INTERNATIONAL COLD WAR MILITARY RECORDS AND HISTORY

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

EDITED BY WILLIAM W. EPLEY
INTERNATIONAL COLD WAR MILITARY RECORDS AND HISTORY


Sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the United States Army Center of Military History

Edited by William W. Epley
Foreword

The end of the Cold War has created many opportunities for greater openness and communication between former adversaries. Previously, occasional bilateral exchanges and visits involving military historians and archivists of the Western and Eastern blocs had occurred, but no international gathering to discuss mutual problems had ever taken place. The conference in Washington in March 1994 that brought together over 140 representatives from 17 countries thus marks an important milestone.

Histories of the Cold War have too often been written from narrow nationalist viewpoints. The French philosopher Pascal observed, however, that truth is "not displayed by standing at one extremity, but rather by touching both ends at once and filling in all the space between." In the spirit of Pascal's wisdom, the conference organizers and sponsors sought to begin a more meaningful search for the historical truth by building a more solid foundation at both ends of the former East-West political and multi-national rivalry through a greater understanding of one another's military archives and historical programs.

In the United States, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provided strong encouragement for this effort, while the Legacy Resource Management Program provided the funds for its organization and publication of its proceedings. The Legacy Program, currently administered by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security, was created in 1991 to enhance the management of Department of Defense (DoD) natural and cultural resources. One significant aspect of the program is the physical and literary history of the Cold War, hence the great interest of its program managers in this international meeting.

At the conference participants from 12 nations not only presented and discussed their formal papers, but also considered ways to maintain the spirit of cooperation through future joint programs. Possibilities included microfilming records and inventories, preparing joint documentary publications, exchanging research scholars, and holding other international conferences on Cold War themes. Consideration also began on the future establishment of a regular mechanism for coordinating such exchanges of information.

As a follow-up to the conference, the U.S. Department of Defense set up a Cold War Historical Committee composed of representatives from the
Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint History Office, and each of the military service history offices. The committee seeks to promote the exchange of information concerning Cold War historical activities among DoD historical offices, international military history and archives institutions, and other concerned governmental and private organizations. The U.S. Army Center of Military History serves as the executive agent for the committee.

So far the committee has undertaken two specific projects. With Legacy Program funds, it provided short-term grants to 15 international scholars to conduct research in the United States during the fall of 1994 on various subjects related to Cold War military history. Participants included scholars from Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom. In addition, the committee began publication and circulation of a semiannual newsletter, Cold War History Newsletter, the first issue of which appeared in January 1995.

It is my hope that the conference has established a foundation for the future sharing of information regarding military aspects of the Cold War. All, indeed, will benefit from a process that promotes greater openness among nations.

ALFRED GOLDBERG
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INTERNATIONAL COLD WAR MILITARY RECORDS AND HISTORY
Introduction

The International Conference on Cold War Military History and Records, held in Washington, D.C. 21-26 March 1994, was the culmination of nearly two years of planning and preparation. The original impetus for the conference came from a September 1992 proposal of Dr. Alfred Goldberg, Historian for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz. Dr. Goldberg expressed concern about the danger that ongoing political and economic turmoil in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc presented to their invaluable historical records of the Cold War era. He stated that it would be in the best interests of the Department of Defense (DoD) "to assist military historians and archivists in these countries in identifying and preserving their records and making them more readily accessible."

Dr. Goldberg proposed several actions to accomplish these objectives. The most important were to sponsor an international conference in Washington, D.C., and publish the conference's proceedings. The conference would review all aspects of Cold War military history, with the primary focus on official archival and historical programs and on declassification of and access to records. The centerpiece would be a case study of one of the most critical confrontations of the Cold War—the Berlin crisis of 1958-61. Dr. Goldberg believed that the conference and the resulting personal contacts that would be established among the military historians and archivists of the former Cold War antagonists would accelerate the process of understanding among the nations and the development of new and cooperative approaches to the study of the history of the Cold War.

After receiving Under Secretary Wolfowitz's approval, Dr. Goldberg submitted a request to DoD's Legacy Resource Management Program for funds to hold the conference. He asked the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) to plan and conduct the proposed conference and to act as the executive agent for OSD. Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, Chief of Military History, agreed and gave me responsibility for organizing the conference. I delegated principal planning authority to Dr. Judy Bellafaire,
who had successfully planned and conducted the large conferences of Army Historians in 1990 and 1992.

Initial plans called for the conference to be held in late 1993. Delays in obtaining funding, however, forced the rescheduling of the conference to March 1994. Dr. Bellafaire and I contacted official historians in the other U.S. armed services and in Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands who had taken part in past CMH conferences to determine interest and willingness to participate. We also turned for advice in organizing the conference to a number of experienced and knowledgeable people: my longtime friend and colleague, Dr. Bruce W. Menning of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Dr. James Hershberg of the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington; and Dr. Rebecca Cameron, the manager of the Cold War Task Area of the Legacy Resource Management Program. Representatives from the U.S. Holocaust Museum, the Library of Congress, the National Security Archive, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, the National Archives, the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), and historians from other U.S. government agencies also furnished helpful insights.

During the summer of 1993 I met individually with the military attachés from Russia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and the Czech and Slovak Republics and formally invited their countries to participate in the Cold War Conference as guests of the Department of Defense. I also sought and obtained permission for representatives of CMH and OSD to visit their countries to discuss the details and requirements of the conference with the official historians and archivists, potential participants, and, if necessary, their superiors. Dr. Ronald Landa, who acted as the conference’s project officer on Dr. Goldberg’s staff, and I visited Eastern Europe and Russia in September 1993 to make the necessary official connections. This trip, as well as prompt acceptances from the Western European and Canadian invitees, assured that the conference could indeed be held in March 1994 as planned.

A major area of concern was translation and interpretation services. Because the costs of simultaneous translation were beyond our budget, we decided to translate all papers into Russian and English and allow all non-English speakers to present their papers in their native tongue if they desired. Eight military interpreters from the Defense Language Institute (DLI) acted as escorts to the Russian, Czech, Slovak, and Polish visitors and assisted them in question and answer sessions. The American military linguists from DLI were: Specialist Janaki Alishio (Air Force), Czech; Senior Airman Anastasia Campbell (Air Force), Russian; Petty Officer 2d
Class Samuel Dale (Navy), Russian; Master Sergeant John M. Jaworski (Air Force), Polish; Sergeant First Class Jack K. Holman (Army), Russian and DLI Team Leader; Staff Sergeant Jeffrey Roberts (Air Force), Russian; Sergeant Kenneth Silver (Army), Russian; and Staff Sergeant William Walsh (Air Force), Russian. A contract interpreter fluent in Magyar assisted the Hungarians.

The ground-breaking conference was held from 21 to 26 March 1994 in the Crystal City Doubletree Hotel. Nearly 140 historians and archivists from 17 countries took part. In addition to taking part in the formal sessions, participants were able to visit the National Archives, the National Security Archive, the Pentagon, and the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Important relationships were established and the open and free exchange of information and concerns confirmed Dr. Goldberg’s original expectations. Two special sessions of the official participants resulted in agreements on future contacts and cooperation. In addition, Dr. Goldberg proposed the establishment of a semi-annual DoD Cold War History Newsletter for exchanging information among the countries on their Cold War activities, programs, and publications.

The Department of Defense subsequently established a Cold War Historical Committee under the executive agency of the Center of Military History. The committee coordinates the exchange of information on Cold War historical work among the services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and OSD. Much of the committee’s work has been ably carried out by Mr. William W. Epley of CMH’s Field and International Branch, who was given the specific tasks of editing the conference papers, guiding them through the publication process, preparing the Cold War History Newsletter (the first issue of which appeared in January 1995), and assisting Dr. Bellafaire in managing the research travel grant program. In the summer of 1994 the committee, with funds from the Legacy Program, provided travel grants to 15 scholars to visit Washington for research in the holdings of the National Archives and Records Administration and various service historical centers. The visits of these historians and archivists from Austria, France, Great Britain, Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Poland not only cemented official and personal relationships previously established during the March meetings but also brought in some new scholars and countries which had not participated in the conference. The Cold War Historical Committee hopes to sponsor another international conference in 1996.

Many people have contributed significantly of their time and talents to assure the success of the conference and produce this publication. Drs.
Goldberg and Landa of the OSD Historical Office were critical from the very first and never wavered in their support and encouragement. Brig. Gen. Nelson and Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, Chief Historian, CMH, provided essential support. Dr. Bellafaire carried the main burden of planning with grace and aplomb. Drs. Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., and Robert K. Wright Jr., along with Messrs. Billy Arthur and Ted Ballard, lent their considerable assistance before and during the conference. Special mention must be made of Mr. Terry Offer, the secretary of Field and International Branch, who is an exceptional jack-of-all-trades and made enormous, although largely unseen, contributions to the success of the conference. To all of them, my everlasting appreciation for their many, many contributions.

My deepest thanks are due to Frank G. Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who delivered the opening address at the conference, and to Dr. Dennis Bark, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, who spoke at a luncheon session regarding post-World War II developments in Germany. The conference would not have proceeded smoothly without the skill of those who served as moderators at the various sessions: Dr. Goldberg; Dr. Stuart Rochester, Deputy OSD Historian; General William Y. Smith, ret. (USAF); General Nelson; Col. Steven Bowman, Director, U.S. Army Military History Institute; Dr. Kent Zetterberg, Department of Military History, Swedish Armed Forces Staff and War College; Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, Chief, Historical Office, SHAPE/NATO; Dr. Jaroslav Hrbek, Deputy Director, Research Bureau, Historical Institute of the Army of the Czech Republic; and Dr. Dean C. Allard, Director of Naval History, U.S. Naval Historical Center.

Throughout the planning process and during the conference itself, Dr. Bruce W. Menning was our primary link to the Russian military historians and archivists. To him more than anyone else goes credit for obtaining and maintaining participation of the Russian delegation. His personal knowledge of the subject matter, extensive contacts with Russian officials in Moscow, and his deep commitment to establishing a dialogue with our Russian colleagues were keys to the success of the conference. Drs. Menning and Landa, along with Dr. J. Dane Hartgrove of the National Archives, also assisted in translating the Russian papers.

Dr. Goldberg’s initiative already has produced significant results which have enhanced our knowledge and understanding of the Cold War. These proceedings are a very visible result of the International Conference on Cold War Military History and Records, but even more important are the vibrant official and personal contacts that have grown up among and between the archivists and historians of the participating nations. Former
adversaries have now joined their efforts and begun to open their archives
to each other so that we, as well as future generations, can further our
understanding of the tense and difficult period known as the Cold War.

JOHN T. GREENWOOD
Chief, Field Programs and Historical Services Division
U.S. Army Center of Military History
Project Director, Cold War Military History and Archives Conference
Chairman, DoD Cold War Historical Committee
SECTION I

Russian Perspectives on the Cold War
The Cold War: Origins and Lessons

Major General V.A. Zolotarev

The global confrontation between the two systems that lasted almost 50 years and brought the world to the brink of suicide now may be assessed as an era which generally has come to an end. Naturally, the significance of its outcome allows for greater understanding of the preconditions and the early stages of the "Cold War," its main characteristics, its general nature, and its lessons for the future.

Favorable opportunities for studying this extremely dramatic and very instructive period have been greatly expanded with the introduction into scientific circulation of a wide range of heretofore classified documents.

The combined efforts of scientists, politicians, scholars, and representatives of the general public in Russia and the United States have greatly assisted the search for answers to various questions which in turn has lead to greater comprehension and appreciation of this period of acute international confrontation. It is important that this joint activity gains in strength. Examples of this strength are the international symposia and conferences held in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Washington and Moscow and dedicated to different aspects of the former confrontation of the two military and political blocs. It should be stressed that the criteria for the participants of these historical forums was not an ideological one imbued with national selfishness. Rather, the participants have as a priority the interests of humanity and carry responsibility for the destiny of world civilization. This allows new opportunities for more objective and thorough illumination of the history of the "Cold War" throughout all its course, from its inception to the end.

In assessing the historiography, it is obvious that the "Cold War" more often has been considered thus far within international community as a phenomenon that dealt mainly with the military confrontation on a global scale. This is why researchers have focused mainly on such post-World War II events as the Berlin and Caribbean crises, the Korean War,
Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Much attention also is paid to analysis of various aspects of the arms race, especially the accumulation of strategic nuclear missiles. Finally, many works are dedicated to the ideological contradictions of the two social and political systems. Much less attention has been devoted to the study of basic processes, such as those dealing with the economic interests and geopolitical ambitions of the opposing blocs.

*The Problem of Culprits of the “Cold War”*

During the years of the anti-Hitler coalition, geopolitical ambition and ideological contradictions between the communist USSR and western democracies were put aside (but did not vanish) because the major priority was defeat of the common enemy — Fascist Germany. However, immediately after the defeat of the Third Reich, a drastic turn in international relations developed in 1945 that was directly connected with the results of the war. Contradictions began to appear between the western democracies and the Soviet model of totalitarianism, which in due course took the form of the “Cold War.” But what shape would it take? How long would it last? What would be the end result (would it develop into a “Hot War”)? All the answers to these questions depended upon politicians.

Looking for a culprit in the “Cold War” is in our opinion a useless exercise because everything in world politics is inter-connected. Thus, any action of one party, which at first glance provided an incentive for the escalation of hostility, if studied thoroughly, will turn out to be a response to some measure of the opponent. One should be forthright: both opposing parties did not act with pristine motives and this led to increased tensions on a global scale in the post-war period, even though the cooperation reached during World War II created conditions for the coordinated solving of problems. The USSR did not maximize its huge moral authority obtained during the war to consolidate peace-loving forces. The imperial ambitions of Stalin and his advisors triumphed. The USA and other western countries, blinded by anti-communism, saw the “Hand of Moscow” in all popular liberation movements (the increasing influence of left-wing forces in the first post-war years, the struggle for the liberation of colonies, demonstrations against nuclear diplomacy, etc.). Many factors contributed to this; among them, the aspiration of the USSR to establish pro-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe, attempts of the western allies to accept unilaterally the capitulation of German troops in Italy, Roosevelt’s death, the unexpected cessation of Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR, and so forth. At the London (September 1945) and Moscow (December 1945)
Conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers, attempts of the USSR to pursue again the policy of “spheres of interests” did not succeed, nor did Western attempts to prevent the establishment of pro-Soviet governments in Bulgaria and Rumania.

Churchill’s speech in Fulton, Missouri, became an ideological manifesto of the “Cold War.” It was given during a period when the USSR was trying to create pro-Soviet autonomous republics in Iran (Iran, Azerbaijan, and Kurdistan). Truman put forward his doctrine (1947) in response to the policy of the Soviet Union in the Balkans (proposals about the joint defense with Turkey of the Black Sea straits and support to the Greek communists in their struggle against the pro-American government). This is the way that the geopolitical confrontation developed.

In that same year, 1947, the “Marshall Plan” was adopted. The plan provided for the economic rehabilitation of Europe with American aid and under control of the US. The Soviet Union rejected the plan and prevented its extension to the countries of Eastern Europe. This greatly contributed towards the economic collapse of Eastern Europe. The famous American statesman George F. Kennan’s well-known letter in 1947 about “restraining communism” also contributed to an increase in tensions. At Communist Party meetings, Stalin called for increased vigilence in the struggle against “war mongers” and American imperialists seeking at world domination. These statements contributed to the ideological emergence of two opposing camps. Finally, Stalin’s concept of “the world camp” naturally had a geopolitical character with the USSR at the center, the countries of the peoples’ democracies in the next circle, and the outside circle comprised of colonial countries struggling against imperialism.

Was it possible to prevent such a development and avoid the “Cold War”? Obviously, yes, although a subjective analysis is contrary to historical science. But to prevent the Cold War, it was necessary for the USSR to recognize the economic interests of the West in Eastern Europe and for the USA and the European democracies to have a greater understanding of Soviet national interests and the apprehensions of its leadership regarding the creation of a new “cordon sanitaire” around the USSR. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Geopolitical and economic problems (the gist), covered with ideological camouflage (the phenomenon), severely limited cooperation among the former allies and brought about the formation of opposing military and political blocs.

The precondition for creation of these blocs was initiated by the “Marshall Plan” that split Europe into two groups of states: those who adopted the plan and those who rejected it. This was followed by the Soviet Union’s creation in 1947 of the Information Bureau of Communist
Parties (COMINFORM) which coordinated activity of the ruling parties in the countries where those parties determined all policy, including military. Then, in 1948, a system of inter-state treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe was made. These were treaties of an “anti-western” orientation. Actually, these treaties were all bilateral agreements, but altogether (35 treaties) they formed an interconnected system. Finally, in 1949, a Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) was created by the Soviet Union.

The West responded by creating a Western European Union (England, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg) in 1948, and the next year a military and political North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established, which included 12 states (the USA, Canada, and 10 countries of Western Europe). In this manner, the opposition blocs were formed, a process which ended in 1955 with the creation of the Warsaw Pact organization.

Parallel with the development of political antagonisms, an escalating arms race by the opposing camps was taking place. The West decided to oppose the military power of Soviet field armies (located in the center of Europe and capable of reaching the English Channel in two weeks) with air-atomic and later missile-nuclear power. The prefixes “air-” and “missile-” are very important here. They are important because in our historiography much attention was devoted to the destructive power of atomic (nuclear) weapons. In nuclear competition, after a short delay, we advanced to the level of the USA. As far as the potential of a weapon is concerned (in 1961 a nuclear weapon with the potential of about 60 megatons was tested), we surpassed the US. Soviet aviation could use nuclear weapons within the full depth of the Western Europe, and general conventional forces could occupy these vast territories in a short period of time.

Taking into consideration national traditions and experience of World War II, the USA capitalized on its strategic aviation to provide the striking power for its nuclear weapons. Only the US possessed both strategic aviation and nuclear weapons during the first post-war years. American air-power theorist A. Seversky stated that the decisive factor was not the nuclear weapon itself but the new means of delivering the nuclear weapon to the target (strategic aviation and later missiles). US specialists believed that these assets would bring victory in a future war. Soviet analysts believed that the indisputable technological superiority of American over Soviet industry, combined with American experience in the air war against Germany and Japan, would allow the U.S. to wage a war on its conditions while the ground war was conceded to the Soviets.
The US concluded that military superiority was to be maintained by the maximum development of air (space) offensive assets to the detriment of its Army and Navy [until the SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) appeared]. These priorities were the foundation of the strategy of “massive retaliation,” with the obvious emphasis on strategic aviation. Strategic nuclear forces [ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), SLBM, strategic aviation] were a very important component of all the succeeding strategies of the USA and NATO (“counter-force,” “credible deterrence,” “direct confrontation,” and so forth) in combination with the development of general-purpose forces. These were also aimed at waging local wars and conflicts within the framework of the strategy of “flexible response.”

The Soviet Union accepted the challenge and became involved in the strategic nuclear missile arms race while in fact playing on an unfamiliar field. This created a constant “race after the leader (USA)” mentality. In the end, it overstrained the Soviet Union as the increasing level of militarization perniciously influenced the national economy of the USSR. But all of that was only revealed later, in the 1980s. However, from the late 1940s and into the 1950s, the “Cold War” assumed the form of ideological competition and an unprecedented arms race. Still, it was a war; even though “Cold”, it was almost always on the verge of becoming “Hot.” During these years, the world experienced not only the lessening of military danger, as was expected by nations after the nightmare of world slaughter, but also its escalation. The point was that the number of local wars and military conflicts grew in comparison with the previous periods of world history. Absolutely new types and forms of confrontation also appeared—less evident, camouflaged, but no less dangerous (“undeclared” wars, wars “by proxy,” balancing “on the verge of war,” military “intimidation,” and so forth).

One of the first crises occurred in Berlin in 1948–49, which was provoked by the Soviet blockade of land routes to West Berlin. The crisis’ main cause was introduction by the Western powers of monetary units in the occupied territory of Germany, which was believed to be economically damaging to the Soviet occupation zone. The blockade of air supply routes to West Berlin might have brought military conflict to Europe with unpredictable consequences. Fortunately, a compromise was found on 5 May 1949 during the negotiations among the former allies. The blockade of Berlin was lifted.

The second Berlin crisis and the threat of war appeared in August 1961 in connection with the construction of the “Berlin Wall.” As was officially announced, the Wall was built for the purpose of suppressing subversive activities against the GDR (German Democratic Republic)
from West Berlin. But such actions were an open violation by the USSR and the GDR of international legislation and inter-allied agreements on the status of Berlin, where U.S., British, and French troops were located. An armed confrontation appeared inevitable but was eased as a result of various contacts between Khrushchev and Kennedy. An informal agreement was reached about free access to Berlin for Allied servicemen and citizens. Judgement about the events of the confrontation can now be made because the USA has just declassified correspondence between the governments of the two countries on this matter.

Later a much more difficult decision was reached by Khrushchev and Kennedy in one of the most dramatic episodes of the “Cold War”—the Caribbean Crisis. Now that the USA has declassified the personal correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy during the time of the crisis, it becomes clear that Americans themselves unintentionally provoked the USSR to place missiles on Cuba.

The point is that at the end of the 1950s, when the US and the USSR possessed ICBMs, the two countries were holding equal positions, determined by the time of flight of missiles between both sides (approximately 30 minutes). The level of missile detection capabilities was also equal (15 minutes). In order to gain an advantage in case of war, in early 1962 the USA installed the medium-ranged missiles “Thor” and “Jupiter” in Europe (in Turkey, Italy, and England), which were capable of striking the USSR in 10–12 minutes. To equalize the threat, the Soviet Union in October 1962 secretly introduced into Cuba the medium-ranged “R-12” missiles capable of destroying objects 2000 kilometers inland in the US and began their installation.

The USSR’s action was a response in kind, but also dissimilar because the U.S., according to NATO decisions, had installed its missiles in Europe openly. The USSR was doing it secretly, and even its own people and the international organizations did not know it. When the secret was disclosed, the USSR explained that its desire was to protect Cuba against American aggression. The secret delivery of Russian missiles to Cuba was disclosed by the USA, and it was the main reason for the “missile crisis.” As a result of Russian-American talks, the Russian missiles were removed from Cuba and the American missiles were removed from Turkey and Europe.

The Caribbean crisis was considered by world public opinion as an extremely dangerous precedent. Such events could result in a global nuclear war. After 1962, the USA and the USSR stopped threatening each other with nuclear weapons and avoided creating conflicts. The main lesson of the crisis was that even under conditions of military-political contradictions and mutual suspicions, a strong desire for talks indicated the
possibility of achieving compromise. Later in the “Cold War” there were other military and political crises which were also capable of transforming themselves into global conflict (the wars in Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan).

An impartial analysis of “Cold War” events, when new facts and documents are disclosed, may help to find more objective answers to the causes of these Cold War confrontations. As mentioned earlier, the “Cold War” was not predetermined. History always presents alternatives, and there are always choices for the actors. The politicians responsible for their respective governments did not take advantage of opportunities when they presented themselves. In the late 1940s and 1950s, for example, two such opportunities appeared which could have improved relations between the USSR and the USA. These were the decisions taken respectively to create the Warsaw Pact and NATO. World public opinion came out against the overall threat of nuclear war. The best minds of humanity, such as Einstein, Russell, Kapitsa, and Sakharov, headed the movement to prevent nuclear war. These people initiated growth in the human conscience of world society. Thanks to them, the increasing impasse of the arms race was broken and the ice of “Cold War” melted. With this result, we hope for the best.

A number of politicians did try to normalize the international situation. Changes took place in the USSR, for example, after Stalin’s death. President Eisenhower’s election led many leaders in both the West and East to believe in the possibility of ending the Cold War. The war in Korea was over, and there were increasing contacts between the USSR and the USA in science, education, and the arts. For the first time since World War II, a meeting of the heads of governments of the USSR, the USA, the UK, and France took place in 1955. The growth of military expenditures in the USA was reduced, and a reduction of armed forces took place in the USSR.

During the summit in 1955, Eisenhower proposed the “Open Skies” Plan to control armaments of both sides (the USSR proposed that both sides should control their own representatives in garrisons, bases, and communication centers). Khrushchev refused Eisenhower’s plan because “Open Skies” could have shown how far behind the USSR was in the development of new armaments and exposed Khrushchev’s myth of the colossal military power of the USSR. However, the meeting in Geneva eased international tension (reduction of armed forces, trade development, cultural links.) But then events of 1956 in Egypt and Hungary negated all of this. The “Cold War” started again. The next relative softening was in 1959. Khrushchev’s visit to the USA, the accord for the next summit, and in 1960, Eisenhower’s invitation to Moscow—all this promised to ease ten-
sions. But the well-known incident involving American pilot-spy Francis Gary Powers, who was shot down on 1 May 1960 in the USSR, destroyed all hopes.

Hopes were restored after the Caribbean crisis when a constructive dialogue between Khrushchev and Kennedy led to an accord prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, space, and under water. Kennedy’s assassination stopped the process. A new round of the arms race began, the Vietnam War began, and events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 worsened the international situation again.

What lessons can be drawn from the history of the 1950s and 1960s? First of all, policy is the art of patient dialogue with an opponent. One cannot do it without studying the details of proposals given by the parties (such as the “Open Skies” proposal), during periods of stress or in response to perceived provocation.

In the close interconnected world of those days, the balance of force was a detriment to the balance of interests. The priorities of geopolitical ambitions and ideological stereotypes seriously constrained the possibilities for compromise and did not lead to constructive policy.

For this same reason, the lessening of tensions in the beginning of the 1970s was short lived. This easing of tensions appeared under conditions of military and strategic parity, when both blocs realized that victory in nuclear war was impossible and that they should cooperate in ways that would prevent nuclear catastrophe [ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile), SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)–1, and SALT–2 agreements]. But egotistical national and allied interests contributed to the instability of the eased tension. The USA and its allies wanted to weaken the Warsaw Pact and the USSR’s influence in the “Third World.” They tried to weaken the Soviet system and democratize it, thereby creating more chances to increase the influence of imperialism in the world.

Lack of coincidence in interests led to an increase in the use of armed force and other non-constructive actions. Americans were doing their best to overcome Russia by means of improving the quality of their strategic armaments based on new technologies.

The USSR was also again involved in the new round of the armament race. It was a hard round for the USSR because its economy started to fail. During the last four Five-Year plans the USSR did not have any national income growth.

But in the 1970s–80s, the Soviet government did not pay attention to that fact or did not realize this until too late. In the European part of the USSR new medium-range RSD–10 (SS–20) missiles were deployed with the capability of destroying targets in the full depth of Western Europe,
and in 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. The West in turn deployed “Pershing-2” and cruise missiles in Europe and continued to build up new expensive armaments.

In the beginning of 1980, the USA had 550 “Minuteman-3” ICBMs with 3 warheads each to counterbalance 820 Soviet ICBMs. All these American ICBMs were capable of destroying 4300 warheads and 39% of the Soviet potential. The USSR was capable of destroying 91% of all American ICBMs. Theoretically it could be done by launching 210 ICBM “SS-18” (each with ten warheads) against American ICBM launch silos. As a result of this strike, 1,960 warheads and 18% of all American warheads would be destroyed. But it was a heavy burden for the Soviet economy to carry such potential.

According to DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) information on this period of the “Cold War,” 144 assembly factories were producing armaments in the Soviet Union. Among them, 24 produced ground armaments, 34 naval armaments, 37 aviation armaments, and 49 produced missile armaments. There were 3500 other factories supplying these assembly factories. The larger part of the factories belonged to nine ministries, responsible for research and armament production.

Nationally, militarization consumed 72 kopeks of every ruble, all spent for military purposes. At the same time, this armament improvement increased the danger of nuclear war. Under conditions of increased political tension, it was extremely dangerous. Being on the verge of nuclear war, Western and Eastern politicians considered scientists’ opinions and the voice of world opinion. In 1985, constructive dialogue between the USA and the USSR took place. It led to an agreement about the liquidation of short- and medium-range nuclear missiles and the signing of the SALT-1 and SALT-2 agreements.

What conclusions can be drawn from our analysis of the “Cold War?” First, one can say that the people who governed their countries after World War II allowed geopolitical ambitions, ideological convictions, and suspicions to shape their policies.

For all its vices, humanity paid a huge price to draw such conclusions. The primary conclusion is that the search for agreements should not be a single act but a permanent process and a factor in international relations. Sincerity, trust, and openness should characterize a politician, not bluff, cunning, and deception.

We would do well to listen to Eisenhower’s advice when he said, “The most terrible thing is when policy is in the hands of military.” As a professional military man, he knew of what he spoke. Besides, he knew military problems too well. It was 1958, when generals and lobbyists insisted on
increasing the military budget because the US was lagging behind the USSR. But Eisenhower knew the real state of matters and did not submit to their influence. He said that the government can only hope to God if the president did not know the military as well as he did. Probably he was right. In my opinion, Eisenhower's term as the president of the USA is not studied profoundly in Russia. As a serviceman he made efforts to normalize relations between two countries, soften confrontation, and hold the extremists at bay in his country. Being a professional military man, he turned out to be a famous politician of international class.

A professional military man is known by his mechanical and mathematical abilities. He prefers to know for sure how many missiles, bombs, and submarines there are. A statesman prefers to pay attention to the balance of interests, not to the balance of forces. I would like to correct myself: military policy cannot be pursued without servicemen, but it must be led by statesmen. If we want to avoid "Cold Wars," we need new politicians who are capable of appreciating democratic values. They should be free from national egoism and global interests. As Churchill once said, "Statesmen are not politicians because politicians always think about the forthcoming elections and statesmen think of the future generations."

One should understand the fact that the end of the "Cold War" does not mean that old habits, tradition, psychology, and mentality disappear. The course of domestic and foreign policy can be changed, but it is much harder to transform political mentality, the way of thinking, and peoples' views. There is a confrontational way of thinking which is used during crises to achieve self-interested goals. An example is military slogans and speeches made by leaders of national parties and movements during recent elections in our country. Their success is a very dangerous symptom. It means that the rudiments of the "Cold War" were deeply rooted in the consciousness of the Russian people. There are also reasons to believe that the psychological war is an element of the "Cold War" and is now being transferred to the former Soviet bloc. This is proved by a number of malicious attacks on Russian history, the history of World War II, and the historical traditions of our people, which never disappear from the ultra-radical and even centrist press in countries of Eastern Europe, the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), and in Russia. These actions are aimed at leaving our people without an historical memory. It is no mere chance that the scandalously famous writer Viktor Suvorov (Rezun) says in the preface to his notorious book, Ice-Breaker, "The memory of the just war (World War II) is the only one with support in society. I'm destroying it." The relapses to "Cold War" thinking are inherent in the public con-
sciousness of other countries’ people, in those who took an active part in the East and West confrontation.

The most important lesson of the “Cold War” is that the severe realities of this nuclear century require us to oppose the irrational military-technical opposition to the idea of equal security for everybody. Without nuclear confrontation, redundant armaments have to be reduced to reasonable levels adequate to meet the current threat (for instance, unauthorized launching of nuclear tipped missiles, the appearance of new nuclear powers with extremist regimes, etc.). It will be difficult to create a global system of averting war on the basis of total, mutual, and equal security.

Well-grounded answers to the insistent questions of modern times can be provided by thorough research of the social-political and military-technical aspects of “Cold War” history. Finally, the reliable national security of nations and the whole world can be achieved by reducing international tensions and by recognizing historical experiences and developing mutually beneficial and cooperative partnerships.

APPENDIX

In March 1946 the process of fanning the “Cold War” was strongly initiated. First there was the example of Churchill in Fulton, then Stalin’s answers to foreign reporters. The former talked about an iron curtain controlled by a Moscow police regime in the USSR and other countries where the principles of democracy were not being observed. The latter equated the recent ally to a “war monger” and accused him of calling for aggression against the USSR and repeating Hitler’s theory of races.

It is probably time to enlarge our understanding of the “Cold War.” I would object to a too narrow explanation of it as a “condition of the international relations system.”

The basic characteristic of this “condition” was the opposition of two social-political systems during a technical-industrial revolution and an arms race fraught with dangers of nuclear holocaust for both sides. It is not possible to understand this explanation of the “Cold War” at once. Initially the politics embraced only a propagandistic level without scientific overtones. Very soon Truman replaced Churchill (the American president attended the Fulton speech), and Great Britain was replaced by the USA as the main enemy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet press was filled with articles which revealed the imperialistic nature of the “Marshall Plan,” the anti-Soviet essence of the Truman Doctrine, etc.
It was the information about American research on thermonuclear weapons and their testing in October 1952, however, which led to thermonuclear tests in the USSR. At the same time, the creation of a “Super Bomb” was also stimulated by American testing in October 1952. US national security would not have been damaged if the Americans had listened to the advice of J. Robert Oppenheimer and had not gone forward with the creation of the “Super Bomb.” Moreover, the Soviet Union would not have managed to take the lead position in the creation of nuclear weapons, because the United States had time to respond to the Soviet program.

The most important landmarks in nuclear weapons creation by the Soviet Union were:

a. The first chain reaction in an experimental nuclear reactor (December 25, 1946);
b. Critical mass produced in a plutonium reactor (June 10, 1948);
c. The first test of a plutonium bomb (August 29, 1949);
d. The first test of a uranium bomb (Uranium-235) (October 1951);
e. The first test of a thermonuclear bomb of 200–400 kilotons (August 12, 1953);
f. The first test of a “super bomb” of 1600 kilotons (November 22, 1955).

The Beginning of Nuclear Confrontation

During the decades of the “Cold War,” the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the USA repeatedly took part in various incidents. Here are a few examples which led to alerts of US strategic forces:

a. A US aircraft was shot down over Yugoslavia (November 1946);
b. Inauguration of the president of Hungary (February 1947);
c. Berlin crisis (January 1948, April 1948, June 1948);
d. Korean War; European security (July 1950);
e. Japanese and South Korean security (August 1954);
f. Soviet aid to Guatemala (May 1954);
g. Suez crisis (October 1956);
h. Political crisis in Lebanon (July 1958);
i. Political crisis in Jordan (July 1958);
j. Conflict between China and Taiwan (July 1958) (Quemoy and Matsu islands);
k. Berlin crisis (May 1959, June 1961),
l. Installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba (October 1962);
m. Removal of American missiles from Turkey (April 1963);

n. North Korean seizure of “Pueblo” (January 1968);

o. The Arab-Israel War (October 1973).

This list includes those incidents during which American strategic forces with nuclear war missions could have received an order to conduct nuclear strikes. The list excludes incidents with possible use of tactical nuclear forces. There were a total of 18 incidents, 14 of which came close to involving Soviet forces and 9 of which were estimated by the American political leadership to have posed a serious threat of starting a direct conflict with the Soviet Union. The nuclear threat was used more often during the early years, when the USA dominated strategic positions. In the late 1960s, when the USSR achieved equality with the USA, the threat was real only twice. However, the USSR brought its strategic forces to alert only once, during the Caribbean crisis.

**Strategic Balance in the 1980s**

The Secretary of Defense at that time, Harold Brown, delivered in his report of the military budget for the 1982 Fiscal Year an analysis of how an exchange of Soviet and American alert forces would influence the strategic balance. The analysis of this scenario shows:

1. Until 1987 the exchange between Soviet and American nuclear forces with Soviet preventive strikes against American forces on everyday alert could have given the Soviet Union considerable advantage in equivalent megatonnage, that would be evident either observing the terms of SALT or without it. The United States, as previously, would have “the large residual ability to launch a strike at the Soviet and non-Soviet military and industrial objectives and government centers.” In the conditions of full alert, the correlation of forces after an exchange of strikes would have been more advantageous for the United States.

2. Until the late 1980s, Soviet aggression “could have probably brought to the retained forces, a correlation less advantageous for the USSR than earlier” because the USA had new kinds of strategic weapons.

3. Within the SALT limitations the whole situation seemed more favorable for the USA. This was determined by the fact that the USSR would have considerably enlarged strategic weapons without the SALT.

4. At worst the potential of US strategic forces would be considerable for retaliatory strikes after an exchange of mutual strikes (i.e., even after the US would launch a retaliatory strike at the Soviet objectives).
Defense Production

The following data on military production during these years illustrates the relative lag of the USSR in the arms race:

Defense Industry Group of Ministries of the USSR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of the Industry</th>
<th>Production items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aviation industry</td>
<td>Aircraft and tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense industry</td>
<td>Weaponry for Army regular arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessel industry</td>
<td>Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric industry</td>
<td>Electronic components and equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio industry</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal industry</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle machine building</td>
<td>Nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General machine building</td>
<td>Strategic missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine building</td>
<td>Ammunition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annual Production of the Main Types of Weapons in the USSR, 1966–1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical aviation aircraft</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>3100</td>
<td>4250</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>5500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such increases in weapons' production were directly connected to the increase of military spending. The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) estimates are not a surprise because they are partly based on the industrial output. However, the value of the material is determined not only by quantity but by quality. The USSR's defense industry as well as that of the western countries faced the problem of increased costs for every new generation of the weapons. This was explained first by the use of very expensive and rare raw materials, modern technology, and the large amount of electricity and electronics, all of which increased prices; second, by the relatively high level of spending on research and development.

From 1974 to 1978 the USSR's profits from selling weapons to all buyers increased from 12 to 15 percent of all exports and became an important
factor in Soviet foreign trade. But the importance of weapons’ export for the Soviet defense industry during those years can be illustrated by more visible results. US Government estimates of Soviet defense spending and weapons sales allow us to calculate that from 1974 to 1978 the value of the weapons’ exports in Soviet rubles accounted for approximately 16–20% of the Soviet spending for buying modern technology for their Armed Forces. Probably one-sixth of the total Soviet military production was either exported or replaced already exported armaments.

The Production and Export of the Main Types of Weapons
(from 1976 till the middle of 1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of weapons</th>
<th>Produced</th>
<th>Sold</th>
<th>Percent Sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks and Self-propelled Guns</td>
<td>17975</td>
<td>7877</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>7150</td>
<td>17093</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Vehicles</td>
<td>28250</td>
<td>9678</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Ships (big)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Ships (middle and small)</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aircraft</td>
<td>6950</td>
<td>3172</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>4725</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Ground-to-air” Missiles</td>
<td>265000</td>
<td>16041</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison of Military Spending and of the Number of
NATO and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces

Military Spending (in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Institute of Strategic Studies (London)</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>88,983</td>
<td>142,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Allies</td>
<td>60,471</td>
<td>98,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149,454</td>
<td>240,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>214,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw Pact Allies</td>
<td>7,937</td>
<td>16,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>139,937</td>
<td>230,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stockholm Research Institute

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>110,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Allies</td>
<td>74,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>184,028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Strength of Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>2,130,000</td>
<td>2,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Allies</td>
<td>2,944,300</td>
<td>2,847,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,074,300</td>
<td>4,897,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>3,575,000</td>
<td>3,663,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw Pact Allies</td>
<td>1,064,000</td>
<td>1,101,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,639,000</td>
<td>4,764,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The “Cold War” is history.
2. Getting over its vestiges, both material (weapons) and moral (individual and social psychology), will be difficult. Only together, openly cooperating with mutual respect for national interests, can we overcome the syndrome of the “Cold War.”
Ladies and Gentlemen! Honored Colleagues!

Let me thank the representatives of the office of the Secretary of Defense, the USA Defense Department, and the Army Military History Center of the United States of America for organizing this conference that is so important for today and for inviting all the Russian military historians to participate in it. In these measures we see the results of the warming of relations that has begun between our countries.

Our American colleagues have created good conditions for us to work productively. The open discussions and exchange of information facilitate the coordination of military historians and the development of unified views on many contemporary issues, including the critical issues of the "Cold War." Conference discussion of the Cold War is significant in that the discussion as a whole is based on genuine archival documents, which, as is known, represent the character and memory of a nation. As a reflection of a nation's activity, archival documents contain an unlimited potential for influencing present and future society.

The "Cold War," as submitted for discussion among the military historians of the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, was a critical political confrontation between two social systems in the world arena and in many of its respects, was paradoxical and contradictory. Our task, as I perceive it, is to examine its substance truthfully. The "Cold War" should enter into human history the way it was in reality. Hence, it is a great responsibility each of us bears.

In this speech I wish to consider several aspects of the "Cold War" and express my opinion of them, based, of course, on the archival materials, official publications, and miscellaneous publications currently available.
First, about the term "Cold War" itself. As is well-known, every war including the "Cold War," is a concrete expression of historical conditions, fundamental tendencies, and the natural development of a certain epoch. Consequently, in order to evaluate this important war correctly, it is necessary first of all to determine its real political content and its moral and legal characteristics. This makes it possible first to see their interrelationships; secondly, it allows us to understand their place and role in the historical process; and thirdly, it assists us in developing an opinion about them.

Is "Cold War" the same concept for all of us or our countries? I think not, and this can be explained. The countries of the world were divided and opposed to each other for a long time. Mutual accusations flowed endlessly.

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines "Cold War" as "the aggressive policy of reactionary groups of imperialistic forces against the Soviet Union and other Socialist nations after the Second World War."" The "Cold War," as described in the Russian Language Dictionary, "is the policy of reactionary groups of imperialistic nations, resulting in the festering of tensions and hostilities in relationships with the USSR and other Socialist nations."

In other Soviet publications "Cold War" is characterized as the use of force or threats of force in international relations, a tendency towards the use of psychological tactics, attempts to blockade Socialist nations economically, the conduct of subversive activity against them and the provocation of international crises, world-wide encouragement of the arms and military preparedness race, surrounding the USSR with a network of military bases, and the fanning of anticommunist propaganda.

The "Cold War" and similar foreign political doctrines—the "position of power" and the "overthrow of Communism" policies, "teetering at the edge of war," etc.—resulted in an increase in international tension. Direct and open opposition was expressed in the global assault ("crusade") against Socialism. A carefully developed and detailed program, embracing political, economic, ideological, and military aspects and including the most extreme measures—teetering at the edge of war—lay at the basis of this assault.

I do not know how the "Cold War" is characterized and what is included in its concept in the official publications of the USA, England, France, and other countries, but I think it is different from what is in Soviet publications.

If the Soviet side saw the threat of aggression from the USA and its allies, then the USA, it should be assumed, saw the same from the Soviet
Union and the entire Socialist camp. In my opinion, this should not be so. Concrete parameters of the “Cold War” are needed, and no matter from what circumstances the hostility originated from, it should be judged by them. In Russia we usually say, “you must always begin from the beginning,” i.e.-from the starting point.

According to Soviet publications, the first steps towards the “Cold War” against the USSR were undertaken by right-wing groups in the USA and Great Britain even before the end of the Second World War. In the spring of 1945 the President of the USA, H. Truman, decided to take “a hard line” in relationships with the Soviet Union. Winston Churchill’s speech in Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946 was an open declaration of the “Cold War.” The term “Cold War” began to be used from that very moment.

The Russians know Churchill as a distinguished British political, governmental, and military figure. He was Prime Minister in 1940–45 and 1951–1955. During the Second World War Churchill’s government entered into an alliance with the USA within the framework of an anti-Hitler coalition. He was very determined in his speeches and opinions. One must assume that he gave a quite specific definition of “Cold War” in the mentioned speech.

To gain a better understanding of the issue, maybe that part of Churchill’s speech that deals with the “Cold War” should be published in the collections of conference materials. This is up to the organizers of the conference.

The intransigence of both sides and their deep hostility foreordained the creation of two conflicting blocs in the years right after the war: the Northern Atlantic Bloc (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. The first was created in 1949; the second, in 1955. NATO—according to official Soviet publications—represents, “an aggressive military and political unit, directed against Socialist countries and revolutionary and national liberation movements. The USA, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Iceland were included in it. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952. NATO is one of the main sources of international tension in Europe and other regions of the world.” Official Soviet publications further state, “the creation of the Warsaw Pact is considered the response of the Socialist nations “to the creation of the aggressive political unit of imperialistic forces—NATO. Its main purpose is collective defense against the aggressive aspirations of the Imperialists, the combined struggle for a stable peace, and the spread of international cooperation. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia entered into it.”
It may be assumed the USA and other countries in their turn created the NATO bloc for collective defense from possible aggression from the Soviet Union and the entire Socialist camp.

Each side, therefore, judged itself to be right. As a result of the hostility, the situation was artificially supercharged, there was an arms race, and crises and conflicts arose. The world was on the edge of war, and everyone suffered because of it. A wise man of ancient China, Mo-tsei, said: “To solve political conflicts between nations by war is the same as compelling all the people on earth to take one medicine for different illnesses: it may turn out to be useful for only three to five persons....”

During the first post-war decade in the “Cold War” arsenal, the Berlin Crisis of 1953, expressed in the attempted coup d’état in the German Democratic Republic, left a deep trace. In view of its particular acuteness we shall reveal some aspects in the way they have been established in our documents; they have become available to researchers only recently.

Thus on 17–19 June 1953, in East Berlin and a number of other places in the GDR there were numerous antigovernment speeches accompanied by massive riots and violent acts against government agencies and defense institutions; this created an explosive situation within the entire territory of the GDR. The crisis, as it is described in documents, was prepared and coordinated by the special services of the USA, England, France and Western Europe.

The course of the events is scrutinized, their causes and effects, the actions of the Soviet Occupational Forces to interrupt the subversive and terrorist acts and threats in cities, large populated points, and transportation are revealed in the documents in chronological order. The daily reports of the Command Group of the Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany to the USSR Ministry of Defense about the political situation and the events occurring within the territory of the GDR and part of West Berlin in the period from 16–29 June 1953 are in the collection of documents.

Reports on the crisis were presented to party and government leaders. For example, the report, “On the Events of June 17–19, 1953 in Berlin and the GDR and Some Conclusions about These Events,” was sent on 20 June to the first deputy of the President of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov and the vice president of the USSR Council of Ministers; USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, N. A. Bulganin. The report was signed by the Head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, V. Sokolovsky; the USSR High Commissioner in Germany, V. Semenov; and the Assistant High Commissioner, P. Yudin.” Another report “On the Position in Berlin
towards Evening on June 16, 1953 was sent to V. M. Molotov and N. A. Bulganin, and signed by V. Semenov and Colonel General A. Grechko, commanding the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

Information on the course of the crisis was organized along the lines of military information. For example, three reports were sent by the strategic headquarters of the staff of the group of Soviet occupational forces in Germany to the head of the main strategic headquarters of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N. O. Pavlovskiy. The first contained generalized data on the demonstrations and strikes in the GDR in the period from June 17–19, 1953; the second was about the position and degree of military preparedness of the occupational forces of the western forces in West Berlin towards evening on June 20, 1953; and the third, about the evaluations in the western nations of Soviet policy, directed at the reunification of Germany, and also about the prognosis for possible changes in the government of the GDR in association with the events of June 17–19, 1953.

The collection also contains a report of Colonel Fedeykin about the situation in the GDR towards evening on 18 June 1953; Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy's measures to be taken to normalize it, authorized by the USSR MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs] in Germany; and a letter from the General Secretary of the SUPG [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] CC [Central Committee], V. Ulbrecht, to the USSR High Commissioner in Germany, V. Semenov, requesting the Soviet government to provide assistance to the GDR in supplying the population with fats and meat. The decision of the Politburo of the SUPG CC, "On Taking Emergency Measures to Improve Immediately the Supply of Provisions to the Population." There are also other reports.

Analysis of both the external and internal causes of the antigovernment demonstrations in the GDR on 17–19 June 1953 occupies an important place in the documents. The demonstrations were characterized first as large-scale international provocations, which were planned beforehand. The day, 17 June, is called "X-day," i.e.- the day of open demonstrations against the democratic regime in the GDR by secret Fascists and other organizations operating above all under the leadership of the American intelligence service.

The centers, located in West Germany and West Berlin, conducted direct subversive activity against the GDR. One of them was created in March 1952; a certain Ya. Kayder, formerly the president of the Christian Democratic Union in East Germany, was its director. This center, relying on its agents in the GDR, encouraged the GDR population's will to resist, gathered information on the operation of the people's enterprises, exposed
and forwarded industrial secrets to West Germany, and organized counter-revolutionary provocations. In the West German Ministry on Common German Issues existed a document entitled “Advice for the Study of Issues of the Reunification of Germany, One Task of which is to Develop Variants for the Restoration of Capitalist Practices in the GDR.”

Members of the so-called Committee of Free Lawyers with a center in West Berlin were also occupied with espionage. Saboteurs from the “Group to Fight against Inhumanity,” which planned blowing up bridges and locks and the assassination of GDR leaders, fought against the social and political system in the GDR.

The “East Bureau” of the Social Democratic Party of the FRG conducted active subversion. The central printing unit of the party newspaper “Neuer Forvert°” wrote on 23 September 1952,

“Playing a special role in resistance to the Communist system fell to the lot of the East Bureau...only after the Communist Party in the Soviet Zone... is overthrown by other active factors, will the scope and meaning become apparent of the secret resistance of the Social Democratic Party in the Soviet zone. Systematic work was done so that this day could come.”

The Soviet Control Commission in Germany repeatedly asked the representatives of the allied powers to stop the espionage and terrorist operations in West Berlin. The western countries, however, not only did not take any such measures, but, on the contrary, encouraged provocation on the sector borders in Berlin and created a mood of anxiety among the population of the city and country. The American radio stations “Radio-Free Europe” and “RIAS,” operating in West Germany and West Berlin played an especially aggressive role in the ideological battle against the GDR.

The events occurring on 17 June 1953 in Berlin and other large cities of the Soviet zone of Germany were planned beforehand by widespread speeches over the entire territory of the GDR to promote revolution and simultaneous change of the government in the GDR. This was confirmed, as noted in one of the reports mentioned above, first, by the simultaneous start of riots in Berlin, Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Leipzig, Jena, Here, Halle, Bitterfeld, Dresden, Kotbus, Riesa, Termine, and others; second, by an identical tactical operation—work stoppage in plants, factories, city transportation and organizations with the aspiration to seize the same objectives—the district committees, the state security institutions, and prisons; third, by the fact that many of the speeches had identical slogans: pay salaries by the old standards; reduce prices for food rapidly; down with this government by free and secret elections, freedom of political prisoners, abolish the security organizations.
Along with demonstrating the external causes of the June events in the GDR, detailed analysis is given in a number of documents of their internal foundations, which arose mainly from the difficult economic situation of the republic and the serious errors of its political and governmental leadership.

The difficult material situation, which worsened with the summer of 1952, was the main cause of discontent among the workers. Important foodstuffs, such as margarine, butter, sugar, eggs, milk, and grains were not sold in the markets of the GDR. There were very few woolen materials, and leather shoes and many other products were scarce although there was a surplus and a large assortment of these goods in West Germany, which were imported from the USA, England, France, and other neighboring countries. Similarly, the prices for products and goods were higher in the GDR than in the FRG.

In order to create a stable economic situation in the GDR and raise the population’s standard of living, delivery of goods as reparations to the Soviet Union and Poland were stopped, exporting of goods to the Soviet Union was stopped at the expense of the income of Soviet businesses in the GDR beginning in the second half of 1953 so that these goods could be directed at developing the foreign trade of the GDR and providing for the internal needs of the republic. Expenses collected from the GDR for the upkeep of the Soviet occupational forces were sharply curtailed. Other measures were also taken.

The documents show that towards evening of 18 June 1953 there was a sharp decrease in antigovernment demonstrations. Soviet forces closed the border with the western countries. Normal life and the operation of government agencies was restored. Soviet forces were located around 6:00 on 18 June in 45 cities of the GDR in addition to Berlin.

In the reports of the Soviet command about its actions to cut off the massacres and excesses in the cities and in transportation, cases of special aggression and cruelty by individual insurgents and rebel groups against security organization and state personnel were noted; extreme measures of punishment had to be metered to them because of this.

According to “Information on the Number of Killed, Wounded, Shot, and Arrested Participants in the Antidemocratic and Antigovernment Demonstrations in the Period from 17 to 20 June, 1953,” the following figures were given for this entire period: strikers—430,515; demonstrators—336,376; killed: rioters—29; police and party activists—111; wounded: rioters—350; police and party activists—83; arrested and detained—9,530; 6 people were sentenced to be shot."

The people of the GDR had different attitudes towards the events of 17–19 June 1953: some were indignant towards the provocateurs; others
supported their actions; a third group were indifferent. As early as the third day after the beginning of demonstrations by the antigovernment forces in the GDR, it became clear that the coup d'état planned and prepared by the western subversive centers was collapsing. An overwhelming majority of the population of the republic did not support this political venture, despite the people's widespread dissatisfaction with the economic situation of the country and the government's policy in this area.

In 1954, the Soviet government abrogated supervision over the government agencies of the GDR, and on 25 January 1955, the Soviet Union ended its state of war with Germany. In accordance with the 20 September 1955 treaty between the USSR and the GDR, relations between the two nations began to be based on complete equality, mutual respect of sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs.

The coup d'état attempt in the GDR in June 1953 was not the last. The Berlin crisis was renewed with new force in 1958–1962. This, I hope, will be related by other colleagues. I want only to emphasize that the German Democratic Republic has been one of the main centers of tension in Europe throughout its history. Consequently, the Soviet Union was forced to maintain a large concentration of forces there. In the first post-war years it was called the group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany, then the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the Western Group of Forces; in the near future it will be completely disbanded.

The direct confrontation of two groups, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in the center of Europe and the fear of each of them that they might be weaker than the other generated an arms race unprecedented in history. In Europe so much nuclear ammunition and other means of destruction were stockpiled that there would be enough for repeated annihilation of every living thing on earth.

This circumstance forced many political leaders to become pensive. As seen from Soviet publications, at the beginning of the seventies, because of radical changes in the alignment of forces in the world arena and the establishment of a military and strategic balance between the East and West, the ruling circles in the USA were forced to respond to the peace initiatives of the USSR and other Socialist countries. A spirit of detente and the principles of peaceful coexistence began to be established in international relations.

At the start of the 1980s, however, extreme reactionary forces in the West successfully undermined the process of healing and normalizing the international situation that had begun. They took a course towards the return to the “Cold War,” towards direct and open confrontation; they
called for a global assault ("crusade") against Socialism. A thoroughly developed and comprehensive program, embracing political, economic, ideological, and military aspects, including the most extreme measures—teetering on the edge of war—lay at the base of this assault.

There is still one more subject of the "Cold War," to which I would like to draw attention: the history, course, and results of the Second World War and its most important part—the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.

The contribution of our people to the destruction of the Hitler horde, which crushed all the countries of Europe under it, is well known throughout the world. Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, and other countries fell within several days in face of their charge. Our people fought with the German military machine one on one for a long three years. Only in June 1944 did the forces of the USA and England land in northern France; this hastened the defeat of our common enemy.

Colossal sacrifices were required to stop the enemy and then drive him back and destroy him in his own den. The total loss of human life in our nation during all the years of the Great Patriotic War is estimated at almost 27 million; included in that number are 8 million irretrievable losses from the Soviet Armed forces as well as border and national guardsmen.\(^2\)

In this case the Soviet Armed Forces lost more than 3 million of its armies, killed, wounded and missing in action in freeing the peoples of Europe and Asia. Our losses totaled more than one million just in the number killed in the fields of battle in direct implementation of our liberating mission.\(^3\)

No other nation made as many large sacrifices as the Soviet Union, and no other people experienced what our people experienced. Our people's grief is incalculable. It did not bypass a single home or a single family in our country.

In the tremendous engagement with German Fascism our nation defended not only its independence, but it also made a decisive contribution to saving the human race from German enslavement and did not allow the dark night of Fascism to fall over the world.

When, because of its sudden attack, the German Fascist forces successfully seized the strategic initiative, the military and political leadership of Germany anticipated a quick victory. On 14 July 1941, i. e.- less than a month after the start of the attack, Hitler published an order, which provided for reorganization of his armed forces. This reorganization was to be subordinate to a new mission—the development of military actions against England, and if necessary, against the USA.

This is historical truth, with which the entire world is familiar. Unfortunately, the "Cold War" also affected it. The fundamentals of the
victory were the subject of deep falsifications. Historical extremists and every other kind of falsifier made intensive efforts to undermine the principles of the inviolability of the postwar boundaries and to drive a wedge into the relationships of the USSR with certain nations by revision or complete rejection of the Atlantic and Potsdam agreements. Attempts to deny the decisive role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in the destruction of the Hitler horde and at the same time to magnify the contribution of the West in the victory won a special place.

In the past our people have never belittled and will not belittle now the contribution that the western allies, other anti-Fascist forces, and the Resistance forces made to our victory. The allies fought successfully in Africa and Italy and directly routed the Fascist armies after opening the second front (beginning in June 1944). But there were not as many personnel and different military weapons and technical equipment on any of the fronts of the Second World War as there were on the Soviet-German front. On an average almost 70 percent of the divisions of the Fascist army were throughout the war; out of every four Hitlerite soldiers, three fought continually on the eastern front, and only one on the western. There were not so many continuous, uninterrupted, and bitter military operations on any of the other fronts of the Second World War as there were on the Soviet-German front.

It is not at all coincidental that after the brilliant victories at Stalingrad, in the battles at the Kursk Bulge and the Vistula and Oder Rivers, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Charles de Gaulle, Dwight Eisenhower, Bernard Montgomery, and many others addressed many good words to the Soviet government and its army. In particular, General Eisenhower said, "The campaigns conducted by the Red Army played a decisive role in the defeat of Germany." In a message to I. V. Stalin, the President of the USA, H. Truman, emphasized, "We value highly the magnificent contribution of the powerful Soviet Union in the interest of civilization and freedom. You have demonstrated the talent of a freedom-loving and highly courageous people in smashing the evil forces of barbarity, no matter how powerful they might be."

The military alliance of the USSR, USA, and England overturned the advantages of the Fascists and prepared to isolate their enemies and defeat them in single combat. Our people remember the meeting of the Soviet and American forces on the Elbe and the joint battle against a common enemy. And nothing of this should be forgotten.

Only a little more than a year remains before the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the victory. We should consider this date not only from the point of view of the past but the present and future as well.
As a military historian I want to turn to you, military historians of European nations, with a request to do what is possible to prevent amateurs from distorting the truth about the “Cold War” in all its manifestations, and first of all, from distorting the truth about the Second World War. Even though social systems may be different, no one should be allowed to distort, suppress, or destroy the function of social memory, especially in the generations that entered the world after the Second World War. The distortion of the history of the war and the victory over Fascism is directed at disparaging the real achievements in the struggle for peace and representing the sacrifices made by the peoples of the world in the struggle for freedom and democracy as meaningless in the eyes of millions of people. This is especially dangerous now, when the responsibility of people for the destiny of peace has increased.

The issue of the Second World War is important also because of the fact that but for our common victory in it over German Fascism with you, everything in the present might not exist and our nations might not be in the form they are today.

Thank you for your attention.

ENDNOTES

7. RF CAMD, f. 16, list 3139, n. 155, sheets 166–214, 217–222.
8. CAMD, f. 16, list 3139, r. 155, sheets 31–33, 41–42, 43–44.
11. CAMD, f. 16, list 3139, r. 155, sheet 236.
SECTION II

The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962: Soviet And East German Perspectives
Who Actually Built the Berlin Wall?  
The SED Leadership and the 13th of August 1961  

Dr. Helmut Trotnow

“Only knowledge makes it possible for us to dismantle prejudices with their demonic forces.”  
Valentin Falin, 1993

The opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 came suddenly and unexpectedly. Even the border troops of the GDR (German Democratic Republic), notorious for their bureaucratic harassing tactics at the intra-German border, were overtaken by events. The Berlin correspondent of the London Times, reflecting upon the events of those days, reports that following the press conference in East Berlin, she went immediately into the Western part of the city to pass on to the central editorial office in Great Britain the just announced sensational news about travel liberties for citizens of the GDR. As she passed the international visitor checkpoint, Checkpoint Charlie, she announced cheerfully to the East German border guards, “You can all travel now!” For an answer she received that unambiguous gesture of the hand to a certain spot on the forehead, “She doesn’t have all the cups in her cupboard” (or “She has a screw loose”), commented one of the two guards to his colleague.

If there was one symbol that portrayed the East-West conflict in an especially dramatic way during the “Cold War” era, it was the Berlin Wall. Not only the symbol for the division of the German nation and its capital; it was also the symbol for the separation of the entire political world between East and West. A complete scientific analysis of the events of that time and their motives is not yet possible today. The essential sources in former eastern as well as western sides are only partly available to historical researchers, and this will not fundamentally change in the foreseeable future. First, because the dynamics of events were so abrupt that the relevant files on all sides actually have yet to be collected. To compound mat-
ters, at least on the eastern side, the collapse of the former ruling political system has also lead to the destruction of files. Second, the prevailing international 30-year statute of limitations hinders access to the files. In view of the events in the GDR, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany has created a special arrangement. The use of important sources, especially those that refer to the former ruling party, SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), have been made available for research to a greater extent. This permits scrutiny of the beginning of events which—at least in the German context—reached a climax with the events of 9 November 1989.

The erection of border installations across Berlin and later also throughout Germany began on 13 August 1961. The events back then came fast and furious and affected the people just as suddenly and unexpectedly. The political-historic research has repeatedly dealt with the subject of the Berlin Wall because of the political-ideological confrontation in the time of the Cold War. But a full assessment was impossible so long as, on one side, the 30-year rule prevailed and, on the other side, the files in the communist countries remained closed. With the end of the Cold War and the termination of the 30-year rule, for the first time regardless of political-ideological considerations, the existing files can be surveyed. Most of what previously was categorized as “classified” material and closed is now available without any problems. History has moved on and leaves the historians its related signs for critical examination and inclusion.

The following article examines the construction of the Berlin Wall and investigates the question of who actually made the decision. Was it the East German party leaders of the SED, as the recently published memoirs of Julij Kwizinski, the last Soviet ambassador in the former German Federal Republic, suggests? Could it not be that the leaders of the GDR only complied with what the Soviet leadership advised them to do? In general, there is the question of the role of the Soviet Union, which has occupied an absolutely dominant role in military as well as in diplomatic relationships within the eastern bloc and also within the GDR. The primary sources for this article are the files of the Politburo of the SED for the time in question. The Politburo of the party was the most important decision-making body of the GDR, the state institutions being merely facades. In retrospect, this is nowhere more visible than in the Building of the Head of State of the GDR in East Berlin. Erich Honecker entered these premises only very seldom. His real area of operations was in the central building of the SED.

The term “wall” was adopted quite some time after 13 August 1961. Originally the border cordon consisted of barbed wire and concrete posts,
which little-by-little were supplanted by concrete slabs and, later, by masonry. The East Germany's ruling SED leaders were, after all, Prussian, wanting their cruel border to appear clean and orderly. Barbed wire did not convey such an impression. So stones and concrete slabs were used. The visage of the wall was, almost up to its end, changed again and again, consolidated and perfected. Since the beginning of the 1980s in the center of Berlin facing west, the elements of the wall were designated the longest mile of art on earth because of its graffiti paintings. At the eastern side, on the other hand, the masonries were aggressively white. The section was a military prohibited zone.

The term “wall” emerged for the first time on 15 June 1961. It was first used by Walter Ulbricht, Secretary-General of the SED and the most powerful man in the GRD at that time. Rather abruptly, he used a press conference in East Berlin to issue a very fundamental statement answering the question of a West German journalist. “I fathom your question in that manner,” he set out, “that there are people in West Germany, who wish that we mobilize the construction workers of the capital of the GDR to erect a wall, yes? It is not known to me, that there exists an intention like that...” The decisive council meeting of the Politburo on closure of the borders occurred on 7 August 1961. Under point three of the daily agenda Ulbricht reported a meeting of the party leaders of the Warsaw Pact, which had taken place 3–5 August in Moscow. At this point the Secretary-General must have presented the German party with a program. The later published resolution of the GDR government specifically referred to the consent of the “participant countries of the Warsaw Pact.” The minutes of the Politburo Council were written in a manner that only those who already knew about it could understand. “The launching of the act,” they read, “will occur in the night from Saturday to Sunday.” The 7th of August was a Monday, so only the weekend of 12–13 August could be inferred. Precisely during that night—shortly after midnight—police, military, and the workers’ militia branch began to cordon off the sector boundary to the GDR.

The interest of the SED leadership in maintaining the highest level of secrecy is confirmed by another resolution of the council. As if it were an incidental matter, another point in the minutes notes, “Comrade Ulbricht will invite the Council of Ministers on the weekend for a get-together.” This reference does not imply a social function. The Council of Ministers was, after all, the official government of the GDR. It is true that the party and its body made the political decisions, but these had to be translated into action by the state authorities. It appears that the members of the government—those not in the Politburo—were informed about the border
closing just a few hours before the beginning of the action. The circle of
the initiated remained tight and controlled. Even the Central Committee of
the SED (by party statutes the decisive body between the party organs),
according to the records, was informed not earlier than two days after the
event. One can only conclude from all this that the erection of the wall was
planned and carried out by a small group within the Politburo, excluding
the state and other party bodies.

How large was this group, and what party leaders belonged to it? This
action could not be undertaken without planning. Extensive preparations
and planning were necessary. The border with the Federal Republic of
Germany embraced some 1,400 kilometers and, around West Berlin, 160
kilometers. Obtaining building materials and employing military and
police troops required intensive logistic preparations. Members of the
Politburo who were concerned with these jobs could not possibly have par­
ticipated in the meeting of the Politburo in this time frame until 7 August.
An examination of the minutes shows that above all four names appear
again and again as “excused”: Erich Honecker, Paul Verner, Alois Pisnik,
and Willy Stoph.

Honecker’s leading role of the building of the wall grew out of his
position at the time as Secretary of the National Defense Council. Verner
was First Secretary of the party district that included Berlin and presum­
ably, therefore, was appointed to the staff because his party organization
had to bear the main load of the work in Berlin. The situation was similar
for Pisnik, the party secretary of the district including Magdeburg, who
had the longest section of the border with the German Federal Republic.
Finally, Stoph, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, had to par­
ticipate because Prime Minister Otto Grothewohl had been seriously ill
since November 1960. Moreover, as former Minister of Defense, Stoph
could be useful with his experiences for the planning staff.

From the records of the Politburo it is clear that as early as July 1961
the population of the GDR and East Berlin was prepared for a closing off
of the borders through an intensified propaganda campaign. Even though
the written minutes were pure resolution minutes and the respective course
of the meetings can only be deduced indirectly, the minutes from 28 July
detail grounds for the limited entry for citizens of the GDR to Berlin,
especially for males at the ages eligible for military service. “The ruling
military circles of West Germany and the parties of war in the other impe­
rialistic countries of NATO,” one can read there, “use the barbaric methods
of slave trade in order to undermine the socialistic order of the GDR.”

It remains open to conjecture to what extent the GDR superiors
believed their own statements. It is a fact that since the foundation of the
state in the year 1949, strictly speaking even since the erection of the sector boundaries by the four victorious powers of World War II, the population in the eastern part of Germany did not want to accept the fact of the dominant role of the Communist Party (KP). Moreover, the desperate economic conditions were not apt to keep the people in the GDR. From 1949 until 1960 almost 2.5 million people left the country. Half of them were younger than twenty-five, and almost all of them had qualified professional training. The small GDR with a total population of about 16 million residents could not afford such a draining of its human resources. The former capital, Berlin, proved to be a loophole for those desiring escape. Actually, Berlin as a whole was, after the end of World War II, located in the middle of the territory of the Soviet occupation zone, from which the GDR later emerged. But in the London Agreement of 1944, the future victorious powers obtained an autonomous sector. The sector boundaries were aligned to the borders of the municipal districts of the year 1920. Even though the border in the east sector was guarded, the town, with over two million inhabitants, presented diverse possibilities to escape. In addition, there were about 50,000 people who lived in the east of the city but commuted daily to work into the western sectors. Once the refugees had reached West Berlin, they were provided with identity cards from Berlin and could be brought into the Federal Republic of Germany via air. It was absolutely clear to the SED leaders that the constant stream of refugees signified an economic threat to the GDR. Bearing in mind the rejection of suggestions from the previous council of the Warsaw Pact on 29 March 1961, Ulbricht made it unequivocally clear to the other KP leaders that the GDR in the long run would not be able to comply with its industrial commitment if the stream of refugees could not be curtailed.

But the action of sealing the border on 13 August 1961 was also used by the SED leadership to delete undesirable legal requirements from the initial constitution of the GDR. As found in the enclosures to the minutes of the council of the Politburo, the protection of the home and the maintenance of the privacy of the mail service were abolished at the urging of Honecker. On the 15th of August the Politburo decided upon a “plan for a further extension of border protection.”

The successful building of the wall directly contributed to Erich Honecker’s eventual advancement to party leader and head of state. Meanwhile, it became clear in subsequent years that the rationale for the wall lay within the very societal makeup of the GDR itself. The problem of escapes stayed faithfully with communist Germany from the beginning to the end. In this respect the aging head of state of the GDR was correct when he answered relevant questions from the West in January 1989 with
Remarks that the reasons that had lead to the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 still existed and, thus, the border installations should remain. Only in one point was the political leader mistaken in his comparison between 1961 and 1989. The general political climate had changed decisively.

The Soviet Head of State and Party Leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, approved reform endeavors that were no longer compatible with conditions in the GDR. Valentin Falin, the most knowledgeable expert on Germany in the Soviet leadership, confirmed in his memoirs that Gorbachev gave Soviet troops stationed in East Germany in October 1989 the order to keep neutral in the case of internal political conflicts. The Soviet leadership, therefore, not only determined the beginning but also the end of the Berlin Wall. In March 1961, when the leaders of the Warsaw Pact rejected Ulbricht's plans for the wall, Nikita Khrushchev did not come to the aid of his German comrade. Not until the council meeting at the beginning of August did he change his disapproving position. One of the participants of this council meeting described its conclusion as follows, "Ulbricht said: Thank you, comrade Khrushchev! Without your help we cannot solve this dreadful problem." But the Kremlin leader answered: "Yes, I agree; but not an inch farther!" Khrushchev's intention to keep the further development tightly in his hands can also be read into this. He introduced a new military commander to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact, the troops of which were supposed to safeguard the wall building operations with the aid of the Soviet troops. It was none other than Marshal Ivan S. Konev, who in 1945 together with his famous colleague Marshal Zhukov, had directed the Soviet assault on Berlin. The task to quell possible turmoil among the population of the GDR, with the aid of the twenty divisions under his command, fell upon Konev. Incidents, such as occurred on 17 June 1953, were not be repeated. In addition, the experienced military commander would also guarantee that the West would not reach any false conclusions concerning the sealing of the border. At his meeting with the western military governors of Berlin, he said on 7 August: "Gentlemen, you may be reassured, whatever is going to happen in the foreseeable future: Your rights will not be touched."

In retrospect, considered from an East German perspective, Khrushchev's action was absolutely logical and consistent. There was no alternative—unless the Soviet Union was willing, because of West Berlin, to begin a war with the western Allies that would have automatically escalated into a nuclear confrontation. Leaving the GDR to its fate, which certainly would have meant that the end of the second German state, was an alternative for which the Soviet Union was not yet prepared.

Strictly speaking, the Soviet Union had been struggling with the Berlin problem since the end of the war. The German communists had not man-
aged to appease the population with their social system. Stalin already had been forced to recognize that the four-power status of Berlin. Despite its geographical advantages, Berlin developed into a disadvantage for the building and upholding of the communist rule in the second German state. Stalin had hoped to solve the problem through the Berlin blockade of 1948. But the western Allies, led by General Lucius Clay, were not to be driven out of Berlin. Clay's arguments determined the Berlin politics of the United States continuously until the year 1989. John F. Kennedy's famous speech in 1963, "I am a Berliner!" or Ronald Reagan's 1987 statement, "Mister Gorbachev, open this gate!" are only two examples. "As long as the door is closed," Reagan stated before the Brandenburg Gate, "so long will this wall continue as a wound, not only the German question will remain unanswered, but also the question of freedom for all of humankind."

In 1953, as Khrushchev assumed the office of his predecessor, he took up Stalin's thoughts again. At the end of the 1950s, he felt secure enough to risk a confrontation with the West again. It helped Khrushchev that the Soviet Union had succeeded in launching the first man-made spacecraft into orbit. The shock of "Sputnik" left the Americans deeply insecure. A year later, Khrushchev developed the ideas of a separate peace on account of Berlin, which went down in the annals of history as the "Khrushchev Ultimatum." After that, the first negotiations took place in 1959 in Geneva the conference of the four foreign ministers, where each the representative of Germany-East and Germany-West were allowed to listen at a "children's table." However, the shooting down of the U2 reconnaissance plane above Sverdlovsk a year later destroyed any further rapprochement. In spite of his erratic exterior behavior, e.g., at his United Nations appearance in 1960 or at his meeting with the young American president in Geneva, the Soviet Party leader frequently operated with a hidden card up his sleeve. This is especially true with regard to communist internal conditions.

Konev had enough authority to keep the hotheads within the Soviet military and the GDR leadership under control. The communist rulers in the GDR were very well aware that the propagated social and state system could survive only if the tension between East and West remained severe. Each rapprochement lead inevitably to questions of the necessity of the existence of the GDR. How easy the confrontation in Berlin could have changed into war was demonstrated by the incident on 22 October 1961 at the border crossing point Checkpoint Charlie. The GDR leaders wanted to be certain in their assessment of the Americans and tested the steadfastness of the American dignitaries in view of the four-power status of the city. For several days armed tanks of the Soviet Union and of the United
States stood directly opposite each other. "As an immediate observer of the domestic events," the cool and unemotional Falin writes in his memoirs, "I confirm that eventually only seconds and meters separated us from an accident."

**Literature on the subject:**


**Documents**

The Berlin Crisis from the Perspective of the Soviet General Staff

Dr. Bruce W. Menning

My remarks today focus on the Berlin crisis of 1961 as it was communicated from the Soviet General Staff to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These remarks are based on several hundred pages of daily reports from the General Staff to the Central Committee. While extensive, the materials are incomplete in several ways. First, they are declassified from the secret level only. Consequently, there are numerous gaps caused by deletions of documents bearing a higher level of classification. Second, these materials must be viewed as they are: only part of a larger informational jigsaw puzzle. As a historian, I remain convinced that seldom do we encounter a "smoking gun," that is, isolated testimony of such overwhelming importance that it challenges us fundamentally to reshape our understanding of a given event or period. Therefore, valuable as the present materials are, they are limited in scope and chronological span, and ultimately they must be viewed in larger context. Still, they provide useful insight, and it is my hope that they are only the beginning of a larger flow of materials from the Russian military archives.

