Forging the Shield
The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

by
Donald A. Carter

Center of Military History
United States Army
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# ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Dr. Robert M. Citino</td>
<td>North Texas University</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Author</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

1. Setting the Stage  
   - Germany in 1950.  
   - The Emerging Threat and the Move Toward Collective Security  
   - The European Command in 1950  
   - Perceptions of a Rising Threat  

2. The New Mission  
   - Building the Seventh Army  
   - Growing Pains.  
   - Reorganization and Realignment  
   - Identifying the Threat.  
   - Firepower and Mobility: The Seventh Army’s Conventional Doctrine  
   - Early Thoughts on an Atomic Option  
   - Development of the Communications Zone  
   - Logistical Support for the New Mission  
   - Berlin, 1951–1952: Standing Fast and Showing the Flag  
   - The End of the Beginning  

   - 1953: The Cold War Takes a New Turn  
   - Keeping a Watchful Eye to the East  
   - Changes in Command and Combat Readiness  
   - The Seventh Army Goes Nuclear.  
   - Manning the Force: USAREUR’s Personnel Pipeline  
   - Additions and Subtractions: Organizational Changes in USAREUR and the Seventh Army  


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hardening the Support Structure</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settling in for the Long Haul</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Exercises</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Steadyin Influence</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Strengthening the Alliance</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building NATO’s Military Capabilities</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating USAREUR into the NATO Command Structure</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Support for Military Assistance Programs in Europe</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Military Liaison Missions and the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving the Alliance Forward</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rearming the Germans</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Toward a German Contribution to Western European Defense</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designing a Structure for German Integration—The European Defense Community</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Plans for Training the New German Army</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building a New German Army</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completing the German Army Assistance Program</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1955: A Year of Transition</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Look Comes to USAREUR</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Striving for Combat Readiness</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation GYROSCOPE</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The End of the Occupation in Austria</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Effect of German Sovereignty on U.S. Forces in Europe</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaching an Uneasy Equilibrium</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Achieving Atomic Mindedness</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The “Spirit of Geneva” Evaporates</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower Versus the Generals: The Army Struggles to Find a Role Within the New Look</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Leadership in USAREUR</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Effect of Funding Cuts on USAREUR</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for Atomic Warfare</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentomic Reorganization</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapting the Logistical Support Structure to Atomic Warfare</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complications of Alliance Defense Planning</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Second Thoughts</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The “New Look” Gets a New Look</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting Pentomic to the Test</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Training</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rethinking Concept C and COMZ Realignment</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. Army Southern European Task Force</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tying Up Loose Ends</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing Dependents</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconsiderations</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Approaching Stalemate</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-evaluating the Enemy</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREUR’s Role in the American Intervention</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Lebanon</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1958 Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning to Live with the Status Quo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Getting Along with the Neighbors</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Transfer of Military Liaison Functions</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the Office of the High Commissioner to</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the European Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Controlling the Message</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bones of Contention: Major Points of Friction Between German Civilians and the U.S. Army</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning to Get Along at the Local Level:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation and Goodwill Programs</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining the Relationships</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitting in with the French</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charities and Disaster Relief: Being a Good Neighbor When it Counted</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Convergence of Cultures—Elvis Goes to Europe</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The Berlin Crisis</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A Bone in the Throat”</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khrushchev Renews His Ultimatum</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wall</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winding Down the Confrontation</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. From New Look to Flexible Response</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looking Beyond Berlin: The Strategic Environment in 1961</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a New Division</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipping the Force for Flexible Response</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Priorities</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Distractions ................................................................. 457
Looking Toward the Future ........................................... 463

13. Conclusion: Defining an Era ........................................ 465

Bibliographical Note ......................................................... 471
Acronyms ........................................................................ 487
Map Symbols ..................................................................... 491
Index .............................................................................. 493

Tables

No.
2. Seventh Army Logistical Support ........................................ 74

Charts

No.
1. Organizational Structure of the European Command as of 31 December 1950 ......................................................... 11
2. Organizational Structure of the United States Army, Europe, 1 August 1952 .............................................................. 31
3. Organizational Structure Seventh Army, 31 January 1952 ......... 75
4. Allied Command Europe .................................................. 146

Maps

No.
1. Occupied Zones of Germany, August 1945 .......................... 2
2. Seventh Army Deployment Zones, West Germany, 1951 .......... 22
3. U.S. Army, Europe, Area Commands, 1 December 1952 ...... 33
4. Primary Approaches for Soviet Attack .................................. 39
5. European Command, Bremerhaven Lines of Communication ..... 59
6. Lines of Communication, France, 1950s ................................. 61
7. U.S. Army, Europe, Family Housing West Germany, 30 June 1953 .... 130
8. U.S. Army Training Cadres West German Army Troop Training Schools, 1956 ..................................................... 198
10. NATO/USAREUR War Plan, Lech-Weser Line, 1955 ......... 239
11. Seventh Army Command, West Germany, 1957 ................. 286
12. Seventh Army Defense Lines, West Germany, 1957 ............. 288
13. Nike Missile Sites, 30 June 1958 ........................................ 330
15. Beirut and Vicinity, Lebanon, 1958 ........................................ 352
16. Berlin Crossing Points, 1961 ........................................... 415
17. Seventh Army Dispositions in 1962 .................................. 437

Illustrations

General Thomas Handy, September 1949 ........................................ 8
Lt. General Manton S. Eddy, August 1950 .................................... 17
12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, in Dorningheim, October 1951 ........................................ 19
Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion build a ferry .......................... 46
19th Infantry patrol near Hanau, October 1951 ...................... 47
Soldiers conceal M26 tank near Hanau, October 1951 ............ 47
V Corps Artillery Fire Support Control Center ....................... 48
Situation map for Exercise COMBINE, October 1951 ............. 50
Armored half track of the aggressor forces during Exercise COMBINE, October 1951 .................................. 51
Field dental clinic, December 1952 ........................................ 53
Soldiers prepare fried chicken during a field exercise, November 1952 .................. 54
Headquarters, 7917th Labor Supervision Detachment, Fontenet tent area, January 1952 .................................. 62
571st Ordnance Ammunition Command, Captieux, France .......... 64
LACM pulls up to a floating dock and crane .......................... 66
USNS Pvt. Francis X McGraw at Le Tur Belle, France .............. 67
Troops unloading at La Pallice, France, April 1953 ............... 67
East German border guards and tank, 19 June 1953 ................ 84
Soviet tanks in Berlin, June 1953 ........................................ 85
Lt. General Charles Bolte, January 1953 ............................... 88
Marshal of France Alphonse Juin and General Hoge ............... 89
106-mm. recoilless rifle, October 1953 ................................. 90
Maj. Gen. James Gavin checks map coordinates ..................... 92
43d Infantry Battalion and 67th Tank Battalion, 2d Armored Division, move into attack position ..................... 94
A heavy tank company from 6th Infantry in Grunewald .......... 95
43d Infantry Division conducting reconnaissance with “westland” forces in Gresenhren ..................... 100
Soldiers of Company K, 110th Infantry, move through the outskirts of Gerberstein ..................... 101
A 280-mm. cannon, October 1955 ...................................... 103
1st Gun Section, Battery B, 59th Field Artillery Battalion .......... 103
Gun crew of the 91st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion ............ 114
A Gun jeep with 106-mm. recoiless rifle ........................................ 270
SETAF’s 543d Field Artillery Missile Battalion prepares
a Corporal missile ......................................................... 292
M59 armored personnel carrier ........................................ 302
Soldiers board an H–34 helicopter .................................. 303
Corporal erector .......................................................... 304
Corporal missile ready for launch .................................... 305
General Clyde D. Eddleman ............................................. 308
An H–34 helicopter ailsf to a 105-mm. howitzer ................. 316
Jeep equipped with recoilless rifles attached to an H–34 helicopter .......................... 317
Field maintenance shop in Rheinau ................................. 320
Corpsman administers Salk vaccine to U.S. dependents ......... 321
SETAF helicopter transports a small chapel to the summit
of Mt. Grignone ......................................................... 323
Rear Admiral Sherman R. Clark and Maj. Gen. John P. Daly ... 324
2d ACR trooper checks an East German guard tower near
Hof, Germany ............................................................ 334
Russian military missile display ....................................... 336
Tanks moving through Red Square .................................... 337
1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, 24th Infantry
Division unloads west of Beirut ....................................... 348
Soldiers of the 1st Airborne Battle Group move out after
landing at Beirut airport ................................................ 349
Soldiers catch up on the news in a foxhole in Beirut .......... 354
A lifeguard on a stand made of C-rations watches soldiers
swim in the Mediterranean ............................................ 355
“Airborne Annie” helps soldiers lay wire in Lebanon ........ 356
The 187th Infantry, 1st Airborne Battle Group on patrol .... 357
A German child meets a man portraying a Native American
in Mannheim ............................................................. 374
Red Diamond chorus and German orphans sing Christmas carols ... 398
Santa visits the children of Friedberg Kinderheim, December 1955 . 398
Sgt. Elvis Presley briefs his reconnaissance team .............. 401
Construction of the wall around Brandenburg Gate ............ 413
“Wall of Shame” looking from East Berlin ....................... 414
1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, passes Helmstedt checkpoint .. 418
1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, waits at Helmstedt checkpoint . 419
U.S. MPs on the West Berlin side of Wilhelmstrasse .......... 421
U.S. armed patrol escorts a USAREUR-registered civilian
vehicle into East Berlin .................................................. 422
Reinforced rifle squad preparing to set up on border .......... 424
Allied entry point to East Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie ....... 425
Davy Crockett in Jeep mounted mode .............................. 443
A three-man crew prepares the Davy Crockett ................. 444
Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson ........................................ 450
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 2d Artillery, 8th Infantry Division during Exercise WINTERSHIELD II ........................................ 454

Most of the major military conflicts between the end of World War II in 1945 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were fought in Asia and the Middle East. Ironically, Europe, where no war was fought, was the epicenter of the Cold War. The stakes were highest there for both sides as two fundamentally opposed ideologies and political systems confronted each other across the so-called Iron Curtain. The forces of Western Europe and the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet Union and its European satellites created a rival Warsaw Pact. Both sides saw war in Europe as a potential Armageddon that could bring total victory or catastrophic defeat. As a result, both sides shaped their political and military strategies and arranged their military forces to fight that war. By the time the Cold War ended in 1989 with the destruction of the Berlin Wall—the Iron Curtain incarnate—and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, both sides had spent huge sums of money and devoted vast human resources to preparing for a war that thankfully never came.

In 1951, however, war in Europe seemed imminent and perhaps even inevitable. The East-West conflict had already gone hot a year earlier with the fighting on the Korean peninsula. To the leaders of the West, especially the United States, that far off conflict was seen as simply the prelude to the start of the main struggle for the real “prize”: Europe. The United States had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, pledging military support for the nations of Western Europe in the event of Communist incursion. Thus, for the first time in its history, America had bound itself by treaty obligations as a member of a standing alliance. In February 1951, after a series of congressional hearings devoted to the subject, President Harry S. Truman determined to reinforce the weak U.S. occupation forces still in Europe with four additional divisions. The reactivation of the Seventh Army in Europe and its preparations to face the armies of the Soviet Union in defense of Western Europe marked the beginning of a forward deployed strategy for the United States Army that remained in place for the duration of the Cold War.

Forging the Shield tells the story of the U.S. Army in Europe during the critical 1950s and early 1960s. It spans the period between the return of major U.S. combat forces to Germany in 1951 and the aftermath of the Berlin crisis of 1961–1962. During that time, the troops in Europe became the public face
of the Army to Europeans and Americans as well as to the rest of the world. The service directed almost all of its training, equipment, and force development toward that potential day when its troops would face Soviet divisions streaming through the Fulda Gap and into Germany. The establishment of a credible conventional deterrent in Germany, backed up with our nuclear forces, was one of the central linchpins of the U.S. strategy of containment of Soviet power. It was a visible symbol to the world that America had placed its flag and its soldiers—its citizens-in-arms—in harm’s way to reinforce its commitment to peace and freedom in Europe. This important volume tells the story of the U.S. Army in the early days of the Cold War as our commitment evolved into the multigenerational defense of Europe and the values of freedom. The Army in Europe has remained a central pillar of U.S. defense and foreign policy throughout the Cold War and into the new reality of post–Cold War Europe today.

Washington, D.C.  RICHARD W. STEWART
1 February 2015 Chief Historian
Donald A. Carter was born in Albany, New York, and grew up in Oneida, New York. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1977 and served as a Field Artillery Officer until 1992. During that time, he received a Ph.D. in history from the Ohio State University in 1985 and served as a military history instructor, both at West Point and at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. After leaving the Army he joined the U.S. Army Center of Military History as an archivist. In 1995 he left CMH to serve with the Gulf War Declassification Project and the U.S. Army Declassification Activity. He returned to CMH in 2003 as a historian. His publications include “Eisenhower Versus The Generals,” in *Journal of Military History* (October 2007); “The U.S. Military Response to the 1960–1962 Berlin Crisis,” for a National Archives pamphlet commemorating the release of Cold War records; and “Wargames in Europe: The U.S. Army Experiments with Atomic Doctrine,” in *Blueprints for Battle* (University Press of Kentucky, 2012). He is married with two children and lives in Dale City, Virginia.
In the introduction to Volume I of *American Military History*, Richard W. Stewart argues that military history is more than the study of armed conflict, campaigns, and battles. It is also the story of how societies form their institutions for their collective security and how those institutions operate in war and peace. It is the story of soldiers and the subculture of which they are a part. In a broad sense, Stewart concluded, military history has to study the armed forces as institutions and as manifestations of the power of the state.1 This approach is particularly appropriate in the case of the Cold War, which was, by and large, a conflict contested by means other than combat. Throughout the extended face-off between the Communist and non-Communist blocs, both sides jockeyed for position in other ways, through economics, propaganda, public opinion, information management and distribution, intimidation, and in some cases, bluff.

For the most part, U.S. military and political leaders, and the intelligence networks that supported them, believed that the Soviet Union did not desire war with the West. To some extent, this was based on an assumption that no sane individual or government would risk global war—nuclear war—for whatever gains might be achieved in Europe. From there, it is not a great leap to the evolution of a grand strategy in Europe rooted in the perception of commitment. Neither the United States nor the nations of Western Europe had a desire to match the military strength of the Soviet Union. For most of the Cold War period, but particularly during the ten years immediately following the end of World War II, the West harbored a greater desire for economic and social recovery. With that in mind, beginning with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the American strategy became one of demonstrating its determination to support the nations of Western Europe. As long as America’s military policies and structures showed its clear commitment to preventing Soviet expansion, U.S. leaders believed the Communists would not be tempted to launch an attack because of the expectation of an easy win. If the West could

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convince the Communists that the cost would not be worth the risk, the Bear would not attack.

Clearly, the linchpin of this strategy was the demonstrated, unequivocal guarantee of the United States to help defend Western Europe. Without the promise of U.S. manpower, industry, and military technology to back it up, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense was credible. For the United States, the down payment on its commitment was the reactivation of the Seventh Army in Europe in December 1950. By that time, the mighty armed force that had marched across the continent to subdue Nazi Germany in 1945 had evaporated, leaving behind a feeble shell barely capable of carrying out the occupation mission assigned to it. The return to Europe of a complete field army, and the development of command and control, administration, and the logistical infrastructure to support it sent a clear signal to the Soviets as intended. Whether it presented a credible forward defense in and of itself, or merely served as the trip wire for a nuclear response was never particularly relevant. The force represented an American commitment to the continent.

Throughout the 1950s, most of the senior officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to the command were veterans of World War II who retained much of the confidence they had gained through victory in that conflict. Although some new technologies had emerged, most of their vehicles, weapons, and equipment were the same they had used to defeat the Axis. While war with the Soviet Union was in no way a pleasant prospect, it was not yet the unthinkable Armageddon it would eventually become. With the successful testing of thermonuclear weapons still a few years off and without a clear understanding of the full implications of a nuclear exchange, many officers still considered the atomic bomb to be just another weapon in the American arsenal. Theirs was a generation that had not only invented the atomic bomb, but had employed it in combat, twice. It would be a few more years before the bomb, ballistic missiles, and concepts of deterrence and mutual assured destruction would come to dominate military strategic thought.

That being said, at least in the early days of the U.S. Army, Europe’s, (USAREUR) forward deployment mission, its leaders believed that they could give a good account of themselves in battle with the Soviets. While they acknowledged the Soviet’s numerical superiority, many believed that the training, doctrine, and the quality of the U.S. troops and equipment tended to even the odds. Through their maneuvers, tests, and exercises, USAREUR and the Seventh Army tried to develop the tactics and doctrine that would enable them to fight outnumbered and win.

By the middle of the 1950s, the U.S. Army had become enmeshed in the larger strategic debates of the period. The growth in the number of atomic weapons and the development of larger, more powerful warheads threw into question existing beliefs and preconceptions of modern warfare. It was a time of soaring political rhetoric as leaders on both sides sought to reconcile national goals and ideals with the reality of the Cold War. In the United States the Army found itself struggling to justify its existence as it competed with the Air Force
and the Navy for money, resources, and a clearly defined role in the nation’s
defense. Even though the Eisenhower administration retained its infatuation
with atomic weapons and the Strategic Air Command, the president himself
never wavered in his support for the Army’s mission in Europe. As a result,
despite calls from many quarters for a downsizing, if not complete elimination
of the Army’s ground combat responsibilities, the troops remained overseas as
the cornerstone of NATO’s defense force. As such, USAREUR and the Seventh
Army helped to preserve the traditions and skills of a ground combat force as
the rest of the service grappled with larger strategic and institutional issues.

Even though it was part of the larger debate, USAREUR had to keep its
focus on more pragmatic concerns. New weapons and equipment inevitably led
to changes in organization and doctrine. When the Army tried to take advantage
of battlefield atomic weapons to offset cuts in troop strength and conventional
arms and equipment by devising a new divisional organization, Seventh Army
divisions converted to the new pentomic structure. The command spent the
next several years testing and refining the new concept.

With most of the national defense budget going to strategic programs that
emphasized air and sea power, USAREUR struggled to meet its mission and
support requirements with the limited resources available. U.S. Army leaders
in Europe had to make difficult choices in allocating money for training,
maintenance, and construction. These were crucial decisions, for in contrast to
their counterparts in the United States, the leaders dealt with the Soviets and
East Germans every day. They interacted with the West German government,
its citizens, and ultimately, its armed forces on a regular basis. The command
had to prepare for that time when political theory might erupt into reality. The
officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army in Europe had to come up with realistic
approaches and solutions to the very real issues they faced each day.

Nowhere was this more true, or the effects of the U.S. presence in Europe
so keenly felt, as in the divided city of Berlin. Throughout the Cold War, but
particularly during the period between the blockade and airlift from 1948 to
1949 and the building of a wall separating eastern and western sections of the
city in 1961, Berlin sat at the epicenter of the East-West conflict. American and
Soviet military personnel, as well as Germans on both sides, faced each other
on a daily basis and played a dangerous game of one-upmanship that could
easily have escalated out of control. If war was going to erupt in Europe during
this time, it was probably going to start in, or be about, Berlin.

In many ways the 1950s represents a golden age in the history of the United
States Army. Between the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the escalation
of the conflict in Vietnam beginning in 1963, the force in Europe was what the
American public identified as the United States Army. Its presence in Germany
evoked memories among the millions of soldiers who had served there during
World War II and the subsequent occupation. It was a force that was, for the
most part, popular in Europe as a visible symbol of an American commitment
to keep its allies free from Communist oppression. More important, the Army
as an institution still enjoyed the prestige and respect of a civilian population
that had not yet heard of Vietnam. In the early 1960s, it would be the Army of Elvis, and a force popularized weekly on television by the Big Picture and on radio by the Army Hour.

It would perhaps be too much to say that it was the presence of the U.S. Army in Europe that saved the continent from Soviet domination. It is hard to measure to what extent the force served to deter Communist aggression. Nonetheless, it seems clear that, as the most visible expression of an American commitment to support the nations of Western Europe, the U.S. Army’s deployment there during the continent’s most vulnerable years posed an unacceptable risk to those who calculated the odds. Although Soviet planners could not predict with any degree of certainty what the American response would be, the presence of so many of its citizens on the continent, already prepared to fight, ensured that there would be one.

In a broader sense, the force in Europe during the 1950s provides the historical, doctrinal, and spiritual link between the G.I.’s of World War II and Korea and the grunts who would fight in Vietnam. For most of the period, the Soviet Union and the nations of the Warsaw Pact were the designated opponents against whom the American military prepared to fight. The U.S. Army, in particular, developed its weapons and equipment, designed its doctrine, organized its units, and trained its soldiers to fight the Soviets in Western Europe. It was not until the early 1960s and the construction of the Berlin Wall that the U.S. military began to turn its attention away from Western Europe and toward new potential conflicts in other parts of the world. The next decade would force the Army to prepare for a different kind of war as it began its intervention into Southeast Asia.

This book covers the period between 1951, the reactivation of the Seventh Army in Europe, and 1962, the immediate aftermath of the crisis leading up to the building of the Berlin Wall. As an official history of the U.S. Army, it is based, for the most part, on the records of that organization. Although its structure is essentially chronological, two topics stood out as transcending this approach and meriting independent discussion. The role of USAREUR in rearming and training the new German Army spans several years and is perhaps the Army’s single greatest contribution toward maintaining security in Western Europe. Likewise, the relationship between American soldiers and their French and West German hosts evolved over time and is a critical element in telling the story of the U.S. Army in Europe. Both subjects are discussed in depth in separate chapters at appropriate points in the book.

Although military jargon has been kept to a minimum, some German words or phrases that have become ubiquitous in the language of American soldiers, kasern and gasthaus come to mind, have been retained. For place names we have relied on the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Many people contributed to the successful completion of this book. Although I cannot mention all of them here, a number deserve special thanks. As Chiefs of Military History, Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, Jeffrey Clarke, and Robert Dalessandro provided material and moral support throughout
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Finally I would like to express my gratitude to my family for supporting my work throughout the many years, and also to Professors Allan Millett and Williamson Murray at the Ohio State University, who got me started along this road so many years ago.

The final work is the product of the efforts, guidance, and advice of all of those noted above. As always, I alone am responsible for whatever errors or inadequacies remain.

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DONALD A. CARTER
In the five and a half years following D-Day, the mission of U.S. troops in Europe had come almost full circle. From total war it had moved through demobilization and peacetime occupation to combat readiness as part of an international defense against Soviet expansionism and intimidation. In the process, the U.S. Army in Europe had begun planning and reorganizing for that new role, but in 1950, the troops and support facilities necessary to carry out the mission were lacking. The existing command structure in Europe, the European Command (EUCOM), was a product of the postwar occupation and unprepared to direct a theater of war. Perhaps most significantly, the absence of an established logistical system to support a buildup of U.S. forces made the American commitment to help defend Western Europe an empty promise at best. It seemed clear that if U.S. policy in Europe was to be credible, it would be necessary to reinforce U.S. forces there to a point where they could present a realistic counterweight to the threat posed by the Soviet Army.

Germany in 1950

Although American soldiers also manned garrisons in Austria and Trieste, the center of the U.S. Army’s presence in Europe was Germany. As 1950 began, the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union occupied those portions of Germany that they had inherited when they divided the defeated nation into four zones of occupation in 1945. The U.S. Zone covered the southern third of the country and consisted of the German states of Hesse, Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg, along with a smaller region surrounding the northern ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven on the North Sea. The British sector comprised the northwestern portion of Germany, and included the states of Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia. In the westernmost part of Germany, French forces occupied a smaller section that the Allies had carved out of the original American and British zones. It contained two barely contiguous regions that met at a single point along the Rhine River near Baden-Baden and included portions of Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and the Saarland. The Soviets claimed as their responsibility almost all of eastern Germany. Their occupation zone included the former German states of Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The four Allied powers had also divided the
German capital of Berlin into four sectors (Map 1). The portion controlled by the Soviet Union came to be called East Berlin, while the sectors controlled by the Western allies became West Berlin. Thus split, the city sat like an island in a Communist sea, one hundred miles east of the line that divided Soviet occupied Germany from the Western zones.

From the North Sea to Austria, and from France to the Elbe River, the three Western zones collectively covered an area of roughly 95,750 square miles. The population of 50.8 million included more than 8 million refugees or expellees, who had migrated or had been forced out of homes to the east. Topographically, the northern coastal plain was quite flat and, in the east, extended southward almost 120 miles. Farther west and throughout the central region the terrain was dotted with foothills and forests. In the southernmost areas, those that included the American-controlled states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, the elevation rose steadily and the rolling hills increased, culminating in the Bavarian Alps in the south and the Black Forest in the southwest. Most of the region’s major rivers, including the Rhine, Weser, and Elbe flowed from south to north, emptying into the North Sea. The Danube, however, flowed generally eastward from its source in the Black Forest, draining much of southern Germany and emptying eventually into the Black Sea.1

Less than five years after its surrender in 1945, the Western portion of occupied Germany was on its way to full political sovereignty. On 8 April 1949, the United States, Great Britain, and France signed an agreement merging their three zones and allowing the formation of a German-elected government. Referred to as the Occupation Statute, the agreement assigned to the new body all governmental powers except those designed to preserve the rights of the Western allies to keep and maintain troops in their assigned areas, to assume control in the event of an emergency, and to enforce the terms of the surrender. In accordance with the terms of surrender, the Allies had disbanded all German armed forces, leaving only local police and a small border patrol force. The agreement ended the period of military government in Germany and turned the remaining administrative responsibilities of occupation over to the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG). This office consisted of eight major subdivisions that monitored and assisted the developing German government in the areas of economic affairs, political affairs, general counsel, military security, labor affairs, intelligence, public affairs, and administration. The first high commissioner, John J. McCloy, assumed his post in May 1949. Four months later, in September, the first freely elected German parliament since 1933 opened its first session in Bonn and established the German Federal Republic, or West Germany.2

By 1950, West Germany had begun to recover from the effects of Allied bombing, invasion, and occupation after World War II. Although its population had suffered painful food shortages during the initial years of the occupation, the recovery of many of the nation’s family-owned farms had restored agricultural production to near prewar levels, and Western assistance made up much of the shortfall. Postwar inspections revealed that German industry had not been destroyed to the extent that earlier bomb damage assessment had estimated. After five years, much of Germany’s coal and steel production had begun to recover, while other industries stood poised to begin a decade-long expansion that historians and economists would label the West German miracle. Observers in HICOG noted that the economy was still in a period of readjustment, required by the loss of resources and markets in the east. By the end of 1950, however, currency reform, and the introduction of the common deutsche mark (DM) across West Germany and West Berlin, seemed to be the necessary catalyst, and German industry began to approach prewar levels.\(^3\)

For the most part, the Germans themselves were still somewhat ambivalent regarding their position in the developing rift between the former Allies. Even though the economy was beginning to pick up steam many still chafed at the limitations and restrictions placed on them by occupation rule. A steady stream of refugees from the East provided ample evidence that life under Communist rule was no better than their own, and quite possibly worse. Still, for most Germans, the eventual reunification of their divided nation was of far greater importance than the larger East-West conflict.\(^4\)

### The Emerging Threat and the Move Toward Collective Security

Almost as soon as the surrender documents had been signed in Europe, the ties that bound the Soviet Union to the Western allies began to disintegrate. Resistance from the United States and Western Europe to Soviet demands for reparations from Germany created friction between the former allies. Meanwhile, political pressure from the Soviet Union, reinforced by the presence of its victorious armies in the heart of Europe, drew Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, and, eventually, Czechoslovakia under Soviet domination. In February 1946, a lengthy telegram from the deputy head

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\(^3\) Zink, *The United States in Germany*, pp. 260, 293–303; McCloy’s Statement on Western European Integration, 19 Mar 1950, Entry 6, Rcds of the European Command, Record Group (RG) 549, National Archives, College Park, Md. (NACP).

of the U.S. Mission in Moscow, George F. Kennan, to the State Department provided a firsthand description of Soviet expansionism and warned that the West must act to contain it. Increasing Communist influence in France and Italy coupled with an active insurgency in Greece further fueled Western suspicions of Soviet intentions and, in March 1947, prompted President Harry S. Truman to declare a policy of American military and economic support for nations battling against Communist expansionism. In June of that same year, the Kremlin refused to cooperate with a plan by U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall for European recovery, forbade East European countries from participating, and launched a campaign in the Western press condemning the program.5

Tensions between the former allies came to a head in June 1948. They failed to agree on economic policies for occupied Germany, and the Western allies introduced, in their zones, currency reforms that replaced the reichsmark with a new deutsche mark. When the allies began to issue the new currency in the Western sectors of Berlin, the Soviets responded by increasing restrictions on road, rail, and barge traffic into the city until, by 24 June, they had cut off all Western ground access to Berlin.6 During the next fifteen months, American and British pilots flew 2,343,301 tons of food, coal, and other essential supplies into the blockaded city. Although the Soviets officially lifted the blockade in May, the allies continued the airlift through the end of September 1949 to ensure that a suitable stockpile was in place.7

The growing Soviet pressure on Berlin and the larger sense of threat it instilled throughout Germany added momentum to an ongoing re-evaluation of the U.S. position in Western Europe. As part of a review of U.S. foreign policy in 1948, Kennan, the director of the State Department’s policy planning staff, had ventured that some form of political, military, and economic union in Western Europe would be necessary if those nations were to hold their own against Communist interference and encroachment. Planning was, in fact, well underway by then. It came to fruition in March 1948, with the signing of the Treaty of Brussels. The signatories—the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—resolved to work together to promote


6 Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, p. 147; Min, HQ, European Command (EUCOM), Deputy Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 22, 29 Jun 1948, Entry 211, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1947–1951, RG 549, NACP.

European economic recovery and took the first steps toward establishing a program for their mutual security. Initial achievements included an integration of air defenses and the creation of a joint command structure known as the Western Union Defense Organization. On 30 April 1948, the defense ministers and military chiefs of staff of the five Treaty of Brussels countries began a series of meetings to study their military equipment needs and to determine what supplementary aid they could request from the United States. Beginning in July, American and Canadian defense leaders attended the meetings in a nonmember status.8

The following year, 1949, proved to be decisive in fully engaging the United States in the security interests of Western Europe. After nearly twelve months of preliminary talks, on 4 April, twelve Western nations including the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, which established the basis for an integrated defense of Western Europe. Under the terms of Article 5 of the treaty, all parties agreed that they would consider an attack against any one or more of them as an attack against all. Furthermore, in the event of such an attack, each nation pledged to render assistance, including the use of military force. In a departure from its historical position of nonalignment, the United States entered the alliance, committing its armed forces to the defense of foreign soil prior to an actual declaration of war. Despite concerns that the pact threatened the nation’s traditional abstention from foreign entanglements, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on 21 July.9

In a further expression of the American commitment, on 6 October, President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which authorized the allocation of $1 billion to NATO members for the purchase of equipment, materials, and services that would strengthen their capabilities for individual or collective defense. Congressional leaders debating the aid package tied it directly to European acceptance of a coordinated defense plan under a single unified command. Those in opposition to the bill argued that the European nations had not yet shown that they would be willing to make such a commitment. Despite these misgivings, early in December 1949 NATO’s

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twelve member nations met in Paris and gave unanimous approval to plans for an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area.\textsuperscript{10}

The European Command in 1950

The major U.S. military headquarters in Europe in 1950 was the European Command, located in Heidelberg, Germany, and commanded by Army General Thomas T. Handy. Its varied responsibilities included the coordination of administrative and logistical support to its component commands, the preparation and coordination of emergency and evacuation plans for U.S. forces in Europe, and the coordination and review of budget requests and priorities. Although designated as a unified command by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, the headquarters was manned almost exclusively by Army personnel. On 1 January 1950, the three service components of the command—United States Army, Europe (USAREUR); United States Air Force, Europe (USAFE); and United States Naval Force, Germany (USNAVFORGER)—represented a total of 103,038 assigned or attached military personnel.\textsuperscript{11}

Also located in Heidelberg, USAREUR began 1950 as a fully operational headquarters responsible for the administration, support, and control of most U.S. Army units in the theater. Its major subordinate units included the U.S. Constabulary, headquartered at Vaihingen, Germany, ten miles northwest of Stuttgart; the 1st Infantry Division, headquartered at Bad Tölz, twenty miles south of Munich; and the various military posts that provided administrative and logistical support to American occupation troops throughout the U.S. Zone. In all, the command numbered about eighty-three thousand soldiers. Although it functioned as a separate headquarters, USAREUR remained closely associated with EUCOM throughout most of 1950. As in previous years, many personnel played dual roles within staff divisions of both organizations.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition to Germany, U.S. Army forces performed postwar duties in other conquered nations of Europe. Almost fifteen thousand soldiers assigned to U.S. Forces, Austria, continued to perform occupation duties there. Another contingent of five thousand, identified as Trieste United States Troops (TRUST), helped to provide security in that city, which was located on the Italian Adriatic coast and had been divided between U.S. and British occupation forces on one side and the Yugoslav Army on the other. Although neither command belonged


\textsuperscript{11} Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 31–33, 68; Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 8–10. Both in Historians files, CMH.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
to EUCOM, reporting instead directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both relied on the command for administrative and logistical support.

As the last remaining U.S. Army division serving with the occupation forces in Germany, the 1st Infantry Division had dispersed throughout the U.S. Zone and Berlin. In 1947, EUCOM initiated efforts to reassemble the majority of the division to serve as a theater reserve. The command relieved division personnel from most of their occupation duties and directed the division commander, Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn, to begin a program of tactical training and improved combat readiness. By 1950, however, most of its subordinate units remained scattered across the U.S. Zone while USAREUR and EUCOM leaders searched for suitable locations to consolidate them.\(^\text{13}\)

At the same time, Army leaders in Europe also took steps to realign the U.S. Constabulary. Upon its activation in July 1946, the Constabulary’s mission had been to maintain general military and civil security, to assist the military government in carrying out its objectives, and to control the borders of the U.S. Zone of occupation. Constabulary troops also helped train a new German police force that handled most cases dealing with German civilians. At its peak the Constabulary consisted of thirty-two thousand men, organized into three brigades, nine regiments, and twenty-seven squadrons. Each squadron consisted of five troops, three mechanized with M5 or M8 armored cars and two motorized with jeeps. Additionally, each regiment had a light tank company equipped with M24 tanks, a section of nine liaison-type airplanes, a horse platoon of thirty mounted men for work in difficult terrain, and a motorcycle platoon for highway patrols. Headquarters and service troops provided administrative and maintenance support for each regiment. Constabulary units maintained an active patrol system and cooperated closely with German local and border police throughout the U.S. Zone. Separate constabulary squadrons operated in Berlin and Austria but were not part of the U.S. Constabulary proper.

By the end of 1948, German police had assumed responsibility for most security duties in the U.S. Zone and EUCOM ordered U.S. forces to begin reorganizing into a more tactical posture. On 20 December, the Constabulary completed a transformation into a more combat ready force by reorganizing its 2d, 6th, and 14th Regiments into armored cavalry regiments. The new units received shipments of light and heavy tanks and other new equipment, while an increased emphasis on recruiting in the United States helped to provide the additional manpower they required. At the same time, the command inactivated two other squadrons, the 15th and 37th, to provide personnel for two new field artillery battalions, the 70th and 74th.

Beginning in 1947 for elements of the 1st Infantry Division and in 1948 for the three new armored cavalry regiments of the Constabulary, EUCOM conducted a tactical training program designed to return the units to an acceptable level of combat readiness. During the winter of 1948–1949, every battalion spent two weeks in cold weather training at Grafenwöhr, an old German Army training area about forty miles northwest of Nuremberg. Exercise NORMAL in the summer of 1948 and Exercise HARVEST in September 1949 provided the units with an opportunity to demonstrate their combat proficiency. While observers noted that the participants exhibited excellent mobility and a sound grasp of

15 Min, HQ, EUCOM, Deputy Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 13 Apr 1948, Entry 211, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1947–1951, RG 549, NACP; Historical Division, EUCOM, Reorganization of Tactical Forces: V-E Day to 1 January 1949, 1950.
tactical fundamentals, they pointed out that much still remained to be done. In particular, General Handy noted that many of the World War II vintage vehicles and weapons could not stand up to the strain of the maneuvers.\textsuperscript{16}

Over the next year, additional exercises led EUCOM’s leaders to believe that the command was well trained by peacetime standards, but they acknowledged that it was difficult to apply a single set of measures to such evaluations. During Exercise RAINBOW, conducted between 11 and 18 September 1950, the command once again tested its major combat units in a series of combat exercises. The enemy, portrayed by the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, attacked across the eastern border of the U.S. Zone on the morning of 11 September. Friendly forces, consisting of the 1st Infantry Division, the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and other elements of the Constabulary, withdrew to predetermined positions, conducted defensive operations, and launched a counteroffensive on 13 September. Assisted by simulated allied reinforcements, the defenders completed their operations by 18 September, attaining all objectives and driving the aggressor back across the border. On the basis of their performance during Exercise RAINBOW, the EUCOM deputy chief of staff for operations, Brig. Gen. Edward T. Williams, estimated that Army elements within the command had an operational readiness of 85 percent but would need an additional three months of intensive training for them to be fully ready for combat.\textsuperscript{17}

Other efforts to restore the 1st Infantry Division and the Constabulary to higher levels of combat readiness were also beginning to pay off. One of the most significant developments was the progressive buildup to desired overstrengths of the major tactical units in the European Command. By the end of May 1950, the 1st Infantry Division was at 96.5 percent of its total personnel authorization while the Constabulary was at 97 percent. By mid-August, both organizations exceeded 100 percent of their authorized strengths (\textit{Chart I}).\textsuperscript{18}

Despite the progress that EUCOM made, other impediments to combat readiness remained. As the number of troops assigned to EUCOM continued to rise, so too did the number of military dependents. Army leaders acknowledged the value to morale of having families accompany deploying soldiers, but also recognized the numerous challenges that would be associated with an increased civilian community. In several cases, a shortage of troop housing prevented the command from consolidating its tactical units. Because many units were still dispersed in occupation locations, they lacked ranges and local training areas where they could develop tactical skills on a daily basis.


\textsuperscript{18} Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 70–71; Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, USAREUR, p. 105.
*USAREUR, though still in existence, was no longer operational as of 31 December 1950.

The only large-scale maneuver area available for training units of battalion size or larger was the former German Army site at Grafenwöhr. The force in Europe also lacked any semblance of a logistical support base capable of sustaining a wartime theater. Most of the maintenance, supply, ordnance, and other service units needed to support the combat elements were not available. Perhaps most important, almost all of EUCOM’s supplies and reinforcements came into the theater through the German port of Bremerhaven on the North Sea. The line of support linking the port and the command’s deployed units ran parallel to the border between the allied and Soviet zones in Germany and within easy reach of any potential Soviet advance.19

**Perceptions of a Rising Threat**

By the beginning of 1950, events had conspired to convince many military and political leaders in the United States that conflict with the Soviet Union was imminent. In September 1949, U.S. scientists picked up traces of radioactivity over the Pacific Ocean that indicated the Soviets had exploded their own atomic device. Although U.S. intelligence agencies had long reported that the Soviets were on the verge of such an achievement, to many U.S. officials, the loss of the American atomic monopoly was shocking. The victory of Mao Zedong’s forces in China in October 1949 reinforced fears that communism was still on the march worldwide. The fall of China seemed to expose Japan, India, and all of Southeast Asia to a similar fate. The Communist victory in China also gave rise to finger-pointing and recriminations in American politics. Disclosures that Soviet spies Alger Hiss and Klaus Fuchs had penetrated the State Department and the atomic laboratories at Los Alamos prompted Senator Joseph McCarthy, a Republican from Wisconsin, to begin a well-publicized hunt for Communists within the State Department and the Truman administration.20

Despite these diversions, U.S. strategic planners firmly kept their eyes on the Soviet Union as a potential foe. In December 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved Joint Outline Emergency War Plan **Offtackle**, a revision to the previous plan, **Halfmoon**, to reflect the strategic changes in Europe brought about by the NATO alliance. According to **Offtackle**, in the event of war with the Soviet Union, the United States would safeguard the western hemisphere and its own mobilization base, conduct a strategic defensive in the Far East, and wage a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia. In Europe, allied forces would defend essential areas along the periphery, pulling back to a line along the Pyrenees if they did not have to evacuate the continent altogether. The allies would conduct a sustained strategic air offensive from the United Kingdom, and whatever bases they could hold in southern Italy, the Mediterranean, or

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North Africa. This air-sea offensive would destroy the vital elements of Soviet war-making capacity, defend base areas and lines of communication, provide aid to allied nations, and clear the way for an eventual counteroffensive and, if necessary, return to the European continent.21

The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 served to underscore a sense of urgency and imminent threat to Western Europe that had been growing since the Soviet imposition of the Berlin blockade in 1948. Although the North Korean invasion seemed to be a logical extension of the Communist victory in China, the Joint Chiefs considered the conflict in Asia to be a war against the wrong enemy. The action, however, provided an indication that the Soviets were no longer constrained from military action by the Western monopoly on atomic weapons. Analysts noted similarities between the situation in Korea and that in Germany, raising concerns that the next blow would fall in Europe. As with Korea, Germany had been divided into two parts, one of which was a Soviet satellite with aggressive intentions. Soviet armed forces in East Germany greatly outnumbered U.S. and NATO forces in Western Europe—forces that were only just beginning to mobilize. Nonetheless, for EUCOM, the immediate effect of the conflict, with its pressing requirements for manpower and logistics, was to postpone reinforcements and to delay shipments of new equipment.22

The concerns expressed by the Joint Chiefs were reinforced by U.S. intelligence reports. The newly established Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) observed that the Soviet Union’s treatment of the Korean situation most likely reflected a belief that the Soviet bloc had reached a military and political position superior to that of the West. In view of the recent Soviet atomic test, CIA analysts believed that Moscow intended to exploit the end of the Western atomic monopoly, relying on its superiority in conventional forces to intimidate rather than to negotiate, therefore eschewing general war but increasing the tempo of pressure and agitation on Germany in order to feed a war scare throughout Europe. Other reports described an expansion of East German paramilitary forces and predicted that those units would soon constitute both a potential threat to West Germany and an even more immediate threat to West Berlin. These forces already included thirty-five thousand “alert police” assigned to field units of battalion-type organization that included infantry, artillery, tank, signal, and engineer components. Although the East German military headquarters had enough Soviet tanks and heavy artillery for training but too little for operational purposes, the reports insisted that the Soviets could remedy such deficiencies easily from stocks already in East Germany. The reports concluded that the rapid increase in East German military capabilities raised more and more of a possibility that the Soviets would wield them as instruments of policy toward

all of Germany. Their value as a psychological threat, moreover, seemed every bit as important as their actual military potential.23

With the threat in Europe growing and U.S. forces struggling to hold their lines in Korea, President Truman announced on 10 September 1950 that he had approved substantial increases in the strength of U.S. forces in Europe. Although the timing and nature of these increases required coordination with NATO allies and the approval of Congress, the president’s announcement reinforced the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe and spurred the effort to increase the American presence on the continent.24

Truman’s decision elicited a response from the Army leaders in Europe as well. On 17 September, with the understanding that additional troops would soon be coming his way, the EUCOM commander, General Handy, requested authority from the Department of the Army to activate a field army headquarters within the command. He argued that the early experiences of U.S. forces in Korea indicated the need for a command and control element at that level. The new headquarters would oversee a self-contained force that could readily be transferred to allied operational command in case of an emergency. All Army units with tactical missions, including combat, combat support, and service support elements, would be assigned to the field army. In response to General Handy’s request, on 24 November the Department of the Army reactivated the U.S. Seventh Army and placed it under the command of Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy. At that time, EUCOM placed the 1st Infantry Division and all remaining elements of the U.S. Constabulary under Seventh Army command and inactivated the Constabulary headquarters. On 2 December, the Army reassigned all military posts previously under USAREUR control to EUCOM headquarters. With that action completed, the command made plans to discontinue Headquarters, United States Army, Europe. Meanwhile, the Seventh Army established its headquarters at Stuttgart and began to prepare for its new mission.25

23 National Intelligence Estimate, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Probable Soviet Moves to Exploit the Present Situation, 11 Dec 1950, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH; Min, HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference Notes, 3 Jan 1950, Entry 211, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1947–1951, RG 549, NACP; CIA, Probable Developments in Eastern Germany by the End of 1951, 28 Sep 1950, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH.


As 1951 began, the U.S. Army in Europe had started planning and reorganizing for its new mission to participate in the defense of Western Europe along with the military forces of the NATO alliance. At the time, the Seventh Army remained largely a paper force, consisting only of the reconstituted 1st Infantry Division and various elements of the U.S. Constabulary, which was still in the process of reorganizing into armor and armored cavalry units. The Army headquarters in Europe had given little thought to the organization, tactics, and doctrine that it might employ in the event of a Soviet attack. Remediating these conceptual problems would take some time. The first step in this process would be to bring to Europe the military forces necessary to turn the promise of security into a reality.

**Building the Seventh Army**

The process of building a credible deterrent force began in December 1950, when the European Command (EUCOM) issued a letter of instruction to the Seventh Army’s commanding general outlining his responsibilities. In the letter, EUCOM delegated to the Seventh Army the primary mission of training and combat readiness. It also transferred various existing operational assignments and emergency and contingency plans to the Seventh Army that had previously fallen to the Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and it made that command responsible for the training and logistical support of all units, facilities, and installations that had come under its control. The Seventh Army also became accountable for all border security missions still assigned to U.S. forces, including the investigation of border incidents, interrogation of illegal border crossers, and liaison between U.S. and Soviet military forces operating in the occupied zones.¹

With its headquarters up and running by the beginning of 1951, the Seventh Army was an army in name only. Its major elements included the understrength 1st Infantry Division and the 2d, 6th, and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments. The 1st Infantry Division, “The Big Red One,” had not yet fully consolidated

¹ Letter of Instructions, HQ, EUCOM, 1 Dec 1950, Entry 2052, USAREUR G3 Operations General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
its units from their occupation locations dispersed throughout the U.S. Zone. The three armored cavalry regiments had their headquarters at Augsburg, Straubing, and Fritzlar, Germany, but scattered most of their units across nearby towns and villages. EUCOM had pieced them together from various Constabulary squadrons to reduce overall manpower requirements and to create a mobile reserve force. A field artillery group, an air defense artillery group, and leftover elements of the Constabulary that EUCOM had not yet incorporated into reorganized units made up the rest of the army. Upon its activation, the Seventh Army assumed planning and operational responsibilities for alert orders, noncombatant evacuation, and interzonal agreements previously assigned to USAREUR and the Constabulary.²

The European Command’s original plan had been to discontinue Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and to transfer all of its missions and responsibilities to the Seventh Army but several technicalities prevented that inactivation. Final review jurisdiction for courts-martial of Army personnel throughout Germany, Austria, Trieste, and other sites, for example, rested with the senior Army headquarters in Europe. As a result, because EUCOM was a joint command, USAREUR had to be retained at least as a paper organization in order to review the Seventh Army’s legal proceedings. Moreover, since Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy’s appointment as commanding general of the Seventh Army occurred while Congress was not in session, he had to remain on USAREUR’s rolls until Congress reconvened and confirmed his new appointment. Although all of its troops had been withdrawn, USAREUR thus remained in place for the time being without troops or units, but with General Eddy still assigned as commanding general.³

Eddy brought impressive credentials to his new assignment. He had served during World War I as a machine gun battalion commander and had been wounded in action late in the war. During World War II, he had commanded the 9th Infantry Division under General J. Lawton Collins and the XII Corps under General George S. Patton Jr. A future Army chief of staff, General William C. Westmoreland, who served as an artillery battalion commander in the 9th Division under Eddy, described his former commander as a great believer in giving responsibility to his subordinates and letting them go about their business with minimum interference. Another World War II contemporary, war correspondent Ernie Pyle, remarked that General Eddy had the personality of an old shoe, totally without arrogance or pretension. He carried a reputation as a talented military trainer. As historian Russell Weigley observed, during

² Troop List, HQ, Seventh Army, Jan 1951, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, Historical Section 1951, RG 338, NACP; Historical Division, EUCOM, Reorganization of Tactical Forces: V-E Day to 1 January 1949, 1950, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, USAREUR, p. 64, Historians files, CMH.
³ Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 43–44, Historians files, CMH.
the war Eddy had provided his officers with “perhaps the best schooling in divisional command to be had in the American Army.”

Introducing himself to the Frankfurt Press Club in March 1951, General Eddy described his personal philosophy of training. He believed in less spit and polish and more time in the field. In that way, he could provide junior officers and sergeants with the opportunity to exercise leadership under actual field conditions. Most important, he proclaimed, was the necessity to maintain the edge of combat readiness. He compared himself to a football coach, preparing a team to play in some uncertain place, at some unknown time, or not at all. True to his word, throughout his tenure as Seventh Army commander, Eddy placed greater emphasis on training individuals and small units than on larger unit maneuvers and exercises. He expected his subordinate commanders, particularly platoon leaders and company commanders, to inspect training personally and to correct errors until their soldiers performed all tasks correctly. To the soldiers, Eddy presented something of a grandfatherly image but one that was backed

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up by considerable combat experience and an old soldier’s belief in the value of discipline and hard work.5

The decision in Washington to send four divisions to Europe in 1951 prompted U.S. commanders in Europe to prepare a detailed and comprehensive program for receiving, processing, and locating the troops upon their arrival in the theater. For Seventh Army planners, tactical considerations took precedence, and they made every effort to keep the organization in a state of combat readiness. Even so, a lack of troop housing inevitably determined to some extent the temporary locations of many units, despite an expedited construction and rehabilitation program launched by the command. To each new unit that arrived in Europe, the Seventh Army assigned a sponsor unit of similar type and size. In addition to preparing quarters for the incoming troops and arranging for the initial issue of property and equipment, sponsor units dispatched an officer to meet the incoming commander at the port of debarkation and to advise him on matters of immediate concern to him and his subordinates.6

With plans in place, the new divisions began to arrive in May 1951. The first of the reinforcements to reach Europe, the 4th Infantry Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Harlan N. Hartness, had already begun training recruits for the duty, using a cadre of noncommissioned officers dispatched to the United States by the Seventh Army for that purpose. As it came ashore, the 4th Infantry Division moved into its assigned areas north and northeast of Frankfurt, near the convergence of the Rhine and Main Rivers. The next division, Maj. Gen. Williston B. Palmer’s 2d Armored Division, arrived in the summer. Its recruits had also undergone months of intensive training at Fort Hood, Texas, at the hands of experienced commissioned and noncommissioned officers from Europe. Envisioned by Seventh Army planners as the spearhead of a counterattack force, the division moved into barracks areas west of the Rhine River with major elements setting up headquarters in and around Mainz, Bad Kreuznach, and Baumholder. The 4th Infantry and the 2d Armored Divisions joined the 1st Infantry Division to form Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist’s V Corps, which set up headquarters in Frankfurt and became operational at the end of August 1951. When fully deployed, the V Corps fielded 687 tanks, 74 rifle and armored infantry companies, and 438 artillery tubes of 105-mm. or greater.7

7 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Ltr, Eddy to Gen Thomas T. Handy, Cdr, EUCOM, 21 May 1951; Ind, Maj Gen I. D. White, Dep Cdr, Seventh Army, to Commander in Chief (CINC), EUCOM, Dec 1950, sub: Location of Augmenting Troops. Both in Entry 33508, Seventh Army,
The V Corps commanders brought considerable European experience from their assignments during World War II to their new positions in the Seventh Army. General Dahlquist led the 36th Infantry Division from the beaches of southern France in August 1944 to the German plains in May 1945. General Hartness had served as the assistant division commander of the 26th Infantry Division, which fought with General Patton’s Third Army across Europe. General Palmer had commanded the VII Corps Artillery from Normandy to the Elbe River. Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, was the only senior leader in V Corps without European experience, having served in the War Department and in China during World War II.8

Because the Army had already committed most of its active forces to the war in Korea, the remaining two divisions deploying to Europe, the 28th and the 43d Infantry Divisions, were National Guard units mobilized in December 1950. Both failed to muster more than half of their strength when they assembled

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8 General Officers Biographies, Historians files, CMH.
and were filled out with draftees and volunteers. Due to a lack of transportation and insufficient training facilities in Germany, each division also spent months training in the United States before it shipped overseas in late 1951. When the two divisions arrived they joined the VII Corps, headquartered near Stuttgart and commanded by Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress. The 28th Division, under Maj. Gen. Daniel B. Strickler, occupied barracks near the cities of Ulm and Augsburg in southern Germany. The 43d Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Kenneth F. Cramer, took up station in the area between Augsburg and Munich, a region that stretched fifty to one hundred miles farther east. Once all its units arrived in theater, the VII Corps accounted for 312 tanks, 62 rifle and armored infantry companies, and 324 artillery tubes 105-mm. or greater.9

The VII Corps commanders were a more diverse group than their V Corps counterparts. As National Guard and reserve officers, they were a bit older, and all had experience early in their careers as junior officers in Europe during World War I. General Burress had commanded the 100th Infantry Division during World War II, seeing continuous action between its commitment to combat in October 1944 through V-E Day. General Strickler came to Europe as a battalion commander with the 28th Infantry Division in July 1944; he had taken a reduction in rank in order to get a command with the division as it deployed overseas. General Cramer served in the Pacific, as the assistant division commander for the 24th Infantry Division.10

Throughout 1951, the command added smaller units to complete its order of battle. The three armored cavalry regiments already present in Europe—the 2d, 6th, and 14th—occupied forward positions along the boundary between the U.S. and the Soviet Zones or along the Czechoslovakia border. They acted as a security screen for the V and VII Corps. In the north, the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment patrolled the interzonal border between Hersfeld and Bamberg, providing the forward screen for the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions. Farther south, in the VII Corps sector, the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment patrolled between Bamberg and Regensburg to the front of the 28th Infantry Division, while the 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment operated between Regensburg and Landshut, in front of the 43d Infantry Division. In order to strengthen the forward screen and to provide the armored cavalry regiments with some immediately available artillery, the Seventh Army assigned a separate armored infantry battalion and field artillery battalion to each regiment. The 373d Armored Infantry Battalion at Wildflecken and the 631st Armored Field Artillery at Hammelburg worked with the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 371st Armored Infantry Battalion and the 70th Armored Field Artillery Battalion at Nuremberg aligned with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Farther south, the 370th Armored Infantry Battalion at Munich and the 74th Armored Field Artillery Battalion at Landshut went with the 6th Armored

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9 Ltr, Maj Gen Withers A. Burress, Cdr, VII Corps, to Eddy, 16 Jul 1951, Withers A. Burress Papers, MHI; Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Order of Battle, USAREUR, 31 Dec 1952.
10 General Officers Biographies.
Cavalry Regiment. The infantry battalions also provided forward observers and fire support communications networks that were lacking in the armored cavalry organization. Additional artillery and engineer battalions as well as other supporting elements continued to arrive throughout the year (Map 2).11

The Seventh Army assigned the armored cavalry regiments an additional mission of border security as a supplement to the West German border police. It directed the cavalry units to conduct 24-hour surveillance of critical points and avenues of approach, especially the borders between the U.S. occupation zone and the Soviet occupation zones in Austria and East Germany and between the U.S. occupation zone and Czechoslovakia. To accomplish this mission, the cavalry was to conduct mobile patrols along the border areas, to establish manned observation and listening posts, and to employ aerial observation as available. Patrols were to report any evidence of unusual troop movements or concentrations of forces on the other side of the border. As part of their normal routine, patrols would check in daily with German checkpoints and border patrols operating along their routes. Company and battalion headquarters would also communicate daily by telephone or by staff visit with German border authorities in their areas. EUCOM guidance specified that troops engaged in border missions were to be thoroughly trained, to be instructed to conduct themselves in a dignified manner, and to take no action that would cause embarrassment to the U.S. government.12

Seventh Army operational instructions also included detailed guidance for the border units. At a time agreed to by commanders, patrols from each regiment would establish physical contact at boundaries between their assigned sectors. All patrols and observation posts operated under tactical conditions. They carried basic loads of ammunition and maintained continuous radio contact. Instructions authorized the use of force as necessary, including the use of weapons, to apprehend unauthorized Soviet or Czechoslovakian military personnel within the U.S. Zone. The instructions also authorized the use of weapons to resist arrest or detention by Soviet or satellite authorities operating in the U.S. Zone.13

Patrols covered the entire border at least twice a day, once in daylight and once at night. They worked in twelve-hour shifts and consisted of not less than two combat loaded quarter-ton trucks, known popularly as jeeps, or one jeep and one M8 armored car mounting a 37-mm. gun. At a minimum the patrols

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The New Mission consisted of a patrol leader, an assistant patrol leader, a radio operator, a machine gunner, and two drivers. One vehicle carried an SCR–506 AM radio while the other mounted a .30-caliber light machine gun. Patrols normally operated no closer than one hundred meters to the border and no farther away than ten kilometers. Ed Keaney, a sergeant with the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, remembered:

Two ham sandwiches in a bag and maybe a K ration, out the gate and off to the tower by Munnerstadt which was our start point. . . . We would patrol all the way down to Königshofen and back. The border was little more than a plowed strip and a few stakes, it was easy to make a mistake.14

The border units also established observation posts, some permanent and others temporary. Each post was manned by a minimum of three soldiers, one to keep watch, one to record any notable observations and to work the radio, and the third to provide security for the outpost. Each team was cross trained so that team members could rotate functions. During periods of darkness or poor visibility, observation post personnel could move forward to preselected listening posts where they could still monitor activity in the immediate area. To the Germans living on both sides of the boundary the soldiers of the U.S. border patrols became some of the most enduring symbols of the Cold War.15

Growing Pains

The Seventh Army’s rapid expansion presented several challenges to its leaders. The augmentation caused the number of troops assigned in Europe to more than triple in less than two years. On 1 January 1951, the Seventh Army’s military strength had been 2,907 officers and 42,320 enlisted men and women. By the end of the year the numbers had increased to 9,818 and 152,410, respectively. Throughout the theater, the number of U.S. Army personnel in EUCOM rose from 86,146 assigned in December 1950 to 252,137 by the end of 1952 (Table 1).16

General Eddy complained, however, that many of the incoming soldiers were poorly trained draftees who did not meet his standards. Although their backgrounds and educational levels indicated that they had the potential to be good soldiers, the lack of supervision by junior officers and noncommissioned officers during their time in the replacement pipeline had eroded some of the military courtesy, alertness, and discipline that the general expected. Large numbers even lacked the basic education required for a successful tour in the

16 Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, p. 68; Cmd Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, pp. 46–49, Historians files, CMH.
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

service. Eddy pointed out to the Army chief of staff, General J. Lawton Collins, that more than sixteen thousand of the new troops arriving in his command required extra training to bring them up to the fifth grade level of education required by service regulations. This schooling, he concluded, imposed an undue burden on his command and reduced the amount of useful service time in Europe for those soldiers.17

The Seventh Army commander also reported that many of the new replacements had only a few months remaining on their enlistments. One group of 1,537 soldiers that had recently arrived contained 8 percent with less than six months of service remaining and over 40 percent with less than nine months. He pointed out that a replacement arriving in August 1952 with six months of enlistment remaining had to depart the command in January 1953 to allow for shipping and separation processing time. That left him with only four and one-half months, barely sufficient time to orient him on his duties in Europe.18

In his reply, General Collins reminded Eddy that the Army was constrained by the two-year terms of service assumed by the draftees. Many of those soldiers being trained as specialists required eight or more months of training before the service could deploy them overseas. Nonetheless, Collins issued instructions that, as of 1 February 1953, all personnel being shipped overseas would have at least nine months of usable service time remaining.19

Table 1—U.S. Army Strength in Europe
January 1951–December 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>EUCOM/USAREUR</th>
<th>Seventh Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1951</td>
<td>86,146</td>
<td>45,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1952</td>
<td>231,651</td>
<td>162,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1952</td>
<td>252,137</td>
<td>152,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


18 Ltr, Eddy to Collins, 12 Sep 1952.

19 Ltr, Collins to Eddy, 20 Oct 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1954, RG 549, NACP.
With so many reinforcements arriving over the space of a few months, problems also arose with matching new units with their required equipment. In a letter dated 18 September 1951, Eddy notified General Mark W. Clark, chief of Army Field Forces, that many nondivisional support units were arriving in Germany without the minimum essential equipment required to carry out their missions. Some artillery units had trucks but no weapons, while another had received seventeen artillery pieces but no trucks to pull them. A few months later, the Seventh Army chief of artillery reported that thirteen heavy artillery battalions had arrived in theater with M4 tractors instead of the authorized M8 tractors. The limited ammunition carrying capacity of the M4 tractors forced EUCOM to issue additional two-and-one-half-ton trucks to make up the difference. For other units arriving without required items, the command sometimes took up to eighteen weeks to locate the missing equipment or to provide suitable replacements.20

The most serious problem presented by the influx of reinforcements was a lack of suitable barracks to house the new troops. EUCOM had initiated an emergency construction program, but many incoming units still had to occupy facilities that placed them far from their intended deployment areas. Because the rehabilitation of existing kasernes—former German military installations—took less time than new construction, the command focused on preparing facilities it already owned, or could easily acquire from the Germans. By the end of 1951, work was in progress or already completed on seventy-six installations that EUCOM had acquired as part of its expansion plan.21

Unfortunately, as one EUCOM staff officer later noted, many units were “more or less stuck where the kasernes were,” at considerable distances from their deployment areas. The command simply did not have the money to purchase land near where the units ought to be. No one at the time, he concluded, was willing to push for more forward basing areas. As a result, the bulk of the Seventh Army’s tactical forces ended up located in the southern and central portion of the U.S. Zone and uncomfortably close to major centers of German population, cities such as Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Heidelberg, and Frankfurt. Although General Eddy attempted to relocate some units to the north and northeast along the main avenue of a possible Soviet advance, he noted that, no matter how he located them, large gaps remained.22

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Many of the resources necessary to begin preparing the troops for combat were also in short supply for EUCOM and the Seventh Army. The war in Korea caused occasional shortages in fuel and ammunition that could otherwise have gone to training. The most critical commodity, however, proved to be land. The combat units required firing ranges to support a wide variety of weapons as well as extensive tracts of open space for maneuver. The need to accommodate large bodies of troops spread across so wide an area further complicated matters. The addition of four new divisions plus associated army and corps headquarters and support elements necessitated the acquisition of much more land for training.23

Early in 1951, General Eddy laid out his requirements for additional training facilities in a letter to the EUCOM commander. He warned that planned troop increases would place a great strain on his available training resources, particularly firing ranges and maneuver space. He estimated that each division under his command would require maneuver space in its own locality suitable for use by units of up to regimental combat team size. He requested at least one additional major training area with facilities that could support division-level maneuvers and firing by tanks, artillery, and other long-range weapons. Eddy reminded General Handy that several of his units lacked areas where they could conduct small-unit training and independent exercises in the immediate vicinity of their kasernes. He recommended acquiring local training sites large enough to support small-arms firing ranges, facilities for demolitions training, and divisional training grounds where troops could train with a greater variety of weapons including mortars, grenades, rocket launchers, and .50-caliber machine guns.24

To alleviate some of the shortages, General Eddy recommended that U.S. forces acquire trespass rights from the Germans similar to those employed by the Wehrmacht in former days. This would allow U.S. forces to acquire the land they needed. In response, General Handy requested the assistance of John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, in negotiating with the Germans for the release of additional land for military use. By September 1951, plans for local training areas began to take shape. EUCOM allocated the necessary funds and initiated an extensive range construction program.25

Requirements for large-scale maneuver areas presented different problems. Major exercises conducted by NATO, EUCOM, or the Seventh Army took place
across much of West Germany with few restrictions on where troops could move or train. Such exercises precluded any live firing, however, and the expenses involved in reimbursing German civilians for damage done to their property or belongings forced Army leaders to limit most training to established areas.

Existing sites at Grafenwöhr and Wildflecken had been adequate for unit training prior to the 1951 augmentations. A former Wehrmacht site in eastern Bavaria, Grafenwöhr had been the U.S. Army’s main training area since its return to tactical training in 1947. It covered more than fifty-six thousand acres and could house one thousand men in barracks and twenty thousand in tents. Grafenwöhr had varied terrain with rolling hills, forests, and lakes, which made it suitable for a wide range of activities. It was large enough to support multiple regiments, with small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery ranges. Plans to expand the facility to include tank and antiaircraft artillery ranges had been complicated by its proximity to the U.S.-Soviet zonal border and the need to relocate approximately fifteen thousand local civilians. Wildflecken was a much smaller training ground located approximately twenty miles southeast of Fulda. Opened by the Germans in 1938, the area served as a training site for low mountain warfare and had served as the training hub for several Nazi SS divisions during World War II. After the war, the area was one of the large collection points for displaced persons. The Seventh Army reopened the site as a training area in 1951. It covered 17,670 acres and could support a regimental combat team and light artillery. It also accommodated a number of small arms, machine gun, mortar, and demolition ranges.26

Army leaders looked for ways to supplement the two major training sites. In addition to Grafenwöhr and Wildflecken, American units had also trained periodically at Baumholder in the French Zone. In March, General Eddy and General Augustin Guillaume, the commanding general of French occupation forces in Germany, signed an agreement that standardized procedures governing use of the area. In exchange for maneuver and stationing rights in the U.S. Zone, the French turned over kasern and garrison portions of the area to the U.S. Army. The two forces agreed to joint use of ranges and training sites.27 A later pact signed in May divided the use of the training area on a fifty-fifty basis and gave the Seventh Army the right to full-time occupation of permanent housing at the camp. With that, U.S. troops and German construction crews descended on the facility to begin work on necessary improvements. By the end of the year, progress on the required ranges, recreation facilities, and additional

27 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Agreement Between Commanders in Chief of the United States Forces of Occupation and the French Forces of Occupation in Germany, 7 Mar 1951, Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Planning, Organization, and Training, Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP.
housing was well underway. Representatives of the two armies met quarterly to allocate range time and facilities.\(^{28}\) For the soldiers who trained there, Baumholder was renowned for its cold, rainy weather and the gritty mud that clung to everything and could literally dissolve boot socks. The only good thing about training at Baumholder, some remembered, was the French officers club. The food was outstanding and many American soldiers devoured the chateaubriand steak for two along with French fries and a dessert. Although the Alsatian beer was not terribly popular, the wine was always good.\(^ {29}\)

General Eddy’s recommendation that the Army requisition and establish a new division-size training area proved to be more difficult to carry out. The European Command had planned to obtain an area near Hammelburg, about sixty miles east of Frankfurt, but resistance from the local inhabitants was too strong. Early in 1952, however, the German government turned over to the U.S. Army a former German training site and some adjoining land near the town of Hohenfels.\(^ {30}\) Comprising 40,378 acres, enough to accommodate two regimental combat teams, the area was located approximately twenty miles north of Regensburg. Further removed from the Czechoslovakian border than other U.S. training sites, Hohenfels was less vulnerable to a sudden attack from the east and a less provocative location for large-unit training. Work continued on the site through 1952, including construction of housing for ten thousand soldiers, tent areas for seven thousand more, thirty-two ranges of various types, and an urban combat facility designed to prepare troops for fighting in cities. The grounds were unsuitable for tank firing practice, however, due to restrictions on the types of ammunition that tanks could fire there. In the end, EUCOM abandoned proposals to expand the area so that tanks and antiaircraft artillery could fire because of the need to relocate civilians, the proximity of highways and railroads, and the requirement to shut down most of the training sites whenever larger-caliber ranges were in use.\(^ {31}\)

The lack of firing ranges for tank and antiaircraft artillery within the U.S. Zone proved to be an enduring problem. Throughout this period, U.S. forces used British tank ranges at Hohne, on the North German Plain east of Hannover; antiaircraft ranges at Putlos, about thirty miles east of Kiel on the Baltic Sea coast; and antiaircraft ranges on the Isle of Sylt, approximately


\(^ {30}\) Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951.

seventy miles north of Bremerhaven in the North Sea. The great distance U.S. soldiers had to travel to reach those facilities complicated support arrangements and constituted a serious security risk because the ranges were so far removed from the units’ designated defensive positions. For that reason, Army leaders continued to search for alternative sites.32

Throughout the training process, perhaps the most important resource was the troops themselves. In order to turn groups of young, inexperienced soldiers into cohesive fighting units, the men had to be available for training and to remain in their assignments long enough for the full benefits of the process to take effect. This proved to be difficult to do. Shortly after the initial surge of reinforcements in 1951, many of the troops who had come to Europe with the new divisions returned to the United States, their terms of enlistment having expired. In the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, most of the national guardsmen who had become proficient in their combat specialties went home. The two units experienced a 35 percent loss in personnel between April and July 1952. The situation was even worse in the 4th Infantry Division, where 42 percent of the enlisted strength departed for the United States between August and October.33 By the end of 1952, the Seventh Army reported that its training situation had become a treadmill on which units constantly labored but never advanced beyond a certain point.34

The availability of troops for training was complicated by the Seventh Army’s mission, which required its subordinate elements to maintain a presence in their designated sectors. This meant that the V Corps, for example, had to keep two armored cavalry squadrons, six infantry battalions, three tank battalions, four field artillery battalions, and various support organizations near areas of possible enemy approaches into the corps sector. In times of heightened tension, those forces had to leave their garrisons and move either to field locations or to defensive positions located along likely Soviet approach routes.35 Forces on alert could neither train at any distance from their home station, nor conduct any operations that might put excessive wear on their weapons, vehicles, or equipment because everything had to be ready to go to

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35 Memo, Brig Gen Einar B. Gjelstein, Ch of Staff, Seventh Army, for Major Commands, 25 Jul 1952, sub: Tactical Readiness of Seventh Army Units, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
war at a moment’s notice. The result was that many units could not conduct any significant field training except when they planned well enough in advance to visit one of the major training facilities once or twice a year.

**Reorganization and Realignment**

U.S. military leaders in Europe recognized the need for a command structure that could direct U.S. military units in the theater while maintaining an ability to integrate readily with NATO forces in an emergency. To that end, during the second half of 1952, the theater carried out a series of organizational changes to clarify command relationships and to align U.S. forces in Europe under NATO and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), leadership. Until August 1952, EUCOM was the senior U.S. military headquarters in Europe. A joint Army, Navy, and Air Force organization that answered originally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it had been responsible to SHAPE for operations since April 1951. In the meantime, the United States had activated two important military commands in Europe apart from EUCOM: the U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and the U.S. Air Forces in Europe. In order to coordinate the administrative and supply activities of these two organizations with the main U.S. Army component in Europe, and to align all three underneath a single headquarters, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff created the U.S. European Command in August 1952. At the same time, General Matthew B. Ridgway succeeded General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). The establishment of the U.S. European Command gave Ridgway authority over U.S. forces in an area extending from Norway to Turkey.36

The reorganization had an effect that rippled down through the rest of the U.S. Army forces in the theater. Ridgway named the current EUCOM Commander, General Handy, to be his deputy and directed him to establish the new headquarters at Frankfurt. Two weeks later, on 15 August, the Seventh Army Commander, General Eddy, moved up to assume General Handy’s former position as commanding general of EUCOM, which had been redesignated U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, a World War II division commander who had most recently served as the deputy chief of staff for plans, U.S. Army, replaced Eddy as Seventh Army commander.37

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SEVENTH U.S. ARMY

** Excluding Wiesbaden Military Post, but including Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.**

Staff divisions of Headquarters, USAREUR, having certain assigned and attached units under command of respective chief of division, or director:

- Adjutant General, Provost Marshal, Special Activities,
- Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance,
- Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Transportation.

TWELFTH AIR FORCE

U.S. NAVAL FORCES GERMANY

32d AAA Brigade

66th CIC Det

SP TRPS HQ USAREUR

7961st USAREUR Det

Military Posts *

USAREUR COMZ

Tech and ** Admin Divs

32d AAA Brigade

66th CIC Det

SP TRPS HQ USAREUR

7961st USAREUR Det

Military Posts *

USAREUR COMZ

Tech and ** Admin Divs

7755th Dependents Schools Detachment

7756th Audit Agency

77893d U.S. Military Liaison Mission to C-in-C Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany

7950th JAMAG ***

7792d Office of U.S. High Commissioner, Germany ****

7791st Office of U.S. Commander, Berlin ****

*** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting for operational purposes to U.S. EUCOM.

**** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting for operational purposes directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

***** Assigned to and administered by Headquarters, USAREUR, but reporting directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, on military matters but reporting directly to U.S. High Commissioner for Germany on such functions as are directed.

In the division of responsibilities between the two headquarters, U.S. EUCOM assumed command of all U.S. armed forces in Europe, excluding those in Berlin, Trieste, and Austria (Chart 2). U.S. Army, Europe, became the administrative headquarters for all Army forces in the same area, except for the forces in Austria and Trieste, both of which performed this function for themselves and reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The commander, U.S. EUCOM, delegated responsibility to the USAREUR commander for military aspects of the occupation of Germany and designated him as the single point of contact for dealing with the German Federal Republic and the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. The primary mission assigned to the new U.S. EUCOM was to support the supreme allied commander and to represent U.S. policies and interests within SHAPE. In addition, it had responsibility for coordinating logistical and administrative matters of interest to all three military services, including procurement, negotiations for base rights, and military aspects of the Mutual Security Program for Europe.38

The system of military posts and subposts that had provided logistic and administrative support throughout the theater since 1947 also underwent reorganization (Map 3). This was particularly important because reinforcement and relocation of units and the introduction of support elements into France had drastically shifted concentrations of troops. Efforts to make the Seventh Army self-supporting had also served to lessen the importance of the support functions of military posts.

With that in mind, USAREUR reduced its manpower requirements and administrative costs by consolidating dozens of posts and subposts throughout Germany into four principal commands. The Northern Area Command, led by Brig. Gen. Basil H. Perry, headquartered at Frankfurt, consolidated military posts and subposts around Frankfurt, Würzburg, and Bamberg. Under the command of General Cramer, the Southern Area Command, headquartered in Munich, absorbed installations located around Munich, Augsburg, Garmisch, Stuttgart, and Nuremberg. The Western Area Command included only the former Rhine Military Post along the western bank of the river. Its headquarters was at Kaiserslautern and it was commanded by Brig. Gen. Oliver W. Hughes. The former Heidelberg military post became the Headquarters Area Command under the leadership of Col. John F. Cassidy. The Berlin Command and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation were not included in the four areas but operated as separate commands assigned to USAREUR. The former Wiesbaden Military Post, which housed most of the U.S. Air Force personnel in the theater, came under the administrative control of the Twelfth Air Force. The four area commands reported directly to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe,

38 Capt Russell A. Gugeler, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Redesignation of Headquarters European Command as Headquarters United States Army Europe 1952, 1954, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives.
and inherited the same support missions previously performed by the posts and subposts.39

In general, area commanders were to provide supplies and services to units, agencies, and personnel stationed within their geographic areas. Responsibilities included the provision of such support services as medical and chaplain activities, the enforcement of rules of military conduct and discipline, the control of military police activities and functions, the maintenance of general and internal security and the preparation and justification of fund requirement estimates. In addition to their general courts-martial jurisdiction, area commanders assumed special and summary courts-martial jurisdiction over certain Army personnel located within their areas of responsibility.40

As if to recognize the de facto end of the Army’s role in the occupation of Germany, and its acceptance of its new mission to help defend Western Europe, USAEUR inactivated the last two remaining squadrons of the U.S. Constabulary. On 15 December 1952, with new units continuing to arrive and the command needing additional personnel to bring them up to full strength, the 15th and 24th Constabulary squadrons retired their colors and transferred their soldiers to other units within the Seventh Army.41

Identifying the Threat

As part of his tour of U.S. Army units in Europe in 1951, General Eisenhower asked soldiers, “Why are you in Germany?” Invariably, the answer was, “To keep the Russians out of Western Europe.” When the general then asked why that was important, soldiers frequently replied that if they had to fight the Soviets, it would be better to do so in Europe rather than wait to fight the battle in the United States. General Eddy believed that those two questions and the responses to them expressed the essence of the U.S. military mission in Germany. It was, therefore, essential for the soldiers and leaders under his command to learn as much as possible about their potential adversaries.42

39 Memorandum for Record (MFR), Brig Gen Edward J. O’Neill, USAEUR Acting Ch of Staff, 1 Dec 1952, sub: Conference on Reorganization with Generals Cramer, Perry, and O’Neill, Entry 2000, USAEUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
The view from the Soviet side was somewhat different. Soviet leaders recognized that their devastated economy could not support a war with the West, and avoiding such a conflict became their most important objective. A history of bloody invasions from the West, however, had taught them to insulate themselves from Western expansionism. To that end, they intended to maintain their influence in Eastern Europe, holding those states as a buffer against Western encroachment. Also, because the most recent incursions had come at the hands of a united, militaristic Germany, it was an essential part of Soviet policy that Germany remain disarmed and, if not dismembered, then at least neutral or within the Soviet sphere of influence. Western protests over reparations exacted by the Soviets further bewildered Soviet leaders, who believed they had not received sufficient recognition for their World War II sacrifices. The growing mistrust of Western intentions, coupled with Joseph Stalin’s own personal paranoia only heightened the emerging Cold War tension.43

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 had forced the Soviet Union to build the largest army in the world. Although the Soviet armed forces had demobilized to some extent, by the end of 1950 they still outnumbered Western military units in Europe by approximately ten to one. By 1952, one NATO intelligence report estimated that the strength of Soviet bloc ground forces approached 6.5 million men, organized into 235 divisions. That number included sixty divisions from the satellite nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Paramilitary forces in East Germany—trained, equipped, and supervised by the Soviets—provided an additional one hundred thousand soldiers. The report indicated that the strength, equipment, and fighting value of the satellite divisions were inferior to those of Soviet units, but it predicted an increase in numbers and an improvement in performance over the next few years. The report concluded that the expansion of its economy and the high state of readiness of its armed forces gave the Soviet Union the ability to launch a successful surprise attack against Western Europe, the Near East, or the Middle East. Soviet naval and air forces could also initiate attacks throughout the North Atlantic area.44

The CIA offered similar numbers in its own assessments but provided more detailed information about the Soviets’ economic potential and ability to mobilize. It warned that the Soviet economy was already at a high state of war readiness and that its productive capacity could maintain a major war effort without any significant escalation. One analysis predicted that the Soviet ground

43 Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2011).

forces could expand to a strength of 8 million men, organized into 320 divisions, within 30 days of beginning a full mobilization. Their satellites could also muster an additional five million reserves but would have difficulty equipping a ground force of that size. The CIA also believed that Soviet bloc forces were organized and positioned to initiate hostilities with little or no warning. Reinforcing this assessment, spot reports collected by Seventh Army intelligence analysts verified the forward deployment of numerous Soviet combat units throughout East Germany. Agency analysts concluded that the Soviets would continue to conduct aggressive political and psychological warfare and that the danger of military aggression would remain acute until the NATO powers achieved an adequate position of strength.45

The most immediate threat to Western forces in Germany was posed by the four regional commands the Soviets had left behind in their satellites and occupied territories. The Group of Occupation Forces in Germany, the Northern Group of Forces in Poland, the Central Group of Forces in Austria and Hungary, and the Southern Group of Forces in Romania each consisted of several infantry and tank formations of varying sizes that the Soviets could launch against the West.46

Far and away the most formidable of these formations was the Group of Occupation Forces in Germany. Formed in 1945 from the remnants of the 1st and 2d Belorussian Fronts, the group included six complete army headquarters: the 1st Guards Tank Army with its headquarters at Dresden, the 2d Guards Tank Army headquartered at Fürstenberg, the 3d Shock Army at Mägdeberg, the 3d Guards Mechanized Army at Luckenwalde, the 4th Guards Mechanized Army at Eberswalde, and the 8th Guards Army at Weimar-Nohra. Altogether, the Group of Occupation Forces in Germany constituted a mechanized force of 22 divisions with an estimated strength of 370,000 men. A July 1951 NATO report on the Soviet order of battle estimated the force to consist of eight tank, ten mechanized, and four infantry divisions. Several intelligence reports throughout the period, however, noted that the Soviets were steadily upgrading the less mobile organizations. When fully mobilized, the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany included almost six thousand tanks and self-propelled guns with more than three thousand aircraft available in the theater. More ominously, NATO intelligence analysts believed that the Soviets


could expand the force in Germany to 75 to 90 divisions and more than 50,000 aircraft within a few weeks.\textsuperscript{47}

As they attempted to prepare their defenses against this overwhelming force, U.S. military planners paid a great deal of attention to the tactics and doctrine of their potential opponent. They believed that Soviet battle doctrine in the postwar period would reflect the lessons the Red Army had learned while fighting the \textit{Wehrmacht} on the Eastern Front during World War II. A study of Red Army tactics during that conflict and reports from current Communist military exercises indicated that once the Soviets went on the offensive, they took advantage of their numerical edge in artillery and tanks to overwhelm their opponent. Massed artillery and mortars, often more than three hundred tubes per one thousand yards of front, bombarded enemy positions prior to an attack. Assault forces spearheaded by large numbers of tanks then struck defensive positions at several points across a broad front. Infantry divisions, organized like their western counterparts on a triangular basis, would advance on fronts as narrow as two miles with two regiments forward and one in reserve. Battalion and regimental commanders took positions where they could observe their entire formations throughout the attack, a clear difference from U.S. tactics where regimental commanders seldom could see both flanks of their formations in combat. A second division followed the leading wave, sometimes at a distance of less than 750 yards. When the first echelon began to slow down, the second reinforced or passed through as the circumstances required. Additional armored formations followed in subsequent waves, seeking to build on success until a breakthrough occurred. When it did, mechanized forces or cavalry pushed through the breach to attack the defender’s rear while less maneuverable infantry expanded the breach and mopped up along the main battle line.\textsuperscript{48}

In this context, much of the organizational and technological development in the Soviet Army throughout the early 1950s focused on increasing the mobility of its offensive forces and the pace of their attacks. Reforms after World War II increased the number of tanks and assault guns in the attack and provided trucks and armored transport for much of the supporting infantry. Infantry regiments and divisions became mechanized, with a tank regiment assigned to each

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mechanized division. The increased mobility allowed commanders to maintain the rapid tempo of an attack, to facilitate surprise, to retain the initiative, and to hinder the enemy’s ability to recover and to delay the advance. As they had during World War II, Soviet military planners regarded the offensive as the principal form of warfare and considered defensive operations only when the balance of forces was unfavorable or when preparing to resume the attack.49

In order to reassure their own troops in the face of such overwhelming Soviet military strength, U.S. intelligence briefings often focused on the hardships and vulnerabilities of the individual Soviet soldier. Briefers observed that the Soviet soldier was tough and accustomed to severe hardships but that he had been taught all his life to follow the orders of his superiors, both military and political. As a result, individual soldiers were unlikely to display initiative on their own in the absence of their leaders. U.S. analysts believed that the Soviets’ non-Slavic soldiers from east and central Asia were poorly educated and less disciplined. While some elite formations, such as those designated as Guards, would be formidable opponents, Western analysts believed that the regular Soviet units were inferior and not as well-trained and equipped as their Western counterparts.50

Overriding all U.S. and NATO concern for enemy doctrine and military capability, however, was the Soviet development of atomic weapons. By the beginning of 1951, the CIA estimated that the Soviet Union possessed plutonium bombs with an explosive power of roughly 20 kilotons. It predicted that by 1954 the Soviets might have as many as two hundred such weapons at their disposal. Already, their air force had sufficient aircraft and bases of operation to attempt an atomic strike against the United States or the United Kingdom. With this in mind, most U.S. military and political leaders believed that the Soviets would retain their atomic weapons for strategic strikes against Western cities and that, until more were available, it was unlikely they would use them against military targets on a European battlefield. Because of this, USAREUR leaders expressed more immediate concern about the large stock of chemical weapons the Soviets already possessed and their research and development of biological agents.51

As they refined their analyses, Western intelligence agencies identified three primary avenues through which an invading Soviet force might advance into USAREUR’s sector (Map 4). The most important, known as the Hessian Corridor, ran in a generally southwesterly direction astride the Frankfurt-

50 Rpt, USAREUR Intelligence School, sub: Outstanding General Characteristics Common to Soviet Soldiers, Entry 211, EUCOM General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
Map 4
Kassel autobahn, where gently rolling terrain favored large-scale mechanized operations. A portion of this approach, however, passed through a narrow region about fifty miles northeast of Frankfurt that was constricted by steep, wooded ridgelines. This potential choke point was known as the Fulda Gap. This was the most direct route from the Soviet Zone, and the Soviet 8th Guards Army was poised immediately across the border on the other side of the gap. Because the corridor was also the shortest route to France and the English Channel, and it exposed many of the major industrial cities in the U.S. Zone, the Seventh Army placed the V Corps, with its two infantry divisions and one armored division, in position to defend this approach.52

A second principal avenue of approach funneled through the Hof Gap, which began about one hundred miles east of Frankfurt and ran west-southwest from Nuremberg through Heilbronn and Karlsruhe. Although it was farther removed from the large Soviet army group in East Germany, it was readily accessible by smaller satellite forces in Czechoslovakia. The Seventh Army positioned the VII Corps, the smaller of the two, to defend this more indirect approach. Although the region’s well-developed system of east-west highways and generally favorable terrain offered an attacker excellent mobility, the analysts noted that the area’s forests and high ground gave defenders good observation and fields of fire.53

Other potential avenues of approach demanded less attention from the Seventh Army. The Meiningen Gap, midway between the two primary approaches, ran southwest from the zonal border near Mellrichstadt to the vicinity of Mannheim. The analysts noted that ridgelines and rivers within the area formed a natural series of obstacles and barriers that would slow a Soviet advance. The North German Plain stretching west from Berlin offered much more open terrain for an armored assault, and the Soviet 3d Shock Army occupied billets just across the border in East Germany. This route, however, ran outside the area for which the U.S. Army had primary responsibility. Halting an advance in that region would be the mission of the British Army of the Rhine, later reinforced by military forces from Belgium and the Netherlands.54

**Firepower and Mobility: The Seventh Army’s Conventional Doctrine**

Although it represented a formidable combat force, the Seventh Army could not match the numerical superiority possessed by the Soviets. Soviet forces within striking distance of Germany outnumbered U.S. and NATO units in personnel, tanks, and almost all major combat systems. As a result, from its


53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.
inception, the Seventh Army had to develop battle plans that would enable it to fight and win while outnumbered. Leaders planned to do this by building on the service’s World War II organization and doctrine. Divisions retained their traditional triangular structure, providing for two maneuver elements that could advance together or independently toward one or more objectives, and maintain a reserve that would push forward to assist in exploiting a breakthrough. In a defensive posture, division commanders would normally deploy two regiments forward along the main battle line while keeping the third to the rear, poised to counterattack.

Reports of the General Board, European Theater of Operations, and studies by the Historical Section of Army Ground Forces reflected the serious and diligent effort the Army made to learn from and build on its experience in World War II. The Army established the board in June 1945 to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed during the war by U.S. forces in the European theater. Its report comprised more than 8,000 pages in 131 volumes and made recommendations for the future organization and employment of almost all elements of the Army.55

The Army’s return to Europe also prompted its leaders to look to the German experience in World War II for doctrinal guidance. Military historians invested considerable effort in analyzing Germany’s campaigns on the Eastern Front and cataloging the lessons to be learned. The USAREUR Historical Division sponsored a foreign military studies program based initially on interrogations of Germany’s senior military leaders shortly after V-E Day. Information gathered in this way formed the basis for a number of Department of the Army pamphlets on such topics as Soviet combat methods in World War II; war on the Eastern Front as told from the German High Command’s perspective; and studies of operations and tactics at the corps, division, and regimental levels. To supplement the program, senior German officers with World War II experience against the Soviets spoke before assembled groups of American officers.56

While, in hindsight, much of the German assistance and advice might have seemed self-serving and often misleading, the Army had few other places to turn. Although many German officers presented perceptions gained early in the war when the Soviet Army had presented little resistance, others had conducted withdrawals and delaying actions in the face of superior Soviet forces. At a time when any assistance was better than no assistance at all, many of the U.S.

planners were also willing to overlook some of the uglier aspects of the German conduct in the Soviet Union if it meant they might obtain a few bits of useful information. If the same German scientists and engineers who had designed the V–1 and V–2 rockets that rained down on London could now be hard at work designing American missiles, U.S. military planners saw no reason why they should not profit from the experiences of the German Army during the Soviet campaigns.57

As a result, American attention to the lessons posed by the German experience was soon reflected in the operational doctrine the Seventh Army employed. Already confronted by a lack of training areas suitable for large-scale maneuvers, the Seventh Army began to adopt the German Army’s strong emphasis on small-unit tactics. Its plan for the defense of Western Europe soon began to resemble the German system of mobile defense with a lack of fixed linear defense concepts and an emphasis on a more active resistance in which tanks replaced antitank guns and tank destroyers as the primary antitank weapon.58

The war in Korea also helped to shape U.S. Army doctrine in Germany. The conflict had been going on for six months by December 1950 when the United States reactivated the Seventh Army in Germany. Army leaders from the chief of staff on down recognized the importance of transferring information and lessons learned through hard experience in Korea to the rest of the service. In a letter to General Eddy, who had just taken command of the Seventh Army, Army Chief of Staff General Collins discussed lessons from the conflict that Eddy could apply to training in Germany. Collins did not believe that the U.S. experience in Korea to date indicated any need for drastic revisions in training and doctrine. Instead, he stressed the importance of aggressive leadership at all levels of command and insisted that training that developed absolute proficiency in basic combat skills and encouraged the innate resourcefulness of the American soldier would produce the best results. Eddy passed the letter on to his corps and division commanders.59

The formal training and doctrine apparatus of the Army also identified critical lessons from the conflict and distributed them across the force. Operating under a contract with the Department of the Army, the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University submitted a semiannual report in June 1952 that discussed thirteen ongoing projects in Korea. These included studies on the effectiveness and lethality of various weapons, guerrilla operations, the effect of fatigue on soldier performance, and the infantryman’s load. Although

59 Ltr, Collins to Eddy, 7 Feb 1951, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
distribution of the report was limited, copies did find their way to USAREUR and the Seventh Army headquarters.\textsuperscript{60} The Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces, also published extracts from classified command reports of units fighting in Korea. It furnished copies throughout the Army Staff and to all schools and major commands in the service. The extracts contained specific information and recommendations derived from unit experiences in combat. They suggested improvements in training, modifications in weapons and equipment, and tactical innovations across the force.\textsuperscript{61} In other training bulletins, the office published detailed critiques of significant combat actions in Korea. One paper, distributed in December 1951, contained a discussion of the battle for Hill 1243, known as Heartbreak Ridge. It noted the need for closer infantry-artillery-air coordination and careful prior planning of air and artillery support. The report also pointed out that the failure of junior officers to issue complete orders to their soldiers caused confusion during the action.\textsuperscript{62}

In Europe, the USAREUR and Seventh Army training staffs provided opportunities for veterans coming to the command from Korea to share their experiences. Units at various levels scheduled lectures and meetings with these veterans and encouraged all personnel to attend.\textsuperscript{63} In January 1953, the 28th Infantry Division in Germany and the 45th Infantry Division in Korea initiated a program in which soldiers in each unit exchanged letters with their counterparts in the other. Dubbed “Operation Buddy,” the program allowed the troops of the two divisions to form friendships and gave the men in Europe a chance to question and learn from their counterparts seeing action in Korea. In one such letter, the commander of a frontline company in the 45th Division related to his counterpart in the 28th the importance of training men in noise and light discipline at night. Being able to suppress a cough or to read a map without rustling the paper might make the difference in concealing a position from enemy infiltrators. Another letter between company first sergeants discussed the difficulties of keeping forward-deployed troops supplied with water. Brig. Gen. John G. Van Houten, assistant commander of the 28th Division, summarized

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the program by saying that it helped his men answer the question, “What can I do to make myself combat ready?”

The conflict in Korea provided lessons in combating a numerically superior foe, but the nature of that war made Army leaders in Europe reluctant to place too much reliance on the developments in tactics, organization, and equipment that it seemed to suggest. Neither the North Korean nor the Chinese armies employed the type of mechanized assault force the Americans expected to face in Europe. While Korea highlighted the killing power of massed field artillery, a lesson not lost on those planning for combat in Europe, the country’s mountainous terrain channeled forces into narrow valleys and offered few opportunities for the war of movement emphasized by the German doctrine of mobile defense. Although the Army made a serious effort to incorporate lessons learned in Korea across the entire force, its senior officers also argued that nothing truly new had come to light. The chief of the Organization and Training Division of the General Staff, Brig. Gen. David A. D. Ogden, observed that, while units had learned some new techniques and ideas, in most instances it was a case of learning old lessons over again.

The battle plans and operational doctrine that began to emerge in the Seventh Army in 1951 thus combined many of the elements gleaned from the Army’s most recent experiences. General Eddy, for example, recognized that a traditional fixed defense employing static, fortified positions would not hold in the face of the overwhelming numbers the Soviets could field. The Seventh Army lacked sufficient combat forces, he noted, to defend in strength all along its assigned front and even if he could gather the forces required to halt a determined attack, they would then present lucrative targets for massed Soviet artillery or air-dropped atomic munitions. Instead, embracing the German concept of mobile defense, he planned to deploy his armored cavalry regiments forward to provide early warning, to force the attackers into assault formations, and to determine the main directions of an attack. Once the units had made initial contact with an invading force as it crossed the interzonal border, the armored cavalry units would harass the advancing formations, inflicting casualties as they pulled back.

Most of the Seventh Army battle plans assumed a period of rising hostilities, prior to an actual attack, during which the commander could position his forces and make final preparations for combat. Although the armored cavalry

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66 Memo, Lt Col Fred J. Martineau, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Major Units and Staff, 2 Apr 1952, sub: Defense on a Wide Front (Mobile Defense), Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.

regiments occupied positions well forward—and Seventh Army’s standing orders required both corps to maintain a percentage of combat forces in the vicinity of the primary approach corridors—the vast majority of the army’s combat power occupied garrisons well removed from their initial battle positions. In order to get those units into position for combat, the Seventh Army established a three-level escalating alert system. During the initial level, an order for simple alert directed antiaircraft units to move to their assembly areas and engineer units to move to designated bridging or demolition sites. Upon receipt of the order, corps headquarters canceled all leaves and passes, and recalled their personnel from military schools. The order also directed units engaged in training away from their assigned battle positions to return to garrison to prepare for deployment.68

Two further alert levels completed the system. At the second level, the reinforced alert ordered further steps to prepare the Seventh Army for combat. Upon receipt of this order, the V and VII Corps began to deploy their units to initial battle positions. Air defense restricted zones became effective, and engineer units began construction of temporary bridges and ferries to aid in the evacuation of noncombatants. Other engineer units placed charges and prepared to execute demolition plans. Military police units, along with area commands, began the process of evacuating noncombatants from the anticipated battleground back to safe areas in France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. All tactical headquarters established and tested their designated communications nets. Area commands opened logistical supply points and initiated rear area security plans. The order for reinforced alert brought Seventh Army to the point where it was ready for war. The final level, the order for general alert, indicated that hostilities were imminent.69

The SHAPE Emergency Defense Plan for 1952 directed the Seventh Army, as part of Central Army Group (CENTAG), to conduct a delaying action as far forward as possible in order to allow time to evacuate noncombatants from the battle area and to allow the bulk of allied forces to withdraw to the west of a line marked by the Rhine and Ijssel Rivers in western Germany. This was the farthest to the east that SHAPE leaders believed they could hold a defensive line given the forces they had available. Once Soviet ground forces penetrated to the Rhine, a maximum allied effort, employing land and air forces with all forms of atomic support, would attempt to hold on that line. The plan called for withdrawing forces to make maximum use of demolitions to delay the Soviets and to deny them the use of important installations such as airfields, bridges, telecommunications sites, and supply dumps. Although Seventh Army units were to engage advancing Soviet units where they could in order to slow down the advance, the leadership’s paramount concern was to preserve its primary

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68 Operation Order (OPORD) OSA 2–52, Order for Simple Alert, HQ, Seventh Army, 10 Aug 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
69 OPORD ORA 2–52, Order for Reinforced Alert, HQ, Seventh Army, 10 Aug 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
forces intact for the defense of the Rhine.wooded and hilly terrain in the area of the Fulda and Hof Gaps offered possible temporary defensive positions. Guidance from SHAPE headquarters also recommended delaying positions along the Weser and Ems Rivers in the north, on the Fulda River and nearby favorable defensive terrain in the center, and on the Main River–Ludwig Canal and Neckar River in the south.⁷⁰

With this guidance in mind, as the cavalry units pulled back, they would eventually pass through forward elements of the infantry divisions. In the area around the Fulda Gap, the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment would pass off the delaying mission to detachments from the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions. Farther south, in the area around the Hof Gap, the 2d and 6th Armored Cavalry Regiments would hand off the battle to smaller elements of the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions. These tank and infantry units would continue the delaying action and then withdraw to successive positions along riverlines, at

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The 19th Infantry patrol sets up a .57-mm. recoilless rifle near Hanau on 6 October 1951.

Soldiers use straw to conceal their M26 tank near Hanau during Exercise Combine in October 1951.
road junctions, and other potential choke points, trading space for time and inflicting maximum casualties on the Soviets as they advanced. A successful delaying action would depend on small combat forces holding critical road centers and dominant terrain for as long as possible by employing preplanned demolitions, minefields, and the fire of all supporting weapons. Commanders plotted “killing grounds,” where they could slow down and bottle up an advance long enough to concentrate all available firepower on the enemy forces. Nonetheless, the wide fronts that individual units would have to cover required U.S. forces to become more self-reliant. They could not expect to find friendly units immediately to their right or left.\textsuperscript{71}

As the defenders continued to pull back, massed artillery and mortar fire would break up enemy assault formations and inflict casualties. Traditionally, massed artillery had always been one of the strengths of the U.S. Army, and doctrine for its employment specified that field artillery battalions were never to be held in reserve. Therefore, Seventh Army commanders positioned most of their artillery well forward to engage advancing Soviet forces as soon as possible. As attacking forces continued their advance, the artillery units would displace to the rear by battery, always keeping two-thirds of their firepower in action. U.S. commanders could call on forty-six battalions of field artillery and

\textsuperscript{71} Memo, Col Robert C. Gildart, Acting Dep Ch of Staff, Plans, Seventh Army, for CG, 43d Inf Div, 21 May 1952, sub: Delaying Action, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
eighteen battalions of antiaircraft artillery in addition to the mortars organic to their infantry battalions. The ability of American gunners to concentrate fire on a single target and to deliver it in a single, simultaneous volley (the time-on-target) had made them the most proficient in the world during World War II. This would be a considerable battlefield advantage.\(^7^2\)

Maintaining the level of support necessary to do all this required an organization and system of communication that allowed rapid transmission of target information from a forward observer on the front line back to an artillery fire direction center farther to the rear. The extended distances that the defense had to cover and the frequent movement of all units involved tested the limits of existing communications equipment and systems for all of the Seventh Army’s units. General Eddy told EUCOM’s commander, General Handy, in 1952 that if all the studies and boards conducted up to that point were correct, signal communications range requirements for the Army’s “Defense on a Wide Front” doctrine greatly exceeded existing capabilities. He believed his units needed additional radios and other modernized communications gear as soon as possible in order to implement the tactics Eddy envisioned.\(^7^3\)

Despite the enormous firepower available to the Seventh Army, U.S. military leaders in Europe were under no illusion that they could halt a determined Soviet offensive without additional reinforcements. The distance between a potential Soviet crossing of the inter-German border and the main line of defense along the Rhine River was, in some places, less than eighty miles. Once the U.S. forces fell back to the west behind the Rhine, they lined up with elements of the French I Corps near Koblenz on their northern flank and elements of the French II Corps near Strasbourg on their southern flank. With the limited forces available, the best the NATO forces could hope for was to delay the enemy advance for as long as possible and to retain control of ports of entry along the French coast to allow reinforcing units to enter the theater. Most senior officers agreed that the Rhine River offered the best place for U.S. and allied forces to make their most determined defense. From that position, the CENTAG commander could launch local counterattacks to seal off enemy penetrations and to destroy isolated units. General Eddy planned to use the 2d Armored Division in this capacity because the mission would put the unit’s mobility, firepower, and shock action to the best use. Army leaders recognized, however, that without timely reinforcements, or without the introduction of

\(^7^2\) Memo, Col Lynwood D. Lott, Asst Adj Gen, EUCOM, for Seventh Army Distribution, 11 Sep 1952, sub: Order of Battle, USAREUR, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; DA Field Manual (FM) 6–20, Artillery Tactics and Technique, October 1953.

atomic weapons in support of their defense, they could not hope to maintain the Rhine River defense line indefinitely.74

In 1951, the Seventh Army sought to test these ideas and to refine its battle plans in a series of major field exercises. Starting in October with Exercise Combine, observers noted that much of the force’s training seemed too closely related to World War II tactical experiences. In the preliminary after action report on the exercise, umpires identified a need for further work and concentrated training on a wide range of subjects. In particular, they stressed a need for additional emphasis on small-unit training and individual soldier skills, particularly in the conduct of delaying actions, the type of operation in which they were most likely to be engaged. The report recommended that the tempo of the exercises be increased so that small-unit actions could take place at more nearly the speed that would be experienced under combat conditions.75

74 Memo, Pachler for Training Br, 14 Apr 1952, sub: Defense on a Wide Front; SHAPE Emergency Defense Plan 1–52, 1 Dec 1951, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH.

75 Preliminary After Action Report (AAR) FTX–51 (COMBINE), HQ, Seventh Army, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
The most frequent issue that arose in exercise critiques was an unrealistic assumption that ground units would retain the same almost unlimited air support they had enjoyed during the campaign across Europe at the end of World War II. Even so, air-ground coordination was poor throughout the maneuvers. To some extent, this reflected the postwar military reorganization and the formation of an independent U.S. Air Force dedicated to the concept of strategic bombing. Also, as the commanding general of the Twelfth Air Force in Europe, Maj. Gen. Dean C. Strother, indicated, in the event of war his command would be concerned primarily with the defeat of the enemy air force in the air and not with the support of ground forces. Although the Twelfth Air Force supported most major exercises and its officers worked closely

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with Seventh Army representatives to refine close air support procedures, Air Force commanders placed a much lower degree of emphasis on training and equipping their forces for ground support missions than their Army Air Corps predecessors in World War II had. In particular, Army and Air Force leaders sparred over operational control of tactical air units in an emergency. Senior Army leaders, General Eddy in particular, pressed for ground force control over close air support. This position was anathema to Air Force doctrine and bitterly contested by its officers.\(^7\)

Subsequent exercises over the next year helped to refine doctrine and war plans to some extent, but they were primarily designed to evaluate the level of training throughout the command. In July 1952, the Seventh Army participated in Command Post Exercise (CPX) \textit{Grand alliance}, conducted by the NATO Central Army Group headquarters. Tactical headquarters and staffs down to division and separate brigade level participated in training that tested their abilities to orchestrate a range of military operations and to coordinate planning with headquarters and personnel of other nations. The most crucial aspect of the training was for unit headquarters and staffs at all levels to demonstrate an ability to communicate with one another. Criticisms of the operation noted poor signal planning and numerous lapses in communications security. Encryption and subsequent decryption of secure message traffic took far too much time to support fast-moving operations. The final report on the exercise concluded that all units required considerable improvement in the timely reporting of information, particularly that involving air support or enemy order of battle.\(^7\)

Other exercises, such as \textit{Rose Bush} and \textit{Equinox}, in September 1952, combined U.S. forces with allied units to test the ability of different nationalities to work in concert. In \textit{Rose Bush}, components of the U.S. V Corps and the French II Corps defended against an aggressor force composed of the U.S. 2d Armored Division and the French 1st Armored Division. Commanders staged the event as a free maneuver with no fixed scenario to restrain decision making. For three days, the defenders conducted an extended delaying action, counterattacking whenever possible, as the invaders advanced toward the Rhine. The critique that followed indicated that while communications security remained a concern, General Eddy’s emphasis on small-unit leadership and training had paid off for the Seventh Army in the competence and aggressiveness its soldiers and noncommissioned officers had shown. However, General Dahlquist, the V Corps commander, raised some concerns about the exercise’s lack of realism.


The 43d Infantry Division field dental clinic, December 1952
He noted the great difficulty in trying to reproduce for the unit commanders the intensity of combat. He recounted an instance where he encountered a young soldier standing near a bridge whose job it was to inform oncoming units that the bridge had been blown up and the road had been mined. The procedure, the general said, could not replicate the stress faced by a young commander discovering the mines for himself.\textsuperscript{79}

One week later the VII Corps took its turn in Exercise \textsc{equinox}, with the 43d Infantry Division and elements of the French I Corps defending against attacks mounted by the 28th Division supported by the French 4th Division and a group from the French 25th Airborne Division. Despite some language and communication barriers, the two nations demonstrated their ability to

\textsuperscript{79} HQ, Seventh Army, Critiques of Exercise \textsc{rosebud} for Subordinate Seventh Army Units, 7 Sep 1952, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; HQ, Seventh Army, Guest Observer Division, Exercise \textsc{rose bush}, Frankfurt Military Post, Critique Notes, 9 Sep 1952, V Corps Command Reports, RG 407, NACP; Howard Kennedy, “Here’s What Exercise \textsc{rose bush} Was All About,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 21 Sep 1952.
coordinate their actions. The maneuver director, French Lt. Gen. Roger J. Noiret, praised all participants for the teamwork they had exhibited.  

**Early Thoughts on an Atomic Option**

Through the end of 1951, the Seventh Army planned only for a conventional defense. Officially, the U.S. Army had yet to consider atomic weapons as firepower available to support a war on the ground. Nonetheless, some individual officers had already begun to consider how to use atomic weapons to support conventional battlefield maneuvers. Army professional publications such as *Military Review* and *Army Information Digest* had printed several articles on the subject. Then, in November 1951, the Army published Field Manual 100–31, *Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons*, which incorporated many of the ideas advanced in the professional journals into the service’s first attempt at formulating a tactical nuclear doctrine. The manual expressed the service’s position that atomic weapons were not “absolute” weapons that could end conflicts all by themselves. Instead, they were powerful new weapons that had to be properly integrated into tactical operations.

From 2 January to 20 February 1952, the Army conducted a two-sided tactical exercise in upstate New York, employing the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 11th Airborne Division, and the 278th Regimental Combat Team. Exercise *Snowfall* was the first maneuver to include the simulated tactical use of atomic weapons. Both friendly and aggressor forces dropped notional atomic bombs from aircraft to break up enemy formations and to facilitate maneuvers on the ground. Commanders experimented with procedures for target selection and the effects of atomic explosions on troops and equipment.

At the same time, the Army also initiated a series of tests at Yucca Flats, Nevada, to study the effects of an atomic detonation on troop behavior. Known as the Desert Rock exercises, the project exposed troops, under varying degrees of protection, to atomic explosions. The researchers also placed military equipment, vehicles, and tethered animals at assorted distances from the detonation to assess the blast and heat effects. Besides becoming conditioned to the concept of atomic combat, the participants in the effort learned that, properly dispersed and protected, they could survive an atomic explosion and continue

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their mission. Later tests in the series integrated live atomic explosions into maneuvers as troops left their foxholes and, accompanied by tanks, advanced toward ground zero.\(^{84}\) While the tests included periodic checks to determine levels of radioactive fallout, however, they demonstrated a lack of understanding of radiation’s long-term effects. Army training literature tended to treat the matter rather lightly. It remained for further tests and experiments to confirm the implications of radiation exposure.

