animals. The large-scale dismounting of these units began in the spring of 1942 when seven federalized National Guard horse-mechanized regiments and the 6th Cavalry Regiment were directed to turn in their animals. Similar orders were issued to various other units in the following months. The 1st Cavalry Division was dehorsed during April and May 1943, and finally the 2d Cavalry Division and the 56th Brigade of the Texas National Guard were dehorsed in March 1944.18

The rapid dismounting of the Army naturally was reflected in the return of more animals to depots than were being issued by these installations. In the fiscal year 1942 about 6,000 animals were issued as compared with approximately 15,000 returned, and on 30 June 1942 the depots still had more than 21,000 on hand despite the sharp drop in procurement. While fewer horses were sent back to depots in the following fiscal year, with the dehorsing program nearing completion, the number still exceeded the issues—about 6,900 were returned as against 5,200

16 Rmt Div, Annual Statistical Rpt, FY 1941, p. 3.
17 Rmt Div, Annual Statistical Rpt, FY 1942, pp. 3-4.
18 (1) Rpt, Rmt Br [circa Sep 45], sub: QMC Accomplishments in World War II. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Gordon W. Cook, OQMG, to Gen Herr (ret.), 13 Jun 46, no sub.
issued. That the excess was not greater can be attributed mainly to the unexpected demand from the Coast Guard for riding horses for its beach patrols, then actively engaged in protecting U.S. shores against landings from hostile submarines. The Remount Branch supplied more than 3,000 riding horses to the Coast Guard during the fiscal year 1943, slightly more than the total number of horses of that type furnished to the Army in that period.¹⁹

During the ensuing year, however, the danger from submarines virtually disappeared as a result of the increasing effectiveness of countermeasures, and issues of horses to the Coast Guard dropped sharply to about 800, a figure which, though small, was still half the number of horses requisitioned by the Army. Issues to the Coast Guard finally all but ceased, and at the end of the fiscal year 1944 many horses on beach patrol were declared surplus to existing needs.

Statistics on file in the Remount Branch for the fiscal years 1941 through 1945 reveal the extent to which horses were eliminated in World War II. Approximately 33,000 horses were returned to the depots by using agencies during these years, as compared with less than 31,000 issued to units and stations, exclusive of the 3,900 loaned to the Coast Guard. Most of those issued to the Army in the earlier years of the war were sent back in the later years, with the result that the depots always had a considerable excess. Although procurement was brought to an end in 1942, more than 28,000 horses were turned over to disposal agencies for sale between July 1943 and December 1945. Throughout the war period only forty-nine horses were shipped from the zone of interior to the armed forces overseas.

Although the requisitioning of horses for military use virtually ceased, the Army horse breeding program continued in operation throughout the war on a slightly reduced scale. Difficulty was experienced in placing stallions with civilian agents because war conditions and the shortage of farm labor made it impossible in many instances to provide proper care. Breeding activities therefore were somewhat curtailed both at depots and on stud farms. Nevertheless, approximately 39,000 foals were produced during the war years.²⁰

Many protagonists of the military use of horses were not convinced that the complete dismounting of the Army was a wise policy. They argued that operations in mountainous areas in World War II proved their contention that horses were a useful supplement to motors and that the cavalry was a valuable adjunct to armor. They pointed to the apparently effective utilization of animals by the Soviet Army and to the wartime experience of the U.S. Army, particularly after the landings in Sicily and Italy where the tortuous terrain made reconnaissance extremely difficult and heavy weapons sometimes lagged far behind the infantry. Only horse cavalry, they maintained, could have overcome these obstacles. In Italy, it was asserted, there had been "desperate need for some type of unit that could penetrate cross country and get through the different mountains at a decidedly faster rate than the infantry."²¹

¹⁹ Data obtained from records in Rmt Br, OQMG.
²⁰ (1) Rpt, Rmt Br [circa Sep 45], sub: QMC Accomplishments in World War II. (2) The Army horse breeding program was transferred to the Department of Agriculture on 1 July 1948 by legislative action. U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 62, pp. 197-98. (Act approved 21 Apr 48.) Within a year the breeding program was liquidated.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a report in August 1943, stated that horse-cavalry units could have been used in Tunisia if they had been available.\textsuperscript{22} Undoubtedly they could have been used to good advantage in Sicily, Italy, China, and Burma. In fact, many commanders from time to time cited the need for cavalry. It is apparent therefore that developments in motorization, mechanization, and aviation actually did not make horses obsolete in certain types of operations, and that the decision of the War Department against shipping horse units to combat theaters was based largely upon other considerations, primarily the severe shortage of shipping space.\textsuperscript{23}

Transportation of horses and their forage was costly in ship tonnage. In strenuous campaigns horses could not live entirely off the land, and grain was not only more bulky than gasoline but was needed regardless of the amount of combat activity. Another factor was that the feeding and upkeep of horses presented great difficulties to a motorized army, and tended to complicate troop movement and supply. Moreover, with the dismounting of many units early in the war most of the experienced horsemen were scattered throughout the Army on other assignments, and, with only a limited program for training replacements, comparatively few men capable of training and caring for horses were available when battle experience made it evident that animals could be used and were needed for mountain fighting.

An element of uncertainty regarding the wisdom of the policy relating to the use of horses appears to have persisted in the War Department General Staff throughout the war. While it ordered most of the old horse organizations converted to infantry, artillery, armor, or reconnaissance units in 1942, it still retained the 2d Cavalry Division more or less intact until early in 1944, when the division finally was sent to North Africa, without its animals, only to be inactivated and broken up upon arrival overseas.\textsuperscript{24} The only other cavalry division, the 1st, was sent to the Southwest Pacific early in the war and fought dismounted as infantry, under special Tables of Organization. As late as November 1944 the War Department was still discussing the possibility of using horse-cavalry units in the final stages of the war against Japan.\textsuperscript{25}

**Demand for Pack Mules**

In contrast to the declining interest in horses, the demand for mules increased during the war. This shift in requirements is illustrated clearly by records on file in the Remount Branch, OQMG, showing the number of animals purchased in the United States during the war. These records reveal that purchases of horses outnumbered those of mules by more than five to one in the fiscal year 1941, and by nearly two to one in the fiscal year 1942 when procurement of both kinds of animals dropped off sharply as the need for them failed to materialize. The situation changed radically, however, beginning with the fiscal year 1943, when only four horses were purchased, and none were purchased thereafter. In the same year 10,200 mules were procured, and in the

\textsuperscript{22} Memo, AGF for OPD WDGS, 10 Nov 44, sub: Orgn of Horse Cav Units, with Incls, AGF 320.2.
\textsuperscript{23} Memo Slip, AGF G-3 for G-2, 7 Sep 44, sub: Orgn and Equip of Cav Recon Units, AGF 321/.01.
\textsuperscript{24} Greenfield et al., *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 336.
\textsuperscript{25} Memo, AGF for OPD WDGS, 10 Nov 44, sub: Orgn of Horse Cav Units.
PACK ANIMALS IN ITALY carrying rations to a snowbound platoon (above). Troops check supplies before starting on a long, steep climb to the front lines (below).
PACK ANIMALS IN BURMA leaving Myitkyina airstrip with food and supplies that were flown in (above). Pack train travels over a winding mountain trail (below).
Battle experience in the winter of 1942-43 accounted for the sudden interest in procurement of mules. Observers overseas reported that Army ground units had discovered in their early encounters with the enemy that while modern warfare had made the general use of horse cavalry of questionable value, there was no question about the need for animals in rugged mountain terrain where few if any roads existed. Standard cargo trucks, experience revealed, could be used only on the main roads in the mountains. Jeeps could usually negotiate the narrow twisting trails in the lower ranges, but beyond the jeep trails, where much of the fighting took place, animals were needed to pack supplies to the foxholes, dugouts, and gun emplacements of the troops who carried the fight to the enemy. The mule was preferred to the horse for this task because it was surer of foot, more hardy, and consumed less food.

The principal function of animal transport was to supply ammunition, water, and food, and, to a lesser degree, to move heavy weapons to troops at points that could not be reached by motor vehicles. Mules were also utilized to some extent in the evacuation of the wounded. Pack animals were needed almost constantly while fighting was in progress in the mountains. Upon reaching open terrain, however, the troops used mechanized reconnaissance and supply units when they were available, and moved the animals forward in trucks until more mountains were encountered.27

Pack mules were utilized by U.S. forces initially in World War II in Tunisia during the winter of 1942-43. The number used there, however, was comparatively small. When the fighting moved over to Sicily many more were used,28 but it was in the rugged mountain terrain of Italy that mules were employed for the first time on a really extensive scale. Animal pack outfits also were used in the China-Burma-India Theater, especially during combat operations in Burma.

Despite the sharp increase in procurement of mules in the United States, most of the pack animals used by the Army overseas were procured in the theaters in which the troops were operating. Of the 30,500 mules procured by the Remount Branch in this country during the war, only about 7,800 were shipped to the U.S. armed forces overseas, with an additional 3,500 sent to the United Kingdom under lend-lease.29 Many times that number were utilized by the Army in the theaters where needs for them were encountered. The U.S. Army Quartermaster Remount Service in Italy, for example, procured approximately 15,000 pack animals and issued 11,000 to the using forces in the Italian campaign alone.30

There were several reasons why more

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26 The following tabulation shows the number of horses and mules purchased in the fiscal years 1941-45:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Horses Purchased in United States</th>
<th>Mules Purchased in United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,403</td>
<td>30,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>21,546</td>
<td>4,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2,859</td>
<td>1,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Ltr, Maj Harry M. Rhett, Jr., to OQMG, 3 Jan 45, sub: Observations of Pack Mules, MTO.
28 Ltr, Maj Gen Manton S. Eddy, CG 9th Inf Div, to CG Seventh Army, 21 Sep 43, sub: Authorization for Procurement of Mules.
29 Data obtained from Rmt Br, OQMG.
30 History of the Quartermaster Peninsular Base Section, MTO, in the Italian Campaign, October 1943-May 1945 (n. d.), p. 230. (Hereafter cited as Hist off QM PBS, MTO.)
pack mules were procured abroad than
were sent to the theaters from the United
States. One of these, of course, was that it
was extremely difficult to obtain shipping
space for the animals and their forage.
Another was that requirements for animals
in the theaters, particularly in the early
stages of the war, were not anticipated suf-
iciently in advance to enable shipments to
be made. In this connection there appears
to have existed even in the minds of many
early planners in the War Department an
implicit faith in the ability of mechanized
forces to move over any type of terrain,
and apparently this faith persisted until
the troops in the field actually began to en-
counter rugged mountains in which motor
vehicles simply could not operate. In any
case, it is obvious that no adequate ad-
vance plans were made for the use of pack
mules overseas or for the training of per-
sonnel to handle and care for the animals.

Most of the pack animals obtained over-
seas by the Army were procured on requi-
sition through the theater remount serv-
dices, which purchased the animals locally
and processed and trained them before is-
suance to troops. In many instances, how-
ever, particularly during the early part of
the war, Army units had to commandeer
animals on the spot when need for them
suddenly arose. Later in the war many
mules were captured from the enemy. In
some cases, pack mules owned by civilians
were hired to carry supplies to the troops
up in the mountains.31

The War Department policy of replac-
ing the cavalry with mechanized units and
the concomitant curtailment of the pro-
gram in the United States for training per-
sonnel in the care and handling of animals
resulted in a serious shortage of experi-
enced horsemen in those theaters where
urgent needs developed for pack animals.
The Fifth Army, one of the largest users of
pack animals, eventually solved the prob-
lem in the Italian campaign by utilizing
experienced Italian Army horsemen who
had the added advantage of being familiar
with the terrain. By the end of the Italian
campaign the U.S. Army Remount Serv-
ice in Italy was supplying animals to fif-
teen Italian pack troops and to the U.S.
10th Mountain Division. The Italian pack
units on the average consisted of 260
mules, 12 horses, 11 officers, and 320 en-
listed men. Each of the U.S. Army divi-
sions to which these pack troops were at-
tached had a U.S. liaison officer who
advised the Italians of the tasks to be ac-
complished.32

Dogs for War Purposes

From ancient times canine docility,
watchfulness, speed, acuteness of smell and
hearing, love of man, and eagerness to
please him have made dogs valuable for
many kinds of military service. The uses to
which they have been put have changed
in accordance with developments in war-
fare down through the ages.

Before the introduction of gunpowder,
dogs usually took an active part in combat.
The early Greek and Roman soldiers
made use of large dogs by equipping them
with spiked collars and sending them for-
ward to attack the enemy. During the
Middle Ages war dogs were outfitted with
armor and frequently used to defend cara-
vans. The North American Indians de-
veloped the use of dogs for pack and draft

31 (1) Ibid., pp. 230, 237, 245. (2) Ltr, Maj Rhett to
OQMG, 3 Jan 45, sub: Observations of Pack Mules,
MTO. (3) Interv, OQMG historian with Maj John
M. Brooks, 8 May 51. (Major Brooks served with the
7th Infantry Regiment in Sicily.)
32 (1) Ltr, Maj Rhett to OQMG, 3 Jan 45, sub: Ob-
servations of Pack Mules, MTO. (2) Hist of QM PBS,
QMG in India, to Maj Gen Raymond A. Wheeler,
CG USAF CBI, 10 Jun 43, no sub.
work as well as for sentry duty. By the early part of the twentieth century most European countries were utilizing dogs in their armies. Russia used ambulance dogs during the Russo-Japanese War. Dogs were employed as sentries by the Bulgarians in the Balkan upheaval of 1910, by the Italians in Tripoli, and by the British on the Abor Expedition in the Himalayas. During the long-drawn-out Spanish-Moroccan War, the Rifis camouflaged the animals in garments to make them indistinguishable from their owners in the hazy visibility of the desert and trained them to run along the front lines and draw the fire of the Spaniards, thus revealing gun positions.\(^{33}\)

Dogs were used in sizable numbers in World War I, particularly by the Germans, French, and Belgians, and proved of considerable value under advantageous conditions for certain types of auxiliary duties. The German Army is reported to have utilized approximately 30,000 of the animals for messenger and ambulance service. The French and Belgian Armies employed them on a smaller scale for messenger, ambulance, and draft work.\(^{34}\)

Despite the long history of their military use by other countries, dogs had never been utilized by the U.S. Army in tactical operations before World War II. At the time of Pearl Harbor the sled dog was the only type to be found in the Army. About fifty of these animals were assigned to military stations in Alaska, where they were employed when snow and ice precluded the use of horses, mules, or motorized transportation.\(^{35}\) Apart from the animals in Alaska the only other sled dogs were the forty obtained from the Byrd Antarctic Expedition on its return early in 1941. They were used by the Air Corps Ferrying Command in rescuing airmen forced down in snowbound and desolate parts of Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland.\(^{36}\)

**Origin of the War Dog Program**

The Army still had no plans for training dogs when the United States entered World War II. That such a program was eventually adopted was due partly to the enthusiastic support given the idea by the major organizations of dog owners and partly to the vision of a few military men who foresaw various ways in which dogs might be serviceable. As soon as it became apparent that the United States might become actively involved in the war, fanciers of dogs pointed out the possible value of the animals to the armed forces, and leaders of several prominent dog organizations turned their attention to developing training techniques that might be militarily useful, particularly in sentry and casualty work.\(^{37}\)

The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the sudden entry of the United States into the war greatly stimulated interest in the use of dogs for sentry duty. With industrial plants and Army installations being rapidly...
ly expanded, the potential damage that might be done by saboteurs, enemy aliens, and fascist-minded groups was constantly mounting, and precautionary measures were required. The necessity for such measures was further emphasized early in 1942 when German submarines began to operate in large numbers near the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and the landing of expert saboteurs loomed as a distinct possibility. Dog fanciers were not slow to point out that the animals might be extremely valuable auxiliaries if they were attached to Coast Guard beach patrols then being organized to prevent such landings, and if they were used as guards at industrial plants and Army installations.

Dogs for Defense, Inc., was established in January 1942 as a national organization to guide the patriotic purposes of dog owners along constructive lines.\(^{38}\) It was designed to serve as a clearing house for co-ordinating the various attempts to develop interest in sentry dogs. Enlisting the co-operation of the American Kennel Club, the registration body for all pure-bred dogs, Dogs for Defense mobilized the most powerful professional and amateur influences in order to acquire dogs by donation and, after training, to distribute them where they were most needed. Shortly after the establishment of Dogs for Defense, prominent dog breeder and exhibitor; Arthur Kilbon, who for years had written articles about dogs for the *New York Sun* and other publications under the pseudonyms Arthur Roland and Roland Kilbon; and Len Brumby, head of the Professional Dog Handlers’ Association.
Defense, the American Theater Wing War Service made a formal offer to donate dogs to the QMC for defense purposes, an offer accepted by The Quartermaster General with War Department approval early in February. Inasmuch as the organization of the Theater Wing group did not lend itself readily to the actual procurement and training of dogs, officials of Dogs for Defense agreed to assume these responsibilities.\(^{39}\)

Within the OQMG, supervision of the program was assigned initially to the Plant Protection Branch of the Inspection Division on the theory that dogs would be used chiefly with guards at civilian war plants and Quartermaster depots. Requirements were estimated originally at only 200 animals.\(^{40}\) While Dogs for Defense quickly accepted the donation of 100 acceptable dogs, the training program it instituted proved unsatisfactory since the organization had to rely on the volunteer services of qualified trainers at private kennels scattered in various parts of the country, and standardized instruction was therefore impossible. Moreover, the demand for sentry dogs was beginning to outstrip the original limited conception of the number required.

As a consequence, a new training program was developed in the summer of 1942. Procurement continued to be accomplished by Dogs for Defense, but its training function and the supervision of the program generally were transferred in June from the Plant Protection Branch to the Remount Branch, which had long experience in dealing with animals and furthermore had strategically located depots capable of handling the enlarged program.\(^{41}\)

The scope of the program was soon broadened to include training of dogs for a wide variety of tactical uses by other arms and services. On 16 July 1942 the Secretary of War directed The Quartermaster General to include in the program training for roving patrol, messenger, and sled work, in addition to fixed sentry duty. The directive also ordered the AGF, the AAF, and the theaters of operations "to explore the possibilities of using dogs advantageously in the various activities under their control."\(^{42}\)

In the fall the functions of the QMC were further expanded to include the procurement and training of dogs for the Navy and the Coast Guard. The latter required dogs in mounting numbers for its beach patrols, and the Navy needed them for sentry duty at its yards, air stations, ordnance plants, and ammunition depots.\(^{43}\)

**Procurement and Training**

To implement the greatly expanded program The Quartermaster General ordered the establishment of war dog reception and training centers.\(^{44}\) Their function was to receive animals procured by

\(^{39}\) (1) Ltr, Rachel Crothers, Pres. of American Theater Wing War Service, to TQMG, 28 Jan 42, no sub. (2) Ltr, TQMG to USW, 29 Jan 42, sub: Sentry Dogs. (3) Ltr, USW to TQMG, 10 Feb 42, sub: Procurement of Dogs. (4) Ltr, Henry I. Caesar, Pres. of DFD, to TQMG, 2 Mar 42, no sub.

\(^{40}\) Ltr, Chief of Plant Protection Br, OQMG, to Pres. of DFD, 13 Mar 42, sub: Procurement of Dogs.


\(^{42}\) Ltr, SW to CG SOS et al., 16 Jul 42, sub: Use of Dogs in the U.S. Army.

\(^{43}\) Memo, Lt Col Frederick C. Foy, GSC, for TQMG, 30 Sep 42, sub: Procurement and Tng of Dogs. The Marine Corps procured its own dogs and trained them at New River, N. C.

\(^{44}\) Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 28 Jul 42, sub: Tng of Dogs for Use in U.S. Army.
Dogs for Defense, give them a rigid physical examination, classify them according to the type of work for which they seemed best fitted, and provide the training necessary to make them useful to the Army. In addition, the centers had the task of training enlisted men to serve as dog handlers in order that there might always be available personnel capable of caring for the animals and supervising their work.

The first of these centers was established in August 1942 at the Front Royal, Va., Quartermaster Depot. Three others were opened late in 1942—at Fort Robinson, Nebr.; Camp Rimini, Mont.; and San Carlos, Calif.—and a fourth was opened in April 1943 at Cat Island, Gulfport, Miss. The centers at Front Royal and Fort Robinson were located at permanent remount installations, while the others were independent establishments. Camp Rimini, situated in a region in the Rocky Mountains where the snow lay on the ground for many months of the year, was utilized exclusively for the training of sled and pack dogs. Cat Island was used for tactical training because its semitropical climate and dense vegetation made it a suitable place to prepare dogs for use in jungle warfare.

All of these centers, except the one at Fort Robinson, were discontinued during the latter half of 1944. By the summer of that year the Allied military situation had improved to the extent that the need for dogs to assist in guarding U.S. coast lines and zone of interior installations had virtually disappeared. As a result, the number of sentry dogs returned began to exceed by far the number issued. Training activities, which were then being devoted increasingly to the instruction of scout dogs, were concentrated thereafter at the Nebraska post.

In 1942 and 1943, when practically all of the dogs were trained to perform the comparatively simple tasks involved in sentry duty, both sexes of more than thirty breeds were considered suitable for military service. Experience revealed, however, that even for watch duty some breeds were unsatisfactory. By the fall of 1944 the number of preferred breeds had been reduced to seven—German shepherds, Belgian sheep dogs, Doberman-Pinschers, farm collies, Siberian huskies, Malamutes, and Eskimo dogs. Crosses of these breeds also were acceptable.

Dogs for Defense served as the procurement agency for the Corps until March 1945, when its officials asked to be relieved of this responsibility. At that time the QMC set up its own organization for dog procurement. During its three years of operation Dogs for Defense obtained approximately 18,000 dogs through donation. Between 1 March and 27 August 1945 the Corps recruited 1,380. Purchases of sled and pack dogs had been made earlier by

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45 (1) Rpt, Rmt Br [citra Sep 45], sub: QMC Accomplishments in World War II. (2) Memo, TQMG for Dir of Mil Tng, ASF, 1 Jun 43, sub: Expansion of War Dog Reception Center and Tng Centers.


47 (1) Among these were Great Danes, whose large size made them unsuitable for training, and hunting breeds in general because they were too easily diverted by animal scents. Ltr, Chief of Rmt Br to Marie A. Stone, 2 Jun 43, sub: Specifications for Dogs. (2) For a listing of breeds that were acceptable in the early stages of the program, see WD TM 10–396, 1 Jul 43, sub: War Dogs, p. 3.

48 WD SB 10–115, 6 Sep 44, sub: Horses, Mules, Horse Breeding, and Dogs, p. 3. For use as sled dogs, Malamutes, Eskimos, and huskies were preferred since their large, long feet and thick pads enabled them to haul heavy loads over ice and crusted snow. Partly because these animals were scarce and partly because they had always been purchased as the need arose, the Army continued to buy most sled dogs, as well as pack dogs, instead of procuring them through Dogs for Defense.
the QMC. Thus a total of about 20,000 dogs were procured during the war. Of these, only slightly more than 10,000 finished training for some form of war work, the others being disqualified for one reason or another. Undersize, disease, temperamental defects, inferior scenting powers, and extreme excitability under gunfire or other noise were the principal causes for rejection.

A highly specialized program for training both dogs and their handlers was set up by the Remount Branch through the cooperation of technical experts of the Military Training Division, OQMG, and leading dog trainers in the country. Of basic significance was the development of a comprehensive plan whereby dogs and handlers could be trained together as a team for sentry or tactical work, since the effectiveness with which the animals performed their duties depended not only upon the thoroughness of their own training but upon that of their masters as well.

Attempts were made to standardize training methods insofar as possible. Conditions varied considerably, however, and adjustments had to be made in accordance with the number and quality of men and

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49 Rpt, Rmt Br [circa Sep 45], sub: Accomplishments in World War II.
Kennels at Front Royal War Dog Reception and Training Center. Enlisted men are training to become dog handlers.

dogs to be trained, the number and quality of instructors, the availability of facilities, and the time that could be allotted. Sentry dogs could be trained in about eight weeks, but other types usually required approximately thirteen weeks.³⁰

Training of war dogs during the early part of the program was limited almost exclusively to sentry animals for which there was a big demand. Experiments in the use of dogs for other military purposes were being carried on, but it was 1944 before other types were trained on any sizable scale. Of the 10,425 dogs trained at the war dog centers during World War II, nearly 9,300 were for sentry duty. The Coast Guard utilized approximately one third of these.³¹

Trained sentry dogs were issued by the QMC to hundreds of military installations.

³⁰ WD TM 10–396, 1 Jul 43, sub: War Dogs, p. 137.
³¹ Statistical Data Book I, Rmt Br, OQMG (n. p.).

The following table shows the numbers and types of dogs trained by the QMC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Dog</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Trained for Army</th>
<th>Trained for Coast Guard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,425</td>
<td>7,251</td>
<td>3,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry</td>
<td>9,295</td>
<td>6,121</td>
<td>3,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sled and pack</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine detection</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of various kinds, such as coastal fortifications, harbor defenses, arsenals, ammunition dumps, airfields, and depots, as well as to industrial plants. Although many civilian establishments that were engaged in the production of military items employed one or more dogs to help guard their plants, most of the animals trained by the Corps were utilized by the armed services. At the height of the enemy submarine activity the largest group of sentry dogs was, of course, that attached to the Coast Guard for use with beach patrols guarding the long stretches of shoreline along the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific.