Now, a few words about how I received these documents. Since the summer of 1990, I have been conducting research on a larger project on the evolution of Russian and Soviet troop mobilization in strategic perspective. Given the greater accessibility to and availability of materials on the Cold War, quite naturally I hoped to extend my study into the post-1945 period, perhaps even into the 1960s, depending upon whether the Russian government accepted something like a 30-year rule governing access to heretofore sensitive materials. More than a year ago, when Dr. John Greenwood informed me that the U. S. Army Center of Military History would sponsor a conference on military archives and the Cold War, I decided to test the waters of declassification and access by requesting materials from the
Russian military archives to support both my larger research project and the objectives of the conference. Thus, in January 1993, I submitted a formal written request for documents on the Berlin crisis of 1961 to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Nine months later, in September 1993, I received the materials on which today's presentation is based. I will treat issues of access and related experiences at greater length under a different venue as this conference unfolds.

Let us turn to the materials themselves. Altogether they comprise nearly 300 pages (from a total of 400) of daily situation reports from the Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff through the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense to the Central Committee. These reports cover the period between 16 August and 31 December 1961. In length, they vary from one to several pages, sometimes with addenda in the form of memoranda on meetings, copies of formal protests and rejoinders, transcriptions of radio broadcasts, and the occasional commentary of larger institutional actors. The reports appear in relatively standardized form. They are usually written in three-to-five paragraph format, but occasionally the number of paragraphs drops to two or expands to about nine. The first paragraph or grouping of paragraphs describes the situation in Berlin and East Germany, while the second details changes in U. S. and NATO forces on a local, regional, and even world-wide scale. The final paragraph or grouping of paragraphs usually deals with Soviet military activities, to include changes in readiness rates and contingency missions, most frequently for troops within the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG). Occasionally the order of information varies. Original copies are usually signed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal R. Ia. Malinovskii, and the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal M. V. Zakharov. Copies are verified either by Colonel-General S. P. Ivanov, Chief of the Operations Directorate, or by a stand-in.

These documents come from fond (collection) 16, that is, the collection of the Main Operations Directorate (GOU) of the Soviet General Staff. This collection is part of a larger grouping of materials which the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation maintains under the auspices of its own organization, the Historical-Archival Section of the General Staff. The materials were transmitted to me in complete photocopy form, and I was permitted to view the originals from which the copies were made. There is no doubt in my mind that they are authentic. At the same time, however, I must add that I did not see the inventories (opisi) which permit the archive user to examine the overall contents of the collection and to determine where these documents lie in relation to similar materials.
I should add in passing that copies of these same materials are probably located in the archives of the Central Committee. However, under the rules for declassification, only that agency which originated a document has the right to declassify that document, which means that only the Operations Directorate of the General Staff can declassify its own documents, and, then only in cases in which other directorates or organizations are not concerned. If others are involved, they too must concur with declassification.

Before turning to specific matters of substance, it is worthwhile to say several things about the tone and overall content of these materials. For the most part, these situation reports consist of straight-forward reporting. There is little or no analysis to accompany the recounting of events, incidents, statistics, and miscellaneous items of information. At the same time, the ideological overtones are muted. That is, beyond labelling rock-throwers as “pro-fascist hooligans” and organizers of demonstrations as “fascists,” the language and terminology used would find acceptance under a variety of professional venues. In fact, the dry regurgitation of information even under crisis conditions sometimes struck this reader as banal. During a good part of the period under review, the possibility existed that events might lead to a direct military confrontation. Yet, the two most often repeated phrases in the reports are “the situation in Berlin and in the whole territory of the German Democratic Republic has been quiet in recent days,” and “the situation in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany is unchanged.”

In discussing substance, I will adhere to the broad categories suggested by the documents themselves, although not necessarily in the order in which the categories appear. That is, I will review—albeit too briefly—the larger elements of possible military confrontation, selected aspects of the situation in Berlin itself, and information of utility in determining the perspective of the General Staff and selected key players on the unfolding crisis. For reasons of presentation, the audience should understand that I am compressing several hundred pages of documentation into several dozen paragraphs.

First, as might be expected, these documents reveal that the Soviet General Staff carefully monitored the global and regional military build up which accompanied the steady rise in tensions over the status of Berlin. Thus, on a daily basis during the last quarter of 1961 the General Staff transmitted to the Central Committee information on the deployment of U.S. strategic nuclear assets, including intercontinental bombers, missiles, missile-carrying submarines, and fleets. This information usually focussed on numbers, locations, and apparent changes in deployment rates and status. The lion’s share of attention went to assets of the U. S. Strategic Air
Command, especially B-47 and B-52 bombers, either as they were deployed forward or as they flowed back and forth between the U. S. and bases in Europe and North Africa. To a lesser, although still important, extent, the same kind of information was provided about Strategic Air Command deployments in the Far East.

The majority of this information appears in the form of raw numbers. For example, on 22 September the first such reference shows that within “the European zone” the Strategic Air Command counted 163 strategic bombers of the B-47 type, including 66 in England, 69 in Spain, and 23 in Morocco. According to the General Staff, these forward deployments in Europe exceeded the normal groupings by 40–50 aircraft. Forty-eight additional bombers were deployed in “the Far Eastern zone” along an arc stretching from Alaska (16) through Japan (6) to islands in the western Pacific (26). Meanwhile, Operation “Sharp Axe” placed a dozen B-52 bombers on constant airborne alert over the continental United States. After 22 September, these and related deployment figures appear on a near-daily basis and are among the most repetitious citations in the General Staff reports.

Until year’s end, the only variation in this flow of information concerns changing airborne alert and patrol patterns. On 3 October, “Sharp Axe” became “Wire Brush,” with a temporary reduction in the number of B-52s to eight. On 6 November, the Soviets detected “a new patrolling operation” called “Chrome Dome,” which kept up to 15 B-52s airborne on race track-like routes between the continental U. S. and either the Mediterranean or Alaska. Meanwhile, after 22 September strategic bombers also rotated regularly between Europe and the U. S. in accordance with Operation “Responsive Action.” References to “Chrome Dome” continue until the end of 1961.

The same wealth of information does not extend uniformly to naval and intercontinental missile deployments. On 10 October, the General Staff cited press accounts for the previous week which reported U. S. completion of a fourth base for Atlas E missiles, thereby raising their total number to 36. There are only two references from mid-November to the presence of three U.S. missile-carrying submarines on patrol in the Norwegian Sea. Scattered commentary on U. S. naval deployments devotes particular attention to the general locations of attack carriers, especially in the Mediterranean and the Far East. The report for 14 September states that, “according to intelligence information, the American Sixth Fleet has been released from defense of the Mediterranean, and only the execution of offensive missions as the strike nucleus of NATO’s south wing is being planned.”
I have not attempted to correlate this information with what western records would assert was fact from the U.S. and NATO perspective. There is nothing in the Soviet figures to suggest dissimulation. A good guess is that some of the top secret materials withheld from me might address the same information in greater depth, but the same materials might also suggest collection methods and sources. Phrases used to introduce materials of a military intelligence nature include “according to information in our possession” and the more direct “according to intelligence information.”

Figures similar to those cited above appear with regard to the build up of U.S. and, to a more limited extent, of conventional allied military forces in Europe. Numbers refer both to reserve call-ups and to ground forces brought to Europe during the period under consideration, including elements of XVIII Airborne Corps, the 24th Infantry Division, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and two divisions from the U.S. National Guard. Figures also extend to the build up of tactical air strength, especially in Spain and Germany. As might be expected, specific information appears on the number of troop units in West Berlin, including their deployments, armaments, equipment, and planned rotations to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

Considerable information also appears on the nature and timing of various exercises, whether single service, joint, or combined. During the period surveyed, these ranged from periodically scheduled exercises such as “Autumn Shield” and “Main Barge” to special CENTO and North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) exercises which might possibly be considered atypical of the usual flow. Particular attention was paid to joint and combined troop exercises in the NATO central region. Throughout much of the entire period, battalions of U.S. Army nuclear-capable field artillery conducted exercises at Grafenwohr in West Germany. Farther afield, the Soviets monitored U.S. Navy exercises, including those of the First and Second Fleets, respectively off the American west and east coasts. These fleet exercises, beginning on 20 and 21 October, elicited special interest because their purpose was “to work out questions of conducting nuclear strikes against shore objectives.” If nothing else, the extent and continuous nature of U.S. and western exercise activity create a powerful impression in the pages of materials from the Russian military archives.

Comparable materials on Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces are scanty, either because the Soviets and their allies did not consider symmetrical responses appropriate or because this type of information was so compartmentalized that it would not appear in secret-level reports to the Central Committee. Thus, although a steady flow of U.S., and to a lesser extent, of
Canadian and British troops, came to Europe and the FRG, the documents reflect no response in the form of a partial mobilization of Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground troops. The capacity for reaction to events in Berlin was also reflected in contingency missions (not elaborated) for those troops which would be expected to respond to military crisis in the city itself. While the Berlin wall was going up in August, one reinforced battalion from the 8th Guards Army and one motorized rifle battalion with a tank company from the 2d Guards Tank Army were apparently on stand-by status in close proximity to Berlin. During the night of 21–22 August, they returned to their permanent places of deployment, respectively at Merseburg and Rostock. Throughout the period under review, 20th Guards Army was the Soviet unit tabbed with primary responsibility for local response, while the Soviet 24th Air Army provided support. As required, Soviet troops were to receive augmentation from the 1st and 8th East German Motorized Rifle Divisions. One Soviet tank battalion (30 tanks) from the 68th Tank Regiment of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division actually appeared in Berlin proper for augmentation during the last week of October, when U. S. and Soviet tanks confronted each other directly at the Friedrichstrasse crossing, or Checkpoint Charlie.

General Staff documents add an ominous background note to what is already known about the basic elements of confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie. Nearly two weeks beforehand, on 13 October at 24.00 the Soviet Air Defense Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Long-Range Bomber Forces and fighter aviation assets of the military districts and groups of forces had been brought to a state of heightened combat readiness. The phrase in Russian is “... privedeny v povyshennyiu boevuiu gotovnost’.” These forces included the bulk of the USSR’s strategic nuclear assets, and this state of enhanced readiness continued without commentary until 24.00 on 8 November. If “heightened combat readiness” can be understood as “low-level alert,” then we have direct evidence that at least once during the Berlin crisis of 1961 the Soviets held their nuclear strike forces on some kind of alert status.

What prompted the alert is difficult to determine from the General Staff documents. It came two days after four American officers tried to ignore East German Volkspolizei or “Vopos” (People’s police) while passing...
through the closed checkpoint at Unkenstrasse. Warning shots were fired, and the American officers withdrew. A formal protest followed. Perhaps more significantly, the same document announcing the alert also notes:

According to intelligence, during the period from 20.00 on 14 October until 8.00 on 15 October conduct of an exercise is planned for the anti-aircraft defenses of the USA and Canada under the code name 'Sky Shield-2.' In the exercises will participate all forces and means of anti-aircraft defenses for the North American continent, and also the strategic bombardment aviation of the U.S. and Great Britain.26

The historian might argue that a low-level alert was a prudent Soviet response to the NORAD exercise. However, this argument alone probably cannot account for the duration of the alert.

Less perplexing—but still significant—in view of the large number of exercises occurring in the West and, indeed, around the globe, was the fact that the General Staff documents say little about Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises. Except for “scheduled training” during “heightened combat readiness” within GSFG for the entire period under review, the documents record only one Warsaw Pact exercise for front and army-level staffs, code named Buria (Storm), which ran between 29 September and 10 October.27 Otherwise, the record on Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises is silent.

Let us now turn to those momentous events of late October, when U.S. and Soviet tanks faced off at short range across Checkpoint Charlie. For the most part the essence of incidents between 22 and 27 October is conveyed with little assessment and analysis. Addenda to various reports include the formal protests lodged by Major General Albert Watson, the U.S. Commandant in Berlin, and whatever responses and counter-protests the Soviets deemed appropriate. The Soviet Commandant in Berlin, Colonel A. V. Solov’ev, operated under the direct supervision of Marshal I. S. Konev, one of the two original Soviet conquerors of Berlin, who had recently returned to Germany to assume command of GSFG.28 Konev’s U.S. counterpart was not General Lucius Clay, whom President Kennedy had dispatched to Berlin in August as his special envoy, but General Bruce C. Clarke, who commanded U.S. Army Europe. Nonetheless, Soviet reports clearly ascribe to Clay much of the responsibility for what they considered the more provocative incidents of late September and October.29

The flow of reports, copies of protests, and memoranda of conversations with Solov’ev’s immediate counterparts indicates that the official Soviet position was to insist that all matters related to the crucial question of border control lay within the jurisdiction of the East German govern-
ment. When General Watson protested against restrictions on western access to East Berlin, Colonel Solov'ev responded that:

the regime for passage through the control points on the sector boundary has been established by the government of the GDR [German Democratic Republic], and the commandant's office of the Soviet garrison in Berlin cannot decide this question.\(^{30}\)

When the British Commandant lodged similar protests, Solov'ev repeatedly refused to serve as intermediary between the western military missions and the East Germans.\(^{31}\) Despite such assertions, the difficulty for the Soviets was that by mid- and late October, their position was becoming increasingly untenable. Without the imposition of some kind of restraint on the East Germans, the danger was that various shooting incidents along the interzonal boundary and altercations at the checkpoints would get out of hand, or as the Soviets put it, lead to "undesirable serious consequences."\(^{32}\)

The justifiable preoccupation with shooting incidents highlights another important aspect of General Staff reports on the situation in Berlin: they constitute a near-daily chronicle of fugitive border crossings, hair-raising escapes, shootings, demonstrations, rock-throwing incidents, and exchanges of inventive and tear gas canisters.\(^{33}\) On the basis of this information, it would be possible to compile a log of successful versus unsuccessful defections. From the Soviet perspective, the clear understanding was that the East German \textit{Volkspolizei} resorted to gunfire too easily and too recklessly.\(^{34}\)

The record, abbreviated as it is, indicates that the Soviet command acted to moderate East German conduct. For example, as early as 24 August, Marshal Konev expressed concern to East German party boss Walter Ulbricht about the number of times the \textit{vopo}s had discharged either warning shots or aimed fire during various incidents along the border with West Berlin. On 25 August, Konev repeated this concern to General Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, the GDR Defense Minister.\(^{35}\) Although the East Germans promised to exercise restraint in the future, subsequent actions never seemed to match assurances, with the result that on 14 October Konev once again raised the issue, this time with Erich Honecker, Secretary of the East German Communist Party Central Committee. The Soviet Marshal bluntly declared that the first 13 days of October had witnessed 31 instances of what he labelled "disorderly firing" along the border.\(^{36}\) Although Honecker too promised restraint, the record indicates that the number of shooting incidents remained a matter of great concern for the Soviets throughout the period.

East German actions made it difficult for the Soviets to answer legitimate U.S. protests over reduction of access, greater control over border
crossing, and demands to show identification, especially from members of the U.S. Berlin garrison not in uniform. Two circumstances, in particular, caused the Soviets great concern. The first was U.S. response to the vopo challenge on 21 September to military personnel not in uniform along the access route between Berlin and Helmstedt, which led to the detainment of two U.S. servicemen for six hours. General Clay’s response was to deploy radio-equipped road patrols of uniformed military police “for technical assistance” along this route, which by four-power agreement lay under Soviet control. The Soviets strongly protested this action, but did nothing else, although they closely monitored the patrols on a daily basis until they were terminated on 30 October.37

The second circumstance, of course, involved the several confrontations between U.S. personnel and vopos at Checkpoint Charlie. These incidents were reported out factually with very little commentary, except to note that the U.S. was deliberately behaving in a provocative manner. There appears to be little new in these reports. However, Soviet assessments of U.S. troop strengths, deployments, and equipment provide useful background for the events leading up to the confrontation of 27 October. For example, as Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff has indicated elsewhere, the Soviets were aware of the fact that a number of U.S. tanks (8–9 of 29) were equipped with bulldozer blades which might have been used either to push aside vehicles or to attack the wall itself.38 Although the General Staff mentions these specially-equipped tanks, its reports do not ascribe to them the same overwhelming significance that Garthoff detects in the reminiscences of later Soviet commentators. Nor, do reports to the Central Committee mention any U.S. military exercises held during September in secluded areas of Berlin. In fact, when the reports actually refer to exercises held in Grunewald between 18 and 20 October, what seems significant was the number of U.S. troops (about 3,500) involved.39

Additional assertions about the events of late October are difficult to make on the basis of the General Staff materials—there is a crucial gap in the flow of documents for the period between 27 October and 2 November, during which time critical aspects of the confrontations at Checkpoint Charlie might have received greater attention.40 Here we must either await additional materials from the archives or defer to our Russian colleagues for a more complete picture of the situation.

At the same time, however, documents in the General Staff file do include several important joint reports to Khrushchev from Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovskii. These reports, dated 19 and 25 October, appear to reinforce conventional wisdom that Khrushchev relied on these high-ranking offi-
Officials as part of a crisis team. Reporting at Khrushchev's request, the two ministers reviewed the main points of contention, including especially the issue of unrestricted access to East Berlin for U.S., British, and French military and diplomatic personnel. Gromyko and Malinovskii noted that "the new regime for border crossing with West Berlin" established on 13 August had not affected military and diplomatic personnel, who retained access to East Berlin through all border crossing points. However, on 22 August the East German Ministry of Internal Affairs had introduced additional control measures, reducing the number of crossing points from thirteen to seven and specifying that only one, Friedrichstrasse, be used for the passage of foreigners and western military and diplomatic personnel. The latter two categories were to enjoy unhindered access, although in reality the Vopos had begun to request identification from all personnel in civilian dress. The two Soviet ministers acknowledged that previously the accepted practice had been to permit unrestricted passage to all personnel, regardless of dress, travelling in vehicles bearing the registration and markings of the various military and diplomatic missions to Berlin. In the judgment of the two Soviet officials, it was precisely the demand for identification from military personnel in civilian clothing, both within Berlin and along the access route to Helmstedt, which had sparked the most serious incidents.

To complicate matters, the joint report of 19 October noted that the East Germans were preparing additional control measures. On 20 September, Ulbricht had informed the Soviet ambassador (presumably N. G. Pervukhin) that the East German government intended to introduce a system of visas for foreign access to East Berlin, to include diplomatic personnel. When asked for an opinion, the Soviets had answered that in principle these plans "do not elicit doubts from us." However, the Soviet ambassador advised Ulbricht that:

the given moment in our opinion is not suitable for the establishment of additional control measures on the border with West Berlin in as much as they can evoke an unnecessary aggravation of the situation and make our position difficult in connection with negotiations getting under way between the USSR and the US.

On 28 September, according to Malinovskii and Gromyko, Khrushchev himself had repeated these misgivings in a letter to Honecker, and on the next day Honecker reported that the East German Politburo had agreed to set aside any new measures "for awhile."

On the twelfth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic (7 October), Ulbricht had raised the issue once again with A. I. Mikoyan, head of the Soviet visiting delegation, especially with regard to limiting
access to western military and diplomatic personnel. According to Malinovskii and Gromyko, Ulbricht had stated that the free passage of Americans to East Berlin “exerts a demoralizing influence on the population, especially the youth, and gives birth to doubt within the population about the strength of the people’s power.” He warned that the East Germans would not long tolerate American violations of GDR sovereignty, but that no new measures would be taken while US-USSR negotiations were on-going.

At the same time, Gromyko and Malinovskii reported that the Americans would continue to press for unrestricted access to East Berlin, provoking incidents if necessary to demonstrate that the border could be crossed at any point. The two ministers pointedly added that in regard to the incident at the Unkenstrasse crossing and others “the people’s police of the GDR opened fire without sufficient grounds, and that this could have had undesirable serious consequences.”

The report of 19 October closed with the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister advising Khrushchev that Ulbricht be counseled against taking any new measures without prior discussion with the Soviets. Further, the report recommended that Khrushchev inform Ulbricht that “according to information in our possession” the Americans intended to provoke the East German police into as many incidents as possible; therefore, the police must be restrained in order that they not yield to these provocations. Finally, with reference to GSFG, the two ministers advised the dispatch of Soviet officers in mobile radio-equipped patrols to monitor the border with West Berlin for conflict prevention. In the event that incidents arose involving western military personnel, these were to be brought immediately to the attention of the Soviet command, which would then send officers to conduct an investigation along with the East Germans.

The message of 25 October covers much of the same ground, but asserts more strongly that insistence by the East Germans that all personnel in civilian dress present documents, regardless of vehicular markings and registration, had caused a series of incidents, including those of 22–24 October. These ultimately led to American military police escort for the vehicles in question, a situation that has “created the danger of serious conflicts.” Meanwhile, the East Germans had requested 7,000 land mines to sow along the border, an eventuality which the Soviets saw as “greatly complicating the situation.” The result was that, “all these undesirable phenomena aggravate the situation and create convenient grounds for provocation by the Western powers and do not favor the creation of conditions for negotiations for conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.”
In view of these considerations, Gromyko and Malinovskii advised Khrushchev that:

We consider it necessary to review the situation created in the GDR and request that comrade Ulbricht take measures to halt such actions of the police and GDR authorities which create tensions not corresponding with the requirements of the moment.\[49\]

In particular, the ministers recommended that Khrushchev advocate unrestricted access to East Berlin for vehicles of the western powers. In the event persons riding within these vehicles aroused suspicions, a Soviet officer was to be called to the scene immediately. Also, GSFG should implement the measures recommended on 19 October.

Amid the flow of detailed information on various military aspects of the Berlin crisis, the above two reports are among the most important documents in the General Staff file. They indicate both growing apprehensions about the ability to contain incidents and growing impatience with the East German penchant for violence. They also reveal a willingness to seek compromise on issues likely to provoke additional confrontations, especially at Checkpoint Charlie.

Against this background, conventional wisdom from secondary accounts indicates that Kennedy and Khrushchev used “back channel” communications to defuse the crisis.\[50\] Through the first several weeks of November the flow of General Staff reports revealed a gradual lessening of tensions, but whether this development stemmed from improved East-West communications or simply from better intelligence is difficult to discern. Whatever the case, the General Staff report to the Central Committee for 22 November stated unequivocally that there was little to fear from an impending meeting between President Kennedy and Konrad Adenauer, the West German Chancellor. Here the record clearly states:

According to information in our possession, at the anticipated meeting with members of the American government and Kennedy personally, Adenauer will insist on more decisive U. S. measures on the removal of barriers between Democratic and West Berlin.

The American side will agree with Adenauer in words and support his request, but in reality plans to do nothing beyond conversations.

The position of the American government on the Berlin question remains the same—to avoid military conflict.\[51\]

How long this understanding had been the case is not discernible from the documents in this collection. It does, however, cast a curious light on subsequent reports of the continuing U. S. military build up and the state of heightened combat readiness that reigned within GSFG until the end of the file on 31 December 1961.
In closing I might note that these documents from the General Staff indicate just how incomplete and tentative our understanding is of these momentous events three decades ago. Although much research has been done, clearly much remains. If we truly desire to foster a constructive international atmosphere in which lessons of the Cold War, confidence building, and military transparency are objectives worthy of pursuit in themselves, then we must get on with the work ahead of us. In particular, because primary documentation is the life-blood of our common labor, part of that work involves pressing forward as rapidly as possible with issues of declassification and access to materials.

ENDNOTES

3. See, for example, ibid., l. 35.
4. See, for example, ibid., ll. 7, 16, 94, 116, 136, 182, 400, and numerous others throughout the file.
5. Ibid., l. 94.
6. Ibid., l. 8.
7. Ibid., l. 222.
8. See, for example, ibid., l. 148.
9. Ibid., l. 128.
10. Ibid., ll. 258 and 263 cite the Robert Lee, the Theodore Roosevelt, and the Patrick Henry.
11. Ibid., l. 66.
12. See, for example, ibid., ll. 7, 27, 46, and 70.
13. See, for example, ibid., ll. 297 and 362.
14. See the table, ibid., l. 368.
15. Ibid., ll. 57, 59, 60, 69, 68, 128, 131, 211, 219, 222, 232, 238, 240, and numerous others throughout the file.
16. Ibid., ll. 57, 61, 234, and 241.
17. Ibid., ll. 159–160.
18. Yet, on 29 August the Soviet government announced its decision to defer temporarily the release of active duty service personnel to the reserves; see Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961 (Baltimore, 1973), 157.
19. Istoriko-arkhivnyi otdel GSh, f. 16, op. 3329, d. 40, l. 400.
20. Ibid., l. 16.
21. Ibid., l. 19.
22. Ibid., l. 184; this tank battalion could not be employed without the direct personal instructions of the Commander, GSFG.
23. Ibid., l. 136.
24. Lifting of this status is announced in ibid., l. 228.


28. *Ibid.,* II. 27, 101; nothing in the documents confirms Peter Wyden’s assertion in *Wall: The Inside Story of Divided Berlin* (New York, 1989), 127, that Konev was a figurehead for General I. I. Jakubovskii, whose name is not even mentioned.

29. *Istoriko-arkhivnyi otdel GSh*, f. 16, op. 3329, d. 40, l. 283.


34. *Ibid.,* especially l. 294.

35. *Ibid.,* l. 27.


40. For example, an entry in *Ibid.,* I. 213, for 4 November indicates that the Soviets possessed the contents of General Clay’s telephone conversation of 27 October with President Kennedy, yet the addendum with the conversation is not attached.

41. These reports are in *Ibid.,* II. 280–285, and 293–297.


51. *Istoriko-arkhivnyi otdel GSh*, f. 16, op. 3329, d. 40, l. 262.
SECTION III

The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962: The U.S. and NATO Perspectives
The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962: Views from the Pentagon

Dr. Lawrence S. Kaplan

Berlin served as a potential source of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the first 25 years of the Cold War, but for almost a decade after the lifting of the Berlin blockade there was relative calm. During that brief period, the East Berlin uprising in 1953 or the admission of West Germany into NATO in 1955 might have sparked fire over the exposed Western position in West Berlin. But in none of the incipient crises did the Soviet Union specifically challenge Western rights in West Berlin or access routes to the city under the terms of the wartime agreements of 1945. In the absence of documentation, the historian can only speculate why the lull ended abruptly in 1958.

What is not speculative is the significant role the Department of Defense played in the unfolding of the crisis in the last years of the Eisenhower administration and the first years of the Kennedy administration. While the State Department had primary responsibility for negotiations over Soviet efforts to erode the Allied status in Berlin, it was the military on the scene and in the Pentagon who had to cope with military implications of Soviet initiatives. Although petty harassment in the form of delays and “administrative” difficulties had been periodically imposed on individual passengers traveling in Allied military convoys, there had been no direct challenge until 10 November 1958 when Premier Nikita Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union would “hand over to the sovereign German Democratic Republic those functions in Berlin which are still wielded by Soviet agencies.” Two weeks later the warnings became explicit. On 27 November the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum calling for an end to Allied rights in West Berlin and the conversion of West Berlin into a “free city.” The United States was given a grace period of six months to make the change. If this were not done, “the Soviet Union will then carry out the planned measures through an agreement with the GDR.”
The U.S. response was essentially worked out in a series of State-Defense discussions in January 1959 in which there was consensus over meeting a Soviet or East German challenge to surface access by military action on the ground rather than resorting to another airlift. American resolve was tested in the next month when Soviet military authorities at the western end of the autobahn demanded the right to board the trucks in a military convoy and inspect their contents. The convoy commander refused. The vehicles were kept impounded for two days until the convoy was finally released after a protest by the embassy in Moscow. Three months later Khrushchev backed away from his ultimatum. The funeral of Secretary of State Dulles provided an occasion for the deadline to be overlooked.

Troubles over Berlin, however, were not over. Khrushchev renewed his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany even as a new summit meeting was planned for the spring of 1960. And, after a brief show of conciliation before President Kennedy took office, he dispatched a harsh note to the Federal Republic on 17 February 1961, indicating that if the West did not participate in a peace treaty, the Soviet Union’s signature “will also mean ending the occupation regime in West Berlin with all the attendant consequences.”

Within a week of the presidential inauguration the Joint Chiefs sent suggestions to the secretary of defense for measures requiring early implementation. The JCS in turn had been reacting to a letter from former Secretary of State Christian Herter delivered to them in October 1960. They recommended holding exercises linked to access routes. On the same day General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, chairman of the JCS, referred to another memorandum from the acting secretary of defense on 29 October 1960, urging action on a checklist that could be put into effect immediately or used for future tripartite discussions. A major concern at this stage was to work out ways of maintaining Allied legal rights in Berlin “without unduly alarming the public.” For the benefit of the new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, Lemnitzer noted the efforts of the U.S. Coordinating Committee on Contingency Planning for Germany to have its working group come to grips with such matters as economic sanctions against East Germany or the Soviet Union.

The JCS responded to both the State and Defense requests, even before the provocative Soviet note of 17 February 1961 reached them. As Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze reported to Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 10 February, the JCS had come up with a variety of countermeasures which stopped short of overt military action. Those chosen from the checklist included: 1) intensification of a public relations campaign to influence Allies as well as to
present a show of U.S. determination; 2) identification of specific economic measures to be applied; 3) leaking the existence of tripartite military plans to conduct an exercise that could force open a blocked autobahn if necessary.  

These countermeasures were purposely intended to avoid provocation. Nitze felt that in the absence of a direct Soviet challenge to the Allied position in Berlin, it was useful to combine preparedness with caution. A careful mix was all the more important at a time when the Western Allies and the Soviets were assessing "the timber of our new Administration and to measure that assessment against the will and solidarity of the Allies." At the same time Nitze made it clear that the capability to respond quickly and effectively to any aggression would have to be "a prelude to any serious negotiations."  

The difficulties in Defense planning for Berlin contingencies were complicated by divisions among the Allies and within the Defense establishment itself. They surfaced in LIVE OAK, a tripartite (later quadripartite) military staff for Berlin contingency planning under the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad, where differences developed over the utility as well as the size of a probe along the autobahn to test Soviet intentions. The Europeans believed that no amount of conventionally armed ground forces would be sufficient to defeat a determined enemy. The Joint Chiefs agreed with these beliefs. Defense of the West, including Berlin, remained anchored to a low nuclear threshold. In contrast, McNamara and Nitze, joined by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson as unofficial presidential adviser, were convinced that strong conventional forces not only would contain an attack but also would deter a nuclear exchange.  

What was critical in the winter of 1961 was the administration's judgment about the activities which had taken place under Eisenhower before it arrived on the scene. The McNamara team had doubts about Norstad's and the Joint Chiefs' attitude toward the role of conventional forces in Europe. The JCS thinking hitherto had been that whatever took place on the conventional plane would quickly escalate to the nuclear, a conclusion shared by the Allies. The administration's reservations about Norstad and the JCS extended to all aspects of the machinery which the Eisenhower administration had assembled. The Kennedy White House did not dismantle the older organizations, such as the U.S. Coordinating Committee; it simply by-passed them. Ad hoc policy studies and special investigations under new advisers took their place, until the Berlin Task Force, headed by Nitze from Defense and Foy Kohler from State, was established in the summer of 1961. Planning for the defense of Berlin was fitted into a larger frame-
work of NATO policy planning, with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs taking responsibility for a full-scale review of the situation in the spring of 1961. 12

Soviet pressures over West Berlin gave a special urgency to Dean Acheson's review of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. His Berlin report, presented informally in June 1961, was a logical supplement to his comprehensive NATO report. Acheson recommended military preparations that would carry conviction, which bluster about a nuclear strike would fail to achieve. As in his fuller NATO report, Acheson found the appropriate response to Soviet aggression in the application of conventional forces to the problem. If the Soviets attempted to exclude the Western allies from physical access to the city, he wanted a division-sized probe to raise the stakes of the crisis. If it also raised risks of a general war, the risk was worth taking if it inhibited further provocations. Acheson's findings supported the substance of the JCS recommendations, if not their reasoning. 13

Whether or not the Acheson intentions were less rigid than their rhetoric, he opened a round of intense examination of the extent of American and NATO preparedness in the event of a renewed crisis over Berlin. Both Secretary of Defense McNamara and Presidential Adviser McGeorge Bundy dispatched urgent requests to the JCS about the state of countermeasures against aggressive actions by the Soviets. The Joint Chiefs responded before the end of April with a mixed report. On the positive side they found that U.S. contingency planning was proceeding in line with the checklist that had been agreed upon in the winter. They were less satisfied, however, with the readiness of the two partners in Berlin, particularly with respect to planning for a division-sized probe. The JCS felt that considerably more troops had to be in place in Europe before they would give an enemy pause, and that no probe should be attempted until that time. In specific response to Acheson's recommendations, which they found for the most part to be "a realistic analysis of a complex politico-military problem," they recommended putting off his division-sized probe to a later stage in the crisis. Since a smaller force conceivably could open the autobahn by itself, a larger force should be launched only if the battalion probe failed. 14

The JCS response contained contradictions. On the one hand, the Chiefs seemed confident that a smaller probe could settle the issue militarily, or at least push it up to the political level. On the other hand, their assumptions continued to rest on an early resort to nuclear weapons inasmuch as no long-term defense of Berlin was possible. If this were the case, nuclear arms, not conventional forces, were the only answer, both as a deterrent to war and as a weapon of war.
It was this assumption, a legacy of the previous administration, that distressed the OSD in 1961. The JCS position turned on a rapid acceleration from conventional to nuclear response. This might have been reasonable in 1958, but, according to Nitze, it was not feasible three years later. Nitze hoped that the possibilities of a West German contribution joining those of the British and French, even if only on a bilateral basis, might be integrated into JCS thinking. The Acheson study suggested as much. In any event, in keeping with the spirit of the Kennedy administration, Nitze wanted the president to have more flexibility in decision-making.15

McNamara listened more closely to Acheson's and Nitze's views than to those of the Joint Chiefs. The idea of moving directly to nuclear war after only token ground action was repugnant to him on logical as well as moral grounds. Nor were the Chiefs' pessimistic judgment that East Germany alone could stop a Western drive of one or two divisions acceptable to him. But given the Delphic nature of the JCS advice the secretary's report to the president on 5 May 1961 was able to incorporate their support for an exploratory probe without accepting their doubts about the defensibility of Berlin or their excessive reliance upon the nuclear thinking of the Eisenhower era. To Nitze and Lemnitzer he recommended the raising of a "substantial conventional military force" before resorting to nuclear war.16

The Joint Chiefs immediately challenged the Secretary of Defense. They found many of his opinions unworkable, and told him so; "substantial military force" was too vague. The SACEUR agreed with the Chiefs. Norstad saw no virtue in a large probe that would not be found in a smaller probe if the objective was only to smoke out Soviet intentions. Should the East Germans and Soviets block access to Allied traffic, they could frustrate a probe of any size. Hence, "the greater the force used the greater the embarrassment which would result from failure."17

Norstad's pessimism may have been a consequence of his close association with the British and French. The meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo in early May 1961 did not hold out any promise of firm collective action.18 Key questions of what economic countermeasures the Allies might take in the event that access routes were blocked, or what steps would be taken to increase manpower in the event of a major crisis in Berlin, went unanswered. Because of this vacuum, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric asked the Chairman of the JCS to weigh the merits of unilateral action, and to give his office advice on temporary reinforcement of U.S. forces in Europe as a way of demonstrating to the Soviets the seriousness with which the United States regarded their threats. Gilpatric wanted to know specifically the implications of an air mobility
exercise of two battle groups, of the movement of two Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) divisions, and of the call-up of one reserve division for active duty for two months.  

Khrushchev’s aide-memoire of 4 June 1961, which followed his meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, added a sense of urgency to the JCS response. The Soviet premier claimed that whatever the United States and its allies might do, the Soviet Union would sign a treaty with East Germany before the end of the year. The Chiefs delivered their answers on 6 June to Gilpatric’s query about the availability of reinforcements. Provisional reliance would be placed on two STRAC airborne groups which, along with 224 aircraft, could be dispatched to major training areas in Germany within two to three weeks. If necessary, an additional STRAC unit could be sent on a crash basis within nine days. Their preferred solution was to extend the service by 30 to 60 days of one of the 27 National Guard divisions scheduled for training exercises in the summer of 1961. The desired end product of this mobilization procedure would be a presidential declaration of a national emergency and the call-up of more reserve troops as well as more National Guardsmen.

This was also the direction in which Dean Acheson was moving. It was Acheson to whom the president turned in the disarray that followed the Vienna summit, since the acerbic statesman’s reports on Berlin represented the only sustained methodical thinking about the problem that was then available. Kennedy appointed him on 16 June to keep special watch over the situation. Acheson’s voice, augmented by such like-minded officials as Paul Nitze of OSD, Foy Kohler of State, and Walt Rostow of the White House staff, articulated coherent as well as definite points of view which were all too rare at this time in the Kennedy foreign policy establishment. Acheson’s advice, submitted on 28 June, followed the Joint Chiefs’ with respect to a declaration of national emergency. The Soviets had to be convinced, he claimed, that the United States would go to war in defense of Western interests in any part of Europe. By reducing the issue to simple terms, Acheson played a pivotal but not conclusive role in determining American policy on Berlin.

Despite the advice of Acheson and the JCS the president decided against declaring a state of national emergency. Such an act could have too many negative repercussions, from soaring prices through panic buying to a violent Soviet reaction. Acheson strongly disagreed with this prognosis at the NSC meeting of 13 July. He asserted that if the president deferred calling up the reserves or postponed declaring a national emergency, the deterrent effect would be lost. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, however, convinced McNamara that an orderly and sustained buildup would be
more likely to reassure allies and impress enemies than a full but hasty national mobilization. The way was now open for the president to lay down a clear American position in his public address of 25 July, in which the initiative would be his, not Khrushchev's. Even though he refused to accept Acheson's advice on full mobilization, he did order steps to be taken which were just short of full-blown mobilization—increasing the number of draftees, extending the terms of military service, and recalling selected reserve units to active duty. To pay for these increases he asked for an additional $3.25 billion for the Defense budget.

But how meaningful were these measures? Throughout the month of August the DoD provided only a limited implementation of the buildup. Reinforcements for Europe were only on a contingency basis. The assumption in the Pentagon was that the Soviets would undertake no serious actions until after September, and possibly not until the end of the year. Deployment of the six divisions publicized in the president's address would not be in place until 1 January 1962.

In retrospect, the message may have raised rather than lowered tensions. As the Congress proceeded to act on the proposals, McNamara underscored the uncertainties of the time by informing the House Committee on Armed Services that, "because we cannot foresee with certainty how events may develop over the coming months, we cannot say at this time whether the strength increases we now propose will necessarily be permanent." These uncertainties were compounded by European uneasiness over the dispatch of troops, many or few. The Allies emphasized the debilitating vulnerability of conventional forces, whatever their numbers, in the face of the Warsaw Pact's overwhelming superiority in manpower and weaponry. Only the threat of a nuclear response could deter the enemy from denying the West access to Berlin. Administration planners saw the situation differently. They believed that increased conventional forces would encourage flexibility, allowing the Soviets to return to the status quo before the conflict escalated to a degree that neither side wanted. Kohler and Nitze labored to make this point stick with the working group.

Conflict between the approaches of the OSD and NATO became evident in the North Atlantic Council's reactions to the administration's initiatives. Here the issue was not just over the nature of the deterrent; it was over the lack of communication between the Berlin planners and the Council. Secretary-General Dirk Stikker complained to Norstad about the failure of the tripartite group to keep him informed of its preparations for a crisis over Berlin. He felt it to be important that the contingency measures be considered an "all-NATO exercise."
The secretary-general found a sympathetic audience in Dean Rusk who suggested on 8 August that the military contingency group coordinate its plans with NATO as a whole. At the very least, the U.S. military representative to the Council should be kept "systematically informed of Berlin planning in all its aspects." General Clark Ruffner, the military representative, noted that no procedures had been established to make these connections up to that time.30

The explanation for this dysfunction was clear enough on the surface. While the tripartite force in Berlin was under the NATO rubric, NATO's authority did not encompass the tripartite powers' right of access to Berlin. For this reason LIVE OAK planning functioned outside the organization, even though General Norstad as LIVE OAK commander employed some of his SHAPE staff, and in an emergency would also use NATO's communications to "visualize realistically the execution of any Berlin contingency plan in isolation from NATO."31

It was in this environment of Western confusion that Khrushchev and his East German surrogates acted. Some 30,000 East Germans had fled to the West in July, and another 20,000 left in the first 12 days of August. Citing a Warsaw Pact declaration of 6 August, the GDR leader, Walter Ulbricht, blamed West German provocateurs for the exodus, and then set in motion new border controls. The "Wall" itself was first a string of cement blocks built into a wall on the Potsdamer Platz after pavement and street car tracks were torn up. It was not extended until 18 August. The Wall took its final form on 19 August.32

The Wall was a "complete tactical surprise," as John Ausland of the Berlin Task Force noted.33 It could not have been better timed. Western leaders for the most part were away from their offices—Kennedy at his summer White House in Hyannisport, Macmillan on vacation in Scotland, and French officialdom presumably at the Riviera. It was August, after all. Although Ulbricht had talked about a "wall" prior to 13 August, its actual construction had not been anticipated. All the scenarios created by American planners centered on a crisis growing out of a Soviet peace treaty with East Germany, and the consequent interference with Western access to West Berlin. Problems of East Berlin, on the other hand, evoked either a hesitant reaction, or none at all. For over a decade the three powers in Berlin—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—had accepted the erosion of their legal position in East Berlin largely because they had no means of effecting meaningful implementation of the original quadripartite agreement. In this context the building of the Wall was beyond the control of the West, another step in the incorporation of East Berlin into the GDR. But it did not affect the Western presence in West Berlin.
Initially, there was as much relief as apprehension in the U.S. and Allied response to the Soviet/East German action. Western observers had been increasingly worried over the impact of the refugee flow on the health of the GDR; the Wall at least staunched this flow of population from East to West. It appeared to be a preemptive effort to prevent a dangerous East German insurrection as its economy withered. There was certainly a sense of relief in Secretary Rusk's public statement on 13 August: "Available information indicates that measures taken so far are aimed at residents of East Berlin and East Germany and not at the allied position or access thereto." His additional comments to the effect that limitations on travel in Berlin violated the status quo were little more than a formality.34

Nevertheless, there was also apprehension over the deterioration of morale in West Berlin and in West Germany over what seemed to be a passive response on the part of the three occupying powers. The best that the Allies could come up with in the immediate aftermath was to impose restrictions on East Germans traveling to NATO countries. The Berlin Task Force was equally cautious. It recommended that military preparations be accelerated but not too dramatically. Its members feared that ostentatious reinforcement of the Berlin garrison would only underscore the Allied inability to defend the city. From his perspective as Chairman of the JCS, Lemnitzer observed that "everyone appeared to be hopeless, helpless, and harmless."35

OSD's position was similar to State's. McNamara had publicized his thoughts on Berlin two weeks before the Wall went up. He recognized that Khrushchev's recent stance "showed a marked change and a much firmer line than existed" in 1958. At the same time he cautioned against a panicky buildup in response to this change: "We should not rush to increase our forces and then rush to tear them down." The peaks and valleys of an adversarial relationship, he believed, should not deter the DoD from a steady course of planning.36

The Wall changed neither McNamara's rhetoric nor his reasoning, at least not immediately. On 14 August he told an interviewer that "we have two purposes in mind in connection with this build-up. The first is a clear demonstration—demonstration beyond misunderstanding—of the Western determination to defend freedom in Berlin and to defend the allied rights in Berlin. Our second purpose, associated with the first objective, is to build up military power, to provide a more effective deterrent, as to insure an increased capability for military action in the event the deterrent fails."37

While there was an admirable consistency in this reiteration of policy, it hardly seemed responsive to the crisis at hand. McNamara admitted that "the recent move to blockade East Berliners, of course, was a move by the
Soviet Union and/or its East German satellite and certainly is unrelated to any action we have taken. It does, of course, violate the treaties which we are parties to and I understand that a strong protest therefore will be submitted against the action that has been taken." If there was no complacency in his language, there was also little recognition that the actions of the Warsaw bloc could affect the timetable of the DoD's military preparations.

It was only after Berliners themselves, notably Mayor Willy Brandt, had demanded stronger protests that the United States was jarred from its relative calm. Brandt released an unsettling letter that he had sent to President Kennedy in which he demanded among other things immediate dispatch of troops to Berlin as a guarantee of continuing intention to remain in the city. If there was no complacency in his language, there was also little recognition that the actions of the Warsaw bloc could affect the timetable of the DoD's military preparations.

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The presence of two leading Americans did calm German fears, at least for the moment. Clay turned out to be such a source of inspiration that the president considered making him the U.S. military commander in Berlin. That he did not pursue this approach was because of the strain that McNamara and Lemnitzer anticipated would be placed on relations with the command structure already on the scene. Instead, they recommended that he be called chief of mission with the rank of ambassador, thereby relieving Ambassador Walter Dowling of additional duties. Major General Albert Watson, the U.S. Commandant in Berlin, was also deputy chief of mission, and so could report to Clay without disrupting command channels. On 30 August the president appointed Clay as his personal representative in Berlin.

The significance of the general's role in Berlin did not go unrecognized in Moscow. Khrushchev claimed that he picked Marshal Ivan Konev to be the Soviet commander in Berlin as his direct response to the Clay appointment. He made it clear that it was a political gesture by observing that Konev spent most of his time in Moscow.

The dispatch of a Seventh Army battle group of 1500 men to Berlin on 20 August was another effort to impress the Warsaw bloc and the West Berliners alike with the seriousness of American support of the integrity of the city. The column proceeded across the autobahn unchallenged. This action could be interpreted as a successful riposte, even if belated, to the
construction of the Wall. Its success demonstrated, as William Kaufmann noted, that the Soviets “were not all that interested in a showdown.” There was no question that the 1st Battle Group, 18th Infantry Regiment, entered Berlin in triumph. Vice President Johnson personally greeted the troops when they arrived, signaling, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., asserted, a turning point in West Berlin’s crisis of confidence.43

But the convoy also conveyed a different message. Its commander unwittingly set a precedent that the Soviets were able to exploit in the future against subsequent troop movements from West Germany to West Berlin. As the convoy arrived at the Soviet checkpoint on the approach to the city shortly after dawn 20 August, a Soviet officer had some difficulty in counting the number of soldiers on the trucks. The U.S. officer in charge then ordered the troops to dismount to expedite the processing of the tired men. While counting was an established and accepted practice, the emptying of trucks for counting on the ground was not. In future challenges the Soviets were able to use this precedent to demand dismounting on a regular basis. The incident showed just how vulnerable the tripartite powers were to interference with their supplies and communications to Berlin.44

Despite the momentary lift of morale following the combination of highly visible troops and high-level Americans on the scene, there was no evidence that the Soviets were intimidated, or even impressed, by these actions. Rather, their behavior seemed to suggest that they were advancing rather than retreating after 13 August. The Wall had been extended and reinforced. On 23 August new regulations curtailed movements of West Berliners into the East; special authorization was hereafter required. No Western outcry followed this change.

Nor was there significant reaction to the ending of the quadripartite status of East Berlin. The Soviets hardened the symbol of the Wall by terminating the surviving occupation agencies in East Berlin. While they did not stop Western patrols from entering East Berlin, at least in principle, they progressively reduced the number of entry places to one—Checkpoint Charlie at Friedrichstrasse. And even this concession probably would not have been tolerated had the Soviets not wanted reciprocity in West Berlin, particularly their access to the Red Army war memorial. Before the year ended the U.S. commandant had denied himself entry into East Berlin after GDR officials insisted on processing documents of American diplomatic personnel entering the East. This self-denial severed formal relations among the four-power commandants. It seemed to be only a matter of time before East Germany would take control of Western access to West Berlin itself.45
The president was painfully aware of the situation the Wall had created. He goaded the secretaries of state and defense to accelerate their political and military preparations for countering the new challenges from the East. Nitze agreed by the end of August on the need for a “fundamental reappraisal” of the July decision for “restrained, gradual, military strengthening” of the U.S. position in Berlin. Programs had been proceeding too gradually, their contents too restrained. McNamara had already acted. On 18 August he had asked the services what they could do to advance the readiness date from 1 January 1962 to 15 November 1961. The Secretary of Defense now realized, as he had not four days before, that the deployment of six additional divisions to Europe “at any time after 1 January 1962” was too leisurely a pace. The Joint Chiefs recognized in their telegram to Norstad on 25 August that the “U.S. right of access to West Berlin from FRG is of such importance as to require, if necessary, the use of force entailing combat.” By contrast, they were willing to consider the U.S. right of access to East Berlin to be satisfied “as long as one entry point is available for the unimpeded movement of allied personnel.”

It was in the context of a perceived emergency over Berlin that the OSD was to play a major role on the Berlin Task Force, with Nitze as an equal partner of Kohler. Such deference to Defense contributions was appropriate in light of the increasing significance of U.S. troops confronting the Soviets in Berlin. As much as any action, McNamara’s decision on 18 September, supported by the JCS, revealed that the Berlin Task Force was in full motion.

It was at McNamara’s advice that the president moved to strengthen U.S. forces in Berlin on a crash basis, not with the six divisions Lemnitzer and Army Chief of Staff General George Decker would have preferred, but with the deployment of 73,000 reservists, along with one regular division. The risks were recognized. Even six divisions might not be enough to cope with a major Soviet attack, but might be more than enough to trigger a nuclear war. But risks had to be taken. “While a conventional build-up alone,” McNamara advised, “would be unlikely to convince Khrushchev, the absence of a build-up would probably increase his doubts of our determination.”

This decision accelerated a process that had been underway since the spring: namely, a continuing search for “options,” as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Henry Rowen put it, in response to a wide variety of Soviet actions. The term “horse blanket” has been applied to the list of scenarios the West could conjure up, with Nitze of Defense and Seymour Weiss of State as the two principals charged with stuffing as many potential reactions to Soviet provocations as
possible under the horse blanket. By the end of September the horse blanket had been reduced to a “poodle blanket” under which fewer but not lesser options were placed. There were four in all, ranging from probes of platoon strength on the ground as the first stage to embargo and troop mobilization as the second, to naval blockade and non-nuclear ground advance into GDR territory as the third. Lastly, if none of these efforts led to the cessation of Soviet provocations, nuclear weapons would be deployed, beginning with selective attacks for purposes of demonstration, and proceeding through tactical weapons to a general nuclear war. The final phase in the poodle blanket sounded an apocalyptic note.

The administration was ready in mid-October to act on Defense recommendations. The president gave approval on 18 October for the U.S. commandant in Berlin to send up a few tanks to the checkpoint to demolish an illegal barrier. The plan then would have the tanks withdrawn from the border and stationed just inside the Allies’ sector. This aggressive posture was the result of an agreement by State and Defense, with the JCS concurrence, on policy guidance for General Norstad wherein the president specifically endorsed the poodle blanket proposals. The president intended to place the United States “in position to undertake a series of graduated responses to Soviet/GDR actions in denial of our rights of access.” In a cautionary addendum he mentioned that he wished to “avoid on the one hand delay that would damage the Western position and on the other an over-hasty reaction, before our forces are ready, which would sharply increase the probability of nuclear war.” A second admonition was contained in his emphasis on developing the capacity to fight with non-nuclear forces. The poodle blanket plans received NSC approval when NSAM 109 was promulgated on 23 October 1961.

As these plans were being formulated there was a general assumption that there would be British and French support for the American initiatives. This was not forthcoming. Allied discomfort over American impulsiveness added to General Norstad’s restiveness over policies flowing from Washington. He foresaw the Soviets playing one ally off against another as they exposed the weaknesses of each. As the man in the middle, Norstad was worried about his responsibilities not only as USCINCEUR and SACEUR but also as agent of the tripartite powers in LIVE OAK. He was unsure when he could act independently without excessive and time-consuming consultation with his superiors. To visiting representatives of State and Defense he unburdened himself in late September about the “inadequacies, almost the dangerous inadequacies, of the strategic concept employed in the LIVE OAK directive.” He doubted NATO’s willingness to use nuclear weapons “under any contingency.”
Norstad had reason for concern. Even in OSD, which should have been the strongest advocate for granting him maximum authority, there was hesitation. Nitze for a time in September seemed to waffle over rules of engagement that would authorize him to attack ground targets in the “Berlin air corridor without the approval of NATO’s Defense Committee.” Lemnitzer eventually convinced Nitze to accept this position on this issue. But in general there was no consistent policy to guide the SACEUR beneath the level of full-scale conflict. On such an important matter as military planning in the event of an East German uprising the Secretary of Defense was unable to win agreement from the British on anticipating a decision to intervene. Such action, according to the British ally, should not be subject to determination prior to the event. While McNamara was sympathetic to Norstad’s plight, he was forced to settle for “expeditious” Allied approval of plans for assuring access to Berlin.

U.S. planners had to repress their frustrations in public, but behind the closed doors at White House and NSC meetings they were fully vented. When the president asked on 20 October what to do about the negative reactions of the Allies, Acheson responded: “We should make up our own minds and then tell heads of state what they should do. We have coordinated at the ambassadorial level long enough. Hang on. Ambassadors go to heads of state, and let them know what we propose to do.” This seemed to be one time that Acheson's hard line had the full backing of his colleagues. But this shared sentiment had to remain in camera.

While the hesitations of the Allies may have complicated, they did not prevent the United States from substantially increasing its forces in Europe. The addition of 37,000 personnel to the Seventh Army, combined with the announcement in September that 40,000 troops were enroute to Europe, may have been responsible for Khrushchev's backing away from his intention to sign a peace treaty with East Germany before the end of the year.

This show of resolve should have made an impression on Khrushchev. It certainly impressed the White House sufficiently to take up negotiations with the Soviets from an assumed situation of strength. The president announced on 13 September, one month after the erection of the Wall, that he would agree to Secretary Rusk's talking with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at the forthcoming meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. The initiative, however, appeared to be more Khrushchev's than Kennedy's. Through the medium of Cyrus L. Sulzberger of the New York Times, the Soviet leader opened personal communications with the president. In the event that his informal message miscarried, Khrushchev used his press representative in Washington to have Press Secretary Pierre
Salinger transmit the message directly to Kennedy. And on 29 September he wrote a personal note to the president from his Black Sea villa.\textsuperscript{60}

The Gromyko-Rusk talks afforded Khrushchev another opportunity to scrap his timetable for a separate treaty. He could claim that Gromyko’s efforts in New York and Washington “left us with the impression that the Western powers were showing a certain understanding of the situation and they were disposed to seek a settlement of the German problem and the question of Berlin on a mutually acceptable basis.” Consequently, he was ready to concede that “we shall not... absolutely insist on signing the peace treaty before 1 December 1961.” Such was the Soviet decision on 17 October 1961, the first day of the 22nd Party Congress.\textsuperscript{61}

Whatever the reason for his postponement of the deadline, the act was followed almost immediately by the most serious confrontation between the Soviets and the Americans in Berlin since the Berlin blockade of 1948. It was not as dramatic as the Wall but it was potentially more explosive. On 27 and 28 October, at Checkpoint Charlie separating East from West Berlin, American tanks faced Soviet tanks. Whether this was another episode in the Soviet campaign against Allied positions in West Berlin or an aberration from the more conciliatory line implied in the Pen Pal exchanges and in Khrushchev’s pronouncement at the Communist party Congress is still open to debate. The confrontation may have been a reaction to what the Soviets interpreted as U.S. provocations, such as the behavior of General Clay, the president’s special representative in Berlin.\textsuperscript{62}

Clay arrived on 19 September and immediately—and ostentatiously—increased patrols on the autobahn. His aggressiveness was not only a personal gesture on behalf of worried West Berliners but also a rebuke to the cautiousness of the White House’s management of the Berlin crisis. Clay’s status made an intricate command relationship in Germany even more convoluted. Major General Albert Watson was the senior American officer, the commandant in Berlin, who reported in his political capacity to Ambassador Walter Dowling in Bonn and in his military role to USCINCEUR in Paris through General Bruce Clarke, commander of the U.S. Army, Europe, in Heidelberg. Additionally, there was a State Department mission in Berlin headed by Allan Lightner, who reported both to Dowling and Watson as well as directly to Washington.\textsuperscript{63}

It was Lightner who unwittingly precipitated the crisis. He and his wife were en route to the opera in East Berlin on the evening of 22 October when he was stopped at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint and asked to show identification. Up to this time civilian license tags were sufficient to permit passage. The U.S. position was that the ceremony of requiring a civilian official to identify himself to a GDR officer was an effort to erode
the right of the occupying power to travel anywhere in Berlin. When East German guards stopped him a second time, a squad of U.S. military policy with loaded rifles escorted his car into East Berlin. After driving a block he returned to the West and then repeated the routing, driving a mile into East Berlin before turning back.64

On the following day GDR leader Walter Ulbricht issued a decree requiring Allied civilians to identify themselves before entering East Berlin. Two days later U.S. armed patrols again accompanied civilian officials across the line. To point attention to the significance he attached to the issue, Clay asked Watson to deploy tanks at Checkpoint Charlie, in accordance with Poodle Blanket recommendations. This action alarmed the British, who had never objected to showing their passports when asked. They were all the more alarmed when Marshal Ivan Konev, Clay’s Soviet counterpart, sent his own tanks into the city. This challenge induced Clay to move U.S. tanks to the demarcation line. Six Soviet tanks were deployed just 100 yards away.65

The next stage might have been a shootout between the opposing sides. It did not take place. Khrushchev ordered his tanks to pull back sixteen hours after they had been moved up to the line. In his memoirs he claimed a victory in thwarting American tanks from bulldozing border installations.66

Khrushchev may have been mistaken about American objectives in the confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie, but he had some grounds for judging the outcome to be a Soviet triumph. Over the next few years the challenge to the West over GDR frontier controls as well as to the use of air corridors to Berlin continued, although on a less dramatic scale.67 On an even larger canvas the Wall symbolized the achievement of an important objective: namely, the stabilization of East Germany by stopping the flow of manpower from East to West.

Yet there was a price that the East bloc had to pay for contesting the West’s presence in Berlin. The tripartite powers did not budge from their position in West Berlin, or in their demand for access to the city. This was the critical issue that kept the crisis over Berlin from becoming a zero-sum game. Neither side was willing to go to war over the city in 1961. Both Clay and Konev were subsequently recalled. And while the end of this confrontation did not inhibit further Soviet harassment over the next two and a half years, the Soviets were unable to force the United States to accept East German control over access to Berlin before a treaty was signed.

When the treaty was finally concluded in June 1964, it implicitly accepted a "status quo ante bellum" over the Western position in Berlin.
After six years of tension over Berlin the treaty was an anticlimax. What counted was left unsaid. Beneath the rhetoric of traditional statements of friendship and collaboration was the omission of any reference to Allied troops in West Berlin or to their right of access to the city. The only reference to West Berlin was a brief article which stated that "The high contracting parties will regard West Berlin as an independent entity." By their silence the Soviets gave up their demands.

The secretary of defense's ability to fashion a policy during the extended crisis was always complicated by the difficulties in reaching consensus within the department. In Europe, Norstad, understandably sensitive to the concerns of the Allies, had continuing doubts about the utility of probes. In the Pentagon the Joint Chiefs were more supportive of these efforts, but they shared with Norstad and the Europeans fundamental suspicions about the doctrine of flexible response which McNamara's and Nitze's emphasis upon conventional forces underscored. Outside the department, McNamara had to cope with pressures from White House agents, Acheson and Clay, who would have used conventional forces more aggressively than the Defense establishment wanted. On balance the most effective contribution to McNamara's policies in the Berlin crisis was made by the Office of International Security Affairs under Paul Nitze.

On another level the Berlin crisis placed the Pentagon on center stage in shaping American foreign policy. While Defense was nominally a junior partner in the process, the nature of the Berlin crisis broadened McNamara's role in the Kennedy administration. This was reflected in dramatic increases in defense funding in the third amended budget of fiscal year 1961, in the enlargement of conventional forces, and in plans to reform the reserves system. Defense emerged from the Berlin crisis with new authority as a participant in the management of national security issues.

**BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE**


U.S. military records for this period are abundant, although many of them remain classified. The major source of information on the Berlin crisis derives from records of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Federal Records Center Accession 64A2382, in Record Group 330, Washington National Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Maryland. The Joint Master Files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the records in the Office of the Chairman, JCS, located in the Pentagon, offer the important perspective of the Joint Chiefs. The third member of the Pentagon triad was General Norstad, both in his capacity as CINCEUCOM and SACEUR. The NATO records at SHAPE are closed, but the studies of the SHAPE historian on the workings of LIVE OAK and of Norstad's role in the crisis provide insights into the richness of the records, as do the volumes of Kenneth W. Condit and Walter S. Poole in the official history of the JCS, prepared by the Historical Division of the Joint Secretariat.

A large collection of Secretary McNamara's papers (formerly Federal Records Center Accession 71A4470) have recently been transferred from the Washington National Records Center to the National Archives in Washington and are now part of Record Group 200. Research for this paper was done when the collection was housed at the WNRC.

The papers of Generals Lyman L. Lemnitzer as JCS Chairman and Maxwell Taylor as military adviser to the President are in the National Defense University Library. Oral histories of McNamara, Lemnitzer, and Paul Nitze are kept in the OSD Historical Office.


ENDNOTES


4. Nitze letter to John Ausland, 24 April 1974, Nitze Papers, Library of Congress, noted that an airlift could be interfered with. But the main reason for removing that option was the need "to impress upon the Soviets that we had a right to be in Berlin and that we would go to extreme lengths to protect our rights." See also Watson, "The Problem of Berlin," p. 18.


6. Aide-Memoire from the Secretary of the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany, 17 February 1961, Documents on Germany, p. 726.


10. Ibid.


28. Tel, Gavin (Paris) to Secretary of State, No. 632, 3 August 1961; Finletter (Paris) to Secretary of State, POLTO 143, 5 August 1961, OSD Historical Office.
29. Gen Clark M. Ruffner memorandum for JCS, 10 August 1961, Subj: Berlin Planning, 092 Germany (Berlin), Box 32, FRC 64A2382.
31. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 2/14–15.
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40. Ibid., p. 192; Austland, “Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin,” 2/17.

41. McNamara memorandum for the President, 24 August 1961, Box 54, McNamara Papers. Fears about Clay’s propensity to act unilaterally were not fully removed in August. They would arise again as new crises developed in subsequent months; Walter Poole interview with Lemnitzer 2 February 1977, in JCS History, p. 193; John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York: Knopf, 1989), pp. 157–58.


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48. Telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Europe (Norstad), 25 August 1961, FRUS, p. 370.

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52. ISA draft of “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in Berlin Conflict,” 12 October 1961, Germany 1961, 092 October 1–14, Box 51, FRC 64A2382. This document was issued as National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 109 on 23 October 1961; see Gregory W. Pedlow draft paper, “General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis,” pp. 26–27; see also Admiral J. M. Lee letter to Steven L. Rearden, 18 May 1984, Nitze Papers, on devolution from horse to poodle by way of pony blanket.

54. Gavin (Paris) tel 1885 to Department of State, 7 October 1961, FRUS, pp. 481–83; Finletter (Paris) tel POLTO 500 to Secretary of State, 20 October 1961, and Gavin (Paris) tel 2058 to Secretary of State, 17 October 1961, both in Secretary of Defense Cable Files, OSD Historical Office.


59. Kohler memorandum for Bundy, 7 October 1961, Subj: Military Buildup for Berlin, Germany 1961, 092, October 1–14, Box 51, FRC 64A2382; McNamara memorandum for the President, 10 October 1961, Box 54, McNamara Papers.

60. Ausland, “Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin,” 3/5–6; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 599. See editorial note on Sulzberger and Salinger, FRUS, pp. 401–02; letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 29 September 1961, ibid., pp. 444ff, the first of what has been called the “Pen Pal Correspondence.”


63. Ausland, “Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin,” 3/11–12, for Clay’s role seen from the perspective of a member of the Berlin Task Force.

64. Lighther’s account of the incident in Lightner (Berlin) tel no. 805 to Department of State, 23 October 1961, FRUS, p. 524; Norstad note on incidents in Berlin, 26 October 1961, NAC Briefing File, Norstad Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


Allied Crisis Management for Berlin:  
The LIVE OAK Organization, 1959–1963

Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow

One minute before German unification on 3 October 1990, a small organization located within the compound of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) even though not a part of the NATO structure, sent out messages notifying the governments of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States that its operations were now ceasing. The LIVE OAK organization had passed into the pages of history thirty-one years after being founded during the early stages of one of the tensest periods of the Cold War, the Second Berlin Crisis.

Throughout most of its existence, LIVE OAK was shrouded in secrecy. During its early years even the most innocuous references to the organization were stamped “TOP SECRET,” and it was only in 1987 that LIVE OAK put its name on its building and allowed its personnel to wear the organization’s crest on their uniforms. The extensive secrecy that long surrounded LIVE OAK has until recently hampered the work of scholars studying the Second Berlin Crisis. However, German unification and elimination of special Allied rights in Berlin not only ended the need for LIVE OAK itself but also removed the need to continue to protect documents related to Berlin contingency planning. Therefore, in the past four years the American, British, and German governments have released large numbers of formerly classified documents on the Second Berlin Crisis. Thus even though the official four-power LIVE OAK archives and the two classified histories of LIVE OAK remain closed to scholars, there are now more than enough sources available to illustrate the role played by LIVE OAK during the Second Berlin Crisis.

The Founding of LIVE OAK

LIVE OAK came into existence as a result of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s demands in November 1958 that the Western Allies give up
their position in West Berlin, a demand that was soon followed by Soviet harassment of Allied military convoys to and from Berlin. On 10 November 1958 Khrushchev called for the end of the Western Allied “occupation regime” in Berlin and threatened to turn over the Soviet Union’s functions in Berlin to the German Democratic Republic. Four days later, Soviet guards blocked a US convoy on the autobahn from Berlin to West Germany for eight hours before the convoy commander gave up and returned to West Berlin. By the end of November Khrushchev had strengthened his threat to the Allies, giving them six months to end their rights in Berlin and make it a “free city.”

The renewal of Cold War tension over Berlin resulting from Khrushchev’s ultimatum and the harassment of Allied convoys led to considerable military planning by the United States on ways to deal with Soviet threats to Allied access to Berlin. There were also a series of meetings between high-level officials of the three Western Allies to develop a coordinated policy, and on 14 December 1958 the three powers announced their intention to maintain all of their rights in Berlin, including the right of free access.

Despite this outward show of unity, the Allies were divided on the best course of action to take in the event the Soviets began obstructing access to Berlin. The United States was not willing to rely on an airlift like the one of 1948–49 without first attempting to meet the Soviet challenge on the ground, including trying military force to restore access. The British Government was much less inclined to try ground action and was willing to resort to an airlift again. During the early months of 1959, tripartite meetings continued in Washington, leading to the formation of the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group to coordinate Allied planning for Berlin. This group was composed of the British and French ambassadors in Washington and a senior U.S. State Department official.

Despite the considerable amount of diplomatic activity that had taken place in the months following the Khrushchev ultimatum, there was still little coordination of possible Allied military responses. This deficit became glaringly obvious in February 1959, when the crisis escalated after Soviet checkpoint guards blocked a U.S. convoy for more than 50 hours. The United States was seriously considering using force to free the convoy when the Soviets finally allowed it to proceed following a strong U.S. protest note and a press conference by President Eisenhower to publicize the Soviets’ actions. On the same day that the U.S. convoy was blocked, the Soviets also stopped a British truck and demanded to see its contents. After carrying out the inspection over the objections of the driver, the Soviets allowed the truck to proceed. This incident clearly demonstrated
the need for greater Allied coordination of their responses to the growing Soviet pressure on Allied access to Berlin.8

Arriving in Washington during the final stage of this convoy crisis, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Lauris Norstad, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the United States European Command (USCINCEUR; the command is called USEUCOM), met with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and called for the creation of an organization to coordinate Allied planning efforts. On 18 February 1959, after returning to Paris, he ordered “the establishment at HQ USEUCOM of a small concealed US-only group, to be a nucleus for any tripartite staff I might have to form, and meanwhile to consider military problems concerned with access to Berlin.”9

The following day Norstad told Sir Frank Roberts, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to NATO, about the proposed tripartite organization and asked him to pass this information on to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd along with Norstad’s desire for the “participation of one or more British officers in the group being formed at USEUCOM.” Roberts replied on 3 March that Lloyd had conferred with Prime Minister Macmillan, who had agreed that his country “would be happy to participate.” With British support in hand, Norstad then approached General Paul Ely, France’s Chief of Staff for National Defense, on 11 March. General Ely immediately indicated his personal support and six days later informed Norstad that the French government was also in agreement.10

Norstad now had support from the Allies but no firm decisions from his own government, and on 17 March 1959 he expressed his concern to the JCS that “although over 3 months have passed since the Russian ultimatum, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France have not yet made provisions for tripartite military planning to cover possible developments of the Berlin crisis nor provided for a tripartite military command should such an establishment be required.” All Norstad had received were several State Department proposals that had substantial disadvantages, and he complained that there had been no coordination, and certainly no agreement, with Britain and France. Noting that “if trouble starts, the whole military problem, whether on a NATO or a national basis, falls squarely into my lap,” Norstad called for the immediate establishment of a tripartite military staff. In his view this staff would number no more than 20 officers and an equal number of clerks, and it “would function strictly as the staff of the military commander.” Norstad added that he also contemplated “some German participation, at least for coordination purposes.” He proposed that the tripartite staff be concealed initially under the cover that it was “planning the common use of military
facilities” with the code name “LIVE OAK.” This message achieved the desired result, as the JCS immediately cabled its approval. Thus by the end of March 1959 all three Western Allies had given their final approval to the formation of a tripartite military planning staff, with President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan doing so at their meetings in Washington on 20–22 March 1959. The tripartite foreign ministers then met in Washington on 31 March, and on 4 April 1959 the three powers issued a paper that summarized the results of their deliberations on Berlin contingency planning. This classified document, which became known as the Tripartite Basic Paper, stated that the new tripartite staff in Paris would be “under the general supervision of General Norstad” and would be responsible for planning “quiet preparatory and precautionary military measures of a kind which will not create public alarm but which will be detectable by Soviet intelligence” and also “more elaborate military measures in Europe, which would be generally observable, including (1) measures to be implemented after the Soviet Government has turned its functions over to the GDR and (2) measures to be implemented after Allied traffic has been forcibly obstructed.”

The Tripartite Basic Paper established an elaborate political oversight process, with the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington responsible for “overall coordination” of Berlin contingency planning, while the “Three Embassies in Bonn” (the American, British, and French Ambassadors to the Federal Republic of Germany) were to make recommendations for the details of Allied movements to Berlin by ground and air. The plans and recommendations produced by the LIVE OAK staff were sent to the Tripartite Chiefs of Staff for review before being submitted for final approval to the Ambassadorial Group.

The Tripartite Basic Document stated that Norstad supervised LIVE OAK “in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces, Europe,” but this does not mean that the new organization was subordinate to the U.S. military command structure in Europe. LIVE OAK was a unique tripartite organization, separate from Norstad’s other two commands (USEUCOM and SHAPE). Thus, the principle was soon established that Norstad commanded LIVE OAK wearing a “third hat” separate from his U.S. and NATO hats. In contrast to his other two hats, however, General Norstad’s “Commander, LIVE OAK” hat did not involve true command authority. All LIVE OAK plans and decisions required the approval of all three (later four) powers involved; very little authority was delegated to General Norstad.

LIVE OAK’s small core of U.S. personnel quickly expanded to include British and French personnel, and by mid-April 1959 all were working in a
small barracks block within the USEUCOM compound at Camp des Loges in St. Germain en Laye, some 20 kilometers west of Paris. Day to day supervision of the organization lay in the hands of its Chief of Staff, British Major General W. G. Stirling (commander of the British Army of the Rhine’s 2nd Division), but Norstad and the Deputy US CINCEUR, General Williston B. Palmer, kept close tabs on what was going on at LIVE OAK. The initial personnel strength was 35, organized into three national delegations and a secretariat with a small administrative staff. Each of the three LIVE OAK powers provided personnel from all three services.

At the time of its founding, LIVE OAK was not expected to have a very long existence. Once its personnel completed their contingency plans for Berlin, a task that was estimated to take about six to eight weeks, the organization would have accomplished its original mission. As a result, all of its staff remained on the rosters of their parent organizations in the expectation that they would soon be returning.

While the LIVE OAK staff was assembling in Paris, its command arrangements remained unclear. On 7 April the U.K. Chiefs of Staff Committee (the British equivalent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) noted that “it was not clear whether the group was intended to be an integrated staff responsible only to General Norstad, or three national staffs briefed by their respective national authorities but reporting only to General Norstad, or three national staffs responsible in the first instance only to their national authorities.” A Foreign Office representative then informed them that the Ambassadorial Group had agreed in Washington that the three national teams “had the right to receive instructions from, and to report to, their own national authorities.”

Norstad was concerned that this decision could lead to LIVE OAK being controlled by a group of committees, which would leave him without any command authority over LIVE OAK’s work. He therefore informed the U.K. Chiefs of Staff that due to the short time available for planning, a committee system would not be feasible. In addition, he wanted to be “fully responsible for the work of the planning staff since he, as SACEUR, might ultimately be responsible for carrying out the measures proposed.” Norstad also mentioned privately to the U.K. National Military Representative at SHAPE that through the proposed arrangements “he hoped to exercise some restraint over the more dangerous elements in the Pentagon.” Since Norstad had agreed that the national elements of LIVE OAK could consult with their governments, the UK Chiefs of Staff approved his desire for the LIVE OAK staff to be organized as a “combined joint staff” reporting directly to Norstad but “consulting as necessary with their national political and military authorities.”
On 14 April 1959 Norstad drafted a memorandum containing his own concept for LIVE OAK as a “military staff, made up of appropriate representation from each of the three countries concerned.” He noted that the senior Allied officers (a British major general and a French brigadier general) could also serve as national representatives for the purpose of receiving political advice from their countries. Norstad then called in the senior British and French officers at SHAPE, and got their support for this concept of command.21

**LIVE OAK Planning for Ground Operations**

The LIVE OAK staff quickly began to produce the studies requested by the Tripartite Basic Paper, a task that was made easier by the planning that already been done by national military authorities, particularly in the United States. Just two weeks after LIVE OAK’s founding, its first study on “Quiet Preparatory and Precautionary Military Measures” was on its way to the Tripartite Chiefs of Staff. These measures included increased practice of alert measures, retaining U.S. units for training in the British Army’s area, increased patrolling of the inner-German border, increased use of the autobahn by French military traffic, preparation of sites for additional navigational aids for a Berlin airlift, and the designation of a single commander for Allied forces in Berlin.22

The next task for Norstad’s LIVE OAK staff was to draft plans for a probe to test Soviet intentions in the event that access to Berlin was blocked. On 14 May this study was ready. It offered three possible courses of action: Course A, a probe that would stop if confronted with Soviet or East German obstacles; Course B, a probe whose personnel would attempt to remove such obstacles but would stop if the Soviets or East Germans showed a willingness to use force; and Course C, a probe with attached engineering equipment to overcome obstacles without the use of weapons (except for self-defense).23

Although there were some concerns by both British and American military authorities that Course of Action A was unsuitable because it would not show whether or not the Soviets/East Germans were willing to use force to block access to Berlin, the study was generally found to be acceptable and was approved by the Ambassadorial Group with all three options included, in order to provide maximum flexibility for political leaders when the use of a probe was being considered. Far more controversial was the final task set forth in the Tripartite Basic Paper, the study of additional military measures that could be initiated if the initial probe proved unsuccessful.
By mid-June 1959 the LIVE OAK planners had completed a draft study of “More Elaborate Military Measures,” which essentially reflected the British government’s viewpoint that if an initial probe demonstrated the willingness of the Soviets to use force to deny access to Berlin, there was no point in trying to use further military force on the ground in an attempt to restore access. Norstad sharply criticized the study for giving the overall impression that “there are no military measures which can be taken by the Tripartite Powers, short of thermo-nuclear war, in the event we are denied access to Berlin.” While recognizing that Allied forces in the access corridors would not be able to defeat the Soviet forces that could be brought against them, he still called for courses of action that would “compel the Russians to face the unmistakable imminence of general war should they persist in obstructing access to Berlin.” Thus in Norstad’s view, if an initial probe or probes proved unsuccessful, “a substantial effort should first be made to reopen ground access by local action in order to raise the stakes, convince the USSR of the determination of the Three Powers to maintain their lawful rights even at the risk of war, and to exclude the possibility of a successful Soviet bluff.”