In January 1952, the Army Staff submitted a draft circular, “Staff Organization and Procedures for Tactical Atomic Warfare,” to EUCOM with a request that it be tested in a command post exercise. The Seventh Army evaluated the procedures as part of Exercise SPRINGTIME, held 14–17 April 1952. The analysis that followed noted that normal processes for intelligence, reconnaissance, and communications were far too slow and inadequate for the timely recognition and development of target information for atomic attack. The exercise also revealed that the circular lacked sufficient detail on damage control following an enemy atomic strike. In particular, the Seventh Army staff recommended a review of the personnel and equipment required for the various types of labor and rescue squads. At least half of the observations dealt with necessary changes in medical services. The mass casualties resulting from an atomic strike, for example, would require evacuation and medical care beyond the capabilities of existing facilities and organizations. It would be the responsibility of commanders at all levels to assist the medical service by every means possible.\(^{85}\)

Perhaps most significantly, the Seventh Army’s response noted that the proposed circular contained nothing on the employment of artillery as a means of delivery. In May 1952, Secretary of the Army Frank C. Pace described work underway to develop an artillery piece capable of firing an atomic projectile. Weighing about eighty-five tons, the prototype 280-mm. cannon had a range of about twenty miles and had to be moved while suspended between two heavy truck transporters. Although the gun had not yet fired a nuclear warhead, the Army had tested it with conventional ammunition. Pace claimed that the weapon could hit its target under any weather conditions and would be especially effective in defending against enemy forces massing for an attack. This was a particular point of interest to EUCOM and the Seventh Army, which had to

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rely on the Air Force to deliver any atomic munitions they might need on the battlefield.86

By this time, it was clear that the Army had come to see its forces in Europe as a sounding board and test bed for its evolving doctrine on atomic warfare. Even before the Seventh Army had completed its evaluation of the Army Staff’s draft circular, the Department of the Army sent both that command and EUCOM another draft training circular, this one entitled “Combined Arms Units in Atomic Warfare.” Between March and May 1952, both commands passed the document through appropriate staff sections for review and comment. The Seventh Army responded that the draft, which discussed the use of dispersed maneuver units to exploit the effects of a friendly atomic strike, was well written and urgently needed by units throughout the command. It passed its comments on to the next higher headquarters for a final response back to the Department of the Army. The impressions of the European Command echoed those of Seventh Army. In its response, however, EUCOM noted that training materials accompanying the circular overemphasized radiological capabilities and did not adequately describe prevention and protection techniques for troops deployed for combat. As part of his review, the EUCOM chemical officer recommended that chemical and biological training be included in the circular since those subjects were integral to Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR) training. His recommendation was overruled by EUCOM’s assistant chief of staff for operations, who believed the additions would unnecessarily complicate the circular.87

Despite these initial considerations at the theater-army level, training and tactical exercises in Europe remained focused on conventional warfare. The major maneuvers and command exercises for 1952 continued to test the Seventh Army’s ability to conduct a conventional defense. None of the major training events of 1952 made reference to atomic weapons in their scenarios or operations plans.88 NORTH WIND, a VII Corps command post exercise conducted in January 1952, did include an enemy atomic strike in its scenario, but that event had little impact on the scheme of maneuver for either side. Its primary purpose was to prompt units to take appropriate radiological decontamination measures. During the command post exercise critique, Seventh Army observers


commented that although atomic play had been included in the scenario, individual and unit actions indicated that many still did not know what they needed to do in the event of an atomic attack.\textsuperscript{89}

**Development of the Communications Zone**

Whatever doctrine it chose to employ, the Army would not be able to mount a successful defense in Europe until it developed a logistical base that would provide the ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and supplies the force would need to fight. Beginning in 1945, troops in Germany received supplies almost entirely through the port of Bremerhaven on the North Sea at the mouth of the Weser River. With its excellent cargo facilities and lines of communications south across the flat plains of northern Germany, the city was well suited to meet the needs of the occupation troops during times of peace. By mid-1948, however, the evolving Cold War raised serious concerns. The Berlin blockade, in particular, focused attention on the vulnerability of the supply line running south from Bremerhaven. It ran dangerously near the border between the two Germanys and could be cut both by land and air in any battle that developed.\textsuperscript{90}

The European Command began a search for alternatives. Early in 1949, its Logistics Division initiated a series of studies and staff estimates evaluating possibilities for a new line of support. In peacetime it could supplement the one from Bremerhaven, but in the event of war, a new line of support would become the primary link between the logistical and industrial base in the United States and allied forces in Europe (Map 5).\textsuperscript{91}

In November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the new line should run through France, whose two thousand miles of coastline and excellent port facilities made it the obvious choice, but whose political rivalries presented problems. By January 1950, a EUCOM survey team and representatives of the French General Staff had reached an agreement on the installations and facilities required, and a joint cost estimate for the entire project. It fell to the State Department and its representatives in France to negotiate the necessary agreements with the French government. Negotiations began slowly, as France’s internal political turmoil and the intense nationalism of its people made the stationing of foreign troops on its soil a difficult proposition. Frenchmen who vividly remembered the Nazi occupation of only a few years before could not be expected to welcome another alien body of troops within their borders,


\textsuperscript{90} HQ, USAREUR Communications Zone (COMZ), 1 Feb 1956, Entry 2282, USAREUR Information Division General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; D. J. Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, 1953–1963 (HQ, USAREUR, 1964), p. 151, copy in Historians files, CMH; Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, p. vi.

\textsuperscript{91} Jean R. Moenk, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, Establishment of Communications Through France, 1950–1951, 1952, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives.
Map 5
even if the troops seemed to improve the nation’s security. Moreover, an active Communist Party within the National Assembly would take advantage of this supposed infringement on French national sovereignty to stir up antigovernment feeling.

The constitution of a new, more stable French government under Prime Minister Rene Pleven in July 1950 allowed an intensification of negotiations. On 6 November, the United States and France signed an executive agreement establishing a line of communications from the southwest port areas of Bordeaux and La Pallice to the German frontier. As part of the agreement, the United States received port facilities, storage depots, the space to build more depots, and transportation rights on French highways and rail lines. The French agreed to contribute 2 billion francs, about $6 million, toward the cost of the enterprise. Associated technical agreements between the service arms of the two nations established a French-American Fiscal Liaison Office and a system of contracting for local labor and materials from the French economy. In order to minimize French sensitivity to the stationing of foreign troops on their soil, EUCOM initially avoided any reference to the evolving infrastructure as a Base Section or Communications Zone. The term line of communications served the purpose. Commonly understood in the military terminologies of France, the United States, and Great Britain, line of communications played down the command’s establishment of permanent military facilities (Map 6).

At first, the Army had little to work with in starting up its new support base. Prior to the agreement, the only existing U.S. military organization in France had been the American Graves Registration Command, European Area. On 1 December 1949, in anticipation of the final U.S.-French agreements, EUCOM activated the 7966th EUCOM Detachment and attached it to the Graves Registration Command. Most of the personnel from that command transferred to the 7966th EUCOM Detachment and the Graves Registration Command was later inactivated. In August 1950, EUCOM authorized the formation of the 7964th and 7965th Area Commands to serve as base section and advance section headquarters for the line of communications in the event of an emergency. Within three months, it had shifted the 7966th Detachment from Paris to Orléans where it would serve as the headquarters for the line of communications.

92 Ibid.; Memo, Col E. C. Gorsuch, USAREUR Budget Ofcr, for Comptroller of the Army, 22 Oct 1953, sub: The USAREUR LOC, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
The 7965th Area Command moved into northeastern France, in the Verdun-Metz area, to supervise the forward depots and the 7964th Area Command established its headquarters in La Rochelle, on the coast about eighty miles north of Bordeaux, to oversee the western ports and rear supply points.95

Five days after the signing of the agreement, on 11 November, approximately one thousand American troops from EUCOM ordnance, quartermaster, and other support units moved into France with three hundred trucks and one hundred trailers. Most of the convoy headed for the ports of Bordeaux and La Pallice to open operations there. In mid-November 1950, the first ships with supplies for the U.S. Army in Germany had docked at Bordeaux and began to unload.96

By July 1951, the French political scene had changed to such an extent that EUCOM was able to reorganize and rename its operating agency in France. On 15 July, with the blessing of the French leadership, the command

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96 HQ, USAREUR COMZ, 1 Feb 1956; Memo, Col Andrew P. O’Meara, Dep Dir for Plans, EUCOM, for D/Log, Dep Ch of Staff for Ops, 16 Nov 1950, sub: Data for Reply to Questions by Press on Logistic Operations in France, Entry 6, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
announced the establishment of the EUCOM Communications Zone and redesignated the 7964th and 7965th Area Commands, as Base Section and Advance Section, respectively. The 7966th EUCOM Detachment became the Orléans Area Command supporting the Communications Zone headquarters and a number of smaller detachments in the area not included in the two larger commands. Under the new organization, the commanding general, Communications Zone, was responsible for the rapid development and operation of the line of communications and the preparation of plans for its rapid expansion to meet the emergency needs of EUCOM. In addition to being responsible for the procurement of all labor, facilities, and supplies from the French economy, he was to be the official representative of the commander in chief, EUCOM, in all negotiations with French governmental agencies.97

With the agreements concluded and headquarters elements in place, the establishment of the support network in France posed two primary problems; first, the organization, manning, and operation by U.S. forces of selected points in the system; and second, the relocation of existing depots from Germany to new sites west of the Rhine and the shipment of supply stocks to the new locations. As U.S. support units moved into France, they found living conditions to be particularly spartan. Almost no housing existed for troops and their families, and the Americans had no authority to requisition such properties as they had in Germany. Given the command emphasis on the construction of supply depots and storage facilities, troops lived in temporary, prefabricated barracks with some occupying tent cities for extended periods of time. Shortages of supplies and bureaucratic conflicts between U.S. military officials and local French governments delayed work on many projects. Of approximately eighty projects authorized for construction by EUCOM, work had begun on only twenty-nine by the end of 1951. The lack of facilities delayed the shift of strategic supplies to such an extent that by 31 December 1951, only 44 percent of the total tonnage was actually stored in France. Furthermore, inadequate storage facilities at many locations caused deterioration in some of the stock that had been moved. The ordnance depot at Captieux, sixty miles south of Bordeaux, received an average of sixty railcars a day loaded with ammunition. One USAREUR inspection found loads of ammunition lying along the soggy roadside for lack of any better place to store them.98

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Delays in construction continued throughout 1952. By midyear the commanding general of the Communications Zone, Maj. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis Jr., reported that he faced three major challenges in that area: a shortage of engineers to carry out the necessary design and site adaptation; an acute shortage of general construction labor, particularly in the northeastern sector of France; and delays imposed by both U.S. and French regulations when negotiating working agreements with French construction agencies. 

After a visit with General Sturgis in December 1952, General Ridgway, SACEUR, noted that the entire process required greater command supervision. French construction firms lacked the capability to carry the combined peak loads of both U.S. Army and Air Force construction programs, and French governmental authorities were of little help in coordinating construction requirements. Excessive bureaucracy on both sides, and restrictions imposed by French government agencies charged with the aesthetic protection of the French landscape further complicated construction efforts. Although Ridgway believed that the situation could be improved if the U.S. chain of command could foresee

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trouble sufficiently in advance to initiate corrective action, he acknowledged that a shortage of construction materials and heavy machinery in France was also a major problem. As if to emphasize the importance the command attached to the effort in France, the EUCOM commander, General Handy, in a March 1952 meeting with the senior officers in the command, declared that the front line in the effort to provide security for Europe was no longer the Seventh Army or the Twelfth Air Force—it was the line of communications.\textsuperscript{100}

As the Communications Zone and the theater’s logistical infrastructure began to take shape, leaders prepared to keep the supply pipeline open under wartime conditions. World War II had taught them that there could be no guarantee that adequate port facilities would be consistently available to unload supply ships. Amphibious operations in the Pacific as well as initial operations in support of the Normandy beachhead had demonstrated the need for an over-the-beach logistical capability. In 1952, the command began a series of exercises to develop an organization capable of offloading ocean-going ships onto open beaches by means of small boats. The initial test, labeled Operation SOB, for Supply over the Beach, occurred 4–8 June, at Pointe de Grave, France, 60 miles north of Bordeaux. In just four and a half days, 1,500 troops from the Communications Zone Base Section used amphibious trucks and landing craft to unload some 6,500 tons of cargo and ammunition stored on pallets from the SS \textit{Nevadan}. Winches and cranes on board the ship lifted the materiel into the smaller vessels, which then moved it to designated sites ashore. There, truck- or tractor-mounted cranes transferred it to land transport.\textsuperscript{101}

In an evaluation of the exercise before the EUCOM staff, Deputy Director of the Logistics Division, Brig. Gen. Frank A. Henning, declared the operation a success. The pallet method appeared to be feasible if the cranes and other lifting devices required to do the job were available. General Henning concluded that, even with limitations imposed by unfavorable weather conditions, it would be possible, with continued training, to augment the port capacity of western France by this means. He recommended continuing the training as well as regularly scheduled tests and exercises with a view toward developing


unit skills and prestocking required equipment. Along that line, he announced that another ship would be unloaded at the same site in the following month.\textsuperscript{102}

In August, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, Maj. Gen. Walter J. Muller suggested that USAREUR should view the potential shortage of port facilities in wartime as an allied, rather than just an American, problem. Under wartime conditions, most U.S. Army forces in Europe would come under the command of the NATO headquarters. In that light, General Muller requested that USAREUR consider a wider range of beaches throughout the theater. The repetition of exercises at known locations, he said, did little to collect the kind and amount of information desired by the NATO headquarters. Responding, USAREUR indicated that it considered the logistical exercises to be purely U.S. training and not subject to the approval of the allied headquarters. After making that point, however, it agreed that the command would get diminishing returns from experience gained in exercises held in the same or similar locations. As a result,

\textsuperscript{102} HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference Notes Number 16, 24 Jun 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

Troops unloading into Army DUKW, part of OTB exercise at La Pallice, France, in April 1953
subject to French approval, the command agreed to hold future exercises in areas desired by alliance members.\textsuperscript{103}

Officials at the Department of the Army observed the training with great interest. In October, they submitted an assessment and guidance to USAREUR based on their analysis of the initial exercises. They suggested that the operations offered the opportunity to test and evaluate different types of containerized and palletized loads and the methods for unloading them. The training also served as an excellent vehicle to test experimental materiel-handling equipment. The guidance suggested that future exercises should attempt to deploy troops over the beaches to test the system’s ability to deal with personnel as well as cargo. In an effort to conduct the exercises under the most realistic conditions possible, the officials added that exercise planners should also consider the effects of mass destruction weapons on beach operations and that beaches large enough to permit the sort of wide dispersal of equipment and personnel required in an atomic environment should receive priority in the selection process. The document concluded with a recommendation that the exercises continue on a monthly basis.\textsuperscript{104}

\textbf{Logistical Support for the New Mission}

While EUCOM struggled to bring the Communications Zone on line, it also addressed the administrative and logistical challenges that the initial buildup of forces in Europe entailed. The reinforcements coming to Europe would require vast quantities of food, ammunition, and fuel before they could become combat ready. In order to provide those resources, the command had to develop the organization and infrastructure to support such an effort.

In early January 1952, the deputy director of the EUCOM logistics division, General Henning, identified the problems involved in bringing the additional combat forces into the theater and preparing them for a forward defense mission. He reminded the EUCOM staff that the logistics division would have to plan for the support of units located across a broad area from France’s seaports to Berlin. Specific tasks and resources would have to be identified and delegated to unit commanders, military post commanders, and the chiefs of technical services at EUCOM headquarters. To accommodate incoming personnel, equipment, and supplies, those officers would have to forecast and prioritize requirements for storage facilities and housing. Next they had to acquire and position reserve stocks of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies that combat forces would need in the event of an enemy attack. Meanwhile, EUCOM needed to replace many

\textsuperscript{103} HQ, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, Beach Supply Exercise, 19 Aug 1952; Memo, Maj Robert V. Roverts, Asst Adj Gen, for CINC, EUCOM, 26 Sep 1952, sub: Supply Over the Beach Exercises. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

\textsuperscript{104} Memo, W. L. Cheatham, Adj Gen, for Cdr, USAREUR, 29 Oct 1952, sub: Supply Over the Beach Exercises, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP.
World War II–era vehicles and weapons with more up-to-date equipment, to repair and rebuild other unserviceable items, and to procure the construction materials necessary to begin work on barracks, family housing, hospitals, motor pools, and other facilities the incoming forces would require.105

The responsibility for the procurement and distribution of Class I supplies—primarily food for the almost three hundred thousand soldiers, sailors, and airmen to be stationed in Western Europe by the end of 1952—lay with the quartermaster section of the EUCOM logistics division. As troops began arriving in Europe in 1951, the EUCOM quartermaster, Maj. Gen. George A. Horkan, scoured Europe and North Africa for fresh fruits and vegetables, while receiving shipments of meat, canned goods, and packaged food directly from the United States. By the end of 1952, the Army’s food service program in Europe had grown to include sixty-six commissaries, thirteen bakeries, twelve coffee roasting plants, an ice cream plant, and other operations working around the clock to serve soldiers at more than seven hundred mess halls scattered throughout France and Germany. In addition to providing fresh food for soldiers both in garrison and in the field, quartermaster elements also purchased and provided packaged long-term rations that would be on hand at all times in case of an emergency. The European Command required all Army units except those stationed in England to maintain a prescribed load of three days of rations per soldier.106

The Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency was responsible for the procurement of all Class III products—petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL)—for U.S. military forces everywhere. Military ships transported bulk petroleum products from the United States to Europe, where they were distributed by civilian companies under contract to the government. Tankers delivered about 15 million gallons of gasoline and 2 million gallons of diesel per month through the port of Bremerhaven. Additional fuel for use in France came through the port at Le Havre. Once contractors delivered bulk shipments to military posts and subposts, USAREUR and Seventh Army quartermasters controlled the distribution of POL to units.107

Preparing U.S. forces for combat in Europe required massive procurements and allocations of Class V materiel, ammunition—more so than any other

105 HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference Notes Number 1, 8 Jan 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
107 Memos, Brig Gen Frank A. Henning, Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, for USAREUR Ch of Staff, 1 Dec 1953, sub: Procurement of POL for US Forces in Europe, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; and Brig Gen John M. Lentz, Seventh Army Ch of Staff, for Seventh Army Distribution, 8 Apr 1952, sub: Information for Commanders of Newly Assigned Units, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
type of supply. Units preparing to fight a war with the Soviet Union required enormous amounts of ordnance, from basic small-arms ammunition to the man-size shells that the largest artillery pieces fired. One immediate complication in achieving this goal came from the war in Korea. From 1950 through 1953, USAREUR had to compete with units in combat for access to all types of ammunition. In the end, expanding industrial capacity in the United States was able to satisfy all requirements.

In EUCOM, logistics, ordnance, and chemical officers used data from World War II to establish the amount of ammunition required in combat on a daily basis for each type of weapon. This calculation resulted in what was referred to as the basic load for each combat unit. Although some logisticians within the Department of the Army believed that combat experiences in Korea justified a reduced expenditure rate, Seventh Army leaders argued that combat in Europe would, in fact, require an even greater allocation of ammunition. They believed, for example, that the potential for air and armored combat in Europe greatly exceeded the threat posed in Korea. They also pointed out that superiority in artillery fire was essential to compensate for the Soviet’s preponderance in men and materiel. They felt so strongly about the need for increased basic loads for artillery units that many battalions maintained combat loads of ammunition greater than their authorized complement of vehicles could transport.

For armor and artillery units, the ammunition supply problem was complicated by the variety of munitions each had to carry. Tanks mainly fired general-purpose, high-explosive shells but also needed armor-piercing rounds for use against other tanks and white phosphorus rounds to block an enemy’s line of sight with rapid-building plumes of smoke. Developments in engineering provided frequent upgrades in antitank munitions to cope with the improving armor enemy tanks continued to receive. Artillery units also carried an assortment of munitions as well as a number of different types of fuzes and propellants. In all cases, ordnance officers had to replace older ammunition with improved types when they became available.

Although EUCOM had the primary mission to provide logistical support to Army units in theater, the Seventh Army also had to organize and train a

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self-contained force that could operate independently under allied operational command. For that reason, instructions from EUCOM to the Seventh Army in December 1950 had made it clear that the command was to assume responsibility for its own logistical support wherever possible using its own assigned support units. Although it would always have to rely on higher echelons to maintain supply lines and to provide depot level maintenance, the Seventh Army would need sufficient transportation, maintenance, quartermaster, medical, and other support elements to sustain its forces in combat without other outside assistance.\footnote{Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; HQ, EUCOM, Organization of a Field Army Headquarters, 4 Oct 1950, Entry 2052, USAREUR G3 Operations General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.}

In his first year as Seventh Army commander, General Eddy drove his command to become logistically self-sustaining and able to provide all the support necessary for extended, independent operations. In that regard, Eddy listed four immediate goals to get the Seventh Army ready to go to war: the command needed to establish an initial stock of reserve and replacement equipment to support sustained operations; incoming units had to receive all of their authorized weapons and equipment; commanders and staffs had to implement procedures to conserve expendable supplies and materials; and maintenance officers had to devise a system of command maintenance inspections to ensure that vehicles and weapons were combat ready.\footnote{Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; Order of Battle, USAREUR, as of 30 June 1953, Entry 2130, USAREUR General Letters, 1953, RG 549, NACP.}

Prescribed load directives required all Seventh Army units to have sufficient fuel on hand to move all of its wheeled vehicles 300 miles and all of its tracked vehicles 130 miles. The balance for the tracked vehicles, 170 miles, was to be prestocked in strategically located storage points. The Seventh Army established caches for the 1st Infantry Division at Bad Mergentheim and Schwäbisch Hall, locations along the route to its designated deployment area. Together, the two depots contained almost fifty thousand gallons of fuel, all of it stored in five-gallon cans. Hundreds of gallons of grease and oil were also on hand for the division’s use.\footnote{Memo, Donaldson for USAREUR Distribution, 7 Apr 1953, sub: Prescribed Loads (Class I & III); DF, McGinley, G–4, to Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 26 Feb 1951, sub: Progress Report of Prestocked Supplies East of the Rhine River; Memo, Lt Col John R. Turner, Asst Adj Gen, for CINC, EUCOM, 8 Jun 1951, sub: Establishment of Additional Prestocked Supplies. Both in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.}

In addition to these depots and others like them, USAREUR directed the Communications Zone to establish a special reserve capable of fueling full-scale operations for sixty days. The Seventh Army’s situation was complicated by the fact that all of the depots, shops, and supply points needed to sustain it were located almost entirely in the area where the main battle would occur. General Eddy commented that if the Soviets succeeded in pushing to the Rhine, the captured facilities and supplies would produce an excellent line of support for their army.\footnote{Memo, Col E. T. Henry, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 5 Sep 1953, sub: USA-REUR Supply Distribution Policy Directive, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, Entry 2130, USAREUR General Correspondence, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.}
The Seventh Army’s logistical self-sufficiency began to improve as more and more of its support units arrived in theater. Almost all of its quartermaster units arrived in Germany in 1951. The 2d Quartermaster Group established its headquarters in Kornwestheim, a suburb of Stuttgart. Its subordinate battalions, the 14th, 15th, and 35th Quartermaster Battalions set up operations in Darmstadt, Munich, and Ludwigsburg, respectively. The 7th Quartermaster Group established itself in Baumholder, the joint U.S.-French training area in the French Zone. One of its two component battalions, 327th, also set up in Baumholder while the other, the 56th, took up station in nearby Kaiserslautern. The new quartermaster units included two petroleum companies, one petroleum depot company, one laundry company, one clothing and general supply company, one repair maintenance company, two subsistence companies, one bakery company, one bath company, and three bath detachments. Many of these units were inexperienced, but they developed their skills through on-the-job training. Each also underwent thirty days of tactical training at Grafenwöhr.

The Seventh Army quartermaster had hoped to draw all supplies from a distribution and storage system to be established by his own units by June 1951. The command failed to meet this goal, however, due to the unusually wide dispersion of its units across the U.S. Zone that its peacetime configuration required. At the end of the year, one-half of all subsistence and fuel supplies and almost all other commodities continued to pass through EUCOM depots. Nonetheless, leaders remained confident that enough Seventh Army units were available to provide necessary support to the Army if an emergency occurred and a move to tactical positions became necessary.

The command’s maintenance and ammunition-handling capabilities came together in a similar manner. At the beginning of 1951, the Seventh Army had about half of the ordnance units necessary to attain self-sufficiency in those areas. By 1952, the 47th Ordnance Group at Ludwigsburg and the 50th Ordnance Group at Sandhofen supervised six ordnance maintenance and supply battalions. These battalions, the 71st at Illesheim, the 80th at Esslingen, the 85th at Oberursel, the 8th at Griesheim, the 19th at Böblingen, and the 38th at Nellingen, included a mix of medium and heavy automotive maintenance companies, as well as separate detachments for the repair of small arms and heavy weapons. These enabled the Seventh Army to perform all of the maintenance it was authorized to do at its level. The repair and rebuilding of heavily damaged vehicles and equipment remained the responsibility of higher-level ordnance depots. The 57th Ordnance Group at Miesau oversaw the 82d Ordnance Ammunition Battalion at the same location. The 57th Group also controlled the 37th Ordnance Battalion, which ran the ammunition supply point at Münster, in the British Zone, through which Seventh Army drew all

117 Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951.
of its training ammunition. Units requiring more than one railcar of munitions drew directly from the EUCOM Ammunition Depot, located about fifty miles southwest of Mannheim.\(^\text{117}\)

Despite these additions, Col. Joseph Horridge, the Seventh Army ordnance officer, remained concerned about the forward deployment of so much of the theater’s depot and heavy maintenance operations. However, EUCOM had neither enough funds nor enough readily available space to relocate the facilities to safer locations west of the Rhine. As General Eddy had also pointed out in his command report, Colonel Horridge warned that the loss of those stocks and capabilities in an attack would seriously affect the entire theater’s ability to perform its mission. If captured by the Soviets those resources would greatly augment their capabilities.\(^\text{118}\)

The distribution of supplies to dispersed troop units required a substantial hauling capacity, and the Seventh Army’s transport organizations also completed their deployment in 1951. The 10th Transportation Group headquarters at Kornwestheim oversaw three separate transportation battalions; the 27th, also at Kornwestheim; the 29th, stationed at Nellingen, about ten miles northwest of Ulm; and the 122d, at Zirndorf, a suburb of Nuremberg. Two additional truck battalions, the 38th and the 411th, supported the V and VII Corps directly. Although all equipment was on hand and leaders regarded vehicle maintenance as excellent, the Seventh Army transportation officer warned that the truck and car companies were operating at about 15 percent below authorized personnel strength. In addition, all of the command’s cargo trucks were rebuilt World War II surplus that would not hold up to heavy use over prolonged periods of time. While the truck battalions were technically part of the support structure, their primary function was to motorize the infantry divisions. Leaders estimated that it would take six truck companies, the usual complement of one battalion, to place one division on wheels. The truck companies participated in division training and exercises, providing other transportation services only when not needed by the infantry (Table 2).\(^\text{119}\)

During 1952, the Seventh Army continued to move toward logistical self-sufficiency. However, a high rate of personnel turnover, a lack of individual training in specialized military support skills, shortages of tools and equipment in some maintenance and engineer units, and a lack of shop space and suitable work areas hampered progress toward that goal. Even so, work toward relocating support depots and storage sites for equipment stockpiles proceeded steadily. By September 1952, the force had repositioned almost all

\(^{117}\) Seventh Army Cmd Rpt, 1951; William M. Donnelly, “‘Under Army Orders’: The U.S. Army National Guard During the Korean War” (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1998).


of its subsistence stocks to locations farther to the west, had established eleven prestock sites for fuel and lubricants in secure locations, and had entered into negotiations with the German government to acquire additional sites. Completed fuel storage sites included those at Mannheim, Schwäbisch Hall, Bad Mergentheim, and Böblingen. Construction of hardened ammunition storage areas likewise continued, with about 40 percent of the wartime stocks required by the combat forces in place. One site at Böblingen, southwest of Stuttgart, held one thousand tons of ammunition and another fifteen hundred tons of fortification material. Engineers also worked to expand existing storage sites, such as the prestock site for the 1st Infantry Division at Bad Mergentheim, about twenty-five miles south of Würzburg (Chart 3).120

### Berlin, 1951–1952: Standing Fast and Showing the Flag

Throughout the early 1950s, Berlin remained a focal point for tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. In January 1950, the Communists announced plans for a massive demonstration and parade of more than five hundred thousand East German youths through the Western sectors of Berlin during the Whitsuntide celebration on 30 May. Feeling that such a demonstration presented a serious threat to West Berlin security, the Americans, along with the British and French, alerted their forces and declared their intention to support the West Berlin police with military force if necessary. When the demonstrations and parade occurred with minimal violence or disruptions, Western authorities

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Chart 3—Organizational Structure of Seventh Army
31 January 1952

Source: Order of Battle, EUCOM (U.S. Army), 31 January 1952.
claimed that the failure of the Communists to cause a greater disturbance resulted in “a resounding defeat of Kremlin Cold War strategy.”

By 1952, Berlin had settled into an uneasy equilibrium for the U.S. troops there. When EUCOM was redesignated as the U.S. Army, Europe, in August 1952, its command relationship with the Berlin Command and the Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin, remained unchanged. The U.S. Commander, Berlin, Maj. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson, reported directly to Headquarters, USAREUR, on military matters and to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany for issues related to civil affairs or dealings with city officials. The U.S. garrison in Berlin amounted to about forty-five hundred troops, which included the 6th Infantry, the 759th Military Police Battalion, and a number of smaller support units.

In May 1952, after the governments of the United States, France, and Great Britain had signed conventions with the Federal Republic of Germany that would begin its transition from occupied state to sovereign nation, the foreign ministers from the three allied nations signed a declaration reaffirming security assurances for Western Europe, Germany, and Berlin. The statement concluded that the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of military forces of the three powers within the city was an essential element for peace in the current international situation. Furthermore, the three powers affirmed that any attack on Berlin from any quarter would be regarded as an attack on their forces and themselves.

Nonetheless, Soviet and East German harassment and propaganda persisted as irritants for U.S. soldiers stationed in the city. In May 1952, Communist authorities increased the tension, closing down the border between the eastern and western halves of Germany, leaving West Berlin as the last remaining exit point from which refugees could travel safely to West Germany. As a part of the process, in an effort to exercise tight control of people and freight moving into and out of the city, Communist border guards attempted to force the allies to observe complex new restrictions on their rights of access to the city. In the view of U.S. leaders, the only way to maintain freedom of movement into and out of Berlin was to exercise it on a regular basis and to refuse to comply with any and all efforts by the Soviets to impose limitations. As a result, the provision of escorts for military convoys and trains into and out of the U.S. sector became one of the primary missions for the soldiers of the Berlin Command.

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123 Msg, U.S. Cdr, Berlin (USCOB), signed Mathewson, to CINC, EUCOM, for Dir of Intel, 21 Jun 1952, sub: Security Information; HQ, EUCOM, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 3 Jun 1952. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1954,
American soldiers and their dependents unfamiliar with border restrictions in and around the city were often detained by Soviet or East German police. Travelers deviating from the autobahn between Helmstedt and Berlin, the single highway authorized for access into the city from the west, quickly found themselves in the custody of Soviet or East German police. Although U.S. military police patrolled the corridor on a regular basis, their movements were often restricted by the Communist authorities. It was not uncommon for soldiers unfamiliar with the city’s transit systems to board the wrong bus or train and end up in East Berlin. There they were usually apprehended by East German police and detained, sometimes for months. In one extreme case, two American privates returning to their unit late in 1952 took the wrong train and found themselves in East Berlin where the Soviet authorities held them for six months offering them money, jobs, and university educations if they would turn Communist. As in most cases, once the Soviets had exhausted all propaganda value from the incident, they released the two to American custody.124

Near the end of 1952, U.S. and Soviet representatives met to discuss several locations along the U.S.-Soviet sector border where the demarcation line was in dispute. After cartographic experts determined several locations where the border had been incorrectly marked, both sides agreed to replace erroneous signs, but the action was not accomplished without incident. On 16 December, East German police arrested M. Sgt. William T. Rice of Headquarters Company, 7780th Composite Service Battalion, as he stood approximately three feet inside the Soviet Zone while surveying a newly erected marker. Since the sergeant was on duty performing a mission that had been negotiated between U.S. and Soviet authorities, his arrest and detention were unjustified. The Soviets returned him to U.S. custody without comment two days later. Before releasing him, however, they required him to sign a confession admitting that he had illegally crossed the Berlin border.125

Concerned by the continuing harassment and alarmed by the growth of the East German paramilitary forces, the Western allies in Berlin took initial steps to develop a coordinated plan for the defense of the city. A combined study completed in 1950 had concluded that, if all available East German forces were concentrated for a deliberate attack against the Western sectors of the city, the allied forces would probably not be able to offer effective resistance. The three Western headquarters formed a combined committee, which became known as the Allied Staff, Berlin, to study the issue and to recommend courses of action in the event of a Soviet or East German attack. By the end of 1952, the group

drew up its first combined plan for the defense of the city. Known as Operations Instructions Number 3, it called for each of the three national forces in West Berlin to form a defensive perimeter within its sector. The British would defend the area around the Olympic Stadium, the French around Tegel Airfield, and the Americans around Tempelhof Air Base. Each of the three allied garrisons would be responsible for defending its own base; or, if the situation demanded, the three national forces would be regrouped to defend any one of the three strongpoints. A series of exercises and studies indicated that, in any case, the Western allied garrisons would offer little more than token resistance to an attack by enemy military forces. The tests did, however, lay the groundwork for future planning.126

The End of the Beginning

Although USAREUR and the Seventh Army were still not prepared to face a serious offensive from the east by the end of 1952, they had made significant headway. In the place of what had been a single reconstructed division and odd leftover components of the Constabulary stood five full divisions and three armored cavalry regiments, organized into two corps and under the direction of a complete field army headquarters. Moreover, these combat elements were supported by ample artillery, engineers, and all the other combat and service support components the force would need to engage in battle. In France, the construction of depots, maintenance facilities, ammunition dumps, and the rest of the force’s logistical infrastructure was also well underway. Perhaps most important, the Army had taken major steps toward developing a headquarters organization in Europe that could provide wartime leadership and coordination to U.S. forces in the theater while also integrating into NATO’s command structure.

Nonetheless, critical challenges remained. The Seventh Army still lacked the training facilities, ranges, and sufficient prestocks of ammunition, fuel, and supplies to make it battle worthy. Despite the fact that its units ended 1952 at close to full strength, the rotation of more than one-third of its trained soldiers back to the United States during the year was a clear indication of another problem to solve. Finally, although the Army and the Air Force had begun an effort to coordinate a doctrine for close air support of ground forces, more work remained. Many leaders throughout USAREUR believed that only atomic weapons delivered on the battlefield would offset the Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. That conviction implied revisions in organization, equipment, and doctrine to fight in an atomic environment. These were issues that the Army would have to address if its deployment to Europe was to represent a fully credible deterrent.

1953: The Cold War Takes a New Turn

The new year brought three important changes that would each have a direct impact on American military forces in Europe. In January, a new president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, assumed the role as commander in chief with a level of military experience far surpassing that of any of his predecessors since Ulysses S. Grant. Two months later, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin died without leaving a clearly designated successor, forcing U.S. intelligence services to speculate on what effect the transition might have on the situation in Europe. Finally, on 27 July, after more than two years of talks, negotiators in P’anmunjom agreed to an armistice in Korea.

A military career that began in 1915, included service in two World Wars, and culminated in the role of supreme commander in Europe, gave Eisenhower ample stature to consider himself as an expert in military affairs. From 1922 through 1925 he had been stationed in Panama as executive officer under Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, commander of the 20th Infantry Brigade and widely regarded as the smartest man in the Army. Service under General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines from late 1935 through 1939 and under General George C. Marshall in the War Plans Division of the General Staff during the first six months of 1942 had prepared Eisenhower to assume the responsibilities of the supreme allied commander in Europe during World War II. He could truthfully say that he had learned his craft from some of the greatest military leaders of the twentieth century. After World War II, President Harry S. Truman had asked him to serve as Army chief of staff, a job in which he presided over the demobilization of the wartime Army. Later, in the spring of 1949, he had served as an informal chairman of the Joint Chiefs before the official creation of that position. In that role he experienced firsthand the intense debates as each service competed for its share of the shrinking military budget.

Building on that background, the new president came into office convinced that a strong economy was the true source of national security. He believed that the Soviet Union and its satellites could never defeat the United States as long as the latter retained its superiority in productive capacity, so he encouraged military leaders to design a security policy and force structure that the nation could support over the long haul: enough to provide adequate security, but not so much as to damage the growth and stability of the nation’s economy. With
those goals in mind, he viewed a balanced budget as a necessary component to a sound security policy. He felt so strongly about this that he made his Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, and his Budget Director, Joseph M. Dodge, major participants in meetings of the National Security Council.  

Eisenhower’s experience in World War II, and his analysis of the fighting in Korea, had led him to the conclusion that conventional ground forces were largely obsolete. The ruins he had seen throughout Europe reinforced in his mind the horrors of an extended ground war. He did not think that the nations of that region would survive another such conflict. Meanwhile, the United States had been fighting in Korea for almost three years without any discernible end in sight. Eisenhower was appalled at the amount of money the Truman administration was spending to pursue the war. The prolonged stalemate underscored for him the futility of trying to match the Soviet or Chinese armies on a man-for-man basis. To his mind, such “small wars” wasted manpower and placed an unacceptable burden on the economic resources of the nation.

In May 1953, the new president convened a conference of scientists, statesmen, and military experts to evaluate possible national strategies for dealing with Communist expansionism. Because the initial meeting took place in the White House sunroom, Eisenhower dubbed the series of meetings “Project Solarium.” He appointed separate committees to study and then to present the case for three distinct courses of action. Alternative A was essentially a restatement of the containment policy aimed at sustaining U.S. armed forces over an extended period of time and aiding other nations in building up their own defenses. This option, however, did not specify any consequences for continued Soviet encroachment. Alternative B proposed identifying a clear line around the Soviet bloc beyond which it would not be allowed to expand. Any violation of that perimeter would be cause for general war. Alternative C called for actions up to and including military force to weaken the Soviet Union’s hold over its satellite empire and to encourage maximum disruption and popular resistance throughout Communist territories.

After the three teams briefed their positions on 16 July, the president presented his observations. He noted that the only thing worse than losing a global war was winning one and wondered what the United States would do with the Soviet Union even if it did manage to defeat the Communist nation.

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It was clear to him that the United States had to continue a policy of assisting its allies in building up their own defenses. Although some of the aggressive actions proposed by Teams B and C would be included in aspects of the national strategy, it was clear that any measure of preventive or preemptive war was unacceptable. Rather than a strategy of liberation, variations on existing policies of containment would be much more desirable.\(^4\)

With these goals in mind, the new administration adopted a strategic course it described as the New Look. This approach aimed at providing a sturdy military posture that the nation could maintain over an extended period of time, what Eisenhower referred to as “the long haul.” The policy emphasized airpower and a reliance on atomic weapons and stressed that they would be employed in the event of general war. In the president’s mind, no other kind of military conflict with the Communists was possible. Instead, the administration would rely on a combination of covert activities, psychological warfare, and propaganda to keep the Soviets off balance and to counter their efforts to intimidate the West.\(^5\)

Public enthusiasm for curtailing the defense budget received a new impetus in July 1953 when an armistice brought the fighting in Korea to an end. Almost immediately, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson predicted that the administration could trim defense spending by as much as a billion dollars. Even so, defense officials acknowledged that it would be difficult to achieve additional savings in the immediate future because so many fixed costs would continue. In the short term, they said, they would be able to cut back on the use of consumables such as ammunition, reduce equipment repair, and terminate combat pay.\(^6\)


As Army chief of staff, General Ridgway fought a rearguard action trying to maintain funding and personnel levels that he felt his service required to perform its mission. His poor relationship with Secretary Wilson, however, coupled with the latter’s enthusiastic deference to the president’s vast military experience usually placed the Army in an indefensible position. As a result, the service experienced a steady decline in its budget, manpower allocation, and influence within the American defense establishment.7

Although willing to reduce spending, the Army’s leaders took steps to mitigate public clamor for a hasty demobilization lest any movement of the sort snowball into a national demand to end deployments to Europe. They initiated a public relations and information campaign in which they emphasized that the rapid and disorganized draw down after World War II had left the United States in a position where it had not been able to respond to early Communist challenges. Soviet tactics, they said, remained sufficiently flexible to allow the Soviets to pursue their long-range goal of world domination in other theaters. The United States should not be lulled into believing that the truce in Korea represented a change in Soviet intentions. Continued vigilance was essential.8

Complicating matters, events in the Soviet Union also threatened to change the dynamic between the two Cold War superpowers. On 6 March, the Soviet Union announced the death of Stalin, the nation’s premier and general secretary of its Communist Party. To Western observers, Stalin had been the face of the Soviet Union through the purges of the 1930s, World War II, and the early stages of the Cold War. His death prompted wide speculation about possible Soviet responses. In the United States, Senator Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, hoped that “moderates inclined to peace” would win out. The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Dewey J. Short (R-Mo.), warned, however, that the Soviet Union’s new leader might prove to be even more dangerous than his predecessor and could provoke conflict abroad in order to consolidate his position at home.9

The CIA produced a special intelligence estimate to assess the probable consequences of Stalin’s death and to identify his most likely successor. The report expressed the agency’s belief that Georgi M. Malenkov’s prominent role in the Communist Party and his planned elevation to the position since 1948 suggested that no immediate challenge to his ascension would occur. Given the nature of the Soviet state, however, analysts believed that a struggle for power could develop at any time. Some contributors to the report warned that any disagreement that became so widespread as to involve the Soviet Army or the

8 Memo, DA, Office of the Adj Gen, for Major Commands, 6 Oct 1953, sub: Post-Armistice Troop Deployment, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
internal security forces could prompt a violent response and might loosen Soviet control over its satellite states. The report also noted that, while ruthless and determined to spread Soviet power, Stalin had not let his ambitions steer him into reckless courses of action. At least initially, the new regime would lack his freedom of action and his ability to maneuver because it would lack his immense prestige and authority. As a result, it would probably exercise caution in the near future and adhere to established Soviet positions.\(^\text{10}\)

For the time being, Soviet policy remained focused on two primary goals: to prevent the remilitarization of West Germany, and to hinder West German consolidation into the Western camp. In pursuit of those goals the Soviets maintained a steady stream of propaganda aimed at the West Germans, stressing a lack of freedom in the Federal Republic and the subversive influence of the United States in political affairs.\(^\text{11}\)

**Keeping a Watchful Eye to the East**

Within a few months after Stalin’s death, it became clear that the basic economic and military strength of the Soviet empire remained intact. Although an internal struggle for power within the Soviet government had resulted in the arrest and execution of First Deputy Prime Minister Lavrentiy Beria and an increase in influence for new Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, there appeared to be no weakening of the control the government held over either its own population or its satellite clientele.\(^\text{12}\)

The Soviet government and its military demonstrated their willingness to deal ruthlessly with any form of internal rebellion on 16 June 1953, when a demonstration by workers in East Berlin protesting against increased work quotas erupted into a full-scale riot. The next morning, as thirty thousand demonstrators overturned kiosks and tore down Communist flags and posters on the Potsdamer Platz, East German police opened fire on the crowd. A short time later, Soviet tanks, armored cars, and infantry deployed throughout the city in an attempt to bring the mob under control. East German and Soviet officials declared martial law, banned all gatherings of more than three persons, and established a curfew from 2000 until 0400. In the meantime, protests and disturbances had broken out in a number of cities across East Germany. The Soviets dispatched troops to Halle, Mägdeberg, Danzig, Jena, and other

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destinations in an attempt to maintain civil control. By the time order was restored, hundreds had been killed or wounded. West German officials would later report that in the aftermath of the rioting, the Soviets executed sixty-two of the primary instigators and arrested twenty-five thousand protesters. In the end, even though the disturbances subsided, Berlin clearly remained a powder keg at the center of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.13

More to the point for the U.S. Army in Europe was the continued strength and influence of the Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe. Although Western analysts at the time observed no substantial increase in numbers, they did report on a series of modernization programs under way throughout the force. It is now clear, however, that between 1952 and 1954, the Soviets embarked on their own version of the New Look. During that time, manpower strength in the Soviet Army declined almost 25 percent, from 4.3 million to 3.2 million. Although still greatly outnumbering those in the West, Soviet ground forces also received less funding and decreased in importance while funding and research increased for

strategic aircraft and land-based rockets and missiles. Nonetheless, the Soviets retained their formidable base for expansion, and Western analysts believed that their troop strength could be almost doubled within a month of mobilization.¹⁴

By 1953, after several years of studying the Soviet Army and its soldiers as potential adversaries, U.S. Army leaders had prepared a slightly more nuanced analysis than earlier studies had presented. A service handbook described organizational changes in the Soviet divisional structure as placing that force firmly on the road toward full mechanization. The changes indicated that the extreme centralization that had characterized the force’s World War II operations was being relaxed in favor of a more conventional distribution of command responsibility. Observations of large-scale maneuvers likewise indicated that the Soviets were improving their ability to integrate the actions of infantry, armor, artillery, and air elements into well-coordinated military operations.¹⁵

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The U.S. Army’s perception of the Soviet soldier, meanwhile, became much less of a caricature than it had been in the past. Instead, the Army’s analysis noted that the official image of the ideal Soviet soldier as a dauntless fighter, capable of withstanding any degree of hardship was directly contradicted by the Soviets’ own management and training literature. These directives and regulations took a dim view of the Soviet soldier and depicted him as lazy and shiftless and in need of constant supervision. The analysis concluded that the Soviet population was obviously too heterogeneous and far-flung to draw such easy generalizations of its people. The authors believed, however, that because the Soviet Army consisted primarily of peasant stock inured to hard manual labor, its soldiers would be used to operating with few creature comforts. One of the most important characteristics of the Soviet soldier, especially the Great Russians native to central and northeastern portions of the Soviet Union, was a deep and abiding patriotism that would be easily aroused by an invasion of his homeland. While, in many cases, the soldiers rejected much of the political indoctrination they received, their dissatisfaction in no way diminished their love of country.16

In summarizing its analysis, the U.S. Army manual concluded that, throughout the Soviet Army, a concerted, well-executed, and generally effective program of training had brought efficiency to a high level. Searching for shortcomings that the West could exploit, the manual focused on the Soviets’ infatuation with their World War II success. Unquestionably, it said, they had failed to distinguish between the generally applicable lessons of that experience and lessons valid only for that particular kind of war. When the Soviets trained for the offensive, as a result, they usually did so against a rigid, immobile defense of the type that Hitler had forced on his commanders in the east. Left unsaid was the hopeful conclusion that the Soviets would be less prepared to deal with the type of active defense that NATO and the West planned to implement.17

Another area of concern for Western planners was the growing size and competence of the Soviets’ satellite armies. In April 1953, the HICOG reported that the East Germans had 145,000 men in uniform. Although roughly 25,000 were engaged in border and transportation security missions, more than 110,000 served as members of the so-called “people’s police,” in essence, the new East German Army. The force included two infantry divisions and one armored division equipped with Soviet heavy equipment, artillery, and tanks. The remaining ten thousand men were almost equally divided between the Soviet Zone air force and the embryonic navy. The high commissioner’s office also reported ongoing construction of a submarine, a destroyer, numerous patrol boats, minesweepers, and coast guard craft for East German “sea police” units. Despite the growth in size of these forces, some analysts questioned their willingness to fight. They concluded that, while the satellite forces would

16 Ibid., p. 70.
17 Ibid., p. 4.
probably fight well against traditional enemies, they would be less reliable in a conflict against the West.18

Although the soldiers on both sides of the border managed to avoid starting a shooting war, relations between U.S. and Communist armed forces remained tense. Communist guards continued to harass U.S. soldiers as well as West German civilians who strayed too close to the border. In some cases, East German or Czechoslovakian troops took potshots at U.S. border patrols.19 The Americans were also guilty of their share of provocations. Radio networks sponsored and financed by the United States beamed a steady stream of anti-Communist programming into the Soviet Union and its satellites. U.S. military and civilian aircraft frequently deviated from the authorized air corridors leading into and out of Berlin. Although the U.S. border patrols generally maintained a high level of discipline while performing their duties, other American soldiers, on and off duty, managed to cross the border into Communist territory on a regular basis. The U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, East Germany; the Office of the High Commissioner in Berlin; and Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, all provided formal channels through which both sides communicated and resolved the various violations and incidents.20

Changes in Command and Combat Readiness

As the leaders of USAREUR and the Seventh Army continued to study their adversary and to prepare for potential conflict, their focus remained on improving combat readiness. This remained true despite another turnover in leadership beginning in 1953. General Eddy had long believed that his position as USAREUR commander warranted a fourth star. In March, when President Eisenhower refused to authorize the promotion and encouraged Eddy to make way for a younger officer, Eddy retired.21 General Bolte moved up to replace


General Eddy as USAREUR commanding general. Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge, in turn, replaced Bolte as Seventh Army commander. Commissioned as an engineer, Hoge had directed the construction of the 1,030-mile-long Alaskan/Canadian (ALCAN) Highway across northwest Canada to Alaska in 1942. He had then commanded the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade on D-Day at Omaha Beach and Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, in the defense of St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge. It was Hoge, at the head of Combat Command B, who had discovered the intact Rhine Bridge at Remagen that had enabled the First Army to jump the last barrier to Germany’s defeat.

The new Seventh Army commander had definite ideas how best to deploy his command. He noted that infantry battalions preparing defensive positions tended to limit themselves to frontages of 1,200 meters or less. He pointed out
to his commanders that such doctrine was a holdover from World War I and that fronts had been considerably longer throughout World War II and Korea. He expected his infantry battalions to train to defend positions of up to 5,000 meters in width and to become more self-reliant, since they could not expect to have friendly units to their immediate right and left. The wider frontage, Hoge said, required greater coordination of supporting firepower. The infantry would have to be in position to locate targets for mortars, artillery, and close air support, and to direct those fires rather than wait to engage the enemy with its own weapons at closer ranges. Hoge was less inclined to support a policy of destroying everything of value as his forces pulled back before a Soviet assault. Such actions, he believed, would have little effect on a Soviet advance and only enrage the civilian population.22

Hoge implemented similar revisions in the Seventh Army’s offensive doctrine. It was generally better, he said, to give a battalion extra maneuver space rather than to confine it to a narrow avenue of attack. With sufficient room to deploy, a battalion could advance in one direction to seize an objective, regroup, and

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Marshal of France, Alphonse Juin (left), and General Hoge, Seventh Army, near Frankfurt in September 1953
then move on toward another objective from a different direction. He reminded commanders that, with the flexibility they had in their own weapons and supporting artillery from higher headquarters, they could engage almost any target that they could observe. Also, the larger the space to maneuver that a battalion had at its disposal, the more varied types of terrain it might be able to exploit in its advance. In order to test the ability of his battalions to adapt to the extended frontages that he envisioned, Hoge approved modifications to standard infantry battalion training tests that combat units took in other theaters. Seventh Army tests placed greater emphasis on the physical conditioning, long-range communications, and extended tactical resupply the new doctrine would require.²³

For the troops on the ground, the wide frontages inherent in Seventh Army plans and training presented different challenges. William E. DePuy, then a lieutenant colonel in command of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, described the concept as a squad and platoon war. Noting how thin his units would have been on the ground, DePuy remembered that he had about one platoon for each paved road in his sector. About a mile or two separated the platoons. Each platoon would have a jeep-mounted 106-mm. recoilless rifle,

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GROWING INTO THE ROLE

one or two 3.5-inch bazookas, and a few machine guns to defend its position. Perhaps they would be assigned a section of tanks, but probably not. They would scatter a few mines across the road and get ready to fight.24

In their training as well as their daily routines, soldiers of the Seventh Army prepared for the worst-case scenario, a surprise Soviet attack across the border between East and West Germany. The memory of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor still lingered in the minds of many senior officers, so much so that the prevention of a surprise attack was incorporated into the service’s operational and training manuals. For that purpose, battalions from the three armored cavalry regiments maintained a round-the-clock vigil from observation points and patrol routes along the border. Jeep and armored car patrols ran the length of the border daily, from north of Kassel, where they linked up with British elements, down to the point where the Czech and Austrian borders intersected the U.S. Zone. In addition, the command inaugurated an extensive series of practice alerts and musters to ensure that units could reach their battle positions in the shortest time possible. These exercises included assembly of personnel and equipment, packing of all basic load shipments of supplies and ammunition, and movement to simulated assembly areas within ten miles of the kasern. In some cases, units continued the exercise with a movement into initial battle positions. It was a Seventh Army requirement that each unit within the command maintain such a state of readiness that it could begin movement to the field within two hours of an alert.25

New corps commanders brought their own innovations to improving combat readiness. When Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin became commander of the VII Corps in December 1952, he observed that infantry battalions began their training tests from their garrison stations. The troops would eat a hearty breakfast and then mount trucks that would take them to the training site. Gavin had the battalions begin the exercise with an all-night march. The way a lieutenant or captain made decisions after forty-eight hours without sleep and an eighteen-mile march, Gavin believed, was quite different from how the same lieutenant or captain made decisions walking straight out of the barracks.26

In 1953, as part of an effort to test and to improve unit response times, the command instituted periodic exercises known as HANDICAP BLACK. Intelligence personnel from USAREUR headquarters would deliver written messages simulating enemy contact to patrols, listening posts, observation

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26 Interv, Lt Col Donald G. Andrews and Lt Col Charles H. Ferguson with Gen James M. Gavin, 16 Apr 1975, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI.
posts, company headquarters of the armored cavalry regiments, or anyone else who was in position to report an actual enemy attack. Agents dropped off one message daily along the border and additional messages to other units within the command on a random basis. Units receiving the initial alerts transmitted their reports through notification channels to the next higher headquarters. Each headquarters in turn pushed the message up the chain of command until it reached the Seventh Army. The maximum allowable time the process could take from beginning to end was thirty minutes.27

Combat readiness in the Seventh Army continued to improve as additional leadership rotations soon brought even more World War II experience to the command. In October 1953, General Bolte returned to the United States to serve as the Army vice chief of staff. General Hoge moved up to take his place as USAREUR commander. To replace him as the Seventh Army commanding general, the Army selected Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, then serving as the deputy Army chief of staff for operations and administration. McAuliffe was one of the most colorful officers in the Army, having earned renown while serving as acting commander of the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne during

the Battle of the Bulge where he responded “Nuts!” to a German demand for surrender. He was known as “The Old Crock” to the men who served under him, a title he had won when he remarked that jumping out of an airplane was a hell of a business for an old crock like himself. Later in the war he had commanded the 103d Infantry Division as it advanced through the Siegfried Line.28

McAuliffe came to the command with a reputation as a soldier’s soldier. He disdained formal inspections, reviews, and the typical canned spit and polish presentations usually reserved for visits by a general officer. Instead, he preferred to see troops in the field conducting regularly scheduled training. He expected his commanders to adopt a philosophy of decentralized leadership, so that platoon leaders, company commanders, and sergeants could train their men without feeling that every move they made was being “supervised by a

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hovering senior.” Training supervision, he said, should evaluate results rather than process. As with General Hoge before him, McAuliffe also emphasized increasing the tempo of tactical training. He believed that this kept interest in an exercise high and helped junior leaders learn to think on their feet and to make quick but well-reasoned decisions.29

Throughout 1954, Seventh Army training continued to emphasize the integration of various combat arms, understanding that the strengths of one could offset the potential weaknesses of another. Infantry regiments experimented with different ways to exploit their assigned tank companies, whether to employ them in an “overwatch” role, providing covering fire as the infantry advanced, or in a convergent attack, with the tanks advancing from one direction and the infantry from another. Divisions also reverted to the World War II practice of combining infantry, tank, and artillery battalions to form combat teams. This allowed commanders to experiment with different ways of controlling the ad hoc formations.30


30 Memos, Brig Gen George E. Lynch, Ch of Staff, for CG, Seventh Army, 28 Aug 1954, Training and Deployment of the Tank Company of the Infantry Regiment, Entry 33515, VII Corps, 1953–1966, RG 338, NACP; and CWO I. L. Roach, V Corps Asst Adj Gen, for CG,
Within the small enclaves surrounding U.S. garrisons in Berlin and Trieste, and for the occupation forces still remaining in Austria, training and preparations for combat were a bit more problematic. In Trieste, the 351st Infantry maintained firing ranges for all but its heaviest weapons and conducted rigorous mountain warfare training in the hills surrounding the city. Soldiers of the 6th Infantry in Berlin had similar ranges in the city’s extensive “Grunewald” parklands. They also practiced riot control, urban combat techniques, and other subjects specific to their circumstances. The limited amount of land available to both regiments, however, forced the troops to travel at least once a year to major

maneuver areas in West Germany for more extensive training. In Austria, the troops of the 350th Infantry had more training space, but administrative duties limited the amount of time available for training. The U.S. Army, Europe, and the Seventh Army provided transportation, logistical support, and supplemental attachments of tanks, artillery, or engineers to assist with training whenever these units deployed to Grafenwöhr. Although elements from each command often participated in major training exercises, none were able to take part in events greater than battalion strength due to the need to maintain the bulk of each unit on standby in garrison.31

Reasoning from their experiences in World War II and Korea, Army leaders believed that one way to offset the Soviet advantage in numbers would be to exploit American airpower, specifically the Twelfth Air Force, under the command of Maj. Gen. Dean C. Strother. Its headquarters had been in Wiesbaden since 1951, but midway through 1953, it moved to Ramstein Air Force Base, outside of Kaiserslautern. In January 1953, it consisted of three fighter-bomber wings flying F–86F Sabres, a light bomber wing using B–26B Invaders, a tactical reconnaissance wing with RF–84F Thunderflashes, and two troop carrier wings flying C–54 Skymasters and C–119 Flying Box Cars. In addition to providing support for U.S. forces in Europe, most of the numbered Air Force wings were integrated into NATO’s air arm, the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force. To integrate combat actions on the ground with U.S. Air Force operations, USAREUR and the Seventh Army focused their attention on three areas where the Army had a significant interest.32

The first was close air support. From the Seventh Army’s earliest training, commanders had made coordination with their Air Force counterparts a high priority. To that end, USAREUR and Seventh Army planning staffs incorporated tactical air support into each major exercise. Despite the U.S. Air Force’s growing emphasis on its strategic forces and a doctrine of massive retaliation, the Twelfth Air Force in Europe continued to rehearse and to refine its procedures for close air support. The interest of NATO and the supreme allied commander, first General Ridgway and later General Alfred M. Gruenther, in providing close air support to alliance ground units helped to keep U.S. Air Force units in Europe involved in such training. Twelfth Air Force aircraft

participated in almost every major Seventh Army field exercise as well as many conducted by the corps and divisions.33

By 1953, the most pressing problem that U.S. commanders had identified with close air support was the lack of a full-time direct liaison between the Twelfth Air Force and Seventh Army maneuver units. The Air Force command took steps to remedy the situation early that year when it activated a tactical air control squadron with sufficient control parties to assign to major ground units, including corps, divisions, brigades, and sometimes battalions. These two- or three-person teams advised ground commanders on the best employment of air support and provided radio communications between ground units, aircraft, and the combat operations center or air support operations center, usually located with the Seventh Army headquarters. To man this center, the Twelfth Air Force provided a combat operations section, containing both fighter and reconnaissance elements. It included two officers from the Seventh Army intelligence and operations sections and maintained constant direct communications with the Seventh Army, all major Air Force units, and tactical air control centers. In practice, tactical air control parties would relay requests for air support to the combat operations center, which would approve the mission and assign it to available aircraft. Once the aircraft arrived on station, the tactical air control parties would guide them onto their targets. As an additional coordination measure, the Army permanently assigned ground liaison officers to each fighter-bomber and reconnaissance wing while the Air Force assigned officers to each Army corps and division.34

Concerns about the coordination of close air support were exacerbated by the incompatibility of some Army and Air Force communications equipment. Neither USAREUR nor the Twelfth Air Force possessed a sufficient number of the very high frequency (VHF) or ultra-high frequency (UHF) radios required to communicate with advanced aircraft. Although partially resolved when Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties with the proper radios linked up with Seventh Army units, communications shortages persisted.35

The second aerial activity in which USAREUR and the Seventh Army invested considerable interest was air defense. Given the distinct possibility that incoming enemy aircraft might be delivering atomic weapons, the Army placed increased emphasis on tracking them and shooting them down. It was difficult to develop trained antiaircraft artillery crews because the only firing

33 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 32, Historians files, CMH.
ranges available for use by most antiaircraft weapons were in the British Zone along the North Sea coast. Long travel distances for participating units, conflicts with adjacent NATO ranges, and relatively brief periods of weather suitable for training hampered progress in this area.

Throughout 1953 and 1954, the Army and the Air Force engaged in protracted and often heated discussions over operational control of weapons and aircraft devoted to the air defense mission. It was the Seventh Army’s position that the field army commander should have operational control over supporting tactical air forces while Air Force commanders were loath to give up any level of authority over their aircraft. The two commands also differed over the alert status and rules of engagement for air defense weapons. Fearing for the safety of their own aircraft, air commanders preferred a hold-fire status, which required ground units to obtain command authorization before engaging targets. Ground officers, however, preferred preapproval so that they could engage any aircraft that violated established friendly approach corridors. Control of the air space above the battlefield became as important an issue as control of the supporting aircraft. Despite ongoing discussions, neither issue was ever fully resolved.36

Beginning in 1954, air defense units in Europe began to receive new equipment. The first was a radar-guided 75-mm. gun known as the Skysweeper. Although it was a marked improvement over visually guided weapons, it took troops more than four months of training to learn the intricacies of the new system. Also in 1954, the USAREUR commander received advanced notice of the conversion of six of his antiaircraft gun battalions to Nike missile units. His instructions included logistical and real estate requirements for the fixed installations the missiles would occupy. Although the guidance directed no immediate action on the part of USAREUR, the command began preliminary searches for suitable sites for the installations and a firing range where it could test the missiles.37

By mid-1954, Seventh Army commanders also began to experiment with a third type of aerial operation. For some time, infantry units had cooperated with the Air Force on air transport training. In many cases this simply involved briefings on proper procedures for loading equipment onto transport aircraft. Some units, however, underwent more advanced training, learning to conduct

36 Memos, Col Walter E. Kraus, Ch, USAREUR Training Br, for Col Dolph, 15 Sep 1953, sub: 90mm AA Training; and Maj Fred E. Hansard, Asst Adj Gen, for CINCUSAREUR, 12 Feb 1953, sub: The Army’s Role in Air Defense. Both in Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP. Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 236; Schlight, Help from Above, p. 220.

37 Ltr, Col Donald C. Tredennick, Dep Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, to Maj Gen Stanley R. Mickelsen, AAA and Guided Missile School, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP; Msg. DA, Dep Ch of Staff for Logistics, to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Nov 1954, Ref #DA–970925, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (NADC); Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 166–70, Historians files, CMH.
an air assault, albeit one from fixed-wing aircraft into an established airhead. In June 1954, the Seventh Army attached the 328th Helicopter Company to the VII Corps. Equipped with the H–19 Chickasaw, the Army’s first true transport helicopter, the new unit presented the Seventh Army with an opportunity to develop a more ambitious air assault doctrine. The Seventh Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, requested that the VII Corps develop tactics and techniques for the use of the helicopters in a number of roles. He included among those the vertical envelopment of an enemy defensive position, an attack across a severe terrain obstacle, the evacuation of isolated units, the quick positioning of a blocking force to meet an enemy penetration, and the evacuation of wounded. The number of helicopters available was small, but VII Corps infantry units were able to begin training with them on a limited basis.38

The Seventh Army Goes Nuclear

Although their training efforts and doctrine continued to reflect a conventional orientation, USAREUR and Seventh Army leaders were beginning to consider the implications the use of atomic weapons would have for their battle plans. Even more than conventional air support, atomic weapons offered the greatest potential for offsetting the Soviets’ numerical advantages. The Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy made it clear that the United States would employ them in any general war with the Soviet Union. If that occurred, the Strategic Air Command would have the primary responsibility to drop atomic bombs on targets deep within the Soviet Union. Without a means of delivering atomic munitions of its own, the Seventh Army had to rely on whatever bombs the Air Force was willing to divert to tactical support. Some within the Army, however, were skeptical about receiving any level of Air Force support. In a critique of atomic weapons play during Exercise Spring Tide in May 1953, for example, the USAREUR commander, General Bolte, questioned the use of atomic weapons in support of frontline operations, noting that the Army and Air Force in Korea had been unable to identify suitable targets near the front lines. Bolte also warned Seventh Army leaders to carefully consider what targets merited attack by atomic weapons. Participants in the Command Post Exercise (CPX), he said, “were often guilty of using a hammer to kill a fly.”39

39 Rpt, Joint Strategic Plans Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 May 1953, sub: Revision of Information for General Ridgway on Availability of Atomic Weapons (JCS2220/19), Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH. Quote from Memo, Col Donald C. Tredennick, Dep Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Maj Gen Claude B. Ferenbaugh, 3 Jun 1953, sub: Critique of Spring Tide CPX, Entry 2060, USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 Operations, General Correspondence Decimal File, RG 549, NACP.
Extensive criticism during the discussions that followed CPX Spring Tide reflected the inexperience of most of the staffs in dealing with these issues. One Seventh Army intelligence observer commented that most staff sections involved in the exercise seemed to have little appreciation for the impact of a twenty-kiloton detonation in their vicinity. He also noted extreme delays in processing information on potential atomic targets, and added that communications encryption procedures were so slow and cumbersome that they created bottlenecks in the flow of information. Another officer commented that staff sections had no idea how the command would reconstitute units or command posts that had been devastated by atomic attack.40

Whatever their doubts, by conducting a number of staff and command post exercises during 1953, USAREUR’s commanders began to consider how best to incorporate friendly atomic munitions into their planning. At the same time, they also began to consider the effects enemy strikes might have on their own forces. Maneuver forces would have to learn to fight dispersed, while retaining the mobility to mass whenever an opportunity to attack presented itself.41

40 DF, Col Albert S. Britt, Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, to Seventh Army Staff, 17 Jul 1953, sub: Critique of CPX Spring Tide for Seventh Army Staff, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
The command’s first in-depth experiment with atomic warfare came in September 1953, when the Seventh Army participated in Exercise Monte Carlo, a NATO free-maneuver war game. About 175,000 troops, including 120,000 Americans, 27,000 Belgians, 22,000 French, and 6,000 British participated in the effort, the largest inter-allied maneuver since World War II. The official objectives of the exercise were to test liaison between allied commands, to emphasize offensive operations, to perfect air-ground techniques, and to make effective use of mines and demolitions. Without a great deal of public comment, however, NATO and USAREUR planners also designed the maneuver to focus on the development of atomic warfare techniques and the employment of atomic weapons. One purpose of the effort, they said, would be to instill in participating soldiers an “atomic mindedness” and to dispel misconceptions about the use of atomic or chemical weapons.\footnote{James Quigley, “175,000 Men Open Monte Carlo Today,” *Stars and Stripes*, European Edition. 10 Sep 1953. Quote from Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 244–49.} To do that, the maneuver would test the ability of ground forces to communicate with air units capable of delivering atomic weapons, to concentrate quickly from widely dispersed positions, and to coordinate their movements with fire support because an atomic bomb explosion could disrupt an attacking armor formation. Since atomic weapons could also rupture the strongest enemy defenses, attacking
ground units would also attempt to synchronize their movements with aircraft delivering atomic munitions in the final phases of an assault.43

The maneuver identified many of the same deficiencies seen in earlier command post exercises, but, because it involved live troops, it also revealed entirely new problems. Staff officers reported that the overall flow of information was generally superior to previous exercises, most likely due to the exchange of liaison officers between many of the staffs and headquarters involved. Nonetheless, communications between Seventh Army headquarters and those of participating allied forces were inadequate and slow. The staff critique also noted that the logistics scenario was generally not realistic. A large percentage of the rations and fuel supplies required for the exercise was prestocked prior to the maneuver, and not replaced on the basis of daily consumption. Exercise planners pointed out that this procedure was necessary, however, because the Seventh Army lacked sufficient truck transport units to move all the supplies while, at the same time, supporting corps and division operations. The most illuminating aspect of the critique, however, was the absence of comments regarding atomic matters. Among its major points, the critique noted that the Seventh Army had not received firm guidance regarding the atomic aspects of the exercise until 7 September, leaving insufficient time for coordination and planning at its level. Although ground units had maneuvered, in many cases, in response to simulated atomic strikes, the report made no mention of coordination issues with the Twelfth Air Force. The report did note that poor weather had prevented many aircraft from flying and that the Twelfth Air Force had not established a Tactical Air Control Center at the Seventh Army command post for the exercise.44

The Army took steps toward breaking its dependency on the Air Force for atomic support in Europe in October 1953, when two 280-mm. atomic cannons belonging to the 868th Field Artillery Battalion arrived in Germany. The Army had developed the artillery pieces in 1952 and tested them in the Nevada desert on 25 May 1953, with the successful firing and detonation of an atomic projectile.45 Weighing eighty-eight tons, each enormous weapon required two heavy tractor trucks to move it, one to its front and the other to its rear. The section had a top speed on the highway of thirty-five miles per hour. Although relatively slow and ungainly, the pieces could be emplaced and put into action in about the same amount of time that conventional heavy artillery required. The guns lacked the range and flexibility of aircraft delivered munitions, but

44 Memo, Lt Col Frank D. Jones, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 26 Oct 1953, sub: Staff Critique—Exercise MONTE CARLO, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
The men of the 1st Gun Section, Battery B, 59th Field Artillery Battalion, prepare to fire a 280-mm. gun, May 1956.
they provided a far greater measure of accuracy and reliability. Most important, unlike the Air Force, they could provide atomic fire support to Army ground units at night and in any kind of weather.46

The message implicit in the delivery of the new weapons was as important as the tactical capabilities they represented. As the guns arrived, Army leaders made a great show of displaying the ordnance for the American and European press.47 The cannons symbolized the Eisenhower administration’s commitment to defend Europe with atomic weapons while also giving the Seventh Army the ability to provide its own atomic fire support without having to rely on the Air Force.

By the end of June 1954, five battalions of the atomic artillery had arrived in Europe and were becoming more firmly established as essential components of any proposed defense in Western Europe. Assigned to the 42d Field Artillery Group at Baumholder and placed under Seventh Army control, these battalions were the 59th, located at Pirmasens, the 264th at Bad Kreuznach, the 265th at Baumholder, the 867th at Kaiserslautern, and the 868th at Baumholder. In its annual training guidance, the U.S. Army, Europe, directed the Seventh Army to employ them throughout division, corps, and army-level maneuvers. The USAREUR commander, General Hoge, and the Seventh Army’s commander, General McAuliffe, both acknowledged the increased level of emphasis on atomic doctrine and training throughout their organizations. Hoge told news reporters that the Soviets would not hesitate to use atomic weapons on the battlefield and that his command had to be prepared for them. McAuliffe told a similar audience that he planned to broaden the atomic training program throughout the Seventh Army and would increase that emphasis as the command received information and guidance from actual atomic tests in the United States. In an article for military journals, McAuliffe wrote that his men had tried to envision the possibilities of atomic warfare and had emphasized in their training a rapid exploitation of the effects of atomic weapons in the attack. Personnel had also trained extensively, he said, on measures to minimize the effects of radiation, blast, and heat caused by enemy atomic weapons.48

The 280-mm. cannon battalions dragged their big guns all over Germany as they participated in field exercises from division- to NATO-level maneuvers.49 As a result of this training, the Seventh Army developed standard operating

procedures that integrated atomic fire support into its battle doctrine. Artillerymen and engineers learned, for example, to address some of the complications the new weapons entailed. Engineers, in particular, had to conduct a route reconnaissance prior to their movement of the big guns to ensure that bridges and roadways along a route could bear the weight. In many cases, they had to avoid small villages because their corners were too tight to negotiate without damaging property.\(^\text{50}\)

John C. Gazlay, an infantryman with the 13th Armored Infantry Battalion, remembered that, when traveling down the narrow, high-crowned roads in Germany, the lead tractor would travel on the right side of the road, while the rear tractor traveled on the left. This arrangement would present a frightening sight for oncoming traffic, which had to take to the shoulders to allow the moving roadblock to proceed. Gazlay remembered one particular gun section that had approached their task with a sense of humor. On the lead tractor the cannoneers had stenciled the name SHAKE, the gun and carriage had been stenciled with a pair of dice and the name RATTLE, and the rear tractor bore the stenciled name ROLL.\(^\text{51}\)

Representatives from USAREUR and the Seventh Army met with allied officers from NATO’s Northern Army Group and the First French Army to discuss apportioning the weapons during combat. As a result, USAREUR agreed to prepare two battalions, tentatively the 264th and 265th, for attachment to the Northern Army Group and one battalion, tentatively the 59th, for attachment to the First French Army. The two remaining battalions would stay under Seventh Army control. Although USAREUR directed the Seventh Army to make the battalions as self-sustaining as possible, the command announced that it would control rates of fire and resupply for both conventional and atomic ammunition. In order to assist allied commanders, USAREUR established Atomic Liaison Units in all NATO ground force headquarters at the corps level and above.\(^\text{52}\)

Maneuvers and exercises for the rest of the year included extensive atomic training. The big gun battalions participated in both the NATO Central Army Group Exercise INDIAN SUMMER and the Northern Army Group Exercise BATTLE ROYAL. To support them, Army technicians constructed pyrotechnics that simulated atomic detonations, so that troops would recognize when to

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52 Memo, Brig Gen Leo V. Warner, Adj Gen, USAREUR, for CG, Seventh Army, 9 Mar 1954, sub: Employment of 280mm Battalions, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; Ltr, Hoge to Maj Gen James E. Moore, Army War College, 19 Dec 1953, USAREUR Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations), General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP.
take appropriate actions. Observers and evaluators directed their comments toward improving survivability in an atomic environment and streamlining procedures for identifying and attacking likely targets. They also addressed needs for better camouflage and increased dispersion because American atomic forces would be high-priority targets for the other side’s weapons. Other officers found the process for identifying targets and forwarding the information to atomic delivery units to be cumbersome and time consuming. As had been the case in previous exercises, communications proved to be a consistent problem as units worked to streamline procedures for coordinating atomic fire support. At a Seventh Army Signal Conference during August 1954, commanders discussed possible personnel additions and equipment improvements to division signal companies to facilitate communications between the widely dispersed elements of the force.

By the end of 1954, USAREUR and the Seventh Army were well on their way toward developing an operational doctrine based on the use of atomic weapons. Much, however, remained to be done. The 280-mm. guns remained the only atomic capable weapons system under Army control. A July inspection by a team from the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces noted continued deficiencies in procedures for employing aerial-delivered atomic weapons in support of ground combat operations. The observers noted that these shortcomings stemmed from an absence of a jointly accepted doctrine between the Army and Air Force to determine the number of weapons to be allocated to ground support and the types of targets to be attacked. For the time being, without a firm commitment from the Air Force to devote some of its munitions to targets in the battle area, most of the command’s available combat power remained conventional in nature.

Manning the Force: USAREUR’s Personnel Pipeline

Regardless of how the Army chose to fight the battle in Europe, it required a steady stream of soldiers to maintain its force there. Many of the troops who had arrived in the initial augmentations in 1951 and 1952 had been draftees

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and reservists with little time left in service. Their departure in 1952 and 1953 exacerbated an already high rate of turnover, especially in the Seventh Army. With that in mind, bringing enough soldiers into the command to keep up with the losses and then assigning them to positions that matched their skills with unit requirements proved to be a daunting task.\textsuperscript{56}

Procedures for identifying personnel shortages, requisitioning individual replacements, and placing them into units had evolved over time as the Army’s organization and infrastructure in Europe had grown more complex. In 1951, General Eddy had complained that the Seventh Army had little control over the number of replacements it might receive in a given period and no control over unit selection and placement. An Army Field Forces inspection team noted that EUCOM was assigning individuals into branches other than those in which they had received their basic training and that those who had received specialized training were often not assigned to positions where that training could best be employed. EUCOM and the Seventh Army responded that they had based all replacement assignments on their own priorities and in the light of known military occupation specialty shortages. To compensate for this, on-the-job training and USAREUR, Seventh Army, and unit schools attempted to prepare individuals for their new assignments.\textsuperscript{57}

In August 1952, the Department of the Army began to test a system that combined four-man teams of replacements into companies for shipment overseas. The enlisted men were grouped in teams early in their training with the expectation that they would remain together throughout their tours. In theory, this would help to improve unit morale and cohesion. For the trip overseas, the Army planned to incorporate the teams into “carrier companies,” temporary organizations that would move the troops to their new assignments. These units would consist of 165 privates, 4 officers, and 4 noncommissioned officers. An additional officer and enlisted man would serve as escorts for the deployment. The experiment sought to determine the administrative value and general desirability of retaining men in such provisional units through the later stages of basic training. To that end, the Department of the Army would seek to keep the groups together as much as possible so that the four members of each team might end up in the same squad or platoon.\textsuperscript{58}

In an initial test, the first company arrived in Europe in September 1952 and joined the 28th Infantry Division. Observers who monitored its progress found that the carrier companies presented several administrative advantages.

\textsuperscript{56} Ltr, Eddy to Collins, 5 Nov 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.


\textsuperscript{58} Ltr, Collins to Gen Thomas T. Handy, CG, USAREUR, 23 Jun 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Since personnel could travel on a single order, administrative officers had fewer entries to make in personnel records. Processing at the port of debarkation was simpler because the members of each team all had similar military occupational specialties and could be classified quickly. Morale and discipline throughout the transition was good because the troops were already familiar with the cadre in charge. USAREUR endorsed the process, but recommended its restriction to combat specialties. Leaders believed that the buddy teams would not be practical for lower-density specialists such as mechanics and medics, in cases where a given unit would have fewer holes to fill.  

Official implementation of the program began to great fanfare in September 1953, when the first carrier companies began arriving at Bremerhaven and went directly to their divisions without having to process through the USAREUR replacement depot at Zweibrücken. After that, however, the approach began to break down. The divisions assigned intact four-man teams to regiments, but the regiments frequently broke up the teams to assign soldiers as they saw fit because individual squads or platoons rarely had blocks of four vacant slots to fill at any given time.  

An Army Field Forces inspection report summarized the advantages and disadvantages of the system. In addition to the administrative streamlining the system demonstrated, the carrier companies also provided better control over replacement deployments and cut processing time in the pipeline by two or three days. The report also confirmed an improvement in troop morale, commenting that establishing destinations well in advance of the actual transfer of personnel helped to improve mail service from home. The process, however, was not without its disadvantages. Assignment of the four-man teams to squads, for example, was impractical because most existing squads could not absorb four replacements at one time. The approach, moreover, threw off established ratios for racial integration, education, and aptitude that higher headquarters required. The report also warned that breaking up the teams at lower echelons could negate any increase in morale the program achieved since soldiers might conclude that the Army had broken its promise to keep them together for the duration of their tour of duty.  

Those misgivings notwithstanding, late in 1953, the Department of the Army announced that it would expand the carrier company program to include field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, armor, and engineer replacements. With USAREUR comprising the largest concentration of American soldiers overseas,
it served as the test bed for the program when the first of the experimental companies arrived in February 1954. In most cases, the Seventh Army could not assign carrier companies to a single division because their strength in particular military specialties often exceeded the authorized number of troops in those areas. When that happened, the companies were inactivated after they reached Bremerhaven, and their personnel were assigned individually or in groups to whatever units could take them.62

Independent of the carrier company program, in November 1953, the Department of the Army initiated a plan to train, process, and ship complete infantry platoons on an experimental basis. The purpose of the test was to provide overseas theaters with well-trained lieutenants, noncommissioned officers, and infantry squads in preassembled platoons. The Army limited the trial to twenty-eight units, the first four of which began training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, on 16 November 1953. One junior officer, one senior noncommissioned officer, and four leadership course graduates who would serve as squad leaders were assigned to each platoon. The remainder of the group consisted of troops who had completed eight weeks of basic training. The plan called for the lieutenant and the noncommissioned officer cadre to lead the unit through eight weeks of advanced individual training and then through processing and shipment overseas.63

Once the platoons arrived overseas, USAREUR and the Seventh Army continued the experiment. For the purposes of the test, the Department of the Army had instructed the commands to retain each platoon’s unit integrity through its assignment to a division and its subordinate units. In that way, it sought to determine the general level of training within the platoons, the initiative and abilities of their leadership, and whether the training level of each platoon was such that the unit could begin participation in company-level training immediately upon arrival in theater. Between January and May 1954, the Army shipped eleven of the units to USAREUR, which in turn assigned three platoons each to the 1st, 4th, and 28th Infantry Divisions, and two to the 43d. The Seventh Army directed the divisions to retain the platoons intact at least through the test period and set 1 July 1954 as the target for the submission of test results, comments, and recommendations.64

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The divisions found the performance of the new platoons to range from average to slightly above average. The units demonstrated outstanding morale, but their efficiency suffered because their newly designated squad leaders lacked experience in dealing with their soldiers and with the tasks required of their new positions. As a result, commanders rated the platoons as unready to begin company training immediately upon arrival. Although the divisions considered the experiment a success, they recommended the assignment of more experienced noncommissioned officers to the platoons. Corps commanders, for their part, expressed doubts about keeping platoons intact within established companies and noted that the new units would lack the experienced veteran personnel distributed throughout the rest of the company. Absorbing the new platoons intact, moreover, would cause considerable disruption by forcing company commanders to disband existing platoons and to redistribute their personnel throughout a company. Ultimately, USAREUR reported to the Department of the Army that while the assignment of entire platoons to infantry companies might be desirable, battalion commanders should have the leeway to reassign personnel as they saw fit. Although it deemed the tests successful, the Army rejected the platoon replacement system because it was less flexible than the existing carrier company approach.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1954, USAREUR hosted similar tests with experimental armor platoons. The Seventh Army received nine platoons for testing and placed one each in the 1st, 28th, and 43d Infantry Divisions, three in the 2d Armored Division, and one each in the 2d, 6th, and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiments. Unlike their infantry counterparts, each armor platoon contained one officer, one senior noncommissioned officer, and five four-man tank crews. The evaluations, however, produced results similar to those found in the infantry platoon tests. The junior leaders in the platoon lacked the experience to play an immediate role in more advanced unit training. After completion of the testing, the Army discontinued the armor platoon program as well.

Adding to the personnel turbulence prevalent throughout the command was the ongoing process of racial integration. Presidential Executive Order

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9981, issued by President Truman in July 1948, declared a policy of equality of opportunity and treatment in the armed services. Army regulations that followed in January 1950 directed units to assign and use personnel according to skills and qualifications without reference to race or color. While the regulation did not explicitly commit the Army to a policy of integration, leaders perceived it to be a step in that direction. As an additional step, on 27 March, the Army abolished the recruiting quota system for enlistments that had limited the percentage of blacks in the Army to 10 percent of the total.68

In December 1951, EUCOM submitted to the Department of the Army its plan for the integration of black and white soldiers under its command. By definition, integration meant the elimination of all-black units. Some would be inactivated while others would be replaced by similar units consisting of integrated personnel. The percentage of blacks in all units was to approach 10 percent, the overall percentage of black soldiers throughout the command. One of the basic tenets of the plan was that units would retain their combat effectiveness throughout the integration process. Integrated blacks would be expected to maintain the same standards of performance as white troops. The command would not implement the plan, however, until the Department of the Army approved it.69

Most commanders in Europe met the proposed integration with considerable skepticism. They feared the disruptions within their units and the social problems that would arise within the civilian population. The commanding general of the Seventh Army, General Eddy, had mixed feelings on the subject. He had observed unsatisfactory performance in many of his all-black units and had concluded that integration was desirable not only for the sake of his own mission but for the Army’s efficiency as a whole. Still, in 1951, General Eddy wrote to EUCOM Commander General Handy that blacks were suitable for truck companies, ammunition companies, and engineer and quartermaster service units but had not displayed the high degree of initiative required for service in infantry, armor, and combat engineer organizations. He recommended the integration of Seventh Army units on the basis of one black soldier for every nine or ten whites. He also added that he believed that black officers posed a special problem because they were unsuited to command white soldiers.70

Despite such reservations, the Army carried on with its program of desegregation and on 1 April 1952, the European Command began a phased integration of all of its Army elements. At that time, most blacks in USAREUR


were still serving in segregated units. Only about 7 percent of total black enlisted strength, some two thousand black specialists, served in integrated units. Of 139 black units in the command, 113 were service elements, such as transportation or supply units, while only 26 were part of the combat arms. Because EUCOM directed that combat units would be integrated first, the focus of initial efforts was on the Seventh Army. General Eddy directed that the changeover would occur through individual transfers and adjustment of assignments within the stream of incoming replacements. Any mass transfer of black personnel into white units was to occur only with his prior approval. Seventh Army guidance also required personnel to be integrated into existing companies, platoons, and squads, and not organized into separate all-black elements. The eventual goal of the integration program was that the percentage of black strength in all units would approximate the overall percentage of blacks within the command.

In February 1953, the Army’s new chief of staff, General Ridgway, requested information from USAREUR on segregation in the armed forces for his own reference. In its reply, the command reported that it was almost 18 percent black, with a current strength of 194,724 whites and 34,446 blacks. The integration of previously segregated combat units was 86 percent complete with the remainder expected to be done by the end of March 1954. While USAREUR noted some instances of racial discrimination by German proprietors of clubs and other establishments, it found no evidence of racial segregation in local housing policies, athletics, or recreational areas. No serious disciplinary problems had resulted from the integration of whites and blacks in the same units.

Despite the headquarters’ optimistic assessment, integration of the Army’s units in Europe did not occur without at least some opposition. Complaints from white, Southern soldiers integrated into a previously all-black transportation battalion, for example, prompted Senator Russell of the Senate Armed Services Committee to request an investigation. Commanders attributed most problems to differences in educational levels and competition for the attention of Germany’s female population. They also noted that in many locations off-duty soldiers still lacked diversions and that alcohol often contributed to disturbances. To a great extent, off-duty blacks and whites self-segregated, establishing de facto black and white bars and establishments in many German communities. Despite inevitable frictions, few on-duty altercations occurred.

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72 Memo, Brig Gen Frederic J. Brown, Dep Ch of Staff, U.S. EUCOM, for CINCEUSA-REUR, 10 Feb 1953, sub: Segregation in the Armed Forces, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
73 Ltr, Col Creswell G. Blakaney, Office, Ch of Legislative Affairs, to Adj Gen, EUCOM, 23 Apr 1953, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Memos, Capt Justin R. Ormsby, Investigating Ofcr, for CO, 552d Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Gun Bn, 13 Jun 1951, sub:
To some extent, the pace of integration was accelerated by the attitudes and response of the German civilian population. Raymond Pace Alexander, a distinguished lawyer and civil rights advocate traveling in Europe, reported to Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall in 1951 that people across Germany, including mayors and officials, had asked him again and again how a free, liberal, and democratic country like America could maintain a segregated army. Black soldiers serving in Germany often experienced more personal freedom than they could in many places in the United States. While serving as a lieutenant in Germany during the late 1950s, Colin L. Powell remembered that “for a black man, especially those out of the South, Germany was a breath of freedom.”

They could go where they wanted, eat where they wanted, date whom they wanted, just like other people. The dollar was high, the beer was good, and the German people were friendly.

As the process continued, the EUCOM leadership had to adjust the ratios upward because the percentage of blacks in Europe continued to rise. By mid-1953 black soldiers accounted for 16 percent of Army personnel in Europe. Nonetheless, by November 1953, the integration of combat units was complete. As for service units, the process was delayed in many cases because of the high percentage of black truck drivers in the command’s transportation units and a corresponding shortage of white personnel with the same skill classifications. Still, by March 1954, only twenty transportation units remained to be integrated. Throughout the spring, USAREUR received an influx of white drivers, leading on 9 July 1954, to the integration of the last all-black transportation unit in the Seventh Army. On 11 August 1954, the 68th Transportation Company in the USAREUR Communications Zone became the final element in USAREUR to integrate. The inactivation of the command’s last all-black unit, the 94th Engineer Battalion, came three months later on 27 November 1954, completing the process. Although not every single element in Europe had yet reached a proportional representation of the races, the segregation represented by the all-black units was gone.

Given the level of personnel turbulence throughout the force, particularly that of soldiers rotating in and out of Europe at a rapid pace, the Army took steps to ensure that each soldier understood the importance of his mission and the righteousness of the cause in which he served. To that end, USAREUR...
and the Seventh Army sponsored an extensive troop information program, designed to convince each soldier that he and his unit had an important role to play in preserving the security and values of the United States of America. The program also gave each soldier an understanding of those American principles and values, as well as the threat posed to them by the spread of communism.  

In its application, the troop information program was a command function at all levels. Higher headquarters directed the topics to be addressed each month, based on suggestions provided by the Department of the Army; the responsibility for troop instruction lay with the company commander or his designated representative. Areas of troop information to be stressed included national and international affairs, general military subjects, standards of conduct, and the history and mission of the U.S. Army. During the third quarter of 1954, for example, the Department of the Army provided materials for discussions on the military strength of Red China, Communist treatment of U.S. prisoners of war, the soldier and the reserves, and the high price of going absent without leave (AWOL).  

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78 Memo, Maj Gen William E. Bergin, TAG, for CINCUSAREUR, 5 Nov 1953, sub: Troop Information Guidance, Third Quarter, FY54, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. For an overview of the Army’s program for political indoctrina-
In addition to the monthly indoctrination classes, other aspects of the troop information program involved raising the general level of education among the troops. The Army encouraged commands to teach English to their non-English–speaking soldiers, and to bring each member of the command to at least a fourth-grade level of education. Off-duty classes and self-study materials were also made available to assist those who wished to advance to higher levels.  

Additions and Subtractions: Organizational Changes in USAREUR and the Seventh Army

Along with the personnel turbulence caused by the integration program and the constant rotation of replacements into and out of the command, USAREUR also experienced a number of organizational changes during the period between January 1953 and December 1954. In January 1953, the Army activated the 42d Field Artillery Group and assigned it to the Seventh Army. At the time, the group consisted of only a headquarters and headquarters battery, but it provided the command structure and administrative support for the 280-mm artillery battalions as they arrived in the theater. Also in January 1953, the 19th Armored Cavalry Group, later redesignated as the 19th Armor Group, arrived in Germany and joined the V Corps. The group headquarters, stationed at Frankfurt, assumed control of three heavy tank battalions and one armored infantry battalion that were already present in the theater, assigned directly to V Corps headquarters. These units, the 141st Tank Battalion at Hanau, the 322d Tank Battalion at Hammelburg, the 510th Tank Battalion at Mannheim, and the 373d Armored Infantry Battalion at Wildflecken served as a mobile reserve for the corps.80

In November of the same year the Army assigned the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) to USAREUR and the Seventh Army. The Army had activated the group in May 1952 to conduct partisan warfare behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. In the tradition of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Jedburgh teams that had operated during World War II, the Special Forces inherited the mission to organize and train indigenous personnel inside enemy territory and to coordinate resistance movements. To accomplish these missions, the 10th Group deployed to Europe with a unique organization. The basic operational element was the A Team, with eight to twelve noncommissioned officers and one commissioned officer. For administrative purposes, ten A teams comprised a company, with a senior captain commanding. Three companies made up a battalion, commanded by a major with a small staff, collectively called a B Team. The 10th Group, commanded by a colonel, consisted of three battalions.81

Finding the soldiers to fill out the group proved to be a challenge. Each prospective trooper had to cross train on a wide range of skills, including light and heavy weapons operation, communications, hand-to-hand combat, demolitions, and first aid. Most would have to learn at least one language in addition to their native tongue, and all would have to qualify as paratroopers.82

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The new unit required a unique type of soldier. When its first commander, Col. Aaron Bank, reported to the group’s new headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, he found one warrant officer and seven enlisted men assigned. Recruiters scoured the Army for airborne, ranger, and OSS veterans who might be interested in this new endeavor. To supplement those it could find within its own ranks, the Army also turned to another source for volunteers. The Lodge-Philbin Act passed by Congress on 30 June 1950, commonly referred to as the Lodge Act after its primary sponsor Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.), authorized the voluntary enlistment of up to twenty-five hundred foreign national males into the U.S. Army. Although the act failed to provide enough soldiers to create the Volunteer Freedom Corps the senator had envisioned, it did encourage more than one hundred Eastern Europeans to sign up for the Army Special Forces and Psychological Warfare units between 1951 and 1955. With their knowledge of the people, languages, customs, and terrain in which the 10th Group was to be employed, the Lodge Boys, as they came to be called, were ideal Special Forces recruits. Accustomed to hard living in post–World War II Eastern Europe, they took easily to Army training. Sfc. Henry M. Koefoot, one of the recruits’ initial trainers, remembered that there were no “whys” or “ifs” when you told the new soldiers to do something. All you saw was a streak of lightning and the job was done. Nor was physical fitness a problem. The men were in their twenties and early thirties and had lived a hard life. They were happy to be soldiers.83

The story of Rudolf G. Horvath, a refugee from Hungary, was fairly typical for the émigrés from Eastern Europe. In July 1950, motivated by Voice of America radio broadcasts that described the opportunity provided by the Lodge Act, Horvath made his way through Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Russian-controlled zone of Austria to the Danube River. There he swam across the Danube River at night, into the U.S. Zone of Austria, and made his way to Linz, where he flagged down the first vehicle he saw, an American military police jeep. After several months of dealing with a series of German civil authorities and American military officials who had never heard of the Lodge Act, Horvath encountered an American clerk-typist who was familiar with the law. Finally, in September 1951, after passing a series of language and mathematics tests, Horvath received his orders to report to Sonthofen, Germany, for induction into the U.S. Army. Then, along with about fifty other Lodge Act enlistees, he boarded a ship for transfer to the United States and basic training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Throughout the next year, Horvath graduated from basic training, completed initial Special Forces training at Fort Bragg, and survived airborne school at Fort Benning, Georgia. By the

end of September 1952, he returned to Fort Bragg as a fully qualified member of the 10th Special Forces Group.84

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved plans that employed the 10th Special Forces Group in Europe, they had waited for the right opportunity to order the deployment. That chance came in June 1953 when construction workers in East Germany initiated an uprising against the Communist government in East Berlin. The depth to which the revolt spread throughout East Germany encouraged U.S. military planners to deploy the 10th Group, which specialized in fomenting just such resistance movements. In late November 1953, 782 soldiers of the 10th Special Forces Group boarded the USNS General A. W. Greely for passage to Bremerhaven. Because the existence of the group was still classified, the troops wore sterile uniforms without visible patches, stripes, or insignia. After enduring catcalls and jeers from those new recruits already on board, the 10th Group soldiers reappeared on deck after a few hours at sea in uniforms complete with patches, rank, and parachute badges.85

When the group arrived at its new home in Bad Tölz, Colonel Bank discovered that it was assigned to the Seventh Army for administration, supply, and training, and to USAREUR for operations. He also quickly learned that neither the Seventh Army nor USAREUR staffs had clear understandings as to proper employment of his organization. He felt that the senior headquarters perceived the Special Forces as some sort of all-purpose, super-commando outfit, rather than the organizers of a stay behind resistance operation. Bank and his staff took pains to explain their organization, its mission, and its capabilities to the senior staffs and commanders, but it took some time to overcome the healthy suspicions the conventional officers had for the special operations soldiers.86

Although the Seventh Army allowed the Special Forces considerable leeway in developing its own training schedule, higher headquarters occasionally had to rein in some of the group’s more ambitious undertakings. In May 1954, for example, the 10th Special Forces planned a series of night parachute drops into areas not normally available for military training. Seventh Army and USAREUR training staffs insisted that the exercise be modified on the grounds that jumps into areas not accustomed to military exercises might cause panic among the civilian population. The risk of having soldiers chased and shot at by German police uninformed of the exercise was too much, on the one hand, for planners to accept. On the other hand, if the group publicized its nighttime operations, a surprise airdrop by enemy parachutists could be mistaken for a

86 Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, pp. 192–200.
friendly training exercise. In the end, the USAREUR chief of staff directed the group to use established military drop zones for its training.  

Another change of particular importance to the Seventh Army was the return of the two National Guard units, the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions, to the United States. Because most of the reservists who had returned to active duty and deployed with the division had ended their service and gone back to civilian life, the two units were no longer representative of the states from which they entered federal service. Moreover, as USAREUR Commander General Bolte pointed out in August 1953, the armistice in Korea was likely to cause various congressmen to call for the return to state control of those divisions the Army had called to active service for the duration of the conflict. Bolte suggested that, to preclude such actions, which might result in a reduction in the total number of divisions deployed to Europe, the Army could replace the numerical designations of the two units with those from regular divisions that had been active in the European theater during World War II.

Following Bolte’s advice, the Army reorganized the Seventh Army, albeit mostly on paper. On 7 May 1954, the Army released the 28th Infantry Division from its assignment to USAREUR and returned its colors to state control in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. To take its place, the service reactivated the 9th Infantry Division, which General Eddy had commanded during World War II, and transferred the unit to Germany without personnel or equipment. Most of the battalions of the old 28th Division received new designations to units associated with the 9th Division. For example, the 110th Infantry of the 28th Division became the 47th Infantry under the 9th Division. In the same manner, the colors of the 43d Infantry Division returned to the three New England states from which the unit had been drawn. Taking its place was the reactivated 5th Infantry Division, which, like the 9th Division, had fought its way across Europe in 1944 and 1945. Both new divisions assumed the duties and missions that had been assigned to their predecessors, using the same troops and equipment.

Although the U.S. garrison in Trieste was not part of USAREUR or U.S. EUCOM because it reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its inactivation and the redeployment of its troops marked an important milestone in the evolution

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87 Memo, Brig Gen Douglas V. Johnson, Asst Ch of Staff, for CINC, U.S. EUCOM, 14 May 1954, sub: Special Forces Training, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
of the U.S. Army’s mission in Europe. Under the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty, signed in September 1947, the city of Trieste and the land surrounding it became a free territory and a ward of the United Nations. Situated on the border between Italy and Yugoslavia, the territory was divided into two zones, with the United States and Great Britain administering the city itself and the land to the north, and with Yugoslavia controlling the area to the south of the city. For the next several years, the United States and Great Britain maintained garrisons in their zones to prevent encroachment from the Communist forces of Yugoslavia. The American force, known as Headquarters, Trieste, U.S. Troops (TRUST), included the 351st Infantry, an artillery battery, a reconnaissance company, an engineer company, and other supporting troops.90

In the early 1950s, Yugoslavian leader, Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s break with the Soviet regime led to a period of rapprochement with the West. Seeking to take advantage of the situation and to eliminate the needless source of tension that Trieste had become, the United States and Britain renewed efforts to find a political solution for the stalemate there. In October 1954, the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and Yugoslavia reached an agreement that essentially recognized the status quo. The pact returned Zone A of the disputed territory, the area occupied by the Americans and the British, to Italy and ceded Zone B, the area controlled by Yugoslavia, to that nation. Within weeks TRUST was inactivated and its personnel reassigned to the U.S. Forces, Austria; to U.S. Army, Europe; or to other commands in the United States.91

The withdrawal of the Trieste garrison removed one regiment from the initial U.S. commitment to NATO in the event of war. In exchange for this, however, the West gained the neutrality of Yugoslavia, and the United States was able to conclude negotiations with Italy concerning other bases for both U.S. and NATO troops. Although President Eisenhower expressed the hope that other European allies would commit additional forces to reinforce what he considered the southern flank, no immediate troops were forthcoming. Over the course of the next year, however, the allied occupation in Austria would also come to a close and the new bases in Italy would provide the logical destination when U.S. forces in Austria began to redeploy.92


92 Memo, Sec Def Charles E. Wilson, for Exec Sec, National Security Council (NSC), 3 Aug 1954, sub: Redeployment of United States Forces in Trieste; Memo of Conference in Presi-
Hardening the Support Structure

By the end of 1952, the growth of USAREUR and the Seventh Army in Europe added responsibilities for the Communications Zone and prompted changes in its organization. A letter of instructions approved by the USAREUR commander, General Eddy, on 16 September 1953, consolidated and clarified previous directives and guidance. Foremost was a mission to continue to develop a line of supply across France along an axis that ran from French ports near Bordeaux, through Poitiers, Orléans, and Verdun to Metz. This line would provide logistical and administrative support for U.S. forces in France; partial peacetime logistical support for U.S. forces in Germany; facilities for the receipt, storage, issue, and maintenance of USAREUR theater reserve and command stocks; and, in time of war, the basic structure for expansion into a fully developed Communications Zone capable of furnishing logistical and administrative support for all U.S. forces in Western Europe. Priorities for construction as part of this development included communications facilities, headquarters buildings, pipelines, hospitals, storage depots, and maintenance workshops. Housing for troops and their families, and associated dependent support facilities, would come later as time and resources permitted. In the meantime, many soldiers serving in the Communications Zone lived on the French economy or in vast colonies of tents or other temporary shelters.93

Although the development of the line of communications through France made slow but steady progress, by the end of 1953 the majority of supplies for U.S. forces in Germany continued to enter the theater through Bremerhaven. In December, after a careful evaluation of three courses of action proposed in a USAREUR study, the Department of the Army approved that part of the plan labeled “Concept C,” which called for continued development of the French supply line until all items necessary for the support of combat operations could come through France. Nonessential items would come through Bremerhaven. The goal was for 70 percent of USAREUR’s supplies to arrive through French ports by the end of 1957.94

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The effort to reposition war reserve stocks of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies along the line of support also continued apace. In addition to moving depots away from the probable axis of a Soviet advance, USAREUR leaders also worried about the vulnerability of their support installations to aerial attack and sabotage. Important facilities had to be dispersed and hardened so that they might be shielded from enemy bombs and missiles. Spreading them out, leaders hoped, would make them harder for enemy observers to identify while preventing attackers from focusing their efforts.  

By the end of 1954, roughly 80 percent of the required stocks were on hand in the theater. According to USAREUR’s planning for wartime support, the command’s goal was to locate fifteen days of ammunition supply in prestock points east of the Rhine, thirty days of supply in Germany west of the Rhine,

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thirty days in the Communications Zone Advance Section, and thirty days in
the Base Section. For other items, twenty days of supply would be stored in
Germany, with fifteen days in the Advance Section and twenty-five in the Base
Section. In many cases, construction workers had to rush to complete storage
facilities before the vast piles of stocks they were to house began to deteriorate.\textsuperscript{96}

The transportation and storage of fuel and petroleum products posed their
own special problems. In 1952, the total issue to EUCOM and USAREUR
was well over 100 million gallons. USAREUR logistical experts calculated that
port facilities would need to receive a daily average of 39,000 barrels of bulk
petroleum products in peacetime and up to 77,000 barrels initially during a war
emergency. This would maintain a 60-day special reserve of aviation fuel for
the U.S. Air Force in France and Germany, a 40-day special reserve of military
gasoline for all U.S. military forces in France and Germany, a 50-day peacetime
level stock of aviation fuels, a 50-day peacetime level stock of gasoline for U.S.
military forces in France, a 30-day supply for U.S. military forces in Germany,
and a 30-day supply of diesel, kerosene, and other special fuel products for all
U.S. forces in France and Germany. Tankers delivering these supplies docked
at piers in North Germany’s Weser River between Bremen and Bremerhaven.
From there, technicians pumped the fuel into a 79-million-gallon underground
fuel storage depot at Farge, part of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation.\textsuperscript{97}

A former Nazi complex that had survived World War II and was well
protected, the facility at Farge still lay too close to the line any Soviet advance
would follow. With that in mind, the European Command had begun
negotiations with the French early in 1951 for the construction of a 10-inch
petroleum pipeline that would run from the port of Donges on the Loire
Estuary in western France to Melun, located between Paris and Fontainebleau.
The negotiations dragged on for two years, largely due to disagreements over
the size of the pipeline and the amount of flow that would be reserved for the
French. Initially, the commanding general, Communications Zone, represented
U.S. Army interests in the negotiations, but the commander, U.S. European
Command, took his place late in 1952. Finally, in April 1953, U.S. Secretary
reached an agreement that allowed the construction of an even longer pipeline
that would connect the port of Donges to the city of Metz in eastern France
near the German border. Under the terms of the agreement, the French agreed
to pay for the acquisition of the land and necessary rights of way. The United
States would determine specifications, construct and operate the pipeline, and

\textsuperscript{96} HQ, USAREUR, Briefing to Asst Sec Def Thomas P. Pike, G–4 Portion, 4 Feb 1955; Ltr,
Maj Gen Samuel D. Sturgis, COMZ Cdr, to Eddy, 7 Jan 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General
Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

\textsuperscript{97} Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 250; Memo, CWO Carl E. Sabo,
Asst Adj Gen, for CG, USAREUR COMZ, 22 Aug 1952, sub: Petroleum Pipeline and Storage
System, LOC, France, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549,
guarantee that the French would receive an average of 5 percent of the flow for their own use, as long as that did not interfere with U.S. military requirements. Construction on the line began within a month.98

As USAREUR and the Communications Zone continued to refine their support capabilities, the Seventh Army approached logistical self-sufficiency. By March 1953, the command had achieved the ability to support itself in all areas except two, medical and quartermaster support. There was a shortage of qualified professional personnel and a need to provide support existed not only for the force’s own troops but also for military dependents and U.S. government workers. As a result, EUCOM and the Seventh Army agreed that area commands would retain responsibility for dispensary and hospital care and for maintenance of medical goods and equipment. Seventh Army doctors and medics would run their own aid stations in garrison and serve as combat medics in the field.

Quartermaster support was more troublesome. The limited number of supply units assigned to the Seventh Army had to service both the fixed installations and troops in the field spread across a wide geographic area. This was compounded when the Seventh Army deployed because the infantry divisions often used their own quartermaster truck companies to transport troops. In the end, commanders decided that Seventh Army quartermaster units could not service both fixed installations and units in the field because the division of labor involved would hamper their ability to remain prepared for emergency missions. For that reason, supply support for the Seventh Army’s units became the job of the military posts that housed them while quartermaster units assisted where they could. The lack of sufficient truck companies to satisfy both logistical and troop transport requirements would remain a concern for some time to come.99

Maintenance throughout the Seventh Army was generally good but required constant command emphasis, particularly on first-level, operator care of motor vehicles. Early concerns about vehicles taken out of service, or deadlined, because of a lack of spare parts were alleviated by having depots issue frequently requested spare parts in advance, rather than waiting for requisitions. Command Maintenance Inspection Reports for the V Corps included evaluations of fifty battalions and separate companies in 1953 and forty-three in 1954. Of these, seventy received ratings of superior or excellent, fourteen received ratings of satisfactory or very satisfactory, and only nine received ratings of unsatisfactory. When, in November 1954, the 14th Armored Cavalry reported a deadline rate of 5 percent of general purpose vehicles and 14 percent of combat vehicles, the regimental commander, Col. Maxwell A. Tincher, received a scathing letter from


99 HQ, Seventh Army, Attainment of Logistical Self-Sufficiency, 29 Apr 1954, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Msg, Seventh Army, signed Hoge, to CINCALFCE, 28 Sep 1953, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Lt. Gen. Charles E. Hart, the V Corps commander, inviting him to correct the situation without delay. For the Seventh Army as a whole, the assistant chief of staff, G–4, reported that, for a nine-month period beginning in October 1953, the Army had maintained an average deadline rate of just over 2 percent for tanks and armored vehicles, 1 percent for field artillery pieces, and 2 percent for antiaircraft artillery.100

Toward the end of 1954, however, it was becoming apparent that the wheeled vehicles in the theater were becoming a maintenance concern. In July 1954, the VII Corps inspector general reported that during the previous three months, seven company-size units out of twenty-nine inspected had been rated unsatisfactory for wheeled-vehicle maintenance. The Seventh Army assistant chief of staff, G–4, later noted that those general purpose vehicles that had accompanied deploying units to Europe in 1951 and 1952 were now well over four years old. Because of the mission in Europe, the wear and tear on the vehicles greatly exceeded that anticipated by the manufacturers. Because units could expect no mass replacements for the vehicles, he urged commanders at all levels to pay greater attention to preventative maintenance to bring the vehicles up to required standards.101

Far and away the greatest maintenance headaches during this period, however, resulted from the fielding of the new M47 Patton tank. As early as October 1951, tests conducted by the Army Field Forces Board disclosed a number of deficiencies in the fire control and turret components of the tank, which made it unacceptable for issue to troops. After several months spent working out the faults, the Army deployed the first of the new tanks to Europe in May 1952. It did not take long for new problems to arise. At the August 1952 Seventh Army Commanders Conference, the assistant chief of staff, G–4, reported on the numerous deficiencies operators had identified in the new tanks. These included failures of the connecting rods in the auxiliary engines, faulty shock absorbers, defective master junction boxes, and excessive wear on the rubber track. He indicated that technical representatives from the manufacturers and ordnance depots throughout USAREUR were working on potential solutions to the problems. Just a year later, in September 1953, the Seventh Army ordnance section reported that seventy-four M47 tanks had been deadlined for failure of final drive assemblies during Field Training Exercise MONTE CARLO.