Reports from military installations and civilian establishments using sentry dogs were on the whole quite favorable. The generally satisfactory nature of the service the dogs performed was demonstrated by the small number of using agencies that abandoned their employment and by the large number of requisitions for additional animals. Failure to obtain satisfactory results usually occurred when the dogs were handled by constantly changing or inexperienced personnel. In many instances the use of dogs made it possible to reduce the number of human sentries and at the same time increase the efficiency of patrols, particularly when the post covered a large area. The dogs enhanced the efficiency of protective work both by supplementing man’s limited powers of hearing and smell with their own superior senses and by making possible a more thorough search for intruders under and around railroad cars and parked vehicles, behind rows of stacked supplies, in holes, in ditches, and in other places not readily accessible to men.

On the other hand, there were various handicaps to the effective use of sentry dogs. One of these was the disruption of the dog-master relationship. When this happened, the animal was likely to lose interest or even fail to perform his duties. Another was the failure to adhere to the fundamental principle that a dog’s training never ends. If an animal did not receive almost daily exercise in his duties he quickly lost keenness for his work. Still another was the inclination to permit the dog to become a public pet. This problem, while present in the use of all war dogs, was especially likely to threaten the satisfactory employment of sentry dogs because they often had to live in places where there were many passers-by.

*Shift of Emphasis to Tactical Use*

By early 1944 the war dog program had begun to undergo extensive changes. With the gradual abatement of the submarine menace after mid-1943 and the eventual lifting of the blackout, the need for guarding coast lines and zone of interior installations steadily decreased. Consequently the demand for sentry dogs became progressively smaller and more of these animals were being returned to the training centers than were being issued. A few of the sentry dogs were detrained and returned to their owners, some were sent overseas for sentry duty, and others were retrained for tactical service with units in the theaters, where demand for dogs for use in combat became more urgent, particularly in the Pacific. Eventually all dog-training activities were centralized at Fort Robinson, and more and more attention was devoted to training dogs and their handlers for use with combat units.

In the absence of any definite policy on

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52 ASF Cir 151, Pt. III, 22 May 44, sub: Dog: Use by MP.
the part of the AGF regarding their use, the training of dogs for tactical service in 1942 and 1943 was necessarily limited and experimental. Military officers generally were unfamiliar with the possible usefulness of these animals in combat and rather skeptical of their value. There also was a widespread belief that they could not be sent to tropical areas on account of the great variety of diseases and parasites likely to attack them. The few animals that had been trained for tactical work, therefore, were employed chiefly for tests or demonstration purposes. Even the instruction of these dogs was seriously handicapped at first by the scarcity of trainers experienced in teaching scout and messenger work; most of the men who had experience abroad in schooling war dogs were engaged in other essential work.

Moreover, preliminary reports on the use of scout and messenger dogs in North Africa by the British in 1942 and 1943 had indicated that their work was unsatisfactory. According to observers, the animals were easily frightened and confused by artillery fire, and those doing scout work lost their sense of direction and neglected to smell out the enemy. While messenger dogs ordinarily gave good service on short patrols, they also were affected adversely by heavy gunfire. It was suggested that, though conditions in North Africa might preclude their successful employment in that region, "in close country such as the islands of the south Pacific" they would have a very definite use in guarding lines of communication and would be particularly useful in detecting infiltrating troops.\(^{53}\)

As a precautionary measure, in the event that the Army might require them, the QMC continued to train dogs in small numbers for tactical use, emphasis being placed upon scout and messenger dogs. The War Department General Staff decided in the spring of 1943 to send a detachment of six scout and two messenger dogs overseas to operate with troops in the Pacific as a test of their value under combat conditions.\(^{54}\) A few months later, in the summer of 1943, experiments were begun with mine detection dogs (M-dogs) as a result of inquiries from North Africa, where the advance of the Allied armies was being delayed by nonmetallic mines that could not be located by mechanical devices. These experiments appeared to be satisfactory, and the first mine detection unit was ordered activated in November 1943.\(^{55}\)

The enthusiasm with which this project began later turned to disappointment. Only two units of mine detection dogs were ever activated and trained. Both were sent to North Africa, where the animals failed to prove their proficiency in locating mines when they were used on typical German mine fields. The M-dogs had been tested in the United States and pronounced excellent detectors, but when tried out under battlefield conditions they fell far short of attaining the standard of efficiency that had been established by the Corps of Engineers. In two tests in September 1944 the dogs located only 51 and 46 percent, respectively, of the mines planted.\(^{56}\) Inasmuch as the discovery of at least 90 percent was considered essential to...
make any method of mine detection practicable, it was decided not to employ the dogs. Both units were inactivated and M-dog training was discontinued.

Meanwhile, reports coming in from the Southwest Pacific on the experiments with scout and messenger dogs were on the whole highly favorable. The observer with the dogs in New Guinea reported that in the period between July and December 1943 the animals were used in the forward and combat areas and had given "consistently excellent performance." This experience established the fact that dogs could be deployed effectively in tactical units. The observer found that scout dogs used in reconnaissance work warned patrols of the presence of Japanese at varying ranges up to 1,000 yards, depending upon conditions of open or closed terrain, wind direction, and dampness of ground. They could be employed effectively in amphibious operations to detect the enemy on beaches and in undergrowth along the shore, for the dogs had no fear of water or travel by small boats. He reported that messenger dogs demonstrated that they could cover distances of from 600 to 1,000 yards with great speed over any kind of terrain, and that their chances of getting through were excellent as they presented small targets.

On the other hand, the observer reported that combat experience revealed certain weaknesses in the training of dogs. The most apparent of these was that, while the dogs had been trained against the firing of small arms, most of them had not been conditioned to withstand the noise of heavy gunfire and as a consequence their usefulness deteriorated rapidly when they were suddenly exposed to heavy artillery action. A tendency on the part of some of the dogs to bark at night was also noticed.

The observer reported that the animals worked more effectively when the dogs and their handlers were thoroughly familiar with each other.

As a result of this and similar reports that came in later, the program for training dogs for tactical use was expanded in 1944, and efforts were made to overcome the shortcomings brought to light by combat experience. Particular emphasis was placed upon training scout dogs, teaching the animals to be silent at all times, and exposing them to simulated battle noises in the early course of their instruction in order that they might learn to exhibit no fear or other reaction in the presence of heavy gunfire.

Since the function of scout dogs was to give silent warning of the approach of an enemy, they were trained for use principally with reconnaissance and combat patrols and at outposts. Their chief tasks were to warn of ambushes or attempts at infiltration. Though the distance at which they were able to give warning depended upon a number of factors, such as the ability of the master to understand his dog, wind direction and velocity, volume or concentration of human scent, humidity, and denseness or openness of country, the dogs usually could detect the presence of enemies long before the men became aware of them. When operating with reconnaissance or combat groups, the dog and his master proceeded a short distance in advance of the patrol, following the general direction indicated by the patrol leader, but moving so as to take advantage of wind and other conditions favoring the dog's power of scent. Upon the dog's warning of a hostile presence, the master im-

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57 Ltr, Lt Robert Johnson to CinC GHQ SWPA, 6 Dec 43, sub: Rpt on Experience of Trailing Dogs in New Guinea.
mediated the patrol leader, who in turn issued instructions as to the course of action to be taken. At outposts the dog and his master remained at a fixed position a short distance from the unit to which they were attached, and the animal was taught to alert while stationary.58

Development of War Dog Platoons

Except for the two experimental Engineer M-dog units, the initial issues of dogs and handlers trained for duty overseas were as casual detachments. It was not until March 1944 that the War Department authorized the establishment of Quartermaster war dog platoons and issued special Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E's) for that purpose.59 Originally a platoon consisted of twelve scout dogs, twelve messenger dogs, one mine detection dog, one officer, and twenty-six enlisted men. Three months later, on the basis of early theater experience, the mine detection dog was eliminated and the number of scout dogs was increased to eighteen, while the number of messenger dogs was reduced to six and the number of enlisted men to twenty. Fifteen Quartermaster war dog platoons were activated and trained in 1944, and all were shipped overseas. Seven of them saw service in Europe and eight in the Pacific.60

These platoons were unique in that they served with infantry units and engaged in tactical operations in the combat areas, yet the QMC supplied and trained not only the dogs but the handlers as well. The men were expert in directing the work of the dogs, but the fact that many of the handlers were physically unfit for combat service and had had no experience in infantry tactics, scouting, and patrolling proved to be a serious handicap. Another weakness of the early platoons was that they had not been given advanced training with AGF units of the kind with which they were to be associated.

To correct these deficiencies the War Department transferred the responsibility for the activation, training, and preparation for overseas movement of the dog units to the AGF late in 1944.61 This meant that handlers were to be selected by the AGF from men who had been trained in infantry tactics and scouting and that the units would be given advanced instruction with infantry organizations. The Quartermaster General, however, retained responsibility for the procurement of dogs and their basic training and the issue of dogs and handlers.

A concurrent development was the decision to revise the T/O&E and eliminate all messenger dogs from the platoons "since combat reports indicate that this type dog has proved neither as desirable nor as essential as the silent scout dogs."62 The new T/O&E, released in December 1944, changed the name of the units to infantry scout dog platoons and provided that each was to contain twenty-seven scout dogs.63

Between December 1944 and the spring of 1945 the fifteen Quartermaster war dog platoons were redesignated infantry scout dog platoons.

59 (1) T/O&E 10–397T, 1 Mar 44, sub: QM War Dog Plat. (2) Ltr, TAG to TQMG et al., 9 Mar 44, sub: Constitution and Activation of the 25th QM War Dog Plat, AG 322 (7 Mar 44) OB–SPMOU–M.
60 (1) T/O&E 10–397T, 24 Jun 44, sub: QM War Dog Plat. (2) Statistical Yearbook of the Quartermaster Corps, 1944, p. 65.
61 Memo, SW for CG AGF et al., 25 Sep 44, sub: Responsibility for War Dog Orgns.
62 Ibid.
63 T/O&E 7–167, 14 Dec 44, sub: Inf Scout Dog Plat.
dog platoons and reorganized to conform with the new T/O&E. During 1945 the AGF activated and trained six infantry scout dog platoons. Five of these, however, did not complete their training until shortly after V-J Day and consequently were not sent overseas. Thus all but one of the sixteen war dog platoons that saw service in the war were activated and trained by the QMC.

Evaluation of the War Dog Program

At first the war dog program was conducted largely as an experiment to determine which, if any, types of militarily trained dogs might be of value to the Army in modern warfare. Numerous uses for the animals had been envisioned by dog fanciers, but after extensive tests the QMC actually trained and issued dogs for only five kinds of duties. Of these, pack and sled, mine detection, and messenger dogs proved of slight service, either because the latest mechanical devices were superior to them or because of the limitations of the animals themselves. The training of mine detection dogs was discontinued completely after tests in North Africa revealed that they had no practical value. Opinion was divided concerning the usefulness of messenger dogs. Some observers reported excellent results under certain conditions, but their use proved quite limited and the War Department eventually eliminated them from war dog platoons.

The two types of dogs for which a real need was demonstrated were sentry dogs and silent scout dogs. The former proved of outstanding assistance in guarding Army and Navy installations both in the zone of interior and in the theaters of operations. But insofar as tactical use was concerned, the silent scout dog alone survived the severe tests to which the animals were put in World War II. Scout dog platoons, which emerged in the latter part of the war, were found to be "a capable and valuable adjunct when properly trained and used." 64

The experimental nature and limited success of the war dog program is reflected in statistics. Although approximately 20,000 dogs were procured, only about half of that number were trained and issued by the QMC, and fewer than 1,900 of these were shipped overseas. It was late in 1944 before scout dogs were being sent to the theaters in any sizable numbers, and by the end of the war only 436 had been shipped abroad, as shown in the following table: 65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Dog</th>
<th>Total Trained</th>
<th>Issued in ZI</th>
<th>Shipped Overseas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,425</td>
<td>8,531</td>
<td>1,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentry</td>
<td>9,295</td>
<td>8,396</td>
<td>899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scout</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sled and Pack</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Detection</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures fail to give an accurate representation of the comparative military value of the various types of dogs, for, in contrast to all other types, the demand for scout dogs was increasing in the closing months of the war, and plans were launched in the summer of 1945 to recruit at least 1,600 more of them for scout work in the Pacific. 66

As in the case of mules, though requirements were relatively small, when a real need arose for scout dogs there was no substitute for their particular capabilities. At the same time, there were various condi-

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64 WD Tng Cir 35, Sec. I, 20 Aug 45, sub: Inf Scout Dog Plats.
65 Statistical Data Book 1, Rmt Br, OQMG (n. p.).
tions and circumstances under which the dogs were unable to perform satisfactorily, and, consequently, it was of vital importance that the handlers be acutely aware of the limitations of the animals as well as their abilities. It was equally important that the dogs be thoroughly schooled in their duties and that their handlers be well trained in scouting, patrolling, and minor tactics.

Reports received from overseas during and immediately following the war give ample evidence that, while many satisfactory results were obtained from the use of scout dogs in the war against Germany, these animals were employed much more effectively in the islands of the Pacific. The dense tropical vegetation and the semidarkness of the jungles even at midday afforded the Japanese excellent opportunities to infiltrate behind the American lines and conduct reconnaissance. Such enemy operations could not easily be detected by ordinary patrols, but when dogs accompanied these patrols they were able to detect and give silent warning of the enemy long before the men became aware of them. The dogs could also be used to good advantage in mountainous areas, in river bottoms, and in heavily wooded terrain.

The presence of the animals with patrols greatly lessened the danger of ambush and tended to boost the morale of the soldiers.

Personnel who have used the dogs state that they have saved many lives and are enthusiastic over their value. It was noted that where a dog was present on a patrol, there was a feeling of security and relief from the nervous tension caused by fear of an ambush. This enabled the patrols to operate more efficiently and cover greater distances.67

The fighting on Morotai in the Netherlands Indies illustrates the manner in which scout dogs were used with maximum benefit. There the enemy at first offered only slight resistance, retreating into the mountainous jungles of the interior and then sallying forth in small groups to harass the Americans. In patrol operations designed to uncover Japanese bivouac areas, supply dumps, and lines of communications the 26th War Dog Platoon proved invaluable. During the period 17 September–10 November 1944, the dogs made more than one hundred patrols with infantry troops, ranging from a patrol of five men to a rifle company of two hundred or more. The commander of the 155th Infantry Regiment reported that the dogs never failed to alert at less than seventy-five yards and not a single casualty was suffered while a scout dog was being employed.

Of equal importance is the ability of the dog to pick up enemy bivouacs, positions, patrols, troop reconnaissance, etc. long before our patrol reaches them. This advance warning has frequently enabled our troops to achieve surprise and inflict heavy casualties on the Japs.68

Not all reports on the use of scout dogs were favorable, even in the Pacific. Most of the unsatisfactory results, however, appeared to be traceable to attempts to utilize the animals when conditions were not favorable. Reports showed that in open country with no trail to follow the dogs were unsuccessful because they strayed easily and made too much noise moving through the underbrush. Nor could they be employed properly in crowded areas since they alerted on detecting all human beings outside the immediate patrol. They sometimes even gave

67 Ltr, Lt Col Peter Calza, Hq I Corps, to CG Sixth Army, 10 Aug 45, sub: Rpt on Infantry Scout Dog Platoon, AG 319.1 Rpt 45.
68 Ltr, Col Walter J. Hanna, CO 155th Inf Regt to CG USAFFE, 2 Nov 44, sub: Use of War Dogs with an Inf Regt.
warning on pigs, chickens, carabaos—in fact, on any creature giving forth a scent. 69

In the war against Germany conditions generally were unfavorable to the widespread use of dogs. Scout dogs in two platoons operating with the Fifth Army in Italy in the autumn of 1944 were reported to have been extremely gun-shy under artillery fire. This distracted them from their scouting duties and made them virtually useless. 70 Gun-shyness was a major weakness of most of the dogs assigned to the early platoons because they were trained to become accustomed only to the firing of small arms. Later on the training program was adjusted to overcome this failing, but it was never found particularly advantageous to use the animals in heavy combat. More and more their activities were restricted to duty with reconnaissance patrols.

Other reports from Italy stated that in open country the scout dogs were so conspicuous that the enemy discovered them before they could alert. In the mountains, in which so much of the fighting took place, soft, deep snow and steep, slippery trails prevented the dogs from working satisfactorily. Similarly, the animals were found to be of little use in heavy rains and deep mud. But on a static front, when the weather was clear, with no snow or mud on the ground, or when there was a firm crust on the snow, scout dogs could be employed advantageously. After the final offensive against Germany began, the rapid movement of troops and the intense gun-

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69 Ltr, CO 26th War Dog Plat to CG USAFFE, 2 Nov 44, sub: War Dogs with Inf Regt.
70 Ltr, Maj Rhett, AFHQ, QM Sec, APO 512, to TQMG, 21 Dec 44, sub: Observation on QM War Dog Plts, MTO.
fire made the utilization of dogs for scouting impractical, and they were used instead as sentries.\textsuperscript{71}

That scout dogs did perform valuable service in the European theater as well as in the Pacific is illustrated by one experience the 33rd Quartermaster War Dog Platoon had while serving with the 6th South African Armoured Division of the Fifth Army in Italy. On the night of 20 December 1944, a small reconnaissance patrol led by one of the dogs of the platoon and his handler, Cpl. Robert Bennett, left a forward outpost to investigate a village approximately a mile inside enemy territory.

A few hundred yards into the enemy territory the dog halted suddenly. Not yet sure of the scent, he advanced a few steps, then halted again, this time every hair bristling, his nose pointed straight ahead. The patrol leader crept cautiously forward alone, and not more than 200 yards away discovered a large group of German soldiers in ambush. With this valuable information, the patrol returned to the outpost where they called for mortar fire to wipe out the enemy position.\textsuperscript{72}

Although much of the war dog program had negative results, these were undoubtedly outweighed by the positive achievements. The best evidence of this is the fact that the War Department authorized a scout dog platoon in planning the postwar Military Establishment. For the first time in its history the Army recognized that dogs possessed sufficient tactical value to justify their inclusion in regular peacetime units.

\textsuperscript{71} Ltr, Lt John W. A. Shibley, Jr., CO 35th Inf Scout Dog Plat, 8 Nov 45, sub: Scout Dogs in Italy.
\textsuperscript{72} Ltr, Maj Warren A. Thrasher to TQMG, 4 Feb 45, Incl 4, Rpt, Lt Austin A. Risse to QM Fifth Army, 25 Dec 44, sub: Activity Rpt, AG 391.1 Misc Rpts.
CHAPTER XI

Quartermaster Laundry and Dry Cleaning Operations

The Quartermaster Corps, by making provision for clean clothing through the operation of laundries and dry cleaning plants, performed a special service that contributed immeasurably to the health, comfort, and well-being of the soldier. This was a service of comparatively recent development in the Army, for until 1901 the enlisted man had been left to take care of his laundry needs as best he could.

At that time efforts were made at the post level to assist military personnel in obtaining prompt and regular laundry service at reasonable rates. Laundries, operated by civilian personnel, were organized at some of the larger Army posts by post exchange officers who utilized post exchange funds for the purpose insomuch as the Army was not granted appropriations for laundries or authorized to operate them. Post exchange councils prescribed prices for laundry work and salaries for laundry personnel. In most instances, the facilities were commercial laundries operated as a post exchange feature under revocable licenses that were issued to firms to enable them to furnish laundry service to stations. In addition to administering the post exchange laundries, the councils also controlled relations with commercial laundries serving the various posts.

In 1909 Congress gave the QMC authority to establish its own laundries with funds provided in the appropriations for “General Supplies,” and subsequent appropriation acts made provision for their maintenance. As a consequence, the Corps established fourteen small steam laundries in the years before World War I, but the operation of these post laundries was of a strictly limited nature, since they were constructed only in the absence of other facilities. They were not established at posts where post exchange laundries or commercial facilities were functioning satisfactorily. The operation of the Quartermaster post laundries was completely decentralized. They were administered by the post quartermasters, who rendered all returns and money accounts as prescribed by regulations. These laundries were intended to be self-sustaining, their expenses of operation and maintenance being met from the prices fixed for the work done. These prices varied widely, however, un-

1 (1) Ltr, Actg SW to Hon. John B. Shannon, Chairman of Committee to Investigate Government in Business, 15 Sep 32, and Incl, Rpt Showing Origin and Development, Authority for Operation and Advantages of Maintaining Laundries and Dry Cleaning Plants for Use by the Army, prepared in OQMG by Capt John R. Holt, 331.5. (Hereafter cited as Holt Rpt.) (2) Regulations for the Army of the United States (Washington, 1913), pp. 71, 73, 74.

2 U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 35, pp. 742-45. (Act approved 3 March 1909.)
under the prevailing system of decentralization. The lack of uniformity also applied to the quality of the work performed, since the OQMG set no standards for laundering and exercised no over-all supervision of operations. With the declaration of war in 1917 and the concentration of large numbers of men at cantonments, the laundry problem assumed serious proportions. Not only did laundry service have to be furnished for officers and men at camps and for Army hospitals, but facilities also had to be provided overseas because the Secretary of War delegated responsibility for organizing and operating laundry companies for overseas duty to The Quartermaster General under the National Defense Act of 1916.

Then, too, the fact that the money clothing allowance for enlisted men was abolished made all clothing issued government property and placed upon the government the responsibility for cleaning, repairing, and pressing it. The OQMG therefore took steps to construct government-owned laundries at the larger camps, and on 9 August 1918 the Secretary of War authorized the construction of nineteen cantonment laundries at a cost of $300,000 each.

One of the most important aspects of laundry activities during World War I was the development of a mobile laundry unit for use overseas near the front. This unit grew out of the need to disinfect and clean clothing at the "wash-up" and "delousing stations." The direct relationship between clean clothing and sanitary conditions in the Army brought the laundry function of the Corps into close association with the functions of bathing and disinestation.

Except for one cantonment laundry, all were abandoned at the close of the war, but the large quantity of laundry machinery purchased during the war enabled the OQMG to establish laundries on a larger scale in the postwar period than in the years preceding 1917. While some mobile laundries were set up at various stations along the Mexican border, they were gradually taken out of active circulation and their equipment was installed in available buildings to provide fixed-type laundries.

By the end of the 1920's the QMC had installed forty Quartermaster laundries as well as four dry cleaning plants at major installations in the United States and its possessions. Quartermaster operation of dry cleaning plants as adjuncts to laundries dated from World War I. The large quantities of woolen clothing and blankets that needed dry cleaning led to a plan for the construction and operation of government-owned dry cleaning plants, but this project was abandoned with the signing of the Armistice. Not until 1920 were such plants erected and operated as part of the laundry service.

Further expansion or even adequate maintenance of these laundries and dry cleaning plants in the decades before World War II was handicapped by the meager funds granted by Congress for this purpose. The number of laundries tended

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4 Rpt cited above, n. 3 (2).
5 For a more detailed account of World War I activities, see Louis Filler, Laundry and Related Activities of The Quartermaster General, QMC Historical Studies, 13 (Washington, 1946), pp. 3–16.
6 The laundry at Camp Devens, Mass., was continued in operation since this camp was retained as a Regular Army station.
7 (1) See Holt Rpt, pp. 1–2. (2) Chief of Laundry and Surplus Prop Br to Asst Exec of Sup Div, OQMG, 7 Nov 39, sub: QMC Laundries and Dry Cleaning Plants.
8 Holt Rpt, pp. 1–2.
to decrease as stations were abandoned. By 1939 the QMC was operating thirty-four laundries, five of which included dry cleaning plants. Furthermore, during these years the laundry equipment of most installations became obsolete and needed to be replaced.9

Actually the continued existence of Quartermaster laundries during this period was threatened. Opposition to the laundry service provided for the Army by the Corps came from the organized lobby of laundry owners who complained of unfair and unnecessary competition. These charges became more persistent and pointed as the economic depression increased the importance to commercial laundries of each potential customer.10 As a consequence, QMC representatives had to appear regularly at Congressional hearings to defend the operation of Quartermaster laundries. In 1932, for example, the OQMG prepared a special report that was submitted to a Congressional committee investigating government competition with private enterprise. In transmitting the report to the committee’s chairman, the Secretary of War officially opposed the abolition of the Quartermaster laundries as “uneconomical and contrary to the public interest.”11 Congress renewed the necessary appropriation, but opposition to the operation of Quartermaster laundries continued.

While the OQMG struggled to maintain a laundry service for the Army in the years following World War I, it was at the same time developing standardized procedures and methods of operation for the laundries under its control. These developments were initiated by the publication of two Army Regulations that became the basic documents for guiding the procedure and operation of Quartermaster laundries.12 Issued in the summer of 1923, these regulations provided the means for standardizing laundry activities to a degree unknown in the years before World War I.

Then there had been little need for close supervision of laundries. They had purchased such supplies as they needed and had usually operated according to the commercial experience of the installation superintendent. Supplies accounted for approximately 15 percent of annual expenditures, and, inasmuch as the Laundry Branch, OQMG, after the war operated within budgetary limitations, it was warranted in controlling the quantities of laundry supplies consumed. On the basis of lists of requirements which were revised in the light of experience, the branch eventually developed a table of laundry allowances that was first issued to the field in 1930.13

By 1930, too, the branch offered a detailed statement of recommendations relating to laundry operations that was incorporated in the Handbook for Quartermaster...
It explained the use and proper method of handling various items of laundry equipment, described and analyzed the use of various kinds of laundry supplies, and recommended washing formulas for processing different items of clothing and equipage. This statement marked the beginning of standardized laundering methods. Standardization was further promoted by the specifications developed by the Laundry Branch for laundering done under commercial contract. First developed as a service for the Civilian Conservation Corps, these specifications were also applicable to contracts executed in behalf of the Regular Army. They not only established standards that private firms were to achieve in executing contract laundry work, but they helped as well to define those of Quartermaster laundries.