Norstad forwarded the draft study to the Tripartite Chiefs of Staff along with his own highly critical comments, but he also directed LIVE OAK to revise the study to include the use of substantial ground forces of at least a reinforced battalion in size, with larger forces also to be examined. In addition he asked the LIVE OAK planners to look at possible “military reprisals” such as “interference with Soviet ships or aircraft, jamming of navigational and communication facilities and intensification of unconventional or psychological warfare operations.”

British military officials were concerned that Norstad had rejected the draft study because he was in sympathy with the hard-line U.S. viewpoint that favored the use of force to restore ground access to Berlin because “the USSR would back down in face of a threat of war.” The British also feared that if the Soviets did not back down over Berlin, the United States seemed to be “willing to initiate the nuclear offensive on the grounds that it is better faced now than later.” These views were in sharp contrast to the British opinion that it was doubtful that “the West as a whole, or indeed the United Kingdom, would in the last resort be prepared to go to war, far less to initiate war, over access to Berlin.”

After key British military and diplomatic officials had an opportunity to talk to Norstad about the LIVE OAK study, however, they found his views more flexible than they had assumed. Norstad informed Sir Frank Roberts that “it was for the military authorities to put forward various alternatives for possible military action, . . . leaving it to Governments to
decide which course, if any, to adopt.” Norstad said that he “would not advocate any particular course; his concern was that the revised LIVE OAK paper should examine all possible military courses of action and their implications.” However, Norstad did tell Sir Francis Festing, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that he “could not accept that there was no possible intermediate action between nuclear war and acceptance of Russian or East German obstruction, as determined by the probe.”

By the end of July the LIVE OAK staff had revised the “More Elaborate Military Measures” paper to include the possibility of battalion-, brigade-, and division-sized operations but noted that only the battalion-sized operation was a realistic course of action. All of these operations, from the smallest platoon-sized probe to battalion or larger operations, would only involve troops from the three Western Allies, because they were the only countries with the right to send troops along the access routes to Berlin. Thus there were no plans to involve Germany or other NATO allies at this stage of Berlin contingency planning.

On 5 August 1959 Norstad approved the revised paper and sent it to the Tripartite Chiefs of Staff, although his political advisor, Raymond Thurston, reported that Norstad had done so “only after considerable soul-searching since, in fact, he considers it as only partly responsive to his critical comments on the first draft.” Thurston also noted that one of Norstad’s reasons for letting the study go forward was that “given the present turn of events on the international scene, the LIVE OAK planning effort is not destined to get much attention from governments in the months immediately ahead.”

Not only was LIVE OAK planning not receiving much attention, the organization’s very existence was being questioned. The initial planning called for by the Tripartite Basic Paper of 4 April 1959 was finished, and LIVE OAK therefore no longer seemed necessary. Furthermore, the threat to Allied access to West Berlin appeared to be fading. Berlin was now one of the main subjects of discussion at a four-power (U.S., U.K., France, and U.S.S.R.) conference of foreign ministers that had opened in Geneva on 11 May 1959, and Khrushchev’s original six-month ultimatum had expired in late May without any further action by the Soviets. As a result, the British government asked General Norstad in August 1959 if LIVE OAK “would be closing down soon.” The threat to Berlin seemed even more remote after Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959 and told President Eisenhower that there was no longer any “time limit within which he would sign a Soviet-East German peace treaty.”

He did, however, reduce the organization in size and eliminate all of the general officer positions, effective 1 October 1959. The slimmed down
LIVE OAK staff continued to work on Berlin contingency plans, but governmental interest was low. Norstad's attentions also turned elsewhere, and the frequency of his meetings with the leadership of LIVE OAK (now just colonels) declined substantially.\(^{31}\)

The pace of work for the smaller LIVE OAK staff slowed considerably, and one former member recalled that during the summer of 1960, "afternoons were spent swimming in the pool outside the office and even playing tripartite cricket."\(^{32}\) Despite the slower pace during 1960, the LIVE OAK staff and other Allied headquarters continued to draw up additional plans for actions to be taken in the event that the Soviets restricted Allied access rights to Berlin. Responsibility for drawing up the plans for ground actions lay with the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine (CINCBAOR), from whose sector any ground advance along the autobahn access route would be launched.\(^{33}\) Air plans were the responsibility of Commander-in-Chief US Air Forces Europe (CINCUSAFE). Thus for military planning purposes, Norstad and the LIVE OAK staff already had two subordinate headquarters, BAOR and USAFE, for ground and air operations respectively.

In June 1960 CINCBAOR submitted his plan for the initial probe designed to determine if the Soviets were willing to use force to block Allied access. This company-sized force was known as Operation FREE STYLE. General Norstad approved this plan and sent it on to the Tripartite Chiefs of Staff.

Planning for the larger (battalion-sized) operation to be undertaken in the event that the Soviets blocked the initial probe proved more difficult because the British government was very reluctant to undertake such an operation unless "the risk of global war is accepted and all preparations, including mobilization, have been made to demonstrate the determination of the West. Such an attempt should therefore only be made with the agreement of all the N.A.T.O. nations."\(^{34}\) After General Norstad had rejected the initial LIVE OAK study on More Elaborate Military Measures because it had reflected these British views, the revised version of the study recommended planning for larger military operations. The British government finally agreed that planning for such operations could proceed "subject to the reservation that it is entirely without political or military commitment." Thus the British reply stated that "the Chiefs of Staff consider that plans should be made to cover any likely contingency, but that the decision whether and when to implement any or all of such plans can only be taken by Governments in the light of circumstances at the time."\(^{35}\)

CINCBAOR's initial planning for Operation TRADE WIND, the battalion-sized operation, was completed in June 1960 and immediately
approved by General Norstad. While formally approving the plan, the British Chiefs of Staff remained skeptical of the entire idea, noting that to defeat such a force, the Russians would not even have to use force but could simply remove one of the 47 bridges between the frontier and Berlin. If bridges were removed both in front of and behind the force, it would be “in an ignominious position, from which it would be difficult to extract it.” Thus the implementation of the TRADE WIND operation “would be unlikely to achieve its aims and would probably result in a military debacle.”

General Norstad remained convinced of the utility of the TRADE WIND plan and called for the tripartite battalion combat team to be assembled and trained under a suitable cover story. While the U.S. and French governments consented to such training at a meeting of the Washington Ambassadorial Group in December 1960, the British government remained reluctant to proceed with such training because of their deep misgivings about the operation and their concern about “the added risk that was inherent in perfecting the plan, thus making it easier to launch the operation.” The official reason given by the Chiefs of Staff for objecting to Norstad’s proposal for training the TRADE WIND force was that the planned cover story (an ACE Mobile Force exercise) was insufficient and likely to endanger the force’s security; when General Norstad came up with a new cover story, the British reluctantly agreed to the proposed training in early 1961.

The final ground operation proposed in the “More Elaborate Military Measures” study was a tripartite division-sized operation, which soon was designated “Operation JUNE BALL.” Given the British government’s reluctance to undertake even a battalion-sized operation to restore access to Berlin, it should come as no surprise that the British Chiefs of Staff completely rejected the idea of a division-sized operation, considering it “likely to result in a military disaster.” British concerns on the likelihood of such an operation were reduced soon afterward, when the senior British officer at LIVE OAK, Colonel R.J. Chaundler, informed the Chiefs of Staff that Norstad’s personal views on such an operation actually “corresponded closely” with theirs. Although unable to envision circumstances which would justify the use of a division-sized force, Chaundler explained, Norstad nevertheless “felt that it would only be prudent to prepare this plan in case future circumstances arose which made its use imperative as a last resort.” Norstad “could not accept that a battalion-sized operation should be the last and largest in the series before posing the ultimate threat of nuclear war.”

Since tripartite governmental approval had already been given for planning such an operation, the British sought to slow its progress by
requesting that LIVE OAK first prepare a feasibility study. The resulting LIVE OAK study did find some possible uses for a division-sized force, and in January 1961 General Norstad instructed CINCBAOR to begin drafting plans for such an operation. Planning received a major setback when the French government stated that it could not provide any more forces other than those already earmarked for the tripartite probe and battalion-sized operations, and General Norstad therefore gave some thought to having such planning proceed on a U.S.-U.K. basis, but the French eventually did designate forces for JUNE BALL, which was approved by General Norstad in the summer of 1961.

All of the above ground operations were designed to run from West Germany to West Berlin, but to increase flexibility in Allied planning, General Norstad directed in September 1961 that the Allied Staff Berlin develop plans for operations similar to the probe (FREE STYLE) and battalion-sized (TRADE WIND) operations, but traveling in the opposite direction, with the forces to be drawn from the three Allied garrisons in West Berlin. The plan for a company-sized probe from Berlin to West Germany was known as Operation BACK STROKE, and the battalion-sized tripartite operation from Berlin was called Operation LUCKY STRIKE. The LIVE OAK powers approved these plans in early 1962, subject to the reservation that the mounting of any of these operations would still require final governmental approval.

Air Access Planning

One area of particular emphasis was planning for countermeasures in the event of Soviet or East German interference with Allied air access to Berlin. In contrast to ground access, Allied air access was firmly anchored in agreements drawn up between the Soviet Union and the three Western Allies in November 1945 and October 1946.

Under these agreements the Western Allies had the right to use three air corridors, each twenty statute miles wide, leading from Frankfurt, Hanover, and Hamburg in Western Germany to West Berlin (see Map 1). Flights within these corridors were limited to aircraft from the Occupation Powers plus the Polish airline LOT (which had established flights prior to the creation of the corridors). In addition, the four-power occupation forces in Berlin had the right to fly anywhere in the Berlin Control Zone (BCZ), defined as the air space up to 10,000 feet within a twenty-mile radius of the Allied Control Authority Building in the U.S. sector of Berlin.

The ceiling for the air corridors themselves was not so clearly defined. The Soviet Union took the position that the 10,000-feet limitation also
applied to the corridors, while the Western Allies insisted that there were no altitude ceilings in the corridors. During the first decade of the corridor's existence, the Allies did not press this issue because it did not seem very important; higher altitudes were not needed by existing transport aircraft. However, by failing to conduct flights above 10,000 feet during the years prior to the Second Berlin Crisis, the Allies in effect had allowed their claim to the higher altitudes to erode. By the late 1950s, new, larger transport aircraft, in particular the C-130, which performed best at altitudes above 10,000 feet, had come into service and would be invaluable if another Berlin airlift became necessary. The United States therefore attempted to reclaim the right to fly above 10,000 feet by sending several C-130s to Berlin on 27 March 1959, but such a move was now seen as escalatory in the on-going crisis, and the Soviets responded by buzzing the aircraft with fighters and sending a strong protest note. A second attempt on 15 April led to a similarly strong reaction from the Soviets. The United States then abandoned the attempts to reclaim the right to fly above 10,000 feet, and the following year, on 9 March 1960, Secretary of State Christian Herter announced that President Eisenhower had decided that there was no "operational necessity" for such flights, although the Western Allies did have the right to fly into West Berlin at any altitude.45

Prior to LIVE OAK's founding in April 1959, there were already several Allied aerial contingency plans in existence. The oldest and largest plan was the Quadrupartite Berlin Airlift (QBAL) plan, which was in essence a repeat of the 1948–49 Berlin Airlift for aerial supply of West Berlin, with the three Western Allies providing the aircraft and the Federal Republic of Germany providing the cargo, airfield facilities, and logistical and administrative support. Operation TRIPLE PLAY was a plan for the aerial evacuation of Allied non-combatants and selected aliens from Berlin, and Operation GARRISON AIRLIFT was designed to provide for the logistical support of the Allied garrisons by air in the event that military surface traffic was interrupted. In July 1959 the Allies added a fourth plan, CIVIL AIRLIFT, which would provide for the substitution of civil by military aircraft to maintain air services to Berlin if scheduled commercial flights ceased.46

In October 1959 General Norstad proposed that CINCUSAFAE be designated as the overall commander for military air lift operations to Berlin, to include these four contingency plans. Soon afterward, however, the United States government objected to the association of the QBAL plan with Berlin contingency planning because U.S. policy called for the avoidance of reference to a Berlin airlift "in order to preclude giving the USSR the indication that the United States would institute an extensive airlift
rather than aggressively defend our legal rights of access to Berlin.” As a result, the subject of a Quadripartite Berlin Airlift was removed from LIVE OAK planning.47

The three remaining plans were combined together as Operation JACK PINE, which also included measures to be taken in the event that the Soviets or East Germans interfered with the execution of these plans or with Allied air access to Berlin in general. General Norstad approved Operation JACK PINE in May 1960, and the airlift portions of the plan received swift tripartite governmental approval. However, the portion of the plan dealing with actions to be taken in the event of interference with Allied rights of air access, in particular the rules of engagement, proved more controversial. In response to British government objections submitted in November 1960, LIVE OAK revised JACK PINE in January 1961, changing the rules of engagement so that tripartite fighter aircraft would only be authorized to open fire on Soviet or East German aircraft when the latter had fired at or in the direction of tripartite fighter or transport aircraft.48 The portion of the air access plan dealing with airlifts subsequently became known as JACK PINE I, while the plans for the use of tactical air forces in support of airlift operations were called JACK PINE II. Among the courses of action that were under consideration for this portion of the plan was one in which fighters would be placed on alert at the corridor entrances, ready to go to the aid of transports in the corridors; a much more aggressive course of action was for fighters to go into the corridors on escort duty.49

One additional measure decided in 1961 was for military pilots to fly civilian airliners in the event of Soviet interference with commercial air access to Berlin. This measure—called Military Sponsored Air Service—was incorporated into a series of amendments to JACK PINE proposed by LIVE OAK in November 1961. Another new feature was the Military Air Transport Probe, which called for flights in the air corridors by unarmed and unescorted military transport aircraft to provide “an immediate response and test of Soviet/GDR intentions should they take action to harass or otherwise attempt to deny air access via established air corridors.” The proposed JACK PINE revisions also included a section on “Ground Suppression and Air Obstruction Operations,” which listed measures to be taken in the event of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) or surface-to-air missile (SAM) attacks or in case air obstructions such as balloons were placed in the air corridors. In the former case, tripartite fighters and ground attack aircraft would attack the AAA/SAM site if it could be positively identified, otherwise a preselected AAA/SAM site within the air corridor would be attacked. However, sites located in built-up areas would not be attacked.50
The proposed Military Sponsored Air Service and Military Air Transport Probe received rapid approval from the tripartite governments, but the provisions for air attacks on barrage balloons and ground installations proved more controversial. By the end of the year, the U.K. and U.S. governments had come out in support of such measures being delegated to General Norstad for use in emergencies, but the French government stated that such decisions must be made by the governments at the time.51

*Increased Size and Mission for LIVE OAK, 1961*

Despite the reduced level of tension over Berlin after Khrushchev withdrew his ultimatum in September 1959, concern about possible Soviet moves to reduce Allied access rights never went away completely, because throughout the following year the Soviet leader continued to threaten to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany and thus eliminate Allied rights in Berlin.52

Soon after the new U.S. administration of President John F. Kennedy took office, Khrushchev began indicating that Berlin was about to become a central issue in East-West relations again. In February 1961 he sent an aide-memoir to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, repeating the various Soviet proposals on Germany. Then in March Khrushchev told U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson that “his prestige was engaged in Berlin and he had waited long enough to make his move.”53

The rising possibility of renewed tension over Berlin led to discussions in the spring of 1961 between General Norstad and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff over the idea of making LIVE OAK capable of functioning as a tripartite operating staff for use in emergencies, in addition to its day-to-day functions as a planning staff. This proposal took on increased relevance in June 1961 after Soviet Premier Khrushchev met with President Kennedy and bruskly called for a settlement of the Berlin question by the end of the year, threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the Western Allies failed to agree to his demands. In late June 1961, General Norstad formally proposed an increase in the size and rank structure of LIVE OAK.

The three governments soon agreed, and on 19 July 1961 LIVE OAK again had a British general as Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. G. H. Baker. The other nations also upgraded their delegations, with the United States and France each providing a brigadier general. The total personnel strength soon climbed back up to 35, with provisions for additional augmentation from SHAPE and USEUCOM for a maximum strength of 49 during operations.54
Soon after the expansion of LIVE OAK into an operating staff, it and the entire Allied crisis management organization became quadripartite through the addition of representatives from the Federal Republic of Germany. At the highest level, the tripartite foreign ministers agreed on 5 August 1961 that the West German ambassador in Washington should become a member of the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group, converting it into the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group (this name was soon changed to the Washington Ambassadorial Group, perhaps in order to avoid confusion because the term “quadripartite” was sometimes also used to refer to the four wartime allies, which included the Soviet Union). The ambassadorial group soon established a number of subgroups to deal with specific issues. Beginning in September 1961, LIVE OAK’s contingency planning would be reviewed by the new Military Sub-Group before final submission to the Washington Ambassadorial Group.55

LIVE OAK also became quadripartite at the beginning of August 1961 through the arrival of a German colonel assigned as Liaison Officer. This addition represented a major success for General Norstad, who had long argued for German liaison to LIVE OAK because he strongly believed in the need for proper coordination of Allied contingency planning with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. As early as the summer of 1959, Norstad had arranged for Brig. Gen. Peter von Butler, the German National Military Representative (NMR) at SHAPE, to be briefed on LIVE OAK’s planning without, however, receiving copies of the plans themselves.56

In the summer of 1960 the Germans had formally asked to participate in Berlin contingency planning, but the U.K. Chiefs of Staff had opposed such a move, arguing that the Germans had “no legal right to a position of equality with the Three Powers over Berlin.” The British military leadership had also expressed concern over the poor state of German security, which meant that the Russians were likely to learn details of LIVE OAK’s planning if the Germans became involved, and had also noted that if the Germans were allowed to participate, other NATO nations might also claim the right to do so. But when the situation worsened in the summer of 1961, the British finally dropped their objections to German participation in Berlin planning.57

The addition of a Liaison Officer was just the first step in the conversion of LIVE OAK into a genuine quadripartite organization. Additional German officers and enlisted personnel were gradually added to the various staff sections, and by 1962 Major General Baker, the LIVE OAK Chief of Staff, suggested that now that the Germans were playing an
increasing part, "it would be appropriate if they also took on a share of the financing of LIVE OAK," an idea which was quickly supported by the Germans in their desire to cement their position in Berlin contingency planning.58

LIVE OAK's expansion in size and conversion into an operating staff came just in time for the organization to deal with the greatly increased level of activity in Berlin contingency planning that had resulted from Khrushchev's renewed ultimatum in June 1961. The pace became even more hectic after the Berlin crisis escalated through the construction of the Berlin Wall beginning on 13 August 1961. LIVE OAK was now operating around the clock. To keep up with the fast-breaking situation, General Baker moved his holiday caravan next to the LIVE OAK building and remained on duty for days on end.59

The renewed crisis over Berlin revealed serious shortcomings in LIVE OAK's communications capabilities, since it was located inside a U.S. facility (USEUCOM), which forced the United Kingdom and France to collect their secure communications from the U.K. Communications Center at SHAPE and the French Ministry of Defence respectively. To improve communications, permit closer supervision of LIVE OAK by its commander (SACEUR Norstad), and facilitate coordination of NATO and LIVE OAK planning, LIVE OAK moved on 4 September 1961 from the USEUCOM facility at St. Germain en Laye to another suburb of Paris, Rocquencourt, where the SHAPE compound was located. The new location was approximately 11 kilometers south of the original one.60

The move to the SHAPE compound greatly facilitated coordination of LIVE OAK planning with that of NATO, which had become much more involved in Berlin contingency planning as a result of the escalation of the Berlin Crisis in August 1961. In the months that followed, SHAPE planners developed a series of BERCON (Berlin Contingency) plans that could be used if the LIVE OAK plans proved unsuccessful in stopping a crisis. The BERCON plans therefore started where LIVE OAK's plans left off, with a single division operating along the access routes to Berlin (JUNE BALL in LIVE OAK's planning and BERCON CHARLIE ONE for NATO), and went on to include corps-sized advances into East Germany, aerial supremacy operations, and even the possible use of a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons to demonstrate the West's determination to maintain access to Berlin. LIVE OAK and SHAPE also worked on plans for the transition of control of contingency operations from LIVE OAK to SHAPE during a crisis. With its new operational capability, LIVE OAK could control the probe and battalion operations,
but the JUNE BALL divisional force would have operate under NATO control.\textsuperscript{61}

\textit{The Addition of Naval Countermeasures}

When the Berlin crisis began to heat up again in 1961, some senior officials inside and outside LIVE OAK expressed concerns about the existing Allied contingency plans. In April 1961 the Chief of the United Kingdom’s Defence Staff, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, gave his opinion of the LIVE OAK contingency plans to President Kennedy:

I told the President that I thought this made no military sense at all. What would happen to a battalion on the autobahn? The Russians would blow up a bridge in front, a bridge behind, and then sell seats for people to come and laugh. And if that was a farce, a division would be a tragedy. It would require a front of thirty miles to keep moving—fifteen miles each side of the autobahn, and it would be seen as an invasion of East Germany, and that would lead to all-out war.\textsuperscript{62}

Such concerns were shared by Brig. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, III, head of the U.S. team in LIVE OAK, who wrote a paper for General Norstad on “the Right and Wrong Way to Go to War Over Berlin.” Richardson noted that the Soviets and/or East Germans could deny access to Berlin without violating NATO frontiers or threatening NATO security, whereas Allied military operations to reopen access to Berlin would involve the seizure of East German territory and attacks on military bases far from Berlin, which would clearly invoke the defense provisions of the Warsaw Treaty. Richardson therefore advocated a global approach to a Berlin access crisis:

If Berlin access is denied by force, the allied objective should be to create circumstances under which the Soviets, not the allies, have to either back down or initiate general war. This cannot be done by local military action in the Berlin area. It might be done, however, by reacting to a forceful denial of access to Berlin with the progressive application of global constraints on the USSR until these become so objectionable that the USSR is forced to negotiate Berlin access in return for their removal, or seek their removal by aggressive use of forces.\textsuperscript{63}

Some of Richardson’s suggested global measures included closure of the Dardanelles, isolation of Cuba, or denial of Soviet civil air transit.

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany was also concerned that the existing Allied contingency plans were not the best way to deal with an access crisis. After the crisis escalated in the summer of 1961, German representatives in various quadripartite bodies called for their allies to consider ways of dealing with a Berlin crisis away from Berlin
and the access routes, where the Soviets were strongest. The Germans therefore supported the idea of taking advantage of Allied naval superiority to put pressure on the Soviet Union.64

As with so many other aspects of Berlin contingency planning, the British government was reluctant to consider the idea of maritime measures against the Soviet Union:

Whilst action against the Russian in the maritime sphere might appear superficially to be attractive, such measures were, in fact subject to serious disadvantages as a means of bringing the pressure to bear upon the Russians. The latter would be largely invulnerable to a blockade, whilst the West would suffer severe economic dislocation; the neutral nations would be alienated; and since we could not, short of all-out war, attack the Russian submarine bases, we should face the prospect of war at sea at a severe and sustained military disadvantage. The [Chiefs of Staff] Committee had agreed that the report of the Blockade Working Group should be discussed in the Ambassadorial Group but only to avoid an accusation that we were once more dragging our feet and because there was a chance of demonstrating the futility of a naval blockade.65

A little more than one year after the Germans proposed the use of naval measures in a Berlin access crisis, the effectiveness of such measures in a confrontation with the Soviet Union was clearly demonstrated by the successful U.S. “Naval Quarantine” of Soviet shipping to Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. As a result, in December 1962 the four LIVE OAK powers created a quadripartite organization known as DEEP SEA, which was responsible for devising a series of naval countermeasures for possible use in a Berlin access crisis and implementing these measures if directed to do so by the political authorities. DEEP SEA was not subordinate to LIVE OAK; the new body reported directly to the Washington Ambassadorial Group. DEEP SEA was located in Washington, DC, and ultimately supervised three Naval Countermeasures Coordinating Centers (NAVCORCENTs): one in Norfolk, Virginia (SEA SPRAY); a second collocated with LIVE OAK; and a third one (manned only during exercises or actual operations) in Hawaii. The naval contingency plans developed by these quadripartite staffs were known as NAVCONs (Naval Countermeasures), whereas NATO’s naval contingency planning used the term MARCON (Maritime Contingency), although there were initially also some naval countermeasures in the BERCON Delta series, making for even more confusion.66

Unlike land and air contingency plans for Berlin access routes, naval countermeasures were not confined to just France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event naval countermeasures were to be instituted, West German vessels would participate equally.67
The creation of DEEP SEA and its subordinate staffs in December 1962 represented the last major organizational change in the overall Allied political-military crisis management structure that was created during the Second Berlin Crisis.

**Renewed Tension in 1962: The Air Access Crisis**

Although LIVE OAK continued to refine its plans for Berlin access operations, its new role as an operational headquarters overshadowed the original mission in the early months of 1962, when the Soviets began interfering with Allied air access to Berlin. Although not directly denying the Allies the right to fly in the three air corridors to Berlin that had been guaranteed by agreements drawn up between the Soviet Union and the three Western Allies in 1945 and 1946, the Soviets began on 7 February 1962 to reserve extensive blocks of air space and time in the corridors for their own aircraft. If allowed to stand unchallenged, such tactics would have greatly hindered Allied air access to Berlin. With the full backing of the Western Allied governments (in this case the British government did not drag its heels because it viewed Allied rights in the air corridors as essential to the successful conduct of an airlift), General Norstad and the LIVE OAK staff therefore began to implement some of the plans that had been developed in the past two years for use in the event of Soviet interference with the air corridors. The primary tool was "aerial probes" flown by military transport in defiance of the Soviet restrictions. The Allied probes encountered Soviet harassment in the form of fighter aircraft flying past or in front of them at high speed ("buzzing"), and later the Soviets even dropped chaff in the corridors in an attempt to disrupt Allied radars, but the Allied flights continued.

Throughout this "Air Corridor Crisis" in February and March 1962, Norstad and LIVE OAK carried out carefully measured responses, which John C. Ausland, a State Department official closely associated with Berlin planning, characterized in poker terms as "matching but never raising Soviet bets." Thus even though Norstad had received authorization to send flights in the corridors at over 10,000 feet or to employ fighter aircraft in the corridors under certain circumstances, he chose not to exercise these powers. Norstad's cautious approach infuriated the more aggressive General Clay, President Kennedy's Special Representative in Berlin, but Norstad's policy was supported by the President.

The Soviet campaign of air corridor harassment ended suddenly on 30 March 1962, and the Second Berlin Crisis seemed to fade away.
Khrushchev’s ultimatum from the previous summer had again expired with any further Soviet action, and even the very tense Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 did not lead to Soviet countermoves against Berlin, as many Allied planners had feared. 71

The Last Showdown: The Autobahn Crisis of 1963

Although the Berlin crisis seemed to be over by the end of 1962, there was one final flare-up of tension in the autumn of 1963, when the Soviets began to block Allied convoys to and from Berlin because of disagreements over inspection procedures. All of a sudden LIVE OAK found itself closer to initiating its ground contingency plan than ever before.

In order to understand what came to be known as the “Autobahn Crisis” of 1963, it is necessary to look at the evolution of procedures for Allied convoys to and from West Berlin. Because of the lack of formal written agreements with the Soviets on the subject of Allied ground access to West Berlin, procedures for Allied convoys had gradually evolved through trial and error and various ad hoc arrangements. By the outbreak of the Second Berlin Crisis, the main remaining points of dispute were advance notification of convoy movements, dismounting for headcounts, and inspection of vehicles. All of these issues were complicated by the lack of agreement not only between the Allies and the Soviets but also among the Allies themselves.

The United States had agreed to notify the Soviets in advance for all convoys with eight or more vehicles, but the Soviets continued to demand advance notification for convoys of three or more vehicles. To avoid a showdown on this issue, U.S. officials did not send convoys of three to seven vehicles. The British, on the other hand, did provide advance notification for convoys of three or more vehicles. 72

The dismounting issue was even more complex. By the late 1950s the Allies and Soviets had agreed that the number of personnel in convoys would be verified at each end of the autobahn in order to allay Soviet concerns that convoys could be used to drop off agents or pick up refugees while en route. However, the Soviets wanted Allied troops to dismount for counting, while the Allies, in particular the United States, insisted that the troops be counted in their vehicles. This position was seriously undermined on the night of 20 August 1961, when the commander of the large convoy containing the U.S. battle group on its way to reinforce the Berlin garrison agreed to have his troops dismount in order to speed the processing of the convoy after several Soviet headcounts had failed to agree. The Soviets quickly regarded this action as a precedent and stepped up their
demands that the personnel of other convoys dismount. The United States finally decided to authorize convoys with more than 30 passengers to dismount for headcounts, except in the case of inclement weather, but this policy was not officially accepted by the Soviets. British policy was for convoys with more than forty personnel to dismount, but only if at least one vehicle contained ten or more passengers. The French generally sent troops to Berlin by rail, so the dismounting issue did not arise.73

The final area of contention was inspection of vehicles. The Soviets demanded that the Allies drop the tailgates of their vehicles for inspection. The United States refused to comply, saying that the Soviets had no right to inspect the contents of Allied vehicles. The British, whose trucks were much higher than those of the United States, did allow the lowering of tailgates so that Soviet guards could see into their trucks.74

Although there had been periodic difficulties with the Soviets over these issues, no major confrontation concerning ground access had arisen during the most dramatic period of crisis in Berlin, the years 1959 to 1962, except at the very beginning (the convoy stoppages of 14 November 1958 and 2–4 February 1959). Then in the autumn of 1963, the Soviets decided to mount a major challenge to Allied ground access by pressing the dismounting issue. While this issue may seem minor, the real issue was whether or not the Soviets could single-handedly change existing procedures for Allied convoys to and from Berlin.

The first indication of trouble came on 9 October 1963, when the commander of a U.S. convoy which fell into the dismountable category because of its size, refused to dismount his troops because it was raining whereupon the Soviet checkpoint guards did not clear the convoy. After slightly more than an hour of US-Soviet disagreement, the rain stopped, the troops dismounted for the headcount, and the convoy was allowed to proceed. The same thing happened to a second U.S. convoy (also of dismountable size), but once again no confrontation developed because the rain stopped and the troops dismounted.75

On the following day, 10 October, Allied headquarters in Berlin were braced for trouble and it came. At 0859 hours, eastbound U.S. convoy with 25 passengers (thus non-dismountable by U.S. standards) reached Marienborn, the Soviet checkpoint at the western end of the autobahn from Berlin. The convoy commander refused a Soviet demand for dismounting. An hour later a second U.S. convoy, westbound from Berlin with twenty vehicles but only two passengers, reached Marienborn. Although this convoy had been cleared without any difficulty by the Soviet checkpoint at Babelsberg (at the eastern end of the autobahn to Berlin), the Soviets at Marienborn demanded that its personnel also dismount, a
demand refused by the convoy's commander. There were now two US convoys stuck at Marienborn.

LIVE OAK was immediately alerted and began monitoring the situation closely. Because the Commander LIVE OAK, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, was in the United States at the time, the Deputy US CINCEUR, General John P. McConnell, directed LIVE OAK during this crisis. After receiving several Allied protests and a U.S. ultimatum that the convoys would soon proceed with or without clearance, the Soviets allowed the two convoys to proceed without dismounting, but the whole process began anew when the eastbound convoy reached Babelsberg early on 11 October and was again met with a Soviet demand for dismounting. After consulting with political and military authorities in Washington, London, and Paris, General McConnell ordered the convoy to proceed without Soviet authorization. The Soviets then blocked the autobahn with armored personnel carriers (APCs) to prevent the convoy from moving.

The use of APCs by the Soviets was seen as a major escalation, and early on the morning of 12 October LIVE OAK began taking preliminary steps to assemble the small Allied units that would be used to execute the FREE STYLE (company-sized probe) contingency plan. A few hours later, the Soviets backed down and allowed the US convoy to pass without dismounting, ending this phase of the crisis. Tensions rose again on 16 October after a British convoy was stopped at Babelsberg for nine hours, but the Soviets finally allowed the British convoy to proceed.76

As a result of this renewed tension over ground access to Berlin, the Allies agreed to standardize convoy procedures, primarily along the lines of the existing US procedures. Henceforth the Allies would only be willing to lower vehicle tailgates for inspection when the tops of the tailgates were over six feet (1.83 meters) from the ground. The criteria for dismounting troops was set at 31 passengers (excluding those in buses), but dismounting was not to be carried out in inclement weather. Advance notification would only be given for convoys of eight or more vehicles. On 29 October 1963 the tripartite powers gave lists of these new procedures to the Soviet Military Liaison Missions at the three main Allied headquarters in Germany.77

After giving the Soviets five days to study the Allied procedures, the United States sent a test convoy of non-dismountable size on 4 November. As in October, the Soviets demanded that the personnel dismount and the convoy commander refused, starting another standoff at Marienborn. It soon became clear that the Soviets were not going to allow the convoy to proceed after a short detention, and once again the US and Allied crisis management staffs swung into action. Even President Kennedy and his top cabinet officials became involved.78
As in October, the United States stated that the convoy would proceed without clearance if the Soviets did not process it by midnight. When this deadline passed, the convoy started to move forward but was blocked by Soviet APCs. Several hours later, the Washington Ambassadogial Group authorized LIVE OAK to assemble the FREE STYLE probe. While Allied units began moving toward their assembly areas, the British and French governments agreed to send “sympathetic convoys” to see if the Soviets were prepared to block all convoys over the dismounting issue or just US convoys. By the end of the day, two convoys—one French and one British—that were non-dismountable under the new Allied standards had arrived at Soviet checkpoints and were soon allowed to proceed even though their commanders refused Soviet demands for dismounting. The US convoy remained blocked by Soviet APCs.

By this time the Soviets were aware of the Allied troop movements and may also have heard of some of the other countermeasures being considered by the U.S. government, including cancellation of the recent decision to sell wheat to the U.S.S.R., so they began looking for a way to end the crisis and ordered to begin processing the convoy without requiring dismounting. The United States turned down this offer because the Soviet APCs were still blocking the convoy. Early on the morning of 6 November 1963 the Soviet APCs withdrew and processing of the convoy began. The last phase of the Second Berlin Crisis was over.

The Soviets had had enough of confrontations on the autobahn. Soon afterward the Soviets sent a reply to the 29 October Allied message regarding convoy procedures, stating that there was evidently some confusion on the part of the Allies concerning Soviet procedures for convoy clearance. The note then set forth Soviet procedures that were slightly different from those of the Allies but still compatible. In effect, the Soviets were informing the Allies that there would be no more interference with Allied ground access to Berlin, and this turned out to be the case.

Even though the FREE STYLE probe had not actually been launched, Berlin Task Force member John Ausland believed that “assembling FREE STYLE may have served a useful purpose in conveying to the Soviets our concern.” Ausland also noted one other contribution of the probe: “Having FREE STYLE assembled may also have helped the British agree to send a convoy, since this was a less unpleasant alternative than the use of FREE STYLE.”

The assembling of the FREE STYLE probe force during the Autobahn Crisis of 1963 was the closest that LIVE OAK ever came to implementing any of its ground contingency plans. The naval contingency plans were also never put into effect, so the air measures taken during the Air
Corridor crisis of 1962 turned out to be the only time that LIVE OAK actually executed any of its many contingency plans. In the years that followed, LIVE OAK continued to perfect its plans and conduct multinational exercises in preparation for another Berlin crisis that never came. Even the reduction in tensions that resulted from the Quadripartite (in this case meaning the U.S.S.R. and the three Western Allies) Agreements in 1971 did not lead the four LIVE OAK Powers to abandon their crisis management organization for Berlin. It was not until German unification in 1990 ended Allied rights in Berlin and on the transit routes that LIVE OAK finally went out of existence, thirty-one years after it had been founded as a temporary organization to draw up contingency plans for a month or two.

Conclusions

The LIVE OAK organization was a significant crisis management instrument throughout the Second Berlin Crisis. Initially its role was one of preparing contingency plans, but when the crisis intensified in the summer of 1961, LIVE OAK also took on an operational role. This capability was successfully demonstrated during the “Air Corridor Crisis” of early 1962, when LIVE OAK and associated Allied headquarters took over the management of all Allied air traffic to West Berlin and successfully withstood the Soviet challenge to Allied rights in the air corridors. A final test came in the autobahn crisis of autumn 1963, when LIVE OAK came very close to implementing its initial ground contingency plan.

It is hard to know exactly what effect LIVE OAK and its plans had on the Soviet Union’s actions during the crisis. The existence of LIVE OAK and also the details of many of its plans were known to the Soviets through the activities of Georges Pâques, a French NATO official arrested for espionage in 1963, who had previously been closely involved with French Berlin planning. Thus the knowledge that the Allies were prepared to use military force to maintain their access rights to Berlin may well have served as a deterrent to the Soviets.83

LIVE OAK was also a very successful example of multinationality. The organization itself was closely integrated, even though officially working on the basis of national teams, and LIVE OAK’s contingency plans called for a high degree of multinationality, even including company-sized units, and these plans were tested in field training exercises.

LIVE OAK’s significance does not lie solely in its activities related to Berlin. Its creation and the kinds of planning it carried out were forerunners of a major change in Allied strategic thinking. When LIVE OAK was created in 1959, NATO’s official strategy was still one of “massive retalia-
tion.” But the Second Berlin Crisis forced Western leaders to take a close look at their plans and determine if nuclear threats were a credible response to a Soviet blockage of Allied convoys to Berlin. The wide variety of contingency plans developed by LIVE OAK and—beginning in 1961—NATO gave the Western governments a full range of possible responses, with various escalatory stages. These plans were a much more credible deterrent than the threat of nuclear war because they were more likely to be used in a crisis. The work of LIVE OAK can thus be seen as an important step toward the development of the new Western strategy of “flexible response,” which became NATO’s official doctrine in 1967.

ENDNOTES

1. For example, the lack of accurate documentation on LIVE OAK led Kori Schake to place the founding date of LIVE OAK one year too early in her path-breaking examination of Contingency Planning for the 1961 Berlin Crisis (Nuclear History Program Working Paper, February 1989). Her belief that LIVE OAK had been established in April 1958, long before the start of the Second Berlin Crisis, led to some confusion among the participants in two subsequent oral history sessions. See Hans-Peter Schwarz, ed., Zeitzeugenbefragung zur “Berlin-Krise,” 30. Januar 1989 in Bonn, Nuclear History Program, Dokumentationsstelle Bonn, May 1989, p. 18, and Zeitzeugengespräch am 20. Februar 1990 in Bonn (Berlin-Krise) (draft), Nuclear History Program, p. 4.

2. The best source for declassified US documents is the National Security Archive in Washington, DC (hereafter cited as NSA). Despite its official-sounding title, this is a private organization that seeks to open up government documents to researchers by using the provisions of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act and the Mandatory Review for Declassification process. Another good source of declassified U.S. documents on the Second Berlin Crisis is the papers of General Lauris Norstad, which are held in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas (references to the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, are cited as “DDEL, NP”). British documents that have been declassified after 30 years are deposited in the Public Records Office (hereafter cited as PRO), located in the London suburb of Kew. Declassified German documents are held by the German branch of the Nuclear History Program at the University of Bonn.

3. The first official history of LIVE OAK, a “U.S. Eyes Only” history, was prepared by the U.S. European Command historian in the early 1960s: H. H. Lumkin, “LIVE OAK: A Study in Thirty Months of Combined Planning, February 1959–September 1961 (U),” no date, U.S. Top Secret, now Secret. When the events of 1990 made it clear that LIVE OAK’s days were numbered, the organization asked the present author, Chief of the Historical Office at SHAPE, to prepare a classified history based on its four-power documents. That study—Gregory W. Pedlow, “LIVE OAK and Allied Access to West Berlin, 1959–1990 (U),” 15 March 1991, LIVE OAK TOP SECRET (French, German, U.K. and U.S. Eyes Only)—retains its original classification and is on file along with the rest of the LIVE OAK organization’s classified files in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg. The four LIVE OAK powers have agreed to open these records to the public in the year 2005. The present study is based solely on the declassified national records now freely available to scholars, but these records often contain summaries or even complete copies of LIVE OAK documents.


7. During its early years of existence, the terminology for the Tripartite Ambassadorial Group often varied from document to document and included such terms as Tripartite Working Group, Tripartite Planning Group, Ambassadorial Steering Group, and the Three Ambassadors.


10. NSA, Paris to SECSTATE 3200, 4 March 1959; Paris to SECSTATE 3295, 11 March 1959; Paris to SECSTATE 3410, 17 March 1959.

11. USClNCEUR to JCS, ALO 284, 17 March 1959, in Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter cited as FRUS], VIII, pp. 495–497.

12. NSA, JCS to USClNCEUR, JCS 956537, 18 March 1959.


14. The "Tripartite Chiefs of Staff" did not actually meet together; the term simply refers to the senior military leaders of the three Western Allies: the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, France's Chief of Staff of National Defense, and the United Kingdom's Chief of the Defence Staff. Thus LIVE OAK correspondence to the "Tripartite Chiefs of Staff" actually consisted of three separate letters. The Tripartite Chiefs of Staff did not make the final decision on LIVE OAK plans, however. This authority remained firmly in the hands of the political leaders of the LIVE OAK powers, working through the Washington Ambassadorial Group. For more information about the political oversight of Allied military planning for Berlin see Henri Paris, "Berlin, Symbole et Enjeu Strategique," Defense nationale (November 1987), p. 42; Honoré M. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision Making (Berlin, 1980), pp. 128–129; and the oral history transcripts of several former members of the Washington Ambassadorial Group in Schwartz, ed., Zeitzeugenbefragung zur Berlin-Krise, pp. 11–14.

15. During the early years of LIVE OAK, the Deputy USClNCEUR (DCINCEUR), General Williston B. Palmer, and his successor, General Charles D. Palmer, played an active role in the direction of LIVE OAK, but eventually the role of the DCINCEUR became one of an alternate "Commander, LIVE OAK," who would only become involved with LIVE OAK when the SACEUR/USClNCEUR was not available.


18. PRO, DEFE 4/117, COS(59)24(9), 7 April 1959. The "COS" series of PRO records contains the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and supporting documents such as correspondence and Joint Planning Staff Studies.

19. PRO, DEFE 4/117, COS(59)26(3), 14 April 1959. The term "dangerous elements in the Pentagon" may have been a reference to JCS Chairman Nathan B. Twining, who in a December 1958 meeting on Berlin told the Secretaries of State and Defense, "We must ignore the fear of general war. It is coming anyway. Therefore we should force the issue on a point we think is right and stand on it." NSA, U.S. Delegation to Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Memorandum of Conversation, "Berlin," 13 December 1958.


21. Thurston to Kohler, 20 April 1959, with attached Memorandum by Norstad, "LIVE OAK Planning Staff," 14 April 1959, NSA. This memorandum served as LIVE OAK's Terms of Reference until replaced by a new document on 9 April 1962 (see PRO, DEFE 5/126, COS(62)172, 16 April 1962, with Annex, "LIVE OAK Terms of Reference," 9 April 1962.

22. PRO, DEFE 5/91, COS(59)85, 22 April 1959, "Berlin Contingency Planning: Copy of a Memorandum dated 18th April 1959 from the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe to the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff," with attachment, "Quiet Preparatory and Precautionary Military Measures of a Kind Which Will Not Create Public Alarm but Which Will Be Detectable by Soviet Intelligence."


24. In late May 1959 the LIVE OAK Chief of Staff, British Major General Stirling, met with the British Chiefs of Staff and informed them that the report on More Elaborate Military Measures would be quite acceptable to the United Kingdom because of its conclusion that "it would be senseless for the French, United States and United Kingdom forces to initiate action in Eastern German, with the intention or re-opening the autobahn and keeping it open, unless national authorities had agreed to place their forces under SACEUR's control for the operation, and until the consent of all nations of the N.A.T.O. Alliance had been obtained." PRO, DEFE 4/118, COS(59)32(1), 26 May 1959.


27. Norstad's discussions with Roberts and Festing are summarized in PRO, DEFE 4/119, COS(59)42(1), 7 July 1959.

28. NSA, Thurston to Kohler, 17 August 1959.

29. PRO, DEFE 4/120, COS(59)52(4), 18 August 1959.


31. During 1959 Norstad had met at least once a month with senior live OAK officials, but in 1960 the only such meetings occurred in May (in conjunction with the Paris Summit) and August. Norstad Appointment Calendars for 1959 and 1960. For LIVE OAK's reduction in size see LIVE OAK Staff Directive 1–3, "LIVE OAK Organizational Manning," 10 May 1989.


33. See Norstad's letter to General Sir Dudley Ward, CINCBAOR, 10 July 1959, in which Norstad states that the tripartite governments had approved Ward's designation as "field commander" for "military operations to be taken as a result of Soviet or East German action to obstruct Allied access to Berlin." This letter was accompanied by a
Letter of Instruction giving LIVE OAK's guidance on the preparation of plans for the initial probe. PRO, DEFE 5/93, COS(59)173, 17 July 1959.

34. PRO, DEFE 5/91, COS(59)96, "Berlin Contingency Planning, Guidance on Further Military Measures; Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff," 24 April 1959.


37. PRO, DEFE 4/133, COS(61)3(6), 10 January 1961.


41. The British Chiefs of Staff also hoped that the LIVE OAK feasibility study might come to the conclusion that the division-sized operation was not practicable, in which case "the pressure on us to agree to the preparation of the plan would be eased." PRO, DEFE 4/130, COS(60)66(2), 25 October 1960.


44. For the text of these agreements see the "Decision of the Control Council Approving Establishment of Berlin-Hamburg, Berlin-Buckeburg (Hanover) and Berlin-Frankfurt-am-Main Air Corridors, November 30, 1945," and the "Revised Regulations Governing Flights in Air Corridors in Germany and the Berlin Control Zone, Issued by the Air Directorate, October 22, 1946," in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944–1970 (Washington, D.C., 1971), pp. 48–50, 67–77.


47. Kogan, Crisis Over Berlin, Part III, p. 75.


53. Ibid., pp. 398, 400–401.

54. LIVE OAK Staff Directive 1–3. The British government had initially been reluctant to agree to Norstad's proposed enlargement of LIVE OAK because of concern that this "would be taken as a sign of British agreement to LIVE OAK's plans." However, after hearing from General Sir Hugh Stockwell, the British Deputy SACEUR, that the presence of a British major-general at LIVE OAK would actually strengthen the British position and enable them "to know exactly what the U.S. representatives in LIVE OAK were doing" and also "bring out any weaknesses in current LIVE OAK planning," the Chiefs of Staff Committee supported LIVE OAK's expansion. PRO, DEFE 4/136, COS(61)42, 4 July 1961; COS(61)43, 11 July 1961.

66. NSA, USCINCEUR to JCS, EC9-10915, 13 July 1959. National Military Representatives are senior officers at SHAPE who deal with national matters and represent their nations' interests, whereas most SHAPE officers serve in international positions.


58. PRO, DEFE 4/147, COS(62)58(1), 25 September 1962.

59. Humphreys, “Memories of LIVE OAK,” p. 3.

60. Ibid.


71. At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis a U.S. convoy to Berlin was delayed for a short period at a Soviet checkpoint in a dispute over convoy procedures, and the U.S. mission in Berlin suggested that the U.S. take advantage of the Soviet preoccupation with Cuba to force a showdown on the procedures issue. However, after consulting with senior State and Defense Department officials, Ausland directed the U.S. mission in Berlin to avoid causing any difficulties on the autobahn. Ausland, “Six Berlin Incidents,” p. 25.


73. Slusser, “Berlin Crises,” p. 398; Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev and Berlin, ch. 6, 7–8.

74. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev and Berlin, ch.6, 6,16.

75. The best accounts of the Autobahn Crises of October and November 1963 are in Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev and Berlin, 6/5–6/23. Ausland, a member of the U.S. Government’s interagency Berlin Task Force, was in Berlin in October 1963 when the Autobahn Crises started. For State Department documents on the crisis see Frus, XV, pp. 594–615, 620–630.
77. Ausland, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin*, ch. 6, pp. 17–18; FRUS, XV, p. 621, n.3.
78. Ausland, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Berlin*, ch. 6, pp. 18–19.
79. A “sympathetic convoy” was one that was dispatched by one of the Western Allies after a convoy from one of the other Allies had been stopped. Such a move tested Soviet determination to stop all Allied access to Berlin, rather than just one nation’s. A “sympathetic convoy” was national rather than tripartite in composition.
The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962: Sources for the Berlin Crisis

Dr. Charles S. Sampson

This paper describes and evaluates official U.S. sources on the diplomatic and political aspects of the Berlin crisis, 1958–1962. Insofar as documentation was available, it will also discuss military records relating to the crisis. For the purpose of giving some structure to the description of the voluminous material on Berlin, the paper is divided into two parts corresponding to the administrations of Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy.

The Eisenhower Administration, 1958–1960

During the years 1958–1960, the White House, National Security Council (NSC), Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked closely together in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Berlin. Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and, after April 1959, Christian A. Herter advised President Eisenhower and led the deliberations of the NSC, while the White House and the NSC directed the preparation of contingency papers on Berlin that included the input from other executive agencies. The Department of State also prepared and coordinated exchanges of views and discussions of policy with the British, French, and West German governments. In addition it drafted briefing papers for and attended the meetings between President Eisenhower and the Heads of State or foreign ministers of these countries and the Soviet Union dealing with Berlin. The description that follows lists the most important sources of documentation on these processes and evaluates their significance for research on the Berlin Crisis. The most important documentation from these sources has been published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, volumes VIII and IX. Other less important sources for the Berlin crisis during
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the Eisenhower administration are enumerated in the List of Sources in those volumes.

Records of the Department of State

The indexed central files of the Department of State are one of the two or three most important single sources for policy toward Berlin during the Eisenhower administration. They include policy papers, memoranda, memoranda of conversation, telegrams to and from the Department of State and its foreign service posts and delegations to international conferences, correspondence between the President and the Secretary of State and their foreign counterparts and some military records. For the period 1958–1960 the individual files 396.1, international conferences; 611.62A, U.S.-West German relations; 762.00, German including Berlin, political affairs; and 762.0221, German territorial issues are paramount. These records detail the implementation of policy toward Berlin and the proceedings of the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting, 11 May–5 August 1959. Since these files are indexed, they are easy to use. They are open to the public for research at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C.

The lot files of the Department of State contain more specific records of Ambassadors and other senior Foreign Service officers, individual bureaus, offices, staffs, and other specialized units of the Department of State. Unlike the central files, lot files are poorly indexed with many having single page guides for multi-box lots. This can make the researcher’s task far more difficult. Within this general category of files the following lots are the most significant for the Berlin crisis:

EUR/CE Files. These are the files of the Office of Central European Affairs. They consist of nine individual lots that were retired to the National Archives in 1991 and comprise approximately 100 cubic feet of records covering the period from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. They include comprehensive records of the Department of State’s Berlin Task Force; sets of basic documents, both public and classified, on Berlin; records relating to the establishment and role of LIVE OAK, the tripartite military planning group on Berlin; and extensive general political files on Berlin. These records are not yet available to the public.

Conference Files, Lot 64 D 560. This lot, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, contains the definitive U.S. record of the proceedings of the Geneva Foreign Ministers conference, 11 May–5 August 1959. It includes briefing papers for the conference, orders of the day, chronologies, seating plans, telegrams to and from the U.S. delegation and to and from the Secretary of State (who headed the
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deligation), summary and verbatim records of the sessions, press releases, memoranda of the conversations that took place during the conference, conference documents, and various miscellaneous materials relating to the proceedings. Some of this material is duplicated in the indexed central files, and while this lot has not yet been opened to the public, copies of the statements and conference documents are available in the published official U.S. and British records of the conference.

Bruce Diaries, Lot 64 D 327. Comprising 11 cubic feet and covering the years 1948–1974, these black binder diaries include daily entries during Mr. Bruce’s tenure as Ambassador to Germany, 1958–1959. They are particularly valuable for the view from Bonn of the Berlin crisis and for Bruce’s conversations with U.S. and Allied officials on the Berlin situation. In addition to his personal record, the diaries contain some official documents. A declassified set of the diaries is at the Virginia State Historical Society in Richmond, Virginia.

Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204. This lot contains the Department of State’s collection of the correspondence between the President and the Secretary of State and their counterparts in the Soviet Union, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. It includes a complete set of their exchanges of messages on Berlin, both public and private. Some of this correspondence is duplicated in the indexed central files and most, if not all, is also available at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. The material in this lot has been selectively declassified.

Secretary of State’s Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199. This lot is a chronological collection of the memoranda of conversations of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1953–1960, primarily with foreign officials. It is the best single source for materials of this kind, since it includes records of most such meetings. There are a large number of memoranda of conversation on Berlin in the lot not only with the principal participants in the crisis, but also with officials of other countries who were concerned about the evolution of the situation. Some of the memoranda of conversation in this lot, which is not available to the public, is duplicated in the indexed central files.

Records of the White House and NSC

Most important White House and NSC records on the Berlin crisis are included in the collections at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. While some of the Department of State records described above are also present, the Eisenhower Library is valuable primarily for unduplicated records of the White House and NSC.
Whitman File, 1953–1961, NSC Records. This file contains the memoranda of the discussions at the regular and special meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) during the Eisenhower administration. It also includes the NSC Records of Action, which recorded the decisions taken at NSC meetings and issued instructions to various governmental agencies; the position papers from which the Executive Secretary briefed the Council; and the numbered NSC documents, which stated U.S. policy on particular problems and topics. While the numbered papers and the Records of Action are duplicated in the Department of State files, the memoranda of discussion are unique to the Eisenhower Library. They provide the record of how decisions on Berlin were reached at the highest level of the U.S. government, what positions the various Executive agencies of the U.S. government took on policy toward Berlin, and show that, for the most part, Secretaries of State Dulles and Herter were the driving forces in formulating U.S. policy. They also demonstrate the importance of President Eisenhower's input into the formulation of that policy and particularly reveal his doubts about the strength of the Western position in the city. Much of this documentation has been declassified.

Whitman File, 1953–1961, International File. This body of high-level White House material contains three boxes of records on the visit of Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev to the United States in September 1959, including briefing papers, memoranda, memoranda of conversation, and other documentation relating to the visit. In particular it includes complete records of Khrushchev's conversations with President Eisenhower on Berlin. Much of this material is duplicated in the Conference Files, Lot 64 D 560, at the Department of State, but some of the documentation on the Chairman's visit to the United States is unique to this collection. The memoranda of conversation during the visit and most of the supporting documentation have been declassified for scholars.

Whitman File, 1953–1961, DDE Diaries. The Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries consist of about 28,000 pages arranged chronologically. The collection includes White House staff memoranda, reports correspondence, memoranda of conversations, and memoranda of telephone conversations with Secretary of State Dulles. Unfortunately for the Berlin expert, most of the latter category date well before 1959, although there are some very important ones at the end of 1958. Only occasional memoranda of telephone conversations between the President and the Secretary of State exist in Department of State files. Within this massive collection are many important high-level documents on the Berlin crisis that were not found elsewhere. Much of this documentation is available to scholars.
Military Sources

Since this paper deals with the record of the political and diplomatic aspects of the Berlin crisis during the Eisenhower administration, few military files figure prominently. Probably the most important of these is:

Communications Center Files for the Headquarters of the Department of the Army. Formerly held at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, this collection of hundreds of reels of 16 millimeter microfilm is now part of Record Group 319 at the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland. For the Berlin researcher this collection is significant for the telegrams to and from the U.S. Command, Berlin; the U.S. Army, Europe; and the U.S. Commander in Chief Europe, which are only occasionally found either at the Eisenhower Library or in the files of the Department of State. The collection is not easy to use since these cables are not on discrete reels, but are intermixed with all of the other communications center traffic for any given day. The collection is not open to the public.

Two other sources of military records were found to be helpful. The first is the files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA), housed in Record Group 330 at the Washington National Records Center. These files contain memoranda, memoranda of conversation (especially those with allied Defense Ministers), and scattered Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) documents. For the political and diplomatic aspects of the Berlin crisis, they were only occasionally useful. These records are being reviewed for access to scholars.

The second source of military documentation is the records of the JCS, in particular the numbered JCSM memoranda on the Berlin crisis. For the Eisenhower administration there were not many of these papers, but the few that were drafted comment on the strength of the U.S. position in Berlin and on the papers that were prepared on political and economic contingency planning in the event of a blockade of the city. Many of the papers also exist in the various records at the Eisenhower Library. Declassification of these records has resulted in some of them being made available to the public.

Gaps in the Records

Although the Eisenhower administration was generally systematic in its record keeping, gaps exist. A researcher would hope to find records of all the telephone conversations between the President and his principal advisers on Berlin, but they are noticeably missing. Similarly, diaries or
personal accounts of the U.S. Ambassadors in Moscow, London, and Paris would be helpful to supplement Ambassador Bruce's. While not so important for the Eisenhower administration, records of the President's discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff might help illuminate the political and diplomatic aspects of the crisis.

The Kennedy Administration, 1961–1962

For the period of 1961–1962 the sources demonstrate the predominant role of President John F. Kennedy and his advisers at the White House in formulating U.S. policy on the Berlin crisis. Particularly in 1961 the President met frequently with his advisers from the Department of State and Defense, CIA, and JCS to draft policy directives. In this period the National Security Council, which had figured prominently as a forum for discussion during the Eisenhower administration, was partially eclipsed and its papers superseded by National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs). President Kennedy also asked experts outside the government to contribute their views on the problem.

As the Kennedy administration perceived the question of access to Berlin, military considerations assumed a far larger role in its planning than had been the case in 1958–1960, particularly in the area of contingency planning for a Berlin blockade. These changes relegated the Department of State to a secondary position, a situation mitigated by its participation in or direction of the several governmental and intergovernmental working groups necessary to formulate U.S. policy on Berlin and then to reach agreement on that policy initially with the British, French, and West Germans, and subsequently with the NATO allies, who had begun taking an active interest in the problem. The description that follows lists the most important sources of documentation for the Kennedy administration and evaluates their significance for research on the Berlin crisis. The most important documentation from these sources has been published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, volumes XIV and XV. Other less important sources for the Berlin crisis during the Kennedy administration are enumerated in the List of Sources in those volumes.

Records of the Department of State

The indexed central files of the Department of State remain an important source for policy on Berlin during the Kennedy administration. They include the same kinds of documents enumerated in the description for the Eisenhower administration, but also contain records of the Berlin Steering
Group, the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin, and the Four-Power Working Group. They are the best source for the meetings on Berlin of the four Western Foreign Ministers, and also contain some military records. For the period 1961–1962 the most important individual files are 611.61, U.S.-Soviet relations; 762.00, German, including Berlin, political affairs; 762.0221, German territorial issues; 862.181, internal travel in Germany; and 962.72, air transportation in Germany.

Lot Files of the Department of State

EUR/CE Files. See the description for the Eisenhower administration. These files are equally important for the Kennedy administration.

Conference Files, Lot 66 D 110. This lot, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State, contains extensive documentation on President Kennedy’s trip to Europe and the summit meeting with Khrushchev in June 1961. It includes briefing papers, memoranda of the conversations on Berlin, telegrams to and from the U.S. delegation, and miscellaneous records on the meeting. The records of the summit conference are available to the public and a complete set of the memoranda of conversation will be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, volume VI.

Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. These files contain the chronological files, White House and miscellaneous correspondence, memoranda of telephone conversations, and texts of speeches and public statements of Secretary of State Dean Rusk for the years 1961–1969. The memoranda of telephone conversations, although there are almost none with the President on Berlin, and the correspondence with the White House are significant for the Berlin crisis.

Records of the White House and NSC

The most important single collection of material on the Berlin crisis during the Kennedy administration is the National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, contained in 25 boxes at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts. These files contain memoranda to the President from his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, and other White House staffers; records of high-level presidential meetings not only with U.S. officials, but also with foreign government leaders; reports on Berlin by outside experts including former Secretary of State Dean Acheson; economic, military, and political contingency plans, correspondence between the President and General
Clay and Chancellor Adenauer; JCS and Department of Defense memorannda on the situation; cables on the most important aspects of the crisis; and sets of Berlin Quadripartite Documents. No single source contains such a wide variety of high-level material on the Berlin crisis, 1961-62. Much of it has been declassified under Freedom of Information requests.

**Military Sources**

**Norstad Papers.** Located at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene Kansas, these papers of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Lauris Norstad, are particularly valuable for showing the role of LIVE OAK in planning for military contingencies in case Berlin were blockaded. Norstad’s papers for the period 1961–1963 include cables to and from the JCS, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Command in Berlin. They also contain memoranda of conversations with U.S. and European officials on the military and political aspects of the crisis. Only a few of these documents have been found elsewhere, and they have mostly been declassified. Norstad’s papers contain less valuable documentation on the 1958–1960 period of the crisis.

**Taylor Papers.** Located at the National Defense University at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., these are the papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Adviser to President Kennedy, 1961–1962, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962–1964. Their special value is in providing contingency planning papers for military probes along the autobahn to Berlin in case the city were blockaded. The papers also contain the only records of several high-level meetings on Berlin and include reports on informal U.S. mid-level and working group meetings for which there are no other records. Some of these papers are available to the public.

The Kennedy White House did not keep records in the systematic manner of its predecessor, especially at the beginning of its tenure. So it is not surprising to find significant lacunae in the documentation on the Berlin crisis or less comprehensive records for important meetings. NSC meetings at the start of the administration were held infrequently, and records for those meetings that were held are very short, giving little idea of the ebb and flow of the discussions. In some cases the scanty official records are supplemented by the notes of some of the participants.

As with the Eisenhower administration, there are also no records of the President’s meetings with the JCS. This is a major loss for the record of the Kennedy administration since so much of the contingency planning focused on military responses to a blockade of access to Berlin. Another more general category of missing records for the White House are many of
the President's meetings with his senior advisers and with foreign diplomats. The President's appointment book is replete with references to such conversations for which no records have been found.

Another gap is the absence of the records of many telephone conversations both at the White House and at the Departments of State and Defense in the face of evidence in other documents and appointment books that many such calls on Berlin were made.

Despite these gaps the official documentation that exists in records of the several Executive agencies of the U.S. government provides a wealth of material from which a researcher can construct a detailed picture of the American diplomatic and political response to the Berlin crisis.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Crisis Over Berlin

Walter S. Poole

I will describe what the Joint History Office has written about the Cold War and the Berlin confrontation, and I will indicate how far declassification seems likely to proceed in the near future. Our major publication is a series called The JCS and National Policy that begins in the autumn of 1945 and probably will continue through the end of the Cold War. The volumes in the series follow a standard format. Most begin with a "men and methods" chapter describing the principal officials and the decision-making process. Then they depict the evolution of national strategy, which leads naturally to an examination of how the force structure was determined each year. Then comes an account of arms control negotiations. SALT and START loom large in our histories. Since each president knew the Senate would not ratify a treaty unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) endorsed it, the JCS were consulted and kept satisfied at every stage of negotiations, which gave them something close to veto power. Each volume then moves on to regional problems. Chapters deal with geographic areas: NATO and Western Europe; the Middle East; the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, which of course began claiming much more attention during the 1970s; Africa and the Indian subcontinent, which appear intermittently in the series; and the Far East, which frequently requires more than one chapter per volume. We also have done a separate seven-volume account of the JCS role in the Vietnam War; four volumes have been declassified and the rest should follow before long.

Until several years ago, the Documents Division of the Joint Secretariat carried out a systematic declassification review—not of our volumes, but of the documents in JCS files. That process had gone through documents for 1963 when it was stopped largely for budgetary reasons. Unfortunately, most JCS papers about Berlin still remained classified, often because the JCS were responding to correspondence from the Secretary of Defense or the White House and National Security Council
that is itself still classified. Reviews now are made only in response to Freedom of Information Act or Mandatory Declassification Review requests for specific topics or documents. As things stand today, a private organization, the National Security Archive, has requested Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reviews of a large number of JCS documents about Berlin. In nearly all cases, the Joint Staff has indicated no objection to release these, but other agencies have yet to concur.

As for the volumes in our *National Policy* series, the first six covering the autumn of 1945 through the end of 1956 have been declassified and published. The seventh volume covering 1957–1960 devotes part of a chapter to Berlin. We have just put the whole manuscript, which is classified TOP SECRET, into the queue for interagency declassification review, a process that usually takes at least two years. The eighth volume in our series covering 1961–64 also has a chapter devoted to the Berlin crisis. This book is classified TOP SECRET, and it has not yet been put into the queue for declassification review. We have been sending only one book at a time so as not to clog further a system that already is overburdened. This, incidentally, is the last volume that deals with Berlin, although our series now is completed through 1976 in classified form.

We also have a TOP SECRET and rather lengthy chronology, *Germany and the Berlin Question*. It runs from 1945 through June 1962 and was compiled by our office between 1961 and 1963. It consists of a series of short narratives followed by summaries of documents that were drawn from a number of agencies. This chronology came into being for a curious reason. In mid-1961, when international tensions began rising again, the Special Assistant for Arms Control on the Joint Staff was Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF. Undeterred—or perhaps emboldened—by the fact that statesmen had grappled unsuccessfully with the German and Berlin problems for more than a dozen years, General Smith crafted his own solution. Germany, like ancient Gaul, should be divided into three parts. An independent, neutral, and disarmed Middle Germany, consisting of the territory temporarily occupied by the Western Powers in 1945, would separate NATO from Warsaw Pact forces and create conditions leading to eventual reunification. When this proposal reached the Joint Staff’s Plans and Policy Directorate, J–5, action officers felt some unease but lacked enough background knowledge to identify flaws. So they commissioned the JCS Historical Division to prepare a chronology covering diplomatic as well as military issues. Thanks in part to this chronology, Smith’s proposal went no further. It reappeared once, seven years later in a book co-authored by Smith and General Curtis LeMay, both of whom by then were retired.
Now I would like to speculate about how much documentation about military contingency plans seems likely to become available in the near future. I foresee more difficulties for the period 1961–62 than for 1958–59. President Eisenhower felt that if the Soviets shut off ground access to West Berlin, efforts at reopening access should be limited to a relatively small ground probe. That kept the focus clear and the catalogue of plans fairly limited. But President Kennedy wanted an elaborate list of graduated non-nuclear responses at his disposal. In response, by the autumn of 1961, the JCS had worked out dozens of reactions to more than 30 possible challenges. Beyond this, of course, tripartite LIVE OAK plans (US, UK, France) were maturing and a quadripartite Washington Ambassadorial Group (US, UK, France, West Germany) was working on such matters as economic and maritime countermeasures against the Soviet Bloc.

Such an outpouring of activity has left us, I think, with a two-fold problem. First, the US plans grew much more detailed during 1961–62, which in itself can make them more sensitive and difficult to declassify. Second, Berlin planning really resembled an exercise in coalition diplomacy. The French, British, and West German governments did not share the Kennedy administration’s enthusiasm for graduated, flexible response. Thus there was a disjunction between unilateral US plans and the activities of LIVE OAK and the Washington Ambassadorial Group. Declassification of LIVE OAK and Ambassadorial Group documents has been postponed to the next century. If we are allowed access to US plans alone, we could very well get an inaccurate impression of how united the allies were and what responses they had agreed upon. What was approved in the White House might have been opposed in SHAPE, London, Paris, and Bonn. I believe that, once the whole spectrum of documents becomes available, planning for Berlin can offer insight into the constraints upon American leadership.
SECTION IV

The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962: The West European Perspective
Britain and Berlin, 1958–1962, and
Note on British Sources for Berlin, 1958–62, and the Cold War

Heather Yasamee*

“What is West Berlin to you, if you do not want to fight against us?”

Khrushchev, 26 July 1959

Throughout the Cold War struggle for the German heart of Europe, symbolized by Berlin, the primary concerns of British policy were to fulfill its responsibility as one of the four Occupying Powers in Germany and to assure European security through the strength of the NATO alliance. This meant a long-term commitment to Berlin, to the reunification of Germany on a free and democratic basis and, above all, to keeping the Americans in Europe.

In this context, the main aims of British policy through the succession of crises over Berlin from 1958 to 1962 were to honor the pledge to defend West Berlin and to support the Western alliance while avoiding a blockade situation or a calamitous war. In practical terms this meant a readiness to negotiate, to find a modus vivendi, and even to consider de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic. In short, this meant all means which stopped short of materially weakening the position of the Western Occupying Powers in Berlin. In the last resort, Britain was prepared to fight.

The main difficulty in maintaining a physical presence in Berlin and in defending the legal right to be there until the signature of an All-German peace treaty was that the position of West Berlin was not defensible by conventional military means. Nor was the booming economy in West Berlin sustainable by means of a second airlift, ten years after the success-

* The opinions expressed are the author’s own and should not be construed as an expression of official government policy.
ful 1948 airlift. In determining how hard a line to take with Khrushchev, much depended on Western analyses of Soviet intentions, the future of Germany, and the long-term viability of Berlin in the nuclear age. The common factor in all of this was the lack of certainty of any general agreement. In the Berlin poker game, every move had to be judged in the light of its repercussions on the elaborate legal, diplomatic, and military scaffolding then supporting the special status of Berlin.

Particular difficulties for Britain in maintaining its corner in Berlin included the worsening problem of military overstretch worldwide and deteriorating political relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, which was acquiring the military capability, if not the political will, to replace Britain as Number Two to the Americans in NATO's plans for the defense of Europe.

Within these and other constraints, such as an anxious public opinion, British Ministers and officials displayed constructive and imaginative leadership, with eyes focused as much on some of the wider interlocking issues, which complicated and constrained action, as on the specific question of Berlin. In his memoirs, Harold Macmillan recalled that his immediate reaction as Prime Minister to the Soviet ultimatum of November 1958 was to put it in the context of the Geneva nuclear test ban negotiations, which seemed likely to drag on "more or less indefinitely," and the British struggle to build a bridge between EFTA (European Free Trade Area) and the EEC (European Economic Community) on which "it is clear that the Germans have sold out to the French on every count." In Macmillan's opinion, it was not possible to deal with Berlin, the test ban, and EFTA separately even though,

The groups of powers in this strange quadrille keep changing. In the first, it is Russia and the three occupying powers, with Germany the most interested and the most to gain. In the second, France is out and Germany is out. In the third, the United States seems uninterested and the Germans and French have made an unholy alliance against the British. We must think of all these problems together, for that is what the British people will do.7

*The Soviet Ultimatum*

After the resolution shown by the Western alliance to support Berlin against the Soviet blockade of 1948–9, the Western stake in Berlin passed largely unchallenged until 10 November 1958, when Khruschehev announced at a Soviet-Polish Friendship rally that the time had come to renounce the remnants of quadripartite occupation in Berlin and to create a normal situation in the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet leader proposed to hand over Soviet functions in Berlin to the East
German authorities, called upon the West to establish relations with the GDR and to “negotiate with it if there are any questions concerning Berlin which interest them.” Mr. Khrushchev followed this up with an official note on 27 November serving notice that the Soviet Union regarded all existing arrangements about Berlin as null and void and proposing negotiations between the Occupying Powers for the establishment of Berlin as a demilitarized free city. Meanwhile there would be no change in access procedures for military traffic from the west to Berlin for six months. With this six-month ultimatum, Khrushchev triggered an international crisis, which, in varying degrees of tension, was to last until the autumn of 1962.

**British Analysis of Soviet Intentions**

British response to Khrushchev’s surprise shock tactics in November 1958 hinged on assessment of how far the Soviet leadership intended to press their strategic advantage in Berlin (100 miles inside the Iron Curtain). Early British analysis tended to view Soviet intentions as limited: Khrushchev’s initiative was a test probe into the strength of the NATO alliance which would stop short of war. Reflecting on the situation from Moscow, the British Ambassador, Sir Patrick Reilly, considered that the six-month ultimatum was “an unusually skillful move calculated to give Western resolution time to fade and for Western differences to develop.” Furthermore, it had been “only a matter of time” before the Soviet leader would use the Berlin lever to break the deadlock on Germany by forcing a Summit on Soviet terms.