He indicated that depots had initiated a crash program to rebuild damaged assemblies and to requisition new ones to bring the tanks back on line. By October, it was clear throughout the Army that the tank was still unsatisfactory. The Army assistant chief of staff, G–4, proposed to USAREUR a new plan to rehabilitate and store the M47 tanks as new M48 tanks, a reworked and improved version of the original Patton tank, were received from the United States. The rebuilt M47s, he concluded, would go to European allies through the Military Defense Assistance Program.102

By the end of 1954, a vast network of maintenance, supply, transportation, and other logistical facilities had developed to support the combat units of the Seventh Army. As much as the fighting forces, the presence of that huge logistical infrastructure in Europe represented a commitment to the continent and served as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. Even if the airfields, depots, pipelines, and roads that made up the supply network presented tempting targets to Soviet...
military planners, they also sowed second thoughts about the consequences an attack might incur. With so much invested in the support of allied military forces in Western Europe, the U.S. commitment to the defense of the region could not be taken lightly.

**Settling in for the Long Haul**

When President Eisenhower used the term “for the long haul” to describe his approach to defense spending and national strategy, his intent was to establish a program that the nation could sustain indefinitely, without succumbing to the peaks and valleys approach of previous administrations. It was not his idea that the term might come to describe the commitment of American soldiers to the defense of Europe. He had hoped that most of that burden would be borne by the Europeans themselves. Nonetheless, it was clear by 1953 that USAREUR was beginning to develop the physical infrastructure and the personal relationships it would require for an extended stay on the continent.

Very early in the Army’s transition from an occupation force to a forward-deployed line of defense in Europe, leaders recognized the importance that dependents had in maintaining troop morale. General Eddy noted in 1952 that although the presence of families in a theater that might erupt in conflict on short notice was a challenge, it was outweighed by the prospect of so many servicemen serving overseas with only intermittent contact with their loved ones. He also expressed a belief that the arrival of American civilians had been a steadying influence on the people of Western Europe. The families offered examples of American life to the German people and fostered a more informal atmosphere for developing better relations with them. Furthermore, their presence might also serve to reassure the Soviets that the U.S. Army was there only as a defensive force.103

Early USAREUR policies had discouraged soldiers from bringing their wives and families to Europe. Housing in the German communities surrounding American military installations was scarce, and in most places U.S. government quarters were nonexistent. This was particularly true in some of the smaller cities such as Heilbronn, Ulm, and Augsburg, which had not had to support large populations of American soldiers prior to the 1952 troop augmentation. For the most part, the command authorized only officers, noncommissioned officers, and senior government civilians to bring their families overseas. Even they usually endured a waiting period of six months or more before quarters became available. When some soldiers brought over families at their own expense, their presence in the theater created economic, political, and security problems with

which the command was not yet ready to deal. The German government, in particular, discouraged the practice because it placed additional stress on an already limited civilian housing market. Forced to search for housing farther and farther away from their barracks areas, soldiers found themselves too far away to respond to alerts within required time standards. As a result, in March 1952, USAREUR limited the visas of dependents coming to Germany to a period of 90 days and required those who had exceeded that limit to return to the United States. Although guidance allowed for some command discretion where government housing might be available, it advised that such latitude had to be used with caution.  

By late 1953, however, morale issues had reached such a point that General Hoge, USAREUR Commander, decided policies on dependents had to change. Many of the personnel who had initially come to Germany with the new divisions had been mobilized national guardsmen who had chosen to leave their families at home during their short deployments. Their departure left the Seventh Army with a much higher percentage of Regular Army noncommissioned officers. Serving longer periods of deployment, those soldiers expected to be accompanied by their families. This posed a problem for Hoge. Although construction programs had alleviated the housing problem in some areas, it remained an issue throughout most of Germany and almost all of France. In Germany, the average wait time for housing was 7.3 months for officers and 11.7 months for enlisted personnel. In France, the average wait time was 4.1 months and 8.6 months for officers and enlisted, respectively. With these delays in mind General Hoge authorized all those eligible to sponsor families overseas to bring them to Europe, whether or not government housing was available, as long as they could find housing somewhere in the local communities. As the number of civilian dependents waiting to come to Europe continued to grow through the rest of the year and into 1954, USAREUR accelerated housing construction throughout Germany and France. (See Map 7.)

The large-scale construction programs provided masonry apartment buildings and individual dwellings grouped together in American complexes

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with schools, libraries, chapels, and recreation facilities conveniently located within each community. In Germany, some fifty-nine community areas evolved, including those in Berlin and near Bremerhaven. Other larger areas included those near Munich, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg where some of the greater concentrations of American forces were to be found. In Heidelberg, for example, Mark Twain Village was located immediately adjacent to USAREUR headquarters, and a second, even larger facility—Patrick Henry Village—was outside the city. In Munich, where the American housing complexes were widely dispersed, USAREUR established two separate shopping centers, each consisting of a supermarket-type commissary, a post exchange of department store proportions, a snack bar, an automobile parts store, laundry and dry cleaning, a beverage shop, a banking facility, and other convenience shops. When completed, each housing area had all the aspects of a “little America,” set off from the local community. Smaller and more limited communities arose in France where less land was available for development. As a result, many American families had to find housing in the local French communities.106

It did not take long for some back in the United States to call into question the amount of money being spent on soldiers and their dependents in Europe. On 3 January 1953, Senator Olin D. Johnston (D-S.C.), stated in a public interview

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that U.S. government workers serving overseas lived in expensive apartments or houses, employed three or four domestic servants, and received salaries and cost-of-living expenses far in excess of those in the United States. Picking up on the U.S. news reports, newspapers throughout West Germany published stories about the luxurious living of Americans abroad. The USAREUR public information officers reported to U.S. EUCOM that the articles created the erroneous perception that U.S. employees and, by implication, U.S. military personnel were living in ostentatious luxury. Public affairs staffs and senior military leaders took pains to point out the inaccuracies in many of the senator’s statements.\textsuperscript{107}

Just a few weeks later, in March, Congressman Walter F. Horan (R-Wash.) initiated another investigation based on letters he had received from constituents complaining about money being spent to maintain luxurious recreation areas at Garmisch and Berchtesgaden. In reply, USAREUR pointed out that those areas were the only locations outside of military communities where soldiers could spend leave time at a relatively low cost and with recreation facilities comparable to what they might find at home. While there, a soldier could stay in a comfortable but modest hotel, eat familiar American food, and participate in a variety of summer and winter sports and activities. The command also pointed out that, while at the Army-run rest centers, soldiers were still under military control and were readily available in case of an emergency. While soldiers using the facilities paid reasonable prices for their food, lodging, and entertainment, most of the money to maintain the facilities came from the German government. Despite these assurances, politicians and civilians back in the United States continued to question expenditures in Europe that they considered frivolous. With political leaders looking for ways to trim the defense budget many expenditures in Europe seemed to be fair game.\textsuperscript{108}

Despite these concerns, the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Germany continued. After housing, the most critical element for dependent families was schools. Average enrollment in grades 1–12 rose from 7,000 for the school year ending in June 1952 to 12,000 for the school year ending in June 1953. By the end of the school year in 1954 the number exceeded 20,000 and USAREUR was operating 95 elementary schools and 11 secondary schools in Germany and France. It employed more than eleven hundred teachers, librarians, and principals. During this period, the command faced increasing difficulties in recruiting new teachers and holding on to established employees. The problems grew out of disparities in pay and working conditions.


\textsuperscript{108} Memo, Murphy, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Ch of Staff, 18 Mar 1953, sub: Recreation Center at Garmisch, Germany, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
between teachers in public schools in the United States and those employed by USAREUR. Population growth in the United States had led to a shortage of qualified teachers there, forcing USAREUR to compete with stateside systems where conditions of employment were superior to those in Europe. In addition, most U.S. school systems did not recognize service in Army schools for promotion or retirement purposes. Indeed, the lack of adequate retirement provisions for USAREUR-employed teachers as compared with other civil service employees was another obstacle to recruiting competent personnel. Although the command forwarded proposals for removing its teachers from some of the more restrictive regulatory requirements of the Civil Service Commission, it received no response before the beginning of the 1955 recruitment period.109

During this time, an increase in the number of dependent children and a rising concern for the problem of juvenile delinquency, reflected both in the United States and overseas, prompted USAREUR leaders to turn their attention to leisure and recreation facilities for both soldiers and their families. In April 1953, the USAREUR commander, General Bolte, wrote to the Army chief of staff, General Collins, to express his concern that senior Army officials considered construction of such facilities as bowling alleys, gymnasiums, and athletic fields to be “unessential.” To the contrary, he said, he considered an effective recreation program the greatest single deterrent to disciplinary infractions and serious incidents that might otherwise reflect discredit on the United States and its armed forces.110

In the end, American military leaders realized that it was critical to maintain a high level of morale throughout their forces if they were to carry out their long-term mission in Europe. With that in mind, the command sponsored the construction of facilities and initiated programs throughout the theater that would keep the troops occupied and entertained when they were not engaged in military training. This was particularly true around major metropolitan areas, such as Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Kaiserslautern, and Stuttgart, where large concentrations of U.S. forces led to the development of extensive dependent housing areas and military communities. Most of these boasted at least one movie theater, a library, a bowling alley, and other comforts soldiers and their families might expect to find in any reasonably sized community back home. The European Motion Picture Service provided movies for the more than three hundred cinemas throughout the theater. Many were first-run films available within a month or two of their initial release. Bowling drew more participants than any other sport. By the end of 1954, almost one thousand bowling lanes with more than three hundred sanctioned leagues were in operation throughout


110 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, p. 120; Ltr, Bolte to Collins, 30 Apr 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
USAREUR. The command also maintained two hundred large libraries and another one hundred fifty smaller book collections that it rotated through small facilities and outposts. Similar in many ways to the service clubs, the libraries often hosted group discussions, slide shows, story hours for children, travel talks, and music appreciation programs. Many also had soundproof rooms where soldiers could listen to the latest Broadway shows, classical music, or dramatic readings.\(^{111}\)

The USAREUR Special Services office, under the direction of the Special Activities Division of the command’s headquarters, organized and supervised athletics, recreation, and entertainment programs throughout the command. It ran more than one hundred twenty service clubs with facilities for shuffle board, pool, ping-pong, and playing cards. Most also maintained music rooms stocked with instruments so that soldiers could hold informal jam sessions. Club directors planned and conducted tournaments and contests, arranged for guest speakers and group discussions, and sponsored movies, concerts, theatrical plays, and dances. Many clubs also sponsored weekly sightseeing excursions and set up travel sections that assisted soldiers in planning leaves and tours. Located in cities, kasernes, and even training areas like Grafenwöhr, Baumholder, and Hohenfels, where they could benefit the largest number of troops, the clubs were open twelve to fourteen hours a day, seven days a week.\(^{112}\)

Craft shops and photography labs also run by Special Services were almost as numerous as the service clubs. The shops provided working space, tools, and materials for a wide range of hobbies, including electronics, graphic arts, painting, sculpture, wood and leather working, metal crafts, ceramics, cooking, and automotive mechanics. Customers paid only a small fee for the materials they used. Photography labs provided equipment for processing both color and black-and-white pictures. Both types of facilities were staffed with full-time instructors to assist hobbyists with any problems they might encounter. USAREUR also sponsored numerous exhibitions, competitions, and shows where craftsmen and hobbyists could display their work.\(^{113}\)

Also available to soldiers overseas were the radio programs of the American Forces Network (AFN). Run by the Armed Forces Radio Service, the network had originated in London during the early days of World War II. By 1954, it had grown to seven studio outlets and more than thirty transmitters, broadcasting its program schedule to nearly 50 million people across the continent. While the primary station was located in Frankfurt, the network also maintained stations


in Berlin, Bremerhaven, Munich, Stuttgart, Nuremberg, and Kaiserslautern. Because it was the only English-speaking American network in Europe, AFN tried to present a wide range of programs appealing to all ages and types of people. At various times during the day, troops or their families could tune in to *The Bob Hope Show*, *Fibber McGee and Molly*, *The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet*, the daily news, or the weekly baseball game. Voice of America broadcasts were also available throughout most of Europe and featured a variety of news, information, and public service programs.\footnote{“AFN Shuffles Its Schedules, Will Introduce 13 New Shows,” *Stars and Stripes*, European Edition, 10 May 1953; “The Voice of America,” *Stars and Stripes*, European Edition, 2 Aug 1951.} Although a major share of its programming consisted of shows provided by stateside radio networks, much of its most popular material was generated locally. In Stuttgart, for example, the Seventh Army Special Services Section produced half-hour segments that featured singers and musicians from within the command.\footnote{“AFN Starts Its 12th Year on the Air in Europe Today,” *Stars and Stripes*, European Edition, 4 Jul 1954; Hickman, *The United States Army in Europe*, p. 112; Memo, CWO Charles L. Landry, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, V Corps, 26 Oct 1954, sub: Seventh Army Radio Program, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.}
Especially popular with enlisted soldiers, but much less so with the USAREUR leadership, was the independent newspaper *Overseas Weekly*. Distributed in Europe since 1950 by its publisher and editor, Marion von Rosbach, the newspaper took great pleasure in tweaking military leaders throughout USAREUR. Known both as the G.I.’s newspaper and the “Oversexed Weekly,” the newspaper presented a regular mix of sports; court-martial testimony, particularly those containing lurid or sexually explicit details; and descriptions of the hardships of enlisted life caused by what the paper considered incompetent or corrupt leadership. Although the paper was beloved by most junior enlisted men, it drew the wrath of the USAREUR leadership, who had it banned from military newsstands in 1953. Nonetheless, its continued publication and distribution throughout Europe caused consternation throughout the command and often raised eyebrows in the German civilian population.116

The mercantile center of most installations was the post exchange. By January 1953, the European Exchange System maintained more than 2,300 shops and outlets of all types throughout Germany, France, and Austria. Although the various cafes and snack bars located on military posts and along the autobahn were the most popular services provided, large installations also offered barber and beauty shops, laundry and dry cleaning, tailors, shoe repair, flower shops, and photo studios. Exchange garages and service stations dotted the major road networks. Profits from the system were a primary source of revenue for a command welfare fund that supported many recreation and soldier assistance programs throughout USAREUR.117

While popular with American soldiers, the exchange system was less so with German merchants. The West German Retail Association had charged in 1952 that soldiers were purchasing goods such as cameras at reduced prices and then reselling them for a profit. It also questioned whether special stores for military personnel should be allowed to replace retail establishments that contributed to the German economy. The Exchange Service responded that while its stores did indeed charge less than local retailers, it purchased the cameras from German manufacturers who made a respectable profit. In the end, the exchange stores continued to offer significant bargains to soldiers on some high-dollar items, but


German retailers soon learned to compete successfully in other areas by offering a wider variety of many products than the exchanges could afford to stock. As the increasing number of civilians and the expansion of recreational facilities gave a clear indication that the command was settling in for an extended stay, soldiers began to question some of the administrative and regulatory policies the U.S. command had put into place to allow for a rapid response to any threat. The normal duty day in USAREUR began at 0800 and lasted until 1700 Monday through Friday. Saturday was usually a work day but in many cases only until 1200. Unit commanders always had the option of extending work hours to whatever extent necessary to complete training or other requirements. When the troops were in garrison and worked normal duty hours, they were still subject to commandwide curfew, which required them to be off the streets and out of public places by 2400 Monday through Saturday, and by 0100 Sunday. Although officers and enlisted soldiers of the upper three grades on leave or pass were exempt from the curfew, they were expected to abide by the spirit of the order and not to loiter in the streets, bars, or restaurants during the designated time periods. Units tracked compliance with the order through regular bed checks. In May 1953, expressing the belief that he could trust the people in his command regardless of the hour, the USAREUR commander, General Bolte, rescinded the curfew. Bolte, however, delegated authority to his unit commanders to continue to enforce the measure as a disciplinary action when appropriate.

The command’s commitment to combat readiness had also limited the percentage of troops who could be on leave or pass at any given time. Since all units in the Seventh Army had to be prepared to depart from their home stations for emergency positions within two hours of alert notification, no more than 15 percent of a unit’s present-for-duty strength could take leave or receive a pass at any one time. Everyone else had to be available for duty within two hours, with at least half capable of reporting within thirty minutes. While commanders understood the adverse effect on morale that such restrictions would impose, they hoped that their recreational programs and associated facilities would compensate.

Although Sunday was supposed to be a day off, the command noted that training schedules were tight and that Sunday mornings were often the only time that commanders might have to tie up loose ends. In 1954, however,

118 “German Stores Blast EUCOM PX’s,” Army Times, 23 Aug 1952.
USAREUR chaplains revolted. When Chief of Army Chaplains Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Ryan toured the command, he was besieged by complaints that commanders were scheduling maneuvers and other training on Sundays. In a letter to the USAREUR commander, General Hoge, Ryan acknowledged the requirement to maintain combat readiness but he observed that one battalion had gone to the field on thirteen consecutive Sundays for maneuvers that the chaplains and the men felt were not vital. Hoge agreed that such training was excessive and directed his subordinate commanders to curtail Sunday training.121

Another area in which the command began to relax its requirements was in the wearing of civilian clothing during off-duty hours. U.S. Army regulations required soldiers in occupied areas to be in uniform at all times. By 1953, soldiers and officers were questioning what they considered to be an infringement on their personal freedom. In April the USAREUR staff canvassed senior leaders at all levels to gauge their positions on the matter and determined that many did not favor the change. The command’s Deputy Provost Marshal, Col. Shaffer F. Jarrell, expressed many of the concerns that surfaced. He feared a loss of control over military personnel due to nonrecognition. It would be more difficult to police off-limits areas, to enforce curfews, and to identify personnel entering barracks, exchanges, clubs, or other areas limited to military access. He cautioned that the lack of uniforms might also encourage a breakdown in the officer-enlisted relationship. Finally, he warned of an increase in barracks larceny because troops would not be able to fit all of their belongings in wall lockers.122

Lt. Col. Ralph E. Nelson, Deputy Provost Marshal for U.S. Forces in Austria, presented another side of the argument. Soldiers in that command had worn civilian clothes during off-duty hours since early in 1952. Nelson pointed out that the change had improved relations between soldiers and local civilians because it placed them on a more equal footing. He added that the privilege had strengthened morale throughout the command and served as an incentive for good behavior on the part of troops who did not want to lose it. Enlisted men reported that it was easier to maintain their military clothing since they no longer had to wear it after duty hours. The use of civilian clothing also reduced the number of minor incidents requiring military police intervention, including such infractions as the wearing of unbuttoned blouses or jackets, improper head gear, hands in pockets, or failure to render military courtesies to superiors.123


122 Memo, Col Shaffer F. Jarrell, Dep Provost Marshal, for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, USAREUR, 22 Apr 1953, sub: Telephone Conversation Between General O’Neil and Colonel Jarrell, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

123 Ltr, Lt Col Ralph E. Nelson, Provost Marshal, U.S. Forces in Austria, to Brig Gen Jeremiah P. Holland, Provost Marshal, USAREUR, 14 Apr 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
The USAREUR commander, General Bolte, hesitated to implement the change because he had already decided to eliminate the mandatory curfew. He wanted time to evaluate the effects of that action before addressing the uniform policy. Still, support for the measure spread throughout the command. As a result, in October 1953, USAREUR obtained permission from the Department of the Army to allow troops to wear civilian clothes during off-duty hours. The new privilege did not come, however, without restrictions. Enlisted men below the rank of sergeant could not take advantage of the change until they had served in the theater for thirty days. Soldiers, moreover, had to maintain a standard of appearance and good taste appropriate for members of the U.S. armed forces.124

The new policy went into effect on 1 November with mixed results. For the next several years, USAREUR leaders worked to interpret and define standards for the wearing of civilian clothing. While the post exchange system struggled to stock enough civilian clothing to meet the newly created demand, the headquarters received complaints from German restaurants and hotels about American soldiers and their dependents wearing attire that they considered to be in poor taste. In August 1954, USAREUR issued additional guidelines for dependents. The directive forbade bare midriffs, strapless or low-cut dresses, shorts on teenagers or women, and blue jeans on mature women. In an attempt to improve the appearance of American women in public places, the regulation also prohibited the wear of pin curlers or any curlers in the hair without a suitable scarf or headgear. Women dressed improperly, the directive concluded, could not enter U.S. installations or facilities such as post exchanges, commissaries, theaters, and service clubs. Despite the furor raised by many women and dependents, the overall effect of the new policies was to raise the morale of most soldiers throughout the command.125

Noncombatant Evacuation Exercises

The steadily increasing number of dependents in the theater forced USAREUR leaders to add still another dimension to their emergency planning. In the event that hostilities between the Soviets and the West grew imminent,


the command would have to evacuate thousands of wives, children, and other civilians from the immediate combat area. A well-designed evacuation plan would serve an additional purpose, however, for its execution during a period of escalating tensions would both act as a sign of increased readiness and make the Soviets think twice about beginning any hostilities. Just as the presence of families and children sent a signal to the Soviets that U.S. intentions were peaceful, their removal would send an equally strong indication that the Army in Europe took its business seriously.

In September 1952 USAREUR had directed the Communications Zone to review existing plans and personnel requirements to support the evacuation of noncombatants in Germany through France to staging areas at Bordeaux and La Pallice. The request indicated that, upon implementation of an evacuation order, the Communications Zone could expect to receive 60,000 noncombatants, riding in 25,000 civilian vehicles and entering France at 8 designated border crossing points. In particular, USAREUR asked the Communications Zone commander to assess plans for traffic control, for feeding and billeting the evacuees, and for their final movement out of the theater.\(^{126}\)

The resulting study made some bleak observations about the U.S. Army’s readiness to carry out the evacuation. Although some plans existed for Base Section Headquarters—the component of the Communications Zone that oversaw ports and supply depots in western France—none were available for its subordinate units. Also, while the U.S. State Department was charged with the evacuation of U.S. tourists from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the Army had no assurance that it would not be called on to assist in their movement as well. Neither had the Navy provided any guarantee that ships would be available to return the personnel to the United States. No one had earmarked rations, tents, or medical supplies for use by evacuees. Measures to ensure adequate traffic control by military police along the route were untested and lacked detailed plans for movement control. The 508th Military Police Battalion, which was responsible for traffic control along the southern portion of the evacuation route, could not reach the French-German border until four hours after the first groups of dependents began crossing into France. In its conclusions, the study recommended establishment of a special planning group of representatives from USAREUR, the Seventh Army, and the Communications Zone to isolate specific problems and come up with a revised plan for noncombatant evacuation.\(^{127}\)

The group met early in 1953. By May it had prepared a draft plan, Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) 1–53. Dubbed “SAFEHAVEN,” it called

\(^{126}\) Memo, Lt Col A. W. Johnson, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, USAREUR COMZ, 18 Sep 1952, sub: Personnel Requirements in Support of NEO, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1954, RG 549, NACP.

\(^{127}\) Memo, Col Robert G. Kyser, Dep Dir of Logistics, for Ch of Staff, USAREUR, 14 Nov 1952, sub: Evacuation of Non-Combatants, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
for the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants from Germany and France to a staging area on the southwest coast of France near Bordeaux and La Pallice, where they would await transport to Great Britain or the United States. A supplement to the plan, published on 1 July 1953 and labeled NEO 2–53–3, outlined procedures for extending the ground movement of some of the people into the Iberian Peninsula. Both plans assigned responsibility for transporting evacuees to safe havens in Great Britain or back to the United States to the U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and to the U.S. Air Force, Europe. With USAREUR’s chief of staff approved the plan on 7 May and assigned planning responsibility to the assistant chief of staff for operations, plans, and training.

With the groundwork well under way, U.S. forces in Germany and France began preparations for the testing and implementation of the evacuation plan. Military communities established a block warden system and a process for notifying residents once an alert occurred. Units with evacuation missions received training and any additional equipment they needed to perform their assignments. The command positioned stockpiles of supplies along evacuation routes, near assembly areas, and in the Bordeaux–La Pallice staging area. In the summer of 1953, USAREUR arranged for a test of the plan, which it named Exercise ROADBOUND. The commanding general, Seventh Army, took overall control and supervision of the effort and of coordination with the U.S. Air Force, Europe. The commanding general, USAREUR Communications Zone, oversaw the exercise in France and was responsible for coordination with the French authorities.

The exercise commenced on the morning of 12 November 1953 with the announcement of a USAREUR-wide alert. Approximately one thousand military personnel and five hundred vehicles departed home stations in Germany for staging areas in the vicinity of Bordeaux. Area commands, districts, and detachments simulated their duties by dispatching a single vehicle to represent each convoy element of one hundred fifty vehicles. At least thirty vehicles traveled over each of the evacuation routes. Each of the ten field hospitals

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involved dispatched an ambulance-type bus to simulate patient evacuation. Columns using the northern evacuation routes completed their journey to the staging area in forty-nine hours. Along the longer southern routes, evacuees took seventy-two hours to complete the journey. The exercise revealed numerous flaws in the plan and in its overall execution. A failure to issue strip maps to participants caused considerable confusion, especially in France because route markings in several places were difficult to follow. Rest and resupply areas also lacked toilet facilities. Evaluators concluded that all personnel involved needed additional training, especially in traffic control and communication. They recommended the scheduling of another exercise for the following year.131

Before it could conduct another test, however, the command had to make a number of changes to the overall plan. Because the number of military personnel available to assist the evacuation effort was limited, USAREUR assigned volunteer male civilian employees of the Department of the Army as block wardens and drivers for the evacuation columns. When the block warden system broke down due to its voluntary nature, the command issued the assignments on military orders. Because of a lack of available drivers and the lengthy trip required at least one assistant driver in each vehicle, the Army encouraged civilian nondrivers and high school students to apply and qualify for drivers permits.132

The second exercise, Roadbound II, began on the morning of 12 October 1954, with another USAREUR-wide general alert. This time, observers noted another major problem: it took forty-five minutes for area commands to receive notification of the alert and ninety minutes before all military service units got the word. Signal communications between the Seventh Army and the Communications Zone Advance Section were so inadequate that the two headquarters had difficulty coordinating their actions. Once the evacuation began, drivers found that they still lacked sufficient strip maps for their entire journey and found many of the maps they did receive were inaccurate. Meanwhile, some of the wreckers and other heavy vehicles assigned to assist the movement could not maintain the prescribed speed. Complicating matters further, unfamiliarity with convoy procedures and, at times, an inability to follow fairly simple guidance meant that many units arrived at designated checkpoints too early or too late, causing traffic congestion and backups all along the route. On the plus side, evaluators noted that the construction of the tent camp in the Communications Zone Base Section was particularly efficient.133

After the exercise was completed, USAREUR planners agreed that movement plans were still not coordinated. Although the command had made a noticeable improvement from the previous year’s test, the evacuation plans still had a long way to go. Commanders and staff acknowledged that more training and further testing would be required before they could feel comfortable

133 Ibid., p. 212.
with the overall plan. It had also become clear what a massive undertaking an evacuation would be if the command ever had to put the plan into effect.\footnote{Ibid., p. 213.}

**A Steadying Influence**

By the end of 1954, the U.S. Army in Europe had come to grips with many of the challenges that its mission as a forward-deployed force had posed. Although its leaders would never be completely comfortable with the balance of conventional forces between East and West, they believed that their training, equipment, and doctrine would enable them to put up a good fight. Moreover, the addition of atomic artillery to the Seventh Army’s arsenal presented even graver risks to potential attackers. It seemed clear to leaders throughout USAREUR that such advanced weapons would play an even greater role in their war planning in the years to come.

The Army had grown into its role in Europe in other ways as well. Although work continued in many areas, the Communications Zone and the line of support through France were well established. Almost all of the vital supply depots and maintenance shops had been moved away from the immediate battle area. Meanwhile, USAREUR had made significant progress in reducing its personnel turbulence and in creating a long-term institutional memory in its units. The arrival of an increasing number of families throughout the command, and the steady growth of housing and recreation and welfare facilities to support their presence, likewise contributed to an emerging sense of stability.
STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE

The U.S. Army’s primary contribution to Western European defense had been the reactivation of the Seventh Army and the development of the command and control and logistical support headquarters that accompanied it. The service also helped to strengthen the NATO alliance through the integration of its forces into the NATO command structure and through its administration of military assistance programs for the various member nations. Even before the completion of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States had initiated a series of military assistance programs for European nations standing in the path of Soviet expansion. Beginning with aid to Greece in 1947, the Truman administration dispatched money, military equipment, and advisers to the various countries involved. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 formally assigned the vast majority of U.S. military aid to the NATO allies. With a preponderance of forces in the theater, the Army became the primary sponsor for most of these military aid programs. Its depots and repair shops rebuilt World War II–era equipment to be included in the assistance packages and provided training and maintenance teams to help allied military forces learn how to use it.

Smaller components within USAREUR also strengthened the alliance in their own way. As the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated after World War II, both sides desired a mechanism to oversee their interests in the other’s zone of control, and to resolve conflicts between opposing forces before they could escalate into more serious confrontations. The military liaison missions—originated in a 1947 agreement between Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, Deputy Commander, European Command, and Col. Gen. Mikhail Malinin, Chief of Staff, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany—helped USAREUR manage its relationship with the Soviet Army and later became a vital source of intelligence as the Cold War threatened to become a shooting war.

Building NATO’s Military Capabilities

Although the North Atlantic Treaty committed each of the signatories to a mutual defense, no mechanism existed in 1949 to translate political goals into a military strategy. Likewise no unified command structure directed the combined military forces of the member nations. The five nations of the Western
European Union had conducted military planning through a committee of their respective chiefs of staff, reporting to another committee of the five defense ministers. This arrangement would serve as a point of departure for planning NATO’s military organization.¹

In September 1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson had presented to President Truman their thoughts on the structure and organization of a NATO military defense force. They agreed that it should consist of national contingents operating under their own commanders, but responsive to overall NATO control. The two secretaries also concluded that one overall commander should have sufficient authority to organize and train the various elements within the structure and to exercise the full powers of a supreme allied commander in time of war. To support that officer, they recommended an international staff representing the military services of all participating nations. Acheson and Johnson agreed that an American officer should fill the position of supreme allied commander, but only with the full approval of the European nations. In the strongest terms, the two also stated that the United States should proceed “without delay” in the formation of West German military units that would play an essential role in the defense. Truman favored many of the recommendations and forwarded the letter to the National Security Council for further consideration. On 11 September 1950, after considering the council’s views, Truman approved the memorandum, making it the basis for the American position when the United States participated in European defense planning.²

On 19 December 1950, at the sixth meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Belgium, representatives from the twelve treaty nations formally approved and announced the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the supreme commander of an integrated allied force for the defense of Western Europe. The general immediately named the Army’s deputy chief of staff for plans and operations, Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, to be his chief of staff in the new command. The two officers had been close personal friends since the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers when they had both served on the staff of the Third U.S. Army under Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger. Also on 19 December, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace and Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins announced that all U.S. forces in Germany would come under the operational command of General Eisenhower. Shortly thereafter, the French Minister of Defense, Jules S. Moch, placed the three French divisions serving

² United States Position Regarding Strengthening the Defense of Europe and the Nature of Germany’s Contribution Thereto, 11 Sep 1950, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
in Germany at Eisenhower’s disposal and promised two additional divisions in the coming year.³

Despite such promising initial commitments, no command structure as yet existed to plan and coordinate the actions of NATO’s military forces. General Gruenther assembled a handful of U.S. military officers, who began at once to study the problems of organization and command. Because of its central location and excellent communications, Eisenhower and Gruenther decided that Paris would be the initial home of the new headquarters, despite some resistance from British representatives who decried the movement of the headquarters from London. Early in 1951 Gruenther’s planning staff joined representatives of eight other NATO nations in Paris to form the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), Planning Group. Because military staff systems differed among the member nations, the planning staff debated how to structure the headquarters so that staff appointments were distributed fairly. In the end, it elected to follow many of the precedents that had been established by the Western European Union. The old headquarters had already studied many of the organizational problems now faced by the SHAPE planners and had bequeathed to them plans that served as the basis for their discussions. More important, the previous headquarters had helped to develop a number of officers of different nationalities with experience working together as an allied team.⁴

In April, General Gruenther disclosed that the headquarters organization would resemble the American model with four primary staff bureaus: administration, intelligence, plans and operations, and logistics. Unlike the American model, however, SHAPE would have a fifth section devoted to organization and training. The staff would also include several special sections to deal with areas such as communications and finance. Complicating the process of creating a staff organization was the need to avoid offending various member nations, many of whom had long and glorious military traditions. Accordingly, Gruenther created spaces for two permanent deputy chiefs of staff, one—normally a French officer—to deal with logistics and administration, and a British officer to handle plans and operations. General Eisenhower also named three primary assistants to aid him in the overall direction of the force: British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery to serve as deputy supreme commander, British Air Chief Marshal Hugh W. L. Saunders to serve as air deputy, and French Admiral Andres G. Lemmonier to be naval deputy.⁵

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The next step for the planning group was to divide the theater into subordinate elements that individual commanders in chief could manage (Chart 4). Three separate commands would deploy north to south according to the continent’s natural geographic features. In the north, Allied Forces, Northern Europe, under the command of British Admiral Eric J. P. Brind, was responsible for an area that included Scandinavia, the North Sea, and the Baltic. In the south, Italy and the areas around the Mediterranean fell under Allied Forces, Southern Europe, commanded by U.S. Admiral Robert B. Carney. Because of the overwhelming importance of the central sector, Eisenhower decided that, as supreme commander, he would retain control over its operations. To assist him, he appointed French General (later Marshal) Alphonse P. Juin to be Land Forces commander, U.S. Air Force General Lauris Norstad as Air Force commander, and French Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard as Flag Officer (senior naval officer) Western Europe. In 1952, after Greece and Turkey had joined NATO as part of its southern flank, SHAPE created a separate command for naval forces in the Mediterranean, under the leadership of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.
Later, in 1953, NATO leaders decided that the Central Command needed its own commander in chief and appointed Marshal Juin to that position. He, in turn, named General Marcel M. Carpentier to serve as commander of Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (ALFCE).\textsuperscript{6}

The connection between the political leadership of NATO and the military command structure of SHAPE was provided by the Military Committee. Although an advisory committee outside of NATO’s command structure, the committee disseminated guidance to the supreme headquarters, and military expertise and advice to the North Atlantic Council. As agreed in 1949, each signatory nation contributed one military representative to the committee, normally its chief of defense. In the case of Iceland, which had no armed forces, the committee extended membership to a civilian official. Although the full committee met infrequently, much of its business was conducted by designated representatives or by the international military staff. The latter’s role was to serve as the executive agency for the Military Committee and to ensure that its policies and directives were implemented as intended. The staff consisted of

431 military and civilian personnel divided into six directorates: intelligence, plans and policy, operations, logistics and resources, communications and information systems, and armaments and standardization.\(^7\)

The armaments and standardization directorate reflected recognition among all member nations that they could more efficiently provide for their mutual defense with common standards for tactics, procedures, weapons, and equipment. Although agreements concerning tactics and procedures developed relatively quickly, the standardization of weapons and equipment among the military forces of the member nations proved to be harder to achieve. At least initially, a de facto measure of standardization was achieved because so many countries used American weapons and equipment supplied under the military aid program. However, as those items became obsolete, many countries expressed some reluctance to remain dependent on others for their military equipment. They replaced American items with models of their design, thus increasing rather than reducing the types of ammunition, tools, and spare parts required. Each nation had its own internal standards for screw threads, the caliber of armaments, electronics, and other subcomponents of military weapons and equipment. Even when states reached an agreement regarding a particular piece of equipment, as when they adopted the Belgian FN rifle as a standard item of NATO equipment, it was seven or eight years before British troops in Germany received their complement.\(^8\)

As the command structure came together, NATO’s military leaders turned their attention to developing sufficient military strength to counter the Soviet threat. Neither the United States nor the rest of the NATO allies were prepared to match Soviet military strength. With its forces already deeply committed to the war in Korea, the United States had little to offer in readily available forces. Instead, it exerted considerable political pressure on its allies, calling on them to provide a greater share of the conventional forces required. At the February 1952 NATO conference in Lisbon, U.S. officials could promise a reinforcement of only two divisions within thirty days of initiating full national mobilization. Any further divisions would not be available for at least 180 days. British reinforcements were similarly constrained. Although French and Italian representatives promised an additional seven and five divisions, respectively, within thirty days, many American military leaders were skeptical of their ability to meet those commitments. In total, member nations pledged to provide 53 2/3 divisions to be available within thirty days of mobilization by the end of the year, and 89 2/3 by the end of 1954. While the American commitment would remain relatively stable, rising from the existing 5 2/3 divisions in 1952 to a total of 9 2/3 in 1954, the agreement called for considerable increases on the part of the European allies. For nations

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whose economies were still recovering from World War II, this was going to be a tough sell to their populaces. 9

General Eisenhower worked tirelessly for the remainder of his time as SACEUR to convince the Europeans to provide the agreed on forces. Until they delivered, however, the U.S. Army in Europe, along with its NATO allies, had to fight the battle with whatever forces they had on hand. They would have to hold on long enough for the strategic bombing campaign and U.S. atomic bombs to knock the Soviets out of the war.

Eisenhower departed Europe on 1 June 1952, and was replaced as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, by General Ridgway. It was Ridgway who proposed to the Joint Chiefs a new organization that would place the U.S. officer designated as the overall allied commander in Europe in the position of a unified commander with authority over all U.S. forces in the theater. As its principal mission, the new, unified U.S. European Command supported SACEUR and U.S. policies in Europe. To this end, the command received the

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responsibility for coordinating joint logistics and for administrative issues, such as procurement, negotiations for base rights, and administration of military aspects of the Mutual Security Program for Europe. It also provided military representation to all NATO, international, and U.S. agencies in Europe. At the same time, the old European Command (EUCOM) became U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and retained all of its original responsibilities.10

By 1953, the sense of urgency that had bolstered the determination of the European allies had begun to wane with NATO’s military strength still far short of the goals the alliance had set at the Lisbon Conference in 1952. When, in

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10 Capt Russell A. Gugeler, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, The Redesignation of Headquarters European Command as Headquarters United States Army Europe 1952, 1954, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 1, Historians files, CMH; Msg, U.S. Liaison Ofcr (USLO), SHAPE, from Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, to CINCEUR, for Gen Thomas T. Handy, 8 Jul 1952, Ref Number ALO–1328, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Lt Gen Manton S. Eddy, CINCUSAREUR, for Ch of Staff, 10 Sep 1952, sub: Logistical Coordination in Central European Command, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
August, General Gruenther became SACEUR, he called for a reappraisal of NATO’s military strategy with the understanding that the conventional forces available to SHAPE would not be sufficient to stem a determined Soviet assault. As a close friend of the new president, Gruenther shared many of Eisenhower’s ideas regarding the primacy of atomic weapons. Only by making them available to NATO’s military commanders, he believed, could the alliance plan for a credible defense of Western Europe. On 20 August, he directed Air Marshal Walter L. Dawson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, to establish an ad hoc committee to study how atomic weapons should be integrated into NATO’s defense plans. From that point forward, the alliance would base its plans on an assumption that its military commanders would have atomic weapons at their disposal, and would use them in the event of a Soviet attack.  

**Integrating USAREUR into the NATO Command Structure**

As the alliance began to develop its military command structure, the member nations had to determine which military units to assign to NATO, and the manner in which national forces would connect to an international chain of command. Although the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAPE), in Europe during World War II offered a model of sorts, the idea of such an organization during a time of peace added a degree of complexity.  

The links between the U.S. Army’s command structure in Europe and NATO’s military headquarters took some time to develop. Beginning on 2 April 1951, the Army placed EUCOM and the Seventh Army under the control of the SACEUR. General Eisenhower exercised this command through the intermediate headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe.  

On 24 September, ALFCE announced the provisional organization of the Interallied Tactical Study Group, composed of representatives from France, the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The objective of the group was to establish common doctrine and procedures that would enable the military forces of different nations to work together and to integrate units where necessary. The group intended none of its work to replace or amend existing national regulations or guidance. It would instead establish a common vocabulary, provide common definitions, and assist commanders to understand the principal tendencies of the allied forces under their control. In pursuit of these goals, the headquarters authorized members of the group to deal directly with any of the allied commands in Germany and to attend exercises or training events conducted by their units. Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, also directed the group to prescribe to its forces in Germany tactical exercises or experiments in support of its studies. Among the issues its members

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chose to examine were the effects of new weapons on tactical operations, means of controlling forces along extended frontages, and the parameters within which German forces might be employed in the future.\textsuperscript{12}

One of the study group’s primary tasks was to produce a volume of Tactical Instructions that would provide commanders and staffs with a single source for guidance on operational doctrine. By January 1953, the group had prepared a draft and distributed it to the various allied commands for comment. In response, USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. Robert G. Gard, underscored issues that remained unresolved. Questioning some of the defensive concepts expressed in the manual, Gard noted differences between the British and American approaches, particularly British discomfort with the rearward movement involved in a mobile defense, and recommended that an entire chapter be devoted to the subject. He also criticized the omission of any consideration of the refugee problem and the control measures necessary to prevent fleeing civilians from interfering with defensive plans. The study group continued its work for the next several years, but its influence and importance waned as the various allied military contingents gained experience in working with each other through combined exercises and training.\textsuperscript{13}

In November 1952, SHAPE attempted to clarify command relationships within the theater by announcing the creation of two new army group headquarters in central Europe. In the northern sector, British General Sir Richard N. Gale, Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, took command of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG). In the southern sector of the theater, General Eddy, USAREUR commander in chief, became the Central Army Group (CENTAG) commander. In that position—directly subordinate to General Juin, the ALFCE commander—he controlled the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army. Although USAREUR headquarters maintained a separate planning element for its NATO mission, in many cases staff officers held two positions, splitting time between USAREUR and CENTAG. NATO war plans served as the basis for both CENTAG and USAREUR emergency wartime planning. The CENTAG plans section and the USAREUR operations staff developed an annual planning cycle to update the concept of operations.


\textsuperscript{13} Memos, Toth for CINCUSAREUR, sub: Report on the Interallied Tactical Study Group Conference 27–28 Jan 1953; Brig Gen Robert G. Gard, USAREUR Dep Ch of Staff for Ops, for CG, Interallied Tactical Study Gp, 26 Mar 1953, sub: Comments on Part I of Tactical Instructions; and Gard for CG, Interallied Tactical Study Gp, 20 Apr 1953, sub: Comments on Draft Instruction for the Tactical Employment of Large Interallied Units. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NADC.
and annexes devoted to command and control, intelligence, and logistics.14

With an international chain of command in place, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, began to exert its influence over USAREUR’s operations and training. USAREUR received increasing guidance from that headquarters and, in return, submitted a number of concerns to it for resolution. Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, also provided training guidance on a number of subjects to its various subordinate units. Its coordination with USAREUR included the implementation of atomic defense training and scenarios and missions to be highlighted in upcoming maneuvers. Although SHAPE seldom interfered with the day-to-day operations of its subordinate elements, it did instruct the Seventh Army to provide direct feedback from its important exercises and maneuvers, including tactical and logistical lessons learned, problems with communications, command post performance, and any other matters warranting the supreme allied commander’s attention.15

As part of the growing relationship between USAREUR and SHAPE, U.S. Army units in Germany participated in extensive training exercises involving other allied forces and supervised by NATO headquarters. In mid-May 1952, EUCOM and the French First Army conducted Command Post Exercise MAYTIME. Other participating headquarters included the U.S. Twelfth Air


Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

Force, the French First Air Division, the Seventh Army, and both the V and VII Corps. In the *Maytime* concept, an aggressor invaded western Germany. Allied forces withdrew to a Rhine River defensive line and, following friendly reinforcement, counterattacked while supported by fighters and fighter-bombers.\(^{16}\)

In addition to testing air-ground communications and procedures for all elements involved, *Maytime* prepared the various headquarters for participation in a larger exercise in July—*Grand Alliance*—directed jointly by Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, and Allied Air Forces, Central Europe. Held in France and Germany, the exercise included the British Army of the Rhine, the I Belgian Corps, and the Second Allied Tactical Air Force as Army Group A; and EUCOM, the French First Army, the Seventh Army, and the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force as Army Group B. In its scenario, an enemy attacked on a wide front. Allied forces delayed the aggressor with maximum use of demolitions at certain strategic rivers and, after a withdrawal, launched a counteroffensive. The final report on the event indicated that all concerned had much to learn about communications and coordination between participating units and the control of such large combat forces in the field. In addition to some of the expected language challenges, participants found that terminology, abbreviations, and acronyms used in orders and communications varied from nation to nation. A special report prepared by the 307th Communication Reconnaissance Battalion indicated that communications security was a major problem, particularly within the Seventh Army. The battalion had been able to prepare an almost complete order of battle for the Seventh Army simply by listening to its unsecure radio transmissions.\(^{17}\)

Two operations in September 1952 allowed elements of the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army to maneuver across most of West Germany and tested their ability to coordinate their actions. In Operation *Rose Bush*, held between 6 and 8 September, the U.S. V Corps, with the 4th Infantry Division and the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the French II Corps, with its 3d Infantry Division and one regiment of the French 1st Armored Division, defended against an attack by the U.S. 2d Armored Division and the remainder of the French 1st Armored Division. Altogether more than seventy-five thousand troops were involved in one of the largest exercises conducted up to that time. Two weeks later, between 17 and 19 September, Exercise *Equinox* pitted the French I Corps, the U.S. 43d Infantry Division less one regimental combat team, the French 5th Armored Group, and the French 2d Infantry

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\(^{16}\) Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, pp. 203–04; Memo, Gen Alfred M. Gruenther, SHAPE Ch of Staff, for NATO Distribution, 8 Feb 1952, sub: Tactical and Mobilization Plans for 1952–1953, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP.

Division against the U.S. VII Corps, the U.S. 28th Infantry Division, the French 4th Infantry Division, and one airborne group of the French 25th Airborne Division. As part of the exercise, friendly forces led by the French I Corps fought a delaying action against the attacking U.S. VII Corps. In both maneuvers evaluators indicated that operational liaison between U.S. and French forces had shown marked improvement over the previous year, and General Juin himself expressed his satisfaction with the improved coordination he had seen. Nonetheless, a Seventh Army critique noted that coordination between units, particularly along adjacent boundaries, still needed work.18

Subsequent exercises allowed Seventh Army units to operate not only with their CENTAG counterparts, but also with the British, Canadian, Dutch, and Belgian forces of NORTAG. Exercise Battle Royal in September 1954, for example, mixed units from both groups for six days of maneuvers that ranged across the NORTAG zone and emphasized the use of the newly arrived 280-mm. atomic cannons. Involving nearly 140,000 troops from five nations, the maneuver was larger than anything USAREUR or CENTAG had held up to that time.19

Despite the occasional large-scale field maneuver, NATO more often chose to evaluate subordinate elements through command post exercises that sent only headquarters sections to the field. Such exercises employed fewer troops and were less expensive to support. Tests such as Draw Bridge in August 1953 and Counter Thrust in January 1954 continued SHAPE’s efforts to develop smooth working relationships between allied staffs and to improve communications between the various headquarters. Communications between U.S. and French units continued to be a sticking point. After one exercise, General Bolte commented that difficulties arose from a lack of understanding of communications procedures on the part of liaison officers. He believed that many of them preferred to use their own personal radios and telephones rather than to employ the formal communications system.20

As U.S. doctrine increased its emphasis on atomic weapons, USAREUR leaders considered how best to share their knowledge with their NATO counterparts without violating security restrictions. At the highest levels, General

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Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

Ridgway, Supreme Allied Commander, and Field Marshal Montgomery, his deputy, and their staffs received briefings on the new weapons and how to employ them. USAREUR also prepared and sponsored a Special Weapons Orientation Course for senior officers and staff assigned to NATO forces. Initially, the USAREUR commander served as a deputy for atomic matters to the ALFCE commander. In 1953, however, the USAREUR commander at that time, General Bolte, pointed out that this was a dubious approach since, in the event of hostilities, he would be fully engaged directing the Central Army Group. As an alternative, he suggested appointing a senior U.S. Army general as a permanent member of the Allied Land Forces staff, acting as adviser for atomic operations. Bolte’s successor, General Hoge, carried this approach one step further by providing liaison teams to all allied headquarters, corps and above, to advise their commanders on the employment of atomic weapons.²¹

Although the supreme allied commander and the SHAPE staff took an obvious interest in the training and readiness of the various allied forces, they focused to an even greater extent on the development of the USAREUR Communications Zone and the line of communications through France. Because much of NATO’s wartime resupply and reinforcements would have to come from the United States, it was clear to both Eisenhower and Ridgway that the U.S. Army’s supply facilities and logistical network would support the military forces of the entire alliance. Ridgway, in particular, closely monitored the construction of depots and supply points throughout the Communications Zone and took great interest in the construction of the petroleum and lubricants pipeline from the French ports to the Rhine. The SACEUR emphasized the point by directing his immediate deputy, General Handy, to get all senior leaders involved in supporting the project and to provide “ceaseless command supervision” to ensure that the job got done on time.²²

Thus, by 1954, the U.S. Army’s role as a deterrent to Soviet expansion in Europe—indeed the service’s very existence—was thoroughly intertwined with the success of the NATO alliance. The Army as an institution had moved into a critical period as the nation adopted a military and strategic policy that not only


²² HQ, EUCOM, Agenda for SRE-CINCEUR Meeting, 12 Feb 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Ltr, Ridgway, Supreme Allied Cdr, to Handy, Dep CINC, EUCOM, 24 Dec 1952, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
turned increasingly toward air power and atomic weapons, but also questioned the cost and utility of large conventional forces. For the next several years, service leaders experimented with innovations in technology, organization, and doctrine as they attempted to prove to the Eisenhower administration that the Army had a role to play on the modern atomic battlefield. For much of that time, it was primarily the commitment of USAREUR and the Seventh Army to Europe and NATO that kept alive the Army’s tradition as a ground combat force.23

**Army Support for Military Assistance Programs in Europe**

Before the alliance could deploy a credible defense against the Soviet Union, however, most of its member nations required assistance in building up their own military strength. Of the member nations, only the United States was in a position to supply military materiel and economic assistance to the rest. As the United States military representative for military assistance in Europe, the EUCOM commander inherited responsibility for the coordination of Department of Defense activities in support of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in Europe authorized by President Truman in 1949. The Joint Chiefs established military missions representing the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to advise the various governments receiving U.S. military aid, and prepared to deploy them early in 1950. It was the duty of those missions, called military assistance advisory groups (MAAG), to assist host governments in preparing requests for military aid and in forwarding them with appropriate recommendations to the United States. They would also help to develop and to implement training plans for the introduction of new equipment.24

Further details of the European Command’s role in the implementation of the program came together in early 1950. It assumed responsibility for providing administrative assistance to advisory missions; for opening its training facilities to allied military students; and for coordinating the storage, repair, processing, and delivery of vehicles, weapons, and equipment that would go to foreign defense forces. The Joint Chiefs also assigned to EUCOM the tasks of supervising the groups’ internal organization, supplying administrative services

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for their military and civilian personnel, and arranging for logistical support that was not provided by the State Department.25

To coordinate the various advisory missions throughout Europe, the Joint Chiefs established the Joint American Military Advisory Group. At an orientation meeting in London in January 1950, representatives from the various agencies involved in setting up military assistance programs in Europe agreed to include the Joint American Military Advisory Group and advisory group personnel within the authorized troop strength of EUCOM as part of the EUCOM staff. In March, the joint advisory group published a basic directive to all military assistance advisory groups, setting forth policies to govern missions, organization and operations, reporting channels, signal communications, and matters such as decorations and publicity.26

As military assistance programs for Europe got underway, responsibility for delivering military equipment to the recipient nations fell to EUCOM. During the initial years of the program, shipments were to include equipment excess to the needs of U.S. forces. The first priority was to provide equipment to meet maintenance and training requirements of existing allied forces and then to fill unit materiel deficiencies or to modernize materiel for their forces in being. Only then would the program shift to providing equipment for new allied units that were part of the planned force buildup. The initial shipments programmed for the NATO allies included about forty-two thousand tons of vehicles, ammunition, and equipment.27

American efforts to support and equip NATO allies benefited, in part, from the stockpiles of World War II vehicles and equipment that U.S. armed forces still retained under their control. Late in 1951, the Department of the Army proposed a large-scale endeavor known as the “World War II Vehicle Replacement Program,” designed to refurbish older vehicles in the hands of American forces and prepare them for shipment to allied nations after they were replaced with more modern equipment. As a result of the initiative, the European Command agreed to recondition approximately 25,500 World War II vehicles during the period between October 1951 and the end of 1952. The exchange got off to a slow start, however, because delays in shipping the newer vehicles to Europe left American units reluctant to turn in their old equipment until replacements were on hand. After a directive from the president in January 1952 to accelerate deliveries to recipient nations, EUCOM increased the emphasis placed on the program. At the monthly meeting between senior

26 Ibid.
EUCOM leaders and the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) in February 1952, Maj. Gen. Aaron Bradshaw Jr., EUCOM Chief of Logistics, reported that the delay in transferring old vehicles to the repair facility had become a serious bottleneck in the system. He warned U.S. commanders that if they could not keep pace in turning in the older vehicles, the new items would go directly to NATO countries. As a result of this new emphasis, EUCOM shops and depots had rebuilt and delivered 41,200 vehicles to NATO countries by 31 December 1952.28

Also in response to the president’s directive, the Department of the Army and the European Command decided to divide the vehicle transfer program into two parts and to run the exchange of tracked vehicles separately. Late in 1951, the Army notified EUCOM that it would ship new M47 Patton tanks to Europe in the coming year to replace older M26 Pershing models in use by the troops. The Department of the Army expected the command to deliver one older tank to selected NATO countries for each new model it received. Because American forces did not yet have their full complement of tanks, however, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, authorized the command to retain its older tanks until it had reached its full authorization of 1,640. Once it did, American units would begin turning in one older M26 for each new M47 they received. By the end of 1952, the command had all of its M47 tanks in place and had rebuilt 988 older M26 tanks for delivery to France, Belgium, and Italy.29

The wheeled and tracked vehicle rebuilding efforts were only part of the overall military assistance the United States provided to its allies. By the end of 1952, Army units had collected, rebuilt, and delivered almost ten thousand radios and more than one thousand pieces of engineer equipment. Meanwhile, an ordnance small-arms program had restored more than twelve thousand weapons and placed them in stockpiles for future delivery.30

The redesignation of EUCOM as USAREUR in August 1952 and the establishment of the new headquarters, U.S. European Command, brought about a shift in the responsibilities for carrying out the Mutual Security Program. The U.S. European Command assumed the role as the senior U.S. military headquarters in the theater, reporting directly to the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under the reorganization, the functions of the Joint American Military Advisory Group were to be absorbed by the military assistance division of U.S. EUCOM headquarters. Once the new headquarters was established, however, the division delegated many of those responsibilities back to USAREUR, including budgeting, funding, civilian...

30 Ibid., pp. 304–05.
personnel administration, and related reporting requirements. The USAREUR headquarters retained responsibility for carrying out the Army portion of the military assistance program.

The wheeled vehicle program drew to a close in 1953 and the tracked vehicle program a year later. By mid-1954, USAREUR had no more World War II–vintage vehicles, weapons, or equipment to refurbish. By the end of the year, of the fourteen shops that had started working on items in September 1951, only four remained open: the rebuild depots at Schwäbisch-Gmünd, Ober-Ramstadt, Böblingen, and Mainz. Subsequent mutual aid deliveries would come directly from the United States without needing major restoration in Europe. The U.S. Army, Europe, however, continued to play a role in the reception, initial storage, and minor maintenance of military equipment in the course of delivering it to recipient nations. For example, most of Stockpile A, approximately 227,000 tons of materials reserved for Austria once it regained its sovereignty, was stored at the Fontenet Ordnance Depot in France. Smaller amounts resided in warehouses in Austria maintained by U.S. forces there.

In a report early in 1953 to General Ridgway, General Handy wrote that the effectiveness of every piece of equipment, no matter how modern, depended on the ability of its operators to use and to maintain it properly. For that reason, he said he believed that the additional training and technical assistance U.S. Army personnel provided to the NATO allies were at least as important as the equipment itself. In addition, the training gave the United States an opportunity to teach sound military doctrine and procedures, the value of which would outlast the equipment furnished.

For that reason, the EUCOM operations, plans, and training staff and the Joint American Military Advisory Group developed plans from the very beginning of the program to teach people how to use the equipment properly. As early as February 1950, Department of Defense guidance stipulated that foreign governments had to request training to receive it, and then only if U.S. military assistance advisory groups certified that a nation was unable to do the job on its own. The principal objective of the effort was to develop a cadre of foreign instructors who could then assume responsibility for the rest of the program in their country. The plan included the assignment of foreign students to U.S.

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31 Ibid., pp. 310–11; Memo, Brig Gen Frank A. Henning, EUCOM Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, for Secretary of the General Staff (SGS), 6 Apr 1953, sub: USAREUR Responsibility for MAAGS, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
tactical units to gain on-the-job experience and to attend selected schools and centers within the command.\textsuperscript{34}

Instruction opened at EUCOM training centers in May and offered forty-seven courses ranging in length from one to ten weeks. More than fifteen hundred foreign students received training under the primary 1950 program with an additional ninety-nine included in a supplemental summer program. Students from Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway received instruction at various EUCOM schools, including the Signal School at Ansbach, the Engineer School at Murnau, the Ordnance School at Eschwege, the Transportation Corps Training Center at Hammelburg, and the Tank Training Center at Vilseck. Others joined elements of the 1st Infantry Division or the U.S. Constabulary at Grafenwöhr, Sonthofen, Vaihingen, or Fuesson to observe training and to receive on-the-job instruction. In addition, sixty-six students from eight countries attended the fall maneuver, Exercise \textsc{Rainbow}, where they were attached to participating units to gain familiarity with U.S. doctrine and methods in the field.\textsuperscript{35}

By 1954, fourteen nations allied with the United States as part of the NATO treaty or other security agreements had participated in Mutual Defense Assistance Program training. Although USAREUR schools continued to offer instruction to foreign students, discussions with country representatives revealed that instead of classroom instruction, students were more interested in seeing how the U.S. Army operated in the field. The Seventh Army and USAREUR indicated that they could support some additional, limited training, as long as the assistance required did not interfere with their own training or operational readiness. Seventh Army leaders, in particular, requested that visits be coordinated at least three months in advance, that no more than five visitors would join a battalion at any one time, and that their visits would last no more than three weeks. In addition, Army officials expected visitors to have knowledge of conversational English and at least three months of training in their own army prior to their visits. Despite a number of requests, USAREUR and Seventh Army commanders refused to authorize the creation of traveling training assistance teams because the extensive amount of time the teams would be on the road would adversely affect readiness and training in their own units.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 136–41; Memo, Lt Col Clarence F. Nelson, Ch, Schools Section, for Dir, EUCOM OPOT, 15 Feb 1950, sub: Status of Plans for MDAP Training to Be Conducted in EUCOM, Entry 2062, USAREUR Training Branch, General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.


\textsuperscript{36} Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 370–71. Memos, 1st Lt W. H. Schuttler, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, Seventh Army, 8 Feb 1952, sub: Training of Allied Personnel; and Lt Col Hugh M. Exton, Ch, Training Div, for Dir, OPOT, 1 Mar 1951, Informational
At the end of 1954, U.S. military assistance programs had been active in Europe for five years. During that time, EUCOM, USAREUR, and Army units throughout Europe had participated in the transfer of vast quantities of military equipment to allied nations and in the training of allied personnel to use the goods they had received. In so doing, the service made a significant contribution toward the creation of a viable defense force for Western Europe, and to some extent, had helped to standardize the way NATO military forces trained and maintained their equipment. Despite this progress, American political and military leaders pointed out that only the participation of a restored West German military component could provide the alliance with the manpower necessary to stand up to a Communist attack.

The Military Liaison Missions and the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee

While the enormous Mutual Defense Assistance Program provided millions of dollars worth of military aid to allied nations, smaller USAREUR enterprises also made significant contributions to Western European security. Consisting of no more than fourteen people, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission not only provided an expedient means of communicating with Soviet occupation officials, but also served the allies as a valuable set of eyes behind the Iron Curtain.

By April 1947, both sides recognized the need for a mechanism to protect their interests in each other’s zones of control and to address issues that arose between their military forces before they could evolve into serious confrontations. The Soviets had already reached agreements with the British and the French, establishing liaison teams in their respective zones. The British had signed the initial agreement with the Soviets on 16 September 1946, calling for the accreditation of teams of thirty-seven to each side. The French had also signed an agreement with the Soviets on 3 April 1947, allowing for the exchange of eighteen personnel.37

The United States and the Soviet Union reached a similar agreement 5 April 1947, when General Huebner and General Malinin signed an agreement authorizing an exchange of military liaison missions accredited to the commander in chief of each nation’s occupation forces. In the Soviet Zone, the U.S. mission would be stationed in Potsdam, while the Soviet mission would be based at Frankfurt in the U.S. Zone. The agreement authorized members of each mission to

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travel anywhere within the zone in which they were stationed, except for military facilities, without escort or supervision. In addition to establishing a liaison to the Soviet headquarters, the functions assigned to the U.S. team included providing aid to U.S. personnel in the Soviet Zone, assisting in implementing agreements related to graves registration, extraditing prisoners for trial in the U.S. Zone, and protecting U.S. trains from pilferage in crossing the Soviet Zone.38

The U.S.-Soviet agreement limited the respective missions to fourteen personnel. The U.S. contingent was composed largely of Army officers with a few enlisted drivers, but it also included one representative each from the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force. The relatively small size was primarily the result of vocal opposition from U.S. counterintelligence agencies to the presence of many Soviets roaming freely in the U.S. sector of Germany. Accredited mission members carried Soviet travel and identification cards, printed in German and Russian, allowing them freedom of travel throughout the Soviet Zone. By the letter of the agreement, all members were to be military, with “no political representation.”39

To support the fourteen mission members accredited to the Soviet Union, USAREUR also maintained a rear echelon office in the U.S. sector of Berlin. Staff there included an operations and security control officer, an operations sergeant, an administrative sergeant, two stenographers, and a driver. The Berlin office maintained liaison with the U.S. commander in Berlin and stored files of classified documents not allowed in the main compound in Potsdam. The office also provided some administrative support to the mission, although, in accordance with the agreement, most routine administrative and logistical support remained the responsibility of the Soviet Army.40

When not touring East Germany, mission members split their time between the headquarters in Potsdam and West Berlin. Most of the U.S. mission officers were married, and their families lived in the American sector of West Berlin, where housing and educational and recreational facilities were superior to those that the Soviets provided in their zone. Nonetheless, USAREUR encouraged officers and their families to spend weekends at the Potsdam House, as the mission headquarters in the Soviet Zone came to be called. The Soviets and East Germans also allowed them to travel in the Soviet Zone and to stay in East German hotels. As a result, many were able to observe the disparity between the standards of living prevalent on each side. The enlisted drivers for the

mission were mostly young and unmarried. They lived in the Potsdam House for several months at a time, with periodic reliefs for less strenuous service in West Berlin.41

The breakdown of postwar joint allied occupation machinery for Germany, the Berlin blockade, and the division of Europe into Eastern and Western camps created an environment radically different from that which had prevailed prior to the signing of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Military and civilian leaders on both sides looked for ways to increase their understanding of the other side’s capabilities and intentions. Allied commanders demanded improved intelligence capabilities to better understand the training, organization, and capabilities of Soviet military forces, particularly the estimated twenty-two divisions that made up the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. That was the largest Soviet military force outside the Soviet Union and would be the vanguard of any advance against the West.42

It did not take Western leaders long to recognize that the officers of the military liaison mission, with their legal and theoretically unlimited access to the Soviet Zone of Germany, were ideally positioned to collect exactly the kind of information that Western commanders required. As the tensions between East and West increased, both sides began to use their missions to gather intelligence and monitor military movements within their respective zones. Although subsequent agreements had established secured areas that were off limits to the missions, both sides engaged in a sort of cat-and-mouse game, seeking to gather intelligence with their own personnel while attempting to suppress the movements and information gathering of the other side.43

While U.S. officials formally protested any limitations placed on their mission in East Germany, they also directed American soldiers to monitor the movements of the Soviet mission at all times. Whenever U.S. troops encountered a Soviet team, they were to forward a spot report through intelligence channels to USAREUR headquarters. Reports were to include information on the date and time of the sighting, location, a description of the vehicle and the occupants, and the direction of travel. Although the soldiers were specifically ordered not to attempt to impede the Soviets in any way, incidents did occur. One soldier recalled that occasionally an American tank might “accidentally” push a Soviet vehicle off the narrow German roads.44

Early attempts at military espionage by U.S. mission personnel were, by most accounts, fairly amateurish. Initially, there was little coordination of effort.

43 Ibid., p. 23; HQ, Seventh Army, G–2 Training Notes, 26 Mar 1956, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
with other missions and no clearly established network for the consolidation and evaluation of reports. Most officers lacked any formal intelligence training, and almost none spoke Russian at more than a rudimentary level. By 1950, however, the mission began to coordinate its intelligence-gathering efforts with its British and French counterparts, and after the dissolution of the military occupation government in Germany, it submitted its reports to the USAREUR deputy chief of staff for intelligence. After 1951, all officers assigned to the U.S. mission received a two-year course of instruction in German and Russian. In addition, members received compulsory intelligence training and follow on instruction in photography and memory enhancement.45

Mission officers also received improved equipment to facilitate their new assignments. Sturdy Chevrolets, better suited to mission tours in East Germany, replaced the smaller, more fragile Opels. Each sedan averaged about forty thousand miles per year, mostly in the Soviet Zone. The heavier cars held up better during drives that frequently included maneuvering off asphalted roads onto forest trails, across streams, and through ditches in order to observe restricted military installations or to hide while watching passing military convoys. Externally, the vehicles were standard U.S. military sedans, painted olive, with clearly identifiable license plates. Later models would include product improvements such as additional fuel tanks, heavy-duty shock absorbers, and switches enabling independent control of brake lights to confuse Soviet or East German agents who frequently tailed the U.S. tours.46

Most of the key priorities for military intelligence collection in East Germany were established by USAREUR and NATO. Of primary importance to Western analysts was an assessment of readiness and capabilities of Soviet forces in Germany for offensive action against Berlin, West Germany, or all of Western Europe. Mission observers reported on troop training, deployment, mobilization, armament, enhancement of communications capabilities, and changes in logistics, any of which might provide indications of an impending attack. Although most reports focused on Soviet military activities, the mission also provided information on East German forces as they grew in strength and capability. Observers took particular note of new weapons or equipment, especially any that involved atomic or chemical warfare. Mission reports suggested a particular interest in whether units returned to home station once exercises were complete. Failure to do so would have indicated a shift in disposition, or more important, a potential for hostile action.47

U.S. mission members conducted their assignments, or tours, in teams usually consisting of a driver and an observer. Tours could last anywhere from

part of a day to several days, although the average trip lasted about forty-eight hours. To begin the journey, the driver would pick up his officer or observer in West Berlin, at his home or at the rear echelon headquarters. First was the challenge of leaving West Berlin. In January 1952, the Soviets closed most checkpoints into and out of Berlin. The only access point that was open to U.S. traffic, including U.S. mission personnel, was the checkpoint that marked the end of the autobahn leading into Berlin. To arrive at the checkpoint, all vehicles leaving Berlin had to cross the Potsdam Bridge. It was thus a simple matter for Soviets or East Germans, assigned to tail the mission vehicles, to wait for their quarry to cross the bridge. What usually followed was a car chase straight out of Hollywood as the U.S. mission team would attempt to lose their pursuers. With the more powerful automobiles and more experienced drivers, it was usually only a matter of time before mission personnel were successful.48

Although the Soviets occasionally conducted their own surveillance, it was usually the East Germans who tried to follow the U.S. tours. However, when East German agents detained U.S. mission personnel, they immediately transported them to the local Soviet commandant. In most cases the Soviet officer dismissed the East Germans at once. After a pro forma lecture on maintaining the terms of the agreement and not pushing their privileges of access too far, the Americans were usually quickly released. The Soviet recognition of East German sovereignty had no effect on the military liaison missions. They continued on as if the occupation were still in effect. Neither East nor West Germany had any standing when it came to the U.S.-Soviet agreement.49

At times, surveillance and harassment efforts took a harder edge, as the Communists attempted to detain or damage an American vehicle. Col. August E. Schanze, the U.S. chief of mission, described one such encounter in a letter of protest he filed with Col. Gen. Semion Ivanov, the deputy chief of staff for the group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany. On a mission beginning 19 March 1952, U.S. personnel drove to Stralsund, on the northern coast of East Germany, where they stayed the night. The Americans were followed by four Soviets dressed in civilian clothes for the entire trip. While they stayed overnight in a hotel, two of the Soviets remained in the car while the other two sat in the hotel lobby. The next morning the Soviet vehicle was joined by another, also carrying four men in civilian clothing. As the Americans traveled along the autobahn, one of the Soviet cars began aggressively passing the mission car, driving for extended periods in the oncoming lane and occasionally bumping them. At one point the driver threw a bottle out his window onto the pavement ahead of the American car, and U.S. officers reported that he appeared to be intoxicated. In a format long established by both sides, Schanze reminded the

Soviet officer that such actions were a discredit to the Soviet Army and not in accordance with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.\textsuperscript{50}

Despite the eagerness with which the mission officers embraced their new assignments, it was important that they retain at least the façade of fulfilling their official liaison responsibilities. When the \textit{Stars and Stripes} printed a story that referred to the Soviet Military Liaison Mission as spies, the chief of the U.S. mission responded sharply in a letter to the chief USAREUR civil affairs officer. In his letter, he warned that such references were inaccurate and objectionable, and would lead to the Soviets applying a similar description to his own activities. Continuation of such accusations and rhetoric could well make his situation in East Germany untenable.\textsuperscript{51}

In September 1952, as incidents involving the military liaison missions increased, USAREUR established a formal Soviet Relations Advisory Committee to handle the staff actions that resulted. The committee consisted of the director, intelligence division; the director, civil affairs division; and the chief, public information division. The director, operations, plans, organization, and training division and the political adviser were also regular participants in meetings of the committee. Official functions of the committee included preparing USAREUR policy with regard to the military liaison missions, adapting plans to counter various actions of the Soviet mission, and responding to protests filed by the Soviet authorities. Unspoken and unofficial was the additional function of recommending to the U.S. mission those areas in which they were to focus their efforts to gather information.\textsuperscript{52}

Both sides were careful not to take actions so serious that they might be deemed justification for abrogating the agreement. Reciprocity became the most important theme in dealing with each other’s liaison teams. When, in August 1952, the Soviets declared three U.S. mission members persona non grata and expelled them from East Germany, the Americans reciprocated by relieving three members of the Soviet Military Mission in Frankfurt. When the Soviets denied the American chief of mission access to a crossing point more convenient than the Helmstedt checkpoint, the Americans denied a similar request from the Soviet mission at their earliest opportunity. At times, the policy seemed to get in the way of effective liaison between the two sides. In June 1953, an exasperated Colonel Schanze wrote to the chief of the USAREUR civil affairs division that he needed help in reining in the actions of the U.S. military police


\textsuperscript{52} Memos, Brig. Gen. Mark McClure, Dir. of Intel., for Ch. of Staff, 17 Sep 1952, sub: Establishing Mechanism for Handling Soviet Mission Problems; and Maj. Gen. Edward T. Williams, Ch. of Staff, for Staff, 7 Oct 1952, sub: USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
and the West German police against members of the Soviet mission. Each time that he went to the Soviets to complain about the way his personnel had been treated, he said, he found that the Western police had done something to completely nullify his complaints. The end result, he concluded, was that they were annoying the Soviets and causing them to submit his own personnel to longer and more stressful detentions.53

Although the expansion of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission’s intelligence role downgraded the liaison function to secondary status, the responsibilities did not disappear entirely and, in fact, also contributed to the overall picture of Soviet outlook and intentions. Mission members used their periodic contact with Soviet senior officers to develop biographic sketches of each officer and to elicit as much as possible their views on current events and the East-West relationship. In addition to those contacts brought about by professional requirements, each side also hosted social events designed to foster improved relations between the two forces. The U.S. mission hosted three large functions at the Potsdam House each year. These included a celebration commemorating the anniversary of the meeting of U.S. and Soviet forces at Torgau in 1945, an Independence Day picnic, and a Thanksgiving Day dinner. These were usually lavish events and often included wives and families. Engagements sponsored by the Soviet forces allowed U.S. mission officers to form impressions of morale-boosting activities among the Soviet troops, including housing conditions and provisions for dependents and the support and recreational facilities available to them.54

Even though U.S. and Soviet personnel formed few real friendships as a result of this regular interaction, both sides were able to maintain a cordial working relationship even during politically tense periods. The relationship survived any number of detentions and incidents, some of them quite serious, because each side recognized the useful arrangement it stood to lose if disagreements escalated to Washington and Moscow. Every now and then, however, signs of genuine kindness shined through the official rhetoric. In May 1953, Colonel Schanze learned through a casual conversation that Senior Lieutenant Makarov, an officer with the Soviet External Relations Branch, had developed a fondness for singer Patti Page’s rendition of “Doggie in the Window.” Schanze arranged through a colleague at the local armed forces radio station to send a copy of the record to Makarov.55

The relationship between the U.S. Mission and the East Germans was usually more troublesome. The East Germans held the opinion that cessation of

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major parts of the Potsdam Agreements, the breakdown of the Allied Control Council in Berlin, and the formation of two German states had voided the basis for the existence of the Allied missions on their territory. Although East Germany’s political leaders and, by extension, its police forces, denied the legitimacy of the U.S. mission, Soviet forces stationed throughout the country ensured enforcement of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. In most cases, East German authorities detaining U.S. mission personnel quickly turned them over to the Soviets, who then released the detainees once the pro forma warnings and lectures had been dispensed with.56

In retrospect, both the U.S. and the Soviet military missions served an important role in preventing minor disagreements from escalating into more dangerous confrontations. Their presence behind enemy lines gave assurances to each side that the other was not preparing for imminent hostilities. Initially designed to provide a channel for communications between the two occupation forces, the missions gradually evolved into a kind of mutual inspection system, which greatly reduced the possibility of armed conflict. The U.S. Mission served as a point of contact with the Soviets in East Germany that kept open a channel for quiet negotiations and helped to avoid irresponsible military actions by either side. Ultimately, the missions provided an example of East-West cooperation from which later efforts toward détente and arms control might evolve.57

Moving the Alliance Forward

The creation of a military command structure for NATO and the replenishment of allied armed forces were important initial steps in building security for Western Europe. They symbolized the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty from a political agreement to a true military alliance. At the same time, NATO military leaders understood that these preparations would be meaningless if they could not take further steps to close the gap between their military forces and those available to the Soviets in Eastern Europe. Despite the best of intentions, it was unlikely that the nations of Western Europe would be able to follow through on their commitments made at the Lisbon Conference. One source of military power, however, remained as yet, untapped. A rearmed West Germany might just provide the manpower and hardware to bring NATO’s forces into relative balance with those of the Soviet bloc. As the alliance moved forward, most realized that achieving that goal would not be easy.

Despite the commitments the NATO allies had made at Lisbon in 1952, it was clear to alliance leaders that they would be unable to provide sufficient forces for a conventional defense of Western Europe without the participation of West Germany. Throughout the early 1950s, member nations struggled to find a way to integrate German manpower into NATO defenses without renewing fears of German militarism that had plunged Europe into war three times in the previous century. When, in 1954, the European Defense Community (EDC) failed to win approval in the French National Assembly, the Americans began a unilateral effort to bring a rearmed Germany into the NATO alliance.

**Working Toward a German Contribution to Western European Defense**

In retrospect, it is remarkable how quickly U.S. policy toward German rearmament underwent a complete reversal. Although a plan by Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. Morgenthau Jr. for the complete pastoralization of Germany had been rejected as overly harsh, demilitarization and control over heavy industry remained a key element of the Allied occupation during its initial years. In 1947, U.S. policy shifted to reconstruction and economic assistance as exemplified by the Marshall Plan. The Soviet blockade of Berlin beginning in June 1948 and extending through May 1949 stoked allied concerns for the security of Western Europe. When the United States joined the NATO alliance in April 1949, it committed its armed forces to a defense of Western Europe in the event of a Soviet attack.¹

By 1950, U.S. military and political leaders had begun to consider seriously a shift in policy toward German rearmament. In February, the CIA reported that East German “Alert Police” were conducting intensive military training under the watchful eye of Soviet officers. This force of thirty-five thousand men was organized into battalion-size units and included specialized artillery, tank, signal, and engineer units. The CIA concluded that the only reasonable purpose for such a force was to serve as the nucleus for a restored East German Army. Although the West Germans had also established substantial police and security elements, albeit without tanks and artillery, American leaders denied

any formal consideration of West German rearmament. On 2 May, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised the secretary of Defense that “from the military point of view, the appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of Western Europe against the USSR.” Concerned that talk of German rearmament was premature and would disrupt Western European unity, President Truman was not open to the advice. In a 16 June 1950 memo to the secretary of State, he referred to it as “militaristic” and “not realistic with present conditions.”

The North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 cast the question of German rearmament into an entirely new light. Many American political leaders saw a connection between the attacks in Korea and the perilous situation in Western Europe. Sentiment grew in Congress to encourage the Germans to take a hand in their own defense. In September, as U.S. soldiers in Korea fought to maintain defensive positions around the port city of Pusan, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, traveled to Washington to discuss with the president the creation of a West German defense force. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson announced his support for rearmament, saying that the United States needed to find a way for the Germans to contribute to the defense of Western Europe. By early 1952, General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, informed his senior staff that he regarded German rearmament and the integration of German forces into Western European defenses as his highest priority. As one German scholar later noted wryly, while the Korean War may not have been the father of German rearmament, it certainly proved to be the obstetrician.

Evidence of U.S. military support for German rearmament began to appear in USAREUR’s burgeoning relationship with the West German border police, the Bundesgrenzschutz. The Department of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff discouraged any official USAREUR support for the German police that might be interpreted by the Soviets as encouraging some form of

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remilitarization. Nonetheless, the command’s leaders and units steadily forged a close relationship that began to lay the groundwork for a new German Army.

In September 1950, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had taken the first steps to establish a federal police force that would provide customs and border control and serve as a counter to the East German paramilitary Volkspolizei. He envisioned a highly mobile force of some twenty thousand men, equipped with light arms and machine guns. German officials informed EUCOM that, under those limitations, the police force could in no way be considered an army, but they did allow that it might eventually become the nucleus of a German contribution to a European Defense Force.4

Regular communication and coordination between the organization and U.S. military units had begun almost immediately after its formation in 1951. In July, Maj. Gen. George P. Hayes, Deputy United States High Commissioner for Germany, relayed a request to the European Command for armored cars to be used by the border police. Hayes indicated that, while he would not approve the issue of the medium weight cars the Germans requested, he would agree to deliver up to sixty light M8 armored cars if EUCOM could provide them in a reasonable amount of time. He also asked EUCOM to supply a limited number of 60-mm. mortars with training ammunition. The headquarters responded that it had the equipment on hand and would turn it over to the Germans once it had approval from the Department of the Army. That came in November. When the German police began active patrolling along the border, early in 1952, they had M8 armored cars at their disposal.5

Late in 1951 and early in 1952, representatives from EUCOM, the Seventh Army, and the Bundesgrenzschutz held a series of meetings to clarify the role the Germans would play in border security and to establish coordination measures between the three commands. Officially, they agreed that it was undesirable for the police to indulge in intelligence-gathering activities. Capt. J. R. Haines, Director, Frontier Inspection Service in the British Zone, pointed out, however, that the Germans were “keen young men” who would be eager to provide whatever assistance they could. Furthermore, they would be able to

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4 Allied High Commissioner for Germany, Political Affairs Committee, German Proposals for the Creation of a Federal Frontier Protection Authority, 20 Jan 1951, Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Planning, Organization, and Training Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP; Memo, Felicien A. Fraser, Special Agent, Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), for CG, Seventh Army, 15 Jan 1951, sub: Security Survey of US-Soviet Zone Border, 15th Constabulary Squadron Area, Entry 2052, USAREUR G3 Operations General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP; HQ, EUCOM, Defense of Western Germany, 13 Sep 1950, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.

5 Ltr, Maj Gen George P. Hayes, Dep U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, to Gen Thomas T. Handy, CINC, EUCOM, 28 Jul 1951; Memos, Brig Gen Edward T. Williams, Dep Ch of Staff for Ops, for Dir, OPOT Div, 31 Jul 1951, sub: Equipping of German Border Police; and Lt Col Ritchie Garrison, EUCOM Intel Div, for Col Philp [sic], 7 Nov 1951, sub: Meeting with Representatives of the Bundesgrenzschutz. All in Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP.
collect intelligence by whatever means were at hand in the normal execution of their duties. Seeing an opportunity that was too good to pass up, the Germans and Americans set up procedures for passing information, both to the allied powers and to the German authorities.6

The meetings also established procedures for settling border violations. The German police took responsibility for control of illegal crossings by civilians and by military personnel from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern European countries. The Americans meanwhile retained responsibility for apprehending, disarming, and detaining Soviet military personnel violating the border. By February 1952, the German police and Seventh Army border units had established effective liaison and working relationships.7

As the relationship matured, in January 1952, the chief of the operations branch, Col. Guy L. Pace, complained about restrictions regarding the sharing of classified allied information with the German border guards. He argued that greater integration of operations between the Germans and Seventh Army could increase border security, improve the exchange of intelligence information, and eliminate misunderstandings between the two organizations. The Seventh Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Col. Charles H. Valentine, made an even more compelling argument. Anticipating that, in emergency operations, the border police would come under Seventh Army control with a clearly defined role in its overall mission, he asserted that USAREUR and the Seventh Army needed to be able to share classified plans and information with the Germans.8

At the same time, the Bundesgrenzschutz was itself developing a more martial orientation. Its organization followed familiar military patterns, with twelve battalions of four companies each. In addition, the Germans formed a naval unit for patrolling their coastlines and a technical battalion that included engineer, signal, and ordnance elements. The Germans established centralized schools to train officers, noncommissioned officers, vehicle drivers, radio operators, and technicians. All units trained initially with carbines, machine guns, and pistols, and with the light mortars and the M8 scout cars when they arrived. The U.S. command encouraged the Bundesgrenzschutz to use the American facilities as long as they did not interfere with the training of U.S. forces. To that end, a

6 HQ, EUCOM, Minutes of Conference Held at Headquarters, Intelligence Division, Wahn-erheide, 14 Nov 1951, Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP.
7 Ltr, Federal Minister of Interior to Grenzschutz Liaison Ofcr, 10 Apr 1952; Memo, Lt Col Benjamin F. Taylor, Ch, Special Plans Br, for Ch, Opns Br, 8 Feb 1952, sub: West German Frontier Police. Both in Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NADC.
8 Memos, Col Guy L. Pace, Ch, Opns Br, for Ch, Special Plans Br, 5 Jan 1952, sub: West German Frontier Police, Entry 2051, USAREUR Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training Classified General Correspondence, 1950–1952, RG 549, NACP; and Col Charles H. Valentine, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, for Ch of Staff, sub: Items of Interest to the Headquarters for Discussion with USAREUR, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
liaison team located in Seventh Army headquarters coordinated the use of small arms ranges with them.9

Publicly, American forces remained reluctant to be seen as too closely associated with Bundesgrenzschutz training. When Germany’s minister of the interior requested a joint U.S.-German exercise in September 1952, for example, USAREUR headquarters declined. Responding to a Seventh Army request to participate, the command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Brig. Gen. Robert G. Gard, wrote that extreme caution was to be the norm in any move that might be interpreted as an effort to develop the Bundesgrenzschutz into a paramilitary force. Although the proposed exercise involved only normal police functions, he continued, the mere participation of the United States could be interpreted as containing a hidden motive. Prudence, however, did not prevent USAREUR and Seventh Army from assisting the Germans in more surreptitious ways. The Seventh Army, for example, provided copies of its training manuals on civil disturbances, mountain operations, and operations against guerrilla forces for use in training.10

During the next year, the relationship between the Americans and the Bundesgrenzschutz grew less circumspect. On 26 March 1953, the Germans conducted an exercise at the Wildflecken training area in which the U.S. 373d Armored Infantry Battalion participated. The event featured a series of attacks on a pillbox by Bundesgrenzschutz infantry and armored cars, supported by U.S. tanks and heavy mortars. Observers included Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, U.S. VII Corps Commander, and Maj. Gen. Kenneth F. Cramer of the U.S. Southern Area Command. Brig. Gen. Einar B. Gjelstein, Seventh Army Chief of Staff, expressed concern over the implied approval of such obvious military training, but allowed it to proceed lest a cancellation cause more adverse publicity than the exercise itself would generate. In his report to USAREUR, he said he believed that no harm had been done. Ironically, the Germans had also invited Gjelstein’s superior, Seventh Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, to witness the training two weeks earlier. The general expressed his written regrets to the Bundesgrenzschutz commander, adding that he looked forward to attending similar functions in the future.11

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9 Memos, Garrison for Philp [sic], 7 Nov 1951, sub: Meeting with Representatives of the Bundesgrenzschutz; and Capt John E. Kempf, Liaison Ofcr, for CG, Seventh Army, 21 Apr 1952, sub: Use of Rifle Ranges by Bundesgrenzschutz, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
10 Memos, Brig Gen Einar B. Gjelstein, Ch of Staff, for CINCUSAREUR, 20 Sep 1952, sub: Bundesgrenzschutz Request for Joint Exercise; Brig Gen Robert G. Gard, Dep Ch of Staff for Ops, for CG, Seventh Army, 21 Nov 1952, sub: Bundesgrenzschutz Request for Joint Exercise; and 1st Lt Harry L. McFarland, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, Seventh Army, 28 Nov 1952, sub: Use of Field Manuals by German BGS. All in Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, Training, RG 549, NACP.
11 Ltrs, Gjelstein, Ch of Staff, to Maj Gen Edward T. Williams, 6 Apr 1953; Cdr Grasser, Border Security Office South, to Lt Gen Charles L. Bolte, Seventh Army Cdr, 9 Mar 1953; and Bolte to Grasser, 18 Mar 1953. All in Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
USAREUR headquarters tried to hold the line on further militarization of the German police. In a letter to the deputy U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Samuel Reber Jr., General Gard recommended that a request by the German chancellor for 37-mm. antitank guns, heavier mortars, and aircraft be disapproved. He added that it was no longer possible to provide excess military equipment to the Germans as the command had committed all excess stocks and spare parts to the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and earmarked them for contingents of allied defense forces.¹²

As the inevitability of eventual West German sovereignty became clear, Army leaders no longer saw any need for subtlety in the USAREUR relationship with the Bundesgrenzschutz. Just one month later, an officer from the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment reported on a German maneuver he had observed. He described a controlled exercise in which the police units operated in battalion- and regimental-size units in the attack and on the defense. Their tactical performance, he said, was splendid. “Their operations strongly resembled those of the best World War II German infantry.” He noted that their combat effectiveness was only impaired by the absence of heavy weapons, adequate communications equipment, and a developed supply system. He concluded that all Bundesgrenzschutz troops bore the hallmarks of first-class professional units.¹³

The ease and swiftness with which the Germans transformed the Bundesgrenzschutz into a military organization in all but name indicates the degree to which its members were already prepared for service. Many were World War II veterans who had been military professionals for most of their lives. It seems clear that USAREUR and the Seventh Army were willing participants in this process, even though it violated guidance from the Department of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nonetheless, the soldiers in Europe recognized who the Bundesgrenzschutz were and what they were going to become, and they played an important role in the transition.

### Designing a Structure for German Integration—
The European Defense Community

Before the Western Allies could consider the addition of German military units to their overall defense force, it was first necessary to create a structure where the Germans could be integrated into the force without rekindling fears of militarism. Several nations who had so recently suffered at the hands of the German Wehrmacht were more than a little reluctant to see it reborn in any form.

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¹² Ltr, Gard, Dep Ch of Staff for Ops, to Samuel Reber Jr., Dep U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 29 Apr 1953, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP.

¹³ Memo, Lt Col Dewitt C. Armstrong III, Cdr, 1st Bn, 2d Armd Cav, for Cdr, 2d Armd Cav, 9 Oct 1954, sub: Observation of Bundesgrenzschutz Maneuver, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1966, RG 338, NACP.
Whatever reservations about renewed German militarism some Western European nations might have had, the case for rearming the Germans had become too compelling to ignore. If the Soviet Army was to attack, all concerned preferred a military strategy that included a strong initial stand along a line as far to the east as possible, preferably on the Elbe River which ran through East Germany. Allied military leaders doubted that NATO could muster the forces necessary to defend the line without resorting to German rearmament. With the Americans unable or unwilling to increase their commitment, only the Germans could make up the shortfall. In addition to the nation’s soldiers, the alliance anticipated the support of German industry as well. U.S. Ambassador to France David K. E. Bruce wrote to the secretary of state that it would be ridiculous for the Germans to be free to manufacture consumer goods for their own profit while the rest of Europe was making sacrifices to strengthen the defense effort.14

Despite the growing clamor in the United States and among NATO military leaders for German rearmament, many Europeans, particularly the French, were reluctant to remilitarize their former foe. In October 1950, only slightly more than five years had passed since the end of World War II. Heads of government throughout Europe had suffered at the hands of Nazi aggression. The French Defense Minister, Jules Moch, whose son had been garroted by the Germans during the war for aiding the resistance, threatened to resign and bring down the French government if German participation in Western European defense was allowed. Moch warned that a rearmed Germany would soon abandon the Western alliance and side with the superior military strength of the Soviets.15

Nonetheless, the French realized that they could not long resist American pressure to add German divisions to the defenses of Western Europe. On 24 October 1950, French Premier Rene Pleven presented to the French Assembly a plan to integrate German units into a new, experimental NATO force. German manpower, no larger than battalion size in strength, would be assigned to cadres withdrawn from existing French divisions to form new, composite units. As part of his proposal, Pleven asked for guarantees from the United States and Great Britain that they would not allow Germany to create a national army. Defense Minister Moch also made it clear that France would not tolerate a German Defense Ministry, a general staff, or German divisions.16


American diplomats and senior military staff recognized immediately the difficulties inherent in such a plan. If German participation was to be dependent upon an integrated European defense establishment, it would be subject to innumerable delays while the allies debated and negotiated the details of that organization. Almost all of the NATO military leaders agreed that attempting to form effective military forces by mixing regiments, battalions, or companies of different nationalities was militarily unsound and could not produce a fighting army. In addition, the approach seemed to consign Germany permanently to a second-class status with no control over its military units once they had been raised and turned over to the European Defense Community, as the proposed organization came to be called. In describing the proposal, Secretary Acheson observed that while the German people might be willing to participate in a true European army in which all nations were treated equally, they would not participate in a plan where they were openly and blatantly treated as inferiors. Indeed, one German weekly newspaper observed that what the French truly wanted was German forces superior to the Soviet Army, but inferior to the French Army.17

French reluctance was not the only obstacle on the path to German rearmament. Many Germans themselves were reluctant to remilitarize. Some feared that restoration of a German army would only provoke a Soviet attack, resulting in the complete devastation of their homeland. Others had been genuinely relieved to be rid of the Prussian-based military caste and worried that rearmament would resurrect the remnants of that military state. Perhaps the most prevalent concern was that, by restoring their armed forces and casting their lot so firmly with the West, they would indefinitely postpone the national reunification that remained the strongest political motivation in Germany. This desire was so obvious to Western analysts that some expressed unease that, as the Germans’ influence and strength within the alliance grew, they might argue that NATO’s objectives should extend to the reunification of their nation.18

Of particular concern to those eager to incorporate German soldiers into the defenses of Western Europe was the attitude of those officers and men who had fought in the Wehrmacht during World War II. In many cases the initial response had been described as ohne mich (without me). However, encouraged by former leaders such as Hasso E. F. von Manteuffel, Franz Halder, and Hans Speidel, this reluctance began to change. One by one, various veterans’ organizations began to express their grudging support for German participation in Western

defense. Although many still expressed fears that they might, at some point, be abandoned by their erstwhile allies, those concerns were overridden by a desire not to be left out of the planning process altogether.  

On 27 May 1952, after more than a year of negotiations and under strong encouragement from the United States, representatives from France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed the European Defense Community Pact, which began the process of integrating the military and economic resources of Western Europe. The resulting structure, the European Defense Community, would strengthen NATO and support the sort of internationally integrated military force that would ease Germany’s transition into the alliance. Under the terms of the agreement the Germans could organize up to twelve divisions each with a wartime strength of twelve thousand to fifteen thousand men. These units would combine with similar-size elements from other EDC members to form integrated corps. With the signing of the pact, the nations entered a two-year period of planning for military and economic integration. This allowed time for the various national parliaments to debate and then to ratify the treaty.  

The delegations that drew up the treaty formed an ad hoc body, the European Defense Community Interim Committee, which continued to meet to study and resolve any problems that might arise during the ratification period. The group contained four subcommittees: military, economic, political, and legal. Each would develop basic plans in its area of responsibility for use in the event that all nations ratified the agreement. In order to maintain liaison between his headquarters and the interim commission, the U.S. EUCOM commander, General Ridgway, created a small staff known as Detachment A, which would later form the nucleus of a Military Assistance Advisory Group to Germany. For the most part, the group’s contribution was limited to providing information on U.S. military organization and procedures to German members of the commission. Because of French reluctance to establish closer contact with the Germans, however, each potential subject for discussion had to be cleared by the entire commission before it could be discussed with the Germans.  

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For the United States, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, had responsibility for administering the Mutual Security Program in Europe and for preliminary plans regarding military assistance to West Germany. He delegated the task of providing facilities required by initial German training cadres to his component commanders, the commanders in chief of the USAREUR, USAFE, and USNAVFORGER.\(^{22}\)

The supreme allied commander delegated to the commander, Central Army Group, responsibility for coordinating stationing plans for German contingents in the U.S. and French zones based on Allied Land Forces, Central Europe’s designs for deploying those units. To that end, on 17 March 1953, Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, in his role as commander in chief, Central Army Group, hosted a conference in Heidelberg to begin developing those plans. He directed separate working groups from the U.S. Army, Europe, and the French Forces in Germany to study the availability of installations, facilities, and training areas for use by German contingents. The Central Army Group (CENTAG) headquarters would monitor their work and keep Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, and the European Defense Community Interim Committee informed of their progress.\(^{23}\)

At this initial meeting, representatives for both sides considered how to reconcile the needs of the future German forces for barracks and training space with the requirements of the American troops already present. Guidance from the Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (ALFCE), emphasized that the positioning of the combat elements of the proposed German forces had to conform with already approved deployment plans, while service elements might be stationed elsewhere. The proposed German force was represented by officials from the Dienststelle Blank, an office named for its chief, Theodor Blank, who the chancellor had designated to deal with questions related to military forces in Germany. The chief German delegate, Col. Bogislaw Von Bonin, described a two-phased approach to the activation of German contingents. Cadre units would form first. Once fully trained, they would become the nucleus for full divisions with supporting troops. The USAREUR representative, Lt. Col. Jack A. Requarth, cautioned that American requirements for troop housing and training areas had themselves yet to be fully met. While he acknowledged the

\(^{22}\) Memo, Maj Gen Claude B. Ferenbaugh, Ch of Staff, for USAREUR Staff, 28 Oct 1953, sub: Policy on Requests or Queries Concerning the German Contingent of the European Defense Forces, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 1953–30 Jun 1954, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 359–60, Historians files, CMH.

\(^{23}\) Memos, Ferenbaugh for USAREUR Staff, 28 Oct 1953, sub: Policy on Requests or Queries Concerning the German Contingent of the European Defense Forces; and Col Lynwood D. Lott, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 27 Mar 1953, sub: Minutes of the Central Army Group Conference Conducted at Heidelberg on 17 Mar 1953 Relative to Initiation of Studies on the Stationing of EDC (German) Land Forces in the United States and French Zones of Germany, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP.
German force’s needs in principle, he argued that barracks and training areas might not be available in all the locations the Germans wanted.  

That warning notwithstanding, the United States tried to make the program work. During 13–18 April, a team of personnel from USAREUR and the Dienststelle Blank conducted a detailed survey of installations and training areas throughout the U.S. Zone that USAREUR had designated for possible use by the Germans. It found a new camp at the U.S. training area at Grafenwöhr that could accommodate up to five thousand troops and be available by October 1953. Another site at Hohenfels could accommodate around twenty-five hundred men. The team also investigated a number of smaller billet areas, most of them former Wehrmacht kasernes occupied by American units or German civilians. The Americans agreed to study the requests and to decide which of the facilities could be turned over to the Germans. The two sides continued to meet on a monthly basis for the next year, identifying potential sites to be transferred to the German armed forces and trying to anticipate and resolve problems that would arise with the implementation of the European Defense Community.

In June 1954, the Germans unveiled a plan that would accommodate all of their forces. It depended on several factors: the number of facilities relinquished by the U.S. and French forces, the acquisition of necessary land from the Federal Republic, and the availability of construction funds. Initially, the new units would occupy rebuilt Wehrmacht kasernes as well as some tent camps so that troops could be near training sites. The construction of additional maneuver areas in Germany would be contingent on EDC approval as well as the availability of necessary funds. Until the Germans could construct their own training areas, they expressed the hope that USAREUR could fill in the gap. As the summer drew to a close, the two sides moved closer and closer to an agreement that would facilitate the activation and stationing of the new German Army.

By the summer of 1954, only the French had failed to ratify the European Defense Community agreement. Opposition in that country had intensified throughout 1953, so much so that none of the successive French governments that held office during that time dared to submit the treaty to the National Assembly. Influential in their opposition were General Charles de Gaulle, who had left office but nonetheless wielded considerable personal influence, and

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Marshal Alphonse P. Juin, the commander in chief of NATO’s central region. Although the French insisted that Germany’s armed forces be under European control, many in France were unwilling to submit their own military to the same requirements. Meanwhile, French Communists exploited fears of German and American intentions and portrayed Soviet intentions as peaceful. Premier Pierre Mendes-France finally put the treaty before the National Assembly on 28 August 1954. It was voted down two days later by a margin of 319–264. The European Defense Community was dead.27

USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance

In the wake of the French rejection, officials in the U.S. Department of Defense decided to accelerate the process of creating a new German armed force with or without French cooperation. The Americans assumed that, although the French had rejected the European Defense Community plan, they would not actively oppose a joint Anglo-American effort. As the predominant U.S. military headquarters in Germany, it would fall to USAREUR, in coordination with a nascent German defense establishment, to prepare the detailed plans that would begin the process of creating a new German Army.

On 2 September 1954, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare recommendations for U.S. military assistance to West Germany. The Department’s guidance to the Joint Chiefs included assumptions that force totals for the new German military would closely resemble the goals originally proposed in the European Defense Community treaty. As such, Germany’s armed forces would be limited to an overall strength of 12 divisions, 1,326 aircraft, and 300 naval vessels. United States military assistance to the Germans would include preparation and training that began at the cadre stage and extended to the attainment of combat ready units.28

Since the German armed forces would join the defense scheme of the West through NATO rather than the European Defense Community, the United


States, as the leading NATO power, assumed the primary role in their formation and training. The United States was also the only NATO member in a position to provide the massive amounts of arms and equipment needed to get the new German formations off the ground. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Department of the Army assign overall responsibility for training the German armed forces to the commander of U.S. European Command, who would delegate specific responsibilities to his component commanders.²⁹

With a German contribution to Western defense moving toward realization, NATO military leaders discussed with members of the Dienststelle Blank the composition of the new German Army. Original German planning called for twelve tank divisions, organized into six corps, with the potential to expand to eighteen divisions. Officers from SHAPE headquarters argued for a more balanced force. For the six divisions earmarked for the Center Army Group, General McAuliffe preferred an organization composed of four infantry divisions and two armored divisions. The Northern Army Group commander, British General Sir Richard N. Gale, agreed with McAuliffe’s proposal, but preferred smaller division organizations than those envisioned by the Germans and the Americans. Both officers requested additional information on German tactical and operational concepts before commenting further on the potential organization of forces.³⁰

The Germans did indeed have some thoughts about NATO’s strategic and operational concepts. In a 1948 paper summarizing the West’s need for German participation, former Wehrmacht general Hans Speidel had said that allied weaknesses made a defense along the Rhine, let alone the Elbe, questionable. German divisions would offset this weakness, but only with a change in strategy. In another memo drafted by Speidel and another former Wehrmacht general, Adolph Heusinger, the Germans rejected the concept of a defense along the Rhine because it would mean the abandonment of Western Germany, Austria, and Switzerland to the Soviets. The paper, later endorsed by Adenauer, made clear that the change in strategy would be the cost of German participation in Western European defense.³¹

In November 1954, the Germans presented a new plan for their eventual contribution to the NATO defense system. It was based on an army consisting of six infantry and six armored divisions, as well as three armored, two mountain,
and two airborne brigades. Under this proposal, the training period for the new German Army would expand from twenty-four to thirty-six months. Over the first eight months, USAREUR instructors would focus primarily on training German officers and noncommissioned officers. After that, various units would become partially manned by the phasing in of volunteers and, somewhat later, draftees. By the end of the process, the field army would reach its full strength of 375,000 men. With this in mind, in December 1954, General Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, in his role as the commander of the U.S. European Command, assigned to USAREUR the responsibility for training and assistance to the entire German Army.  

The USAREUR staff was already planning for that mission. Its assistant chief of staff for operations had assumed overall supervision of the project, which the Plans Section of the Center Army Group had transferred to the USAREUR Operations Staff’s Advance Planning and Training Section. Meanwhile, USAREUR’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj. Gen. Robert G. Gard, had directed all of the command’s staff divisions to begin developing plans based on their areas of responsibility. With this initial work in place, USAREUR was prepared to move forward with the task almost as soon as it received the assignment.

After several exchanges of draft proposals, on 1 December 1954, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, issued a letter of instruction defining USAREUR’s role in the program. For the most part, this was to consist of providing training for German cadres and specialists, furnishing logistical support, and administering the project’s budget. To facilitate German planning, USAREUR was to supply information and technical advice in accordance with current security regulations and U.S. EUCOM directives. German instructor cadres were to be trained by U.S. personnel from the Department of the Army and USAREUR. The U.S. Army, Europe, was also to allocate spaces for German students in its branch and technical schools. Until such time as the German Army’s logistical organization was capable of assuming responsibility, USAREUR was also to provide assistance in the reception, storage, maintenance, and distribution of vehicles, weapons, and equipment that arrived as part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Although USAREUR took the position that it could not assume any tasks that would affect its combat efficiency, U.S. EUCOM responded that it had no authority

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32 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 325–26, Historians files, CMH; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 13–14; Reed, Germany and NATO, pp. 69–70.

33 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 13–14; Reed, Germany and NATO, pp. 69–70; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 323–24; Memo, Maj Gen Robert G. Gard, Dep Ch of Staff for Ops, for Asst Chs of Staff, 2 Sep 1954, sub: Planning in USAREUR for Assistance in the Formation of the German Army, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
to rescind or mitigate any of the taskings but would forward to the Department of the Army requests for additional funding, personnel, or resources.34

Final Plans for Training the New German Army

By the end of 1954, the U.S. Army in Europe had made substantial progress in preparing to help train and develop the new German Army. Assuming that mission, however, required the USAREUR headquarters to establish the staff and infrastructure that could coordinate the plans and turn them into a functioning program. Once in place, those organizations cooperated with their German counterparts to work out the remaining details and to develop a final plan for training.

U.S. EUCOM had originally directed USAREUR to submit a final draft plan for training assistance by 1 February 1955. To coordinate preparation of the program, USAREUR established an advanced planning and training section within the training branch of the assistant chief of staff for operations. The Department of the Army assigned Col. John A. Heintges to head the organization. Toward the end of December, staff sections responsible for portions of the USAREUR document realized that they needed clarification of corresponding German plans before they could complete their work. German plans, for example, called for complete battalions of infantry, armor, and field artillery to demonstrate American tactics and doctrine. Heintges realized that such a requirement could never be supported. To resolve such differences, in January 1955, USAREUR asked for and received an extension for the submission of the final draft plan.35

Titled the USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, the final draft was complete by 17 March, with concurrence by contributing general, technical, and administrative divisions. It opened by restating the mission as USAREUR understood it. In addition to providing training assistance during the first formal year of the program, the command would use Mutual Defense Assistance Program funds to render all required logistical support. It expected to continue


the effort until the Germans were capable of training their own units, with the objective of phasing out U.S. involvement by 1 April 1957.\footnote{HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 29 Mar 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549, NACP.}

In order to oversee the implementation of the plan and to coordinate training, USAREUR established the Control Office, German Training Assistance Group (GTAG). This group—consisting of twelve officers, three enlisted men, and three Department of the Army civilians—was actually a redesignation of the advanced planning and training section that had operated under Colonel Heintges and had developed the support plan. The office would also serve as the single point of contact between the USAREUR commander and the MAAG, Germany, on all matters pertaining to the provision of assistance for the German Army.\footnote{Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 24–25; HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 29 Mar 1955.}

The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Germany, came into existence in December 1955 after the German government ratified a formal military assistance agreement with the United States. Headquartered in Bonn, the group initially consisted of members of the old Advance Planning Group that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established under the U.S. European Command to coordinate military assistance planning with the Germans after the collapse of the European Defense Community. Once formalized as a MAAG, the organization added U.S. Air Force and Navy components in a fashion similar to other European assistance groups. In addition to providing a direct link between senior U.S. military headquarters and the Dienststelle Blank, the office responsible for planning the new German armed forces, MAAG, Germany’s mission was to assist the German government in preparing requests for aid under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Under its first commander, U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Germany, reported to the U.S. ambassador on matters related to the overall mutual security program and its coordination with American foreign policy. The group reported to the U.S. European Command on the strictly military aspects of the program.\footnote{Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix, pp. 315–16.}

Once training began, twenty-two training and maintenance teams would operate under the supervision of the Control Office, German Training Assistance Group. Fifteen would provide training directly to German personnel. These included armor, armored reconnaissance, armored infantry, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, infantry, antitank, engineer, aviation, military police, ordnance, quartermaster, medical, transportation, and signal teams. Their primary mission would be instruction on U.S. weapons and equipment. In addition, teams would offer advice and guidance on U.S. organization and tactics, training, staff procedures, and field communications. Each team would include individuals with the sort of military specialty skills and experience
necessary to handle instruction on the great variety of U.S. weapons and equipment the German Army would receive. Separate engineer maintenance, ordnance maintenance, and signal maintenance teams would help to repair and keep in running order vehicles and equipment used by the Germans and the trainers. As a secondary responsibility, when requested, they would also provide guidance to the Germans on maintenance problems. Two teams, the Materiel Reception Groups North and South, helped organize storage depots receiving Mutual Defense Assistance Program items while supplying on-the-job training for German depot personnel. They also provided advice on U.S. maintenance and logistics practices. A driver instruction team trained tracked-vehicle drivers and a military academy team conducted training on U.S. weapons, equipment, and tactics for both the German Instructor Course and the German Military Academy.  