Administrative Organization

Developments Within the OQMG

By 1939 the varied and comprehensive experiences of the OQMG in maintaining and operating a laundry service for the Army during the previous twenty years had provided an adequate basis for meeting the laundry requirements of World War II. These were formidable only because they were so huge. To handle the task it was necessary for the OQMG to expand the administrative organization responsible for laundry operations.

In the years following World War I, this responsibility had been vested in the Supply Service, or Supply Division as it was later renamed, and administered in the decade of the twenties by the Laundry Branch. The close association of salvage, reclamation, and laundry operations initiated during World War I was continued in the postwar reorganization of the OQMG by placement of the Laundry Branch in the Salvage Division of the Supply Service. By 1930 the dwindling importance of salvage activities had resulted in the elimination of the Salvage Division, and responsibility for laundry operations was transferred to the Clothing and Equipage Branch of the Supply Division. By the end of the thirties OQMG administrators had once more returned to the idea of associating laundry, surplus property, and eventually salvage operations in a single branch within the Supply Division.

On the eve of World War II, laundry activities were being administered by a section in the Laundry and Surplus Property Branch of the Supply Division. It prepared the regulations affecting Quartermaster laundries and dry cleaning plants, exercised over-all supervision of them, gave technical advice on specifications for supplies, machinery, and equipment, and approved their purchase. It prepared the budget estimates for these facilities and collaborated with the Construction Division in preparing floor plans for buildings and the arrangement of laundry machinery.

These activities were being handled by four persons in 1940, a situation that was soon changed by the impact of the rapid growth of the Army and the accompanying expansion of laundry facilities of newly established installations. Increased activities resulted in the redesignation of the Laundry Section as a branch in June.

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14 OQMG Office Memo 119, 30 Aug 21, sub: Orgn of OQMG.
15 (1) The Laundry and Surplus Property Branch was established by OQMG OP 24, 7 Sep 38, sub: Office Orgn. (2) This branch was expanded into the Laundry, Salvage and Surplus Property Branch by OQMG OP 25F, 15 May 41, sub: Sup Div.
1941—a status it held for the duration of the war, although the functional reorganization of the OQMG in March of the following year caused the Laundry Branch to be shifted to the Service Installations Division with the breakup of the Supply Division. By that time its personnel had increased to fifteen civilians and six officers.\textsuperscript{16}

Responsibilities of the Laundry Branch were somewhat modified by the functional reorganization of the OQMG. Thus the branch’s Fiscal Section and its personnel were transferred to the Fiscal Division in an effort to centralize all fiscal matters in one division and speed up the supply program by providing necessary funds promptly. Similarly, most of the procurement functions of the OQMG, including those of the Laundry Branch, were centralized in one Procurement Division.\textsuperscript{17} In lieu of making contracts with manufacturers, issuing procurement authorizations, and making payments as required, the Laundry Branch thereafter acted as a liaison in procurement and purchase matters. In practice, however, its procurement responsibilities were not appreciably lessened since it continued to prepare all necessary data for use by the Procurement Division.

Both equipment and machinery for installation in Quartermaster laundries and dry cleaning plants and supplies for their operation had to be procured. Supplies included expendable items—soaps, detergents, and special materials, such as ink, paint, and rust removers—for which Tables of Allowances had been set up as early as 1930 and later revised by the Laundry Branch on the basis of new information obtained from reports submitted from the field. Supplies also included housekeeping items such as brushes and mops, ironing and finishing supplies, and various machine accessories—sponge cotton cloth, needles, sewing machine oil, and pins. The maintenance of laundry service for the Army required the use of a wide variety of buttons, thread, and shears, while paper and twine had to be supplied for the wrapping and checking department of the laundries.

Under the functional organization of the OQMG, these supplies, which had formerly been procured by the Laundry Branch, became the responsibility of the General Supplies Branch of the Procurement Division. Actual procurement was accomplished by various depots, but as the supply of certain essential commodities dwindled, centralized procurement and distribution by special supply depots of the more important laundry supplies was increasingly emphasized. The Jersey City Quartermaster Depot, for example, became the central procuring agency for soaps and detergents after 1 July 1943 and for all authorized alkalis in January 1944.\textsuperscript{18} In this development as in all others, procurement and distribution of laundry supplies conformed to the general supply procedures of the OQMG.\textsuperscript{19}

Purchase of equipment and machinery by the Laundry Branch during the first year and a half of the war was limited to the acquisition of machinery for replace-
ment purposes and for use in buildings already in existence. Responsibility for setting up laundry facilities and for procuring laundry machinery for initial installations and for use in new buildings was vested in the Corps of Engineers, to whom these functions had been transferred from the Construction Division, OQMG, late in 1941 along with all other construction activities of the QMC. Responsibility for initial procurement was separated from construction operations and returned to the OQMG in June 1943. Actually, the Corps of Engineers had never purchased items of laundry equipment even before this transfer; they had been procured by the Washington Quartermaster Depot upon direction of the Office of the Chief of Engineers. With the centralization of procurement in the OQMG, an efficient purchasing organization was established at the Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot. The Chief of Engineers retained responsibility for the determination of requirements and the authorization of funds for laundry equipment used in new facilities, either constructed or acquired.

The Corps of Engineers remained responsible for constructing new laundry facilities. The Laundry Branch, OQMG, maintained a close relationship with that Corps, continuing to authorize the construction of laundries as it had in the past, determining whether existing commercial facilities could take care of local needs or whether another Quartermaster laundry, not unreasonably far from the site in question, could handle a camp's requirements.

At the same time that procurement responsibility was returned to the OQMG, responsibility for the specifications and design of laundry equipment and for the control and administration of the stockpile of laundry and dry cleaning equipment for new facilities both in the zone of interior and in the theaters was transferred from the Corps of Engineers to the QMC. This transfer was vigorously defended by The Quartermaster General when the Corps of Engineers later sought a modification of the directive.

Within the OQMG these responsibilities were distributed among the divisions according to the functional organization of the office. Thus the preparation of specifications for laundry equipment was assigned to the Military Planning Division, purchase and inspection to the Procurement Division, storage and issue to the Stockpiling Division, and the administration of the stockpile of equipment to the Laundry Branch of the Service Installations Division.

The changes made in procurement responsibility modified relationships between the QMC and the Medical Department. Hospital laundries were built only when other facilities for handling hospital bulk work, in particular Quartermaster laundries which processed the work free, were not available. Such laundries operated under rules and regulations promulgated by the Medical Department and were not under the jurisdiction of The Quartermaster General. Their construction, however, did fall within the province of the Con-

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20 ASF Memo S5-103-43, 8 Jun 43, sub: Assignments by PAR.
23 OQMG OO 25-46, 10 Aug 43, sub: Assignment of Functions Transferred from CE.
struction Division, OQMG, during the emergency period and later passed to the Corps of Engineers. The constructing agency provided the funds for initial procurement of equipment. All additional equipment was procured through the Laundry Branch, funds being provided by The Surgeon General’s Office. This was in accordance with regulations that made the QMC responsible for the procurement of supplies used by two or more branches of the Army. After the transfer of procurement responsibility for laundry and dry cleaning equipment in the summer of 1943, the Laundry Branch initiated all procurement for hospital laundries as well as for Quartermaster laundries. Subsequently, the Medical Department was directed to transfer to the QMC all funds held for the purchase of laundry and dry cleaning equipment and supplies. Thereafter such supplies and equipment were furnished to laundries operated in conjunction with hospitals without reimbursement.

The operation of laundries, too, posed problems of mutual interest and required the co-operation of the OQMG and The Surgeon General’s Office. The latter controlled all matters relating to the protection of health while the Laundry Branch, OQMG, offered technical advice in its field. Until the summer of 1944, hospital laundries and Quartermaster laundries were under the staff supervision of The Surgeon General’s Office and the OQMG, respectively. At that time, in view of the “critical labor situation all over the country and the dwindling availability of commercial laundry service,” Headquarters, ASF, became greatly interested in insuring maximum utilization and efficiency of operation of Army-owned laundry and dry cleaning facilities. As a result, staff responsibility for all laundries, including those at general hospitals, was vested in The Quartermaster General. He was expected, however, to adhere to the detailed standards for all hospital laundry service furnished by The Surgeon General, and to maintain close liaison with him in reference to such activities.

As the war in Europe drew to a close, the changes in assignment of functions made in 1943 were defined with greater precision. At that time, The Quartermaster General was assigned responsibility for the specifications for, and the purchase, inspection, storage, and issue of, all fixed and mobile laundry and dry cleaning equipment operated by the Army. He was also responsible for determining requirements and providing funds for mobile laundry and dry cleaning equipment and for all replacements. On the other hand, the Chief of Engineers administered these last two functions as they applied to equipment for newly acquired or newly constructed fixed facilities. Similarly, the Commanding General, AAF, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service were responsible for determining requirements and providing funds for the fixed equipment used in plants performing specialized operations for these branches. In determining requirements for equipment at new facilities and additional equipment at existing facilities, the Chief of Engineers and The Quartermaster General consulted with the Commanding General, AAF, with regard to those facilities at installations under his command and with The Surgeon General.

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24 WD Cir 7, Sec. II, 5 Jan 45, sub: Responsibility for Procurement of Equip and Supplies.
25 WD Cir 352, Sec. IV, 30 Aug 44, sub: Program to Effect Improvement in Opn of Laundry Facilities.
in reference to those operated in conjunction with hospitals.26

Relations With the Field

Quartermaster laundries and dry cleaning plants were established at posts or camps in the zone of interior, and responsibility for their proper operation was vested in the commanding general of the corps area within whose jurisdiction they were located. Technical supervision of these facilities was a function of The Quartermaster General. He prescribed the methods, standards, regulations, and allowances for the operation of the installations, determined production standards, suggested methods for improvement of operations, and made technical inspections.

The rapid expansion of Quartermaster laundries beginning with the emergency period and the increasing need for closer supervision of them raised problems in relationships between the field and the OQMG. For example, commanding officers of the corps areas had early been advised to station experienced laundry officers at each Quartermaster installation. Inspection, however, revealed that posts were operating either with officers untrained in Quartermaster methods and procedures or with trained officers who were assigned additional duties that interfered with those relating to laundry operations.27 Such inspection as was possible with the limited number of personnel in the OQMG restricted advisory work to one visit to each camp annually. Under the circumstances, the inadequacies of laundry operations suggested the need for more frequent inspections. In September 1942, therefore, five inspection areas were established, each under a laundry inspector. He was expected to visit the QMC laundries in his area every six months and make such additional special inspections as might be directed by the Laundry Branch. He worked in close co-operation with the service command, sending word of an impending inspection well in advance of his visit; in no case was he to interfere with the normal operations of a service command but he was to function as a technical adviser to help the commanding officer achieve maximum results.28

The technical inspector also conducted investigations to determine the necessity for constructing new laundries or for acquiring commercial facilities for operation by the QMC, and he made arrangements for commercial service under contract. The importance of these investigations was pointed out by the chief of the Laundry Branch:

From past experience it has been found that with practically no exceptions, Service Commands will concur with recommendations from posts, camps and stations for the construction of new laundries or acquisition of commercial facilities. Usually such concurrence is made with little or no effort made to determine the necessity for such construction or acquisition, or the availability of service from commercial plants or nearby Quartermaster Corps installations. Such experience has indicated that recommendations by the Service Commands were not based upon facts and that independent investigation by qualified O.Q.M.G. Technical Laundry In-

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26 WD Cir 7, Sec. II, 5 Jan 43, sub: Responsibility for Procurement of Equip and Supplies.
27 (1) Memo, Gen Munnikhuisen, OQMG, for TAG, 10 Oct 41, sub: QMC Laundries. (2) Ltr, TAG to CGs of All CAs, 14 Nov 41, sub: Assignment of Laundry Offs in New QMC Laundries, AG 210.312 QMC (10–10–41) MO–A–M.
28 Chief of Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 8 Jul 43, sub: First Anniversary Conf of CGs SvGs.
spectors were usually required to prevent unnecessary duplication or acquisition of laundry and dry cleaning facilities.\(^{29}\)

Such facts caused the OQMG in the summer of 1943 to oppose a proposal by Headquarters, ASF, to decentralize continuing inspections to the field.\(^{30}\) On the other hand, the rapid growth of the Army and the increase of administrative problems had necessitated a greater delegation of responsibility to the field. Thus to expedite laundry operations all matters pertaining to the hiring of laundry employees, including the determination of wage rates, had been decentralized to the service commands in the fall of 1942.

It was not to be expected that the exercise of staff supervision and actual operation of the laundries could be accomplished without some disagreement over authority. The Laundry Branch had established a system of inspection, on the basis of which it prepared and sent recommendations to the service commands, suggesting, for example, that unsatisfactory laundry officers be replaced, incompetent workers be removed, machinery be repaired, and supply policies be brought into accord with regulations. However, it was not always easy to get action on these suggestions, and inspectors upon returning later to an installation too often found nothing had been done.\(^{31}\)

In a number of instances in 1944 inspectors found that laundry officers were being assigned additional duties unrelated to laundry operations, though this had been prohibited by instructions to the field as early as 1941. As a consequence, the OQMG called attention anew to this directive and re-emphasized the importance from an operating standpoint of having an experienced, well-trained officer in charge of a laundry. The Commanding General, Seventh Service Command, took exception to what he considered an infringement of his authority—"a typical illustration of the growing tendency on the part of Staff Divisions and Technical Services, ASF for a centralized control of service command post activities as well as those at service command headquarters." Hampered by drastic reductions in overhead personnel and yet responsible for operations, he felt that commanders ought to have full latitude to assign personnel to obtain their maximum effective use. Although the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, ASF, was in sympathy, the Quartermaster General was quick to point out that Quartermaster laundry operations were a $24,000,000 a year business which could not be entrusted to inexperienced, untrained personnel. Where trained laundry technicians were not employed, plants operated unsatisfactorily and losses were incurred. The Chief of Staff himself had stressed the necessity for improving laundry service, and in the interest of clarifying responsibilities the Quartermaster General suggested the promulgation of a new directive that he had already submitted to Headquarters, ASF.\(^{32}\)

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\(^{29}\) Chief of Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 25 Aug 43, sub: Decentralization of Continuing Inspections.

\(^{30}\) Memo, TQMG for DCoS for SvCs, ASF, 30 Aug 43, sub: Decentralization of Continuing Inspections.

\(^{31}\) See, for example (1) Ltr, Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, to CG Ninth SvC, 21 Jun 43, no sub. (2) Ltr, Col Brunswold, OQMG, to CG Fifth SvC, 29 Jun 43, sub: Unsatisfactory Opn of QMC Laundry at Camp Campbell, Ky.

The need for this directive was heightened by the changed situation in the zone of interior, where by the summer of 1944 the QMC “was over the hump” in providing laundry service. Instead of an expansion program, post quartermasters were soon to be confronted with the necessity of placing their laundries on a stand-by basis, and of disposing of those becoming surplus to War Department needs as stations were inactivated throughout the country. At the same time, there had to be a maximum use of existing laundries and increased efficiency of operation in order to provide the largest number of stations with the maximum service possible—by multiple-shift operations, if necessary. The accelerated movement of troops overseas had eased considerably the task of providing laundry service for the posts and camps, but, as the pressure upon the laundries decreased, officers and men tended to become more critical of the service given. The Laundry Branch, sensitive to these developments, placed an increasing emphasis on the quality of the work performed rather than on production goals as in the past, and in the interest of effecting an improved laundry service drafted a new directive.³³

This directive was published in August 1944. It was aimed at the promotion of “prompt service, elimination and prevention of backlogs, adherence to established standards of quality in performance of work, and maximum utilization of facilities to provide adequate service.” ³⁴ The directive reiterated that The Quartermaster General would continue to function as the staff agency of the Commanding General, ASF, and to have technical control of the operations of all laundries, including for the first time those operating at general hospitals. This technical control, it was pointed out, included “formulation of policies, and the authority to issue instructions covering the utilization of equipment, plant methods, plant lay-outs, supply allowances, and procedures, and detailed directives to insure uniformity of quality of work performed.”

Operating control, on the other hand, continued to be vested in the commanding generals of the service commands, except for disinfestation plants at embarkation ports for which the Chief of Transportation was responsible, and AAF rag laundries, a responsibility of the Commanding General, AAF. The Quartermaster General was to assist the service commands by periodic inspections and to direct corrective action where necessary. In the following month operating control of laundries at Air Forces stations was transferred from the service commands to the Commanding General, AAF. Insofar as the QMC was concerned, this transfer had no effect upon its responsibility for technical supervision but simply meant that henceforth the OQMG would deal directly with the AAF instead of the service command on all matters pertaining to laundries at Air Forces stations.³⁵

In the light of difficulties that had been encountered, the August directive again stated that The Quartermaster General

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³³ (1) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 26 Jul 44, sub: Opn of Laundries and Dry Cleaning Plants, inclosing draft of WD Cir and changes to ARs. (2) An amended version was submitted in Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 2 Aug 44, same sub. (3) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 8 Aug 44, sub: Responsibilities for Supervision of Laundry Ops.
³⁴ WD Cir 352, Sec. IV, 30 Aug 44, sub: Program to Effect Improvement in Opn of Laundry Facilities.
³⁵ (1) WD Cir 388, 27 Sep 44, sub: Transfer of Responsibilities, Pers, and Equip at Class III Installations. (2) Address, Col Frederick H. Koerbel, OQMG, at Meeting of OQMG Tech Laundry Advisers, 30 Oct 44.
would determine the need for the establishment or expansion of Army-operated facilities as well as the need for discontinuance of any of them. Moreover, he would decide on changes in their operating capacities, such as increasing the number of shifts in order to meet demands or eliminate backlogs, and rule on all matters relating to commercial service, though the service commands would still negotiate and award contracts in accordance with regulations. Finally, his responsibilities in personnel matters were clarified through the authorization granted him to direct the transfer and assignment of laundry superintendents to all installations, and of laundry officers at all except AAF stations when this would improve operations. He could recommend transfer and reassignment of laundry officers at AAF installations, but action was dependent upon the decision taken by the Commanding General, AAF.

To carry out the objectives of the program of improved laundry service, the commanding general of each service command was directed to establish at his headquarters a director of laundry service. The Quartermaster General assisted the service command in selecting a qualified and competent officer for this position. The directors, under the supervision of the service command quartermasters, were empowered to carry out the provisions of the August directive for the commanding generals of the service commands and The Quartermaster General.

Late in October the aims of this program were furthered by a conference of laundry technical advisers held at the OQMG. The problems facing the Laundry Branch and its personnel in the field were explored and the scope and significance of the new directive thoroughly analyzed.

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**Expansion of Fixed Laundries**

**Construction**

In 1940 there were only thirty-three Quartermaster fixed laundries, twenty-nine of which were in the United States and four in its overseas possessions. Five of those within the country included dry cleaning plants. When the Army first began to expand in the emergency period, The Quartermaster General adopted a policy of constructing Quartermaster laundries at most of the large camps, but the availability of commercial service for smaller camps was to be investigated. At that time laundry machinery could be readily obtained, and the construction policy proved a sound one in view of later developments, such as loss of skilled labor, low priorities, and the tremendous increase in the volume of civilian laundry work in defense plant areas which hampered commercial laundries in providing service for the Army.

Opposing government competition and protesting that they could handle all laundering for camps in their vicinities, commercial laundries in some instances were successful in curtailing the construction program. On the other hand, the expense involved and the large amounts of critical materials used in building Quartermaster laundries made it impossible for the QMC to provide sufficient facilities for the QMC to provide sufficient facilities for the Army. It therefore became the rule to build Army laundries only when service could not otherwise be obtained. The OQMG encouraged co-operation between military installations and commercial laundries to

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36 ASF Cir 335, Sec. II, 6 Oct 44, sub: Laundry Sv Program.
37 Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 30 Jun 42, sub: Summary of Activities for 1942.
secure adequate service. The need for construction was further modified by the use of commercial laundry pools and by Army lease or purchase of commercial facilities. By mid-1943 it was established policy to obtain commercial service wherever it was possible to do so and to construct laundries and dry cleaning plants only where service was unavailable. Civilian plants were taken over only when they were suitable and commercial service could not be obtained.  

Use of Laundry Pools

Early in the emergency, commercial plants had affirmed their willingness and capacity to handle Army laundry work, but by mid-1941 they had become "largely reconciled" to letting the Army do its own washing and were "quite willing to let it build as many laundries as it wants." Barring certain exceptional civilian laundry setups, the industry was being forced by circumstances beyond its control to admit that it could not meet Army demands and that the QMC was doing a better job in its own interest. "An ever-expanding demand upon civilian laundries, growing out of rapidly swelling war industries, aggravated by lack of labor and supplies, has brought about this condition and not any lack of willingness on the laundryman's part." While the volume of civilian work was proving more attractive in some instances than assuming responsibility for Army requirements, most thoughtful representatives of the industry realized that they could not decry government "competition" and then abandon Army work without suffering the consequences. The troops had to be provided with laundry service, and if private firms did not furnish it the government would, either by commandeering laundries or building its own.

The QMC was more than willing to give laundrymen ample opportunity to prove their ability to satisfy Army requirements and to come to terms with individual commercial laundries or combinations of them. There was no one best plan for handling Army laundry work, and various methods were evolved for pooling commercial facilities, not all of which, however, proved satisfactory. Combinations were created in the Boston area, Miami, Topeka, Memphis, Nashville, Youngstown, Des Moines, St. Paul, and elsewhere during 1941–42.

One of the largest of such pools was organized in the Boston area to provide service for the 50,000 trainees stationed at Fort Devens and Camp Edwards. The OQMG originally had planned to build a laundry at Fort Devens in the first cantonment building program in 1940, but commercial laundries, fearful of losing their skilled workers to the Quartermaster facility, agreed to provide the necessary service, and the OQMG canceled its construction plans. Laundrymen in the area organized the Defense Laundries and Dry Cleaners, Inc., to furnish five-day service, but the arrangement never proved satisfactory though it operated for two years. By January 1943 the OQMG had to acquire and operate two commercial laundries as Quartermaster facilities in order to supplement the work of the trade association.

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38 Chief of Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Insts Div, OQMG, 8 Jul 43, sub: First Anniversary Conf of CGs SvCs.
41 "What'll It Be—Reveille or Taps?" Starchroom, October 15, 1942, pp. 4, 6.
Six months later it was necessary to acquire another commercial laundry since Defense Launderies and Dry Cleaners, Inc., informed officials at Fort Devens that it would discontinue service on 24 July.\textsuperscript{42}

A more successful agreement was negotiated between the AAF Technical Training Command at Miami Beach, Fla., and the local laundrymen. So effective was the "Miami Plan" that it served as a model for similar arrangements elsewhere. Confronted with the usual variation in prices, irregular service, and similar difficulties, the commanding officer called the laundrymen together and made it clear that Army needs would have to be met. For their part Army officials took steps to standardize procedure on pickups and deliveries, for which Army trucks were used. Deductions were permitted from payrolls to satisfy indebtedness to the commercial pool. On the other hand, the pool clearing house, called Service Launderies, Inc., organized the production of its members, adopted a piece rate with graduated charges for enlisted men and officers, and collected the money due the laundries, deducting 5 percent to pay its operating expenses and to provide both a reserve fund for retiring its organization and a sinking fund against deferred payments by the Army.\textsuperscript{43} So well managed was this pool and so promptly were accounts adjusted that losses to Miami laundries by defaulting soldiers were negligible.

The difficulty experienced by laundrymen in collecting laundry charges from individual soldiers posed one of the major problems for the Army in obtaining commercial service. Bulk work—that is, the laundering or cleaning of such government-owned items as mattress covers, sheets, and pillow cases—offered no difficulties in effecting satisfactory arrange-


\textsuperscript{43} James T. Larrimore, "The Ramparts We Wash," Starchroom, October 15, 1942, pp. 9ff.

\textsuperscript{44} AR 210-50, 31 Dec 34, sub: Posts, Camps, and Stations.

\textsuperscript{45} WD Cir 309, Sec. II, 11 Sep 42, sub: Exchanges and Commissaries Placed on Cash Basis.
by increasing the amount of paper work and the personnel needed to operate collection and delivery stations and resulting in the end in higher prices for the soldier. The director of the Service Installations Division, OQMG, argued that many firms would lose interest in Army business because of the added accounting burden. He felt that a contract would be legally feasible under the authority that the Army had to deduct charges from the payroll, and he urged its use. This would mean that the government would assume financial responsibility for bills unpaid because of death, desertion, or for other reasons. The proposed change would also simplify and promote more satisfactory relations between the Army and the commercial laundries. Furthermore, he pointed out that inasmuch as credit was allowed soldiers patronizing Quartermaster laundries, the War Department directive discriminated against private firms.

Early in 1943, therefore, the War Department permitted post quartermasters or supply officers to execute government contracts for commercial laundry and dry cleaning services for enlisted men, the charges for which were to be paid from funds authorized to regional Quartermaster depots for the purpose. The government was to be reimbursed by deductions from the monthly payrolls. Within a month this directive was modified to permit the use of any rate or combination of rates, whether monthly or weekly, and by the pound or piece, thereby permitting a greater latitude in the kind of arrangements that could be made by the posts.

In addition to instituting the contract system, the Laundry Branch was instrumental in obtaining a regulation that permitted reimbursement to commercial laundries for unclaimed Army clothing. There was no way in which the laundryman could recover his losses unless he disposed of such clothing to the public. This procedure was undesirable, and instructions were therefore issued to the field making appropriations available for the recovery of such clothing. Proprietors of laundries and dry cleaning establishments were to be paid a reasonable service charge for the laundering or dry cleaning of all unclaimed government clothing that they returned. This clothing was thereafter restored to stock for Army use.