Reasons why Khrushchev should have chosen this particular time to apply the lever were variously thought at the time to include:

a. The need to stabilize the GDR and gain some Western recognition for the Soviet satellite bloc in Europe, both politically and economically. Reilly considered this to be Khrushchev’s primary aim as part of the need to strengthen the Soviet hand in the East-West battle for the under-developed countries. “Mr. Khrushchev may well think that he cannot weld the Satellites into an effective whole for this purpose, or indeed have a reliable guarantee against the occurrence of another Hungary, unless the present situation can be shown to have been accepted by the West, through the sterilization of West Berlin and Western recognition, explicit or tacit, of the GDR.”

b. The need to close the escape hatch through Berlin. This became increasingly pressing as the crisis lengthened. Overall more than 2.5 million refugees left the GDR through Berlin between 1949 and 1961. In 1959 the rate was 250–300 a day (10,000 a month) peaking at 30,000 in July 1961, the month before the wall went up.
c. The Soviet belief that the US was on the point of supplying nuclear weapons to the FRG. Initially thought to be a main motive, this came to be regarded as only a secondary one, fuelling the Soviet drive for a summit on Germany with the aim of achieving the neutralization of Germany via a revised Rapacki plan.

d. Mr. Khrushchev's personal need for a Cold War victory to restore his authority at home, which had been undermined by such setbacks as the failure to open up a missile gap, only limited success in the Middle East, and blows to Soviet standing in the communist bloc (e.g., Albania) weakened by the widening schism with China. British officials tended to discount this as a motivating factor, pointing to the further damage Khrushchev had done to his position by creating more tensions within the GDR, where the idea of free city status for Berlin was said to have been a profound shock.

e. Perhaps no design or strategy at all, but a typically reckless impulse by Khrushchev carried away by the dynamics of Cold War confrontation. Although a minority view, this interpretation recurs in contemporary British speculation about the crisis at a time when Russian experts in the Foreign Office so often concluded that, "It is always next to impossible to foretell what the Russians will do or why they will do it." 6

Macmillan's concern that Khrushchev had overreached himself, and sooner or later would have to be helped to back down by some face-saving formula, was shared by the Foreign Office where early predictions of the likely course of the crisis proved remarkably accurate. By the spring of 1959, it was reckoned now that Khrushchev's long-sought summit was nearer in sight and that he understood that the West was going to stand firm on Berlin, he would start looking for a way out and meanwhile try to keep the temperature down. The Foreign Office started to prepare itself for a long haul during which it was expected that Khrushchev would be ready to negotiate on the basis of a long drawn out series of East-West exchanges, resorting to threats and ultimatums when it seemed useful to turn up the heat. At the same time it was considered that Berlin was too useful a source of blackmail for Khrushchev to want to settle the question once and for all, so that officials resigned themselves to the fact that "the process of persuading Mr. Khrushchev that he cannot have his cake and eat it may well prove arduous." 7

The British Response

From the beginning, it was clear to the British government that Allied rights and the freedom of West Berliners must be defended. Abandoning
Berlin was “out of the question” and as early as 22 November, Macmillan acted to allay Adenauer’s concerns by telling Khrushchev bluntly that “the British have every intention of upholding their rights in Berlin which are soundly based.” In so far as Russian moves were thought to be an attempt to force the West out of Berlin, Britain was prepared to dig its heels in and, if necessary, fight. According to the Foreign Office to do otherwise “would be as fatal to NATO as it would be dishonorable.”

At the same time it was argued that recognizing the GDR was not worth a war. As the Foreign Office put it to their Western partners in November 1958 there were 3 choices: a.) abandoning Berlin; b.) resorting to force; c.) and staying in Berlin but dealing with and if necessary recognizing the GDR—said to be “greatly to be preferred to course b.”

According to the terms laid down by Khrushchev, dealing with the GDR meant in practical terms accepting that East German, not Soviet, authorities would control access to Berlin by issuing passes and inspecting the tickets, etc. Such a prospect appalled veterans such as Dullas who said uncompromisingly that, “Our rights of access stemmed from our victory over Germany. To allow any Germans to control us would be to let the vanquished control the victors.” This kind of sentiment was dismissed by Macmillan and his Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, who repeatedly argued that it was not justifiable in a nuclear age to make the issue of who checked the railway tickets into a casus belli, since “What matters is whether civil and military supplies actually reach Berlin” not by which means access is secured. As to recognition, Lloyd said at the outset of the crisis that “From a British point of view dealing on a de facto basis with the East German authorities is a reasonable course and I would not much mind if it ended up with the recognition of the GDR Government.”

Initial American reaction was disappointment with the British line, while in Bonn, Adenauer took it as confirmation of long-held suspicions about British staying power in Europe. Essentially, however, it was a realistic view of the cards held by the West. Berlin was not defensible either militarily or economically via an air lift and eventually everybody came to admit that the question of who stamped railway passes was not a casus belli, even though this meant getting closer to recognizing the GDR and farther away from the long term goal of reunification to which all had been committed since the Potsdam agreements of 1945.

The western response took shape in a series of bilateral, Foreign Ministers and North Atlantic Council meetings from which the agreed line was: a.) no abandonment of Berlin; b.) no lasting settlement without reunification; c.) no neutralization of Germany; d.) no acceptance of measures likely to lead to departure of US, Canadian, and British forces from Europe.
In April 1959, Macmillan called this "papering over the cracks" and regretted the tendency to come up with lofty declarations which did not solve the immediate problem of deciding what to do when meeting with rejection at the Geneva negotiating table. Macmillan’s own ideas for a more pragmatic and practical approach were strongly influenced by British military assessments of their own and NATO defense capabilities, by the need to keep the FRG on board at every stage, and by the weight of public opinion.

Defending Berlin

Although the West was pledged to defend Berlin, the reality was that Berlin could not be defended on the ground by conventional land forces against superior combined numbers of Russian and East German forces much closer at hand. In May 1959, Selwyn Lloyd admitted to Gromyko that the Western garrison in Berlin was of symbolic value rather than military importance after telling Khrushchev in February that "It gave the West no military advantage to maintain garrisons in West Berlin, on the contrary they were in some ways a liability." A land break-through to Berlin was thought to stand little chance of success when the Soviet Union controlled more than 80 divisions which they could roll to the Iron Curtain within days. Agreed Western plans to this end were said to be little more than paper proposals. British reluctance to sign up for unrealistic contingency planning irritated the Americans. Similarly American insensitivity to early British hints about the desirability of reviving the war-time Combined Chiefs of Staff system as a means of lifting Britain “out of the European queue” shook British confidence in the “special relationship.” In the end, Macmillan was to say,

The United Kingdom had associated themselves with the so-called contingency plans so as not to be accused of weakness but they had always insisted that the final decision to implement the plans must be taken at a political level at the critical moment. The truth of the matter was that any war in Europe would develop into nuclear war.

Berlin in Global Strategy

The emphasis of Britain’s long-term defense planning and spending effort had by now moved away from conventional means of defense towards dependence on nuclear weapons as the main deterrent against any Soviet aggression. Commenting on NATO declarations of December 1958, which reaffirmed members’ obligations to maintain the Allied position in Berlin, Duncan Sandys, British Defense Minister, reminded his colleagues
that "NATO could not dream of adopting this firm and robust attitude were it not for the immense nuclear power of the United States which lies behind the NATO shield....The safety of the West continues to depend upon our ability to convince the Russians that a major attack upon any member of NATO will provoke massive nuclear retaliation." At the same time, as stated in the British Defense White Paper of 1957, "It must be frankly recognized that there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons....The overriding consideration in all military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it."

In practical terms this meant spending less money on conventional forces, more money on nuclear research and development within the constraints of a 20% cut in the British defense budget overall, and supporting the Americans at every turn. Despite the reallocation of defense spending, the importance of maintaining conventional forces was recognized. The problem facing British Ministers was that the economy could not support the cost of deploying forces to meet all of Britain's overseas obligations. "The United Kingdom could not go on doing everything" Macmillan told Adenauer in January 1962. Putting more troops into Germany, as Britain had pledged to do as part of the 1954 Bonn agreements, meant abandoning other positions. Rather than do that, British policy was directed towards getting the European members of NATO to take a fairer share of the defense burden in Europe, to enable British forces to shore up their position in the Middle East and Asia on the basis that "It is now generally recognized that Europe cannot be defended in Europe alone. It is essential that our flank in the Middle East and beyond is not turned." The scale of British withdrawal from Germany announced in the 1957 White Paper (20% reduction in land forces and 50% cut in air power) so soon after the 1954 Bonn agreements caused dismay and some resentment in the Federal Republic, especially when accompanied by requests for a bigger German contribution to remaining British occupation costs. As a result Anglo-German relations, never easy under Adenauer, became strained at a time when keeping the FRG on board at every stage of western handling of the Berlin crisis was of paramount importance. Much of this importance lay in the fact that the Federal Republic was potentially the biggest contributor in NATO plans for the land defense of Europe.

Public Opinion

It is clear from recently published American and German documents, that the Americans had overtaken the British in readiness to accept the
consequence of the FRG’s growing military strength for bilateral relations as a whole. The British government’s efforts to improve its own bilateral relations with the FRG were not helped by a semi-hostile public opinion, which 15 years after the end of the war had difficulty in accepting Germany as a full-fledged ally, still less as one to go to war for. As Macmillan said at the outset of the crisis,

It would not be easy to persuade the British people that it was their duty to go to war in defense of West Berlin. After all in my lifetime we have been dealt two nearly mortal blows by the Germans. People in this country will think it paradoxical to use a mild term, to have to prepare for an even more horrible war in order to defend the liberties of people who have tried to destroy us twice this century....We and our allies should do and should be seen to do what ordinary people would think reasonable. For instance, it would not seem reasonable to ordinary people that West Germans who profess to desire closer contacts and reunification with the East Germans should refuse absolutely to discuss these matters in any forum with the East Germans.18

The importance of carrying public opinion along with a tough Western line on Berlin which could lead to nuclear war features in many of the discussions on Berlin. Selwyn Lloyd’s remark that “We should be sure that we could select an issue on which to stand over which we would get public support” was a constant refrain. In some ways public opinion was a double-edged factor. On the one hand, the tremendous public fear and pressure to reduce tension encouraged initiatives such as Macmillan’s visit to Moscow, which divided the Alliance.18 On the other hand, it acted as a restraint on Soviet moves since as Dulles was to say, “the Russians had a vested interest in respectability and he therefore thought it would not be a difficult task to mobilize world opinion.”19 It was recognized that one problem in mobilizing public opinion lay in the skill of Soviet propaganda and presentation. According to Macmillan the Soviet offer in January 1959 for a peace treaty, a variation of the 1952 Stalin Note, had a certain specious attraction, while Dean Rusk admitted that in general the Soviet proposals were simple, plausible, and seductive.

Solutions?

Until the spectacular failure of the Paris Summit in May 1960, British efforts to find a solution to the Berlin crisis were directed towards finding a basis for negotiation with the Soviet Union on the wider issues of Germany and European security. The aim was to find some compromise rather than outright Cold War victory. In 1959, as part of a Future Policy Study for the next 10 years (1960–70), the Foreign Office asked the question “should we endeavor to establish a modus vivendi with the Russians in
Europe? Would this assist the preservation of our interests in other parts of the world?”

Part of the search for a _modus vivendi_ in the early days of the Berlin crisis included a greater willingness than French or American Occupying Powers to entertain the Soviet proposal of “free city” status for Berlin and the pushing of ideas for involving the UN in Berlin. These ranged from the impractical suggestion of establishing the UN Headquarters in Berlin to ideas for establishing UN sub-bodies there as a means to maintain Berlin’s vitality. Such initiatives got nowhere with the US or with France, although there was rather more readiness to listen to British suggestions of reducing troop levels in Berlin and some curtailing of Berlin-based non-military activities.

**Reunification**

All initiatives towards a _modus vivendi_ were complicated by ambivalent attitudes towards reunification. After ten years of two Germanies, the attraction of preserving the _status quo_, which more or less worked, was increasing. So much so that the Future Policy Study concluded “Though we cannot admit it publicly, both sides would gain by avoiding the reunification of Germany.” In any case the prospects of reunification were remote. With great prescience in February 1959, Mr. Dulles observed that he did not think reunification of Germany would ever be negotiable except in circumstances in which the Russians had decided that they could afford to adopt a new approach to their satellites. Apart from this he was not sure whether many people were eager for reunification. He was certain that General de Gaulle did not want it and he doubted whether in his heart, Dr. Adenauer really wanted it. Dr. Adenauer did not want the CDU to be swamped by a lot of socialists. A reunified Germany would present very difficult problems so far as the Common Market was concerned. It was not at all certain that we might not be the losers on balance.

Macmillan concurred in this analysis, but maintained that the Allies must continue to aim for reunification in the long term and went on to speculate that,

If there was ever any danger that in order to obtain reunification the Germans might seek to do a deal with the Russians either on a Molotov-Ribbentrop basis or by volunteering to subject themselves to a status of neutrality then it seemed to him that we might as well try to anticipate this and get some price in return for it. It could be argued that the only hope for the future lay in a progressive relaxation of the Communist grip both in Russia itself and in the countries which the Russians now controlled. If we could secure the liberation of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, even perhaps at the cost of some apparent concession to the Russian point of view in
Germany, it might be a tremendous gain. But this was all very much in the future and the notion that we might set ourselves any such goal as this hardly needed to be considered at present and certainly must not be breathed.21

Although Selwyn Lloyd later assured the State Department that this kind of thinking ran far ahead of the Foreign Office, there was a good deal of speculation there as to how long the Germans would wait for reunification. In January 1959, senior FO officials suggested to the head of the German Foreign Ministry that “In five years’ time might there not be increasing pressure from German public opinion for reunification on almost any terms, e.g., neutralization?... Herr van Scherpenberg said there was no significant inclination in Germany towards neutralization. It was recognized that the maintenance of Germany’s Western alliance was of paramount importance and German public opinion would understand and accept the continued division of Germany provided that they could see some light at the end of the tunnel."22 Meanwhile, the West German Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano could contemplate “without the slightest shock any necessary arrangements with the DDR."23 In thinking about any such arrangement, British hands were effectively tied by American reluctance, in turn influenced by the uncompromising attitude of General De Gaulle. The French President made it clear throughout that whatever others might do, France would not recognize the GDR and that without general detente worldwide, any limited agreement on Berlin was “hardly worth the paper it is written on."24

In 1959 the more pragmatic British approach was not helped by deteriorating relations with Dr. Adenauer. Despite Adenauer’s own readiness to countenance some understanding with the Soviet Union (e.g., acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line), his fear of an Allied deal with the Soviet Union over the head of Germany and suspicion of British “softness” towards the Soviet Union in particular further damaged Anglo-German relations. British talk of “thinning out” and readiness to promote inspection zone areas was sometimes confused, especially in Bonn, with total disengagement. Furious at Macmillan’s “Voyage of Discovery” to Moscow at the end of February 1959, Adenauer was even more disturbed by reference in the resulting Anglo-Soviet communique to agreement to study the possibilities of “increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection.”25

When Macmillan and Lloyd saw Adenauer and his Ministers in Bonn afterwards they “launched quite an attack upon us about ‘disengagement,’ which they seemed to think we had agreed in principle with the Russians. We argued that ‘limitation and inspection in an agreed area’ was the only
way to avoid ‘disengagement,’ which we too thought very dangerous. It took an hour or more of quite heated discussion to get these suspicions out of their heads. The Chancellor was slow to understand and seemed to cherish some resentment.”28 Macmillan’s “great adventure” to Moscow irreparably damaged his already poor personal relations with Adenauer, despite the fact that it succeeded in defusing Berlin tension with the withdrawal of both insistence upon de jure recognition of the GDR and the six-month ultimatum together with Soviet acceptance of the West’s counter-proposal for a meeting of Foreign Ministers as a stage to the long-sought summit.

The failure of the Paris Summit in May 1960 was a turning point in British policy over the Berlin crisis. As far as Macmillan was concerned, his whole policy of agreement through negotiation lay in ruins leaving no alternative but to swing solidly behind US-led determination to face Khrushchev down. The nature of the crisis, especially after the combative meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, became more obviously a trial of strength between two Super-Powers. However, it was the show-down over Cuba rather than action over Berlin which proved decisive in bringing the crisis to an end. Certainly by the end of 1962 Macmillan had come to agree with de Gaulle’s analysis and his conclusion that after Cuba “Berlin could be left alone for a while.”29

**Reflections**

In April 1961, some two and half years into the Berlin crisis, the British commandant in Berlin commented with some surprise that “The Western position in Berlin has shown itself somewhat less difficult to maintain than might have been expected.”30

In some ways the pattern of the 4-year Berlin crisis could be said to have conformed to that of the whole Cold War period when Soviet diplomacy so frequently gained the upper hand, giving way only when confronted with a united Western front. This pattern was recognized by the British Chiefs of Staff in the early Cold War days when Russian policy was said to be “fundamentally opportunist,” always ready to “exploit any weakness” in western unity, but equally ready to draw back when confronted with determined opposition. According to the British Chiefs of Staff, the Russians had a “split mind”, one half aggressively expansionist, the other half traditionally defensive, and in 1950 they predicted that a war of nerves (of varying intensity) was likely to prevail for the indefinite future.31

Of course, the Berlin crisis was not just about regularizing an out-of-date post-war legacy. Berlin symbolized the division of Germany, which
all were pledged to end, albeit on their own very different terms. In the Cold War battle for Europe, Germany was commonly regarded as the prize. By 1950 the Foreign Office acknowledged that "In the contest between the Great Powers, Germany has become a pawn, which both sides wish to turn into a queen." In 1958 there was still much truth in Lenin's dictum that "Whoever holds Berlin, holds Germany. Whoever holds Germany, holds Europe."

In the last phase of the Berlin crisis, "the Western Powers were all agreed that the maintenance of the status quo was the best we could hope for in Berlin." This was essentially what happened, enabling all sides to claim some kind of success. The Wall effectively took the heat out of the situation, especially after the tank stand-off in Friedrichstrasse in October 1961. Thereafter, the prospect of actual fighting over Berlin appeared more remote, although Soviet needle tactics on access continued to keep Western nerves on edge.

In revisiting the Berlin crisis today, with the historian's benefit of hindsight, the question remains whether the West over-reacted to Khrushchev's ultimatum in November 1958? Only the Soviet documents can tell us whether Khrushchev intended from the outset to force a showdown on Berlin, or whether it was an opportunistic probe into a soft area designed to remove "the bone in his throat" and to end an anomalous situation represented by the GDR, whose stability was the key element in holding on to the rest of Eastern Europe.

Consequences of the Berlin crisis included renewed impetus for more concrete planning for the defense of Europe of which the establishment of the LIVE OAK organization in April 1959 is perhaps the most directly related example. More generally, the Berlin crisis could be said to have cemented the process whereby NATO was becoming a main forum for political as well as military consultation. In his memoirs, Frank Roberts, British Permanent Representative to NATO 1957–1960, recalls this period as the most interesting and exciting for the development of NATO. Certainly German commitment to NATO was becoming more whole-hearted. The perceived threat to Berlin did much to end German ambivalence about re-gaining military strength and even nuclear capability. The ambivalence said to be widespread among the young, who at the time of rearmament formed part of "a large and active body of opinion in Germany, probably most widespread among the younger generation, which is not engaged on considering how and when and under what conditions Germany should make her contribution but which simply does not want to make any contribution at all."

Western readiness to defend Berlin and take a hardline with the Soviet Union boosted the confidence of the FRG and helped to dispel lin-
growing suspicions that the Occupying Powers would make a deal over the head of Germany. This confidence or sense of security in turn helped to create the conditions in which Brandt’s Ost Politik could take root. This preparedness to deal with the GDR, itself strengthened through gaining a place at the international negotiating table, and to move towards de facto recognition was in some limited respect a vindication of British policy, little appreciated at a time when all governments had their own Moscow agenda.

In terms of power and influence, Britain could not be said to have had an especially “good” crisis. It was ironic that Britain, which had built the whole of its post-war foreign policy around the Anglo-American relationship, whose strength derived from American acknowledgement that Britain was the most reliable ally, should be cast by some in the defeatist role. In 1950, Truman’s remarks that in the event of war in Europe, only the Americans and the British could be relied upon to fight, strengthened British belief in the Anglo-American relationship as the mainspring of Atlantic defense.35 Ten years later, the situation was clearly very different. Britain’s declining capacity to play a strong military role inevitably had consequences for the political relationship. For Britain, still recovering from the humiliation of Suez, the limits of power and influence were becoming ever more exposed.

Despite noticeable improvement in Anglo-German relations in the post-Wall era, the key axis remained the Franco-German one, whose high-point was reached in the Franco-German treaty of 1963. Within the European alliances, Britain was becoming an outsider and kept there by the determination of General de Gaulle who effectively vetoed British entry to the Common Market on the eve of the treaty in January 1963. It is to this period that belongs Acheson’s remark at West Point in December 1962 that Britain had lost an empire and not yet found a role.

Perhaps ultimately the modus vivendi reached on Berlin was mostly a success for French policy. Since 1945 French national interest lay less in German reunification or confederation than in assuring the security of France against the perceived threat not only from the Soviet Union but also from Germany. A divided Germany with a stronger half tied into the West via the economic, political, and military integration founded on Franco-German rapprochement had been the object of French policy since 1950. It offered not only the best guarantee of French security, but also, in de Gaulle’s eyes at least, the possibility of independence from the United States should his perceived alternative aspirations of a French seat in a tripartite directorate of NATO fail. In the Cold War climate of 1958–62, any long term solution for Berlin or Germany could only be reached with the
Soviet Union on the basis of some form of neutralization. This was never an option for France nor in the last resort for Britain since it presented the dilemma first posed by Eden in 1954,

"Is Germany to be neutral and disarmed? ...If so, who will keep Germany disarmed?

Or is Germany to be neutral and armed?

If so who will keep Germany neutral"?

ENDNOTES


5. Moscow dispatch No 52 of 13 April 1959, FO 371/143412: NS 1022/42.


11. FO telegram to Washington No 8112, of 15 Nov 1958, FO 371/137333: WG 10113/64


15. Cmdn 124, April 1957, 'Defense Outline of Future Policy.'


APPENDIX

Note on British Sources for Berlin 1958–62 and the Cold War

The primary sources for official British papers on the Berlin Crisis are the files of Government departments such as the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defense, Prime Minister's Office and Cabinet Office. These files are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London and are freely available on demand to members of the public, both British and foreign. In accordance with the Public Records Acts of 1958 and 1967, Government departments transfer their files to the PRO 30 years after their creation. 1964 papers were opened in January 1994 (see Annex for a selection of the main Berlin files).

Although most files are opened after 30 years, some may be closed for longer if it is established that their release would harm the defense or international relations of the UK, would disclose information given in confidence or would cause substantial distress or danger to an individual. In 1992 the FCO introduced a more flexible records policy, as part of its commitment to Open Government, foreshadowed in a speech by the Secretary of State, The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd, in May when he said: “In Britain the culture of secrecy went too wide. The presumption should be that information is released unless there are compelling and substantive reasons of national interest to withhold it.” (Address to Knole Club, May 1992).

As part of this new records policy the FCO is reviewing the whole of its withheld archive dating back to 1923 with the emphasis on release...
rather than retention. Over 3000 items have been released since January 1992. These include papers on the Berlin Crisis and Germany as shown in the Annex, and it is hoped that more (e.g., on contingency planning) will be released as the special review progresses.¹

Foreign Office Records

The main Foreign Office political files are available at the PRO in class FO 371. This class contains the files of the political departments. Until April 1961 German affairs were handled by Western department (file designation WG); thereafter by Central department (CG). Selected files are listed in the Annex. The filing system and organization of the Foreign Office means that papers on, for instance, views in Washington or Moscow on the Berlin Crisis will be on these files and not the files of the department responsible for American or Soviet affairs (respectively American and Northern departments; file designations AU and NS). Similarly Embassy files, often incomplete, are much less fruitful than the relevant FO 371 papers.

In addition to the files of Western, Central and Northern departments, illuminating papers are contained in the ZP files of the Permanent Under-Secretary's department (PUS). This department was responsible for high level planning and policy-making, high-level visits, meetings and conferences and liaison with the Ministry of Defence and Joint Intelligence Committee.

From April 1961 planning and co-ordination was undertaken by Western Organizations and Planning department. Highlights include the FCO contribution to the 1960 Future Policy Study for 1960–70 which, among other things, raised the question 'should we endeavor to establish a modus vivendi with the Russians in Europe? Would this assist the preservation of our interests in the rest of the world'?²

Planning papers, such as this and the Chiefs of Staff reports on defence policy and global strategy, which have recently been released,³ reveal some of the assumptions underlying British policy and the scale of British interests worldwide. They help to place specific areas, such as Berlin, in context by providing an overall view of Britain’s overseas commitments and capacity to meet them. They indicate the planned priorities of British foreign policy, which like all plans are changed as changes in the international situation occur. To some extent therefore their significance can be limited for historical assessments of a crisis when decisions on the day can have more effect than plans of a month or a year ago.
New Releases

Until 1993 Foreign Office files on NATO, WEU and other international organizations dating back to 1949 were withheld because they contained documents belonging to international organizations for which there is no internationally agreed release policy. These documents are now being separated out so that Foreign Office material can be released. The files in question are those from Western Organizations department 1949–1957, from Western department which was responsible for policy towards NATO and WEU from 1957 to April 1961 and from Western Organizations and Planning department, which held these responsibilities prior to 1957 and again after April 1961. The first files for 1963 and 1949 were opened at the PRO in January 1994. Files for the years 1950–1962 will follow in due course. These are likely to prove an important new source for understanding British policy in the formative period of Western defence co-operation and the structural development of NATO. Some will be directly relevant to the Berlin Crisis.

Further new releases from the FCO include the previously retained papers of the Russia Committee. This Cold War committee of senior FO officials met from 1946 through to the mid 1950’s with a brief to assess the trend of policy in the Soviet Union and China and more generally the trend of Communism worldwide. It developed as a kind of think-tank which at monthly meetings reviewed positions, analyzed events and tried to anticipate next moves on the basis of all available information, including intelligence. About half the Committee’s papers, especially for the 1946–7 period, were routinely released after 30 years. The rest were released in January 1994. Overall this adds up to a dream collection for the hard-pressed researcher providing a British bird’s eye view of Soviet intentions in the early years of the Cold War. Some of the new papers are revealing, especially of British analysis in the fluid and uncertain period following the death of Stalin in 1953. Although this Committee had faded out by the time of the Berlin Crisis, the highly speculative tone of much of their deliberations was to recur in the ‘varying, but admirably presented, views’ of the Russian experts in the Foreign Office so ruefully acknowledged by Harold Macmillan in his memoirs.

Private Papers

Private Office papers of FO Ministers and officials are collected in FO 800 and can be rewarding, if patchy. The papers of Selwyn Lloyd (FO 800/691–746; Secretary of State from 1955 to July 1960) are, for instance,
much less fruitful than those of Ernest Bevin (FO 800/434–522; Secretary of State from 1945 to 1951) and contain nothing on the Berlin Crisis. The Private Office papers of Lord Home as Secretary of State from 1960 to 1963 are not yet available.

The National Register of Archives lists and indexes collections of private papers held outside official archives and gives details of their availability. It records for instance the fact that Harold Macmillan’s papers are deposited at Birch Grove and not yet open to researchers. In this case, however, the loss to historians is limited by the fact that these private papers and diaries have been heavily drawn upon already and used both by Macmillan in his six volumes of memoirs and by Alastair Horne in his two-volume official biography.

Other Government Departments

The files of the Prime Minister’s Office in PREM 11 reflect Macmillan’s key role in British diplomacy during the Berlin Crisis. These are an important source, although in general they tend to be patchy, e.g., they do not always include copies of both outgoing and incoming correspondence. Cabinet Office files in the CAB series at the PRO are an essential source. General correspondence is filed in CAB 21, while Cabinet records can be found in CAB 128 (Minutes) and 129 (Memoranda). Most of the Cabinet Committees are entered in the CAB 134 series and include, for instance, the papers of the Berlin Non-Military Counter Measures Committee set up in 1961. Many of these papers have only recently been released. The papers of the Defence Committee (CAB 131) are likely to be important for studies of the Berlin crisis. They show how defence and foreign policy considerations worked together to shape the British position during the Crisis and the Cold War as a whole.

The close inter-relation of papers and files from one government department to another reflects the Whitehall system of consultation by committee which developed strongly in the post-war years. By tracing the evolution of particular papers, such as the Cabinet paper on UK Future Policy for 1960–70 from its first draft in the Foreign Office, through all the varying committee stages to final submission to the Cabinet, historians can learn as much about the making of policy as the policy itself. This is currently an area of growing interest among British historians.

Other Archival Collections

A number of University and institutional libraries such as Churchill College Cambridge, King’s College London and the Universities of Leeds
and Birmingham have extensive record collections, particularly of private papers, which supplement and complement the British record at the Public Record Office.

Published Documents

Many British documents on Germany and Berlin have been published in a series of Command Papers. The most useful issues are the two Blue Book collections in Cmd 1552 (1961) and Cmd 6201 (1975), which contain Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin from 1944–1973, with excellent narrative Introductions. Other relevant Command papers include Cmd 670 and 719 (1959), Cmd 797, 829 and 868 (1959) on the Geneva Conference and Cmd 6932 (1977) on Problems of Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Postwar British documents are published in the official series Documents on British Policy Overseas. This series, launched in 1984, follows its predecessor series Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–39 in publishing key documents on British foreign policy. The volumes, edited by the FCO’s Historians, have an accompanying set of microfiches on which supplementary documents are reproduced.

Volumes published to date:

Series I: 1945–50

V. Germany and Western Europe, August–December 1945 (1990).

Series II: 1950–55

I. The Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, May 1950–December 1952 (1986).
IV. Korea, June 1950–April 1951 (1931).
In preparation:

V. Germany, 1952–4.
VI. Middle East, 1951–3.

The publishing program of *Documents on British Policy Overseas* has not yet reached the later 1950’s, but it is hoped that the Berlin Crisis will be covered in due course.

1. A current list of new releases is available on request from FCO Historical Branch, Clive House, Petty France, London SW1H 9HD.
2. FP (FO)2 of 22 June 1959, FO 371/143702: ZP 25/10. The Future Policy Study itself is filed on CAB 129/100.
3. The 1950 and 1951 global strategy papers have been published in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, Series II Volume IV, Appendices I and II (HMSO, 1991). For the recently released 1952 paper, see CAB 131/12.

ANNEX

File List of Some FO Sources on the Berlin Crisis 1958–1962

1958

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<td>Internal political situation in Berlin; application of treaties</td>
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<td>Geneva 4 Power Working Group</td>
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<td>FO 371/145864–145889</td>
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Outline of phased plan for reunification, security in Europe and peace settlement

Meetings of UK Steering Committee on future strategic policy

Internal political situation in Berlin

Signing of peace treaty with Germany

Working group and summit Berlin

Berlin Crisis; non-military counter-measures

GDR measures to restrict access to West Berlin

Soviet attitude towards peace treaty on Germany and status of Berlin

Anglo-American discussions on world problems

Anglo-American visits and meetings, Bermuda, Washington and London

Tripartite discussions on foreign and defence strategy

Berlin

Soviet attitude towards peace treaty with Germany and status of Berlin

Berlin and the UN

Access between East and West Berlin

Use of Berlin air corridors
New Releases on Berlin and Germany Since May 1993

1962

- **FO 371/163528, 37, 49**
  - Germany: internal political situation in FRG and DDR—internal political situation of Soviet Union

- **FO 371/163559**
  - Germany: political relations DDR-UK

- **FO 371/163580, 86, 89, 94**
  - Germany: Soviet attitude towards peace treaty with

- **FO 371/163639, 57**
  - Germany and status of Berlin—recognition of DDR—international views on Berlin—Oder-Neisse Line—commercial relations FRG/Soviet Union—paper on ‘Suspicions of a revival of German militarism’

- **FO 371/163695**
  - DDR propaganda sent to the UK
The French Army During the Second Berlin Crisis
(November 1958–August 1961)

Lieutenant-Colonel Frédéric Guelton

If it would be necessary to summarize as briefly as possible the role played by the French Army during the second Berlin crisis between November 1958 and August 1961, it would probably be possible to say that the French Army did not play any role and even more, that this crisis did not exist. And thus it would be possible to conclude even before beginning.

But, from another point of view, the events endured by France and its army during those few years were so exceptional and sometimes so disconcerting, that they deserve, at least, to be studied.

Between 1958 and 1961, France, which had also just experienced defeat in Indochina in 1954 and humiliation in Suez in 1956, weathered successively: (1) a war, qualified as an order maintenance operation in Algeria, from 1954 to 1962; (2) a change of constitution and the birth of a new republic, namely the fifth; (3) the return of General de Gaulle “to public office”; (4) the explosion of the first French atomic bomb in the Sahara in February 1960; (5) an attempted military putsch in 1961, several months before the building of the Berlin Wall; (6) the birth of a terrorist organization which opposed French policy in Algeria through the use of violence: the OAS, i.e., the Secret Army Organization.

These key events for the future of France and its army, alone, represent one major event every six months while the Berlin crisis was evolving. And if we add the notion that General de Gaulle never believed in the risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union, we reach the first simple explanation of the relative place of this crisis in the French political, diplomatic, and military sense.

In order to attempt to give an account of the main developments the French Army experienced against the backdrop of the Berlin Crisis, first, we are going to deal with the way it assumed the weight of the decoloniza-
tion wars in its [the army's] march towards modernization by posing the following two basic questions: (1) To what extent was the Algerian War a burden in the modernization of the army? And (2), what definition of the future war was given in France around 1958, and to what form of modernization did it lead?

After reflecting on the first theme, we shall look more directly into the role played by General de Gaulle from May 1958 by posing the following two questions: (1) What was the place given by General de Gaulle to atomic weapons and to the army in general in the restoration of France's ranking in the world? And (2), how did de Gaulle approach the Berlin Crisis?

Before tackling these different points, it is important to introduce the sources in existence or used.

The State of Available Sources

The nature and diversity of the situations experienced by the French army beginning with 1958 pose an obvious problem with sources.

The archives are abundant. But they are not easy to access because, even if all the unclassified archives before 1964 are theoretically accessible, in the legal framework in force, the absence of published inventories is a basic limitation for researchers. In addition, issues linked to French nuclear technology are often classified, which prohibits their use without ministerial dispensation, and the Algerian War archives are open only sparingly since it is a fact that the passions that encompassed this conflict are today still far from being appeased. Finally, there seem to be very few archives directly concerning the Berlin Crisis, and they are of limited interest, according to the inquiries the Historical Department allowed us to make. What remains are the Historical Department's private archives, which are especially interesting because they give personal information from private papers and accounts of the numerous actors of this period.¹

The open documentation is as rich as it is of varied quality. The military journals of the time, newspapers, participants' accounts, and on-the-spot studies are interesting, but they require considerable critical judgment and discernment on the part of the historian, since some of the texts are partisan. Fortunately, some major university works that are beginning to appear will make possible a more discriminating reading of the period. They are relayed by scientific journals, like the Revue d'Allemagne or Relations Internationales, that compile articles with considerable interest. Finally, research and publications about General de Gaulle furnish us with useful information on most of the major events and lines of thought of the period, whether they were favorable or fiercely opposed to the principal actor.
The French Army during the Berlin Crisis: From Decolonization to Modernization

First, it is necessary to note that despite General de Gaulle’s reemergence in public affairs and the special place that defense issues occupied in his mind, French military policy after 1958 continued the one developed by the leaders of the IVth Republic. General de Gaulle’s contribution is thus characterized mainly by his will to succeed.

This policy, the broad lines of which General de Gaulle outlined in his 1951 Pont-Saint-Esprit speech, was marked by the double stamp of coherence and ambiguity because it was based on attachment to the idea of national sovereignty and to the perception that the European states could not guarantee their own defense without the United States.

The Weight of the Decolonization Wars

For France, the military, human, moral and financial burden of the decolonization wars, especially the Algerian War, was so great it put a heavy strain on all the attempts to evolve until 1962; (this makes a study of the accomplishments between 1958 and 1962 all the more interesting). In fact, while in 1954 there were still only 80,000 men in Algeria, the number reached 450,000 men three years later; in all almost 1,500,000 French soldiers fought in Algeria, and almost 80% of them were conscripts.

Thus, the entire modernization of the army was set back with the intervention in Algeria. Units stationed in France, as in the FRG, were deployed there, and sometimes all the modern equipment was left in garrisons; this happened for the 5th AD [armored division], which left all its modern equipment in Germany when it departed to occupy a sector of Oranie. Military leaders, like General Guillaume, head of the Armed Forces General Staff, handed in their resignations because they opposed the interruption in a promising modernization.

Thus, until 1958 French military policy was based more on ambiguity than on a reasoned choice because the pull between the desire to equip a modern army in Europe and the need to deploy rustic and basically equipped units to Algeria was so great.

In a speech dated 10 May 1957, M. Bourges-Maunoury, Defense Minister, illustrated this situation perfectly. On the one hand, the minister showed that he was politically committed to respecting commitments made to the Allies in NATO, when he declared,

Our military apparatus should be in a position to respond to the three basic elements that characterize our country’s position in the world: 1—
Participation in Western security and defense within the context of the Atlantic and European Treaty; 2—Home country defense; 3—Internal and external defense of the French Union.

However, when he defined the objectives to be attained immediately, the reality of the Algerian War imposed decisions on him that were contrary to his initial political intentions: “First objective: establishment of an African army in Algeria.”

General Zeller, who in 1957 was commanding the Strategic Reserves, was even more specific. In a note that he wrote in July of that year, he recalls that the strategic reserves, the main unit of which consisted of seven divisions intended for combat in Europe, were rendered, “incapable of completing their mission because of significant withdrawals of their equipment and also because of the transfer of most of them to North Africa.”

That is why he suggested finding a solution for the conflict between the involvement in Europe or (and) in Algeria and its devastating consequences by widening NATO’s responsibility towards North Africa. This would make possible the consideration that the use of the French strategic reserves in North Africa was not in response only to a French vision of this conflict, but also to a global Atlantic Treaty strategy aimed at preventing an encirclement across the African continent. General Zeller continued,

Moreover—without entering the field of major strategy—these large units can be imagined playing an important role in case of a more or less generalized conflict outside the continental European theater, either against internal opposition in Africa, or even by opposing a direct threat posed by the Russians, or others, outflanking the European positions in the southern Mediterranean or the very body of Africa.

A Modernization for What War?

Paradoxically, if the Algerian War marked French military policy deeply with its imprint, it was also expressed by the development of a train of thought that wanted to modernize the French Army despite the war. This current was also certainly all the stronger as it sought to free itself from the Algerian pressure that placed a burden on it. One of the consequences of this pressure was to relegate, de facto, the French Army to the role of infantry reserves for NATO. This was clearly reinforced with the General de Gaulle’s arrival to power.

But modernize for what war? For the subversive war with its psychological component, for a classical war, or for a nuclear war? If each form of war had its partisans. General de Gaulle, however, made a decision, recalling that war is all the same, even if sometimes it may assume differ-
ent habits, and that consequently, “we should organize our forces to con­front simultaneously these three dangers and have a polyvalent organiza­tion as a result.”

Thus, at the height of the Algerian War, France turned resolutely towards de Gaulle, towards modernization of its military tool beyond any conjectural consideration, and with a clear political objective—at least at that time—in its mind: to return France to a ranking as a world power. And if for the military this modernization was within a classical perspective, for General de Gaulle it was within a political perspective and proceeded necessarily through the creation of national nuclear weapons. That is why we think, along with M. Vaïsse that, “as early as 1959 de Gaulle gave priority to the strike force, and for him it was more important to have the bomb than to save French Algeria. [Because], for de Gaulle, the Algerian War was conducted to the detriment of the country; it reinforced France’s dependence in relation the Atlantic Alliance; in a word, it was the main obstacle in the path of France’s achieving greatness.”

This evolution that de Gaulle desired was considered very positively throughout the Armed Forces, but often in contrast to General de Gaulle’s vision, in an exclusive and obsessive perspective which was to keep Algeria within France. General Zeller, who became head of the General Staff of the Army, wrote significantly in his Directive Number 1, 30 August 1959, “As a result of long years of trouble, the Nation with more stability and authority at its head has rediscovered confidence in its destiny ... beyond all the differences, it is naturally the interests and service of France that should form the guide for its action.”

But the paradox remained in the supreme commander’s mind, and if General Zeller defined “Soviet Communism” and subversion as the prima­ry threat hanging over France, he had to admit that the army’s engagement zones were (in order): (1) Algeria, “which currently constitutes the main objective of its action”; (2) Western Europe, “united with the allied forces of the Atlantic Treaty”; (3) the home country, “internal defense against the subversive actions of our enemies should remain one of the fundamental concerns”; (4) the entire foreign theater, “where the government may be induced to decide to intervene.”

What Modernization?

To respond simultaneously to its international commitments, the national restrictions of the Algerian War, and the objectives set by de Gaulle, more and more numerous studies on defining a long term policy for the French Army were conducted starting with 1958. If it seems obvi­ous that one of the very numerous characteristics of 1958 was for the army
the desire to modernize at any cost, how was that modernization defined within the high circles of authority in the country?

Among the basic documents that governed the different studies, we found the directives given by General de Gaulle to the Heads of Staff Council on 13 October 1958. Their philosophy was simple: France should have all the military attributes necessary for its defense in complete sovereignty, despite the Algerian crisis; the first of them was nuclear weaponry.

The Army

To satisfy the objectives established by General de Gaulle, the army thought it should have "powerful, mobile forces as safe as possible from nuclear effects and ready at any time" to deal with any attack coming from the outside, as well as numerous, mobile internal forces to fight against internal subversion. For that, the plan was for the army to be organized into intervention forces and internal defense forces.

The intervention forces, 115,000 men strong, with 60 to 70% serving long term, were organized in peace-time, into 6 divisions—two AD, two DMI (motorized divisions) intended for intervention in Europe within the framework of NATO as well as two ABD (airborne) intended for airborne or air transport intervention. The DMI and ABD were formed with identical structures; this made it possible through the addition or subtraction of equipment to use them in any type of war. They were characterized by their ease of use and gave rise to the necessity the army felt of being able to fight both in Europe and on the African continent.

The Internal Defense Forces (within the country and Algeria) consisted of 300,000 men, consisting of 176,000 from the active army and 125,000 from the "first extension", i.e. from the recall of men who had just ended their military service.

The total of these forces, which reached—with reinforcements not shown above—the figure of 500,000 men was qualified as a priority force. They constituted the heart of the French Army and had to be equipped and modernized by priority.

But this land army proposed by General Zeller suffered from a significant handicap, because neither the budget nor the anticipated five year plan made it possible to equip it. While an allocation of 700 billion francs over five years was planned for equipment, General Zeller estimated that 925 would be necessary for the intervention forces to be really capable of using decentralized tactical nuclear weapons on the divisional level (ballistic or guided missiles) to fight against a heavily armored and mechanized
enemy, possibly in a nuclear environment, and finally, to have the capacity to fight in the peripheral theaters of operation.

The internal defense forces had to have the tactical and strategic mobility of mechanization, helicopters, and airplanes. Widely equipped with signal equipment, they had to be able to conduct psychological warfare operations. This latter fact demonstrates well the impact of the engagements in Indochina and Algeria.

Thus, despite multiple difficulties, as early as the end of 1958 the desire to restore the balance in favor of Europe was apparent. This was reflected in a plan for 1962 to reduce the numbers stationed in Algeria to 180,000 men or three intervention divisions (two ABD and one DMI) and seven territorial forces. This effort would have made it possible to reinstall a force of 60,000 men organized into an army corps with three divisions (one DMI and two AD) in Germany.

The Navy

The efforts to modernize the navy had to be turned towards development of its intervention capability (today, one would say projection) and creation of a nuclear strike capacity. There was also a plan to produce a reasonable effort in the fields of missiles and nuclear propulsion.

To reach these three major objectives, the navy had to have eventually about fifteen naval aeronautics flotillas and about 300,000 tons of vessels, the main units of which would consist of two or three aircraft carriers, cruisers, missile-launching atomic submarines and hunter-killer submarines. It should be noted that in the different documents consulted, the development of naval logistics and amphibious assault methods are given special attention. As far as manufacturing was concerned, the goal was to raise the level of construction gradually and especially the availability of intervention forces as well as their mobile logistic devices, and the level and availability of forces to protect the lines of communications at the rate of the plans required by its final objectives.

Finally, the Chief of the Defense staff, at this time General Ely, considered that an operational nuclear submarine construction site should be established as soon as possible.

The Air Force

In 1958 the Air Force seemed the obvious choice to carry nuclear weapons in the near future. Its priority objective was to manufacture a manned aircraft capable of delivering arms of this type, i.e., the Mirage IV.
"The Air Force should set the implementation of its strike means as its essential goal, and without expecting to obtain any IRBM with the desired range, the creation of a piloted heavy attack force capable of delivering nuclear arms." In addition, it is remarkable to note that the operation of strategic or tactical transportation, using both the airplane and the helicopter, is a priority over air defense or combat. Its immediate transport capacity should be close to 600 tons.

The effect of the Algerian War also was apparent in the place occupied by transport helicopters and ground support aviation, so-called cooperative aviation, which would have numbered from 200 to 300 planes.

Thus, for the French high command the return of General de Gaulle as head of state seemed to be a significant victory, which was going to make possible accelerated modernization of the army, despite the Algerian War. But this new breath of life did not make it possible to get free from the Algerian constraint, as General Zeller showed on 19 January 1959 in a directive addressed to general staff officers for the New Year. In fact, if he was seeking above all to inspire a spirit of modernism in the army—his main words were "renovate, create, and accomplish"—Algeria was no less than his primary preoccupation since it put a serious strain on the implementation of a "future military system." He continued, "It is a question first (and foremost) of continuing the operations in Algeria ... It is also necessary at the same time and despite budgetary constraints, to begin building the future military system in all fields .... The rhythm of events in Algeria alone still determine the rhythm of this construction."

This contradiction is explained by the fact that the French High Command approached the modernization of the army from a strictly military perspective: it was a question for it to give France the most suitable military tool for making peace in Algeria and to be able to occupy a select place within the Alliance. This was all the more important since Germany entered NATO in 1955.

General de Gaulle's vision was completely different. The French Army was above all a political tool. To maintain its rank, France should be equipped as rapidly as possible with a nuclear strike force capable of closing the gap between it and the great powers. And if the military did not envision withdrawing from Algeria, General de Gaulle did not reject the possibility of doing so, even if as he said, "the Algerian problem currently dominates our entire national defense."18

In fact, if Algeria was the very first subject approached by de Gaulle in his October 1958 directives, he did it pragmatically several days after the Constantine Speech, since he expected that France might be induced to leave this country. He said,
First the Algerian problem, which for ten years after the Indochina problem has been handicapping the entire future military policy, has to be resolved. Either we can resolve the Algerian problem in the coming year and as a result, reduce our military costs in Algeria and organize the establishment of an army of the future, or the Algerian problem is insoluble unless we leave Africa for good. There is no solution other than these two that have just been mentioned. I hope to stick to the first.\(^9\)

General de Gaulle, France, Atomic Weapons, and France’s Rank

During a conference he held for the members of the Defense Institute for Higher Studies on 3 November 1959, General de Gaulle confirmed his concern with national independence: “It is necessary that France’s defence be French... If a country like France should happen to go to war, it must be its own war. Its effort must be its own effort.”\(^{20}\)

During the same year, addressing the students of the War College, he declared, “the result is that, in the next few years, we obviously must acquire a force capable of operating for us, a force that is suitable to be called a strike force that can be deployed at any time. It goes without saying that nuclear weapons that we will manufacture or buy, but that will belong to us, will be at the base of this force.”\(^{21}\)

Through these two citations we see clearly the guiding thread of General de Gaulle’s policy in the field that is of interest to us now. This policy aimed at giving France the rank of a great power and making it sovereign and master of its destiny through nuclear weapons.

To do this, France was going to oppose with regularity the USA’s policy of domination in Europe and within NATO, draw closer to Germany to counterbalance the United States/Great Britain team, and promote the development of completely national nuclear weapons.

The announcement made by de Gaulle to Foster Dulles in July 1958 of the French intention to create a national strike force, even if the Americans were hostile to nuclear proliferation and even if they hoped to preserve, as they had shown with the British, a leadership position in nuclear matters, logically fits within this general perspective. So does the handwritten letter sent by de Gaulle to Eisenhower in September 1958 in which the general proposed an overhaul of NATO, which would see the American leadership, assisted by the British, replaced by a USA, France, and Great Britain triumvirate. Could this letter to Eisenhower and the proposals that it contained be favorably accepted or was it a question of a political maneuver by General de Gaulle, who was seeking to move away from NATO?

Professor Vaïsse thinks, based on the statements of the people around de Gaulle, that it was a question above all of a method used by France to
mark out its course towards military and, especially, nuclear independence. The first illustration of this was the withdrawal of the Mediterranean fleet from NATO’s command several months later on 7 March 1959.

This independence was acquired on 13 February 1960 when the first French atomic bomb exploded in the Sahara Desert, near Reggane, when General de Gaulle exclaimed: “Hurrah for France! Since this morning it has become stronger and prouder!” In fact, at the Paris summit, which was to bring together the Allies and the Soviets during the following May, General de Gaulle would represent the third Western nuclear power.

This political role that de Gaulle conferred on nuclear weapons becomes clear when the chronology of main events that marked the birth of a nuclear France is examined. The interval between the significance that de Gaulle accorded the first French atomic explosion, the ambition he exhibited to have the three vectors of these weapons as quickly as possible and then thermonuclear weapons, and the moment when the final objective was attained, was 11 years. It was in 1971 that the first missile launching nuclear submarine (MLNS), called Le Redoutable, entered into active service, joining the Mirage IV strategic bombers, operational since 1967, and the Albion platform missiles, operational since 1968. That meant that the great design expressed by General de Gaulle as soon as he returned to public affairs and which made it possible for him to be in the midst of the great nuclear powers beginning in 1960 was not successful until a year after his death.

Thus, for de Gaulle French nuclear technology was an all-out political weapon. Dreading nuclear haggling between the Americans and the Soviets which could impact on Europe within the context of the “graduated response” doctrine and emphasizing the equalizing power of the atom, he equipped himself with a necessary and adequate means of deterrence against the USSR, and also of potential pressure upon the USA in case of disengagement of the latter from the European continent.

The Berlin Crisis and de Gaulle

But, in fact, what did the Berlin Crisis represent for France, the French Army, and de Gaulle?

In truth, nothing. And all the more so since during the entire crisis de Gaulle thought, despite Khrushchev’s bragging, that the latter was bluffing and the danger of war did not exist. As André Fontaine has shown,

De Gaulle summarized the situation by saying that if the Soviets wanted war, it would not be avoided by giving in over Berlin, and that if they did not want it, there would be no reason to make concessions to them. His calm, as usual, was complete. To the Soviet ambassador, whose language to him was threatening, he answered a little later: “Oh, well, Mr. Ambassador,
we shall die together!” In fact, he was convinced that M.K. was bluffing. Besides, a Soviet diplomat in Paris had to admit this very unwillingly in the same period to a high-ranking officer of the French Foreign Office: “We are resolved to go very far,” he said. “Do you, therefore, want war?” “No, of course not.” “In that case”, the Frenchman responded, we shall go very far as well...

C. Buffet, who devoted several studies to this issue, confirms this approach for us and recalls that in his Letters, Notes, and Carnets, General de Gaulle considered that the crisis opened by Khrushchev in 1958 was in fact only “very secondary.”

And it was, certainly because this crisis was “very secondary,” that General de Gaulle, a politician, whose pragmatism no longer needs to be demonstrated, was able to use it and exhibit a firmness never refuted by the facts. We can approach de Gaulle’s point of view through what he thinks about: (1) French-German relationships; (2) French-American relationships; (3) France’s rank in Europe and the matters of principle that resulted from it.

In repeating as the main point the arguments developed by C. Buffet, we think first that General de Gaulle made the Berlin Crisis a matter of principle and that his rejection of any type of discussion was based on the simple reason that it was never necessary to negotiate under pressure.

“If we yield to pressure, the psychological balance will be broken. Then the natural bent of things will cause the Soviets always to demand more, and the Western states to add endlessly to their concessions until the time when because retreat has become unacceptable for the former and reconciliation impossible for the latter, an explosion will occur.”

In addition, the presence of France in Berlin as an occupying power was for de Gaulle a matter of principle, and intellectually to accept a discussion of it necessarily involved a challenge to this principle. That was why, even if he was convinced that M. K. was bluffing, General de Gaulle was ready to do anything to oppose a Soviet takeover by force that would deprive France of its access to Berlin, and if a situation of this type occurred, “we would have responded by all sorts of methods.”

Finally, in February 1960 France became a nuclear power, and it should not be forgotten that General de Gaulle did everything to ensure that the first explosion occurred before the Paris summit between the Four Great Powers in May 1959, in order to demonstrate thoroughly to the other nations what France’s place in the field of world affairs was. This concept was confirmed by Vaïsse who wrote, “General de Gaulle rushed to have the bomb, because it constituted a diplomatic tool that would make it possible for him to take a seat at the table of the Great Powers.”
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General de Gaulle’s attitude was also based on his conception of Europe and a relationship that should exist between France and Germany. The crisis was the opportunity which allowed him to reinforce new bonds between France and FRG, born from the meetings and friendship that existed between de Gaulle and Adenauer. In this matter the decisive meeting was certainly that of 14 September 1958, which occurred at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises. It also made it possible for him to show Chancellor Adenauer the value of a French friendship that was more certain and more credible than that of the Anglo-Saxons, and to create doubt in his mind about American determination, a doubt that had become even more strengthened since the death of F. Dulles. Finally, it made it possible for him to show Germany that the future of Europe belonged to the Europeans.

On the other hand, in his relationships with the United States of America, General de Gaulle showed an avowed will for national independence. But he also demonstrated himself to be very much an ally, completely separate, who even if he never submitted, was nevertheless always faithful, as Jean Baptiste Duroselle recalled when he wrote that France of the 1950’s was considered on this side of the Atlantic, as “the capricious, uncertain, recalcitrant ally, who sometimes did the best, and sometimes the worst.” He also showed himself to be a more energetic ally than the British by refusing any compromising attitude as long as the crisis lasted. Thus he was able to announce on 31 May 1960 on the subject of Berlin:

The recent ordeal demonstrated the profound solidarity of the Western nations. Certainly, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Macmillan, and I each had our problems and our temperament. But in the face of the event, as the three friends that we are, we had no difficulty in reaching an agreement in wisdom and firmness. Our alliance appeared as a living reality.

However, on 13 August 1961, the allies and France remained “at ease.” On the 22d, General de Gaulle proposed, “having the allied troops remove the obstacles erected at the intersector border, but since this hypothesis was rejected by the English and the Americans, the French refused to act alone.” And during the press conference that he held two weeks after these events, de Gaulle declared that the Berlin Crisis was “really derisory.”

In fact, when the year 1961 ended, the French Army, which was still enmeshed in the Algerian affair, had already established all the construction sites for its modernization, and de Gaulle already had the military tools necessary for his policy and a certain idea that he had of France. But the Berlin Crisis, which made it possible instantaneously to confine the Soviet sphere of influence in the East, was reflected also for de Gaulle in the necessity to defer for “a certain length of time” his great European
dream, that of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, at least—perhaps—until another European politician would evoke some day the idea of a common European family.

ENDNOTES

1. We are thinking of General Ely’s private archives among others.
2. General Guillaume handed in his resignation in 1956.
3. 10 May 1957 Speech of M. Bourgès-Maunoury, Minister of the National Defense and the Armed Forces (SHAT 3T 135).
4. Notes on the Strategic Reserves, n° 074/EMRS/CAD of 10 July 1957, SHAT 3T135 EMAT/E.
5. Ibid.
6. In their lightened Algerian-type version.
7. Ibid.
11. 16 December 1958 note addressed to the Minister of the Armies, n° 20, 553/EMA-BEG-S.
12. The plans fluctuated between five and seven divisions. General de Gaulle thought that “if we arrived at five divisions, it would be good enough.” Directives given verbally by General de Gaulle... Op. cit., SHAT 6N506.
13. AD: Armored Division. DMI: Division of Mechanized Infantry. ABD: Airborne Division.
14. General Zeller envisioned, in fact:
- an active army of 390,000 men;
- an extension—that is to say, mobilization of soldiers who had just finished their military service—which brought the strength to 750,000 men.
15. Four metropolitan and three organic.
19. Ibid.
22. These two citations were extracted from André Fontaine’s personal notes.


28. Even if it failed because of the U2 affair.


31. *Ibid.*, p. 536. Episode confirmed by the French officer to whom General de Gaulle directly telephones, telling him in substance to “remove the obstacles after agreement with the allies”.

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The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962: The German Federal Military Archives’ Papers

Dr. Manfred Kehrig

I.

When the second Berlin crisis began with the ultimatum of the Soviet General Secretary Khrushchev on 27 November 1958, the Bundeswehr was still a very young institution. Its existence dates back to the end of 1955, and in the years up to 1960 it was still in the first stages of formation. There was no telling at this time how the army and also the state which it served, the Federal Republic of Germany, would develop, although the Federal Republic of Germany had already existed for ten years. This uncertainty put a strain on German citizens, soldiers, and politicians. In economic terms, West Germany was making gigantic strides away from the ruins of 1945 and forward to a new future, integrated into the newly-forming European Community, and closely linked to the United States of America. How the divided Fatherland could be restored was a problem for which no one had a convincing solution at that time. Adenauer persistently followed the aim of using a firm German standpoint in all his policies. These included the restoration of the ability to make alliances and international recognition, economic prosperity, further conservative-liberal development of the constitution, and to make clear to the Soviet Union and its allies that a war aimed at conquering western Europe and expelling the Americans from the continent would be futile. He hoped that, in the course of time, the political and economic development of the Federal Republic of Germany would be so attractive for the East Bloc that it would finally abandon its ideological aggression.

The Bundeswehr was formed after bitter internal and protracted external political debate and was regarded by Konrad Adenauer primarily as an instrument for restoring the Federal Republic of Germany’s ability to make alliances. The prime consideration behind the formation of armed forces in
the Federal Republic of Germany was the argument that the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact needed to be answered by a credible deterrence potential and that West Germany ought to be involved in this potential. It was not so much the idea that a country's armed forces represent part of its sovereignty, that the capability for defence against attacks from the outside actually allows sovereignty in terms of commonly accepted international law. The "congenital defect" of the one-sided formation of the West German armed forces as a deterrent continues to show its effects even in today's Bundeswehr.

According to the constitution, peacetime command over the West German armed forces, although integrated into the NATO alliance, is vested in the Federal Minister of Defence who is to hand over command to the Chancellor in the event of war. In view of the arrangements made in the Weimar Republic, sound historical and constitutional reasons were brought forward as to why the Head of State should not be granted supreme command over the armed forces. The primacy of politics was a matter of course for the soldiers who had helped to establish the Bundeswehr, some of whom had been active in the resistance against Hitler. On the other hand, the civilian political authorities charged with developing the armed forces both in parliament and in the "Amt Blank" believed that the overwhelming dominance of the civilian element in the form of the so-called Defence Administration (Wehrverwaltung) was sufficient to prevent soldiers from "grazing politically where the grass is greener," as Konrad Adenauer put it in 1949 at the early stages of the discussion about rearmament. The Inspector General was head of a department in the Ministry of Defence like any other civilian head of department. In this capacity he was in absolutely no way superior to the other heads, and what is more, he was subordinate to the under-secretary of state. Self-confident personalities found this situation acceptable only by relying on the awareness that their unselfish services, which took account of the new situation, allowed their country, their nation, and their state to regain their strength. The Inspector General, as highest ranking soldier and as military adviser to the Federal Minister, had a Bundeswehr operations staff at his disposal which was above the three services. The medical corps was not placed under his command, rather it was placed under the under-secretary of state for administration. Animosity, resentment, and deep mutual distrust were the consequence. Many soldiers asked themselves if their readiness to serve the Federal Republic of Germany could possibly take them to the court of another Nuremberg Trial. Army, air force, and navy had their own commanding staff, each with subordinate sectors. They were commanded by officers with active service experience, among whom until 1958 one of the
strongest personalities was the inspector of the air force, General Kammhuber.

II.

Following an agreement between the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior, the records of the armed forces which were no longer needed for operational service were to be handed over to the document center of the Military History Research Office (Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt) where they were to be evaluated by researchers working for the office and from where they would eventually find their way into the military archive of the Federal Archives. Proper and well-ordered record administration developed gradually over the years, with some chaos reigning in the first years of the Bundeswehr’s existence. It was not until both ministries agreed on integrating the records of the military archive and establishing a federal archive/military archive under the auspices of the civilian federal archive administration that some kind of order began to emerge in the registration and archiving procedures. This is the situation one has to keep in mind when inquiring as to the contents of the relevant Bundeswehr documents on the Berlin crisis. Allow me now to present the result of my research work:

1. The years 1958 through 1962 yield very little information from the Ministry of Defence, which was originally composed of the minister and his permanent (civilian) under-secretary of state; later on of the minister, the permanent under-secretaries of state, the parliamentary secretaries of state, and the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr. The bulk of the information from this command level was handed down a few years later and was included in the Bundeswehr Military Archive only recently. Whether the sparse records of the years 1958 through 1962 contain any relevant information on the Berlin crisis needs some closer scrutiny, particularly since virtually all these documents are still classified. The only records that the Information and Press Office of the Ministry of Defence supplied was a file with documents on the landing in 1961 in Berlin of two aircraft of the 32d Fighter-Bomber Squadron which had lost their way and the disciplinary action taken against the squadron commander. What needs to be reviewed in its entirety are the records of the Press and Information Service of the Ministry of Defence, as well as press releases issued by the press section covering the period in question, which are all found in Record Group BW 1.

The records of the Wehrverwaltung (Defence Administration) did not yield any relevant information. This is hardly surprising in view of the political tensions and animosities of those years which beset the civilian
offices of the Ministry of Defence or the headquarters of the *Bundeswehr*, whose prime duty was the personnel and material procurement for the armed forces.

All in all, the records of the ministerial command level, the information and public relations staff section, and the records of the Defence Administration require some careful research in order to make any exhaustive and valid statements.

2. The command staff of the armed forces (FüS) coordinates army, navy, and air force and works for the Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr* and his deputy. The records of this organization, collected in the military archive as record group BW 2, initially provided only two files on the subject. The first file is entitled, "The Berlin Crisis 1961/62: Situation Reports on Military Security," which was simply the reference file for the G–2 head of department in the command staff of the armed forces, General Wessel. Wessel later succeeded the legendary General Gehlen as chief of the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*) in Munich. The second file is entitled, "Analysis of the Berlin crisis from the point of view of the NATO involvement of the German military representative at MC/NATO," and consists of 42 pages with appendix, mainly press articles. However, it contains analyses which are mainly concerned with the NATO work and the results of the situation reports from the NATO angle, not so much measures and considerations from a national point of view.

The Military Command Council (*Militärischer Führungsrat*) was an institution which the Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr* and the inspectors of army, air force, and navy used as a forum to discuss matters and issues affecting the armed forces. The council was constituted on 8 December 1955. The documents in record group BW 17 contain no relevant information on this subject. What is particularly remarkable in this context is that the period from 1958 to 1962 is missing altogether. There is as yet no explanation for this gap. The Ministry of Defence informed us once again that the missing documents cannot be found in the ministry.

Department II (G–2 Department) of the command staff of the armed forces with special responsibility for enemy intelligence was of course engaged in the analysis of the situation on the inter-German border and its effect on the military forces in the Eastern Zone, later the German Democratic Republic (GDR). But the reports for 1958 are rudimentary. However, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 is meticulously documented. In fact, the entire series is a precise reflection of the military intelligence situation in relation to the East Bloc. These reports constitute the most detailed documentation in the military archive on the Cold War.
The records of the “Stabsabteilung (Staff Division) Fü S III,” which was mainly responsible for military policies and operational matters, might contain a great deal of useful and relevant material. Thanks to its coding by VSD (classified) diary numbers, its file numbers and docketing, its existence can neither be verified nor is it accessible at present because of existing security clearance regulations.

The same can be said of the records of the Special Staff “LIVE OAK” (closed until October 2005). This body held a special position inside NATO because it was composed of representatives from the three western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany which convened to discuss and resolve measures to be taken in the event of a Berlin crisis or in the event of a global military confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Two years ago, these records were handed over from Brussels to the Military Archive for mandatory safekeeping. Before these files were handed over, NATO chief historian Dr. Pedlow, prepared a detailed memorandum for SACEUR on the work of “LIVE OAK.” One copy of the memorandum is in the Military Archive, but it cannot be released until 2005.

3. As far as the documents of the Command Council of the Armed Forces and hence the documents of the three army corps are concerned, no indicators referring directly to Berlin could be established, and no documentary evidence of the immediate effects of the crisis (e.g., alert measures for the army) were found. Again, the VS information delivered by the staff sections Fü H III and Fü H II contain inadequately labeled supporting documents.

4. The review of the military diary records of the former “Kommando Territoriale Verteidigung” (territorial Defence Command) provided in its annotation for September 1961 an undoubtedly important order issued by the command staff of the Bundeswehr. On 17 August 1961, it reads, “In addition to the special measures for the rapid deployment of the Bundeswehr ordered by the Ministry of Defence in response to the developments in the political situation, the appropriate orders will be issued to the (1) subordinate levels of command of the Territorial Defence Sector.” This is the only tangible piece of evidence on the Berlin crisis in the documents of the Military Archive which we found in the course of our investigations to date. The tradition of the military diaries in the Bundeswehr was discontinued in 1961 after the relevant order had been revoked. This was to enable the armed forces to concentrate on their “immediate tasks.” The sources of the army are therefore exceedingly sparse for our subject.

5. Research work carried out in the records of the federal navy and the federal air force provided no indication which would make plausible
the immediate access to documents of the kind we need. Again, classification is a major obstacle in our research activities. However, certain plans are mentioned in literature (e.g., Franz-Josef Strauß: "Erinnerungen"; Admiral Rudolf Steinhaus: "Soldat—Diplomat"; Gerhard Schmückle: "Ohne Pauken und Trompeten") which provide reference points regarding the Berlin measures taken by the command staff of the Bundeswehr or by NATO. More detailed investigations are needed along these lines of reference.

6. Since its inception, the Military Archive has collected both official and non-official records. Any one of us who has ever worked with documents will find that the genesis of decision-making processes are often very inadequately documented. This is why the Military Archive has always insisted on collecting the papers of renowned soldiers and military scientists. Today, the Archive keeps more than 800 literary estates in custody, covering the period from 1867 until today. Among these are more than 200 from the Bundeswehr period. Of particular interest for our subject would be the review of personal papers covering the period from 1958 through 1962. For example: Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, first inspector of the Federal Navy; Brigadier General Dr. Friedrich Beermann, security adviser for the parliamentary SPD group and himself member of parliament for that party; General Johann Adolf Graf Kielmannsegg, who was instrumental in the formation of the Bundeswehr and held high commands in it, was German NMR at SHAPE, and who ended his career as CINCENT; Lieutenant General Matsky, Commanding General of the 1st Corps in Munster from 1956 through 1960; Lieutenant General Graf Baudissin, who held highly important offices both in the national sector and in NATO; General Ulrich de Maizière whose papers provide one of the most important historical sources, not only for our subject. The list of personalities could be continued ad infinitum, only the most important ones are mentioned here. The papers of the defence ministers Theodor Blank and Franz-Josef Strauß are in the archives of the political Party foundations.

Summary: The documentation on file for the Bundeswehr does not seem to contribute a great deal to our subject. This is most likely due to the fact that crisis management was not really the domain of any national government but mainly in the hands of the NATO alliance. Regarding German records, we must keep in mind that the three allied powers had after the war assumed certain security obligations for Germany as a whole, and that Germany's sovereignty was quite simply restricted until the early 1990s. What must also be kept in mind is that the German armed forces were integrated into NATO and held under national command only to a
very limited extent. Their status alone dictated that their deployment be discussed in terms of the Alliance and not on a national level.

III.

Since 3 October 1990, the Military Archives have also been responsible for the records of the National People’s Army of the GDR (Nationale Volksarmee der DDR or NVA). Allow me now to present information on our subject which has been recorded in the documents of the NVA.

1. The record group “Secretariat of the Minister” only contains a modicum of political facts highlighting developments leading up to 13 August 1961. Most files refer to the immediate measures taken after 13 August 1961, with the building of the Wall and the continuation of corresponding measures during the following years. The main items in the above document record group are: orders and instructions for border security, on the use of firearms against members of the Allied Military Mission; reports and analyses on border security, collaboration with the population living close to the border, the level of deployment and defence preparedness of the NVA, and collaboration with other armed organizations, compliance of relatives of border troops and of the population. The record group also contains three files on speeches and reports by the Minister held in 1960 and 1961, 33 files of command minutes, and 15 file units of council minutes (Kollegiumprotokoll). One or the other reference is found in all of these, but no information on how the appropriate decisions were made in the military sector.

2. This is the record group of “Chef des Hauptstabes” (Chief of Staff of the National People’s Army) who held a dual function: Secretary of the National Defence Council (Nationaler Verteidigungsrat) and Chief of the General Staff.

In his capacity as Secretary of the National Defence Council, he was responsible for maintaining the files of the corresponding record group, which has been preserved in full and which has been secured completely by chief of staff, Colonel General Strelitz, for the years 1970 until 1990, after the collapse of the GDR in 1989/1990. The record group includes interesting minutes of meetings of the Security Commission (Sicherheitskommission) and of the National Defence Council on border security measures, on the evaluation of military manoeuvres, letters addressed to soldiers and officers of the Bundeswehr, measures on strengthening the defence readiness and assessments of the military combat importance of the individual NATO troops. The record group “National Defence Council” includes some important references on the
propaganda aimed at the domestic population, the NVA and the border troops, on the preparations for the Defence Act and the Military Service Law of 1961, on the security on the German-German border and references to the notorious “Einsatzeleitungen” (Task Force Commands). The record group is also highly significant because the National Defence Council/Security Commission were the highest-ranking committees in the GDR with overall responsibility for defence policies; the orders and directives found in this record group are implementations at the troop level of the defence policy, while the information reports provide details on the situation prevailing at any one time and the response to certain decisions.

3. The record group “Chef des Hauptstabes” includes measures to secure the state borders and the territorial waters, reports on unusual occurrences at the German-German border, and reports of the commanders of 1st and 8th Schützendivision (Armored Infantry Division) concerning events on 13 August 1961. The documents of Department G–3 of the Chief of Staff (Operations Administration) include reports on the status of defence and combat readiness of the NVA, measures to secure the German-German border right up to the deployment of the NVA on 13 August 1961, and on the Western operational theater in general. The Department G–2 (Reconnaissance Administration) is represented with a total of 80 files for the years 1958 until 1962 alone. The record group is at present still unexploited.

4. Record group “Rückwärtige Dienste” (Rear Services) contains only two files on the relevant period. They include information on enhancing security on the German-German border and on the equipment and material supplies of the border troops. The “Politische Hauptverwaltung” (General Political Administration) has as little as one file for the relevant period; the main entry is an appeal to the army by the Minister and the head of state for the protection of the borders.

5. The record group “Kommando Deutsche Grenzpolizei” (German Border Police Command) provides orders and directives for border security, on the observance of formalities for residence permits and transit permits also for citizens of West Berlin, information details and assessments of tactical exercises, e.g., on the character of modern warfare and the special features of its initial stages, details on border and coastal security, operations situation reports, statistics and reports on unusual occurrences, such as border violations.

6. The “Kommando der Grenztruppen” (Border Troop Command) of the GDR is well documented. Its chief reported directly to the Minister of National Defence, but the troops (for disarmament reasons) were in fact not part of the Ministry of National Defence organization. The documents
of this command contain details on the structure and the implementation of border security, propaganda work, and intelligence activities in relation to NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany on the German-German border. An interesting study on the deployment of border troops and of the NVA on 13 August 1961 has also been found.

7. The documents in “Kommando Volksmarine” (People’s Navy) and in “Kommando Luftstreitkräfte” (Air Force Command) provide only very few details of any value on the subject at hand.

Summary: Overall, the documents of the National People’s Army have been much better catalogued than those of the Bundeswehr. This is due to the fact that the Military Archive of the GDR had kept only 800 meters of files of the German armed forces between 1867 and 1945, whereas the Freiburg archive kept 13 kilometers of documents which are waiting to be archived and processed. Both German states have nonetheless maintained a wealth of documentary evidence on military traditions which may be profitably exploited for our subject.

IV.

I would now like to deal briefly with the issues involved in use, declassification and reciprocity.

The basis for the use of the documents held by the Federal Archive is § 5 of the “Bundesarchivgesetz” (Federal Archive Law) as amended on 13 March 1992 (BGBl, [Federal Gazette] I p. 506). It specifies that anyone may apply for the use of the archives of the Federal Republic, provided that the documents are 30 years and older and provided that legal provisions do not prohibit their use. Archive documents may be submitted to the user no earlier than 30 years after their generation, unless the inspection involves persons of contemporary history and persons in office actually performing their office. In the latter case the period of protection may be extended as long as reasonable account is taken of the interests of the person affected (Section 5).

§ 5 also stipulates that there is no principle of reciprocity, which means for example, if the military archives of country X does not allow staff of the Federal Military Archive to use their archives, the Federal Military Archive has no legal grounds on which to refuse the military archive staff of country X the use of its own documents. The use of the archives is not permitted if there are sufficient reasons to believe that the welfare of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its “Länder” is jeopardized, or if there is reason to believe that the interests of third parties are in need of legal protection, or if the conservation status of the archives is
at risk, or if the inspection would result in unreasonable administrative expenditure, or if certain obligations to maintain secrecy would be breached in criminal law.

Classified documents may be submitted to a user if these documents are also 30 years or older and if they have been reclassified as accessible. This is at present the biggest problem of the Military Archive because it holds about 4,000 running meters of classified documents which cannot be submitted because declassification is overdue. We are in the process of remedying this grievance by arriving at a new general and harmonized regulation which will affect all Federal departments.

On 29 October 1993, the Federal Minister of the Interior issued a regulation on the use of the Federal Archives. § 2 of this regulation stipulates that archive documents will be submitted for use either in the original or in copy, will be issued as copy, or that information on the contents of the archive will be supplied. The Federal Archive has sole power of decision on the mode of usage. In principle, archive material will be submitted in the original only on the premises of the Federal Archive. If microfilms or microfiche have been made of archive documents of the Federal Republic, these substitute documents will be submitted in place of the originals.

Anybody wishing to use the Military Archives may do so by stating the precise subject and the purpose of his or her research. The Federal Archive will decide on whether to grant the application or not; it may also stipulate certain conditions be fulfilled. If a user violates the provisions of the Federal Archive Law or the provisions of the regulations pertaining to the use of the archive material in the Federal Archive, the user may be prohibited from using the archive material.