Personnel to man the training groups would come from several sources. The U.S. Army, Europe, would provide 76 officers, 365 enlisted men, and 1 civilian, most of whom would come from the Seventh Army. An additional 94 officers, 49 enlisted men, and 2 civilians would be from the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Germany. The remaining U.S. personnel, 54 officers and 213 enlisted men, would arrive on temporary duty from the United States. One hundred interpreters recruited from the German population would also assist the Control Office and teams.  

In addition to the teams, the plan also provided for on-the-job training with U.S. units and for Germans to attend USAREUR schools. It also described a series of demonstrations by American units, including presentations on most of the vehicles and weapons used by the U.S. Army. The command designed the demonstrations with a view toward the rank of the invited observers. Generals and senior commanders witnessed operations suitable to their levels of authority. Junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and other enlisted personnel attended programs more suitable to their needs.  

As USAREUR prepared to begin training, it became apparent that problems still remained. The command had made no provisions in the original plan for German language courses for American personnel because it had assumed that civilian interpreters would participate. As preparations continued, however, officers in the Control Office recognized that even if interpreters were present, ignorance of the German language on the part of the trainers would seriously diminish the effectiveness of the entire program. As a result, USAREUR proposed to the Department of the Army that more than one hundred trainers, especially MAAG personnel, should receive a sixteen-week course in German at the Army language school in Monterey, California. A lack of funds, however,
and the inability of the school to admit such a large body of students on short notice precluded this. Instead, USAREUR proposed to send the group to its Intelligence School in Oberammergau, Germany, for a twelve-week course. The Department of the Army approved this approach, and all of the students were able to complete the course before beginning their training assignments. The U.S. Army also went ahead with its plan to hire civilian interpreters and added them through its regular personnel channels.42

Another challenge arose in December 1955 when the Department of the Army informed USAREUR that, except for the complement from the Military Assistance Advisory Group, all personnel requirements would have to come from the command’s own resources. On the basis of this decision, USAREUR revised the personnel section of the plan and informed the Seventh Army, the Communications Zone, and the technical service commands of the new requirements. At the same time, the commands received more specific guidance on selection criteria. Candidates for both officer and enlisted slots had to demonstrate high moral character and leadership traits, professional competence in their assigned military specialties, and outstanding ability as military instructors. Although proficiency in the German language was desirable, it was not a prerequisite. To ensure that all of these requirements were met, the USAREUR commander directed that a general from each command interview each enlisted man selected from his command before placing him on a team.43

Another problem facing the U.S. planners was an inability to release classified information to the Germans. This occurred because security clearance procedures were based on NATO standards, with the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, retaining final authority over who could have access to classified information. By December 1954, only 43 of the 800 employees of the Dienststelle Blank had been cleared for even the lowest categories of classification. Complicating matters even further, Department of the Army security regulations required that no classified information be released to the Germans. Since, by agreement with German authorities, the plan the Germans had prepared for reactivating their armed forces was classified top secret, this had the absurd effect of barring U.S. personnel from discussing the draft with its authors. In the spring of 1955, after a series of conferences among representatives of U.S. EUCOM, HICOG, and USAREUR, the Department of the Army established a new policy for delegating disclosure authority. This allowed USAREUR planners to share operational and logistical planning of direct concern to the Federal Republic. In particular, it included permission

42 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 12–15, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives. Msgs, Advanced Planning Group (APG), from Bonn, to CINCEUR, 28 Jul 1955, Ref# APG–336; and DA, from G–1, to CINCEUR, 18 Aug 1955, Ref# DA–986979. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

43 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 3–4.
to share information regarding military organization, maintenance of U.S. equipment, and basic tactical doctrine required to begin training. Later that same year, the Germans and Americans agreed to downgrade the overall classification of the plan from secret to confidential, making it available to a wide group of planners on both sides.44

Building a New German Army

With plans in place, both USAREUR and West German military representatives were ready to take the next step. As they began implementing the German training plan, both sides identified significant issues still to be resolved. With start-up dates for actual training drawing near, the two groups continued negotiations to work out differences that remained.

Since early in 1952, when a German contribution to Western defense had first come under consideration, USAREUR had studied the problem of making major training areas available to allied contingents. Throughout the period when the European Defense Community Treaty was under consideration, negotiations between USAREUR and representatives of the Dienststelle Blank on the release of barracks areas to the Germans had gone smoothly.45 All sides believed that they could share local areas and firing ranges equitably. The U.S. Army, Europe, insisted, however, that German troops stationed in the U.S. Zone could only use the major training areas at Grafenwöhr, Wildflecken, Baumholder, and Hohenfels on a “space available” basis. Any other policy, the command felt, would detract seriously from its own combat readiness. To the north, the imminent withdrawal of contingents of the British Army of the Rhine made the sharing of training facilities less of a challenge. Nonetheless, competition for training time at the Belsen-Hohne Tank Training Area, the only full-scale tank range in Germany, remained intense. Based on earlier agreements, the British represented U.S. interests in negotiations with the Germans over training sites in their area. In the end, despite extensive negotiations, the Federal Republic refused to release enough land to create new division-size training areas for the German Army. Faced with the reality that the West’s overall combat


45 HQ, USAREUR, Summary of the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the USAREUR Working Committee-Deployment of EDC (German) Land Forces in the US Zone of Germany, 15 Jul 1953; HQ, USAREUR, Report of the Seventh Meeting of USAREUR Working Committee on EDC (German) Deployment, 10 Sep 1953. Both in Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
effectiveness would be greatly enhanced by the addition of trained German divisions, USAREUR had little choice but to agree to share its facilities.\textsuperscript{46}

In its letter of instructions, U.S. EUCOM had assigned two major logistical responsibilities to USAREUR: to provide administrative and logistical support to the U.S. training teams and to assist the German Army in the reception, storage, distribution, and maintenance of weapons, vehicles, and equipment obtained through the military assistance program. The second of these two requirements posed a problem for the command. General Hoge, USAREUR Commander, argued that storage facilities west of the Rhine were already filled with USAREUR’s own equipment and supplies, and those east of the river were too vulnerable to a potential Communist attack. General Heintges later recalled that the Army staff in Washington got a little ahead of itself in shipping vehicles and equipment to Germany. Before the Germans had any place to store them, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces were stacked up all over Bremerhaven. As a partial solution, U.S. EUCOM suggested finding German civilian contractors who could provide temporary storage space for the incoming goods. Accepting the proposal, the Department of the Army supplied the necessary funds and USAREUR made the arrangements. The U.S. European Command also coordinated with the Department of the Army to hold some stockpiles of equipment in the United States until USAREUR called for them. This minimized the amount of time USAREUR would have to store supplies and equipment in its depots. Ultimately, most of the equipment bound for German use remained in the United States until the German Army’s own depots at Luebberstedt, near Bremerhaven, and Eberstadt, near Darmstadt, were prepared to receive it.\textsuperscript{47}

As mobilization of the new force got underway, in June 1955, representatives of the Defense Ministry traveled to the United States for a 25-day tour of military installations. After visiting the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York; the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia; the Field Artillery Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, the officials announced that they were greatly impressed with American training

\textsuperscript{46} Msg, CINCUSAREUR to Department of the Army (DEPTAR), for G–3, 20 Apr 1954, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 33–38; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 186–90, Historians files, CMH; Memos, Col Carl N. Smith, Ch, Civil Affairs Div, for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 22 Oct 1955, sub: Briefing of General McAuliffe on Seventh Army Permanent Training Area Problem, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; and Col Edgar H. Snodgrass, Judge Advocate, for USAREUR Asst Ch of Staff, 4 Jun 1953, sub: National Military Areas in Germany After Establishment of Contractual Relationship, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

\textsuperscript{47} Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 325; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance, 1955, pp. 38–42; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 15–19; Interv, Pellicci with Heintges, 1974, p. 478.
methods and equipment. All former *Wehrmacht* officers, they indicated that the new German force would adopt much of what they had observed.48

The revival of the German military now went into high gear. On 12 November 1955, the Bundeswehr swore in its first contingent of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The date was symbolic, for it marked the two hundredth anniversary of the birthday of General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, the great Prussian military reformer of the late-eighteenth to early-nineteenth century. In a sweeping reorganization of the Defense Ministry, the government set up four new departments, one for the armed forces as a whole and one each for the army, navy, and air force. Lt. Gen. Adolf Heusinger, former Chief of Operations for the World War II *Wehrmacht*, became Chairman of a Supreme Military Council, which consisted of the heads of the four departments. Lt. Gen. Hans Speidel, Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in France, took charge of the Armed Forces Department. Both officers had been implicated in

the 1944 plot to assassinate Adolph Hitler and arrested by the Gestapo. Speidel had escaped from his imprisonment and remained in hiding until he could surrender to the French. Heusinger had been injured in the attempt on Hitler’s life and had been released by the Gestapo due to lack of evidence against him. Both appeared sufficiently anti-Nazi to lead the new German armed forces. To celebrate the occasion, the Defense Ministry held a review in its garage, for the Bundeswehr did not yet have a parade ground.49

Even before the Federal Republic had completed legislation that would authorize the formation of its new armed forces in May 1955, German military planners had begun informal discussions with their American counterparts on early activation of a few token companies to serve as cadres for training subsequent organizations. In October, the German defense minister formally requested U.S. training support for seven companies that would form by 31 December. Numbering eight hundred men in all, they included four companies of mixed combat specialties, one military police company, one service company, and one band. The mixed companies would consist of four platoons each, for a total of sixteen: two infantry, two armored infantry, two engineer, two signal, two antiaircraft artillery, two field artillery, one armored reconnaissance, one armored antitank, one armored, and one ordnance.50

The Germans wanted the troops involved to begin reporting on 1 December 1955 to a training facility at Andernach, Germany, twenty-five miles south of Bonn on the Rhine. The units would reach full strength and begin training by 2 January 1956. After two months of basic infantry training, the platoons would break up for three months of special, branch-oriented instruction. The Germans expected that once the units were fully trained, the platoons would separate to form cadres for their own school training battalions. The German Defense Ministry requested three officers and twenty-four enlisted men from USAREUR to conduct the initial training. It also asked for basic weapons to arm the trainees and for a few vehicles to support the effort.51

The U.S. EUCOM and USAREUR approved the plan and began preparations to supply training personnel and equipment. When representatives from


50 Memo, Col Joseph G. Felber, Ch, Training Br, for Oakes, 7 Oct 1955, sub: New German Plans for Early Activation of Seven Companies, 1 January 1956; Msg, HICOG, signed Conant, to CINCEUR, 16 May 1955, Ref 732. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

51 Ibid.; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 19–24; Memo, Capt Leslie N. Shade for Col John T. Corley, 10 Oct 1955, sub: Meeting to Discuss Plans for Activation of the German Army, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
GTAG inspected the Andernach training facility and found it to be adequate, company grade officers and enlisted men received quarters in the camp. On 19 December 1955, USAREUR activated the U.S. training team for Andernach at Patton Barracks in Heidelberg. The group spent three weeks preparing lesson plans, rehearsing instruction, and attending briefings on the details of its mission. On 9 January 1956, it moved to Andernach and went to work.⁵²

Completing the German Army Assistance Program

With West Germany becoming a full-fledged member of the NATO alliance, and with much of the West’s defensive strategy dependent upon the incorporation of German manpower, USAREUR and the Seventh Army continued to move forward with assistance and training support for the new German Army. The daily contact between German students and their American instructors often revealed differences in the military traditions of the two nations. Nonetheless, the process developed a close bond between the two that helped to strengthen the overall alliance.

The Andernach training program, which began on 9 January 1956, served as an excellent rehearsal for the implementation of the overall assistance plan later in the year. Because none of the personnel from the Military Assistance Advisory Group had yet completed language training at Oberammergau, the training team commander recommended that eight to ten interpreters should join the project for its duration. Once U.S. instructors began work, however, they discovered that approximately 80 percent of the students could speak and understand some English. As a result, the expected language problem did not materialize. Arrangements for feeding the Americans, however, proved to be an unforeseen challenge. The standard German diet did not meet U.S. military standards in terms of quantity or caloric content. Yet, for political reasons, the team commander felt it desirable for U.S. personnel to eat with their German colleagues. In the end, although officers ate all three meals with the Germans, enlisted men shared only the noon meal. By the end of the training, none seemed to have suffered for it.⁵³

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⁵² Memos, Oakes for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 14 Nov 1955, sub: Activities of the German Training Assistance Group Week 7 November to 10 November 1955, and 21 Nov 1955, sub: Activities of the German Training Assistance Group Week 14 November to 19 November 1955. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 20–21.

⁵³ Msgs, HICOG, Bonn, to CINCEUR, 16 May 1955; and APG, from Bonn, signed Conant, to CINCEUR, 28 Jul 1955, Ref # APG–336; Memo, Felber, Ch, Training Br, for Maj Gen John C. Oakes, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, USAREUR, 7 Oct 1955, sub: New German Plans for Early Activation of Seven Companies. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP, Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 19–24.
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

The Andernach team began formal instruction on basic infantry weapons on 16 January 1956. Four officers and twelve enlisted men taught morning classes to five German officers and forty noncommissioned officers. The Germans insisted, however, that their own leaders should train their junior enlisted soldiers. Therefore, after receiving instruction in the morning, German personnel would lead the classes in the afternoon, with the Americans standing by to serve as assistant instructors. In the end, this process proved to be too time consuming. The training team members returned as the primary instructors after three weeks.54

The team completed its mission at the end of April 1956. Altogether, it had conducted fifty-five hours of training on basic U.S. weapons and one hundred seventy hours on more specialized arms and equipment peculiar to the various branches of the service. More important, the effort seemed to have developed an attitude of mutual respect and friendship between the instructors and the students. General Heintges told a story about a group of U.S. trainers who had gone out to a restaurant with some of the German noncommissioned officers. There, a table of teenage boys began to make fun of the new German soldiers and the uniforms that they wore. While the Germans were far too disciplined to

54 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 19–24.
respond, the Americans went over and “cleaned up on the youngsters.” When Heintges told the German general in charge of personnel that he planned to discipline the soldiers, the German begged him not to. “Don’t punish them,” he said, “They fought for us and I am going to give them a medal.” In that light, planners hoped that the initial effort had set the stage for success in the larger program.

In March 1956, USAREUR activated the first of its planned branch-oriented training teams. On 15 March, the armored reconnaissance training group assembled and began preparations at Mangin Kasern in Mainz. It was organized into four parts: a weapons section to teach the use of small-arms and crew-served weapons, an automotive section to provide instruction on the M41 tank and the M47 recovery vehicle, a communications section, and a tank gunnery section. During rehearsals, the instructors discovered that the use of interpreters extended class times up to twice as long as indicated on lesson plans. Classroom leaders had to take this into account when they organized their schedules.56

55 Ibid., p. 23. Quotes from Interv, Pellicci with Heintges, 1974, p. 482.
56 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 25–26; HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Upon completing its preparations and rehearsals, the team moved to Grohn Kasern, a German Army installation near Bremen, on 25 and 26 April. There it began working directly with a German training battalion. On 18 June, it began a new course of instruction for German officers and noncommissioned officers who would serve as faculty for the Bundeswehr reconnaissance school. The first classes for students at the school began on 3 July. The team divided its time between working directly with school cadre and assisting them with students.57

German Army doctrine gave company commanders considerable leeway in training matters, particularly regarding subjects and the amount of time to devote to each. As a result, the quantity of instruction delivered by the Americans fluctuated considerably. One company, for example, might request and receive twenty-two hours of U.S. training, while another received none, preferring to be taught by German cadre who had received earlier instruction. In other cases, the Germans requested classes in the operation but not the maintenance of U.S. communications equipment. Although the U.S. team pointed out the need for teaching soldiers how to install, tune, and take care of the equipment, German company commanders considered the training unnecessary. Later, the same officers complained that their radio systems lacked the sending and receiving range that the Americans had promised. When U.S. operators demonstrated how to maintain and adjust them, however, they functioned according to their specified distances.58

By the end of 1956, the armored reconnaissance team had provided a total of 1,096 hours of formal instruction on maintenance, communications, tactics, and tank and mortar gunnery, and had spent another 500 hours advising on the firing range. It had presented instruction equivalent to that received by U.S. basic trainees to the entire cadre of the German armored reconnaissance school as well as to elements of three line battalions. The team also assisted with the training of three complete cycles of students at the reconnaissance school. The only real drawback it encountered was an inability to teach a cadre of German instructors how to perform advanced training on U.S. equipment. Initial organizational problems as well as shortages of personnel and equipment prevented German units from releasing their own personnel long enough for the intensive training required to produce qualified instructors.59

The activation and operation of the other six combat branch training teams followed the same pattern. During March 1956 the armored infantry team began instruction at the German school at Munsterlager, about thirty miles south of Hamburg. The armor team also began training at Munsterlager; the infantry team at the German infantry school at Hammelburg; the antitank team at Bremen; the antiaircraft team at Rendsburg, fifteen miles west of Kiel; and the field artillery team at Idar-Oberstein, fifty miles southwest of Frankfurt. At each location, the U.S. training team would first provide instruction for the

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
school battalion, composed of officers and enlisted men who would provide staff and faculty for the branch school. Once those men had been trained, the team would assist the school cadre in the classes it sought to provide on equipment, organization, and tactics. The level of American involvement varied with the degree of expertise the German instructors had developed. In most cases the Americans also ran firing ranges and taught weapons courses at those sites. Most teams also provided mobile training elements that worked with German line battalions as they organized.60

American instructors at the various locations reported many similar observations. They perceived, for example, that experienced *Wehrmacht* veterans, particularly the tankers, had little difficulty mastering weapons and gunnery skills. Younger students often focused intently on theoretical aspects of the training rather than practical applications and were slower to master techniques. Most teams also reported reluctance on the part of the Germans to embrace any instruction related to maintenance of the equipment. It seemed as if the Teutonic culture that revered the warrior did not feel the same enthusiasm for the mechanic or the technician. American advisers attempted to introduce the U.S. Army concept that the unit commander was directly responsible for the maintenance of his unit’s equipment. Nonetheless, the issue of organizational maintenance, typically done in American units at the company and battalion level, emerged as a recurring problem with German veterans who had no such tradition.61

A larger problem for the Americans was the need to create a logistical system for the German Army from the ground up. With the exception of a few civilians and Labor Service personnel employed by the U.S. Army, Germany had no personnel experienced in maintaining U.S. equipment. The Adenauer government’s decision to create tactical units as quickly as possible aggravated the situation by limiting the amount of time personnel could spend in orientation and training. Germany also lacked the technicians, depots, repair shops, and doctrine required to establish a logistics system. It was difficult for the U.S. training team, for example, to conduct logistics classes before the German quartermaster department had established its basic service regulations. In other cases, a lack of available spare parts for the U.S.-supplied equipment compounded the problem. It would require time and training before a German requisition system could develop to generate the steady stream of equipment and spare parts necessary to maintain the new force.62
U.S. training teams for other technical specialties experienced similar problems as they began operations in March 1956 (Map 8). The signal team began working with the German signal school battalion at Sonthofen, seventy miles southwest of Munich near the Austrian border. The engineer team moved to Munich, the home of the German engineer school battalion. Because of the highly technical nature of the subject, USAREUR specialists gave specific instruction to the interpreters assigned to the teams and helped to translate equipment nomenclature. Signal classes, in particular, were hampered by a lack of instructional equipment and training aids.63

In order to service communications and engineer equipment at the German schools until school personnel could perform their own maintenance; USAREUR activated two signal teams and one engineer maintenance team. One of the signal teams moved to Munsterlager to provide maintenance support to the armored and armored-infantry schools there and to the antiaircraft school at Rendsburg. The second team set up shop in Sonthofen, where it assisted the U.S. signal training team and the German school. Repairmen from this group also worked with a U.S. detachment at Grafenwöhr, checking and repairing equipment for the German units assembling there. The technicians quickly found that when they exhausted the spare parts that came with the initial issues of equipment, inefficiencies in the German logistical system caused delays of several months before replacement components arrived. The engineer maintenance team, operating out of the Rhine Engineer Depot at Kaiserslautern, experienced similar difficulties. The team leader reported in his year-end report that the German engineers he accompanied did not seem to understand the importance of a reliable spare-parts system.64

Additional training teams became operational as German school battalions mobilized and training facilities began to receive students. Originally planned as two separate elements, the quartermaster and transportation teams combined in January 1956 because the German Army would soon consolidate those two service branches. Instruction began at the training site at Andernach in July. At that time, transportation instructors found that a shortage of space limited their ability to conduct training in vehicle maintenance, driver testing, and convoy operations. Although quartermaster instructors were able to demonstrate U.S. field kitchens and laundry and shower units, the lack of established logistical


64 HQ, USAREUR, Standing Operating Procedures for the Operation of GTAG Signal Maintenance and Training Teams, 1 Feb 1957; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 42–45.
doctrine within the German Quartermaster Corps limited their ability to conduct detailed training on those subjects.65

Other training teams became active later in 1956: the medical troop training unit at Degerndorff, about fifteen miles south of Munich; the ordnance troop training team at Sonthofen; the military police team, also at Sonthofen; and the aviation training team at Memmingen Airfield, fifty miles west of Munich. Each team experienced challenges similar to those faced by earlier groups, but new issues unique to their own situation also often arose. In particular, since the concept of a military police corps was new to the German Army, the mission of the training team for that subject had to be expanded to include basic organization and functions. The team discovered that German law did not grant jurisdiction to its military police in matters pertaining to criminal investigation or the operation of military prisons. Instead, the German Defense Ministry asked the team to focus on traffic control and patrol operations. The military police school also suffered initially from a lack of doctrinal manuals and service regulations.66

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65 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 42–45.
The U.S. command activated a team to assist the German military academy at Hannover in May 1956. This unit experienced more strenuous preparation than most and held its personnel to higher standards of conduct and appearance. Any suspicion of alcohol problems, financial or family issues, a poor attitude, or anything less than the highest ability to train soldiers was cause for removal. Only the highest U.S. Army standards were acceptable at a school for future German officers. Despite the language barrier, the Americans found the German staff so competent that it required only a minimum of professional assistance. As a result, after less than five months, the entire team, less one liaison officer, moved to a second German academy at Husum on the North Sea coast, where it began an assistance program similar to the one it had just completed.  

Aside from its training responsibilities, USAREUR had a second mission included in the German Assistance Program: to assist in the reception, storage, and issue of weapons, vehicles, and equipment for German Army units as the materiel arrived in theater. Although USAREUR had originally planned to provide two materiel receiving groups, efficiencies in the German buildup plan reduced the requirement to one. A team of nineteen officers and twenty-three enlisted men reported to the German Army depot at Hesedorf, fifteen miles

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southwest of Hamburg, in May 1956. As had been the case for most of the German logistical system, organization and doctrine for the groups were still evolving. For that reason, the team could not use much of the classroom and field training it had prepared prior to deployment. Instead, it conducted a series of on-the-job training events designed to demonstrate and explain the American system of depot storage. The team helped the Germans to establish stock control and accounting systems and provided instruction on the basic weapons and ordnance material stored in the depots. When requested by the Germans, it also sent detachments to other installations and field sites to assist with maintenance and supply training and to provide guidance on the storage and handling of ammunition.\(^{68}\)

Although they represented a significant commitment on the part of USAREUR, the training teams were, by no means, the command’s only contribution to the mobilization and training of the West German Army. Even before the ratification of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact, members of the Bundeswehr planning staff were attending U.S. Army exercises and demonstrations. The USAREUR plan for German Army assistance included a detailed schedule of demonstrations. These involved static displays of weapons, vehicles, and equipment; demonstrations of their employment; and platoon, company, and battalion exercises that illustrated American tactics and doctrine. The command also invited senior German officers to attend major U.S. and NATO exercises to observe higher-level operations and staff functions. Lower-ranking personnel attended Seventh Army training sites, both in garrison and in the field.\(^{69}\)

In line with U.S. European Command’s guidance, USAREUR also opened up its school system to attendance by West German military personnel. During the first year of the program, it allocated 530 spaces for German students in its technical service schools. Meanwhile, the Seventh Army also allotted 200 spaces for German students at its Tank Training Center in Vilseck. In addition, the command allowed other German personnel to observe training in its schools and depots without actually admitting them as students. Technicians, for example, visited American ordnance facilities in order to try and close the gap.

\(^{68}\) HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR German Army Assistance Plan, 1 Apr 1955; Joseph W. Grigg, “U.S. Arms Spark Bonn Forces Buildup,” *Stars and Stripes*, European Edition, 14 Sep 1956; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 57–58.

in maintenance and engineering expertise that had developed over ten years of military inactivity.\textsuperscript{70}

In October 1956, German authorities submitted their requirements for training assistance for the following year. Their requests shifted the emphasis of the training program from assistance to schools to direct aid to major tactical units. Representatives from USAREUR and the Military Assistance Advisory Group met later that year to coordinate a revised letter of instructions that the U.S. European Command then published. The MAAG would assume operational control of the entire training assistance program on 1 July 1957. In the meantime, USAREUR would not only continue to provide the school training teams, but would also activate additional field teams to furnish advice to German tactical units. The USAREUR commander, General Hodes, wrote to the new MAAG commander, Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, that he had no objection to providing the additional support as long as sufficient funds were available and the requirements did not detract from his primary mission of readiness for combat.\textsuperscript{71}

In order to support the new emphasis on training German units, USAREUR activated eleven additional training teams and heavily reinforced the maintenance teams. It redesignated the existing teams as school teams. Although they had largely completed their work with the school battalions by the end of 1956, the school teams remained in place to provide advice and assistance to German instructors and cadre. Meanwhile, signal and ordnance maintenance teams separated into regional detachments to better support widely dispersed German elements. They continued to provide field maintenance, on-the-job training, and professional advice concerning U.S. equipment used by the Germans. The new U.S. training teams also spread themselves across the country to lend training support to their German counterparts (Map 9).\textsuperscript{72}

The transfer of control of the training program from the USAREUR German Training Assistance Group to the Military Assistance Advisory Group began in September 1956 when operational control of the Material Receiving Group and Ordnance Maintenance Team Number 3 passed to the Army section of the Military Assistance Advisory Group. After the transfer of control, the two were


\textsuperscript{71}Ltr, Gen Henry I. Hodes, USAREUR Cdr, to Maj Gen Clark L. Ruffner, Ch, Military Assistance Advisory Gp, 28 Aug 1956, Entry 2169, USAREUR Civil Affairs General Correspondence, 1952–1956, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, GTAG Memo 25, 6 Dec 1956, Entry 2035, USAREUR Admin Memos, 1956–1957, RG 549, NACP; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 62–66.

\textsuperscript{72}Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 197–98; HQ, USAREUR, GTAG Memo 25, 6 Dec 1956; Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, p. 65.
consolidated and redesignated as the U.S. Advisory/Liaison Team (Logistics). U.S. Army, Europe, agreed to augment the organization with temporary duty personnel and to continue to provide administrative and logistical support.73

Because the increased number of teams had begun to strain the German Training Assistance Group’s ability to maintain administrative control, the Military Assistance Advisory Group agreed to assume operational control of the service school units. Following approval from the U.S. European Command, fifteen teams, totaling forty officers and eighty-four enlisted men, shifted to Military Assistance Advisory Group control on 15 February 1957. Once the transfer was complete, the German Training Assistance Group remained responsible for thirteen teams: two signal maintenance and training teams, two ordnance company teams, the military academy team at Husum, the antiaircraft school team, and seven field training teams.74

On 26 June 1957, U.S. EUCOM approved a Military Assistance Advisory Group plan to assume control of the remaining teams. Although USAREUR turned over the responsibility for training assistance to the MAAG on 1 July 1957, it continued to provide administrative and logistical support. Its units also provided temporary duty personnel, on a diminishing basis, until the German Army was prepared to meet all of its own training requirements. The command’s maintenance responsibilities were also substantially reduced, but its schools continued to accept German students on a space-available basis. In the end, with its responsibilities complete and its functions in the hands of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, USAREUR closed the German Training Assistance Branch of its operations division.75

Of all the contributions of the U.S. Army in Europe during the Cold War period, its role in the reconstitution and training of the new German Army is perhaps the most significant. Within the span of ten years the U.S. view of Germany had evolved from despised enemy to valued ally. Throughout this period of transition, it was the officers and men of USAREUR who served as the primary point of contact between the two nations. It would not take long before the Germans were fielding their own vehicles, weapons, and equipment, and developing procedures and doctrine more suited to their own experiences and military traditions. Nonetheless, as U.S. soldiers helped to prepare the nascent German forces for their role as bulwark of the NATO alliance, they also generated a sense of cooperation and mutual respect between the two armies that contributed to the growing bond between the two nations.

73 Historical Division, USAREUR, USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army, 1958, pp. 66–68.
By 1955, ten years had passed since the end of World War II. At first glance, little had changed. Two great military powers still faced one another along what had come to be called the Iron Curtain. Even so, the West felt a renewed sense of hope. The American military commitment to Europe as part of the NATO alliance had alleviated fears of impending Communist advances. For a time calm settled over the East-West confrontation. In June, the foreign ministers of the four occupying powers announced the completion of arrangements for a summit meeting beginning on 18 July in Geneva, Switzerland. Although attendees resolved little of any substance, both sides seemed to draw optimism from the ensuing “Spirit of Geneva.”\(^1\)

Although the calm proved to be short-lived, the sense of transition in the relationship between East and West would not. Until 1955, most American activity in Europe had taken place in response to perceived provocations by the Soviet Union. The reactivation and reinforcement of the Seventh Army, the establishment of the logistical support line across France, and the development of a combat doctrine to counter anticipated Communist aggression were, in a sense, all reactions to military and political activity behind the Iron Curtain. In 1955, however, the initiative passed to the West. The restoration of West German sovereignty and the acceptance of that nation into the NATO alliance, the rebirth of West German armed forces as the Bundeswehr, and the evolution of U.S. Army organization and doctrine in response to the strategic policies of President Eisenhower’s “New Look” all created a new set of challenges to which the Soviet Union would have to respond.

The New Look Comes to USAREUR

For the U.S. Army in Europe, change was driven by the strategic policies of the administration in Washington. By 1955, President Eisenhower had begun to implement some of his national security policy, called the New Look. Believing that a sound economy was fundamental to the nation’s security, Eisenhower

directed the services to prepare a military posture that the United States could sustain over an extended period of uneasy peace, for the long haul as he put it, rather than to expand forces at a greater cost each time an international crisis arose. The president believed that the nation should avoid entanglement in small brushfire conflicts and rely on its atomic arsenal to retaliate against any foe that directly threatened national interests. Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, therefore instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a defense budget that would provide reasonable security without causing financial and economic unrest at home, without raising fear abroad that the United States was preparing to unleash global war, and without raising apprehensions among allies that we were reneging on overseas commitments.2

With all four services competing for larger shares within a more constrained defense budget, the American commitment to Western Europe emerged as a point of contention. In a 1954 staff paper describing the basic tenets of the New Look, Admiral Arthur W. Radford and the Joint Chiefs of Staff observed that the United States had deployed a “disproportionately large” portion of its forces to overseas areas. While those dispositions had helped to strengthen the determination of the nation’s allies to resist communism, they had placed excessive demands on its armed forces, which were now overextended. The Joint Chiefs suggested that the deployments to Europe and Korea were not only costly, but precommitted the United States to fighting wars in those regions, whether it wanted to or not. The paper recommended a reduction in the American commitment overseas and a shift of more of the burden to allied forces. The United States’ primary contribution, the Joint Chiefs said, came from its air forces, which were armed with atomic weapons and dwarfed any power ever before created by any nation.3

As a result of these strategic priorities, the defense budget for 1955 established new force objectives that placed greater emphasis on Air Force and Navy airpower. The Army, meanwhile, faced a reduction in the number of its active divisions from twenty to fifteen, and a drop in its personnel ceiling from 1.5 million to 1.1 million, to be achieved by the end of 1956. General Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, bitterly contested the reductions and opposed the increased reliance on atomic weapons inherent in the new strategic policy. His protests received little support from Admiral Radford, Secretary Wilson, or the president. Instead, Ridgway’s stance earned him pariah status both at the White House and within the Department of Defense. Frustrated by his inability

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to influence the discussion, Ridgway retired at the end of his first tour as Army Chief of Staff in June 1955. In his memoirs and in later interviews, the former paratrooper maintained that he had always planned to retire when he completed his tour. Nonetheless, it was fairly clear throughout the administration, the Department of Defense, and even the Army Staff that President Eisenhower would not have retained him.4

The impact on USAREUR of the cuts in personnel that Ridgway had opposed was initially quite small. In February 1955, the Department of the Army imposed a reduction of 2,075 spaces in the command’s personnel ceiling and directed it to submit recommendations for changes to achieve the new manning level. In its response, USAREUR noted that it had already given up 1,248 enlisted spaces as a result of a recent reorganization and consolidation of supply depots in Germany and France. It further proposed to inactivate three armored field artillery battalions, the 70th, 74th, and 517th, assigning the firing batteries to the three armored cavalry regiments. This would achieve a personnel savings of 872 spaces through the elimination of headquarters and service batteries. In anticipation of additional cuts during the coming year, the Seventh Army assistant chief of staff for personnel directed his section chiefs to look for ways to consolidate tasks in order to reduce their own personnel requirements.5

The Seventh Army G–1 was prescient. By the end of 1955, USAREUR had to prepare to make even greater reductions in troop strength. It would have to eliminate personnel spaces, for example, to compensate for new artillery units that would be arriving in Europe later that year. The command proposed to achieve those savings through a reorganization and reduction of the 10th Special Forces Group from almost nine hundred officers and enlisted men to approximately two hundred fifty. The USAREUR assistant chief of staff for operations, Brig. Gen. John C. Oakes, warned, however, that the cuts would have to be carefully considered due to the cellular structure of the Special Forces units and the specialized skills of many detachment members. At the

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end of the year, the proposed reductions in the Special Forces group were still under deliberation.6

While many aspects of the New Look were troubling to the European allies, the specter of U.S. force reductions on the continent was most disturbing, for talk of troop withdrawal from Europe reinforced fears that U.S. interest in the region was transient and that the Americans might at any time return to a more isolationist foreign policy. Chancellor Adenauer expressed particular concern that the United States might use the introduction of German divisions into NATO’s defenses as a justification for reducing its own contributions. Publicly, President Eisenhower tried to reassure his allies that the United States had no intention of reducing its commitment. Privately, however, he complained that he had never intended or desired the American deployment to Europe to be permanent.7

Whatever force the Army retained in Europe would take on an even greater significance as, in addition to its role within the Western Alliance, it came to represent the very survival of the service. Given military policies that emphasized airpower and atomic weapons, the Air Force and, to a lesser extent, the Navy absorbed the largest part of the defense budget, played the greatest role in strategic planning, and seemed to carry the most prestige. Meanwhile, the Army struggled to remain relevant, both in national security affairs and in the eyes of the American public. The new Army chief of staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, waged a concerted campaign to improve the service’s image and to demonstrate that it had a role to play on the modern battlefield. He told the USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, that he was troubled to see the Army depicted as hidebound, backward-looking, and outmoded. He urged McAuliffe to help him sell the idea to the American public and to Congress that the service was a versatile and flexible member of the defense team and that, while it was developing its own family of powerful atomic weapons, it also retained the ability to vary the application of military force to the needs of the moment.8

6 Memos, Col William R. Peers, Ch, Unit Requirements Section, for Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, 19 Feb 1955, sub: Report of G3 Staff Visit to USAREUR; and Oakes for Ch of Staff, 4 Oct 1955, sub: Proposed Message to DA on Reorganization of the 10th Special Forces Group; Msg, DA, from Dep Ch of Staff, Logistics, to CINCEUR, 30 Dec 1955, Ref DA–994588. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.


8 Ltr, Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, CSA, to Gen Anthony C. McAuliffe, USAREUR Cdr, 15 Sep 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
McAuliffe responded that he was in complete agreement with Taylor’s sentiments. He pointed out that in the past year USAREUR had been the subject of favorable articles in such popular mass publications as Look, U.S. News and World Report, Saturday Evening Post, and Newsweek. The U.S. Army in Europe provided about one-third of all material appearing on the service’s weekly Big Picture television show and on Army Hour radio show. Moreover, NBC News had just completed a special television presentation on the units patrolling the border. While the command’s relationships with the U.S. press were “splendid,” McAuliffe could only note that reporters seldom visited Army installations in Europe. The Air Force had flown correspondents into the theater for brief visits, he said, but those individuals rarely met with the Army.9

McAuliffe also made sure that the need to publicize the Army’s success in Europe was clear to his subordinate commanders. He urged the Seventh Army commander, Lt. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, to use every means at his disposal to tell the Army’s story frequently and accurately. Accordingly, the Seventh Army relied on an organized public information program that used publications, hometown news releases, local newspapers, and radio and television broadcasts to tell its story. Maj. Gen. Numa A. Watson, commander of the Southern Area Command, assured his superiors that he had made the issue one of his highest priorities, and he identified the Army’s Home Town News Center, a public information project to relay news about individual soldiers back to their local newspapers, as a valuable instrument in getting the word out. He suggested that if the command devoted additional personnel to the effort to promote the Army, it would get even better results.10

Thus, with U.S. ground forces drawing down in most areas around the world and with a potential conflict with the Soviet Union the primary threat to U.S. national security, USAREUR found itself as the Army’s best hope for selling its message to the American public. In many ways, USAREUR and the Seventh Army became the public face of the service. At the USAREUR commander’s weekly staff meeting on 19 April 1955, the public information officer admonished attendees that they could not rely solely on military media such as the Stars and Stripes and Armed Forces Network to get out their message. If they were to reach the more than four hundred million people that made up the populations of the United States and the NATO allies, they would have to publicize their activities on the national wire services and television

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9 Quote from Ltr, McAuliffe to Taylor, 21 Sep 1955. Ltr, Taylor to McAuliffe, 14 Oct 1955. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

and radio networks. Only in that way could the service hope to overcome the stranglehold the Air Force and Navy were placing on the defense budget and military policy.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Striving for Combat Readiness}

The increased emphasis on the use of atomic weapons in American strategic policy influenced the preparations of American forces for combat against the Soviet Union. Because the Eisenhower administration had little interest in funding research and development aimed at improving conventional weapons, the Army focused much of its attention on developing and procuring rockets, missiles, and artillery munitions capable of delivering an atomic warhead. That focus manifested itself in Europe in reduced funding for gasoline, ammunition, spare parts, and other conventional training requirements. In response, USAREUR and the Seventh Army began a serious consideration of how to integrate atomic weapons into their plans for the defense of Western Europe.

In reality, USAREUR and Seventh Army leaders had little choice but to place a greater reliance on atomic weapons.\textsuperscript{12} President Eisenhower’s New Look strategic policies pushed the early use of atomic weapons and encouraged commanders to regard them in the same way as any other conventional weapon. A study prepared by NATO’s Military Committee showed that most European nations had not met the conventional force goals they had set for themselves in 1952. As a result, the only way Western forces would be able to prevent a rapid conquest of Europe would be to employ both tactical and strategic atomic weapons as early as possible. With that analysis in mind, General Gruenther, the supreme allied commander, told his staff that he considered his number one requirement to be perfecting procedures for the delivery of atomic weapons. He wanted those procedures to be tested in all major NATO training events.\textsuperscript{13}

To support this approach, U.S. European Command contingency plans directed USAREUR to provide atomic-capable artillery units with accompanying logistical elements to designated NATO forces and to assign staff to allied headquarters to assist in planning for the battlefield employment of atomic weapons. Seventh Army units had already tested plans to allocate two battalions of 280-mm. cannons to British forces in the Northern Army Group as part of Exercise \textit{Battle Royal} in 1954. In August 1955, USAREUR approved

\textsuperscript{11} HQ, USAREUR, Commander in Chief’s Weekly Staff Conference, 19 Apr 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

\textsuperscript{12} Ltr, McAuliffe, USAREUR Cdr, to Gen Alfred M. Gruenther, SACEUR, 8 Jul 1955; Memo, Oakes, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for CINC, 23 Aug 1955, sub: SHAPE Exercise Calendar. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

another request from NORTHAG to contribute one battery of 280-mm. guns and one battery of Honest John rockets for Exercise STORMVOYEUR. The command also prepared plans to attach one battalion to the First French Army as well.14

Meanwhile, in the Seventh Army, much of the operations and planning staff became engaged in preparing doctrinal literature and plans for the conduct of atomic warfare. Atomic artillery units participated in almost every major field-training exercise, from division-size to NATO maneuvers. Although it was difficult to fire even conventional rounds from the huge, 280-mm. guns due to a lack of suitable firing ranges, Seventh Army technicians constructed a pyrotechnic device that simulated an atomic explosion for use in field training. Command post exercises began to focus almost exclusively on coordinating the

movement of the atomic artillery, locating suitable targets and setting up the complex communications channels necessary for verifying target information and authenticating release of the weapons from higher headquarters. Right away, observers noted that these procedures were entirely too cumbersome and slow to engage targets in a timely manner. In Exercise Fox Paw during October 1955, forward units identified and nominated twenty targets for attack with atomic weapons but were unable to engage any, usually because the enemy forces had dispersed before they could be fired on.\textsuperscript{15}

The exercises were successful, however, in illustrating to the troops the destructive power of atomic weapons. During Exercise Cordon Bleu in September, a NATO army consisting of the U.S. VII Corps and France’s 5th Armored and 7th Light Mechanized Divisions under the overall command of Lt. Gen. George H. Decker, VII Corps Commander, defended against an aggressor attack conducted by the U.S. 2d Armored Division and the French 1st Armored Division. Although much of the maneuver was highly scripted, the twelve hundred umpires who ran the exercise assessed heavy casualties, especially in connection with notional atomic strikes. The men learned that even if it was not precisely on target, a single atomic weapon could destroy an entire command post. In one instance, eighteen hundred simulated casualties entered the VII Corps medical chain of evacuation. This was a far greater number than U.S. units had encountered in previous maneuvers but represented what many believed to be an accurate estimate for an atomic conflict. Umpires and observers noted that medical support was spread much too thin for effective evacuation of casualties. In one case, where a simulated atomic strike had wounded almost six hundred men, two aid men showed up to handle their evacuation. Because insufficient litter jeeps were available, it took almost ten hours to transport the casualties to medical facilities. As a by-product of the exercise, Seventh Army training literature began to caution troops that, in many cases, they would have to perform their own first aid and transport their own wounded.\textsuperscript{16}

Other exercises, especially early in the year, tested the ability of divisions and corps to implement the “wide-front” defense that had become an integral part of Seventh Army’s doctrine. In February 1955, the Seventh Army conducted CPX Sting Ray that included all of its headquarters and command post elements down to battalion level. The primary aim of the effort was to test the ability of the staffs involved to establish communications up and down the line.


215

1955: A YEAR OF TRANSITION

...while also controlling the maneuver of their dispersed elements. In particular, the command wanted to learn how to maintain communications with logistics and other support elements positioned well to the rear, and how to best link up with higher headquarters and other units along the line to facilitate planning and coordination. 17

Despite the growing interest in atomic warfare, up until early 1955, USAREUR had only six 280-mm. cannon battalions, each with three two-gun batteries, to provide all of its organic atomic fire support. Moreover, the guns themselves were controversial. Critics pointed to the difficulty in transporting them through European villages and along narrow roads and bridges. American newspapers published articles and showed pictures of guns that had skidded off roads and gotten stuck in ditches. Artillerymen defended the performance of their weapons and praised their performance but nonetheless conceded that more agile systems were needed. 18

Reinforcements were already on the way. Late in 1954, the first battery of Honest John rockets arrived in Europe. Seventh Army demonstrators unveiled

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17 Memo, Col Eugene E. Lockhart, Ch, Maneuver Div, for G–3, 10 Feb 1955, sub: Initial Instructions, CPX STING RAY, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
18 Msgs, DA, Ch of Information, to CINCUSAREUR, 27 Sep 1955, Ref DA–351241; and USAREUR to DA, for Ch of Information, 10 Oct 1955, Ref SC–29016. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
The controller crew makes final checks before firing a Corporal missile at White Sands, New Mexico, October 1955.
the new weapons to the European press in January the following year. The truck-mounted, surface-to-surface rocket was unguided and had a maximum range of about fifteen miles. It was considerably more mobile and could be prepared to fire in less time than the 280-mm. cannon. Corporal guided missile battalions followed shortly thereafter in February 1955. The Corporals were liquid-fueled, surface-to-surface guided missiles with an approximate range of seventy-five miles. Although these weapons were capable of firing both conventional and atomic warheads, their inaccuracy when compared with conventional heavy artillery made them poorly suited for nonnuclear use. They did, however, provide the Seventh Army with new options for atomic fire support. The command assigned Honest John batteries to the V and VII Corps headquarters as part of their artillery support assets. The Corporal missiles remained under Seventh Army control because they could reach targets beyond the corps boundaries.\(^{19}\)

A lack of available firing ranges hampered training with the new weapons. By the middle of 1955, the Seventh Army had launched only two Honest John rockets, using ranges at Grafenwöhr, the largest U.S. training area in Germany. By the end of the year, USAREUR and U.S. European Command were still negotiating to obtain suitable facilities in Africa where the units could train. As a result, although the addition of rocket- and guided-missile units increased the Seventh Army’s options for atomic firepower and helped to diminish its reliance on Air Force–delivered munitions, the lack of firing ranges limited the command’s ability to train its soldiers to use and support the weapons.\(^{20}\)

As a further upgrade to the flexibility of its atomic arsenal, USAREUR received word in May 1955 that the Army had developed an atomic shell for its 8-inch howitzer. At thirty-five tons, the artillery piece was less than half the weight of the more cumbersome 280-mm. cannon. The 8-inch guns could fire a shell out to a range of almost twenty miles and were already deployed to Europe in substantial numbers. Although none of the new projectiles reached Europe by the end of the year, and the 280-mm. cannons remained the mainstay of the Seventh Army’s atomic arsenal, it was clear that the command was expanding its options as it prepared for an atomic conflict.\(^{21}\)

In contrast to the growing infatuation with atomic weapons at higher echelons, combat battalions in the Seventh Army continued to emphasize conventional tactics and doctrine in their training. Infantry and armor battalions

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Tanks of the 1st Battalion, 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, defend against attacking NATO forces during Exercise Cordon Bleu in October 1955.

Aggressor forces move through Dinkelsbühl during Exercise Cordon Bleu in October 1955.
spent weeks at Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken, and in local training areas, perfecting defensive operations along an extended front, and practicing delaying actions as part of a mobile defense. The command’s training literature stressed the integration of infantry, tanks, and artillery into combat teams and directed that each of those branches would prepare to work closely with the other two. To evaluate their level of readiness, divisions administered tests to the companies and battalions under their command. A typical exercise would combine an armored infantry battalion with a tank company, an engineer platoon, and forward observers linked to an artillery battalion. That force would then attempt to carry out its assigned missions against a slightly smaller but similarly organized opponent. Operating on a front of approximately six miles, infantry battalions might begin the test with a delay and withdrawal mission, pulling back as far as fifteen miles. In the next phase, the battalion would construct a more traditional perimeter defense but almost immediately begin planning a counterattack, which it would execute within twenty-four hours. Tank and armored cavalry battalions conducted similar tests, but covered even greater distances due to their mobility.22

Artillery battalions underwent training evaluations designed to validate their own unique capabilities. Seventh Army guidance for the administration of battalion tests was accompanied by reams of checklists, designed to assist umpires in verifying that units performed required tasks by the numbers. The exercises placed the highest emphasis on the speed and accuracy of indirect fire. Each one included a number of required missions with strict time and accuracy standards for each. Umpires graded procedures along the gunline, computations in the fire direction center, and accuracy of fires in relation to the assigned target. The tests also evaluated the unit’s ability to move and establish a new firing position, to communicate, to defend itself against aggressor attacks, and to supply and maintain itself in the field. Upon completion of the evaluation, units received grades of excellent, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory. Seventh Army after action reports indicated that out of forty-six battalions tested the previous year, forty had received ratings of satisfactory or excellent. The remaining six battalions successfully completed retests later that year, or early in 1955.23

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The after action reports noted, however, that almost half of the units tested demonstrated shortcomings in speed or accuracy of fires. Umpires attributed these shortcomings to a lack of fire discipline in the firing batteries, improper gunnery techniques used in the fire direction centers, and errors in survey. As a result, observers from Seventh Army and the two corps headquarters made those areas of particular concern for inspections and evaluations held in 1955.24

The Seventh Army’s training also retained much of the emphasis on individual and small-unit skills that had been instituted by General Eddy years before. Senior officers urged company and battalion commanders to improve map reading, marksmanship, and basic troop-leading procedures in their squads and platoons. Emphasizing that any unit capable of being located and identified could be destroyed by an atomic attack, leaders also stressed training in dispersion, camouflage, and communications security. Because ten years had passed since the end of World War II and almost five years since the heaviest fighting in Korea, the command placed increased weight on developing its lieutenants and junior noncommissioned officers. Although many veterans of those conflicts remained in USAREUR and the Seventh Army, most had progressed to more senior ranks. Division noncommissioned officer academies provided a structured environment for training those junior leaders. Many units also depended on more informal systems for passing on combat experience.25

During this period, USAREUR and the Seventh Army also continued to harness developing technologies to expand the range of tactical options available to their commanders. Aircraft had been an integral part of the Army since prior to World War II. For the most part, however, they had been assigned to field artillery units and employed for reconnaissance and for target identification. The use of helicopters in Korea, not just for reconnaissance, but also to deliver supplies and to evacuate casualties from the battlefield had demonstrated the utility of that new technology in a wider range of roles. As a result, when the Seventh Army reorganized under a new Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) in 1953, several fixed-wing and rotary aircraft were assigned to each division. These included the H–19 Chickasaw helicopter for training and light transport, the H–13 Sioux helicopter for observation and medical evacuation, the L–19 Birddog airplane for observation, and the L–20 Beaver airplane for liaison and light transport. This development created an immediate shortage of trained pilots in the theater. In March 1954, the Seventh Army headquarters organized an aviation section to supervise flight operations and training throughout the command. A short time later, on 1 July 1955, it established

24 Memo, Jones for CG, VII Corps, 10 Dec 1954, sub: Emphasis in Training of Field Artillery Units.
the Seventh Army Aviation Training Center at the Stuttgart airfield to provide locally trained pilots.26

Later that same year, USAREUR also created an aviation branch within its transportation division to coordinate organization, training, operations, and employment of the command’s growing aviation resources. The new organization immediately went to work planning for the addition of six companies of H–13 and H–19 helicopters to USAREUR and the Seventh Army. Although the Army normally designated aviation companies as service elements, the six coming to Germany were categorized as combat units. While the rotary aircraft were suitable for movement of small units over difficult terrain or emergency resupply of combat units, their limited operating radius and lift capacity made them unsuitable for large-scale logistical operations or tactical maneuvers. Even so, they proved to be particularly useful in transporting troops through the mountainous terrain in Austria and southern Germany and offered commanders the potential ability to shift troops quickly to trouble spots, to support actions on their flanks, or to carry soldiers behind enemy lines. The arrival in late

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1955 of the larger capacity H–34 Choctaw helicopters allowed planning for movements up to company size in strength.27

On the ground, USAREUR infantrymen also looked to increase their mobility through the introduction of fully tracked armored personnel carriers. World War II–vintage half-tracks had provided them with some flexibility and protection from small-arms fire, but the vehicles tended to bog down in difficult terrain and offered no overhead cover. The newer M75 was fully tracked, and its fully enclosed troop compartment offered some protection from shrapnel, small-arms fire, and the thermal or radiation effects of an atomic explosion. The USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, however, cautioned against wholesale conversion to the carriers in Seventh Army infantry divisions. He pointed out that the limited visibility they afforded the crews made the vehicles less than ideally suited for operations in heavily wooded or built-up areas. He believed that the carriers required improvements and modifications before they could be employed throughout the command.28

By the end of the year, USAREUR and the Seventh Army were well on the way to establishing a doctrine based on atomic weapons. Although unit organizations still retained their conventional forms, most training exercises and war plans took for granted that atomic weapons would be used by both sides. With their new weapons and equipment, and their preparations to fight a widely dispersed and mobile battle, American soldiers in Europe presaged changes that would occur throughout the service.

**Operation Gyroscope**

Although the command had made significant progress in developing its combat doctrine, finding an efficient way of rotating troops into and out of Europe remained an elusive goal. Even after several years of experiments with different methods, USAREUR and the Seventh Army continued to suffer high rates of personnel turnover. Soldiers reported to and departed from the command so quickly that it was difficult for leaders to develop the teamwork and unit cohesion necessary to build strong units. Experiments with rotating entire platoons of infantry and armor had shown some promise but had not completely solved the problem. They did, however, set the stage for a much more ambitious program that was to begin in 1955.

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28 Ltr, McAuliffe to Garrett Underhill, 7 Jun 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Late the previous year, the Army had begun to develop a concept that would interchange divisions, separate regiments, or battalions between overseas locations and their permanent stations in the United States. Under this system, a division would serve a two- to three-year tour in Europe and then change places with a similar force in the United States. The units, with dependents if possible, would move in their entirety from the old station to the new. Then, after another two to three years, they would change places again. Most vehicles and heavy weapons would remain in place, with each unit using its predecessor’s equipment and facilities.29

The program, dubbed Operation Gyroscope, had three primary goals: improve morale, increase combat effectiveness, and reduce costs. The Army’s chief of staff at the time, General Ridgway, believed that Gyroscope’s greatest benefit would be better troop morale due to more stable enlisted assignments. In effect, soldiers would know well in advance when they would rotate to Germany and when they would return. Because most units would return to the same station in the United States from which they had departed, military families could buy homes and establish roots in familiar American communities. The plan also promised that soldiers and their families would move overseas together whenever possible, minimizing the sort of long separations that almost inevitably harmed troop morale. Planners also hoped that Gyroscope would reduce the turbulence caused by frequent personnel changes and that keeping soldiers in the same unit over longer periods of time would enhance esprit de corps. Overall, Army leaders hoped that the improved morale resulting from Gyroscope would influence public perceptions of military service in general and of the Army in particular.30

Service leaders also believed that, in addition to improving morale, the new rotation plan would produce more tangible military advantages. Under traditional rotation systems, units experienced a complete turnover in personnel over three years. At times, the turbulence was even more dramatic, as when a mass exodus of reservists and draftees occurred after the 1951–1952 augmentation. Army personnel officers hoped that the improvement in morale they expected from Gyroscope would stem the loss of experienced manpower, thereby decreasing the necessity to train new replacements. In addition, by allowing men to spend most of their careers in the same units with their friends, the plan would improve teamwork and trust. Gyroscope would also conserve manpower by eliminating the extensive network of personnel reception and processing stations. Soldiers manning those stations could serve other purposes, and the time the troops spent in the processing pipeline would be at a minimum.

29 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, p. 87; David A. Lane, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives.

It went without saying that the planning and execution of movements involving large bodies of troops also provided excellent preparation and training for emergency wartime deployments.³¹

With the Eisenhower administration cutting deeply into the Army’s budget, Gyroscope’s predicted monetary savings proved most appealing of all. By making military service more attractive, Army officials hoped that the program would limit personnel turnover by increasing the reenlistment rate. This would reduce the paperwork, processing time, clothing distribution, and training costs associated with bringing in new recruits. The mass movement of personnel overseas would also result in considerable savings. Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the Department of the Army’s deputy assistant chief of staff, G–1, for manpower control, estimated that the cost of relocating a division from its home station in the central United States to a port of embarkation on the coast would be lowered by more than $1 million, as opposed to transfer overseas of the same personnel as individuals. Mass packing would reduce shipping costs, and the consolidation of preparations for overseas movement for personnel would enable the Army to provide those services more expeditiously and efficiently. Planners also hoped that the requirement for departing units to transfer vehicles, heavy weapons, and organizational equipment to incoming units would encourage commanders to demand more careful maintenance, which might cut down on replacement costs.³²

In the spring of 1955, the Army moved the 216th Field Artillery Battalion to Germany as a test of the plans for the larger unit rotation. This “Little Gyroscope” included 156 dependents of military personnel, a major innovation in peacetime rotation policies. The ship carrying the unit docked at Bremerhaven on 25 March 1955. Within twenty-four hours, all the new arrivals were at their posts in Darmstadt, two hundred miles to the south. Sponsors from the 760th Field Artillery Battalion prepared quarters for the incoming families, an effort that included providing food for three days and completing commissary, post exchange, and alcoholic beverage purchase documentation.³³

The first full-scale Gyroscope exchange with USAREUR troops involved replacing the 1st Infantry Division at Darmstadt with the 10th Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas. Even before the first elements packed their bags, the rotation began to generate positive effects. Recruiting offices in the United States reported that they were swamped with requests from men who wanted to volunteer for service with the 10th Division. The Seventh Army invited the division’s commander and key personnel to observe a V Corps maneuver, Spring Shower, in March, to familiarize them with corps war plans prior

³¹ Lane, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957.
³² Ibid.; “Gyroscope Plan Spurs Army Reenlistments.”
³³ Lane, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957; Memo, Maj Gen Aubrey S. Newman, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Ch of Staff, 11 Mar 1955, sub: News Release—Arrival of the 216th FA Battalion; Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
to their deployment. After an exchange of advance parties in May, the main movement began on 2 July 1955, when the first increment of the 10th Division sailed from New York Harbor. The group, consisting of elements of the 86th Infantry, arrived at Bremerhaven ten days later on 12 July. The troops began moving into barracks vacated by the 1st Division’s 16th Infantry the next day. That evening, the soldiers of the 16th Infantry prepared for departure on the same boat that had carried their replacements.34

The rotation continued throughout the summer, but it did not go without incident. General McAuliffe, the USAREUR commander, reported to the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, that the initial shipments had arrived at considerably less than the 110 percent strength the plan had required. General Taylor acknowledged the shortage and promised that it would be made up in the next increment.35 In addition, logistics personnel reported that many young officers within the 10th Division had gotten married in the weeks prior to the deployment, complicating an already critical housing shortage. In June, as a result, the USAREUR chief of staff notified the 10th Division that delays in the housing construction program would cause seventy-three families assigned to the Aschaffenburg area, thirty miles east of Darmstadt, to be housed temporarily in government-leased quarters in nearby communities.36

The first elements of the 1st Division reached Kansas at the end of July 1955. On the thirtieth of that month, Headquarters, 1st Division Artillery, cased its colors and handed its mission to the 10th Division Artillery. By 27 September, with the rotation past its midpoint, the 1st Division’s commanding general, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy Jr., departed for the United States, and the 10th’s commander, Maj. Gen. George E. Martin, formally assumed charge of his predecessor’s area, responsibilities, and mission. The final elements of the 10th Division arrived in Germany at the end of November. The last of the 1st Division departed shortly thereafter. Stars and Stripes labeled the move the “Biggest Switch” in the Army’s history.37


35 Ltr, McAuliffe to Taylor, 20 Jul 1955; Memo, Col Lester S. Bork, Acting Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Ch of Staff, 21 Jul 1955, sub: Understrength in Initial Elements of the 10th Division; Ltr, Taylor to McAuliffe, 16 Aug 1955. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.


Meanwhile, the Army also experimented with a regimental-size Gyroscope exchange between the 2d Armored Cavalry, stationed at Nuremberg, and the 3d Armored Cavalry at Fort Meade, Maryland. In preparation for an August rotation, the two units exchanged advanced-planning groups in January 1955. The most significant difficulty the rotation posed had to do with USAREUR’s commitment to maintain three companies on border patrol throughout the exchange period. Leaders in both organizations feared that they would have insufficient time to conduct technical inspections and property inventories before transferring responsibility for the mission to the incoming regiment. In the end, they solved the problem by staggering the rotation so that an advanced party and two battalions completed their exchanges before the third battalion and headquarters elements arrived and took command. In effect, for a brief period, units of the 3d Armored Cavalry took over border operations under the command of the 2d Armored Cavalry. This enabled the two regiments to execute the turnover with minimal disruption.38

With several further Gyroscope exchanges in planning for the coming months, the Army began to study concerns that had emerged from the first swaps. Not enough ships had been available during the busy summer months to handle the large number of people involved in the transfer. USAREUR had received only 18 percent of the cabin space it required for soldiers and their families crossing the Atlantic. The command warned future participants in the program that such requirements would have to be filled by air transport, and that families who desired surface transport for medical or personal reasons might experience delays in their passage overseas. Although the transfer of property went smoothly, unexpected challenges did arise. Throughout its twelve-year stay in Europe, the 1st Division had accumulated a great deal of property never accounted for on TOE. After an evaluation, USAREUR provided a loan to the 10th Division so that it could purchase the equipment outright from the departing units.39

The need to transfer divisions to Europe at a greater-than-authorized strength to allow for attrition during the transition and to transfer divisions back home that were up to strength and combat ready placed enormous burdens on personnel systems in both the United States and Germany. In preparing to deploy overseas, Gyroscope units continued to add troops to their rosters right up until the moment of deployment. This caused many soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers to miss essential orientation and training they should have received prior to departure. It was impossible, moreover, to deploy

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an entire division with personnel who had two to three years of time in service remaining. Almost as soon as they arrived in Germany, the divisions began receiving replacements to make up for soldiers who were preparing to depart. To conserve on moving costs, the Department of the Army also directed that soldiers already stationed in Europe serve a minimum of two years. In order to avoid sending soldiers back too early, or to maintain required quotas of Regular Army personnel, units returning to the United States had to exchange troops with other units in the Seventh Army and USAREUR. The resulting personnel turbulence negated much of the improvement in morale and combat efficiency that Gyroscope was intended to provide.40

The most troublesome and controversial problem revealed in the initial rotations was the lack of adequate dependent housing throughout Europe. One of Gyroscope’s supposed advantages was that, consistent with the availability of transportation and housing, dependents would accompany

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Soldiers from the 11th Airborne Division arrive in Bremerhaven as part of Operation Gyroscope.

A soldier of the 25th Signal Battalion and his family are met by Maj. Gen. E. D. Post, Commander, Western Area Command, at the Kaiserslautern train station.
units overseas. After the first rotations, however, USAREUR concluded that family housing in each of the areas designated for Gyroscope units fell short of minimum requirements. A staff analysis concluded that units had not heeded qualifying conditions for concurrent travel and that each was arriving with more married personnel and more dependents than the command could house. As an example, the report cited the 3d Armored Cavalry, to which USAREUR had allocated 461 sets of quarters in the area around Nuremberg prior to deployment, had arrived in Germany with 527 married personnel. This left sixty-six military couples and families unable to obtain quarters in the foreseeable future. Although USAREUR recommended limiting the number of married personnel within deploying units, the Army rejected the proposal as unworkable and contrary to the family stability objectives the program was supposed to foster. The USAREUR personnel staff also discovered that the operations staff had made plans to move a considerable number of families from Austria into billets that it had allocated to Gyroscope. The situation prompted the USAREUR chief of staff, Maj. Gen. John F. Uncles, to admonish the chiefs of all staff divisions to improve coordination between sections and specifically to recheck their plans regarding Operation Gyroscope to avoid such conflicts in the future.41

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41 Memo, Maj Gen Aubrey S. Newman, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for SGS, 19 Oct 1955, sub: Subjects for Discussion at Army Commander’s Conference, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; Lane, Operation Gyroscope in the United States Army, Europe, 6 Sep 1957, p. 19; Memos, Ch of Staff for Chs of All Staff Divs, 13 Jun 1955,
Still, the command considered the Gyroscope experiments successes and planned for several more in the upcoming years. In March 1955, the Department of the Army directed USAREUR to prepare to rotate two more divisions in 1956. The plan called for the 11th Airborne Division to replace the 5th Infantry Division in January and for the 3d Armored Division to replace the 4th Infantry Division in May. In both cases the USAREUR staff had to consider how to conduct equipment exchanges between different types of units. In the case of the 11th Airborne Division, the incoming and outgoing divisions both agreed that the incoming organization would bring with it all items that were unique to an airborne unit. The Department of the Army also directed the 11th to bring with it thirty days of supplies peculiar to an airborne division. After that, the USAREUR technical services would provide a 180-day supply of spare parts for each new item introduced into the theater. The exchange of the 3d Armored Division with the 4th Infantry Division required the shipment of up to seven hundred additional tanks and other vehicles to Europe in advance of the personnel rotation. The Seventh Army, however, opposed a plan to store the vehicles at its own kasernes due to its inability to evacuate them in the event of an emergency. The USAREUR logistics staff and Seventh Army leaders were still working on a solution to the problem when the year ended.42

The End of the Occupation in Austria

The Gyroscope effort was not the only major challenge facing USAREUR personnel officers during 1955. The imminent redeployment of troops assigned to U.S. Forces, Austria, complicated the already turbulent movement of units into and out of USAREUR. In April 1955, after years of wrangling with the Western allies, the Soviet Union announced that it was ready to sign a peace treaty with Austria and to restore the nation’s independence. Officials in the U.S. State Department interpreted the offer as an attempt by the Soviets to take the Austrian issue off the table before dealing in more detail with issues regarding Germany. Even so, the offer did not come without a price. In return, the Austrians had to agree to maintain a policy of strict neutrality, to permit no foreign military bases on their soil, and to pay the Soviet government $160 million annually for the next ten years. Despite these conditions, the Austrians were eager to end the occupation. For the United States, Great Britain, and France, the agreement had the benefit of removing Soviet troops from Austria,

sub: Illustrations of Type Staff Failures; and Newman for G–3, 6 May 1955, sub: Gyroscope Responsibility. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. HQ, USAREUR, Weekly Commanders Conference, 10 Jan 1956, Entry 2135, USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP.

1955: A YEAR OF TRANSITION

231

a political victory of sorts. It was also probably the best deal they were going to get. On 15 May 1955, the four nations signed a treaty that granted Austria its independence.43

By mid-July all four occupation powers had ratified the treaty, setting into motion a stipulation that all foreign troops be out of Austria within ninety days. Soviet forces began withdrawing at a rate of almost one thousand troops a day. Meanwhile, USAREUR technical services screened U.S. supply stocks in Austria and began evacuating selected items to depots in Germany and France. Among the U.S. occupation units transferred to Germany were the 70th Engineer Battalion, the 510th Field Artillery Battalion, and elements of the 350th Infantry, all of which were attached to the Seventh Army. The 4th Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion was inactivated, but the Army


Troops of the 350th Infantry prepare to case the unit colors for the last time on Austrian soil, August 1955.
transferred its history and lineage to the 19th Armor Group which it then, on 1 July 1955, redesignated as the 4th Armor Group. By the end of October 1955, all of the sixteen thousand U.S. troops and their dependents stationed in Austria had withdrawn to bases in Germany or Italy, or had departed the theater for new assignments in the United States. Any remaining U.S. property, facilities, or supply stocks went to the Austrian government.44

Even before the signing of the Austrian treaty, the United States had begun planning for the activation of a new command in Italy. Known as the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), the new organization would compensate for the loss of forward positions in Austria and assist the Italian Army in confronting a potential invader along NATO’s southern flank. Troops who redeployed from Austria to Italy went first to Camp Darby at Livorno, on the coast of the Ligurian Sea and one hundred fifty miles north of Rome, and later moved to northwest Italy, settling in at Camp Passalaqua at Verona, one hundred miles east of Milan, and Ederle Kasern at Vicenza, twenty miles farther east. These troops included the 1st Battalion, 350th Infantry; the 85th Field Artillery Battery (Honest John); the 409th Antiaircraft Artillery Battery; the 532d Combat Engineer Company; and several other smaller support elements. The task force became operational on 25 October 1955 under the command of Brig. Gen. John H. Michaelis.45

The new organization had a complicated chain of command, reporting to NATO’s Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe, for operational matters, to the U.S. Department of the Army for administration, and to Headquarters, U.S. European Command, for international and civil affairs. Since it was organized to provide support to friendly forces, U.S. military planners considered it a prototype for the kind of deployable ground force envisioned by the Eisenhower administration. Once in place, it began demonstrating the Honest John rockets to its Italian allies and training selected officers and noncommissioned officers on their employment. In September, the U.S. European Command requested an addition of three demolition teams to SETAF’s organization. The teams would be assigned to the force engineer and plan and execute demolition and barrier missions along primary avenues of approach for the enemy. As with the Honest John battery, the demolition specialists also prepared to assist allied forces in the theater.46


46 HQ, USAREUR, G–4 Plans, Peacetime Planning Responsibilities and Wartime Command Relationship Between USAREUR and SETAF; Msg, CINCEUR to DA, G–3, 16 Sep 1955, Ref
The Effect of German Sovereignty on U.S. Forces in Europe

The peace treaty with Austria and the withdrawal of U.S. forces brought to an end the American occupation mission there. The more significant political change for U.S. forces in Europe, however, and the event that would truly mark 1955 as a year of transition was the restoration of sovereignty to West Germany. Only then could the United States and NATO begin the process of rebuilding the German armed forces and integrating them into their plans for Western European defense.

The Western allies had begun laying the groundwork for a sovereign Germany in 1952 with negotiations that culminated in the signing of the so-called Contractual Agreements, or Bonn Conventions. These agreements mapped out West Germany’s transition from occupied nation to sovereign state and were to go into effect with the passing of the European Defense Community Treaty. After the French Assembly rejected that compact in August 1954, however, the allies entered into another round of negotiations and, in October, signed a new pact known as the Paris Accords. The new agreements included a “Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany,” which stipulated that the Bonn Conventions would go into effect upon the termination of the allied occupation rather than on the establishment of the European Defense Community, as originally planned. The protocol included a series of amendments enumerating the rights and responsibilities of the allied military forces that would remain in Germany. Others defined the contributions West Germany would make in support of the defense effort and laid the groundwork for a status-of-forces agreement conforming to NATO standards.47

After ratification by the German government, the Paris Accords went into effect on 5 May 1955, bringing to an end the allied occupation and establishing the Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany, as a sovereign nation. Shortly thereafter, on 9 May, the Federal Republic’s flag was raised in front of the SHAPE headquarters building in the Versailles suburb of Paris, symbolizing the nation’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the same time, President Eisenhower signed an executive order abolishing the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany and replacing the office with a U.S. mission.


James B. Conant, former president of Harvard University and the sitting High Commissioner, was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as the first U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic. Conant assumed traditional ambassadorial authority with respect to responsibilities and governmental functions of the United States in the Federal Republic of Germany. U.S. military authority in Germany, however, flowed through NATO and SHAPE. The commander in chief, U.S. European Command, as the senior American commander in Europe, retained all of his duties with respect to U.S. military functions in West Germany. Since Berlin was not part of West Germany and therefore not subject to the agreements, however, USAREUR and the Seventh Army continued the military occupation of the American sector of the city. Ambassador Conant met with USAREUR leaders on a monthly basis and maintained direct liaison with the command on matters related to troop relations, public information, and peacetime psychological warfare.48

German sovereignty had an immediate monetary impact on USAREUR. Under a 1952 agreement between Germany and the allies, the West German government had provided deutsche marks equivalent to $142.9 million per month to support allied forces stationed on its soil. Of that, the average U.S. share came to $63.5 million, most of which went to USAREUR. With those funds, the command paid the salaries of more than one hundred twenty thousand German civilian employees, financed a large number of its construction projects, and procured a multitude of support items and services. For the first twelve months after gaining sovereignty, the Federal Republic agreed to pay an average of $63.3 million per month in deutsche marks for the support of all allied forces. Of that total, U.S. forces would receive an average of $24.7 million per month, roughly 40 percent of the previous amount. Any payments after the first year would have to be renegotiated, taking into consideration the extent of the German defense contribution to NATO at that time.49

The reduced contribution of deutsche marks forced USAREUR to take aggressive action to curb its expenses. As an added complication, the secretary of defense decreed that no U.S. appropriated funds would pay for goods or services that U.S. forces had normally purchased with deutsche marks. This prompted the command to discharge several thousand German workers, to

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reduce the procurement of locally produced items that it had traditionally purchased on the German economy, to eliminate many custodial services, to cut utility and engineer expenditures, and to freeze laundry and dry-cleaning services at existing levels. When these reductions proved insufficient, a second cutback in local workers followed. The reduction affected custodians, drivers, caretakers, housekeepers, kitchen workers, and troop mess attendants. Of more importance, the ruling left the Army’s Fiscal Year 1955 building program in Europe only 52 percent funded and postponed the construction of $23 million worth of troop facilities meant to replace those being returned to the Germans. In effect, USAREUR had to pay rent on those facilities until it could obtain the funding to build its own.\(^50\)

Delays in housing construction complicated the Army’s relationship with its German hosts in another area. Even before the Bonn Conventions went into effect, USAREUR leaders recognized that the requisition and retention of German-owned properties had become a major source of friction between U.S. forces and the local population. At the end of World War II, U.S. Army units had seized German hotels, businesses, and residences for use as headquarters and troop billets, and for other purposes. Although the Army had returned many buildings to their owners and paid rental fees on most of those it still occupied, the commanding generals of the Seventh Army; U.S. Army, Europe; and the U.S. European Command received numerous letters of complaint from German citizens demanding the return of their homes, businesses, and other commandeered possessions. Although USAREUR made an honest effort to return properties as soon as possible, the need for housing, billets, kasernes, and training areas to support the flourishing Seventh Army made it impossible to meet all of the demands. In late 1955, it prepared a list of 5,347 properties required by the Army and Air Force under a provision of the Bonn Conventions. Of these, 2,538 were houses in Bremerhaven, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Stuttgart, and other cities where U.S. forces were concentrated. Buildings used for unit headquarters, warehouses, and training sites made up most of the remaining properties. Negotiations between the United States and Germany over the continued use of these facilities went on through the end of the year.\(^51\)

Germany’s return to sovereignty also meant a change in the status of U.S. soldiers, their dependents, and government civilians stationed there. Under a 1952 agreement between the United States and Germany, known as the Forces


Convention, every member of “the forces”—including military personnel, non-German employees of the U.S. armed forces, and non-German dependents of both—was required to observe German law, except as specifically delineated in the Bonn Conventions or other agreements. It required all non-German personnel to carry serially numbered identification cards that were subject to review by German authorities on request. Although the German police had no power to arrest allied personnel or dependents, they could apprehend and search them and would deliver them to U.S. custody if they were suspected of acts of espionage or threats to persons or property, or disruptions of the peace. Germans could also bring civil actions against American military personnel, their dependents, or military civilians working in Germany without first obtaining the consent of U.S. authorities. The agreements likewise guaranteed the rights of members of the forces to travel freely throughout the Federal Republic, exempted them from most German taxes and customs controls, and allowed them to maintain automobiles under U.S. licensing and registration.52

The USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, took a number of steps to inform his soldiers of their new rights and responsibilities. Referring to a detailed report published in the 6 May 1955 edition of the European Stars and Stripes titled “YOUR Status in Germany Has Changed,” he directed his officers to use the article to educate their personnel. Overall, the article endorsed the new relationship with Germany as a great opportunity for U.S. personnel to share with the German people, on a basis of friendship and equality, the task of common Western defense. Four months later, USAREUR revisited the same subject with an information bulletin, titled “Your Rights and Obligations in Germany,” that was to serve as a teaching aid for public information classes throughout the command. The pamphlet provided background on the Bonn Conventions and the emergence of the Federal Republic, and then laid out the rights and obligations of American servicemen and their families in West Germany.53

Once West Germany had regained its sovereignty and had been admitted as a full member of the NATO alliance, circumstances required a more formal status-of-forces treaty than the 1952 agreement. The Germans, in particular, were anxious to ensure that their nation would not receive less advantageous treatment than other NATO countries. Negotiations conducted by civilian diplomats rather than military officers began in October 1955. They included representatives from France, the United Kingdom, and other nations that would continue to station troops in West Germany as part of NATO’s forward defense. The Army’s role was limited to providing technical information upon

53 Ibid.; HQ, USAREUR, Monthly Commanders’ Conference, 2 May 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR Information Bull, Your Rights and Obligations in Germany, 9 Sep 1955, Entry 2282, USAREUR Information Division General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
request. Although all sides hoped to conclude the talks within six months, the talks ran several more years before agreement could be reached.\footnote{Hickman, The United States Army in Europe, p. 20; Memo, Brig Gen George W. Gardes, Judge Advocate, for McAuliffe, 28 Sep 1955, sub: Jurisdictional Problems in Germany Under NATO SOF Agreement, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP; “Accord Due on Forces in Germany,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 May 1955.}

Germany’s elevation to the role of full partner in the NATO alliance also produced significant changes in the way USAREUR prepared for its combat mission. Many decisions its commanders had made unilaterally now required consultation with their German allies. Although the Forces Convention included language that guaranteed access for U.S. military units to training sites, the timing and locations for maneuvers would now have to be more closely coordinated with German authorities. The Americans would also have to take greater care to minimize interference with civilian traffic and damage to properties, crops, and land as the result of training. General McAuliffe, warned the Seventh Army commander, General Hodes, that he would have to be satisfied with less than the amount of land he desired for permanent training areas. Concerned that his units would not have sufficient space to train at the dispersed distances specified in their doctrine, Hodes groused in response that he was “sore” at whatever agency let the Germans have their sovereignty before all of the Seventh Army’s training area requirements had been met.\footnote{State-Defense Steering Committee, German Forces Arrangements Negotiations—Maneuver Rights of a Force, 25 Jan 1955; Memo, Col Carl N. Smith, Ch, Civil Affairs Division (CAD), for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 22 Oct 1955, sub: Briefing of General McAuliffe on Seventh Army Permanent Training Area Problem. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.}

West Germany’s new membership in NATO required major revisions in the alliance’s plans for the defense of Western Europe. Although the American and other NATO forces had markedly improved their level of training and combat readiness since 1949, and had begun to incorporate atomic weapons into their defense plans, the Soviet’s numerical advantage remained a concern. With a West German contribution still in the planning stage, NATO counted at best eighteen full-strength divisions with some smaller formations. The Northern Army Group consisted of, north to south, the I Dutch Corps with two divisions, the I British Corps with four divisions, and the I Belgian Corps with two divisions. Canada and Luxembourg provided brigade-size contributions. In CENTAG, the five U.S. divisions of the V and VII Corps still constituted the main line of defense. Although the five divisions of the French First Army reinforced the line on paper, their contribution was becoming problematic. By June, the French had shifted the equivalent of two and one-half divisions from eastern France to Algeria. When the United States and other alliance members challenged this transfer of forces, General Jean-Etienne Valluy, the French representative on the NATO Standing Group, argued that the insurrection in
North Africa was merely another front for NATO’s struggle against the spread of communism.\footnote{Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956, pp. 136–41.}

Up through 1955, most war plans called for a main line of defense along the Rhine River in Germany and the Ijssel River in the Netherlands, but that would change. General Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, noted that NATO could not defend West Germany from its westernmost boundary. If the West Germans were to be part of the alliance and were to contribute substantial troops for its defense, then NATO had to plan to defend all of West Germany. A NATO planning document published in November 1954 stated that the combination of new tactical atomic weapons and a substantial German defense contribution would allow the alliance to contemplate a real forward strategy with a main line of defense well to the east of the Rhine. The Seventh Army’s atomic artillery could target concentrations of Soviet armor, thus offsetting the Soviet Army’s most significant advantage. Additionally, some analysts also believed that the strengthening of NATO’s defenses with additional German units made the possibility of a surprise attack more remote. If war came, they said, the likelihood was for a more deliberate attack, probably launched in conjunction with bombardment of key positions and installations by atomic weapons. They called for a re-examination of alert measures to allow greater time for decision making at the national level and for more training of NATO forces in how to absorb and survive an atomic attack \textit{(Map 10)}.\footnote{Memo, J. E. Stephens, B. R. Eggeman, Joint Secretariat, for Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategic Plans Group, 26 Mar 1953, sub: Revision of Format of Part B of JSCP, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH; “Gruenther Says German Forces to Give NATO Depth,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 20 Mar 1955; Memo, Maj-Gen Llewelyn (Ll.) Wansbrough-Jones, British Army, Principal Staff Ofcr (PSO) to Dep SACEUR, for Dep Ch Plans Ofcr (DCPO), 11 Aug 1954, sub: Emergency Defense Plan, 1955, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH; Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on the Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years, 18 Nov 1954, NATO Strategy Documents, 1949–1969, Historians files, CMH.}

Successive plans moved the defense forward, eventually settling on a line defined by the Lech River in the south and the Weser in the north. Ultimately, while the addition of German divisions would help to make a forward defense possible, many leaders believed that they might require even more reinforcements to enable such a strategy. To them, the Rhine still appeared to be the best place to establish the main line of defense. The USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, allowed that his command would no longer have to double-time back to the Rhine River, and he guaranteed that it could make an act of aggression against West Germany a very costly venture.\footnote{Richard L. Kugler, \textit{NATO’s Future Conventional Defense Strategy in Central Europe: Theater Employment Doctrine for the Post–Cold War Era} (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Arroyo Center, 1992), p. 11; James Quigley, “McAuliffe Says Buildup Moves Defense Line East of Rhine,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 13 Apr 1955. For more detail on SHAPE and USAREUR considerations regarding the effect of a West German contribution on NATO battle plans, see Trauschweizer, \textit{The Cold War U.S. Army}, pp. 37–42.}
The plan to withdraw to the Rhine was vexing to the Germans in another way. U.S. forces had prepared detailed demolition plans for use in the event of a Soviet attack. Prior to their withdrawal, Seventh Army units expected to destroy as much usable war material and transportation infrastructure as they could, to demolish bridges, airfields, oil supplies, and anything else that might be of military value to the enemy. Especially critical targets for demolition were bridges over major rivers and hard-surfaced aircraft runways over three thousand feet in length. If hard structures such as these were to be destroyed expeditiously, they had to be prepared ahead of time. Engineers had to bore special holes, called chambers, in locations where they could place the explosive devices to produce the most damage. In many cases, German civilians in the vicinity of the projects bitterly opposed the activity because the preparations seemed a clear indication that the Americans were going to abandon them. Others protested the destruction of such important landmarks and transportation arteries under any circumstances. In several cases protesters damaged construction equipment on a site or sabotaged the chambers themselves.59

Under these pressures, USAREUR revised its policies and adopted a more conciliatory attitude. General Hoge met with Gebhardt Mueller, Minister President of Baden-Württemberg, and agreed to defer work on twelve projects in Stuttgart, Mannheim, Heilbronn, and Heidelberg. In Wetzlar, a mob of eighty persons destroyed partially completed chambers on two bridges, leading Hoge to defer work on those as well. When the Minister President of Bavaria, Hans Erhard, also requested a delay in chambering programs, USAREUR tried to draw a line. The command considered demolition preparations for three bridges over the Main River in the vicinity of Bamberg to be essential to its defense plans. Nevertheless, negotiations with German local authorities and political leaders proved fruitless and, once the Federal Republic of Germany gained sovereignty, advance preparations for demolitions came to an end. After some consideration, USAREUR shifted much of the responsibility for preparing demolition sites to the new German Army. By that time, USAREUR had completed 322 of the 381 projects it considered essential to its defensive plans.60

The issue of greatest concern to many Germans was NATO’s increasing reliance on atomic weapons as the cornerstone of its defensive plans. For several years, Communist propaganda had played on Europeans’ fears of what an atomic war might mean for their homelands. If any doubt remained, NATO


Exercise **Carte Blanche** in June 1955 erased it. In what was predominantly an air maneuver designed to test communications, command and control, air defense, and counterstrike doctrine, opposing forces dropped 335 atomic bombs in a mock battle in West Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Exercise umpires estimated that the simulated attacks resulted in almost 2 million dead and 3.5 million wounded even before the effects of radioactive contamination came into account.\(^{61}\)

The estimate aroused a firestorm. Up until **Carte Blanche**, there had been little public comment about the implications of a potential defense of Western Europe based on tactical atomic weapons. After it, however, the floodgates opened. Substantial discussion began among the European allies and within the international media on what would occur. Fritz Erler, the opposition Social Democratic Party speaker in the German Parliament questioned the relevance of German participation in Western Europe’s defense if Germany was going to be devastated by atomic weapons anyway. Chancellor Adenauer called the **Carte Blanche** report “frightening,” and felt he was being stabbed in the back by his potential allies as he worked to make German participation in NATO a reality. In critiques of subsequent NATO exercises, the Germans questioned the excessive use of atomic weapons against what they considered inappropriate targets. They expressed particular concern about their use in areas where NATO policy had encouraged civilians to remain in their homes to prevent large flows of refugees.\(^{62}\)

For their part, many Americans appeared callous or indifferent to German concerns. One USAREUR political adviser, Allen B. Moreland, warned that the command had to be more careful in publicizing exercises like **Carte Blanche** because it would embarrass Federal Republic authorities who were trying to pass legislation authorizing a German armed force. He noted that the German people were sensitive to discussions of the potential use of atomic weapons. While a sound argument could be made that they needed to be educated to the facts of life, he said, it might be a little too early to begin the lessons. Moreland concluded by noting that he was only recommending the limitation of publicity, not any modification of the exercises themselves.\(^{63}\)

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\(^{63}\) Memo, Allen B. Moreland, Political Adviser, for Dep Ch of Staff for Opns, 20 Aug 1955, sub: Elimination of Publicity in Germany on Atomic Destructiveness, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
Highlighting West Germany’s sovereign independence, Chancellor Adenauer embarked on a trip to Moscow in September 1955 to establish full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In the process, he not only laid the groundwork for future trade negotiations, he also secured the release of more than nine thousand German prisoners of war. The release was of such importance to the German people that it increased the chancellor’s political stature in both East and West Germany. Western intelligence analysts concluded that if Adenauer had made no secret concessions to the Soviets, West Germany’s position within the alliance remained secure. That said, it was equally clear that the nation’s automatic compliance with all Western policies and initiatives could no longer be taken for granted.64

Reaching an Uneasy Equilibrium

Up until 1955, much of the U.S. military activity in Europe had come in response to Soviet provocations. During most of that time, the Soviets seemed to have the initiative in the ongoing East-West confrontation. Throughout 1955, however, USAREUR’s continued development of a doctrine based on the use of atomic weapons, its buildup of atomic-capable units, and the recognition, imminent rearmament, and almost immediate acceptance of West Germany into the NATO alliance put the Soviet Union at enough of a disadvantage that it had to respond.

Its initial response was political, to create its own alliance for mutual defense. On 14 May 1955, only four days after the Western allies formally recognized West Germany, the Soviet Union announced the formation of an East European alliance system known as the Warsaw Pact. The nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania signed a multinational Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which was identical to their existing bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union. Although the alliance only legitimized military relationships that already existed, it provided the Soviet Union with a more efficient structure for dealing with its allies and an official counterweight to NATO in East-West diplomacy. Four months later, on 20 September, representatives from the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union signed a treaty restoring sovereignty to East Germany.65


From that point on, Western recognition of the German Democratic Republic became one of the most important aims of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets believed that this would achieve two important goals. First, it would formally end the occupation period and terminate the rights of the Western powers in Berlin. Second, it would officially recognize the existence of two German states and would postpone indefinitely, if not permanently, movements for German unification. In the end, it was this latter point that became the most important. The U.S. ambassador to West Germany, Conant, reported that, at a July summit conference in Geneva, the Soviets were unwilling even to discuss the prospect or to make any concessions that related to German unification.

Whatever temporary hopes the “Spirit of Geneva” had engendered dissipated in renewed conflict and controversy over Berlin as the Soviets tried to force the West to recognize the eastern sector of the city as the capital of the German Democratic Republic. Thus, they could argue that East Berlin was no longer occupied, and that, henceforth, all people entering East Berlin would be subject to the laws of East Germany. The Soviets also turned over to the East Germans control over their own frontiers, including the border between East and West Germany, access points into Berlin and between East and West Berlin, and lines of communications between West Berlin and West Germany. The three Western allies responded that the agreements between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic did not relieve the Soviets of their obligations and responsibilities under the existing four-power agreements pertaining to Germany and Berlin.

Although the Soviets continued a propaganda campaign designed to enhance the prestige of the East German government and to force international recognition, their actions consistently stopped short of any direct violation of the four-power agreements. In early December, for example, when the East Germans arrested two U.S. soldiers involved in a street fight in East Berlin, they quickly turned their prisoners over to Soviet military authorities. Three days later, after the customary exchange of protests and accusations, the Soviets released the two men to U.S. custody. When Communist propaganda


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Nonetheless, U.S. intelligence analysts continued to keep a watchful eye on military developments in the Soviet Union and East Germany. The size of the Soviet Army and its mobilization potential remained stable, with 175 combat ready divisions and a capability to raise and equip an additional 125 from trained reserves and existing stocks of equipment. Analysts noted that, since World War II, Soviet production of modern weapons and equipment had continued at a much higher level than what the nation required to replace its losses. As a result, they said, the Soviets had accumulated sufficient stockpiles to support 175 divisions in combat for a period of one year without drawing from current production. In addition to stationing twenty-two of their own divisions in the German Democratic Republic, the Soviets provided modern tanks, armored vehicles, equipment, and training to an East German Army whose numbers exceeded one hundred thousand.\footnote{Memo, R Adm Edwin T. Layton, Dep Dir for Intel, for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 Feb 1955, sub: Soviet Ground Forces Mobilization Potential, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH; “Bonn Reports Russ Increasing Strength of East German Army,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 1 Feb 1955. For a more nuanced appraisal of Soviet attempts to coordinate the military efforts of its disparate Warsaw Pact allies, see Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma, eds., NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2008).}

The Soviet military also found it necessary to respond to U.S. initiatives in the area of military doctrine. As with the Americans, the Soviets started to emphasize the use of atomic weapons in their organization and training. They had reduced the size of their divisions from ten thousand to seven thousand men and had begun training in smaller, more mobile formations designed to operate in an atomic environment. They replaced older World War II–vintage towed-artillery and heavy mortars with more mobile rocket launchers, recoilless guns, and armored self-propelled guns. Documents obtained by U.S. intelligence agencies indicated that Soviet units in East Germany were training in both offensive and defensive operations in a simulated atomic environment.\footnote{Msgs, DA, G–2, to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Aug 1955, Ref DA–986091; and USAREUR to Standard Distribution, 8 Aug 1955, Ref SX–1670. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. “Buildup of A-Army Reported in E. Zone,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 19 Nov 1955.}
By 1955, the dividing line between East and West Germany, as well as the border between West Germany and Czechoslovakia, had become clearly defined with fences, minefields, patrols, and signs warning approaching personnel. Nonetheless, violations on both sides were commonplace. Spot reports filed by U.S. border patrols or the German Bundesgrenzschutz described frequent incursions by Communist military personnel, usually to harass civilians working nearby, with occasional shots being fired. U.S. soldiers were also guilty of illegal border crossings, sometimes to taunt East German guards, at others to take pictures of themselves in Communist territory. In many cases, the Americans would find themselves in the custody of Soviet or East German military authorities. In many cases, the incident would escalate to such proportions that it would have to be resolved by senior military and diplomatic officials.\textsuperscript{71}

To many USAREUR and Seventh Army leaders, it was clear that the East-West confrontation had evolved. Although the two great military machines faced each other across the inter-German border, the Cold War had become more of a political struggle than military. It was time to rein in some of the more free-spirited behavior of the U.S. soldiers. In response to complaints about U.S. infractions along the autobahn leading into Berlin, General Uncles, the USAREUR chief of staff, promised a re-emphasis on regulations for those traveling to Berlin and harsher punishments for violations. The USAREUR Information and Education Division produced a bulletin describing the risks involved in illegal border crossings and directed unit commanders to present the instruction to all of their troops. An American soldier, the lesson concluded, was of little value to his country while spending time in a Communist prison.\textsuperscript{72}

General McAuliffe captured something of the Army's new role when he wrote to the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, requesting a change in his instructions. While he recognized the traditional duty of a soldier to escape after capture by an armed enemy, he pointed out that the situation in Europe differed greatly from a shooting war. The United States, just as it controlled its own borders, recognized the right of Soviet and satellite governments to prescribe who might or might not enter their territory. Therefore, it was unrealistic to instruct U.S. personnel to attempt to escape from police or military authorities who had jurisdiction over those geographic areas. Moves of the sort, he said, might result in acts of violence that could render negotiations for return impossible and lead to more serious confrontations. Taylor concurred in McAuliffe's assessment, allowing only that USAREUR had to take special

\textsuperscript{71} Msg, CG, Seventh Army, to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Oct 1955; Ltr, Riedl, Ministerialrat, to American Consulate General Section for Public Safety, 22 Sep 1955; Memo, Col Gilbert J. Check, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, for Ch of Staff, 20 Oct 1955, sub: Border Incident. All in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

\textsuperscript{72} Ltrs, Maj Gen Charles L. Dasher, U.S. Cdr, Berlin, to Maj Gen John F. Uncles, USAREUR Ch of Staff, 21 Nov 1955; and Uncles to Dasher, 14 Dec 1955. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP. HQ, USAREUR, Information Branch, Attention: 50 Meters to Border, 2 Sep 1955, Entry 2282, USAREUR Information Division General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
precautions to keep individuals with knowledge of sensitive information from putting themselves into positions where they risked detention.73

Thus, while the U.S. Army in Europe carried on with its mission to prepare for war against the armies of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the nature of the confrontation had begun to change. While the threat had always been more political than military in nature, the increasing readiness of U.S. and NATO forces in Europe had made the chances for armed conflict appear even more remote. The West’s increasing reliance on atomic weapons and the imminent arrival of reinforcements in the form of German divisions raised the stakes in any Communist calculation of what would constitute a successful attack. Although few could foresee a circumstance where the Soviets would actually risk military action, the West’s increased military strength would also make it less vulnerable to the threats and intimidation that had become a staple of Communist foreign policy.

73 Msgs, CINCUSAREUR, signed McAuliffe, to DA, for Taylor, 20 Jul 1955, Ref SX–1362; and DA, from Ch of Staff, to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Aug 1955, Ref DA–986344. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
As early as 1953, USAREUR and Seventh Army training exercises had aimed to instruct commanders and their staffs in the employment of atomic weapons and to instill in the troops an atomic mindedness that accepted the munitions as part of the modern battlefield. Under President Eisenhower, the Army had tried to make a virtue out of necessity, emphasizing the use of rockets and missiles with atomic warheads as a way to achieve more battlefield killing power for less money, quite literally a bigger bang for the buck. Then, in 1956 and 1957, the service took the next logical step, designing its entire force structure around its atomic arsenal. Although the Army conducted a series of tests of the new pentomic division in the United States, the logical proving ground for the new organization was Europe, where the troops of the Seventh Army had already begun preparing to use atomic weapons in a defense against Soviet invasion. With the reorganization of its divisions designed to function on an atomic battlefield, the Seventh Army began a series of tests that epitomized its search for a way to fight outnumbered and win.

The “Spirit of Geneva” Evaporates

The four-power summit in Geneva in July 1955 had caused some to anticipate a thaw in relations between the East and the West. American intelligence analysts believed that the hardening of Western will and resistance to Communist expansionism had forced a shift in Soviet foreign policy. Local military aggression in Europe or in some other theater would lead to general war, which was something Soviet leaders wished to avoid. The analysts noted the recent conclusion of the peace treaty with Austria, signs of a willingness to accept some Western positions on disarmament, a reduced hostility in Soviet propaganda, and increased Eastern bloc contacts with the West as indications that the Soviets wished better relations. NATO military planners, as well, perceived a somewhat diminished threat, at least until Soviet nuclear strength achieved relative parity with the United States.¹

As if to demonstrate their good intentions, in June 1956, the Soviets announced major troop reductions throughout their entire armed forces and withdrawals from East Germany. The move included the elimination of sixty-three divisions and brigades and an overall reduction of approximately 1.2 million men. At the same time, allied leaders received formal invitations from the Soviets to observe the withdrawal of 33,500 troops from East Germany at the end of the month.²

Western analysts and military leaders, however, placed little stock in the partial demobilization. The massive Soviet ground force, they believed, could easily absorb such a reduction without losing any significant offensive capability. Moreover, they assured civilian political leaders that Soviet air defense systems, submarine forces, and long-range aviation would take no such losses. In his turn, the chairman of West Germany’s Supreme Military Council, General Adolf Heusinger, called the withdrawals from East Germany of no real importance. The divisions involved, he said, could easily return to Germany on very short notice.³

Events in Eastern Europe during the second half of 1956 made clear just how illusory any post-Geneva spirit of goodwill might have been. In late June,

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Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, serving as Poland’s Minister of National Defense, ordered his armed forces to put down labor strikes that had broken out in Poznan. In doing so, the Communist forces killed between fifty and one hundred workers while wounding hundreds more. More than three hundred, whom the Communists believed to be leaders and instigators of the strike, were arrested.4

Four months later, emboldened by Poland’s struggle for more independence and inspired by U.S.-sponsored Voice of America and Radio Free Europe broadcasts, Hungarians rose up in rebellion against their own Soviet-controlled government. Instigated by university students in Budapest but soon spreading to cities and citizens across Hungary, the revolt quickly expanded beyond the point where it could be controlled by the Hungarian Army or by Soviet military forces stationed there. When a new provisional government threatened to conduct free elections and to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets intervened in force. On 4 November, under the direction of Marshal Georgy Zhukov, Soviet Defense Minister, and Marshal Ivan Konev, Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, Soviet tank divisions entered Hungary

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to regain control. Soviet troops occupied all major cities and seized control of airports and train stations, radio stations, supply and weapons depots, and other military and strategic objectives. Hungarian resistance ended on 10 November with approximately twenty-five hundred killed and more than two hundred thousand refugees.\(^5\)

Despite pleas for assistance from resistance leaders within Hungary, President Eisenhower chose not to intervene. He believed that any overt support to the resistance might prompt an even more severe response from the Soviets. Instead, he preferred to rely on propaganda, psychological warfare, and occasional covert operations to maintain pressure on the Soviets. Given Hungary’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and the inability of U.S. forces to reach that nation without traversing neutral Austria, Titoist Yugoslavia, or Communist Czechoslovakia, the United States could do little. The North Atlantic Treaty bound its members to come to each other’s mutual defense; it contained no provision for taking offensive action. Without national or international support, USAREUR had few options. Other than some humanitarian support for refugees fleeing the embattled Eastern European countries, U.S. forces in Europe took no action in response to the Soviet crackdown.\(^6\)

Adding a further complication, on 31 October, French and British military forces began a joint operation to seize the Suez Canal and to assist Israeli military operations against Egypt. Eisenhower believed the attacks were ill-advised and vowed that there would be no U.S. involvement in the hostilities. The participation of two NATO allies in the adventure caused some in the U.S. Congress to question the future of the alliance.\(^7\)


The crises in Hungary, Poland, and the Middle East caused American political and military leaders to reassess not only the United States’ relationships with its European allies and the Soviet Union, but also the mission of U.S. military forces in Europe. The NATO allies agreed that Soviet actions were as brutal as ever and had dissipated any illusion of reduced tension in Europe. American analysts argued that the harsh response in both countries underscored just how much Soviet control throughout its sphere depended on the presence of Soviet armed forces. It was, therefore, in the best interests of the United States to encourage any developments that might lead to the withdrawal of those forces from the satellite nations. U.S. policies should continue, they said, to promote movements in Eastern Europe that worked toward greater freedom without going so far as to provoke counteractions that would result in the suppression of “liberalizing” influences.8

As if to preclude any spread of revolutionary spirit into East Germany and Berlin, Soviet and East German military officials in Berlin introduced tighter controls on rail and road access from West Germany into the city. Increased harassments included searches of cargo on trains entering and leaving Berlin, removal of mailcars, confiscation of parcel post and freight shipments, and new demands for special clearances and paperwork for trains other than regularly scheduled shuttles for assigned personnel into and out of the city. On the autobahn, Soviet guards subjected Western traffic to intensive searches and delays. By the beginning of 1957, the guards were demanding to see identification cards for all travelers, a requirement that USAREUR had traditionally refused to observe. The U.S. command insisted that identification for the officer in charge of the convoy, proper travel orders, and troop manifests were all that inspectors needed to see. The showdown continued through 1957 with USAREUR limiting convoys into Berlin to the minimum necessary to maintain units stationed there.9

To Western observers, the situation in Berlin was becoming more ominous by the day. Visitors to the Western sector of the city reported a bustling economy, new housing and other construction springing up in all directions, and a population that was well-dressed, well-fed, and confident. In contrast, East Berlin seemed to be covered by a “thick, murky cloud of doom.”10 People still lined up on a regular basis for rations of daily necessities. Buildings, streets, and

9 HQ, USAREUR, Chief of Staff Weekly Meeting, 28 Nov 1956, Entry 2135, USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP; Memo, CINCEUR for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 Nov 1957, Ref # EC 9–6296, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP; Operations Division, HQ, USAREUR, The U.S. Army in Berlin, 1945–1961, Dec 1962, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives.
10 European Observations Rpt of Leon H. Gavin of Pennsylania, 11 Jan 1956, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549, NACP.
transportation facilities were run-down and shabby. Of even greater significance, thousands of refugees continued to stream through the city to find safe haven and greener pastures in the West. In November 1957, operatives of both the State Department and CIA reported persistent rumors that the East Germans intended to seal off the perimeter of West Berlin, isolating it from the eastern sector of the city as well as the rest of East Germany. The intent of such an action, they said, would be to “dissuade” Soviet Zone and Sector residents from entering West Berlin, and to route traffic from the Soviet Zone directly to East Berlin rather than through the western portion of the city. The Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged that they had no specific plans for dealing with a restriction on freedom of circulation within the city but seemed to dismiss its importance, asserting that neither the allies nor the citizens of West Berlin would be greatly hampered by the denial of facilities in East Berlin.11

In summing up the situation in Europe at the end of the year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to the secretary of defense that the Hungarian revolt, the situation in Berlin, and the Soviet Union’s resumption of policies of threat and intimidation had created a much less favorable climate for further East-West negotiations in Europe. Instead, the hardening Soviet attitude seemed to call for increased vigilance and the continued modernization of U.S. and NATO military forces.12

**Eisenhower Versus the Generals: The Army Struggles to Find a Role Within the New Look**

Meanwhile, back at home, the Army struggled to compete with the Navy and Air Force for funding, personnel, and a significant role in the Eisenhower administration’s national security establishment. Between the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the end of 1956, active Army strength had fallen from over 1.5 million to just over 1 million, and the doctrine of massive retaliation and its reliance on strategic nuclear forces had left the service with a steadily decreasing portion of the national defense budget. Between 1953 and 1955, the Army chief of staff, General Ridgway, had fought a losing battle against

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12 Memo, Gen Nathan F. Twining, Ch of Staff, USAF, for Sec Def, 26 Apr 1957, sub: U.S. Military Position on European Security and German Reunification, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH.
President Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson in an effort to preserve the Army’s role in national defense.\textsuperscript{13}

Ridgway’s successor as Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, faced the same challenges. To an ever-increasing extent, the Army’s senior officers believed that they were engaged in a struggle for the service’s survival. Their fears seemed justified in July 1956 when Anthony Leviero, a columnist for the \textit{New York Times}, revealed a plan proposed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur E. Radford, to cut the armed forces of the United States by eight hundred thousand men. In his position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Radford had become one of the most visible and vocal spokesmen for President Eisenhower’s strategic policies. His approach, which media commentators dubbed The Radford Plan, would reduce the Army by almost half, leaving it with the primary mission of keeping order within the United States in the event of an enemy atomic strike. Radford expected the NATO allies to provide the manpower for ground warfare, while USAREUR retained only small token forces armed with atomic weapons. He even questioned the Army’s expenditures on continental air defense, saying that the money would be better spent on improving early warning systems and retaliatory capabilities.\textsuperscript{14}

Notwithstanding Radford’s positions, the president’s most influential advocate for his vision of national defense was the secretary of defense. A highly successful businessman and former chief executive officer of General Motors, Wilson enthusiastically supported the president’s belief that defense spending should never be allowed to imperil the economic vigor of the nation. He seized on the Soviet force reductions to defend his own budget proposals and explained that the U.S. Army needed to reduce its size and to take advantage of new technologies and modern weapons. At the same time, he rejected requests to replace or update stocks of conventional weapons, vehicles, and equipment and


encouraged the new Army chief of staff, General Taylor, to submit requests for weaponry that were more in step with the administration’s strategic outlook.15

To Taylor, the Army’s greatest challenge was to demonstrate to the president, Congress, and the American public that the Army was a modernized force that had an important role to play on the atomic battlefield. At the same time, the general also firmly believed that the service had to retain and update its conventional forces in order to respond to confrontations short of general war. In this respect, he had to walk a fine line, extolling before Congress and the American public the force’s flexibility and responsiveness to smaller brushfire wars while also remaining well aware of the president’s guidance that he would authorize the use of tactical atomic weapons in any conflict in which the United States became engaged. In the face of continued personnel and budget reductions, Taylor struggled to limit the damage and to find new service roles that would justify additional funding.16
To an extent, he seized on the administration’s fascination with modern weaponry to ensure that, at the very least, Army research and development projects could go forward. Recalling his service’s post–World War II round up of German scientists as part of Operation PAPERCLIP, he publicized Army progress in the development of surface-to-surface missiles such as the Redstone and Jupiter. Noting that modern aircraft would soon fly too high to be engaged by conventional antiaircraft weapons, he also promoted funding for the service’s search for an effective response. The Nike surface-to-air missile was the result. Although some of the Army’s missile projects competed with similar programs underway in the Navy and Air Force, most generated enough interest in Congress and in the Defense Department to allow the service to continue its research.17

Years of intense interservice debate, however, forced Secretary of Defense Wilson to clarify the various services’ roles and responsibilities in the employment of missiles and other long-range weapons. In a November 1956 memorandum issued to the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the secretary settled a number of issues. He limited Army development and use of surface-to-surface missiles to those with a range of two hundred miles or less, with the idea that such weapons would be employed within the army and corps boundaries. The Air Force gained exclusive control over the operational employment of long- and intermediate-range missiles, but the secretary allowed Army research and development on its intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Jupiter, to continue. Wilson’s decision also expanded the Army’s role in antiaircraft defense, assigning it responsibility for the development, procurement, and manning of air-defense missiles with a horizontal range of one hundred miles or less for close-in defense. This ruling cleared the way for further improvements in the Army’s Nike family of missiles and, for the first time, gave the service a major role in providing air defense for the continental United States.18

It was equally important to the Army chief of staff to show how an atomic age Army could fight on the modern battlefield. With this in mind, the service also introduced the Lacrosse guided missile, the Little John rocket, and the

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Dart guided antitank missile. The addition of these weapons to the inventory, and the Army’s focus on developing even more, led some observers to predict the imminent demise of traditional field artillery. The service also developed improved versions of many of its conventional vehicles and equipment, including new models of tanks and armored personnel carriers, but those drew considerably less interest from the public and the administration.19

While the new weapons were still in their early stages of development, the Army had already begun work on redesigning its force structure to demonstrate its atomic capabilities and potential. Under pressure from the Department of Defense to reduce the size of the Army’s units and its overall manpower in 1954, General Ridgway had directed the chief of Army Field Forces, General John E. Dahlquist, to study the problem with several objectives in mind. Those

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Achieving Atomic Mindedness

included increasing the ratio between combat and support units, achieving greater flexibility and mobility in combat units, maximizing the effects of technological advancements, and improving the force’s capability to sustain itself for extended periods in combat. Ridgway reinforced the idea that Army commanders were assured the use of available atomic weapons support. By the fall of 1954, Army Field Forces had produced the outline for a new division structure that it labeled the Atomic Field Army (ATFA).20

The ATFA studies produced mixed results. The experimental organization reduced and consolidated many of the service and support elements, reduced the size of the division artillery, and cut the number of infantry battalions in the infantry division from nine to seven. Instead of the previous organization of three infantry regiments, infantry divisions were to create task forces as the situation required, under the direction of smaller combat command headquarters. The reorganization cut nearly four thousand men from the infantry division and almost twenty-seven hundred from the armored division. In 1955, tests of the 3d Infantry Division in Exercise Follow Me and the 1st Armored Division in Exercise Blue Bolt indicated that, while the concepts held some promise, they required a great deal of new equipment, especially radios and personnel carriers, before the Army could implement a complete reorganization. Also, many officers throughout the service were reluctant to let go of traditional organizations and doctrines with which they were more familiar. Nonetheless, the ATFA studies served as a point of departure for Taylor’s own consideration of a new organization and doctrine for the Army. His experience during the Korean War had already caused him to consider potential changes in the Army’s combat structure. As chief of staff, he now faced the dilemma of maintaining as much of the Army’s combat strength as possible in the face of looming budget and personnel cuts.21

The result was the pentomic organization. Instead of the traditional three regiment triangular division of World War II, or the even older four-regiment square division of World War I, General Taylor envisioned a division composed of five self-contained formations called battle groups. Smaller than a regiment but larger than a battalion, each of these groups would consist of four rifle companies, a 4.2-inch mortar battery, and a company containing headquarters and service support elements. An infantry battle group would have an authorized strength of 1,356 soldiers while an airborne battle group would be slightly larger at a strength of 1,584. The new pentomic division would consolidate the division artillery into two battalions. One would be a


Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

105-mm. howitzer battalion with five batteries, the other a mixed battalion fielding two 155-mm. howitzer batteries, an 8-inch howitzer battery, and an Honest John rocket battery. The latter two were nuclear systems that would give the division its primary offensive punch. One of the most important principles of the restructuring was the elimination from division control of all nonessential elements by removing much of the force’s support base, including transportation, supply, and aviation, which became the responsibility of corps and higher headquarters. Given anticipated personnel cuts, perhaps the most important result of the restructuring, in General Taylor’s view, would be a reduction of the authorized strength of the Army’s infantry and airborne divisions. Under the new organization, the infantry division would shrink from 18,804 to 13,748 men and the airborne division from 17,490 to 11,486. Because Army leaders believed that the capabilities of the armored divisions already met the requirements of the atomic battlefield, the strength and organization of those units would change little.22

Taylor saw the pentomic organization as ideally suited for fighting an atomic war. The five subordinate battle groups in each of its divisions enabled the force to disperse in greater width and depth than was possible with a traditional, more compact, three-regiment organization. Companies within the battle groups could also spread out, so that no single element presented a lucrative target for an atomic attack. Taylor believed that improved communications equipment would allow division commanders to exert more direct control over their separated units than in the past. He also contended that new armored personnel carriers that would soon join the force would afford the mobility to enable the formations to converge rapidly and to exploit opportunities provided by atomic fire support.23

Although other senior officers in the Army questioned whether the new equipment could deliver what Taylor expected, the general pushed on with his plans. The first division to undergo reorganization under the pentomic concept, the newly reactivated 101st Airborne Division, began its training in the fall of 1956 at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. After a series of tests and exercises in the United States, Taylor announced in May 1957 that all infantry and airborne divisions would complete a conversion to the pentomic model by the middle of 1958. Once again, many officers remained reluctant to embrace the new organization and the changes in doctrine it entailed. Taylor and his

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Achieving Atomic mindedness

Staff actively engaged in a campaign to convince them. In a meeting with Army school commandants to sell them on the reorganization he noted that the doctrine of massive retaliation had reduced the likelihood of a general nuclear war, but there was still a chance that smaller, nonnuclear conflicts would arise out of local aggression. The Army had to be prepared for these small wars as well as for nuclear confrontations. Taylor believed that the new divisions, although controversial, could meet both challenges. Left unsaid was his conviction that the new organization would show the American public a modern, forward-thinking Army and restore the service to a meaningful place in New Look defense policy.24

New Leadership in USAREUR

In Europe, the challenge of adapting to the fiscal and strategic policies of the New Look had passed on to new leaders. Most of the original leadership that had brought the Seventh Army back to Europe had long since moved on. Their successors, however, possessed equally impressive credentials and had served with distinction during World War II and the Korean War.