**Purchase and Lease of Laundries**

While it made use of available commercial laundry and dry cleaning service, the OQMG also found it necessary in the fiscal year 1943 to inaugurate a policy of purchasing or leasing commercial laundries and operating them as Army facilities. This policy was based primarily on the need to conserve critical materials, but the OQMG was also motivated in some instances by its inability to obtain satisfactory service from the laundry owners. Whether or not to acquire a plant in a given area was determined by a Laundry Branch representative who surveyed the facilities and ascertained whether the owner was willing to negotiate a lease.

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46 (1) Col Hamilton to Col Barnes, OQMG, 7 Nov 42, sub: Laundry Sv at Posts. (2) Memo, Dir of Mil Pers, ASF, to ACoS G-1, 19 Dec 42, sub: Credit for Laundry Sv.
47 (1) WD Cir 43, Sec. II, 9 Feb 43, sub: Credit for Commercial Laundry and Dry Cleaning Sv. (2) The collection procedure for payroll deductions was specified in AR 35–2440, 26 Feb 43, sub: Finance Dept. (3) WD Cir 90, Sec. VIII, 1 Apr 43, sub: Credit for Commercial Laundry and Dry Cleaning Sv.
48 WD Cir 467, Sec. IV, 12 Dec 44, sub: Clothing.
49 Chief of Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 23 Jun 45, sub: New QMC Laundry and Dry Cleaning Plants.
though consent of the owner was not requisite. The Corps of Engineers then sent appraisers and technicians who arranged for purchase or lease of the property, depending upon the situation encountered. If so much new machinery had to be installed or other improvements made that a lease ultimately would be more expensive than outright purchase, the plant was purchased. New machinery installed in a leased plant remained government property, but the Army agreed to make it available to the owner at “reasonable prices” if he so desired.

The appraisers discussed the terms of lease or purchase, which were based upon an annual percentage of the Army’s appraisal of real estate and equipment. No compensation was given the owner for good will or rolling stock, which he was free to dispose of as best he could. If qualified, the laundry owner or his managers were commissioned as captains or first lieutenants and placed in charge of the plant. Most of the laundry employees were retained as civil service personnel at the same wage rates they had previously received.50

The number of commercial laundries leased or purchased began to rise steadily after June 1942. By March of the following year there were ten, and by June the number had increased to fifteen.51 The Army

51 (1) Ibid., p. 21. (2) Chief of Laundry Br to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 23 Jun 43, sub: New QMC Laundries and Dry Cleaning Plants.
had met its requirements by the summer of 1943, and The Quartermaster General advised laundermen operating within a fifty-mile to sixty-mile radius of camps that they might refuse to do laundry work for the Army without fear of facing acquisition proceedings if the Quartermaster laundry was not operating at full capacity. He announced in the fall of the year that further acquisition or building of Quartermaster laundries was unlikely.\(^5\)

Through construction, lease, and purchase, Quartermaster fixed laundries and dry cleaning plants expanded enormously in number during the emergency and the war years. The number of laundries in the zone of interior and overseas had almost tripled by 30 June 1942, and when the war ended in Europe they totaled 287, of which 193 were in the United States. Before the war there had been only half a dozen fixed facilities overseas in American possessions. The war brought a rapid multiplication of them from thirteen in 1942 to ninety-four at the end of the war. At the peak of their operations in 1944, the fixed laundries in the zone of interior and overseas handled some 2,150,000,000 pieces of laundry, or more than 78,000,000 bundles.\(^5\)

Before June 1943 the Laundry Branch did not build or acquire dry cleaning plants because there was much less need for them than for laundries. Certain items—woolen shirts and blankets, for example—could be laundered under controlled conditions instead of dry cleaned. By putting on extra shifts the professional cleaners had been able to handle larger amounts of work, but it was recognized that dry cleaning service was not adequate. Army needs became more imperative as dwindling supplies and labor and the drafting of owners increased the mortality rate of dry cleaning plants. At the same time the increased quantities of salvage from overseas necessitated uninterrupted service to return used clothing and equipment to stock. Hence the Laundry Branch expanded its facilities by acquisition and construction with the result that it more than doubled their number by 30 June 1943. At the end of the war there were

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\(^5\) See Table 19.
seventy-seven dry cleaning plants, of which twenty-seven were in the zone of interior and fifty were overseas. They handled approximately 18,000,000 pieces of dry cleaning in the fiscal year 1945.54

Use of Mobile Laundries

The service provided overseas by fixed laundries was supplemented by that furnished by mobile laundries operated by Quartermaster laundry units, which followed the troops into the theaters of operations. The use of mobile laundry equipment dated from World War I, but little effort had been expended to bring it up-to-date before World War II. Handicapped by a lack of funds, the OQMG had been unable to make much progress with experimental units until 1940. By the following year, mobile laundry equipment, utilizing a van-type trailer drawn by a tractor, had been developed and standardized through the co-operative efforts of the Laundry Branch and the Motor Transport Division, OQMG. Although this equipment was a great improvement over that used in 1918, its deficiencies were promptly revealed in its operation in North Africa. Subsequently, under the guidance of the Research and Development Branch, a more satisfactory design was developed.55

Unfortunately, development and procurement came too late and none of this equipment had been used in the battle zones.56

54 Ibid.

55 For the development of this equipment see Risch, The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, I, Ch. IV.
newly designed and improved mobile equipment was put into operation during the war. Although approximately 2,000 of the old van-type semimobile laundries were procured and most of them operated overseas, there never was a sufficient number to take care of all laundry needs in the theaters. Moreover, their limited mobility confined their use largely to rear areas. As a result, the American soldier in many instances applied his ingenuity to the problem of maintaining cleanliness and developed and operated makeshift laundries that supplemented the efforts of the mobile units in all theaters.

**Operation of Quartermaster Laundries**

Quartermaster fixed laundries in the zone of interior were established primarily to provide service for enlisted men, but they also handled the work of other groups and organizations. If the capacity of a facility became overtaxed for any reason—for example, because of scarcity of labor—priorities for service were established. Enlisted men's clothing had top priority, followed by the laundering of government-owned property such as that used in hos-

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56 (1) General Gregory indicated that 1,200 of these mobile laundries were in operation in the theaters. See *Laundry Age*, October 1, 1943, p. 61. (2) Address, Col Koerbel, Chief of Laundry Br, at QM Conf, 2-4 Oct 44.

57 For the operation of these mobile laundries by Quartermaster laundry units overseas, see (1) Alvin P. Stauffer, *The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan*, Ch. X; (2) Irving Cheslaw and William Chaikin, *The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany*, Ch. VIII, both volumes in preparation for this series.
pitals and in the Army Transport Service and accumulated at repair shops in the course of reclamation operations. The laundry of officers and other authorized patrons, such as civilian employees, had the lowest priority. At hospital laundries, which eventually came under the control of The Quartermaster General, hospital work and the laundering of government-owned property had top priority. Next in order they handled the clothing of enlisted personnel, senior cadet nurses, authorized civilian attendants and employees, and officers.\textsuperscript{58}

Laundry service to enlisted personnel was offered at a flat monthly rate. In 1941 an effort was made to enact legislation that would allow free laundry service to enlisted men, but the proposed act was deemed undesirable by the OQMG inasmuch as it would have discriminated against soldiers who did not happen to be stationed at camps possessing Quartermaster laundries.\textsuperscript{59} Various alternative suggestions proved unacceptable and for the duration of the war a flat rate of $1.50 a

\textsuperscript{58} (1) AR 210–10, par. 14, 20 Dec 40, sub: Administration—Posts, Camps, and Stations. (2) AR 30–2135, 12 Jan 45, sub: QMC Laundries and Dry Cleaning Plants.

\textsuperscript{59} Memo, Lt Col Edward B. McKinley, OQMG, for CoS G–4, 11 Jun 41, sub: HR 4638—Free Laundry Sv.
month was set by The Quartermaster General. The single bundle rate was fifty cents.\textsuperscript{50} On the other hand, organizational work, such as the white clothing of cooks and bakers, and sheets, pillowcases, blankets, and other bedding, was laundered or dry cleaned free of charge. While laundry and dry cleaning services were provided without reimbursement to any arm or service of the Army, other departments of the federal government were required to pay for them.

The resulting work load offered no special problems for the QMC beyond the familiar difficulties of establishing adequate facilities despite low priorities and shortages, of increasing operating efficiency through improved techniques and institution of multiple-shift operations, and of overcoming labor scarcities. While the burden of laundering and dry cleaning for enlisted men decreased as troops moved overseas, the renovating of used clothing and equipage turned in by troops upon their departure overseas as well as that shipped back from the theaters steadily increased in amount and importance. Such clothing and equipage had to be renovated rapidly not only to speed its return to stock and subsequent reissue but also to prevent undue deterioration, which resulted when these items remained soiled for prolonged periods of time. The main problem was to synchronize laundry and reclamation operations. The economical use of laundry facilities for this purpose could be accomplished easily when the responsibility for both laundry and reclamation operations was vested in the same officer. By 1944 relations between repair shops and laundries and dry cleaning plants had been adjusted and integrated to permit ready processing of the steady stream of clothing and equipage.

Shortage of labor was a major difficulty that the QMC shared with many industries whose low wage level resulted in a loss of workers to better-paying war industries. However, civilians employed in Quartermaster fixed laundries had the advantage of working under civil service regulations, which granted sick leave and other benefits that generally were superior to those provided by commercial laundries. While the QMC attempted to keep wage rates at the same level as those prevailing in nearby commercial facilities, overtime gave the worker an opportunity to augment his income.

As a consequence, laundry owners lost many of their skilled operators to Army installations, much to their vexation. In their efforts to find workers for laundries, post quartermasters frequently had to be cautioned about the repercussions that might result from the practice of indiscriminately attracting experienced employees from commercial firms. Laundry owners were further irritated because Quartermaster laundries did not share the task of training new workers in the face of the growing labor scarcity. To remedy this situation, the Laundry Branch worked out arrangements with the Civil Service Commission whereby an examination for “Laundry Trainee” was announced. This permitted Quartermaster laundries to hire personnel and train them on the job, paying them 20 percent less than regular employees during the training period. After that they could be recommended for promotion.\textsuperscript{61}

This action eased somewhat the pressure upon commercial firms but did not

\textsuperscript{50} SB 10–1944, Feb 45, sub: Charges for Sv Rendered EMs by QMC Laundries.

\textsuperscript{61} (1) Col Kocber, Laundry Br, to Pers Div, OQMG, 31 Jul 41, sub: Civil Sv Exam for Laundry Trainees. (2) See Insp Rpt, Col W. F. Long for TQMG, 5 Sep 41, no sub.
settle the problem of labor shortage. To meet its needs, the OQMG sought, without success, adoption of a policy permitting the use of personnel in the Women's Army Corps. It also urged the use of enlisted men in laundries located in areas of particularly acute labor scarcity, but early in the war there was little authority for permitting such use of enlisted men. Furthermore, higher authority did not favor the practice even when enlisted men were classified for limited service. Not until early in 1943 was a directive issued specifically permitting the employment of enlisted men in laundries.62

Prisoners of war offered a far more productive source of manpower. The Office of the Provost Marshal General broached the subject of using such labor to The Quartermaster General as early as the fall of 1942, but little immediate action followed although some internment camps were constructed at posts possessing Quartermaster laundries.63 While the OQMG was eager to use the labor of prisoners of war to relieve a situation in post laundries that was becoming progressively more acute, the Eastern and Western Defense
Commands rejected the idea.\(^{64}\) When The Adjutant General informed the service commands in the summer of 1943 that German prisoners of war might be used in post laundries where an adequate labor supply was not available, the Laundry Branch took steps to offer technical advice on, and urged the desirability of, using such labor. In time a body of experience in the employment of prisoners of war at laundries became available. Although an excellent work record was established at a number of camps, as a rule production by prisoners of war was not comparable to that of civilians. A survey of August 1944 indicated that their average efficiency was only 50 percent that of civilian personnel.\(^{65}\)

In their operation of Quartermaster laundries, supervisors and laundry officers were guided by the technical information furnished by the Laundry Branch. Early in the war the bulk of this information was found in a number of pamphlets, manuals, circulars, and regulations. By the end of 1944 much of the data had been brought together in two publications—a manual and a bulletin—that established standard operating procedures.\(^{66}\) These publications took cognizance of changed conditions that required modifications of laundry practices as a result, for example, of the variations in the types and textures of the clothing processed. They also offered detailed information to laundry supervisors who had the task of training new employees and of superintending the growth of their laundries in accordance with standard laundry procedures.

Although during a greater part of the emergency and the war years quality work was of less importance than the quantity of essential production accomplished, the Laundry Branch nevertheless issued special instructions to ensure the proper washing and finishing of garments as well as the proper use of equipment and supplies. Washing formulas had been developed many years before the war, but they were revised in 1941 and again in 1943 to permit "a good quality of washing with a maximum safety factor" in order that they might be used by inexperienced personnel.\(^{67}\) It is true that quality production in all aspects of laundering could not be emphasized before the fall of 1944 when most of the troops had been transported overseas and the pressure for production was eased. Until that time the efforts of the Laundry Branch were devoted to the elimination of unwarranted delays in laundry service resulting from excessively heavy work schedules, inadequate planning, or insufficient personnel.

In addition to scrutinizing every phase of the laundry process to expedite the service offered, the Laundry Branch also made use of tests to arrive at more suitable formulas or methods of operation. Laundering tests were conducted under controlled conditions by the Quartermaster Board at Camp Lee to determine, for example, the causes for the felting of woolen socks and their excessive shrinkage in washing. The laundering process itself was investigated

\(^{64}\) 2d Ind, Col Hastings, OQMG, to PMG, 9 Mar 43, on Ltr, Hastings to PMG, 26 Feb 43, sub: Utilization of POWs.

\(^{65}\) (1) Ltr, TAG to CGs SvCs, 9 Jun 43, sub: Labor of POWs. (2) ASF Cir 290, 5 Sep 44, sub: POW—Efficiency in QMC Launderies.


\(^{67}\) (1) Ltr, Col McMullen, OQMG, to CO CFQMD, 7 Dec 43, no sub. (2) Operating details are more fully elaborated in Filler, Laundry and Related Activities of The Quartermaster General.
to determine at which stage the greatest shrinkage was produced. Other tests were concerned with the effect of laundering upon color and redyeing of clothing and equipage.68

Private industry, particularly the American Institute of Laundering, also conducted tests for the QMC. A number of commercial firms co-operated in testing formulas designed to conserve chlorine and hypochlorites, which were important in the bleaching process. On the basis of data thus accumulated the OQMG formulated its recommendations. Tests conducted by both commercial and military agencies provided the Laundry Branch with a vast amount of data that enabled it to meet specific situations for which it might otherwise have been unprepared.

CHAPTER XII

Care of the Dead

The care of deceased military personnel and the maintenance and supervision of national cemeteries are among the special services that have long been entrusted to The Quartermaster General. During its early existence, the national government depended upon a post cemetery system to provide burial facilities, and the antecedents of later procedures are based on customs that developed in those years in the burial of soldiers at post cemeteries.\(^1\) The legal basis, however, for the traditional responsibilities of the Quartermaster Corps in the care of the dead rests on the legislation enacted by Congress during the Civil War, which marked the origin of the national cemeteries.\(^2\)

**Growth of Functions**

In the fall of 1861 the Secretary of War ordered the Quartermaster General to provide forms for preserving burial records at Army hospitals and materials for registered headboards that were to be placed at the heads of all soldiers' graves. The maintenance of interment records was thus inaugurated and the first step taken toward preserving the identity of the graves of the dead. It was the responsibility of the commanding officer of the military corps or department to enforce the proper execution of burial regulations and forms within his command.\(^3\)

The procedures thus initiated were hardly adequate for an orderly disposition of the remains of military personnel, particularly since no provision had been made for burial sites. This oversight led patriotic cemetery associations in the North to set aside burial plots for Army dead or to deed such properties to the government. Congress itself took action in 1862 by authorizing the President “to purchase cemetery grounds and cause them to be securely enclosed, to be used as a national cemetery for the soldiers who shall have died in the service of the country.”\(^4\)

As a consequence, the work of establishing such cemeteries and removing to them the remains of those who were killed in battle or died of disease in the Civil War was begun immediately under the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster General. Of the fourteen national cemeteries established in 1862, all except one at Antietam, Md., were set up for the service of troop concentration areas or hospitals. Later, as a result of losses in battle, more national cemeteries were established. In spite of difficulties the Quartermaster General could report to the Secretary of War in

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1 One of the oldest of the post cemeteries, dating back to 1816, is the Fort Crawford Cemetery at Prairie du Chien, Wis.
2 *U.S. Statutes at Large, XII*, 596 (Act of 17 July 1862); *XIV*, 353 (Act of 13 April 1866); *XIV*, 399 (Act of 22 February 1867).
3 WD GO 75, 11 September 1861.
4 *U.S. Statutes at Large, XII*, 596 (Act of 17 July 1862).
1864 that "the improvement of the national cemeteries has been a source of great gratification to all who visit them, and entirely dissipated the prevailing opinion of those living remote from Washington, that soldiers were irreverently or carelessly buried." 

With the end of the war, eighteen additional national cemeteries were established in 1866, all but one of which were for the concentration of battle dead and most of which were in former Confederate territory. At the end of hostilities the Quartermaster's Department also instituted a complete survey of the graves of all the soldier dead. This resulted in the assumption by the government of the responsibility for the care of some three hundred soldier plots.

The role of the Quartermaster General in caring for and providing final disposition of American war dead was definitely established by efforts the Department made to collect and reinter the remains of deceased Union soldiers. This task was "virtually completed" by 1870 when the remains of 299,696 Union soldiers had been buried in seventy-three national cemeteries. Of these war dead 58 percent were identified. In 1876 the War Department confirmed the delegation of all responsibility for supervising national cemeteries to the Quartermaster General and ordered the transfer to him of all records previously kept in the office of the Secretary of War.

Basic procedures for the maintenance and supervision of national cemeteries were formulated during the years immediately following the Civil War. At the same time, out of this program emerged the principle of returning the war dead to their native soil by exhuming them from battlefield burials in territory previously held by the enemy and reintering them in the consecrated ground of a national cemetery. When troops were sent overseas during later wars, it was a simple matter to extend the principle to include areas outside the continental limits of the United States. First utilized during the Spanish-American War, this principle had a much broader application in World War I.

The way was paved for the appearance of a theater graves registration service during World War I by the fact that by then the QMC had been militarized. Specialized troop units had been created to perform functions carried out earlier by civilian employees or detachments from the line. The theater graves registration service consisted of specialized operating units for the care of the dead to function in close support of combat forces, and a headquarters staff that was charged with the preservation of mortuary records and the maintenance of temporary burials and semipermanent military cemeteries. Within the territorial limits of his command, the theater commander was responsible for the conduct of all graves registration operations. On the other hand, the formulation of all general policies and uniform technical standards rested with The Quartermaster General who, when hostilities

3 Annual Reports of The Quartermaster-General from 1861 to 1866 (Washington, 1880), p. 48.
6 Annual Report of The Quartermaster General Made to the Secretary of War for the Year 1870 (Washington, 1870), p. 68.
7 (1) WD GO 68, 25 July 1876. (2) In 1868 the War Department had made the commanding officers of posts responsible for the burial grounds of military posts, although a list of the names of those buried was to be forwarded to The Quartermaster General at the end of each year, and in the event a post was abandoned, interment records were to be transmitted to him. The order emphasized that all national cemeteries would remain directly under The Quartermaster General and the officers of the Quartermaster's Department. WD GO 45, 14 July 1868.
ended and theaters were inactivated, assumed full control over field operations and bore direct responsibility to the Secretary of War for final disposition of the remains of the dead.

During the twenty years following World War I, the responsibilities of The Quartermaster General contracted to the hard core of permanent cemeterial functions that had to be administered in times of peace. He had direct control over Arlington National Cemetery and Mexico City National Cemetery, and in addition he was responsible for the establishment and general supervision of all national cemeteries, soldier plots, Confederate burial plots, monuments, and military parks under the jurisdiction of the War Department, and the maintenance of all records pertaining to them. He purchased grave sites and procured and distributed government headstones and grave markers. He directed the training and assignment of supervisory personnel for national cemeteries. He provided for the recovery and disposition of the remains of deceased military and civilian personnel when such expenses were payable from War Department appropriations and maintained all interment records. He was responsible for handling all graves registration activities in the United States.9

These peacetime functions were greatly expanded by the sharp increase in the size of the Army in 1940 and, after Pearl Harbor, by the additional responsibilities exercised in wartime in connection with graves registration activities overseas. In the fall of 1943 these responsibilities were further extended by the designation of The Quartermaster General as Chief, American Graves Registration Service. He was charged with formulating policies for the operation of the graves registration services outside the continental limits of the United States.10 The expansion of wartime responsibilities culminated in the assignment of responsibility to The Quartermaster General for returning the remains of all American dead, including those of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, and civilian employees of the War Department and other agencies of the government, after the cessation of hostilities.

Administrative Organization

In 1939 the peacetime cemeterial functions of The Quartermaster General were being administered by the Memorial Branch in the Administrative Division, OQMG,11 but as Quartermaster activities increased the branch was raised to the status of a division at the end of 1940.12 Within a little more than a year, as a result of the functional reorganization of the OQMG in March 1942, the Memorial Division was again reduced to a branch and was assigned to the Service Installations Division, which acted as a catch-all for miscellaneous functions of the OQMG. The director of this division was responsible for administering such unrelated activities as those pertaining to the procurement and training of horses, mules, and dogs.

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8 For modifications of this jurisdiction, see Executive orders of 10 June and 11 July 1933, and 26 February and 25 April 1934.
9 AR 30–5, 8 Dec 42, sub: QMC—General Provisions.
10 WD Cir 206, 11 Sep 43, sub: Gr Reg.
11 (1) OQMG OO 4, 7 Jan 37, sub: Office Orgn. (2) In describing the administrative organization, the term "memorial" had been substituted in June 1930 for "cemeterial," used since Civil War days, as being more adequately descriptive of the duties performed by the organization in the OQMG. OQMG OO 22, 2 Jun 30, sub: Office Orgn.
12 (1) OQMG OO 144, 27 Dec 40, sub: Office Orgn. (2) OQMG OO 23, 31 Jan 41, no sub. (3) OQMG OO 25, 3 Feb 41, sub: Office Orgn.
(remount), the disposal of salvage and surplus property, the operation of laundries, and the care of the dead.

**Effect of the OQMG Reorganization**

The reduction of the Memorial Division to a branch was accomplished with complete disregard of the fact that it was in the process of assuming increased responsibilities and obligations. As the armed forces expanded from some 1,500,000 men to a peak of over 8,000,000, the work load increased not only in the permanent sections of the branch, such as the National Cemetery Section, but also in the Overseas Section, established 22 December 1941 to act as a central office of mortuary records for overseas mortalities and burials.

Nevertheless, the personnel allotment authorized for the branch remained fixed at fifty-four civilians. As a result of its increasing work load and the normal attrition of personnel, a large backlog of work soon developed. As early as March 1943 the director of the Service Installations Division was aware that the Memorial Branch was undermanned, and he sought more personnel, asserting that the work of the National Cemetery Section had increased about one third because of the growth of the Army, while that of the Overseas Section had quadrupled.\(^\text{13}\)

Repeated efforts to secure more personnel led to a personnel utilization survey of the branch by a consultant of the Organization Planning and Control Division, OQMG. He found the branch “too finely divided for the number of employees, volume of work, and functions performed,” and he recommended that its six sections be consolidated into four and its twenty-two subsections be reduced to five. By means of this rearrangement of organizational elements and through the adoption of new procedures outlined in the survey which would increase the productivity of each unit, he predicted that all backlogs could be eliminated and additional responsibilities assumed with an increase of only two employees.\(^\text{14}\)

In view of the critical personnel situation that existed throughout the War Department, the director of the Organization Planning and Control Division thought that the survey report merited intensive study. While the chief of the Memorial Branch accepted some of the recommendations made — there were forty-eight in all — he rejected in general the major suggestions offered. In particular, he deemed impossible the consolidation of the functions and duties of the various sections and subsections, since the work of each, he contended, was highly specialized and pronounced lines of demarcation had long existed. Many of the procedural changes he rejected as conducive to errors. He pointed out that absolute accuracy was essential in the work of the branch, for any error could bring anguish and create doubts in the minds of relatives of the dead, or, in other instances, could lead to costly replacement of headstones or corrections of inscriptions. He emphatically disagreed as to the desirability of using “form” letters in the branch to expedite the preparation of correspondence, which he believed required careful composition, the exercise of tact and sympathy, and the cautious weighing of information to be dis-

\(^{13}\) (1) Sv Instls Div to Fiscal Div, OQMG, 17 Mar 43, sub: Additional Pers. (2) Sv Instls Div to Civ Pers, OQMG, 22 Jun 43, same sub. (3) Sv Instls Div to Civ Pers, OQMG, 1 Jul 43, same sub.

closed. Although the director of the Organization Planning and Control Division urged reconsideration of the rejected suggestions as offering “excellent opportunities of improvement,” no further action was taken on the basis of the survey, and the personnel problems of the Memorial Branch remained unsolved.

Relegation of the Memorial Division to the status of a branch not only hampered its chief in pleading his case, but was incompatible with his responsibilities as technical adviser to The Quartermaster General, particularly after the latter had been designated Chief, American Graves Registration Service. Interposed between the chief of the Memorial Branch and The Quartermaster General was the director of the Service Installations Division. In the fall of 1942, still another intermediary was established when direction and supervision of the Service Installations Division and other operating divisions of the OQMG were assigned to the Deputy Quartermaster General for Supply Management and Operations.