Finally, a brief word on the declassification of documents in the Military Archive:

The Federal Archive Law stipulates that classified material must be offered to the Military Archive if these documents are no longer needed for proper services operations. They must be handed over if the Military Archive decides that the documents are deemed to have lasting value. Regarding the procedure of handing over and disclosure, the Federal Minister of the Interior has issued the “Directives on surrendering classified material to the secret archive of the Federal Archive,” on 20 March 1991, which specifies in detail:

1. Prior to surrender officials must check whether the VS classification may be revoked with immediate effect.

2. If the VS classification cannot be revoked at this point in time, the surrendering authority decides on the date the VS classification is revoked and informs the Archive of that date.
3. If, prior to surrender, special reasons prevent the surrendering authority from specifying a date of revocation of the VS classification, the surrendering authority must specify a date on which a final decision on the VS classification will be taken.

The "Militärische Zwischenarchiv" (Intermediate Military Archive) will soon process the data on the revocation of VS classifications with computer assistance.

For all classified documents which have been surrendered to the Intermediate Military Archive without the appropriate decision on the revocation of the VS classification, the surrendering authorities must arrive at a decisions by 31 December 1994.
SECTION V

Russian Military Archives
The Military Archives of Russia

Colonel V. V. Mukhin

Military documentation occupies a major place in the Russian State records system. By virtue of the existing legislation on archival matters adopted on 7 July 1993, “The Bases of the Russian Federation’s Legislation Regarding Russian Federation Archival Records and Archives,” a definite system for preserving and utilizing military documentation was established and began functioning.

A specific feature of the preservation of military documentation in Russia is that it is stored not in one place, as in some countries, but in several state and departmental archives. For example, pre-1941 documentation is under the control of the Russian State Archival Service (Gosudarstvennaia arkhivnaia služba Rossii, or Rosarkhiv). The records of the tsarist army (the period prior to 1917) are kept in the State Military History Archive (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voyenno-istoricheskiy arkhiv, RGVIA). The records of the Soviet Armed Forces (the period 1917–1941) are kept in two archives: the Russian State Military Archive (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv, RGVA) in Moscow and the Russian State Archive of the Navy (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Voyenno-morskogo flota, RG VMF) in St. Petersburg. For the period 1941–1990, the bulk of Armed Forces documents (more than 40 million files) are kept in the departmental archives of the Ministry of Defense (Ministerstvo oborony, MO).

Within the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense the organization and management of the archival service are carried out by the General Staff through its Historic-Archival and Military-Memorial Center (Istoriko-arkhivnyi i voyenno-memorial’nyi tsentr General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhenyh sil, IA/VMTsGSVS). In order to provide for the preservation and utilization of military records, the following institutions have been established in the Ministry of Defense:

a. Two central archives: the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony, TsAMO, Podolsk,
Moscow oblast), and the Central Naval Archive (Tsentral'nyi Voyenno-
morskoi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony, TsVMAMO, Gatchina, St. Petersburg oblast). These archives hold military documentation for army and naval forces, respectively, for the period from 1941 to the present. They contain combat, accounting, and informational records, as well as personnel records and Party and Komsomol papers of the central apparatus, fronts, districts, fleets, armies, formations, units, and ships.

b. The Archive of Military Medical Records in the Military Medical Museum of the Ministry of Defense, in which are stored the records of the military medical units and installations responsible for the wounded and sick of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period: about 20 million medical certificates and case histories, more than 30 million record cards for these two categories, and about 2 million files of other records. Included are case histories from the Afghanistan War, the Chernobyl disaster, etc.

c. The archives of the military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and flotillas.

One must keep in mind that the original records of the State Defense Committee and of party and governmental institutions regarding defense matters, as well as General Headquarters (Stavka) directives regarding combat operations during wartime, are not kept in the Ministry of Defense archives. These records are in the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, formerly the Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow, ul. Il'yinka, 12), and in the Russian State Center for the Storage and Study of Materials on Recent History, formerly the Archive of the Marxism-Leninism Institute (Moscow, ul. Pushkinskaya, 15).

In the Ministry of Defense archives there are no records, films, or photodocuments of the interior and border forces. They are stored in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the former Committee for State Security (KGB), as well as in the Russian State Archive of Film and Photo Documents (Krasnogorsk, Moscow oblast).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union a portion of the records of some military districts (Kiev, Carpathian, Odessa, Byelorussian, Central Asian, Turkmen) for the 1980s and '90s have remained in the territory of the "near abroad" states and have been stored in the respective military archives of Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and other countries. This creates definite difficulties, since the dispersal of the records has a negative effect on reference and scholarly work.

The Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense hold records with permanent and temporary terms of retention. District, group, and fleet
archives keep records for 10–15 years. At the end of this period, the documents may be destroyed or transferred for continuing storage to the central archives.

The basic classification and registration unit for documents in the archives of the Ministry of Defense is the archival fond. A fond is a group of documents formed as a result of the activity of a single document creator, i.e., directorates of the central organs of the Ministry of Defense, directorates of military districts, and directorates of armies, divisions, military units, ships, installations, and others. Each archival fond receives an official name and number.

Papers of prominent military figures, which have reached the central archives through purchase, as gifts, or by any other legal means, comprise the personal fonds.

Registration of documents in the archives is done by fond and within the fond by opis (inventory) and by delo (unit of preservation or file).

In order to indicate the composition and contents of the records and to provide for document search and utilization, as well as the performance of other kinds of work (i.e., acquisition, registration, etc.), a set of guidebooks and registration documents have been created, which constitute the system of scholarly-reference apparatus for the Ministry of Defense archives. These consist of lists of inventories of files, historical references, certificates and lists of fonds, document catalogues, surveys of the fonds, thematic surveys of the documents, and other guidebooks of an informational nature.

During the last ten years, in accordance with governmental decisions regarding certain privileges for war veterans, personnel materials in the military archives have been used more extensively. These include verifications of an individual’s service in the Armed Forces and reference and service information for foreigners and others who took part in cleaning up the effects of the Chernobyl disaster. The archives also verify the circumstances surrounding missing servicemen and determine where those killed in action and those who died of wounds have been buried. During the past 10 years alone the central military archives have generated more than 8 million responses to letters of inquiry. Control over the reference work in the military archives is exercised by the members of the archives department of the General Staff.

In addition to the great volume of archival work, all these institutions are also kept busy with scholarly and research activity. They provide qualified help and assistance to military history researchers. During the past 8 years alone there have been about 7,000 researchers in the central military archives who have used the records for the following purposes: military-
historical and encyclopedic works, monographs, teaching aids, military memoirs, art publications, and articles on the history of unions, formations, units, and ships. In addition, researchers have prepared doctoral and master's theses, mostly on the subjects of operational, combat, and political training of the troops and heroic-patriotic and military-memorial work.

It is necessary to note that the nature of the documentary materials used by researchers has changed significantly over time; it is now more in-depth. During the first 20–30 years after World War II, the main objects of study were the records of the Supreme Headquarters, fronts, and army departments, while during the past 10–15 years, records of smaller formations and units have been used as the basic materials. Formerly questions of strategy and operational art were studied; now it is tactics. Much attention is also devoted to the heroic deeds of Soviet soldiers.

In the Russian Armed Forces a great amount of work is also being done in publishing archival records. Documents are featured in special collections and in thematic anthologies in the journals Voprosy istorii (Problems of History), Voennaya mysl' (Military Thought), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military History Journal), and others. In addition, collections of documents and materials have been published on the history of Soviet-Bulgarian, Soviet-Korean, Soviet-Czechoslovak, Soviet-Polish, and Soviet-French relations, as well as, among a series of other subjects, on the The Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in Europe During the Second World War. Currently in preparation is a work, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People: Historical Sketches, as well as plans for publishing the directives of the Supreme Headquarters, documents on the major operations of the Great Patriotic War, documents from the Marshal G. K. Zhukov collection, and documents on the Korean War (1950–1953). Military archives also help various governmental institutions and organizations to develop collections devoted to the participation of republics and territories in the Great Patriotic War as well as to take part in the editorial preparation of the Memory Book.

Russian military archivists also participate in the work of the International Committee on Military Archives headed by Dr. Manfred Kehrig, the last meeting of which was held in 1993 in Turkey; the next meeting will take place this year [1994] in Warsaw. We are cooperating with our foreign colleagues in preparing for the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. At an international conference in Moscow in 1993, attended by our American and British colleagues and devoted to newly-opened archival materials, we focused on the problems of joint operations of our navy and its allies in protecting the northern ship convoys during the war. At two conferences (in Moscow and Ingolstadt, Germany) devoted
to events in 1943 on the Soviet-German front in the Kharkov and Kursk regions based on new archival materials relating to these issues, we had an interesting exchange of views with our German colleagues.

Several conferences are being planned for 1995 in Moscow and Berlin on the topic of the end of World War II. Russian military archivists are getting ready for those conferences a large number of previously unknown, interesting archival materials pertaining to the events of 50 years ago.

In order to carry out a more thorough investigation of archival records, some countries (Japan, the United States, Sweden, and others) are forming associations and commissions to search for missing servicemen. Moreover, some countries (Germany, the United States, Poland, and others) actively search archival materials on behalf of museums that are setting up permanent exhibits. Their organizers—historians and other specialists—spend much time in the military archives, hoping to come across interesting materials which can be used in the exhibits. We completely understand these activities of foreign researchers and specialists and during their investigations provide them with appropriate help and support.

The geography of the interest in military information is quite varied. In 1993 alone dozens of researchers from Germany, Japan, and the United States worked in the military archives of Russia, as well as historians from Poland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Great Britain, Korea, Vietnam, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Canada, Mongolia, and other countries. We constantly receive a multitude of private letters inquiring about relatives who disappeared during military conflicts or peacetime, the fate of POWs, their places of burial, and other questions. Thus the scope of the interests of foreign researchers is apparent.

As before, there is a great interest in many countries in the events of World War II. Major battles, including sea battles, are studied in detail, the roles of different armies and countries during the war are analyzed, and the role of the American and British economic and military assistance to the USSR is evaluated. Especially energetic searches are carried out for missing servicemen, planes, ships, and submarines.

Historians of some countries are continuing their research regarding Nazi war crimes. The question is raised, "How could civilization and barbarism co-exist in Europe?" Conferences on this theme are being planned.

Foreign researchers show continuing interest in the historic events in the Far East. They study in detail records on events in Manchuria, the surrender of the Kwantung Army, the total course of combat operations, and the fate of prisoners taken by the Soviet Union.

The normalization of relations with Korea has caused growing interest in historical events on the Korean peninsula. American, Japanese, and
Korean (both South and North) researchers are trying to recreate from archival materials the real picture of combat operations in Korea in 1945 and the course of the Korean war from 1950 to 1953. Moreover, we have received many requests from researchers concerning the the Afghanistan conflict, the Cuban crisis, and more recent events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. Work in these materials is conducted in accordance with “The Bases of the Russian Federation’s Legislation regarding Russian Federation Archival Fonds and Archives,” which establishes a 30-year closed period for the records. During these 30 years, no foreign researchers are allowed to work with such records.

This is why I would like to explain the procedures for access by foreigners to records in the military archives.

Access is supervised by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Foreign researchers may be admitted to the unrestricted (open) materials only. When they ask to see closed materials, we examine these materials. When we find no secret data, we remove the “closed” designation for these papers and they can be studied as usual.

During 1992–93 the General Staff removed many “Secret” stamps from archival documents touching on military subjects. All restrictions on the use of Supreme Headquarters documents were lifted. Documents on wartime losses were declassified. Members of the Historico-Archival and Military-Memorial Center of the General Staff prepared and published a book based on these documents, *The Secrecy Stamp Deleted* (i.e., “The Documents are Unclassified”), about the losses of the USSR Armed Forces in various wars and military conflicts.¹

We have accomplished much declassification of the entire literature (books, pamphlets, collections of papers, etc.) of the Great Patriotic War period. Archival files were opened for researchers and a previously secret book was specially published, in which are described in detail the first actual use in our country of nuclear weapons at the Totsk proving ground in 1954. Some declassified records reveal the fate of American airmen shot down over our territory during the Cold War or during the Korean War. This data was turned over to the Russian-American Commission on the fate of American POWs. Similar action was taken with regard to documents on the incident involving a Swedish DC–3 aircraft in July 1952 and documents regarding the loss of a Swedish transport ship torpedoed by a Soviet submarine during World War II.

We have declassified documents on the preparation and implementation of the transport of Soviet troops to Cuba during the Cuban crisis. We have opened to the public documents about the arrest of Swedish diplomat
Raoul Wallenberg. We are now preparing to declassify archival records on Soviet military activities during the Korean War (1950–1953) and some other documents for which the 30-year closed period has passed.

In accordance with a decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Russian military archivists have been given a special task—to ascertain the fate of Russian (as well as Soviet) servicemen who disappeared abroad during the postwar period. They were our military advisers and crews of aircraft, ships, and submarines. I would like to ask our military archivist colleagues to help us resolve such questions.

The practical value of history consists above all in its ability to preserve human experience and to guide us in making more correct decisions concerning contemporary problems. That is why historians (and this includes military historians) are entirely justified in seeking to introduce into modern scholarship new documents and, on the basis of these documents, to interpret and generalize about historical facts and events. And we military archivists, without doubt, play a large role in this. The main task of Russian military archivists is to preserve the invaluable national heritage of our country—the documentary records of the Armed Forces.

The following are the addresses of the Russian Federation’s military archives:

Rosarkhiv
Russian State Military Archive (RGVA)
125884, Moscow
ul. admiral Makarova, 29
Tel. 199-88-39

Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGA VMF)
191065, St. Petersburg
ul. Khalturina, 39
Tel. 312-11-37

Russian State Military History Archive (RGVIA)
107864, Moscow
ul. 2-ya Baumanskaya
Tel. 261-20-70

Ministry of Defense
Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO)
142100 Podolsk
Moscow Oblast
Tel. 137-90-05
Central Naval Archive (TsVMA)
188350 Gatchina
Leningrad Oblast
Tel. 812-71-1-48-81

Archive of Military Medical Documents of the
Military Medical Museum (VMM)
191180, St. Petersburg
Gospital'nyi per., 2
Tel. 315-53-58

Historico-Archival and Military-Memorial Center of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
103160, Moscow
K-160/328
ul. Znamenka, 19
Tel: 296-88-46/296-88-50
Fax: 247-64-70

ENDNOTES

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Colonel N. P. Brilev

Documentation in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Tsentr'nyi archiv Ministertva oborony, TsAMO) sheds light on many important pages in the history of Russia (the Soviet Union) and its Armed Forces. These holdings are the basic starting point for military history research. The richest collections and fonds (or record groups), which have been assembled by the archive's staff over a period of 50 years, are actively used for scholarly and practical purposes.

Today the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, one of the country's major archives, is entrusted with custody of the records of the Soviet Army from 1941 through May 1992, and since then with the records of the Russian Army.

The archive began its history as the Division of Archives, which was created in 1936 to preserve records of the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense (Narkomat oborony). Prior to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in 1941, there were about 200,000 delo or files maintained in the Division of Archives. In order to provide for the safekeeping of the records in wartime conditions, the Division was moved in July 1941 from Moscow into the interior to Buzuluk, Orenburg oblast. In August 1941, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the most valuable documents—operational directives and summaries, operations orders and reports, war diaries, descriptions of operations, and records of political organs—began to be sent by the active armies to the Division of Archives in Buzuluk.

Gathered in the archive were not only the records of the Central Directorates of the People's Commissariat of Defense, but also those of the Directorates of the fronts, the armies, the units, and institutions of the active armies. As a rule, records received from a front were not prepared for long-term storage and utilization. Under difficult wartime conditions,
the small team from the archive carried out an enormous amount of work in preserving archival records. During the war more than 3 million files came to the archive from the active army.

Between 1946 and 1948 the Division of Archives was moved from Buzuluk to Podolsk, Moscow oblast (about 40 km. from Moscow) and reorganized as the Archive of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR. On November 15, 1975, it was renamed the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. Since May 1992 it has been the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the archive’s tasks were considerably broadened. It was necessary in a very short period of time to collect all the combat documents and put them in order for scholarly and practical utilization.

During the period from 1948 to 1955, more than 10 million new files came to the archive from the Armed Forces. At the same time about 200,000 files from the pre-war period were transferred for permanent custody to the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (currently the Russian State Military Archive).

In 1951 the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense began the description of the records of the Great Patriotic War. The description included the precise designation of every file’s composition and contents and the compilation of new opisi or inventories. At the same time an assessment was made of the value of the records, as a result of which documents which had no scholarly or practical value and for which the term of storage had expired were destroyed.

In 40 years about 3 million files were described by the archive’s staff. For all the most important records of the Great Patriotic War, new opisi were compiled and the necessary scholarly and reference apparatus were prepared (e.g., historical guides, document reviews, catalogues, and reference books).

A great volume of extremely necessary work was carried out to enable the records to be utilized. Today the archive’s staff and researchers have the capability of finding the required files, or information about them, in the shortest possible time. In addition to the traditional scholarly and reference apparatus, we are creating an automated computer-based informational and search system for the archive’s records. Such a system is being set up for the fonds of the Ministry of Defense’s central and main directorates and the directorates of the fronts, armies, corps, and divisions. We are creating an automated informational and search system for, among other things, personnel records of privates, sergeants, and officers killed during the war. The introduction of automation and computerization into
archival work is constrained most of all by the lack of money and also, of course, by the great amount of work required to prepare the records and information for storage on the computer.

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense currently holds more than 18 million files of the main staffs of the services, the branch staffs, the main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense (People’s Commissariat of Defense, Ministry of the Armed Forces, War Ministry), the field directorates of the combined-arms fronts, air defense fronts, military districts, groups of forces and army groups, and various formations, units, and installations included in the above-mentioned entities. For more precise organization of the archival work of collecting, registering, describing, and preserving all the fonds—about 100,000—are divided into several groups according to their significance and the type of combat force or service arm. The most valuable fonds of the Ministry of Defense’s main and central directorates form one major group, those of the units and installations of the Air Force form another group, those of the units and installations of the armored and mechanized troops form a third group, etc. Formed as separate collections are records of: (1) the field directorates of the fronts; (2) the directorates of military districts and groups of forces; (3) the military educational institutions; (4) the rear service units and installations.

In addition, several documentary collections were established in the archive, among which are the personnel files of officers and generals (about 3 million files) and documents on losses of privates, sergeants, and officers killed during the Great Patriotic War, among other conflicts. As a rule, the records of one group of fonds are stored in a single archival depository.

In the fonds of the directorates of the General Staff documents have been preserved which describe the measures taken by military authorities to strengthen the defense of the state and to improve troop organizational structure and combat readiness. A significant portion of these fonds consist of operational directives and combat operational orders for the direction of military operations on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945.

Records devoted to the combat experience of troops are of great value. In order to develop generalizations about this experience, a Department for Utilizing Combat Experience was established within the General Staff.

Significant interest is shown in the records regarding military questions discussed at governmental meetings and international conferences of the countries in the anti-Hitlerite coalition.
In the fond of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy are records on the structure, organization, and activities of the party-political organs in war and peacetime.

Especially valuable are the political reports of the fronts and armies, in which information is summarized about the political-morale condition of the troops, party-political work, execution by the personnel of military units and formations of their superiors' orders and directives, the course of military engagements, and those who distinguished themselves in battle.

In the fond of the Armed Forces Rear Services Staff are records regarding: (1) supplying the troops with military technical equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel-lubricant materials, foodstuffs, and uniforms; (2) transport and transport lines exploitation, technical support and repairs, transportation of troops; (3) technical repair work; (4) supply of air bases; (5) provision of medical assistance to the wounded and sick and their evacuation and treatment; (6) everyday commerce, maintenance of billets, and financial support; (7) repatriation of prisoners of war; (8) provision of assistance to the peoples of countries liberated by the Soviet Army from the German-Fascist occupiers, (9) restoration and repair of industrial enterprises, highways, railroads, bridges, and harbors that were destroyed as a result of military operations.

In the fond of the Armed Forces Rear Services Staff for the postwar period are records on furnishing the Soviet Army and Navy new technical equipment and weapons, improving the materiel-technical provision of the troops, and constructing new military installations, bases, depots, airfields, and cantonments.

Records in the fonds of the Main Directorate of Cadres and of the Main Directorate of Higher Military Educational Institutions deal with the training of officers and the posting and assignment of cadres in the Armed Forces.

In the fonds of the Main Staffs of the Armed Forces service arms (ground forces, air forces, air defense forces) are documents on the management of combat and operational training, the material and technical support and supply of units and formations, and the introduction and mastering of new types of weapons and technology.

In the fonds of military districts during the period of the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period are records devoted to training of forces and reserves; demobilization of the Armed Forces and their conversion from a wartime to a peacetime footing after the Great Patriotic War; management of the forces of various military districts; providing of combat and political training of troops in peacetime; readiness improvement; strengthening of military discipline and order; and the construction of barracks, cantonments, ranges, and other installations.
Fonds of the directorates of groups of forces contain documents on the combat and political training of the personnel of units and formations, on cooperation with state organs and local inhabitants, on the exchange of combat training experience with allied armies, on the carrying out of joint exercises, on eliminating the remnants of the Second World War, and on rendering assistance to strengthen the combat readiness of allied armies.

Among the basic riches of the archive are the records of large and small formations, units, and institutions of the Great Patriotic War period (1941–1945). The documents reveal the world-acclaimed historical victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over the Hitlerite aggressors. They shed light on the activity of the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Commander’s General Headquarters (Stavka) in organizing the enemy’s crushing defeat, the international help rendered by the Soviet Armed Forces to the peoples of Europe, and show the mass heroism and dedication of Soviet warriors and their devotion to the Motherland.

In the numerous fonds of the field directorates of fronts and armies are a wide representation of documents on defensive and offensive operations on the strategic, front, and army levels.

Most interesting are the records regarding the major operations of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945, such as the battle around Moscow; the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk; the battles for Leningrad and the Caucasus; and the Byelorussian, Vistula-Oder, and Berlin offensive operations.

In the records of operational combat units it is possible to trace how Soviet military strategy solved the problems of strategic defense organization in the initial stage of the war; organized and conducted a strategic offensive in great depth on a broad front; prepared and carried out a sequence of strategic operations of groups of fronts by front and in depth; correctly selected sectors for main strikes; shifted from strategic defense to counteroffense and developed the same into a general strategic offensive; coordinated efforts of all types of combat forces and service arms for the achievement of major strategic and operational goals; formed and efficiently utilized strategic reserves, massing forces and materiel in decisive directions; penetrated the enemy defenses in great depth and gained tactical success in various operations; employed armored forces as spearheads in developing successes; and centralized the strategic direction of troops.

The fonds of the fronts and armies shed light on the activity of outstanding commanders such as Marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov, I. S. Konev, K. K. Rokossovsky, B. M. Shaposhnikov, and others.
The fonds of the field directorates of the Western, Reserve, Bryansk, Kalinin, and Southwestern Fronts and the field directorates of their armies describe the course of the fighting during the battle of Moscow, the tenacity and heroism of Soviet soldiers who defended Moscow, the preparation and execution by Soviet forces of the counteroffensive, and the destruction of large groups of enemy forces.

Materials in the fonds of the directorates of the Stalingrad, Southeastern, Southwestern, Don, and Voronezh Fronts show the exceptional intensity of the Battle of Stalingrad. The records bear witness to the precise conduct of defensive and offensive operations and to the encirclement and annihilation of the large enemy group commanded by General Fieldmarshal von Paulus.

The records show the efficient cooperation between fronts and armies in the simultaneous establishment of the inner and outer fronts to encircle the enemy and develop a counter-offensive on the outer front. The records also reveal the strength of the Soviet Army, the high level of military capability, and the courage and mass heroism of the Soviet warriors.

Very fully represented in the fonds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense are records on the Berlin operation in 1945, which was conducted by the forces of the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. The documents shed light on the course of the fighting; the skillful direction of troops; the massed utilization of artillery, tanks, and aviation; the breaking down into small units and the simultaneous encirclement of the largest enemy strategic group of forces in history; and the widespread conduct of nighttime combat actions. The records bear witness to the high level of Soviet military capability and the leadership ability of the military commanders.

In the numerous fonds of combat formations and units are the basic documents on the conduct of combat actions and the military and political training of small units. A large portion of the fonds consists of personnel records.

A significant portion of the records at the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense is devoted to the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces and the varied military and material help given to peoples of foreign countries in their struggle against the Hitlerite aggressors and the Japanese militarists. These records show the unselfish help of the Soviet Union to the local and central organs of power in the liberated countries in providing foodstuffs to the population and in helping to restore agricultural and industrial facilities and cultural monuments.

In the fonds of the archive there is a small quantity of records touching upon the cooperation of allied armies during World War II, basically during the final phase of the war.
The records of the archive sufficiently reveal the military and operational activities of the rear service units of the Armed Forces, which provided the troops with everything necessary for the successful waging of battles and operations.

The documentary materials of large and small formations and units reveals improvement in military science, both in military strategy and in operational art and tactics.

In the fonds of the archive are found a significant number of various documents of a personal nature, which are actively used in archival reference work (i.e., in the preparation and issuance of archival guides for questions regarding military units and installations, state and public organizations, and responses to individual letters and inquiries). During the period 1983–1993 alone the archive composed and sent out 5,500,000 reference letters.

In the personal fonds of Marshals of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov, K. Ye. Voroshilov, M. V. Zakharov, and F. I. Tolbukhin, as well as Generals of the Army A. I. Antonov, A. T. Stuchenko, and other prominent military leaders are personal correspondence, memoirs, speeches, addresses, manuscripts, photographs, and other documents from the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period.

Personal fonds of prominent military leaders are acquired by the archive as gifts, or the archive purchases them by special agreement.

In surveying the question of preservation of archival records, it is necessary to note that the most complete representation of materials in the fonds of the archive relate to combat activities of the Soviet Army during the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War (November 1942 through May 1945). Records of units, formations, and institutions which were encircled during the first days and months of the war were either partially or completely lost.

In the fonds of military units and institutions of the postwar period (1946–1970) are documents basically on combat, political and special training; combat readiness of the troops; party-political work; and personnel records. The fonds of the directorates of border military districts have information on violation of the Soviet Union’s airspace by foreign aircraft and in some cases on the use of air defense measures against the intruding aircraft.

The 1950’s are the period of the Korean War. In the fond of the 64th aviation fighter corps, which took an active part in the Korean War, there are combat reports, operational summaries, reports, descriptions of air battles, casualty data, etc. These records present a sufficiently full and dramatic picture of one of the periods in the Cold War.
Records of the military units and formations which took part in the war in Afghanistan were transferred to the archives in the military districts where the units and formations were relocated after their withdrawal from Afghanistan, generally to the archive of the Turkestan military district.

After the USSR's disintegration, the records of the archive of the Turkestan military district stayed in Uzbekistan. The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation has received a small portion of these documents, basically personnel records which are necessary for conducting reference work.

One of the main tasks of the archive is organizing the documents for scholarly and practical uses.

Utilization of the documentary materials of the archive is along three basic lines: (1) providing documents in the reading room for researchers; (2) publishing documents and utilizing them in connection with the preparation of scholarly works; (3) furnishing copies and extracts of documents to military units, institutions, and state organs; (4) sending reference letters of a social and legal nature to individuals.

On the basis of documents in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense major military and historical works have been prepared and published, including *The History of the Second World War, 1939–1945*, 12 volumes; *The History of the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945*, 6 volumes; *50 Years of the USSR Armed Forces*; and many others. Archival materials have been used extensively in encyclopedias, in the writing of biographical sketches of Soviet generals and military leaders and documentary and feature film and television scripts, and in compiling the histories of military districts, unions, and formations.

Many prominent Soviet generals and military leaders have worked in the archive's records at various times. Among these were Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, I.S. Konev, R.Ya. Malinovsky, V.I. Chuikov, the famous writer K. Simonov, and others.

In order to introduce the most valuable records into the scholarly sphere, the archive has for a number of years issued thematic collections of documents both in print form and in microform. Archival documents have been systematically published in the periodical press and featured at exhibitions.

Permission for researchers to work in archival records is dependent on their significance:

- for documents of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, of directorates, of military districts, groups of forces and fronts, permission may be granted by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
— for documents of military units and formations up to the directorates of an army, including the post-war period, and for still classified documents from the Great Patriotic War, the Chief of the Historical-Archival and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff can grant access;

— for documents of military units, large and small formations up to the directorate of an army for the period 1941–1945, including declassified records, the Chief of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense can grant access.

As a rule researchers are not provided with originals of archival documents, of which there are microform copies. Instead of the originals, the microforms are used.

The nature and volume of the documents to be utilized are evaluated by the responsible officials, who have the authority to grant access to the records, and they take into account the theme and the purpose of the work.

At the request of the researcher the archive may provide copies of archival documents that do not have classification markings.

During the entire postwar period the records of the Central Archive have been actively used, especially for reference work. About 5,000 files are typically used for research work in the Central Archive each day.

The Chief of the Central Archive is also responsible for ensuring the preservation of the records in the archive.

The purposes and tasks of the archive are determined by the Statute on Archives.

The Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is an autonomous institution of the Ministry of Defense, subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Direct control over the archive’s activities is exercised by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff through its Historico-Archival and Military-Memorial Center.

The archive organizes its work in conjunction with the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Central Archive of the Navy, the Archive of Military Medical Documents of the Military Medical Museum, the Russian Committee on Archival Affairs, and other public institutions regarding specific questions.

The archive provides accession, registration, preservation, and utilization of archival records for permanent and longterm custody that were created during operations by the Armed Forces (except for the Navy) from 1941 to the present.

The procedure by which an archive acquires documentary materials is set forth in the appropriate standing orders, which stipulate the terms of
custody (in the military units and institutions, in the archives of military districts and groups of forces, and in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense) as well as the regulations for preparing documents and transferring them to the archives.

According to the standing orders, military units and institutions must deposit in the appropriate military archives all closed files designated for permanent or temporary (over 5 years) terms of custody. Records with terms of custody more than 25 years are deposited in the Central Archive for storage.

The present system of acquisition by military archives has enabled the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense to collect the most valuable records reflecting various aspects of the activity of the Armed Forces both during the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period. These records are a very important source for scholarly research into our Motherland’s history, the history of World War II, and the development and growth of the Russian Armed Forces.

The address of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF) is:
142100, Russian Federation
Moscow Oblast
Podolsk
The telephone number is 137-90-05.
Observations and Experiences of an American Scholar in the Russian Military Archives

Dr. Bruce W. Menning

My purpose today is to share with you briefly the perspective of a scholar who over the last 25 years has spent about four years conducting research in Soviet and Russian archives, including military archives. These remarks cover the time between my first substantial research stay in the Soviet Union during 1969 and my last brief research visit in Russia during December 1993. In viewing this span retrospectively, I am reminded of Sholokhov’s remarks about looking back while walking across the Don steppe: “Everything around me seemed so clear at the time, but now much of it is enveloped in a distant haze.” Through the haze of more than two decades I see much frustration and anxiety, many setbacks, and a number of hard-won triumphs. Many of the latter have come since 1990, and my impression is that the future holds promise for additional breakthroughs on the research front, but that this promise remains muted because of the present unsettled situation in Russia.

A primary obligation, if not the primary obligation, of the historian is to impart a sense of perspective on contemporary events. Yet, the whirl of the moment constantly fights against perspective, and this perception is perhaps no truer than in the realm of archival access and use. Little more than four years ago, we could not even dream of requesting materials from the recent holdings of military and naval archives in Moscow, Podolsk, and St. Petersburg. Before the end of the Cold War, only the elect even among Soviet scholars received access to military archives from the Soviet period. Moreover, as my colleague, William C. Fuller, has pointed out, as recently as 1989 he could not rely on full access to pre-revolutionary military and diplomatic archives for completion of his *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600–1914* (1992). Restrictions often applied to selected holdings even within the archives of the Imperial Russian Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. Now, in contrast, we have almost complete access to military-
related materials not only from the Imperial Russian period, but also from the Soviet period up to 1941. I say "almost complete access," because some limitations regrettably still exist for selected materials from the pre-1941 period of Soviet history, a subject to which we will return later. In addition, as my paper yesterday indicated, we can anticipate very limited access to selected materials from the period of the Cold War. This and related developments, which have been discussed elsewhere, mark an immense step forward in the realm of archival-based research.

The presence of Russian military archivists at this conference marks another immense step forward. They have travelled here not only to impart their own perspective on aspects of the Cold War, but—unlike the situation in the past with our Soviet colleagues—at least implicitly to subject themselves to searching queries about declassification of and access to research materials. For this we are grateful not only to them for their openness and patience, but also to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for permitting them to spend this valuable time with us.

Now for my own observations on the nature and pace of change in the field of Soviet and Russian archives, especially military archives. Twenty-five years ago, in September 1969, when I arrived as a graduate student at the train station in Rostov-on-Don to begin an academic year of research on the history of the Don Cossacks, my Soviet adviser greeted me with a phrase from the satirists Ilf and Petrov, "This is not Rio de Janeiro." Actually, what he meant to say was that Rostov was not Moscow, and that the issue of my access to the regional historical archives was still up in the air. I spent the next four months reading materials available in local libraries and sitting at the feet of regional scholars who imparted a wealth of knowledge about Don Cossack history. While immensely valuable, informed insight and references to printed materials were not covering some very large research gaps in a doctoral dissertation which had to be completed during the coming months. However, after many bureaucratic tussling matches, in January 1970, I finally received permission to work in the local archives until May. In May, I transferred to Moscow to complete research on the 18th and 19th century Don Cossacks in the Central State Military Historical Archive (TsGVIA). A stone wall greeted me. Nonetheless, at least I had sufficient materials from the local archives in Rostov to complete my dissertation.

Four years later I returned to Moscow as a junior professor to renew my quest for access to the pre-revolutionary military archives. This time, again after a good bit of bureaucratic haggling, I managed to slip through a crack in the stone wall to become one of the first foreign scholars to conduct research at TsGVIA. It was then that I discovered some very curious aspects
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF AN AMERICAN SCHOLAR

of Moscow-based archival research for foreigners. First, as a foreigner, I did not work directly in the military archives. Rather, I worked in the reading room of the Central State Archival Administration on Bol'shaia pirgovskaiia street. Materials which I ordered were laboriously transported there from the pre-revolutionary military archives, which were located some distance away on Vtoraia Baumanskaia street. In addition, I had to operate “in the dark” while ordering documents. As had been the case in Rostov, I was not permitted to view inventories for the various archival collections. These inventories, or opisi, are extremely helpful in assisting the reader to determine the contents of collections and where materials lie in relation to one another. Without the benefit of inventories, I had to submit an elaborate research plan to the Main Archival Administration and then negotiate directly (and blindly) with archival assistants to determine what materials I might order. Some materials were provided and others were not, and there was never a clear explanation why selected materials never appeared. Despite these obstacles, I left Moscow after three months of archival research with a considerable amount of notes from the collections of such pre-revolutionary military luminaries as G. A. Potemkin and P. S. Saltykov. The fact that I got anything at all was a tribute to the professionalism of archival assistants who figured out ways to get the job done while working within the framework of a most cumbersome system.

At this stage, you might ask about possibilities for receiving materials as photo copies and microfilm. In theory, American exchange scholars could order several hundred dollars’ worth of duplicated materials from Soviet archives and libraries. In practice, except for requests dropped at Lenin Library in Moscow, where the duplicating facilities were excellent, orders for photo copies or microfilm often disappeared somewhere into the proverbial “dark hole.” Many requests were certainly filled, but few, if any, were received from the pre-revolutionary military archives.

Against this background, I travelled during 1990–91 to Moscow for a third long-term stay, this time to begin a lengthy research project on a sensitive topic, Russian and Soviet troop mobilization in strategic perspective. The times seemed to bode well. We had just successfully completed reciprocal visits of U. S. and Soviet military historians in which several officers at this conference participated. We had also witnessed the dramatic changes which Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost’ were beginning to produce within Soviet society, including the military. Now was the time to press the edges of the envelope, to promote research which would initiate a better understanding of each other’s military in the name of confidence building and transparency. For this purpose history seemed an ideal vehicle.
With apprehensions over just how sensitive the issue of troop mobilization was, my research objective was to limit my study to the inter-war years, 1921–1941. My ambition was to do for our understanding of 1941 what A. M. Zaionchkovskii had done for 1914 with his volume (1926) on Russian preparation for the Great War. After all, Soviet military historians themselves were just beginning to receive access to materials for the inter-war period in preparation for the appearance of a multi-volume 50th anniversary treatment of the Great Patriotic War. Yet, as my year in Moscow progressed, there seemed to be very little "trickle down effect."

Early on, I tried repeatedly and unsuccessfully for access to the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (old TsGASA, now the Russian State Military Archive, or RGVA). Finally, in March 1991, I discovered the full dimensions of the problem: not only was I not gaining access, Soviet military historians were not gaining sufficient access to do a credible job with their own anniversary history. Full news of the latter development appeared on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The newspaper Nezavisimaia (The Independent) published an account of how Colonel-General D. A. Volkogonov and his Military History Institute had been subjected on March 7 to intense criticism within the upper reaches of the Soviet military for supposedly faulty and biased coverage of the inter-war years in the first draft volume of the projected history. Needless to say, within this context General Volkogonov's plea for freer archival access fell on deaf ears.

At the same time, my own research fortunes did not exactly duplicate those of the historians from the Military History Institute. Early in 1991, I received access for several weeks of research in the Library of the Soviet General Staff. This unique opportunity allowed me to review a number of rare military periodicals and monographs. Then, in May 1991, thanks to a letter to the Chief of the General Staff from the administration at the University of Kansas, where I hold adjunct faculty status, I at last received permission to conduct limited research in the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army. I use the term "limited" again because at that time the majority of materials housed in TsGASA were still classified, and I was granted access only to declassified collections. The files of the Operations and Mobilization Directorates of the Red Army Staff, both of which were crucial to my research on the inter-war years, remained closed. In July 1991, I again found myself returning home with the proverbial "half a loaf" and being thankful that I had received enough materials to begin writing a serious monograph.

Since the August coup of 1991, the situation has alternately improved and regressed. By the summer of 1992, when I once again returned to
Moscow, the majority of the materials found in the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), as the old Central State Archives of the Soviet Army is now called, were open—at least in theory. RGVA had been subordinated to the Russian Archival Administration, and, for a brief period, it appeared that the chief problem confronting me was how to find sufficient time to deal with the immense wealth of new material now available. Something else of significance also occurred: Russian archivists at RGVA began to propose active collaboration with western scholars for the joint preparation and publication of materials from their collections. As a result of this initiative, Professor Mark von Hagen of Columbia University and I actively began to sponsor a joint Russian-U.S. effort to publish the protocols of the Military Revolutionary Council and the military correspondence of Leon Trotsky. Meanwhile, despite renewed efforts to limit access and declassification, western and Russia scholars began to avail themselves of whatever unclassified materials were accessible at RGVA. At the less sensitive TsGVIA, the pre-revolutionary military archives, the entire collection was thrown open to the scholarly public, and, with certain practical limitations, this continues to be the case.

The events at RGVA and TsGVIA do not mean that the future is without clouds. In particular, three developments since the halcyon days of mid-1992 have emerged to erode many of the apparent gains made in access to Russian military archives. The first is the deteriorating state of the Russian economy, which threatens the continued existence of the entire institutional infrastructure. Buildings cannot be maintained, salaries cannot be paid, and reading rooms sometimes cannot be kept open. And, given the nature and extent of the current crisis, the system of state archives simply does not enjoy high priority within the state budget. To be blunt, it is difficult to worry about archives when the Russian Government must be concerned about larger challenges facing the population. Thus, for example, reading rooms are likely to be closed during the summer months because archival staffs cannot be paid a year-round salary. Unfortunately, these are the very months when foreign scholars are most likely to use the archives.

Second, the situation has taken a turn for the worse in matters of declassification and access. Since late 1992, there has been an impulse to systematize rules for declassification of sensitive materials, with the result that even pre-1941 materials—once at least in theory considered open—are now sometimes denied to researchers. In practice this turn of events means that important collections and files at RGVA, including those of the Operations Directorate of the Red Army Staff, are now all but closed to scholarly research. This development has placed me in a curious position: I no longer have access to materials which I once received freely before
the new rules for declassification and access were spelled out. Still, the situation is better than before. Access to RGVA and its declassified collections can be obtained simply by presenting a letter of introduction to the administration.

A third circumstance which makes life more difficult for the researcher in Russian military archives is uncertainty over the location of key materials. For example, in order to conduct a systematic study of military strategy and troop mobilization during the inter-war period, I must have access to war plans and mobilization schedules. Yet, in so far as I could discern in 1992, when I did have access to selected materials from the Operations Directorate for the pre-1941 years, these plans and schedules do not exist within the collections at RGVA. This perception seems especially true for the war plans of 1940–41 and the last mobilization schedule for the pre-1941 period, MP–40. The obvious assumption is that they must exist somewhere else, either at the Historical-Archival Section of the General Staff or at the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO). Unlike RGVA, these two archives are subordinate to the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense.

As my Russian military colleagues will testify, access to materials within these two military archives flows through the Historical-Archival and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I first met with Colonel V. V. Mukhin, who heads the Archival Section of this Center, in January 1993, when we attended a conference on Cold War history held in Moscow under the joint auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. When I expressed the desire to obtain materials on both pre-1941 Soviet military history and the history of the Berlin crisis—the latter in preparation for this conference—Colonel Mukhin spelled out the ground rules for submission of requests. They had to be made in writing to the General Staff well in advance of expected delivery and with as much detail as possible on the documents in question. In January 1993, I submitted requests for documents on the Berlin crisis and received materials nine months later. During subsequent research visits to Moscow, I left additional requests for declassification and received photo copies of materials related to pre-1941 war planning. At no time was I permitted into an archival reading room and under no circumstances did I view the all-important archival inventories, or opisi, which are so crucial for conducting effective research in the Russian archives. As might be expected, I had to compensate the Center for materials received and for time spent by its representatives in ferreting out the documents requested. Contacts have been produc-
tive in a scholarly sense, and on the whole I am grateful for the cooperation of the Center and its parent organization, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. It is my fervent hope that these first few steps in receiving materials on the Cold War will ultimately be followed by giant strides in access, especially as something approaching a 30-year rule gains greater acceptability in Russia.

In looking back on more than twenty years’ research in Soviet and Russian military archives, it seems to me that the glass has been either half empty or half full. On one hand, the obsession with secrecy so characteristic of the Soviet period caused many delays and gaps in my research and not a little frustration. On the other hand, I almost always came away with sufficient materials to push the research rock a bit farther uphill. Since 1991, the situation has improved markedly, but it has not produced the dramatic breakthroughs necessary for us to press forward systematically with a study of the military aspects of the Cold War. To rephrase Ilf and Petrov, we are not in Rio de Janeiro, but we have made some progress in our journey. We need to consider seriously how to support additional progress. As matters now stand, I might dream about materials to support a continuation of my research on mobilization and strategy into the 1960s, but there are times when I just wish that I could receive everything available on the pre-1941 period.

On the basis of my experience, what counsel would I offer my colleagues who desire to access to archival materials on the Russian military? My answer would be much the same as it was with reference to Soviet archives ten or twenty years ago: maintain a sense of perspective and observe what I call the three P’s—politeness, patience, and persistence. The great majority of archival officials operate in good faith. Therefore, it usually makes little sense to become angry when they cannot deliver everything we expect. Under normal circumstances the archivists are eager to provide whatever materials are permitted within the larger institutional context. Patience is also a virtue when dealing with Russian military archivists. This is all the more so now, when Russian archives—military and civilian—operate without sufficient working hands and without realistic budgets. For example, the same staff of the Historical-Archival and Military Memorial Center must not only respond to the queries of working historians but also to the requests of the joint Russian-U.S. POW-MIA Commission. A researcher cannot simply walk in off the street and expect that a request can be filled within a day or two. Then too, if a request is denied, I would advise a scholar to persist in that request while attempting to determine the grounds on which it was originally denied.

In addition to these prescriptions, it is worthwhile to develop professional credibility. This derives not only from a record of publication in the
general area but also from the ability to talk knowledgeably in Russian about the subject under investigation. Letters of introduction from parent organizations are also important in establishing initial credibility.

Finally, we might ask what we should be doing to press ahead with initiatives related to additional declassification and access. Here I would say that activities such as this conference are significant points of departure. We need to discuss important issues in a collegial atmosphere and come away with recommendations for our superiors to develop additional and substantial contacts and even cooperative projects. For example, the aforementioned joint Russian-U.S. proposal for the publication of materials on the history of the Revolutionary Military Council and Trotsky might serve as a model for further cooperation, especially on Cold War topics. Another and even more relevant precedent is the project for publication of materials on the Cuban missile crisis. We must also build linkages and cooperation with such on-going parallel activities as the Cold War International History Project which has been so ably managed by James Hershberg, our colleague from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

In the end, we must do whatever we can to encourage the process of declassification to foster access to additional key materials, especially on the history of the Cold War. Too often this process falls hostage to a mixture of mutual apprehensions, institutional inertia, and bureaucratic politics. And, it is this mixture which becomes the true enemy in our quest for additional primary materials upon which to base better historical accounts of the Cold War.
SECTION VI

Central And Southeast European Military Archives
Cold War Military Records in Czech Military Archives and Possibilities of Their Study

Dr. Valdimir Pilat

Revolutionary changes in the late 1980s opened new possibilities for historiography in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. New fields and themes of research which until then were never even dreamed about. Among them was also the opening of then Czechoslovak archives, including military records. This fact aroused a lot of interest among scholars, including those from abroad. What was, and above all, what is their starting position at the present?

On 1 September 1992, the amendment to law No. 97/1974 of the Code about the archives came into force. It has been published in Section 72 of the Code of Laws of CSFR from 30 June 1992 under No. 343. Publishing this amendment was, however, preceded by a long period of discussion which had already started at the end of 1989. The need to change thoroughly the old law No. 97/1974 of the Code, which mirrored conditions and possibilities of the just overthrown totalitarian regime, was discussed for the first time at a conference of archivists in December 1989. Preparatory work on the amendment started at the beginning of the following year. At the so-called Scientific Archival Council of the Ministry of Interior, a preparatory commission was constituted. A wide community of archivists took part in the process of submitting their notes and proposals. On the basis of the gathered material, the archive administration, together with the legislative department of the ministry, drafted a paragraphed version of the amendment.

In addition to a number of partial or cosmetic changes, some articles were substantially changed, compared with the original “Communist” law. From the user’s point of view, the most important were the changes in Articles 11 and 12 of the abovementioned law. The conditions for study were put in the amendment in accordance with the Charter of Basic Human Rights and Freedoms. Article 12 was in fact stricken off and incor-
porated into Article 11. Very important is the fact that now the right to permit (or forbid) access to the records is given to the director or leader of the given archive. In comparison with the original Article 11, the closed period limiting the access was shortened from 50 to 30 years.

This issue generated a lively discussion in the circle of experts, as some archivists for various reasons, preferred retention of the former period of 50 years closed limit. To conform the Czechoslovak conditions as far as possible to the practice of developed European countries, e.g., to open the widest spectrum of records, in the end it was decided to shorten the period. This does not, however, mean that the 30-year period automatically encompasses all of the records. For some documents, for example Court files, the period and limits are given by other legislative measures.

First two paragraphs of Article 11 of the law No. 343/1992 of the Code, important for our theme, currently have the following reading:

§ 11

1. Everyone has access to the records which are kept in the archives. Into the collections less than 30 years, access is possible only with permission of the director or leader of the archive, where the documents are kept.

2. Permission for access to the files less than 30 years cannot be given if by such an access the security of the state or public security or personal interests protected by a law would be endangered.

In addition to the general articles, law No 343/1992 of the Code contains also Article 25, which pertains to the archives of then federal ministries of defence, interior, security information service, armed forces, armed security corps, and security services. For scholars who want to examine such archives, above all paragraph 1 of the abovementioned article is important. It reads as follows:

1. Files, kept in the archives of Federal Ministry of Defence, Federal Ministry of Interior, Federal Security Information Service, armed forces, armed security corps and security services, form a part of a unified archive file. These archives are directly controlled by the Ministry of Interior and administered by their founders.

To a foreign scholar intending to get permission for study military records kept on the territory of the Czech Republic, we suggest to proceed in following way:

1. Via the military attaché of his country, submit an official request addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic.
2. In case of a positive reply, make direct contact with the director (chief) of the given archive and discuss with him the date of visit and above all the files required.

At present it is possible to study in the following three military archives:

**a. Vojensky historicky archiv, Praha-Karlin**
(Military Historical Archive)

Address: Sokolovská 136/Invalidovna
180 00 Praha 8–Karlin,
Director: Mgr. Ivan Stovíček, CSc.
Telephone: Prague 247 226 96 or Prague 232 60 89

The most important collections kept here are:
- Ministry of National Defence ČSR/ČSSR 1945–1977:
  - office/cabinet of minister
  - main military council
  - collegium of minister
  - office of state secretary
  - deputy ministers
- Main/General Staff 1945–1977:
  - office of chief of staff
  - departments and sections of the staff
  - headquarters of services and branches (infantry, armor, etc.)
- Military Bureau of the President of the Republic, 1945–1965
- Headquarters 1st Military District, 1950–1958
- Headquarters Western Military District, 1958–1965
- Headquarters Central Military District, 1958–1965
- Corps Headquarters, 1945–1958
- Headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments dissolved in 1947–1977

**b. Archiv Ministerstva Obrany, Praha-Karlin**
(Archive of Ministry of Defense)

Address: Sokolovská 136/Invalidovna
180 00 Praha 8–Karlin,
Chief: Major Jan Koňarík
Telephone: Prague 247 222 01
The most important collections kept here are:

- cabinet of minister
- collegium of minister
- deputy ministers

Council of the State Defense, 1978–1989:
- council secretariat,
- council meetings,

General Staff, 1978–1989:
- office of chief of staff
- operations department
- intelligence department
- organization of mobilization department
- department of land forces
- department of air force and air defense
- logistic department,

Main Political Directorate:
- office of the chief

c. Vojensky správní archiv, Olomouc
(Military Administrative Archive)

Address: Náměstí republiky 4
771 11 Olomouc
Chief: Lt.-Col. PhDr. Mojmír Sklenovský
Telephone: Olomouc 403 75

The most important collections kept here are:

Council of the State Defense, 1969–1977:
- subordinate councils of defence of republics, regions, districts,
- Headquarters Western Military District, 1969–1989
- Headquarters of the armies (field and air)
- Headquarters of division, brigades and regiments dissolved after 1977
- Headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments still in service

The development of the Czechoslovak Army (renamed Czechoslovak People’s Army in 1954) was influenced after 1945 by extreme and, in many cases, senseless secretiveness. Therefore, you cannot depend on the common tools which would normally be a reliable guide to archive files. A detailed agreement with the director (chief) of the given archive is very useful.
In addition to the military archives, there is another very important archive for the theme we are discussing, perhaps even the most important. This is the former archive of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which currently is part of the Central State Archive (Státní ústrední archív). The importance of this archive is the fact that all the key questions, including military and defense, were in past years subject to the supervision of the party, based on the so-called leading role of the party. The data for this archive are following:

**Archív ÚV KSČ**
(Archive of the Central Committee of Communist Party)

Address: Nábřeží Ludvíka Svobody 12
110 00 Praha 1
(Building of the Ministry of Transport)

The most important collections are:

- Presidium of the Central Committee,
- Political Bureau of the Central Committee,
- Secretariat of the Central Committee,
- General Secretary.

Requests for access permission must be addressed to:
Archivní správa ministerstva vnitra ČR
(Archive Administration, Ministry of Interior)
Milady Horákové 133
166 21 Praha 6

Detailed requirements and possibilities of study are to be discussed with the director of Státní ústrední archív (Central State Archive), Dr. Václav Babicka. His address is:
Státní ústrední archív
Karmelitská 2
118 01 Praha 1,
Telephone: 24 51 02 10

You must, however, take into consideration that for the themes related to the defense of the state and to the army in general, a statement regarding the safety of state secrets will be requested by the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic.

Practically no scholar would probably be permitted to gain access to documents concerning industrial production plans and exports of arms.
An enormous amount of documentation is produced in the course of an armed force’s operations, some portion of which is of lasting value for the people and the nation and is of unalterable importance, not only for studies in regard to war and the military but also for socio-political issues, economic, cultural, scientific, educational affairs, physical training and sports.

The functions of the *Sieci archiwów Wojskowych* (military archives system) are to select materials of historical value from papers originating as a result of these activities; to collect, store, process, and make them available for official and scientific research purposes; and implement scholarly, instructional and popularization activities. In addition, as an office of public information, the archives provide services in the area of issuing all sorts of certifications, descriptions and reproductions of file documentation in its possession.

The military archives system operates on the basis of orders from the Minister of National Defense and instructions for archiving military documents approved by the Chief of Staff of the Polish Army. These documents are regulatory executive statutes governing the national archives and records which became effective on 14 July 1983 (Legal Register, No. 38, Item 173).

The following were established under the resolutions covering the above-noted administration of the system of military archives:

a. *Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe* (Central Military Archives);

b. Branches of the Central Military Archives;

c. Archives of the Central Institutions of the Ministry of National Defense and of the military districts and branches of the armed forces.
I. Main Objectives of the Military Archives System

As an historical archive, the Central Military Archives shall:

a. Carry out research pertaining to archival theory and methods;
b. Establish the principles for developing specific type of archival materials;
c. Formulate a system of archival information;
d. Determine the principles for accumulating the military records and information;
e. Establish a system for distribution of the increased holdings of archival records;
f. Determine the principles for organizing and maintaining an inventory of archival materials;
g. Provide professional training of archival personnel;
h. Issue permission for destruction of files;
i. Provide archival expertise in subordinate branches;
j. Accept Category "A" archival materials from branches for permanent storage.

Archives of Military Districts and the Branches of the Armed Forces, which are branches of the Central Military Archive, shall:

a. Oversee the operations of subordinate offices;
b. Provide expert appraisals in units and institutions;
c. Make visits to subordinate offices;
d. Provide training for office personnel and essential administrators;
e. Accept military archival materials and non-archival documents from the offices of subordinate institutions and units;
f. Sort out Category "B" non-archival documentation (for example, differentiated periods of storage, such as B-10, B-50, etc.);
g. Transfer Category "A" archival materials to the Central Military Archives.

The establishing instructions and office personnel shall:

a. Establish an objective classification and archival classification of military documentation on the basis of instructions;
b. Accomplish the initial process of archiving military documentation;
c. Implement a process for sorting non-archival documentation in Category "BC" (material for short-term storage);
d. Transfer Category "B" non-archival documentation and Category "A" archival materials to branches of the Central Military Archives.
II. Nature and Scope of Archival Collections

The records of the Central Military Archives and its branches are calculated at more than 12,000 linear meters and includes 5,045 collections. In addition, some 400,000 maps and 11,000 maps on various scales are part of this total. An additional 13,500 linear meters of material are stored in the three storage depots of the Central Military Archives (not including the branches).

Three groups of file collections can be segregated by the type of subject matter:

a. Files from 1912–1939, of which files associated with World War I account for only a small number. Among other things, these include documents of the Polish Legions, the Polish Reinforcement Corps, the Polish Armed Forces, the Eastern formations, the Army of General Haller, the Department of the People’s High Military Committee, the Interim Military Commission of the State Council, the Silesian Uprisings, the Uprising of Poland and the Army of Poland, the Ministry for Military Affairs of the General and Grand Staff, the Commander in Chief of the Polish Army, the Inspector General of the Armed Forces, and the district corps commanders from 1918 through 1939;

b. Rudimentary sets and collections of files on military defense after 1939, the resistance movement from 1939 through 1945 and the Polish Armed Forces in the West;

c. Polish Army files from 1943 to the present, including the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff of the Polish Army, the central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, the leadership and units of the military districts and branches of the armed forces.

The Central Military Archives also have a collection of 400,000 photographs from 1900 through 1949, a cartographic collection covering the years from 1840 through 1950 (about 11,000 maps and plans), and military publications and regulations. In addition, it also possesses personal and decoration files (Virtuti Militari, the Cross and Medal of Independence, the Order of the Polish Renaissance, the Cross of Valor, Cross of Honor) and a collection of civilian press clippings belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

As a result of the work of the Military Archives Commission in Moscow, more than 430,000 photocopies of files have been handed over to the Central Military Archives. The processing of these copies of files on Polish soldiers interned and imprisoned during the period of military operations after 17 September 1939 as well as those imprisoned in the former USSR after 1945 is currently underway.
III. Archival Information Assistance

Access to archival materials, which has recently become a focus of the archival process, is dependent on the administrative status of the file material and listings of the appropriate evidentiary-informational aids.

The archival catalogs (books and cards) are the basic informational aids at the Central Military Archives.

Books are listed as part of collections that have been compiled. They include the activity and structure of the originator, the history of the archival collection, the characteristics of the collection, the content and analysis of the group's methods of arrangement.

At the end of 1992, book inventories existed for:

a. 1,669 collections for the period between wars (54,446 archival units);
b. 706 collections for the Second World War (26,618 archival units);
c. 78 collections for the post-War period (27,233 archival units).

The card inventory consists of cards of a specified format and samples that are arranged for each archive unit and systematized according to accepted systems for each collection (type of files). The Central Military Archives also has a number of topical card files (not including the branches):

a. Silesian rebels - 45,000;
b. Court file - 63,094,000;
c. Outline file cards - 72,000;
d. Personal and decoration files of the period between wars - 622,087;
e. Post-War personal files - 160,163;
f. Map inventory - 9,900;
g. Information card file - 193,230;
h. Organizational file of originators of file collections - 7,386;
i. File of topical investigations during the period between wars - 38,425;
j. Post-1943 investigations - 11,699;
k. Photographic collection - 51 (8,160 photos);
l. Photograph albums - 118 albums.

The inventory and card files provide access to every unit archival unit stored in the Central Military Archives.
Archival materials are safeguarded, stored, processed and preserved so that they may be of service to society in the broad sense of this word. They are made available, first of all, for the needs of science and its different fields since the archival records cover all aspects of the life of the nation. Private citizens may also borrow these files for their own vital needs associated with the course of service and work and with the ups and downs of close family members.

The military archives opens up the materials in its possession under the same rules as the national archives. The main principle observed is to allow access to archives over 30 years old under the condition that they do not violate the legally protected interests of the state and its residents.

Permission to use the records of the Central Military Archives is granted by its chief on the basis of letters presented from military units, institutions, social organizations and the like that commission studies to be carried out. The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army may grant permissions to persons from foreign countries.

Permissions are valid for a period of one year. Access is granted to collections that have been compiled. Microfilm archival materials are rendered in the form of microfilms. The military archival records are made available on site — in the archives and only in rooms set aside for this purpose.

Internal archival rules and regulations establish the specific principles for use of the records. This is done as a service free of charge. Payments are collected when copies of documents, photographs, etc., must be made and these costs are given in a price list. Sample costs are 0.4 Zloty (about US $0.25) for a one-sided copy of a document and 0.9 zloty for a photograph (about US $0.50).

The following is the structure of the system of Military Archives in Poland:

Branch No. 1: Archiwum instytucji Centralnych MON (Archives of Central Institutions of the Ministry of National Defense)

Branch No. 2: Archiwum Warszawskiego Okręgu Wojskowego (Archives of the Warsaw Military District)

Branch No. 3: Archiwum Pomorskiego Okręgu Wojskowego (Archives of the Pomeranian Military District)

Branch No. 4: Archiwum Slaskiego Okręgu Wojskowego (Archives of the Silesian Military District)
Branch No. 5: Archiwum Marynarki Wojennej (Archives of the Navy)
Branch No. 6: Archiwum Wojsk Lotniczych i Obrony Powietrznej
(Archives of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces)

The following are the official duties of the Military Archives System:

a. Shipping the growing archival stock;
b. Gathering and storing archival materials;
c. Processing archival material;
d. Providing access to archival material;
e. Administrative management operations.

VI. The “Cold War” As It Is Reflected in the Files of the Central Military Archives

The history of the Polish Army after World War II has been documented in detail in the materials stored in the Central Military Archives. These materials make it possible to carry out research on all aspects of the functioning of the Army in the past. This also makes it possible to note those fields of its activity that were the result of Cold War policies imposed on Poland by the Soviet Union. Studies of these issues have been undertaken in the past by Polish historians, although their results have been held under a proviso of secrecy. The file collections include files on the Cabinet of the Minister of Defense, the General Staff of the Polish Army, the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Army, the Main Inspectorate for Military Training, the Main Inspectorate for Territorial Defense, the Main Quartermaster of the Polish Army, the Department of Personnel Staffing of the Ministry of National Defense, and files belonging to the staffs of the military districts and branches of the armed forces. Analysis of these files by historians and other military specialists during the early 1980's have had an effect in the form of expanded material compilations in which the problems of the Cold War have found their own reflection.

A secret work entitled “Rozwój ludowego Wojska Polskiego w latach 1945-1980” [Development of the People's Army of Poland during the Years 1945-1980], which was put together by more than a hundred specialists, includes more than 11,000 type-written pages altogether and can be used at the Military History Institute with the consent of its director. Among other things, the international and internal factors that determined the development of the armed forces, the stages of their development, their organizational structure, the problems of combat training and education, qualitative changes, the development of military equipment, the shaping of its ideological and political countenance, the involvement of the army in
the process of the consolidation of communist power in Poland, and the relationship and scope of cooperation with the Soviet Army and the other Warsaw Pact armies, are included in this document in richly documented manner. Although it was never the intent of the authors and editors of this work to condemn the Cold War policies of the Eastern bloc, the facts and assessments presented here make it possible to get a complete picture of the consequences that arose from them for Poland.

The secret compilation entitled "Ludowe Wojsko Polskie w okresie zagrozenia socjalistycznego państwa i stanu wojennego" [The People's Army of Poland During the Period of Threat to the Socialist State and Martial Law] should be appraised in a similar manner. It presents the scope and forms of the army's activities during the state of war. This compilation completely ignores the problem of Soviet pressures on Poland during 1980 and 1981, however, as well as the process of preparation to implement a state of war.

The reason for the Cold War was "the historic mission of communist forces against the so-called forces of the old order." This ideological desideratum was indoctrinated in the armed forces in the communist bloc. For this reason, from the outset, the leaders of the Polish military formations that originated in 1943 on the soil of the USSR were members of the Union of Polish Patriots, who were completely subject to Stalin. After the war, the Polish Army was also under the control of the communist party. This close union between the army and the party made it possible to ensure, among other things, the party's unlimited authority within the nation and its ability to grasp an instrument to come to grips with its opponents.

The Main Political Directorate, which acted on the laws of the Department of the Central Committee of the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party], assured the influence of the party within the Polish Army. The file on this organization gives rise to studies of the army's dependence on the party. At the same time, it calls attention to the expanded political and party structures within the army and their activities.

Political indoctrination of professional personnel and soldiers was an important mission of this activity. Among these documents, we find guidelines for political propaganda work, programs for political training, and other documents noting the diversity of forms of ideological influence on the armed forces. If, however, we try to use them exclusively to assess the attitudes and morale of the soldier, we might well come to false conclusions. In reality, soldiers in the Polish Army displayed independent thought to some extent and rejected some portion of what was given them in the process of ideological training.
During the postwar decades, the important functions of the command of the Polish Army were handed over to Soviet generals and officers. During the period from 1949 to 1956, Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, who was also the top military leader in the communist bloc, was vice premier of the Polish Council and Minister of National Defense. Altogether, in 1945, approximately 17,000 Soviet officers served in the Polish Army. After the war their numbers dropped significantly, and from 1948 through 1956 it varied from 250 to 500 persons, although these people were in the most important leadership posts. Files having to do with the Cabinet of the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff of the Polish Army, the Ministry of National Defense Personnel Staffing as well as new collections of files having to do with the Political Bureau of the PPR [Polish Workers' Party], the Presidium of the National People's Council and the Office of President Boleslav Bierut, also attest to dominance of the Polish Army by Soviet military personnel. The dissertation examination of Edward Nalepa entitled "Oficerowie radzieccy w Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968" [Soviet Officers in the Polish Army during the Years 1943-1968], which is based on these and other documents, recently took place at the Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny (Military Institute of History, WIH).

While Soviet officers were present in the Polish Army, there were numerous instances of repression aimed against Polish officers. These involved soldiers in the Home Army, officers who had returned to the country after the war from the West as well as soldiers who had come from the classes and social strata that the communist authorities had designated as the enemy. Altogether, several thousand soldiers were subject to repressions in various forms. These ranged from the most benign, consisting of dismissal from professional military service, through arrest and being transported to camps on the territory of the USSR, forced service in labor battalions, and slave labor in coal and uranium mines all the way up to and including many years of confinement and punishment by death. Unwarranted prosecutions and abuses of legal process were the "basis" for imprisonment of 135 officers of the Polish Army within the context of so-called "conspiracies in the Army" on penalties of many years in prison and 37 on penalty of death (21 sentences were carried out).

Documentation for this tragic chapter in the history of the army is found primarily in the collections of files belonging to the military prosecutor and courts and materials of the Main Office of Information for the Polish Army (the counter-espionage service and actual political police in the army), which was the organization most responsible for repression in the Army. Unfortunately, about 90% of the archival materials were destroyed in late 1989 and early 1990 before being transferred to the
Central Military Archives. As a result, the files of the Main Office of Information now include primarily just normative and legal documents, a few plans and reports, training and economics and financial documents. With few exceptions, any operational documentation has been destroyed. Not long ago, materials showing the scale and forms of repression were enriched by documentation on prisoners of war and prison camps for Home Army soldiers who were removed from Poland by agencies of the Soviet NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs] from 1944 through 1947.

Overburdening of the Polish economy in relation to its capabilities with expenses for the build-up of the armed forces and weapons productions is associated with the Cold War. Materials showing the organizational and technical development of the Polish Army during the periods of great tension in international relations are found in collections of files belonging to the central institutions of the Ministry of National Defense as well as in the history noted above. Insofar as weapons production is concerned, there are two collections belonging to the Cabinet of the Ministry of National Defense and the chiefs of the technical services of the Polish Army, while the greatest volume of materials is found in the Archives of the Central Planning Commission under the Council of Ministers of the Polish People's Republic and in the Archives of New Records and in collections belonging to the ministries of heavy industry, machine building, the chemical industry, the communications industry and others. Files having to do with the Six-Year plan (1949-1955) are worthy of special attention.

It was in the name of the “Cold War” that the military-industrial complex so ruinous to the Polish economy was built. Reflections of this problem are found in collections of files belonging to the Cabinet of the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff of the Polish Army, and the Administration for Procurement and Supply of Military Equipment. Among other things, these collections include directives of the Ministry of National Defense on matters of the reorganization and disposition of forces, production plans for plants under the Central Administration of the Weapons Industry, correspondence with the Minister of Defense of the USSR in regard to supplies of military equipment, and notes on planned support of the Armies needs during specific years.

Texts of agreements signed between the governments of the Polish People's Republic and the USSR on supplies of weapons and military equipment that shaped the industrial structure of Poland can be characterized as an exceptionally valuable source. In the later years, they were the reason for the inappropriate economic development of our country.
The burden on the Polish economy forced by Moscow to benefit the armed forces and the engagement of Poland in the confrontational politics of the East bloc had done nothing to advance society. The Polish people, who were made tragically wiser during the years of war, were especially sensitive to all actions of the communist powers capable of drawing it into a new military adventure. The decline in quality of life stemming from this policy is also undisputed. Frequent social tensions had occurred in Poland in light of these events. Some of them had taken on the rather radical form of mass strikes and street demonstrations as well as attacks on party buildings and facilities belonging to security services.

The party leadership had also directed military detachments against these rightful social activities. The weary and wounded had fallen. Documentation covering the tragic episodes of the military history of the Polish Army is intact. They are found in the Central Military Archives in Warsaw and its branches in Wroclaw, Toruń, and Odyn.

Collections belonging to the command of the Silesian Military District and the Command of the Public Safety Corps provide a complete picture of events in Poznan during 1956. These collections also include files belonging to military units taking part in the pacification of the area to include military messages, operational reports, reports having to do with the atmosphere among the soldiers, information about their hostile responses to the authorities.

The basic archival materials characterizing the involvement of the army in the December events in Wybrzeg in 1970 are kept in Toruń in a separate file marked “December 70.” This collection includes operational documentation of the staff of the Pomeranian Military District, the command of the Navy and leadership of four divisions and other military units as well as internal military units involved in special actions in Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, Elblag and other cities from 15 through 24 December 1970. The final report from the command of the Pomeranian Military District for the Chief of the General staff of the Polish Army, which shows the full extent of the engagement of Pomeranian Military District forces against the people of Wybrzeg, are of special scientific value.

Documenting the state of war has long been an object of interest for Polish historians. It was generated first of all in the National Defense Committee and the General Staff of the Polish Army. The basic documents are found there as secret materials just as before. The KOK [National Defense Committee] is concerned primarily with legal-governmental elements of the state of war while the General Staff deals with the precise determination of objectives and the means for their realization by the staff and units of the Polish Army. The lack of access to these files does not yet
allow a full scientific representation of these problems and especially the aggregate of the relationship between authorities in Moscow and Warsaw. In the hopes of getting information on this subject directly from sources at the Military Institute of History, a meeting was held with General W. Jaruzelski and all of his closest associates in February 1992. The stenographer’s transcript from this meeting is found in the collections of the Military Institute of History. In all of the central institutes and the institutions of the branches of the military, all documents having to do with the state of war are covered by a special procedure that does not permit destruction of any documents, even those of low archival and historical value. The totality of these files, which covers mainly the functioning of the armed forces up through December 1981, has been maintained in the Central Military Archives.

In 1968, the Polish Army also took part in the intervention by Warsaw Pact Forces in Czechoslovakia. Collections in the Central Military Archives include a group of files marked with the code word “Dunaj” [Danube], which includes 78 volumes. It contains staff materials that have not been put into order of which operational documents such as directives from General W. Jaruzelski, then Minister of National Defense, ordering participation in operation “Dunaj” by a separate army, organizations of the Chief of the General Staff derived from them and operational orders from Brigadier General Florian Siwicki, commander of the 2d Army.

A chronological register of activities is included and a description of the most important events of a military and political nature are found in the daily operational reports sent by the staff of the 2d Army to the General Staff of the Polish Army. These reports contain information that shows the dynamics of actions taken by Polish detachments during the intervention in Czechoslovakia, the relationship of the people to the intervention units as well as problems associated with command and communications.

The operational portion of this documentation includes reports covering the status and combat readiness of the military, reports on the status and combat readiness of these forces, and a wealth of correspondence with the staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact (the onset of preparations for intervention are found in the resolution giving orders to the Polish Military).

A large portion of the materials from the “Dunaj” collection have to do with the political and propaganda aspects of armed intervention. Among other things, they include information on negotiations that took place on the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks in Moscow on 24–26 August, descriptions of the political situation in Czechoslovakia (and especially in
the areas where the Polish Army was stationed), reports on the political-morale situation in Polish detachments, and descriptions of political-propaganda efforts undertaken. Notes and encoded messages from representatives of the Polish diplomatic corps holding credentials in various countries concerning reactions to the armed intervention are an important supplement to the political picture.

The most important materials having to do with the political aspects of the Polish Army's involvement in the intervention in Czechoslovakia are found in the Archives of Modern Records and in collection 1354 of the former Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party. Included here among other things are official records of meetings of the Political Bureau at which the question of intervention is discussed; the official record of a conversation between the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and Marshal Y. Yakubovskiy, Commander in Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, on 19 April 1968 in Warsaw during which Wladislaw Gomulka expressed consent to the involvement of the Polish Army in preparations for the intervention; and official records of meetings of communist party leaders in regard to Czechoslovakia.

Materials generated by the National Defense Committee, which was the highest government agency making decisions on policies of defense, the armed forces, the weapons industry and civil defense after 1959, play a fundamental role for research into Poland's involvement in the Cold War politics of the East bloc. All documents of the National Defense Committee were turned over to the Central Military Archives in the early 1990's. They include, first of all, constitutional regulations on matters of defense, establishing statutes on the universal obligation of national defense, and decrees governing the state of war and exceptional conditions. National Defense Committee files reflect the overall state of affairs associated with the functioning of government authority, local administration, the armed forces, the weapons industry, and the economy as a whole as well as infrastructure for supply and communications in conditions of states of increased need and warfare.

Resolutions of the Military Council of the Ministry of National Defense and guidelines of the National Defense Council in regard to improving the system of civil defense, the principles involved in creating national reserves, border protection, militarization of the national economy, and the broad concepts of civil defense are found in these files.

Correspondence between the President of the National Defense Council and the political, administrative, and Polish military leadership is valuable material for adding to our knowledge of the conditions and func-
tioning of the political-military system of Poland. In general, this has to do with overall system solutions. Documentation having to do with joint actions within the context of the Warsaw Pact has been significantly diminished. Documents depicting the individual stages of development of the political-defensive doctrines of the nation dominate in this area. In the process of assessing the totality of the files having to do with the National Defense Council, it is important to state that it is of great study value while explaining the functional mechanisms of the new defense system in the Polish People’s Republic in conditions of limited sovereignty and the domination of a foreign power.

VII. Summary

We have presented here some general information on archival materials stored in the Central Military Archives. We have attempted to give a brief characterization of some collections of files, but certainly not all, while trying to meet the expectations of the conference organizers. We have also noted the general rules for using these collections while stressing that, at present, Poland does not have universal limitations on access to documents beyond the 30-year period of pertinence. At the same time, we would like to stress that many of the documents having to do with Polish involvement in the Cold War policies of the East bloc and its military cooperation with the Soviet Army and the structures of the Warsaw Pact are found in the archives of the Russian Federation. We are counting on being allowed access to them in the near future.

Dr. András Horváth

Ladies and Gentlemen! Dear Colleagues!

I am sorry, but I cannot speak on such interesting topics as what we have listened to yesterday and today. Although I am a historian, I am also an archivist. My task is give you some background information, because Hungary, due to her size, could not form a global policy. In the Middle Ages, she was a mid-size power, but since 1920 Hungary has been a small country in Central Europe. She was only one of the victims of the Stalinist great power, and she was forced to introduce a despotic-bureaucratic, state-power system. The period between 1949–1956 was one of the most tragic of the stormy history of Hungary. The total oppression and humiliation of the nation resulted in the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, which Russian troops defeated. Listen to my words patiently. I would like to show you some examples of the typical Bolshevik mentality. Their phraseology seems comical today, but at the beginning of the 1950s, it caused deadly serious results for the Hungarian nation. As you know, it was not merely the system of oppression, but also the system of folly! After the wonderful year of 1989, we hope that Central Europe never experience Bolshevik rule again.

The Enemy is everywhere. It watches our mistakes like a lynx, every movement of ours is being watched by them. They do everything to obtain information. Entering into possessions of important data, they immediately send them over to one of the imperialistic powers. The activity of the Enemy is a permanent threat not only against our socialism-building people, but also against all the peace camp.