In the Seventh Army, General Henry I. Hodes had taken command in December 1954. Like his predecessors, he had considerable combat experience. He had commanded the 112th Infantry of the 28th Infantry Division throughout the campaigns in France and Germany and then led the 24th Infantry Division in Korea. After serving as the commandant of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he had come to Europe in March 1954 to command the VII Corps. Eight months later, when General McAuliffe moved on to USAREUR, Hodes assumed command of the Seventh Army. After eighteen months in that position, in May 1956, he followed the normal progression and succeeded McAuliffe as USAREUR commander.25

Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke succeeded Hodes as commander of the Seventh Army. Clarke had led combat commands in the 4th and 7th Armored Divisions during World War II and had earned praise during the Battle of the Bulge for his defense of the area around St. Vith in the face of multiple German attacks. He had also commanded the 2d Constabulary Brigade in occupied Germany from August 1949 through March 1951. There, he was instrumental in establishing the Constabulary Noncommissioned Officers Academy, which became a model

25 HQ, USAREUR, Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conference, 10 May 1956, Entry 2135, USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP.
for later enlisted service schools throughout the Army. He later commanded the I Corps in Korea.26

One of the most colorful general officers in the Army, Clarke was also one of the most polarizing. His supreme confidence in his own capabilities as a trainer and his conviction that his methods were the best way to develop combat readiness left little leeway for opposing philosophies or independent approaches. His frequently cited credo was that a unit only did well those things that the commander checked. Toward that end, Clarke expected each commander to carry with him at all times a detailed assessment of his unit. They were to update this assessment daily in more than thirty areas, including training, discipline, maintenance, morale, and community relations. During his frequent visits to subordinate units, he personally inspected the assessments and ensured that each commander forwarded a copy of the self-appraisal to the next higher headquarters. He instructed his subordinate commanders to use the self-appraisals as a checklist when preparing efficiency reports on their junior officers.27

27 Ibid.; Interv, Col Francis B. Kish with Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, pp. 174–75, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI. Memo, Col Harold H. Newman, Adj Gen, for COs of Each Combat Command, Group, Regiment, Battalion, Separate Company, and Battery, 14 Aug 1956, sub: Report of Unit Commanders to the Army Commander; HQ, Seventh Army,
Clarke’s various checklists soon became famous throughout the Seventh Army. In October 1956, after only a few months in command, he distributed a detailed, multipage checklist to be used by units during field training. He directed unit commanders to use the checklist in preparing for training tests and to have umpires, controllers, or other staff officers use such forms to evaluate training each time the unit went to the field. The checklists were to be completed in duplicate, with one copy going to the unit commander and the other to the next higher headquarters. The general also had detailed checklists for conducting unit training tests and for preparing operational orders. He told his officers that a detailed checklist would prove invaluable in a time of pressure by enabling commanders to plan with speed instead of haste.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{28} Memos, Maj Gen William W. Dick, Ch of Staff, for Seventh Army Distribution, 6 Jun 1956, sub: Remarks by the Army Commander; Lt Gen Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army Cdr, for Distribution, 8 Oct 1956, sub: Field Training Exercise Checklist; and Capt Albert Emry Jr.,
Clarke believed that his greatest contribution to the training of the Seventh Army would be to make it more realistic. To that end, instead of generating the Army-wide practice alerts from his own headquarters, he saw to it that initial alarms originated from border outposts, which would be the first to observe an actual attack. At the same time, he applied many traditional educational concepts, breaking the training process into four steps: explanation, demonstration, practical application, and examination. He felt that the Army did well on the first two but spent too little time on practicing a desired skill and almost none on examination. Throughout his tour he pushed individual soldiers and units to show that they had thoroughly mastered the tasks they had been taught.29

Many officers found Clarke’s manner to be abrasive and felt his approach left little room for initiative from his subordinates. Clarke’s successor, General Clyde Eddleman, had little use for the leadership philosophies and aphorisms his predecessor had posted on walls throughout his command. When briefed on Clarke’s system of imposed self-evaluations, Eddleman wondered aloud why the general bothered to inspect at all. Clarke’s chief of staff, the future Army chief of staff, Harold K. Johnson, perhaps summed up his boss best when he observed that General Clarke knew more about training than any officer he had ever known, and practiced it less.30

The Effect of Funding Cuts on USAREUR

In 1956, after four years of the Eisenhower administration, the Army was beginning to feel the full effects of the personnel and budget cuts the New Look had established. Although the Army did its best to shield the force in Europe from the worst of the reductions, USAREUR stood out as one of its largest and most expensive commands. Its new leaders would have to deal with reduced resources as they continued to prepare the command for the defense of Western Europe.

Major cuts came twice in 1956. In May, the Department of the Army imposed an enlisted manning level of 92.2 percent of USAREUR’s authorized strength. This amounted to a reduction of more than eleven thousand troops. Six months later, the level fell to 85.3 percent of authorized strength. The USAREUR commander, General Hodes, applied the cuts equally over all units but exempted the five divisions of the Seventh Army: the 4th and 10th Infantry

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29 Interv, Kish with Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, pp. 175–76; HQ, Seventh Army, Remarks by the Army Commander, Army Commanders’ Conference, 31 Jul 1956, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

30 Interv, Smith and Swindler with Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, p. 31.
Divisions, the 11th Airborne Division, and the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions, and the 6th Infantry in Berlin.31

With the divisions exempted, the cuts fell heavily on headquarters and staff sections. Both USAREUR and the Seventh Army canvassed their extensive staff elements to identify where the cuts should occur. Then, on 1 January 1957, the Department of the Army reduced the USAREUR headquarters authorization from 2,971 spaces to 2,438, a cut of 15.8 percent in military personnel and 20.5 percent in civilians. Subsequent reductions by the Department of Defense lowered this figure even further, leaving USAREUR headquarters with an authorized strength of 1,929 by the end of 1957. The Seventh Army’s and the Communications Zone’s headquarters and staffs experienced similar reductions. In all, USAREUR fell from over 246,000 troops in July 1956 to around 224,000 by December 1957.32

The most significant effect of the Army’s budget cuts on U.S. forces in Europe, however, was a limit on the amount of gasoline USAREUR could purchase. Although the commands had no real shortage of fuel as a commodity, and no shortages in war reserve stocks, USAREUR and the Seventh Army had to cut their consumption of gasoline due to a lack of funds to pay for it. In April 1956, the USAREUR assistant chief of staff for logistics directed a 60 percent reduction in the command’s fuel consumption. A short time later, by transferring funding from other sources he was able to increase the availability of fuel up to 70 percent of normal usage.33

The restrictions had an enormous effect on unit readiness and training. The Seventh Army was forced to cancel many of its monthly practice alerts and to limit vehicle movement during its training exercises. In September 1957, the Seventh Army chief of staff directed units to allow only wheeled vehicles to participate in practice alerts. Since tracked vehicles burned far more fuel, they were left at home until restrictions could be lifted. Looking for additional ways to conserve gasoline, the Seventh Army commander, General Clarke, instructed units to limit administrative trips and to combine and consolidate those that absolutely had to be made.34

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31 Annual Hist Rpts, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 38–39, and 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 46–56, both in Historians files, CMH; Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 14 Jun 1956, sub: Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conference, Entry 2135, USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP.


33 Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 25 Apr 1956, Chief of Staff’s Weekly Staff Conference, Entry 2135, USAREUR Weekly Staff Conferences, 1956, RG 549, NACP; Transcript, HQ, Seventh Army, 20 Dec 1956, sub: Remarks by the Army Commander, Army Commanders’ Conference, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

34 Memo, Col Milburn N. Huston, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 26 Sep 1957, sub: Movement of Vehicles During Practice Alerts, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338,
The budget cuts also created shortfalls in funds available for the maintenance and upkeep of Army facilities in Europe. In October 1956, USAREUR announced a 10 percent reduction in money available for repairs and utilities in the upcoming fiscal year. Leaders throughout the command promoted conservation campaigns designed to reduce the use of heat, lights, fuel, and water. In a command letter, General Clarke reminded his soldiers that the cost of coal, electricity, and fuel was considerably higher in Europe than in the United States. He directed the appointment of a conservation officer in each group, regiment, and battalion to educate the troops and to enforce reductions in energy consumption. With less money available for basic upkeep, inspectors soon noted increases in buildings needing paint, light bulbs that needed to be changed, and other assorted repairs that remained uncompleted.35

At first glance, the cuts seemed likely to have a serious effect on the USAREUR service school system. Indeed, in July 1956, the command learned that it would receive funding for twenty thousand students for the coming fiscal year, against a projected requirement of thirty-two thousand. Working to resolve the shortfall, however, the USAREUR staff noted that as much as 10 percent of each quarter’s school allocations went unfilled. To remedy this, rather than assign quotas directly to units that often did not fill them, the command passed control over admissions to the schools themselves. The staff also canvassed unit commanders to determine which courses or schools could be eliminated or curtailed without a serious impact on readiness. It was then able to achieve further savings by reducing overhead costs, cutting the length of some classes, eliminating others, and consolidating several service schools. As a result, the school system was able to operate within its budget and graduated an average of over twenty thousand students each year.36

Training for Atomic Warfare

Shortly after assuming his position as Army chief of staff, General Taylor sent word to USAREUR communicating his desire to stress training in atomic warfare at all levels of command. Department of the Army guidance for the fiscal year 1957 training program in Europe was to base all training exercises on


35 Transcript, HQ, Seventh Army, 12 Oct 1956, sub: Remarks by the Army Commander, Army Commander’s Conference; Memos, Lt Gen Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh Army Cdr, for All Cdrs, Seventh U.S. Army, 28 Mar 1957, sub: Conservation; and Brig Gen Gerald F. Lillard, Arty Ofcr, for Ch of Staff, 5 Sep 1956, sub: Problems Raised by Units During Recent Visit of the Army Commander. All in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

situations where both U.S. and aggressor forces had tactical atomic weapons. At NATO headquarters, the supreme allied commander, General Norstad, had also begun to revise his battle plans around the early and optimum use of atomic weapons by all forces at his immediate disposal. The U.S. Army, Europe, had already anticipated the shift in doctrine and had included the employment of simulated atomic weapons and guided missiles in all of its major field exercises and maneuvers. Among other responsibilities, units had to be able to operate and protect themselves in a contaminated environment, exploit the opportunities provided by friendly atomic strikes, and conduct operations in widely dispersed formations in anticipation of enemy fire. Soldiers also learned how to decontaminate themselves and their equipment once they had cleared a contaminated area.37

Because knowledge of the tactical use, effects, and exploitation of atomic weapons was so important, particularly at lower echelons, the USAREUR assistant chief of staff for operations formed an ad hoc committee to study atomic training requirements and to make recommendations. The committee screened training tests and lesson plans from stateside service schools for materials it could use to improve USAREUR atomic training. It published a special circular on atomic warfare training that prescribed the standards of proficiency each individual was to have at his level of responsibility. It also produced a memorandum that specifically identified the responsibilities of each staff section if atomic warfare occurred. Throughout 1956, USAREUR and the Seventh Army hosted conferences highlighting the command’s atomic-capable weapons systems and providing attendees with opportunities to exchange ideas on the best ways to employ them.38

The Seventh Army also produced training literature outlining how it planned to fight an atomic war. In *Tactical Guidance for Atomic Warfare*, published in April 1956, leaders identified the requirements for dispersion and all-round security in an atomic environment. The document prescribed a mobile defense with battalions dispersed along dominant terrain, but prepared to concentrate rapidly to counterattack the enemy. Above all, defensive positions were to be


supported with integrated conventional and atomic fire support. Commanders would coordinate counterattacks with atomic strikes aimed to break up enemy concentrations.\(^3\)

The Seventh Army's increasing reliance on atomic firepower was evident in its conduct of field training exercises during the latter months of 1956. In early November, the V Corps participated in Exercise **SABRE KNOT**, which sought to train individuals and small units in the offensive and defensive use of atomic weapons and the evacuation of mass casualties caused by enemy attacks. The corps attached one 280-mm. gun battalion to each division and also placed one Honest John battery in direct support. Early phases of the exercise also included simulated detonation of atomic demolition munitions to create barriers and to help delay the enemy advance. As the five-day exercise proceeded, division and corps commanders launched thirty-six atomic strikes against aggressor forces. One month later, the VII Corps conducted a similar exercise, **WAR HAWK**, with the same training goals. In both cases, observers reported the usual deficiencies in communications, camouflage, and security. Observers and umpires also expressed special concern about the movement and logistical support of atomic units in such a potentially lethal environment. Their most significant finding was that control of atomic strikes had to be decentralized to division and corps

\(^3\) Memo, Lt Col Golden F. Evans, Asst Adj Gen, for Seventh Army Distribution, 2 Apr 1956, sub: Tactical Guidance for Atomic Warfare, Vertical File, MHI.
commanders. Control at higher levels prevented atomic support from keeping up with the tactical situation on the ground.40

The extensive use of the 280-mm. guns throughout the training exercises also revealed serious shortcomings in the command’s ability to keep them in service. Maintenance of the guns and their transporters proved to be a chronic and difficult problem. Due to the rotation of trained personnel and the absence of a formal training program for specialists in both the artillery and supporting ordnance battalions, many units lacked the qualified mechanics needed to keep the equipment running. As a stopgap solution, General Hodes directed the 42d Field Artillery Group to conduct a one-time unit school using its own ordnance instructors. That course of instruction, leaders hoped, would provide a large enough cadre of trained mechanics to cross-train personnel back in their original units and keep the equipment operational until they could adopt a more formal solution.41


Because so much atomic doctrine depended on communication and coordination between headquarters, staff elements, and support units, command post exercises were a particularly important component of USAREUR’s training. Exercise BEAR CLAW, a SHAPE-sponsored command post exercise held on 6–9 March 1956, appeared to substantiate ground commanders’ views that they needed greater authority over the use of atomic weapons allocated to them. The process for passing the release of atomic weapons down to the army and corps level was still too cumbersome. In July 1956, the Seventh Army conducted Command Post Exercise SUMMER STOCK, involving all regimental and higher headquarters and including those of the atomic delivery units. During the exercise, the Seventh Army tested the concept of a tactical support center with the intelligence, operations, and fire support staff sections all collocated in the same tent. Consolidation of the fire support coordination center for army artillery, the antiaircraft operations center, the Army aviation section flight operations center, the Army signal section electronic warfare center, the chemical weapons center, and the intelligence and operations air staffs, meanwhile, facilitated air support and antiaircraft operations. In August, Command Post Exercise CLEAN SWEET tested the ability of the Central Army Group and the Seventh Army to coordinate their staff functions in an atomic environment. Evaluators judged much of the training to be ineffective because of an unrealistic portrayal of the effects of enemy atomic weapons strikes. They declared estimates of projected losses to be untrustworthy because of the difficulty in gauging the effects of an enemy atomic attack. In response, Seventh Army leaders vowed that future exercises would incorporate much more severe losses and destruction.42

Not all of the Seventh Army’s training, however, dealt with atomic warfare. At lower levels, particularly within the infantry and armored battalions, much of the training remained focused on traditional operational concepts. Throughout the first half of 1956, for example, the 39th Infantry, 9th Division, engaged in a series of tests to evaluate possible ways to reorganize the infantry battalion. The goals of the project were to simplify training, tactics, and supply without increasing the size of the unit, and to reduce the types of weapons it employed without reducing its combat effectiveness. As part of the test, the regiment reorganized its 3d Battalion into several different configurations with varying complements of weapons. Based on their observations, division and regimental leaders forwarded several recommendations to Seventh Army headquarters. Although they tested companies with four rifle platoons, they concluded that problems with communications, command, and control greatly outweighed the additional firepower the extra platoon provided. Instead of assigning mortar

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Achieving Atomic Mindedness

and antitank sections directly to the rifle platoons, observers recommended retaining a heavy weapons company, consisting of two 81-mm. mortar platoons and one antitank platoon, within each infantry battalion.43

The group’s most important recommendations concerned what weapons, vehicles, and equipment the Army should normally assign to a battalion. The increased range and power of the 81-mm. mortar, it concluded, eliminated the need for the smaller 60-mm. mortar previously assigned to rifle platoons. The evaluators were almost unanimous in their suggestion that the .30-caliber carbine be eliminated and replaced by standard M1 rifles. Officers, they said, should only carry pistols because they had more important combat leadership tasks than acting as riflemen. Considerable debate arose concerning appropriate antitank weapons for the battalion. The new 106-mm. recoilless rifle was praised for its range and accuracy, but observers suggested that it was too hard to set up and too difficult to displace once it had revealed its location by firing. They agreed that rifle platoons needed a heavy line-of-sight weapon to engage enemy machine gun positions, but most believed that the smaller 57-mm. recoilless rifle was the best fit for that element. The test revealed other shortages in communications equipment and transport, and the evaluators suggested additional radios, antennae, and trucks to alleviate those concerns.44


44 Ibid.
American units also tested their readiness to work alongside their NATO allies. In March 1957, U.S. Army headquarters down to division and separate regiment level participated in NATO Exercise LION NOIR, designed to train all contingents in the Central European area in basic procedures and to test plans for bringing the international force up to a full wartime footing. This would also be the last major CENTAG exercise before Seventh Army divisions began their conversion to the pentomic organization. Also participating were headquarters and staff elements from the Central Army Group, the Fourth Tactical Air Force, the Portuguese 3d Infantry Division, a Luxembourg regimental team, and, for the first time, representatives from the nascent II German Corps. A critique conducted by CENTAG indicated that all staff elements needed more frequent participation in atomic planning to ensure greater familiarity with the procedures and the potential results. The review added that USAREUR did not allocate enough atomic weapons to allied and subordinate commands to allow for training at all levels. More ominous were observations that CENTAG defenses might not maintain their organization and cohesion in the face of atomic attacks expected ahead of a Soviet offensive.45

Although most of the Central Army Group’s comments on the exercise were fairly bland, those of representatives of the German Ministry of Defense were almost scathing. Participating for the first time in a full-scale NATO exercise, the Germans used Lion Noir as the basis for a comprehensive review of their own plans, procedures, and organization. They complained that the Seventh Army imposed excessive reporting requirements not in keeping with what was expected of other national forces. Furthermore, they said the exercise showed that supply levels for German forces were unrealistic and that the rapid enemy capture and destruction of Germany’s production base would require the nation’s forces to depend on other sources for logistical support. The Germans reserved their most pointed commentary, however, for the excessive use of atomic weapons throughout the simulation. In contrast to the U.S. critique that too few had been allocated, the Germans asked why atomic weapons would be used at all when the scenario presented no clear targets for them. Particularly vexing was U.S. and NATO reliance on atomic weapons on German territory when it was the alliance’s policy to limit the number of refugees and to encourage local populations to remain in their homes. The Germans expressed the belief that the United States and NATO should use atomic weapons only to attain a tactical objective that they could not take by other means.46

By the end of 1956 and into 1957, the United States and West Germany appeared to be going in opposite directions on the defense of Western Europe. With German infantry and armored divisions beginning their formal training and preparing to take their place in NATO’s defense plan, the Federal Republic expressed concerns about American reliance on atomic weapons. For their part, the Americans, constrained by the economics and force structure imposed by the Eisenhower administration’s strategic vision, had little choice but to become even more wedded to their atomic firepower.

**Pentomic Reorganization**

In March 1957, the Army announced plans to begin the conversion of its divisions in Germany to the new pentomic structure. Because of the successful tests conducted by the 101st Airborne Division in the United States, officials selected the 11th Airborne Division, a similar organization, to be the first USAREUR unit to convert. The 11th completed its restructuring by the end of April, forming five completely air-transportable battle groups. In so doing, however, it lost much of its heavy equipment and experienced a strength reduction of 5,500 men, falling from around 17,000 to approximately 11,500. Most of the surplus equipment and personnel were reassigned within the theater.47

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47 Memo, CSA for Joint Chiefs of Staff, on U.S. Forces in Germany, 11 Feb 1957, JCS 2124/183, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic Files, 1957, RG 218, NACP; HQ, Seventh Army, G–3 Training Jnl, Test of Airborne Capability of 11th Airborne Division Combat Groups, 26 Apr 1957, Entry 33505, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul
Less than one month later, the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, 11th Airborne Division, began a series of squad, platoon, and company exercises at the Hohenfels maneuver area. The training emphasized maneuvers in street and village fighting and provided troop leaders with some experience in dealing with the larger squads and platoons the new organization employed. In a departure from previous procedures, squad leaders took direct responsibility for the employment of platoon weapons such as machine guns and rocket launchers. Likewise, rifle platoon leaders experimented with direct command over sections of recoilless rifles and medium mortars. Leaders from Seventh Army headquarters and the other divisions observed these and other training exercises in preparation for the reorganization of the rest of the force.48

Reorganization of the Seventh Army’s other divisions took place even as those units continued their rotations as part of Operation Gyroscope. After the switch of the 3d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions in the summer of 1956, the Army returned to the effort’s original scheme, with the exchange of two like divisions. In October 1956, the 8th Infantry Division from Fort Carson, Colorado, took over from the 9th Division in the area around Göppingen. In 1957, USAREUR used the rotation of the 4th and 2d Armored Divisions to reorganize the Seventh Army and to deploy its more mobile armored divisions forward. As part of a three-way rotation, units of the 4th Armored Division began arriving in Germany in November 1957 and moved into billets around Göppingen, formerly occupied by the 8th Infantry Division. At the same time, the 8th Division moved to Bad Kreuznach, taking over facilities vacated by the 2d Armored Division when it departed for the United States. When the movement was complete, the 8th became a part of the V Corps, joining the 10th Infantry and the 3d Armored Divisions. The 4th combined with the 11th Airborne Division to form the VII Corps.49

With Gyroscope rotations complete, the divisions in Europe went on with their transformation to the pentomic model. The experiences of one unit, the 8th Infantry Division, indicated some of the concerns faced by unit commanders. The division’s commander, Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Watlington, took particular care in preparing his officers and noncommissioned officers for tactical
operations under the new organization. During the month prior to the unit’s reorganization, he directed each of his regiment and battalion commanders to conduct a series of lessons for the officers under their command. In a minimum of six hours of instruction, each leader was to discuss battle group operations in the attack, on the defensive, and in retrograde operations. Additional periods of instruction dealt with the organization of the division artillery, the division tank battalion, and the division cavalry reconnaissance squadron. The general assigned even more responsibilities to his infantry battalion commanders, directing them to conduct training for company-grade and noncommissioned officers in rifle company tactics, fire support planning, and logistical support.\(^{50}\)

By the end of August, the division’s transformation was complete and the unit had begun training under its new configuration. Individual battle groups rotated through the major training site at Hohenfels to conduct squad and platoon exercises and range firing for crew-served weapons, such as machine guns, recoilless rifles, and mortars. The division headquarters and staff carried out Command Post Exercise SWAN SONG to test and practice the use of division communications nets, command and control techniques during displacements, and the concept of a pentomic infantry division in the attack.\(^{51}\)

By the end of 1957 the Seventh Army had completed its transformation. Under the new organizations, the infantry divisions were reduced by approximately 3,400 men to an authorized strength of about 13,750 men. The division artillery lost one 155-mm. and two 105-mm. howitzer battalions in exchange for one composite unit, consisting of two 155-mm. howitzer batteries, one 8-inch howitzer battery, and one Honest John rocket battery. While the infantry divisions lost their regimental tank companies, the former reconnaissance company was replaced by an armored cavalry battalion. Each division also lost one antiaircraft artillery battalion. The battalions involved, however, remained as nondivisional units, assigned to the corps or the army headquarters. To meet the requirements for reduced personnel strength, the organization pooled elements not habitually needed at the division level with corps and army echelons. Besides the armor and antiaircraft units, these included transport, supply, and some engineer units previously assigned to the division. The three armored cavalry regiments and the 4th Armored Group also underwent changes in keeping with the pentomic concept. They received

\(^{50}\) Memo, Maj Gen Thomas M. Watlington, 8th Inf Div Cdr, for CG, Div Arty, and CO, Each Regiment and Separate Battalion, 9 Jul 1957, sub: Training in Operations of Combat Elements of the ROCID [Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division] Division; Monthly Unit Chronology, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 5th Inf, 8th Inf Div, 2 Aug 1957; Memo, Col Lynn D. Smith, Ch of Staff, for All Staff Sections and Cdrs of Separate Companies, 24 May 1957, sub: Instruction on ROCID Organization. All in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

\(^{51}\) Training Memo 3, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 13th Inf, 28 Aug 1957; Memo, CWO Lenual C. Neal, Asst Adj, for CG, 8th Inf Div Arty; CO, Each Battle Group, Separate Battalion, and Separate Company; and Ch, Each General and Special Staff Section, 17 Aug 1957, sub: Initial Instructions Number 1, CPX SWAN SONG. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
ordnance-maintenance support and armored engineer units to give them an increased capacity for independent operations.\(^5^2\)

As the transition to the pentomic division progressed, some officers expressed doubts about some of the leadership responsibilities and personnel issues the new organization entailed. With helicopter companies and armored personnel carrier units moving from the division to the corps and army levels, leaders within the transportation corps suggested that their branch ought to control the administration and employment of those units. The USAREUR commander, General Hodes, countered that he considered both types of units to be combat oriented. As such, he said, they should be manned by people trained and experienced in the arts of firepower and maneuver. He accused the transportation corps of empire building. Armor officers expressed concern about logistical support for the separate tank battalions included in the pentomic infantry division. The division lacked the ammunition and fuel-hauling capacity that the armored elements required. The tankers also worried that infantry commanders would not understand how best to employ their assigned tanks.\(^5^3\)

Whatever reservations he might have had, Hodes did his best to encourage support for the new concepts throughout his command. He told his senior commanders that concerns about the new organization were unfounded and reflected a lack of understanding of its true capabilities. He assured them that the Army’s leaders had made the decision to reorganize only after careful analysis and that they recognized the United States could not fight World War III with the same organization and equipment it had employed during World War II. The Army’s decision to reduce manpower in favor of modern weaponry, he said, had been a conscious choice, for one atomic weapon had the same effect as several hundred battalions of conventional artillery fired at once. In that light, the reorganization of the divisions was a necessary and desirable move toward solving the problems of the atomic battlefield. Seventh Army and USAREUR exercises over the next few years would reveal whether or not the general’s optimism was warranted.\(^5^4\)


\(^{53}\) Memo, Maj Gen Ralph C. Cooper, Asst Ch of Staff, G–3, for Ch of Staff, 13 Dec 1957, sub: Branch Control of Armored Personnel Carrier Units and Helicopter Companies, Entry 2031, USAREUR Organization Planning Files, RG 549, NACP; Ltr, Lt Gen Charles E. Hart, CG, U.S. Army Air Defense Command, to Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice Ch of Staff, 16 Dec 1957, Lyman L. Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University, Fort McNair, D.C.; Final Rpt, HQ, V Corps, Seventh Army Armor Conference, 8–10 Oct 1957, MHI.

\(^{54}\) HQ, USAREUR, Comments of Commander in Chief at Ambassador-Commanders Conference, 4 Feb 1957.
Adapting the Logistical Support Structure to Atomic Warfare

With the new developments in organization, doctrine, and training, USAREUR’s combat units were well on their way toward preparing for atomic warfare. At the same time, service leaders re-examined the command’s logistical structure in the light of the new emphasis on atomic weapons. Infrastructure designed to support a World War II–style defensive effort would not necessarily meet the demands of a modern atomic war.

The continued development of the Communications Zone and the line of support across France had remained essential to USAREUR’s combat readiness, but Concept C, the USAREUR goal of importing 70 percent of the command’s wartime needs through French ports and the lines of communications, had yet to be achieved. Although USAREUR found it more economical to bring most of its supplies through Bremerhaven or the Dutch port of Rotterdam, the command’s logisticians realized that it was essential for wartime preparedness to maintain a functioning supply line leading back to the French ports. In addition to many language and cultural problems with French construction firms, the USAREUR logistical staff reported that the command’s own structure hampered its ultimate goals. Since 1951, the technical services—quartermaster, engineer, ordnance, signal, medical, transportation, and chemical—constituted subordinate divisions under EUCOM/USAREUR. The chief of each division was that service’s senior staff officer, who acted as commander of troops, installations, and activities assigned to his control. Each commanded depots and oversaw logistical functions in Germany and supervised supply and stock control functions throughout USAREUR. The commanding general, Communications Zone, however, directed the operations of the depots in France through his subordinate commanders in the Base Section and the Advance Section. A new section formed in 1954, the Seine Area Command, provided administrative and logistical support to international and U.S. elements of SHAPE and its subordinate allied headquarters; to Headquarters, U.S. European Command; and to several other attached organizations.55

In September 1955, the USAREUR commander, General McAuliffe, initiated a study to examine how logistical responsibilities were aligned throughout his command and how that alignment related to his wartime mission. The study indicated that under the existing system, the Communications Zone was not performing its wartime mission. The current location of USAREUR logistical headquarters in Heidelberg was too far removed from the geographical center of wartime supply operations in France and so far forward as to be vulnerable

55 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 33, Historians files, CMH; HQ, USAREUR, Briefing to Asst Sec Def Thomas P. Pike, 4 Feb 1955; HQ, USAREUR, Office of the Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, Concept C Goals for Implementation, 31 Mar 1955; Memo, Maj Gen Harry P. Storke, Asst Ch of Staff, G–4, for Ch of Staff, 19 Sep 1955, sub: USAREUR Logistical Structure—Staff Study. Last three in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
to enemy action. The report concluded that the transition from the present peacetime alignment to a wartime posture would require a complete realignment of USAREUR logistical responsibilities, movement of the USAREUR technical services to France, and assumption of the full USAREUR logistical mission by the Communications Zone. Based on the findings of the study, General McAuliffe proposed to place control of all depots, USAREUR supply and stock management, and all other wartime logistical activities in the theater under the Communications Zone’s commander. The change would have the effect of making the Communications Zone the logistical command for all of USAREUR. To reinforce this point, McAuliffe indicated that the technical service division chiefs and the majority of their support personnel would move from USAREUR headquarters to the Communications Zone.  

McAuliffe’s proposal prompted serious disagreement between the directors of the technical services and the commander of the Communications Zone, Maj. Gen. Philip E. Gallagher. Under the original proposal, once the technical service chiefs came under Gallagher’s control they would assume command of their respective depots. General Gallagher argued that if World War II was any lesson, the depots should remain under the direction of the Base and Advance Section commanders. He preferred the more decentralized command structure because of the distances involved, communications difficulties, and the requirement for dispersal in the face of threatened atomic attack. The debate forced USAREUR to postpone implementation of the realignment until it could resolve most of the differences in the following year.  

After several months of planning, USAREUR began the realignment of its support base on 1 July 1956. Included in the action was the transfer of more than twenty-four thousand personnel and dozens of depots and support units to the Zone’s control. As part of the realignment, the commanding general of the Communications Zone inherited the responsibility for all supply to the Seventh Army and to the area commands. Depots and other logistical support facilities throughout USAREUR came under the control of the section or area commanders. For their part, the USAREUR chiefs of technical services relinquished their command responsibilities and assumed a greater role in planning and supervising within their areas of specialization. The reorganization eliminated the command structures set up by the technical services to control the various units under their supervision. By the end of 1957, only two remained, the U.S. Army Signal Command, Europe, at Heidelberg, which consolidated military communications throughout the European theater, and the U.S. Army

57 Memo, Storke for Ch of Staff, 19 Sep 1955, sub: USAREUR Logistical Structure—Staff Study.
Petroleum Distribution Command, Europe, at Fontainebleau, which retained control over the fuel distribution facilities.58

Despite the consolidation, USAREUR commanders continued to express frustration at the complexity of the support apparatus. General Hodes, for one, complained in October 1957 that if the command had as many people handling, distributing, and maintaining supplies as it did handling the paperwork in connection with them, there would be no problem. With that in mind, his command continued to consolidate procedures in the Communications Zone and studied how to simplify logistical functions further while still maintaining accountability for supplies and equipment.59

The logistical support structure was evolving in the Seventh Army as well. In 1957, General Clarke concluded that supporting elements of his command had become so large and diverse that his technical staff could no longer control them effectively. Various units under the Chemical Command, the Transportation Command, and the Engineer Command reported directly to the head of the corresponding division on the Seventh Army staff, while medical, quartermaster, and signal groups reported directly to him. Clarke proposed the formation of an overarching Seventh Army Support Command that could exert effective control over all those elements while relieving the chiefs of his staff sections from having to command technical services. In response, the U.S. Army, Europe, activated the Seventh Army Support Command. The new organization contained a chemical battalion; an engineer group; three medical groups; a military police battalion; three ordnance groups; a quartermaster group; a signal company; two transportation groups; and a number of smaller finance, postal, and personnel units. The Seventh Army’s commander retained operational and technical control over the attached units, but the commanding general of the new Support Command was responsible for discipline, security, public affairs, housekeeping, welfare, and morale throughout his organization.60

In addition to the many staff and organizational changes in the logistical support structure, USAREUR planners also began to reassess the physical infrastructure. One of the first issues requiring attention was a dispersal of

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depots and logistical facilities throughout the theater. As they stood, some of the larger consolidated support installations presented lucrative targets for Soviet atomic or chemical attacks. Forty miles to the west of Heidelberg, the Rhine Engineer Depot at Kaiserslautern, the Pirmasens Signal Depot, the Germersheim Ordnance Vehicle Park, and the Miesau Ammunition Depot all occupied vast tracts of land within twenty to thirty miles of each other. As early as March 1953, in preparation for a briefing to the then-commander of the U.S. European Command, General Ridgway, officials from the Operations Research Office and the Combat Developments Branch conducted an inspection of depot storage facilities around Kaiserslautern to determine their vulnerability to atomic attack. They reported that three properly placed atomic bombs could put the entire area out of action for at least two days. Furthermore, while the facilities might be restored in as little as two days, they would have no more than 15 to 20 percent of their pre-attack capacity. The report went on to say that an attacker could combine low-yield nuclear weapons with conventional incendiaries to achieve very good results. The authors added that the most effective attacks might include chemical agents to contaminate equipment and kill personnel.61

For that reason, in 1955, USAREUR and the Communications Zone began efforts to disperse logistical support facilities in order to improve their chances of survival in an atomic attack. Their plans were complicated by congestion at existing depots, difficulties in obtaining more real estate, and a need for extra funds. As a temporary alternative, USAREUR’s logistical planners recommended the adoption of a balanced, multistorage depot system in which stocks from each class of supply would be housed in every facility. In that way, the destruction of storage sites for single classes of supply would not eliminate an entire reserve stock. A Communications Zone plan for reorganizing depot functions provided for storing each combat-essential item or commodity in a minimum of two locations in the Base Section and three locations in the Advance Section. Existing facilities could be used with only minor modifications, but future construction would conform to changes required to support atomic operations. By the end of 1957 the Communications Zone had established general depots at Bussac, France, in the Base Section, and Nancy, France, and Kaiserslautern in the Advance Section. Other major facilities in the Communications Zone included ammunition depots at Captieux and Trois-Fontaines; ordnance depots at Fontenet and Braconne; quartermaster depots at Ingrandes, Périgueux, and Metz; signal depots at Verdun and Saumur; engineer depots at Chinon and Toul; and medical depots at Croix-Chapeau and Vitry-le-François.62

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61 Memo, Lt Col Lowell E. Thompson, Combat Developments Br, for Col Robert E. Quackenbush, Ch, Combat Developments Br, 3 Apr 1953, sub: Inspection Trip, Entry 2028, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1958, RG 549, NACP.

As efforts to disperse and protect storage depots continued, in August 1957, USAREUR directed the Communications Zone to use specially constructed bunkers that took advantage of natural terrain at storage sites to protect stocks from atomic attack. At each facility, engineers were to disperse the bunkers to the greatest extent possible and to shield them further with dirt and concrete. Buildings were to be dispersed so that no more than two thousand square feet of storage space would be destroyed by an atomic blast from any direction. By the end of 1957, USAREUR and Communications Zone engineers were still looking for appropriate sites on which to begin construction.63

The storage and security of USAREUR’s atomic weapons presented further challenges, for in addition to the segregation and protection required for all ammunition storage sites, security regulations required that atomic weapons be maintained in a controlled-access environment. To that end, the USAREUR ordnance officer was responsible for all atomic storage sites assigned to the Ordnance Command, and the Seventh Army commander and the commanding general, USAREUR Communications Zone, controlled access to classified sites in their respective areas. Personnel assigned to the facilities required special security clearances and wore tamper resistant identification cards. The sites themselves were constructed so that weapons and warheads were surrounded by concentric circles of increasing levels of security. Perimeter fences, special lighting fixtures with emergency power backups, and guard forces supported by a readily deployable reaction force offered additional protection.64

Military police guard units generally provided security at the atomic weapons storage sites. Living conditions at the sites were spartan and the guards endured boredom, loneliness, and during the winter months, frigid weather throughout their tours of duty. The military police (MPs) spent hours patrolling and watching fence lines where nothing happened. As a result, many guards picked out a tree or deer family and watched it grow throughout their tour. Because of the critical nature of their work, MPs on duty in the watchtowers were forbidden from any other activities such as listening to a radio or reading a book. Since most storage depots were located in isolated areas, usually few diversions were available for off duty time as well. Overindulgence in alcohol and, later, drugs, plagued site commanders.65

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Despite the critical nature of their work, senior leaders decreed that the guard units did not have a need to know the nature of the ammunition they were protecting. In many cases, guards never learned why their assignment was so important until long after they had departed. A soldier from the 558th Military Police Company, watching over one special weapons depot recalled that his unit had secured a mix of Corporal, Honest John, Nike, 280-mm., and 8-inch rounds, each with yields equal or greater to the detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He noted that the policy that the MPs had no need to know was a serious mistake. They needed to understand the importance of defending the site. It is probably no surprise that a large percentage of the MPs who were assigned to the weapons storage sites left the Army after the experience.66

In addition to hardening, dispersing, and securing the ammunition storage sites, commanders recognized a need to examine the transportation network required to deliver special munitions to missile and artillery units on the front line. They wanted to know, for example, if local roads would support the movement of supply convoys forward, and if those movements could be concealed from enemy observers. Most important, commanders had to determine whether or not they could bring atomic ammunition forward quickly enough to meet time limits for engaging a target. Complicating matters further, Exercise SABRE KNOT in 1956 revealed that artillery and missile units were not realistically anticipating their resupply requirements. While VII Corps logisticians had submitted a required supply rate of 2,832 tons of ammunition for the exercise, artillery units had requested only 650 tons. To observers, this suggested that they were not replenishing their ammunition stocks once they had expended their basic loads. As a result, the system for resupplying forward elements from ammunition supply point stocks was not being fully tested.67

Development also continued on other critical infrastructure programs. Construction on a petroleum pipeline across France had begun in 1953. By June 1957, the main section between the French channel ports and Metz, near the border with Germany, was complete. It included tank farms and storage facilities at various points along the way, with railhead and truck-loading racks so that operators could transfer fuel to other means of transport. When completed, the line ran 380 miles, almost all of it at least 40 inches below ground. It could transport three types of fuels—jet fuel, gasoline for tanks and vehicles, and gasoline for piston-driven aircraft—as long as engineers ran a mechanical scrubber the length of the line between transitions. At Metz, the pipeline connected to a NATO system that could pump the fuel to USAREUR and allied installations as far as the east bank of the Rhine in Germany.68

66 Ibid., pp. 326, 336.
67 HQ, Seventh Army, Comments of Seventh Army Staff Members on SABRE KNOT.
In 1956, the Communications Zone opened a school at the Chinon Engineer Depot, about 120 miles southwest of Paris, to train those who would operate or maintain the pipeline. There, the 543d Engineer (Pipeline) Company conducted month-long sessions for engineer units from throughout Germany and France. Engineer officers from Great Britain, Turkey, and West Germany also took part. Subjects included storage tank and pump station construction, hydraulics, safety measures, and the operation of special equipment for pipeline construction. After three weeks of lectures, films, and practical applications, the course concluded with a five-day field problem during which the unit in training built, operated, and dismantled an entire pipeline system.69

Just as older projects such as the petroleum pipeline were nearing completion, others were just getting started. In August 1956, the Department of the Army instructed USAREUR and the Seventh Army to begin planning to receive six battalions of Nike antiaircraft guided missiles. Each battalion consisted of four separate batteries in addition to its headquarters elements. Because the missiles had ranges of forty kilometers and were designed to protect large areas, batteries were generally well dispersed and often several miles apart. Each battery site required three separate areas—a control area, a launch area, and an administrative area. The Seventh Army selected six 90-mm. antiaircraft gun battalions to be exchanged for the new missile system and identified twenty-four potential locations for individual firing batteries. These initial positions were designed to protect the air approaches to the large logistics complex at Kaiserslautern, airfields in the Bitburg-Spangdahlem area, and Rhine River bridges between Mainz and Karlsruhe. Additional criteria for position selection included suitability for attached radar stations and proximity to existing U.S. installations. Since Nike personnel had to be ready to launch missiles at any time of the day or night, planners gave primary consideration to locating each site near troop housing areas.70

With potential sites for the missiles identified, USAREUR officials set about negotiating with the Germans for acquisition of the land required. They had already briefed key German officials on U.S. plans to deploy the missiles, and, in June 1956, an Army team began a series of exhibitions throughout Germany, showing off a prototype of the missile and its associated equipment. Almost immediately, the program ran into determined local opposition, largely over the potential loss of agricultural land, a belief that the installations would increase the likelihood of enemy air attack, and widespread opposition to rearmament.

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By April 1957, USAREUR had acquired only six of twenty-four planned sites, and German representatives declared that they would be unable to deliver any more in the foreseeable future. Work began on construction of the first two sites toward the end of the year.71

As the physical infrastructure of USAREUR’s support base began to reach maturity, Army leaders took a closer look at some of the processes that drove logistical support of the command’s forward-deployed forces. This seemed to be particularly important because of the stringencies the Army was experiencing under the Eisenhower administration. With this in mind, in December 1955, the Department of the Army directed USAREUR and Seventh Army to test a new system for moving supplies and repair parts from the continental United States to units in active Army areas. The basic principle of Project Modern Army Supply System (MASS) was to stock only the most frequently needed items with the organization that used them, while retaining less frequently used items farther to the rear. Seldom used items were to be stored outside of the combat zone until requested.72

In theory, employing the latest methods of communication, data processing, and transportation, logisticians would be able to identify, locate, and deliver parts stored in the rear, or even in the continental United States, to the mechanic at the front within a reasonable period of time. Tactical units would stock only a small amount of frequently needed parts plus some critical insurance items. At the next higher level, direct support maintenance units, usually at division or corps, would carry a stock of parts to replenish those units as well as to conduct their own support activities. The unit would also maintain formal stock control records and would be responsible for the accuracy of the requisitions sent forward for supply action. An Army depot would be the final source of repair parts within the theater. Reflecting a careful analysis of demand experience, its stocks would be able to fill 85 percent of all requisitions made by Seventh Army units. Requisitions for items it did not have on hand would be routed to the United States by high-speed electronic communications. Receiving top priority, the orders would be filled and shipped to Europe by the fastest available means.73

While the new system cleaned out warehouses and streamlined operations at some levels of the supply system, it also placed a good deal of stress on USAREUR and Seventh Army transportation units. Because of the large


number of deliveries required and the great dispersion of direct support companies, it was not feasible for the Seventh Army to assign responsibility for administrative and logistical support to any specific unit or location. Instead, the command’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. William W. Dick Jr., directed all units to render maximum support to drivers moving supplies. This included providing overnight billeting and messing for drivers, security for cargo and vehicles, and wrecker service for disabled trucks.\footnote{HQ, Seventh Army, Logistical Support for Project MASS, 24 Jul 1956, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “Army Truckers Keep Project MASS Rolling,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 Dec 1956.}

In February 1957, after seven months of testing, General Clarke appointed a board of senior officers to assess the operation. The commander of the 10th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, chaired the group. Clarke recognized that his command was serving as a test bed for the project, but he insisted that the purpose of the system was to support Seventh Army and not the other way around. In particular, he wanted the board to examine the degree to which the operation had benefited the units down to company level, the effect it had on the number of inoperable vehicles and equipment, and the amount of time required to return them to service. He also wanted to know how the system would make a transition to wartime requirements, and how long it would take to receive repair parts under Project MASS as opposed to previous systems.\footnote{Memo, Clarke for Maj Gen Barksdale Hamlett, 7 Feb 1957, sub: Survey of the Functioning of Operation MASS in the Seventh United States Army, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.}

The board’s report identified several deficiencies that had kept the Seventh Army from receiving the full benefit from the new system. To begin with, the command’s stocks of repair parts at the onset of the experiment had been insufficient to support the test. Lacking a clear understanding of the concept and having little confidence in its effectiveness, maintenance and supply personnel at all levels requisitioned more parts than the program authorized and maintained unauthorized reserves. Meanwhile, the board charged that the Department of the Army had provided insufficient funds to support an unhampered and valid test. The time allotted for resupply, moreover, was not adequate to keep up with demand. Most important, the preponderance of old vehicles and equipment throughout Seventh Army and the exceptionally high tempo of operations it maintained during the year created an abnormally high demand for both parts and funds and did not reflect usage rates in other parts of the service.\footnote{HQ, Seventh Army, Board Rpt on the Test of Modern Army Supply System in Seventh United States Army, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 238–40.}

The report also addressed the specific questions raised by General Clarke. It concluded that the test itself had caused considerable problems for Seventh Army units, primarily due to a lack of sufficient funding to test the program fully and a lack of initial orientation and training for participating personnel.
The group’s analysis indicated that the program had little overall effect on the amount of inoperable time for the Seventh Army’s vehicles and equipment. The report also indicated that Project MASS would be adaptable to combat operations only if an adequate stock of spare parts was available in the area to cushion against the expected losses in transportation assets and supply depots, and the increase in demands that an outbreak of hostilities would engender. In conclusion, the report acknowledged that the new system had great potential but that planners would have to alter the program to compensate for its deficiencies.\(^77\)

The Department of the Army considered the report invaluable because it highlighted crucial problems that the service needed to fix before it could extend MASS to other units overseas. Since the consensus was that the problems identified could be corrected, the Army concluded that the test had proven the feasibility of the new system. As a result, USAREUR extended the program into the next year throughout the command.\(^78\)

By the end of 1957, most of USAREUR’s logistical support base was in place. Supply, maintenance, ordnance, and other staff personnel had laid the groundwork for sustaining the Army’s first full-time, forward-deployed force. What remained to be seen, however, was how well the system could keep up, given the demands of the new combat organization and doctrine that remained relatively untested. Throughout the coming year, logisticians would have to work side by side with their frontline counterparts to determine how successful the system would be.

Complications of Alliance Defense Planning

Since the early days of the Western European Union, Western military leaders had been forced to develop their defense plans based on the political and strategic requirements of the various allied nations. Up until 1955, however, most of NATO’s member states had already experienced coalition warfare as part of the World War II alliance against the Axis. The admittance of Germany into NATO added a new dimension to the complexity of planning for Western Europe’s defense.

Although officials of the German Defense Ministry had represented their government at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, since 1955, it was not until July 1957 that the first of the Bundeswehr’s ground forces—three infantry divisions and two corps headquarters—officially came under NATO control. The 1st, 2d, and 4th Infantry Divisions had only reached 60–80 percent of their wartime strength and still needed substantial training before they would be ready for combat. The 1st Infantry Division set up its headquarters

\(^{77}\) HQ, Seventh Army, Board Rpt on the Test of Modern Army Supply System in Seventh United States Army.

in Hannover, the 2d Division in Giessen, and the 4th Division in Regensburg. The II and III German Corps staffs had already begun their participation in NATO planning and exercises, and they established their headquarters in Ulm and Koblenz. As units of the III German Corps began active training in the sector to the north of the U.S. V Corps, formerly occupied by French forces, the U.S. Seventh Army withdrew the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment from the forward security screen there. On 8 November 1957, German units assumed that mission.79

The arrival of these formations represented the first installment of the German plan for participation in the defense of Western Europe. The initial program presented by the Germans to the Advanced Planning Group in 1954 had called for a defense contribution of five hundred thousand men with a ground force of twelve divisions, six armored and six infantry. Both German and American military planners had expected to recruit and mobilize the entire force within thirty-six months. By the end of 1957, however, fewer than one hundred forty thousand troops were under arms, and it was clear that the buildup would fall short of those goals. General Hodes noted that the German corps lacked sufficient artillery support and adequate communications equipment. He recommended a priority for those items in future military assistance program shipments.80

The German Army patterned the organization of its divisions after a U.S. model. The basic infantry division structure included three combat commands, each consisting of three motorized infantry battalions and an armored battalion. Combat support elements included a division artillery regiment and antiaircraft, engineer, and reconnaissance battalions. Armored divisions differed only in the organization of the three combat commands, which were tank heavy, each containing two armored and two infantry battalions. The artillery regiment was also mechanized. In both cases, the divisions numbered between eleven thousand and thirteen thousand men. In order to keep the maximum fighting strength forward, planners kept the support structure small and reliant on territorial reserves and the civilian sector. Even as the Germans were going forward with these initial deployments, however, there were indications that the initial organizations would not last for long. Led by the new German defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, senior German leaders, both civilian and military, were already pushing for a leaner, more mobile force structure that employed German-designed weapons and equipment rather than surplus American items.81

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81 Karanowski, The German Army and NATO Strategy, p. 44; Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix, pp. 325–30; Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold
Map 11
With the promise of German divisions to reinforce NATO rapidly becoming a reality, SHAPE defense plans evolved in acknowledgment of the German contribution (Map 11). For the Seventh Army, this meant that its initial contact with an advancing enemy would be even farther forward than in previous plans and that its forces would be fully committed to the battle well east of the Rhine. In the northern half of the Seventh Army sector, the V Corps devoted its priority of defensive effort to a possible approach from the northeast through the Fulda Gap toward Frankfurt and Mainz. In the southern portion of the zone, the VII Corps defended against an advance through the Hof Gap toward Nuremberg and then straight west toward Mannheim. Battle plans indicated an objective of delaying, neutralizing, and destroying enemy forces along their main axes of penetration in order to create conditions necessary for a NATO counteroffensive.\(^8^2\)

Covering forces composed of armored cavalry units would make contact with the invader’s lead elements as far to the east as possible to delay his advance. Additional forces composed of detached elements from the infantry and armor divisions would deploy along Phase Line TOULOUSE, which ran roughly from Kassel in the north, south to Fulda, southeast to Bamberg, jogged west of Nuremberg and then turned back to the east of Augsburg and Munich before heading south along the Inn River to the Swiss border. Delaying actions beginning along this line would trade space for time, while disrupting enemy formations and inflicting on them as many casualties as possible. The Seventh Army would use the time gained through these operations to complete the evacuation of noncombatants, to cover the deployment of its remaining forces, and to carry out planned demolitions and barrier construction.\(^8^3\)

Additional forces from the two corps would join the delaying action at Phase Line YORK, which ran from a line about twenty miles west of Bad Hersfeld south to Würzburg, farther south through Ulm, and then south along the Iller River to the Swiss border (Map 12). Forces engaged along Phase Line YORK were supposed to hold until ordered to withdraw by the Seventh Army commander. This was a critical point in the defense as it would allow remaining forces to complete final preparations along the main line of defense. In the northern portion of the American sector, attackers would have less than 100 miles to advance before reaching the outskirts of Frankfurt. In the south, the greater

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distance between the border and major cities along the Rhine allowed more room for the delaying action.84

Throughout this portion of the fight, the 8th Infantry Division would remain well to the rear, serving as the Seventh Army reserve. Its primary role would be to provide rear-area security, guarding the Rhine River crossings and protecting airfields and supply depots from sabotage or airborne attack. Its units had to be prepared to support either the V or VII Corps or the German III Corps once the fight reached the main battle line.85

The expectation of a strong German contribution also allowed western leaders to draw the main line of defense to the east of the Rhine, in an effort to retain the industrial areas around Frankfurt and the Ruhr Valley. Phase Line RICHMOND, the main battle line, ran from just northwest of Giessen southeast to Hanau, south along the Main River to Heilbronn, and then south to Stuttgart and along the Neckar River to the Swiss border. Once the forward delaying actions were completed, all available forces would join the defense of the RICHMOND line. The V and VII Corps would be joined by the II German Corps to the south and the III German Corps to the north. Seventh Army leaders hoped that a well-prepared defense along this line could be held. Even so, Seventh Army plans acknowledged that Phase Line TORONTO, along the Rhine, was still an option as a last-ditch defensive position.86

The plans showed little expectation of reinforcements from the United States. Although the United States had committed itself to providing up to twelve additional divisions to NATO defenses if hostilities broke out in Europe, only one or two might be available within thirty days of mobilization. Most were National Guard divisions that required at least six months of training before being ready to deploy. More to the point, President Eisenhower firmly believed that the West could not win a war with the Soviets with conventional means, and he had no intention of sending large-scale reinforcements to Europe. In March 1956, he had approved a National Security Council paper indicating that the United States would consider nuclear weapons as conventional and would use them in any general war and in military operations short of general war. He amplified this position two months later in conversations with Admiral Radford and General Taylor, when he defined general war as a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and emphasized that the United States would use nuclear weapons without restriction from the outset. NATO’s strategic plan also reflected this approach as it regarded conventional forces as a shield, to protect as much of Western Europe as possible and to guard the

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
alliance’s atomic retaliatory forces. Those forces were the sword, which would strike the major blow against the Soviet Union.87

As units of the new West German Army prepared to take their place in NATO’s defense structure, USAREUR and the Seventh Army prepared to work alongside their new allies. In March 1957, the Seventh Army commander, General Clarke, made history when he attached the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment to the German II Corps as part of the seven-day NATO command post exercise, LION NOIR. It was the first time that U.S. troops of any sort served under German command. The cavalry regiment’s commander, Col. Wilson M. Hawkins, praised the newly formed German staff for the smoothness and ease with which it accepted his unit into its operations. Following a similar exercise, LION BLEU, the next year, a Seventh Army after action report nonetheless noted that language issues remained a problem when allied units became part of German operations. It also recommended the attachment of a U.S. signal support unit to the German II Corps to facilitate communications between the two organizations.88

For USAREUR, the successful integration of the Bundeswehr into Western Europe’s defenses was not without cost. In addition to the manpower and training time the Americans had devoted to preparing the new German army for deployment, they now faced increased competition for the dwindling land that could be devoted to billets and training areas. West Germany’s rapid postwar recovery and industrial development meant that fewer tracts of land would be available for military use. As German troop strength began to build, U.S. and French forces turned over to the Federal Republic many of the billets, ranges, and other military facilities they had occupied since the end of World War II. With no room for the creation of new, large-scale maneuver areas, the Seventh Army had to share access to many sites with German units and had to compete with both the Germans and other NATO allies for access to firing ranges for tanks, artillery, and air defense weapons. In order to strengthen the relationship with their new German partners, USAREUR recommended language training for its officers and authorized on-duty time for classes.89


89 Msg, Bonn to Sec of State, 5 Nov 1956, sub: German Troop Accommodations Problem, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Geographic Files, 1957, RG 218, NACP; Memo, Capt William S. Wood,
Although discussions on the alliance’s strategy for Western European defense usually took place at levels of command well above USAREUR and the Seventh Army, the two commands found themselves in the center of interallied debates over the role of atomic weapons in defense plans, locations for storing atomic warheads, and sharing of atomic weapons and warheads with the NATO allies. In January 1956, a State Department Policy Planning Staff paper mused that sharing control over the use of atomic weapons might convince NATO allies that the United States would use atomic weapons only for defense and only as necessary. Allied hostility to atomic weapons, the memorandum noted, was based primarily on a fear that their use would destroy the social order of all concerned. To remedy that, the United States had to stress the deterrent value of the weapons rather than their use.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite their misgivings, or perhaps because of them, leaders among the NATO allies called for access to tactical atomic weapons as essential to their own self-defense. In response, the U.S. Departments of Defense and State began working on plans to assist selected allies in achieving their own atomic capabilities. At the same time, planners also noted that a dispersal of atomic weapons stockpiles outside the United States and the storage of weapons near where they would be needed seemed to be militarily desirable. NATO allies, many of whose populations actively opposed plans to position atomic weapons within their borders, might accept and support such storage more readily if the weapons involved included some that would be designated for their own use in time of emergency. German membership in NATO, however, raised a special problem. Although the Germans were forbidden by treaty from manufacturing their own atomic weapons, they were not prohibited from obtaining them from the United States or any other ally. Nonetheless, the French would surely resist any move to equip German forces with nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{91}

The Germans, for their part, seemed to walk both sides of the issue. In meetings of the NATO defense ministers, they supported the distribution of tactical atomic weapons down to division level. One of the first objectives of a restored German munitions industry was to develop an artillery piece, capable of firing American atomic munitions, that was lighter and more maneuverable than the U.S. guns. Chancellor Adenauer, however, was more ambivalent. He expressed

\textsuperscript{90} Memo, State Dept, Policy Planning Staff, for Sec of State, 4 Jan 1956, sub: Sharing of Control of Atomic Weapons, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.

Troops of SETAF’s 543d Field Artillery Missile Battalion prepare a Corporal missile for firing during NATO Exercise COUNTERPUNCH, September 1957.
concerns that the alliance had placed too much emphasis on atomic weapons in its plans for Western defense and that it might thus have no other credible options beyond their use if a confrontation with the Eastern bloc occurred. He was particularly concerned that the American shift toward an atomic-based strategy might cause the United States to reduce its military commitment to the continent. With an eye always to ultimate German unification, he also worried about the impact NATO’s atomic strategy would have on future negotiations with the Soviet Union.92

The American shift toward an atomic-based doctrine raised numerous issues throughout the NATO alliance and caused some to question the ultimate purpose of ground-based, conventional forces. Facing economic concerns even greater than those of the United States, British officials, in particular, argued that if a “shield” of ground combat units was still required, it was no longer the alliance’s principal military protection. Allied conventional forces need not be capable of winning a major land battle, but only of preventing local infiltration and political intimidation. The alliance’s “sword” was now the nuclear arsenal of bombs and missiles that it could deliver against the Soviet Union over the heads of any land armies assembled on the ground below.93

By the end of 1957, atomic weapons had come to dominate U.S. and NATO thinking where the defense of Europe was concerned. Adopting a strategic policy based on airpower and atomic weapons, President Eisenhower had turned the U.S. armed forces away from traditional concepts of conventional warfare. Putting aside its doubts and struggling to secure a role in the national defense effort while balancing the necessity for atomic weapons against an abhorrence of actually having to use them, the Army searched for new organizations, weapons, and missions that would complement that approach. For their part, USAREUR and the Seventh Army completed the conversion of their forces to the pentomic concept and began to test the viability of the new organization. Only time would tell whether they would or could succeed.


The latter years of President Eisenhower’s second term produced a reassessment of U.S. strategic policy as military and political leaders alike began to reconsider the implications of massive retaliation. The successful launch of an earth-orbiting satellite by the Soviet Union in October 1957 prompted many to re-evaluate the policy in the light of what they perceived as a shift in the strategic balance. At the same time, U.S. Army leaders across Europe engaged in a series of exercises and tests to prepare their units for combat under the new atomic-oriented pentomic organization. Initial shakedowns under the new structure indicated that a number of problems remained to be resolved. Nonetheless, USAREUR continued to consolidate its presence in Europe, seeing existing projects through to their conclusion while launching new efforts aimed at modernization and expansion. Despite its continuing introspection and its efforts to resolve whatever doubts it might have had about its readiness for combat, the U.S. Army in Europe presented a strong public face to its allies and foes alike as the United States and the NATO alliance worked through some of the prickliest diplomatic and foreign policy challenges they would face in the twentieth century.

The “New Look” Gets a New Look

Despite calls from his service chiefs and many in Congress for more military spending, President Eisenhower remained true to his conviction that a strong economy was the nation’s most potent form of defense. At the core of the president’s strategic philosophy was a firm belief that any conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would be a total or general war that would be decided by an exchange of atomic firepower. He had little use for arguments that called for increasing expenditures on conventional forces capable of fighting limited wars. The new secretary of defense, Neil H. McElroy, echoed the president’s sentiments when he said that if two major opponents were involved in a conflict, they could hardly avoid an all-out military struggle.¹

Despite Eisenhower’s convictions, the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, continued to argue for increased funding to support his service’s conventional forces. In tones more measured and less provocative than those of his predecessor, General Ridgway, Taylor pressed many of the same points in challenging the president’s military views. Repeated cutbacks in manpower, he said, had sapped the Army’s ability to meet the requirements of all of its assigned missions. As for the issue of potential American involvement in limited conflicts, he disagreed vigorously with President Eisenhower and was particularly critical of the United States’ lack of sufficient transport aircraft to deliver Army combat units to overseas trouble spots. Despite his less confrontational approach, by the end of his fourth year Taylor had become every bit the pariah within the Defense Department that Ridgway had been. Although he was three years shy of sixty years old, the normal retirement age for generals, Taylor retired when his term as chief of staff expired in July 1959. He would continue his crusade against the Eisenhower defense policies with the publication of his first book, The Uncertain Trumpet, in 1960.

Taylor was not the only senior Army officer to leave the service in frustration over military funding. In January 1958, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, the Army’s chief of research and development, announced his own plans to retire from the service. When questioned about the rather abrupt and premature nature of his decision, Gavin told a Senate subcommittee on military preparedness that he saw his Army deteriorating while the Soviet Army was growing. Under those conditions, he could not go to Capitol Hill and defend a budget in which he did not believe. He told reporters that he felt he could contribute more to national defense from the outside than from within. Gavin’s decision, and the well-orchestrated publicity that accompanied it, provided fresh ammunition to Democrats in Congress who were already more than willing to challenge the president’s strategic policies.

The most basic of Eisenhower’s assumptions—American nuclear superiority—had already taken a serious blow in October and November 1957 when the Soviet Union successfully placed two Sputnik satellites into Earth’s orbit. The same ballistic missiles that had launched the satellites could be fitted with nuclear warheads targeted on the continental United States. Americans who had counted themselves as safe from a technologically inferior Soviet bomber

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force now faced the threat of seemingly unstoppable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capped with atomic warheads.  

This realization produced misgivings in Western Europe as well. America’s NATO allies questioned whether or not the United States was prepared to use its nuclear weapons in defense of Europe if the Soviets did not attack the American homeland itself. With an atomic stalemate in place, they feared that the U.S. deterrent no longer applied to NATO and that the Soviets, with their greater conventional forces, would gain the upper hand. The U.S. State Department instructed its representatives to assure the NATO nations that the United States would live up to its pledges and that an attack on one would be regarded as an attack against all. U.S. officials referred to the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin airlift, and the intervention in Korea, not to mention the physical presence of large numbers of American troops in Europe, as clear evidence of America’s commitment. At NATO headquarters, General Norstad reminded the European allies that the alliance forces presented a shield, organized, equipped, trained, and deployed to respond promptly and effectively with either conventional or atomic weapons, thus providing other options than an all-or-nothing response. Norstad described NATO’s conventional capabilities as a firebreak that if strengthened, could deflect minor incursions and allow time for diplomatic solutions before defenders would have to resort to nuclear options.

Although the president continued to express his doubts that mutual deterrence provided an umbrella under which a conflict might be waged in Europe without escalating to general nuclear war, he acknowledged that the matter required further study. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, long a champion of massive retaliation, conceded to the German Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, that the alliance had to be prepared to deal with limited situations without all-out war. It would be awkward, he said, if the alliance were forced to choose between attempting to repel a Soviet incursion with conventional weapons or employing the full force of America’s strategic nuclear arsenal. He believed that small, clean atomic weapons producing lower levels of fallout represented a third option, particularly for such limited situations.

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6 Memo, Donald A. Quarles, Dep Sec Def, for Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 May 1958, sub: Basic National Security Policy: Points Raised by the President, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH; Memo of Conversation, State Dept, 5 Mar 1958, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
Thus, despite the carnage within its senior leadership, the Army was beginning to find fertile soil for its arguments that the nation’s conventional forces needed strengthening. In late 1957, the Security Resources Panel of the president’s Science Advisory Committee delivered a report suggesting that U.S. and allied forces required greater strength and mobility for the conduct of limited operations. The Gaither Report, named for the panel chairman, Horace Rowan Gaither, a Ford Foundation trustee and a cofounder of the Rand Corporation, concluded that America’s armed forces needed the ability to deter or suppress small wars before they became big ones. Congressional critics of administration policies also increased their attacks. In August 1959, Senator John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.) accused the administration of putting the United States in a box where it would have no option less than a massive nuclear attack to respond to limited Soviet aggression. Overseas, both the supreme allied commander in Europe, General Norstad, and the commander in chief of Allied Forces in Central Europe, French General Jean E. Valluy, called for heavier conventional forces to increase NATO’s flexibility. The new Army chief of staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who replaced General Taylor in July 1959, came to that position with a reputation as a skilled negotiator with experience in dealing with a wide range of conflicts. He eagerly took up the Army’s cause but was able to deal with its adversaries in the Defense Department and the Eisenhower administration in a more collegial manner than his predecessors.7

Finally, scholars and analysts outside of military circles were also beginning to devote serious thought to the implications of strategy in the era of atomic weapons. Two seminal works on the subject appeared in 1957 to add depth to the strategic discussions. Robert E. Osgood’s Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy and Henry Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy both challenged strategic assumptions made by the Eisenhower administration and argued for a greater flexibility in American military options.8

Thus, as the Eisenhower presidency drew to a close, debate continued over America’s ability to conduct military operations beneath the level of full-scale nuclear war. The president continued to believe that the country could not afford to deploy military forces to support every contingency, and that the threat posed by America’s nuclear arsenal would be enough, in most cases,

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to deter foreign aggression. His opponents argued that stronger conventional forces were required to protect American interests from threats that might seem beneath the threshold of nuclear retaliation. What role, if any, nuclear weapons might play in such a limited conflict remained a matter of discussion. Meanwhile, Army leaders in Europe grappled with the same questions as they tried to reconcile traditional battle plans and concepts of land warfare with the pentomic organization and atomic weapons–based doctrine that the service had thrust on them.

**Putting Pentomic to the Test**

By 1958, the Army was ready to begin converting its divisions in Europe to the new pentomic organization. Its leaders had designed the new division specifically to operate on an atomic battlefield, and Europe was the theater where such a conflict was most likely to take place. Successful implementation of the new organization would be an important step in the evolution of NATO and USAREUR plans for the defense of Western Europe.

Despite General Taylor’s enthusiasm for the pentomic reorganization, early evaluations revealed flaws in the concept even before the divisions in Europe began to convert. In the United States, the Army had tested the concept in multiple exercises and had referred the new organization to its various branch schools for study and comment. One of the most traumatic and controversial aspects of the pentomic concept was the elimination of the traditional regimental affiliations. Soldiers of all ranks were uncomfortable giving up unit identities that had contributed to morale, discipline, and cohesion throughout the Army’s history. It was also apparent that, while the organization depended on new technologies for its survival on the battlefield, many of those items were not yet available. Of particular concern were shortages in improved armored personnel carriers and radios with increased range, absolute requirements for a doctrine that relied on dispersion and mobility for its battlefield survival. Platoon and company leaders were left to ask if they were expected to defend their positions with a due-out slip for the new equipment.9

Other deficiencies were also apparent even before the concept moved to Europe. Small-unit leaders expressed concerns over the extended frontage the Army expected them to defend as part of the pentomic doctrine. Proponents of the concept explained that atomic weapons gave those units greatly increased firepower, but only if the units actually employed them. Without the atomic fire support, ground units appeared to be seriously undergunned. More senior leaders questioned the ability of higher headquarters to sustain the new divisions logistically. The pentomic reorganization had stripped much of those capabilities from the division, without a corresponding increase in the capabilities of

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corps-level support units. All in all, many in the Army suspected that the new organization had marginally improved the division’s ability to operate on an atomic battlefield, but had seriously degraded its conventional capabilities.10

Officers in Europe had also voiced their concerns long before the conversion. As early as 1954, the USAREUR commander, General Hoge, had written to the Chief of Army Field Forces, General John Dahlquist, to express his misgivings. The proposed elimination of infantry regiments in favor of combat command–type organizations, he wrote, did not present any material advantages but posed several serious disadvantages. He believed that it was simpler to make attachments and detachments to existing regiments rather than to discard traditional formations altogether. Consolidating the administrative and service support for the three battalions in a regiment, he added, seemed to be more economical than providing the same support for three separate battalions. Moreover, he said, the Army’s regiments had long, proud traditions which were invaluable in the development of morale, esprit de corps, and teamwork. They should not be lost.11

General Hoge went on to assess other aspects of the proposed division design. Reductions in the amount of conventional artillery posed a particular concern. Means must be available, he said, to attack infiltrating forces when they were too small to present profitable targets for atomic weapons. This was particularly true when battle groups were, by necessity, spread across a wide area where infantry weapons lacked the range to cover the gaps between defensive positions. Also, supporting artillery could not use atomic munitions when frontline forces were engaged in close combat without endangering friendly troops. Hoge did support the proposed reduction in a division’s support base and the transfer of many such functions to higher levels. Elimination of some frills, he said, would make the division less unwieldy.12

Despite these early concerns, the reorganization in Europe went forward and, by the beginning of 1958, the Army had reorganized all five of its divisions in USAREUR to fit the pentomic concept. At that point, following a series of unit rotations, the Seventh Army consisted of the 11th Airborne Division, with its headquarters in Augsburg; the 3d and 4th Armored Divisions in Frankfurt and Göppingen, respectively; and the 8th and 10th Infantry Divisions in Bad Kreuznach and Würzburg, respectively. In the V Corps area, the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment provided a security screen from Bad Hersfeld in the north to Bad Kissingen in the south for the forward positions of the 8th and 10th Infantry Divisions. The 3d Armored Division was in reserve, prepared to reinforce or counterattack. Farther south, in the VII Corps area, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, in the vicinity of Nuremberg and the 11th Armored Cavalry

10 Ibid.
11 Ltr, Gen William M. Hoge, USAREUR Cdr, to Gen John E. Dahlquist, Ch of Army Field Forces, 13 Sep 1954, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspondence, RG 549, NACP.
12 Ibid.
Regiment in the vicinity of Regensburg and Straubing, patrolled in front of the forward positions of the 11th Airborne Division and the 4th Armored Division.\(^{13}\)

Although the pentomic reorganizations were to be servicewide, no command in the Army was in a better position to test the new concept than USAREUR. Its five combat divisions, three armored cavalry regiments, and heavy support structure made it the largest assemblage of fighting power in the service. Moreover, the pentomic structure and its accompanying atomic doctrine were specifically designed to deal with the Soviet Army. By 1958, with the U.S. Army prepared to adopt the organization throughout the service, it was up to the officers and soldiers of USAREUR to determine whether or not the new concept would actually work.

Once the reorganizations were complete, USAREUR instructed the Seventh Army to evaluate the new pentomic infantry division and to recommend changes it deemed necessary to the unit’s TOE. With a major Seventh Army training event, Exercise \textit{Sabre Hawk}, scheduled to begin in February 1958, the command requested an extension of the deadline for the submission of its report until after it had completed that test. In an interim response, however, it suggested that, based on its study of the new organization to that point, augmentations to the division artillery and the battle group engineer platoon were desirable, along with the addition of a security platoon to each battle group.\(^{14}\)

With the extension approved, the Seventh Army put the new organization to the test. Beginning on 10 February, \textit{Sabre Hawk} fielded more than 125,000 soldiers for the largest maneuver yet in the history of the force. The V Corps maneuvered against the VII Corps in an area bordered roughly by Fulda, Giessen, Schwäbisch-Gmünd, and Gunzenhausen, and encompassing parts of Bavaria, Hesse, and Baden-Württemberg. The maneuver included a series of attack, defend, delay, and withdraw scenarios while controllers accompanied each unit to evaluate training and to assist commanders in keeping up with movements and actions scheduled in the event’s master plan. The 72d Field Artillery Group—organized for this exercise with one battalion of Honest John rockets, one battalion of 280-mm. cannons, and one separate battery of Honest Johns—provided general support to the VII Corps and was prepared to deliver atomic fires on call. A similar collection of atomic-capable units under the direction of the 18th Field Artillery Group supported the V Corps. Elements of the Twelfth Air Force provided simulated atomic air support to supplement the firepower of ground units on both sides. The maneuvers tested atomic weapons employment, target acquisition, resupply, and aerial troop movement.

\(^{13}\) David A. Lane, Historical Division, HQ, USAREUR, Operation \textit{Gyroscope} in the United States Army, 6 Sep 1957, Historical Manuscript Collection, CMH Archives; Memo for Sec Def, 23 Jan 1957, sub: Order of Battle Report to SACEUR of U.S. Forces Assigned, Earmarked for Assignment, and Earmarked for Assignment on Mobilization, Joint Chiefs of Staff Geographic Files, RG 218, NACP.

\(^{14}\) Msgs, CG, Seventh Army, to CG, VII Corps, 6 Dec 1957; and CG, Seventh Army, to CG, USAREUR, 30 Jan 1958. Both in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
while emphasizing individual and small-unit training under cold-weather conditions. As the initial defending force, the V Corps also experimented with stay-behind patrols, trained for long-range reconnaissance, and equipped to identify potential targets for the corps’ long-range atomic weapons.15

The critique of the exercise by the Seventh Army’s operations and planning staff identified training deficiencies traceable to flaws in the new organization. Divisional transportation and support units, for example, lacked sufficient personnel, vehicles, and equipment to ensure timely delivery of atomic weapons to forward artillery units. In response, the Seventh Army operations staff informed major combat units that they had to be prepared to provide emergency reinforcements to defend atomic weapons support and delivery installations

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against guerrilla or direct attack. Exercise controllers also admitted that they were unable to comply with the U.S. Army Continental Army Command’s guidance that each corps should plan to evacuate two thousand casualties per day. Incorporating that level of casualties into the exercise scenario, they contended, would have forced commanders to devote major resources to mass casualty evacuation and treatment to the extreme detriment of tactical training objectives. Medical evacuation and treatment of atomic warfare casualties, they said, would have to be the focus of other training exercises.  

General Clarke, the Seventh Army commander, voiced his own concerns. He believed that the exercise showed that the division artillery was not strong enough to provide adequate conventional or atomic firepower. Nor did the 4.2-inch mortar have sufficient firepower as a direct-support weapon for the battle group. Most important, the new organization lacked any centralized command and control over the artillery at the division level. He believed that it was important for the division to be able to mass the fires of all its assigned
artillery, although that concept ran counter to the pentomic philosophy of dispersed, semi-independent operation of battle groups.17

In March 1958, Seventh Army units down to division level participated in Command Post Exercise LION BLEU, which focused attention on atomic response capabilities throughout NATO. The exercise identified conflicting priorities between the Army and the Air Force. Air commanders favored the early employment of most of their atomic weapons, leaving very little for subsequent support of ground units. The services also differed on what approach to targeting would best support ground offensives. Air Force leaders favored an interdiction campaign that would impede the enemy’s movement by hitting rail lines, bridges, and other related targets. Ground commanders preferred to destroy enemy troop and vehicle formations first. They believed that the destruction of the transportation network would only impede their own movement when they moved to counterattack. LION BLEU also demonstrated that ground units needed to spread out to a far greater width and depth than originally planned in order to avoid presenting tempting targets for the enemy’s atomic weapons. At the same time, however, units had to retain sufficient mobility to come together quickly to counterattack when the opportunity presented itself. Older concepts of established lines, protected flanks, and mass attack

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were best forgotten. Finally, as the first major exercise in which the German II Corps headquarters took part, the test identified communication problems arising from language differences and established a requirement for stationing a permanent U.S. signal support detachment with the German headquarters.\textsuperscript{18}

With two major exercises under its belt, the Seventh Army headquarters requested an evaluation of the new force structure and doctrine from its

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subordinate unit commanders. Initial comments reflected some uncertainty about tactics and techniques that were best suited to the new formations. Division and battle group commanders requested more specific guidance in a number of areas, including the employment of aviation units, the availability of battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and the placement of boundaries and other control measures to align forces and to orient their movements. The most urgent need, commanders noted, was more specific guidance on the degree of control and the amount of authority they would have at lower levels over the division’s “on-call” atomic firepower. Overall, many of those questioned expressed a belief that as their experience with the new organization deepened, they would gain more insights into the tactics and techniques it would require.19

Combat unit commanders, in particular, expressed concern that many of the weapons, vehicles, and other technologies available to them did not adequately support the new mobile forces concept. For example, the maximum range of the 4.2-inch mortar, the only indirect-fire weapon assigned specifically to the battle group, was only about four thousand meters, too short to support the unit under the widely dispersed deployments planners envisioned. Forward observers detailed in support of the rifle companies, unit commanders added, were unable to cover the entire frontage of their units. Further compounding that problem, they said, was an overall lack of sufficient conventional artillery support for their divisions. In the V Corps, unit commanders tried to resolve the shortage by breaking up three battalions of supporting corps artillery to supplement the existing 8th Infantry Division Artillery, creating one composite battery for each battle group. Doing so, however, diminished the amount of artillery available to the division or the corps for other missions. Divisions also lacked any credible means of defending themselves against attacks by enemy aircraft. At the battle group level, moreover, radios and other communications equipment were unreliable, heavy, and lacked sufficient range to connect headquarters with their scattered companies and platoons. Finally, unit leaders pointed out that battle groups lacked any self-contained capability for rapid, cross-country movement. The division headquarters did have armored personnel carriers consolidated in its transportation battalion, but only enough to move one battle group at a time. For an organization whose battlefield survival depended on its ability to disperse widely when on the defense and then to concentrate its forces rapidly when preparing to attack, the shortfalls in communications and mobility were particularly troubling.20

The new division’s peculiar five-sided structure and streamlined chain of command also produced unforeseen complications. Without superior commu-

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nications, division commanders found it difficult to control the actions of five distinct maneuver elements. Moreover, the lack of intermediate headquarters between the division commander and the battle groups forced division staffs to monitor the communications of as many as sixteen subordinate elements at once. Lacking an intermediate battalion headquarters, company officers found themselves reporting directly to the battle group commander, a colonel. Without an assigned direct-support field artillery battalion, the battle group commander was forced to rely on his mortar battery commander as a senior fire support coordinator, a responsibility for which most lacked both the experience and the training.21

The implementation of the new organization in Europe revealed other unintended consequences. Aside from the challenges it posed for command and control, the extended span of control also limited the professional development of many mid-level officers. The new infantry and airborne divisions contained no command-level position for lieutenant colonels, the traditional battalion commanders. Only the armored divisions retained command slots at that particular level. The lack of command positions for infantry lieutenant colonels limited opportunities for those officers to gain experience and upset traditional career progression paths.22

Even as USAREUR carried on with its evaluation of the pentomic structure and doctrine, the command continued to experience personnel, equipment, and spare parts shortages that the reorganization was supposed to alleviate. At the end of May 1958, the Seventh Army reported that, of its forty-nine atomic artillery and missile units and the ordnance support units that supported them, twenty-one were considered operationally ready, twenty-two as marginally ready at reduced capability, and six unready. Although technically competent, most units lacked sufficient personnel and were experiencing shortages in essential electronics, spare parts, and communications equipment. The source of these deficiencies was clear. The Army was devoting to research and development funds that might have otherwise gone to eliminating them. In his annual historical report, the commander in chief, U.S. Army, Europe, General Hodes, pointed out that the continuous development of new missile systems made it very difficult to maintain combat readiness on a day-to-day basis. Nonetheless, he said that USAREUR was committed to atomic warfare doctrine. In a staff memorandum outlining major objectives for the command in the upcoming year, Hodes identified his number one imperative as the establishment of an atomic and missile combat capability for U.S. and NATO land forces. The

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21 Memos, Cdr, VII Corps, for Cdr, Seventh Army, Apr 1958, sub: Evaluation of Mobile Forces Concept; and Gunkel for CG, 8th Inf Div, 4 Mar 1958, sub: Monthly Chronology Report, 8th Infantry Division Artillery; Intervs, Lt Col Lowell G. Smith and Lt Col Murray G. Swindler with Gen Clyde D. Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, pp. 28–29; and Smith and Lt Col Hatcher with Gen Donald V. Bennett, 21 Apr 1976, p. 12. Both in Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI.

objective, he wrote, was 100 percent atomic capability at all times. On 1 July 1958, General Clarke returned to the United States to take over the Continental Army Command, and Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman succeeded him as Seventh Army commander. Eddleman had served as assistant chief of staff for operations for General Walter Krueger in the Pacific Theater throughout World War II, earning citations for bravery during the Leyte and Luzon campaigns and receiving his promotion to brigadier general on the Leyte beachhead. After the war, he had served as deputy commander of U.S. Troops in Trieste; as chief of the Army Plans Division; and as assistant chief of staff for operations, G–3. After serving briefly as commanding general of the 4th Infantry Division in Europe from May 1954 until May 1955, he returned to the United States to become commandant of the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He had been in that assignment for only four months when, in September 1955, the new chief of staff, General Taylor, asked him to serve as his deputy chief of staff for plans.

Eddleman and Clarke presented as striking a contrast in leadership styles as could be imagined. Clarke, an armor officer, was an outspoken, seat-of-the-pants micromanager who believed firmly in checking into all the details at the lowest echelon of command. Eddleman, an infantryman, was reserved, by the book, and more interested in efficient staff work and the chain of command than in personal inspections of every unit in his command. In describing Eddleman, Clarke called him a faceless general who lacked imagination. For his part, Eddleman expressed gratitude for the smooth transition the departing Seventh Army commander had arranged, and the outstanding staff he had left in place, but he had to note that his predecessor’s methods of training and leadership could not have been more different from his own.

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24 Intervs, Smith and Swindler with Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, pp. 30–32; and Col Francis B. Kish with Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, p. 198, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI; MFR, Maj W. H. Vinson, Asst Sec of the General Staff, 24 Dec 1959, Commander in Chief’s
As one of the principal architects of the pentomic structure during his tenure as deputy chief of staff for military operations, Eddleman joined readily in discussions assessing the atomic organization. He pointedly described the new division organization as “not exactly what we want, but on the right track” and predicted that it would be discarded within five years in favor of some more capable type of unit.25 In an article for *Army Information Digest*, Eddleman commented on the discrepancies between what equipment and technologies were required and what the Army could get at the moment. First and foremost was sufficient ground and air transport to allow each battle group to move independently. The full development of the pentomic concept, he said, was incompatible with foot speeds. The general also noted the lack of progress in adapting logistical support systems to keep up with the requirements of the mobile atomic battlefield. He challenged his officers to increase their emphasis on unit training programs, schools, and orientation courses so that soldiers might be better prepared for the challenges that the new organization and the doctrine that accompanied it would inevitably raise.26

At a Seventh Army Artillery Conference held at V Corps headquarters in Frankfurt in November 1958, Eddleman summarized the deficiencies in artillery support inherent in the new division. Because of the greater dispersion of units and the increased depth of the division battle zone, he said, the area that artillery had to cover was much larger, but the pentomic conversion had greatly reduced the number of tubes available in a division to support the infantry. Further, the absence of direct-support battalions left battle group commanders without an experienced artillery adviser and without an organization that could plan, control, and readily communicate with whatever additional artillery might be needed. As a result of Eddleman’s review, the Seventh Army recommended to the Department of the Army that the division artillery for the pentomic infantry division should increase from two battalions to five 105-mm. howitzer battalions—consisting of two batteries each—and a composite battalion, consisting of three 155-mm. howitzer batteries and one battery of 8-inch howitzers. These additions would provide a direct-support artillery battalion for each battle group and a larger, more powerful battalion of artillery giving general support to the division. The division could also achieve some personnel savings, the proposal noted, by combining the headquarters and service batteries of each battalion into a single element.27
Later exercises and maneuvers identified more flaws in the pentomic organization. In the summer of 1958, the Seventh Army participated in Full Play, a SHAPE-sponsored, combined atomic warfare and air defense exercise that evaluated all elements involved in the effort’s logistical support. The exercise revealed that ordnance and transportation units responsible for supporting the delivery of atomic weapons to the Seventh Army were unprepared to carry out their assignments. Soldiers in those units lacked sufficient training in their responsibilities and the communications necessary to coordinate the transport of atomic weapons from storage sites to the units that would fire them. As Sabre Hawk had already indicated, the divisions lacked the personnel and vehicles to assist with the movement of those munitions.28

As USAREUR and Seventh Army leaders continued to assess the effects of the pentomic reorganization through the remainder of 1958, training emphasis shifted from tactical operations to logistical support and to the security and movement of atomic weapons. In October, USAREUR conducted Quick Serve, a command post and maneuver exercise designed to test the ability of atomic munitions support units to deploy rapidly and to guard, transport, and deliver atomic weapons to firing units at the expenditure rate expected in an atomic war. Participating artillery and missile units fired 141 simulated atomic warheads during a three-day period. In the end, reviews of the exercise indicated that procedures for authenticating presidential release of nuclear weapons, and for transmitting that release authority from the supreme allied commander down to the Seventh Army commander, were too cumbersome. Also, ammunition supply points were too far from firing units to deliver munitions forward in a timely manner. In their final reports, both the Seventh Army and USAREUR recommended that ammunition supply points be located in urban areas along readily accessible road networks and close to the units they supported. In that way, they said, ammunition vehicles could travel to the supply points, load, and return to their units during hours of darkness. The commands also recommended that initial ammunition loads for Honest John units should be increased to compensate for the long distances between units and their supply points. The Seventh Army also complained about strings higher headquarters placed on many weapons, reserving them for use against specific targets. The command wanted to keep these restrictions to a minimum to reduce time spent waiting for the release of the weapons. Overall, the exercise proved so valuable as a gauge of the logistical readiness of atomic support units that USAREUR made plans to repeat it on a regular basis.29

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28 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 170–71; Memo, Huston for Seventh Army Staff Sections, 12 Mar 1958, sub: Actions to be Taken as a Result of FTX Sabre Hawk Critique.

29 Memos, Gen Henry I. Hodes, USAREUR Cdr, for Distribution, 15 Sep 1958, sub: USAREUR Directive No. 1, Exercise Quick Serve; Lt Col Harry W. Bues Jr., Asst Adj Gen,
The final big Command Post Exercise of 1958, **Bounce Back**, reflected the approach toward atomic warfare that the Army was beginning to adopt. Because the exercise was designed to test rear-area security and damage-control operations, the scenario depicted an initial aggressor strike employing forty-nine separate atomic warheads with yields ranging from 5 to 100 kilotons against NATO military installations. Observers noted that after the strike it was difficult to generate a sense of realism for the exercise’s participants. What had started in the early 1950s as an honest attempt to portray and understand the realities of atomic warfare had, by 1958, come to resemble the plot of a Hollywood science fiction thriller. As the exercise demonstrated, the idea of a doctrine based on atomic weapons had grown increasingly abstract because much of the effort seemed to involve mathematical calculations of how much of the force would remain after the initial strikes. Evaluators noted in their reports that personnel no longer seemed to be taking the training seriously. Following one simulated atomic strike, commanders ordered a field hospital to evacuate because it was in the middle of a predicted fallout pattern. When the Seventh Army surgeon countermanded the order, deeming the move impractical, controllers declared the hospital and all its personnel lost due to radiation exposure.30

Some of the surrealism of the moment was captured by the operations section of V Corps in a booklet it distributed at that time. Titled “Tips on Atomic Warfare for the Military Leader,” the manual reduced atomic tactics to comic book form as a voluptuous Atomic Annie offered to tell soldiers all about the atomic facts of life. It depicted soldiers who, after surviving an atomic strike, rallied those who remained and continued the mission as the ghosts of their dead comrades waved farewell in the background. Annie also assured her readers that they had nothing to fear from radiation, as long as they took proper precautions before they attacked through a contaminated area.31

The surrealism of atomic warfare was sinking in throughout the Army. Lt. Gen. Arthur S. Collins Jr., an instructor at the Army War College during the period, remembered that typical maneuvers or map exercises assumed that the United States would fight conventionally until it began to lose, and then let loose several nuclear weapons to reverse the tide. He questioned whether anyone involved had any idea the amount of damage that would result. Having seen what one small 20-kiloton bomb had done to Hiroshima, he could only imagine what the weapons employed in the defense of Germany would do to...
the cities, towns, and countrysides we were trying to defend. To him, at least, the whole concept no longer made any sense.32

By the end of the year, it was clear that the pentomic organization and the atomic training and doctrine that accompanied it were neither realistic nor appropriate responses to the military threat in Europe. The concept continued to unravel as observers identified new shortcomings with each successive training exercise. Under the pentomic organization, infantry divisions retained only enough armored personnel carriers to move one reinforced battle group at a time. For an organization whose very existence depended on mobility, this was an extraordinary deficiency. In addition, since the organization consolidated armored personnel carriers at the division level and parceled them out as required, drivers could not consistently train with the companies and squads they supported. Communications and command and control assets were likewise inadequate to manage so many dispersed subelements. With no intervening headquarters between the company and the battle group, the organization had too few experienced mid-level leaders. Without them, it was impossible for the commander to maintain effective control. As the maneuvers and command post exercises revealed, the pentomic division lacked the transportation and support assets to sustain itself over any extended deployment.33 The structure was so deficient in support units, one division commander noted, it was necessary to take personnel and equipment from line units to make up the difference.34

The USAREUR commander, General Hodes, summarized his concerns in a message he sent to the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, in September 1958. In what he labeled as a realistic appraisal of the combat readiness of his command, Hodes informed Taylor that USAREUR had “reached a point of calculated risk” beyond which he could not recommend proceeding without a complete re-evaluation of the mission and purpose of the command. He described the reductions that he had made in service and support elements in order to maintain a superficial appearance of combat readiness in the fighting units. Support organizations in the Communications Zone, he said, now consisted of more than 50 percent local civilian labor. The command had been forced to compensate for the lack of capabilities in its rear zone by pre-stocking large amounts of supplies in the Seventh Army area. Personnel restrictions imposed by the Army had required USAREUR to inactivate the equivalent of ten battalions of conventional artillery. Antiaircraft artillery battalions had also lost

34 Interv, Lt Col Robert T. Reed with Gen Hamilton H. Howze, 14 Oct 1972, p. 7, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI.
personnel. Complicating the problems caused by force reductions, the general concluded, numerous technical problems plagued some of the new weapons and equipment that were supposed to offset the shortages. The Corporal and Redstone missiles were too immobile and took too long to put into action, the Honest John was not sufficiently accurate, and communications and electronic equipment lacked both range and reliability. Although Hodes promised to use his resources to the best of his ability, he warned that the accomplishment of his wartime mission was no longer a “foregone conclusion.”

Other Training

Despite the emphasis on preparing for atomic warfare and implementing the pentomic reorganization, units throughout USAREUR and the Seventh Army continued to hone their readiness through more traditional training as well. For the most part, planning for atomic warfare remained a concern for senior commanders and their staffs. At lower levels, units practiced those skills that would allow them to make their own contributions to the defense in the event of a Soviet attack.

Notwithstanding some emphasis on surviving in an atomic environment, combat units tended to focus their training efforts on the same attack and defend scenarios practiced by their World War II counterparts. Infantry battle group and company commanders struggled to adjust to the opportunities and limitations offered by the new organization even as their main effort remained fixed on the traditional roles and missions of small units in combat. In contrast, the armored divisions had undergone little reorganization, so their training remained much as it had always been, emphasizing the mobility, firepower, and shock associated with those types of units. Armored commanders made a point of emphasizing the continuity in their doctrine. Col. Richard L. Irby, commander of Combat Command A, 3d Armored Division, directed his officers to study the armored tactics and doctrine as spelled out in the armored series field manuals. He reminded them that their tactics were to be those of an armored division, not of a battle group.

Battle groups and battalions continued to conduct most of their tactical training at USAREUR’s major maneuver areas. Although divisions occasionally deployed in their entirety to Grafenwöhr, the command’s largest site, more often than not they rotated battle groups or combat commands through any of the four major training areas at Baumholder, Grafenwöhr, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken. In a typical rotation squads and platoons spent two weeks working

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35 Msg, CINCUSAREUR to DEPTAR, Exclusive for Taylor, 18 Sep 1958, Message # SX–6738, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP.
on small-unit tactics and qualifying with machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, and rocket launchers that they could not fire in local training sites near their kasernes. Squad and platoon problems covered day and night attack and defense, combat in urban areas, and withdrawal from contact. Combat proficiency courses tested the ability of squad and fire team leaders to deploy and control their men. Training emphasized fire and movement, breaching obstacles, tank-infantry coordination, and individual leadership skills. Unlike major division-level maneuvers, where leaders often felt compelled to follow a scenario, smaller unit exercises encouraged sergeants and junior officers to think for themselves and to develop innovative solutions for the problems an exercise posed.\(^{37}\)

In order to evaluate the level of training at each echelon, Seventh Army training guidance required unit commanders to conduct unit training evaluations once a year. Battalions, battle groups, and division artillery conducted tests for each squad, section, platoon, company, and battery under their command. Smaller units tested first, with individual squads perfecting tactics at that level before advancing to platoon- and company-level evaluations. The exercises occurred under combat conditions as much as possible and, at the company level, against a live opposing force. Unit commanders received orders and terrain overlays twenty-four hours before the start of the evaluation. Umpires from a higher headquarters then graded each platoon and company according to checklists devised for each type of test. In addition to deploying their own forces, company commanders had to plan on receiving tanks, armored personnel carriers, mortars, or other attachments as required by the mission and scenario in their particular test.\(^{38}\)

Battalion or battle group tests were even more complex and were generally the most significant event in a unit’s training year. The two corps headquarters had the responsibility to plan and administer the exercises to all battle group and battalion-size units under their command. For infantry and armor units, they still emphasized conventional missions and tactics because battle groups had no atomic-capable weapons of their own and planning for friendly atomic strikes usually occurred at a higher level. Any focus on atomic matters was

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\(^{38}\) HQ, Seventh Army, Training Cir 20–1, Seventh United States Army Training Directive, 4 Feb 1960; Memo, Col Lynn D. Smith, Ch of Staff, for Distribution, 1 Jan 1959, sub: Training Memorandum No. 1, Training Program 1959; Training Plan, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 5th Inf, 8th Inf Div, Interior Rifle Platoon in the Attack, 1958. All in Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP. Training Memo 6, HQ, 1st Battle Gp, 13th Inf, Baumholder Training: 6–24 May 1958, 14 Apr 1958, Entry 30742, 8th Infantry Division, RG 338, NACP.
limited to testing a unit’s ability to take protective measures against and to recover from enemy chemical or atomic attacks. The crucial element of the infantry test was the ability of a battle group to concentrate its forces from dispersed positions in order to launch an attack. Troops would usually have the assistance of tanks, trucks, or armored personnel carriers from elsewhere in the division. Because most vehicles were no longer permanently assigned to the infantry, however, troops were unable to work with the same drivers each time they trained, making it difficult to develop teamwork and coordination of fire and movement.39

In artillery battalions, training tests generally emphasized the speed with which a unit could respond to a call for fire and the accuracy of the rounds it delivered. In 1958, however, artillery battalions in the 4th Armored Division—with the support of the division commander, a former artilleryman, Maj. Gen. Andrew P. O’Meara—developed new tests that placed increased emphasis on keeping pace with fast-moving armored operations. The tests evaluated how long it took for a battery to occupy a position and prepare to fire. They also required a battery to respond to a call for fire while on the march. It would have to move into firing position without the benefit of a survey or reconnaissance and deliver rounds on target within ten minutes. As a result of the new approach, a battery’s junior officers and section leaders had to make critical decisions under pressure in an atmosphere that senior leaders hoped would approximate the stress of real combat.40

As more helicopter units joined USAREUR and the Seventh Army, commanders devoted an increasing amount of time to airmobility training. Instead of using helicopters to move small numbers of soldiers to isolated tactical engagements, they could now move entire battle groups by air. In January 1958, for example, forty-seven H–34 Choctaw helicopters transported 950 men of the 1st Battle Group, 28th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, from Heilbronn to the training area at Baumholder in an exercise designated Operation LION LIFT. In addition to the troops, the helicopters carried some fifteen tons of weapons and equipment into the landing zone. Six months later, eight hundred men of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, moved into the Hohenfels training area, using a combination of ten H–34 Choctaw helicopters and twenty U–1A Otter fixed-wing aircraft. Both exercises demonstrated the potential for rapid mobility that massed helicopter airlift could provide.41


Since the Soviets had a reputation as skilled night fighters, a large portion of U.S. training concentrated on night operations. As part of that emphasis, in April 1957, USAREUR and the Seventh Army directed that all infantry, armored infantry, and reconnaissance units should conduct ranger training programs that stressed patrolling, small-unit tactics, and night operations. As a result of that directive, by 1958, most units had created specialized sections or platoons within their organizations that had trained for long-range patrolling, night movements, and actions behind enemy lines. Often with the assistance of personnel from the 10th Special Forces Group, these specialized units also trained to conduct unconventional warfare operations and to assist local indigenous resistance groups. Even the 6th Infantry in Berlin organized a Ranger unit. It practiced its craft in the wilderness of the city’s Grunwald Park. The West Berlin Zoo obligingly loaned the soldiers nonpoisonous snakes so that they could get used to dealing with them in the wild.42

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The long-range patrol units also served another important purpose. As early as 1955, Seventh Army intelligence officers had recognized a need for small units to gather information related to potential targets for atomic weapons. Col. Gilbert J. Check, the Seventh Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, suggested that commanders should develop the capability to patrol to the limits of the weapons supporting their units. At the corps level, for example, that would require sending scouts out to a distance of about fifteen miles to identify targets within range of the Honest John rockets in direct support to the corps. Seventh Army patrol units would have to operate to the more extended range of the Corporal missile. Check noted that such extended-range patrols might have to be inserted by helicopter or airplane and parachute. He also identified the requirement for lightweight, long-range radios and all-weather, silent-running helicopters before the long-range patrols would be completely practical.43

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43 Memo, Col Gilbert J. Check, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, for CINCUSAREUR, 18 May 1955, sub: Problem for Discussion, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
In 1959, the Seventh Army headquarters directed both the V and VII Corps to conduct field tests of their long-range reconnaissance patrols to determine the optimal makeup of the patrols and any factors limiting their effectiveness. Seventh Army evaluators determined that three men could operate efficiently for a brief period of time, but that six was the ideal number. Patrols could operate efficiently for about four days before beginning to lose effectiveness. Leaving patrols in place as the main body withdrew was deemed the least risky means of getting personnel into the patrol area. Insertion by parachute or helicopter involved a greater risk of detection and, in the case of the former, required trained parachutists.44

The soldiers of the 10th Special Forces Group continued their own highly specialized training as well. Individuals and teams underwent cross-training in demolitions, communications, medical treatment and first aid, and in the organization and development of guerrilla forces. In addition to providing instructor cadre for USAREUR service schools, the group also provided instruction in long-range patrolling to various Seventh Army units. Group exercises involved cold weather indoctrination, cross-country movement, and survival techniques. One such exercise, held in 1958, required each soldier to cross forty miles of mountainous terrain in seventy-two hours with a compass and a 1:100,000-scale map. Since each Special Forces trooper was also airborne qualified, many field exercises also included tactical parachute jumps.45

Training for soldiers in Europe frequently involved orientation on new types or models of weapons and equipment. In addition to experimenting with helicopters for massed troop movements, some in USAREUR began to contemplate using them as weapons platforms in support of ground operations. In 1958, the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, requested permission from the Army to arm the helicopters operating under his command. Following Department of the Army approval early in 1959, the Army’s light H–13 Sioux helicopter, sporting twin .30-caliber machine guns mounted on its landing skids, began appearing in European skies. Later that year, Brig. Gen. Clifton F. Von Kann, director of Army aviation, proposed arming the aircraft with light guided missiles to create a fleet of airborne tank killers. At the same time, troops in infantry units began qualification testing on a new rifle, the M14, and a new machine gun, the M60. Both were designed to fire NATO’s newly standardized small arms round, the 7.62-mm. cartridge. By then, the Army’s extensive research and development in short- and medium-range missiles also paid dividends. Units employing Lacrosse surface-to-surface and Hawk surface-to-air missiles began preparing for deployment to Europe. The 5th Missile Battalion, 42d Artillery (Lacrosse), completed its movement to USAREUR in

March 1960. The first Hawk battalion, the 4th Missile Battalion, 57th Artillery, did not arrive in Germany until 1961.46

Rethinking Concept C and COMZ Realignment

The pentomic reorganization had little effect on the organization or function of the USAREUR Communications Zone. Nonetheless, the line of support across France continued to evolve as the USAREUR headquarters moved to streamline logistical support throughout the command.