Effect of the War Department Reorganization

If the chief of the Memorial Branch was removed from immediate and direct contact with The Quartermaster General as a result of the reorganization of the OQMG early in 1942, The Quartermaster General himself was equally remote from direct communication with the Under (initially Assistant) Secretary of War on matters pertaining to national cemeteries under the jurisdiction of the War Department. In these matters the Chief of Staff had no jurisdiction whatsoever. This resulted from the fact that national cemeteries were deemed nonmilitary installations, the administration of which constituted a civil function of the QMC akin to the control of rivers and harbors exercised by the Corps of Engineers. National cemeteries had been created by legislation that authorized the Secretary of War to establish and maintain them, and this authority he had delegated to his Assistant Secretary of War and in turn to The Quartermaster General. On the eve of World War II, general supervision of all national cemeteries was a function of The Quartermaster General, but direct control and supervision was exercised in the field by the commanders of the corps areas in which the national cemeteries were located, except those specifically exempted. The Quartermaster General was authorized to communicate directly with the corps area commanders on all matters relating to the administration of national cemeteries.

When the War Department was reorganized in March 1942 and the Services of Supply was established, it was assumed that the civil functions of the QMC were to be exempt from any change in control as were those of the Corps of Engineers, but this was not specifically stated. Most of the representatives of the Memorial Branch believed that communication with the Under Secretary of War through the Commanding General, SOS, was intended to apply only to matters relating to the procurement, storage, and distribution of regular supplies, which were not involved in the administration of national ceme-

15 Chief of Memorial Br to Dir of OP&C Div, OQMG, 24 Jul 43, sub cited fn. 14.
16 Dir of OP&C Div to Dir of Sv Instls Div, OQMG, 4 Aug 43, no sub.
17 OQMG OO 25–10, 10 Oct 42, sub: Appointment and Reassignment of Key Pers.
A subsequent delegation of duties assigned to the Under Secretary of War put a different interpretation on the matter, and thereafter all communications from The Quartermaster General to the Under Secretary of War relative to cemeteries had to be channeled through the Commanding General, SOS. As a part of the general reorganization, corps areas were later redesignated service commands, but this brought no change in QMC relationships with the field.

Until March 1942, graves registration activities in the theaters—that is, the identification and burial of the dead, the registration of graves, the administration of military cemeteries in active theaters of operations, and the original execution of mortuary records pertaining thereto—were a command function and as such were under the supervision of the Chief of Staff. In reference to such matters, there was direct communication between The Quartermaster General and the Chief of Staff. Until 1940 this channel of communication led to G-4, the Supply Division, but at that time the supervisory function was reassigned to G-1, the Personnel Division, on the premise that "Graves Registration was essentially a service dealing with personnel (although deceased.)" In March 1942 this direct line of communication was disrupted by the interposition of the newly created SOS and all communications thereafter had to flow through its commanding general.

Struggle for Divisional Status

While channels of communication with higher echelons of authority remained fixed after March 1942 for the duration of the war, efforts were made to reduce the number of authorities between The Quartermaster General and his chief adviser on graves registration matters. It was the spring of 1944, however, before the Memorial Branch gained divisional status, and not until after hostilities ended in Europe was the desired organization for its overseas activities achieved.

The branch's reorganizational efforts were merged in the summer of 1943 with a program of preliminary planning for the return of the war dead, which was a part of the over-all demobilization planning being undertaken in the War Department. Assigned to The Quartermaster General by the chief of the demobilization planning unit, initially located in the ASF but later transferred to the General Staff, this study of a program for the return of the war dead was delegated to the chief of the Memorial Branch. At approximately the same time, Col. Robert P. Harbold was appointed to that position. He was brought into the organization by The Quartermaster General because of his experience and the knowledge he had gained in graves registration activities during World War I. Colonel Harbold energetically sought to effect the kind of organization he deemed necessary for carrying out the mission of the Memorial Branch.

The directive requesting submission of the study had suggested that it be presented in three parts: Part I, Determination of the Policy Relative to Burials Overseas and the Return of the Dead; Part II, The Plan of Operation, Both in

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19 (1) WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, sub: WD Reorgn. (2) WD Cir 181, Sec. V, 10 Jun 42, sub: Assignment of Duties. (3) SOS GO 21, 10 Jul 42, no sub.
20 (1) WD GO 35, 22 Jul 42, sub: Redesignation of CAs. (2) AR 170-10, 10 Aug 42, sub: SvCs and Depts.
22 Ltr, Brig Gen William F. Tompkins, ASF, to TQMG, 22 Jun 43, sub: Demob Plng.
the United States and Overseas, Including the Organization Required and the Personnel by Types; and Part III, The Possible Necessity for the Expansion of the National Cemeteries and the Acquisition of Sites for Cemeteries in Foreign Countries.

The OQMG submitted its plan for the return of the war dead on 14 August 1943, but since any comprehensive program was dependent, according to the Memorial Branch, upon the branch’s expansion into a division and the organization of an American Graves Registration Service, most of the study, which was incorporated in Section A of Part II, was devoted to a detailed plan for the reorganization of the Memorial Branch. Briefly this phase of the study proposed a simplification of the chain of authority in the OQMG and an expansion of the Memorial Branch.

The need for simplification was made more urgent by the anticipated designation of The Quartermaster General as Chief, American Graves Registration Service. It was argued that no effective or useful purpose was served by the dual supervision exercised over an organization engaged in nonmilitary activities by the director of the Service Installations Division and the Deputy Quartermaster General for Supply Planning and Operations, both of whom performed essentially military functions. Instead, it was proposed that the chief of the Memorial Branch should be regarded as the deputy to The Quartermaster General in his extraordinary capacity as Chief, American Graves Registration Service.

The subordination of the Memorial Branch in the Service Installations Division was regarded as the immediate cause of most of the administrative confusion and a basic reason for the hesitancy in formulating graves registration policies.

To have this Division under an intermediate office and not under the direct supervision of The Quartermaster General necessitates all questions of policy and important questions pertaining to this Division being taken up first with the intermediate office and educating it as to the necessity of such procedure; the intermediate office then taking case up with the next higher echelon and finally the matter may or may not reach The Quartermaster General at the discretion of intermediaries who do not have full knowledge of the working functions of the Division.

Using the opportunity afforded by the preparation of this study, the chief of the Memorial Branch sought to convince higher authority that intelligent consideration of the problems pertaining to the disposition of the war dead had to be predicated on the immediate restoration of the Memorial Branch to its former divisional status and the establishment of an autonomous Graves Registration Service Branch within the reconstructed division. The proposed division was to be developed largely by expanding sections into branches and subsections into sections.

The Special Planning Division, concerned with demobilization plans to be activated at the end of hostilities, approved the broad policy recommended in the study but confined its comments on organization and personnel to that proposed for the theater. It offered no comment on the suggested internal reorganization of the

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23 This study, submitted to the Special Planning Division, War Department Special Staff, was listed as Study 34—Determination of the Disposal of the Dead, Proposed Plan. (Hereafter cited as Policy Study 34.)
24 The original draft of WD Cir 206, issued 11 September 1943, was submitted on 15 July. For discussion of the delays incident to its approval see Steere, The Graves Registration Service in World War II, Ch. IV.
Memorial Branch. The Quartermaster General, too, ignored this presentation of the branch's case in behalf of a divisional status. Nine months elapsed before the persistent efforts of the chief of the Memorial Branch to obtain divisional status were recognized. Possibly the fact that military authorities in the summer of 1944 believed the end of hostilities was near influenced the decision to redesignate the Memorial Branch as a division and enable it to prepare for the tremendous task ahead.

Colonel Harbold was not idle in advocating his case in the intervening months. The designation of The Quartermaster General as Chief, American Graves Registration Service, caused him to re-examine the personnel problem in the branch in the light of the new burdens imposed on the Overseas Section. His request for additional personnel led to a review of personnel requirements of the Overseas Section in October that again drew from the survey staff of the Organization Planning and Control Division proposals for procedural changes calculated to increase the productive capacity of that section. Chief among these was the suggestion that the section adopt a photographic process in the preparation of its necessary basic records. Allowing a sixty-day transitional period for the change-over from the old system to full operation under the new, the investigators estimated that thirteen employees, or five less than the existing strength, would be sufficient to handle the work of the Overseas Section.

Although this recommendation was accepted, the change was not effected until March 1944 because of innumerable delays in installing the photographic machine and obtaining smooth, continuous functioning. By that time the chief of the Memorial Branch was again directing the attention of The Quartermaster General to the personnel problem of his organization in a lengthy, critical indictment of the personnel policy pursued and an analysis of the needs of the various sections. Correction of the situation was urgent. His plea was followed six days later with another for more personnel and the submission of an organization chart for the branch that could be expanded to one for a division.

On the basis of their study of the problem, representatives of the Organization Planning and Control Division had produced a plan of organization that differed sharply from that conceived by Colonel Harbold and his advisers. The latter had suggested raising the Graves Registration Service Branch to a position of virtual autonomy within the proposed division, but the Organization Planning and Control Division recommended joining the former Overseas Section and the Planning Requirements Section into a single Registration Planning and Requirements Branch, which would supervise the preparation of plans, specifications, and estimates for new national cemeteries and the maintenance requirements and engineering aspects of all national cemeteries, as well as the preparation and processing of records pertaining to the overseas dead. It

26 (1) Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 28 Nov 43, sub: De-mob Plng (Disposal of the Dead). (2) Dir of Opns, ASF, to Dir of Control Div, ASF, 20 Sep 43, same sub. (3) Dir of Control Div to Dir of Pers and CoTT, 24 Sep 43; same sub; and 1st Ind, CoTT to Dir of Special Plng Div, 13 Oct 43, on same.

27 Ltr, Chief of Memorial Br to Pers Authorization Off, OQMG, 28 Sep 43, sub: Increase in Pers.


29 Chief of Memorial Br to TQMG, 30 Mar 44, sub: Pers.

30 Chief of Memorial Br to TQMG, 5 Apr 44, sub: Survey of Pers in Memorial Br.
also recommended consolidation of the Headstones and National Cemetery Sections into a single branch. In lieu of Colonel Harbold's proposed arrangement of six branches and eighteen sections, the plan of the Organization Planning and Control Division offered "a simple and integrated organization" of only three branches and six sections. Early in May 1944, when the Memorial Branch was established as a division under the supervision of the Deputy Quartermaster General for Administration and Management, it consisted of three branches—the Cemeterial, the Planning and Registration, and the Administrative.

The grant of divisional status permitted an increase in personnel allotments previously prohibited. It was questionable, however, whether proper recognition had been given to the expanding activity of the Graves Registration Section, which required about 50 percent of the personnel of the entire division. Its incorporation in the same branch with a section concerned exclusively with cemeterial affairs in the United States combined incompatible elements in one organization. This union was dissolved after a year. At the recommendation of the director of the division, the two sections were established as individual branches in June 1945. A month after V-E Day, an organization approximating the one advocated by Colonel Harbold since August 1943 had been brought into existence.

Despite the handicaps imposed by administrative difficulties and lack of personnel and the backlogs of work that accumulated as a consequence, the Memorial Branch (later Division) met the demands of the war years in the main fields of its activities—the administration of national cemeteries, the procurement of headstones and markers, the disposition of remains, and graves registration in the theaters.

National Cemeteries

When World War II began in 1939, the Memorial Branch through its National Cemetery Section was administering cemeterial functions that were soon to be greatly increased by the expansion of the armed forces. Basic procedures, however, had long been established and, with few exceptions, remained unchanged. Regulations, which by the time of the war were known as National Cemetery Regulations, had been formulated by the OQMG and approved by the Secretary of War. First published in 1878 and subsequently revised to take cognizance of later legislation, these regulations covered the administration of national cemeteries, their maintenance and upkeep, arrangement of graves and plots, monuments and markers, and other matters pertaining to personnel and operations.

Burial Rights

The right of burial in a national cemetery originally was restricted to "the soldier who shall die in the service of the country," which was interpreted to mean the soldier killed in battle. This provision

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31 Ltr, E. O'Toole, OP&C Div, to Gen Barnes, Dir of OP&C Div, 13 Apr 44, no sub.
32 OQMG OO 25-78, 6 May 44, sub: Establishment of Memorial Div.
33 (1) Ltr, Dir of Memorial Div to TQMG, 12 Jun 45, sub: Reorgn of Memorial Div. (2) OQMG OO 25-78A, 14 Jun 45, sub: Orgn of Memorial Div.
35 U.S. Statutes at Large, XII, 586 (Act of 17 July 1862).
was clarified in 1866 by specifically including those “who fell in battle or died of disease in the field and in hospitals during the war of the rebellion,” but the right of burial was still limited to those in actual service.\textsuperscript{36} In 1872 Congress extended the right of burial to honorably discharged soldiers who were in destitute condition, and the following year it liberalized the law to include all honorably discharged veterans of the Civil War. These were all soldiers, sailors, or marines who served either in the regular or the volunteer forces. Evidence of an honorable discharge afforded sufficient authority for the superintendent of any national cemetery to permit interment.\textsuperscript{37}

This basic law as set forth in the revised statutes of 1878 was later amended by Congress at various times until the privilege of burial in national cemeteries was extended to all individuals who served in the armed forces of the nation in either peace or war and whose last discharge was honorable. The armed forces included the Regular Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, National Guard when in federal service, the Organized Reserve when on active duty other than for training or receiving instructions, the Women’s Army Corps, and the Army and the Navy Nurse Corps. Congress also extended the privilege of interment to members of the cabinet of President Wilson who served during the period 6 April 1917 to 11 November 1918, although such burial had to be without cost to the United States.\textsuperscript{38}

While Congress liberalized the right of burial by extending the privilege through the amendments it enacted, it in no way altered the legal right to burial, which remained restricted to honorable service in the armed forces of the nation. On the other hand, the right of burial was considerably modified over the years by actions taken by the Presidents, Secretaries of War, and Quartermasters General. Beginning as early as 1887, when the Quartermaster General authorized the interment of the wives of officers in lots assigned to the latter in national cemeteries, the rigid cemetery regulations were modified in accordance with customs prevailing at post cemeteries where the family relation was recognized by the provision of burial sites for the families of the officers and enlisted men of the garrison. As a result of the modifications introduced, the wife, minor children, and adult unmarried daughters of the deceased could be buried in national cemeteries.

These deviations from the express sanction of the law evolved entirely as a matter of custom but had become so well settled long before World War II that they were included in Army Regulations and National Cemetery Regulations. The “impelling tie of family relation” had considerably modified the original intent of the national cemetery as the final resting place for the remains of military personnel who had honorable service in peace or war.\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Policy on Establishment}

Extension of the right of burial to all veterans who had been honorably dis-

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., XIV, 353 (Act of 13 April 1866).
\textsuperscript{37} (1) Ibid., XVII, 202 (Act of 1 June 1872), and 605 (Act of 3 March 1873). (2) Revised Statutes of the United States, 2d ed. (Washington, 1878), par. 4878.
\textsuperscript{39} For a more detailed discussion of this evolution see the lengthy memorandum prepared by the chief of the Memorial Branch for The Quartermaster General, 19 October 1943, on the subject: Burial in National Cemeteries.
charged from the service affected the policy the War Department pursued in the establishment of national cemeteries. Originally, during the Civil War and for some seventy years thereafter, it was War Department policy to establish cemeteries only where and when the needs of the War Department required them. Most of the national cemeteries had been established during the period 1862–70. Once the concentration of Civil War dead had been completed, the number of national cemeteries increased gradually because of the abandonment of many frontier posts and the necessity of concentrating the remains buried in these post cemeteries in central cemeteries for designated areas. This had been accomplished by 1892. National cemeteries had thus been established on battlefields or for concentration of the remains of those killed in battle. Later when space in the original cemeteries was exhausted, some of these areas had been enlarged to care for those who died in the service. The national cemetery system, however, had been essentially a facility of the War Department to care for its dead, and the burial of veterans was incidental to War Department needs. The law gave only the privilege or right of burial in a national cemetery to the veterans; it did not obligate the government to provide burial space.

Adherence to this policy had posed no problem before World War I for there had been comparatively few veterans who were entitled to burial in the national cemeteries. As a result of that war, however, it was estimated that over four million veterans would become eligible for burial in national cemeteries. The Assistant Secretary of War requested a review of War Department policy in 1929. Since at that time sufficient burial space seemed to be available, the OQMG recommended the adoption of the following policy:

To extend the present cemeteries, if practicable, when burial space therein is exhausted and additional space is desired.

If the above is impracticable, to establish new cemeteries in convenient localities to the cemeteries in which burial space has been exhausted.

Actually, the subject lay dormant for a few more years. By the mid-1930's, the approaching exhaustion of burial space in some national cemeteries, the pressure exerted by veterans' organizations to have national cemeteries established throughout the country, and the interest of Congress in the subject compelled a re-examination of War Department policy. This review was initiated as the result of a proposed bill to establish five additional cemeteries, and was continued later by a proposal to establish about twenty new cemeteries, one in each state in which there was no national cemetery. There was obviously a desire on the part of Congress to adopt a policy that would extend the cemetery system to provide for veterans. For the first time, it was assumed that the government was obligated to provide burial space for honorably discharged veterans. It followed that it was the duty of the War Department to anticipate the burial needs of discharged veterans and in due course recommend to

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40 Ltr, Maj Gen Henry Gibbins, TQMG, to ASW, 8 Feb 37, sub: Policy Re: Establishment of National Cemeteries.
41 Memo, Maj Wade H. Haislip, OASW, for TQMG, 11 Jan 29, no sub.
Congress the establishment of cemeteries for that purpose only. But this required autocratic decisions by the War Department, since some locations would have to be denied while others were accepted. Consequently the department would be subject to much criticism as well as to constant pressure and agitation.

On the basis of an analysis prepared by the OQMG, the War Department came to the conclusion that the choice of localities for national cemeteries should be left to the discretion of Congress; that the War Department would remain neutral but that it should supply full and complete information which would enable Congress to decide whether a cemetery was warranted by the facts and to act accordingly.\(^4\)

In general, by 1939 it had become the policy of the War Department to establish new cemeteries only on the basis of special acts of Congress authorizing them. During the thirties several new cemeteries were thus established. It was true that under existing laws the Secretary of War had authority to establish national cemeteries, to accept donations of land from any state for this purpose,\(^4\) and to purchase land when required. Experience, however, had shown that this authority was of “little practical use” since funds were required to establish a new national cemetery and to maintain it. Procedures under the laws required that the Bureau of the Budget, as well as the appropriations committee of Congress, had to be convinced of the need for the proposed cemetery. Hence, “in the last analysis, it is a question which must be decided by Congress.”\(^4\)

\textit{Renewed Interest in Expansion}\n
World War II put a stop to any program of expansion. The Memorial Branch of the OQMG undertook no new construction during the war years. It did complete in the fiscal year 1942 construction of the new Golden Gate National Cemetery near San Francisco, Calif., the establishment of which had been authorized by Congress in 1939. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, on 29 December 1941, Congress had authorized the Secretary of War to establish a national cemetery in the vicinity of Portland, Ore., but the Memorial Branch submitted no estimate of appropriations for this purpose and initiated no such project.\(^4\) This was in line with a Presidential directive that funds for lands and cemeterial purposes should be limited to urgent defense needs. In planning for the care of the dead, the Memorial Branch indicated that no steps would be taken to establish additional cemeteries until after the cessation of hostilities.\(^4\)

Long before the end of the war, however, a bill had been introduced in Congress that proposed to provide one national cemetery in every state and such other national cemeteries in the states, territories, and possessions as might be needed for the burial of war veterans.\(^4\) Referred to the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, the proposed bill was then sent to the War Department with a request for a report covering the estimated number of soldiers of all wars who would

\(^4\) Ltr, TQMG to ASW, 8 Feb 37, sub: Policy Re: Establishment of National Cemeteries. (2) Memo, OASW for SW, 5 Mar 37, sub: Policy of WD to be Expressed in Rpts to Cong. (3) This policy was approved by the Secretary of War on 2 April 1937. (4) Authorized by Congress on 29 June 1938. See U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 52, p. 1233. (5) Ltr, SW to Senator Rufus C. Homan, 3 Jan 40, no sub. (6) Material Submitted by OQMG for Annual Rpt, ASF, for FY 1942. (7) Policy Study 34, Pt. III, p. 2. (8) HR 3582, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Nov 43.
be eligible for burial in each state, the space required, an estimate of costs, and recommendations for implementing the plan. The Memorial Branch prepared a voluminous, comprehensive report that recommended the establishment of seventy-two national cemeteries—sixty-nine in the United States and one each in Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii. Nine of the existing national cemeteries were to be included in this expansion program, but the other seventy were either to be inactivated immediately upon passage of the bill or after the new cemeteries had been established.\footnote{The original study in six volumes was later thoroughly revised and condensed into two volumes. See National Cemeteries: A Study Prepared in the OQMG Upon Request of the Committee on Military Affairs, Reference HR 516, 15 Feb 45.}

No action was taken in the 78th Congress, and the bill was proposed again in the following Congress. In the meantime, the Memorial Branch was engaged in considerable planning and correspondence on the proposed expansion program. The efforts expended on this planning were fruitless since Congress failed to enact the proposed bill into law. Interest in expanding the national cemeterial system was to be renewed during the postwar years.

**Maintenance and Operation**

Since no new construction was undertaken during the war years, the work of the National Cemetery Section (later Branch) was confined largely to the care and maintenance of existing national cemeteries. Funds for this purpose were granted each year by Congress in the War Department Civil Appropriations Act based on the annual estimates for the operation of national cemeteries submitted by the Secretary of War to Congress.

There could be little or no curtailment during the war of the detailed paper work necessary for the maintenance of accurate burial records or of the discharge of the customary duties performed by the Memorial Branch (later Division) in the verification of service and authorization for burial. An individual who died while on active service could be interred by the superintendent of a national cemetery without authorization by The Quartermaster General, but if any doubt existed as to an individual's eligibility status his service had to be verified and his burial authorized by The Quartermaster General. Such verification and authorization were also necessary in the case of an individual who died after discharge or retirement from the armed forces. Burials in the national cemeteries had increased by slightly more than 1,000 in the fiscal year 1945 as compared with the fiscal year 1942.\footnote{There were 6,948 interments in the fiscal year 1942 and 7,989 in the fiscal year 1945. See Materials Submitted by OQMG for Annual Rpt, ASF, FY 1942, 1945.}

**Headstones and Markers**

One of the important and continuing functions of the Memorial Branch in peace and in war has been the furnishing of headstones for the unmarked graves of all former service men whose last service terminated honorably, regardless of whether they were buried in a national, post, or private cemetery. If the relatives or other applicant desired the government to mark the grave, the same type of stone was furnished regardless of rank.

The origin of this Quartermaster responsibility stems from measures initiated during the Civil War. The first step was taken in the fall of 1861 when Secretary of
War Simon Cameron, realizing the importance of having veterans' graves properly marked, directed the commanding officers of the military corps or departments to mark the graves of deceased soldiers with registered headboards that were to be furnished by the Quartermaster General. Later, when national cemeteries were established, Congress, too, recognized the importance of marking veterans' graves in a suitable manner and therefore directed the Secretary of War...

... to cause each grave to be marked with a small headstone or block, which shall be of durable stone, and of such design and weight as shall keep it in place when set, and shall bear the name of the soldier and the name of his State inscribed thereon, when the same are known, and also with the number of the grave inscribed thereon, corresponding with the number opposite to the name of the party in a register of burials to be kept at each cemetery and at the Office of the Quartermaster General, which shall set forth the name, rank, company, regiment, and date of death of the officer or soldier; or, if these are unknown, it shall be so recorded.

This legislation had limited the use of headstones to graves in national cemeteries, but when the Civil War was over agitation soon developed in behalf of proper marking of the graves of veterans buried in private cemeteries. As a result, Congress authorized the Secretary of War to furnish headstones for the graves of soldiers who served in the Regular or Volunteer Army during the war and who were buried in private village or city cemeteries in the same manner as for those interred in national military cemeteries.

No further extension of Quartermaster responsibility occurred until 1906 when the question was raised of marking the graves of Confederate veterans in national cemeteries and in Confederate burial plots maintained by the government. At that time Congress made provision for the appropriate marking of the graves of the soldiers and sailors of the Confederate army and navy who died in federal prisons and military hospitals in the North and were buried nearby. The provisions of the act were continued by subsequent annual appropriation acts. It was not until 1929, however, that a broader law made provision for marking the graves of Confederate soldiers in national and private cemeteries.

No further legislation relative to the use of headstones was enacted by Congress for almost twenty years. While headstones were erected on the unmarked graves of veterans of the Spanish-American War and World Wars I and II, no enabling legislation was enacted before 1948 for the purchase of headstones for the graves of any veterans other than those of the Civil War. To secure these headstones the Memorial Branch depended on annual appropriations.

Design

Not until the establishment of national cemeteries reached the stage where permanent markers could be placed did the problem of design provoke much discussion. While many suggestions were made, no immediate decision was reached. In 1872 Congress passed an amendment to the act of 1867, authorizing the Secretary of War to advertise for sealed bids within ninety days of its passage. These ad-
Advertisements were to be made for sixty days successively in at least twenty newspapers, with contracts to be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. The OQMG called for bids, and sample headstones of various sizes and designs were received, but nine months later no decision had been made. At that time Congress further amended the law to provide for sixty days' advertisement in ten newspapers of general circulation. At the same time, it appropriated $1,000,000 for furnishing the headstones.