The intonation of the quotation is typical—at the beginning of the 1950’s, not only in the army, but also in civil life, “utmost vigilance” was
demanded from subordinate employees by their leaders “because the Class Enemy works for the imperialistic intelligence services.”

Stalinism tried to consolidate its power partly by the means of physical terror, partly by the force of the Asiatic-despotic and bureaucratic-official organization in the countries ruled by that ideology. The atmosphere of suspicion and distrust under these conditions became general, not only in public offices, but in every workplace.

Naturally these tendencies succeeded to an increased degree in the army, as keeping the armed forces in hand was always fundamentally important for a Bolshevik dictator, as Mátyás Rákosi was. Both he, and the other Muscovite leaders, who were his comrades in the exile, strived to force upon the traditionalist and conservative Hungary, a totally alien Byzantine-Bolshevik type of state power system. They wanted to create the atmosphere of fear and distrust to deter the people even from the idea of the resistance. The Hungarian citizens awoke frightened from their sleep every night whenever a car passed by on the streets outside their houses. They thought that the feared State Defense Office or the Military Policy Department had again arrested someone. The “big black car” and the “siren” became a symbol—there were more political captives in the prisons than ever before.

The Stalinist Hungarian leadership tried to crush the so called “Class Enemy” by the means of resettlement, internment, and by the drafts for the military labor service. Rákosi and his companions, who aped the Soviet Union in everything, wanted to transform Hungary into a country the hydroelectric powerplants, enormous industrial establishments, iron and steel, and, what is more, even cotton production! The forced industrialization was combined with forced development of the Army. In the Army, one of the most important factors was to eliminate the earlier body of military officers because the Communists thought them to be unreliable. Military qualifications and the experiences in command were nothing at that time without “political reliability”.

A great number of the new “reliable” officers had only elementary school educations. Although with new weapons the equipment became better after the development of the Army, the expanded effective force both among the officers and the enlisted men resulted in a sort of “dilution.” It was evident that in the event of international conflict the knowledge of the Hungarian officers, who were without military qualifications both on the level of the Chief of Staff and the troops, would be inadequate. In that situation their professional “impotency” could have resulted in catastrophic casualties for the Hungarian People’s Army. In spite of this fact, the Hungarian Rákosist leadership was extremely optimistic. They pro-
claimed in a loud voice that the Hungarian soldiers would fight superbly against the "imperialists."

The Hungarian Bolsheviks transformed not only the military structure. To accomplish their aims, they felt instinctively the need drastically to break with traditions, should they be centuries old or new ones. The approximately 150-year old public office administration and document management system was a somewhat new tradition, which had been applied not only in the public administration and in the "municipalities" but also in the Army. Although Rákosi and his companions did not need external stimulation to break this system radically in every respect, they adopted a top secret paper management system in the Hungarian People's Army, evidently under Soviet pressure. It was not only the personal fixed idea of the Defense Minister, Mihály Farkas.

As mentioned, the modern public office administration and document-management system was based on 150 years of tradition at that time. It was applied everywhere, from the Ministries to the smallest local governments, and naturally in the Army too.

The fundamental part of the old system was the so called "registry number" method, in which the individual documents were numbered at the time they were issued. The finding of the documents was guaranteed partly by the adequate numbers of the register book and partly by the alphabetical index books, which related to the registry numbers.

The most important part of the documents was the so called "reference sheet" on four pages. Different letters, petitions, applications, and official correspondence were connected to this and to the subject-connected documents which had been deposited by the occasional pre- and post-registry numbers.

On the reference sheet were listed the "pro domo" internal notes of the Ministry or the notes of another public office relating to the subject matter. When the four pages of the sheet had been filled, a new one was connected to it. On the document, the situation, referring to the total subject matter, could be traced back because of the date stamp; the directives and instructions of the Minister, the Under-Secretary of State, or the Head of Department; the deadline; and the names of the rapporteurs on the sheet. So the personal responsibility for individual decisions, or their absence, could be exactly ascertainable. It was important not only for the leaders of the offices, but also to historians, and this fact helps us do research work. We may call this "reference sheets, document management system"—according to Max Weber's opinion—a "positive bureaucracy" because the entire system is clear, synoptical, and logically consistent.
Both in the Hungarian Defense Ministry, and in other public offices, this order and document management system was valid until 1949. The "top secret system," which was introduced at that time by Defense Minister Mihály Farkas, fundamentally changed the situation. The above-mentioned benefits totally disappeared. The new system was an order of distrust and suspicion, and the results were totally chaotic. This fact caused difficulties and problems to the clerks at that time, who were accustomed to the old system, and currently to researchers and archivists. On the following pages we will try to find the origin of the new document management order, not only the "official" roots of it, but also the real ones.

The idea about introducing the new method emerged already in 1948. In July 1948, the Military Committee had a meeting. They discussed the real insufficiencies of the present system and simultaneously demonstrated they wanted fundamental changes:

Official secrecy in the Army is totally unorganized. The idea of the military secret is totally unknown... The troops are overwhelmed by a great number of written orders, bulletins, private information. This fact offers a great deal for the possibility to the intelligence-services of the Enemy to obtain the secret data of the Hungarian Army.6

The legal predecessors of the so-called "Military Committee" were the similar organization of the communists and social democrats. After the fusion of the two parties in 1948, it became the Minister's advisory council.

The fact that the Military Committee was asked about the matter of secrecy indicated that fundamental change would be initiated, and that would be a radical break with the earlier system. The Defense Minister, Mihály Farkas, issued his "Order of the Day the Second," on 27 September 1948, in which he established the following:

According to my Order there was a control in the rooms of the Defense Ministry about custody of the documents. . . . I establish the fact, that the employees of the Defense Ministry have no vigilance, carefulness and the sense of responsibility about the documents including secrets, or private data, entrusted them. In the controlled rooms almost without exception lie about several documents, registers, accounts and memorandums on writing tables, filing racks, and in unclosed desk drawers and commodes. You can find notes, drafts, and carbon-papers in waste-paper baskets. From the stuff found under these conditions, you can detect without any hard work the actual means and localization of those means of the Hungarian Army, in addition the plans for next year, too. This situation means that we help the agents of the uncontrollable Enemy to infiltrate into our ranks. Therefore, those employees who have guiltily and carelessly offended secrecy have become accomplices of the imperialists, no matter whether on purpose or not . . . ."
Although the Order of the Day still spoke about negligence and guilty carelessness, it was evident that the matter of secrecy would be on the agenda later because Mihály Farkas had decided to change the existing situation. The so-called "disorder" was only a pretext for him to destroy the old official structure. The essence was to create a new one which would be a break with Hungarian traditions and would be suitable for realizing the aims of the Bolsheviks. They wanted to form the entire official system similar to the Soviet one. It was not only their own idea, but they received external pressure to do that. Naturally, Soviet influence was very strong in every respect at that time:

The organization of secrecy was entrusted on the leaders of highest level in the Army. The suggestions about the tasks were very concrete and they reflected the conceptions of the Soviet advisory comrades, too. \(^8\)

The preparations for introducing the new document management system accelerated in spring 1949. The 8th Department (Secret Document Management) of the Hungarian General Staff was created on 1 April. Besides the establishment later of the "Collegium of the Defense Ministry,"\(^9\) it was decided to elaborate rules and orders relating to document management. The concrete accomplishment of that task was the work of newly created General Staff’s Secret Document Management Department. The operations urged by the Minister, too, at the end of that summer arrived at the point at which he issued the provisional regulation relating to the subject. The "Provisional Secret Document Management Order of the Hungarian Army,"\(^10\) issued on 13 August 1949, signed by the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General László Sólyom (who was later executed), was an attempt to introduce the new system in the most important military organizations beginning on 15 September 1949. It was evident that the provisional order would be shortly followed by the new Order of the Minister relating to the settlement for a longer period.

Minister Farkas did not delay issuing the new Order of the Minister, Number 303.162. eln.,\(^11\) on 12 November 1949, which once and for all repealed the earlier document management system and introduced the "top secret" one. Considering that the switching over to the new system had begun in August, it was put into force very quickly on 21 November.

Although according to its title it was a "Provisional Order," despite its being changed each year between 1949–1956, the November of 1949 provisions were basically unchanged. From the point of view of our topic, there is a need to know some, but not all, of the details.

Two days after the issuance of the Minister’s Order, another Order appeared,\(^12\) to regulate some questions of its implementation. It established
two secret vice-departments at the divisions, at the military schools, and military districts. One of them was subordinated to the Staff Headquarters, the other to the Personal Chief of the Division Headquarters. There was no change in this respect at the troops and organizations which had the earlier secret document management organs.

The secret “Document Management Order,” issued 12 November, was elaborated with scrupulousness in detail as to what was to be done during various phases of the document management process. The mailing of the secret documents was allowable exclusively by courier service. The diplomatic bag was prepared and selected by the Secret Document Management Department of the General Staff. The Secret Defense Vice-Department of the addressee handed over the documents in an exclusive “departmental workbook” to the department which prepared them. During the settlement of the matter, the rapporteurs were allowed to write all notes or sketches only in an exclusive so called “exercise workbook,” which was paginated, interleaved, and authenticated by the Chief of Department. The filled exercise books were removed from the register book and burned, and so noted in an official report.

For present day historians, that process causes several disadvantages. As the documents noted, the decision-making process for important decisions was annihilated. In a great many cases, we know only the decisions, but we don’t know the motives behind them. In the earlier “reference sheets system,” almost all the stages of the decision-making process could be followed.

The “burning system” was also disadvantageous for the clerk who was occupied with other matters because it caused irreparable “amnesia” when the matter casually had to be discussed again.

An exclusive copying office was established to copy the secret documents. The head of it was the senior typist in rank. When only one or two typists worked for the organ, they had to work in the room of the secret document management. Copies of secret documents were prohibited except for keeping them in exclusive registers. Only the typist and the controller of secret management were allowed to stay in the copying office. The typist was prohibited from keeping any material which may have remained after the work, in their tables, or from taking it from the room. When they had difficulties in making out the text, they could only ask either the rapporteur of that document or the senior typist. The secret materials had to be kept in a safe or in an iron-covered, carefully closed deed boxes. It was strictly prohibited to put the material in wooden boxes. The organs of the secret document management had to be accommodated in such rooms with iron-bars to secure the windows and firmly closed iron window shutters.
Carrying secret documents on an official journey was prohibited. The forwarding by courier service was allowed only in a double envelope, and no deliveries to private flats were permitted. In the press room, printing secret publications was possible only under the control of the security and secret organs. These publications had to be preserved in an exclusive secret library, and they established a secret reading room to examine them.

The out-of-date documents were destroyed. The drawings and photos were bound into an album. The destruction of the albums had to be noted in an exclusive register book.

Special care was demanded for the treatment of mobilization papers. Absolutely reliable persons were allowed to elaborate on those matters, and the competent commander had to be there during the working process. The materials used for copying—the drafts, carbon papers, and scrap pieces of papers had to be burned—and the event had to be noted in an official report. Copying or excerpting from the mobilization papers was prohibited.

The Chief of the General Staff exercised control over the secret document management system through the Secrecy Department. The occasional disappearance of secret documents had to be reported immediately and in detail.

When so-called "secret conferences" were convened, a great number of increased safety measures had to be carried out. In those conferences, each person was given a special exercise book to write in or take notes. The exercise book was issued by the competent secret organ. At the end of the conference, the invited persons had to return the exercise books. The secret organ either destroyed them or, when needed, sent them by diplomatic bag to the service post of the participants, but the exercise book could not be taken away.

According to later rules, civil employees were not allowed to work in secret document management. In addition, the troops or a sub-officer of the active force had to have special permission to do the work. It was prohibited to use any telecommunication apparatus in front of unknown people or to speak about secret matters or visit foreign missions or consulates. The employees who worked for secret workplaces were allowed to correspond with foreigners, but only according to special regulations. They had to report to their leaders that fact, or if any relative or contact worked for one of the foreign missions.

In the secret management department, a great number of further regulations were valid. For example, they had to close the envelopes with special seals and strings. There were only five seals that could be put on such envelopes according to the regulation. It was not allowed for the courier,
while delivering the documents, to use any public traffic vehicles, including the taxi-cabs. A special car was given to him and armed escort as well. When the addressees found any injuries on the envelope, they immediately had to make a special official report. When the employee left the office, he had to lock the document into his personal safe, or put it into his so called "working writing pad" and seal it. The "working writing pads" which were not sealed were not deposited at the end of work-time. During the breaks and the time of ten-o’clock snack, the document also had to be put into a safe. On special occasions, for example when there were fixed the drawings on the sketching board, it was allowed to leave them in the room, but it had to be covered with dark-papers and had to be closed it with a seal.

The secret records were kept in specially modified buses, or in underground vaults under field circumstances so as to manage the matters properly.

After the new system was totally developed in December 1950, 362 secret offices existed with 571 rapporteurs. This number grew permanently in 1951, too. In June, 386 secret offices existed with 713 filled workspaces.13

"The Secret Document Management Group-Section-Department of the General Staff" was established in August 1950 with a total of 39 employees. Their task was the coordination and the country-wide direction of secret document management. On 1 December 1953, the Group-Section-Department became an independent department again; its official name was "The 8th Independent Department of the Hungarian People's Army's General Staff." However, the establishment of the Central Secret Record Office of the Hungarian Defense Ministry was a more important step than the former one.14

They needed it because for a long time there had not been any document selection and storage, either in the Ministry nor at troop-level. Therefore, secret material piled up everywhere.

Although the secret management regulation included every detail, the directives were not taken seriously. As the official reports of the Defense Ministry's Collegium attest,15 several irregularities were found during the implementation ordered by Mihály Farkas. At the gates of the army posts, the identity check was formal and many employees did not disclose the secret documents and so on. For this reason the political instructors were most seriously accused: "... The political instructors with their inactions gave an poor example in keeping the Secret Management Regulation, they themselves helped to lull the communist's vigilance."16

The official report about those examinations were generally discussed at the sessions of the Collegium, but naturally the Minister—Mihály
Farkas, the four-star general himself—took the final decision in the matters. In January 1953, he said,

... we have to consider, Comrades, that the imperialist intelligence services, first of all the American Intelligence Service, increases their activities and with the help of their well-organized subsidiary companies, move heaven and earth to enter into possession of our secrets. The disorder in Secret Document Management of the Hungarian People's Army unfortunately still exists even today, which gives a very serious help to the imperialist intelligence services at their work ... I hope, Comrades, you have read the article of the “Pravda” which was issued in the “Szabad Nép” [this was the newspaper of the Hungarian communists], too. In that article the question is that besides the imperialistic intelligence services there is another serious enemy and it is the lack of vigilance. It is—living among us—a very serious enemy. Isn’t it the lack of vigilance that ... in safes of the officers, commanders, there are secret documents without keeping them under control, and they can’t tell us what are in their safes?! Isn’t it the lack of vigilance that there lie about by the dozen secret or top secret documents [and] maps without keeping them under control and “top secret” documents are vanishing? ... In addition, simultaneously, in our army posts there are hundreds of civil employees, who are either daughters of old Horthyist officers, or daughters of wealthy peasants and reactionary civil servants, typist women, short-hand writers, office employees. And these persons are working in such workplaces in our People’s Army, where they can see and catch secret materials. ... Here you are, please, the lack of vigilance!

The Minister’s thunderous speech and the unbending rigor generally resulted in not much of an upswing. The “Secret Document Management System,” which was elaborated so carefully, as the Minister’s words showed, wasn’t suitable for creating “perfect military secrecy.” It was considerably over-regulated but in spite of that it could not create order. On the contrary, it resulted in disorder and the disappearance of some important documents. The rapporteurs lost the significance of the matter in the labyrinth of the top secret bureaucratic management. The positive traditions, which existed before 1949, the clear and simple paper management system, came to nothing and the personnel responsible for the matter could not be so exactly caught in the act. In addition, as Mihály Farkas perpetrated purges in the Army, the intellectual-educational level and the military professional knowledge of the new officers and clerks in the Army, even according to the official report, was much lower than before. So the old system lived on only in the memory of some “casually retained” employees.

The most cruel part of the Bolshevik rule was the period between 1949–1953. They terrorized the so called “Class Enemy,” but this was only the first step. After it began, the disintegration of these “reactionary” social strata was accomplished by depriving them the means of
their support. In addition and in extreme cases, the terror machinery of the Bolshevik state physically liquidated them. The main aim of that attack was the middle-class, forming the social backbone of the country, because their conservative scale of values and their traditionalism was diametrically opposed to the effort of the Stalinists. They wanted to transform Hungarian society, to make it an obedient "flock of sheep." Stalinists wanted to achieve this aim by imprisonments, resettlements, and forced military labor service. Although Bolshevik rhetoric said that the so called "Horthyist Christian middle class is the Main-Enemy," the fist of state power "knocked down" each civil strata of Hungarian society.

It is characteristic of the Rákosi era that in the labor camps along the Tisza River, there worked together the sons of Jewish cafe-owners, Roman Catholic engineers, and wealthy Calvinist peasants. They were all fellow sufferers, and they had to do the same forced labor service. Rákosi and his comrades carried on an anti-intellectual campaign to destroy the civil scale of values, because they saw the intellectuals as so strong in spiritual and moral respects, which was dangerous for them. In the articles of "Szabad Nép," the journalists of the Communist Party on several occasions pointed to the alleged "fact" that a great part of intellectuals "collaborates with the imperialists." In that situation it was "natural" that the knowledge of English, French, or German languages was "suspicious" in advance. The spiciness of the anti-intellectual attacks was the fact, that Mátyás Rákosi, the General-Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party himself, was a well-educated, very intelligent man. He could speak four important foreign languages, and he was at the time of his youth, during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, an eminent student who was sent to Vienna to study in the famous "Collegium Hungaricum." Between the two World Wars he was a Communist exile in Moscow, so his knowledge of the Russian language was also excellent. In spite of it, Rákosi hated the intellectuals as if he was not one of them.

The Hungarian Bolsheviks wanted to realize, beside their respective aims, a direct, very palpable, material aspiration: they wanted to seize the houses, the properties, the shops of the "mossbacks" and the other movable and immovable possessions for themselves. It was the preferred "amusement" of the State Defense Office's leaders to pick out for themselves the house or cottage of a wealthy civilian family. After that, they removed the legal owner from Budapest by the means of "resettlement," and in some weeks occupied the building.

A great number of the highest leaders of the Army also made the best of the opportunity to seize big houses and cottages, all the more because,
as mentioned above, dozens of them became high-ranking officers without any military qualification. They needed, because of prestige, spacious and comfortable homes.

Though in civil life in 1953, after Stalin's death and in consequence of Prime Minister Imre Nagy's reforms, some abatement ensued, there was no sign of it in the Army. In these circumstances it was impossible to revise the system elaborated in 1949.

Though it is true that the brutality of state power decreased significantly between 1953–1956, the initiators of the reforms could not reach the decisive "breakthrough." Therefore, the situation of political uncertainty prevailed, and this was characteristic in those years. On the "teeter totter" of policy, then, the reformer Imre Nagy and the Bolshevik Mátýás Rákosi sometimes took the lead over the other one.

The public opinion of the country began to hope that the, "nightmare would come to an end and emerge as a more tolerable political system." As we mentioned, there was no sign of it in the Hungarian People's Army.

Although the top secret document management system introduced in 1949 was changed over the years, this fact did not touch the "essence" of that system. The documents were included in three categories from the beginning of the new order: (1) "Top Secret;" (2) "Secret;" and (3) "Exclusively for Military Service Use."

In the "Top Secret" category there were:

a. Documents about army organization and development, and fiscal matters relating to the main matters;
b. Operational matters and stationing of troops;
c. Military counter-intelligence, codemaking, and intelligence-service matters;
d. "M" (mobilization) and "K.R." (military-police) documents which had to be treated with special processes and totally separated from the other matters;
e. Military industrial and transport matters;
f. Fiscal matters;
g. Force of arms matters.

In the "Secret" category were:

a. Personnel matters, organization, and personal redeployments;
b. Troop training, principal matters of the military training and the most important orders relating to the training;
c. All the so-called "Confidential Matters" on the first point.

In the "Exclusively for Military Service Use" were:

a. Regulations;
b. Work helps;
This original document-selection system was changed in 1950, so that the matters of the “secret document management” became the following: (1) “Extraordinarily Important-Top Secret;” (2) “Top Secret;” and (3) “Secret.”

The earlier “Exclusively for Military Service Use” category was unanimously referred to “Open” document management. There were some less important regulations, work helps, expositions, and the Official Gazette, too.

A “Special Order” of the Defense Minister regulated each occasion supplementary to the order of the elaboration, usage, control, and the custody and forwarding of the documents and papers which belonged to the three “super secret categories.” It was put down in writing that what kind of matters belonged to “Secret” document management. This description was written in an exhaustive register. Consequently, the essence of the change was the fact that a “super top secret” and “totally closed” register was composed, and it was more detailed than the register which was issued in 1949. In 1950, the main aim was that the persons who were instructed by the “Personnel Main Group Directorate” to manage secret document management should be suitably familiar with the “jungle” of the different kind of papers. The framework of this paper does not allow me to familiarize you with these registers, but the method of the regulation was similar to the “Order” issued in 1949.

The results of this process was the transformation of the earlier (before 1949) European official system, with its shortcomings, into an Asiatic-type military bureaucracy, which worked with little efficiency.

At the beginning of this paper, we already noted the fact that this “top secret system” was disadvantageous to historians and archivists. Yet, we also received a particular and at the same time typical “gift” from the Stalinism. It is not a pleasant estate! Thank you for your attention.

ENDNOTES

1. At the time of the general election (4 November 1945), the conservative Independent Smallholders Party got 57% of all the votes.
2. The “State Defense Office” was the most hated terror organization of the Bolshevik state. It was a separate “state” within the state and could do anything it wanted.
3. The “Military Policy Department” was almost as feared in the Army as the “State Defense Office” was in civil life.
4. Between 1949 and 1953, a great number of the Hungarian civilians and wealthy peas-
ant families lost their homes, and they were sent to small villages and labor camps by “resettlement.”

5. The sons of the middle class did not receive any weapons during military service. They were placed in military labor camps.


9. The “Collegium of the Defense Ministry” was formed from the earlier military Committee.


14. Ibid.

15. HL–1967/T–102/05/1.


17. Ibid., 146–147. fol.

18. Ibid., 149. fol.

19. The Tisza River is the second largest river in Hungary after the Danube.


The Romanian Military Archives: An Important Source for the Detailed Study of the Cold War

Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru Osca

The Archives of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence possess a valuable stock of military and political-military documents dating from 1876 to the present and concerning the crucial events in the history of the Romanian people and of South-East Europe.

Thus far, Romanian and foreign researchers have been interested in events such as the Balkan wars, the war of national union, the inter-war period, and World War II. Mention should be made of the fact that after the December 1989 Revolution, the documents concerning the anti-Soviet campaign (22 June 1941–23 August 1944) and the campaign against Bolshevik Hungary (1919) were also put at the disposal of historians.

The information on these periods and events is contained in over 350 archival collections, out of which the most significant and interesting, for an experienced researcher, are those created by the General Headquarters; the Military Cabinet of the Head of the State; and the General Staff—Sections 1: Organization and Mobilization; 2: Intelligence; 3: Operations; 4: Equipment; 5: Training; and 6: Transportation; The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Romanian Armies; the I, III Army Corps, etc. The documents included in these stocks make up files which are definitely inventoried and selectively microfilmed.

The military archives also possess a limited number of collections of which the most valuable pertains to the interval 23 August 1944–12 May 1945, when the Romanian Army waged war against the Third Reich, joining the armies of the United Nations. At present, efforts are made to substantiate a collection of documents concerning the anti-Soviet campaign and a collection of documents and photos having as subject “The Army and the Great Union (1918–1919).”

The archives created in the inter-war period are partially incomplete because of seizures during military operations, voluntary destruction of
documents to prevent their falling into enemy hands, and destruction caused by air bombing. Also, this was particularly due to the fact that the USSR took over on behalf of the Allied Control Commission, a large number of documents. Included were those issued by the Military Cabinet of the Head of the State (in fact, the whole archives issued by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers during the period 1940–23 August 1944), documents of an informative nature belonging to the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff and its bodies, the archives with a technical character (building designs, inventions, innovations, etc.) as well as the entire archive seized by the Romanian troops from the German and Hungarian armies after 23 August 1944.

The seizure of archival documents (there are four files attesting to this) also took place after 1945 but on a smaller scale. Likewise, at the urging and under the supervision of Soviet representatives, officers from various departments of State Security took away documents from the Military Archives in the interest of the communist power. The documents seized by Securitate (Security) structures under the pretext that they were of an anti-Soviet and anti-communist character were used to bring to trial and charge cadres of the Army for alleged crimes or atrocities perpetuated during Marshal Ion Antonescu’s rule. At present, the Archives of the Ministry of National Defence have no control over those documents, but in the conditions created by the Revolution, we intend to take the necessary action to bring them back into our possession in their entirety or at least partially.

Concerning the Cold War, which did not attract the obvious interest of the Romanian historiography before 1989 and whose periodicity has not been agreed upon, the Romanian Military Archives do not have special collections. Researchers have ordered documents which only tangentially dealt with such matters.

After the Revolution of December 1989, as interest in that phenomenon increased, we reviewed the topics related to it and planned our documentation to answer the possible demands of Romanian and foreign researchers.

A preliminary and so far incomplete study, led to the conclusion that the documents in the Romanian Military Archives that may have interest to any researcher referring to the following: the strategic covering by Soviet occupation troops in our the national territory and their movements during the periods of crises in Yugoslavia (1950–1953) and Hungary (1956); the role of the Soviet occupation army in the establishment of the communist regime in Romania and the purging of the Romanian officer corps of the pro-Western and anti-Soviet elements; the elimination of the Romanian officer corps of the pro-Western and anti-Soviet elements; the
elimination of the Romanian traditional military doctrine and its imposed replacement with the military doctrine of the communist bloc; the introduction of the Soviet model in the army with sweeping changes as regards outlook, organization, training, and equipment.

A topic that may be of interest for researchers is the study of practical steps taken by the Romanian authorities, at the insistence of the leadership of the former USSR, in the huge diversion of resources along the Romanian-Yugoslav border. In this area, the Romanian communist authorities spent huge sums to build a complex system of casemates against a hypothetical enemy supported by an economy completely drained by World War II and the payment of war damages.

A great number of documents refer to the perception of the 1956 Revolution in Hungary in the Romanian armed forces and the propaganda activities carried out in the large units and units of the Romanian army to prevent a similar development in Romania. So far we have identified no intention of the Soviet and Romanian leadership to engage the Romanian army in overt combat against the anti-communist movement in Hungary. In fact, the scale of actions to support the Hungarian revolution in various towns of Romania was quite small due to the draconian actions taken by the Securitate. However, some military documents make significant reference to the latter. Quite relevant is also the fact that after the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, a new purge of the Romanian army was conducted to remove the cadres that had openly expressed their stand against the Soviet intervention in Hungary.

Although at this time we cannot make a complete assessment of the impact that the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Romania in 1958 had on the dynamics of the Cold War, it is quite certain that a scholar can derive important conclusions from this event. The Romanian Military Archives can provide a significant amount of documents concerning the consequences in the strategic, economic, and political fields. In fact, starting in 1958, the Romanian Army witnessed some changes in organization, in the sense of the gradual return, as much as this was possible during a communist dictatorship, to Romanian military traditions. For instance, the divisions and regiments returned to their traditional numbering, and in 1958 it was decreed that the Army Day be celebrated on 25 October (as it is celebrated at present), the day marking the complete liberation of Transylvania from Horthyist occupation. Formerly Army day was 2 November, when the “Tudor Vladimirescu” Division was set up on the Soviet territory by Romanian prisoners of war. Likewise, changes were made in the Romanian military uniform and later on, a national military doctrine was worked out and a national defence industry was developed.
The problems above are suitably reflected in documents issued by various military structures, and they can be studied, for the most part, by interested researchers.

Naturally, the Romanian Military Archives also possess more recent documents, with both direct and tangential reference to the Cold War, but which, in keeping with Romanian legislation and international archival practices, are not prepared to be put at the disposal of the researchers.

Among them, it is obvious that justified interest will be shown to Romania’s stand on the intervention of the Soviets and their allies in Czechoslovakia (August 1968). Mention should be made of the demarches, risky during those times, repeatedly made by military cadres holding key positions in the army who succeeded in persuading the authorities to give priority to the national interests and not to the interests of the bloc. As a result, Romania made a singular stand among the socialist countries: namely, it did not take part in Czechoslovakia’s occupation and even publicly condemned the intervention in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak State.

The main collections of the military archives reflecting the complexity of the phenomenon called the “Cold War,” and particularly its military component, were created by the former political structure in the armed forces, the Cabinet of the Defence Minister; The General Staff Section 1: Organization-Mobilization; the Command of Air Forces; the Command of the Naval Forces, The Command of the Frontier Guard Troops; and Military Regions I–III.

Beside these stocks prepared to be put at the disposal of researchers, in the conditions of the December 1989 Revolution, the Military Archives temporarily took over a series of documents created by the former Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party. After brief archival processing and inventory to hand over the stock to the lawful owner—the General Directorate of the National Archives, we remarked that they included a great number of very interesting documents which are mandatory for any thorough study of the “Cold War,” particularly as regards the grasping of its political, ideological, psychological and economic aspects. Undoubtedly, the study of these documents will be regulated by orders of the General Directorate of the National Archives, and we are convinced that this will happen fairly soon. In the following I shall make reference to several technical problems related to the functioning of the Romanian Military Archives.

Archival activity in the armed forces is regulated by the national legislation, internal instructions, and rules that specify in detail how the specific laws should be applied in the military field.
At present, the functioning of archives in Romania, including the military ones, is regulated by Decree No. 472/1971, but the provisions of that document no longer correspond to the new condition of the Romanian society. Therefore a bill was forwarded and discussed in the Senate commensurate with the most modern similar documents in force in the countries with older democratic traditions.

The Romanian Military Archives have representatives in the International Committee of the Military Archives and frequently take part in the meetings of the Committee and in the International Colloquia of Military History.

Responsibility for the organization and functioning of Military Archives rests with the General Staff which exercises it through a special department called Military Archives. It deals with working out regulation drafts, and it controls the setting up, preservation, and capitalization of archival stocks and their circulation.

Access to the documents in the Military Archives is permitted to all Romanian and foreign researchers who express their scientific interest in them and is limited by the international standards in the field.

Concurrently, certificates are issued and copies of personal documents are made for the citizens at home and abroad, who need the respective data for various practical purposes. For instance, since the 1989 Revolution some 500,000 certificates were issued for veterans, prisoners, war widows, former political detainees, and other citizens who requested data about their military situation.

The study of documents in the Military Archives can be made in adequate conditions. The specialists of the archives meet the requirements of researchers whose number has risen lately. This is due to both the opening of stocks that until December 1989 Revolution had special restrictions and to the abolishing of political restrictions which had tacitly functioned until the date and which supposed the approval of State special organs other than the Military Archives.

At present, both Romanian and foreign historians willing to study documents in the Military Archives can write to the chief of the Military Archives, mentioning their name, address, profession, the theme (themes) and goal of his study, the period in which he/she would like to conduct the study, and enclosing some letters of recommendation on behalf of institutions in their field of activity, which, nevertheless, are not mandatory. The request is answered in 30 days at the most from the day of receipt.

In principle, there is no restriction to the study of documents in the archives which were set up at least 30 years ago. There are a few exceptions for the documents which irrespective of the period in which they
were created, are still topical in data and information concerning the national defence.

The collections put at the disposal of researchers are inventoried and the inventory can be examined in its entirety. The Military Archives do not have systematic catalogues and computerization is in its incipient stage; the instruments created through computerization are estimated to be placed at the disposal of historians starting in 1995. However, this is not an impediment for researchers as archivists with university studies and rich experience and thorough knowledge of the stocks they are in charge with are always very helpful.

When quoting archival sources in published works, the Romanian and foreign researchers are recommended to use the formula: “Archives of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, stock ____ (the name of the stock), file no. _____ p ____.” When reference is made to microfilms, the formula is used: “Archives of the Romanian Ministry of National Defence, stock microfilms, box no.____ frame ____.”

The researcher can request either a photocopy or microfilm copy of the archival document; the archives possess the apparatus to meet the requirements very quickly at the prices commensurate with the national market. Usually they are established according to the level of international prices, and payment is made in hard currency or lei.

For foreign researchers from institutions that have signed cooperation agreements with the Romanian Military Archives, the documents are copied on a reciprocal basis.

As regards the introduction of computers in the military archival work, the first steps were taken after December 1989. At present the Military Archives are equipped with IBM-P.C. compatible personal computers with 286, 386, and 486 processors and modern fax. They also have:

a. Panasonic KX P.1592 Multi-Mode Printers;
b. A Hewlett Packard Paint Jet XL 300 printer;
c. Color scanner.

We also use the following software:

a. MS DOS 5.0;
b. ISIS and FoxPRO 2 management systems for the data bases;

During the first stage, the following data were computerized:

a. The existing collections of the Military Archives, the limit years, the quantity of archives in linear meters, the names borne by the collection's creators, processing stage, place of storage;
b. The situation of requests forwarded to the Military Archives at home and abroad and the respective answers;
c. Catalogs of commands, large units, and units committed to action in World War II.

As mentioned above, efforts are being made to make catalogues of documents and thematic inventories.

Regarding the study of military memoirs, the modern Romanian armed forces had in its ranks many personalities who exerted sometimes decisive influence on events and situations in the history of the Romanian people. For this reason there has always been a constant interest in their life and work, and the largest amount of information can be found in their personal memoirs.

The personal memoirs of officers (retired or deceased) who were in command of various echelons are also kept in the Military Archives. Their study, according to the provisos of the new law of archives, has to adhere to certain rules such as the archivists’ obligation to make sure that the public image of the respective personal will not be affected. The personal memoirs of officers in active duty or in the reserve are studied only by officers from competent bodies of the active structures of the army.

In the immediate future, specialists in the Romanian military archives will have to solve a series of urgent and complex problems of a scientific, archival, and material nature.

One such problem is the way in which the archival collections were built and their degree of completion, particularly at the top levels of the armed forces. Another is the comparative role that Romania and its General Staff had in South-East Europe over a long period of time which allows Romanian and foreign researchers to grasp the events in both this geo-strategic area and all of Europe.

We are concerned with making this important treasure of valuable materials known in the scientific world, by rapidly introducing the up-to-date methods of storage and classification, and using modern technological devices for microfilms and microcards. We think that this year we shall succeed in meeting the justified scientific demands of researchers who for whole decades were denied access to Romanian documents.

Concurrently, we further our demarches and promote contacts and bilateral cooperation with similar institutions in Europe and throughout the world, to include reciprocal agreements for the study and exchange of documents and the organization of common scientific meetings such as the common publication of collections of documents on established topics and participation in international scientific meetings and workshops.

The Romanian Military Archives intend to complete their collections of Romanian documents with items that at present can be found in archives in Russia, Austria, Turkey, etc., with a view to offering the
researchers thorough information from various sources and to allow for definite interpretations that are as close to reality as possible.
SECTION VII

Western European And Canadian Military Archives
Canada: Sovereignty, Superiority, and the Cold War

Isabel Campbell

“Canada’s security lies in her own reasonableness, the decency of her neighbours, and the steady development of friendly intercourse, common standards of conduct and common points of view.” These words, stated in the 1920s by O.D. Skelton, the distinguished senior official who professionalized Canada’s Department of External Affairs, are telling. Skelton went on to make a distinction between European and Canadian traditions with his next words, “Why not let Europe do likewise?” Notions of neighbourliness, sharing, and kindness more often associated with kindergarten classes than with a developed nation’s policies of self-defence were consistently incorporated into statements on defence policy. In the Canadian context, complete independence was an unrealistic goal and national interests dictated cooperation with Great Britain and the United States. Moral suasion and diplomacy were the appropriate tools to achieve these goals. Yet, much as Americans came to realize that responsibility and heavy expenditure were the partners of power, Canadians came to realize that reduced powers of decision-making and restricted latitude of action accompanied dependence.

Canadian grand strategy aimed at improving the quality of life in Canada through cooperation with countries who shared similar value systems. If the values of Western civilization were key elements of grand strategy, then the protection of territory, especially in the Canadian context, was only one element of defence. By devoting resources to education, healthcare, social assistance and other programs, Canadians improved their quality of life. Many resources went to defence, but Canadians were able to reduce these by sharing in American defence systems. The existence of a common enemy, the Soviet Union, and a myth of Canadian moral superiority provided some basis for national unity in a country split between French and English. In dramatic terms, Canadians were followers of muscular Christianity; Europeans, the inheritors of Clausewitz and Machiavelli.
Although Canada acquired Newfoundland and Labrador and strengthened its claim to the Arctic Archipelago during the Cold War, the country lacked the means to protect its vast territory and resources. Canadians and Americans engaged in joint defence of Newfoundland waters and NATO allies practiced low level flying in Labrador. These measures contributed to effective security from Soviet forces, but the military was not made responsible for the protection of resources. The coast guard patrolled the Newfoundland fishery and diplomats worked for the acceptance of the 200-mile limit. International management of natural resources made some progress during the Cold War, but concentration upon the Soviet threat and alliance relationships took attention away from some vital interests.

The defence sector always had to compete for funds with costly social programs, and financial constraints inevitably heightened interservice rivalry. All the while, rapid changes in technology both increased costs and altered strategic imperatives, broadening the gap between Canada's international obligations and the resources available to meet them. There were some notable successes and failures. The Canadian Helicopter Hauldown and Rapid Securing Device, known as Beartrap, became widely used in other navies to assist helicopter landings on destroyers, and Canada made important contributions in variable depth sonar and naval tactical data communications systems. The Avro Arrow Mach 2 Fighter and several other high investment defence research developments proved to be beyond national resources. The secrecy which surrounded defence planning meant that the Canadian press and public did not have a full understanding of defence issues and were sometimes misinformed. Yet, early on Canadians decided that “in any full-scale emergency, Canada would be fighting along with other friendly powers. That principle of specialization which is so effective in modern industry must be applied...”. Thus, cooperation made economic sense. Information and intelligence sharing along with defence production agreements, financial agreements including off-shore purchasing by the United States, reciprocal training arrangements and standardization of equipment benefitted Canada's military forces tremendously and assisted the Canadian economy.

Cooperation for defence took place within the contexts of continental security arrangements, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations and, within each country. From 1945 to 1987, Canada participated in alliance relationships based upon perceived threats from the Soviet Union. To some extent, the country balanced its dependence upon the U.S. with multilateralism in the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Formal American-Canadian continental defence collaboration began in 1940 with the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. This relationship was based upon common interest in security against the then victorious Axis powers, and in the ultimate defeat of those powers. During the Second World War, Canada accepted a degree of American strategic direction of its forces, though the wording of ABC-22 (the American-Canadian defence plan) took Canadian sensibilities into account. A pattern was set for the Cold War period.

Military strategic appreciations of Canada's position in 1945 and 1946 were that the country would be vulnerable to attack from the Soviet Union over the Arctic regions within five years. Other assessments identified the Soviet submarine force as a threat to the North American coastline. These appreciations led one senior American officer to conclude in 1946 that,

...the security of Canada will be largely dependent on US installations of a comprehensive air warning, meteorological and communications systems, with air bases for interceptor aircraft in Alaska, Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and elsewhere. Conversely, United States security will depend on similar installations in Canadian territory. This dependence has never existed before as between the two countries, nor ever before has the security of the North American continent been in jeopardy.10

These words would prove prescient.

In 1946, Canadians were not completely convinced. Charles Foulkes, the Chief of the General Staff, criticized the American paper, stating that, “there appears to be a lack of objectiveness... caused by the reluctance of the United States authorities to name the potential enemy. This has been purposely omitted at the request of the American authorities due to their want of confidence in regard to the state of security within their own Departments.” He was even more critical of his own department, stating that Canadian military intelligence was not sufficiently developed to produce much material nor was it even capable of assessing the value of information from other sources.11 Though Canadian military intelligence capabilities increased during the Cold War, dependence upon American sources continued.12

As tension between the Soviet Union and the U.S. increased, Canada accepted the pessimistic appreciations. Control over the Canadian sector of the Arctic, especially over the Arctic Archipelago, became a concern. Canadian claims were not strong; no large settlement or activities were there. American requests to conduct military exercises and set up installations were potential threats. Yet greater threats existed. Not being prepared
to undertake costly defence activities alone, Canada could either assist the Americans or risk losing all claim to the Arctic through inaction.\textsuperscript{13} Other independent research and activity in the North strengthened Canada's claims.

American military initiative was crucial to Canadian defence plans. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence and its subordinate Military Cooperation Committee set up a host of joint working bodies to implement detailed aspects of joint defence.\textsuperscript{14} Once the basic structure of cooperation was in place, these two bodies declined in importance. The joint working bodies continued to cooperate on specific defence plans and projects, such as standardization of equipment and financial sharing. This work was carried out in great secrecy thus many Canadians were unaware of the extent of interdependence. American contracts to Canadian companies were another important feature of the continental effort.\textsuperscript{15} Defence production agreements benefitted parts of the Canadian economy, but tied it more closely to the U.S. defence establishment.

Close military working relationships developed as the two air forces, armies, and navies had joint training exercises, coordinated plans, and reached standardization agreements with respect to equipment. While nuclear weapons and missile technology were being developed as strategic deterrents in the 1950s, the role of the USAF and RCAF grew and interservice rivalry in both countries became more intense.\textsuperscript{16} With respect to the various air defence warning lines, Canadian military planners hoped to take more responsibility for Canadian territory. Cost was still a consideration and, with greater interests and vital interests at stake, the U.S. overshadowed Canada's efforts. Concern over sovereign rights, limited resources and rapidly changing technology, added to the difficulties in defence planning.

Subordination of the Canadian military to higher American military commanders was one result of various defence agreements, notably the North American Air (later Aerospace) Defence agreement of 1957 (NORAD). Such arrangements worked well when full consultation and cooperation between both governments existed. However, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and President John Kennedy did not enjoy a harmonious relationship and the two governments could not come to any agreement over access to nuclear weapons for Canadian forces. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, relations were particularly strained. Lack of consultation between the two governments resulted in delays and less than full-fledged Canadian government support for President Kennedy during the most dangerous crisis of the Cold War. The Canadian military responded as fully as possible to the crisis, but unofficially, while Diefenbaker hesitated.\textsuperscript{17}
Not only were Canadian-American relations at their lowest ebb since the diplomatic and military crises of the nineteenth century, but Canadian parliamentary control of its military was in some doubt. Poor relations between the Canadian Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence also complicated the situation. Howard Green, the Minister of External Affairs, was active in United Nations Disarmament talks and strongly opposed Canadian access to nuclear weapons. Douglas Harkness, the Minister of National Defence, fought hard, though unsuccessfully, to proceed with an agreement which would allow the Canadian military to use American nuclear weapons. The Diefenbaker government was defeated at the 1963 election by the Liberal Party under L.B. Pearson who had changed his stand and promised to proceed with such an agreement. For many Canadians, the battle against communism justified this decision; it was necessary to accept responsibility in alliance relationships. For others, the decision was a betrayal of Canada.

At the same time as the Canadian military gained access to nuclear arms, Paul Hellyer, Pearson's Minister of National Defence, began the process of unification of the armed forces. Integration of the Canadian armed forces began immediately following the Second World War. Concern about the rising cost of government and studies of government structure suggested that more efficient organization could be obtained through complete re-structuring. Unification went much further, eliminating separate service traditions and re-organizing the Canadian military into a single service. A number of senior officers resigned in protest, but unification was completed in 1968. The loss of distinct uniforms and the departure from traditional service ranks for the Navy and Air Force were symbolic blows which cut deeply into military morale. American defence policy, especially in Vietnam, became increasingly unpopular during this same time. Many draft-evaders sought refuge in Canada and their numbers added to Canadian critics of American involvement. Prime Minister L.B. Pearson questioned the air strikes in North Vietnam in a public address in Philadelphia. This led to a frank, but private, reprimand from President Johnson. Pearson admitted that he would have been angry had the Americans made similar remarks about Canadian government policy, but so they had during the Diefenbaker years. Neither country was immune from criticism and quiet diplomacy was not the only route used.

Pierre Elliot Trudeau became Prime Minister of Canada in 1968. The Trudeau era saw a complete review of foreign and defence policy with an emphasis placed upon national interest and defence of Canadian territory. Such principles were not exactly new. The 1971 Defence White paper contained the same concepts as the 1964 Defence White Paper, though the
priorities changed around. Continental defence was the third priority after the United Nations as the first and NATO as the second in 1964. Continental defence moved to second place after surveillance of Canadian territory and coast-lines which had a first place priority in 1971. Though not formally acknowledged in the 1971 White paper, surveillance of our own territory and coast-lines was a part of continental defence, and it remained so. Apparently a rejection of Pearsonian internationalism, the changes were more a question of emphasis and public relations than of fundamental strategy. Reality was dependence. Effective use of resources was still a concern and the military continued to re-organize and review itself in attempts to achieve greater efficiency.\textsuperscript{24}

In an unequal power relationship, friendship and loyalty counted for something, but Canada could not hope for a truly equal say in joint defence matters at times when Americans felt vital interests were at stake. Dependence was mutual. Continental defence was partly the outcome of geography, but American influence was felt during the Cold War in all Western democracies. Most Western policy makers felt that benefits out-weighed disadvantages. Given Canada’s interests, the U.S. was a good friend to have.

Yet U.S. pressure for the nuclear weapons agreement, the subordination of the Canadian military, and defence production sharing could easily be seen as threats not only to sovereignty, but also to Canadian values. Could Canadians maintain a measure of independence with such close American ties? And the nuclear issue was fraught with emotional and moral considerations. Some Canadians felt so violated by the agreement to allow Canadians access to nuclear weapons that one defence critic referred to the woman of easy virtue who wanted to go to another city and start all over again as a virgin, presumably addressing those Canadians who had wished to maintain nuclear virginity.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, a Canadian myth of moral superiority and independence was threatened and in reality could not be maintained. However, illusions of independence and moral superiority remained essential ingredients in statements on defence policy. Canadian criticism of American policy during the Vietnam war and reluctance on the nuclear weapons issue may have been difficult to swallow, but that was a part of the price the United States paid for a high degree of support and cooperation from its closest neighbour.

\textit{North Atlantic Treaty Organization}

During the late 1940s, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Western democracies deteriorated and disillusionment with the United
Nations as an effective organization created a fertile atmosphere of fear and instability. During 1947, Escott Reid, an External Affairs official and the Minister of External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, advocated a collective defence organization of western powers, consistent with the United Nations Charter as a regional security organization.\(^{26}\) By 11 March 1948, with the consolidation of Communist power in Czechoslovakia, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee sent a message to Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King noting that "a regional Atlantic pact of mutual assistance" would be required to provide deterrence from further Communist incursions, particularly with regard to Norway.\(^ {27} \) This message prompted action, but Canadian diplomats had already considered the issue.

They saw NATO as an extension of the United Nations, as a social, economic, cultural and spiritual force beyond its military capacities. L.B. Pearson, the Minister of External Affairs, played a strong role in promoting Article 2 of the NATO Treaty which emphasized the common value system shared by NATO partners. Many criticized Article 2 as impractical and it was not actually implemented until 1969 when the NATO Committee on Challenges to the Modern Society was established. This body hoped to provide some sense of purpose and idealism, especially for disillusioned western youth.\(^ {28} \) Even this Committee made little progress as NATO planners concentrated upon military matters.

Pearson foresaw some of the problems of the western military alliance. NATO’s strategy of deterrence grew into an international arms race. The buildup of nuclear weapons and high research investment in sophisticated methods of killing other human beings took important resources from other government activities and the arms race itself seemed a threat to the quality of life in Western democracies. Deterrence, which remained with NATO throughout the Cold War, was based upon a horror of nuclear warfare.

There were a number of important changes in military strategy in NATO during the Cold War. The strategy of “massive retaliation” did not imply complete annihilation as neither side had that kind of weaponry.\(^ {29} \) Conventional warfare would follow nuclear bomb attacks. Forward defence was the next logical step in this doctrine. It was adopted following the entry of West Germany into NATO in 1954. The use of a sword, strategic nuclear weapons, to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and industrial capability, and a shield, conventional and tactical nuclear forces, to protect NATO countries, grew out of this concept. By the 1960s, “flexible response” gained ground as strategists realized that some limited warfare might occur and sought an alternative to massive retaliation. Again conventional warfare was envisioned on a limited scale in the first step of
direct defence with some tactical nuclear weaponry during a period of deliberate escalation followed by general nuclear response as the last step. The threat of nuclear warfare made the great powers and indeed all countries vulnerable and in a sense interdependent. National interests became associated with international peace and security to a much higher degree.

Canadian diplomats understood this relationship from the beginning and assisted in developing cohesiveness in NATO's early years. Our military contribution was mainly in conventional forces, although Canada was an important early supplier of uranium and our NATO troops were nuclear armed from the mid 1960s into the 1970s. Canadians provided forces for European territory, air training, naval support, mutual aid packages, initially with Second World War non-standard equipment, and expertise. With nuclear deterrence in the background, the initial use of Canadian troops for conventional warfare in Europe was seen as a temporary measure until European nations recovered from the Second World War.

NATO had a price and, in the early fifties, with troops in Korea, that price seemed high. Even so, Canada's contribution was criticized by our allies in the international press a number of times during the Cold War, and we felt compelled to point out that Canada's contribution to NATO—in light of our population, resources, and even our cold climate—was fair. Canadians also saw NATO as an alliance to balance American influence as well as to counter Soviet strength. Other NATO countries shared similar hopes and fears. It was frustrating, however, to have European NATO allies discount the expense of North American continental defence. Strengthening European allies was an important goal, but there were limits and Canada balanced contributions in light of domestic priorities.

The placement of Canadian forces in Europe was a matter of contention between General Simonds, the Chief of General Staff, and General Foulkes, the Chairman, Chief of Staff. Simonds fought to locate the Canadian brigade in the British sector of Germany. Foulkes hoped to increase standardization with the Americans with respect to supply and equipment and preferred a location close to the Canadian air division within the American sector, using American supply lines. Although the 27th Infantry Brigade was placed in the British sector in 1951, Foulkes continued to press his point and later associated bringing the brigade and air division together under the American supply system with proposals for further integration of Canadian forces in the 1960s. He was not the only critic. In a confidential memorandum to General Allard, Vice Chief of the General Staff in 1958, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. A. (Strome) Galloway criticized British NATO strategy, stating that the operational role of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade violated nearly every tactical belief he held.
The loss of control of military strategy was a concern for all NATO partners, including the United States which took on responsibilities in Europe which were not always easy to justify on the domestic front. Canadian military planners took part in international consultations and then, weighed military requirements against a budget set inside Canada by governments with strong social policy agendas. What was ideal or even required from the military side was not always possible. The NATO gap was to plague Canadian defence planners who became obsessed with cost cutting, integration, effective and cheap organization and stretching the defence dollar. Changes in government, in Prime Ministers, in Ministers of National Defence and in the Chairmen, Chief of Defence and in Chiefs of Defence Staff, left different marks on Canadian defence policy. These differences were mostly of emphasis or of changes in defence specifics. A grand strategy of military dependence and a strong emphasis upon the quality of life in Canada remained consistent throughout.

When Pearson became Prime Minister, Canadian forces in Europe got nuclear weapons and the Bomarc missiles in Canada became nuclear armed. This step strengthened Canada’s NATO contribution, though by this time, NATO had other troubles. The change to flexible response was especially problematic for France and with France’s military withdrawal, NATO again reexamined Article 2, attempting to make NATO more responsive and relevant to social and economic changes. In part because of the success of early NATO grand strategy, the standard of living in Europe and the ability of European nations to provide for their own defence were dramatically improved. By the mid 1960s, Canada had declined as a world power, although the quality of life improved. Europeans were less vulnerable and the West Germans much more influential.

Though our military had influence within NATO, some Canadians began to wonder what Canadians were doing in Europe at all. By February and March of 1967, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on National Defence began to consider the military relevance of Canada’s role in NATO. General Allard, by now Chief of the Defence Staff, indicated that while the decision was a political one, he did not disagree with the views expressed by John Gellner, a defence critic with the Toronto Globe and Mail. Gellner questioned NATO strategy and indicated that the military value of Canada’s contribution was minimal. These views would be reinforced by General Allard in public addresses over the next year.

The time was ripe for Pierre Trudeau’s dramatic re-evaluation of Canada’s foreign and defence policies. The subsequent fifty percent cut in Canada’s NATO presence in the early 1970s was credited with diminishing
Canada’s influence in Europe. Yet, contrary to popular myth, Trudeau did consult his military and had Allard’s agreement on changes in the location of troops in Europe. This step was a logical outcome of unification and allowed for the establishment of Canadian Forces Europe and placed all our European forces under Canadian Command.

Trudeau’s changes were dramatic and painful, but concerns with national interest and the quality of life in Canada were not departures from Canadian grand strategy. By shifting the emphasis in Canadian defence policy to national security, Trudeau was responding to changes in Canadian society and recognizing that Europe had also changed. Collaboration and cooperation in the alliance continued. No doubt, the morale of the Canadian military, damaged by unification, was hit again by the cuts to the Canadian NATO contribution. The continued process of defence review and reorganization also took its toll.

United Nations Organization

Collective action in the United Nations was a Canadian defence priority, despite disillusionment with the world body in the early years of the Cold War. Containment of communism, active promotion and development of liberal democracies and industrialization of the Third World were consistently pursued goals. Peacekeeping became an increasingly important activity for the Canadian military. It was one method of fulfilling our alliance duties and it seemed to allow Canadians to make a more independent and morally acceptable contribution to peace and security. It was also a method for the promotion of Canadian values and even carried with it some aspects of a Christian missionary spirit. In these actions and in the war in Korea, Canadians sought high moral ground. Myths of heroism pervade many works about peacekeeping, though in the early days, it did not enjoy high military prestige. As time went on, Canadians participated in more operations, became more experienced and valued for their contributions in communications, air transport and logistics.

Boredom, always an enemy, could create difficult problems for Canadian peacekeepers and any careful review of the war diaries written by units on peacekeeping duty reveals some of expected difficulties encountered when drinking or drugs and inactivity were combined. On the whole, Canadians managed to keep their reputations intact and performed peacekeeping well enough to perpetuate a very powerful myth which has become an important part of Canadian identity as well as Canadian defence policy.
Preserving an independent Canadian identity and Canadian national interests were important aspects of Canadian United Nations activities. Following the Second World War, our diplomats insisted upon the right to participate in Security Council decisions regarding the use of Canadian troops. Canadians did not use conscription during the Cold War: only volunteers from the regular and reserve Canadian forces have ever served on United Nations operations, including the Korean Conflict. Questions of choice were fundamental and a part of the Canadian value system. Although international security was in the Canadian national interest and Canadians sought to fulfill their responsibilities as world citizens, they were able to set certain limits on how those responsibilities affected Canadian society.

The Korean Conflict is often seen separately from other United Nations actions. It was war, whatever terms government used to describe it. While it was different from peacekeeping, Canadian motivation remained much the same. By fighting alongside Americans, British, and other Commonwealth troops in Korea, Canadians made their ideological commitment to anti-communism real. However, Canadians were not uncritical partners. They sought to limit action beyond the 38th parallel which divided the two Koreas and when this failed, to avoid action close to the Chinese border. After Chinese involvement, Canadians began to push for an early peaceful settlement, negotiating with the Indians for intervention with the Chinese and using their influence with the State Department in Washington. Korea was different, but it helped define Canada’s role within the United Nations. Canadians participated as a part of the anti-communist alliance, but they maintained a critical, independent and sometimes, moralistic viewpoint.

In the early Cold War, with the Korean Conflict and developments in NATO, Canadian peacekeeping activities had a very low profile until the Suez Crisis in 1956. The first Canadian observers were sent to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949. This mission and the activities of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965, furthered Canadian interests in maintaining peace between two Commonwealth members. In Cyprus, Canadians played a similar role with regard to Turkey and Greece, two members of the NATO alliance. Canadians went on to take part in numerous endeavours with varying degrees of success.

United Nations activities were listed as the fourth place defence priority in the 1971 White Paper and yet they continued to grow in size and number. The terrorist actions of the “Front de la Liberation du Quebec” (FLQ) created a domestic military priority and internal security was by
1970 a serious concern as the government declared the War Measures Act and the Canadian Armed Forces were called out in aid to the civil power. The changes had been fast and furious. Unification of the armed forces in 1968, implementation various cost-cutting measures, including the reduction of the Canadian military commitment to NATO, a commitment to domestic security and terrorist actions on Canadian soil presented new and difficult challenges. During this time, the military continued to develop mobility and flexibility to meet United Nations needs.

By the mid-1970s, Canadians were serving as observers and peacekeepers in a number of delicate international situations and the United Nations had developed more specific criteria and financial formulas for peacekeeping operations. An international reputation as professional peacekeepers was important for the pride and morale of the Canadian military. Canadian peacekeepers played the symbolic roles of muscular Christians in action. Peacekeeping also played a unifying role within Canada. Unlike NORAD and NATO, United Nations peacekeeping was supported by virtually all political parties. Yet, Canadians recognized that the mere presence of United Nations forces did not resolve a conflict.

Civil Defence

Civil defence shared many of the same features as other areas of Canadian defence policy. There was a strong international component; joint American-Canadian planning and consultation with the NATO Civil Defence Committee. This committee made recommendations and coordinated plans between different NATO countries. Military strategy was firmly anchored in the notion of deterrence. Civil defence was but one aspect of deterrence and preparedness. Many actual Civil defence plans appeared unrealistic and costly. Appreciations of threat in Canada emphasized that there would be little warning of nuclear attack, that Canadian cities were less important targets than American cities, and that the cost of protection was very high in comparison to low likelihood of attack. While civil defence was not ignored completely, it remained firmly on the back burner. Canadians funded civil defence projects which had utility other than for defence against nuclear attack. Improvements in health care facilities, standardization of safety equipment, and planning for local disasters like floods, fires and storms could be easily justified and fit nicely with domestic priorities.

Civil defence in Canada was shunted between Departments, none of which welcomed the additional responsibility. At first, the responsibility of
the Department of National Defence, civil defence received little attention until the appointment of Major General F.F. Worthington as Civil Defence Co-ordinator on 1 October 1948.\textsuperscript{55} Canada co-ordinated plans with the U.S. and visited NATO countries to learn more about the complex situation in Europe. No war had been fought on Canadian territory since 1814 and Canadian civil defence planners complained bitterly about the tremendous apathy of the Canadian population. They were at time tempted to abandon the population to its fate. Still, the less costly and more practical plans progressed.

Virtually all NATO countries had to negotiate with various levels of government to implement civil defence plans: most developed warning systems, evacuation plans and shelters.\textsuperscript{56} Canadians built some shelters, especially in Ottawa and other carefully selected centres. Unlike neutral countries like Sweden which spent considerable amounts on huge shelters to protect their population, Canadians relied upon plans for the evacuation of urban areas. These plans made sense in view of the size of Canada and its relative lack of concentrated urban populations and the unlikelihood of actual attack. Sirens were installed in many Canadian cities, instructional films and tapes were prepared on survival skills and local civil defence committees were established in most urban centres.\textsuperscript{57}

Improvements in health care and a national health insurance plan were domestic priorities that could be linked to civil defence. Dr. F.W. Jackson, a Health and Welfare official serving on a Civil Defence Committee during the 1950s when Canada had no national health insurance, justified plans for a government controlled national scheme, stating that “If no international disaster occurs, we will have at least accomplished something in an overall health program”.\textsuperscript{58} In a similar fashion, disaster relief allowed for the coordination of federal, provincial and municipal authorities in real situations and gave civil defence co-ordinators a sense of purpose.

Practicality did not completely dominate. Concern for the Christian moral character of Canadian society was evident in civil defence plans. The Civil Defence Social Science Committee noted that,

\begin{quote}
Death is the inevitable lot of man in any case and it can be—and often has been—faced without panic by those who were willing to die for a purpose greater than themselves. In the past, this has been the glory of the courageous few; in the future it must become the accepted value (sic) of the majority. Such a populace will still desire self-preservation, but will in addition, desire the preservation of their dependents and of their values still more.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

On the home front, Christian moral values would be protected as well.
The planned evacuation of certain Canadian urban centres posed problems. Emotional disturbances and disruptive behaviour among displaced individuals were expected and plans were created for the spiritual guidance and comfort of citizens. In the case of actual nuclear attack, these plans included the mass burials of unidentified bodies as a possible necessary measure.\textsuperscript{60} Detailed guidelines, distributed to local clergymen, concerned the counselling and care of the bereaved and emotionally disturbed individuals, the maintenance of religious services and sermons and the religious education of children through Parent-Teacher Associations during any disaster. Widespread fear, panic, possible looting or black marketing were to be avoided; good civil defence was equated with the maintenance of law and order, including the preservation of the family and family-oriented values.\textsuperscript{61} Spiritual well-being was regarded as a key factor in successful civil defence.

\textit{Summary}

Canadian grand strategy was successful in providing Canadians with a high standard of living. It was both practical and idealistic. Participation in alliances assisted defence. Canadian forces benefited from standardization of equipment, training with allied forces, and developed their special areas of expertise. Though public statements on defence policy masked our dependence, at no time during the Cold War did Canada have an independent defence plan for the protection of her own territory. Our economy benefited from reduced defence spending and from defence production. We invested in social and health programs to improve our quality of life and in international military commitments outside the country.

These policies were based upon recognition of international interdependence and go back to the ideals of decency and neighbourliness expressed by O.D. Skelton in the 1920s. A belief in the perfectability of mankind and a faith in the future were evident in this grand strategy. It was also based on realism. Canadians criticized the extent of American action in Korea; they moralized about Vietnam; they won Nobel prizes for peacekeeping; they participated in strategic discussions and they developed new military technologies. None of this changed the basic fact of dependence. And worse still, at the end of the Cold War, with several Canadian peacekeepers found guilty in charges related to the torture and murder of a young man in Somalia, Canadians would have to begin to admit that we were not untouched by sin. That admission might be more difficult than even recognition of dependence in a country where moral values played such an important part in statement on defence policy.
CANADA: SOVEREIGNTY, SUPERIORITY, AND THE COLD WAR

ENDNOTES

1. Director General History, 81/519, Hillmer, Norman “O.D. Skelton: the Scholar who set a future pattern” in International Perspectives, September 1972 p.42. The Directorate of History produces official histories of the Canadian Armed Forces. It also holds selected records from the Department of National Defence and private sources to support its historical functions. Annual historical reports from each unit of the Canadian Armed Forces are a systematic source for capturing detailed information. (Hereafter DGHistory).


8. The documents emanating from the Department of External Affairs and from other countries are often needed to get at the rationale of Canadian defence policy. In the Canadian Access to Information Act, Section 13 concerns information provided in confidence from the government of a foreign state; an international organization of states; the government of a province; etc. All such information is exempt from disclosure unless the originating body either consents to it or publishes the information. While safeguarding information received in confidence, the effect of this legislation is that Canadians can often discover key documents concerning their defence policies from foreign governments more directly than their own. Such dependence is frustrating for scholars and archivists alike.


11. Ibid. "Comments on Joint Appreciation Plan by Charles Foulkes, 26 June 46.

12. DGHistory, 73/1223, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff fonds—also known as the Raymont Collection. This fonds, emanating from the Office of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff covers the period from 1946 to 1968, including some documents from 1940 to 1972. For general defence policy history, researchers should examine White Papers and Department Annual Reports, Douglas Bland’s The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947–1985 (Kingston, Ontario: Ronald P. Frye, 1987) and the uncatalogued narratives on defence policy prepared by Colonel R.L. Raymont.

14. Excellent though brief administrative histories of many of these bodies are available at the Director General History in R.L. Raymont’s narratives on Canadian defence policy.


18. DGHistory, 73/1223, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff fonds, files 302 and 309—there are a number of other files in the fonds concerned with this topic. These two are open; others are still classified.


CANADA: SOVEREIGNTY, SUPERIORITY, AND THE COLD WAR

30. Bercuson, David J. “Canada, NATO and Rearmament, 1950–1954: Why Canada made a difference (but not for very long)” in John English and Norman Hillmer’s Making a Difference? Canada’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order (Toronto: Lester, 1992) p. 120. Note that Roy Remple and Sean Maloney disagree and argue Canada did make a difference after the 1950s.


34. DGHistory, 84\126, dossier 30, fonds Allard, General Charles Foulkes, “Our defence dollar is being wasted” Star Weekly Magazine, 14 October 1961, p. 5.

35. DGHistory, 84\126, dossier 16, fonds Allard, 4 CIBG (1958) Galloway to VCGS, 12 Nov 1958.

36. The papers of most of the Prime Ministers and Ministers of National Defence are held in the Manuscript Division, National Archives of Canada. Some papers of the Chairmen, Chiefs of Staff and Chiefs of Defence Staff, especially of Foulkes and Allard are held at the Director General History.

37. Campbell, Consultation and Consensus in NATO. Implementing the Canadian Article p. 28.


39. DGHistory, 73\1223, File 769.

40. Ibid. p. 296.


42. Departmental White papers, 1964, 1971, and Annual Reports, and DGHistory, 73\1223, files 458, 826, and 847. Peacekeeping activities are mentioned as one of four main defence activities in every analysis of defence policy after the Suez Crisis in 1956. Though fourth in defence priorities in the 1971 paper, peacekeeping activities increased in importance and numbers since that date.

43. DGHistory, Kardex 653.003 (D29) Statements and Speeches, Information Division, Dept of External Affairs, No. 47/12 to 54/5, passed to DHist by Lt. J. L. Granatstein, see especially “Views of Canada on matters before the United Nations, 27 Oct 1948.”


45. DGHistory holds most of the war diaries for Canadian peacekeeping units. Almost all of these are classified SECRET, although some portions of the Cyprus and Vietnam diaries have been reviewed and released. These war diaries form a comprehensive and revealing record of Canadian peacekeeping operations, though the quality of them varies.

46. Hillmer, Norman, Peacemakers, Blessed and Otherwise in Canadian Defence Quarterly (Summer 1989) p.55 This article provides an overview of the existing literature
and identifies the major themes that appear in it. Other articles in the same issue of Canadian Defence Quarterly provide useful accounts of specific missions.  

47. DGHistory, Kardex 653.003 (D29) Statements and Speeches, 54/3, p. 3.  

48. Fabian, pp. 132–133.  


50. William Johnston at DGHistory is now preparing a critical re-evaluation of Canadian operations in Korea.  


53. Ibid., p. 234.  

54. DGHistory, 73/1223, File 62—Civil Defence Policy Committee records.  

55. DGHistory, 73/1223, Raymont, R.L. “The Formulation of Canadian Defence Policy, 1945–1964” p. 23. In August of 1949, a sub-committee of the War Book Committee was appointed to study problems of civil defence. By 1951, a Cabinet Committee on Emergency Measures was introduced. It became the Civil Defence Policy Committee in May 1955, under the Chairmanship of the Secretary to Cabinet. Its members included the Deputy Ministers of Health and Welfare, External Affairs, National Defence, Finance and the Civil Defence Co-ordinator. Administrative responsibility for civil defence passed from the Department of National Defence to the Department of Health and Welfare in February 1951. But, with a numerous departments involved, Privy Council Office served in a co-ordinating function. On 1 June 1957, the Government established the Emergency Measures Organization within Privy Council Office. By 1974, responsibility passed back to the Department of National Defence and the organization was re-named National Emergency Planning Establishment, later becoming Emergency Planning Canada.  

56. DGHistory, Kardex 112.354(D29) General Worthington’s personal and confidential diary, 1956, p. 24—NATO Civil Defence Committee minutes of 30 and 31 May 1956.  

57. see Appendix 2 for a listing of civil defence audiovisual sources.  


60. DG History Kardex file 112.354 (D29)—Personal and Confidential Diary of Major-General F.F. Worthington, 1956, p.21.  

61. Ibid.—various civil defence plans discuss the difficulties of any family separations, the importance of maintaining family units where possible to keep anxiety levels low and consider the importance of family to good psychological health.
The Cold War Archives in the French Army Historical Department

Claire Sibille

Far from forming a single, exhaustive entity, the French Army Historical Department Archives concerning the Cold War are divided into several categories. In fact, the public and private archives dealing with East-West relations from 1946 to 1962 are divided into no less than seven distinct series.

The archives of the Central Defense Offices after 1946, in which series Q, R, S, T serve as a classification context, are on the upper level. Thus, series Q includes the archives of the Secretary General of Defense, the inter-ministry body directly connected to the Prime Minister. Series R corresponds to the archives of the Office of the Defense Minister and the offices dependent directly on it. Documents resulting from the activity of the armies’ staff are classified as series S, those issued by the army’s staff are in series T. The researcher should examine the archives of the commands, divisions, and subordinate units, especially that of the Supreme Command of the French Forces in Germany and the “Indochina” archives. As to the different private archives, they often contain duty documents and are a useful complement to the documents resulting from the actions of public bodies.

Public or private, the Historical Department Archives on the Cold War furnish very diverse and complementary information, despite the inevitable duplications and occasional omissions usually due to the negligence of the dispensing organisms. This report will attempt to specify the principles of classification, their content, and their interest.

Archives of the Secretary General of the National Defense

General Affairs Divisions and Information

Created in 1946, the office of the Secretary General of the National Defense is directly responsible to the Prime Minister. It is in charge of the preparation for international negotiations that have implications for defense
as well as the research and use of information. The classification and content of its archives correspond to its organization and its contributions.

Thus, the notes and files of the General Affairs Division for the Heads of Staff Council dealing with NATO, the European Defense Community, and the Soviet reactions to the Bonn and Paris agreements will be found in sub-series 6Q.

The Information Division transferred to the Historical Department daily and weekly information bulletins on European events from 1949 to 1962, studies of the inter-ministry information committee, in particular, those concerning economic relations between the two Germanies, the Soviet Bloc, Western European defense policy, and the evolution of the Western Communist parties. The periodical production of the Information Application Center 8 consists of information notes on defense in Western countries from 1959 to 1962, mission reports, monthly, semi-monthly, and weekly bulletins, files, notes, and studies on the Soviet world from 1952 to 1979, as well as a significant collection of reports of the military attachés of the Soviet Bloc countries: Albania, G.D.R., Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia.

National Defense Committees 10

The Secretary General of Defense also operates the secretary's office of the Defense Committee. This consultative body was created in 1943–1944 in Algiers by the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Its current form, which resulted from the 7 February 1947 decree, is that of a limited council of ministers. Presided over by the President of the Republic, organically composed of the Prime Minister, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, the interior and finances, the Defense Committee prepares the actual decisions to be made concerning national defense in the council of ministers.

The files of the Defense Committee's sessions from 1943 to 1963 are kept in the Historical Department. 11 The Secretary General of Defense is currently making an inventory of them and reclassifying them. These files include preparation documents for meetings, the minutes of these meetings, and summaries of the decisions. The issues treated almost always involve the relations between Western European countries with a view to building Europe, the relationships between the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and between the two Europes, East and West, American assistance in Indochina, the organization of the “Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe” (S.H.A.P.E.), the relationships of France with Yugoslavia, and French-American cooperation concerning nuclear technology.
Military Office of the Presidency of the Republic

Turned over to the Historical Department by the Secretary General of Defense and integrated into sub-series, the archives of the Military Office and then the General Military Secretary’s Office of the Presidency essentially are studies of the U.S.S.R., the economy during the Cold War, the defense of the Central European theater, and the military strength of the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc from 1948 to 1968. This small archives (about sixty boxes) includes, in particular, information bulletins of the General Defense Staff, and studies of the Defense Institute of Higher Studies.

Archives of the Central Bodies of the Ministry of Defense

Heads of Staff Council

The Heads of Staff Council is a consulting body, made up of the four heads of staff united under the presidency of the Ministry of Defense or under that of the head of staff of the armies, it provides cohesion between the use plans developed by the head of staff of the armies and the predictions and programs of the heads of staff of each army. It sends out notification about strategic orientations, the organization of all the armies, and the military duty statutes.

The Defense Minister’s Office runs the secretary’s office of the council; therefore, this archives has been classified as sub-series 6R. The files are filed in chronological order of the meetings. At the head of the archives there is an index of the issues treated by the council from 1949 to 1965: defense of Western Europe, the French position relative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, defense of Indochina and Southeast Asia, French-American and French-German cooperation concerning weapons, the French-British Suez expedition.

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

Similar themes are encountered in the files of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, filed in sub-series 7R in chronological order of the meetings. Each file includes extensive reports on NATO strategy, French participation in NATO, the situation in Southeast Asia, the Near East, and the Middle East, faced with the “Soviet thrust,” examination of the multi-year development plans of the French armed forces within the context of the Cold War.
The archives of the General Studies Division complements the working files of the Heads of Staff Council; it includes files for the Head of Staff Council, concerning, in particular, security in Europe from 1955 to 1961, long term military policy, and France's relationships with its European allies from 1953 to 1974.

The Information Division has handed over the following to the Historical department:

- b. Information bulletins on the Warsaw Pact from 1969 to 1971;
- c. Accounts of meetings of military attachés accredited to Soviet Bloc countries from 1955 to 1957;
- d. Military information notes concerning the countries of the East and the Soviet occupation in Germany and Austria from 1951 to 1956;
- e. Files on the international situation after Stalin's death from 1953–1954;
- f. Information bulletins on Eastern and Western Europe from 1971–1973;
- g. Information notes on European countries (defense, the internal situation, the economy, foreign relations) from 1949 to 1973;
- h. Information notes for military attachés concerning the European problem, in particular, from 1956 to 1958;
- i. Information bulletins by country (internal situation, foreign relations, armed forces: Albania, G.D.R., Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, North Korea, Vietnam, the United States).

In the Foreign Relations Division archives—this division took part of the contributions and archives of the Information Division—are found:

- a. NATO reports on the situation in Europe and its defense from 1959 to 1974;
- b. Documents analyzing the consequences for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968;
- c. Information bulletins on the Soviet Bloc from 1971 to 1974;

Finally, the monthly and end of mission reports sent by armed forces attachés accredited to European countries; these reports concern defense, the internal situation, the economy, and foreign relations of these countries, and especially their relationships with France, from 1950 to 1974.
An inventory of the armies’ staff archives is currently being made, and the classifications are not definitive; these archives are not closed and therefore are open to growth.