With an eye toward cutting costs and further reducing manpower requirements, in February 1958 USAREUR continued the realignment of logistical functions and technical staff responsibilities it had begun the previous year. As a result of the elimination of logistical operations from its headquarters and the decrease in technical service staffs, USAREUR transferred responsibility for supervision of field maintenance operations in all of its subordinate commands in Germany and France to the commander of the Communications Zone. Other responsibilities that went to the Communications Zone included staff supervision over ammunition operations throughout the theater; the monitoring of engineer construction and modification programs; and oversight of commissaries, laundries, dry cleaning facilities, and other quartermaster operations.47

To clarify lines of communications and authority between logistical facilities and the Communications Zone headquarters, and to convert the Advance Section (ADSEC) and Base Section (BASEC) to a standard TOE status, those latter two organizations were reorganized and renamed as the 4th and 5th Logistical Commands, respectively. The headquarters for the 4th Logistical Command, the former Advance Section, remained at Verdun, while the headquarters of the 5th Logistical Command, the former Base Section, remained at Poitiers. The change had little effect on the day-to-day operations of USAREUR logistics, however, as the duties of the two headquarters remained unchanged and most orders and reports continued to refer to them as the ADSEC and BASEC.48


Field maintenance shop in Rheinau, Germany, 1959
As these efforts continued, USAREUR and Seventh Army soldiers had once again to adjust to a new chain of command. On 1 April 1959, General Hodes, whose three years as USAREUR commander far exceeded that of any of his predecessors, departed for retirement in the United States. After less than a year in command of the Seventh Army, General Eddleman received his fourth star and became USAREUR Commander. At the same time, the V Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Frank W. Farrell, took command of the Seventh Army. Farrell was an infantry officer who had served as chief of staff and artillery commander for the 11th Airborne Division during World War II. As such, he had participated in amphibious landings and other combat operations in the Philippines. After the war, he held a number of positions related to airborne operations, culminating in a two-year tour as commander of the 82d Airborne Division from October 1953 to July 1955. He had served for almost two years as the V Corps commander in Europe before taking over the Seventh Army.49

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Once he replaced Hodes, General Eddleman quickly demonstrated that he had his own ideas about how to simplify and consolidate logistical support. Hodes had transferred responsibility and command authority over support units from USAREUR technical staffs to the commander of the Communications Zone. As a logical extension of that decision Eddleman proposed to move the staff sections themselves, and, in August 1959 he transferred the ordnance, transportation, and quartermaster divisions of the USAREUR staff from Heidelberg to the Communications Zone headquarters in Orléans, France. While at most only eighty people were involved, Eddleman viewed the transfer as the first step in a greater readjustment of the USAREUR staff between Heidelberg and Orléans. He intended to create a single logistical command to direct the Communications Zone and to support the theater army if the force went on a wartime footing. The general was concerned that, as commander of NATO’s Central Army Group, he could not also direct the theater’s logistical support structure if war occurred. As part of his proposed reorganization, he therefore recommended to the new Army Chief of Staff, General Lemnitzer, that the position of commanding general, U.S. Army Communications Zone, should be upgraded from major general to lieutenant general. The officer who held that position would become his deputy with command responsibility for all USAREUR logistical staff functions that relocated to France. He also proposed to move his deputy chief of staff for advanced weapons and guided missiles to Orléans. Becoming the Communications Zone chief of staff, that officer would oversee the buildup of NATO’s atomic and missile capabilities. The Department of the Army approved the designation of the Communications Zone commander as USAREUR deputy commander but did not upgrade the associated rank to lieutenant general.50

The U.S. Army Southern European Task Force

In another organizational change, on 1 January 1958, the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF), moved from the jurisdiction of the U.S. European Command to that of USAREUR. The task force, which had come into existence upon the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Austria in October 1955, had its headquarters in Verona and most of its units under the 1st Missile Command at Vicenza. The missile command consisted of two Honest John rocket battalions, the 159th and 510th Field Artillery Rocket Battalions; two Corporal missile battalions, the 543d and 570th Field Artillery Missile Battalions; the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, trained and designated as sky cavalry; and various support elements. In addition to providing an atomic and

missile capability for NATO’s southern flank, SETAF provided administrative and logistical support for U.S. forces in the Mediterranean theater. It also had responsibility for training cadre personnel for Italian Honest John battalions.\textsuperscript{51}

When SETAF was assigned to USAREUR, both its annual budget and its nearly six thousand military personnel became a part of overall USAREUR authorizations. USAREUR, however, received no corresponding increase in either its funding or its troop ceiling of roughly 226,000. Moreover, it already faced a reduction of nineteen hundred spaces in U.S. military personnel by the end of 1959. General Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, informed both the USAREUR commander at the time, General Hodes, and the Department of the Army, that the only way to maintain the combat potential of Army forces in Germany would be to offset the manpower reductions by turning a comparable portion of SETAF over to the Italians, a process he referred to as “indigenization.” Although USAREUR and the Department of the Army agreed with Norstad’s recommendation, the Department of State

was reluctant to begin negotiations with the Italians on the subject because of impending elections in the summer of 1958. This tabled discussions for a year.52

In response, the Department of the Army submitted a plan for an incremental indigenization that called for the replacement of two thousand Americans with Italians by the end of 1959. A reorganization of the command was completed during the year, but not on the basis of the space-for-space replacement of Italians for Americans that Army leaders had envisioned. In order to achieve personnel savings, the command inactivated two Honest John battalions and three infantry security companies, and it reduced some support battalions to company size. Reductions in the headquarters of SETAF, the 1st Missile Command, and the SETAF Logistical Command provided additional spaces. These losses were partially offset by the activation of two Italian Honest John battalions that were in an advanced state of training and by a promise from NATO’s Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe, to provide Italian infantry security companies. The reorganization also assigned Italian Army personnel to the SETAF general staff to assist with binational responsibilities.53

After these moves, the SETAF commander, Maj. Gen. John P. Daley, warned that plans for further Italianization were not acceptable. Removing the Corporal battalions would cause great concern to the Italians, he said, and the removal of any more U.S. combat troops from Italy in the near future would weaken NATO’s posture in southern Europe by greatly reducing the U.S. Army’s influence on the Italian Army. He recommended that U.S. forces levels remain unchanged for the next few years. General Eddleman, the USAREUR commander, supported these recommendations and asked the Department of the Army to reconsider its plans for further inactivations of U.S. Army units in Italy. As a result, the Army made no further force reductions in SETAF that year.54

Tying Up Loose Ends

As USAREUR neared the tenth anniversary of its activation, a number of its programs and associations began to reach maturity. The comradeship that the Seventh Army started to forge with the new Bundeswehr continued to thrive. The relationship between U.S. forces in Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany also moved to a new level. Within the command, new units and weapons systems arrived to replace older components, while the Army’s experiment with large-unit rotation came to a close.

Although the U.S. Army’s formal participation in the training and development of the new German Army had ended in 1957, the close relationships between German trainees and their American instructors flourished, as fully trained units of the Bundeswehr continued to join NATO’s military force. By the end of 1958, four more divisions—the 3d and 5th Armored, the 1st Airborne, and the 1st Mountain—joined NATO’s defense force. The II German Corps, with the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Mountain Division, held Central Army Group’s southern flank in southern Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, immediately to the south and on the right flank of the U.S. VII Corps. The III German Corps, with the 2d Infantry Division and 5th Armored Division, occupied a sector formerly held by the French I Corps and covering the northern portion of the Fulda Gap. It sat on the left flank of the U.S. V Corps and on the right flank of the I Belgian Corps. The supreme allied commander assigned the 1st Airborne Division to Allied Land Forces, Central Europe, as its primary reserve. The German 1st Infantry Division and 3d Armored Division went to NATO’s Northern Army Group to serve under the I German Corps, which had yet to deploy.55

Throughout 1959, the German forces earmarked for Central Army Group remained two corps headquarters and five divisions: one mountain, one airborne,

one armored, and two infantry. With its divisions stationed on each flank of the American positions, the German Army strengthened the close relationship it had already begun to form with the U.S. Army. Seventh Army units worked alongside their German counterparts during NATO maneuvers and supported them during their own internal exercises. More so than many of the other NATO allies, the Germans and Americans were able to overcome language differences and soon grew comfortable with their developing partnership.56

In much the same manner as the Americans were beginning to reconsider the recently adopted pentomic formations, the Germans, by 1959, were already rethinking the organization of their divisions. Like the Americans, German military leaders recognized that the atomic battlefield required dispersion and smaller maneuver units. They preferred a brigade structure, however, in which battalions were the primary maneuver units. To create a greater number of maneuver and support units, the divisions split tank and artillery battalions in half and brought each of the halves up to full battalion strength with new personnel. They also removed one-third of the personnel from each infantry battalion, combining them to create a fourth battalion from every three. The Germans redesignated their infantry divisions as armored infantry and subdivided them into brigades rather than the regiments and combat groups they had employed earlier. The new armored infantry divisions consisted of one tank and two infantry brigades, with an increased strength of about fifteen hundred men. The armored divisions consisted of one infantry and two tank brigades, with an increase of about twelve hundred personnel. The German brigades were largely self-sufficient and were grouped on an ad hoc basis under existing divisions, which served as administrative headquarters. The reorganization coincided with the release of some twenty-four thousand draftees at the end of March 1959, causing many of the new units to remain understrength for the remainder of the year.57

West Germany’s new military leaders also called on the nation’s expanding industrial base to replace some of their purchased American equipment with German-produced armaments more to their liking. Based on its World War II experience, the German Army wanted its infantry to move and fight from tracked armored vehicles. American doctrine, on the other hand, still called for its infantry to fight on foot. Consequently, American personnel carriers did not provide the weapons or armored protection suitable to the Germans’ needs. Similarly, German doctrine called for tanks with high mobility and firepower,

rather than the heavy armor found on the American and British tanks. As a result, German manufacturers began development of Leopard tanks and Marder armored personnel carriers to replace the American equipment. 58

Somewhat more contentious than the development of the Bundeswehr were negotiations that in August 1959 finally led to the signing of a formal Status of Forces Agreement between West Germany and the six NATO countries—the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada—that had military forces stationed in the Federal Republic. Although extensions of the 1952 Bonn Conventions had covered the rights and obligations of all parties while negotiations were in progress, the Germans signaled after their 1957 elections that they were not willing to extend indefinitely either the convention or the negotiations. The most difficult problems to resolve involved the availability of training areas to USAREUR and other NATO forces. Although the increasing number of military units at NATO’s disposal required larger tracts of land for training than in the past, West Germany’s postwar economic growth placed a premium on whatever space existed. By 1958, the construction of highways, factories, and housing was absorbing an average of nearly two hundred acres per day. In an effort to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Germans on this issue, the U.S. European Command directed USAREUR to establish a training area survey and negotiation board to gather data and to refine U.S. requirements for future negotiations with the German Defense Ministry.59

Other areas of conflict involved fees for telecommunications, insurance and taxation, and criminal jurisdiction. The agreement made no changes to the serviceman’s tax status but called for Americans to pay the same basic rate as the Germans for telephone service. Where crime was concerned, the Germans agreed to waive their right to bring American servicemen or their dependents to trial except in cases of homicide, rape, robbery, or assault. Moreover, American personnel would remain in U.S. custody until the completion of a trial or other criminal proceedings in the German courts. Even though all parties signed the agreement in August 1959, it took four more years for the treaty to be ratified by all seven nations involved, and it did not go into effect until July 1963.60

Also drawing to a close in 1958 was the Gyroscope plan for rotating complete units between the United States and Germany. In March and April 1958, the 3d and 10th Infantry Divisions completed the final full-division swap, with the 3d Division taking over its duties in Germany on 24 April. As before, the units

of the 3d Division moved into billets vacated by the units of the 10th Division, with the division headquarters located in Würzburg and the subordinate units stationed between Aschaffenburg and Bamberg. Even before that exchange was complete, however, the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, announced that future rotations would take place between battle groups rather than divisions. In justifying the change, Taylor said that it had not been possible to keep enough full-strength divisions in the United States to support the program. He also noted that it had proved difficult for divisions in Germany to maintain high levels of readiness and combat effectiveness throughout the process.\footnote{Howard Coley, “3d Infantry Division Takes Over Duties, Mission in Germany of Gyroscoping 10th Division,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 24 Apr 1958; “Taylor Confirms Gyroscope Change to Small Units,” Army Times, 15 May 1958.}

The Army began testing the new approach almost immediately. In July 1958, it redesignated the 11th Airborne Division as the 24th Infantry Division and announced the planned rotation of its airborne battle groups out of Europe by the end of the year. Because of contingency plans requiring the Seventh Army to maintain an airborne capability, another USAREUR division, the 8th Infantry Division, was reorganized as a composite division with two battle groups of airborne and three of standard infantry. When all of the movements were complete, the 8th Infantry Division submitted its evaluation of the battle group rotation. It reported that the combat effectiveness of the outgoing battle groups began to decrease from the moment the two units exchanged advanced parties. Although the incoming personnel were technically qualified to take the field and function as an integral part of the unit, their duties in paving the way for the rest of the rotation precluded such involvement. Battle group commanders also noted a shortage of specialists and junior noncommissioned officers in the contingents that arrived from the United States. They attributed this to an inability on the part of U.S. specialist training schools to keep up with the bulk requirements of a Gyroscope rotation. Unit leaders noted that inspections and turnover of equipment drew an inordinate number of troops and noncommissioned officers away from their normal duties and missions. Because of the drop in unit effectiveness throughout the rotation period, each of the battle group commanders suggested that the Army should end the program.\footnote{“Army Plans New Division,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Mar 1958; “8th Inf Div to Reorganize as an Infantry, Airborne, Composite Unit by Jan. 1,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 29 Jun 1958; HQ, USAREUR, Memo 1–20–29, Comments of the Commander in Chief, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; Marty Gershen, “8th Division Is Going Composite,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 12 Dec 1958; Memo, Col Lynn D. Smith, Ch of Staff, for CG, V Corps, 20 Apr 1959, sub: Evaluation of Battle Group Rotation, Entry 30742, 8th Infantry Division, RG 338, NACP.}

Based, in part, on those reports General Eddleman recommended in September that Gyroscope should cease. He observed that USAREUR had instituted an automated enlisted replacement system in 1956 that seemed to work well for senior noncommissioned officers on assignment to Europe. Replacements for lower ranks, he said, could return to the system of four-man teams organized into
carrier companies that the Gyroscope program had replaced. The Department of the Army approved Eddleman’s recommendations. In October 1959, the first planeload of replacements organized as a carrier company arrived in Frankfurt.63

Ultimately, Gyroscope died because its drawbacks were considerable while the benefits it had promised proved to be less significant than anticipated. Although the improvement in unit integrity and the increased stability of family life that it provided did increase morale, those gains were more than offset by the enormous loss in readiness and combat effectiveness of units as they went through the rotation process. Furthermore, the effort to keep both incoming and outgoing units up to full strength in the period leading up to an exchange caused as much personnel turbulence in the rotating units as was found in non-Gyroscope units. Moreover, if financial advantages stemmed from the full use of transportation facilities that accompanied the movement of large groups of men and dependents, the nonavailability of housing and the need to provide transient quarters for soldiers and their families that came with these moves negated most of the savings. If Gyroscope proved to be less than fully successful as a means of normal troop rotation, however, it did demonstrate the feasibility of large-unit rotation. It was the forerunner of more successful exercises for the rapid augmentation of forces in Germany that began a few years later.64

Even as Gyroscope was drawing to a close, other initiatives in Europe were just getting under way. One project of particular interest to SHAPE and the rest of NATO was the installation of Nike Ajax air defense missiles to protect airfields and major logistics installations throughout Western Europe. Acquisition of the first missile launching sites in Germany had begun in 1957. By June 1958, while many potential sites had been identified, construction had begun on only a few, and only two were completed and occupied by active missile batteries. Those two sites, to the northeast and southeast of Kaiserslautern, were part of the planned ring of sites designed to protect the massive American logistical center there. Most of the delays were the result of difficult negotiations with the various West German states over the acquisition of land in areas where the missile sites would be most effective. Because the purchase of real estate and permanent site construction had not progressed enough to accommodate the six antiaircraft battalions that were to be converted to Nike missile units, USAREUR initiated a plan to build temporary sites. The command diverted money from already approved repair and utilities maintenance projects to finance the construction. All sites were located on U.S. Army- or French-controlled property in order to


eliminate the need to negotiate with the German government for approval, and all of the work was completed by mid-1958, when Nike cadres and equipment began arriving from the United States (Map 13).

Map 13

In the spring of 1959 the first battalion-size package of Nike–Hercules-trained personnel arrived in Europe to convert four batteries of the original Nike Ajax system to a newer model with an atomic capability. Because the Army could convert only those units that were located on permanent sites, only two units completed the changeover during 1959. Located at Wackernheim, a few miles west of Mainz, and Landau, about twenty miles northwest of Karlsruhe, both sites were positioned to protect allied depots as well as major bridges over the Rhine. Incomplete construction at the other permanent sites delayed deployment of the other two batteries.66

Managing Dependents

Although USAREUR and Seventh Army commanders generally described morale in their units as good, they also almost invariably reported that the most important factors weighing on troop morale were shortages in government housing and the length of waiting periods for married personnel whose families had not accompanied them overseas. In January 1958, USAREUR headquarters reported that the Army had approved only slightly more than half of all requests for concurrent travel of dependents the previous month. Recognizing that this was an important component of the command’s overall readiness, USAREUR’s leaders looked for ways to make it easier for soldiers to bring their families with them to Europe.67

The problem in most cases was housing. The command could not allow most soldiers to bring their families with them overseas until government-supplied quarters were available for them. Despite efforts to increase the amount of housing, the Army in Europe never seemed to have enough. A 1954 dependents housing project that provided quarters for more than twenty-two thousand families in American dependent communities throughout Germany had been completed in November 1957. Another construction effort that built some 1,250 apartments and 1,450 single and duplex homes was completed in January 1958. By that time, a proposal to build an additional fifty-two hundred housing units in Germany had gone to the Department of the Army and was awaiting action by the Department of Defense and Congress. Despite all that work, however, waiting times for quarters hovered for as long as a year in housing areas, such as those supporting U.S. installations in Mainz, Karlsruhe, Pirmasens, Baumholder, and Idar-Oberstein.68

Midway through 1958, USAREUR announced an all-out drive to boost the rate of concurrent family travel to 97 percent for Germany and France by the end of 1959. Although the Army could find no additional funds to support

67 Memo, Col Walter F. Ellis, G–1, for G–3 and G–4, 27 Jan 1958, sub: Dependent Housing in Germany, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.
new construction, the command looked for other ways to increase the number of available quarters for U.S. military dependents. One of the first initiatives was an effort to convert several hundred unused maids’ rooms and excess bachelor officer quarters into temporary housing. A second was the establishment of military rental agencies to carry listings of satisfactory housing available on the German economy and to provide legal assistance and an interpreter for negotiations between families and potential German landlords. Later in the year, USAREUR authorized a temporary lodging allowance for up to eighty days for newly assigned personnel and their families to stay in hotels when they first arrived in theater. The command ordered unit leaders to correspond directly with personnel newly assigned to their units before they arrived to assist them in locating accommodations on the German economy. Commanders also assigned sponsors to incoming personnel. Those individuals wrote to inform the newcomers of local housing conditions, provided lists of available accommodations, and identified nearby hotels where they could find temporary lodging.69

For a time these measures seemed to succeed. Concurrent travel averaged more than 80 percent during the final months of 1958. Then, in February 1959, the Department of Defense rejected USAREUR requests for construction of more than ten thousand housing units in 1959 and 1960. The next month, the command had to stop approving travel for dependents planning to stay in German hotels until they could find suitable housing because it had found that as much as 95 percent of families coming to Germany were going into hotels where many incurred expenses far beyond their means. With the tourist season approaching, rates rising, and the number of available hotel accommodations falling, the command could no longer approve concurrent travel for dependents unless government housing was available or a family could verify that it had obtained a German house or apartment.70

Hard on the heels of the announcement that USAREUR was cutting off funding for temporary accommodations came word in May that further cutbacks in the command’s annual budget, rising costs of services and spare parts, and readiness priorities would force even those dependents already in government quarters to tighten their belts. Although housing itself would not be affected, the command announced that less money would be available for maintenance of quarters, support of the school system, and some commissary services.71

Even as they were eliminating funds for dependent housing in Europe, U.S. military and political leaders acknowledged the valuable contributions that U.S. civilians, particularly military dependents, could make toward

the NATO effort. Official military guidebooks and orientation material for dependents urged American family members abroad to consider themselves as unofficial ambassadors who represented the United States and the American way of life. In a late 1959 paper that recommended American responses to the Communist challenge in Europe, the Joint Staff pointed out that U.S. armed forces personnel, civilian employees, and military dependents stationed overseas comprised the largest single group of Americans in a position to contribute to allied standing in the Cold War. Those individuals, exercising the closest contact with America’s allies and within view of the nation’s adversaries, were in a position to reinforce and support the political, cultural, economic, technological, ideological, and psychological advantages of the West in general and the United States in particular. The paper’s authors concluded that the U.S. armed forces should inculcate their personnel and their dependents with an improved understanding of the language, customs, and traditions of the regions where they would live. Presenting a positive impression of Western democracy required Americans to improve their behavior and attitudes toward the forces and peoples of U.S. allies with whom they were in contact.72

Reconsiderations

December 1959 marked the start of the tenth year since the reactivation of the U.S. Seventh Army in Europe and the confirmation of an American commitment to defend Western Europe against Communist provocation and expansion. As U.S. Army leaders in Europe began to sort out the reconsiderations and second thoughts of the previous two years, however, they acknowledged that much had changed. Although Soviet conventional forces remained numerically superior to those of the West, the U.S. commitment, a rearmed West Germany, and a unified NATO provided some measure of assurance that the Soviets would have to think twice before launching an attack.

Underlying the entire military balance in Europe was the specter of atomic warfare. The Eisenhower Doctrine of massive retaliation matched against Soviet achievements in ballistic missiles created a strategic stalemate that planted the seeds for mutual deterrence. If nothing else, the tests and exercises run by USAREUR and the Seventh Army during 1958 and 1959 caused military leaders on all sides to reassess their perceptions of atomic weapons and their value. Most of the senior officers of the U.S. Army in 1959 had served in World War II. Their generation had used atomic weapons to end the war and, for at least a while, they considered them to be just a larger, more powerful battlefield

weapon. The atomic warfare exercises and tests of the pentomic structure changed that. By the end of 1959, it was clear to most that an atomic war in Europe would be a futile exercise that would leave little worth defending in its wake. While they had considerable value as a deterrent, the weapons were of questionable worth on the battlefield.73

What was clear by 1959 was that USAREUR needed to prepare itself for the long haul. While the command’s military strength certainly helped to restrain any Communist thoughts of expansion into Western Europe, its greatest contribution lay in other areas. First and foremost, it provided a strong indication that the United States was committed to Western Europe and the NATO alliance. The forward deployment of a complete field army, the creation of a system of logistical facilities and depots to support it, and the growing network of dependent communities indicated that the Americans were there to stay. The U.S. Army’s presence in West Germany also allowed the West to call the bluff on Soviet threats and bluster. Behind that bulwark, Western Europe’s economies could recover and its societies could flourish. Finally, the presence of so many American families spread throughout the theater belied official Communist propaganda about the West’s hostile intentions.

Even as the United States Army, Europe, struggled to adapt to the military and economic policies of the Eisenhower administration, the strategic environment that had shaped those policies was itself undergoing dramatic changes. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union was slowly emerging from the shadows of Joseph Stalin’s paranoia, but it remained a formidable and seemingly implacable foe of the West. Still, it was time to reconsider some of the assumptions regarding the Soviets that had driven U.S. policy since the start of the Cold War. Stalin’s successor, Nikita S. Khrushchev, had, in his own way, tried to improve Soviet relations with the United States and Western Europe. In November 1958, however, Khrushchev declared that the time had come to give up the remnants of the occupation regime in Berlin, and, to that end, he threatened to hand over to the East Germans all of those remaining functions that the Soviet Union still exercised in the divided city. A three-year exercise in brinksmanship followed as East and West jockeyed for control and influence in Berlin. Meanwhile, USAREUR held its position on the front line, trying to keep the confrontation from escalating.

Re-evaluating the Enemy

Just as U.S. and NATO military capabilities had evolved and improved over the previous few years, so too had those of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Western intelligence sources took great pains to monitor developments on the other side of the Iron Curtain and to pass that information along to USAREUR’s commanders.

An analysis of trends in Soviet capabilities and policies by the CIA in December 1958 presented a picture of a Soviet Union starkly different from the studies that it had produced ten years earlier. The report made it clear that, although the Soviets had not yet fully recovered from the devastation of World War II, they had closed the gap with the United States and the West in many areas. The most significant advances were in scientific research and development. Soviet successes with ballistic missiles and earth-orbiting satellites challenged perceptions of Western technological superiority. More important, the interaction of Western scientists with their Soviet counterparts during studies, conferences, and exchanges as part of the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year revealed Soviet equality and even superiority in many fields
of research. Although the agency estimated that Soviet industrial technology still lagged behind that of the United States, it warned that most modern Soviet plants were already on par with those in the United States and that the Soviets were making striking advances in areas of automation and engineering.¹

The most obvious change in the strategic balance since the beginning of the Cold War was the rise of the Soviet Union to a position of rough nuclear parity with the United States. Although the United States still retained a significantly larger stockpile of atomic weapons, the report’s authors estimated that the Soviet Union’s launch of an earth satellite demonstrated its ability to have operational prototypes of intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads ready sometime in 1959. Moreover, Western scientists estimated that the Soviets were capable of achieving considerable further improvements in nuclear weapons technology. In that light, the CIA’s analysts expressed a belief that the Soviets’ own nuclear capabilities were so advanced that they posed a powerful military deterrent to the United States. As a result, it seemed unlikely that either side would deliberately launch an all-out war unless vital national interests were at stake.²

² Ibid.
USAREUR’s analysts doubted that Soviet leaders would use their armed forces directly to achieve their political objectives. The Soviets appeared to be shying away from military confrontation in order not to disturb the atmosphere of relaxed tension that Khrushchev was trying to promote. In all likelihood, they would consolidate economic and political gains they had made and exploit what they believed to be their growing scientific and technological advantages. Believing in the inevitability of the triumph of communism, they anticipated a decline in Western unity and political influence and an easing of West German intransigence with the passing of the nation’s aging hard-line chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. As for the Soviet Army, it would remain where it was, in a position to intimidate its erstwhile allies and to serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the West.3

Also of some interest to Western observers was an emerging rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Although the connection between the two had probably never been quite as warm as the West had at first believed, it was clear by the end of the 1950s that China was beginning to move off in its own direction. While the Soviets appeared to be striving toward better relations with the West, Chinese propaganda was becoming all the more militant. American intelligence analysts asserted that the Soviets regarded

3 USAREUR/CENTAG Intelligence Estimate, 1 Jan 1960, HQ, USAREUR, Ofc of Asst Ch of Staff, G–2, International Relations and Security Network (ISN) Center for Security Studies, Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, Historians files, CMH.
China’s increasing military capabilities with mixed feeling, for if Soviet leaders feared the cost of subsidizing the growth and modernization of China’s armed forces, they seemed even more apprehensive about the development of a large and independent Chinese arms industry. For their part, Chinese leaders viewed Khrushchev’s efforts to improve relations with the West with suspicion and not a small amount of contempt. While the Soviets would continue to assist the Chinese military and to provide it with equipment, the Soviet Union took an unusually neutral stance toward China’s border dispute with India at the close of 1959, and the Chinese Communists gave considerably less than enthusiastic support to Soviet efforts to mediate.4

The primary interest of most analysts, however, remained in the Soviet military posture. American intelligence had confirmed considerable reductions in the Soviet Army since the end of the Korean War. In fact, the Soviets had devoted a great deal of publicity and propaganda to personnel cuts of almost two million men in their armed forces between 1955 and 1957. At the same time, however, Western intelligence noted little, if any, inactivation of major units and was fairly certain that units withdrawn from satellite areas over the previous years had merely moved to locations within the Soviet Union. Any actual reductions had probably come from eliminating nonessential supporting and administrative units, from small cuts in some other units, and from transferring large numbers of labor troops to nonmilitary status. Overall, Western intelligence agencies estimated that Soviet military manpower was little changed and remained in the area of 4 million men: approximately 2.5 million in the ground forces, about 835,000 in the air forces, and another 760,000 in naval units. Given the state of the Soviet Union’s relations with the West, it seemed unlikely that further reductions would occur in the immediate future.5

In December 1959, Western defense leaders reported that the Soviet Union had established a fourth branch to its armed forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces. With an approximate strength of two hundred thousand men, the new force was responsible for manning a growing number of intercontinental and intermediate-range missile sites scattered throughout the Soviet Union. Its commander controlled all missile sites as well as the factories that manufactured atomic weapons, rockets, and guided missiles.6

Although Soviet doctrine contemplated the tactical use of atomic weapons by ground, air, and naval forces, the CIA concluded that few weapons were available for tactical use. Considering the estimated availability of fissionable

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materials, analysts believed that the Soviets possessed sufficient weapons to support long-range attacks against the United States but not enough for tactical missions or air defense. Instead, the Soviet Army trained extensively in the use of chemical and, to a lesser extent, biological weapons on the battlefield. It retained from World War II a large number of chemical munitions, mostly artillery rounds containing nerve agents, and research was underway to develop nonlethal, incapacitating agents. The CIA indicated that Soviet capabilities in these areas were at least comparable to those of the major Western nations and that the Soviet Union’s civilian populations as well as its military personnel had trained in defensive techniques against such weapons.\(^7\)

The Soviets maintained about 175 divisions. Although many were at less than 50 percent of authorized wartime strength, analysts noted improvements in their readiness, stemming from an extensive program to modernize ground units to meet the requirements of modern warfare. Reorganizations in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, which contained most of the Soviet Union’s forward-deployed divisions in Europe, produced a new type of unit, the motorized rifle division. This formation added tanks, armored personnel carriers, and mobile rocket launchers to standard infantry divisions to produce a more mobile and hard-hitting unit. The reorganizations also resulted in the creation of “Tank Armies” composed exclusively of tank divisions and designed for rapid, deep exploitation into enemy rear areas once initial assault echelons had punched a hole in the West’s frontline defenses. The modifications stressed firepower, mobility, initiative, and personnel protection for operations on an atomic battlefield. While the new formations might employ nuclear weapons in support of tactical operations, conventional artillery and unguided rockets continued to provide the majority of fire support.\(^8\)

The CIA’s analysis of the Soviet air force and naval units had important implications for USAREUR. Russian tactical aviation units included some forty-seven hundred jet fighters and twenty-eight hundred light bombers devoted to air support for units on the ground. Another ten thousand fighters were assigned to units with a primary mission of air defense. Although their numerical strength was impressive, most of the Soviet aircraft had limited range and combat ceilings, and were designed for defense of the Soviet homeland. Since the strategic air forces had few aircraft capable of long-range interdiction, a requirement for operations over the North Atlantic, the air units would be


unable to interfere significantly with reinforcements moving to Europe from the United States.9

The Soviet Navy was a different matter. Although it had about three hundred surface ships, mostly cruisers and destroyers stationed in the Baltic and Black Seas and along Russia’s Pacific coast, its real strength lay in its submarines. An increase in worldwide contacts with unidentified submarines noted in a 1958 intelligence estimate seemed to reflect an increased level of training and expertise in the undersea fleet. Its four hundred boats would present a definite threat to any attempt to reinforce and resupply Europe by sea.10

Any discussions of Soviet military strength also had to take into consideration the military potential of its satellite states. The most powerful of these was East Germany, whose ground forces included seven divisions comprising about seventy-five thousand soldiers. These were supplemented by another forty-five thousand troops organized into border police and internal security troops. As with the Soviets, the East Germans had mechanized their rifle divisions and modernized much of their equipment. The East German Navy was small, consisting mainly of mine layers and patrol craft. The East German Air Force possessed 175 modern MIG–15 and MIG–17 jet fighters, as well as a small number of transports and training aircraft. Most of the other satellite nations fielded slightly larger ground forces due to policies of compulsory military service, which the East Germans chose not to implement in order to score propaganda points in the West. Of the satellites, only the Polish Army, frequently included in combined exercises with Soviet and East German forces, approached their level in training, organization, and readiness of weapons and equipment.11

Satellite military contributions did not come without economic and political costs. More than ten years after World War II, the Soviets had extracted all of the reparations and seized as much of the industrial infrastructure as they were going to get. In many cases, the cost to prop up the satellites’ economies and to support their armed forces was far greater than any return on the investment. It was the assessment of American intelligence and diplomatic analysts that “Stalin’s death left a legacy in Eastern Europe of inefficient maladjusted economies and of hatred for Soviet domination.” While this might have been a bit overstated, the revolts in Hungary and Poland during 1956 confirmed the underlying premise. Although a combination of increased Soviet military presence, political indoctrination, and slowly improving standards of living

10 Ibid.
had diminished some public resentment, the reliability of satellite military forces remained questionable. Military planners in USAREUR were quick to note, however, that even if the Soviet Army could not rely on its satellite allies to support a drive into the West, it could reasonably expect them to oppose and delay any Western counterattack, for they controlled all of the traditional routes through which Russia had been invaded in the past and thus provided a buffer between it and its potential enemies.\(^\text{12}\)

That being the case, U.S. intelligence analysts could only conclude a major December 1958 estimate by noting that, if popular resentment of the Communist system remained in many places, it had been reduced in others where a gradual improvement in living standards had occurred. Overall, active unrest did not seem to be a problem, except in Poland where strikes and riots were still possible, and in East Germany where continuing emigration to the West indicated active discontent and remained a seemingly insoluble problem for the Soviet and East German regimes.\(^\text{13}\)

### USAREUR’s Role in the American Intervention in Lebanon

With the confrontation in Europe nearing a state of relative equilibrium, the United States looked to contain Soviet adventurism on other fronts. Over the next several years, the two sides would face one another through a series of proxy confrontations but would avoid direct clashes between their own military forces.

Claiming that Soviet leaders had long coveted control over the Middle East, President Eisenhower, in a 5 January 1957 message to Congress, called for its approval of a policy to send economic and military aid to Middle East nations to assist them in their fight against communism. In response, on 9 March, Congress approved a joint resolution promising such support and pledging to intervene with military force if the president deemed it necessary to help any Middle Eastern country requesting assistance. The policy, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, committed the U.S. armed forces to possible intervention in the Middle East and prompted them to begin planning for that contingency.\(^\text{14}\)

In response to the president’s appeal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the U.S. European Command to develop a joint operations plan for the support


\(^{13}\) Ibid.

of a specified Middle Eastern command, which would be activated when it was needed. Planning involved a joint effort by the U.S. Sixth Fleet; the U.S. Marine Corps; the U.S. Air Force, Europe; the Military Sea Transport Service; the Military Air Transport Service; and the U.S. Army, Europe. The USAREUR contribution to this effort was Emergency Plan (EP) 201, governing the movement of an Army task force from Europe to the Middle East.  

Labeled EP 201, the plan identified specific tasks for each of the command’s subordinate elements in the event that Arab-Israeli hostilities or Communist-inspired aggression against friendly Middle Eastern states required U.S. military action to protect American lives and interests and to bring about a cessation of hostilities. The plan required USAREUR to provide an Army Task Force (ATF 201)—consisting of two airborne battle groups, reinforced with minimum essential combat and service support elements—to a joint commander specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Seventh Army would contribute most of the personnel for the task force. In addition to the two battle groups, the troop list would include a tank battalion, an engineer battalion, two artillery batteries, an Honest John rocket battery (less two launchers), and a number of medical, maintenance, and supply units. USAREUR would coordinate movement of the task force to the airfield or port of departure and provide logistical support for thirty days, or until the Department of the Army assumed that responsibility.

The plan also included support from USAREUR’s other subordinate commands. The Communications Zone would supply support units, mostly engineer, medical, and transportation personnel; move troops to departure points; provide logistical support to the deployed troops; and furnish emergency personnel replacements for the task force. The 7th Engineer Brigade, a unit assigned directly to USAREUR to assist with building projects throughout the command, was to assign one reinforced engineer construction company to U.S. Air Force, Europe, to help with airfield development in the area of deployment.

The plan broke the task force’s troop list into five components: Forces Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo. Force Alpha consisted of the first battle group, an airborne engineer platoon, a medical platoon, and a section from the task force headquarters. It was to be prepared to move out from departure airfields within twelve hours’ notice of an initial alert. Force Bravo, consisting of the second battle group, another airborne engineer platoon, and additional elements from the task force headquarters, had to be able to take off from the departure point within twenty-four hours of notification. Force Charlie contained most of the combat support elements, including an airborne recon-

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15 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959, Historians files, CMH.
17 Ibid.
naissance troop, two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers, an Honest John section, the advance components of an engineer battalion, a maintenance section, and the rest of the task force headquarters. Force Delta contained the logistical and service support units, including the remainder of the engineer battalion; the rest of the Honest John battery; an antiaircraft battery; a military police company; and various chemical, medical, engineer, ordnance, signal, and quartermaster sections necessary to sustain the task force for an extended period of time. The final component, Force Echo, was a medium tank battalion. Although the plan identified specific units assigned to each force, it was flexible enough for units to be added, subtracted, substituted, or moved between components as needed. It also allowed for the deployment of either the entire task force or only selected elements, and a move could be executed by air or by sea, depending on the situation at hand. Units tentatively assigned to the task force had to maintain a state of readiness consistent with the timetable included in the plan.18

Commanders reviewed the lists of unit and individual equipment that troops would need to carry as part of the deployment. Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, assistant division commander for the 11th Airborne Division, noted that some items made less sense than others. He was particularly struck by the inclusion of pith helmets, which had been rejected by Army testers as early as 1934. Despite deleting them from the list of required equipment, the unit received a shipment of the helmets anyway. The general recalled that the command made excellent use of them by issuing them to lifeguards at local swimming areas.19

It did not take long for events in the Middle East to set U.S. contingency plans in motion. Early in 1958, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to add Lebanon, viewed by the United States as pro-Western, to his United Arab Republic. Partly in an effort to ward off Nasser’s influence, the Lebanese president, Camille Nimr Chamoun, attempted to effect a change in his country’s constitution that would allow him to seek a second term in office. As his popularity waned in the face of political opposition from several rebel leaders financed and supported to various extents by Egyptian and Syrian agents, Chamoun’s control over the government became precarious. Radio stations in Cairo and Damascus called on the Lebanese to revolt against the “forces of imperialism and its agents.” By the middle of May, with disorder growing, the Lebanese government prepared to ask its parliament for emergency powers, to include a declaration of martial law.20

In Washington, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles watched the situation in Lebanon with growing concern. On the one hand,

they believed that it was in the United States’ interest to maintain the independence and integrity of Lebanon in accord with the president’s Middle East Doctrine, and considerable congressional backing already existed for an American intervention in the region. On the other hand, both men recognized that Arab nations would bitterly oppose any introduction of U.S. armed forces into Lebanon. They were concerned that interruptions in oil supplies, closing of the Suez Canal to American shipping, and political unrest in Middle East nations normally friendly to the United States would be the inevitable result. Eisenhower suspected Soviet involvement behind much of the Arab unrest and believed the Soviets would continue to push unless the United States chose to intervene. Based on concern over Arab reaction in the region, however, Eisenhower ordered that U.S. forces would intervene only if President Chamoun requested them, and only with Chamoun’s full understanding that the Americans were there only to help maintain order and the stability of the government and not to back him for a second term as president.\(^{21}\)

With that guidance in mind, the State Department instructed the embassy in Lebanon to inform President Chamoun of the conditions under which the United States would be willing to intervene. Chamoun must first file a complaint against external interference in its affairs with the United Nations Security Council. Then, Lebanon was to seek public support from the governments of other nations including at least some Arab states. Only then might the United States intervene. Other than acting in their own self-defense, U.S. forces were not to engage any of the opposing factions. Although President Chamoun received the message, he chose not to make a formal request for assistance at that time (Map 14).\(^{22}\)

The situation in Lebanon continued to deteriorate, however, as rebel factions instigated riots in Beirut and called for general strikes across the nation. In response to an appeal from Chamoun’s government, the United Nations sent a team of observers to Lebanon on 11 June to ensure that outside nations were not aiding rebel forces with arms, equipment, or men. The team reported that the Lebanese Army controlled only a small portion of the country’s border with Syria. Because rebel forces denied the observers access to most points along the border, the team was unable to make any determination about possible Syrian infiltration.\(^{23}\)

Events in July conspired to force President Eisenhower’s hand. On 9 July 1958, President Chamoun announced that he would leave office at the end of


his term without seeking re-election. Despite the announcement, rebel forces declared they would continue their opposition to the Lebanese government. Then, on 14 July in nearby Iraq, a group of young army officers executed a coup against the Iraqi royal family, establishing what the Americans perceived to be a leftist regime. This proved to be the last straw for the increasingly edgy Lebanese president. Upon learning of the coup in Iraq, Chamoun summoned the American ambassador to his office and angrily accused the United States of underestimating the danger in the Middle East. He dismissed U.S. assurances and told the ambassador that he would judge America’s intentions by its deeds. He demanded that U.S. military forces intervene within forty-eight hours. President Eisenhower met with his cabinet, the Joint Chiefs, and key congressional leaders that same day. After those discussions, he issued orders to land an advanced contingent of marines in Lebanon the following afternoon, to move elements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet into the eastern Mediterranean, and to put contingency plans into effect to move two USAREUR battle groups into the country.24

Approximately 1500 on 15 July, some five thousand marines of Task Force 61 began moving ashore on the beaches of Beirut. They encountered little opposition and by nightfall had secured the Beirut International Airport. Marines took charge of the control tower, hangars, and service installations and, in light of previously threatened rebel attacks, formed a defensive perimeter around the airport. Within twenty-four hours of its arrival, the task force began submitting requests for logistical support directly to USAREUR. Brig. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Seventh Army chief of staff, noted that his command had rehearsed well in advance and was prepared to provide the force with whatever it needed.25

Meanwhile, at 0530 on 15 July, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, General Norstad, notified the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, of the imminent operation and directed him to prepare one battle group for deployment to Beirut. Although Hodes had already put the 24th Infantry Division on notice that it might be called on to intervene in Iraq, his warning order caught many of the division’s staff officers by surprise. Many were busily preparing for an already scheduled exercise near Bad Tölz, Germany. Moreover, the 1st Battle Group, 503d Airborne Infantry, which had been designated by the


24th Division as Force Alpha in the original contingency plan, was preparing to participate in the same exercise and was in no condition to reconstitute itself in time to go to Lebanon. As a result, the division decided to substitute the 1st Battle Group, 187th Airborne Infantry, as a new Force Alpha. A few hours later, when the division received another call from USAREUR headquarters raising the alert status another level, the assistant division commander and designated commander of Task Force 201, Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, began to assemble his troops and to prepare weapons and equipment for deployment.26

The effort soon revealed that the planning process had failed to take several important factors into consideration. The first had to do with actually assembling the task force. The battle group for Force Alpha was to be deployed at 110 percent of its full strength. Since units in the 24th Infantry Division were maintained at less than full strength due to personnel and budget restrictions imposed on USAREUR, General Gray had to augment his force with soldiers from across the division. To fill the required officer and noncommissioned officer slots, he received instructions to select the best and most experienced in the division. The 24th Infantry Division also had to provide personnel and equipment to prepare and load the task force at the point of departure, Fürstenfeldbruck airfield, near Munich. In essence, it had to cannibalize itself to deploy one battle group with supporting elements to Beirut. This diminished the unit’s capability to carry out its primary mission in Western Europe by almost 60 percent.27

As the task force prepared for deployment, leaders also realized that the reflagging of the division from the 11th Airborne to the 24th Infantry had unforeseen consequences. As long as the division remained an airborne unit, it was simple to detail individuals and units familiar with airborne marshaling and departure tasks. As the division gradually converted to an infantry unit, it lost many of its airborne-qualified personnel and much of its ability to deploy its units quickly and effectively. The change in the division’s TOE had also reduced the number of parachute riggers required to prepare individual parachutes and the heavier equipment drop packages. As a result troops from the two battle groups had to assist in rigging their own equipment.28

The change in TOE did have certain positive effects for other units who were deploying. Maj. Gen. Robert H. Forman, then a battery commander in the 24th Infantry Division, remembered that the organizational change had increased the number of men authorized in his battery from 97 to 137. Up until the deployment was announced, however, he had received no new equipment.

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26 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; Spiller, “Not War But Like War.”


Vehicles and equipment of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, arrive and unload west of the Beirut city limits.

or people. When the alert was called, his battery was understrength and underequipped, based on the new TOE. It was remarkable, he recalled, seeing all of the new radios, trucks, and people that arrived within a 24-hour period, ready to deploy with his battery.29

The assembled force began movement to the airfield on 15 July at 1400. All elements were at the air base by 1900. Troops started loading the aircraft almost immediately and were prepared to depart by 0800 the next morning. The first plane departed the airfield at 0817 and all elements of the force were airborne by 2248 on 16 July. Because the situation on the ground in Beirut was still unstable, aircraft were loaded so that the troops could make a parachute assault. By the time they made an intermediate stop in Adana, Turkey, however, officials had confirmed that an air landing at Beirut Airport was safe and feasible. Planes began arriving early on 19 July and by that evening Force Alpha had assembled in an area southeast of the airport and was prepared to act as a reserve force.30

With the initial task force deployed, USAREUR made ready to deliver the remainder of the contingency forces to Lebanon. Force Bravo, consisting of the 1st Battle Group, 503d Airborne Infantry, remained on alert and prepared to move to the airfield within twelve hours of notification. When it became clear in the days that followed that there was little chance combat would develop in Lebanon, USAREUR increased the battle group’s alert requirement to forty-eight hours. The force would remain in Europe for the duration of the operation in Lebanon.31

The troops in Lebanon, however, required the headquarters, administrative, and support elements of the other follow on forces. Force Charlie, including the task force headquarters, moved to Fürstenfeldbruck airfield on the afternoon of 17 July. Because of the complications involved in loading such diverse units and an outbreak of severe thunderstorms, the first aircraft did not depart for Adana until early 19 July. Some elements of the force gathered at other air bases in Germany and France, while a small detachment of vehicles and guard personnel went to Bremerhaven for movement by sea. All personnel and equipment except for the seaborne contingent reached Beirut by the evening of 24 July. Force Delta, consisting of additional support units, left Bremerhaven by sea on 26

July and arrived in Beirut between 3 and 5 August. Force Echo, consisting of the 3d Medium Tank Battalion, 35th Armor, moved to Bremerhaven for sea transport by 21 July. It arrived in Beirut on 3 August.32

According to the original plan, an Honest John section of two launchers was to be part of Force Charlie, with the battery headquarters following as part of Force Delta. Prior to departure, however, the Army Staff directed that the launchers be deleted from Charlie and added to Delta. Four days later, however, as Force Delta prepared to load, the Joint Chiefs decided that political considerations made deployment of the atomic-capable rockets into Lebanon inadvisable. The equipment was unloaded and remained at Bremerhaven. To fill the gap, the 24th Infantry Division assumed the mission of maintaining one launcher on twelve-hour alert for movement to Beirut by air or water.33

By the time all of the Army troops of Task Force 201 had arrived, more than ten thousand soldiers and marines were on the ground in Lebanon. Admiral James L. Holloway Jr., the commander in chief, Specified Command, Middle East, in charge of the overall intervention, recognized that he needed a single ground commander to coordinate the activities of Army and Marine units. To that end, the Joint Chiefs approved the admiral’s recommendation that they appoint a joint ground force commander. The Army chief of staff, General Taylor, selected Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, then serving as commanding general of the Northern Area Command in Germany, for the position. Although the marines expressed disappointment that one of their own had not been selected, Army representatives explained that Admiral Holloway had requested an officer of major general rank so that he would not be outranked by his Lebanese counterpart. Adams was already close to the scene in Europe, had just completed a tour of duty in the Middle East, and was a logical choice for the position. Accompanied by only his personal staff, the general arrived in Lebanon on 24 July and, two days later, assumed command of all U.S. land forces in Lebanon.34

32 Ibid.
34 HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959; Spiller, “Not War But Like War”; Interv, Col Irving Monclova and Lt Col Marlin Lang with Gen Paul
Because Adams had no time to assemble a staff prior to his departure, he decided that he would have to use personnel already in Lebanon. Although the simplest solution might have been to merge his staff with that of the Army task force, he rejected that approach because the Army elements would need their own operational staff in the event of hostilities. Instead, he drew 31 officers and 108 enlisted men from the task force staff and received another 8 officers and some clerical personnel from the marines. To demonstrate that his headquarters should accurately reflect the integrated nature of the command, he requested and received a Marine officer to serve as his chief of staff. Adams’ experience in USAREUR and the predominance of USAREUR personnel on his staff simplified communications and procedures, allowing the entire contingency force to draw support from the Army in Europe rather than having to rely on a line of communications all the way back to the United States.35

General Adams made it his first priority to explain to his men exactly what it was they were supposed to do. President Eisenhower had said that their broad mission would be to protect American lives and interests and to sustain the independence of Lebanon, but the new commander needed to express those goals in terms of military tasks and objectives. To that end, he directed his ground units to maintain security around the airport, the port, and the embassy and to keep open principal routes of communication by establishing checkpoints and conducting frequent patrols. His units were to protect the city from harassment, raids, or incursions by rebel forces and to maintain infantry and tank reserves so that they could come to the assistance of any U.S. forces that needed backup. Adams emphasized to his troops that they were there to break up fights, not contribute to them. The rules of engagement for the troops were simple. They were not to fire unless fired on. If they were fired on, they were to establish fire supremacy quickly and put a stop to the engagement. A rifle shot would be met with a machine gun burst and a machine gun with a round from the 90-mm. main gun on one of the force’s M48 Patton tanks. It was doubtful that the rebels could raise the ante from there.36

By 1 August, soldiers had taken over the mission of the marines in securing the airport and the high ground surrounding it, the landing beach, and southern routes into the city (Map 15). The marines, in turn, took responsibility for the security of the city itself and the roads leading into it from the north and east. During the first three weeks of August, the troops were subjected to harassing fire from those portions of the city controlled by rebel forces. Several vehicles were hit, and one American soldier was wounded by a rebel gunman. General Adams lodged a protest with the Lebanese Army leader, Maj. Gen. Fuad

Chehab, and threatened to dismantle strongpoints in rebel-controlled sections of the city if the Lebanese Army was unable to control the situation. American troops followed up by establishing roadblocks on supply routes leading into rebel areas.37

Following their rules of engagement, the troops developed their own methods for dealing with harassment. General Adams told a story of finding two soldiers at one checkpoint deployed in prone firing positions on a sand dune overlooking rebel-controlled ground. When the general stopped to investigate, the lieutenant in charge told him that his position had been fired on by a machine gun in a distant bunker. The officer noted that responding with tank fire would undoubtedly cause heavier casualties than the general would accept. Instead, he placed two of his best marksmen in a vantage point where they could see the backside of the bunker. Each night, he continued, his troops had seen a light emanating from the position. Sure enough, on the evening after they set up the site, the light came on about 2100 and each of his riflemen fired one round, extinguishing the illumination. The next morning a messenger approached the American under a white flag and promised the lieutenant that the rebels would not fire on his position again. Adams took great pleasure in relating the story because it reflected the difficult situation his soldiers faced and the skill and ingenuity with which they responded.38

For the most part, life for the soldiers settled into a routine with little to do outside of their military duties. They could go to the beach to swim in small groups, but since trucks and jeeps were in short supply, the two-mile walk there in the broiling sun deterred all but the most enthusiastic swimmers. Mealtimes, as well, were nothing to look forward to. The men ate C-rations for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. After a few weeks, mess personnel were able to supplement most meals with fresh fruit and vegetables purchased at local markets, but it was not until September that the troops began to receive meals similar to those soldiers received in Europe. In mid-August, regular shipments of ice cream that began to arrive by ship from Italy did much to improve morale.39

In order to maintain some level of combat readiness, and to help relieve the boredom, task force commanders prepared a five-week training program for their units. Beginning on 1 September, the program emphasized individual and small-unit training, physical fitness, and instruction on individual- and crew-served weapons. The staff coordinated with the Lebanese Army for use of live-fire ranges. Targets and enough supplies to equip five new ranges arrived by air from USAREUR. Troops from the airborne battle group also conducted training

38 Interv, Monclova and Lang with Adams, 7 May 1975, pp. 27–29.
jumps, landing in a drop zone located near the north end of the airport. The task force likewise prepared a forty-hour training program for the commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the Lebanese Army. Lebanese leaders, however, considered the program too ambitious and indicated that they could not spare the personnel to be trained. Instead, they preferred to observe American training, and throughout August and September they attended numerous demonstrations and exercises conducted by the task force’s soldiers.  

On 31 July the Lebanese Parliament elected a new president, General Chehab, the Lebanese Army commander. Although the choice offered a glimmer of hope for national reconciliation and was supported by most of the rebel leaders, sporadic violence continued throughout the country. Early in August, both President Chamoun and President-elect Chehab advised the U.S. ambassador that a token withdrawal of U.S. forces would provide a bargaining chip in negotiations with rebel forces. U.S. officials also noted that if such action could take place prior to a scheduled United Nations General Assembly meeting on 13 August, it would preempt protests by the Soviets and keep them from claiming any credit for the withdrawal. With that in mind, one of the two Marine battalion landing teams began to re-embark on 12 August and was completely out of the country within three days. With little fanfare,

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A lifeguard on a stand made of cartons of C-rations keeps an eye on U.S. service members enjoying a swim in the Mediterranean at a beach near Beirut’s international airport.

the remaining marine units gradually began returning to their ships until, by the end of September, all were gone.41

President Chehab took office on 23 September and went about trying to form a government that would be acceptable to all of the various factions. The only action that seemed to have their complete support was the total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon. Therefore, on 8 October, the State Department announced that, by agreement with the government of Lebanon, the United States would withdraw all of its remaining troops by the end of the month.

Through the end of September and into the early days of October, although reconnaissance patrols continued, most of the troops moved into marshaling areas and prepared to leave. Loaded planes began departing Beirut Airport on 15 October. By the end of the month, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon was over.42

Even as President Eisenhower sent his congratulations to the returning troops for a job well done, USAREUR leaders were drawing up a more sober assessment of the mission. Although the command had requested and the Department of the Army had agreed to a rapid replacement of personnel lost to the deployment, additional troops had not been forthcoming. For the duration of the intervention, the 24th Infantry Division in Europe was without 20 percent of its infantry strength and a large portion of its support force. The Seventh Army commander, General Eddleman, pointed out that if Force Bravo had also deployed, the division would have lost almost half of its infantry. Both Eddleman and the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, questioned the wisdom of assigning responsibility for contingency missions in the Middle East

to USAREUR. The requirement for the command to maintain such a capability seemed difficult to reconcile with the fact that the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, designated as the Army’s Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), was specifically organized, trained, equipped, and located for such missions. For USAREUR to have to duplicate those capabilities, the generals argued, was a diversion from its primary responsibilities.\footnote{Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jul 1958–30 Jun 1959, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 35–38; HQ, USAREUR, G–3 Division, The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon, 1959.}

The commander in chief, U.S. EUCOM, General Norstad, reviewed the generals’ comments and informed the Department of the Army and the Joint Chiefs that he agreed and recommended that Middle East contingency missions be assigned to the Strategic Army Corps. The Joint Chiefs agreed to study the issue, but no immediate changes were forthcoming. In due course, the Army rotated the 24th Infantry Division’s airborne battle groups out of Europe as part of Operation \textit{Gyroscope} and replaced them with conventional infantry units. Since USAREUR, for the time being, still had to prepare for rapid deployment contingencies, however, two infantry battle groups of the 8th Infantry Division were converted to airborne. By the end of 1959, the 8th Division had completed

\begin{center}
Members of the 187th Infantry, 1st Airborne Battle Group, patrol through the village of Chiah, August 1958
\end{center}
the conversion, tested its rapid-deployment capabilities, and was prepared to assume the contingency mission.44

The combat units that deployed to Lebanon had learned some lessons of their own. After the difficulties in getting the task force mobilized, the 8th Infantry Division, which had assumed the contingency mission after the airborne battle groups of the 24th Infantry Division rotated back to the United States, maintained one rifle company on two-hour alert with its heavy loads rigged and prepared to load onto the aircraft. The heavy-drop platoon, the division’s parachute-rigging specialists, lived in barracks near the airborne battle groups to facilitate instruction on rigging procedures. The division created a complete scale model of a departure airfield that could be transported throughout the unit to train personnel on mobilization operations. The division tested its procedures in the spring of 1959 with a training exercise that dropped an entire battle group to seize an airfield and to conduct antiguerrilla operations. By the end of 1959, the 8th Infantry Division was better prepared to execute the airborne contingency missions than the 24th Infantry Division had been a year earlier.45

Officers in charge of the logistical support for the deployed troops reported their own lessons learned. Col. Dan K. Dukes, deputy commander of the 201st Logistical Command in Lebanon, recalled the initial period of the deployment as mass confusion. Instead of being able to play a supporting role, his unit was a liability and spent the first few weeks trying to get organized. It took several weeks to sort out the various disparate units and assign specific duties to each. The experience showed him that the logistical units had to train regularly with the tactical units they supported, under conditions they might expect to face in an actual situation. Also, the logistical base had to have greater flexibility, so that its leaders could tailor the support elements to the size and needs of the combat forces. The experiences in Lebanon gave leaders within the USAREUR Communications Zone food for thought as they continued to experiment within the organization.46

The 1958 Berlin Crisis

Lebanon was hardly the only problem confronting U.S. forces in Europe during the late 1950s. Berlin remained a point of contention between the Soviet Union and the West, one that Khrushchev was determined to resolve.

In November 1957, Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an assessment of the Berlin situation that the State Department had prepared in coordination with the CIA and the Department of Defense. The purpose of the study was to examine Berlin’s status

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44 Ibid.; Final After Action Rpt, FTX Heavey Sent, HQ, 8th Inf Div, 16 Nov 1959, Entry 2042, USAREUR G3 Troop Operations, RG 549, NACP.
46 Interv, Col Richard O. Hahn with Col Dan K. Dukes, 11 Feb 1984, pp. 9, 33, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI.
as a city still occupied by the four World War II Allies almost fifteen years after the war’s end, and to evaluate problems connected with continued Western access to the city. It assessed the possible incorporation of East Berlin into the Soviet-controlled German Democratic Republic; the current level of East German interference with travel between East and West Berlin; the disruption of German traffic between Berlin and the Federal Republic; and the intermittent denial of Allied access to Berlin by road, rail, and air.\(^{47}\)

Although the paper considered the potential for several particularly serious actions that the Communists might take to complicate the allied position in the city, it generally concluded that Western policy was appropriate and adequate to meet any challenges. On the subject of possible incorporation of the Soviet sector of Berlin into the Soviet Zone, it recounted the large numbers of refugees that continued to defect to the West but discounted as speculation intelligence reports that indicated that East Germany intended to seal off East Berlin’s borders with West Berlin. It added that, for years, the city had planned a reorganization of transportation, utilities, and city services in the event of a denial of access to the Communist sector’s facilities. As a result, the residents of West Berlin would not be greatly inconvenienced. The study concluded that the East Germans would have little choice but to continue to rely on spot checks coupled with threats and other psychological pressures in order to limit the flow of refugees to the West. As for the possibility that the Communists might attempt to restrict travel between East and West Berlin, the report concluded that no plans existed to deal with that eventuality. Instead, the Allies would meet any move in that direction by lodging protests at the appropriate levels.\(^{48}\)

The State Department’s analysis notwithstanding, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed concern over the ongoing harassment of traffic into and out of Berlin and the Soviet–East German ability to seal off the western sectors. Early in November 1957, the Joint Chiefs requested from U.S. EUCOM an estimate of the situation, of the most probable courses of action the Soviets and East Germans would adopt, and of the allied ability to counter them. In response, General Norstad indicated that recent episodes of rail, highway, and air traffic harassment had underscored the ability of the Soviet Union to interfere with the movement of allied personnel and freight and had highlighted the vulnerability of West Berlin. He expressed his belief that Soviet actions were motivated by three immediate objectives: to force the allies to deal with East German authorities, thus achieving de facto recognition of their government; to embarrass the United States in Berlin and to emphasize the Soviet position of

\(^{47}\) Ltr, Robert D. Murphy, Dep Under Sec of State, to Gen Nathan D. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 Nov 1957, sub: Current Berlin Situation and Access Problems, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.; Msg, Huntington D. Sheldon, Asst Dir for Current Intel, to Dep Dir, CIA, 8 Nov 1957, sub: The Berlin Situation, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP. For more information on the growing flight of refugees from East Berlin and Communist efforts to stem the tide, see Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall.
strength; and to encroach on the allies’ access to the city to such an extent that they would resort to a self-imposed blockade rather than submit to humiliating controls. Norstad expected that the harassment would continue and suggested the possibility that the Soviets would relinquish control of rail and autobahn checkpoints to the East Germans, forcing the allies either to deal with them directly or to discontinue travel.49

Norstad expressed guarded optimism over his ability to deal with a crackdown on travel. He did not believe that the Soviets were planning an all-out crisis over Berlin and he suggested that a firm and united allied response would prevent them from gaining any major advantages. He cautioned, however, that a provocative or unyielding U.S. response would deny the Soviets latitude for negotiations and could bring on a real crisis. Norstad reminded the Joint Chiefs that the security of the American garrison in Berlin was limited to the capabilities of its available forces. Those in the city consisted of the 6th Infantry and two military police companies, with a total assigned strength of 3,272. In the event of another blockade, he reported that the allied stockpile in Berlin included 180 days worth of rations, some 300 days worth of gasoline and associated petroleum products, and a 30-day supply of ammunition. A stockpile accrued for German civilians included a year’s worth of various heating fuels and gasoline, a twelve-month supply of food, and enough medical supplies to last about six months.50

In May 1958, the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, met with the Soviet Commandant in Berlin, General of the Army Nikolai F. Zakharov, in an attempt to diffuse some of the tension “as one soldier to another.” Hodes reminded the Soviet general that, as a military garrison, the U.S. troops in Berlin had to be resupplied on a regular basis. Unfortunately, he continued, Soviet guards had implemented a number of new procedures that appeared to be harassment for convoys entering or leaving Berlin. Guards were demanding to see a list of all personnel in the convoy and personal identification cards. Hodes believed that a simple movement order presented by the officer in charge should be sufficient to allow the convoy to pass. Zakharov appeared to agree with the Hode in this matter but held to the Soviet position that supply convoys attempting to enter Berlin should present a list of the types of cargo that they were carrying. General Zakharov promised to investigate the matter further. For a short time, confrontations at the crossing points diminished, but they soon resumed as diplomats and politicians continued to debate the documentation issue.51

49 Msgs, Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCEUR, 5 Nov 1957; and CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 Nov 1957. Both in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP.  
50 Msg, CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 Nov 1957.  
For its part, USAREUR continued to plan for an emergency reinforcement of the Berlin garrison. The garrison’s main contingent, the 6th Infantry, had reorganized into two battle groups and one company of tanks in June 1958, as part of USAREUR’s conversion to a pentomic structure. This action made no significant change in the number of troops assigned to the command. The reinforcement plan called for two additional infantry companies or one battle group with a few essential light vehicles to be airlifted from Rhein-Main Air Base, near Frankfurt, to Tempelhof, Gatow, or Tegel airfields in Berlin. The U.S. Commander, Berlin, would assume control of the reinforcements on their arrival and was authorized to use them as he saw fit. Planners were under no illusions that the reinforcements would provide the Berlin Command with the capability to withstand a Soviet or East German military attack. Rather, the plan was based on the premise that additional units might be required to deal with an increase in civil disorder or rioting in the city. It did, however, offer a way for USAREUR to demonstrate its commitment to the city and an increased state of readiness to the Communists without resorting to direct military engagement.\(^52\)

In light of the ever-present threat that the Soviets or East Germans would block Western access to Berlin, USAREUR also drafted a contingency plan, labeled Emergency Plan 103, for reopening closed access routes. It was to be implemented only when all other moves short of military action had failed to end restrictions. The plan provided two options for the USAREUR commander, depending on the level of risk he was willing to assume. The first was labeled “determine intentions.” In this case, the Seventh Army would provide one platoon-size, tank-infantry force and a convoy of five trucks to test Soviet intentions to resist passage through the checkpoint at Helmstedt on the East German border. At the same time, the Berlin Command would provide a similar force to test Communist intentions at the Babelsberg checkpoint, where the autobahn entered West Berlin. In the event that guards denied passage to either force, the task force commander was to indicate both orally and in writing his intention to use force to pass the checkpoint. If, after thirty minutes, the guards continued to deny passage, the commander was to direct his force to crash through the barrier and proceed to the opposite end of the corridor. The commander was to withdraw, however, if the Soviets opened fire on his force or if he encountered an obstacle he could not breach.\(^53\)

The second option was to reopen access by force. In this case, the units involved were to be larger and prepared to fight. At Helmstedt, the Seventh Army was to provide a task force of up to battalion-size strength including

\(^{52}\) "6th Infantry in Berlin to Go Pentomic," *Army Times*, 19 Apr 1958; HQ, USAREUR, USAREUR Berlin Reinforcement Plan, 5 Dec 1957, Joint Chiefs of Staff Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP.

tanks and infantry. A general officer would be in overall command. At its end, the Berlin Command was to provide a company-size force, commanded by a colonel. After presenting proper credentials and waiting thirty minutes for a response, the two task force commanders were to proceed through the checkpoints regardless of any opposition they encountered. When the two forces met, they would proceed to Berlin, where they would come under the control of the U.S. commander. The plan noted that any air support would require overflight of East German territory outside the authorized air corridors. Since this would violate existing treaties with the Soviet Union, as opposed to the ground action that was designed to reopen corridors already subject to international agreement, a decision to employ air support would be reserved for the Commander, U.S. European Command. Interestingly enough, a corresponding plan for the evacuation of U.S. trains detained in East Germany was surprisingly less bellicose and called primarily for the lodging of official complaints and for providing on-call assistance to detained personnel.54

Despite the detailed planning, the ability of USAREUR to implement a forced reopening of the Berlin access corridor was questionable. In September 1958, the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, expressed serious concern over the combat readiness of his command in the light of force reductions it had experienced and shortcomings its officers had identified in the pentomic reorganization. He told the Army chief of staff, General Taylor, that the reductions had brought his command to a point of calculated risk beyond which he could not recommend proceeding without a complete re-evaluation of its mission. In order to maintain superficial readiness in his combat units, he had drastically reduced the size and number of service and support elements that would be available in any conflict. A severe shortage of conventional artillery also existed, along with a complete lack of electronic warfare capability. As if that were not enough, the forces necessary to carry out noncombatant and refugee evacuations were insufficient. It was, in short, hardly a time for U.S. policy on Berlin to be overly provocative.55

On the other hand, the Soviets and East Germans had considerable incentive to confront the Western allies on Berlin. In the first six months of 1958, more than thirteen hundred teachers as well as four hundred fifty doctors and dentists had fled to West Germany through West Berlin. The Soviets also regarded the Western sectors of the city as an advanced base from which the United States and its allies could launch all manner of subversive activities against East Germany and the Soviet Union.56 Walter Ulbricht, first secretary of the

55 Msg, CINCUSAREUR to CSA, 18 Sep 1958, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP.
Communist Central Committee in East Germany, helped to ratchet up the level of tension in October by declaring that all of Berlin belonged to East Germany and that the allied forces were there illegally. Some Western observers even suspected that Ulbricht’s Party of German Unity (SED) encouraged people to flee to West Berlin in order to give them a pretext to tighten the screws. In Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s colorful metaphor, Berlin had become a festering sore that the Communists could no longer afford to ignore.57

On 10 November 1958, Khrushchev launched a new salvo in the Soviet offensive. Speaking at a Moscow rally for visiting Polish Communist dignitaries, he once again called for an end to the four-power division of Berlin and then announced that, for its part, the Soviet Union would hand over those functions still under its control in Berlin to the East German government. If the British, French, and Americans wished to retain their presence in Berlin, he said, let them form their own relations with the German Democratic Republic and reach a new agreement. They had long ago, he concluded, abolished the legal basis on which their stay in Berlin rested. The U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn E. Thompson, meanwhile reported to the State Department his own opinion that Khrushchev, having concluded he could not achieve his objectives through negotiations with the present American administration, intended to see what effect strong pressure and increased tension would have on the cohesion of the Western alliance.58

Two weeks later, on 27 November, in an extensive note to the governments of the United States, France, Great Britain, and West Germany, the Soviet Union expanded on the course of action proposed by Premier Khrushchev. The note repeated the accusation that the Western allies themselves had violated the original Potsdam Agreements and had turned West Berlin into a state within a state from which they pursued subversive activity against the German Democratic Republic. In view of this fact, the letter continued, the Soviet Union considered the original Protocol of Agreement between the four powers regarding the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Berlin to be null and void. With that in mind, it intended to enter into negotiations with the German Democratic Republic to transfer all functions that had been performed by Soviet authorities as part of the occupation. Although the Soviets insisted that the most correct solution to the Berlin problem would be to absorb West Berlin into the German Democratic Republic, they proposed


as an alternative its designation as a demilitarized free city. That option would require, of course, the removal of all Western military forces from West Berlin, while East German satellite forces remained in the Communist portion of the city. With the understanding that German authorities on both sides might require some time to resolve questions that would arise, the Soviets proposed to make no changes in the existing procedures for Allied military traffic entering and leaving Berlin for a period of six months.59

The allies believed they had no alternative but to maintain their garrisons in Berlin. If they agreed to deal with the East Germans, they would seriously undermine the existing basis for allied occupation of the city. Any de facto recognition of the East German regime would be a deviation from the assumptions that underlay the four-power agreements at the end of the war. Surely, if the allied garrisons departed, they felt, Berlin would be gobbled up quickly by the Communists. Leaders from Germany and the three Western powers agreed that the potentially dangerous situation would become even more perilous if they failed to adopt a firm and united front in the face of the threat. Diplomats representing the four countries debated for two weeks over where discussions regarding the ultimatum should take place before agreeing to hold talks in Paris as part of the upcoming North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meetings in December.60

Military planning accelerated in response to the growing tension. On 23 November, in response to a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for his views on the Soviet proposal, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, General Norstad, insisted that the allies had either to stress their willingness to use force to defend their access to Berlin or “begin a humiliating process of yielding step by step to the German Democratic Republic.”61 Five days later, a combined working group formed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the departments of State and Defense submitted a series of possible responses and recommendations. The first was for the three ambassadors in Moscow to inform the Soviet government that the Allies would not tolerate any interference with their traffic into and out of Berlin. If the Soviets withdrew their personnel from the checkpoints, the group recommended that the allies send convoys and military trains through the entryways as usual to determine the intentions of East


61 Msg, CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 Nov 1958, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1958, RG 218, NACP.
German officials. If the guards refused passage under established procedures, the group advised terminating military train traffic and attempting to reopen access along the autobahn through the use of limited military force. It noted, however, the probable extreme reluctance on the part of the French and British as well as some of the other NATO countries to approve the use of force rather than to accede to whatever new documentation or identification requirements the East Germans might initiate.62

In a separate annex, the group assessed the implications of any attempt to force open the roadway into Berlin. Allied ground forces in Berlin comprised some eleven thousand men, it noted, including about three thousand West Berlin policemen. Within East Germany alone, the Soviets had stationed twenty divisions, with four in the immediate vicinity of Berlin. The Communists could supplement those forces with seven East German divisions and a well-equipped police force in Berlin. While the allies could probably maintain their position by force if faced only by East German forces, the group believed such an engagement to be unlikely. Rather, any such conflict would bring Soviet intervention and probably lead to general war. Therefore, it concluded, it was not militarily acceptable to commit a large proportion of U.S. forces to a fight for Berlin.63

That being the case, the allies’ best course of action would be to bluff. The authors of the analysis suggested that, as long as it appeared the Soviets did not want to fight an all-out war, the best option would be to convince them that the West would risk such a conflict to maintain its position in Berlin. The allies could signal such a position by placing their forces on a higher alert status, redeploying air and ground units to support potential conflict in the area, canceling military leaves and passes, and simulating operational traffic on tactical radio nets. Almost as an afterthought, the report noted that, if the Soviets did not back down and instead resorted to determined military opposition, the situation could rapidly develop into a general war.64

In a well-publicized visit to West Berlin just three days after the delivery of the Soviet ultimatum, USAREUR’s commander in chief, General Hodes, declared that the garrison in West Berlin was prepared for any trouble with the Communists, that the Army’s forces in Berlin were a symbol of the nation’s support for the city, and that any infringement on their rights of access would be an action against the United States. The commander of the U.S. Army, Berlin, Maj. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, also expressed his command’s readiness,

remarking that he had spent the last seventeen years in a state of suspense of one type or another, so that he was accustomed to situations such as this.65

Almost at the same time that General Hodes was expressing his confidence in the Berlin defenses, however, he was also requesting men, tanks, and other weapons to fill vacant Seventh Army positions and to strengthen the defense of the city. The Army chief of staff, General Taylor, supported Hodes request, going so far as to suggest that the president should consider calling up the reserves. President Eisenhower opposed any such increases, asking what good it would do to send a few more U.S. Army divisions to Europe when they would still be greatly outnumbered by Communist forces. He believed that any war with the Soviet Union would quickly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons, and he doubted that the Soviets would be foolish enough to start a war over Berlin.66 Here, even more so than in the past, the U.S. Army garrison in Berlin was a pawn in a much larger political game of brinkmanship. A symbol of the American commitment to Germany, it had become a clearly defined tripwire in President Eisenhower’s concept of a nuclear-based strategy for the defense of Europe.

The Army’s request for additional forces and the president’s subsequent rejection ignited a lengthy debate in American military and civilian newspapers and magazines. Some commentators expressed shock and outrage that the president would so openly denigrate the ability of U.S. soldiers to hold their position in Europe. Others, more realistically, discussed the ramifications of sending additional troops, and what good they might do if sent. Returning in January 1959 from an inspection tour of U.S. military bases in Europe, two American congressmen, F. Edward Hebert (D-La.) and William E. Hess (R-Ohio), reported that despite a tendency on the part of the media to highlight minor setbacks, U.S. forces in Europe remained the best the nation had ever fielded. While the two legislators admitted that the Soviets could probably overrun Berlin in a relatively short time, they doubted that the Soviets were willing to risk the all-out war that would ensue. More likely, they thought, would be continued Communist efforts to destabilize the population in West Berlin through propaganda and civil disorder. American military authorities,

they concluded, were as well-prepared as could be expected to deal with the challenges around Berlin.\textsuperscript{67}

Meanwhile, the West countered Soviet propaganda with its own public information programs. The USAREUR headquarters made “The Berlin Story” the subject of its first Troop Information Bulletin in 1959. Designed to be used as the source document for classes taught by unit commanders to their troops, the publication described the historical background leading up to the present crisis. Although it claimed to explain the position of both sides in the confrontation, it ridiculed the Soviet proposal to make Berlin a demilitarized free city, calling the offer an ultimatum and threat of war thinly veiled in diplomatic language. Was anyone so gullible or plain stupid, it asked, as to believe that Berlin would remain free while surrounded by East Germany’s 100,000-man armed force plus the Soviet Army’s divisions?\textsuperscript{68}

In January 1959, the Soviet Union submitted a proposed peace treaty with Germany to the three Western allies and stated its intention to convene a conference to consider the draft and sign an agreed-on text. The allies, after discussing the Soviet ultimatum at the mid-December ministerial meetings, reiterated their position that a peace treaty could be negotiated only with a united Germany and that the Berlin question had to be settled within the framework of a comprehensive agreement on Germany. They announced that they were ready to participate in a four-power conference of foreign ministers to deal with the German problem in all of its aspects. The Soviets agreed to a meeting in May, in Geneva, at which representatives of both Germanys would be present as advisers.\textsuperscript{69}

As the six-month Soviet deadline drew near, Khrushchev warned that there would be war if the Western powers tried to force their way into Berlin after the transfer of Soviet functions to the German Democratic Republic. He offered to extend the deadline, however, if negotiations for a Berlin settlement were promising. Seizing that opening, President Eisenhower stated that, regardless of the deadline, the United States would not be the first to shoot. On 11 May 1959, the foreign ministers conference opened in Geneva and, sixteen days later the Soviet six-month deadline quietly expired.\textsuperscript{70}


\textsuperscript{68} HQ, USAREUR, Information Division, The Berlin Story, 10 Jan 1959, Entry 2112, USAREUR Bulletins, 1959–1966, RG 549, NACP.


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
The conference at Geneva lasted almost three months. Throughout the meetings, each side presented numerous proposals and counterproposals concerning Berlin. Taking note of the Soviet announcement that it would withdraw its forces from East Berlin, the Western allies proposed to limit their forces in West Berlin to existing levels. The Russians rejected the offer and charged the United States with using West Berlin for the release of anti-Soviet propaganda. When the Western allies offered to invite United Nations observers to report on propaganda activities that disturbed the public order, the Soviets rejected that proposal as well. Despite a recess between 20 June and 13 July to clarify and re-examine their positions, the two sides were unable to reach any substantive agreement. In the course of the discussions, however, Soviet Premier Khrushchev accepted an invitation from President Eisenhower to visit the United States in September 1959. The meeting, when it occurred, seemed to ease international tensions and, for a while at least, confrontation over Berlin appeared less imminent.71

Learning to Live with the Status Quo

By the end of 1959, World War II in Europe had been over for almost fifteen years. It had been ten years since the end of the Berlin blockade and nine years since the reactivation of the Seventh Army and the creation of the forward-deployed U.S. defense force in Germany. Armies on both sides of the Iron Curtain had grown proficient in their craft and, with the introduction of battlefield atomic weapons, had gained an even greater measure of destructive power. Still, although USAREUR became a bargaining chip in the superpower tug-of-war over Berlin, there was an increasing sense that the time of crisis had passed. In the United States, intelligence analysts, diplomats, and politicians started to believe that the threat of general war was receding, for despite their saber rattling, Soviet leaders seemed less willing to push the West so close to the brink. Although a myriad of conflicts remained, both sides seemed to recognize that from almost every vantage point, the status quo was preferable to the prospect of a nuclear war in Europe.72

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72 CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate, Soviet Tactics on Berlin, 11 Jun 1959, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System, copy in Historians files, CMH.
GETTING ALONG WITH THE NEIGHBORS

Beginning in 1950, the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, and the EUCOM commander, General Thomas T. Handy, held a series of conferences to discuss German-American relations. These meetings were not necessarily because of tensions between the two nations. Instead, they seem to have reflected McCloy’s desire to use the armed services as a missionary force in his objective of democratizing the German people. As a result of these consultations, on 4 August 1950, General Handy issued a directive to his commanders identifying a pressing need for American troops to change their attitude toward service in Germany. The directive called for a re-education of American personnel to reflect their change of mission in Germany from occupation to defense. It also proposed a program for the joint use of recreational facilities and for increased interaction between Germans and Americans wherever possible.

For the alliance to succeed, it was important for the Americans and the Europeans to learn to peacefully coexist. As the number of U.S. troops stationed on the continent increased and as their bases, barracks, and training facilities expanded, conflicts with neighboring communities were inevitable. The rapid growth in the number of American dependents accompanying soldiers to Europe only added to the potential for conflict. To limit these confrontations and to resolve them when they did occur, USAREUR turned to its extensive civil affairs and public information organizations. Those units monitored public opinion in the European press and established programs to familiarize U.S. soldiers with the customs and culture of their hosts. Throughout USAREUR, but especially in the units of the Seventh Army, leaders worked to build goodwill in local communities and to solidify the relationship with their neighbors. Over time, the occupiers became guests, then allies, and then, finally, friends.

The Transfer of Military Liaison Functions from the Office of the High Commissioner to the European Command

Before this path to friendship could begin, however, the Army in Europe had to develop an organizational structure through which it could more effectively relate to the German population. EUCOM and Seventh Army headquarters

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1. Annual Narrative Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1950, HQ, EUCOM, pp. 171–72, Historians files, CMH.
needed a designated office to deal with the kinds of issues that would arise from increased contact with the civilian community.

As part of the lengthy transition from occupation of a conquered enemy to diplomatic relations with a sovereign state, in August 1951, the Western allies began to dismantle some of the formal structure of the occupation and to move their relationship with the Germans to more of a contractual status between equals. Although plans for the process called for the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany to withdraw from many of its oversight responsibilities and to reduce its field organization, the U.S. military would require a mechanism for maintaining firsthand daily liaison with German authorities. EUCOM therefore established a joint working group with the High Commissioner’s office to develop procedures for direct military liaison with the Germans. In the meantime, the command agreed to develop a plan for assuming the liaison mission at the earliest practical date.2

As the transition began, McCloy laid out his concept of the new relationship. He assured General Handy that their two offices would maintain an effective working relationship. He reminded the general that the High Commissioner’s office would bear the primary responsibility for U.S. policy in Germany. Nonetheless, he pointed out many practical reasons for direct relations between U.S. military authorities, agencies of the German federal government, and officials in Hesse, Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg, the three German states under U.S. control. While McCloy would help the military in establishing contacts and advise and assist in every way possible, he did not foresee his involvement on a day-to-day basis. To the contrary, he would intervene only when a disagreement occurred or when matters of a significant political nature were at stake. At the state level, consul generals would bear the burden of overall relations with the Germans in their respective areas but would not interfere in normal civil-military relations. McCloy made it clear that EUCOM and the U.S. Embassy in Bonn needed to maintain close contact and to keep each other informed so the two could speak with one voice to the German population.3

With that guidance in mind, EUCOM set up its organization to manage civil-military relations with both the German government and local communities. In March 1952, the headquarters directed all sixteen military post commanders

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2 Memo, Maj Gen Robert M. Montague, Dir, OPOT Div, for Gen Thomas T. Handy, EU-COM Cdr, 23 Jan 1952, sub: Transfer of Military Liaison Functions from the HICOG Field Organization to EUCOM, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training Files, RG 549, NACP.

to begin planning for the addition of full-time, civil-military representatives on their staffs and at those subposts that required direct military liaison. The directive indicated that candidates for the new positions had to possess tact, common sense, an ability to exercise diplomacy, and a well-rounded military background. The headquarters also announced plans to begin training selected civil affairs personnel in their new duties under the general supervision of the Civil Affairs Division staff. Training would consist of an orientation conference at EUCOM headquarters and on-the-job training at the local level by State Department representatives.4

The EUCOM instructions included a tentative organization for conducting American military relations with the Germans, as well as a detailed analysis of responsibilities and duties that organization would inherit. The director, EUCOM Civil Affairs Division, would oversee all liaison efforts with the German government and civilians. In addition to branches for command and control, operations, and planning, the division would include separate sections to maintain liaison between the U.S. military and the German federal government and to monitor relations with each of the three German states in the U.S. Zone.5

An analysis by the EUCOM headquarters grouped the command’s new military liaison responsibilities into seven broad areas. The first dealt with the exchange of each other’s needs, aims, and plans in order to maintain good relations between the Germans and the American military community. The second envisioned EUCOM headquarters as the single point of contact for matters related to the acquisition or release of real estate. This included negotiations regarding additional land for training as well as coordination of the release of requisitioned properties back to the Germans. Because German customs and laws regarding public safety, health, and legal matters differed significantly from those of the Americans, the third mission included liaison in such areas as water purification, venereal disease control, highway traffic management, black market control, and assistance to both German civilians and members of the U.S. military in legal complaints between them. In the fourth broad area, the civil-affairs units coordinated American and German security responsibilities in accord with allied directives or emergency plans. The fifth function consisted of general civil-military liaison in such areas as assistance to youth activities, mutual celebrations, ceremonies, educational projects, and the resolution of incidents involving U.S. soldiers and German civilians. Under the sixth functional area, hunting and fishing, the new civil affairs sections were also to assist U.S. personnel in obtaining hunting and fishing licenses and in securing access to German-owned streams and hunting grounds. In the final functional area, repatriation, U.S. officials were to assist German authorities

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4 Memo, HQ, EUCOM, for All Military Post Cdrs, 11 Mar 1952, sub: Military Liaison with German Governmental Authorities, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

5 Ibid.
and other official agencies in the return of war prisoners still held captive by the Soviets, as well as the exhumation of Allied war dead.6

Orientation for civil affairs personnel began on 14 May 1952. More than 120 attendees participated in the training, including soldiers from each of the sixteen military posts designated for civil affairs positions as well as representatives from EUCOM staff divisions with interest in the covered subjects. For the most part, the instruction dealt with the functions and responsibilities of the new civil affairs sections. Col. William T. Goodwin, Chief of the Governmental Affairs Branch, EUCOM Civil Affairs Division, stated that members of the civil affairs staff sections needed to coordinate with members of other staff sections concerning mutual problems and to develop standard operating procedures to ensure that they could deal with public relations problems swiftly and smoothly. He emphasized to the attendees, however, that their most important contributions would come at local levels, where the greatest volume of contacts with German civilians and governmental authorities would occur. He urged section leaders to establish offices in places readily accessible to the local civilian population. This would require locating offices outside of military headquarters areas because civilians would be far less likely to bring issues to the attention of the authorities if they had to pass through guarded gates or present special passes to gain access to military-controlled facilities. At the end of the briefing, Colonel Goodwin advised members of the group to compile lists of key government and civilian organizations in their areas and the names and addresses of those leaders in public and private life with whom they would be dealing. The sooner they could learn about issues that were troubling the local population, the quicker they could begin resolving them.7

During the summer of 1952, the new EUCOM apparatus swung into action. The U.S. Resident Offices that represented the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany closed on 5 June. Anticipating this change, the European Command had established civil affairs offices at sixteen military posts and most subposts for the conduct of civil-military relations at levels below that of the German states. The Offices of the State Commissioners in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and the separate U.S. enclave around Bremen closed on 30 June, with EUCOM civil affairs sections assuming their responsibilities the following day. In addition to dealing directly with German civilians and local governments up to the state level, EUCOM also established a separate liaison group in Bonn to deal directly with the Office of the U.S. Ambassador and the German federal government. This group was under the

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6 Ibid.
7 HQ, EUCOM, Conference on Civil Affairs U.S. Military-German Relations, Instructors Manuscript, 16 May 1952, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955; Memo, Capt W. P. Burt, Civil Affairs Control Ofcr, for EUCOM Staff Divs, 2 May 1952, sub: Civil Affairs, U.S. Military-German Relations Conference, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans and Training. Both in RG 549, NACP.
direction of a senior officer and consisted of representatives of EUCOM staff
divisions that dealt full- or part-time with officials in the West German capital.8

By December 1952, the command’s civil affairs structure was in place and
had already begun a series of initiatives to promote better relations between
the German people and American soldiers. General Eddy, the USAREUR
commander, reminded civil affairs staff members that the Christmas season
offered an opportunity to contribute to community festivals, religious services,
recreational activities, Christmas charities, and many other worthwhile
endeavors. As those efforts proceeded, civil affairs officers reported closer
cooperation with German officials in a number of cases, including coordination
between post commanders and local police in resolving traffic problems and
in controlling the spread of venereal diseases. They also sponsored tours of
military installations and civilian business establishments as a means of allowing
Germans and Americans to gain an understanding of each other’s problems.9

In April 1952, General Eddy, as commanding general of the Seventh Army,
had suggested to EUCOM that the Army Advisory Committee Program, which
had been in effect throughout the United States for approximately four years,
might also be successful in Germany. In the United States, the program brought
Army leaders together with local community officials to discuss issues of mutual
concern. Although EUCOM’s commander, General Handy, believed that the
new civil affairs establishment would be sufficient for the time being, he did
instruct the director of the Civil Affairs Division to coordinate with the Seventh
Army’s civil affairs officer to prepare recommendations on General Eddy’s
proposal. On the basis of its findings, the division recommended the creation of
councils at three distinct levels: the Kreis, representing German municipalities
and U.S. military posts and subposts; the Land, or state, representing Bavaria,
Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, and the Bremen enclave; and the federal level,
representing the EUCOM commander and the leaders of the newly formed
West German government. At each level, the councils would meet monthly to
bring together leaders of the local German community and appropriate U.S.
Army and Air Force representatives to discuss mutual concerns. General Handy
directed his post commanders to begin activating the councils right away.10

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8 Memos, Col Karl E. Henion, Dir, Civil Affairs Div, for EUCOM Dep Ch of Staff for
Opns, 1 May 1952, sub: Liaison at Bonn; and Henion for EUCOM Land Relations Ofcrs, 2
Jul 1952, sub: Land Level Civil Affairs; Ltr, Handy, EUCOM Cdr, to Hans Ehard, Bayrische
Staatskanzlei, 10 Jul 1952. All in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955,
RG 549, NACP.

9 Memos, Henion for USAREUR Distribution, 14 Nov and 10 Dec 1952, sub: Civil Affairs
Information Bulletin, both in Entry 2070, USAREUR Civil Affairs Staff Memos, RG 549,
NACP.

10 Annual Hist Rpt, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 372, Historians files, CMH. Memos,
Col Lynwood D. Lott, Asst Adj Gen, for USAREUR Distribution, 12 May 1953, sub: U.S.
Military-Community Advisory Council Program, Entry 2105, USAREUR General Correspond-
dence, 1952–1955; and Lott for CGs and Military Post Cdr, 8 Jul 1952, sub: Monthly Post
Handy’s directives only formalized activities that had been in operation for several years. Beginning in the late 1940s, German-American men’s and women’s clubs had appeared in many garrison towns across Germany. In their early stages, the clubs concentrated on raising funds for local charities, especially those aiding German children. Elites of both communities often held at least nominal membership in the clubs, but the core of the active members consisted of individuals committed to fostering good German-American relations. In the early 1950s USAREUR began to establish more formal German-American friendship committees to aid in the resolution of local conflicts between the command and local communities. Issues brought before the committees included concerns over drunken soldiers who were pulling flowers from the windowboxes of German townspeople and the question of whether German children should be allowed to use the playgrounds belonging to the American housing areas. In 1953, the federation of German-American Clubs sponsored the first German-American Friendship Week, a celebration that would grow into one of the major events both in USAREUR and the German community.11

Commanders’ Conference Notes, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955. Both in RG 549, NACP.

In the meantime, the Seventh Army established its own civil affairs section. Located within the command’s headquarters at Stuttgart, the organization was much smaller than that of EUCOM and contained only three officers, four enlisted men, and one German civilian who served as secretary. The section had two primary functions. The first was to develop contingency plans for the control of refugees and local security in the event of an increased state of alert or the outbreak of hostilities. Its second and far more time-consuming responsibility would be the overall supervision of a German Youth Activities program throughout the Seventh Army area. The United States had officially inaugurated the project in 1946 to keep German children busy during the occupation and to demonstrate democratic principles in planning and carrying out their activities. At its peak in the early 1950s, it had expanded to include approximately three hundred fifty activity centers. Budget reductions, however, had forced the command to close so many of the facilities that by 1953 only seventy-three remained, thirty of which were sponsored directly by Seventh Army units. When neither the Department of the Army nor the U.S. State Department allocated funds to support the activity, the USAREUR commander, General Bolte, authorized the solicitation of sponsors among German businesses and civic groups as well as U.S. troop units. Through that effort, twenty-seven centers were able to remain open. These included the center at Bad Brückenau, jointly supported by the 373d Armored Infantry Battalion and the city council, and four in the Stuttgart area, cosponsored by Seventh Army units and the local German communities.12

Monitoring and Controlling the Message

Other sections of the EUCOM and USAREUR headquarters also had important roles to play in improving relations between the Americans and the Germans. Through its public information and public affairs staffs, the U.S. headquarters monitored German perceptions of American troops stationed in Europe and did its best to present those troops in the most favorable light possible.

Since the early days of the occupation, the Public Information Division had been monitoring German newspapers and magazines as a means of assessing the moods of civilians and their attitudes toward U.S. troops. U.S. commanders were sensitive to articles and stories that portrayed their soldiers in a negative light. For that reason, public information officers often worked closely with intelligence personnel to identify leaders and political organizations behind particularly inflammatory publications. In less extreme cases, the Americans complained about stories based on flimsy fragments of information or pure

12 HQ, Seventh Army, Civil Affairs Briefing for the Commanding General, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

fabrication, noting that publications rarely printed retractions or corrections of errors. An analysis by the USAREUR public information officer suggested that reporters and editors were interested primarily in selling newspapers; the more sensational the news, the more profitable the edition. Events that represented normal or satisfactory progress were not ordinarily accepted as news. The USAREUR chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Edward T. Williams, encouraged his information officers to “beat the press to the punch” by issuing factual, balanced announcements ahead of time on matters that might otherwise become subject to sensational news treatment.13

One branch of the Public Information Division, the German Relations Branch, prepared more methodical analyses of German press attitudes on a weekly and monthly basis. For each period, the section translated German newspaper articles and editorials related to the American presence and identified the percentages of those that were favorable, unfavorable, and neutral in their treatment of the U.S. armed forces. Stories that presented the Americans in a favorable light usually dealt with cultural exchanges and activities or incidents where U.S. troops came to the assistance of German civilians or communities in need. Stories that portrayed the United States in a less favorable light included those on property requisition, traffic accidents, troop maneuvers, and violent or criminal actions by American soldiers.14

Seventh Army and USAREUR leaders took these reports very seriously and used them as a tool to gauge their progress in improving relations with local communities. One Seventh Army staff report in January 1953 noted that while the U.S. image was improving, the command was still receiving unfavorable press coverage. The Seventh Army chief of staff encouraged local commanders to get to know German publishers and editors. He suggested that meetings of the German-American Advisory Councils were good places to do so.15

Public affairs personnel likewise kept close watch on German attitudes toward the U.S. Army. Early in 1953, the public affairs staff of the Office of the High Commissioner administered a survey to almost sixteen hundred West German citizens to determine their feelings about the U.S. troops stationed in their country. The survey noted an improved rapport between Germans and

13 Memo, Col Stanhope B. Mason, Cdr, 26th Inf, for CG, Seventh Army, 12 Jan 1952, sub: Interim Report on Inflammatory Articles Appearing in Bamberg Newspapers, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955. Quote from Memo, Col Bjarne Furuholmen, Ch, Public Information Div, for Ch of Staff, 8 Jan 1953, sub: Inaccurate News Stories, Entry 2277, USAREUR Public Information Division General Correspondence. Both in RG 549, NACP.
Gettin along with the neighbors

Americans over previous years and upward trends in estimates of the American soldier in almost every area where comparisons were available. The Germans noted a friendlier approach on the part of the Americans, with the soldiers more likely to “pass the time of day” with them. Their impression of the fighting qualities of the troops as compared to previous surveys was also better. More than 50 percent of those questioned believed that the U.S. troops would fight well against a Communist invader.16

That was not to say that the Germans did not have their share of complaints. The USAREUR assistant chief of staff for personnel noted that many of the same problems that existed in communities adjacent to military posts in the United States were sources of irritation for the Germans: overindulgence in alcohol, illicit relations with local women, unmilitary bearing of soldiers when off duty, and discourteous driving habits of U.S. personnel. Other issues, however, were more specific to the American presence in Germany. The high rate of pay enjoyed by U.S. servicemen allowed them to purchase many luxuries that the average German citizen could not afford, and the failure of some soldiers to honor just debts offended German merchants. The public appearance and activities of many U.S. dependents, moreover, often alarmed their more conservative German neighbors, as did the troops’ sometimes boisterous behavior and off-color language in public places. Perhaps most important, the language barrier made it difficult for Americans to establish social relationships with local civilians. In evaluating the results of the surveys, American leaders expressed the belief that soldiers lacked an understanding of and respect for many of the customs and standards of the German people. They judged efforts to provide troops with an orientation to Germany before they began their tours of duty in Europe as substandard and unsuccessful.17

The effort to monitor the attitudes of the German people, however, was only one-half of the equation. Beginning late in 1951, EUCOM also conducted a series of surveys to determine the attitudes of American soldiers toward their mission in Europe and their relationships with the Germans and the French. Officers who participated in the study appeared to be well informed about Germany, while enlisted personnel did not. Only 44 percent of the enlisted, for example, could identify Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor of West Germany. While the attitudes of most toward the German people also seemed to be favorable, a degree of distrust existed nonetheless. Nearly three-quarters of both officers and enlisted responded that they liked Germans “all right” or “very much,” but roughly half of both groups felt that Germany was not yet trustworthy as an ally against communism. On separate questions regarding

16 Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of Public Affairs, The American Soldier as Appraised by the West German People, 11 Mar 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

17 Memo, Col Weston A. McCormac, Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, for Dep Ch of Staff for Admin, 7 Mar 1953, sub: Survey Showing German Public Attitude Toward American Soldiers, Entry 33508, Seventh Army, 1950–1966, RG 338, NACP.
eventual German rearmament, almost all respondents favored some form of German involvement in Western European defense.

Responses concerning relations with the French were more troubling. Only one-third of those enlisted men questioned could identify Vincent Auriel as the President of the French Republic. Although the enlisted expressed generally favorable views toward the French people, officers ranked the French lower than the Germans and were much more likely to say that they liked them “very little.” Both officers and enlisted believed that the French would be a useful ally against communism, but more than a third of the officers responding described them as untrustworthy.

Bones of Contention: Major Points of Friction Between German Civilians and the U.S. Army

American military leaders had good reason for concern over the relationship between German civilians and the U.S. Army. The transition of the soldiers from an occupation force to allies in the struggle against Communist expansion was not without its sticking points. Both sides had to overcome a number of prejudices and preconceived perceptions so that they could work through the very real conflicts that threatened a successful long-term relationship.

Although most of the conflicts and misunderstandings between Germans and Americans involved cultural differences or the misbehavior of off-duty American soldiers, matters of official U.S. policy also caused concern both for German civilians and for local governments. By 1952, the most significant of these was the continued requisition of German homes, businesses, or other real estate for use by U.S. forces. In 1951, even though the size of the U.S. force was increasing, EUCOM had announced a policy ending new requisition of living quarters for dependents. Its retention of previously requisitioned living quarters, however, was a particularly hot issue with the German people. It remained a sore point even when the consulate general in Munich released figures to the German press in November 1952, proving that for every dwelling occupied by U.S. dependents, the United States had provided two new dwellings through monetary aid to the Federal Republic.

The Americans made steady progress in returning real estate to its original owners, but when Germany regained its sovereignty in May 1955, thousands of properties still remained in American hands. The USAREUR headquarters

18 HQ, EUCOM, Armed Forces Information and Education Div, Troop Attitudes Concerning the European Mission and European Nations, Jun 1952. Quotes from Memo, Col Maurice G. Stubbs, Ch, Armed Forces Information and Education Div, for Ch of Staff, USAREUR, 30 Sep 1952, sub: Troop Attitudes on European Mission. Both in Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
coordinated with the West German government to identify housing that the Americans no longer needed and to prioritize properties according to the order of their return. It established quotas for major cities within each area command and encouraged commanders to release an even greater number of dwellings if surpluses developed. Quotas were based on inventories done by area commanders in January 1955, and varied from forty-five units to be returned by the Western Area Command around Bad Kreuznach to more than fifteen hundred units to be returned by the Northern Area Command in the area around Frankfurt alone. In some cases, USAREUR faced the problem of having to evict squatters from derequisitioned buildings before it could return the properties to their owners. Even that effort was complicated by German laws, which required the government to find adequate housing for the squatters before it could move them. Nonetheless, German owners lodged frequent complaints with USAREUR headquarters and the German government, demanding the return of their homes. Pressure groups adopting names such as “The League of Occupation Sufferers,” or the “Occupation Evictees” kept the issue alive by clamoring at all levels of government for the release of their properties or for increased payments for their continued use.21

From May 1955 through December 1956, the Americans retained their requisitioned properties under German legislation that had extended the status quo. On 1 February 1957, however, a new Federal Requisition Law became effective, requiring the occupiers to return requisitioned housing to owners by 30 September. The Americans could retain commercial properties for two additional years. The new law assured U.S. forces of the continued use of needed real estate through lease, purchase, or alternate construction. As a last resort, requisition was possible, but in that case the takeover was to be accomplished by the German federal government rather than the U.S. armed forces. For their part, the Americans tried to distance themselves from the process as much as possible. General John F. Uncles, the USAREUR chief of staff, directed that the command would no longer use the terms requisition or confiscated to describe property obtained from the Germans, since the newly sovereign populace found the words distasteful. The Americans would replace the terms with the phrase rent-free property.22

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Another issue that gained prominence during this period was the damage done to German roads, bridges, forests, and agricultural lands as a result of U.S. military exercises and maneuvers. The movement of tanks and heavy trucks along the country’s roads often caused damage to their pavement or collapsed their shoulders and adjacent drainage ditches. Misjudgments of the widths of bridges, their weight capacity, or the heights of underpasses often led to damage to those structures as well. German forestry methods resulted in the cultivation of trees in soft ground without deep tap roots, making them easy to knock down when the Americans tried to use them as anchors for winch lines. Most disturbing was damage to German crop lands when U.S. troops moved cross-country. Vehicles plowing through farm lands damaged crops and disturbed topsoil, often leaving ruts that accelerated erosion.23

As the occupation ended and Germany moved to regain its sovereignty, the troops of the Seventh Army began to lose some of their freedom of movement during military training. With Germany no longer a conquered foe but fast becoming a valuable ally, it became politic to compensate citizens and local communities for damages done. In 1955 USAREUR responded to thirty-six thousand claims for compensation from German citizens. Most of the payments that resulted, amounting to more than $5 million, had to come from the command’s training budget. In August, the Seventh Army commander, General Hodes, issued new instructions regarding the conduct of major maneuvers. As a general rule, he ordered units to confine all movement by tracked vehicles outside of recognized training areas to major roads whose construction would allow for the passage of the heavy vehicles. Units would confine any unavoidable cross-country movement to periods between crops, preferably when the ground was frozen. Any training conducted outside of recognized areas would have to be approved by a general, and any units conducting such training would have to provide damage-control and repair teams from each participating unit down to company level. The Seventh Army took additional action to mollify German concerns by canceling or postponing exercises that conflicted with planting or harvest times, or that would cause unreasonable stress on lands used during the maneuvers.24
Getting Along with the Neighbors

Over time, the Americans learned to coordinate their maneuvers more closely with German authorities and even obtained assistance from local police in controlling traffic flow and directing movement along desired routes. The German police also assisted in keeping civilian traffic away from military columns during exercises. For their part, the Germans gained some appreciation for the Americans’ efforts to avoid damages and to repair them when they occurred. When a German newspaper report accused one U.S. unit, the 25th Signal Battalion, of causing wanton damage in the forest area of Lorsch, just north of Mannheim, during a recently completed field exercise, officials in the local communities leapt to the Americans’ defense. The chief forester of the region acknowledged that some damage to local roads had occurred, but that it had been more than offset by the fact that, during the exercise, the units had helped to prepare several acres of land for cultivation. The mayors of Lorsch and Rinhauen, another local community, also confirmed that the Americans had avoided roads that were most heavily used by civilians and had assisted in the repair of those they had damaged. Overall, the local authorities agreed that the value of the work performed by the soldiers far exceeded any damage they had done.25

While U.S. officials could compensate the Germans for damage to property, dealing with personal injuries and deaths caused by the all-too-frequent traffic accidents proved to be more problematic. In 1952, with most units of the Seventh Army deployed to Europe, the USAREUR provost marshal reported 4,840 vehicle accidents, with 344 fatalities. That number remained fairly constant in subsequent years, so that in 1958, 424 persons lost their lives as the result of accidents involving Army and privately owned motor vehicles. Accidents involving privately owned vehicles of USAREUR personnel caused 304 deaths, including those of 201 German and French citizens. In an effort to reduce the number of traffic accidents and fatalities, USAREUR expanded the authority of unit commanders, requiring junior enlisted personnel to obtain command approval before they could apply for an operator’s license. The directive also gave unit commanders the authority to suspend the license of any member of their unit who committed two or more minor traffic offenses within a ninety-day period. Despite these and other disciplinary measures, the traffic issue never completely went away and remained a sensitive problem between allies.26


26 Memo, Maj M. M. Murray, Adj, for Provost Marshal, Northern Area Command, 3 Sep 1953, sub: Statistical Charts, Entry 2269, USAREUR Provost Marshal General Correspond-
Occasionally, conflicts between German civilians and the U.S. military intruded into emergency war planning. Although, for the most part, the United States and NATO rejected the idea of a scorched earth withdrawal in the face of a Soviet attack, the allies did plan to destroy key bridges and airfields that would otherwise help speed an enemy advance. In anticipation of such actions, U.S. engineers made arrangements with local authorities to prepare for demolition of those bridges they intended to blow up in an emergency. Frequently, however, local communities surrounding the proposed projects objected on the grounds that destroying the bridges would have little military value but would prevent the movement of civilian refugees and disrupt local utilities dependent upon the structures. Frustrated by extended delays to its war preparations, USAREUR revised its policy and published a letter of instructions in November 1954. The new approach adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward the local communities and prescribed that, where local authorities refused to allow preparations, the engineers should forward cases to the German federal government with a request for assistance in obtaining final approval. Once West Germany became a sovereign nation and joined the military alliance, the Americans transferred all responsibility for peacetime demolition preparations to the German Army.27

Learning to Get Along at the Local Level: Orientation and Goodwill Programs

Official policies and government liaison aside, any real progress in improving German-American relations would have to take place in local communities, where U.S. soldiers dealt with German civilians on a daily basis. The problem was that many of the soldiers, particularly the more experienced noncommissioned officers, had fought the Germans during World War II and had come to perceive them as a vanquished people. If the Germans were to become allies, U.S. soldiers had to learn how to deal with them as equals.

As he prepared to address this issue, General Eddy identified a number of potential sources of friction between U.S. troops and the civilian population. He noted the difficulty that Americans and Germans had in making personal contact outside the realm of bars and brothels. Officers and enlisted men with families were especially lax in pursuing friendships with German families, preferring to remain safely in their own community circles. Many soldiers,
he said, also lacked an understanding of German customs and traditions, leading to careless displays of bad feeling on both sides. Infractions typical of young off-duty soldiers, such as alcohol abuse, debt, traffic incidents, offensive language, and mistreatment of local women were magnified by the cultural differences between the two societies. Resolving these sources of conflict, the general concluded, would require greater emphasis throughout his command and also within the local communities.28

For the American troops, the re-education process began almost as soon as they entered the theater. As part of its orientation for newly arrived officers, the Seventh Army included a block of instruction on community relations. The briefer stressed in his opening remarks that the occupation was over and that Germans in all walks of life expected decent treatment. Although the training still reflected some of the stereotypes the Americans associated with the Germans—the Germans were described as a naturally gregarious people and the “country folk” as peasants not as progressive as America’s own rural population—it did try to identify and explain portions of the culture and traditions with which Americans might not be familiar. It emphasized the formality and courtesy that veterans had perceived to be important parts of German interpersonal relationships. The brievers also reminded their students that they earned considerably more money than many Germans and that extravagant displays of this wealth were sure to offend the local community. The most important point the instruction made, however, was the idea that the Germans were people well worth getting to know and could become firm friends once Americans learned to understand and to respect their customs and traditions.29

Early in 1955, the USAREUR Information and Education Division tied everything together in a three-hour orientation course on Germany that every soldier who joined the command received when he arrived. Every troop unit already in Europe also took the course as part of the command’s monthly information and education program. The instruction consisted of three one-hour components. The first was devoted to a review of historical events that had led up to the American presence in Germany. The second was a discussion of Germany and the German people, and the third hour highlighted the opportunities available to an American soldier in Europe and the responsibilities that came with them. The historical dialogue of the first hour led to the conclusion that NATO needed the Germans to help keep the alliance strong. Therefore, it was imperative for each U.S. soldier to act as a personal ambassador to


this important ally. In the end, each soldier would be making friends for democracy. The second section dealt with the Germans as a people and, in contrast to earlier instruction, tried to convey the idea that they were more like Americans than different. It pointed out that many Americans were descended from German stock and that many of the differences in customs and culture between the two nations reflected traditions found among other European allies. The third portion of the instruction highlighted the advantages of a tour in Europe, particularly the opportunity to travel. The class was quick to point out, however, that travel was restricted to Western Europe, as Americans who wandered into East Germany or Czechoslovakia were sometimes never heard from again. As with the other two hours, this part of the lesson concluded by reminding the soldiers that they were carrying the ball in the game of public relations. It was up to them to reflect the best of American democracy in the face of Soviet propaganda.30

The European edition of Stars and Stripes, an unofficial armed forces publication printed under the supervision of the EUCOM Information and Education Division, also helped to promote better understanding between the Germans and the Americans. For several years the newspaper encouraged its readers to improve their language skills by carrying a daily list of common German phrases and their English translations. It also frequently printed articles and columns by its own staff writers describing how American soldiers and their families could become better friends with their German neighbors. These pieces explained some of the history behind German traditions and sought to help young troops feel less intimidated by the customary formality and reserve expressed by many older Germans at first meeting. One particularly eye-opening article, written by a German newspaper editor in May 1953 and carried in Stars and Stripes, described how Americans looked through German eyes. The writer encouraged soldiers to get out of their posts and military communities and get to know the Germans on their own grounds.31

Not surprisingly, sports and athletic contests proved to be an effective means of bringing soldiers and German civilians together. The Army sports program in Europe was extensive, with multiple leagues for most team sports and opportunities for competition in individual pursuits. It was not long before groups of Americans were challenging some of their German neighbors to friendly competitions. Initial contests were limited to those sports most familiar to the Germans: boxing, track and field, and swimming were particularly popular. Over time, as the Americans learned how to play soccer and the Germans gained some experience with baseball and football, they met in these sports

30 HQ, USAREUR, Information and Education Div, Orientation Course for Germany, Mar 1955, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.