After much study two distinct designs were adopted by the Secretary of War. The headstone for the known dead was to be a slab of white marble or durable stone, 4 inches thick, 10 inches wide, and 12 inches high above the ground. It was to be neatly polished and have a slightly curved top. The number of the grave, rank, name of the soldier, and name of the state from which he came were to be cut on the front face of the stone. For the unknown dead, the headstone was to be a block of marble or durable stone 6 inches square and 2½ feet long, the top and 4 inches of the sides of the upper part to be neatly dressed and the number of the grave to be cut on the top. The block was to be set firmly in the ground with the top level with the grave.

By the end of 1873 contracts had been awarded to five contractors in various parts of the country.

This Civil War type of headstone was furnished not only for all the unmarked graves of Union veterans of that war but also for those of the veterans of the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Indian campaigns. Later it was also furnished for the graves of Spanish-American War veterans.

The original design of the headstone for the known dead subsequently was modified on the basis of experience which showed that the stone lacked sufficient width and height. In March 1903 the size was increased to 39 inches in length, 12 inches in width, and 4 inches in thickness, the sunken shield in which the inscription was cut to be 3/16 of an inch deep with the letters of the inscription to be raised to that height in the shield.

World War I brought another discussion of design and a proposal to adopt a new type of headstone for the graves of all veterans. Public sentiment, however, so strongly favored the Civil War type of headstone that the War Department finally decided to continue furnishing it for veterans of the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. A second and new type of headstone was to be used for veterans of World War I and all other wars. After 2,200 headstones of the new type had been erected in national cemeteries, it was decided that they were not satisfactory and a different design was adopted in April, 1922. This headstone was of a slab design, slightly rounded at the top, of American white marble, 42 inches long, 13 inches wide, and 4 inches thick. It was embedded so that 24 inches were above ground. On the front face were inscribed the name of the soldier, his rank, regiment, division, date of death, and the state from which he came. Above this inscription in a small rosette the emblem of religious faith was cut—a Latin cross for those of Christian faith and a Star of David for those of the Hebrew faith. For headstones in national and post cemeteries, the grave number was cut on the rear face of the stone.

This type of headstone had also been in-
tended for use in marking the graves of veterans of World War I who were buried in overseas cemeteries. However, visitors had been so impressed by the simple, white wooden cross and the Star of David used in these cemeteries that they urged retention of these designs. As a consequence, on 17 December 1924 the Secretary of War approved the adoption of these two types of headstones for overseas cemeteries. The inscription on each consisted of the name of the soldier, his rank, regiment, division, date of death, and the state from which he came, together with a record of any decorations that might have been awarded to him.

When Confederate graves were first marked under the provisions of the law of 1906, the type of headstone adopted was of the same size and material as the headstones for Union veterans of the Civil War except that the top was pointed instead of rounded and the shield on the front face was omitted. Later, after Congress passed the act of 1929, the Secretary of War approved the adoption of a design which was a white marble slab, 39 inches long, 12 inches wide, and 4 inches thick, and pointed at the top. On the front face was inscribed the name of the soldier, his rank, if higher than a private, his company, and his regiment. Above this inscription the cross of honor of the Confederate States Army was cut in a small circle.

These three types of upright marble headstones—Civil War, World War I, and Confederate designs—continued to be furnished by the Memorial Branch. In addition, as a trend developed in private cemeteries toward restricting the use of upright markers and monuments in so-called park plan cemeteries, the OQMG developed a flat marker of marble or granite, 24 inches by 12 inches by 4 inches. Lengthwise on the stone were inscribed the name of the veteran, the state from which he entered the service, his rank, organization, and date of death. This type was approved by the Secretary of War on 14 August 1936. Four years later, in response to public demand, Congress authorized the Secretary of War to furnish a marker of such design and material as he approved for use on graves in cemeteries where stone markers were not acceptable. On 11 July 1940 the Assistant Secretary of War approved the use of a bronze marker that was identical with the stone marker, except that because of the material utilized it had a ¾-inch rise in lieu of the 4-inch thickness used in stone.

During World War II one other development occurred as a result of a new type of burial, known as group burial. Any burial of more than three deceased constituted a group burial. Such burials were used in those cases—for example airplane crashes—where individual identification was impossible upon recovery of remains although the individual names were known. This type of burial developed early in the training period and was used to an even greater extent later, particularly in the return of the dead program following the end of the war.

Initially, to mark a group burial, the Memorial Branch had used a stone of upright slab design similar to the World War I type except that the size was increased to accommodate the list of names of those buried in the one grave. Since the number of dead interred in a common grave frequently was very large, such stones were ungainly in size and out of harmony with other markers in the national cemeteries. The Memorial Branch therefore sought authorization to use a flat stone, set flush with the ground, to mark the graves of...
group burials. This new type of stone was approved by the Assistant (formerly Under) Secretary of the Army on 9 May 1950.\(^\text{61}\)

**Procedure**

The procedure for obtaining a government headstone to mark the grave of a veteran had long been established. The headstone was automatically supplied in the case of a veteran buried in a post or national cemetery upon receipt of the interment report of the superintendent of the cemetery concerned. On the other hand, an application was required for veterans buried in private cemeteries. It could be filed by relatives, friends, veterans' organizations, or anyone who could furnish sufficient information to prove that the unmarked grave was that of a deceased ex-service man.

Such applications were received from all parts of the world, and before a stone could be erected the Memorial Branch had to perform a considerable amount of detail work. Receipt of an application involved first of all the verification of service from official records or authorized sources and frequently entailed painstaking archival research. The branch then placed the order for the stone with a contractor, furnished routing and shipping instructions, and made sure that the stone was properly inscribed, finished, and delivered to the correct destination for erection at the grave of the veteran.

When this responsibility was first assumed and for many years thereafter, the quartermaster of the Washington Depot handled the supply of headstones. By 1900 the need for closely supervising the verification of service and the placing of the correct inscription on the headstone caused a centralization of this work in the OQMG, although the duties of letting contracts, placing orders, and furnishing proper shipping instructions were transferred to the Boston Depot as the Quartermaster agency nearest to the quarries where the stones were to be cut. From 1929 on, however, all functions relating to supply were centralized in the Memorial Branch, OQMG, in order to insure prompt supply and delivery of stones.

During World War II these functions of the Memorial Branch continued as they had in the years of peace. War did bring a shortage of critical materials, as a result of which the branch suspended the furnishing of bronze markers for the duration of the war. Military air crashes and deaths at camps in the zone of interior naturally increased the work of the Memorial Branch during the war years, but the peak of its activity in procuring and furnishing headstones and markers was not reached until 1949, when as a result of the return of the dead program about 135,000 stones were required, the largest number ever procured by the branch in a single fiscal year.

**Disposition of Remains**

**Policy Development**

Formulating the policies that regulated the care and disposition of the remains of officers and soldiers who died either in peace or in war constituted an important function of the Memorial Branch. Early Army Regulations established no policies, other than ceremonial, on the disposition of remains, but apparently it became the custom to bury deceased officers and enlisted men at the military post at which they had been stationed, or at the place of their death, if this was deemed proper and right by the commanding officer. The

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\(^{61}\) DF, ACoS G-4, to TQMG, 18 May 50, sub: Group Burial Markers in National Cemeteries.
Articles of War did direct that an inventory be made of the effects of military personnel who died in the service of the United States in order that these might be transmitted to their families or administrators. It was not until the Civil War, however, that policies were formulated more precisely in general orders and later in Army Regulations. By that time the Quartermaster's Department had become responsible for the care of the dead, and Army expenditures for the burial of officers and soldiers were paid from the appropriation for incidental expenses of the Quartermaster's Department in the annual appropriation acts.

During the war years, 1861–65, officers and soldiers were buried where they fell in battle or near military hospitals, and their remains were later reinterred in national cemeteries under the program completed by 1870. After the war, officers and soldiers who died while on duty in the field or at military posts continued to be buried, as in pre-Civil War days, at the nearest regular fort or barracks cemetery, although they could be buried at the nearest national cemetery. Interment in post or national cemeteries occurred if the remains were not claimed by relatives or friends.

In the decades of peace between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, the regulations remained unchanged except for a slight modification in regard to handling expenses. Until 1891 the expense of causing “the body to be decently coffined and transported for burial” continued to be payable from the appropriation for incidental expenses of the Quartermaster's Department. At that time, however, the cost of transporting the remains to a post or national cemetery was separated from other burial expenses and made payable from the appropriation for Army transportation. Burial expenses as such were limited throughout these years to $75.00 for the burial of an officer, $15.00 for that of a noncommissioned officer, and $10.00 for the burial of a private soldier.

Army Regulations were amended during the Spanish-American War so that the remains of soldiers and officers who were killed in action, or who died while on duty in the field or at military posts, could, if their relatives so desired, be transported to their homes for burial by the Quartermaster's Department. Funds for this purpose were specially appropriated by Congress. Burial expenses—$75.00 for an officer and $35.00 for an enlisted man—were specifically limited to the cost of the coffin and the reasonable and necessary expense of preparation of the remains for burial. They were not to include such items as “guarding remains, expense of services of clergyman or minister, music by band or choir, flowers, cost of hire of pall to be used with horse, tombstone, crape or gloves for pallbearers, and expense of grave site where the remains are sent home at the request of relatives.”

After the Spanish-American War the former policy of interring the remains of officers and enlisted men in the nearest post or national cemetery was reinstated.

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62 Military Laws and Rules and Regulations for the Armies of the United States (Washington, 1813), Articles 94, 95.
63 Revised United States Army Regulations (Washington, 1863), p. 159.
64 (1) Hq of the Army GO 43, 3 May 1877. (2) Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1889 (Washington, 1889), pars. 86, 155.
65 (1) Hq of the Army GO 105, 5 October 1885. (2) Hq of the Army GO 29, 10 March 1891. (3) Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1895 (Washington, 1901), pars. 85, 162.
66 (1) Hq of the Army GO 141, 12 September 1898. (2) Hq of the Army GO 151, 22 September 1898. (3) Hq of the Army GO 48, 15 March 1899. (4) Hq of the Army Cir 9, 6 April 1900.
However, the regulations were amended to the effect that if officers and enlisted men were killed in action, or died in military camps or in the field or hospital while in Alaska, or at places outside the continental limits of the United States, or while at sea, their remains could be transported to their homes for interment if so desired by relatives or friends.  

In 1909 this limited application of the policy of shipping home the remains of military personnel was expanded to include for the first time officers and enlisted men who died in line of duty within the continental limits of the United States as well as its possessions, and in peace as well as in war. This became a basic element of the policy governing disposition of remains that continued to be applicable during World War II. As before, deceased officers and enlisted men were buried in the nearest military post or national cemetery, but, if requested by relatives, their remains might be transported home for interment. When death occurred in the United States or Alaska, and early shipment was practicable, the War Department notified the nearest relative by telegraph and requested a reply by telegraph that would indicate whether shipment of remains home was desired, the destination of the shipment, and the name of the person to whom the remains were to be consigned. The consignee was notified by telegraph of the shipment.

Burial expenses continued to be limited to $75.00 for an officer but were increased to $50.00 for an enlisted man. Where practicable, a contract was to be made with an undertaker or other competent person for services during a fiscal year in the preparation of remains for shipment. Furthermore, a report of the disposition of the remains, together with an itemized statement of the cost of burial and transportation, was to be made by the quartermaster directly to the Quartermaster General. Expenses were payable from the same funds as before.

Payment of burial expenses did not remain limited to personnel of the Regular Army. In 1902 Congress authorized the Secretary of War to transport to their homes the remains of civilian employees of the Army who died while on duty in U.S. possessions in Cuba, or in China. This authorization was later broadened to include those civilian employees who died on Army transports or in foreign countries, as well as in U.S. possessions while on duty in the field. From World War I on, burial benefits were extended not only to Regular Army personnel but to officers and enlisted men of the Army of the United States, that is, to those of the temporary military organization of the United States established during an emergency or war period.

Following World War I the problem of national defense was thoroughly explored, and the care of the dead was among the many aspects re-examined. This study resulted in the publication in 1924 of the so-called AR 30 series. Basic policies on the

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67 WD GO 120, 5 July 1904.
68 (1) WD GO 184, 9 September 1909. (2) Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1910 (Washington, 1911), par. 106.
69 Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1910, par. 106.
70 Hq of Army GO 74, 11 July 1902, p. 12. This is a reprint of the appropriation act for civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year 1903. Succeeding appropriation acts provided for the burial expenses of civilian employees.
72 (1) AR 30-1830, 1 Feb 24, sub: Preparation for Burial and Shpmt. (2) AR 30-1820, 1 Feb 24, sub: Disp of Remains.
care of the dead had been well established by that time, but later revisions of the regulations introduced many refinements in procedures covering the identification, preparation for shipment, and inspection of remains, as well as the observation of state sanitary laws and health regulations in the shipment of remains.

Different funds were designated for the payment of burial expenses from time to time. Until 1928 burial expenses were payable from funds specifically authorized in the annual appropriation acts. In that year Congress enacted legislation authorizing appropriation of necessary funds from time to time for the disposition of remains of military personnel and civilian employees of the Army, but the law provided for the payment only of the expenses of interment or of preparation and transportation of the remains to their homes or to national cemeteries. It was not until 1938 that the law was amended to make provision for both transportation and interment of remains.73

By the fiscal year 1931 burial expenses had become payable from a fund designated “Cemeterial Expenses” in the annual appropriation acts and remained so until World War II. At that time it was felt that interment of those who died while on active duty was a military expense not appropriately payable from “Cemeterial Expenses”. During the war therefore, these expenses, as a military charge, were paid from the appropriation “Supplies and Transportation, Army” and later, in 1945, from “Quartermaster Service, Army” in the annual appropriation acts.74

Maintenance and Operation of Post Cemeteries

By the time of World War II, policy governing the disposition of remains had long since crystallized, but details of administration and procedure changed during the war years. Whether interment occurred in national or post cemeteries, the Memorial Branch, OQMG, prescribed the policies of operation. Although post cemeteries antedated national cemeteries, supervision of their maintenance and operation had been placed under The Quartermaster General along with that of national cemeteries when the latter were established during the Civil War. Post cemeteries had been established when posts were located in isolated areas in order to take care of the burials of officers and enlisted men, their families, and civilian employees connected with the Army on duty at the post. In later years, although such deceased continued to be buried at the post cemeteries, modern facilities permitted shipment of remains from practically every post to any place desired by relatives, and as a consequence burials at post cemeteries decreased. Post cemeteries, nevertheless, continued to be operated during World War II, and their facilities were extended to provide burial space for officers and enlisted men of the armed forces of other countries who died in the United States while serving as instructors or students with the armed forces of the United States, or while engaged in promoting national defense.75

Commanding officers of the posts had jurisdiction over the post cemeteries.
corps areas were redesignated service commands in the summer of 1942, post cemeteries within their jurisdiction came under the control of the commanding generals of the service commands. The responsibility of the OQMG for administering funds for the post cemeteries was decentralized to the field and allotted to the commanders of the service commands within whose areas the post cemeteries were located.\textsuperscript{76} As an economy measure, the function of maintenance of post cemeteries was also transferred late in 1942 to the Corps of Engineers, since it had long been responsible for the maintenance of other facilities at post installations. As a result, QMC responsibilities in reference to post cemeteries were delimited. The Memorial Branch continued to furnish headstones and to keep a central record of interment at post cemeteries. It also prescribed the policies on interment practices. With the concurrence of the Chief of Engineers, the QMC approved plans for new post cemeteries and the enlargement of existing cemeteries, and it formulated policy and directives governing their operation.\textsuperscript{77}

\section*{Burial Contracts and Claims}

The impact of World War II led to a modification of the procedures governing burial contracts and the payment of burial claims. In making arrangements for the burial of deceased military personnel, it was customary until 1930 for the post quartermaster to advertise for supplies and burial services. He accepted the lowest bid offered by local undertakers in the vicinity of the military installation, leaving it to the discretion of the bidders to specify what they would furnish. The practice led to the provision of inferior supplies in some cases and to a lack of uniformity in burial services. In an effort to improve the situation, the OQMG established a uniform contract for burial services for the fiscal year 1930.\textsuperscript{78} This action initiated a system that was used thereafter, although the form of the contract was revised from time to time by the Memorial Branch.

Contract procedures in obtaining burial services were governed and limited by the same legislation that applied to procurement procedures generally.\textsuperscript{79} Hence, when an effort was made shortly after Pearl Harbor to streamline the purchasing system generally by suspending practically all legal restrictions on Army buying under the First War Powers Act, the Memorial Branch took advantage of the opportunity to amend the contract provision relating to acceptance of the lowest bid in order to obtain better burial services. The uniform burial contract was modified to read that "awards will be made only to bidders complying with the specifications."\textsuperscript{80}

This move toward negotiation of contracts did not crystallize until the summer of 1943, when complaints on burial services increased to such an extent that The Quartermaster General took action to improve the services. Instructions to the field emphasized that the contracting officer was not required to accept the lowest bid but that the primary objective was quality and satisfactory service.\textsuperscript{81} The services of the most reliable, most competent, and best-established funeral directors in the areas surrounding the posts, camps,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Daily Activity Rpt, OQMG, 4 Aug 42.
\item \textsuperscript{77} AR 210-500, 3 Aug 43, sub: Post Cemeteries.
\item \textsuperscript{78} OQMG Cir Ltr 21, 28 Mar 29, sub: Contract for Burial Sv for FY 1930.
\item \textsuperscript{79} See Risch, \textit{The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services}, I, Ch. VII.
\item \textsuperscript{80} OQMG Cir Ltr 106, Supplement No. 1, 1 May 42, sub: Uniform Contract for Burial Svcs.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Unnumbered Ltr (OQMG) to CGs All SvCs, 26 May 44, same sub.
\end{itemize}
and stations were to be obtained. Before making awards, contracting officers were to investigate the character, ability, financial responsibility, and quality of merchandise of each bidder. All these factors plus the price submitted in the bids were to be taken into consideration in awarding a contract.

Originally the amount that might be expended for burial expenses was limited by Army Regulations. Consequently no higher bid could be accepted unless approved by The Quartermaster General, or by the Secretary of War in those instances where expenses exceeded the limits set for approval by The Quartermaster General. Review, approval, and supervision of burial contracts and expenses were thus centralized in the Memorial Branch of the OQMG.

This centralization was altered in the spring of 1943. Then, in accordance with a policy of decentralizing administrative detail to the field advocated by Headquarters, ASF, the execution of burial services contracts was decentralized to the service commands. Before contracts could become effective they had to be approved by the headquarters of the service command in which the contracting officer was stationed. Furthermore, in order that burial services contracts might be approved by service commands without reference to The Quartermaster General or higher authority, price limitations on burial expenses were eliminated.

At the same time, the administration of burial claims was also decentralized to the service commands because the decentralization of the contract procedure included the administrative examination and approval of claims for burial expenses when such expenses were not arranged for by the military authorities. So many difficulties arose from this action, however, that claims administration was promptly returned to the Memorial Branch within one month.

Even then, final payment of burial claims caused difficulties for the OQMG, the service commands, and the purchasing and contracting officers at the posts, camps, and stations in paying the maximum interment allowance of $50.00 because the regulations required a breakdown of funeral directors’ bills indicating specifically the items of service rendered and the amount charged for each before the authorized allowance could be paid to the next of kin or the funeral director. The difficulties in obtaining a true itemized invoice caused delays in the payment of claims. To expedite payment the Memorial Branch revised the regulations so that the only requirement for obtaining payment was a certificate from the next of kin, or the party negotiating for the funeral, stating the exact amount of the interment expenses without any breakdown. Upon the basis of this certificate the government paid $50.00 or less as indicated.

It was intended originally that responsibility for co-ordinating and supervising contracts at service command headquarters was to remain a Quartermaster function. Consequently, the commanding gen-

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83 (1) [5th Ind]. Gen Styer, Hq ASF, to TQMG, 29 Apr 43. (2) OQMG Cir Ltr 86, 31 May 43, sub: Uniform Contracts for Burial Svs.
85 (1) Ltr, Col Hamilton, Chief of Sv lnstls Div, to All SvCs, 3 Jul 43, sub: Approval of Claims for Burial Expenses. (2) Ltr, Hamilton to All SvCs, 19 Jul 43, same sub.
eral of each service command had been informed that in delegating authority to a member of his staff to approve contracts for burial services, he, "other criteria being equal, should select, if available, a Quartermaster Officer who has had experience in this field, this is in view of the specialized nature of the services to be obtained under these contracts and the fact that they will not be forwarded to this office for review or approval."  

In actuality, because of the changes made in post organization, burial services contracts were handled by purchasing and contracting officers who were not necessarily Quartermaster officers. Their lack of training and unfamiliarity with the procedures and problems involved led to unsatisfactory results. The situation became acute in July 1943. The sharply increased number of complaints reaching the Memorial Branch on the preparation and condition of remains being shipped to next of kin caused the OQMG to take steps to avert any unfavorable publicity.

The Memorial Branch attributed the increase in complaints to a failure to observe specifications and to the inability of some local contractors, particularly those in small towns, to handle in a proper manner accidental deaths, many of which were occurring in the Army Air Forces. Furthermore, there was a laxity in inspection on the part of contracting officers and medical personnel at posts, camps, and stations. These shortcomings were called to the attention of the service commands.

To improve the situation, the OQMG also wrote more detailed and precise specifications into its contracts in order to insure the results desired. To obtain the priorities needed for steel used in caskets, it co-ordinated its program with the War Production Board. In an effort to attract the services of better funeral directors, it sought to ease the price restrictions imposed by the Office of Price Administration by obtaining an interpretation to the effect that adjustments in maximum prices under the General Maximum Price Regulation might be authorized in those instances where a possible shortage of supply of funeral goods and services existed. Contracting officers were urged to call to the attention of bidders the fact that quality of services rather than the lowest bid would govern in making awards of contracts.

The revisions made in the contract form and specifications were effective, but they had to be supplemented by efforts to eliminate the lax and perfunctory inspection of remains and the consequent inadequate preparation which resulted from the failure of purchasing and contracting officers to perform their duties in the required manner at posts, camps, and stations. The Quartermaster General proposed the preparation of a check list of items to be covered by the inspecting officers that would be used as a guide for the contracting and medical officers concerned. He also suggested the assignment of an additional Quartermaster officer as a member of the staff of each service command who would be thoroughly qualified to handle all requirements pertaining to the preparation and disposition of remains.

Study of the problems resulting from decentralization of contracts to the service

\[87\] OQMG Cir Ltr 86, 31 May 43, sub: Uniform Contract for Burial Svs.

\[88\] Ltr, TAG to CGs of SvCs et al., 6 Oct 43, sub: Preparation of Remains of Deceased Mil Pers for Shpmt, SPX 293 (27 Sep 43) OB-S-SPDO-M.

\[89\] Unnumbered Ltr (OQMG) 26 May 44, sub: Uniform Contract for Burial Svs.

\[90\] Memo, Gen Gregory for CG ASF, 26 Sep 44, sub: Preparation of Remains.
commands ultimately led in the spring of 1945 to a more precise delineation of responsibilities in a new War Department circular. It restated that The Quartermaster General under the direction of the Commanding General, ASF, was the staff agency of the War Department for the formulation and promulgation of policies, standards, procedures, and training material for the program on the care of the dead. The commanding generals of the service commands were responsible for the administration and operation of prescribed mortuary procedures at installations under their command. Each service commander was to assign an appropriate staff officer, qualified by ability and experience as a funeral director or embalmer, to direct mortuary activities within the service command. Commanding officers at installations within the service commands were responsible for the performance of mortuary operations. To supervise these operations, each commander assigned, insofar as possible, an officer on his staff qualified by experience in mortuary activities. Thus, the assignment of responsibilities was tightened and an effort was made to place the administration of mortuary activities in the hands of qualified personnel. The procedures for implementing this program were set forth in a technical manual published in May.  

Graves Registration Service

Although the disposition of remains in the zone of interior was accomplished by procedures that continued unchanged, in wartime the theater commander rather than The Quartermaster General was charged with the conduct of all graves registration operations in his command. Technical direction of theater graves registration units, however, remained a responsibility of The Quartermaster General, who formulated all general policies and developed uniform technical standards. Once the war ended and theaters were inactivated, The Quartermaster General resumed full control over graves registration operations and was directly responsible to the Secretary of War for final disposal of the remains of the dead.

**Origins**

The origins of graves registration activities stem from the Civil War when for the first time the government assumed the obligation of identifying and burying in registered graves the remains of all who died in that war and created a national cemeterial system for the realization of that purpose. No special service was created, however, to implement the orders issued for a burial program during the Civil War; instead, as in the past, burial fatigues were detailed from the line. Out of the war emerged a fundamental principle—return of remains to their native soil. This was supplemented in 1898 by Congressional enactment of a special appropriation enabling next of kin to exercise the right of choice in selecting the final resting place of servicemen who died in the Spanish-American War. Their remains could be buried in national cemeteries or returned to their homes at the request of relatives. This precedent continued to be applicable to those who died in overseas garrisons in the years preceding World War I.

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91 (1) WD Cir 145, 16 May 45, sub: Care of Deceased Pers. (2) TM 12–240A, May 1945, sub: QM Mortuary Procedures.  
92 For a detailed analysis of these origins, see Steere, *The Graves Registration Service in World War II*, Ch. I.
On the eve of that war the techniques of graves registration and the practice of returning to their homes the remains of deceased military personnel were recognized in Army Regulations.