*Archives of the Army Staff*

Part of the archives issued from the first army staff office concern the problems posed by French participation in NATO from 1951 to 1966 as well as logistical problems of S.H.A.P.E.

The third office, responsible for weapons research, has turned over to the Army Historical Department briefs of the operations of NATO working groups related to standardization agreements.

The annual and monthly reports of the armed forces attachés concerning the United States and the U.S.S.R. are an integral part of the archives of the second army staff office. Themes that recur the most frequently are the foreign policy of the two great powers, the preparation for psychological warfare within the context of the Cold War, the Korean War and McCarthyism, the organization of the armed forces, and the use of nuclear weapons.

*Other Archives*

Though this survey of issues treated in the archives of central defense organisms cannot be exhaustive, we have now to speak about two other categories of documents: those produced by the subordinate formations in Germany and Indochina from 1945 to 1956, as well as those that came into the Historical Department by an extraordinary path.

*Supreme Command of the French Forces in Germany*

The second office of the Supreme Command of the French Forces in Germany turned over to the Historical Department information files on the armies of the German Democratic Republic from 1954 to 1957, monthly syntheses of information and daily information bulletins, which cover the period 1954–1968. The third office, which produced monthly and quarterly syntheses of the events from 1945 to 1959 in addition to activities reports did the same.

In the archives of the Supreme Command of the French forces in Germany are also found activities reports of the Soviet military mission in the French zone, from 1948 to 1959, as well as defense and warning plans related to the Berlin blockade, especially graphics concerning air
traffic for the Berlin food drop, and the relationships with the German Berlin police and the military police of the Soviet zone from 1945 to 1959.\textsuperscript{44}

In addition, the Historical Department received last year a transfer of archives from the Baden Advanced Information Center; these archives included information bulletins on the army in the German Democratic Republic. The withdrawal of the French forces stationed in Berlin in September 1994 will result in the coming to Vincennes of the archives of the second office of the Command of French Forces stationed in Berlin: monthly information bulletins and photographs of the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic.

\textit{Military Organisms in Indochina from 1945 to 1956}

The Indochina War archives were produced on site and then brought back to France. They were the subject of a printed inventory published in 1990,\textsuperscript{45} which included an introduction and a subject index. The documents originated from bodies such as the office of the general commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in the Far East, the inter-army and ground forces staff, local commands, boards, and missions, and the North Vietnam ground forces. Some files concern American assistance in the associated states, Chinese aid to the Vietminh, recognitions of Ho Chi Minh's government by the U.S.S.R., and the Korean War.

\textit{Private Archives}

The archives of Generals Beaufre, Ely, Koenig, and Marshal Juin\textsuperscript{46} offer on a more limited scale the same features as the preceding since they include a number of duty documents.

The Koenig archives\textsuperscript{47} especially consists of documents concerning French internal policy and the European Community defense plan; indeed, General Koenig was the Defense Minister twice, in 1954 and 1955.

Deposited in the Historical Department in 1967 by Commander Dewasnes, the former aide-de-camp of the marshal, the Juin archives consists of 21 files accompanied by a piece-by-piece listing. As head of the defense general staff, the marshal had to study reorganizing it and new military orientations in the days following the war. In September 1951, he was named Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Ground Forces in the European Central Sector. Two files concerning the Brussels Pact and NATO, the defense of Western Europe, and the organization of the European Central Sector, as well as the European Defense Community,
correspond to this period of Marshal Juin’s activity. Deposited in the Historical Department by Madame Beaufre, the general’s wife, in 1976, the Beaufre archives includes 36 boxes, a part of which corresponds to the offices Beaufre occupied within NATO: he was head of the third office, then assistant head of the staff of the general commander-in-chief of the Western European armies, director of the inter-allied tactical study group, and finally, from 1958 to 1962 in the service of the Supreme Allied Command in Europe. Some files concern the Brussels Pact and negotiations for the Atlantic Pact, the organization of the supreme command, Western European defense, and nuclear war problems.49

General Paul Ely’s (1897-1975) archives were classified into six parts before their arrival in the Historical Department in 1975, and this classification was kept. These archives, marked IK 233, include 89 boxes. The first part goes from 1942 to 1948. The second part consists of General Ely’s daily calendar, which gives us his use of time and summaries of his conversations as well as numerous assessments of the events of 1953 to 1961. The third part focuses on the period when the general was the representative of France in the permanent Atlantic Pact group, and then head of the general staff of the armed forces (1949-1954). The documents concern the European army, the Brussels Pact, NATO, the French army and national defense, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Indochina, and Dien Bien Phu. The subject of the fourth part is Indochina where Paul Ely was named general French administrator in June 1954. The documents deal with the situation in this region, the Geneva agreements, and American assistance. The fifth part corresponds to the end of General Ely’s career (1956-1961), head of the general staff of the armed forces in March 1956, then head of the general defense staff in February 1959. The documents concern the preparation and execution of the Suez operation and long-term military policy. The sixth part duplicates the preceding parts for 1953-1961. The documents concern the organization of defense, military policy, and strategy.

In conclusion, it appears that the portion of the archives that can be immediately accessed in these repositories is very slight. Only 30-year papers of the first and third army staff offices and most of the documents of sub-series 10H are accessible. Decree 79-1035 of 3 December 1979 relative to the Defense Archives in fact put off to 60 years access of the archives of the military office of the President of the Republic, the Secretary General of Defense, the staff second offices, the information and international military relations offices as well as documents classified defense secret and top secret except for dispensations. Registered information files and reports concerning defense are treated the same way. As for
private archives, the official papers located there are subject to a common procedure, access of other documents is granted, according to the agreements passed between the donor and the Historical Department.

Any request for dispensation to the terms for access of defense archives is submitted:

a. To the Prime Minister, as far as the archives coming from the departments connected to him are concerned;

b. To the Minister of Defense as far as the other archives are concerned.

The authorization for dispensation expressly mentions the list of documents that can be accessed, the identity of the persons allowed to examine them, and the place where the documents may be consulted. They also specify, if need be, whether the documents may be reproduced and determine the methods for it.

Given the recent nature of these documents, most of the existing research tools for these archive depositories are typed lists or slips that accompany each transfer of archives; these lists or slips are then revised by each curator in charge of a series except for the Indochina War archives (cf. above) and the private archives which have available a methodical statement, which is really a guide intended to assist the researcher and which introduces each archives succinctly.

An index of the names of persons, places, institutions and important events is cross referenced to the introductory notes.

**APPENDIX**

*The Cold War Archives in the French Navy Historical Department*

By its mobility and its presence on the seven seas, the French Navy archives can provide essential information. Thus, the researcher should find in the French Navy Historical Department a copious and often significant but enough scattered documentation on the Cold War and more generally on the international policy and the defense of France and Western Europe faced with the Eastern Europe.

In Vincennes, the archives from 1945 to 1985 are classified according to a filing system which has been established in the nineteenth century: series are called by double letters and foregoing number III.

Though, these series are often poor for the beginning of the 1950's and you should in the same way consult incoming and outgoing mail of the
General Navy Staff\textsuperscript{31} which is chronological classified according to the issuing organisms or recipients. In this very rich chronological collection—there may be 60, 80 and even more than 100 boxes for a year\textsuperscript{32}—information is more or less abundant in the files: “General Armed Forces Staff”\textsuperscript{33}, “General Staff”\textsuperscript{34} (second and third offices, “general studies”, “signals, listening, radars”, “mobilization”, Department dealing with the Allied, 1956–1957), commands of naval bases and overseas, naval superintendents’ offices, capital ships, forces on the Mediterranean, in the Far East, letters coming from the Prime Minister and the other ministries, naval forces on the Rhine.

Most of the files after 1946 have been classified as sub-series III BB2 (incoming mail). You should find in the different sub-series corresponding to the Staff’s offices:\textsuperscript{35} letters, reports, studies, information bulletins. Though, these files are abundant only after 1960–1970. You should especially consult the activity reports,\textsuperscript{36} the documents concerning safety precaution for periods of international tension,\textsuperscript{37} the archives of the High French Command in Austria,\textsuperscript{38} information bulletins, studies and reports of the second General Navy Staff office\textsuperscript{59} (only 60-year old documents are available) and of military attachés, minutes of meetings, notes concerning long term military policy and development plans of the French naval forces may complete the documents which are classified into sub-series III BB3 (studies and information notes from High Navy Council and Heads of Staff Council).

There are other interesting sub-series, such as III BB4: documents concerning cruises, naval operations, training. You should especially consult sub-series III BB4 O1: the archives of the Armed forces Inspection in Indian Ocean. The sub-series III BB7 contains reports from the naval attachés, information notes on the Navy of other countries, and letters from the detached service accredited to the Supreme Command of the French Forces in Germany\textsuperscript{60} and from the sub-division of the French supply officer in Germany.

The private archives furnish complementary information,\textsuperscript{61} because many of these collections contain copies of official reports and letters. The papers of Admiral Barjot (1889–1960) correspond to the different offices he occupied after the World War II: member of the Navy Supreme Council, commander-in-chief in Morocco and in Tunisia, naval assistant of the Supreme Allied Command in Europe and then assistant of the commander-in-chief of the allied armies during the French-British Suez expedition. The Barjot archives consist of reports concerning Madagascar, South Africa, Australia, Pakistan, Ethiopia, discussions, and information notes on nuclear weapons and on the use of the Marine Forces in NATO.
The archives of Admirals Querville (1903–1967), Castex (1878–1968), Wietzel (1898–1982) and Amman (1904–1988) deal with important problems of foreign policy. Querville commanded in 1953 the division of the Far East, then he was commander-in-chief in North Vietnam and in Central Africa. Wietzel occupied the secretary's office of the Defense Minister in 1947 and had a seat in NATO's Heads of Staff Council. Admiral Amman was chief of the office of the armies' staff and then naval attaché in London.

The researcher should examine series UU, "Indochina War", especially archives issued from the High Commissar, ships and Naval forces in the Far East.\(^6\)

Out of Vincennes, there are the Archives of military ports: Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Toulon. Papers of naval commands and superintendent's offices -CECMED and CECLANT-, information bulletins and syntheses may be an indication of preoccupations and mentalities.

Pierre Waksman is the Archivist in Chief of the French Navy Historical Department.

ENDNOTES

1. In France, the organization of the public Archives is regulated by Law of 3 January 1979 and by Decree 79-1037 of 3 December 1979 relative to the competence of the Public Archives and the cooperation of the governing bodies in preservation and communication of the public documents. The Defense Archives take care of the documents coming from the Defense Ministry and from the Secretary General of Defense. Thus, the Army Historical Department depends on the Army Staff, the Navy Historical Department is connected to the Chief of Naval operations, and the Air Force Historical Department is submitted to the Chief of Staff Air.

2. Heads of the Staff Council, Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

3. Sub-series 3U.

4. Sub-series 10H.


6. "Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale."

7. "Divisions Affaires générales et Renseignement."

8. Sub-series 9Q, boxes 61–64, 68.


10. "Comités de Défense Nationale."

11. Sub-series 2Q.

12. "Cabinet militaire de la Présidence de la République."


14. "Conseil supérieur des forces armées."


17. Sub-series 4S, boxes 41–42.
20. 12S 32.
21. 12S 37.
22. 12S 23.
23. 12S 13.
28. 12S 7.
29. 12S 11–21.
30. 12S 9.
31. 12S 177–204, 208, 216.
32. Sub-series 14S, boxes 1–222.
33. Sub-series 6T, boxes 857–865.
34. Sub-series 15T, boxes 706–711.
36. Sub-series 3U.
37. Sub-series 10H.
38. Series K, private archives.
41. 3U 274–279.
42. 3U 280.
43. 3U 35.
44. 3U 281.
46. Series K.
47. IK 232.
48. IK 225.
49. Boxes 11 to 15, 17, 30.
51. Etat-Major Général de la Marine.
52. 100 in 1956.
53. Etat-major général des Forces armées.
54. Etat-major général.
55. There is a typed catalogue with an index.
56. Sub-series III BB 0.
57. Sub-series III BB 1 MOB.
58. Sub-series III BB 2 EG.
60. "Mission liaison-Marine auprès du Commandement en chef des forces françaises en Allemagne".
61. They are classified as sub-series GG.
62. 1440 boxes, typed catalogue.
A Short Guide to the Organization and Use of British Official Military Papers and Histories of the Cold War Period

John Harding

Introduction.

The intention here is to deal here primarily with military records, indeed mainly those of the Army. Those originating within the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office and within the Prime Minister’s Office will only be mentioned in passing. The aim of this short paper is to provide:

a. An overview of current British records policy and practice;
b. Consideration of the “key” areas of military records ranging from the high-level strategic discussions down to records at regimental level;
c. An outline of military historical writing within the Ministry of Defense and the Army.

British Records Policy.

From the point of view of a military historian by far the most valuable and authoritative sources of papers on the various aspects of British military policy during the Cold War period are to be found in the official papers which are released on a year by year basis to our central national archive, the Public Record Office (PRO), with offices at Chancery Lane in London and Kew in Surrey, the military records being held at the latter.

Before considering these records further, it is necessary to deal briefly with the system by which British official military records arrive at the PRO. The archiving of official records is controlled through the Public Records Acts of Parliament of 1958 and 1967 which, to generalize, provide for the release to the public through the PRO of most official records that have been selected for permanent preservation, approximately 30
years after the record's closure. In its recently published official White Paper on "Open Government," the British Government has confirmed the basic principle of this "30-year Rule."

As will be appreciated, however, given the mass of papers that are produced by government and Service organizations, there has to be a system to select those that are significant and historically worthy of preservation. The practice is that official papers are subject to review five years after their immediate administrative use has ended. A high proportion of routine papers are inevitably discarded at this point. Those for which a continuing administrative use is anticipated, or which are clearly of historical importance, are held in the MOD's archives for a further 20 years, when they are again reviewed. Those which are of historical significance are then transferred to the Public Record Office for release to the public at the 30-year point.

The review process allows account to be taken of the inevitable sensitivities of certain areas and subjects. The Public Records Acts include a formal system for the retention of material within the originating department beyond the 30-year point, or its closure at the PRO until a specified later date. The grounds for such cases are set out in the White Paper and any such material is subject to regular re-review to see if the sensitivity has reduced sufficiently to then allow their release.

As a result of the Government's policy of greater openness, explained in the aforementioned White Paper, a systematic process is underway to re-review records previously withheld from release at the 30-year point because of their contents. The intention is that as many as possible of these should now be released. This exercise has seen the release of more than 5,000 Ministry of Defense files previously unavailable at Kew.

A key feature of the British system of transfer of official papers to the PRO is that on transfer, the papers are always accompanied by detailed lists providing a separate identifying number for each file or volume of papers as well as a subject summary. Further, the records are placed within subject or originator related groups called "classes." For example, the volumes of papers from the British Chiefs of Staff Joint Planners are found within the distinct class of papers at the PRO under reference "DEFE 06" and within that class, each yearly volume or sub-volume has its own specific reference or "piece number."

These lists are readily available at the PRO in hard copy and are also available for all papers up to the early 1960s in a series of microfiche available for purchase so that libraries and academic institutions can have their own copies. A further feature of the Ministry of Defense classes of papers at Kew is that even when an individual "piece" is subject to retention or extended closure, its title is still shown on the class list.
These lists, coupled with the printed guidance leaflets and introductory notes available at Kew on each of the classes of papers provide a valuable tool for researchers and is a great strength of the British system.

**British Military Records.**

**Introduction.** In order to appreciate fully the coverage of the “Cold War” period in British military records, particularly those relating to the army, it is important to remember that for many countries the history of the “Cold War” is often focused largely on developments and tensions in Europe and in particular on the twice crucial flash-point of Berlin, as well as the containment and defensive activities of NATO. For Britain, while her contribution to NATO was a major pillar of Defense Policy, throughout the 40-plus years of the “Cold War,” nevertheless she also had territorial obligations and commitments that called for extensive military deployments outside Europe.

These deployments ranged from “hot” operations where open warfare broke out between the Cold War adversaries or their surrogates, an obvious example is the Korean War (1950–53), to the extensive counter-insurgency campaigns in overseas territories still governed by Britain against local groups who were inspired by, if not actively supported by, the Communist Bloc, an example is the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60.

Britain’s commitments to her overseas territories also resulted in several fairly sizeable non-Cold War related military counter-insurgency campaigns such as the “Mau-Mau” Emergency in Kenya, 1952–54 and the “EOKA” campaign in Cyprus, 1954–59.

Turning to the records of these operations and of British Defense Policy, these naturally fall into a number of categories according to both the originator and to the purpose they fulfilled.

**Policy Papers.** At the top of the pyramid of decision-making and policy during this period was the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, which included the Minister of Defense. Their considerations of defense matters and related policy issues were recorded primarily in the papers of the Defense Committee (DC). The papers of this and indeed other Cabinet level committees are contained, not in the classes of papers at Kew from the Ministry of Defense, but rather in those of the Cabinet Office, mainly in the “CAB” series, the DC being found in classes CAB 130 & 131. Prime Ministerial papers will be found in the “PREM” series. PREM3 and 8 are particularly useful.

Within the Ministry of Defense itself, consideration of issues and associated policy of the 1950–early 1960s is recorded at ministerial level
in the papers of both the Service Ministers Standing Committee (class DEFE 10) and the Ministers' Private Office files in DEFE 13 as well as class DEFE 7 which has more that 2,000 files of the Ministry of Defense Secretariat covering a broad range of defense policy, service organization, and administrative issues between 1946 and the early 1960s. The following examples of just a few titles indicate the value of this material for the study of Britain's Cold War defense policy: “Cooperation in Western European countries in Defense Research & Development, 1958–59” (DEFE 13:339); “UK, US, and German Collaboration on VTOL\STOL aircraft, 1961–62” (DEFE 13:263); “Future Cold-War Policy, 1962–64” (DEFE 13:245); and NATO Strategic Concept (DEFE 16). For the more directly military aspects of policy and planning, the key sources are naturally the papers of the tri-service Chiefs of Staff (COS) who as the Heads of their respective service provided the Minister and the Government with the appropriate professional advice on military matters. These papers fall primarily into two types. First, there are the registered files of the COS secretariat, DEFE 11. The following examples of some of the material indicates the value of this class to students of Britain’s “Cold War” military policies: “The Defense of the Rhine, 1953” (DEFE 11: 91); “NATO Requirements for Medium Range Ballistic Missiles” (DEFE 11: 222); “Organization of & Personnel Strength of BOAR, 1962–63” (DEFE 11: 243); and “Strategic Policy Berlin” (DEFE 11: 246–251). Of further importance are the files of subordinate committees to the COS of which perhaps the most important was the Joint Planning Staff (DEFE 6). Another key committee working for the COS, perhaps the most important, was the Defense Research Policy Committee (DPRC) with its own staff. The volumes of memoranda from this body are to be found in class DEFE 10 organized in volumes by year.

Second, there are the records of the formal COS Meetings themselves (DEFE 4) and the supporting memoranda considered at the meetings (DEFE 5). The Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff are of particular value as, in accordance with British practice, they record and identify the contributions of the individual Chiefs of Staff to the discussions, thus enabling a clearer picture to be gained of any different views that may have been expressed.

With regard to records dealing below the tri-service Chiefs of Staff level, I will concentrate on records concerning the Army and land operations. However the general principles in terms of the organization of business within a service department is generally applicable to the naval and air services.

Within the Army, the two most senior decision-making bodies are the Army Council (renamed in 1964 the Army Board), and its Executive
Committee. In addition there are a number of other sub-committees including two particularly significant bodies: one concerning organizational matters, the Standing Committee on Army Organization (SCAO); and one on weapons matters, the Weapons & Equipment Policy Committee (WEPC). The papers and minutes of the meetings of these key bodies are all in PRO and in one class, WO 163, with material organized in volumes by year. These papers provide an essential tool for the study of the background to the major decisions on the whole range of matters concerning the Army’s organization, deployment, equipment, and maintenance.

For the period up to 1964, the papers of the Army and Ministry policy branches that carry out daily business on these policy matters are found primarily in their “registered” files in class “WO 32” at the PRO. In this class the files up to the late 1950s are grouped on a thematic basis with a separate subject index. Unfortunately this system has now been abandoned and the files from the late 1950s onwards are only placed in a strict numerical sequence making the location of specific subject more time consuming. The other key classes for general overviews at the War Office level of operations and intelligence are: WO 106 Directorate of Military Operations in the War Office, whose later papers run into the post-1945 period, and WO 208 Directorate of Military Intelligence which contains copies of the War Office’s periodic intelligence reviews of occurrences and trends world wide.


It should be noted that from 1939 until 1960, the research, development, and production of weapons and equipment lay not with the Ministry of Defense or the services, but primarily with the Ministry of Supply (MOS). However in 1960, when this arrangement was ended and this task returned to the Services, the files of the MOS were added to those of the Ministry of Defense. The majority of the detailed papers on the R&D aspects are to be found in the several “AVIA” classes at KEW, although both WO 185 and WO 32 contain some central MOS files of particular rel-
evance to Army matters and files concerning chemical warfare research are in WO 188 and WO 195. The extensive Army Operational Analysis papers are found in WO 191.

**Operational Records from 1945.**

The contemporary records of Army operations since 1945 reflect the long-standing practices set out in the regulations issued for the Army’s administration, known as “Queen’s (or King’s) Regulations.” These regulations require all major headquarters, formations (from Army HQs through divisions and brigades), and individual units of battalion equivalent for all arms and services, to produce on a monthly basis a “Commander’s Diary,” formerly known as a “War Diary.”

In order to achieve a measure of standardization in the content of these items, a standard proforma was used which gave instructions and advise on how the Diary should be compiled, the contents required, and disposal instructions. It is expected that the required contents should include details of movements, unit strengths, casualties, outline details of any actual combat, intelligence information, signals and other relevant facts including maps where appropriate.

These Diaries by virtue of the manner of their creation (on a daily basis as the operations develop) provide the most authoritative record of events at the appropriate level. However, it would be wrong to suggest that they provide a perfect or total record. Operational difficulties and accidents have in some cases led to Diaries not surviving to reach the MOD archives or only in incomplete form. Nevertheless they are the essential tool for study of operational and battlefield level matters that have involved the British Army since 1945.

Of course it must be noted here that not all British Army operations since 1945 have fallen easily into the category requiring such Diaries. Further, a new form of report, the Quarterly Historical Report (QHR) was instituted in July 1946 to replace the wartime War Diary. This report, less detailed than the War Diary, was to be kept by all formations and units who had been required to keep War Diaries. The QHR remained in use until April 1950, when the normal peacetime practice of an “Historical Record” was re-instituted.

The QHRs provide both formation/unit level coverage as well as, in some cases, headquarters and its constituent sub-branches. For 1946–1950 therefore, the QHR classes at Kew are arranged by major overseas commands. Examples of these are: WO 261 covers Middle East Land Forces; WO 263 covers Austria; WO 264 covers Trieste; WO 268 covers Germany; WO 268 covers the Far East Land Forces including Malaya, Hong Kong,
Burma, and India. In addition, there are also small classes of specific headquarter’s papers or operational reports for example: those covering operations in Palestine, 1945–48 are in WO 275 with some in WO 191; those covering East Africa, including the “Mau Mau” in Kenya 1952–56, are in WO 276.

Unfortunately, throughout the early period of the Cold War, field headquarters in almost all theaters did not routinely send their papers to the Service archives in the United Kingdom. Instead, they adopted the practice of routine destruction of material in-theater as soon as its immediate administrative use had ended. Therefore, coverage of the organization and administration of British forces in many overseas areas is less complete than might have been hoped for.

In major “hot” conflicts such as the Korean War, War Diaries were produced as were a number of other headquarters files and reports. These Diaries are in class WO 281 and WO 308. Additionally, War Diaries exist in class WO 288 for the Suez Canal operation in 1956, and in WO 305 for the Borneo operations between 1963–67, which are now becoming available under the 30-year rule.

Finally, the files in class WO 106 (Directorate of Military Operations in the War Office) and WO 208 (Directorate of Military Intelligence) should be consulted when studying these operations. Both classes have reports on operations by contemporary commanders. For example, WO 208 includes the intelligence reports of the British Military Mission to the Soviet Zone in Germany (BRIXMISS). A final class of papers are of particular interest: WO 165, The Adjutant-General’s papers which contain some casualty statistics for post-war operations.

It would be wrong to suggest that the surviving coverage of post-World War II British deployments in official records is comprehensive or wholly satisfactory to the military historian. Nevertheless, with careful research, it is still possible to gain a good general understanding of the course of both the development of British policy, strategy, and operations.

**Other Sources of Papers.**

Clearly, another valuable source of materials on Army operations and organization during the Cold War are the collections in the many Regimental and Corps museums, the three National single-service museums, and in the Imperial War Museum. In addition to these official institutions, there are of course a number of Universities and other academic institutions which hold valuable collections of private papers of former service commanders and senior political figures.
This material is of particular importance because it may help further illuminate the official material and fill in some of the gaps that do exist in official coverage. Examples of these, not listed in order of importance, are the Department of Documents at the Imperial War Museum in London; the Liddell-Hart Center in the Department of War Studies, King's College, London; the Archives of Churchill College Cambridge; the Department of Records at the National Army Museum in London; and the Mountbatten papers at the University of Southampton.

*British Official Military Histories and Studies of the Post-1945 Period.*

The British system of recording and producing histories of military operations falls effectively into three main parts. First, Army operations are studied and reported on by a number of bodies within the Ministry of Defense and the Army. The appropriate commanders and their staffs produce immediate “in house” post-operational reports and studies on a wide range of issues and these are supplemented as required by further studies. Examples of these are those reports produced by the Ministry’s Operational Analysis staffs and by the Army’s Doctrine and Concepts Directorate, as well as other by the specialist research establishments. Further longer-term “in house” classified accounts are prepared by the three Service Historical Branches.

These various works are intended to provide authoritative coverage of operations. All aspects are covered to include policy inception at the highest levels, through planning and deployment, logistics and intelligence, down to the combat operations and “lessons learned.” The works are not written intentionally for publication and release to the public, although like all official records, they will pass to the public archives through the standard records review system. For example, the originally classified Report of Operations in Kenya, May 1955–Nov 1956, by the General Officer Commanding, is now at Kew (WO 276: 517).

The authors of the “in-house” studies are naturally given the fullest access possible to records and relevant personnel in order to produce the necessary accuracy and authority that such work demands. The emphasis is on accuracy and thoroughness, based on hard evidence from contemporary, authoritative source material, including the production of extensive supporting annexes of key papers.

The second part involving official military histories are the published works. Many senior commanders may well produce a formal “Dispatch” which outlines the background and the course of the operation. This is
then usually published. For example, the Suez Operation appeared on 12 September 1957 as the “Supplement to the London Gazette of Tuesday 10 September 1957.”

The Government may also subsequently provide Parliament with a “Command Paper” outlining lessons or points from a campaign. An example of this was one delivered to Parliament after the Falklands Operations in 1982. Additionally, “Statements on Defense Estimates,” presented annually to Parliament by the Government, may also contain a summary of recent operations. In some cases, the Ministry of Defense or the Government’s Central Office of Information may produce a short account of the operation for public sale, either during the course of a long conflict, or at its end.

Within this framework of published material, Britain also has a program of writing and publishing “Official Histories,” covering both significant military and civilian subjects in the post-World War II period. These are written as “official histories” with the aim of providing the public at home and abroad with an authoritative overview of the policy and course of events. However the views expressed are naturally those of the author who is normally not a government official, but someone especially commissioned for the individual project. The author receives research help and administrative support from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office which oversees and administers all the volumes of the published Official History series. The authors of these Official Histories are of course given access to the relevant official papers as well as any pertinent personal papers.

An example of an Official History which deals with post-1945 military operations is the “History of the British Contribution to the United Nations’ Operations in Korea 1950–53,” written by General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, the first volume of which was published in 1992 and the second and final volume of which will be published in the near future.

The third part of official military history are unit histories. The British military experience during any period, including that of the Cold War, is covered at a regimental level throughout the British Army. Although we do not have permanent historians serving within field headquarters, formations, and units, there is a long tradition of the publication of historical accounts of units and in some instances of formations. The more recent editions of these include in many instances coverage of the unit’s activities in the Cold War period and campaigns. The works are based primarily on both the Commander’s Diaries where operations are concerned, and for units of both the official “Unit Historical Record” and other papers held with the unit’s own headquarters or museum.
These unit histories are an important source in providing the coverage of events from their level and embracing the more ‘human’ element which may well be less well covered in the other forms of history which concentrate on policy and higher level matters.

Summary

The British Army has a well-established method of recording and subsequently writing about its operations. All are closely linked to the administration of the Ministry of Defense’s archives and Public Record Office archive at Kew.
SECTION VIII

U.S. Military Archives In Washington
As a rapid-deployment amphibious assault force, the Marine Corps always was ready to play an active role when the Cold War turned warm. In the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, Marines were deployed to counter perceived threats by our global adversaries. However, the Marines had no significant operational involvement with the Berlin crisis of 1958-61. Having said that, I must point out that field training exercises and forward deployments in other areas of the world may have been used to threaten our Eastern bloc adversaries. Nixon and Kissinger did not invent the concept of “linkage.”

The Marine Corps Archives hold the operational records of the Marines from World War II through today. The primary reporting units are the battalions and squadrons, with higher echelons also reporting. Prior to 1965 such reports would be called “war diaries” if the units were in combat, “command diaries” in peacetime. These documents provide thorough coverage of World War II, less than thorough coverage of Korea, and erratic coverage of peacetime activities. For many units there are large gaps in the historical record.

You will not be surprised to learn that, in the early stages of World War II and Korea, units were more concerned with battle than with preparation of extensive reports. These were not produced until 18 months after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Fortunately the great battles of the central and western Pacific, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, fall outside this 18-month period. There is a similarly long period of sketchy records for the Korean War; unfortunately, much combat activity already had taken place, such as the Inchon landing and the retreat from the Chosin reservoir. During the downsizing that took place after each war, it seems that very few commanders cared much about documenting their units’ activities.

To correct this problem, in 1965 the Commandant issued an order requiring each command to report annually in peacetime, monthly if in
combat. These reports are called “command chronologies”, and they provide a nearly complete record of the activities of each Marine Corps unit since 1965. They constitute by far the largest part of our holdings. However, even with the Marine Corps Order, we constantly are reminding units to submit missing chronologies.

The command chronology consists of four parts. First is the organizational data, including the unit’s location and the names of the commanding officer and major subordinate commanders. Next is a narrative summary of the unit’s activities during the reporting period. Third is a chronological listing of significant events. The fourth part contains supporting documents, which are anything that the command historian wishes to include: the staff daily journals, messages, maps and overlays, newspaper articles, photographs, orders, or nothing at all. As with all such chronicles, the quality of the command chronologies varies according to the skills and interests of the authors.

We have organized the command chronologies numerically by unit. The records of the 1st Marine Division are followed by the 1st Marine Regiment, the 1st Battalion of that Regiment, the 2nd Battalion, etc. These are followed by all the other 1st battalions in alphabetical order; for example: Engineers, Medical, Military Police, Radio. The remaining echelons follow in alphabetical order: brigade, company, force, group, unit, and they are followed by the 2d Marine Division, etc. The air units have their own numerical designations and are filed separately from the ground units.

As you will have realized by now, this largest component of our Archives will not be of great assistance to students of the Cold War. In one of those batches of miscellaneous records so beloved by archivists, I located a document entitled “Marine Corps Cold War Plan”, issued in 1965. Probably it was iterated annually, but we have only the 1965 version, which we declassified in 1985. The full document is three inches thick and contains detailed mobilization plans. I have forwarded for review by Conference participants two extracts from it containing policy matters. Of course, the full text is available from us.

I have forwarded for your review an extract from another document, “A Concept For the Marine Corps of the 1970’s”, which also is to be found among those miscellaneous records. This 6 inch thick document sometimes is called the Armstrong Board report. The extract consists of the table of contents and the first six parts of the report, which deal with general concepts and policy matters. The entire document was declassified in 1987 and is available from us.

There is a third document that might be useful to Cold War researchers. This is titled, “The Role of the Marine Corps in the National
Security Strategy,” and it was issued in May, 1974. Again, I am providing a copy of portions of this 1 inch thick document to Conference participants. Those portions include extracts from the table of contents, the summary, and a strategic overview which lists Atlantic and Pacific crises in which the Marine Corps was involved. Berlin is not on that list. The entire document was declassified in 1980 and is available to the public.

Locating additional information about Marine Corps preparation for the Cold War will require some scholarly sleuthing. The command chronologies for the Marine Corps schools; for the Research, Development, and Acquisition Command; and for the Combat Development Command might be helpful. These are the organizations responsible for the development of the strategy, tactics, and equipment to be used in future conflicts. I also would recommend the records of the training exercises, which might contain clues about whom, when, and where the Marines were preparing to fight. We have declassified some of these, and we hope to review the remainder during this calendar year. Another possible source of information is the Annual Summaries of Activities and their predecessor series.

All of these records are available from the Marine Corps Archives, although not all of them are physically stored there. Because we have limited storage space, we keep all records generated prior to 1965, and some from the Vietnam War, in the Washington National Records Center, operated by the National Archives in near-by Suitland, Maryland. We can authorize researchers to use specific boxes of records there with 24 hours notice. However, once at the Records Center, a researcher cannot see boxes which had not been requested previously; the National Archives requires a full day’s notice. Some researchers prefer to have us recall the records for their use in our Archives. This requires a minimum of five working days notice to the National Archives.

We are located in Building 58 of the Washington Navy Yard, in downtown Washington and conveniently close to the Navy Archives, the National Archives main building, and the Library of Congress. Reservations are not required to use our facilities, nor is there any restriction on who may use them. Our hours are 8 AM–4:30 PM Monday through Friday, excepting holidays.

Organizationaly the Marine Corps Archives consist of two parts. The Official Records Unit contains the operational records discussed previously. The Personal Papers Unit collects and preserves materials documenting the history of the Marine Corps. These materials include maps, photographs, diaries, letters, memoirs—anything that might add to the historical understanding of what it was like to be a Marine. Our donors rank from
Private to Commandant, and the collections span the entire history of the Marine Corps, from its creation through Somalia.

Many of the collections contain copies of official records stored at Suitland. As an example, General Julian C. Smith’s collection contains hundreds of photographs of the battle for Tarawa, where he commanded the 2d Marine Division. General Oliver P. Smith commanded the 1st Marine Division in Korea, and his collection contains their Special Action Report for September–December 1950, spanning the Inchon landing and the Chosin reservoir.

Because so many of our earlier operational records are in storage at the Records Center, it is useful for researchers to contact us at least two weeks in advance with requests for assistance. It sometimes takes that long to retrieve records from the Records Center. We lack the staff to do any extensive research, but we will search the finding aids of our holdings for relevant materials. If appropriate, we will coordinate requests with the Reference, Library, and Oral History Sections. I have forwarded for Conference participants a copy of one page from our folder title lists of stored records. You will note that it shows not only reports of exercises but also information on the evacuation from the Tachen Islands in 1955 and a plan for war in Cambodia from 1957.

Let me cite you an example of our reference service which illustrates the extent to which we will assist researchers and, by implication, the limits of what we can do. Last summer we had a request from a Japanese researcher for information on the Japanese surrender in Tientsin, which he said was unavailable in Japan. Using the Library, I discovered that the Japanese in China had surrendered not once, but twice, at Tientsin and Tsingtao. Using the dates and Marine Corps units cited in publications, we located the official records dealing with these events, including the surrender documents. We searched our Personal Papers database and found several collections with photographs and accounts of the ceremonies. One of these referred to an interview with General Shepherd, which is in our Oral History Section. We photocopied all this information and sent it to Japan. Answering this request for a clear and easily-researched subject probably consumed a full day of someone’s time, mostly in research. This is the limit of what we can do. Extensive photocopying would have delayed our response considerably.

We can provide limited photocopying service: 20 free pages, thereafter $0.07 per page and $5 per quarter-hour for labor. There is a self-service copier available for $0.15 per page. We cannot copy maps or provide prints of photographs. With identifying information taken from our maps or photographs, researchers can order copies from the National Archives, which
is the official US Government repository for such materials. Researchers may use their own cameras to copy photos. The telephone number for the Official Records Unit is (202) 433-3439; for the Personal Papers Unit, (202) 433-3396. Our FAX number is (202) 433-7265.

We have folder title lists for all of the approximately 3000 cubic feet of records in storage at the Records Center. We will send copies of selected pages from those lists to researchers. Heavy use of the World War II and Korea records has resulted in some of the folders no longer being in their original order. Index cards contain information on all records received since 1965. These indices are available to the public. We now are in the process of converting that information into an electronic database, which we hope to make available to the public at some future time. If staff resources permit, we will add the folder title lists to that database.

The catalog of the personal papers collections exists in electronic form for staff use only. Ultimately, we will make it available to the public via modem. The 2200 donated collections have subject matter cross-references which we can search in our database. Upon request, we will conduct searches and mail the resulting printouts. Currently underway are projects to index our photo and map collections; these will be appended to the personal papers database when complete.

With very few exceptions, everything in our official records that has been declassified is available to the public. There are no restrictions on copying or quoting them. Only a very few of our personal papers collections have donor restrictions on access or copying.

Currently the Marine Corps Historical Center is working on computer storage and retrieval of data, both of finding aids and of the records themselves. I previously have described some of those efforts. We envision a reference database containing information on our archival holdings, oral histories, art collection, and museum collections. In our role as custodian and purveyor of information we in the Archives recognize the present and future importance of automated data systems. We have begun working toward having the command chronologies submitted in electronic form. Once that effort is successful, we will begin planning the conversion of some of our existing paper records. Limited funds and staff constrain these initiatives.

We continue to add more data to our catalog of personal papers and plan to expand it to include collections at other Marine Corps facilities, such as Parris Island, San Diego, and the Research Center at Quantico. Our long-term goal is to add our catalog to the National Union Catalog of Manuscript Collections. We would like to work with the National Archives to develop an up-to-date inventory of Marine Corps records in their cus-
today, in Record Group 127. The National Archives has transferred some records to their regional archival centers; we have lists of those. However, their last inventory of Marine Corps records was prepared 25 years ago.

I should note here that the Marine Corps records managers deal directly with the National Archives on the retirement of documents produced at Headquarters. Because the Marine Corps Archives exist primarily for the maintenance of operational records for use by our staff historians, records from Headquarters do not come to us as a matter of course. There may well be documentation of Marine Corps Cold War activities among these records. As examples, the three documents from which I have provided extracts were generated at Headquarters. That our Archives contain copies is purely an accident. For further information on policy documents, you should contact our Records Manager, Linda Goodwin, at (703) 614-2409.

Our major areas of concern are service, declassification, and conservation. Improvements in our service will involve providing more information, more quickly and more efficiently. As you might have gathered from my preceding discussion, we believe that automated data systems are the answer. We hope to begin receiving and providing records electronically, first within the Marine Corps, later to the general public. We also expect to get our finding aids on-line, both for our donated materials and for the older, paper, records.

Automated data systems also are the answer to conservation of our deteriorating World War II and Korea records. If we can obtain the funding and staff, we will copy selected portions of the battle reports from those wars. Thus, they will remain easily available to our staff historians, students at the Marine Corps University, and our researchers after we retire the paper records to the National Archives. The physical preservation of the hundreds of cubic feet of these war records would be extremely expensive. We lack the ability to undertake such a project, and we do not expect the National Archives to be able to do it, either.

If only someone would develop a method for computers to review documents for declassification! The sheer volume of classified documents and the re-marking requirements prevent us from declassifying documents as rapidly as we would like. We now are working on a major declassification review of all pre-Vietnam records, which we hope to complete by the end of the year. Although many of our Vietnam records have been declassified, we still have hundreds of cubic feet to review; we hope to start on them next year. Rather than become mired in reviewing this large overhang of classified records, we have decided to conduct concurrent systematic reviews of documents related to post-Vietnam conflicts: Beirut, Grenada, Desert Storm.
Like my colleagues from the other military service branches, I am faced with ever-increasing demands for service and have diminishing resources with which to meet them. The Marine Corps Archives has three civilians and a Marine. In order to provide the first-rate service that the Marine Corps and the researcher community expect from us, we will have to be smarter and more creative. Our responsibilities as custodians of the documentary history of the Marine Corps require us to find the resources, change the procedures, do whatever is necessary for us not only to hold the line but to do even better.
The Operational Archives Branch of the Naval Historical Center is a specialized archives whose holdings relate primarily to the operations of ships or other deployed naval forces, and to strategic, policy, and planning programs that are undertaken at senior naval headquarters in Washington or at major fleet commands.

In addition to this subject matter concentration, the records of the Operational Archives are specialized in terms of time period. With only a few exceptions, our materials date since 1939, with approximately half of these documenting the World War II period, and the remainder dating since 1946. The total volume of the archives, amounting to some 10,000 feet of records, is a large figure in itself. However, it is small in relation to modern record accumulations. Focusing on operations, planning and policy, rather than administration and management, much of the value of these Archives stems from the selectivity in its holdings, the unique system of arranging and cataloging the material, and an extraordinarily competent—albeit small—staff. In addition to its own holdings, the staff has extensive knowledge of where other historical material may be located. For example, in recent years, the Navy as a whole has deposited annually some 100,000 feet of documentation in Federal Records Centers, which is a decline from some years ago, when the volume of transferred naval records was closer to 250,000 feet each year. The extent of the Operational Archives' holdings has shown only a slight increase over the last several decades, since new accessions have largely been offset by transfers to other depositories.

Since our origin in 1942, special stress has been laid on acquiring directly from the originating command, as quickly as possible, individual documents relating to the special subject areas of the Operational Archives. Specific examples of such material include the reports describing combat actions or other operations of naval ships and forces in all areas of the world since 1939; war diaries submitted by most commands...
during World War II and the Korean War; and operational plans or orders that provide the broad guidance under which operations in war and peace have been undertaken. Other types of individual documents include documentation on fleet organization and strength, oral histories (including copies of most of Dr. Mason's projects at Columbia University and the Naval Institute), classified publications relating broadly to operations, and the annual command histories which have been submitted by most naval units since 1959 as well as certain other periods. Command histories, both annual and for especially noteworthy events, are a primary source of historical material covering the area of interest of this meeting, particularly those of the Navy's units operating in the fleets and forces. The prose of the narrative is of course important insofar as it reflects the views of the commander and some passages may be worthy of later quotation. Nevertheless, the most important material is hard fact, including the extremely valuable copies of original documents which are appended to the report. All of these materials are indexed and arranged into collections by the operational Archives, and hence from the technical archival point of view, the groups are "created" by us. From the point of view of the user, we hope these well organized and indexed documentary collections greatly facilitate research.

Another major category is groups of records mostly already organized that we receive from major offices within the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, from other major Navy Department staff components in Washington, or from major fleet commands. The total volume of all archival groups created since 1939 is far greater than we could handle and the broad scope of such files would greatly exceed the subject matter boundaries that we have set for ourselves. As a result, we look for and accession those files that are small in bulk, but proportionally more valuable in terms of the information they contain on operations, strategy, policy or planning. Excellent examples of records meeting this description are the relatively compact files of the immediate Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, primarily dating since 1939, which contain much significant strategic and policy data. The often-used Strategic Plans Division (formerly War Plans Division) files and the Politico-Military Policy Division complements the records of the Chief of Naval Operations. Records of other divisions at the headquarters level of the Chief of Naval Operations are the Navy's collection of JCS related matters, the Base Maintenance Division, the Logistics Plans Division, Submarine Warfare Division, Mine Warfare Division, Ship Movements Division, and the Civil Affairs/Military Government Branch. Another ideal group of records for our purposes is the Fleet Operations Division (including the message files of the Navy
Command Center formerly known as the Flag Plot Branch). In this connection, message traffic has become of more and more importance as this has tended, in many cases, to supplant letters as the main medium for the exchange of information and decisions. Further, these dispatches provide insights as to the formulation of policy, reasons behind major decisions, and important controversies. It is exceptionally rich in documentation on virtually all aspects of naval operations during the Cold War era. Considering the number of messages involved the material is limited in bulk and exceptionally well arranged and indexed.

An associated category are the office files of senior naval offices, which, at their best, represent a selection of those materials that were of particular significance to commanders with far reaching responsibilities. Examples of such materials include papers accumulated by former Chiefs of Naval Operations and by several former Admirals that served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The papers of some individuals, received from private sources, also can be found in the Operational Archives, even though it is the policy of the Director of Naval History to encourage potential donors to present such personal manuscripts to the Naval Historical Foundation.

The Archive's staff over the years has pulled together files relating to crises that have occurred since the close of World War II. These include the many encounters with aircraft resulting in damage to the vessels involved and often near-tragic consequences. Coverage of other international incidents such as the Berlin Blockades, and the Cuban Missile Crises to name a few are adequately documented. Another category of records are those from foreign sources. These records deal primarily with the immediate postwar period. Others are minor collections dealing with ship's technical data, order of battle, and items of intelligence on foreign ships. The National Archives holds the very important collection of Naval Attache reports. This large collection covers the period from the end of World War II into the early 1950's.

The Korean War coverage is perhaps the most comprehensively documented collection in the Archives. The Vietnam naval records focus almost entirely on operations themselves with little background material on such subjects as tactics or strategy. For such information we will have to depend heavily upon oral histories or memories of the major participants. With some exceptions most of the Vietnam documentation comes from the fleet or force headquarters level rather than from task units or individuals. Hence, the coverage of such areas as the enlisted men and of the details of some of the smaller engagements are lacking. Highlights of the Vietnam naval records include the year-by-year office files of
Commander Naval Forces Vietnam and a selection of messages collected on the Seventh Fleet flagship and filed topically.

A perusal of the documents quickly confirms Allan Nevin's fears 40 years ago when he set up the Oral History Program at Columbia that modern means of communications have caused the demise of traditional historical source material including the handwritten letter, diary, and report. This trend greatly accelerated during the Vietnam War.

To fill some of the gaps in the record, the Naval Historical Center initiated a modest oral history program in 1967. The precedent for the Vietnam program could be found in the little known Navy project of World War II which was one of the first oral history programs in the country. Lieutenant George Porter, a former Washington newsman, along with several Navy yeomen and a typist began a major interview program in the Washington area early in 1943. Porter's program resulted in more than 400 interviews averaging about two hours in length. Most of the interviews have been transcribed. They provide an extremely rich and valuable cross section of personal experiences during the War. On a much more modest scale, naval historians assigned to Naval Force Vietnam and other commands in Southeast Asia, were briefed in the Naval Historical Center on the need for oral history and the techniques of conducting interviews. As a result, these historians sent to us some 36 taped interviews from Vietnam.

At the same time, the Center began a small oral history program of its own in Washington. Initially, subjects were mostly naval officers who visited the Center to do research. But as the Center embarked on an official history of naval operations in the Vietnam War, the selection of subjects was primarily determined by the need to fill gaps in the available data for the history. To date, we have conducted 23 interviews whose transcripts vary in length from 30 to 100 pages.

I should mention one other oral history program which is partially supported by the Navy: Dr. John Mason’s program at the Naval Institute in Annapolis, Maryland. Prior to joining the Institute in 1969, Dr. Mason had conducted interviews with 33 high-ranking naval officers as part of the Columbia Oral History Program. Several of these officers played key roles in the Vietnam era. The Institute’s program ranks among the among the top ten collections in the nation in terms of hours of tape recorded and transcribed. Many of his subjects were participants in the Vietnam War.

While the Naval Historical Center’s Vietnam oral history program is very small in comparison to these other projects, at least they do provide some color and background which are largely missing from the terse formatted radio messages which make up the core of the Vietnam documentation. Before closing this brief description of the activities and resources
of the Operational Archives, I believe it may be useful to provide some orientation regarding other holdings pertinent to the naval history of the Cold War.

The Operational Archives is only one of the collections whose combined existence reflect the belief that an important function of a governmental historical office can be to facilitate research and writing by non-official historians. The Center’s other repositories of modern materials include the very rich Navy Department Library, the important pictorial and museum’s collections of the Center’s Curator Branch, and the valuable files on individual ships maintained by the Ship History Branch and the excellent records collection specifically dedicated to naval aviation held by the Aviation History Branch. The co-location of these varied resources in the Washington Navy Yard easily allows their coordinated use by the visiting researcher.

Certainly the most extensive and broadest archival resources on 20th century naval history are those held by the U. S. National Archives, and its associated Presidential Libraries.

In addition, many important but lesser known records are in the various Federal Records Centers located throughout the United States. For example, at the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland, there is a large collection of so-called “flag files” representing the records of major naval fleet commands. A majority of these date from the World War II period, but there are significant post-war holdings, including all of the major fleet, force and type commands.

Within the Navy itself, I should mention the existence of several archival and manuscript repositories that, like the Operational Archives, are specialized in their scope. The Naval Academy archives has the official records of the Naval Academy dating since 1929, as well as more scattered materials going back to the origins of this institution in 1845. The Naval Historical Collection of the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., in addition to having personal paper collections of officers associated with the War College, controls the comprehensive archives of the War College itself, from 1884 through the present. These have obvious value for students of strategy and tactics. On the West Coast, the U. S. Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California, has the central collection of official documentation relating to construction battalions, the Civil Engineering Corps, and the construction of overseas bases during the last four decades. The basic group of construction battalion records dating since 1942, and such related materials as the office files of many former chiefs of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the present Naval Facilities Engineering Command, are held by the historian at Port Hueneme. Other
valuable record holdings are in the custody of specialized naval repositories located outside the Washington area. Records relating to missile development and testing at China Lake Center in California and extensive historical sources are being developed at the Submarine Library and Museum at New London, Connecticut, and the more recent Aviation Museum at Pensacola, Florida, on the special holdings on these arms of the Navy.

Finally, I would like to refer to the surprisingly numerous and scattered personal paper collections of naval figures found in state, local, university, and private repositories throughout the United States. A highly incomplete list would include the Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland Historical Societies; the libraries of Duke, Cornell, North Carolina, and East Carolina Universities; the Boston and New York Public Libraries; the Henry E. Huntington Library; and the Hoover Institution of War and Peace. The broad distribution of these documentary resources can be seen as an entirely typical aspect of American federalism and of the strong local roots of the Navy and historical scholarship throughout the United States.

The Operational Archives maintains a card index identifying such holdings, as a supplement to the information contained in our guide to Naval History sources, which already describes such well-known manuscript collections in the District of Columbia as those of the Naval Historical Foundation and the Library of Congress. Although we still have a number of avenues to explore, the card index currently identifies 750 separate collections located in approximately 150 repositories outside of Washington. The day possibly will come when we will be able to undertake the monumental task necessary to publish a new guide to Naval History sources including these additional collections. In the meantime, we would be glad to share the information in our card file with those of you interested in the papers of specific individuals.

I have become increasingly impressed by the broad scope and the great extent of usable record materials on modern U. S. Naval history. It is my hope, as I know it is the hope of the entire staff in the Naval Historical Center, that through meetings such as these, the working scholars in naval history can become better aware of the numerous untapped sources that exist, and hence of the true potential of a field that obviously needs much further development.

The Navy Department Library is another rich and significant research facility of the Navy's historical office. The important pictorial and museum's collections of the Naval Historical Center's Curator Branch collection of some 100,000 photographs, paintings, and prints represents outstanding pictorial documentation for America's naval heritage. A distinctive feature
of this collection is a well-developed indexing system that allows thorough and rapid research into a broad range of topics. Our photographic curators also are capable of providing expert advice regarding the location of materials in other repositories, including the Naval Imaging Command in the Anacostia area of Washington, D.C., and the National Archives. The valuable files maintained on ships by the Ship History Branch, and the excellent records collection specifically dedicated to naval aviation are held by the Aviation History Branch. The co-location of these varied resources in the Washington Navy Yard easily allows their coordinated use by the visiting researcher.

To convey a better idea of how the Operational Archives can assist you in preparing a visit, it may be useful to identify some of the permanent staff members of the Archives. They have an average length of service of more than ten years, are assigned duties that include research, reference, appraisal, processing, writing checklists and guides to the collections, collecting and accessioning new record collections, in addition to functions that are more traditionally archival in nature. It is our hope that one result of the participation of the staff in the total historical process—from the initial appraisal of source material to its interpretation and use in historical writings and publications—will be to help us to know the real information values in our records and hence to better serve the research needs of scholars such as you.

Aside from this aspect of its work, the Operational Archives has traditionally concentrated upon the less visible and glamorous, but nonetheless essential, task of indexing, describing, and publicizing its records. Closely associated with this activity is the fortunate fact that we are able to call on the services of the Naval Historical Center's declassification officer, whose office is in the Operational Archives, to quickly review for declassification specific materials requested by researchers.

The combined effects of all these efforts is hopefully to make this specialized and relatively small archives a user oriented organization. Since one of our primary customers has long been the naval official who is in search of information from the recent past in order to carry out his assigned duties, it further follows that the scope of our collection reflects to a large extent, an attempt to match and anticipate his needs. However, the same subject matter that is needed for official purposes is also of value to numerous scholars. We are in contact with hundreds of such individuals during the course of each year. We welcome their interest and look forward to assisting many more in the future.

Turning to the holdings of the Operational Archives, I will note that a rather detailed tabulation is contained in a booklet describing naval history
sources in the Washington area. Although out of print, perhaps a copy can be found in one of the large university or reference libraries in your area. Today, it should be most useful to provide an overview of the archives by saying a few words about each of its major categories of material.

A number of recent steps have been taken to facilitate scholarly and public access to the historical records of the Department of the Navy. These measures, which are somewhat similar to those being undertaken by the other military services in the United States, include: (1) the inauguration of a program to declassify large groups of older classified records; (2) liberalization of the system under which scholars may have access to documents; (3) basic changes in the methods of classifying and declassifying the Navy's current records; and (4) improvements in the archival administration of certain of these resources.

All of these efforts by the Navy need to be seen in relationship to larger national programs. It also should be understood at the outset that, within the Navy, the Naval Historical Center, with which I am associated, is only one of the organizations working in the access area. Major roles are played also by representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, who are responsible for developing and administering the service's information security programs and by the Navy's records managers.

A new declassification program is currently under study by the Naval Historical Center which focuses on utilizing all available declassification guidelines that potentially could be used by all of the services. Of course this study depends in large measure on the results of the draft presidential executive order.

Generally, a telephone call to the Operational Archives several days in advance of your visit will suffice. If the scope of your research is very broad, more time will be needed. Access by foreign government officials must be made through their embassy's attaché office here in Washington to the Navy's Foreign Liaison Office in the Pentagon. This procedure has been in place for many years and the Attaché's are very familiar with this process. Nevertheless, the Navy looks forward to continuing to work with other governmental agencies and with historians towards the objective of maximizing access by all individuals to the rich resources of naval history in this country.
U.S. Army Cold War-Era Records in Army Custody: An Introduction

Dr. Edgar F. Raines, Jr.

U.S. records in the late twentieth century are highly decentralized and often unsystematic. The old "central decimal files" that are the boon of World War II researchers are long gone. In addition those Cold War-era records still in Army custody—that is published and unpublished documents written between the end of World War II in 1945 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990—are very scattered. Because any serious research on the Army during this period requires solid grounding in the records held by the National Archives, this paper gives a disproportionate emphasis to Army records in the Washington area, specifically at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, and possibly implies a greater degree of centralization than in fact exists. It does not discuss the Pentagon Library because the Pentagon is a closed building. The U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (also the location of the Army War College Library) is the single most important site for Army Cold War-era records still in Army custody, aside from the National Records Centers. Carlisle Barracks is within easy driving distance of Washington. The paper concludes with a discussion of two other significant repositories—the U.S. Military Academy Library at West Point, New York, and the Command and General Staff College Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The core of the permanent manuscript holdings of the U.S. Army Center of Military History (formerly the Office of the Chief of Military History) are located in its Historical Resources Branch, Field Programs and Historical Services Division. Holdings include annual histories from Army staff agencies, major commands, installations, and schools. Generally, annual histories deal with the issues handled by the various sections of a headquarters staff. They are usually descriptive rather than analytical and may not cover all the major concerns addressed by a headquar-
ters. Annual histories are more likely to be comprehensive if initially prepared as classified documents. They also vary greatly in terms of the quality of the writing and the depth of the documentation. Despite these limitations, annual histories can be invaluable guides to existing records and, where those records no longer exist, the best surviving evidence as to what a staff agency, command, installation, or school sought to accomplish during the time in question. In general because the Army tended to treat an assignment to act as historian as an additional duty during the early part of the Cold War, histories from the 1970s and 1980s are liable to be more detailed with a greater wealth of documentation.

The “hot” wars during the period of the Cold War—particularly Korea and Vietnam—have received much attention from Army historians. As a direct consequence, the Historical Records Collection of the Historical Resources Branch, U.S. Army Center of Military History, contains large collections of documents relating to both conflicts. Two sizable subsections of the Vietnam materials are pacification records and the William C. Westmoreland papers. The Creighton W. Abrams message file, temporarily on loan from the Military History Institute, is also available.

The Historical Resources Branch has a considerable collection of transcribed interviews pertaining to Vietnam. Since 1988, the Oral History Activity has conducted end-of-tour interviews with most of the principal officers on the Army Staff. Researchers should contact this branch to find out what interviews are in the process of being transcribed and when they may become available. It also has a selected number of Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada) and a substantial number of Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) interviews.

The Historical Resources Branch also has copies of manuscript studies on Cold War topics ranging in size from a few pages prepared for the Army Staff under deadline to book length studies that the Center has not published. Robert W. Coakley’s, Richard C. Kugler’s, and Vincent H. Demma’s “Historical Summary of [the] Evolution of [the] U.S. Army Test and Evaluation System—World War II to the Present,” at 58 pages represents an intermediate length study, and James A. Huston’s “The U.S. Army in the Current National Emergency: European Buildup,” a study of the U.S. Army in Europe during the early 1950s at 1,000 pages, represents the latter.

Other permanent holdings include a biographical file containing information about secretaries, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries of the Army, general officers, and other important soldiers; an installation file consisting of historical information about selected Army installations; an incomplete file of Department of the Army organizational charts; a
“Selected Materials” file that includes information about Cold War-era incidents, such as briefing slides relating to the 1985 Gander, Newfoundland, air charter crash involving a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division; and, finally, 32 linear feet of as yet unprocessed Cold War records.

Finding aids include the “Annual History File,” the Catalog and Index to Historical Manuscripts, 1940–1966 (2 volumes), and a list of selected post-1966 manuscripts, all available at the Center.

The Center of Military History Library, administered by the Historical Resources Branch, contains 40,000 volumes, about one-third of which fall within the period of the Cold War. Its holdings include a number of government publications often difficult to locate, including: strength of the Army reports, station lists, Department of Defense Telephone Directories dating from 1943 through 1990, lists of casualties for both the Korean and the Vietnam Wars, and Army Registers. The library also has incomplete sets of War Department and Department of the Army General Orders, Army Regulations, annual reports, field manuals, technical manuals, Department of the Army circulars and pamphlets, and military journals. It has some miscellaneous treasures available nowhere else, such as the bound manuscript, History of the Seventh Army during the Demobilization Period. Simply browsing the stacks will reward researchers. The library has a card catalogue as well as several finding aids for other libraries, including a continuously updated list of serial holdings at U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) libraries. The list allows researchers to determine which libraries have a complete run of the military journals in which they are interested.

Other branches at the Center have materials that researchers may find useful. The Organizational History Branch, Field Programs and Historical Services Division, maintains files on all active and selected inactive Regular Army, National Guard, and Reserve units giving capsule summaries of their histories, including dates of activation, inactivation, campaign credits, stations, and selective bibliographies of published works treating their history. The branch also has an incomplete set of unit tables of organization and equipment. The Museums Division collects materials, such as War Department equipment manuals, that allow accurate interpretation of the artifacts from the Army’s past, ranging from clothing to weapons systems. The Histories Division has an extensive collection of photo copies of Vietnam-era records, filling over 70 cabinets. Many of these copies were collected while the war was in progress or immediately after its conclusion, so it is quite doubtful if all the originals still survive. Most gaps appear in the early years of the conflict. The division has much
smaller Korean War and Grenada intervention collections. The Military Studies Branch has a file of Operation JUST CAUSE materials. Like the holdings of the Histories Division, these materials will eventually be retired to the National Archives. Production Division has a small photoarchive developed only in the last few years to support the Center’s publication program.

The Army Art Activity has an extensive collection of paintings covering the period from the Vietnam War (2,000 pictures alone) to the end of the Cold War. Three art teams visited Germany to cover REFORGER exercises, and teams visited Panama (before the invasion), Alaska, Thailand, and Korea in the 1970s. Very little—and that of poor quality—survives from the Korean War itself. The activities of the Army in the continental United States are less well recorded, although there are a few pictures from Fort Story during the Vietnam-era and the National Training Center at Fort Irwin during the post-Vietnam period. Unlike their predecessors in World War II, Cold War period artists did not keep diaries of their activities. The only surviving paper record is a file of orders. One Vietnam era video, “The Might of the Pen,” does contain scenes of an Army art team in action.

The Military History Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, some 125 miles northwest of Washington, is second only to the National Archives and the Library of Congress as a repository of materials pertaining to the history of the United States Army. Three branches are particularly relevant to researchers: the Archives Branch, the Special Collections Branch, and the Library. The Archives Branch holds some 16,000 archival boxes, covering the entire history of the Army. Cold War-era records are already numerous and growing. Given the very recent end of the Cold War and the time at which most individuals donate their papers to an institution, coverage is best during the early years rather than the later period, although there are some distinct gaps during the early period. At present the Archives Branch has nothing on the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and not much more on the Greek Civil War. Collections tend to group about dramatic incidents and conflicts: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 1964 intervention in the Dominican Republic, and so forth.

What follows is merely illustrative of the riches that await a researcher. Alvin C. Gillem, III, (11 boxes) presided over the important Gillem Board on the utilization of African-Americans in the post World War II Army. He served as part of the Marshall mission to China, 1946-47, and as commander of the Third Army (1947-50). The papers of James Evans (21 boxes) are also rich in materials on the service of African-Americans. Willis D. Crittenberger (189 boxes) suffered frustration in trying to make the United Nations Military Staff Committee actually function. Andrew D. Bruce (25
boxes) commanded the 7th Infantry Division during the immediate post-war occupation of Korea. The Ernest Harmon papers consist of 3 boxes. Harmon commanded the XXIII Corps, which ended World War II in Czechoslovakia, and subsequently headed the U.S. Constabulary in Germany. The papers of his sometime aide, John Fye (8 boxes), document Fye’s activities as the U.S. liaison officer to the Czech General Staff. Fye had a special charter to oversee the relocation of the Sudeten Germans at the end of the war. Withers A. Burress (16 boxes) also commanded the Constabulary. A. E. Schanze (1 box) was the U.S. liaison officer at Potsdam. Quinton Lander was the Defense Attache in Rumania, 1953–54, and his small collection of papers focuses upon the difficulties of living behind the Iron Curtain. Charles Donnelly’s papers (13 boxes) include a memoir and diary that reflect his participation in the NATO Standing Group. The Robert M. Littlejohn papers contain 12 boxes pertaining to quartermaster operations in Europe between 1942 and 1946. Richard Moran (11 boxes) was the chief signal officer of Fifth Army at the end of World War II and subsequently became chief signal officer of U.S. Forces, Austria, and U.S. Fourth Army. He retired in 1947. Paul Carroway (32 boxes) commanded the 351st Infantry during the occupation of Trieste. William J. Donovan (over 300 boxes), after stepping down as director of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, operated as a consultant to the U.S. government on intelligence matters. The papers of John O’Daniel (9 boxes) also provide considerable information about Army intelligence operations. Arthur G. Trudeau’s papers (95 boxes) reflect his wide range of assignments: of the 1st Constabulary Brigade and of Task Force Trudeau during the 1948 Berlin Crisis, Army G–2, 1953 to 1955; and chief of Army Research and Development, 1958 to 1962. The papers of Omar N. Bradley’s sometime aide, Chester Hanson (46 boxes), are valuable for the immediate post-World War II period.

The large collection (57 boxes) of the papers of Omar N. Bradley covers his entire career. There are a number of Cold War-era items, including a substantial file pertaining to the relief of Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. The papers of MacArthur’s sometime chief of staff, commander of the X Corps, and commandant of the Army War College, Edward M. Almond, are quite extensive (200 boxes), and contain extended discussions of doctrinal issues, especially Army-Air Force disagreements over close air support. The papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s intelligence chief, consist of 11 boxes. The papers of MacArthur’s successor, Matthew Ridgway (52 boxes), document his service as U.S. representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee; commander, Eighth Army, 1951; commander, Far East Command, 1951–52; supreme allied
commander, Europe, 1952-53; and chief of staff of the Army, 1953-55. The Charles L. Bolte papers (11 boxes) reflect the key positions that Bolte held during the early Cold War, including G-3 and chief of staff of Army Ground Forces, director of plans and operations and subsequently deputy chief of staff for plans on the Army Staff, commander of the Seventh Army and of U.S. Army, Europe, and vice chief of staff, Army, under Ridgway. The Roy E. Appleman papers (37 boxes) consist of Appleman's notes, documents, and interviews to support his volumes on the Korean War. The Clay and Joan Blair papers (in excess of 50 boxes) contain similar materials that they collected in the course of their book on the Korean war and General Bradley's 1983 "autobiography."

The strength of the Lewis B. Hershey collection (1092 boxes) lies in the coverage of the years 1948-1973 when he was director of Selective Service. Hamilton Howze's papers (8 boxes) include his professional writing, an extensive memoir, and scattered correspondence. They provide insights into his development of armor training in Europe during the 1950s, his role in the evolution of Army aviation, the development of the first airmobile division, the use of the Army in domestic disturbances, and U.S.-Korea relations in the early 1960s. George E. Lynch (8 boxes) commanded the 43d Infantry Division during the NATO buildup in the early 1950s and subsequently served as chief of staff of VII Corps. Bruce Clarke (2 boxes) commanded U.S. Army Europe during the 1961 crisis over Berlin. His papers also document the development of armor in the U.S. Army. Roy E. Lindquist (6 boxes) served as chief of the Military Advisory Assistance Group, Iran, from 1958 to 1960. Charles C. Noble was intimately associated with the development of the atomic bomb, but his papers (10 boxes) are most useful for his service as Army liaison officer to the Atlas and Minuteman ICBM programs (1960-63) and his subsequent tour as director, Southeast Asia Construction Group, 1970-1971.

Many collections pertain to the Vietnam War. These include the papers of Harold K. Johnson (138 boxes), William C. Westmoreland (9 boxes), William E. DuPuy (36 boxes), Jonathan D. Seaman (31 boxes), William Peers (26 boxes), George P. Seneff (9 boxes), and Richard M. Lee 14 (2 boxes).

The Archives Branch also holds several semiofficial collections including the records of the Radio Branch, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (11 boxes), the Korean Armistice Commission (13 boxes), Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel papers relating to African-Americans in the Armed Forces (28 boxes), and the Volunteer Army (VOLAR) Evaluation Project at Fort Ord, California (30 boxes). The branch has a nearly complete set of all Army War College stu-
dent papers from the class of 1951 to the present. It also has scattered materials relating to class projects, including Project PINNACLE, a planning exercise from the 1950s to invade southern Russia using light pen­tomic divisions, and scathing comments from senior Army officers questioning its feasibility.

Dr. Sommers and his assistants have surveyed a large cross-section of World War II veterans. Some of the questions lead into the Cold War. Sommers and his assistants are in the process of conducting a survey of veterans of the Korean War. However, to date results are somewhat skewed because most of the respondents served in the 23d Infantry regiment of the 2d Infantry Division. A survey of Vietnam War veterans is planned for the future.

The Archives Branch also contains a very extensive collection of taped interviews, many of them transcribed. The senior officers' oral history project dates from 1971. Each year some students of the Army War College interview general officers and senior civilians about their entire careers. As of 2 January 1992 some 223 such interviews had been conducted. Completed transcriptions range in size from a 20-page interview with Brig. Gen. James W. Barneh, actually an appendix to a much longer interview with Lt. Gen. George I. Forsyth (518 pages) to 892 pages with Gen. Melvin Zais. Most are from 200 to 500 pages long. Included are interviews with the following chiefs of staff of the Army: Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Ridgway, Maxwell D. Taylor, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, George H. Decker, Johnson, Westmoreland, Edward C. Meyer, and John A. Wickham. Copies of many of these are also available in the Historical Resources Branch of the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

The Archives Branch also has interviews relating to a number of topics, for example: the life of Gen. Creighton Abrams (55 interviews), the history of Army Aviation (9 interviews), the history of women in the armed forces (6 interviews), history of African Americans in the armed forces (7 interviews), U.S. Army Materiel Command (19 interviews), Chief of Staff of the Army General Officer Debriefing Program, 1989 (6 interviews), company command in Vietnam (254 interviews), combat command interviews (38 interviews), U.S. Army Information Systems Command, 1987–90 (15 interviews), and combat leadership in Korea (30 interviews).

The Special Collections Branch maintains photographs covering the history of the U.S. Army from the War with Mexico to the present. The photographic record for the period 1945–1990 is particularly rich, some 50,000 to 60,000 pictures. Most were originally included in the donations of personal papers now maintained in the Archives Branch. Generals Almond and Ridgway in particular presented large numbers of pho-
The holdings of the Military History Institute Library, like those of the Military History Institute Archives Branch, encompasses the entire history of the U.S. Army in its collections, which consist of 259,000 books, 335,000 published military documents, 45,000 military journals, 14,000 reels of microfilm, 48,000 microfiche, and 56,000 technical reports. Materials pertaining to the Cold War-era Army constitute a sizable portion of the overall collection. The library, for example, contains virtually complete sets of U.S. Army professional journals published between 1945 and 1990, including the recently declassified monthly Intelligence Review for the early years of the Cold War. It has a good collection of internal Army studies and contract studies done for the Army during the period, including many G-2 studies from the late 1940s and early 1950s. Researchers have found the handbooks and orders of battle, published and unpublished, for foreign armies most useful. The library's collection of field manuals and technical manuals are unsurpassed, while its collection of unit tables of organization and equipment is strong, if not complete. The library has acquired a number of major microfilm collections dealing with aspects of the Cold War, including the Lyndon Baines Johnson National Security Files, the George C. Marshall papers, and the Henry L. Stimson papers. One entire room (16 file cabinets, 400 archival boxes) is given over to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, records. They are supplemented by various Vietnam-era microfilm and microfiche collections, including the Douglas Pike's Indochina Archive. The library has acquired 216 Senior Officer Debriefing Reports, Vietnam from the Center of Military History. It also has 23 interviews conducted by Combat Developments Command with officers completing Vietnam tours and four Combat Development Command Summaries of debriefings, September 1968–January 1971. The library does not include within its holdings many Congressional publications dealing with the Army, publications of the State Department, or highly technical reports, such as those dealing with repair of missile components.

In recent years the Military History Institute has converted to an on-line system of electronic bibliographies, referred to as “refbibs.” A detailed description of the system plus a list of published finding aids is appended to this paper.

The Army War College Library is located just across the street from the Military History Institute. Its mission is to support the courses offered at the War College. The library holds some 75,000 volumes—all secondary sources and virtually all published since 1950. Its particular
strength is its collection of current periodicals, some 900 military science, management, and leadership journals. Back issues are not maintained prior to 1950.

The Special Collections of the United States Military Academy Library, at West Point, New York, contain a sizable number of manuscripts, some 250,000, covering the entire history of the U.S. Army with special emphasis to the development of the Military Academy. Collection efforts at the Military Academy have just begun in earnest for the Cold War. The Class of 1946 is currently raising funds to assemble a Cold War collection. Nevertheless, the library already has seven collections that deserve special mention. The Omar N. Bradley papers consist of 375 boxes. Although much of the collection is disappointing for all but the social historian, it does include Bradley’s correspondence as administrator of the Veteran’s Administration, 1945–1947, and as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949–53. The William A. Knowlton papers (38 boxes) cover his service as secretary of the Army Staff, 1968–1970; Superintendent USMA, 1970–1974; chief of staff, U.S. European Command, 1974–1976; and NATO representative, 1977–1980. George A. Lincoln was a member of the Operations Division of the War Department, General Staff during World War II; member of the Joint Planners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1944–1947; a professor of social sciences, USMA, 1947–1969, and director, Office of Emergency Preparedness 1969–1973. His papers comprise 75 linear feet. The Frank Pace, Jr., papers (20 boxes) cover the period 1950–1988, and thus encompass his tenure as Secretary of the Army in the Truman administration, 1950–53. The collection consists of correspondence, speeches, interviews, scrapbooks, photographs, films, videos, and tapes. The papers of another secretary of the Army, Robert Ten Broeck Stevens (14 boxes), cover only the years when he served as secretary, 1953–55. Williston Birkhimer Palmer was vice chief of staff of the Army, 1955–57; deputy commanding general, U.S. Forces, Europe, 1957–59; and director of military assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense (1959–62). His papers (16 boxes) contain calendars, 1954–62; diaries 1942–47, 1951–62; correspondence; orders; promotions; lectures; speeches; published writings; and photographs. The William Childs Westmoreland papers, 37 linear feet, cover the years 1932–1980. Strengths of the collection lie in Westmoreland’s tours as Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy, 1960–63, and as chief of staff, Army, 1968–72. See the attached list for a description of other collections.

The Command and General Staff College Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, contains in excess of 100,000 books and over 130,000 documents. Its primary mission is to support the curriculum at the
Command and General Staff College. The library contains a virtually complete collection of all U.S. Army professional journals published during the Cold War-era, a large collection of tables of organization and equipment for Army units during the same period, field manuals, and technical manuals. The library holds a considerable number of after action reports and lessons learned reports from the Korean and Vietnam Wars and various Cold War contingency operations, curricular materials produced at the school, and some student papers.

Such a brief summary must overlook some of the richest sources of information, the archives assembled by historians at the commands and schools, the interpretative material and artifacts gathered by Army museum curators, and the holdings of the Army school and technical libraries. The five agencies discussed above should, however, give any student of the Army during the Cold War-era a good starting point for research.

I would be remiss if I did not mention that the publications of the U.S. Army Center of Military History and other Army agencies through their footnotes often provide a valuable guide to the records—both those still held by the Army and those already retired to the Archives. I have appended a preliminary bibliography on Cold War publications and studies of the Center of Military History that may be useful.