U.S. military bands also proved to be effective ambassadors in furthering the cause of U.S.-German, civil-military relations. The Seventh Army band, many of whose members had played in top bands in the United States, toured Germany, playing at least one engagement each weekend during the summer months. Smaller contingents of the group formed combos or dance bands and performed for military and civilian affairs year-round. The 3d Armored Division sponsored both a 51-person division band and a 37-man chorus that entertained at many different functions. Some groups even took crash courses in German so that they could sing traditional German Christmas carols for performances in local churches. Concerts and other cultural performances helped to show the Germans another side to the Americans and to personalize the growing relationship between the two nations.\footnote{Memo, CWO Charles L. Landry, Asst Adj Gen, for CG, 9th Inf Div, 3 Sep 1954, sub: Seventh Army Symphony Orchestra, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 549, NACP; “7th Army Symphony to Tour North Germany,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 4 Feb 1956; Thurston Macauley, “The 3d Armored Division’s Musical Envoys to Germany,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 3 Apr 1958; “Busy Yule for GI Singers,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 7 Dec 1958.}

The effort to build trust and understanding between the U.S. Army and local communities also involved demonstrating to the Germans that the U.S. military knew its business and was a credible partner in the effort to defend Western Europe. American civil affairs officers took care to invite local officials to parades, retreats, and other martial demonstrations. Seventh Army posts and facilities frequently celebrated traditional military holidays such as Armed Forces Day or Veterans Day with open houses and extensive military demonstrations. These events provided civilians from local communities with an opportunity to talk to soldiers and to get a closeup view of vehicles, weapons, and equipment. Giving local children a chance to climb on a tank or to ride in a real Army truck did more to improve the image of the U.S. military than any number of meetings and speeches.\footnote{“Ordnance Corps Observes 142d Anniversary Today, Depots, Shops in Germany to Host Visitors Tomorrow,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 14 May 1954; “60 Installations in USAREUR to Hold Open House Celebrations,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 20 May 1955; “Yanks Celebrate Armed Forces Day in Berlin,” \textit{Stars and Stripes}, European Edition, 18 May 1958.}

Children proved to be a common denominator that drew together the two nations in other ways as well. As an extension of the German Youth Activities
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

program, U.S. Army units sponsored German boys in soap box derby races across the country. The sponsoring units provided materials to build the race cars, prizes, and expense money for local winners to participate in a national championship race. On several occasions, U.S. and German school teachers set up exchange programs, visiting each other’s classrooms and learning each other’s teaching methods. Students switched classrooms as well. In that way, German children learned the origins and traditions of an American Thanksgiving, and, a little later, U.S. students participated in the German Fasching celebration, a pre-Lenten carnival similar to the American Mardi Gras. Although most of the German students were fluent in English, few of the American children could speak German. The exchange visits offered them an opportunity to begin learning the language through conversations with their counterparts.35

In the end, it became clear that the key to building a relationship between U.S. soldiers and German civilians was getting the Americans out into the local communities to meet the Germans on their own terms. The Army chief of staff, General Taylor, expressed this belief in 1956 when he told an audience that Americans living abroad had a tendency to insulate themselves in “little Americas.” He advised officers and soldiers going to Germany to learn as much of the language as they could and to use that knowledge to get to know the neighbors. Ambassador David K. E. Bruce told soldiers the same thing. He encouraged them to be good guests of the German people and to remember their hosts were as tenacious in defending their traditions as the Americans were in supporting their own. Bruce added that the efforts of U.S. military leaders in Europe were paying off and that the soldiers were becoming welcome members of the German community.36

Maintaining the Relationships

Despite the best efforts of unit leaders and civil affairs staffs throughout Germany, and wherever else U.S. troops were stationed, maintaining smooth community relations was not always easy. Many of the soldiers were 18- to 21-year-old men with the usual vices that seem characteristic of that age group. The command did its best to keep the soldiers busy, and when they were in the field, they were less likely to get into trouble. Inevitably, however, troops had off-duty time, and the local communities beckoned with plenty of diversions to offer a young soldier and many opportunities for him to misbehave. General Eddy reminded his junior officers in September 1951 that the undisciplined or


criminal behavior of even one Seventh Army soldier presented a serious obstacle to German-American relations and could easily destroy the good reputation that units had built up in a local community over a long period of time. However, with more than two hundred fifty thousand military personnel and almost sixty thousand dependents, USAREUR comprised a population equal to that of a moderately sized American city. Provost marshal records from the period reflect comparable statistics for most categories of major and minor offenses.\(^{37}\)

Far and away the most common cause for soldier misconduct and subsequent difficulties with neighbors was alcohol consumption. Senior officers acknowledged that, with the expansion of the force in 1951, many of USAREUR’s new soldiers were young men away from home for the first time. The command had developed an extensive program of movies, service clubs, athletics, and social activities to keep off-duty troops entertained, but many still complained of boredom and a lack of things to do. The command was reluctant to deny younger soldiers the same privileges it accorded to the older men, so they were generally free to drink during their nonduty hours. Moreover, German barkeepers were seldom willing to turn down a sale, even to those soldiers who had obviously had enough. With beer and other alcoholic beverages readily available in enlisted clubs and in gasthauses throughout the German community, few restraints existed to keep soldiers from overindulging.\(^{38}\)

Leaders took steps when they could to limit the abuse. After he became USAREUR commander, General Eddy, directed service clubs to eliminate the practice of serving double-shotted drinks. He also banned pre-closing sales and instructed club managers to place more emphasis on the sale of soft drinks and snacks than on liquor. Although he also threatened to place off-limits those German establishments that continued to sell alcohol to already intoxicated soldiers, or that otherwise encouraged troops to drink too much, Eddy acknowledged that the subject was touchy and would require close coordination with the responsible German officials. Subsequent commanders continued most of General Eddy’s policies for the serving of alcohol in clubs,


but the problem of drunk and disorderly soldiers and the disturbances they caused in local communities would never completely disappear.39

The U.S. Army during the 1950s was overwhelmingly a male institution, and the force in Europe was no exception. As late as 1958, the Seventh Army boasted one member of the Women’s Army Corps who served as the personal secretary to the Army commander. For the thousands of single 18- to 24-year-old men who made up the U.S. Army in Europe, the most popular recreational activity in theater was the pursuit of European women. During the occupation, the widespread sexual relations between soldiers and German women, and the thriving entertainment and sex industry that catered to the soldiers, had been deeply upsetting to many Germans. German social scientists reported that the number of sex crimes in West Germany tripled between 1948 and 1951. They also expressed alarm at an influx of risqué or pornographic magazines, books, and movies that seemed to be flooding the country.40

The transition from occupation to partnership had not alleviated any of the Germans’ concerns. Throughout the early 1950s, as the U.S. military buildup took place, newly established American garrison towns lacked the law enforcement capabilities to deal with the influx of so many young men and the social problems associated with such a large military presence. Exacerbating the problem was the fact that fewer than 30 percent of the soldiers sent to Germany were married and even fewer had brought their wives. German authorities outlawed prostitution in many of the smaller garrison communities, and German police and American MPs collaborated on joint vice raids to round up violators. Unfortunately, the random raids also apprehended plenty of “decent German girls” who ended up in government health offices for gynecological exams. To avoid such embarrassment, local communities began to limit the vice raids, choosing to express their displeasure primarily toward the growing number of interracial liaisons.41

The reported rate of venereal disease among USAREUR soldiers usually varied between fifty and ninety soldiers per thousand per month. Although this


41 Maria Hohn, “You Can’t Pin Sergeant’s Stripes on an Archangel: Soldiering, Sexuality, and U.S. Army Policies in Germany,” in Over There, ed. Hohn and Moon, pp. 125–30. For more detailed information on relationships between U.S. soldiers and German women, see Hohn, GIs and Frauleins.
was higher than the overall Army rate, it was consistently lower than that of the total overseas force. German and American authorities attempted to control the spread of venereal diseases by licensing and closely monitoring prostitution and by offering free medical treatment to infected persons. The U.S. Army, Europe, also offered special passes to units that remained free of the diseases for specified periods of time.\(^\text{42}\)

On a more positive note, the number of marriages between European women and American soldiers also continued to rise. In May 1953, the Department of the Army lifted security restrictions that had previously prohibited soldiers who had married German nationals from returning to the European Command for subsequent tours. Shortly thereafter, USAREUR adjusted its own policies, allowing more time than in the past for newly married soldiers to prepare for redeployment back to the United States. In 1955, USAREUR inherited from the American consul at Frankfurt responsibility for interviewing prospective spouses, conducting security reviews, and providing medical examinations. A steady stream of couples appearing before one Berlin official to obtain marriage licenses caused him to complain that U.S. soldiers were depriving Germany of all its pretty girls. While the vast majority of women were “knockouts,” he said, “some of the men were not so handsome.” Many German women, it seemed, preferred the prospect of life in the United States to settling down in postwar Germany.\(^\text{43}\)

One issue that had both positive and negative effects on the German-American relationship involved the amount of money the soldiers and their dependents had to spend in a German economy that was still recovering from the war. One report in 1952 suggested that the thousands of American troops stationed in West Germany would provide an “army of free-spending tourists” for the state. At the same time, however, German merchants complained that discounted purchases made by the troops at post exchanges threatened their own bottom lines. They accused some soldiers of buying goods in bulk to resell elsewhere at a profit. The U.S. Exchange Service pointed out that while the U.S. stores did sell German cameras at prices lower than those found in German shops, the manufacturers continued to make a profit.\(^\text{44}\)

\(\text{\textsuperscript{42}}\) Annual Hist Rpts, 1952, HQ, EUCOM/USAREUR, p. 118; and 1 Jul 1954–30 Jun 1955, HQ, USAREUR, pp. 141–42, Historians files, CMH.


German merchants had a more serious issue with U.S. soldiers failing to pay their debts. During one six-month period in 1957, USAREUR headquarters received approximately twenty-five hundred letters complaining about unpaid debts. In part, U.S. commanders blamed the Germans themselves for extending excessive amounts of credit to irresponsible young men. Moreover, the Army had always taken the position that it was not a collection agency. While commanders took what actions they could against soldiers with delinquent debts, they also worked through the local German-American associations to convince vendors to be somewhat less generous with the credit they extended, particularly to lower-ranking soldiers who could not earn enough money to pay back large debts on time.\footnote{HQ, USAREUR, Commanders’ Conference, 16 Dec 1957, Entry 2115, USAREUR Memorandums, 1952–1965, RG 549, NACP; HQ, USAREUR, Commanders’ Conference Notes, 11 Dec 1959, Entry 2002, USAREUR Secretary of the General Staff Conferences, 1959–1961, RG 549, NACP.}

That is not to say that the Germans were unable to profit from the influx of American soldiers and their ready supply of cash. Taxi drivers around cities such as Giessen and Baumholder later told stories of the “Golden Fifties” when Americans were so well-off that they could afford a taxi to transport them from one bar to another, even if the distance was a mere fifty yards. One young woman used all her savings to buy a Volkswagen Beetle, which she rented to U.S. soldiers for DM 45 a weekend. In a few years she was the proud owner of a fleet of twenty-five cars that she rented to Americans because few Germans could have afforded her fees. Another enterprising young man sold sodas and sandwiches in front of U.S. military barracks. He soon made enough money to support himself while attending the university.\footnote{Hohn, \textit{GIs and Frauleins}, pp. 46–47.}

The recovery of the German economy and the increasing prosperity of the German middle class helped to eliminate another of the major vices of the occupation period, the black market. During the early days of the occupation, an American surplus in almost all goods coupled with an exhausted German economy provided U.S. soldiers with an opportunity to trade excess commodities for art objects, cameras, jewelry, other luxury articles, and local currency. By 1951, however, the recovery of the German economy had brought such large amounts of consumer goods into the market that most black marketing ceased to be profitable. That, plus the increased attention of the U.S. military and German police, border guards, and customs officials, ended the illegal traffic in most commodities. Despite that enforcement, however, a black market continued in cigarettes and coffee. A generous American monthly ration, relatively inexpensive prices, and a 50 percent German luxury tax on these items offered lucrative profits to those willing to take the chance. American officials responded in June 1952 by decreasing the coffee ration from seven pounds to five pounds per person per month for soldiers with families. Single troops living in the barracks saw their ration reduced from four pounds to two pounds per
month. When the illicit trade continued, it became a political football, with the German press and the American military media trading accusations about where to lay the blame. Although the practice eventually declined due to the increased vigilance of the authorities, stiffer penalties for black marketeers, and a declining value of the dollar against the DM, it was never completely eradicated.47

In addition to the normal penalties available through the military discipline system and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, USAREUR leaders had a number of less punitive options at their disposal to assist in maintaining order among the troops during their off-duty time. First and foremost was the curfew. Unless on official leave or pass, soldiers had to be in their quarters by 2400 on evenings prior to a duty day and by 0100 on evenings prior to a non-duty day. In many cases, however, noncommissioned officers were exempt from curfew restrictions, and, over time, enforcement grew somewhat lax. The rising number of incidents involving soldiers and German civilians during the summer of 1956 led the USAREUR commander, General Hodes, to order strict enforcement of the curfew and a re-examination of pass privileges throughout the command. When teenage military dependents sparked incidents through their disorderly public conduct in 1959, USAREUR leaders warned that the curfew applied to them as well and would be enforced. Dependents who violated the restrictions could expect a quick departure from the theater.48

Military police patrols tried to anticipate problems and to intercede before they became major incidents. In many areas, local German police units patrolled jointly with their American counterparts. The two groups learned to work together to defuse situations from each side before major conflicts erupted. Seventh Army units also sent courtesy patrols into communities at night to keep an eye out for disruptive or unruly soldiers and to head off incidents before they became matters for the military police. The courtesy patrols carried no weapons and relied solely on the prestige of the senior noncommissioned officers assigned to the details. They visited bars, gasthauses, and traditional soldier hangouts on a regular basis, checking for proper wear of uniforms, correct identification cards and passes, and the occasional overindulged soldier who might need a ride back to the barracks.49


49 Memo, Lt Col William D. Mouchet, Dep Ch of Staff, Civil Affairs Div, for Asst Ch of Staff, G–1, 23 Aug 1956, sub: Improving Conditions in Areas Adjacent to Military Installations, Entry 2109, USAREUR Civil Affairs Division, General Correspondence, 1952–1956, RG 549, NACP; Marty Gershen, “Saturday Night Beat,” *Stars and Stripes*, European Edition, 20 Aug
Although maintaining a good relationship between the Americans and their German neighbors was an important goal for every senior officer who served with USAREUR, none took the issue more seriously or had a greater impact than General Clarke. As Seventh Army commander from May 1956 to July 1958, Clarke made enhancing relations with the neighbors second in importance only to maintaining the combat readiness of the Seventh Army. He took command of the force at a time when relations between soldiers and civilians were at a low point. Local news media had played up racial friction, drunkenness, and misbehavior by American troops to the point that the Army leadership in Washington expressed genuine concern over the viability of maintaining troops in Europe. In response, soon after he arrived in theater, Clarke set out to visit local officials in all of the German communities surrounding Seventh Army installations. In doing so, he also met with more than one thousand community and municipal leaders in an effort to get to know them and to demonstrate that he cared about their concerns.\(^50\)

Clarke believed in two primary causes for the rise in serious incidents, the ready availability of liquor and the extended hours in which soldiers were allowed to roam the streets. As a first step toward addressing the issues, he proposed to halt the sale of alcoholic beverages by midnight and to make sure that troops were in their quarters by then. He also prevailed on German bar owners to stop selling drinks to U.S. soldiers on credit and before they became dangerously intoxicated. He likewise asked them to explore the possibility of closing their establishments at times when soldiers should be back in their billets. The general stressed as well the leadership responsibilities of troop officers and section leaders. He demanded that officers and noncommissioned officers set a positive example and established harsh penalties for those who could not live up to the standard he expected. Finally, to provide perspective, he reminded Germans and Americans alike of the many positive programs the command had put in place and the contributions soldiers had made to Germany’s economy and to improving the everyday lives of its citizens.\(^51\)

Echoing General Taylor’s concern that American families were setting up isolated colonies in Europe, Clarke also encouraged soldiers and their dependents to get out among the Germans to learn more about them as people. He told his division commanders that it was far better to create positive publicity than to attempt to prevent unwanted attention that had arisen from unfavorable incidents. To that end, he urged them to provide the troops with opportunities

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\(^{50}\) Intervs, Lt Col Lowell G. Smith and Lt Col Murray G. Swindler with Gen Clyde D. Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, p. 17, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI; and Col. Francis B. Kish with Gen Bruce C. Clarke, 23 Feb 1982, pp. 172–73, Senior Officer Oral History Program, MHI.

to interact with local citizens in a positive manner. Ways to generate favorable notice, he said, included athletic competitions between American and German teams, open houses at Army affairs, initiation of unit-sponsored charities such as the adoption of orphanages, and prompt investigation and punishment where appropriate whenever negative incidents occurred. Clarke called his initiative “Good Neighbors to Our German Good Neighbors” and he continued to meet with German and American leaders on a regular basis to reinforce his message.52

Ultimately, the general’s programs succeeded. Under his command, the Seventh Army received the Silver Anvil Award from the American Public Relations Association for its efforts to improve German-American relations. As a capstone to his efforts, the German city of Heidelberg made Clarke an honorary senator.53

**Fitting in with the French**

The Germans were not the only local population with whom the Americans had to learn to get along. In much smaller numbers, U.S. soldiers also served in other European nations including Italy and Austria. It was France, however, that presented the greatest challenge for U.S. soldiers and their families. Having just evicted the Germans after years of occupation, many of the French were righteously indignant at the very idea of having another nation’s soldiers stationed on their soil. Nonetheless, in November 1950, after a year of negotiations, U.S. troops began moving into camps around the country to begin construction of the USAREUR Communications Zone.

As they had in Germany, Army leaders required all newly assigned units entering France to receive an orientation on their new assignment. During the first hour, troops learned about the Army’s mission in France and the importance of establishing a line of support. Because the reason for stationing troops in France seemed to be less obvious than their purpose in Germany, the command was careful to explain in detail the logistical requirements of the forward defense forces. In addition, briefers tried to prepare the newcomers for the spartan conditions they would encounter during their tour. During the initial period of development in France, housing, recreational facilities, or other creature comforts were mostly unavailable for the troops. For the time being, the construction of depots, pipelines, and logistical facilities had a higher

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52 HQ, Seventh Army, Extension of Remarks by the Army Commander, 1 Jun 1956; Extract from Remarks by Lt Gen Bruce C. Clarke, CG, Seventh Army, to the Class of 1957, United States Military Academy, 11 Mar 1957, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 549, NACP; “Seventh Army Emphasizing G-A Good Neighbor Policy,” *Stars and Stripes*, European Edition, 8 Sep 1956.

priority. Those who balked at the prospect of a lower standard of living were reminded that conditions were a lot worse in Korea.\(^54\)

It was particularly important for briefers to emphasize that the nature of the American presence in France was something special. France was not a nation that the United States had defeated in war, and U.S. forces were not there as an army of occupation. To the contrary, France was a free and sovereign nation and a partner in the NATO alliance. The troops were made to understand that some of the liberties they had taken during the early days of the occupation of Germany would not be tolerated in this new environment.\(^55\)

The second hour of the orientation course covered the customs and traditions of the French people and advised the soldiers on how to get along with their new neighbors. First and foremost was a recommendation to begin learning the language as soon as possible. Troop information and education officers provided French phrase books and English-French dictionaries to help servicemen get started. One veteran of previous service in France warned that Frenchmen were intensely proud of their language and that, although many spoke excellent English, they seldom volunteered to speak it or to practice their skills with visitors. Additionally, he said, the French emphasized a rigid adherence to traditional courtesies. Formal handshakes and greetings were an important part of everyday life. Ignoring such niceties could cause cool indifference to become outright hostility. The orientation also emphasized the influence of the Roman Catholic Church throughout the country and warned that many communities were more conservative than the popular image of Paris.\(^56\)

The command was also careful to warn incoming soldiers about another peculiarity of their service in France. Unlike the situation in West Germany, the Communist Party played an active role in French politics. Left wing political parties publicized any incidents that portrayed the Americans in a bad light and that might cause friction between the two allies. Commanders cautioned soldiers to avoid public comment on political issues that could be misconstrued or misrepresented by news media sympathetic to the Communist cause.\(^57\)

The most serious challenge to U.S.-French, civil-military relations came in November 1953 when legislation passed by the French National Assembly made male aliens residing in France for more than a year subject to conscription into the French armed services. This law specifically targeted the United States, which had drafted French nationals into military service even though they had already served in their own armed forces. Alarmed by the prospect of

\(^{54}\) Memo, Information Div, HQ, EUCOM COMZ, for CG, Base Section, 3 Mar 1952, sub: Orientation of Military Personnel, Entry 2045, USAREUR G3 Operations, Plans, and Training, RG 549, NACP.

\(^{55}\) HQ, USAREUR, Orientation Course for France, Sep 1953, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.


\(^{57}\) Msg, USAREUR to Area Commands, 18 Mar 1955, Ref # SC–22034, Entry 2000, USAREUR General Correspondence, 1952–1955, RG 549, NACP.
U.S. dependents living in France subject to conscription, USAREUR began making arrangements to return all military personnel with eligible dependents to the United States if they could not transfer to other duties in Germany or Great Britain. In response to the growing controversy, the U.S. Congress passed legislation in 1955 exempting from selective service requirements any foreign nationals who had already completed military service in their own country. The French government reciprocated by exempting U.S. citizens from its own conscription if they had already met their military obligations. Male dependents who had not yet served in the military remained legally subject to French conscription, but French officials indicated that they would abstain from drafting those individuals.58

Although the principle of having foreign troops stationed on French soil remained a controversial issue in French politics at the national level, U.S. troops managed to coexist peacefully with their neighbors in the local communities. American servicemen reached out to civilians in a manner similar to their counterparts in Germany with comparable results. In a letter to General Handy, General Eddy wrote that increased participation by the French in community relations programs had helped to diminish anti-American feeling and had contributed to a growing anti-Communist sentiment in the French population. As the decade proceeded, good relations remained an issue of the highest importance for the Communications Zone leadership. Maj. Gen. Edward J. O’Neill, commander of the U.S. Communications Zone, Europe, in 1957 promised to do anything in his power to maintain the best possible relationship with the French. There was nothing, he said, on which he placed more emphasis.59

In most cases, U.S. troops serving in Italy found a much warmer reception than those in France, but also suffered a daunting cost of living. Since the U.S. Army contained a relatively high percentage of Italian-Americans, many soldiers and their families found more familiar circumstances in Italy than they had in France or Germany. As in France, however, no government furnished quarters were available in Verona, Vicenza, and Livorno, where most of the U.S. troops served. Although the U.S. headquarters leased a small number of buildings for transient housing, most military families arriving in Italy had to find their own housing on the Italian economy. By 1958, however, the Army began construction of military housing for four hundred families near Vicenza. Shortly thereafter, many of the American units assigned to the Southern

European Task Force were inactivated, with their missions and responsibilities turned over to Italian units.  

Charities and Disaster Relief: Being a Good Neighbor When It Counted

As U.S. leaders worked to strengthen the NATO alliance, it was important to demonstrate to other member nations that they could count on the United States during times of trial. For American troops stationed in Europe, this meant lending a hand when natural disasters or other misfortunes threatened civilian populations across the continent. U.S. assistance during these times not only reinforced the ties of the alliance, but also allowed U.S. troops to garner a measure of respect and admiration from those they assisted.

In February 1953, for example, heavy rains and flooding sent refugees scurrying for higher ground in coastal towns in Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Hurricane-force winds and waves battered the Dutch dikes and pushed flood waters across a 1,000-square-mile area of the Netherlands. The SHAPE commander, General Ridgway, instructed the USAREUR commander, General Eddy, to take charge of U.S. relief efforts in the flood stricken area. The Army’s initial response included sending a detachment of the 39th Engineer Group to serve as forward headquarters for the U.S. relief effort, an engineer dump truck company with three hundred thousand sandbags, and a number of water purification units. The command also dispatched six helicopters and fifteen small reconnaissance planes to assist in searching for survivors. As Eddy’s team began to grasp the full scope of the disaster, more support units—including engineers, amphibious truck companies, aerial supply companies, and additional helicopters—rushed to the stricken region. The helicopters and amphibious trucks proved to be invaluable, repeatedly rescuing victims stranded in isolated sections of the flooded region. Engineer companies reinforced dikes, while transportation companies delivered tools to emergency workers fighting the floods and clothing and food to the thousands of refugees. Signal units worked to restore communications necessary for relief efforts, while medical teams helped treat thousands of displaced people. Before the emergency was over, more than two thousand American troops were engaged in the effort.

When other natural disasters or emergencies hit Western Europe, USAREUR was there to lend a hand. In 1954 when flood waters destroyed bridges in Austria,
engineers from the U.S. garrison there helped to repair the damage. The eagerness of
many American troops to help prompted USAREUR commanders to impose
limits lest the relief efforts interfere with maintaining combat readiness. When
General Hoge observed that Army units had been committed to emergency work
in flooded areas of Bavaria while local resources went unutilized, he revised the
command’s policies regarding civil disasters by directing that USAREUR should
not become involved in large-scale relief efforts unless local resources and those
of the Red Cross were insufficient or unavailable.⁶²

Nonetheless, American troops continued to help out where they could. In
1956, when the coldest winter in fifty years gripped much of Europe, USAREUR
units helped to restore water supplies cut off by frozen pipes and rescued a
10-ton ferry that had become frozen in the middle of Germany’s Main River.
Supply units also assisted U.S. Air Force elements in delivering needed food
and supplies to snowbound villages in Germany and Italy.⁶³

In other cases, USAREUR mobilized its forces to provide humanitarian
assistance outside of the immediate theater. President Eisenhower directed
U.S. forces to take no actions to support uprisings in Hungary and Poland in
1956, but when thousands of Hungarian refugees began fleeing into Austria,
USAREUR once again stepped up to help. As part of Operation MERCY—a U.S.
Air Force, Europe, mission to establish refugee camps in Austria—USAREUR
furnished blankets, cots, and field kitchen equipment. In December, General
Norstad, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, instructed General
Hodes, the USAREUR commander, to prepare a staging area in Munich for the
airlift of some fifteen thousand refugees to the United States. Almost overnight,
soldiers set up a reception facility with cots and mattresses to accommodate up
to five hundred refugees a day while they awaited their flights. Army doctors,
nurses, and enlisted personnel set up a medical dispensary to take care of the
sick. On 11 December, Hodes boarded an aircraft at Munich-Riem Airport
to bid farewell to the first group of refugees departing for the United States.⁶⁴

Often, USAREUR units were able to assist local communities while,
at the same time, providing a training benefit for their troops. Engineer
units, in particular, worked on numerous local improvement projects
that happened to coincide with their military specialties. In May 1952,
for example, engineers from the 4th Infantry Division built a wooden
trestle bridge across a stream near Hanau to connect a local neighborhood

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⁶² HQ, USAREUR, Monthly HICOG-Commanders Conference Notes, 29 Jul 1954, Entry
33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP; “USFA Engineers Help Rebuild Flood-

⁶³ “Army Responding to German Calls for Help in Freeze,” Stars and Stripes, European
Edition, 16 Feb 1956; “Italy to Decorate 301 Yanks for Aid in Snow Crisis,” Stars and Stripes,

⁶⁴ Annual Hist Rpt, HQ, USAREUR, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, p. 298; Ernie Reed, “Army
Plays Host to Haven Refugees,” Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 11 Dec 1956; Ernie Reed,
“Hodes Sees Hungarians Off, Wishes Them Happy Future,” Stars and Stripes, European Edi-
tion, 12 Dec 1956.
with a community swimming pool. For soldiers used to throwing spans across the Main River only to have to retrieve them days later, the task was a welcome change of pace. A few months later, in May 1953, units from the 555th Engineer Group in Karlsruhe constructed playgrounds and athletic fields for neighboring German communities. American units in France played the good neighbor as well. Motorized cranes from the 7373d Transportation Group, stationed near St. Lô in Normandy, rolled out on a regular basis to winch civilian trucks and other large vehicles out of ditches and streams. In these and hundreds of other cases, local communities were thankful for the help, and commanders and soldiers alike were happy to put their military expertise to good use.65

Throughout the 1950s, American soldiers and their dependents opened their hearts and pocketbooks in hundreds of small ways to Germans still struggling to recover from the devastation and depredations of World War II. The German Youth Activities Program sent thousands of children to summer camps through donations from the troops and their families. Officers and enlisted men also gave money as well as time to help initiate or restore youth baseball and scouting programs in a number of German communities. Later, when German hospitals experienced a need for increased supplies of blood and plasma, their requests were answered by thousands of American servicemen and civilians who donated to the German Red Cross. The isolated enclave in West Berlin also presented opportunities for acts of kindness. Beginning in 1953, Army families opened their homes to children from Berlin, offering them “vacations” from their surrounded city. Participating in a USAREUR program entitled Operation Friendly Hand or in an Air Force program known as Operation Kinderlift, USAREUR and U.S. Air Force, Europe, families joined local German communities in hosting the visitors for five-week vacations.66

Some of the Army’s most effective community relations efforts sprang not from official programs or policies but from the basic decency and good nature of the American soldier. In December 1951, little more than a year after the reactivation of the Seventh Army, every major unit within the command sponsored Christmas parties and entertainment with gifts of toys, clothing, and shoes for thousands of German and non-German refugee children. The 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, provided assistance for more than two thousand orphaned children and thirty-two needy families in the Bamberg area through voluntary soldier donations. The following year, with most of its augmentation

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The Red Diamond (5th Infantry Division) chorus and German orphans sing Christmas carols during a party in December 1955.

Santa visits the children of Friedberg Kinderheim at a party given by Company B, 705th Ordnance Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, in December 1955.
units in place, the Seventh Army sponsored Christmas parties for some fifty thousand children. Meanwhile, throughout the entire U.S. Zone of Germany, more than two hundred thousand refugees, orphans, elderly, and needy families received clothing and gifts made possible largely through donations from the U.S. soldiers and their families.\(^67\)

Although the holiday season always placed a spotlight on the soldiers’ charitable efforts, unsung Army personnel contributed millions of dollars in cash, goods, and services to local charities and causes throughout every year. Many units provided year-round support for local orphanages, including money, coal, and vacations at seaside or mountain resorts for underprivileged children. Army engineer units donated time and equipment to help construction projects to assist local communities. In one case in 1956, a group of nuns in the city of Würzburg asked for fuel to run equipment removing rubble from nearby grounds so that they could plant vegetable gardens there. When soldiers from the nearby 10th Infantry Division learned that Army regulations prevented them from donating gasoline, they responded with enough money to keep the equipment running. As if that were not enough, soldiers joined clearing crews during their off-duty time, wielding air hammers, picks, and shovels to help clear the area. More than the civil affairs groups, the friendship councils, and command guidance on German-American relations, it was the thousands of small acts of kindness on the part of units and soldiers throughout Europe that generated a general atmosphere of goodwill toward the American military.\(^68\)

A Convergence of Cultures—Elvis Goes to Europe

Perhaps no other event came to symbolize the emerging integration of American culture, the U.S. Army, and German society as well as the assignment, in October 1958, of Pvt. Elvis Aron Presley to Company D, 1st Medium Tank Battalion, 32d Armor, 3d Armored Division. Because the draft continued throughout the early Cold War period, many celebrities, movie stars, and professional athletes served time in the military. Most, however, remained in the United States, often performing under the auspices of Special Services or

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playing for Army sports teams. For his own reasons, Presley opted for life as a soldier.\(^69\)

By most accounts, the singer was a model enlisted man. Although authorities allowed him to live off post with his father, his grandmother, and various members of his business staff, he declined most special privileges and performed kitchen police duty, took part in the all-night GI parties to prepare billets for inspection, and spent the requisite days and nights in the field, undergoing the division’s extensive training program. During his off-duty hours, he tried to answer some of the five thousand to ten thousand fan letters he received each week, many from Germany.\(^70\)

Elvis turned out to be every bit as popular among the Germans as he was in the United States. As he came down the gangway off the troopship at Bremerhaven, a horde of screaming teenaged fans broke through a police line to get a closer look. Civilian reporters and photographers chronicled most of his

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movements. When he went on maneuvers, opposing unit commanders offered $50 and a three-day pass to any soldier who could capture the famous singer.\(^{71}\)

Although officers from his company commander up to the commanding general of the V Corps asked him to perform for the troops, the singer always politely declined. Lt. Gen. Frank W. Farrell, the V Corps commander, told reporters that Elvis felt he had an obligation to his country and simply wanted to pay it like anybody else. Initially identified for duty as a tank crewman, Presley was instead assigned to a scout platoon where he served as a jeep driver. By the end of his tour, he had been promoted to sergeant and was serving as a reconnaissance squad leader. In March 1960, he returned to Fort Dix, New Jersey, where he mustered out of the service and drove away with his manager, Col. Tom Parker, in a chauffeured limousine.\(^{72}\)

Although the U.S. Army’s role in Germany began as one of occupation, it did not take long for the troops to become accepted as friends by the majority of German citizens. The Berlin airlift and the initial American stand against Communist expansion had generated a basis for goodwill toward the soldiers that charitable work and the basic decency of the troops only expanded. Nonetheless, U.S. Army installations in Germany presented all of the same concerns to their neighbors that Army bases in the United States posed for their local communities, amplified by differences in language, heritage, and culture. The American soldiers brought many hardships and inconveniences to German communities, but they also brought an unprecedented prosperity to local economies and contributed immeasurably to postwar recovery. That Germans and Americans would emerge not just as formal allies but as genuine friends is a tribute to the patience, forbearance, and foresight of leaders on both sides. This would become even more important during the coming months, as the U.S.-Soviet stalemate over Berlin threatened to escalate the Cold War into something a bit warmer.\(^{73}\)


\(^{73}\) Hohn, *GI's and Frauleins*, p. 19.
The election of a new President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, renewed the East-West confrontation over Berlin that had continued to simmer since the 1959 conference of foreign ministers in Geneva. In June 1961, five months after taking office, President Kennedy traveled to Vienna, Austria, to meet with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. The Soviet leader took the opportunity to reissue his ultimatum, threatening to sign a unilateral peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and thus terminate Western access rights to Berlin guaranteed by the original Potsdam Agreement. He once again offered the concession of making Berlin a free city, but only on the condition that the West would recognize the existence of two German states, both of which would join the United Nations. Once the treaty was signed, Khrushchev said, the German Democratic Republic would be a sovereign state. The Soviet Union would regard any violation of that sovereignty as an act of open aggression against a peace-loving country and would respond accordingly.1

“A Bone in the Throat”

The Soviet premier’s message should have come as no surprise to the new American president. The Soviet position on West Berlin had changed little since Khrushchev had issued his initial ultimatum in 1958. At that time, the Soviet leader had told Llewellyn E. Thompson, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that West Berlin was a “bone in the throat” of Soviet-American relations.2

With the new year and the new administration, the confrontation heated up once more. In February 1961, Thompson reported to the State Department that the Soviets remained deeply concerned over West Germany’s military potential and feared that its restored armed forces would eventually take action to force the Soviets out of East Germany. As it was, Berlin remained a convenient and

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forceful means of leverage for the Soviets and an issue in which Khrushchev’s personal prestige had become directly involved.\(^3\)

Less clear to the allies was the influence that East German First Secretary Walter Ulbricht would have on Khrushchev’s actions. To the East Germans, West Berlin had become an escape route to the West and a base for Western espionage and propaganda activities. Ulbricht urged Khrushchev to resolve the situation in Berlin before it threatened the very viability of the East German state. As he agitated for the removal of the Western allies from Berlin, Ulbricht reminded Khrushchev that one of his early rivals, Lavrentiy Beria had been executed as a traitor for suggesting that the Soviet Union abandon East Germany in order to normalize relations with the West. Finally, the East German pointed out that other Communist states, particularly the Chinese, would take great interest in how the Soviet leader dealt with the situation in Berlin. East Germany’s strategic location and the threat posed by the ongoing exodus of refugees gave him considerable leverage, and Ulbricht’s demands exerted increasing influence on Khrushchev’s actions as the crisis intensified.\(^4\)

Western intelligence analysts believed that Berlin was primarily a bargaining chip the Soviets were using in pursuit of larger strategic goals. Although the elimination of the Western enclave deep in the heart of East Germany was desirable, they noted, the city’s status did not directly threaten the security of the Soviet homeland. The growing military strength of West Germany was of far greater concern to the Soviets, as was the continued solidarity of the NATO alliance. In that light, if the challenge to Western access rights in Berlin could foster discord among the Western allies, the Soviet position in Central Europe would only grow stronger. The analysts added that the specter of a reunified Germany haunted Soviet leaders, who feared its restored military potential. The more they pushed for Western recognition of East Germany as a sovereign state, they reasoned, the longer they could ensure retention of the status quo that maintained that country as a buffer zone between the East and the West.\(^5\)

Therein, the analysts continued, lay the key to the Soviet threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic. Although the Soviets could not expect to gain Western acceptance of a two-Germanies solution, they hoped to extract concessions through negotiations that would enhance the international standing of the German Democratic Republic. Western acknowledgment of East German control over access rights to Berlin would constitute a de facto recognition of the East German regime. While the Soviets almost certainly wished to avoid a serious risk of general war, they

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\(^4\) Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall*, pp. 142–43.

\(^5\) Dir of Central Intelligence, Probable Soviet Courses of Action Regarding Berlin and Germany, 24 Feb 1959, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
clearly considered their military strength as a factor increasing the likelihood that they would obtain their goals by political means.\(^6\)

As President Kennedy prepared for his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, he reviewed the main points of the U.S. position on West Berlin. First and foremost, the United States was in Berlin by virtue of its role in the victorious World War II alliance. Its presence in the city was guaranteed, moreover, by an agreement signed by the four Allies at Potsdam that the Soviet Union could not unilaterally abrogate. Just as important, American forces were in West Berlin with the overwhelming approval of the West Berliners. The United States had no intention of being forced out of the city and would use all means at its disposal to maintain its position there. The president and his advisers decided that only three U.S. interests in Berlin were worth a risk of nuclear war: the allied presence in West Berlin, allied access to West Berlin on land and by air, and the freedom and viability of West Berlin itself. Although the president was willing to negotiate on Berlin, the United States would not recognize the East German regime or agree to any other step that might threaten U.S. access to the city. A position paper prepared by the State Department advised Kennedy that the United States should suggest to Khrushchev that, while the situation in Berlin was unsatisfactory to both sides, it was at least tolerable and should be left alone.\(^7\)

U.S. intelligence analysts tried to predict how the Soviets would respond to a number of Western initiatives on Berlin. Although both sides had already engaged in extensive discussion and maneuver, neither had as yet clearly defined its position. Complicating matters further, propaganda and diplomacy seemed inseparably intertwined. Even so, the experts believed that the Soviet Union and East Germany would not explicitly deny the allies access to West Berlin. Instead, the Communists would most likely continue to impose additional conditions or requirements beginning with the replacement of Soviet guards at the checkpoints with East German controllers. It would be up to the West to decide when a particular interference justified the use of force. Should the United States or another Western power attempt to reopen access to the city by military action, U.S. intelligence analysts believed that the Soviets would respond in kind. They might leave initial resistance to East German forces, but they would reinforce quickly with their own local units if they thought it was necessary.\(^8\)

Although some U.S. military planners felt that the Soviets might choose to limit their participation in a ground conflict over access in hopes of avoiding escalation to a larger, possibly nuclear war, the Soviets retained sufficient

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\(^6\) Ibid.


\(^8\) Soviet and Other Reactions to Various Courses of Action in the Berlin Crisis, 6 Apr 1959, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, copy in Historians files, CMH.
military strength in the immediate battle area to influence the action. Soviet forces in East Germany included six armies consisting altogether of ten tank and ten motorized rifle divisions amply supported by artillery, engineer, and air defense elements. The autobahn itself served as the boundary between the 3d Shock Army to the north and the 1st Guards Tank Army to the South. Along the route between Helmstedt in West Germany and Berlin stood the 26th Guards Tank Division at Mägdeberg, the 7th Guards Tank Division at Rossau, and the 6th Guards Tank Division at Wittenberg. Just outside of Berlin, the 10th Guards Tank Division had its headquarters at Krampnitz, and the 1st Motorized Rifle Division at Dallgow. In addition to the ground forces, the Soviet 24th Tactical Air Army in East Germany totaled more than one thousand aircraft capable of ground support, air defense, and interdiction missions. In the event that the Soviets chose to reinforce any of their units in East Germany, they had ample ground and air forces available in neighboring satellite nations as well as in the Soviet Union itself.9

Even if left unsupported, East Germany’s forces were a formidable opponent. The army consisted of two tank and four motorized rifle divisions, two artillery regiments, two antiaircraft artillery regiments, and service support elements for a total of some seventy thousand men. Additional security forces included eight Border Security Police brigades and ten Security Alert Police regiments, all of which were fully motorized and organized into formations similar to those of the military. Western observers believed the East Germans were fairly well-trained but lacking in heavy artillery and logistical support. As a result, they would be unable to offer any serious resistance to a Western advance without significant Soviet assistance in those areas. Other intelligence reports indicated that, by mid-1960, the East German Army had discharged almost all of its officers who had served in the Wehrmacht during World War II. Although that action undoubtedly diminished the overall experience level throughout the force, it did allow for the replacement of those officers with more politically reliable individuals.10

Allied forces in West Berlin were not nearly so imposing. The U.S. Army Garrison, Berlin, consisted of the 6th Infantry’s 2d and 3d Battle Groups, Company F of the 40th Armor, and some smaller assorted support units. The entire force totaled around six thousand men. The troops were stationed at four large military installations—McNair, Andrews, Roosevelt, and Turner Barracks—in Zehlendorf, a borough in the southwest corner of the city. They trained regularly in the Grunewald, the large park near the U.S. barracks. Since that local training area lacked adequate ranges for most heavy weapons and

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10 Ibid.; Msg, CINCEUR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 Jun 1961, Msg # ECJBA9–100505, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP; USAREUR Intelligence Estimate–1961, 1 Jan 1961, Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, Historians files, CMH.
sufficient space for large-scale units, troops also engaged in annual training exercises at the Wildflecken training area and at the British tank range at Belsen-Hohne. In addition to the Americans, the British and French also maintained garrisons in Berlin, about three thousand strong for the British and two thousand for the French. Although the three Western powers maintained substantial stocks of ammunition, fuel, and supplies, they were no match for a serious assault if the Soviets chose to intervene in force.11

**Khrushchev Renews His Ultimatum**

Fully aware of the imbalance of military forces surrounding Berlin, Khrushchev continued to ratchet up the diplomatic pressure concerning the allied presence in the city. The conference in Vienna would give him the opportunity to size up the new American president and to see just how far he could press his military advantage.

During his first meeting with Kennedy in Vienna on 4 June, Khrushchev handed the president an aide-memoire that seemed to dare him to oppose Soviet intentions. The missive accused the Federal Republic of Germany of cultivating “sabre-rattling militarism” and of advocating revisions to borders the Allies had established after World War II. Only a permanent peace treaty that recognized the sovereignty of both Germanies as they had evolved would guarantee that they would not again threaten the European peace. The conclusion of a German peace treaty, the document went on, would also solve the problem of normalizing the situation in West Berlin. The memorandum then once more raised the prospect of making Berlin a demilitarized free city, duly registered by the United Nations. Naturally, it observed, any treaty, whether the United States signed it or not, would terminate Western occupation rights in the city.12

Later that afternoon, Kennedy asked to meet privately with Khrushchev in one last effort to impress on the Soviet leader the importance that the United States placed on its commitment to the people of West Berlin and its right of access to the city. Khrushchev replied that he appreciated the frankness of Kennedy’s remarks, but if the United States insisted on maintaining its presence in Berlin after a treaty was signed, the Soviet Union would have no choice but to assist the German Democratic Republic in defending its borders. His decision to sign the treaty, he added, was irrevocable. The Soviet Union would sign it in December if the United States refused an interim agreement. In a statement that

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was not recorded in the official Soviet or American transcripts because it was too provocative but that was reported later by Soviet participants, Khrushchev told Kennedy that if the United States wanted to unleash a war it should do so now before both sides developed more terrible weapons. As he departed, President Kennedy concluded the conversation by observing that it would be a cold winter.13

Immediately after the conclusion of the Vienna summit, Khrushchev repeated his demands on Soviet television, telling his people that the Soviets would sign a peace treaty whether the West was ready to do so or not. During an unprecedented fireside chat he said that the Soviets would oppose any violations of East Germany’s sovereignty. In a 15 June press conference, Ulbricht, the East German leader, stated explicitly that a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic would give East German authorities control over the access routes to Berlin. He warned the West to negotiate its use of access routes with his country or risk interruptions. Ulbricht made it clear that the Communists wanted the Western allies out of Berlin so that they would no longer be in a position to lure refugees from the East.14

Kennedy and his military advisers weighed their options in light of Khrushchev’s increasing belligerence. Understanding that the Communists’ initial actions would include cutting off Western access to Berlin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff refined plans for various military probes of the autobahn corridor. They also instructed General Norstad, the commander of the U.S. European Command, to review supply levels in Berlin and to determine what commodities, if any, were needed to prepare for an emergency. Although they were prepared to mount an airlift into the city similar to the one that had broken the blockade in 1949, they privately decried the lack of options available to them for dealing with the impending crisis. They informed the president and the new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, that the allies’ lack of military strength in Europe allowed only limited probes which, if turned back by superior Communist forces, would result in a choice between accepting humiliation or initiating nuclear war. To keep that from happening, they urged the president to begin a buildup of U.S. military power in Europe and to encourage the NATO allies to do the same.15

From Europe, General Norstad also lobbied for increasing the U.S. military presence in the theater. He praised the Seventh Army as the best peacetime force the United States had ever fielded and commended the dedication and

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15 Memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff for the President, 14 Jun 1961, sub: Supply Levels in Berlin; Note, the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Improved Position Anticipated from U.S. and Allied Build-up, 14 Jul 1961. Both in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP.
commitment of NATO units, but he stressed the overwhelming number of Soviet tanks, aircraft, and men arrayed against those forces. He urged the president to call up additional reserve units and to deploy additional battle groups to Europe under the guise of training exercises. He also wanted the president and the Joint Chiefs to position additional American naval and air forces where they could contribute to theater readiness, and he suggested that the Seventh Army should conduct more exercises that would require its divisions to move into their alert positions. Those steps, combined with an increase in U.S. military strength in Europe, would give the United States greater freedom of action, the general said, and provide alternatives short of nuclear war.16

After several weeks of discussions with his cabinet, the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a variety of other advisers, President Kennedy made his decision. At 2200 on 25 July, in a speech broadcast on television and radio from the Oval Office, he addressed the nation on the situation in Berlin. After summarizing the course of events since his meeting with Khrushchev, he stated that the United States would never allow the Soviet Union to drive it out of the city, either gradually or by force. The president then announced a series of steps he was taking to increase military readiness. First, he would request from Congress an immediate additional defense appropriation of $3.2 billion, about half of which would go to the procurement of conventional ammunition, weapons, and equipment. He would then request an increase in the total authorized strength of the Army from 875,000 to 1 million men, and augmentations of 29,000 and 63,000, respectively, in Navy and Air Force active duty strength. He also called for doubling and tripling draft calls in the coming months; activating some reservists and certain ready reserve units; and extending the tours of duty for soldiers, sailors, and airmen scheduled to leave the service in the near future. Finally, he postponed programs to retire or mothball older ships and aircraft, and he delayed the inactivation of a number of B–47 bomber and aerial refueling wings. Shortly thereafter, Secretary McNamara announced that 50 percent of the Strategic Air Command’s bomber wings would go on 15-minute ground alert and that three of the Army’s divisions in the United States would be relieved of training duties and prepared for emergency deployment to Europe.17


The Wall

In Berlin the situation continued to deteriorate. Soviet and East German soldiers increased their harassment of U.S. vehicles and trains trying to enter the city, and Soviet authorities periodically renewed attempts to inspect allied vehicles as they crossed checkpoints into and out of Berlin. The Soviets also tried to institute new restrictions on flights approaching the city, while allowing their fighters to buzz allied aircraft flying through the approved access corridors. A year earlier, in May 1960, Soviet fighter aircraft had forced down an American C–47 transport that had strayed off course on a flight from Copenhagen to Hamburg. Although the Communists had released the airplane and its crew a few days later, the incident had heightened the tension for pilots flying the routes into and out of Berlin. Border officials slowed barge traffic as well, implementing new inspections and controls.18

U.S. forces in the city responded by altering the content and increasing the tempo of their training. In West Berlin’s expansive Grunewald Park, the sector’s only open space where units could train, the 6th Infantry’s battle groups tested each other’s readiness to attack and defend. Maj. Gen. Albert Watson II, U.S. Commander, Berlin, directed battle group commanders to modify platoon training tests to cover riot control and combat in cities. Companies donned civilian clothing and acted as rioters to test the ability of their compatriots to maintain order in the face of Communist-inspired civil disturbances.19

In some cases, U.S. commanders went out of their way to ensure that the Soviets knew exactly what they were doing. It was an essential element in the effort to convince the Soviets that the United States would fight for West Berlin and that, while U.S. forces might not be able to hold the city, they would inflict unacceptable losses on the attacker. To that end, the Americans built a mock town in the Grunewald training area, within easy visibility of the East Berlin border. In response, the East Germans built an observation tower to get a better view of the training. One U.S. lieutenant colonel commented that he did not mind the close surveillance. As a matter of fact, he said, “We want them to know that we’re here to stay.” Feature stories in Stars and Stripes reminded the Soviets that capturing Berlin in 1945 had cost them dearly and that any future assault would be equally bloody.20

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For the Communists, however, time was apparently running out. Khrushchev’s repeated threats to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany spurred an increase in the already considerable number of refugees heading west. Well over three million people had fled from East Germany since 1945. German authorities recorded that more than half of those had come through West Berlin, unmistakably marking the city as the “escape hatch” from the Soviet Zone. In 1960, manpower shortages in East Germany had reached a point where the German Democratic Republic experienced difficulties in completing winter planting and harvesting. The East German regime admitted to a shortage of a half million workers of all types in East Berlin alone. By the end of the year, only 380 dentists remained in the Soviet sector, as compared to 700 the year before. Complicating matters further, some twenty thousand of the one hundred fifty thousand refugees who entered West Berlin were of military age, a serious loss in East German military manpower. The trend accelerated in 1961. During February, the exodus averaged 2,650 persons per week. By the end of May, this figure had risen to 3,200. In June, 20,000—and in July, more than 30,000—refugees crossed over to the West, the largest monthly totals since 1953. Planes flying the air corridors from Berlin to West Germany were so full of refugees that extra flights were necessary. In an appeal broadcast to its own citizens, the East German government said that the mass migration was disrupting the economy, damaging the nation’s standing abroad, and threatening its future.21

Communist efforts to stem the tide grew desperate. The East Germans employed more than five thousand police to guard the borders around West Berlin. When that proved to be insufficient, they began drafting members of the “Free German Youth,” a Communist political organization, to assist transportation police in checking buses and trains at crossing points. Party officials took steps to force East Berliners working in West Berlin to give up their jobs. Vigilante groups sanctioned by the Communist government turned in persons suspected of planning flight or of helping others to do so. Increased propaganda meanwhile labeled refugees as traitors and accused the West of plotting to sabotage the East German economy through blackmail and slave trade. Ulbricht told Soviet officials that the flood of refugees was disorganizing the entire life of the Republic. If the present situation of open borders remained, collapse was inevitable.22


On 5 August, the Soviets made one last effort to settle the Berlin question. On the eve of ministerial meetings in Paris between the United States, France, Great Britain, and West Germany, the Soviet Union delivered a note to the embassies of the four nations indicating that it wished to consider and to discuss proposals for the conclusion of a German peace treaty and resolution of the situation in West Berlin. For the most part, the communication was a restatement of the Soviet position as Khrushchev had presented it to Kennedy in Vienna two months earlier. Although a note to the British contained an invitation to put a new proposal on the table, no similar offer appeared in the communication to the United States. While the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, indicated a willingness to talk, he also reiterated that the West would neither abandon West Berlin nor be party to a final treaty that recognized a divided Germany. As the ministerial discussions came to a conclusion on 8 August, the four nations agreed to seek further negotiations with the Soviet Union but to maintain a firm and united position regarding Western access to Berlin and to continue the buildup of NATO forces.23

Some Western leaders appeared to understand the implications of the Soviet and East German dilemma. On a 30 July Sunday morning television talk show, Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) suggested that the best way for the Soviets to reduce tensions in the Berlin Crisis would be to close the West Berlin escape hatch. Certainly, he said, the Soviets had the power to close it. Despite the uproar caused by the Senator’s remarks, the president never refuted them. Early in August, Kennedy mused with his friend, economist Walt Rostow, about the likely outcome in Berlin. Khrushchev had to do something to stop the flow of refugees, or else all of Eastern Europe might fall. Perhaps a wall might be necessary, he said, and the United States could do nothing to prevent it. The Western alliance would act to defend West Berlin, but it would not act to keep East Berlin open.24

The tension continued to build. In Berlin, the chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, Col. Ernest von Pawel, reported to the U.S. headquarters that four Soviet divisions had moved out of their usual garrison areas in East Germany and surrounded Berlin. Lt. Col. Thomas F. McCord, the head of the U.S. Army’s 513th Military Intelligence Group in Berlin, also cited reports of large quantities of construction materials—concrete blocks, barbed wire, and other supplies—stockpiled near the city’s dividing line. Nonetheless, the deputy

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chief of the CIA base in Berlin dismissed the notion, saying that it would be political suicide for Ulbricht to build a wall.25

Not long after, the Soviets acted. On 12 August, the East German regime announced that it would close to both vehicular and pedestrian traffic at all but 13 of the 120 border crossing points between East and West Berlin. Then, in the predawn hours of 13 August, East German police, armored cars, and tanks deployed along the entire border of the Soviet sector of the city. Workers set up barbed wire barricades and began construction of more substantial cement block walls. In some places, they removed sections of the cobblestone streets. Although West Berliners and allied personnel could still travel into and out of East Berlin through a few well-guarded checkpoints, decrees from the East German government forbade its citizens from entering West Berlin. As a precaution against an internal uprising in East Berlin, the Soviet 10th Guards Tank Division and the 19th Motorized Rifle Division deployed to the north and south of the city, and Soviet tanks moved into East Berlin to take up positions at various points in the city. Hiding under a bridge in East Germany, one of Colonel von Pawel’s men reported seeing an entire Soviet division rumbling down the autobahn. To Western reporters and military personnel who could still move about East Berlin, it was clear the Soviets wanted no recurrence of the uprisings that had taken place in Hungary in 1956.26

On 14 August, over ten thousand West Berliners gathered on 17 Junistrasse in front of the famous Brandenburg Gate. The crowd whistled and jeered as East German security police formed a cordon across the gate. West Berlin police were able to control the demonstrators except for a few acts of physical violence, but the East German authorities took advantage of the situation to claim provocations by the West Berliners. In response, they closed the Brandenburg Gate to all traffic, reducing the number of authorized crossing points to twelve.\(^{27}\)

Over the course of the next several days, the East Germans worked to complete the isolation of West Berlin. Some citizens could still escape by leaping across barriers or by finding a way through old houses along the sector border, but police sealed those routes as fast as they could find them. The Soviet Transport Ministry announced a reorganization of train traffic so that direct service between the two parts of the city would no longer exist. In the future, travelers would have to change trains and submit to identity checks before entering the eastern sector. Trains from West Germany into West Berlin would travel as normal, but they could no longer continue into the Communist sector. Local commuter trains and buses from outside the city limits, as well as those originating in East Berlin were also prevented

\(^{27}\) HQ, USAREUR, Record of Stewardship, Oct 1960–Apr 1962, p. 142, Historians files, CMH.
from entering West Berlin. Even the pleasure boats that transported tourists from lakes in East Berlin to the Havel River in the Western sectors were discontinued. Within a week, the East Germans designated the crossing point at Friedrichstrasse in the American sector as the only point of entry into East Berlin for the Allies and other foreign nationals. As East German police and workmen sealed off doors and windows in buildings along the barricade and replaced barbed wire with concrete, the grim reality of a divided city began to sink in to citizens on both sides of the wall (Map 16).28

Politicians in West Berlin urged U.S. commanders to remove the barriers by force, and officers within the Berlin garrison drew up a plan to knock down the barricades with bulldozers. Those moves, however, were overruled by the troop commander, Brig. Gen. Frederick O. Hartel, who reminded his men that the Communists had constructed the obstacles a few feet inside East Germany. U.S. forces would have to go into East Berlin to tear them down—and they


Despite the long-simmering crisis and repeated indications that the Communists would have to do something to contain the exodus of refugees, the Americans were unprepared to launch an immediate response when the time came. On 11 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the services to prepare plans for the deployment to Europe of twenty-eight squadrons of tactical aircraft and up to six Army divisions. On 12 August, the day before construction of the wall began, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, circulated a memorandum through the Joint Chiefs and the major military commands, seeking to update contingency plans for Berlin. In the paper he stated that the United States had to develop plans to initiate military action at any time the situation dictated. Even at that late date, staff officers based their planning on Communist harassment of allied personnel or threats to allied access rights in West Berlin. Other communications among the Joint Chiefs raised the issue of how they might support spontaneous uprisings in East Berlin. The possibility that the East Germans might establish a blockade to keep their own people from crossing over to the West had not been part of the American planning process.\footnote{Memos, Joint Chiefs of Staff for CINCEUR et al., 11 Aug 1961; Gen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for CSA et al., 12 Aug 1961, sub: U.S. Contingency Planning for Berlin; and Chief of Naval Operations for Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 Aug 1961, sub: Possible Uprisings in East Germany. All in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP.}

Although the United States immediately lodged a protest with the Soviets and East Germans, its initial response to the construction of the wall was surprisingly understated. The president’s special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, summed up the sense of many in the president’s cabinet that the action was something the East Germans were bound to do sooner or later. It was just as well, he said, that it happened early and was so clearly a unilateral action on their part. In response to that assessment, Kennedy asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk what steps the United States could take to exploit the development “politically propagandawise.”\footnote{Memorandum From President Kennedy for Secretary of State Rusk, 14 Aug 1961, in \textit{FRUS, 1961–1963}, 14:332.} The situation offered, he believed, a very good stick to use against the Soviets, one that they would most certainly use against the United States if the situation were reversed. Kennedy and Rusk concluded that the decision to close the border had eased the Berlin crisis by solving the Communists’ most urgent problem without threatening Western access to the city. Kennedy told one of his advisers that
the East German action was not a very nice solution, but “a hell of a lot better than a war.”

Political opportunities of the sort were of little comfort to West Berliners, whose leaders complained bitterly to the Americans over the lack of a more forceful response. They were equally distressed at West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt for issuing high-minded statements of protest while taking no concrete steps against the Communists. The deputy chief of mission at Berlin, Edwin Allan Lightner Jr., warned the State Department that unless the United States responded more firmly to the construction of the wall, morale in the city would plummet and along with it, support for the United States. No one there, he said, was asking for a violent response, only for some indication that this was not to be a replay of “Hitler’s takeover of the Rhineland.”

After several days of high-level consultation and public condemnation of the wall, Kennedy elected to continue the military buildup he had initiated following his meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna. On 17 August, the secretary of the Army, Elvis J. Stahr Jr., announced a freeze in service for more than eighty-four thousand enlisted men whose time in service was scheduled to end between 1 October 1961 and 30 June 1962. He also extended tours of duty for Army personnel in Germany and Japan by six months and confirmed the activation of 113 reserve units, a move that called to active duty more than twenty-three thousand soldiers. Finally, Stahr indicated that he would bring the Seventh Army and other U.S. units committed to NATO up to full strength by sending three thousand more troops to Europe. A day later, the White House announced that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson would fly immediately to Europe to meet with West German Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt. Accompanying the vice president would be retired general Lucius D. Clay. Because Clay had been the Allied commandant in Berlin during the 1948–1949 blockade, it was his presence, much more than Johnson’s, that helped to restore morale and to reassure West Berliners that they had not been abandoned.

In addition to dispatching Johnson and Clay to Berlin, Kennedy decided on 17 August to make the American commitment to West Berlin absolutely clear to the West Berliners and the Communists by instructing the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Lemnitzer, to send a reinforced battle group from the U.S. forces in Germany into Berlin to augment the forces already there. Lemnitzer, McNamara, and General Norstad all expressed reservations on grounds that the move would weaken existing defenses in West Germany while adding little to

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the capabilities of the West Berlin garrison. Kennedy set aside their objections, noting that he had made the decision for political, psychological, and morale purposes. The guidance Norstad and the USAREUR commander, General Clarke, received corresponded to contingency plans the command had prepared for a probe along the access route into Berlin. Under that scenario, advancing forces would bypass administrative checkpoints and undefended obstacles. If the column met a superior military force, it would halt and defend itself as necessary in an attempt to remain in place. The commander had the authority to disengage if he believed he was in danger of being cut off or overrun.35

General Clarke alerted the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, just before 2400 on 18 August. In order to meet the time schedule established by the president, he bypassed the Seventh Army, V Corps, and the 8th Infantry Division headquarters and issued orders directly to the battle group commander, Col. Glover S. Johns Jr. At 0530, 19 August, the battle group left its home station at Coleman Barracks, Mannheim, and moved to a bivouac area near the American checkpoint at Helmstedt. In addition to the infantry battle group, the reinforcements included an attached engineer company, an

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The Berlin Crisis

artillery battery, and a provisional military police platoon to help direct traffic as the force moved forward on the autobahn. Promptly at 0630, 20 August, the first set of vehicles stopped at the Soviet checkpoint at Marienborn, where the autobahn entered East Germany. Although the Soviet guards raised perfunctory challenges, the initial convoy, followed by the rest of the battle group, cleared the checkpoint in a short time and made a triumphant entry into West Berlin that afternoon. Colonel Johns demonstrated a flair for the dramatic as he led his battle group into the city. He instructed his company commanders to stand in their vehicles as they made their entrance to pretend that they were Caesar going into Rome. In full battle gear, the troops paraded through the center of the city to be reviewed by Vice President Johnson and General Clay.36

Not all who witnessed the arrival of the battle group were impressed. Sgt. Vern Pike, military police, was already displeased. Like many of the soldiers in Berlin, he believed that the United States could simply have torn down the wall without any response from the Soviets. As for the arriving battle group,

March group of 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, waits at the Soviet checkpoint at Helmstedt, August 1961.

Pike considered it a “rotten lousy outfit” that was unfit for battle. When the new arrivals came to stay in Roosevelt Barracks, they rubbed the long-resident soldiers the wrong way, claiming they had been sent to rescue them after their failure to stop the border closure. Pike noted that the new arrivals would only be there for ninety days before they returned to their garrisons in West Germany. The new troops were drunk and disorderly and often caught fighting and resisting arrest. Pike thought it was a measure of the Berliner’s despair that they would so loudly cheer such a token gesture.37

Confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie

The Kennedy administration had intended the reinforcement as a political gesture designed to reassure the nervous West Berliners. In that respect, the reinforcement, and particularly the return of General Clay, helped to restore morale throughout the city. As might be expected, however, the U.S. actions elicited a response from the Soviets as well.

On 22 August, taking advantage of allied hesitation regarding the building of the wall, the Soviets announced that the border crossing at Friedrichstrasse would remain the only checkpoint where allied military traffic could enter East Berlin. The crossing had previously been somewhat of an open gateway into East Berlin, and U.S. military police checked the location several times a day. However, once the Soviets began constructing the wall, the 287th Military Police Company manned the site on a round-the-clock basis. To support the checkpoint, on 1 September, the Berlin Command requisitioned space at 207 Friedrichstrasse for use as a military police desk. When they added a base radio to the facility, military police designated the location as Charlie, a natural extension of the phonetic alphabet after the use of points Alpha and Baker on the autobahn. By mid-September, the Americans had placed a military semitrailer in the center of the roadway as a control point and Checkpoint Charlie began operations.38

Even before the advent of Checkpoint Charlie, the allies were responding to the Soviet announcement limiting their points of entry into East Berlin. On 23 August, as a display of force and to indicate their intent to retain freedom of action in the city, the three allied commandants in Berlin placed their military garrisons on alert, established checkpoints near border crossing sites, and began extensive patrolling along the newly constructed barriers. Two U.S. tanks with infantry support guarded the Friedrichstrasse crossing point, while British and French forces also deployed to various points along the border. Two companies of the 2d Battle Group, 6th Infantry, ran patrols, while three others remained in reserve at Tempelhof Airport. On 30 August, East German police detained a U.S. military sedan in East Berlin. A mobile reserve of five mechanized infantry

38 Gunnarsson, American Military Police in Europe, p. 90.
squad moved to the crossing point, at which time the East Germans released the sedan. By 1 September, the U.S. Berlin Command was running three patrols along the border each day while also retaining a mobile reserve of a few tanks and one rifle platoon mounted in armored personnel carriers at the airport. Gradually, through successive reductions, forces deployed along the boundary between East and West Berlin withdrew to garrison locations. On 26 September the command handed over the border security mission to the West Berlin police, ceased all patrolling, and returned all troop units to their barracks.39

Because of the continuing tensions in Berlin and, in part, to encourage the Communists to reopen negotiations, Kennedy appointed General Clay to be his personal representative in Berlin with the rank of ambassador. He told Clay that he would be the senior American official in Berlin and would communicate directly with him and with the secretary of State. Kennedy’s initial impulse had been to appoint Clay as commander of U.S. Forces in Berlin, but McNamara and Lemnitzer advised against such a move on the grounds that it would complicate and strain existing command relationships. Nonetheless, the president looked to Clay as his primary representative in Berlin, so much so that

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A U.S. armed patrol escorts a USAREUR-registered civilian vehicle into East Berlin on 27 October 1961.
General Norstad and General Clarke were at times excluded from decisions affecting the U.S. military in the city.  

Given the forceful personalities involved, it did not take long for a confrontation to erupt. Shortly after his return to Berlin on 19 September, Clay found himself in conflict with General Clarke, who protested Clay’s direction of American troops without consulting the commanders of USAREUR or the U.S. European Command. After Clay had used USAREUR troops and helicopters to fly into the isolated western enclave of Steinstucken, Clarke instructed his subordinates to take no further orders from Clay. He then stormed into Clay’s office and, pointing to the red telephone on his desk, challenged him to call President Kennedy, or to “take his cotton-picking fingers off my troops.” Clay responded that he could see that he and Clarke were not going to get along. Despite Clarke’s protests, most decisions and policies on Berlin, including the deployment of U.S. forces there, would be made in Washington after consultations with General Clay or with General Norstad.  

The Americans would have confrontations enough along the sector borders without the discord in their own ranks. On 21 September, East German Volkspolizei (Vopos, or People’s Police) began harassing American and other allied personnel traveling along the autobahn to Berlin, especially U.S. military who were not in uniform but were in clearly marked occupation vehicles. The police stopped cars, made the Americans get out, threatened them, and refused to let them proceed. They sometimes interrogated the Americans or held them for hours. In response, Clay ordered U.S. radio-equipped courtesy patrols to travel back and forth along the autobahn every hour or so to help any Americans stopped by the East Germans. When the Soviets attempted to block the patrols, Clay replaced them with convoys of military vehicles that ran back and forth at random hours several times a day. Clay also restored the U.S. military patrols along the U.S. sector border.  

The next escalation in the crisis began on the evening of 22 October, when Allan Lightner, the senior U.S. diplomat in Berlin, wanted to pass through Checkpoint Charlie to attend the opera in East Berlin. The East Germans denied Lightner entrance to East Berlin when, following U.S. policy, he refused to show his identity papers to anyone but the Soviets. After the guards refused Lightner’s request to see a Soviet officer, the American command sent  

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42 Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin*, pp. 169–70.
Clay viewed the challenges at the crossing point as an opportunity to bring Moscow out into the open. He believed that the Soviets did not wish to go to war over Berlin. By openly challenging East German efforts to limit access to East Berlin, the general believed he could demonstrate that it was, in fact, the Soviets who were in charge and that East German sovereignty was a sham. When U.S. troops in civilian clothes riding in a USAREUR-licensed vehicle were again denied entry into East Berlin on 24 October after refusing to show the East German police their identity papers, Clay directed the formation of three tank-infantry teams to support a series of probes to test U.S. access rights at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point. Team Alfa consisted of five M48 tanks, two infantry squads, an engineer squad, and a medical aid team; Team Bravo had one tank platoon; and Team Charlie included one rifle platoon and one

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Friedrichstrasse, allied entry point to East Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie, 26 October 1961
tank platoon. These three teams deployed to Tempelhof Central Airport during the early morning hours of 25 October.44

At 0635 Clay began a series of tests at the crossing point, using USAREUR-licensed privately owned vehicles. The first attempt to cross went unchallenged. After a second was stopped by East German police, the Americans lodged a protest with the Soviets. When, at 1010, he sent a third probe to the crossing point, Clay moved Team Alfa forward to the checkpoint and had a squad of military police escort the car through the crossing point. The command repeated the tests a day later on 26 October. They likewise succeeded only when escorted by military police, supported by combat ready forces.45

The Americans attempted to repeat the process again on 27 October, but this time the Communists were ready for them. After the civilian vehicle passed through the checkpoint, once again with a military police escort, ten Soviet tanks moved into position on the East German side of the Friedrichstrasse access point. While U.S. leaders boasted that they had once again demonstrated their right of access into East Berlin, and General Clay announced that the presence of the Soviet tanks indicated Soviet responsibility for the harassment at the checkpoint, armed tanks and infantry faced each other across three hundred yards of an urban no-man’s-land, each waiting for the other to make the next move.46

With the U.S. command on general alert, the standoff lasted for seventeen hours. Then, at 1045 on 28 October, having made their point, the Soviets withdrew their tanks from the border crossing. A little more than an hour later, the U.S. tanks and most of the infantry pulled back as well. General Clay told President Kennedy that the tank deployment was a sign that the Soviets did not trust Ulbricht or the East Germans and would take over whenever the risk of conflict grew too great. Meanwhile, the U.S. mission asked that all Americans in civilian clothing, except news reporters, refrain from trying to enter East Berlin through the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint. After twenty-four hours civilians were once again allowed to cross the boundary, but U.S. military leaders in Berlin directed servicemen and official U.S. personnel to continue to avoid travel into East Berlin. The Americans maintained one battle group on standby alert status for the next two weeks. Although the force continued regular patrols along the sector border, it stopped testing access rights and making armored demonstrations at Checkpoint Charlie.47

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45 Ibid.
Winding Down the Confrontation

The standoff at Checkpoint Charlie signaled the high-water mark of the diplomatic confrontation over Berlin. For the Communists, the wall alleviated the hemorrhage of refugees that had threatened the viability of the East German state. In the West, diplomats and military leaders alike were relieved to have the perennial bone of contention mitigated, if not completely resolved. It took some time, however, for both sides to wind down the confrontation.

The Kennedy administration continued with its plans to increase defense spending and to strengthen the U.S. position in Europe. In September, the Department of Defense agreed to Army requests for additional personnel to fill out the Seventh Army’s line units to their required strengths and for nondivisional support units to meet shortfalls in the Communications Zone. By mid-October the first of forty thousand reinforcements landed in France to begin Kennedy’s buildup in Europe. In addition to the individual fillers and support units, the president also ordered the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment to deploy from its base at Fort Meade to Germany. The unit, with its 2,700 soldiers and 122 tanks, began arriving at Bremerhaven in mid-November and became operational in Kaiserslautern by the end of the month. General Norstad also directed USAREUR to rotate new battle groups into West Berlin every two to three months to replace the reinforcements it had sent in August. The Joint Chiefs approved the change, but with the understanding that no more than three battle groups would be present in the city at any one time. With that in mind, on 7 December, elements of the 1st Battle Group, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, began to replace the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, that had moved into the city earlier that year.48

Not satisfied with the extent of the buildup to that point, McNamara and Norstad continued to press for the deployment of additional combat divisions to Germany. Although the president remained reluctant to go beyond the reinforcements he had already approved, he did authorize the services to begin planning for such a possibility. In particular, they could begin pre-positioning enough vehicles, weapons, and equipment in Europe to completely outfit two U.S. divisions, which would move by air from the United States in a time of crisis. On 12 October 1961, USAREUR received a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin preparations to obtain and store equipment. The plan called for the command to secure approximately 125,000 short tons of equipment and supplies

for forty-three units. Vehicles and equipment to outfit one infantry division and one armored division would be pre-positioned in nine separate locations. To meet this requirement, USAREUR established storage sites at Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslautern, Pirmasens, Germersheim, Idar-Oberstein, and Worms. Each location stored all of the vehicles and equipment required for a particular unit, giving the new program its descriptive name—Pre-positioned Organizational Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS). By 7 December, USAREUR had received and positioned sufficient equipment to outfit the two divisions. Meanwhile, through November and December 1961, U.S. Army and Air Force officials debated the requirements to move the necessary personnel and, bit by bit, developed a contingency plan.49

Rapid deployment to USAREUR had been under consideration for some time. In September 1960, the Joint Chiefs had already proposed a test of strategic mobility that would deploy three battle groups from the United States to Germany. Although the initial effort, scheduled for April 1961, was canceled because of a crisis in Laos, planners rescheduled it for January 1962 and tailored it to supplement the ongoing reinforcement of the Berlin garrison. In an exercise labeled Operation LONG THRUST I1, beginning on 16 January, three battle groups of the 4th Infantry Division flew from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Germany, where they took possession of pre-positioned equipment at the Mannheim storage site and prepared for field training. At the end of the exercise, the 1st Battle Group, 22d Infantry, turned in its equipment and returned to its home station; the 2d Battle Group, 47th Infantry, reinforced the Berlin Garrison; and the 2d Battle Group, 39th Infantry, remained in Germany as a temporary reinforcement for the Seventh Army. In addition to providing part of the buildup during the Berlin crisis, the exercise proved that rapid deployment plans and the issue of pre-positioned equipment were feasible.50

Despite those successes, the crisis in Berlin also exposed a redundancy in the Army’s command structure that complicated the flow of information and directives from higher headquarters. Since 1952, U.S. military responsibilities in the city had been assigned to two agencies, both reporting to the USAREUR commanding general: the Berlin Command, a USAREUR headquarters with a tactical mission; and the Office of the U.S. Commander, Berlin, who was the


U.S. member of the Allied Kommandatura and, by direction, the single point of
U.S. military contact in Berlin with the Soviet mission and allied representatives partcipating in the occupation of the city. Even before the onset of the August crisis, the USAAREUR commander, General Clarke, had expressed concern about the overlapping functions and responsibilities of the two organizations. He found that as the crisis intensified, directives from USAAREUR to the Berlin Command frequently impinged on the responsibilities of the U.S. commander, Berlin, and sometimes precluded both the rapid execution of orders and the reporting of results. Therefore, on 1 December 1961, Clarke consolidated all of the U.S. Army forces in Berlin into a single overall command named U.S. Army, Berlin, and designated the headquarters as a major subordinate command of USAAREUR. Without relinquishing any of his former responsibilities or authority, the U.S. commander, Berlin, became the commanding general, U.S. Army, Berlin. The tactical units that had formerly constituted the Berlin Command became elements of a new subordinate command designated as the Berlin Brigade.51

By the end of 1961 a calm settled over the city as both sides moderated their military activities near the border. Having the wall in place, the Communists stemmed the flow of refugees that threatened to deplete their workforce and military manpower. Meanwhile, with the recent confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie fresh in memory, the Americans avoided overt challenges of the East German authorities while maintaining their refusal to recognize the regime. The United States, its allies, and the Soviet Union then entered into a new round of negotiations concerning the future of Germany. Slowly, at first, but with increasing clarity, U.S. military and political leaders began to recognize that if Western access to Berlin was a vital interest for the United States, access to East Berlin, while important, was hardly vital enough to justify the use of force. In describing the policy that was evolving, Col. Lawrence J. Legere, assistant to General Maxwell Taylor—who had recently been appointed as a special military representative to the president—wrote to the general that the country would not shoot its way into East Berlin because even a successful operation would have little effect on the greater confrontation.52

To some, however, the calm that had settled over the city was artificial at best. On 17 August 1962, a young East German boy named Peter Fechter tried to scale the wall about one hundred yards from the U.S. checkpoint on the Friedrichstrasse. As he climbed, East German guards shot him repeatedly.

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52 Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Europe (Norstad), 25 Aug 1961, 14:370–71; Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere for the President’s Military Representative (Taylor), 11 Nov 1961, 14:583–84; Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) for President Kennedy, 22 Nov 1961, 14:619. All in FRUS, 1961–1963. Gaddis, We Now Know, p. 151.
He fell to the ground, wounded, in East German territory. He could not get up and lay on the ground calling for help. Despite his pleas, the commanding general, U.S. Army, Berlin, General Watson, fearing the risk of escalation, would not allow U.S. medical personnel to come to the boy’s aid. After two hours, Fechter bled to death. The event spurred outrage throughout West Berlin and West Germany. The next day the newspapers showed photos of U.S. military police watching the situation unfold, with the caption, “They did nothing.” As one lieutenant recalled, it was an indictment that, politically, they did not deserve. Morally, however, it was another issue. Fechter’s death was a pointed reminder that little, if anything, had really been resolved.53

In October 1962, the focus of the Cold War made a dramatic shift from Berlin to Cuba where U–2 reconnaissance aircraft discovered that the Soviet Union had begun construction of missile sites capable of launching medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles at targets across most of the southeastern United States. As President Kennedy and his advisers worked their way through alternative courses of action, however, they remained aware that a misstep in their reaction to the Cuban missiles could at any time provoke offensive action by the Soviets against Berlin. In the end, although the Americans essentially traded removal of obsolete missiles in Italy and Turkey for the removal of Soviet weapons from Cuba, the public perception of the outcome was that the Soviets and Premier Khrushchev had backed down. Khrushchev remained in power for another two years, but the outcome of the missile crisis weakened his hold over the Politburo, which forced him into retirement in 1964. As for Berlin, negotiations continued to resolve the city’s fate, but with the flood of refugees effectively plugged, the Communists no longer viewed the situation as a crisis. With nuclear war in Cuba averted and with insurgencies brewing in Southeast Asia and the Belgian Congo, the Cold War adversaries had already begun to shift their attention elsewhere. As the Kennedy administration began to fine-tune its foreign policies and strategic outlook, the U.S. Army would have to adjust its own focus as well.54

53 Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, p. 184; Gunnarsson, American Military Police in Europe, p. 93.
On 30 January 1961, ten days after his inauguration, President Kennedy delivered his first State of the Union address. He used the opportunity to announce a reappraisal of the country’s entire defense strategy and, in particular, a modernization of its limited war and nonnuclear capabilities. Two months later, in a Special Message to Congress on the Defense Budget, Kennedy outlined his basic defense policies. He argued that America’s military posture must be sufficiently flexible to respond to challenges across a wide spectrum of threats. Although he expressed support for the continued development of the country’s nuclear arsenal, he noted that since 1945, nonnuclear and guerrilla wars had constituted the most active threat to free world security. With that in mind, he asked Congress to strengthen the military’s capacity to engage in such conflicts and to expand research and funding for nonnuclear weapons.1

The Army’s leaders noted the president’s shift in focus, especially its similarity to proposals previously presented by General Taylor as part of his concept of flexible response. As if to reinforce this connection, the president went even further in July 1961. After an American-supported invasion of Cuba by refugees and exiles failed spectacularly at the Bay of Pigs, he appointed Taylor to a position as Special Assistant to the President for Military Affairs. Little more than a year later, in October 1962, Kennedy called Taylor out of retirement to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor’s defense concepts took nothing away from the strong base of strategic weapons the country had developed under President Eisenhower. He was particularly supportive of the Navy’s new Polaris missile program, which gave the nation a mobile, concealed, and virtually invulnerable strategic deterrent. Where the general had always differed with the philosophy of the New Look was in its lack of consideration for conventional forces. In his eyes, the overreliance on strategic nuclear weapons limited the nation to only one choice when faced with a military challenge. To support his position, he cited the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam. “For all of our massive nuclear power and our professions of reliance upon

it,” he said, “government deliberations over possible U.S. action resulted in a decision to do nothing.” With a new administration clearly more sympathetic to the Army’s point of view, service leaders prepared to move the force in a new direction.2

Looking Beyond Berlin: The Strategic Environment in 1961

Although the confrontation surrounding Berlin dominated national security considerations throughout the first two years of the Kennedy administration, other issues also came to bear on how the Army in Europe was evolving. Even as U.S. and Soviet tanks faced off at Checkpoint Charlie, military and political leaders on both sides pondered the implications of a full-scale war between the two superpowers. Considerations of nuclear warfare still dominated strategic thought on both sides. If a ground battle were to erupt in Europe, many concluded, it would be only a few hours or even minutes before “the great intercontinental exchange of nuclear blows” began. As a result, thousands of American homeowners rushed to build fallout shelters, hoping to ride out a potential nuclear strike.3

As part of the Eisenhower administration’s New Look policies, the United States had made great strides in the development of its strategic weapons systems. In addition to atomic bombs, the nation’s fleet of B–52 bombers carried Hound Dog cruise missiles, tipped with atomic warheads and capable of hitting targets up to eight hundred miles from their release point. Submarine-launched Polaris missiles entered the U.S. inventory in 1960, adding a new dimension to the nation’s tactical arsenal. By 1962, the Air Force had deployed its first Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, completing what became known as the United States strategic triad.4

On the Communist side, the Soviets had hardly been idle, as their propaganda made clear. They made the most of their successful Sputnik satellite launch in 1957, emphasizing the power of their intercontinental ballistic missiles. Under Khrushchev, the Soviets also ran an extensive nuclear testing program, culminating in the detonation of a 58-megaton device in October 1961. The Soviet premier warned that his scientists were working on an even larger, 100-megaton super bomb. He threatened to test the device in the near future if prospects for peace with the West did not improve. In another ultimatum,

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3 Ltr, Thomas K. Finletter, Ch of Mission, U.S. Mission to NATO, to Dean Acheson, 2 Aug 1961, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.

4 MFR, George W. Rathjens, Technical Asst, President’s Science Advisory Committee, 21 Sep 1960, sub: The General Balance of Strategic Forces and Their Relation to the FY 1962 Budget, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
Khrushchev threatened to continue experimenting with even bigger weapons unless the United States halted its own program. In both 1961 and 1962 Soviet nuclear testing totaled more than 200-megatons. The Soviet leader ridiculed the American fallout shelter program, saying such constructions were “absolutely worthless” against his super bombs.5

Despite administration assurances to the contrary, U.S. newspapers decried the apparent “missile gap” they perceived in the capabilities of the two superpowers. The subject had, in fact, become a major issue in the Democratic campaign during the 1960 election. Whether or not the Soviets had pulled ahead in the nuclear arms race was, in fact, less relevant than the realization that they had developed a capability to hit the United States with atomic weapons—a capability against which there was no defense.6

This emerging nuclear parity between the two superpowers had implications for Europe, in light of the Communist edge in conventional forces. The Soviets continued to maintain twenty combat ready divisions in East Germany—ten armored and ten mechanized infantry. Another seventy-four divisions were available west of the Urals, most capable of reaching combat ready status within a week. This number also included six airborne divisions that NATO intelligence officers expected the Soviets to employ in attacks against airfields, communications centers, and nuclear delivery units. The Warsaw Pact nations could also contribute up to thirty-five divisions within a few days of mobilization. Although Western analysts believed that the primary role of Soviet military forces was to allow the Kremlin to conduct its foreign policy from a position of strength, they could not ignore the potential threat inherent in the Communist numerical superiority.7

In the capitals of Western Europe, the combination of strategic parity and conventional imbalance raised concerns that threatened to undermine the NATO alliance. American intelligence analysts noted that while NATO’s European members wished to retain the protection afforded by U.S. strategic nuclear forces, the growth of Soviet nuclear missile forces had created an interest in developing European deterrent forces as well. The emerging superpower atomic equivalence and the growing assertiveness of France and West Germany, the experts said, would soon almost certainly cause those countries to demand greater influence in the military and political affairs of the alliance. Under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle since 1958, France, in particular, called into question the dominance of the United States and Britain in the development


7 SACEUR’s Emergency Defense Plan, SHAPE/144–B/61, 13 Dec 1961, SHAPE Historical Office, Historians files, CMH.
of NATO nuclear policy. Despite continuing reassurances of the firmness of America’s NATO commitment, Europeans increasingly feared that the United States might not be willing to risk its own nuclear devastation to counter Soviet aggression.⁸

The analysts’ words seemed prophetic when, in November 1960, leading lawmakers from a number of NATO countries announced their intention to seek more political authority over the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. They urged the United States and the NATO council to develop an independent NATO nuclear force. General Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), heartily endorsed the idea, saying that the alliance needed a greater voice in the release of nuclear weapons if it was to have any life or meaning. Although the United States had already begun stockpiling atomic weapons in Europe for potential use by NATO commanders, it retained custody and control over the weapons until they were released by the president. Only then would NATO commanders gain access to the atomic firepower allocated to them. The Army also deployed some five thousand soldiers to Europe in July 1960 to serve as custodians and guards for the atomic shells and warheads set aside for NATO. Those same soldiers were trained to assist allied personnel in assembling and launching the weapons. In his General Defense Plan for 1961, the NATO commander asserted that, for any sustained defense of Western Europe to be possible, the alliance must take the initiative in the employment of nuclear weapons.⁹

President Kennedy and many of his advisers were reluctant to relinquish any control over the release and use of atomic weapons, and the issue sparked an enormous alliance debate that would last for years. The American strategic deterrent and SACEUR’s reliance on a nuclear response to most provocations also caused many Europeans to question the viability of any conventional defense. They asked why they should have to devote so many resources to prepare for a type of war that would never take place. As a result, some member governments became unwilling to provide sufficient appropriations to meet

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NATO military goals. Others adopted reduced periods of conscription, making it difficult to develop and maintain adequately trained, combat ready forces.\(^\text{10}\)

In November 1960, a joint State and Defense Department report on the future of the alliance in the 1960s laid out the difficulties the United States faced. It was critical, the analysis warned, for NATO forces to be able to respond to Communist aggression across a broad spectrum of capabilities; yet, since Europeans would perceive a trip-wire strategy as leaving NATO entirely reliant on strategic retaliation for deterrence, their confidence in that expedient would almost certainly decline as Soviet missile capabilities increased. Similarly, Europeans would regard a strategy that relied primarily on nonnuclear forces for deterrence as an invitation for the Soviets to threaten or engage in limited attacks. Indeed, any action on the part of the United States that implied a lessening of the American commitment would seriously undermine support for NATO throughout Europe—a condition, the report concluded, that the Soviets would surely exploit to their fullest advantage.\(^\text{11}\)

A more positive development for the alliance and for the American forces in Europe was the continued development of the West German Army. By October 1961, that force numbered 232,000 officers and men in twelve divisions. Eight of these units—the 1st, 2d, 4th, and 6th Armored Infantry Divisions; the 3d and 5th Armored Divisions; the 1st Airborne Division and the 1st Mountain Division—had completed their training and were on assignment to NATO. Three more—the 7th, 10th, and 11th Armored Infantry Divisions—were still in training but would join the force by the end of 1962. This would make available eleven of the twelve divisions West Germany had committed to the NATO alliance. Another, the 12th Armored Division, would not complete its initial organization and predeployment training until after 1962.\(^\text{12}\)

The addition of these forces not only strengthened and added depth to NATO’s defenses, it also prompted revisions in the alliance’s overall concept for defense. Since the additional divisions allowed commanders to consider holding in place against opening enemy assaults, the allies abandoned all thought of an immediate withdrawal to the Rhine. The Germans began plans to build new peacetime cantonments for their divisions farther to the east, within seventy miles of the border. Initial estimates placed the II German Corps, including the 4th Infantry Division and the 1st Mountain Division, around Regensburg in the south; the III German Corps, including the 2d Infantry Division and the 5th Armored Division, defended in the center near Kassel and Würzburg; and

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\(^\text{10}\) For more information on the growing controversy within NATO over nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons sharing, see Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement*; Grosser, *The Western Alliance*; and Powaski, *The Entangling Alliance*.

\(^\text{11}\) NATO in the 1960s, National Security Council, 8 Nov 1960; CIA, Problems Affecting the North Atlantic Alliance, 1 Nov 1960; Msg, Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCEUR, 24 Aug 1961, Msg # JCS 1226, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal File, 1961, RG 218, NACP.

the I German Corps, including the 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Armored Division, operated in the north in the vicinity of Hannover, Hamburg, and Bremen (See Maps 17 and 18).  

NATO strategy presumed that the defenders would receive early release to use the tactical nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Although planning was moving away from what many had considered to be an overdependence on nuclear weapons and massive retaliation, the alliance’s conventional forces were still no match for Soviet numbers. Under General Norstad, NATO had begun to depict its defensive posture as a sword and shield, the shield being the forward-deployed conventional forces and the sword being the atomic bombs and missiles of the U.S. strategic arsenal. Norstad hoped that his conventional shield would be strong enough to contain minor incursions or to cause a pause in a larger assault, allowing both attackers and defenders to consider their options and the consequences of escalating to a full atomic response. He worried, however, that without access to tactical atomic weapons, the shield would not be able to provide the pause he wanted. With that requirement in mind, the general continued to press President Kennedy to allocate a stockpile of atomic weapons specifically for his use as NATO commander.

Norstad’s battle plan called for the ground forces of NATO’s Central Army Group (CENTAG) to “defend the territories of Allied Command Central Europe as close to the Eastern frontier as possible.” The plan assigned particular importance to the defense of nuclear delivery forces and airfields. It made the CENTAG commander responsible for the defense of the vital industrial areas of the Ruhr and for approaches to the Rhine between Wesel and Bonn in the north and between Wiesbaden and Karlsruhe in the southern portion of his sector. He was not to withdraw his forces for any reason, except to the extent necessary to preserve the integrity of major combat formations for the main defensive battle, which would be fought as far forward as possible. As soon as SACEUR received presidential authority to employ nuclear weapons, CENTAG units would participate in the overall nuclear counteroffensive.

The Kennedy administration, however, remained reluctant to place U.S. atomic weapons under NATO control. The president wished to retain tight control over the U.S. atomic arsenal while, at the same time, pursuing a national military policy based on the concept of flexible response and aimed at limiting conflicts before they escalated into full-scale war. Norstad, for his part, refused to back away from his support for NATO as an independent nuclear power. Disagreement on this issue exacerbated a lack of trust between

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ALLIED FORCES, CENTRAL EUROPE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
1962

ALLIED FORCES
NORTHERN EUROPE
ALLIED FORCES
CENTRAL EUROPE

0
150
0
150
Miles
Kilometers

NATO Signatories
Soviet Bloc

Map 18
the two that had been festering since the Berlin crisis. Weary of the confronta-
tion, Kennedy and Secretary McNamara urged the Air Force general into
retirement in December 1962, replacing him as SACEUR with Army General
Lyman L. Lemnitzer.  

For all of Kennedy’s commitment to flexible response, the Army in 1961
found itself unprepared in many ways to fight in a limited war. Eight years
of adapting to Eisenhower’s New Look had depleted many conventional
weapons programs and rendered numerous training approaches and
contingency plans obsolete. A study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
December 1960 revealed that the Army based most planning for the support
of limited combat operations on a resumption of hostilities in Korea. While
Army forces were sufficiently equipped to engage in limited combat there,
only about half possessed the up-to-date weapons and equipment required
for a war in Europe. Even more important, the study revealed that the Air
Force had fewer than half of the transport planes it would need to fly a
full division of seventeen thousand men to a combat area and sustain it for
thirty days. As a result, although the United States had seven combat ready
divisions—four Army and three Marine—it did not have the ability to put
them into the field swiftly. Likewise, the report concluded, planners would
have to make up for shortages in cargo and troop transport ships through
the use of allied vessels. 

The nation’s growing commitment to battling a Communist insurgency
in South Vietnam made these issues even more compelling. In October 1961,
President Kennedy sent a team led by General Taylor, his special military
representative, and Walter W. Rostow, his deputy special assistant for national
security, to Vietnam to recommend a comprehensive course for American
action there. In its report, the team recommended an expansion of the U.S.
effort in Vietnam, with the United States moving beyond its advisory role
to active participation in administration, intelligence, military planning, and
operations. Even as the crisis in Berlin faded, the administration’s attention
was shifting from Europe to the conflict in Southeast Asia. 

17 Memo, Joint Chiefs of Staff for Sec Def, 9 Dec 1960, sub: Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture
for Limited Military Operations, Pentagon Library Declassified Documents Reference System,
copy in Historians files, CMH; Min, Policy Planning Staff–JCS Joint Staff Meeting, 6 Oct 1960,
Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH; Gene Famiglietti,
Army Pushed,” Army Times, 7 May 1960; “Study Indicates U.S. Would Suffer Brushfire-War
18 Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960, United States Army
in Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985); Graham A. Cos-
mas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, United States Army
Creating a New Division

As the U.S. Army considered the implications of military operations in Southeast Asia, its leaders grew less and less enamored of the pentomic division. By 1961, it had become clear that the new organization was cumbersome, at best, in Europe, and completely unsuited for combat operations in most other potential theaters.

Ever since its experiments with the pentomic force in Europe during the late 1950s, the Army had been well aware of the shortcomings of its atomic-oriented division organization. As early as 1959, General Clarke—who as commanding general of the U.S. Continental Army Command was responsible for developing the Army’s operational concepts and doctrine—directed preparation of a new study titled Modern Mobile Army (MOMAR) 1965–1970. Fresh from his recent assignment as the commanding general of the Seventh Army in Europe, Clarke had clear ideas about what kind of organization the service needed. He maintained that the Army of the future had to be capable of operating effectively on both nuclear and nonnuclear battlefields against a variety of threats anywhere in the world. Units had to be prepared to take independent action or to combine with others to form more powerful combat teams. His experience with the pentomic organization in Europe had led him to believe that the new divisions needed additional conventional firepower and greater tactical mobility. Both, to his mind, would come through increased emphasis on armor-protected vehicles and aircraft.19

Clarke’s influence was readily apparent in the new design produced by the study. In an effort to streamline the chain of command, it eliminated the corps echelon and had divisions report directly to a field army headquarters. The concept also envisioned a simplified division structure with only two variations—a heavy and a medium division. The heavy organization would be strong in tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, while the medium would have fewer heavy components but would still be well-equipped for sustained mobile combat. Both types would include five combat commands, with each command containing three task force headquarters to which leaders could assign a mix of tank, infantry, and support companies. Within the companies, rifle squads would have only seven men equipped with automatic, semiautomatic, and area-fire weapons. Every man and every piece of equipment in both types of divisions would ride in or on a vehicle.20

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Despite interest in many of the ideas the new organization incorporated, the Department of the Army rejected the concept in December 1960. The vice chief of staff, General Eddleman, having just returned to the United States from a tour as USAREUR commander, wrote that the divisions envisioned by the MOMAR study lacked the simplicity, homogeneity, versatility, and flexibility that the Army needed to fulfill its worldwide responsibilities. While they might be well suited for armored combat in Europe, they would have great difficulty adapting to conflicts in other environments. Eddleman directed General Herbert B. Powell, who had replaced Clarke as commander of the Continental Army Command, to take another look at redesigning the divisions for the period of 1961–1965.21

As with Clarke before him, Eddleman’s guidance reflected the lessons he had learned while serving as Seventh Army and USAREUR commander. The vice chief wanted the new study to consider infantry, armored, and mechanized divisions. The heart of the mechanized divisions was to be armored infantry units with the mobility and survivability to operate on a nuclear battlefield. All of the divisions, however, had to be able to operate effectively in both nuclear and nonnuclear war. Eddleman instructed the planners to weigh the retention of battle groups against their replacement with infantry battalions. Noting the many areas around the world where the Army might have to operate, the general suggested that divisions be tailored for different environments. To accomplish this and to increase the overall flexibility of each formation, he suggested the possibility of interchanging battalion-size armor, infantry, mechanized infantry, and artillery units within divisions.22

General Powell and his staff set out to translate those ideas into a workable organization. In less than three months they submitted a study entitled Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) 1961–1965, to the new Army chief of staff, General George H. Decker. The study offered reinterpretations of three standard divisions—infantry, armored, and mechanized infantry. It called for all three to have a common base to which commanders could assign a varying number of combat battalions. Whichever type of battalion—infantry, mechanized infantry, or tank—made up the bulk of the division determined its designation. The common base for every division consisted of a headquarters element, three brigade headquarters, a military police company, a reconnaissance squadron with an air troop and three ground troops, division artillery, a support command, and aviation, engineer, and signal battalions. The division artillery included three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, an Honest John battalion, and a composite battalion containing one 8-inch and three 155-mm. howitzer batteries. The support command consisted of a headquarters and headquarters

21 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 293–96.
22 Interv, Lt Col Lowell G. Smith and Lt Col Murray G. Swindler with Gen Clyde D. Eddleman, 10 Jan 1975, p. 29, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, MHI.
company; an administration company; a band; and medical, maintenance, and supply and transport battalions.  

While the exact makeup of the division depended on the types of maneuver battalions added, an infantry division usually consisted of eight infantry and two tank battalions. A mechanized division normally had seven mechanized infantry and three tank battalions, and an armored division had six tank and six mechanized infantry battalions. The new division structures also included three brigade headquarters, each capable of controlling from two to five combat battalions. Brigade commanders could create combined-arms task forces by exchanging tank and infantry companies between different battalions. With the ability to tailor the organization of a division, brigade, or battalion, the Army would possess the most flexible organizational structure it had ever had. Ironically, the new division structure came very close to matching the German model established with the Bundeswehr’s reorganization a few years earlier. Still, with its roots in the triangular divisions of World War II, most observers agreed that the force was returning to a structure that had already stood the test of combat.

Perhaps the most memorable aspect of the new division structure was the introduction of a new weapon, the Davy Crockett battlefield missile, to infantry battalions and reconnaissance squadrons. Whether mounted on small trucks or armored personnel carriers, or set up on ground tripods, the weapon looked like a short recoilless rifle with a large bulb attached at the end. The “bulb” was a low-yield atomic warhead that the operator could launch from either of two tubes: the 4-inch (120-mm.) with a range of 2,000 meters, or the 6.1-inch (155-mm.) with a range of 4,000 meters. Army publications advertised the Davy Crockett as the “Sunday Punch” of the ROAD divisions. The weapon showed poor accuracy during testing, particularly worrisome with its very short range that left the crew exposed to both blast and radiation effects. Moreover, the idea of small units, led by lieutenants and sergeants, running around the battlefield with portable atomic weapons troubled some of the Army’s leaders as well as those in the Kennedy administration. Like all atomic weapons in the Army’s inventory, the weapons were to be released only on direct authorization from the president.

The proposed division structure was not without its detractors. Some, like Maj. Gen. James H. Polk, 4th Armored Division commander, and later V Corps commander, objected to the rigidity of the standardized divisions. Despite

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25 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, pp. 297–308; Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, pp. 95–96; Ltr, Sec of State Dean Rusk to Sec Def Robert S. McNamara, 16 Jun 1962, Pentagon Library, Digital National Security Archive, Historians files, CMH.
the concept of using battalions as interchangeable parts, they could not move from one division without adversely affecting the makeup of another. General Paul D. Adams, the commander of the U.S. Strike Command and the former commander of U.S. ground forces in Lebanon in 1958, complained at a meeting of the Association of the United States Army that the new division contained far too much extraneous equipment. He simply could not be convinced, he said, that it took 3,318 radios—an average of one per 4.77 persons—to run a division. While Adams’ complaints were largely about the excessive amount of equipment involved, the former Army chief of staff, General Taylor, did not think it was appropriate to introduce a new organization so soon after the pentomic conversion. Taylor believed that the shortcomings of the pentomic division could have been alleviated by adding attached or reinforcing elements rather than by throwing out the entire concept. Nonetheless, General Paul L. Freeman, who would assume command of USAREUR in May 1962, expressed the relief of many when he told an interviewer that the only thing he could say about the pentomic division was “Thank God we never had to go to war with it.”

Ultimately, the supporters of the new organization triumphed. On 4 April 1961, the Continental Army Command staff briefed the Army Chief of Staff,
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

General Decker, on the plan for the ROAD divisions. Decker formally approved the reorganization a week later, and, on 25 May 1961, President Kennedy announced his approval in a special message to Congress. In recognition of his desire for a strategy that provided a wider range of military options—a flexible response—the president announced that he had directed the secretary of defense to undertake the reorganization and modernization of the Army’s divisional structure. Such a change was necessary, he said, to increase the force’s nonnuclear firepower, to improve its tactical mobility in any environment, to ensure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat, and to facilitate its coordination with the nation’s major allies.27

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Although the Army initially planned to begin its transition to the ROAD model early in 1962, and to finish the conversion by the end of 1963, it delayed completion of the effort for a number of reasons. After two units, the 5th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, and the 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, completed their changeovers in the spring of 1962, planners decided to delay further reorganizations until they could test the concept in the field. In addition, much of the equipment necessary to outfit the new divisions was not available in the quantities required. Some Army leaders also suggested that Defense Department officials had pushed for the delay in order to complete studies on how the ROAD structure would affect personnel, ammunition, and fuel requirements over the next five years.28

Meanwhile, although the Army intended the divisions in Germany to be among the last to reorganize, they got a head start in August 1961, when Secretary McNamara approved the transfer of three thousand soldiers and almost fifteen hundred new M113 armored personnel carriers to the Seventh Army in order to complete the mechanization of its three infantry divisions. The Army had begun development of the M113 armored personnel carrier in 1956 to help meet the demands of the nuclear battlefield. It had the ability to keep pace with the tank during cross-country movement and could carry a squad of ten armed soldiers into combat with some protection from small-arms fire. Only half as heavy as the older M59 that it replaced, it was both air transportable and amphibious. The new armored personnel carrier was an essential element in converting the Seventh Army’s infantry divisions into mechanized units. Ironically, the new carriers gave the divisions the kind of mobility the pentomic concept had envisioned, but not in time to prevent the pending reorganization. The additional equipment and personnel provided each battle group with more than one hundred armored personnel carriers, enough to transport all of its rifle and weapons squads, as well as its company and battle group headquarters. The augmentation also allotted fifty armored personnel carriers to the divisions’ combat engineer battalions, giving those units an armor-protected mobility as well.

Throughout 1961 and 1962, USAREUR and the Seventh Army conducted training to integrate the new vehicles and personnel into their units. Exercises placed special emphasis on the use of the armored personnel carriers in various infantry scenarios. By March 1962, the Department of the Army and USAREUR had redesignated the 3d, 8th, and 24th Infantry Divisions as mechanized units. The divisions retained their pentomic structure, however, until mid-1963, when the battle groups were replaced by brigades as part of the transition to the ROAD organization.29

29 Msg, ECJCP 9–91443, CINCEUR, to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 Aug 1961, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Correspondence, 1962, RG 218, NACP; Elliott V. Converse III, History of Acquisi-
Equipping the Force for Flexible Response

President Kennedy’s call for a reappraisal of America’s defense strategy and renewed emphasis on nonnuclear war capabilities provided new impetus for Army equipment and weapons development programs that had languished under the Eisenhower administration. In one of its first moves on entering office, the Kennedy administration added almost 12 percent to Eisenhower’s proposed $41.8 billion defense budget for 1962. Although the Air Force’s Minuteman and the Navy’s Polaris missile programs continued to receive their share of funds, the budget included sizable increases for modernization of the Army’s conventional forces. As a result, the service was able to begin procurement of a greater number of weapons, vehicles, and items of equipment it had been forced to defer under the previous administration.\(^3\)

In Europe, the soldiers of the Seventh Army had already begun receiving the initial issue of a new family of small arms in 1960. One of the first of those was the M14 rifle. The new weapon weighed nine pounds and fired 7.62-mm. ammunition, which the alliance had adopted as its standard small-arms ammunition in 1954. The M14 replaced four weapons that fired different types of ammunition—the .30-caliber M1 rifle, the .30-caliber M2 carbine, the .45-caliber M3 submachine gun, and the .30-caliber Browning automatic rifle. The Army began issuing the new weapon in 1960, but once Congress and the Department of Defense made additional funds available in July 1961, the service expedited manufacture and added a third production source for the new rifle. In 1960, a new machine gun, the M60, began replacing older models in Europe as well. It also fired the NATO standard 7.62-mm. round and took the place of three types of Browning .30-caliber machine guns. The substitution of two new weapons firing common ammunition for several diverse weapons, each with its own special requirements, was expected to ease maintenance, supply, and ammunition problems for USAREUR and Seventh Army forces. It also supported one of the NATO alliance’s earliest efforts to bring some order to the diverse requirements of its member armed forces. In the late summer of 1962, USAREUR began to receive shipments of an additional weapon for its rifle squads, the new M79 grenade launcher. The aluminum-barreled 40-mm. weapon resembled a large-bore, break-action, sawed-off shotgun. With a maximum range of 400 meters, it filled a gap in range between hand grenades.

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and mortars. Special rounds that left the muzzle as buckshot also made the weapon useful for fighting at close quarters.\textsuperscript{31}

The focus on conventional forces also increased the pace of modernization for USAREUR’s larger weapons and vehicles. In 1960, the Army began production of a new main battle tank, the M60. Because the M60 was not a completely new design, but rather a product improvement on the older M48 Patton, the Army did not assign it a new designation. Instead, throughout its deployment, most troops referred to it simply as the M60. U.S. Army units in Germany did not begin receiving the new tank until late in 1961. By the end of 1962, however, the Seventh Army had replaced all of its tanks except those belonging to the three armored cavalry regiments, which the command scheduled for exchange the following year. The new tank fired a high-velocity, 105-mm. main gun while the older model mounted a 90-mm. main gun. Its diesel engine had a cruising range of some 350 miles, a significant advantage over the M48’s gasoline-powered engine and its range of less than 200 miles. The only U.S. Army units in Europe that would retain the old M48 series tanks would be those belonging to the Berlin Brigade. Because the city retained large quantities of prestocked 90-mm. ammunition and because the reduced cruising range would not be a significant factor in the confines of Berlin, General Clarke, the USAREUR commander, announced that the M48 would be fully adequate for the time being. To further enhance the capabilities of its armored force, in the fall of 1961 USAREUR and Seventh Army units also began receiving the new M88 tank-recovery vehicle, which could rescue and retrieve disabled tanks on the battlefield or winch them back to stable ground when they became hopelessly stuck in heavy mud.\textsuperscript{32}

The process of fielding the new vehicles and equipment did not always go as smoothly as USAREUR leaders might have hoped. Although manufacturers had designed the M113 armored personnel carrier to swim across rivers and other water obstacles, the operation required entering the water on a very gentle gradient not usually associated with rivers in Western Europe. Unit commanders often ignored maintenance instructors who provided orientation on the new equipment. One rifle platoon leader remembered how the warrant officer assigned to train his platoon on the new vehicles had warned them not to repeatedly start and shutdown the engines, or “some gizmo would go bonkers from carbon accumulation.” The battalion headquarters ignored the


instruction and directed that all engines be started up once before and once after midnight. “The gizmo went bonkers and, since there was a shortage of gizmos in the theater, we had to park the machines for weeks to wait for gizmos.”

Other new vehicles turned out to be potentially dangerous until troops learned to operate them correctly. A new quarter-ton truck, the M151, heir apparent to the ubiquitous jeep of World War II and Korea, entered the theater in 1961. Lighter but with comparable horsepower to earlier models, the M151 proved to be a bit of a safety hazard because it had more sensitive and responsive steering and braking mechanisms than its predecessor. The Seventh Army safety officer noted that the command could reduce its accident rate if drivers simply drove more slowly.

The 1960s also saw rapid expansion of the Army’s use of helicopters in a wide range of roles. A special board directed by Secretary McNamara and chaired by the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, met in 1962 to make a thorough re-examination of Army aviation requirements. The Howze Board made recommendations that ultimately led to the service’s creation of its first airmobile division. In the meantime, U.S. forces in Europe were already incorporating new aircraft into their aviation units. Bell UH–1 Iroquois utility helicopters began arriving in 1961, giving the Seventh Army a more versatile aircraft than previous models. In May 1962, the 4th Armored Division began organizing an air cavalry troop, consisting of a troop headquarters, an operations section, an aero weapons section with helicopters mounting machine guns, an aero scout platoon to conduct wide-ranging reconnaissance, a service platoon, and an aero rifle platoon that could transport four squads of infantry to trouble spots on short notice. As Seventh Army planning staffs considered how to best employ the new formation, the troops began air gunnery exercises at the Hohenfels training area in December.