In order to secure, as far as possible, the decent interment of those who fall in battle and to establish beyond doubt their identity should it become desirable subsequently to disinter the remains for removal to a national or post cemetery, or for shipment home, it is the duty of commanding generals to set apart a spot near every battlefield, and to cause the remains of the killed to be interred therein, and when practicable, to cause to be placed in the coffin or grave a glass bottle, corked and sealed, containing a slip of paper on which shall be written the name of the deceased, giving the cause and date of death and burial, and, in the case of an officer or enlisted man, his rank, company, regiment, or corps, and bearing the signature of the surgeon or officer in charge of interment. It is the duty of the commanding officer to cause to be made a sketch as accurate as the means at hand will permit of the burial places of those falling in battle.93

The final step in providing for the care of the dead in theaters of operations was taken in August 1917 when the Secretary of War authorized the organization of a "Graves Registration Service, Quartermaster Corps" as an element of the military establishment in Europe. Two months later it was supplemented with three additional units.94 The appearance of a theater graves registration service with its operating units—the Quartermaster graves registration sections—functioning in close support to combat, and a headquarters staff charged with the preservation of mortuary records and the maintenance of temporary burials and semipermanent military cemeteries differentiated World War I from all preceding wars in which the country had been engaged.

Inadequacy of Prewar Planning

Presumably the lessons learned in World War I and the twenty years of peace intervening before World War II should have afforded an opportunity to plan comprehensively for the care of the dead in any future war. Such planning was undertaken but proved inadequate.

The considerable study given to the problem of graves registration early in the twenties resulted in the publication of regulations in 1924 that marked a new period in the history of the American Graves Registration Service.95 These regulations finally recognized that graves registration was a technical function and prescribed the procedures for burials on the field of battle and the method of reporting such burials. They established the policy that The Quartermaster General was responsible in time of war for organizing a graves registration service to supervise all mortuary matters pertaining to the personnel of the Army. The service would function through graves registration units organized in accordance with War Department Tables of Organization. But since these units might exist only on paper, and in any case could be activated only by superior War Department authority, the responsibility of The Quartermaster General was largely advisory, that is, he passed on all measures concerning the organization, equipment, and training of graves registration units as well as on plans for

93 U.S. Army Regulations, 1913, corrected to April 15, 1917, with Supplement Containing Changes Nos. 56-77 (Washington, 1918), par. 491 (1913), p. 112.
94 (1) WD GO 104, Sec. VI, 7 Aug 17. (2) WD GO 130, Sec. II, 4 Oct 17.
95 These regulations, all published on 1 February 1924, were: AR 30-1805, sub: QMC—GrReg; AR 30-1810, sub: Burials on Fld of Battle; and AR 30-1815, sub: Rpts of Burials.
their activation and assignment to field commands.

The type of graves registration unit best adapted to field conditions was under fairly continuous study during the twenty-year interval of peace, and by the fall of 1940 there had been developed on paper for each army corps a graves registration company of four platoons. The Memorial Division was advised that "for planning purposes, four companies have been included in the War Department Augmentation Mobilization Plan, 1942," but their activation, of course, "depended on circumstances." No graves registration units were trained during the emergency period and therefore none participated in maneuvers in 1940–41 or benefited from field experience. The Graves Registration Service remained a paper organization, and no units were activated before the entrance of the United States into the war. Then, between 28 March and 2 December 1942, thirteen companies were activated, but under the accelerated training program of wartime there was no unit training and as a result there were no adequately trained cadres for purposes of augmentation. Not until early in 1943, over a year after the outbreak of war, were facilities available for a comprehensive course of unit training.

The formulation of an approved tactical doctrine and training method was basic to, and had to precede any program for, the activation of graves registration companies. Neither was available, however, until shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor. As late as 3 September 1941, The Quartermaster General had to admit that until a technical manual then in preparation was published the only data available for instructional purposes were the Army Regulations—AR 30-1805 to AR 30-1830—issued in 1924. The manual was published on 23 September 1941, two years after the project had originally been undertaken and barely three months before the attack on Pearl Harbor. As a reference guide it left much to be desired.

Graves Registration Service of World War II

As a consequence of the lack of adequately trained personnel, operations of theater graves registration services were characterized by improvisations during most of World War II. Further, the shortage of graves registration units made for inadequate and ineffective service in the field. For example, in one theater where the prescribed assignment of graves registration companies would have resulted in a ratio of one graves registration man to 650 troops, the actual number assigned as compared with the theater strength showed a ratio of one to 1,200. Nowhere were enough companies provided. Adequately trained graves registration units should have been phased in, in the proper ratio, along with combat units during mobilization if the mission of the Graves

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96 T/O 10-297, 1 Nov 40. The company described in this T/O was never activated; the T/O itself was revised on 21 January 1942.
97 War Plans Br to Memorial Div, OQMG, 31 Jul 41, sub: GrReg Sv.
98 Steere, The Graves Registration Service in World War II, Ch. II.
99 (1) Ltr, Lt Col Alexander M. Owens, QM I Army Corps, to TQMG, 25 Aug 41, sub: Fld Burials and Safeguarding Effects of Deceased. (2) 1st Ind, Maj Mayer, OQMG, to Col Owens, 3 Sep 41, on same ltr.
100 (1) TM 10–630, sub: GrReg. (2) For an analysis of this manual see Steere, The Graves Registration Service in World War II, Ch. II. (3) A revision appeared in January 1945 as FM 10–63, sub: GrReg.
101 Rpt, Col Harbold to Mil Plng Div, 1946, sub: Preliminary Study on GrReg Sv in World War II.
CARE OF THE DEAD

Registration Service was to be accomplished efficiently. The same lack of graves registration personnel was revealed at the War Department level where this shortage and the inadequacy of liaison maintained with the field handicapped the development of measures designed to promote standardization in organizational forms, operating procedures, and technical practices.

The Graves Registration Service was a wartime agency, the life of which extended from the beginning of the war to the completion of the return of the dead after the end of hostilities. The Graves Registration Service of World War II differed markedly from that of World War I in the complexity of its organization and the scope of its operations. Moreover, for the first time, an attempt was made during World War II to establish a central records office, though the shortage of personnel made it impossible for the Memorial Branch to keep abreast of all burial reports received—so much so that two years of work after the war were required to complete and verify the burial records.

The headquarters of the Graves Registration Service established in the Memorial Branch, OQMG, first in the Overseas Section and then, eventually, in the Graves Registration Branch when the Memorial Branch was raised to the status of a division, was handicapped by personnel ceilings and other administrative obstacles. Yet it had a broad mission to accomplish. It was responsible for promulgating directives that would insure efficient accomplishment of the field mission and for recommending training doctrine for graves registration service units. It received reports of interment from the field, verifying the information and advising next of kin as to the place of burial when requested to do so, and it kept permanent records of the place of burial of the deceased. It maintained a continuous study of policies, procedures, training doctrine, forms and records, and Tables of Organization and Equipment in order that changes might be effected to promote efficient discharge of responsibilities. Finally, it was responsible for preparing over-all plans for the administration and operation of the entire Graves Registration Service, including those for the return of the dead when such a program was authorized by Congress.

Whereas in 1917–18 graves registration operations were confined to one front, in World War II graves registration services had to be established in many theaters, decidedly increasing the problem of standardization, particularly since makeshift methods were resorted to because of the absence of adequately trained personnel. The commanding general of each overseas theater or separate command was instructed to organize a graves registration service, which functioned as a part of the office of the chief quartermaster of the theater or command. Its mission was to acquire land to be used for cemeteries and to locate, maintain, control, and preserve the cemeteries. It was charged with marking graves properly and maintaining a record of all graves, whether in these cemeteries or elsewhere, until permanent burial was accomplished or the remains were delivered to the next of kin. The theater graves registration service was responsible for keeping the number of isolated or single graves to a minimum, for the preparation of sketches and other data showing the location of graves and cemeteries, and for the proper burial of the dead in accordance with the existing regulations. Finally, the theater graves registration service was
charged with the collection, receipt, and disposition of all personal effects found on the dead.

Wartime Formulation of Graves Registration Policy

Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, General Gregory initiated action to suspend the shipment home of remains from overseas possessions and other stations outside the continental United States in accordance with Army Regulations.102 This step was supplemented by further action discontinuing the shipment of caskets to overseas stations and base commands in order to save cargo space. Local facilities were to be employed for temporary burials when the supply of caskets on hand was exhausted.103

As a result of these directives such commands as the Caribbean Defense Command, the Iceland Base Command, and others were confronted with the necessity of establishing their own graves registration services. At the same time, with hostilities already under way and no graves registration companies provided for any of the forces outside the continental limits of the United States, The Quartermaster General could only assume that the theater commander, acting on his own responsibility, would take necessary action regarding casualties in his command. This, of course, was what General Douglas MacArthur was compelled to do in the Philippines.104 The Quartermaster General felt that the entire question should be covered in a general War Department directive.

After attempting informally to secure the views of General Headquarters, U.S. Army, upon the proposed directive, The Quartermaster General in January 1942 called the attention of the Chief of Staff to the problems of graves registration and the care and disposal of the effects of deceased soldiers. He appended a directive that he recommended be issued by the War Department.105 After being processed through channels, this directive was published to the field as a circular on 18 February, over two months after the declaration of war.106

By this means the commanding general of each theater of operations and defense command was directed to organize a graves registration service that would function as a part of the office of the quartermaster of the theater or defense command. Necessary instructions conforming to AR 30-1805 and TM 10-630 were to be issued by the Commanding General, GHQ, for those theaters and defense commands under his jurisdiction, while all duties of the graves registration service within the continental United States were to be performed by the Memorial Division, OQMG. Required reports were to be made on forms prescribed by The Quartermaster General. In addition, a number of provisions not covered by the specified Army Regulation and technical manual were included. These forbade photographing of temporary graves, outlined procedures to be followed when death occurred at sea, and indicated that information on burial matters would be disclosed to relatives only by The Adjutant General and

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102 (1) Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 9 Dec 41, sub: Shpmt of Remains. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG, Caribbean Defense Command et al., 13 Dec 41, same sub, AG 293.8 (12-9-41) MB-A-M.

103 (1) Ltr, TQMG to TAG, 24 Dec 41, sub: Shpmt of Mortuary Supplies. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG, Caribbean Defense Command et al., 31 Dec 43, same sub, AG 293.8 (12-24-41) MB-A-M.

104 For elaboration of the improvisation that occurred, see Steere, The Graves Registration Service in World War II, Ch. III.

105 Memo, TQMG for CofS, 20 Jan 42, sub: GrReg.

106 WD Cir, restricted and unnumbered, 18 Feb 42, sub: GrReg.
The Quartermaster General. This last provision caused much confusion. Both The Quartermaster General and the Chief of Staff, GHQ, would have preferred to centralize the handling of such information in the OQMG, but they had been overruled by the Chief of Staff. The field was further informed that detailed instructions on the disposal of effects would be issued later, for The Quartermaster General planned to establish an effects bureau at the Kansas City Quartermaster Depot, a bureau which was subsequently placed in operation.107

Without trained personnel, graves registration services so established resorted to hasty improvisation to meet their needs. This could have been obviated had adequate plans been made in the prewar years to provide properly trained cadres for new units and to establish during the emergency a rate of expansion for graves registration companies that would have maintained some sort of balance with the growth of the armed forces. Makeshift methods were used, for in the absence of trained graves registration units for combat forces technical standards and procedures for the collection and burial of the dead could not be prescribed by The Quartermaster General during the Philippine campaign of 1942 or the initial phases of the North African campaign. Efforts later had to be directed toward eliminating the confusion that resulted and developing uniform procedures of graves registration.

The first move in this direction was made in the summer of 1943 when Colonel Harbold, the newly designated chief of the Memorial Branch, analyzed the areas of confusion resulting from the circular of 18 February 1942.108 The first of these was the joint responsibility of The Quartermaster General and The Adjutant General for furnishing information to relatives and friends concerning grave location, disposal of remains and effects, and other related matters. This represented a duplication of Quartermaster functions, led to the release of erroneous information, and was productive of confusion and embarrassment to relatives and the War Department since reburials were frequently made, and The Adjutant General might advise of one burial place and The Quartermaster General of another. Colonel Harbold therefore recommended that The Quartermaster General be held responsible for the dissemination of all such information since there was a clear line of demarcation between the duties of the Casualty Branch, AGO, and those of the Memorial Branch, OQMG.

A second major area of confusion resulted from the lack of uniformity in the methods of handling the dead in the different theaters of operations. “It is only through concerted action and uniform procedures that efficient results may be expected at the cessation of hostilities when the military dead are returned,” Colonel Harbold pointed out. He therefore recommended that The Quartermaster General be designated Chief, American Graves Registration Service, to direct the establishment of, and formulate policies for, the


108 Ltr, Brig Gen Francis H. Pope, OQMG, to CG ASF, 15 Jul 43, sub: Dissemination of Info Re: GrReg Matters. The letter and an enclosed draft of a proposed circular were prepared by Colonel Harbold, although signed by the director of the General Administrative Services Division in accordance with instructions requiring his signature on all communications from the OQMG indorsing enclosed drafts for publication by the War Department.
graves registration services in the theaters, and, further, that he be authorized to correspond directly with the chiefs of the graves registration services to insure the use of uniform methods. To this end he drafted a revised circular that was submitted to higher authority for approval on 15 July 1943.

In the meantime, Col. Charles S. Hamilton, director of the Service Installations Division, OQMG, called attention to the fact that the Commanding General, Northwest Service Command, was automatically returning bodies of deceased military personnel without consulting the OQMG. He felt that this would lead to embarrassment and that the OQMG would have no record of the disposition of remains from that area when plans were prepared for the return of the military dead. He was of the opinion that no remains should be returned from outside the continental limits of the United States unless it was so directed by the OQMG and on special request of the next of kin. He recommended the adoption of a uniform policy to this effect and the dispatch of a radiogram to the Northwest Service Command instructing conformance to such a policy.¹⁰⁹

The course of action pursued by the Northwest Service Command had grown out of a modification, instigated by that command, of the original policy suspending shipment home of remains following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The change in policy, made over the protest of The Quartermaster General, had permitted remains to be returned to the continental United States from points on the North American continent “by commercial carrier transportation other than air or ocean or coastwise vessels, provided that sanitary shipping requirements of the several countries are observed that such transportation is available therefor and not required for the movement of troops or supplies.”¹¹⁰

Colonel Hamilton’s proposed policy modification would, no doubt, have been effected expeditiously since the Casualty Branch, AGO, had indicated it was in no way concerned, and the director of the Military Personnel Division, ASF, therefore forwarded the recommendation through channels for approval. But at this point and just three days before the Secretary of War approved the change, the Deputy Quartermaster General for Supply Planning and Operations, Brig. Gen. James L. Frink, in a letter transmitted to The Adjutant General through the Under Secretary of War and approved by him, sent a recommendation proposing adherence to the original policy.¹¹¹ The cross-purpose exhibited in this instance was illustrative of the confusion promoted by the multiplicity of intermediaries between the chief of the Memorial Branch and The Quartermaster General and the failure to observe newly established channels of communication with higher authorities.¹¹²

Confronted with approvals of two conflicting directives, The Adjutant General asked instructions of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.¹¹³ The difficulty was resolved by rescinding the indorsement of General Frink’s recommendation by the Under

¹⁰⁹ Memo, Col Hamilton for TAG, 17 Jul 43, sub: Return of Remains.
¹¹⁰ (1) Memo, TAG for Dir Mil Pers Div, SOS, 13 Mar 43, sub: Shpmt of Remains. (2) Informal Memo, TAG for TQMG, 13 Mar 43, same sub, and 1st Ind, Gen Pope, OQMG, to TAG, 20 Mar 43. (3) AGO Memo W55–16–43, 29 Apr 43, same sub.
¹¹¹ Ltr, Gen Frink, OQMG, to TAG through USW, 27 Jul 43, sub: Shpmt of Remains.
¹¹² Memo, Gen Styer, CoS, ASF, for TQMG, 11 Aug 43, sub: Misrouting of Communications.
¹¹³ Informal Action Sheet, Maj Gen James A. Ulio to ACoS G–1, 3 Aug 43, sub: Return of Remains.
Secretary of War and reaffirming the favorable action taken by the Secretary of War on the proposal submitted by Colonel Hamilton. This disposal of the case was approved by the Secretary of War on 14 August 1943, and the revised policy was published to the field on 21 August. The directive continued the policy on shipment of remains unchanged but added that "prior to shipment, a request for instructions will be submitted to The Quartermaster General, and shipment will not be made until receipt of instructions from The Quartermaster General."

The grant of this authority paved the way for acceptance of Colonel Harbold's proposal to designate The Quartermaster General as Chief, American Graves Registration Service. The Adjutant General in forwarding the proposal to the Under Secretary of War indicated his agreement and apparently acquiesced in the view that joint responsibility in the dissemination of burial information had created confusion.

In order to formulate workable procedures, the Control Division, ASF, surveyed the way in which the joint control system had operated in the past. It found that procedures had broken down, and that as a result no official information regarding place of burial was being transmitted to the next of kin by the War Department. However, unofficial information as to grave location reached the next of kin through letters from friends of the deceased, the company commander, or the chaplain.

On the basis of consultation between the chief of the Casualty Branch, AGO, the chief of the Memorial Branch, OQMG, and representatives of G-1 and the Joint Security Control, remedial action for this unsatisfactory situation was proposed and then incorporated in the directive that superseded the circular of 18 February 1942. Under this War Department Circular 206, notification of death was sent to the next of kin by The Adjutant General, who also advised the family that information on the place of burial would be furnished by The Quartermaster General when military security permitted such information to be revealed. The Quartermaster General was responsible for notifying relatives and friends of the grave location, disposal of remains and effects, and other related matters after these had been cleared with the Director of Intelligence, ASF.

Later these procedures were modified to the extent that letters of condolence or sympathy might be written by the responsible chaplain or the immediate commanding officer. They could disclose no burial information, however, and the letters had to be routed through the agency responsible for the rendition of casualty reports to The Adjutant General to insure that the official casualty report had been made prior to release of the letters and that they contained no classified information.

War Department Circular 206 also designated The Quartermaster General as Chief, American Graves Registration, and made him responsible for formulating policies for the operation of the graves registration services outside the continental United States. On all such matters he referred to The Quartermaster General.

115 (1) Informal Action Sheet, Chief of Casualty Br, AGO, to TAG, 17 Aug 43, sub: Revision of WD Cir, 18 Feb 42. (2) Memo, TAG for USW, 17 Aug 43, no sub.
117 WD Cir 206, 11 Sep 43, sub: GrReg.
118 WD Cir 352, Sec. II, 30 Aug 44, sub: GrReg.
was authorized to correspond directly with the chiefs of the graves registration services. Thus the authority and responsibility needed for effective administration of graves registration matters that had been implied in the AR 30 series of 1924 were tardily accorded to The Quartermaster General.\textsuperscript{119}

\textit{Planning for the Final Disposition of Remains}

During the last two years of the war, the Memorial Branch, while administering its responsibilities in reference to the operations of the Graves Registration Service, was at the same time devoting considerable time and study to planning for the disposition of the remains of the war dead at the end of hostilities. Such planning had been initiated in the summer of 1943 in response to a directive from the demobilization planners and had resulted in the submission of a policy study.\textsuperscript{120} From then on the subject was under constant review.

\textit{Policy Study 34}

Although Policy Study 34, submitted to the demobilization planners in August 1943, was, for the most part, used as a vehicle for presenting the case in behalf of a proposed Memorial Division, it also offered a plan of organization for the postwar American Graves Registration Service and proposed in general terms the objectives to be sought in a program for the return of the dead.

The policy to be pursued was based on an analysis of the factors involved and the experience drawn from World War I. It was noted that the preponderance of letters to the OQMG had requested the return of remains to the United States. Various factors suggested that a great majority of the nearest of kin would make such requests. For instance the fact that the graves of their dead were located in distant lands—Africa, Australia, and the islands of the Pacific—precluded the hope of making pilgrimages, a hope that had motivated the decision of next of kin in 1919–20 to let their dead remain in France, Belgium, and England. Furthermore, it was felt that since all but one of the military cemeteries of World War I had been in areas overrun and occupied by enemy troops during World War II, this fact would make its influence felt in determining the decision that relatives would make. The Memorial Branch concluded that requests for return of the dead would exceed 85 percent as compared with 60 percent following World War I.

The Memorial Branch therefore recommended the adoption of a general policy of either returning the dead or concentrating them in national cemeteries to be established in Allied countries, the decision to be made by the nearest of kin. It proposed to determine their wishes in a poll by letter, to be conducted by The Quartermaster General after the end of hostilities. It stipulated further that if requests for return of the dead buried in any Allied country reached or exceeded 70 percent of the total known American burials in that country, all the dead would be returned. Those for whom no authorized requests had been made would be buried in a national cemetery in the United States.

\textsuperscript{119} For operation of graves registration services in the Mediterranean, European, and Pacific theaters see Steere, \textit{The Graves Registration Service in World War II}, Chs. V, VI, VII.

\textsuperscript{120} (1) Policy Study 34, 14 Aug 43. (2) Ltr, Gen Tompkins, ASF, to TQMG, 22 Jun 43, sub: Demob Plng.
nated by The Quartermaster General.\textsuperscript{121}

This program was to be administered through a postwar American Graves Registration Service, the personnel needs of which could only be based on the requirements after World War I and a consideration of such factors as the probable expansion of active theaters, the number of dead in and the estimated losses for these theaters, the lack of communication facilities in the theaters, the distances involved, and the time authorized for completion of the work.

A preliminary study of the situation and the deployment of troops indicated a number of geographical area commands—Pacific, Europe, Africa, Asia, and North America—into which the American Graves Registration Service would be divided for administrative purposes. The tentative organization divided these general areas into ten active zones and two probable zones, and these twelve were further divided into forty-five sectors, indicated only in a general manner to show the possible and probable scope of activities of the American Graves Registration Service. It was estimated that two ports would be required in each sector, or a total of ninety, to handle the importation of supplies from the United States and the shipment of casketed remains to the homeland.\textsuperscript{122}

The Quartermaster General in his capacity as Chief, American Graves Registration Service, was to be the administrative and technical director of this overseas organization, while the American Graves Registration Service Branch, to be established as an autonomous unit in the proposed Memorial Division, would act as his special staff for overseas operations. The zone commanders would report directly to The Quartermaster General. Since it was realized that they would eventually assume the responsibilities for cemeterial operations originally assigned to theater commanders, the American Graves Registration Service was projected as a self-contained organization, with full control over supply and transportation incidental to field operations, as well as administrative and disciplinary jurisdiction over its personnel.

Insofar as a possible expansion of the cemeterial system was concerned, the Memorial Branch considered it unnecessary to plan for the acquisition of sites for cemeteries in foreign countries since the size, number, and location of cemeteries could not be determined until after the cessation of hostilities. Nor was there any need to plan for the expansion of national cemeteries in the United States since, on the basis of World War I experience, the great majority of the dead would be interred in private cemeteries. It was felt that the rate of expansion in some of the national cemeteries was more than adequate to provide grave sites far beyond the 10 percent of remains interred in national cemeteries in the World War I program for the return of the dead.\textsuperscript{123}

This policy study was reviewed by the Director, Special Planning Division, by the Directors of Operations and of Personnel, ASF, and by the Chief of Transportation. The study, together with copies of their remarks, was returned to The Quartermaster General with the advice that the broad policy recommended in the study was approved, but that "changing circumstances may make it necessary that a reexamination of the present plan take place with the conclusion of major hostilities in

\textsuperscript{121} Policy Study 34, Pt. I, pp. 1–2.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., Pt. II, Sec. B, pp. 1–7, 12–13.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., Pt. III, p. 1.
the European-African Theater.”

Criticism of the plan centered largely on the fact that the American Graves Registration Service was proposed as a separate, integrated organization apart from the existing theater commands. This, incidentally, was a criticism that was to be repeated, with variations, again and again throughout the two-year planning period. The Memorial Branch had projected an organization of zones and sectors that would come into operation at the end of the war when the military organizational scheme would be passing out of existence, but higher echelons of authority preferred to fit it into the existing military framework. The Director of Operations, ASF, considered that less attention should be paid to an elaborate graves registration headquarters throughout the world and more to the establishment of sections to fit into headquarters structures of Theaters of Operation.” He was supported in this position by the Director of Personnel, ASF, who thought “personnel should be allotted by the War Department to the Theater Headquarters for distribution to the sectors as organized within the existing chain of command.”

Responsibility for Disposition of All Dead

While the plan embodied in Policy Study 34 remained under general but continuous study, certain aspects of the problem resulted in separate planning programs, such as the one advanced for the expansion of the national cemeterial system to provide burial space for all veterans. Other phases, developed in separate planning programs during 1944, included the planning undertaken in connection with the assignment of responsibility to the Quartermaster General for returning the remains of all American dead, including those in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and civilian employees of the War Department and other governmental agencies, and the planning for the establishment of American Graves Registration Service area commands in quiescent theaters or in rearward areas far removed from the battle front of active theaters. By November work was begun on formulating final plans for the disposition of the war dead. These were approved in September 1945 and represented a synthesis of the planning submitted in the policy study of August 1943 and the separate planning programs of 1944.