Despite the renewed emphasis on conventional forces and equipment, USAREUR also received a series of new rockets and missiles to replace weapons systems it had employed since the early 1950s. In September 1960, the Army announced that the Sergeant medium-range guided missile would replace the older, less mobile Corporal system. A prototype of another solid-fuel ballistic missile, the Pershing, arrived in Germany at almost the same time. USAREUR featured the Pershing in demonstrations with the intent of replacing older liquid-fueled Redstone missiles in the near future. In order to improve protection of key installations and airfields from Soviet air attack, USAREUR received six

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battalions of the new Hawk antiaircraft missile as well as improved versions of the Nike-Hercules missile. Difficulties in procuring sites for the new weapons and disagreements with U.S. Air Force commanders in Europe over priorities for air defense complicated the deployment of the new units.36

As the end of 1962 approached, the Army announced other new weapons and equipment that were either in development or would be ready for deployment in the near future. A guided surface-to-surface missile, the Shillelagh, held great promise as a weapon for use against Soviet tanks. The Redeye, a shoulder-fired, ground-to-air missile would offer infantry units their own defense against low-flying jets and conventional aircraft. Perhaps most important, the development of a 6-inch atomic artillery shell that the Army could fire from its existing 155-mm. howitzers spelled the death knell for both the ponderous 280-mm. atomic cannon and the inaccurate and politically sensitive Davy Crockett.37

New Priorities

The adoption of a doctrine of flexible response was not a complete refutation of atomic warfare. To the contrary, atomic weapons remained an important component of America’s arsenal. For the Army in Europe, the new approach meant preparing for contingencies that might not escalate all the way to a general nuclear exchange while still maintaining the capability to fight and survive on an atomic battlefield. Training in USAREUR and the Seventh Army reflected the shift in priorities as well as the adaptation to new equipment and the new organizational structure.

Along with these changes, the Army’s normal career progression, promotion, and retirement policies brought new leadership to USAREUR and the Seventh Army. In July 1960, the Seventh Army commander, General Farrell, reached retirement age and was replaced by the superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson. As a second lieutenant, Davidson had served as the head coach of the West Point football team from 1933 through 1937, compiling a record of thirty-five wins, eleven losses, and one tie. He had a distinguished career as an engineer officer throughout World War II and Korea. At age 39, in 1943, he was promoted to brigadier general, becoming one of the youngest general officers in the Army. One of his first assignments as a new general was command of the Seventh Army in early

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1944, when General George S. Patton departed after the end of the Sicily campaign and Davidson took over leadership of the reduced planning headquarters.38

When he returned to the Seventh Army in 1960, Davidson brought a down-to-earth, matter-of-fact attitude reminiscent of the leadership styles of Generals Eddy and McAuliffe. In one of his initial messages to his new command, he announced an end to “eyewash,” pointless spit and polish meant to impress inspectors but with little real value for readiness. He regarded traditional inspection preparations—polishing vehicles, painting helmets, and chroming mess kits—as a waste of time. Henceforth, he said, equipment would be judged solely on its ability to perform its intended functions. Believing that overcentralization had become a hazard to combat readiness, he also moved to return more authority and responsibility to junior commanders and noncommissioned officers. To that end, he instructed his subordinates to emphasize squad-, platoon-, and company-level training and to allow sergeants, lieutenants, and captains leeway in deciding how best to carry out their assignments. His intention, he said, was to get away from the detailed guidance, checklists, and overemphasis on statistical comparisons between units that had come to characterize Army training. Although young leaders would make mistakes, he added, errors would be easier to correct in training rather than on the battlefield.39

In evaluating training throughout his command, the general found that giving authority back to junior leaders was not enough. They had to have as many of their soldiers as possible present for duty for their commands to receive

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the maximum benefit from the instruction. Unless the entire unit could train as a team, Davidson believed it would be of little use if it had to go into battle. Although team sports offered morale and physical fitness benefits, the Seventh Army commander found that the command’s extensive athletic program drew too many soldiers away from their units for extended periods of time. To remedy that, he directed increased emphasis on company-level sports with only football, baseball, and basketball teams organized at division level. Moreover, soldier-athletes had to limit themselves to one major organized sport per year. Davidson also noted that he lost more than four thousand soldiers at any given time to full- and part-time duties such as housekeeping and garrison support. While he admitted that he had not solved the problem yet, he did endorse a USAREUR initiative to assign all such duties to one company-size element in a battalion at a time. In that way, the other companies would retain the maximum number of soldiers for regular training.40

A stickler for physical conditioning since his days as the West Point football coach, Davidson “declared war” on overweight and out-of-shape Seventh Army soldiers. It was no good, he said, to have well-trained people if they could not stand-up physically to the demands of combat. He directed that each soldier in the command would take two standard Army physical training tests a year, in addition to a physical ability test that emphasized specific skills required in combat. He promised to ship overweight soldiers who refused to slim down as far to the rear as he could send them. As if to demonstrate his commitment to shaping up the troops, Davidson sponsored a visit to USAREUR by the director of physical education at West Point to evaluate his program and to recommend ways to help soldiers meet physical fitness standards.41

Many of Davidson’s innovations seemed to contradict those of General Clarke, who arrived back in Europe in October 1960, this time to command USAREUR. Clarke’s style of top-down leadership made for an interesting contrast with Davidson’s inclination to push authority and responsibility down to the lowest level. Shortly after taking command, Clarke published a 55-page pamphlet entitled Training Guidelines for the Commander. His publicists at USAREUR headquarters trumpeted the publication as “the greatest pearls of wisdom” on Army training ever compiled. The general’s supporters ensured that the document went to every leader in the command down to company level. For the most part, however, the new USAREUR commander had the larger issues of his own command to manage and left most of the task of running the Seventh Army to Davidson. Clarke, in particular, supported efforts to


improve physical fitness throughout the command and encouraged his own headquarters to devote more time to exercise and physical training. As he had throughout his career, the general railed against wasting soldiers’ time and the hurry-up-and-wait pace of many military functions. He directed his commanders to plan for side training sessions that they could conduct while troops waited for their turn on firing ranges or at other training facilities.

Despite their differences, both men understood that the combat readiness of U.S. Army forces in Europe was their first priority. As the confrontation surrounding Berlin continued to escalate, concerns that USAREUR and the Seventh Army might have to intervene in some way became all the more real. Even more so than it had been in the past, it was imperative to condition U.S. soldiers for combat. As he prepared the Seventh Army for an uncertain future, General Davidson gave his command a new motto that reflected his goal to achieve a continual state of combat readiness—Anyone, Anywhere, Anytime, Bar None!42

The Seventh Army’s training guidance reflected its commander’s determination to decentralize. It dictated that training would focus at the company, troop, and battery level to the greatest extent possible and that unit leaders would have the responsibility and the authority they needed to get the job done. The policy did not, however, relieve higher headquarters of their responsibility for supervision of training within their subordinate elements. To the contrary, the guidance pointed out that a decentralized approach demanded of battle group and division commanders even closer observation and broad professional knowledge to understand the decisions of subordinates and to provide effective guidance and supervision without dampening initiative and enthusiasm.43

The directive’s field training requirements were not so strict, reflecting increasingly imperative financial considerations. It specified that company-size units would hold at least one 24-hour field exercise each month, that battalions and battle groups would conduct at least one 72-hour exercise semiannually, and that divisions would conduct one major exercise of unspecified duration per year. In contrast, ten years earlier, General Eddy had ordered Seventh Army units to spend at least one-third of their time training in the field at or near their emergency positions. The difference in field requirements reflected the tightening of USAREUR’s training budget; the increased cost of fuel, ammunition, and repair parts; the reduced amount of land available on which units could maneuver; and the need to share ranges and maneuver areas with the Germans and other allied units.44

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44 Ibid.; Ltr, Lt Gen Manton S. Eddy, Seventh Army Cdr, to Maj Gen John E. Dahlquist, V Corps Cdr, 19 Jul 1952, Entry 33509, G3 Training Decimal File, Seventh Army, RG 338, NACP.
Major exercises throughout the Seventh Army began to reflect the changes in military policy and doctrine that were emerging at higher levels. In June 1960, the 8th Infantry Division conducted **Bayonet Blue**, in which its infantry battle groups maneuvered against aggressors provided by the divisional cavalry squadron. Held in the rolling hills and woodlands between Kaiserslautern and the Rhine River valley, the exercise featured a simulated atomic strike and tested the infantrymen’s ability to recover from the attack and to thwart a subsequent enemy ground advance. In August, the 24th Infantry Division held Exercise **Summer Shield** in and around the major training area at Hohenfels in central Bavaria. The exercise pitted battle group against battle group in a series of attacks, raids, patrols, and helicopter assaults. The maneuver scenario also featured the use of some atomic weapons, but such elements were, by then, beginning to diminish in frequency and in emphasis because units were more focused on conventional tactics and operations. The armored divisions held their own field training as well: **Peace Maker** for the 4th Armored Division in October 1961 in the area around Bamberg and the Grafenwöhr training area, and **Brandywine** for the 3d Armored Division in November in open areas south and east of Frankfurt. As with those of the infantry, these maneuvers combined some elements of atomic warfare with more robust emphasis on the conventional firepower and mobility of armored warfare.45

To many of the leaders in USAREUR and the Seventh Army, however, the larger corps- and army-level maneuvers were beginning to outlive their usefulness. The tremendous costs of fuel for transporting troops and equipment to maneuver areas and for the exercises themselves were becoming prohibitive. Although the Kennedy administration had increased funds for the procurement of conventional weapons and equipment, money to support training and day-to-day operations remained limited. The larger exercises also caused a considerable amount of damage to roads and crops, requiring the Army to pay for repairs and cutting into its training budget. Finally, the rapid growth of Germany’s industrial centers and the transformation of much of its open land to cultivated farmland left little room for maneuvers on so grand a scale. The Seventh Army, for example, held two major exercises, **Winter Shield** in February 1960, and **Winter Shield II** in February 1961, to test the ability of commanders to control their units through the various phases of combat operations. The maneuvers were some of the largest held by USAREUR and included French and German divisions as well as almost all of the Seventh Army. Yet, while troops and tanks moved along road networks throughout much of

After observing Exercise Winter Shield II and reviewing its achievements, General Clarke decided to eliminate large-scale, free-maneuver events of the sort from future training programs. In addition to the overwhelming logistical, financial, and administrative burdens the large exercises had imposed, the general concluded that they had failed to provide sufficient training to the individual soldier and the small unit and its leaders. Also troubling were the competing priorities such exercises placed on senior headquarters. In the larger corps-level maneuvers, for example, the corps staff had to participate in the exercise itself as a senior headquarters while, at the same time, stretching to oversee all of the planning and administrative and logistical support for the whole operation. Based on those concerns, Clarke directed the Seventh Army headquarters to revise its field training program for 1962 to eliminate large

maneuvers and to substitute division-size field training efforts. With scenario control and direction coming from corps headquarters, the division commanders and staffs would be able to concentrate on the command and supervision required for the successful completion of the exercise. As an added benefit, the smaller scope of these efforts would increase emphasis on training at the small-unit level.47

The Seventh Army’s approach to its annual training tests for combat battalions also came to reflect General Davidson’s decentralized philosophy. Although units undergoing the tests had been maneuvering against live opposing forces since the late 1950s, many of the problems still reflected the checklist-oriented, canned-scenario approach of earlier days. In response, Davidson eliminated the checklists and numerical scores entirely and directed that umpires assign only two grades to participating units—Combat Ready or Not Combat Ready. He also replaced the previous 72-hour Army Training Test with new evaluations for battle groups. These combat readiness tests could last as long as ten days. The problems posed also changed so that they now included not only the battle group to be tested, but also the artillery, tanks, engineers, aviation, and other supporting elements that would normally be attached to that force. The battle group headquarters administered shorter tests to companies and platoons. These pitted each unit against live and constantly changing opponents who forced them to react to a range of unpredictable challenges and situations.48

As it evolved, the Seventh Army training program also reflected the Army’s renewed interest in aerial mobility, either by parachute or by helicopter. The airborne battle groups of the 8th Infantry Division continued parachute training on a regular basis, with their soldiers making as many as twelve thousand jumps during one three-month period. In one exercise during July 1961, more than three hundred soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 2d Artillery, parachuted into the Baumholder training area along with their 105-mm. howitzers, ammunition, and supporting equipment. Other events, such as Fer de Lance in March 1960 and Golden Arrow in May 1960, tested the effectiveness of small airborne units deployed in isolated missions over unfamiliar terrain. Meanwhile, infantry and artillery units that were not parachute qualified made extensive use of the helicopters that were arriving in Germany in ever growing numbers. Aviation units airlifted infantry in a number of maneuvers and simulations. As the quantity of aircraft in the command continued to increase, divisions learned to deploy entire battle groups of a thousand men or more in heliborne assaults.49

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Perhaps the most significant shift in training emphasis during this period resulted from a growing awareness of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Although the United States Army had yet to become fully engaged in Vietnam, its leaders were already preparing the force for its potential involvement. President Kennedy himself had taken a special interest in counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and in the Army’s Special Forces units. In an August 1962 training circular, the Seventh Army headquarters identified the command’s interest in developing an unconventional warfare capability. Since the end of World War II, it noted, active insurgencies and guerrilla warfare campaigns had occurred in more than twenty-five countries around the world. Counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla operations were becoming the Army’s business, and all elements of the force would have to develop a proficiency in this type of warfare.50

As a result, although the Seventh Army’s primary mission remained combat readiness in anticipation of a conventional or atomic conflict with forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the command acknowledged its responsibility for preparing its officers and soldiers for a worldwide role. To that end, commanders emphasized that the Seventh Army’s combat readiness mission already contained a special warfare component because the execution of emergency defense plans might require forward area personnel to engage in operations against hostile airborne forces. Units with rear-area security tasks, they added, would also have a special need for training in counterguerrilla tactics and techniques because radio relay stations, bridges, fuel and ammunition stockpiles, and nuclear weapons storage sites would all be prime targets for saboteurs or airborne attackers. Individuals and small groups might become isolated or cut off during an enemy advance. In such cases, the more they knew about partisan warfare the better, for they had to be prepared to sustain themselves behind enemy lines and to fight as guerrillas while evading or escaping capture.51

With those concerns in mind, special warfare training received increased emphasis in the Seventh Army, which established an intensive school program and furnished mobile orientation teams, tactical training, and a vigorous troop information program. On 2 April 1962, USAREUR augmented those efforts by opening a paramilitary operations course at the Intelligence School at Oberammergau. Available to officers with a rank of captain or higher, the program lasted seven weeks, imparted specific information on military and paramilitary techniques to combat an active insurgency, and supplied guidance

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50 HQ, Seventh Army, Training Cir 31–1, Special Warfare Training, 31 Aug 1962, Entry 33509, Seventh Army, 1954–1965, RG 338, NACP.

51 Ibid.
on how to identify and eliminate sources of unrest within local populations. A mobile training team consisting of officers from the Seventh Army Training Division and the 10th Special Forces Group conducted briefings for key officers, and a training circular provided additional guidance to field commanders on how to integrate special warfare into training programs. The burgeoning interest in counterinsurgency and special warfare played to the strengths of the troops who made up the 10th Special Forces Group at Bad Tölz. Throughout the late 1950s, the group had developed its expertise in organizing partisan units behind enemy lines and in combating guerrilla forces by training with special operations units throughout NATO and in other allied nations. Exercises with familiar counterparts in England, France, and Norway—in addition to opportunities to train alongside troops in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Jordan—provided 10th Special Forces Group soldiers with invaluable experience. The group also deployed teams for operations outside of its European mission area, as in 1960, when a small group of Special Forces troopers accompanied a flight of Army helicopters to the Belgian Congo to assist in the evacuation of American and European civilians from the violence-torn country.

Distractions

No military organization operates in a self-contained environment, where its only concern is to prepare for its operational mission. Instead, units must deal with all the distractions, complications, and formalities that come with existing in the real world. In Europe, USAREUR and the Seventh Army had more than their share of competing issues that demanded their attention.

The distraction with the greatest potential to undermine the combat readiness of the American troops in Europe was the recurring shortage of suitable local and major training areas and facilities. The growing German economy continued to encroach on existing sites, and U.S. forces faced increasing pressure to restrict their use of local training areas or to terminate their use altogether and turn the land over to local governments. This was particularly true of those sites located in or around large urban districts. For several years, the Seventh Army had been free to maneuver across most of West Germany during its major exercises. The growing urban sprawl around major cities and the excessive costs incurred in compensating Germans for damage to property and crops had greatly curtailed that freedom of maneuver. The Americans retained control over their four major training sites—Grafenwöhr, Baumholder, Hohenfels, and Wildflecken—but those no longer met the growing requirements for maneuver space and firing ranges. The mechanization of the three infantry divisions only added to the problem by increasing the amount of space those

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52 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, pp. 4-73–4-76.
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

units had to have to deploy and to train. American forces were also in need of additional sites for armor and river-crossing training, and for parachute drop zones. Demands from the Bundeswehr and from French forces in Germany for access to existing maneuver areas complicated matters further by drastically reducing facilities and training time available to U.S. forces.  

The continued influx of new long-range weapons systems also complicated USAREUR’s ability to train many of its soldiers. In its regular training status reports, the Seventh Army pointed out that it lacked range facilities for many of its new weapons, including its Nike and Hawk air defense missiles and its Corporal, Lacrosse, Redstone, and Sergeant surface-to-surface missiles. Although the command had discussed building a range for NATO use on the island of Crete, it had not yet begun construction.  

In July 1962, with new commanders in place at both USAREUR and Seventh Army headquarters, the command made one more attempt to obtain additional space for training. Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, who had taken command of the Seventh Army in March, sent a letter to General Freeman, who had replaced General Clarke in May, suggesting that USAREUR organize a comprehensive study to determine long-range requirements and to propose solutions. He pointed out that problems with training sites were shared by all NATO nations and had potentially far-reaching implications. A piecemeal approach to resolving the issue had not been effective in the past, he added, and would not be in the future. Freeman declined to sponsor the study at his level, saying that it was primarily a Seventh Army problem and that a USAREUR effort to determine long-range NATO requirements might only open the door for increased requests from alliance forces. The general authorized the Seventh Army to begin a study at its level to determine future requirements and additional facilities or sites that might become available.  

Other distractions arose from the hazardous nature of military training itself. Although safety issues had been a major concern for USAREUR since the activation of the command, accidents were an inevitable by-product of daily activities that included heavy machinery, live ammunition, and men working under conditions of extreme stress and fatigue. Nonetheless, the explosion of an 8-inch howitzer shell in the middle of a Grafenwöhr bivouac area on 2 September 1960 caught the attention of everyone in the theater and served as a reminder of the deadly nature of the Army’s business. The investigation which followed showed that artillerymen of the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery, had loaded the projectile with an excessive powder charge, causing the shell to overshoot

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56 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, pp. 4-57–4-64.
its target by some two thousand yards. It hit a tent area occupied by members of the 3d Reconnaissance Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 3d Armored Division.57

On the scene at the time was 1st Lt. Colin L. Powell, executive officer for Company D, 2d Battalion, 48th Infantry. Powell watched as the shell detonated; dismembered arms, legs, and hands thumped to the ground around him. Inside the tent he zipped open a sleeping bag to find what looked like “an illustration of viscera in a medical textbook.”58 The explosion killed sixteen soldiers and wounded dozens more, making it the worst postwar training accident that U.S. troops in Germany had ever suffered.

After an extensive investigation, the Army brought formal charges of negligent homicide against three men, the battery executive officer, the battery safety officer, and the powder man in the gun crew. It charged the chief of the gun crew with dereliction of duty. The battery safety officer was found guilty of negligent homicide, fined $300, reprimanded, and suspended from any command position for one year. The court found the other defendants not guilty on all counts. A senior artillery officer testifying during the mitigation phase of the trial noted that it was inherently unsafe to bring the higher charges to Grafenwöhr, since the ranges there were not large enough to contain them. He admonished all present that officers running the firing ranges had to stop acting out of habit and keep thinking all the time. The accident prompted the Army to review its firing range safety procedures for all weapons and brought about increased training requirements for personnel appointed as range safety officers.59

While the tragic accident and the subsequent investigation attracted attention throughout USAREUR, the rather arcane details of field artillery gunnery and safety procedures failed to capture the interest of most in the United States. On the other hand, the investigation of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, for his controversial program of anti-Communist indoctrination and his relationship with the John Birch Society fostered considerable debate in Congress, the newspapers, and among the general public.

The case raised the specter of a war hero who had gone too far in his anti-Communist zeal. Walker, a 1931 U.S. Military Academy graduate, had commanded the First Special Service Force during World War II and the 3d Infantry Division’s 7th Infantry during the Korean War. He had served as the commander of the 24th Infantry Division in Europe since 1959. In April 1961, the Overseas Weekly printed a story alleging that a troop indoctrination

program Walker had established to inform his division about the “enemies who would destroy us,” had been based on the philosophies of the controversial John Birch Society. The newspaper had also quoted the general as saying that President Truman, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Eleanor Roosevelt were Communist sympathizers. General Walker responded to the news story by calling the Overseas Weekly “immoral, unscrupulous, corrupt, and destructive.” As one reporter noted, however, he did not specifically deny that he had made the statements in question. Newspapers across the United States reported the confrontation in detail and raised eyebrows in Congress, where various senators demanded that the Army investigate. Generals were entitled to whatever lunatic private views they wished to espouse, one said, but they were not entitled to use the machinery of the U.S. Army to corrupt the troops.60

The Army could not withstand the public outcry for long. On 18 April 1961, Secretary of the Army Stahr directed General Clarke, the USAREUR commander, to relieve Walker of his command and transfer him to USAREUR headquarters pending a formal investigation. Clarke appointed Lt. Gen. Frederic J. Brown, the V Corps commander, to investigate the case as an acting inspector general. Two months later, on 12 June, the Army announced the results of General Brown’s investigation. Based on the evidence, General Clarke concluded that Walker had made derogatory remarks of a serious nature about several prominent American political leaders and members of the press. He also observed that the general had failed to heed cautions by his superiors regarding “controversial activities which were contrary to long standing customs of the military service.” In the end, Clarke administered a formal admonishment to Walker, notified him that the Army had revoked his pending assignment as commanding general of the VIII Corps in Austin, Texas, and directed him to remain in Heidelberg until he received further orders. Walker returned to the United States in October 1961 and, on 2 November, announced his resignation from the Army.61

The general’s resignation prompted a backlash in Congress. Senators Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and J. Strom Thurmond (D-S.C.) argued that Walker had been muzzled by the Pentagon. Other political leaders, including Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and Secretary McNamara countered that the rights of all service members were protected, but that the military was an instrument,


not a shaper of U.S. policy. Military leaders, they said, did not have the right to use the military establishment to advance partisan positions or to alter the decisions of the elected representatives of the people.62

In addition to resurrecting the traditional debate over political expression in the military, however, the Walker case also revealed a nation that was beginning to move beyond the list-waving, loyalty-oath approach to anticommunism that had been exemplified by former Senator Joseph McCarthy. In many respects, the Army’s concerns were less about the general’s right to express his political views and more about the ham-handed way in which he expressed them. The service had been on the receiving end of McCarthy’s witch-hunt when he prompted a Senate investigation into its promotion policies. The live televised hearings helped expose the senator’s accusations as unfounded and his tactics as little more than bluff and bullying. Having played such a significant role in the destruction of one anti-Communist demagogue in the 1950s, the Army was in no mood to embrace another as the new decade began.

On 16 November 1960, President Eisenhower dropped a bombshell that proved to be the greatest distraction of all to the troops in Europe and, in many ways, to the Army as a whole. Less than a week after the election of his successor, John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower ordered the recall, beginning in January 1961, of some 284,000 dependents of U.S. troops stationed overseas. The president was deeply concerned about a serious deficit in the balance of payments and the outflow of gold from the national treasury. By bringing more than half of U.S. military dependents deployed overseas back to the United States, he hoped to curtail the spending of American dollars in foreign markets. With that goal in mind, Eisenhower also directed U.S. agencies abroad, including the U.S. military, to purchase a greater percentage of the goods and services they needed from American vendors.63

The damage to troop morale in Europe was immediate and overwhelming. Just within the previous few months, the Army had taken steps to lengthen overseas tours and to allow some junior enlisted men to have their families accompany them in Europe. One Army spokesman declared that no soldier could be expected to remain in the service when he could not rely on the Army to maintain consistent policies regarding his family. Newspapers and magazines, both military and civilian, were swamped with letters of protest from soldiers and their families. Army personnel officers predicted that resignations would increase in both officer and enlisted ranks, that reenlistment rates would


drop, and that the service would need to expand draft calls to make up for the departures of experienced troops.\(^{64}\)

The Department of Defense and the Army took immediate steps to try and mitigate the impact of the directive. The day after the president’s order, the Defense Department announced that it would meet most of the fifteen thousand per month reduction by halting future movement of dependents overseas rather than by forcing those already there to return ahead of their scheduled departure dates. For his part, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. expressed little sympathy for the plight of the troops. He told reporters that soldiers were accustomed to sacrifice and that it was traditional for them to be separated from their families. While the policy might require strong leadership, he said, soldiers were dedicated people who understood the decision. In response, one soldier told *Stars and Stripes* that the secretary did not speak for the troops, who had pledged their lives for the preservation of the nation, not to save its gold reserves.\(^{65}\)

Before the Army and the Defense Department could begin the reductions, in one of his first official acts after taking office, President Kennedy rescinded Eisenhower’s directive, but with a string attached. Announcing the reprieve, Secretary McNamara asked that, as part of an overall campaign to reduce the gold outflow, each individual residing overseas reduce by $80 per year his purchase of foreign goods. In Europe, General Clarke immediately endorsed the move and urged soldiers and their families to cut their spending beyond the $80 goal. He also supported a continuing campaign for the monthly purchase of savings bonds as a way to stem the flow of dollars into the European economy. For its part, USAREUR took a number of steps to reduce its own foreign expenditures. It canceled several contracts for services or supplies from European vendors and began issuing procurement requests in the continental United States for fulfillment by American companies. The command also reduced the amount of depot-level maintenance in Europe, shifted the rebuilding of major items to facilities in the United States wherever practical, canceled many construction projects to avoid the excessive transfer of funds to foreign firms, and eliminated more than one thousand local hire employees, often replacing them with military dependents or off-duty military personnel.\(^{66}\)


In another attempt to reduce the expenditure of U.S. dollars in Europe, the Army briefly experimented with a unit replacement plan similar in concept to the earlier Gyroscope. Dubbed ROTAPLAN, the concept involved rotating battle groups from the United States to Germany for six month tours without dependents. Each of these units would replace a USAREUR battle group, which would return to the United States with its dependents. In the initial rotation, which began 15 October 1962, the 2d Infantry Division’s 1st Battle Group, 38th Infantry, from Fort Benning, Georgia, exchanged places with the 8th Infantry Division’s 1st Battle Group, 26th Infantry, in Baumholder. The evaluation that followed revealed that preparing the battle groups for rotation and shipping them overseas cost more than normal replacement programs and resulted in no apparent decrease in the flow of gold overseas. Meanwhile, the separation of soldiers from their families caused increased morale problems and, without accompanying per diem payments, led to financial hardships for many in the lower ranks. In the light of these findings, officials in USAREUR concluded that they could not use ROTAPLAN to maintain long-term deployment of forces in Europe and recommended cancellation of the program.67

Taken as a whole, the efforts to reduce overseas expenditures began to show some results by the end of 1962. In June, a letter from USAREUR to the Seventh Army cited a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, which indicated that Army-sponsored individuals in Europe had averaged a $50 reduction in gold flow savings over the preceding year. The command established a new goal of $100 per person for the following year. In response, the Seventh Army established a gold flow committee to consider further actions the organization could take to reduce expenditures.68

Looking Toward the Future

The years 1960 through 1962 were a period of turbulence and transition for the U.S. Army in Europe. The force had endured the benign neglect of President Eisenhower’s strategic priorities but had not yet fully incorporated the changes in organization, equipment, and doctrine necessary to implement completely President Kennedy’s more flexible approach to military policy. If, moreover, the Seventh Army divisions still retained their pentomic structure at the end of 1962, philosophically they had already begun to convert to a more versatile orientation. The years also marked an important milestone, with the Seventh Army, in 1961, celebrating the tenth anniversary of its reactivation.


68 Annual Hist Rpt, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1962, HQ, Seventh Army, pp. 2-2–2-4.
During that time, its presence had helped to allay European concerns over Communist expansion; the East-West confrontation had reached a climax over the construction of the Berlin Wall; and, for a moment, U.S. and Soviet tanks had faced each other at point blank range across the no-man’s-land of Checkpoint Charlie. Then, with those crises resolved, both sides paused to take a breath.

For USAREUR and the soldiers of the Seventh Army, ominous news was beginning to emanate from Southeast Asia. Even as their forces reorganized and recovered from the pentomic–atomic weapons fixation, USAREUR’s leaders considered what effect the growing conflict in Vietnam might have on their own command. Service news publications reported that U.S. Army helicopters were flying cover for troop-carrying aircraft in South Vietnam. The *Army Times* reported in February 1962 that, while the United States had not officially committed troops to combat in the theater, it was well known that more than four thousand soldiers, sailors, and marines were engaged in advisory and assistance activities there. Almost lost in the frenzy caused by the buildup of U.S. forces in Europe to meet the crisis in Berlin was a notification that President Kennedy had sent General Taylor to South Vietnam to determine how best to strengthen that government against Communist attack. Finally, observers in the news media noted the increased attention the administration was beginning to pay to the capabilities of the Army’s Special Forces units, especially as a means of dealing with an emerging mission—counterinsurgency.69

For ten years, the Army in Europe had accomplished what it had been sent to do, maintaining the peace by being at all times prepared for war. By the end of 1962, however, it appeared that an era of single-minded focus was drawing to a close and that a broader array of challenges lay ahead.

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By 1962, USAREUR had achieved almost all of the goals that service leaders had set for it more than ten years earlier. First and foremost, its very existence offered a measure of security in the face of the large Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. Even though American military strength in Europe never approached parity in numbers with the Soviets, the five plus divisions and supporting elements that made up the U.S. Seventh Army were enough to raise the ante to a point where no attacker could assume an easy victory. More important, the presence of so many U.S. soldiers in the path of a Communist advance raised the specter of an American nuclear response. Finally, even if the Communists never crossed the inter-German border, those forces provided a counterweight to Soviet political pressure and coercion and helped to reassure the nations of Western Europe that the United States would stand by them.

The tangible strength of the U.S. Army in Europe was in itself formidable. By the end of 1962, the composition and deployment of the Seventh Army had remained fairly stable since the end of the Gyroscope rotations in 1958. The Seventh Army headquarters continued to occupy at Patch Barracks, near Stuttgart, with the V Corps headquarters at the old I. G. Farben complex in Frankfurt and the VII Corps headquarters at Nellingen Barracks, also near Stuttgart. In the V Corps sector, the 3d Infantry Division occupied barracks around Würzburg, the 3d Armored Division around Frankfurt, and the 8th Infantry Division around Bad Kreuznach. The 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment screened the corps front, covering the primary Soviet approach through the Fulda Gap. Farther south in the VII Corps area, the 24th Infantry Division stayed in the area around Augsburg and the 4th Armored Division around Göppingen and Neu Ulm. The 2d and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiments provided forward security along the border with Czechoslovakia, covering the approach through the Hof Gap. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment remained in Kaiserslautern after its deployment to Germany during the Berlin crisis and served as the Seventh Army’s primary reserve.¹

Although the combat strength of the command would always be important, the true value of USAREUR lay in its role as a symbol of the American commitment to the long-term defense of Western Europe. The return to Europe

¹ U.S. Army Directory and Station List, 17 Dec 1962, Historians files, CMH.
of a complete field army and the development of the command and control, administrative, and logistical infrastructures to support it sent a clear signal to the Soviets. Whether the force represented a credible forward defense in and of itself or merely served as a trip wire for a nuclear response was never particularly relevant. It represented the American commitment to the continent for the long haul.

Despite the nation’s intervention in Korea in 1950, American military and political leaders had always regarded Western Europe as the linchpin in their struggle to contain the spread of communism. As a result, the Army designed its organization, its doctrine, and its weapons in anticipation of ground combat against the forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Early Seventh Army commanders such as Generals Eddy and McAuliffe looked to the German Army’s experience in World War II against the Red Army as a model on which to develop a doctrine for combat in Europe. That analysis, layered on the U.S. Army organization and equipment that emerged after the war, provided the basis for the force’s battle plans in Europe.

The enormous amounts of manpower and equipment available to the Soviets always stood as a dilemma facing those officers in USAREUR charged with defeating a Communist advance. The challenge to find a way to fight outnumbered and win became a mantra for the U.S. Army in Europe. During the early 1950s, concepts of mobile defense with an emphasis on the firepower of artillery and the mobility of armor began to give way to a doctrine based more on the exploitation of atomic weapons. The need to be able to break up large Soviet formations of tanks and armored vehicles prompted the service to develop its own atomic firepower. Army leaders understood that the Air Force’s priorities lay in strategic bombing and in the battle for air superiority over Europe. They could not count on air-delivered atomic weapons or even conventional close air support to break up enemy assaults. The deployment to Europe of artillery, rockets, and missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads provided an answer, giving USAREUR and the Seventh Army a capability to overcome the Soviets’ numerical advantage.

The Army’s obsession with atomic weapons reached a pinnacle in the mid-1950s with the development and fielding of the pentomic division. Although the organization was, in some ways, a response to the Eisenhower administration’s doctrine of massive retaliation, it also seemed to present the best option for defeating the numerically superior Communist forces in Europe. Almost as soon as the Seventh Army reorganized its divisions to fit the pentomic concept, however, its leaders identified fatal shortcomings in the concept. The expanded span of control for division and battle group commanders proved to be excessive, and the Army had yet to field many of the vehicles and equipment that would give the organization the mobility and communications it needed to operate on an atomic battlefield. At the same time, military and political leaders across Western Europe began to have second thoughts about an overreliance on tactical atomic weapons. By the end of the decade, most had come to the conclusion that any atomic exchange in Europe would leave behind little more
worth defending than radioactive piles of rubble. In other words, while atomic weapons might help to deter war, they were not a viable means for fighting one.2

As it began to pull back from its atomic infatuation, the U.S. Army of the 1960s returned to what it understood best and began re-equipping its forces in Europe with a new generation of small arms, armored vehicles, and artillery. With the pentomic experiment behind it, the service was also well on its way to restoring a more balanced organization and doctrine. Although USAREUR would continue to maintain its readiness for combat in Europe, many of its leaders now paused to consider the nation’s growing commitment in Southeast Asia, and how deep that commitment might come to be. In the same manner, many of the troops who would go to war in Vietnam received their early training in Europe. Since USAREUR and the Seventh Army made up such a large portion of the overall force, levies for experienced soldiers to fill out units heading to Vietnam would have to come from those commands.

While, in many ways, the Army in Europe in 1962 looked very much like the Army of 1952, the officers and soldiers who made up the force were different. In 1952, almost all of the senior officers and noncommissioned officers in USAREUR were veterans of World War II. With that experience came a certain amount of resolve and resignation. Although no one looked forward with any eagerness to a conflict with the Soviets, the veterans had survived the greatest war in history and acknowledged a need to prepare for future conflict. For the most part, however, their preparations lacked the sort of apocalyptic anticipation that would come to characterize future visions of modern war. To the extent that they thought about atomic weapons at all, the World War II generation considered them as more powerful versions of the weapons already used. The United States had employed atomic weapons against the Japanese, and it would use them against the Soviets, if need be. By 1962, the change was significant. Only the most experienced noncommissioned officers were World War II veterans, and only the Seventh Army commander and some of his senior leaders had significant combat experience. The threat of widespread employment of atomic weapons cast warfare into an entirely different light. The actual dangers were significant enough, but the negative symbolism of atomic weapons had become even greater. Although no less dedicated and dutiful than their predecessors, the soldiers of the 1960s approached their mission with a greater degree of skepticism and uncertainty.

Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents released after the collapse of the Soviet Union indicate an almost parallel line of thinking regarding warfare in Western Europe. Nearly all Soviet war plans envisioned a conflict beginning with a NATO attack on East Germany. The initial Soviet response included a barrage of some 131 tactical nuclear missiles and bombs against NATO airfields, communications centers, supply depots, and troop concentrations. Plans for

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the Warsaw Pact’s counteroffensive against the Western aggressors included a primary strike across the North German Plain, turning north to the Netherlands and the Danish peninsula. A supporting attack emerging from Czechoslovakia would advance through the Fulda and Hof Gaps with a goal of crossing the Rhine within seven days. Interviews with Warsaw Pact leaders, particularly commanders of allied formations, reflected skepticism toward the utility of nuclear weapons akin to that expressed by Western officers. Nuclear war was impossible, they believed, because both sides would annihilate each other.3

In this climate of mutual uncertainty, the presence of so many civilians and dependents in the theater, and the growth of facilities needed to support them, served as an important barometer of American intentions. Whatever fears the Soviets might have harbored regarding the rearming of West Germany were mitigated to some extent by the growing American civilian community there. As long as U.S. dependents remained in the middle of what would be the main battle area, the Soviets could be reasonably certain that neither the Americans nor the West Germans would initiate hostilities or take any actions that might provoke a military response. On the other hand, the noncombatant evacuation exercises that USAREUR staged on a regular basis provided the West with a means to send a clear and powerful signal that, if necessary, it was prepared to raise its level of readiness by clearing the field for war.

Even if deterrence succeeded and the Soviet Army did not cross the frontier, the presence of U.S. forces in Europe served a political as well as military purpose. By the early 1950s, intelligence analysts had concluded that, despite its threats and bluster, the Soviet Union had no more desire for war than the rest of Europe. What Western leaders feared, however, was that the Communists would use their tremendous military strength to coerce concessions and political cooperation from Western European countries still recovering from the war. The U.S. Army that remained in Europe after 1945 and the troops that followed in the 1950s served to shield Europe from such threats and to reassure Europeans of the American commitment. This allowed Europe’s economies to recover and thrive, setting them on independent, if not always pro-American, lines of foreign policy and economic development. By 1962, with crises over Berlin under control, Western Europe could lapse into a period of relative calm as the two superpowers developed new, less dangerous fields for competition elsewhere.

The Army in Europe thus contributed substantially to the structural, economic, and spiritual recovery of the continent. Germany in 1951 was still

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an occupied nation. Allied forces had rooted out most remnants of the Nazi regime and had confiscated what remained of the German war machine, but the former foe was still unprepared to regain sovereign status. Through their military government and civil affairs components, the European Command and USAREUR worked with German governments at local, state, and national levels to restore civil administration and public works. Through thousands of acts of individual and collective goodwill, American soldiers and units helped to rebuild schools, playgrounds, and other facilities needed to return civilians to some semblance of normal life. Although it served officially as an occupation force until 1955, by 1951 the Army was acting more as an ally in helping to manage Germany’s gradual transition toward sovereignty. Across the nation but particularly in West Berlin, the reassuring presence of American soldiers helped provide a measure of stability and confidence for civilians working to rebuild their lives. As a result, free from the intimidation and threats posed by its Communist neighbors, the West German economy was able to recover and thrive.

Even as West Germany was emerging from its occupied status, it was becoming clear to Western military and political leaders that they could not create a viable defense of Western Europe without the participation of German armed forces. The U.S. Army’s role in helping to arm, train, and guide the Bundeswehr to where it could take its place in the front lines of NATO’s defenses was perhaps its greatest contribution to Western security. American forces established schools for training the new soldiers and provided teams to assist German units learning to use American weapons and equipment. Although the new German Army soon discarded many elements of the American organization and doctrine and began to procure German weapons and equipment as soon as the nation’s economy was able to produce them, it integrated American concepts of military professionalism subordinate to civilian control into its own long-established traditions. As a result, Germany’s new armed forces bore scant resemblance to their Prussian forebears.

The relationship between the U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr continued to grow as they trained together during numerous USAREUR and NATO exercises. American units served under German control on some occasions while German troops operated under USAREUR and Seventh Army command at others. The result was an exceptionally close working relationship between the two forces that helped to solidify the ties between the two nations and the bonds uniting the NATO alliance.

Finally, for the U.S. Army as a whole, the mission in Europe served as a means to preserve the service’s traditions as a ground combat force while its leaders grappled with a presidential administration far more interested in strategic air and sea power. Although Eisenhower had always intended that the Europeans would provide the bulk of the ground force in Europe and frequently expressed his wish to bring home the majority of U.S. troops deployed there, his concerns about the effect American troop withdrawals might have on allied morale and the cohesiveness of the NATO alliance outweighed his desire to...
limit the U.S. ground commitment. When the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, proposed the virtual elimination of the Army’s ground combat mission, the return of almost all Army ground forces from Germany, and their assignment to a domestic security role, public and congressional support for the Army’s continued presence in Europe eliminated any chance for the plan’s approval. The continued commitment in Europe shaped the Army as a ground combat force.

Thus, throughout the early Cold War, the troops in Europe came to define the way the Army saw itself and the way it portrayed itself to others. As the guardians of freedom along the Iron Curtain and across the Fulda Gap, the soldiers of USAREUR and the Seventh Army characterized the Army in the same way as the stubble-faced G.I. Joe of World War II and the heliborne grunt who would come to exemplify the war in Vietnam. From the end of the Korean War through the beginning of Vietnam, when the American public thought about the U.S. Army, it was the force in Europe that came to mind.
The vast majority of primary source material for this period comes from four record groups at the National Archives at College Park: RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; RG 338, Records of U.S. Army Operational, Tactical, and Support Organizations (WWII and After); RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office; and RG 549, Records of the U.S. Army, Europe. The most important records relevant to the period are included in RG 549. It contains literally thousands of archive boxes of records roughly organized by headquarters or staff section. The most valuable are large collections of classified and unclassified correspondence, decimal files, and records from the Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training Section of the G–3 Staff. Although the archives has transferred most records relevant to the U.S. Army in Europe after World War II to RG 549, some still remain under their original record group 338 or 407. These are largely unit history files for Seventh Army and for the divisions assigned to it. The Seventh Army files, located in RG 338 at the time of research, were particularly voluminous and helpful. They included yearly command reports, after action reports from major training exercises, and large sections of correspondence. The records in RG 218 pertain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the Chairmans’ Files and the Geographic Files contain a great deal of planning documents and correspondence related to the various confrontations in and around Berlin.

In 2001, the National Archives began a project to reallocate many of its RG 338 records into new record groups. As a result, many source documents listed as RG 338, or even RG 407 have since been changed to RG 549. In some cases, the physical locations of the records in the archives storage vaults has changed as well. The most reliable constant seems to be the Master Register Entry Number assigned to each series of records. It has remained constant despite the physical and notional movement of the records and is the best way to identify a particular set of records for retrieval. In a few cases, records did not have an assigned entry number. In those instances, the series, hierarchy, and record group identification should be sufficient to retrieve the correct boxes.

As the Army’s primary repository for the personal paper collections of its senior officers, the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, also provided useful resources for this study. Most of the
personal papers collections consist of scrapbooks, records of social engagements, and materials not related to the officer’s time in Europe. General Matthew B. Ridgway’s collection contains some material from his time as SACEUR, while those of Generals Manton S. Eddy and Bruce C. Clarke include some personal correspondence collected during their tours as Seventh Army and USAREUR commander. General James M. Gavin’s papers include a copy of “Beyond the Stars,” an autobiography he intended to publish but never completed. It includes some material covering his tour as VII Corps commander in Europe. Most other relevant collections are relatively small and contain little of value. Of considerably more interest to this project was the collection of oral histories on file at Carlisle as part of the center’s Senior Officer Debriefing Program, also known as the Senior Officer Oral History Program. Of the referenced interviews, those of Bruce Clarke and Thomas T. Handy stand out for the insights they provide into those two officers, while those of Bruce Palmer and Paul D. Adams are notable for their thoughtful observations on the evolving command structure in Europe and the intervention in Lebanon. Copies of almost all the senior officer interviews are also on file at the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Interviews cited:

General Paul D. Adams
Lieutenant General William H. Arnold
Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton
General Donald V. Bennett
General Charles L. Bolte
General Bruce C. Clarke
Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins Jr.
General J. Lawton Collins
General George H. Decker
General William E. DePuy
Colonel Dan K. Dukes (Lebanon)
General Clyde D. Eddleman
Major General Robert H. Forman (Lebanon)
General Paul L. Freeman Jr.
General James M. Gavin
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
General Barksdale Hamlett Jr.
General Thomas T. Handy
Lieutenant General John A. Heintges
General William M. Hoge
General Hamilton H. Howze
General Harold K. Johnson
Brigadier General Adam W. Meetze (Lebanon)
General Bruce Palmer Jr.
General Williston B. Palmer
Some of the most important source material for this period is contained in a series of monographs prepared by the USAREUR Historical Office and on file at the Center of Military History. These very detailed studies cover such topics as the construction of the line of communications across France, replacement and augmentation systems in Europe, and the role of USAREUR in training and equipping the new German Army. The Center also possesses an almost complete set of annual historical reports for the U.S. Army, Europe. Those histories not only serve as detailed primary source material in their own right, but their documentation also points the way to original documents used in their preparation.

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Lane, David A. Operation GYROSCOPE in the United States Army, Europe. USAREUR Historical Division, 6 Sep 1957.
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The U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon. USAREUR Historical Division, 1959.
USAREUR Planning for German Army Assistance. USAREUR Historical Division, 1955.
USAREUR Training Assistance to the West German Army. USAREUR Historical Division, 1958.
Other Records Repositories

Two other government facilities provided relevant information. At the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the Ann Whitman collection, the National Security Council Series, and the papers of General Alfred M. Gruenther helped to establish the parameters of the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” defense policies. Microfilm copies of many of Eisenhower’s papers are also available at Carlisle. The papers of Generals Maxwell D. Taylor and Lyman L. Lemnitzer are on file at the National Defense University at Fort McNair, D.C. Taylor’s papers contain a great deal of correspondence regarding his tour as Army chief of staff and his support for the pentomic division. Lemnitzer’s papers contain some interesting documents concerning his time as chief of staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Berlin crisis.

Internet Sources

The internet hosts a number of Web sites that provided excellent information, particularly almost everything related to intelligence analysis of the Soviet military. Three sites—the Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Freedom of Information Act Reading Room, the Digital National Security Archives, and the Gale Primary Source Media site for Declassified Documents—supply electronic copies of government documents dealing with a wide range of subjects. Of particular interest for this project were intelligence summaries and estimates found on all three sites. The SHAPE historical office in Belgium has recently started posting key documents on its Web site, including many of the studies and decision papers prepared by the military and standing committees concerning alliance defense policies. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Cold War International History Project and the Swiss-sponsored Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security have also produced Web sites containing useful original documents and interpretative publications. ProQuest, available through the Pentagon library Web site, provides access to historical copies of a number of daily newspapers, including the New York Times and the Washington Post. Daily coverage of the Eisenhower administration’s military policy and accompanying editorials give useful context for events as they transpired in Europe.

Army News Publications

The European edition of the Army-sponsored newspaper, the Stars and Stripes, provided a surprising amount of detailed information on the day-to-day activities of soldiers in USAREUR as well as coverage of major exercises and events within the command. The paper’s coverage is in such detail that it caused one USAREUR commander to complain that it was giving, for free, more detailed intelligence information to the enemy than his own intelligence service. The paper’s daily chronology of events in USAREUR provided the framework on which the rest of the volume is built. The Army’s weekly news publication,
Army Times, also had a running account of issues facing the service at-large during this period and some useful insight as to how soldiers perceived them.

**Published Primary Sources**

The State Department publication, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, contains a wealth of presidential, National Security Council, and Department of Defense correspondence covering the U.S. military commitment to Europe. Volumes on Germany, Western Europe, and National Security are particularly helpful. Other primary sources include the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* for Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, published by the Government Printing Office. The published minutes of the *Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area*, held in January and February 1951, establish in great detail the parameters for the American military mission in Western Europe. Several publications by the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University also provided useful information on various Army tests and evaluations.

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Unpublished Works


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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
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<tr>
<td>G–2</td>
<td>General Staff Officer for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G–3</td>
<td>General Staff Officer for Operations and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G–4</td>
<td>General Staff Officer for Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTAG</td>
<td>German Training Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HICOG</td>
<td>U.S. High Commissioner for Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental ballistic missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRRP</td>
<td>Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASS</td>
<td>Modern Army Supply System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHI</td>
<td>Military History Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOMAR</td>
<td>Modern Mobile Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACP</td>
<td>National Archives, College Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADC</td>
<td>National Archives, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHAG</td>
<td>Northern Army Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODOR</td>
<td>Order for the Defense of the Rhine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operations Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPOT</td>
<td>Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORA</td>
<td>Order for Reinforced Alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMCUS</td>
<td>Pre-positioned Organizational Material Configured to Unit Sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PX</td>
<td>Post Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROAD</td>
<td>Reorganization Objective Army Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>Party of German Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETAF</td>
<td>Southern European Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGS</td>
<td>Secretary of the General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOB</td>
<td>Supply over the Beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRAC</td>
<td>Strategic Army Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOE</td>
<td>Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUST</td>
<td>Trieste United States Troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>Ultra-High Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFE</td>
<td>United States Air Force, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAREUR</td>
<td>United States Army, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNAVFORGER</td>
<td>United States Naval Force, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. EUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHF</td>
<td>Very High Frequency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAP SYMBOLS

ARMOR

CAVALRY (ARMORED)

INFANTRY

INFANTRY (AIRBORNE)

REGIMENT OR GROUP

BRIGADE

DIVISION

CORPS

ARMY

Seventh Army

3d Infantry Division

11th Infantry (Airborne) Division

3d Armored Division

2d Cavalry Regiment

7th U.S. Corps
INDEX

Acheson, Dean G., 144, 172, 178, 459–60
Adams, General Paul D., 350–51, 353, 442–43
Adana, 348, 349–50
Air Force, Twelfth, 32, 51–52, 64–65, 96–97, 102, 153–54, 301–02
and atomic weapons, 96–100, 102, 104, 106, 217, 304–05, 432, 448–49, 466
and close air support to ground forces, 51–52, 56–57, 78, 217, 466
See also Tactical Air Control Center; United States Air Force, Europe (USAFE).
Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties, 97
Airborne Divisions
1st, 325
11th, 55, 230, 262–63, 271–72, 300–301, 321, 328, 343, 347
101st, 258–59, 271
Airborne Divisions
Aircraft, fixed-wing
B–26B Invaders, 96
B–52 bombers 432
C–47, 410
C–54 Skymasters, 96
C–119 Flying Box Cars, 96
F–86F Sabres, 96
L–19 Birddog, 220–21
L–20 Beaver, 220–21
MIG–15 and MIG–17 jet fighters, 340
RF–84F Thunderflashes, 96
U–1A Otter, 315
Albania, 4, 35, 242
Alexander, Raymond Pace, 113
Allied Air Forces, Central Europe, 154
Allied Forces, Northern Europe, 146–47
Allied Forces, Southern Europe, 146–47
Allied Kommandatura, 428–29
Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (ALFCE), 66, 146–47, 151–53, 154, 156, 180–81, 325
Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe, 232, 324
Allied Staff, Berlin, 77–78
Allied Tactical Air Forces
Second, 154
Fourth, 96, 270
American Forces Network (AFN), 133–34
Andernach, 192–94, 199
Anderson, Robert B., 182
Ansbach, 161
Anti-armor Artillery Battery, 409th, 232
 Armed Forces Radio Service, 133–34
Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency, 69
Armor Groups
4th, 231–32
19th, 116, 231–32
Armor regiments
32d, 400–401
35th, 349–50
40th, Company F of, 406–07
Armor Center, Fort Knox, 190–91
Armored Divisions
2d, 18, 49–50, 52, 110, 154–55, 214, 263, 272, 465
4th, 272, 300–301, 315, 442–43, 448, 453, 465
Armed Cavalry Group, 19th, 116
Armed Cavalry Regiments
2d, 10, 15–16, 20–21, 46, 48, 110, 176, 226, 465
3d, 55, 226, 229, 300–301, 427, 465
6th, 15–16, 20–21, 46, 48, 110
11th, 300–301, 465
Armed Cavalry Reconnaissance Battalion, 4th, 231–32
Armed Field Artillery Battalions
70th, 20–21, 209
74th, 20–21, 209
517th, 209
631st, 20–21
Armed Infantry Battalions
13th, 105
52d, 322–23
370th, 20–21
371st, 20–21
373d, 20–21, 116, 175, 375
M59, 445
M75, 222
M113, 445, 447–48
Marder (German), 326–27
Army, U.S. Seventh, 19, 142, 143, 161, 207, 245, 328, 388, 463
and air assault, 98–99
and air defense, 97–98
Aviation Training Center, Stuttgart, 220–21
and Berlin, 233–34, 361–62, 366, 417, 418
and border security, 21, 23, 173–74
and the Bundesgrenzschutz, 174–76
and the Bundeswehr, 325–26, 469
and close air support, 51–52, 96–97
command relationships, 151–53
communications, 106, 141, 154
and developing technologies, 220–22, 281, 282, 445, 408–09, 445–47, 448
and German-owned properties, 235, 237, 240, 380
and German Youth Activities program, 375, 385–86, 398
and Kennedy’s military policy, 463–64
and Lebanon intervention, 342, 346, 356–57
maintenance, 124–26
medical support, 124, 214, 302–03, 311
missions, 15, 121, 284–85, 456
morale, 128, 136, 331
and noncombatant evacuation, 139–41, 287
and pentomic reorganization, 272, 273–74, 293, 300–310, 312–13, 466–67
and Phase Lines, 287, 289
and physical fitness, 450–51
public information program, 211–12
racial integration of, 111–13
receiving, processing, and locating troops, 18, 25
recreation, 133–34
and relations with German communities, 369–70, 373, 375, 381, 383, 385, 386–87, 391–93, 398, 400
shortages, 26, 70, 78, 107, 307–08
Signal Conference, 106
and Soviet forces, 36, 40, 49–50, 238, 240, 247
Special Services Section, 134
Support Command, 277
training areas, 26–28, 237, 290, 457–58
training the German Army, 187–88, 193, 202–03
troop housing, 27–28, 235, 331
troop information program, 113–14, 383
units, 15–16, 18, 20–21, 116, 118, 119, 231–32, 300–301
Army Advisory Committee Program, 373
Army Field Forces, Chief of, 25, 256–57, 300
Army Information Digest, 309
Army Times, 464
Army Training Test, 455
Army’s Home Town News Center, 211
Artillery regiments
2d, 455
18th, 458
Artillery Battalions
1st, 2d Artillery, 455
3d, 18th Artillery, 458
Aschaffenburg, 225, 327–28
Atomic Field Army (ATFA) studies, 256–57
Atomic weapons
and the Air Force, 56–57, 217
analysis of exercises related to, 68, 100, 102, 105–06, 240–41, 270–71, 302–04
and antiaircraft weapons, 97–98
and the Army budget, 208–09, 210, 252–54, 256–57
artillery, missile, and rocket delivery of, development and testing, 56–57, 102, 104–05, 212–13, 215, 217, 255–56, 296–97, 331, 442, 449, 466
and Berlin, 366, 405–06, 408
document and battle plans, 44–46, 49–50, 55, 57, 78, 99, 104–05, 106, 222, 311–12, 466
and Berlin, 366, 405–06, 408
and flexible response, 431–32, 449
and German Army organization, 326
identifying potential targets for, 317
and logistics, 275–80, 322
and New Look, 81, 99, 207–09, 210, 246, 295, 432
and pentomic organization, 257–59, 274, 298–301, 305–09, 310, 312–13, 466–67
and redesigning divisions, 441, 445
and SHAPE, 153, 310
and the Soviets, 13–14, 38, 242, 244, 296–97, 336, 338–39, 368, 432–33
tests, 12, 13, 55–56
training related to, 220, 247, 264–66, 314–15, 456
value reassessed, 333–34, 467–68
Augsburg, 15–16, 20, 32, 127, 287, 300, 465
Austria, 1, 3, 7–8, 9, 16, 21, 32, 36, 95–96, 117, 120, 135, 137, 160, 183, 221–22, 229–33, 247, 250, 322–23, 393, 396–97, 403
Babelsberg, 361
Bad Brückenau, 375
Bad Hersfeld, 287, 300
Bad Kreuznach, 18, 104, 272, 300, 379, 465
Bad Mergentheim, 71, 74
Bad Tölz, 7, 118, 346, 457
Baden-Baden, 1
Baden-Württemberg, 1, 3, 240, 301, 325, 370, 372–73
Battle Groups
1st, 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, 418–19, 427
1st, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, 427
1st, 22d Infantry, 428
1st, 26th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, 463
1st, 28th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division, 315
1st, 38th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, 463
1st Airborne, 187th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, 315, 346–47
1st Airborne, 503d Infantry, 11th Airborne Division, 272, 346–47, 349
2d, 6th Infantry, 406–07, 420–21
2d, 39th Infantry, 428
2d, 47th Infantry, 428
3d, 6th Infantry, 406–07
Baumholder, 18, 27–28, 72, 104, 133, 189, 313–14, 315, 331, 390, 455, 457–58, 463
Bavaria, 1, 3, 27, 240, 301–02, 325, 370, 372–73, 397, 453
Bay of Pigs, 431
Beirut, 345–50, 356
Belgian Congo, 430, 457
Belgian Corps, 154, 237–38, 325
Belgium, 5–6, 40, 101–02, 139, 144–45, 151–52, 155, 159, 161, 179, 240–41, 327, 396
Belsen-Hohne Tank Training Area, 189–90, 407
Berchtesgaden, 131
Beria, Lavrentiy, 83, 404
Berlin, 8, 9, 14, 32, 40, 68, 87, 95–96, 129, 133–34, 168–69, 234, 245, 262–63, 335, 389, 447, 452, 468
airlift, 5, 297, 402
blockade, 5, 13, 58, 164, 171, 368, 408, 417
and Checkpoint Charlie, 420, 423–24, 426–27, 432, 464
wall, 410–21, 429–30, 464
Berlin Brigade, 429, 447
“The Berlin Story,” 367
Bitburg, 281
Blank, Theodor, 180–81
Böblingen, 72, 74, 160
Bonn, 3, 186, 192, 370, 372–73, 436
Bonn Conventions of 1952, 233, 235–36, 327
Bordeaux, 60, 62, 63, 65, 121, 139–41
Braconne, 278
Bradshaw, Maj. Gen. Aaron, 159
Brandenburg, 1
Brandenburg Gate, 414
Brandt, Willy, 417
Bremen, 1, 123, 196, 372–73, 435–36
Bremerhaven, 1, 12, 29, 32, 58, 69, 108–09, 118, 121, 123, 129, 133–34, 190, 224–25, 235, 275, 349–50, 401–02, 427
Brind, Admiral Eric J. P., 146
British Army units. See Great Britain.
British Zone, 1, 3, 72–73, 97–98, 162, 173–74
Brown, Lt. Gen. Frederic J., 460
Bruce, David K. E., 177, 386
Brussels, 5–6, 144–45
Budapest, 249–50
Bulgaria, 4, 35, 237
Bundesgrenzschutz (border police). See West Germany (German Federal Republic).
Bundeswehr. See West German Army (Bundeswehr); West Germany (German Federal Republic).
Bundy, McGeorge, 416–17
Canada, 5–6, 155, 237, 327
Cannon, 280-mm., 56, 102–06, 116, 155, 212–17, 266–67, 280, 301–02, 449
Captieux, 63, 278
Carney, Admiral Robert B., 146
Carpentier, General Marcel M., 146–47
Cassidy, Col. John F., 32
Chamoun, Camille Nimr, 343, 345–46, 354–55
Check, Col. Gilbert J., 317
Chinon Engineer Depot, 278, 281
Clark, General Mark W., 25
Clay, Lucius D., 417–21, 423–24, 426
Collins, General J. Lawton, 16, 23–24, 42, 132, 144, 159
Command Post Exercise (CPX). See Exercises.
Communication Reconnaissance Battalion, 307th, 154
Communications Zone, USAREUR, 71, 113, 121, 122–24, 139–42, 156, 188, 263, 275–77, 278–79, 281, 312–13, 319, 322, 342, 358, 393, 395, 427
Advance Section (ADSEC), 122–23, 141, 275–76, 278, 319
Base Section (BASEC), 122–23, 139, 141, 275–76, 278, 319
Seine Area Command, 275
See also Logistical Commands.
Communist Central Committee, 362–63
Conant, James B., 233–34, 243
Concept C, 121, 275
Conner, Brig. Gen. Fox, 79
Constabulary, U.S., 7, 161
Combat readiness training, 10 placed under Seventh Army, 14 reorganizing, 9, 15, 16, 78
units, 9–10, 34
Contractual Agreements. See Bonn Conventions of 1952.
Copenhagen, 410
Corps
INDEX

Crete, 458
Croix-Chapeau, 278
Dahlquist, General John E., 18–19, 52, 256–57
Dallgow, 406
Danube River, 117–18
Danzig, 83–84
Darmstadt, 72, 190, 224–25
Dawson, Walter L., 150–51
De Gaulle, General Charles, 181–82, 433–34
Decker, General George H., 214, 441, 443–44
Degerndorff, 200
DePuy, Lt. Col. William E., 90–91
Dick, Maj. Gen. William W., Jr., 283
Dienststelle Blank, 180–81, 183, 186, 188–90
Doctrine, 161–62, 185, 188–89
air assault, 98–99
Air Force, 51–52, 78, 96–97
ALFCE, 151–52
flexible response, 449, 453, 463–64, 467
German Army, 196, 197, 199–202, 205, 326–27, 469
Soviet, 37, 244, 338–39
See also Eisenhower Doctrine; Truman Doctrine.
Dodge, Joseph M., 79–80
Draft training circular, “Combined Arms Units in Atomic Warfare,” 57
Dresden, 36
Dukes, Col. Dan K., 358
Dulles, John Foster, 297, 343–44
Dutch Corps, I, 237–38
East German Air Force, 340
East German Navy, 340
East German police units
Border Security Police, 406
sea police, 86–87
Security Alert Police, 13, 171, 406 Volkspolizei (People’s Police), 86–87, 173, 423
East Germany (German Democratic Republic), 21, 36, 40, 78, 177, 403–04, 412–13, 467
construction of a wall, 413–17, 427, 429–30
demonstrations in, 83–84
demonstrations by, in West Germany, 74, 76
illegal border crossings, 174, 245
intelligence on military strength of, 13–14, 35, 86–87, 171–72, 244, 340, 367
plan for reopening closed access routes to, 361–62
refugees streaming into West from, 251–52, 341, 359–60, 362–63, 404, 411
restoring sovereignty to, 242–44
restricting travel between East and West, 76, 251, 359–60, 364–65, 405, 410, 413, 420–21
revolt against government in East Berlin, 118
Soviet troop reductions in, 248
transfer of remaining Soviet functions to, 335, 363–64, 408
U.S. mission personnel intelligence gathering in, 163–68
U.S. testing access to, 418–21, 424–26
West refuses to recognize sovereignty of, 404–05, 429
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

Eberstadt, 190
Eberswalde, 36
Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 30, 34, 87–88, 120, 127, 209, 250, 296, 397, 461–62, 463, 469–70
and confrontation over Berlin, 366–68
and Lebanon intervention, 341, 343, 345
New Look policy, 79–81, 99, 207–08, 210, 212, 262, 431–32, 439
as SACEUR, 144–47, 149, 151, 172
Eisenhower Doctrine, 333–34, 341, 343, 345
Elbe River, 3, 19, 177
Engineer Brigade, 7th, 342
Engineer Groups
39th, 396
555th, 397–98
Engineer Battalions
70th, 231–32
94th, 113
Engineer Companies
532d Combat, 232
543d (Pipeline), 281
Engineer School, Murnau, 161
Erhard, Hans, 240
Erler, Fritz, 241
Eschwege, 161
Essling, 72
European Command (EUCOM), 1, 30
7964th Area Command, 60, 62–63
7965th Area Command, 60, 62–63
7966th EUCOM Detachment, 60, 62–63
and atomic warfare procedures, 56–57
and Berlin Command, 76
border mission guidance, 21
Civil Affairs Division, 370–72
Class I supply issues (food), 68–69, 72
Class III product issues (POL), 68–69, 72, 123
Class V materiel issues, 68–70, 72–73
commanders, 14, 30
depots and maintenance facilities, 72–73
equipment issues, 25, 49
and France, 58, 60, 62–65, 153–54
and German-American relations, 369–73, 375–76, 377–78, 384
Graves Registration Command, European Area, 60, 62
housing issues, 10, 25, 378
and Korean War impact, 13, 26
land requirements and issues, 26–27, 28
and legal issues, 16
Logistics Division, 58, 65–66, 68–69
and medical goods and equipment, 124
and public affairs issues, 129, 131
and racial integration, 111–12, 113
redesignated as U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), in August 1952, 76, 150, 159–60
and replacements, 107
responsibilities, 7, 14, 32, 157–60
under SACEUR, 151
and Seventh Army logistical support, 70–71
and Seventh Army manpower, 15–16
shortage of logistical support base, 12
and technical service divisions, 275
troop strength, 23
unit combat readiness improvement efforts, 9–10
vehicle transfer program, 158–62
and West German border police, 173–74
See also Communications Zone, EUCOM; United States Army, Europe (USAREUR).
European Motion Picture Service, 132–33
Exercises
Battle Royal, 105–06, 155, 212–13
Bayonet Blue, 453
Bear Claw, 268
Blue Bolt, 257
Bounce Back, 311
Brandywine, 453
Carte Blanche, 240–41
Clean Sweep, 268
Combine, 50
Cordon Bleu, 214
Counter Thrust, 155
critiques, 51–52, 65–66, 68, 100, 102, 280, 302–04
Exercises
See also Communications Zone, EUCOM; United States Army, Europe (USAREUR).
European Motion Picture Service, 132–33
Exercises
INDEX

DESSERT ROCK, 55–56
DRAW BRIDGE, 155
EQUINOX, 52, 54–55, 154–55
FER DE LANCE, 455
FOLLOW ME, 257
FOX PAW, 213–14
FULL PLAY, 310
German-conducted, 175–76
GOLDEN ARROW, 455
GRAND ALLIANCE, 52, 154
HANDICAP BLACK, 91–92
HARVEST, 9–10
INDIAN SUMMER, 105–06
LION BLEU, 304–05
LION LIFT, 315
LION NOIR, 270–71, 290
LONG THRUST II, 428
MAYTIME, 153–54
MONTE CARLO, 101–02, 125–26
NORMAL, 9–10
NORTH WIND, 57–58
PEACE MAKER, 453
QUICK SERVE, 310
RAINBOW, 10, 161
ROADBOUND, 140–41
ROADBOUND II, 141–42
ROSE BUSH, 52, 54, 154–55
SABRE HAWK, 301–02
SABRE KNOT, 266–67, 280
SNOWFALL, 55
SPRING TIDE, 99
SPRINGTIME, 56
STING RAY, 214–15
STORMVOUR, 212–13
SUMMER SHIELD, 453
SUMMER STOCK, 268
Supply over the Beach (SOB), 65
SWAN SONG, 273
WAR HAWK, 266–67
WINTER SHIELD II, 454–55

Families, 224, 369
and accompaniment, 10, 127–28, 331–32, 461–62
and Berlin, 77
and clothing restrictions, 138
and community relations, 332–33, 392–93, 398, 400
and French conscription, 394–95
and health care, 124
and housing, 69, 121, 128, 227–29, 329, 331–32, 378
and money spent in Europe, 129, 131, 389, 461–62, 463
and noncombatant evacuation, 138–40, 468
and public behavior, 377, 391
and recreation, 132–33
and schools, 131–32
and West German sovereignty, 235–36, 237
Farge, 123
Fechter, Peter, 429–30
Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill, 190–91
Field Artillery Groups
18th, 301–02
42d, 104, 116, 267
72d, 301–02
Field Artillery Battalions
59th, 104, 105
85th (Honest John), 232
216th, 224
264th, 104, 105
265th, 104, 105
510th, 231–32
760th, 224
867th, 104
868th, 102, 104
Field Artillery Battery (Honest John), 85th, 232
Field Artillery Missile Battalions
543d, 322–23
570th, 322–23
Field Artillery Rocket Battalions
159th, 322–23
510th, 322–23
Field Manual 100–31, Tactical Use of Atomic Weapons, 55
Fontainebleau, 123–24, 276–77
Fontenot, 278
Fontenet Ordnance Depot, 160, 278
Fort Benning, 117–18, 190–91, 463
Fort Bragg, 117–18, 356–57
Fort Campbell, 258–59
Fort Carson, 272, 445
Fort Dix, 117–18, 402
Fort Hood, 18, 445
Fort Jackson, 109
Fort Knox, 190–91
Fort Leavenworth, 259
Fort Lewis, 428
Fort Meade, 226, 427
Fort Riley, 224–25
Fort Sill, 190–91
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

and developing common procedures and doctrine with allies, 151
and European Exchange System, 135
and evacuation of noncombatants, 139–41
and French-American Fiscal Liaison Office, 60
and fuel and POL storage and transportation, 123–24, 156, 280–81
and German remilitarization, 177–79, 181–82
and instruction at EUCOM training centers, 161
and intelligence gathering, 164–65
and a line of communications, 58, 60, 62–65, 78, 121, 142, 156, 207, 209, 275–76, 278, 319
and NATO, 148–49, 171, 237–38, 284–85, 291, 298
and Paris Accords, 233–34
schools in, 131–32
and SHAPE, 144–46
and status of forces agreement with West Germany, 236–37, 327
and Suez Canal and Egypt operations, 250
and treaty with Austria, 230–32
troop and family housing in, 128–29, 331–32
and U.S. relations, 378, 381, 393–95, 398
and the vehicle transfer program, 159
See also French armed force units; French Forces in Germany; French Zone.
“Free German Youth” communist political organization, 411
Freeman, General Paul L., 442–43, 458
French armed force units
First Army, 105, 152–55, 212–13, 237–38
I Corps, 49–50, 54–55, 154–55, 325
II Corps, 49–50, 52, 154–55
First Air Division, 153–54
1st Armored Division, 52, 154–55, 214
2d Infantry Division, 154–55
3d Infantry Division, 154–55
4th Infantry Division, 54–55, 154–55
5th Armored Division, 214
7th Light Mechanized Division, 214
25th Airborne Division, 54–55, 154–55
5th Armored Group, 154–55
French Forces in Germany, 180
French National Assembly, 394–95
French Zone, 1, 3, 27–28, 72, 162, 180
Friedrichstrasse checkpoint, 415, 420–21, 424, 426, 429–30
Fritzlar, 15–16
Fuchs, Klaus, 12
Fuesson, 161
Fulbright, J. William, 412, 460–61
Fulda, 27, 287, 301–02
Fulda Gap, 40, 45–46, 287, 325, 465, 467–68, 470
Fulda River, 45–46
Fürstenberg, 36
Fürstenfeldbruck, 347, 349
Gaither, Horace Rowan, 298
Gaither Report, 298
Gale, General Sir Richard N., 152–53, 183
Gallagher, Maj. Gen. Philip E., 276
Garmisch, 32, 131
Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 462
Gatow airfield, 361
German-American Advisory Councils, 376
German Defense Ministry, 177, 192, 200, 284–85, 327
German Democratic Republic. See East Germany (German Democratic Republic).
German Federal Republic. See West Germany (German Federal Republic).
German Military Academy, 186–87
German Red Cross, 398
German Training Assistance Group (GTAG), 186–87, 192–93, 203, 205.
See also Training.
Germershaeim, 428
Germersheim Ordnance Vehicle Park, 277–78
Giessen, 284–85, 289, 301–02, 390
Gjelstein, Brig. Gen. Einar B., 175
Goldwater, Barry M., 460–61
“Good Neighbors to Our German Good Neighbors” initiative, 392–93
INDEX

Goodwin, Col. William T., 372
Göppingen, 272, 300–301, 465
Gray, Brig. Gen. David W., 343, 346–47
British Army of the Rhine, 40, 152–53, 154, 189–90
I British Corps, 237–38
and allied training exercises, 101–02, 154, 155, 212–13
and Berlin, 77–78, 363–65, 407, 412, 420–21
and German remilitarization, 183
and intelligence gathering, 165
and NATO, 148–49, 237–38, 293
and SHAPE, 145–46, 152–53
and Suez Canal and Egypt operations, 250
and training areas, 189–90
See also British Zone; United Kingdom.
Grenade launcher, M79, 446–47
Griesheim, 72–73
Gruenther, General Alfred M., 96–97, 144–45, 150–51, 183–84, 212, 238
Grunewald, 95–96, 406–07, 410
Guillaume, General Augustin, 27–28

Haines, Capt. J. R., 173–74
HALFMON, emergency war plan, 12
Halle, 83–84
Hamburg, 1, 410, 435–36
Hammelburg, 20–21, 28, 116, 161, 196–97
Hanau, 116, 289, 397–98
Handy, General Thomas T., 7, 9–10, 14, 26, 30, 49, 64–65, 111, 156, 160, 369–70, 373–74, 395
Hannover, 28–29, 201, 284–85, 435–36
Hartel, Brig. Gen. Frederick O., 415–16
Hartness, Maj. Gen. Harlan N., 18–19
Hawkins, Col. Wilson M., 290
Hayes, Maj. Gen. George A., 173
Hebert, F. Edward, 366–67
Heilbronn, 40, 127–28, 240, 289, 315
Heintges, Col. John A., 185–86, 190, 194–95
Helicopter Company, 328th, 98–99
Helicopters
H–13 Sioux, 220–22, 318–19
H–19 Chickasaw, 98–99, 220–22
H–34 Choctaw, 221–22, 315
UH–1 Iroquois, 448
Hesedorf, 201–02
Hess, William E., 366–67
Hesse, 1, 301–02, 370, 372–73
Hessian Corridor, 38, 40
Hiroshima, 280, 311–12
Hiss, Alger, 12
Hof Gap, 40, 45–46, 287, 465, 467–68
Hohne, 28–29
Holloway, Admiral James L., Jr., 350
Horan, Walter F., 131
Horkan, Maj. Gen. George A., 69
Horridge, Col. Joseph, 73
Horvath, Rudolf G., 117–18
Housing, 121, 142
construction, 28, 235, 331–32
family, 68–69, 132–33, 225, 227–28, 329, 331–32
in France, 27–28, 63, 129, 393–94
in Italy, 395–96
racial segregation in, 112
of Soviet troops, 168
in West Berlin, 251–52
Huebner-Malinin Agreement, 143, 162–63, 164, 166–69, 363–64, 403
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

**Humphrey, George M.,** 79–80


**Husum,** 201, 205

**Idar-Oberstein,** 196–97, 331, 427–28

**Illesheim,** 72–73

**Infantry Divisions**
- 2d, 463
- 3d, 257, 327–28, 445, 465
- 5th, 119, 230, 445
- 9th, 119, 268–69, 272
- 10th, 224–25, 272, 283, 300–301, 327–28, 400
- 45th, 43–44

**Infantry regiments**
- 8th, 90–91
- 18th, 418–19, 427
- 19th, 427
- 22d, 428
- 26th, 398, 400, 463
- 28th, 315
- 38th, 463
- 39th, 268–69, 428
- 47th, 428
- 48th, 459
- 187th, 315
- 350th, 95–96, 231–32
- 351st, 95–96
- 503d Airborne, 272, 346–47, 349

**Infantry Battalions**
- 1st, 350th Infantry, 232
- 2d, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, 90–91
- 2d, 48th Infantry, 459
- 3d, 39th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, 268–69

**Infantry Center, Fort Benning,** 190–91

**Ingrandes,** 278

**Intelligence School, Oberammergau,** 456–57

**Irby, Col. Richard L.**, 313

**Isle of Sylt,** 28

**Italy,** 5, 12–13, 119–20, 146–47, 159, 161, 179, 231–32, 325, 353, 393, 395–96, 397, 430

**Ivanov, Col. Gen. Semion,** 166–67

**Jarrell, Col. Shaffer F.**, 137

**Jaujard, Vice-Admiral Robert**, 146–47

**Johns, Col. Glover S., Jr.**, 42–43, 418–19

**Johns Hopkins University Operations Research Office,** 42–43


**Johnson, Louis A.**, 144

**Johnson, Lyndon B.**, 417–19

**Joint American Military Advisory Group,** 158, 159–61


**Karlsruhe,** 40, 281, 331, 397–98, 427–28, 436

**Kassel,** 40, 91, 287, 435–36

**Kennon, George F.**, 4–6

**Kennedy, John F.**, 430, 432, 461–62

and the Army budget, 446, 453–54
and atomic weapons, 434–36, 439, 442
and flexible response, 431, 436, 439, 443–44, 446, 463–64
and military buildup in West Germany, 409, 417–18, 420, 427–28
and reopening negotiations with Communists over Berlin, 421–23
and Soviet efforts to drive U.S. out of Berlin, 403, 405, 407–09, 412
and standoff at Checkpoint Charlie, 426 and unconventional warfare, 456, 464 and the wall, 416–17


**Kiel,** 28, 196

**Koblenz,** 49–50, 284–85
Koefoot, Sfc. Henry M., 117
Königshofen, 23
Kornwestheim, 72–73
Krampnitz, 405–06
La Pallice, 60, 62, 139–40
La Rochelle, 62
Landshut, 20–21
Le Havre, 69
Legere, Col. Lawrence J., 429
Lemmonier, Admiral Andres G., 145
Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., 298, 322, 416–18, 421, 423, 439
Leviero, Anthony, 253
Line of communications, 58, 60, 62–65, 78, 121, 142, 156, 207, 209, 275–76, 278, 319, 351
Linz, 117–18
Lisbon, 148–51, 169, 171
Little John rocket, 255–56
Livorno, 232, 395–96
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 117–18
Lodge-Philbin Act of 1950, 117–18
Logistical Commands
4th, 319
5th, 319
201st, 358
See also Southern European Task Force (SETAF), U.S. Army.
Logistics. See Army, U.S. Seventh; European Command (EUCOM); Line of communications; United States Army, Europe (USAREUR).
London, 41–42, 133–34, 145, 158
Lorsch, 381
Lower Saxony, 1
Luckenwalde, 36–37
Ludwigsburg, 72–73
Luebberstedt, 190
Luxembourg, 5–6, 139, 161, 179, 237–38, 240–41, 270
MacArthur, General Douglas, 79
Machine gun, M60, 318–19, 446–47
Macmillan, Harold, 412
Mägdeberg, 36, 83–84, 406
Mainz, 18, 160, 195, 281, 287, 331
Malenkov, Georgi M., 82–83
Malinin, Col. Gen. Mikhail, 143, 162–63, 164, 166–69
Maneuvers. See Exercises; Training.
Mao Zedong, 12
Marienborn, 418–19
Marshall, General George C., 4–5, 79, 113, 171
Marshall Plan, 171
Martin, Maj. Gen. George E., 225
Materiel Reception Groups North and South, 186–87
Mathewson, Maj. Gen. Lemuel, 76
McCarthy, Joseph, 12, 461
McCloy, John J., 3, 26, 172, 369–70
McElroy, Neil H., 295
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 1–2
Mellrichstadt, 40
Meloy, Maj. Gen. Guy S., Jr., 225
Melun, 123–24
Memmingen, 200
Mendes-France, Pierre, 181–82
Metz, 62, 121, 123–24, 278, 280
Miesau, 72
Miesau Ammunition Depot, 277–78
Milan, 232
Milburn, Maj. Gen. Frank W., 8
Military Air Transport Service, 341–42
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Germany, 179, 186–87, 188, 193, 203, 205
Military assistance advisory groups, 157–58, 160–61
Military assistance programs, 143, 157–60, 162, 190, 285
Military Intelligence Group, 513th, 412–13
Military Police Battalions
508th, 139
759th, 76
Military Police Companies
287th, 420
558th, 280
Military Sea Transport Service, 341–42
Missle Command, 1st, 322–23, 324
Missle Battalions
4th, 57th Artillery, 318–19
5th, 42d Artillery (Lacrosse), 318–19
See also Field Artillery Missle Battalions.
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

Missiles
- Dart guided antitank, 255–56
- Davy Crockett, 442, 449
- Hawk antiaircraft, 318–19, 448–49, 458
- Hound Dog cruise, 432
- Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 296–97
- Jupiter, 255
- Minuteman intercontinental ballistic, 432, 446
- Nike, 98, 255, 280, 281, 458
- Nike Ajax, 329–31
- Nike-Hercules, 331, 448–49
- Pershing, 448–49
- Polaris submarine-launched, 431–32, 446
- Redeye, 449
- Redstone, 255, 312–13, 448–49, 458
- Sergeant medium-range guided, 448–49, 458
- Shillelagh, 449

See also Honest John rocket; Little John rocket.

Moch, Jules S., 144–45, 177

Modern Army Supply System (MASS), Project, 282–84

Modern Mobile Army (MOMAR) 1965–1970, 440–41

Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard Law, 145, 155–56

Morale, 260, 277, 353
- and dependents, 10, 127, 128, 331, 461–62, 463
- and new replacement systems, 107–08, 110, 223–24, 227, 329
- and pentomic reorganization, 299–300
- and recreation, 132–36, 450–51
- and wearing civilian clothing, 137–38

Moreland, Allen B., 241

Morgenthau, Henry J., Jr., 171

Mortar, 81-mm. versus 60-mm., 269

Moscow, 242, 363–64

Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, 146–47

Mueller, Gebhardt, 240

Muller, Maj. Gen. Walter J., 66

Munich, 7, 19–21, 32, 72, 128–29, 133–34, 199–200, 287, 347, 378, 397

Münster, 72–73

Munsterlager, 196–97, 199

Murnau, 161

Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, 6–7, 143


Mutual Security Program for Europe, 32, 149–50, 159–60, 180, 186

Nagasaki, 280

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 343

National Security Council, 79–80, 144, 289–90, 409

Navy, U.S., 30, 139, 157, 163, 186, 208–12, 252, 255, 409, 431–32, 446. See also Missiles; United States Naval Force, Germany (USNAVFORGER); U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Neckar River, 45–46, 289

Nellingen, 72–73, 465

Nelson, Lt. Col. Ralph E., 137

NEO 1–53 (draft), safehaven, 139–40

Netherlands, 5–6, 40, 139, 151–52, 155, 161, 179, 238, 240–41, 275, 327, 396, 467–68. See also Dutch Corps, I.

Neu Ulm, 465

New York Times, 253


Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO) 2–53–3, July 1953, 139–40

Normandy, 19, 65, 397–98


North Atlantic Treaty, 6, 143–44, 169, 250

- and air defense missiles, 329–30
- Central Command, 146–47
- and close air support, 96–97
- and conventional forces, 297–98, 436
- and East Germans, 364–65
- and East Germans, 364–65
- defense plans, 287, 289–90, 382, 436, 469
- intelligence, 35–37, 165, 433
- and the Italian Army, 324–25
- line of communications, 156, 280
military assistance programs, 158–60, 162
Military Committee, 147–48, 212
Mutual Defense Assistance Program
training, 161
North Atlantic Council, 147–48
and organization of its military defense force, 144–48, 151–53
and Soviet attitudes toward Europe, 247, 250–52, 467–68
and Soviet strength, 40–41, 49–50, 433
and training areas, 26–27, 97–98, 290, 327, 458
See also Allied Air Forces, Central Europe; Allied Forces, Northern Europe; Allied Forces, Southern Europe; Allied Land Forces, Central Europe (ALFCE); Allied Land Forces, Southern Europe; Allied Tactical Air Forces; Central Army Group (CENTAG); Northern Army Group (NORTHAG); Southern European Task Force (SETAF), U.S. Army.

North German Plain, 28–29, 40, 467–68
North Rhine-Westphalia, 1
Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), 105–06, 152–53, 155, 183, 212–13, 237–38, 325
Nuclear weapons. See Atomic weapons.
Nuremberg, 9–10, 20–21, 25, 32, 40, 73, 133–34, 226, 229, 287, 300–301
Ober-Ramstadt, 160
Oberammergau, 187–88, 193, 456–57
Oberursel, 72–73
Occupation Statute, 3
Offtackle, Joint Outline Emergency War Plan, 12–13
Ogden, Brig. Gen. David A. D., 44
Olympic Stadium, 77–78
“Operation Buddy,” 43–44
Operation FRIENDLY HAND, 398
Operation GYROSCOPE. See GYROSCOPE, Operation.
Operation KINDERLIFT (U.S. Air Force program), 398
Ordnance Groups
47th, 72–73
50th, 72–73
57th, 72–73
Ordnance Battalion, 37th, 72–73
Ordnance Ammunition Battalion, 82d, 72–73
Ordnance Maintenance and Supply
Battalions
8th, 72–73
19th, 72–73
38th, 72–73
71st, 72–73
80th, 72–73
85th, 72–73
Ordnance School, Eschwege, 161
Orléans, 60, 62–63, 121, 322
Pace, Frank C., 56–57, 144–45
Pace, Col. Guy L., 174
Palmer, Maj. Gen. Williston B., 18–19
Paris, 6–7, 60, 123–24, 145, 281, 364, 394, 412
Paris Accords, 233–34
Party of German Unity (SED), 362–63
Périgueux, 278
Perry, Brig. Gen. Basil H., 32
Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), 69
Pike, Sgt. Vern, 419–20
Pirmasens, 104, 331, 427–28
Pirmasens Signal Depot, 277–78
Pleven, Rene, 60, 123–24, 177
Pointe de Grave, 65
Poitiers, 121, 319
Poland, 4–5, 35–36, 242, 248–50, 251, 340–41, 397
Portuguese 3d Infantry Division, 270
Potsdam, 87, 162–64, 168, 405
Potsdam Agreement. See Huebner-Malinin Agreement.
Potsdamer Platz, 83
Powell, 1st Lt. Colin L., 113, 459
Powell, General Herbert B., 441–42
Pre-positioned Organizational Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS), 427–28
Presley, Pvt. Elvis Aron, 400–402
Project Modern Army Supply System (MASS), 282–84
“Project Solarium,” 80
Pusan, 172
Putlos, 28–29
Pyrenees, 12–13

Quartermaster Groups
  2d, 72
  7th, 72

Quartermaster Battalions
  14th, 72
  15th, 72
  35th, 72
  56th, 72
  327th, 72

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., 208–09, 253–54, 469–70
Radford Plan, 253
Radio, SCR–506 AM, 23
Radio Free Europe, 249–50
Ramstein Air Force Base, 96
Reber, Samuel, Jr., 176
Reconnaissance Squadron, 3d, 12th Cavalry, 3d Armored Division, 458–59
Recovery vehicle, M47, 195
Recreation and entertainment, 369
  accusations of frivolous government spending on, 131
  and alcohol and prostitution, 387–89
  and American Forces Network, 133–34
  construction of facilities for, 27–28, 128–29, 132–33, 142
  engaging with West Germans in, 373, 385–86, 398, 400
  and European Exchange System, 135–36 in France, 393–94
  and Overseas Weekly, 135
  and racial integration, 112
  and the Soviet Zone, 163–64, 168
  and the West German Retail Association, 135–36
Regensburg, 20–21, 28, 284–85, 300–301, 435–36
Regimental Combat Team, 278th, 55
Rendsburg, 196–97, 199
Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) 1961–1965, 441–42, 443–45
Rhine Engineer Depot, Kaiserslautern, 199, 277–78
Rhine River, 1, 18, 49–50, 153–54, 238, 281, 289, 453
Rhineland-Palatinate, 1
Rice, M. Sgt. William T., 77
Rifles
  106-mm. versus 57-mm. recoilless, 269
  Belgian FN, 148
  Browning .30-caliber automatic, 446–47
  M1, 269, 446–47
  M2 carbine, 446–47
  M4, 446–47
  M14, 318–19, 446–47
Rinhausen, 381
Rockets. See Honest John rocket; Little John rocket.
Rokossovsky, Marshal Konstantin, 248–49
Romania, 4–5, 35–36, 242
Rome, 232
Rossau, 405–06
Rostow, Walter W., 412, 439
ROTAPLAN, 463
Rotation and replacement, 78, 92–93, 116, 300
  of battle groups, 327–28, 463
  of complete platoons, 109–10
  of personnel deployed to Lebanon, 356–57
  and racial integration, 111–12
  with soldiers with little time remaining on enlistments, 24
  of mechanics, 267
  and USAREUR’s Communications Zone, 342
  using four-man teams combined into carrier companies, 107–09, 110, 328–29
Rotterdam, 275
Ruhr Valley, 289, 436
Rusk, Dean, 416–17
Russell, Richard B., 82, 112
Saarland, 1
Saumur, 278
Saunders, Hugh W. L., 145
Saxony, 1
Saxony-Anhalt, 1
Schanze, Col. August E., 166–68
Schleswig-Holstein, 1
Schwäbisch-Gmünd, 160, 301–02
Schwäbisch Hall, 71, 73–74
Service Battalion, 7780th Composite, 77
Short, Dewey J., 82
Signal Battalion, 25th, 381
Signal School, Ansbach, 161
Skysweeper, radar-guided 75-mm. gun, 98
Sonthofen, 117–18, 161, 199–200
Southern European Task Force (SETAF), U.S. Army, 232, 322–25
Soviet air forces, 35, 38, 338, 339–40, 405–06
Soviet armed force units
   Central Group of Forces in Austria, 36
   Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, 339
   Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, 36–37, 143, 164, 166–67
   Northern Group of Forces in Poland, 36
   Southern Group of Forces in Romania, 36
   Strategic Rocket Forces, 338
   1st Guards Tank Army, 36–37, 405–06
   2d Guards Tank Army, 36–37
   3d Guards Mechanized Army, 36–37
   3d Shock Army, 36–37, 40, 405–06
   4th Guards Mechanized Army, 36–37
   8th Guards Army, 36–37, 40
   24th Tactical Air Army, 405–06
   6th Guards Tank Division, 405–06
   7th Guards Tank Division, 405–06
   10th Guards Tank Division, 405–06, 413
   26th Guards Tank Division, 405–06
   1st Motorized Rifle Division, 405–06
   19th Motorized Rifle Division, 413
   Soviet Military Liaison Mission, 162–63, 167–69
   Soviet Navy, 35, 340
   Soviet spies, 12
   Soviet Transport Ministry, 414–15
   Soviet Union, 1, 3, 4–5, 79, 82, 211–12, 253–54, 354–55, 383–84
armed forces in East Germany, intelligence on, 13–14, 35–38, 84–85, 244, 365, 405–06, 433
and atomic warfare, 13–14, 38, 104, 244, 296–97, 335–36, 338–39, 432–34, 467–68
and Austria, 230–32
and battle doctrine, 37–38, 86, 467–68
bloc nations armed forces, intelligence on, 35–36, 86–87, 340–41, 406, 433
and Cuba, 430
and Eisenhower’s New Look policy, 81, 99, 295–97, 366
expansionism, 4–5, 80, 82, 143, 156–57, 247, 341, 345
and German lessons from World War II, 41–42, 44
harassment of Americans in East Germany, 76–77, 87, 166–67, 245
and Hungary, 249–50, 340–41
logistical infrastructure as deterrent to, 126–27, 334, 465–66
military training of East Germans, 171–72
and Poland, 248–49, 340–41
and possible avenues of advance, 25, 29–30, 38, 40, 122, 123, 465
propaganda, 76, 243–44
and the rearming and sovereignty of West Germans, 177–78, 207, 242, 371–72, 403–04
and relations with Communist China, 337–38
and riot in East Berlin, 83–84
and U.S. concern over possible capture or attack of resources, 71, 73, 277–78
and the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, 162–69
and West German defense strategy, 183, 293
and Yugoslavia, 120
and zonal and satellite border issues, 21, 27, 87, 174
Soviet Zone, 1, 3, 12, 20–21, 27, 40, 77, 86–87, 162–65, 251–52, 359, 411
Spain, 45
Spangdahlem, 281
Sparkman, John J., 298
Special Forces, 456, 464
Special Forces Group (Airborne), 10th, 116–19, 209–10, 316, 318, 456–57
Special Message to Congress on the Defense Budget, 431, 443–44
“Spirit of Geneva,” 207, 243, 247
Sputnik satellites, 296–97, 432–33
St. Lô, 397–98
Stahr, Elvis J., Jr., 417, 460
Stalin, Joseph, 79, 82–83
Stars and Stripes, 167, 211–12, 225, 236, 384, 410, 462
State Department, 4–5, 12, 139, 157–58, 297, 403–04, 435
and Austria occupation, 230–31
and civil affairs, 370–71, 375
and Italy, 323–24
on Khrushchev, 363
and Lebanon intervention, 345, 355–56
negotiations with France for line of communications, 58, 60
Policy Planning Staff paper and atomic weapons, 291
and West Berlin, 251–52, 358–59, 405, 417
Stralsund, 166–67
Strasbourg, 49–50
Strategic Air Command, 99
Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), 357–58
Straubing, 15–16, 300–301
Strauss, Franz Josef, 285, 297
Strother, Maj. Gen. Dean C., 51–52, 96
Sturgis, Maj. Gen. Samuel D., Jr., 64–65
Submachine gun, M3, 446–47
Suez Canal, 250, 345
“Sunday Punch.”  See Missiles.
Tactical Air Control Center, 102
Tactical Guidance for Atomic Warfare, April 1956, 265–66
Tank Battalions
1st Medium, 400–401
3d Medium, 349–50
141st, 116
322d, 116
510th, 116
Tank recovery vehicle, M88, 447
Tank Training Center, Vilseck, 161, 202–03
Tanks
Leopard (German), 326–27
M24, 9
M26 Pershing, 159
M41, 195
M47 Patton, 125–26, 159,
M48 Patton, 125–26, 351, 424, 447
M60, 447
Task Force 61 (marines), 346, 351. See also Marine Corps, U.S.
Tegel Airfield, 77–78, 361
Tempelhof, 77–78, 361, 420–21, 424, 426
Thompson, Llewellyn E., 363, 403–04
Thuringia, 1
Timberman, Maj. Gen. Thomas S., 19
Tincher, Col. Maxwell A., 124–25
“Tips on Atomic Warfare for the Military Leader,” 311
Tito, Marshal Josip Broz, 120
Torgau, 168
Toul, 278
Tractors
M4, 25
M8, 25
Training, 15, 467
and air assault, 98–99
and air defense, 96–98
and Air Force participation in, 51–52, 96–99
and ammunition, 26, 72–73, 78, 173, 212
of artillery, 219–20, 315
and atomic weapons, 56–58, 97–98,
104–06, 153, 212–14, 222, 232, 238,
244, 247, 264–68, 270, 310–12, 331, 434
and aviation assets, 220–22, 315, 448, 455
and battalion tests, 455
and budget cuts, 263, 452
and Berlin, 410, 428
of civil affairs personnel, 371, 372
Clarke’s checklists and philosophy of,
260–62
cold weather, 9–10, 301–02
and combat arms employment, 94
on community relations with Germans, 383
and conventional warfare, 57–58, 212,
217, 219, 268, 313–15, 453–54
to defend wider frontages, 88–91
deployment of additional military force under the guise of, 408–09
development of NATO command structure for continuity in, 144, 145, 151–54
and duty hours, 136–37
and East Germans, 406
of East Germans by Soviets, 171–72, 244
and evacuation missions, 140–42
and flexible response, 449
hazardous nature of, 458–59
for headquarters and division-level staffs, 52
and improvement projects in West Germany, 397–98
to increase grade level of education, 24
and intelligence gathering on Soviet military, 164–65
and Italian military, 232, 323–24
and Korean War, 26, 42–44
and leadership decision-making testing, 91, 93–94, 450–55
and Lebanese Army, 353–54
and long-range reconnaissance patrol tests, 318
and military assistance programs, 143, 157–58, 160–62
on mobilization operations, 358
with new equipment and weapons, 318–19, 445, 447–48
and New Look, 439
in night operations, 316
and parachute jumps, 455
and pentomic organization, 258–59, 272–73, 301–03, 307, 310–12
and the petroleum pipeline, 281
and physical fitness, 450–52
and Project MASS, 283–84
and rapid deployment, 428
of recruits, 18, 29
and reduced usable service once deployed, 24, 29
and replacement assignments and systems, 107–10, 223–24, 226–27, 328
and Soviet soldier image in literature, 86
for Soviet surprise attack, 91
and Soviets, 338–40
and Special Forces, 116–19, 318, 456–57
and supply operations, 65–66, 68, 358
and supply shortages, 78, 212
tactical, 8, 9–10, 72, 93–94, 313–15
and tank maintenance, 125–26
timing and location of, coordinated with West Germans, 237
and transportation, 73, 310
troops unavailable for, 29–30, 44–45, 95–96
and unconventional warfare, 456–57
and unit response time testing, 91–92
for U.S. and alliance forces, 52, 54–55, 212, 238, 270
and U.S. reserve divisions, 289–90
and West German concerns about atomic weapons, 271
and West German police and military, 174–75, 182–97, 199–203, 205, 284–85, 325, 435, 469
See also Exercises.
Training areas, 313–14
and large-scale maneuvers and large-caliber ranges issues, 26–29, 42, 78, 95–96, 217, 290, 406–07, 458
returned to West Germans, 235, 371–72
shared with French, 27–28, 72
shortage of, 10, 12, 20, 26, 78, 327, 457–58
See also Baumholder; Belsen-Hohne Tank Training Area; Grafenwöhr; Hohenfels; Wildflecken.
Training Guidelines for the Commander, 451–52
Transportation Corps Training Center, Hammelburg, 161
Transportation Groups
10th, 73
7373d, 397–98
Transportation Battalions
27th Separate, 73
29th Separate, 73
122d Separate, 73
Transportation Company, 68th, 113
Treaty of Brussels, 5–6
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, 242
Trieste, 1, 7–8, 16, 32, 95–96, 119–20
Trieste United States Troops (TRUST), 7–8, 119–20
Trois-Fontaines, 278
Truck, quarter-ton M151, 448
Truck Battalions
38th, 73
411th, 73
Truman Doctrine, 297
Ulbricht, Walter, 362–63, 404, 408, 411, 412–13, 426
Ulm, 19–20, 73, 127–28, 284–85, 287
Uncles, General John F., 229, 245, 379
Unconventional warfare, 42, 116–19, 175, 316, 318, 456–57
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 391
United Kingdom, 5–6, 12–13, 38, 45, 236–37. See also Great Britain.
United States Air Force, Europe (USAFE), 7, 30, 139–40, 180, 341–42, 397, 398
United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), 7, 8, 41, 152, 381, 423, 460
and aid to local German communities, 397–98, 468–69
and aircraft and helicopters use, 220–22, 315, 318
and ammunition, 69–70, 122–23, 446–47, 452
Army Task Force 201, 341–43, 346–50
and Austria occupation, 230–32
and Berlin border violations, 245–46
and Berlin Command, 32, 76, 428–29
and the Bundesgrenzschutz, 172–76
and the Bundeswehr, 290, 469
commanders, 87–88, 92–93, 259, 321, 443, 449–52
and Communications Zone responsibilities, 71, 121, 140–42, 322
coordinate operations with Air Force, 96–98
and disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts, 396–97
and Emergency Plan (EP) 201, 341–43
EUCOM redesignated as, in August 1952, 30, 76, 150
duty hours and off-duty hours, 136–38
and flexible response, 449
functions transferred to Seventh Army, 14, 15–16
German armed forces training and training facilities assistance, 180–81, 183–90, 192–93, 195, 199, 201–03, 205
and German-owned properties issues, 235, 378–79
and housing, 128–29, 227, 229, 331, 332
and Hungary crisis, 250
and impact of West German sovereignty, 233–35, 236, 237, 380, 382
intelligence on possible avenues of Soviet advance, 38
intelligence on Soviet armed forces, 339–41
intelligence on Soviet desire for military confrontation, 337
and large-scale maneuvers, 453–54
and the line of communications through France, 121, 156, 275, 319, 393
and logistical responsibilities realignment, 275–77, 319
and maintenance of order among troops, 391
and military liaison missions, 143, 162, 163–65, 167–68
and MOMAR study, 441
and National Guard units, 119
and NATO, 156–57
and new weapons and vehicles, 125–26, 222, 445–49
and noncombatant evacuation, 139–42, 468
Northern Area Command, 32, 350, 379
Ordnance Command, 279
organizational changes and unit assignments, 32, 34, 116, 118, 322
and pentomic organization, 271–72, 274, 293, 299, 300–301, 443, 445
and POL, 69, 123, 263, 280, 452, 453
and Project MASS, 282–84
and publicizing Army’s success in Europe, 210–12
and racial integration, 111–13
and recreation and leisure, 132–33, 135
and reducing purchases of foreign goods, 462–63
and reinforcement of Berlin garrison, 361, 427–28
and relations between Germans and U.S. soldiers, 369, 374–77, 390, 392
and release of classified information to Germans, 188–89
and reopening closed access routes to Berlin, 361–62, 365, 418, 424–26
replacement and rotation systems, 107–10, 222, 224–27, 230, 328–29, 463
and reports of luxurious living, 131
responsibilities, 32, 159–60, 182, 184–85, 190, 389
and safety issues, 458–59
and schools, 131–32
and SETAF, 322–24, 325
and SHAPE command relationships, 152–53
and shortage of storage facilities, 63
and soldier misconduct, 386–87
and Soviet chemical and biological agents, 38
Soviet Relations Advisory Committee, 167
and Soviet restriction of travel into Berlin, 252, 360
and Special Forces, 116, 118–19, 318, 456–57
and STRAC, 357–58
and studies on and lessons from the Korean War, 42–44
and technical service divisions, 275
and training areas issues, 217, 327, 380, 452, 458
and troop information program, 114, 367, 383–84
U.S. Advisory/Liaison Team (Logistics), 205
U.S. Army Petroleum Distribution Command, Europe, 276–77
U.S. Army Signal Command, Europe, 276–77
and U.S. Commander, Berlin, 76, 361, 428–29
and venereal disease, 388–89
and Vietnam conflict, 464, 467
and vulnerability of support installations, 122, 277–79
and war plans for Soviet invasion, 238, 240
and World War II vehicle, weapons, and equipment refurbishment, 160, 162
United States Naval Force, Germany (USNAVFORGER), 7, 180
Urals, 433
U.S. Commander, Berlin, Office of the, 76, 361, 410, 428–29
U.S. Constabulary. See Constabulary, U.S.
U.S. European Command (U.S. EUCOM) commanders, 179, 357–58
information disclosure policy, 188–89
and MAAG responsibilities, 205
mission, 149–50
and sealing off of western sectors by Soviets and East Germans, 359–60
and USAREUR responsibilities, 159–60, 184–85, 190, 192–93
See also Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Germany.
U.S. Exchange Service, 389
U.S. Forces, Austria, 7–8, 120, 230–31
U.S. Military Academy, 190–91
U.S. Military Liaison Mission, 87, 162–69, 412, 426
U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 30, 139–40
U.S. Strike Command, 442–43
Vaclenburg, 7, 161
Valentine, Col. Charles H., 174
Valluy, General Jean-Etienne, 237–38, 298
Verdun, 62, 121, 278, 319
Versailles, 233–34
Vicenza, 232, 322–23, 395–96
Vienna, 403, 405, 407–08, 412, 417
Vietnam conflict, 439, 456, 464, 467, 470
Vilseck, 161, 202–03
Voice of America, 117–18, 134, 249–50
Von Bonin, Col. Bogislaw, 180–81
Von Kann, Brig. Gen. Clifton F., 318–19
Von Pawel, Col. Ernest, 412–13
Von Rosbach, Marion, 135
Wackernheim, 331
Warsaw Pact, 242, 246, 249–50, 335, 433, 456, 466, 467–68
Watson, Maj. Gen. Albert II, 410, 430
Watson, Maj. Gen. Numa A., 211
Weimar-Nohra, 36
Forging the Shield: the U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

West German Army (Bundeswehr)
- I German Corps, 325, 435–36
- II German Corps, 270, 284–85, 289, 325, 435–36
- III German Corps, 284–85, 289, 325, 435–36
- 1st Airborne Division, 325, 435
- 3d Armored Division, 230, 325, 435–36
- 5th Armored Division, 325, 435–36
- 12th Armored Division, 435
- 1st Armored Infantry Division, 435
- 2d Armored Infantry Division, 435
- 4th Armored Infantry Division, 435
- 6th Armored Infantry Division, 435
- 7th Armored Infantry Division, 435
- 10th Armored Infantry Division, 435
- 11th Armored Infantry Division, 435
- 1st Infantry Division, 230, 325, 435–36
- 2d Infantry Division, 435–36
- 4th Infantry Division, 435–36
- 6th Infantry Division, 435–36
- 1st Mountain Division, 325, 435–36
- Quartermaster Corps, 199–200

West Germany (German Federal Republic), 1, 3, 25, 32, 248, 333–34
- and aid from U.S. soldiers and dependents to local communities, 397–98, 400, 468–69
- and Army food service program, 69
- and atomic weapons in European defense, 104, 240–41, 246, 271, 291, 293, 297, 311–12, 366
- attitudes toward U.S. personnel, 375–77
- attitudes of U.S. personnel toward, 377–78
- Bundesgrenzschutz (border police), 9, 21, 172–76, 245
- Bundeswehr, 191–92, 196, 202, 207, 284–85, 290, 325, 327, 442, 457–58, 469
- civil-military relationship with U.S., 370–73
- Communist harassment of citizens near borders of, 76, 87, 245
- currency reform, 4, 5
- defense concepts and World War II experience used in U.S. battle plans, 41–42, 44, 466
- and East Berlin, 83–84
- and East German refugees, 362–63, 411
- and evacuation of U.S. noncombatants from, 139–41
- Federal Requisition Law, 379
- firing ranges, 28–29, 217, 290, 452
- and German-produced armaments, 326–27
- housing, 127–29, 235, 331–32
- and Interallied Tactical Study Group, 151–52
- law and U.S. military and civilians, 235–36, 327, 371–72, 391
- logistical line of support in, 12, 58, 121–23
- and logistics system for German Army, 197, 199–202
- and luxurious living of Americans in, 129, 131
- and military reorganization, 326, 442
- and missile sites, 281–82, 329–30
- new line of communications from France to, 60, 62, 63, 121, 123–24, 280–81
- purchasing of goods by Americans in, 135–36, 389–90
- and racial discrimination or segregation, 112–13
- rearmament and military training, 171–73, 176–97, 199–203, 205, 469
- schools, 131–32
- and similarities and dissimilarities to Korean War, 13, 44
- Soviet avenues of advance through, 38, 40
- Soviet concerns over military strength of, 403–04, 468
- Soviet demand for reparations from, 4–5, 35
- and Soviet military mission, 166–67
- Soviet threat to security of, 5–6, 13–14, 337
- and Special Forces, 117–19
- and support depots and storage sites, 73–74
- transition to and as sovereign nation, 76, 83, 176, 207, 233–34, 242, 469
- and U.S. retention of German-owned properties, 235, 371–72, 378–79
See also Exercises; German Training Assistance Group (GTAG); High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG); Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Germany.
Western Union Defense Organization, 5–6
Wetzlar, 240
Wiesbaden, 32, 96, 436
Williams, Maj. Gen. Edward T., 10, 375–76
Wilson, Charles E., 81–82, 123, 207–09, 252–54, 255
Wittenberg, 405–06

World War II Vehicle Replacement Program, 158–59
Worms, 427–28
“Your Rights and Obligations in Germany,” 236

Zakharov, General of the Army Nikolai F., 390
Zehlendorf, 406–07
Zirndorf, 73
Zones of occupation, 1, 363–64. See also British Zone; French Zone; Soviet Zone; U.S. Zone.
Zweibrücken, 108