Exploring the problem of postwar disposition of remains of the war dead, Colonel Harbold raised the question of consolidating all repatriation planning and operations in one agency in order to effect economies in personnel, to facilitate the distribution of supplies, evacuation of areas, and shipment of bodies to the United States, and to expedite completion of the task. He proposed vesting this responsibility in The Quartermaster General and to this end suggested a conference of the interested governmental departments. His program was approved by The Quartermaster General and presented to the Commanding General, ASF, in the summer of 1944. Forwarded through

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124 Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 28 Nov 43, sub: Demob Plng (Disposal of Dead).
125 (1) Transmittal sheet, Gen Lutes, Dir of Ops, ASF, to Dir of Control Div, ASF, 14 Aug 43, sub: TQMG Demob Plng. (2) 1st Ind, Deputy Dir of Pers, ASF, to Dir of Special Plng Div, 13 Oct 43, on Transmittal Sheet, Control Div to Dir of Pers, 24 Sep 43, sub: Demob Plng.
126 See above, National Cemeteries, pp. 369–73
127 Memo, Col Harbold, Dir of Memorial Div, for TQMG, 20 Jun 44, sub: Return of Dead Upon Cessation of Hostilities.
channels to the General Staff, the proposal met with favor, and The Quartermaster General was directed to call a conference for 25 August.\textsuperscript{128}

Responses were prompt and favorable. Apart from the Army, only the State Department had a policy and procedure—antedating that of the Army—for returning its dead from foreign lands. It was represented at the conference and expressed approval of the aims, but ultimately elected to follow its traditional course in caring for its dead. Among the other agencies and departments, only the Navy could point to any large number of remains in foreign lands, but from the beginning of the war it had co-operated closely with the Army in making burials and maintaining records. It had no desire to duplicate the Graves Registration Service.\textsuperscript{129} As a consequence, all of the agencies approved the program for vesting responsibility in The Quartermaster General as Chief, American Graves Registration Service, to effect the return of their dead and to create cemeteries in areas where the dead were not to be returned.

It was not expected that one conference could settle all details, but subsequent exploration of procedures and problems of co-operation, particularly with the Navy Department, led to a satisfactory clarification not only of such procedures as providing escorts, polling next of kin, and transferring jurisdiction over cemeteries established by the Navy or Marine Corps, but also of established graves registration policies.\textsuperscript{130}

\textit{Interservice Planning for Concentration of Remains}

While the Memorial Division, OQMG, and the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Department, were furthering inter-service co-operation within the scope of existing policy, changing conditions in the Pacific made it possible to reconsider early directives governing the disposition of remains that had been issued by the Navy. These directives had made no provision for the consolidation of remains from many small cemeteries in isolated areas in the Pacific because of the shortage of shipping and the necessity of maintaining supply lines. When in the fall of 1944 the naval bases in the Samoan Defense Group were about to be abandoned, the commandant of that Defense Group proposed removing remains from various points and reinterring them at the Tutuila Military Cemetery. Similar inquiries were made by the commanding general of the South Pacific Base Command.\textsuperscript{131} The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, recommended that no action be taken along the proposed lines until after the war, a position con-\textsuperscript{128} (1) Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 26 Jun 44, sub: Return of Dead Upon Cessation of Hostilities. (2) Memo, Dir of Special Plng Div, WDSS, for CG ASF, 21 Jul 44, same sub, and 1st Ind, Hq ASF to TQMG, 29 Jul 44. (3) Letters of invitation were sent out on 10 August to the Deputy Director of Plans and Operations for Demobilization, ASF, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy Department, the Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Air Transport Command, Chief of Chaplains, Transportation Corps, Red Cross, U.S. Maritime Commission, U.S. Employees Compensation Commission, and the Foreign Service Administration of the State Department. \textsuperscript{129} Ltr, Rear Adm Luther Sheldon, Jr., Actg Chief of BuSandA to TQMG, 15 Aug 44, sub: Eventual Return of Remains of Naval Pers. \textsuperscript{130} (1) Memo, William S. Douglass, BuSandA, for Col Harbold, 29 Sep 44, sub: Care of Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Dead in Overseas Areas. (2) Ltr, Harbold to BuSandA, 16 Oct 44, same sub. (3) For elaboration see Steere, \textit{The Graves Registration Service in World War II}, Ch. IX. \textsuperscript{131} Speed Ltr, CofS, COMSOPAC, to CINCPAC, 31 Oct 44, sub: Disinterment and Reinterment Bodies Cemeteries Certain SOPAC Islands.
curred in by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. The latter, however, felt that although no policy on disinterment and reinterment existed, such a policy would be needed, and he suggested action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  

With the concurrence of General George C. Marshall, the problem was referred to the Joint Logistics Committee for study. It created a subcommittee, to which Colonel Harbold, chief of the Memorial Division, was appointed as "Steering Member." The recommendations brought in by the subcommittee were approved with slight change by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In all theaters of operations the Army had been engaged for many months in progressively exhuming and concentrating its dead from isolated graves and small cemeteries. In effect, these recommendations converted the Army policy into one of joint action.

The recommendations provided that the Graves Registration Service of the Army would exhume American dead in small cemeteries outside the continental limits of the United States and concentrate them in larger, readily accessible military cemeteries located near Army installations. These activities, however, were not to interfere with military operations or divert transportation. Where it was not feasible to pursue such exhumation and concentration operations, steps were to be taken by the State Department to obtain the co-operation of the appropriate foreign government controlling the base to provide for adequate security and caretaking of the cemetery. The American Graves Registration Service was also made responsible for the care and concentration of remains at any Army or Navy bases that were to be relinquished in the future. This policy was communicated to the field in February 1945.

Graves Registration Area Commands (ZI) in Active Theaters

As planning progressed, developments in the theaters made it increasingly clear to Graves Registration officers in the field and in the Memorial Division that the problem of integrating elements of the proposed American Graves Registration Service into the active theater establishments would have to be solved. This need was first stressed in the Mediterranean theater where the theater commander was responsible for the security, care, and maintenance of cemeteries in North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy, and where the discharge of this responsibility involved the use of graves registration personnel allocated to the theater for the support of combat operations. Their use for this purpose in rearward areas of the theater, under conditions more or less identical to those in the zone of interior, diluted the strength of graves registration units and impaired their efficiency in the combat zone. This situation would prevail in any theater when combat zones moved forward and service elements closed up to support the combat formation. In time, the rearmost areas of the theaters became passive areas that had little or no strategical, tactical, or

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132 (1) 1st Ind, Deputy CINCPAC and CINCPOA to COMINCH, 23 Nov 44, on ltr cited n. 131. (2) Memo, Admiral Ernest J. King, COMINCH, for JCS, 11 Dec 44, sub: Disinterment and Reinterment of Bodies Outside Continental Limits of U.S.  

133 This action had been taken in accordance with instructions contained in TM 10-630 as amplified by a letter from The Quartermaster General to all the theaters, 13 August 1943, sub: Temporary Cemeteries and Interments Outside Continental Limits of U.S.  

134 (1) JCS Policy Memo 12, 17 Feb 45. (2) Ltr, TAG to CGs of All Theaters et al., 19 Feb 45, sub: Disinterment and Reinterment of Bodies Outside Continental Limits of U.S. (3) Deputy COMINCH-Deputy CNO to Chief of Naval Pers, 20 Feb 45, same sub.
logistical value to the theater commander. Yet the care and maintenance of military cemeteries in these areas had to be continued since they could not be evacuated until hostilities ended.

This was the problem attacked by the Memorial Division in collaboration with the Military Planning Division. In October 1944, Col. Thomas R. Howard, former chief of the Memorial Division and at that time Graves Registration Officer in the Mediterranean theater, was assigned for temporary duty to the OQMG to assist in this planning. The objectives of the program were twofold: first, to secure the immediate release of burdensome theater responsibilities that were dissipating the strength of graves registration companies as the communications zone expanded; and second, to augment gradually within the theater the number and types of Quartermaster graves registration units and appropriate supervisory headquarters so that when the war ended a self-contained American Graves Registration Service area command would be ready to initiate operations incidental to the final disposition of remains.

For this purpose the plan devised called for a program of organization and personnel based on operational requirements during four successive phases of development. Special type Quartermaster graves registration units were to be activated progressively, such as cemetery teams during the first phase and exhumation teams during the fourth phase. The supervisory headquarters included zone and sector headquarters to be set up immediately, with an area headquarters to be established in the third phase. It was thought that greater economy could be secured by allotting personnel to the special type Quartermaster graves registration units without charge to the theater overhead and assigning direct control of them to The Quartermaster General. In effect the theater commander was to divest himself of responsibility for maintaining temporary cemeteries in the rearward areas of his command, which would be administered by the Graves Registration Service area commanders. In November 1944 The Quartermaster General forwarded the plan through channels for approval, recommending that it be sent to the Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, for concurrence and that authorization be granted for presenting similar plans to other theater commanders.

The Director of Plans and Operations, ASF, offered some fundamental objections. He insisted that responsibility for all military cemeteries within the geographical area of an operational theater resided in the theater commander and that personnel assigned to the care of cemeteries had to be charged to the appropriate theater troop basis. Only inactivation of the command or alteration of its territorial boundaries could abolish or abridge the theater commander’s responsibility. Until that occurred, the responsibility of The Quartermaster General for overseas cemeteries should be limited to technical advice and assistance and the formulation of policies as laid down in basic directives. He recommended that the plan with these restrictive comments be submitted to the

135 For a detailed analysis of this program as set forth in Col T. R. Howard, Introductory Study of Phased Development of Activation of Graves Registration Area Commands and Subordinate Units, see Steere, The Graves Registration Service in World War II, Ch. IX.
136 Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 11 Nov 44, sub: Orgn for QM GrReg Sv.
137 1st Ind, Gen Lutes to ACofS OPD, WDGS, 25 Nov 44, on memo cited n. 136.
Commanding General, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, for his comment or concurrence.

The General Staff approved the suggested changes, and G-3 added the recommendation that the plan as modified "be submitted to the Commanding Generals of all Theaters for their information and not for comment or concurrence inasmuch as the Quartermaster General is now charged with the formulation of policies for the operation of graves registration services outside the continental limits of the United States." The plan was thereupon returned to The Quartermaster General to be rewritten, incorporating the recommended changes.

While the recasting of the plan involved no change in organizational structure, it required a restatement of relationships between the theater commander and the Graves Registration area commander and those that would later apply between the Chief, American Graves Registration Service, and the area commander. In the revised plan, responsibility for military cemeteries in the rearward areas was vested in the Graves Registration Service area command of the theater until such responsibility passed to the zone of interior. During this period the area command was to be under the administration and operational control of the quartermaster of the theater command. When a theater was discontinued or its geographical boundaries readjusted, responsibility passed from the theater commander to the zone of interior and The Quartermaster General assumed complete control of all Graves Registration Service activities in such areas. Initial activation of units of the Graves Registration area commands was to be accomplished by the utilization of personnel deployed in the theater and was to be charged against the theater troop ceiling. Copies of the revised plan were sent to the theaters on 30 January 1945.

The inquiry from the Mediterranean theater, which had speeded the formulation of a program for the organization of the Graves Registration Service in the theaters, had resulted in a plan that left the theater commander still saddled with the burdensome responsibility of caring for temporary cemeteries in areas that had lost their military significance. He was given a free hand in activating the elements of an area command in accordance with tables of distribution shown in the plan, but he remained responsible for the organization and had to continue charging the required personnel against his theater troop ceiling. The relief that he sought was denied. While the plan fell short of its original objectives, it nevertheless contributed toward the postwar organization that was established.

Current Plan for the Return of the Dead

At the time the plan for the organization of graves registration services in the theaters was being considered by higher echelons of authority, ASF headquarters became concerned about the status of final planning for the disposition of the war
dead. It directed the Quartermaster General to summarize the various planning projects already developed, merging them into a definite program. The OQMG completed the preparation of the final plan on 1 June 1945 and the War Department approved it on 8 September, four months after V-E Day and some three weeks following the surrender of Japan.\textsuperscript{142}

This so-called Current Plan incorporated many of the administrative and operating units outlined in Policy Study 34, although considerable revision was made in their number. Specifically, the Current Plan provided for three superior area commands that cut across theater boundaries—the American Area, the European and Mediterranean Area, and the Southwest Pacific and Asiatic Area.\textsuperscript{143} These area commands had no counterpart in the organizational scheme of August 1943, and except for the fact that the table of distribution for the headquarters of the Mediterranean theater area command was borrowed intact and applied to the headquarters establishments of two of the area commands, they bore no relationship to, and must not be confused with, the area commands of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Service (Zone of Interior).

The zone-sector organizational arrangement of Policy Study 34 was carried over into the Current Plan with provision made for fourteen zones in lieu of the twelve proposed in 1943, and for a somewhat different distribution of the zones, particularly in the European-Mediterranean Area. Similarly, there was incorporated in the Current Plan, with only minor changes, the internal organization of field operating sections and port offices described in Policy Study 34. It was estimated that 55 field sections would be required for the three area commands and only 30 port offices, which showed a sharp reduction from the 270 sections and 90 ports proposed in 1943.\textsuperscript{144}

Anticipating an early cessation of hostilities in Europe and the continuation for some time of large-scale operations against Japan, the Current Plan provided that until their redeployment or withdrawal for other reasons, all graves registration companies would be utilized to conduct a program of searching the battlefields for unburied remains and to locate isolated graves. They were to concentrate all such remains in established U.S. military cemeteries.

Before the withdrawal of the regularly constituted graves registration companies, cemeterial, exhumation, and reception teams and zone and sector headquarters would be organized and phased in according to the organizational plan for the Graves Registration Service (Zone of Interior) of 30 January 1945.\textsuperscript{145} A program for the return of the dead was not expected to begin for six months after the end of the war, and during this interim these supervisory headquarters and operating units would carry on the work of exhumation, concentration, and other activities of the Graves Registration Service. When the

\textsuperscript{142} (1) Memo, Dir of Plans and Opns, ASF, for TQMG, 30 Nov 44, sub: Current Plan for Return of American Dead and Establishment of Overseas and U.S. Cemeteries. (2) Memo, Col Harbold, OQMG, for Dir of Plans and Opns, ASF, 1 Jun 45, same sub. (3) Memo, Dir of Ping Div, ASF, for TQMG, 12 Sep 45, same sub. (4) This version, known as the Current Plan, was published by the AGO on 24 September under the title "Plan for Repatriation of the Dead of World War II and Establishment of Permanent United States Military Cemeteries at Home and Abroad." (Hereafter cited as Current Plan.)

\textsuperscript{143} Current Plan, p. 18; Exhibits D–G.

\textsuperscript{144} (1) Ibid., pp. 21–22. (2) Cf. Policy Study 34, Pt. II, Sec. B.

\textsuperscript{145} Current Plan, p. 18.
shipment of remains to the homeland was begun, this interim setup would be merged with the over-all organization consisting of three American Graves Registration Service areas and fourteen subordinate zone commands.

The Quartermaster General took steps at once to implement this plan. He pointed to the considerable amount of preparatory work that would have to be accomplished before a program for the return of the dead could be initiated. Because of the long-range character of the program, he emphasized the desirability of establishing a self-sufficient command, independent of other headquarters, so that its activities might be continued without interruption regardless of changes in other forces overseas. He therefore submitted a recommendation for the immediate creation of the American Graves Registration command for the Europe-Africa-Middle East Area.

Obviously, in the Current Plan approved by the General Staff, the area commands cut across theater boundaries, and, in implementing the plan, The Quartermaster General proposed to disregard the theaters and establish a self-contained area command under his direct operational control and supervision. The required personnel would be charged directly to this command.

When this implementation was forwarded to the General Staff in the form of a proposed general order, it immediately encountered objections, for, in establishing a separate command within a theater command it ran counter to War Department policy—a policy that had been set forth in the fall of 1944 in rejecting the original proposal for the organization of the Graves Registration Service (Zone of Interior). Criticism was also leveled at the fact that the proposed general order did not take cognizance of the theater command in designating the commanding general of the American Graves Registration command, nor did it charge personnel allocated for graves registration functions against the theater troop ceiling. The General Staff therefore directed that the order be rewritten to eliminate these conflicts with War Department policies, and further, that it be so drafted that it could "be projected into the Pacific Theater." 147

The OQMG submitted a revised general order on 29 October 1945. The War Department thereupon cabled the theater commanders for their comments and recommendations, in the light of which further changes were made, as, for example, setting up the Mediterranean area as a separate zone because delays were occurring in merging the European and Mediterranean theaters. The general order as finally published at the end of 1945 created two area commands—the European Theater (AGRS-ETA) and the Pacific Theater (AGRS-PATA) and seven separate zone commands.148

The order reiterated that theater commanders and commanders of department, base, and defense commands would be responsible for graves registration activities.

146 Memo, TQMG for CG ASF, 6 Sep 45, sub: Establishment of American GrReg Command in Europe-Mediterranean-North Africa-Middle East-Persian Gulf Theaters, and appended draft of proposed GO.
147 (1) DF, ACoS G-4 to TAG through OPD, 21 Dec 45, sub: Establishment of AGRS Command. (2) WD GO 125, 29 Dec 45, sub: AGRS Area and Separate Zone Commands. (3) The zone commands were the Eastern Defense Command, Alaskan Department, Caribbean Defense Command, Africa-Middle East Theater, India-Burma Theater, China Theater, and Mediterranean Theater.
within their respective command areas until their commands were abolished. At that time, responsibility for such activities would pass to The Quartermaster General. In the meantime, he was charged with technical supervision of all such activities. Required graves registration personnel would be provided within the authorized troop strength.

The publication on 29 December 1945 of General Order 125 marked the climax in the development of planning for the final disposition of the war dead. But the issuance of this order, more than four months after the unconditional surrender of Japan, did not mean that the program for the return of the war dead could be initiated immediately. A vast number of specific details to implement the program had still to be worked out, and innumerable problems, foreseen as well as unanticipated, would have to be solved before the first shipload of American war dead could be returned to their homeland.

The Memorial Division was well aware of the vast and complicated nature of the program it was undertaking. It was immediately concerned with detailed planning for the organizational setup of the area and zone headquarters and of the port offices which would implement the general authorization of 29 December. It had also to begin at once a program of search, recovery, identification, and concentration
of remains and the completion of burial records.

The inadequacy, inaccuracy, and incompleteness of existing burial records constituted a serious bottleneck in the program for the return of the war dead. Congress enacted legislation authorizing the program on 16 May 1946, but until burial records had been assembled and converted into usable form next of kin could not be polled on the arrangements they wished made. The first group were queried in March 1947. This polling was a gradual process accomplished by groups according to schedules of exhumation worked out in the field.

The program was handicapped not only by difficulties stemming from the lack of personnel available for clerical work during the war years, but by other difficulties over which the OQMG had no control. In particular, the return program was delayed by shortages of steel caused primarily by the pent-up civilian demand immediately following the war for such items as automobiles and refrigerators. The situation became critical when strikes in steel plants, and later in the coal fields, resulted in stoppages of steel production and led to the suspension by the Civilian Production Administration early in 1946 of all outstanding ratings and the adoption of an emergency priority system of allocating steel and iron. The Army failed in its efforts to obtain priority for the steel needed in casket production during this emergency period, and the deferred delivery of caskets necessitated a revision of operational schedules.

The steel supply remained exceedingly tight for several months after the steel and coal strikes had been settled, and it was late in July 1946 before the Army was finally successful in obtaining a higher priority rating. Moreover, much additional time was lost while manufacturers were tooling up and trying to solve the many production problems which arose, including strikes in several of the casket plants. As a result, it was the fall of 1947 before the availability of caskets for the return program was assured.

The Current Plan had originally set a date of six months after the end of hostilities to begin shipment home of remains. The task of resolving the various complications that developed delayed the start of such operations for two years. It was not until September 1947 that the first disinterment directives were sent to the Pacific and European areas. The first dead from the Pacific arrived on board the U.S. Army Transport Honda Knot at San Francisco on 10 October 1947, and those from Europe arrived on 25 October at New York on the Joseph V. Connolly.

Statistics on the Return of the Dead Program

According to the official estimate of the Memorial Division as of 30 June 1951, total U.S. fatalities overseas in World War II numbered approximately 359,000. Surprisingly, this figure is slightly smaller than the number of deaths in the Union Army alone in the Civil War, despite the global scope of World War II, its vast naval operations and aerial warfare, great increase in firepower, and the far larger number of
CARE OF THE DEAD 403

TEMPORARY U.S. MILITARY CEMETERY at Gela, Sicily, 1946.

However, disease took a toll of nearly 225,000 Union soldiers in the Civil War as contrasted with only 15,120 military and civilian personnel in World War II. On the other hand, the World War II death list overseas includes fatalities in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, as well as in the Army, and among civilians employed in the Maritime Commission, Red Cross, and all government agencies in the theaters, except the State Department which cared for its own dead. The number of persons who were killed or died overseas in World War I was approximately 81,500,154 or less than one fourth as many as in World War II, but the conflict lasted only nineteen months as compared with the forty-five months of World War II. In World War I action was

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153 The Army Almanac (Washington, 1950), p. 411, lists the number of Union Army fatalities at 359,528, but points out that the total number must have been somewhat larger because it is known that many of the records, especially those of southern prisons, were incomplete. The number of persons subject to the return of the dead program who were killed or died overseas in World War II is estimated by the Memorial Division at 358,967. This estimate included 279,180 in the Army of the United States, 49,329 in the Navy, 21,726 in the Marine Corps, 1,038 in the Coast Guard, and 7,694 civilians, of whom 6,000 were employed by the Maritime Commission.

154 The total number of fatalities overseas in World War I was 81,462, according to data on file in the Decedent Branch, Memorial Division, OQMG.
on a much smaller scale, and fewer than half as many troops were involved.

A total of 280,835 remains were recovered in the theaters during and following World War II.\footnote{Data, as of 30 June 1951, obtained from Memorial Div., OQMG, October 1951.} Although this represents only 78 percent of the fatalities, as contrasted with the impressive record of approximately 96 percent in World War I, most of the reasons why such a large number—78,132—were never recovered are fairly obvious. Naval and amphibious operations were on a vast scale and many more men were lost at sea than in World War I. Moreover, the fighting occurred in all parts of the world, including dense jungles, many little-known islands of the Pacific, and numerous other more or less isolated areas of the globe, a factor which seriously complicated and handicapped recovery. Similarly, air travel was exceedingly heavy over sea lanes, impenetrable jungles, and inaccessible mountain areas, such as the Hump in the China-Burma-India Theater. When planes crashed in such regions, recovery of the dead was often impossible, despite greatly improved search and recovery techniques developed during the war.

Of the 280,835 remains recovered, 270,479 were identified. The 10,356 who were not identified constituted 3.7 percent of the recoveries. This compares favorably with the 1,648 unknowns, or 2.2 percent, in World War I, if the greater difficulties of establishing identity in World War II are taken into consideration. For example, airplane crashes took an exceedingly heavy toll. Many of these planes were completely destroyed by fire or explosion, thus making identification of the dead virtually impossible. Tanks, too, were used much more extensively in World War II and their frequent destruction by fire posed a similar problem of identification.

As a result of instructions from next of kin, remains of 109,866 were buried overseas in permanent U.S. military cemeteries. The other 170,752, or approximately 61 percent, were returned to the United States. Of these, 132,753 were buried in private cemeteries and 37,248 in national cemeteries, while 751 were re-shipped to Canada, Mexico, and other countries.

The return program was financed by Congress in a series of appropriations, the first of which was enacted in May 1946, and the last in 1948. Total appropriations amounted to $190,869,000. For the 279,867 remains, including interments both overseas and in the United States, for which final disposition had been completed as of 30 June 1951 the Memorial Division estimated the average cost of recovery and burial of a soldier to be $564.50. No comparable figures are available for previous wars.
Shortly after its establishment on 11 July 1942, the Historical Section in the Office of The Quartermaster General projected a historical program calling for a series of monographs covering specific Quartermaster functions. These monographs were intended for later use in preparing the comprehensive history of the Quartermaster Corps in World War II. The pertinent monographs, together with studies prepared by historical units at the various QMC field installations, have provided the framework of research upon which much of this volume is based. These have been supplemented by a considerable amount of additional research since the monographic coverage of Quartermaster activities discussed in Volume II was not nearly so complete as it was for the supply operations analyzed in Volume I.

As in Volume I, where the authors used the approved, published monographs, the original collections of photostated documentary materials on file with the Historical Section were reviewed and citations were made directly from them. These materials, after the writing had been completed, were deposited with the Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General’s Office.

The additional source materials consulted in the preparation of this volume were located chiefly in the central files of the OQMG maintained by the Mail and Records Branch, and in the central files of the Adjutant General’s Office. Other documentary materials used, pertaining to both the OQMG and the Army Service Forces, are in the files in storage at the Federal Records Center at Alexandria, Va., that are administered by the Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General’s Office. The materials include circulars, office orders, and intraoffice memoranda; correspondence with field installations, with other government agencies, and with industry; inspection reports; directives from, reports to, and correspondence with agencies exercising controls over Quartermaster operations; transcripts of conferences and interviews; organization charts, manuals, and related data; and numerous other materials. The type of document used is indicated in footnote citations. Where such indication is not made, the document is part of the intraoffice correspondence of the OQMG.

These records are classified according to the War Department Decimal File System, supplemented by further breakdowns originated by the Mail and Records Branch, OQMG. The central files are divided into several main groups: geographic, subject, personnel, commercial, and miscellaneous. In the preparation of this volume the most useful files pertaining to such subjects as conservation, reclamation, salvage, and disposal of surplus property are found within the very broad, inclusive 400 series. Most documentary material on demobilization is filed in the 370.1 and 380 series. While materials on training and personnel may be located under many numbers, the most important files are the following series: 210 (commissioned and warrant officers); 220 (classification and assignment of
enlisted personnel); 320 (organization of the Army); 321 (officers and enlisted men); 352 (Army service and technical schools); and 353 (training). Materials on remount activities are filed chiefly in the 404 and 454 series; laundry operations, machinery, and supplies are located under 331.51, 412.3, and 438; and most documents on the care of the dead are filed in the 293 series. When file numbers have not been given in footnotes, specific documents can be located under the file numbers given above.

In addition to documentary sources, frequent interviews with key operating personnel provided the means for filling in gaps in the documentary evidence, reconciling apparently conflicting evidence, and helping to explain abstruse technical problems.

The authors have also found helpful the unpublished reports and monographs prepared by the Army Service Forces. Copies are on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department
   Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
   Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
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