Historians attempting to treat the U.S. Army in the era of the Cold War face a number of research problems as this essay has already suggested. First is the sheer volume of the official records, particularly during the early years, up through the early 1960s. These are generally well organized through 1958, but at that point the Army (except for the Office of the Chief of Staff) abandoned the War Department decimal system of filing records by subject. Very few people understood The Army Functional File System (TAFFS). What was retained became increasingly problematic and more difficult to locate if saved. There are large gaps in the surviving records. The paper trail for the U.S. Army Continental Army Command (CONARC) ends in 1955, except for copies of records retained in the Command Historian’s Office. The documentation available for high-level staff agencies also falls off. There are, for example, large gaps in the records of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army, during General Westmoreland’s tour; no evidence remains about several major issues addressed by the Army Staff. These weaknesses in the archival record make the kinds of sources discussed in this paper all the more important.

The style of staff work also began to shift drastically beginning in the 1960s with less emphasis on a written record and greater emphasis on oral briefings. By the 1970s and thereafter often the only record of a decision briefing are paper copies of the view slides used by the briefing officers.
Often they are so ambiguous as to leave the recommended solution a mystery in the absence of any other evidence. Moreover, while staff officers often prepared memoranda for record during the early Cold War on important telephone conversations, by the 1970s these usually passed without any comment in the record. Increasingly, interviews are the only way to document significant activities. At the unit level conditions are just as bad if not worse. To this day, clerks are not taught how to retire records. Consequently, most are destroyed—even during operations during which the command structure attempts to secure their preservation. All too often records are saved because an individual historian makes a special effort to contact members of a unit rather than the normal working of the records management system.

And there are other problems. The conversion to electronic records raises a whole category of new issues. The ease with which electronic records may be easily altered raises the question of provenance on a scale that has never existed before. Because these records must be read by a machine, which may become obsolete, records may become inaccessible because it is not possible to keep those machines in repair. On the other hand, most early Cold War records were generated on World War II-quality paper. Within a few years they (and the World War II records) will start crumbling to dust. There are currently no major preservation efforts in progress. These concerns overlook the whole question of access. Most Cold War-era records, although not the ones discussed in this paper—are classified. Given their volume, bulk declassification is the only possible solution. The last administration in the United States to enthusiastically endorse bulk declassification, however, was Richard Nixon’s. The Cold War involved the United States in entangling alliances in peacetime: access to certain key documents can involve the approval of more than simply the United States Government. It is difficult, for example, to write about the U.S. Army in Europe without reference to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A complete history of the United States Army during the Cold War-era will require access to foreign archives. The dispersion of relevant records, great as it is within the United States, thus is not confined within its own borders.

We would not be gathered here today unless we agreed that the importance of the issues involved made the research effort necessary. I hope that this account of the difficulties will not discourage potential researchers but rather provide a sense of realism about the genuine pitfalls involved. The magnitude of the task is such, however, that historians will continue to make discoveries in primary sources long after we have all retired. Let us then begin with equal parts of energy and humility.
I. Bibliographic Finding Aids for the U.S. Army in the Cold War Era, U.S. Army Military History Institute

The Military History Institute is in the process of converting to electronic bibliographies known as "Refbibs." These are "indicative, not exhaustive" and encompass a wide variety of topics, such as "Creighton Abrams" in the larger "Biographical Bibliographies" entry, "Huk Insurgency, 1946–1955" in the "Philippines" entry, and the "Littlejohn Rocket" in the "Weapons" entry to cite but three examples from the era of the Cold War. A sample reference bibliography is attached. The Institute offers "limited interlibrary loan and photocopying for off-site patrons." For further information about access, call (717) 245-3611 or DSN 242-3611.

While "refbibs" are constantly updated and hence increasingly important, they have not yet completely supplanted the Institute's older published finding aids. The ones listed below include many which encompass more than simply the era of the Cold War. In some, such as the bibliographies on the chiefs of staff of the U.S. Army or the British and French armies the material on the Cold War-era is distinctly secondary to entries from earlier periods. Most are out-of-print. All are available in the Institute's reading room and through inter-library loan.


Gole, Lydia J. and Louise A. Arnold, *Dwight D. Eisenhower: A Selected of Sources at the U.S. Army War College Library and U.S. Army*


U. S. Army Military History Institute, Army Annual Reports: An Inventory and Research Guide to Secretary of War Annual Reports, Secretary of the Army Annual Reports, Department of the Army Historical Summaries. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U. S. Army Military History Institute, 1993.


Sample “Refbib” at MHI

USAMHI Cold War
RefBranch
dv Oct 89, Jan 91. Oct 93

COLD WAR

**A Working Bibliography of Military History Institute Sources**

*General/Miscellaneous*


See also:

Military Policy, National
NATO

WWII & Earlier


See also:
“US in Russia, WWII” (Russia-WWII)
“Linkups on Elbe” (WWII-Ger)

1945–1955:


Fleming, Cold War, cited above, Vol II.


Philippborn, Martin. Papers. Arch. Incl intel reports by this Third Army G–2 during early occup of Germany.


See also:

“Berlin Blockade, 1948: (Ger-Occup 2)
Trieste
“Operation Paperclip” (Ger-Occup 2)

Since 1955


Broadwater, cited above.


See also:

"Cuban Missile Crisis, Oct 1962" (Cuba)
"U.S. Defense Spending Since 1945" (Economic)
"Berlin Crisis, 1961–62" (Mobiliz - Mil)

II. Cold War Bibliography

U. S. Army Center of Military History (Formerly Historical Branch, G–2, War Department General Staff, Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, & Office of the Chief of Military History), Washington, D.C.
Out-of-print.

Out-of-print.

A short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.


These compilations replaced the annual reports of the secretary of the Army. All are currently in print.


Bell, William G., “Informational Background on the Secretaries of War and Army” (1960).
A study prepared for limited distribution in the Army Staff, now out-of-print.


A limited off-set edition, now out-of-print.

A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.


A short study with limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A very short study with limited distribution, now out-of-print.


A short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.


Out-of-print.

Coakley, Robert W., Martin Blumenson, and James E. Hewes, Jr., "Three Studies on the Historical Development of Army Logistical Organization" (Ms., n.d.).


An expanded version of the 1969 study; now out-of-print.

Coakley, Robert W., and Richard C. Kugler, "Historical Summary of Army Manpower and Personnel Management System" (n.d.).


A study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.

Coakley, Robert W., and Billy C. Mossman, "Organization for Logistics Planning in World War II and the Korean War and Lessons Learned from the Planning Experience" (Ms., n.d.).


A study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.

Finke, Detmar, "Background and Philosophy Regarding the Position of Secretary of the General Staff" (1967).

A short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.

Finke, Detmar, and Ruth Markwood, "Background and Philosophy of the White House Liaison Officer, 1941–1968" (Ms., 1968).

A very brief essay prepared for limited distribution; now out-of-print.

Fisher, Ernest F., Jr., “Relationship of the ROAD Concept To Moral Considerations in Strategic Planning” (Ms., 1964).


A brief pamphlet focusing on the evolution of the operational and planning functions on the Army Staff.


A short study; out-of-print.


A very brief study; out-of-print.


Organizational charts with a brief explanation of the reason for the reorganization.

Kugler, Richard C., Division Slice and Division Force (1964).

A study produced for limited distribution.


Lynn, James, “U. S. Army Health Services Command” (1973).


McGrath, Paul C., “Army Reorganization” (1950).

A short study produced for limited distribution, now out-of-print.


Mossman, Billy C., “Army Staff Organization for Military Assistance” (c. 1969).


A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

Scheips, Paul J., and Daniel P. Griffin, “The Organization, Missions, and Areas of the United States Southern Command and Its Predecessors” (1967).

A short paper produced for limited distribution.


*The U. S. Army in World War II.*


The final chapter treats the Army’s management of the atomic bomb during the early post war period, ending with its transfer to the Atomic Energy Commission on 1 January 1947.

*Military Occupation.*


The U. S. Army in Korea.


**Korean War Monographs.**

Coakley, Robert W., Karl E. Cocke, and Daniel P. Griffin, *Demobilization Following the Korean War* (n.d.).
A study prepared for limited distribution in the Army Staff, now out-of-print.

A study with limited distribution, now out-of-print.


[McGrath, Paul C.], *Korea, 1950* (1952).³
A photographic history.

Miller, John, Jr., *et al., Korea, 1951–1953* (1956).
A photographic history.


**Korean War Studies.**

A study prepared for limited distribution in the Army Staff, now out-of-print.

A short study of limited distribution, now out-of-print.

McGrath, Paul C., “United States Army in the Korean Conflict” (Ms., 1953).
Mossman, Billy C., "Analysis of Effects of Air and Naval Interdiction on the Korean War" (Ms., 1964).
Mossman, Billy C., "Inflation in the Republic of Korea During the Korean War" (Ms., 1966).


Bergen, John D., Military Communications: A Test for Technology (1986).
Meyerson, Joel D., Images of a Lengthy War (1986).

Vietnam Monographs.


*Vietnam Studies.*

Johnson, Lt. Col. —, "Vietnam-Philippine Insurrection Parallel" (Ms., 1967).\(^3\)

[Luttichau, Charles von], "Review of U. S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation in Southeast Asia, 1961–1964" (Ms., 1964).\(^4\)


*Contingency and Support Operations.*


Printed in off-set, intended for limited distribution only.


Coimprint with Office of History, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Medical Department.


Army Lineage Series.


Out-of-print.


Memoirs.


Reeder, William, "The Korean Ammunition Shortage" (Ms., c. 1954).
Maj. Gen. William Reeder served as G–4 on the Army Staff during the Korean War.
Limited distribution, now out-of-print.

**Mobilization/Demobilization.**

Coakley, Robert W., Karl E. Cocke, and Daniel P. Griffin, *Demobilization Following the Korean War* (1968).
Published in offset with limited distribution, now out-of-print.


A limited-edition, now out-of-print.

**Civil Disturbances.**

The use of federal troops by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to integrate Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Published in offset, now out-of-print.

The final study, published in offset, now out-of-print.


The White Plan was the interwar color plan dealing with civil insurrection. A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.


A study prepared in off-set for limited distribution, now out-of-print.


Covers 29 instances in which Federal troops were used in civil disturbances between 15 March 1966 and 12 November 1966. Out-of-print.


A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.


A study with limited distribution, now out-of-print.


A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.


A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

*Historiographic.*


Off-set publication with limited distribution.

Scheips, Paul J., “Mississippi: The History of an OCMH Monograph” (Ms., 1971).


Miscellaneous.

Anon., “Historical Perspective on Dissent and Dissatisfaction in the Military” (1971).
A study with limited distribution; now out-of-print.
A study with limited distribution; now out-of-print.
Anon., “Mobility Work Project II D—Force Tailoring” (Ms., 1965).
Anon., “Selected Information on Army Posture and Readiness 1940 and 1949 for Comparative Purposes” (Ms., 1965).
An extensive chronology.

A pamphlet outlining the history of the Chief of Staff’s residence from the establishment of Fort Myer as a military post.

A limited edition, printed in off-set, now out-of-print.

Data on three 18th and 19th Century low intensity conflicts entered onto note cards in response to a questionnaire in a manner suitable for numerical coding and

A short essay, prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

Coakley, Robert W., “Universal Military Training” (Ms., 1963).

A very short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.

A very short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.

A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

An off-set publication with limited distribution; now out-of-print.


Coakley, Robert W., et al., Resume of Army Roll-up Following World War II (1968).
Off-set publication; out-of-print.

A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.


An off-set publication; now out-of-print.

Cocke, Karl E., “Chronology of Significant Actions and Decisions Relating To the Development of an All-Volunteer Army” (1972).
A study with limited distribution; now out-of-print.

An off-set publication; now out-of-print.

A very short essay prepared for limited distribution; now out-of-print.

A study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.

Incomplete manuscript.

A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

Includes a discussion of the Korean War as well as World War II.

A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A study prepared for limited distribution in the Army Staff, now out-of-print.

A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A very short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.

A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.


A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

A study printed in off-set and sent to the U. S. Army Provost Marshal General’s School in 1950 to aid in the development of the curriculum. It includes chapters on planning for and the establishment of military government in Austria.
   A very short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.
Matloff, Maurice, “Study on Rotating Professorships in Military History” (Ms., 1969).
Mossman, Billy C., “The Use of Indigenous Forces by the United States Army” (Ms., 1969).
   A short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.
   A short study with a limited distribution; now out-of-print.
   A very short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.
Scheips, Paul J., “The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances Since World War II: Panama Supplement” (n.d.).
   A short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.
   A study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.
Schnabel, James, “U. S. Army in the Cuban Crisis” (1963).
   A very short study prepared for limited distribution, now out-of-print.

Stamey, Roderick A., Jr., The Inter-American Defense Board (1965).
A study published in photo off-set for limited distribution; now out-of-print.

Weinert, Richard P., Karl E. Cocke, and Elmer B. Scovill, "Resume and Rationale of Military Assistance" (1966).
A study with limited distribution. Now out-of-print.


Bibliographies.

Anon., "Korean Armistice Bibliography" (Ms., 1971).
Anon., "Korean War—Selected Bibliography" (Ms., 1972).
A limited distribution publication, now out-of-print.

1. The U.S. Army Center of Military History is a field operating agency of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army.
2. The "Subject Index File" in the Historical Resources Branch of the U.S. Army Center of Military History identifies McGrath as the author of the text. There is no indication of authorship on the book itself. See also, Memo, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1 Oct 54, sub: Schedule of Historical Projects, Historical Records Collection 374.72 (Schedule of Hist Pubs), also in the Historical Resources Branch.
3. Johnson's first name is not given on the study. No Lt. Col. Johnson is listed on any of the surviving OCMH rosters for 1967. After conferring with historians who worked in the office at the time, I feel fairly certain that the author must have been a mobilization designee who prepared this paper while on his annual two-week tour of active duty.
4. The "Subject Index File" in the Historical Resources Branch of the U.S. Army Center of Military History identifies von Luttichau as the author of the text. There is no indication of authorship on the study itself.
5. G-3 Decimal Files, March 1950–1951, 314.7, RG 319, NA.
Historical Documentation in the U.S. Air Force Historical Program

William C. Heimdahl

Introduction

The Air Force Historical Research Agency is the repository for Air Force historical documents. The Agency's document collection began in Washington, D.C. during World War II and moved in 1949 to Maxwell Air Force Base, the site of Air University. The Agency facilitates research for professional military students, the faculty, and visiting scholars. It consists today of over 60,000,000 pages devoted to the history of the service and represents the world's largest and most valuable organized collection of documents on US military aviation. In February 1991, the Agency became a Field Operating Agency of the Air Force.

Except for documents that are classified or otherwise restricted, the Agency's collection is open to the public, and visitors are welcome. More than eighty-five percent of the Agency's pre-1955 holdings are declassified. Under guidance from Headquarters Air Force, the Agency systematically reviews documents for downgrading or declassification. The Agency's collection is also recorded on 16mm microfilm, with microfilm copies deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, and at the Center for Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.

The collection consists of two broad categories of materials that are used for a variety of purposes:

a. Unit Histories. The major portion of the collection consists of unit histories that the various Air Force organizations have prepared and submitted periodically since the establishment of the Air Force History Program in 1942. Reporting requirements have changed from time to time over the years, and the submissions vary in quality. Taken as a whole, however, the unit histories, with their supporting documents, provide remarkably complete coverage of Air Force activities.
b. Special Collections. The coverage provided by unit histories is supplemented by special collections, including historical monographs and studies; oral history interview transcripts; End-of-Tour Reports; personal papers of retired general officers and other Air Force personnel; reference materials on the early period of military aviation; course materials of the Air Corps Tactical School of the 1920s and 1930s; working documents of various joint and combined commands; miscellaneous documents or collections of various organizations, including the US Army, British Air Ministry, and German Air Force; USAF individual aircraft record cards; and large collections of materials relating to USAF activities in the war in Southeast Asia and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The Agency accessions approximately 2,000,000 pages of historical material each year, including annual and quarterly histories of Air Force units as well as additions to the special collections. Working closely with the Air Force Historian and the historical offices of the major commands, the Agency conducts an oral history program to record important historical data that otherwise would be lost. The Agency gives special attention to the acquisition of personal papers of value for documenting Air Force and airpower history.

Over the years, the Agency’s collection has been used by the Air Force for preparation of plans, development of programs, analyses and evaluations of operations, staff studies on many subjects, textbooks and other course materials for Air Force schools, student papers and theses, orientation and indoctrination of personnel, and many other purposes. The collection has provided information regarding military aviation in general and the US Air Force in particular to the Congress, the military services, and other government agencies. The collection has been used extensively by scholars, students, and writers, for books and monographs, master’s theses, doctoral dissertations, magazine articles, and TV and movie scripts.

Information for Researchers

a. Unclassified Research. Unclassified documents in the Agency are available to the public and citizens of the United States need no special authorization to use them. Foreign nationals, however, must submit their request to visit the Agency (giving details of their proposed project) through their respective embassy in Washington, DC, for transmission to the International Affairs Division, Headquarters Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/IADD), Washington, DC 20330-1000. The processing of such applications usually takes between 6 to 8 weeks.
b. **Classified Research.** Many of the Agency’s holdings have been, or are now, subject to security classification under the Department of Defense Information Security Program. If your research involves classified material, you will need to provide proper evidence of an appropriate security clearance and authorization (need to know).

c. **Copying.** The Agency cannot copy documents for either official or unofficial purposes. It will, however, make available copying equipment for researchers engaged in official US Government projects as well as a coin-operated machine for persons engaged in private research. Patrons are advised to bring their own change. Microfilm copies of the unclassified collection are available for purchase by special order.

d. **Photographs.** The Agency is not a photographic repository and does not provide photographic services to researchers. However, researchers who visit the Agency may bring their own photographic equipment to copy photographs contained in the documents, provided the documents will not be damaged in the process. A light stand is available for patron use.

**Finding Aids**

Before undertaking research in the Agency’s collection prospective users should consult in the published materials available in their area of interest. General descriptions of Agency holdings may be found in the National Union Catalog of Manuscript Collections, various library directories, and other published works. A number of detailed findings aids are also available at the Agency.

a. **A Guide to the Resources of the Agency.** This Guide, located at the Reading Room desk, describes the document identification systems used for the collection and provides an index to the organizations represented in the holdings. It is of particular value to persons first performing research at the Agency.

b. **Card Catalogs.** There are two card catalogs covering the holdings of the Agency received prior to 1980. The subject catalog identifies names and organizations alphabetically; the organizational catalog contains items within their classification system order, similar to a shelf list. Together the two card catalogs contain approximately 320,000 cards.

c. **IRIS.** The Inferential Retrieval Indexing System (IRIS) is a computerized finding aid to the organization’s files. Operational since 1983, IRIS contains bibliographic data and abstracts on over 90 percent of the collection at the Agency. By using the computer terminals, researchers can create and view bibliographies of documents containing information
on specific organizations, subjects, time periods, etc. By scanning the terminal screens, they can select materials that provide the best coverage of their topic and request paper or microfilm copies of the volumes for further examination.

Restrictions

A few documents are restricted for reasons other than security.

a. Restricted Collections. Some private material in personal papers and some of the oral history interviews are restricted for various periods of time by the donor. Other documents are restricted under various Air Force administrative regulations.

b. Copyright. Although most official government documents are not subject to copyright restrictions, the Agency’s holdings also include other materials that are subject to copyright protection. The Copyright Law of the United States (Title 17, US Code) controls the reproduction of items under copyright. Agency personnel reserve the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in their judgment, fulfillment of the order would violate copyright law.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense: Historical Program and Records

Dr. Ronald D. Landa

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), as well as its Historical Office, are very much creatures of the Cold War. In 1947 the National Security Act created the National Military Establishment under the direction of a secretary of defense who was to be the president’s principal assistant “in all matters relating to the national security.” In 1949 the National Military Establishment was renamed the Department of Defense.

Later that year the OSD Historical Office was established. Despite OSD’s growth from 300 employees in its first year to more than 2,000 today, the OSD Historical Office has remained constant in size and is one of the smallest historical offices within the Department of Defense. The office has seldom numbered more than three full-time historians. Most staff members have served long tenures. There have been only two office heads: Rudolph A. Winnacker (1949–1973) and Alfred Goldberg (1973–present). Since its inception, the office has been located in the Pentagon.

Responsibilities and Activities

Original responsibilities included coordinating historical activities within the Department of Defense, collecting and compiling records of permanent historical value, and publishing a thorough and objective history of OSD as well as the semiannual reports of the secretary of defense. Over the years the responsibilities have evolved. In the late 1960s, the office ceased involvement in the preparation of the published reports of the secretary of defense. In the 1970s, it embarked on an oral history and has since devoted greater attention and resources to its publication program.

The primary publication effort is a series of volumes, “History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.” These are lengthy narrative works
based on the OSD records as well as on those of other DoD components and government agencies. Because of the time and concentrated effort required in their preparation, the volumes have been written by contract historians and not by the full-time historians, who have a variety of other duties. Two volumes covering the years 1947–53 have been published. Three more volumes covering the period 1953 through 1965 are nearing completion. Like the Department of State's "Foreign Relations of the United States" documentary series, the OSD narrative histories appear 30–35 years after the events they cover.

From time to time special volumes on narrower subjects have been published. One was on the early years of NATO and the U.S. military assistance program. Another presented documents on Department of Defense organizational evolution. Recently the office published a pictorial history commemorating the 50th anniversary of the construction of the Pentagon building. Two works in progress deal with the issue of U.S. prisoners of war during the Southeast Asia conflict. One examines the P.O.W. experience; the other looks at policy making in Washington. Studies are also underway on Western European defense during the Eisenhower administration and on the role of the secretary of defense in foreign affairs, 1947–1985.

In 1965 the OSD Historical Office inaugurated a Department of Defense Historical Studies Program to promote publication of histories regarding problems of mutual interest to the military services. The first—and so far only—volume to appear in the series was a 1981 work on racial integration in the armed forces.

In addition to these books, all of which have been published by the Government Printing Office and distributed widely, the office prepares on an annual basis a limited edition (usually 4–6 bound sets) of a documentary series, Public Statements of the Secretary of Defense. These volumes consist of photo reproductions of the secretaries' public addresses, congressional testimony, press releases, and radio and television interviews. There are nearly 250 volumes in this series, from 1947 through the end of Secretary Richard Cheney's tenure in January 1993. A complete set is kept in the OSD Historical Office. Other sets are deposited in the Pentagon Library and the Library of Congress, and at least one set is presented to the incumbent secretary of defense. A commercial company has microfilmed the volumes from 1947 through 1981 and has them available for sale. From the mid-fifties through the early seventies, the office also published in a similar format a separate series, Public Statements of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Sets of these volumes are maintained in the OSD Historical Office and the Pentagon Library.
Two pamphlets put out by the office serve as reference aids. One consists of brief biographical sketches of the secretaries of defense through 1985. The second summarizes organizational changes and lists important Department of Defense officials by position and dates of service. And like most government historical offices, the staff responds orally and in writing to inquiries from the public, other government agencies, and from within the Department of Defense.

While the main focus of the office's work is its publications program, OSD officials sometimes request that it prepare for internal use studies on certain historical issues. The studies generally are short and done under tight deadlines. Occasionally more comprehensive efforts involving a substantial commitment of resources are required. For example, at the direction of the secretary of defense, a major classified study was undertaken in 1974 regarding the post-World War II strategic arms competition with the Soviet Union. Overseen by OSD's Office of Net Assessment and coordinated by the OSD Historical Office, the project required extra administrative staff, assistance from the military services, and contract studies provided by research organizations. From a vast number of documents and separate studies there eventually emerged in March 1981 a 1,025-page study entitled "History of Strategic Arms Competition, 1945–1972." Most of the study has been declassified.

To supplement the documentary record, the office embarked during the 1970s on an oral history program that now numbers some 150 interviews with 77 individuals. The interviews have focused on the office of the secretary of defense—its organization and its dealings with other DoD components, government agencies, and the White House. Most have been undertaken by a contract historian, who is responsible for preparing the questions, conducting and recording the interviews, and overseeing editing of the transcripts. Although some transcripts have restrictions on access as stipulated by the interviewee, the majority are open to private researchers. A list, with brief descriptions of the subjects covered, is available for consultation in the OSD Historical Office.

OSD Records

The basic research materials for OSD historians are the official records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Three places serve as main storage sites: (1) the OSD Historical Office in the Pentagon; (2) the Washington National Records Center (WNRC) in Suitland, Maryland, a large repository operated by the National Archives and Records Administration about 10 miles southeast of the Pentagon; and (3) the
National Archives in downtown Washington, D.C. In addition, some OSD officials have donated their personal papers to presidential libraries and private institutions around the country.

Given limited storage space, the OSD Historical Office itself maintains only a few collections of original documents. The largest (approximately 175 ft.) is a set of cables—dating from 1950—that were sent and received by the secretary of defense. It is organized chronologically and, through the early 1970s, also by country, geographic region, or subject matter. Some cables bear the handwritten notations of the secretary of defense or his aides. Microfilm copies (30 reels) of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s cable traffic, 1961–63, were made and have been deposited at the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston, Massachusetts. Microfilm copies (89 reels) of McNamara’s and Clark Clifford’s telegrams, 1963–1969, are at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas. All the original cables in the OSD Historical Office, as well as the microfilm copies at the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries, remain classified.

By far the largest volume of OSD material is housed at the Washington National Records Center and designated Record Group (RG) 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. RG 330 consists of nearly 4,000 separate accessions—more than 21,000 feet of material. These records, most of which are classified, remain under OSD control. They cover the period from the mid-fifties to the present and include records retired by all OSD components, as well as the records of three DoD agencies—Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Security Assistance Agency, and Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (renamed Ballistic Missile Defense Organization). Records of other DoD agencies are stored in separate record groups.

Especially helpful to the researcher is a periodically updated computer printout of the accessions. The printout provides the accession number, number of boxes, highest security classification of the material, and a brief, general description of the contents. There are also separate inventories for each accession—records transmittal forms (Standard Form 135) on which the originating office described the contents when it retired the records. These forms list folder titles and, where Top Secret material is involved, individual documents. The printout and the inventories are available for consultation at WNRC.

A third repository for OSD records—the main one for unofficial researchers—is the National Archives in downtown Washington. These records are scheduled to be moved to a new facility in College Park, Maryland—Archives II—in the spring of 1995. Just as at the WNRC, OSD records at the National Archives are designated RG 330, though the
volume at the national Archives (2,205 ft.) is much less. The record group consists of approximately 400 separate collections or entries. The majority cover the early years of OSD’s existence (1947–1955), have been declassified, and are open to unofficial researchers. There is also declassified machine-readable material relating to the Vietnam War: computer tapes of the Southeast Asia Force Effectiveness and Intelligence Division and a data base regarding U.S. military personnel casualties in Southeast Asia, 1961–75.

The key collections at the National Archives are the classified (101 ft.) and unclassified (185 ft.) Secretary of Defense subject correspondence files, as maintained by the Correspondence Control Section, Office of the Administrative Secretary. Detailed indexes exist for both collections. Other important files include those of the various Assistant Secretaries of Defense: Comptroller (49 ft.); International Security Affairs (150 ft.); Legislative and Public Affairs (287 ft.); Manpower and Reserve Affairs (340 ft.); Properties and Installations (30 ft.); and Supply and Logistics (108 ft.). An indispensable collection at the National Archives for the study of weapons development is the files of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (179 ft.). A collection that has attracted considerable scholarly attention is the files (98 ft.) of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency—the “Operation Paperclip” files—regarding the U.S. Government’s recruitment and employment of foreign scientists in the early Cold War years.

A few collections at the National Archives cover later periods and remain classified. They include the technical reports of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, 1958–67 (18 ft.) and records of the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) consisting of working papers used in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1973–80 (6 ft.).

A unique collection is stored not in RG 330, but in RG 200 (Donated Historical Materials). This is a set of photocopies of Secretary McNamara’s classified office files (203 boxes) that he gave to the National Archives in 1990. Among the most useful portions are McNamara’s chronological reading files, his memoranda of conversation, and subject files dealing with weapon development projects—the TFX fighter, the F–111, and the SST program. A finding aid, listing folder titles, is available in the Archives’ Military Reference Branch. Nearly 40% of this collection has been declassified in whole or in part.

With regard to the earlier open material at the National Archives and to those still-classified records at the WNRC for the later period, the most useful collections in general are probably (1) the Secretary of Defense’s
correspondence and reading files, and (2) the files of the office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs. Both contain the highest level documentation dealing with national security policy, as coordinated with the military services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, State Department, White House, and other government agencies.

From the researchers standpoint, at least for those records through the 1960s with which OSD historians are most familiar, there are few gaps in the available records. Unlike practices at some agencies, OSD collections have been saved in their entirety and not screened by records managers to remove duplicates or material deemed insignificant. Rather it is how the files were maintained by the original components that sometimes hinders research. One shortcoming is an absence of a set of consecutively numbered National Security Council (NSC) policy papers. For example, the collections of NSC material for the years 1947–61, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff and the office of the NSC Adviser under the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, include folders for most NSC policy papers. However, entire folders for some papers were kept by the originating office and not retired. And other folders, especially for the late fifties, contain substantial related documents and even drafts of the NSC papers but not the final approved paper. Another shortcoming in OSD records is the absence of a complete set, organized chronologically, of memoranda of conversation involving the secretary of defense. To find a record of a particular conversation, one has to search the appropriate country or subject decimal files, a task made even more difficult when multiple subjects were discussed.

Access and Declassification

For official U.S. government historians, access to OSD records is regulated by written guidelines. The guidelines take into account an Interagency Access Agreement which ensures mutual access to the classified records of each signatory agency for the purpose of official historical research.

Access to OSD records by non-official researchers is regulated according to guidelines in the same documents pertaining to official U.S. government historians. Non-official researchers may seek declassification of specific documents, which can be a cumbersome, time consuming process. Two procedures, depending on the location of the material, are available. The first—the mandatory review process—governs material that has been formally accessioned by the National Archives and Records Administration and is housed at the National Archives or a presidential
library. Although most OSD material at these repositories is open, documents that remain classified are noted by withdrawal sheets in the boxes where the material was originally stored. Under the provisions of Executive Order 12356, any United States citizen or permanent resident alien may request declassification review of those documents withdrawn for reasons of national security. The second procedure governs classified material still under OSD control. Under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), citizens of any country may request release of this material by writing to OSD's Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review. 4

Like other U.S. government organizations, OSD also conducts a program of systematic declassification of its records. A branch within the OSD Records Administrator's Office carries out this function. Progress so far has been good. The branch has completed review of records through calendar year 1959 and is now at work on the period 1960–63. The volume of material under review has steadily increased. The 3,235 boxes for this later period are about 2-1/2 times the number examined for a comparable period of time, 1952–55. To date the branch has declassified about 79% of the documents reviewed. In the last two years of its work, the percentage of declassified material has risen to 87%. It remains to be seen what effect a new presidential executive order, still in draft form, will have on the systematic declassification process.

Despite the ongoing declassification of OSD records, the National Archives in the past has not had sufficient space at its main building in Washington to accession further material. The new facility at College Park—Archives II—should have enough room to accommodate major new accessions to Record Group 330, thus soon allowing unofficial researchers to extend their reach well into the 1960s.

ENDNOTES


7. Interviewees have included Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter; nine secretaries of defense; various OSD officials; members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Central Intelligence Agency Directors William Colby and Richard Helms; and other U.S. government officials.

8. For a list of OSD officials' personal papers kept by the presidential libraries, see the Appendix. In addition, the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., has the papers of secretaries of defense Elliot L. Richardson, Donald H. Rumsfeld, and Caspar W. Weinberger. The papers of James V. Forrestal are at Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey; Louis A. Johnson at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia; George C. Marshall at the Marshall Foundation Library, Lexington, Virginia; Charles E. Wilson at Anderson College, Anderson, Indiana; Thomas S. Gates, Jr., at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Melvin R. Laird at the Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin. As a general rule, personal papers in the presidential libraries and private institutions contain little that is classified or substantive. There are exceptions. For example, the John F. Kennedy Library has 17 microfilm reels of Secretary McNamara's classified office files for 1961–62 and 24 reels of his classified correspondence files, 1962–63, the originals of which are in the WNRC.


11. Records of the Munitions Board, 1947–53 (1,029 fl.) are housed at the WNRC and are open to unofficial researchers.

12. Until 1990 these files were kept in Record Group 330 at the Washington National Records Center and identified as accession FRC 71 A 4401, they are a different collection.
of McNamara papers from the one cited (FRC 71 A 3470) in the State Department's "Foreign Relations of the United States" volumes on Vietnam.


14. Signatories of the Interagency Access Agreement include OSD, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Department of State, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Defense University, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Archives and Records Administration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency have not signed the agreement.


APPENDIX

Personal Papers of OSD Officials in the Presidential Libraries

Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri

Donald F. Carpenter, Chairman of the Munitions Boards, 1948–49
A. Robert Ginsburgh, member of the staff of the Secretary of Defense, 1949–53.
Lawrence R. Hafstad, Executive Secretary, Research and Development Board, 1947–49.
John N. Ohly, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1947–49.
J. Thomas Schneider, Chairman, Personnel Policy Board
Ralph N. Stohl, Director of Administration, 1947–53, and Director of Domestic Security Programs, 1953–55.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Clifford C. Furnas, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development), 1955–57.
Frank D. Newbury, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Applications Engineering), 1953–57, and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), 1957.


Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1957–59

C. Herschel Schooley, Director of Public Information, 1953–58

Federick A. Seaton, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative and Public Affairs), 1953–55.

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts

Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1961–64


Don Price, Deputy Chairman, Research and Development Board, 1947–53.

Barry J. Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), 1969–73.

Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1961–65.

Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas


Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), 1965–69.


Lawrence C. McQuade, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), 1961–63


Ronald Reagan Library, Santa Barbara, California

SECTION IX

U.S. and NATO Archives in Europe
The U.S. European Command Operational Archives: Documenting the History of a Sea-Change

Dr. Bryan T. Van Sweringen

Nothing of him that doth fade,
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.

Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act I Scene 2

The United States European Command (USEUCOM) is one of the five unified commands with regional responsibilities accountable to the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense for the planning and conduct of military operations. It is composed of three component commands: United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE); United States Army Europe and Seventh Army (USAREUR); United States Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR); and the sub-unified Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). The USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) encompasses 82 nations on the continents of Europe, Africa and Asia—an area of approximately 13 million square miles.

Although the Headquarters United States European Command (HQ USEUCOM) was formally established at “0001 Zebra (sic) hours 1 August 1952,” its activation can be seen as an evolutionary process, which actually began in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during the Second World War. This evolution continued on into the postwar period, as USEUCOM and its component commands were shaped by the onset, escalation and end of the Cold War. Beginning in 1989, a “sea-change” swept through the USEUCOM AOR, transforming it “into something rich and strange.” The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have dissolved. Former adversaries have become friends, and Central and Eastern European nations have begun the difficult process of democratization.
There have been negative as well as positive consequences, however. The end of the Cold War has catalyzed the reemergence of national and tribal conflicts. Many of the current operations in which USEUCOM is involved have been generated by these conflicts and rivalries. General George A. Joulwan, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command (CINCEUR), recently characterized the USEUCOM AOR as a "Theater in Conflict."

One of the primary missions of the U.S. Forces forward-stationed in Europe has historically been the support of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command Europe (ACE). With the establishment of USEUCOM in August 1952, the Supreme Commander Europe (SACEUR) was "dual-hatted" as the Command in Chief, U.S. European Command (CINCEUR). Likewise, each of the USEUCOM component commanders assumed NATO command responsibilities. For 30-years, the mission remained essentially unchanged. In 1989, in response to the unprecedented changes taking place throughout the AOR, a new mission statement was developed for USEUCOM:

Support and advance U.S. interests and policies throughout the area of assigned responsibility; provide combat ready land, maritime, and air forces to Allied Command Europe [ACE] or U.S. unified commands; and conduct operations unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners.

As a result of the post war mission environment, HQ USEUCOM began the often painful transition from an administrative to an operational headquarters. An important ingredient in this transition process, which actually predated the events of 1989 by three years, was the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. "Goldwater-Nichols" placed combat command (COCOM) in the hands of the CINCEUR and the other unified Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs), and furthermore defined the relationships between those CINCs ("supported" and "supporting"). This basis, upon which the post-Cold War operations have been executed, is exemplified by General John Galvin’s response to General Schwarzkopf’s (U.S. Central Command) requests for assistance during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM: "The answer is yes, now what is the question?"

Many of these operations are truly unique and, like Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, could not have taken place in the earlier Cold War environment. Operations SHARP EDGE, the non-combatant evacuation (NEO) which took place in Monrovia, Liberia, illustrated the "stabilizing" effect which the presence of U.S. Forces can exert on a volatile political situation. As noted above, as a "supporting command" USEUCOM contributed to the success of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM.
through the following operations: EUCOMM-Z (the deployment of U.S. Forces to Southwest Asia) and PROVEN FORCE (deployment of PATRIOT missiles to Israel). Following the cessation of hostilities, USEUCOM conducted Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to alleviate the suffering of Kurds and other Iraqi citizens displaced by the war, and to insure their security upon their return home. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH extended this protection to Muslims living in Southern Iraq. In an interesting twist of history, Operation PROVIDE HOPE aircraft flying from Rhein-Main Air Base—where the Berlin Airlift originated—provided humanitarian relief to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in January 1992. Operation PROVIDE TRANSITION provided logistical support for the Angolan Elections. Current USEUCOM operations in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) include: PROVIDE PROMISE, SHARP GUARD (NATO), DENY FLIGHT (NATO) and ABLE SENTRY. These operations are truly historic, and it is essential that the significant records they generate be integrated into USEUCOM’s collective memory for operational as well as historical use.

Shortly after assuming my present position as the Command Historian, I reviewed the HQ USEUCOM records in the holdings of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) here in Washington, D.C. (Record Group 349 Records of Joint Commands). Much to my surprise, I found that although records had indeed been retired over the past (at that time) 39 years, there were/are significant gaps in the period since 1955. Given the historic events that have taken place in the both USEUCOM area of responsibility and mission since 1989 and my training as an archivist at the National Archives, I decided to establish an “operational archives” with HQ USEUCOM. This would insure the preservation of significant records for both operational and historical use, and the systematic retirement of those records to the National Archives. Experience has shown that USEUCOM, its component commands and JTF (Joint Task Force)/CTF (Combined Task Force) headquarters, have a “real-time” need for “operational archives.”

The foundation for the U.S. European Command Operational Archives (“OPARCH”), as well as the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command History Program itself, is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memorandum of Policy No. 62 “Guidance for the Joint History Program” (1st Revision—23 November 1992): The CINC’s will be responsible for maintaining historical programs to ensure the production of an accurate, thorough, and objective historical record of the activities of their commands, including all contingency and joint operations conducted by the command.
One of my primary duties as the Command Historian of the U.S. European Command is the preparation of Historical Reports, which are submitted to the Joint History Office, within the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reports are usually prepared from inputs submitted by the Directorates and Staff Offices to the history office. Experience has shown, however, that these "feeder-reports" are often prepared in great haste (in order to meet a deadline) by the most junior people in that particular organization. Although original sources are (sometimes) cited in these reports, they are usually not included. Perhaps because of my professional training as an archivist, I view the collection of significant documents (to include notes of briefing and transcripts of oral history interviews) to supplement the "objective historical record" as an essential function of the historical office. My colleague at USAFE, Dr. Tom Snyder, observes that, "history should be a road map to the documents." Furthermore, a historical report is a summary, and often does not contain the detail required by all researchers (particularly if they are action officers or historians). For the above reasons, the creation of an HQ USEUCOM Operational Archives seemed not only highly desirable, but essential to the history function.

The first step in the creation of the HQ USEUCOM Operational Archives was the arrangement and description of the records already in the custody of the Command Historian's office. In addition to the annual historical reports (AHRs) prepared by the USEUCOM Command Historian, the component commands and other unified commands, the files also contained other reports generated by the command and its components, as well as subject files. The majority of the files remain classified. Many of these records concern the planning and execution of operations in Europe from 1952 until the 1980's, as well as security assistance programs in Africa and the Middle East. Consequently, they will eventually be of great interest to anyone studying the "institutionalization" of the Cold War in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

A substantial number of the Cold War era records found in the files of the Command Historian focus upon contingency planning and exercises within the USEUCOM area of operational responsibility (AOR). As the former "capital of the Cold War," Berlin was one of the primary focal points of these planning efforts. It is interesting to note that the Berlin crisis of 1958–61 may have indeed been the first exercise in post war contingency planning, which established a kind of paradigm for related planning efforts. In addition to plans and exercises there are also complementary Cold War era records of USEUCOM Headquarters and component command organization and activities, as well as special studies.
Another well-documented focal point of the historical files was the creation, build-up, and removal ("fast-relocation") of the lines of communication (LOC) in France during the 1950's. Camp-de-Loges, located near SHAPE on the outskirts of Paris, was the home of HQ USEUCOM from 1954 until 1966. Taken as a whole these "historical records" provide a multi-dimensional—if regrettable incomplete—look at the Cold War from the perspective of the superior U.S. headquarters in theater.

With the assistance of Navy and Air Force reservists, I arranged these files according to the Modern Army Records Keeping System (MARKS). As most of them were related to the history of USEUCOM, I placed them under "870.5a Organizational History," and thereafter alphabetically by key word. This allows a search either manually or by using the "SEARCH" function of a word processing program.

I should note here, that the use of reserve assets is critical to both the operational archives as well as to the HQ USEUCOM History Program itself. Historians in the USEUCOM area of operations (AO) are decreasing proportionally with the U.S. Forces, ironically at a time when new programs and increased operations ideally would require more.

After surveying the history office holdings, I contacted the USEUCOM Directorates and Staff Sections to determine what additional "historical files" might still be held in the directorates. The Operations Directorate (ECJ3), in particular, still retained Cold War planning files, as well as documents covering the more recent period from 1987 until the present. Action Officers already have an "archival sense." They realize that after an operation or exercise has been executed, it is quite likely that similar operations and exercises will be conducted in the future. Anticipating the need for similar estimates, operations orders (OPORD) and execution orders (EXORD) they will retain this material in their files. With the frequent rotation of action officers, the files serve as a kind of operational, institutional memory. Unfortunately, there appears to be no mechanism for the systematic retirement of these files once they were no longer needed, and successors sometimes decided to clear out their safes and begin anew.

Working closely with the Operations Directorate, and the USEUCOM records manager, I proposed the concept of a HQ USEUCOM Operational Archives, which would systematically preserve these records at HQ USEUCOM in a central location for operational use. At the same time, they would be available to the USEUCOM History Office for the preparation of annotated chronologies and historical monographs. Once the records are not longer required by the HQ USEUCOM they will be retired to the Washington National Records Center in accordance with established records management procedures.
The records of the National Archives and Records Administration are maintained on the principal of provenance. This insures that the records are retained in the order which they were generated by the agency. As a result, the records reflect both the organizational structure and the purpose for which they were used. For example, many records generated by the USEUCOM Operations Directorate, carry the MARKS designation of "525 Military Operations." This designation is retained in the operational archives. In order to facilitate both research and retirement, they are organized thereunder chronologically, and thereunder alphabetically. This arrangement, once again, simplifies both manual and automated (i.e. key word) searches.

As in the case of the "historical documents," an inventory of all documents was made using the format prescribed by MARKS. This information is also required for the completion of the forms necessary to insure the retirement of the records of NARA.

It soon became evident that there was not enough room in the History Office to store these additional documents. Consequently, I was able to identify a room that would allow both secure storage of the documents and a work area, where the records could be used both by action officers and historians. This area also provides a working space for reservists who are assigned to my office for training and/or temporary duty.

It should be noted that the USEUCOM Operational Archives were created to support the operational and historical needs of the command, and are not intended to serve broader research needs. As the Command Historian, I have no reviewing or downgrading authority, so that all documents retain their original security classifications. Once USEUCOM has determined that the records are no longer required for operational purposes (to included historical research) they will be retired to the Washington National Records Center (WNRC). After the records have been accessioned, declassification review will be conducted by the National Archives in accordance with the current Executive Order on National Security Information. Following a review for personal data covered by privacy act restrictions, the records will be made available to researchers. Although the operational archives concept is necessarily restrictive in terms of access, it insures the preservation of documents for eventual release.

Since Chairman Powell introduced his "Joint Culture Initiatives" there has been increased interest in the study and analysis of joint and combined operations, with special emphasis upon joint and combined task force (JTF/CTF) organization. As a result, records generated by USEUCOM operations during the period 1989–present are of great academic interest. Together with the historical records of the Cold War period, they document
the history of an evolving, dynamic organization, established during a period of confrontation which, in response to a “sea-change,” has continued to develop in an effort to provide stability and promote democracy in Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is therefore essential that these records be preserved, both as a reference for current operations and as well as a valuable source for researchers. It would be very useful if eventually the records of all the unified commands with regional responsibility could be brought together at one location. As a graduate student, I profited greatly from the work of official historians stationed in Europe during and following the Second World War. Consequently, I feel obligated to provide the coming generation of historians with a similar legacy.
The NATO Archives  
and the Release of NATO Records for Research  

Edwin A. Thompson

NATO officials have approved the presentation of a paper on the NATO records of the Cold War at this conference. The viewpoints expressed herein are entirely personal ones, however, and do not represent the official position of NATO on these matters.

Like other post-World War II international organizations, NATO gave little attention until very recently to the development of an archival program intended to identify and assure the preservation of its permanently valuable documents for historical research purposes. In 1992 the Deputy Permanent Representatives to NATO agreed in principle to the setting up, as a separate entity, of a NATO “Archives Unit.” However, the details of appointing an archivist, organizing an archival unit, and establishing an archival service for all elements of NATO have yet to be addressed leaving the ultimate outcome for NATO records uncertain.

This statement does not mean that most of the historically significant documents created by NATO have not been preserved. They have been—at NATO headquarters in Brussels in two separate registries. The first registry is operated by the International Staff and serves the needs of the Council and its numerous permanent and ad hoc committees, the civil agencies, the Secretary General and the rest of the International Staff. The second registry is under the direction of the International Military Staff and serves the Military Committee and its several planning and support activities based at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

The records in these two registries contain the most important documents issued by the highest level authorities of the NATO alliance since its establishment in 1949. They document all the major political, economic, military and strategic matters undertaken or studied within the Organization. They also cover such related matters as military support, defense production, and military procurement; the building of defense
infrastructure; civil defense planning; transportation to and within Western Europe; internal security cooperation, the development of a common information policy, and the establishment of various cooperative measures requiring common policies and procedures.

My presentation today will focus on the records in these two registries in Brussels, because they are the records I know and, more importantly, because they are the only records which NATO is considering making available for historical research at this time. Excluded from this presentation are any records created by or maintained at SHAPE and the other major allied commands and by the civil and military agencies. These records will be considered for release only after the principal records at NATO headquarters are agreed for release.

Before I describe the civil and military records at NATO headquarters, I will outline briefly the background and the present status of the policies and procedures for the release of NATO records for historical research. NATO engaged a consultant in 1989, Mr. Robert J. Hayward of Canada, to formulate suitable policies for the declassification and release of NATO documents and to recommend a course of action which the NATO Council might adopt to implement that policy. In April 1990 the Council approved the implementation of his proposed, "Policy on the Release of NATO Documents of Historical Significance for Research Purposes," with a trial period. Only the NATO documents issued in registered series and dated between 1949 and 1958 would be considered in this initial slice.

Two professional archivists were employed as consultants by NATO for six months in 1991 and produced an interim report. They returned for 12 months in 1992-93 and completed the work of preparing all of the pre-1959 NATO documents at the headquarters for review by the competent authorities of the member countries for declassification and release. One of the consultants on release, Madam Françoise Pequen, a retired French Foreign Ministry archivist, represented the continental approach to the release of information. I was the other consultant and I represented the Anglo-American viewpoint. My background was that of Director of the Records Declassification Division at the U.S. National Archives from 1972 until my retirement in 1990.

To establish a workable document release procedure, the consultants examined the NATO records held in the two registries at NATO headquarters and identified all of the NATO documents of historical significance pre-dating 1959. We determined the current security classification status of the documents so that those requiring declassification action—the vast majority of them—could be acted upon in accordance with the NATO security regulations. We tried to assist reviewing officials by preparing
descriptions of the records series created by each element of NATO in their historical content and by annexing lists of all of the key documents. We also analyzed the records as they are presently constituted and chose the form in which they could be reviewed and subsequently released for public research if and when that action is approved by the member governments and by the Council.

The consultants’ joint final report with conclusions and recommendations was completed in October 1993 and placed in the hands of the Executive Secretary. It is to be translated and reproduced for consideration by the Deputy Permanent Representatives (Council) sometime in 1994. When they meet to consider our report, the Council will have to resolve a number of very practical questions involved in making of the 1949–1958 NATO documents available for research. First, what is to be released and when—this is subject to any review determinations undertaken by the member governments. Second, how the NATO documents are to be released, that is, the form of the release—as paper records, as microfilm, or as a mixture of both. Third, where the records are to be made available for research use—at NATO headquarters, at another NATO facility, at one or more archival repository; or will they be made available commercially through a microfilm publication firm, or a mixture of these approaches.

We all know that NATO was a political and military alliance formulated by the principal western European democracies, the United States and Canada in 1949 to defend Europe from the threat of Soviet military aggression and internal subversion. We know too, that the organization was concerned with every political-military-economic issue which touched on the security concerns, individually and collectively, of the member nations. I would remind you further, that all of the final decisions of the organization were and are made in unanimity. This requirement often led to long discussions of the different viewpoints and careful preparation of compromises in order to obtain acceptable statements of policy and procedures in final decisions. The NATO documents show the issues being considered and their resolution and frequently just how agreement was reached.

A great many of the NATO documents were formally submitted by individual governments and were recast as NATO registered documents. These documents were considered at formal meetings either by a committee or by the Council for which there are summary records (and in a few instances verbatim records) with carefully drafted conclusions of the decisions reached. In other cases questionnaires were prepared by committees and submitted to the member governments. The individual country responses were sometimes circulated as Committee documents and some-
times were used in the compilation of reports by experts on the Committee or on the International Staff. These documents were considered by the Committee at recorded meetings, amended and approved. All the most significant issues and periodic or final reports of committees, often containing statements of outstanding issues requiring Council action, were made into formal council documents for consideration at regular Council meetings of the Permanent Representatives or at the semi-annual meetings of the Council at ministerial level.

This intimate involvement of the member governments in the origin of most NATO documents explains why their approval of the release of NATO documents is required. The earliest documents of NATO—those of the first nine Council meetings at ministerial level 1949–February 1952 and of the Council Deputies, 1950 through April 1952, are now in the hands of the member governments for their consideration as to whether they should be declassified and released to the public for research. Responses are due in the Spring of 1994. If these earliest documents are agreed for release then additional document listings will be submitted to the member governments covering the 1952–1958 records. The consultants have already prepared such listings for consideration. The burden is now on the member governments to reach decisions.

Let me give you a brief overview of the 1949–1958 NATO documents which are being considered for release. The records of the civilian side of NATO are in the custody of the International Staff Central Registry. The 1949–1958 NATO documents being considered for release are: a chronological series of formal documents in paper form created by or for the North Atlantic Council at its first nine meetings, the documents created by the Council Deputies—reports, memoranda and records of meeting, 1950–April 1952—and the documents created by and for the Permanent Representatives (Council) and the North Atlantic Council meeting in ministerial session, 1952–1958. Included also are paper copies of the most widely circulated memoranda prepared by the Secretary General between 1955 and 1958. These records occupy seven linear meters and are nearly complete in both official languages, French and English.

In December 1954, a microfilm unit was established in the Central Registry to copy the accumulation of documents created by all of the civilian elements of NATO—including those prepared by every board and committee established to carry out particular studies and broad general responsibilities as directed by the Council. By mid-1958 all of the series of NATO documents created since 1949 had been microfilmed on about 250 rolls of 16mm film. Beginning in July 1958 all of the NATO documents were microfilmed in a single sequence by date of issuance. Following their
filming, many of the early series of documents and the chronologically arranged documents were destroyed for security reasons and to conserve space. Documents created by some of the most active long-term committees, however, were retained and were refilmed later in sequential rolls.

A number of the early NATO documents of some elements of the Organization were filmed just once and then destroyed. At the same time paper copies of most of this early period's formal NATO documents were preserved in subregistry-maintained series or subject files which were subsequently retired to the International Staff central registry. Most of these documents have been rearranged into new subject files. But these subject files also contain a great deal of internal organization originated documentation including memoranda submitted by national delegations and documents created by international staff officials. These particular files are not being considered for release at this time. Consequently, we are concerned here with the possible declassification and release of only the formal NATO documents created by the various civilian elements of the organization which are on microfilm.

Locating all of the pre-1959 documents by each originating component on the various rolls of microfilm is made possible by using a card index which was prepared initially to identify and describe each document as it was created. The cards are filed in strict series order by the unique alpha-numeric number assigned and printed on each NATO document as it was duplicated for circulation. The card gives the date of issuance and, for meetings, the date of the meeting being recorded. The titles of memoranda and reports also appear on the cards.

The microfilm unit made its own card indexes identifying the rolls of microfilm containing the documents created by each issuing component and another set of cards for each roll of film listing the series of documents contained on each roll by registration number. The consultants summarized this information in the listings they prepared to facilitate the review by responsible authorities in member governments. Ultimately these listings may be made available for use by researchers when and if the NATO documents described are released.

The surviving military records created before 1959 by the North Atlantic Military Committee, the Military Representatives Committee and the Standing Group are in the custody of the International Military Staff (IFS) Registry. These records were originally organized and maintained by an international military secretariat located in the Pentagon Building in Washington, D.C. The documents, memoranda, notes and messages were placed in a single subject file using the U.S. Army decimal file system. Nearly all the military plans, studies and recommendations on policy and
procedures affecting the alliance and the military commands and agencies were prepared by the Standing Group composed of representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs of France, the U.K., and the U.S. The Standing Group served as the day-to-day executive agency of the Military Committee. A Military Representatives Committee composed of representatives of all the member countries’ military authorities sat with the Standing Group in Washington as advisors and liaison for the Military Committee and also was empowered to take final decisions in noncontentious matters on behalf of the Military Committee. The Military Committee, composed of the Chiefs of staff of the member governments, met twice a year to consider and approve the most important military issues, solved contentious problems, and agreed on the final military advice to be provided to the North Atlantic Council.

Space pressure on the IFS Registry in the 1980s caused the head of that office to greatly reduce the volume of inactive records. Particularly affected by this decision was the original decimal subject file containing all of the pre-1977 Military Committee, and all of the Military Representatives Committee and Standing Group records. The principal document series created by each of these organizations were removed from the subject decimal file arrangement and placed in numerical order. Many of the documents and especially those which were infrequently requested by the staff and those considered of minor value were destroyed along with working papers and drafts prepared by the principal international planning teams which supported the Standing Group and the Military Committee.

The International Military Staff considered establishing a microfilming program to reduce the bulk of the files it maintained. Unfortunately no action was taken to implement these proposals. Consequently, we are concerned here with a unique collection of surviving paper documents without a readily available copy on microfilm to be circulated for review by military declassification and release authorities in member countries. Neither is there a readily available form for wide release to researchers should a decision be made to make them publicly available.

Here is a quick overview of some of the principal series of NATO military documents for the 1949 through 1958 period which should—but cannot readily—be reviewed alongside the Council records described earlier in this paper.

a. The Military Committee formal documents (450 in 87 subject series), records of 22 Chiefs of Staff level meetings and memoranda of every sort (341 memos) totalling about 15,000 papers or less than 2 meters of records.
b. The Military Representatives Committee met 147 times before it was reorganized in 1958 when it held 20 meetings as the Military Committee in Permanent Session. Altogether these two organizations produced about 3,700 pages of meeting records or less than one-half linear meter of records.

c. The Standing Group (S) originated 1,266 formal documents in 255 subject series. The S met nearly 500 times, and also produced a great many memoranda and outgoing cables. These four series of Standing Group documents for the period 1950 through 1958 occupy about 9 linear meters of records.

The declassification and release of these early NATO military records in the custody of the IFS in Brussels may well depend upon the prompt preparation of a microfilm copy for review by declassification and review experts in the responsible capitals. And the declassification and release of the documents created by the military commands and agencies will be delayed until decisions are taken on these highest level military documents of the Alliance.

Later this year (1994) the Deputy Permanent Representatives meet in Brussels to consider the Consultants' report and review the results of the initial submissions to capitals for review and release determination on the 1949–April 1952 records of the Council, the Council Deputies, and the civil boards and committees. The Representatives also will consider the several recommendations made by the consultants concerning changing the release policy, they will evaluate the procedures and practices used during the trial periods, and then will resolve the practical problems associated with any agreed release.

The Deputy Permanent Representatives may choose to convene a meeting of the release authorities of the member states to examine many of these issues and to make recommendations on the steps ahead. The Representatives may also choose to convene a meeting of the national archivists of the member states to consider the related questions of an archival service for all of NATO to ensure the preservation and research access of all of the permanently valuable records originated by the civil and military elements at NATO headquarters and by the civil agencies and the military commands and agencies of NATO in Europe and in North America.

Whatever is discussed and decided in Brussels the NATO governments will probably be required to undertake some level of sustained effort in foreign and defense ministries to accomplish the review of NATO documents for declassification and public release. The NATO governments must also be persuaded of the need for appointing an experienced profes-
sional archivist, for establishing an archival program for all NATO and for selecting a full-time qualified staff to push forward the release of NATO 30-year-old records on a regular basis.

We all agree that the public release of NATO’s 30-year-old documents would make available to historians some of the most important information on the Cold War. You can help this happen by voicing your concern for the care and preservation of the NATO records of historical significance by a professional archival staff. You also can urge the committing of the necessary resources at NATO headquarters and in the national capitals of its member nations toward the goal of promptly making these documents available for historical research.
SECTION X

Writing The History Of The Cold War: The U.S. Military Services
Cold War History at the U.S. Naval Historical Center

Dr. Edward J. Marolda

Most of the Naval Historical Center’s ten branches are important to the collection, preservation, and interpretation of historical material relating to the post-1945 era. For instance, the Ships’ Histories Branch has issued a multi-volume reference series, *The Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships*, and is preparing a follow-on series, *Ships of the Modern U.S. Navy*, that include the histories of the naval vessels commissioned in the last 50 years. The *Naval Aviation News* branch, which publishes six issues of the periodical yearly, often features articles on such topics as the role of the carrier forces during the Cuban Missile Crisis. And, the Navy Department Library branch distributes bibliographies on the Soviet Navy and related subjects.

Naval Reserve Detachment 206, affiliated with the Center, actively acquires documents, oral interviews, and artifacts from naval bases being closed. Most of these facilities, like the submarine base at Holy Loch, Scotland, and the mammoth establishment of Subic Bay in the Philippines, figured prominently in Cold War history.

The Center’s Contemporary History Branch has primary responsibility for coverage of the history of the U.S. Navy in the Cold War, a term which we consider in its broadest sense. The branch, established in 1987, executes the Secretary of the Navy’s global operations; strategy, tactics, and doctrine; role in the national security establishment; relations with defense industries; and the contribution of Navy men and women to the nation during the last half-century. The seven professional historians of the branch accomplish this mission by: 1) organizing conferences, 2) providing advice and reference support to the Navy and the other agencies of the U.S. Government, and, most importantly, 3) researching, writing, and publishing histories.

**Conferences:** Since 1989, the branch has organized the Colloquium on Contemporary History. The purpose of these morning-long confer-
ences, held twice each year, has been to promote the study of post-World War II U.S. and international security issues. Featured speakers and conference participants have included officers from each of the U.S. armed services, historians from the government historical community, analysts from defense-related research organizations, and scholars from U.S. and foreign universities. Topics have included the development of Soviet military forces in the early Cold War, the establishment of NATO, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and American nuclear strategy and missile development. The proceedings of these colloquia have been or will be published.

**Advice and Reference Support:** The branch provides extensive reference and research support relating to the Cold War to the U.S. government and the public. For instance, staff historians are currently assisting in the development of the Navy’s strategic and doctrinal publications by suggesting historical cases and reviewing drafts for accuracy. As another example, branch members helped produce for the naval staff a video entitled “From the Sea,” which illustrates the fleet’s ability to operate in the coastal and inland waterways of the world, as it has done repeatedly during the last 50 years. Finally, the branch has provided advice and information regarding American servicemen held prisoner or considered missing in action during the conflict in Southeast Asia.

**Publications:** The Center’s leadership recognized early, with regard to the publication by the Navy of histories on the Navy, that it was vital to assure the credibility of the product. The Secretary of the Navy concurred and issued a policy statement in which he affirmed that the form, style, and character of such books, as well as their conclusions, are solely those of the author based on his or her best historical judgement arrived at after the most thorough possible research in all relevant records. The author’s conclusions should not be construed as representing the ‘official’ view of the Navy Department or any other government agency. The Center’s professional historians, no less than the public, have benefitted from this affirmation.

In regard to the form of the histories, the Center’s leaders have consistently tried to serve several audiences. Publications that range from 300 to 600 pages are intended to present a comprehensive and well-documented interpretation of the modern Navy. The standard-bearer for the writing program has long been the series, *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict*. Two volumes have been published. They cover the period 1950 to 1965, when U.S. naval personnel served as advisors to the Republic of Vietnam Navy. Three others, which dealt with combat on the rivers and coasts of South Vietnam and in the air over all Southeast Asia, are in preparation. Other works in this major history category include the recent-
ly released study of American submarine construction from 1940 to 1961. Works in progress include a volume on the unification of the services controversy of the late 1940s, a history of women in the U.S. Navy, the Navy’s role in national security affairs from 1945 to 1955, and a history of naval oceanography.

It was also recognized that a different medium was called for to reach a key audience, uniformed officers and civilian policymakers with major responsibilities and little time to digest a 600-page tome. Moreover, it was felt that these prospective customers needed historical information on a timely basis to deal with the crises and issues with which they were confronted every day. Hence, Contemporary History Branch staff and contract historians were charged with the preparation of 200 to 300-page, issue-oriented analyses in a series entitled Contributions to Naval History. The monographs published in this series include studies of American naval strategy in the decade after World War II, of the organizational evolution of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, of U.S. naval mine countermeasures, and of the Navy’s historic presence in the Persian Gulf. Forthcoming works include histories of naval forces in the Persian Gulf War, its responses to the evolution of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and the development of surface ships and weapon systems from 1945 to 1975.

Yet another audience has been addressed with the recently inaugurated booklet series, The U.S. Navy in the Modern World. These strikingly illustrated, 50-page monographs are written in a popular style, but reflect the latest historical information and interpretation. These “mini-histories” are intended for the younger generation of officers and enlisted personnel, who may want a better understanding of their service’s recent experience. The first issue in this series was Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis. It will soon be followed by Assault From the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon. Succeeding booklets will treat such subjects as the Navy’s deterrence of war, support for U.S. foreign policy, littoral operations, refugee evacuations, joint and multinational actions, and ship, aircraft, and weapons development.

The branch has also completed several relevant, stand-alone publications. These include the soon to be released illustrated history of the Navy and the war in Southeast Asia, which seeks to illuminate, for veterans and the public, the Navy’s significant service in the conflict; a history of minesweeping operations in North Vietnam; and two reference works, bibliographies on the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars. Copies of most Center publications can be acquired from the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Valuable archival collections: The archival collections most vital to the study of the U.S. Navy in the Cold War are maintained by the Center’s
Operational Archives Branch. This is the most important repository of information on the U.S. Navy’s operations, policies, and organizational evolution from 1939 to the present. There are a number of record groups held in the archives that have proven essential for almost every subject being researched by Center historians. The Post-1946 and Post-1974 Command, Report, and Plan files are especially rich resources. The records are arranged according to the command that originated them, and thereunder chronologically. The collections start with the highest commands and proceed through regional fleets, numbered fleets, independent forces, shore-based commands, and individual ships. The records include yearly reports, action reports, operation plans and orders, combat studies, and statistical compilations. Not only Navy-generated documents, but those received from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the intelligence agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified commands, such as Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), are held in the Operational Archives.

Other records in the archives that have been a boon to research on the Cold War era are those of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; that is, the naval staff. Included in this collection are the records of the Immediate Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, or the offices concerned with surface warfare, air warfare, policy and organization, strategic plans, political-military affairs, and interaction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These groups hold correspondence, policy studies, reports, and other materials concerning the Navy’s operating forces and shore establishment. As with records generated by the other military services and intelligence agencies during the Cold War, however, much of the Navy’s material requires security classification review before it can be made available to all scholars.

Also held in the Operational Archives are the papers of many key naval leaders of the last five decades, including the letters, memoranda, and public pronouncements of Secretaries of the Navy James V. Forrestal and John Lehman. Although the collections vary in quality and size, the correspondence of Admirals Sherman, Burke, Anderson, and Zumwalt, Chiefs of Naval Operations during the decades after 1945, shed considerable light on policy making.

Another valuable source of information are the hundreds of interviews recorded with officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians. These oral histories amplify our understanding of such subjects as the Navy’s cooperation with industry in the construction of the submarine fleet, the Korean War, and the research and development of weapon systems. The archive also maintains a collection of oral histories that the Oral History Office of
Columbia University and the U.S. Naval Institute completed with senior officers. Naturally, the recollections by naval personnel, often made years after the event, need to be weighed carefully against other types of information.

As an example of sources in the naval archives that have provided a strong foundation for the official histories, one need only look to the Vietnam War material. The Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, Commander Seventh Fleet, and Post-1946 Command File were major groups that presented a wealth of operational detail. This documentation was supported by the microfilmed message traffic of the combat commands.

As another example, several sizeable groups of records cover the contribution of Navy women since 1945, including those of the Bureau of Naval Personnel’s Office of the Assistant Chief for Women and the Bureau of Medicine’s Navy Nurse Corps.

The holdings of the Center’s Ships’ Histories Branch and Aviation History Branch contain vital division and squadron reports, deck logs, command reports, and press releases.

Important records relating to the U.S. Navy in the modern period are also held in the National Archives and other repositories outside the Naval Historical Center. For instance, sizeable groups of material created by the technical bureaus, naval combat and support units, ships, training centers, and civilian research organizations are housed at the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. Similar facilities exist in a number of regions of the United States.

Valuable documentation available in archives external to the Center, for example, relates to the history of submarine design and construction and naval oceanography. Key sources concerning these topics are the records held by the National Archives, the National Academy of Sciences; David Taylor Research Center, Carderock, Maryland; Submarine Force Library and Museum, Groton, Connecticut; Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Massachusetts; Scripps Institution of Oceanography, La Jolla, California; and the Center for American History at the University of Texas, in Austin.

The libraries established around the country to preserve historical information on modern U.S. presidents hold important documents relating to the U.S. Navy in the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. For instance, the Truman Library maintains important documents on the Navy’s activities in China during the 1940s; the Eisenhower Library on the Pacific Fleet’s actions during the Taiwan Strait crises; the Kennedy Library on the naval quarantine of Cuba in 1962; and the Johnson Library on the controversial
Tonkin Gulf Incidents of 1964. The libraries of later Presidents are still being developed and are less accessible to researchers covering the Cold War.

**Newly available archival material:** The end of the Cold War has raised the prospect that not only the archives of our former adversaries but our own will yield valuable information. To illustrate that point, while attending a recent historical conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis at the CIA’s Langley, Virginia, headquarters, I was struck by the irony that for both the Russian guests and myself, it was the first time we had been granted access to that building. The recent openness at the CIA has already produced a thick compilation of previously classified documents on the missile crisis and promises more on the Bay of Pigs and other Cold War episodes. Moreover, the State Department recently released materials on Navy aircraft lost since the late 1940s on reconnaissance missions along the Sino-Soviet periphery. We are also hopeful that after its current investigation of the concept, the Defense Department and the Navy will establish teams to systematically review decades-old classified records in their custody. Finally, with the Cold War over, retired sailors have shown greater inclination to discuss their role in the momentous events of the last half-century.

Equally promising for our research are the archives of past foes that are beginning to open their doors, thus enabling us to recast many of our previous interpretations. For instance, recently available government documents, oral interviews, and open discussions with scholars from the People’s Republic of China have shed new light on historical issues, such as the causes of Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Chinese scholars studying in this country have begun publishing their own English-language journal, covering such subjects as Mao Zedong’s hitherto secret dealings with Stalin. Parenthetically, the U.S. Marine Corps has sponsored research by a scholar from the University of Shanghai on the Marine occupation of North China in the late 1940s. The PRC’s new openness has also enabled scholars like John Garver at the Georgia Institute of Technology and our own official historians to learn much more about China’s involvement in the Vietnam War.

A fresh breeze is also blowing in Vietnam. The controversy over Americans taken prisoner during the war or missing in action has delayed the normalization of relations between Washington and Hanoi, but it has had the salutary effect of making the Vietnam military materials much more accessible to Westerners than would otherwise have been the case. Moreover, because of the improved political atmosphere, leaders like American General Hal Moore and his Vietnamese counterpart in the 1965
Battle of the Ia Drang, have been able to exchange insights on that seminal combat action.

Much the same has occurred with regard to the records held in the archives of the former Warsaw Pact nations. Through the good offices of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War History Project and its newsletter, our naval historians are learning much about what is available in the naval and military archives in St. Petersburg, Budapest, Warsaw, and similar sites. Also helpful have been the periodic conferences held in this country and in Eastern Europe to enable an exchange of views on the events of the Cold War. For instance, during their visit to the Center in 1990, Russian General Dimitri Volkogonov's group of military historians suggested records in Russia that might shed light on U.S.-Soviet naval interaction before the full onset of the Cold War. Contacts between individuals have also borne fruit. Our Russian specialist at the Center has been able to acquire pertinent documents and leads to others through his correspondence with Russian counterparts. Similarly, the well-known German naval historian Jurgen Rohwer has enjoyed fruitful exchanges of materials with his Russian contacts.

Problems: With regard to research in American records on the U.S. Navy in the Cold War, the major problem is the inaccessibility to historians of much relevant material. Continued security classification protection is the principal cause, but not the only one. For instance, while official government historians are authorized to see everything pertaining to their topic, that doesn't mean that they can find all of it or use it when found. There are millions of pages of documents, frames of microfilm, transcripts of interviews, and other sources that touch on naval matters in hundreds of repositories around the country. Moreover, some material, like that dealing with special intelligence methods, battle tactics, and the design or operation of ships, aircraft, and weapons still in use by U.S. and allied military forces, requires continued protection. Even when an agency declassifies potentially useful information, that fact is sometimes not communicated to other agencies.

Obstacles to the use of Cold War resources outside the United States are even greater. The costs involved in visiting a foreign archives for any length of time are certainly a primary deterrent. The problems faced by American archives pale in comparison with those in Eastern Europe. For instance, the Russian government controls the enormous total of 204 million files. With the Russian state in the throes of economic upheaval, the national archives have few funds to store, declassify, or photocopy documents or develop inventories. Moreover, some Russian officials are still reluctant to make available formerly closely held documents, especially to Westerners, even if this is not the typical response.
My one recommendation to this distinguished assembly is that we periodically convene conferences such as this and publish the proceedings. Thus, many more scholars from the nations that endured the half-century Cold War can share our improved understanding of that long and costly global confrontation.
The Air Force History Program
and the Cold War

Herman S. Wolk

Introduction

To some extent, one could view the history of the United States Air Force from its establishment as a separate service in 1947 until its recent restructuring and downsizing in the early 1990s as a chapter in the Cold War story. In that vein, much of what Air Force historians have recorded, researched, and written in the past 46 years has been inseparable from the Cold War. In this paper I will briefly discuss some of the products and organizational elements of the Air Force History Program most directly related to telling the Cold War story.

My paper focuses on the two major aspects of the Air Force History Program. First, it highlights examples of the contributions made by our historians who work for commanders in the field. Then it describes some of the work we have produced here in Washington and at our Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, site of the Air University.

Field Historians

Based on the experience of the Army Air Forces in World War II, the Air Force rebuilt an extensive field history program during the Cold War era—with historians assigned to the major commands that implemented the United States’ policies of deterrence, forward presence, collective security, and reliance on advanced technology. And since the late 1960s (when the war in Southeast Asia showed the need to better record combat operations), the Air Force has authorized historians at most of its wings (the basic organizations that fly airplanes, launch missiles, and operate bases). These field historians are a mix of civilian and enlisted personnel.
Headquarters and unit histories compiled by our field historians—which include narrative summaries and copies of primary documentation—constitute an unequalled source of information on how the United States actually “fought” the Cold War. The historians at the major command headquarters and subordinate units also prepared hundreds of internal studies and monographs on key subjects pertinent to their missions. Most of these publications and organizational histories are available to authorized researchers at the Air Force Historical Research Agency.

During the Cold War era, Air Force historians served in the major commands that carried out or supported the Air Force’s mission. In the interest of time, I will focus today on only three of these commands—each of which represent key Air Force roles in the Cold War.

Perhaps best epitomizing the American military response to the Cold War—especially the policy of “deterrence”—was the Strategic Air Command, known at the time as “SAC.” It was born in 1946 when the need to deal with an aggressive Soviet Union was just becoming apparent to a demobilized America. After the Soviets tested their first Atomic bomb in 1949, SAC, under the leadership of Gen. Curtis LeMay, began an expansion that—in the 1950s—became almost a separate Air Force within the Air Force. And finally, when the Soviet Union dissolved in the early 1990s, so did SAC.

During that entire period, SAC’s historians compiled an ongoing (often Top Secret) historical record of the command’s nuclear capabilities and world-wide activities. In addition to its official histories, it published internal studies on subjects ranging from air-to-air refueling (which SAC pioneered) to the massive conventional bombing operations in Vietnam. Other representative Cold War studies included SAC’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the recovery of nuclear bombs after a mid-air collision over Spain, and an analysis of how the Single Integrated Operating Plan on nuclear targeting reflected national policy. In the public domain, the SAC History Office prepared a regularly updated illustrated chronology of the command, twice reprinted by a commercial publisher for wider dissemination.

The Air Force complemented the strategic deterrence mission by contributing to American overseas forces whose main purpose was the containment of Communism in its Eurasian heartland. This required a powerful forward presence and establishment of collective security arrangements. Nowhere was this effort more intense or complex than in Europe, where its major command, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), contributed the lion’s share of NATO’s air power.

Air Force historians at Headquarters USAFE and its subordinate units—which ranged from England to Spain to Turkey—assembled a thor-
ough record of both the military and diplomatic dimensions of the Air Force’s role in countering the Warsaw Pact and other regional threats to American interests. The internal studies written by USAFE’s historians covered many aspects of the command’s mission, from its evolving base and force structure to military relations with host nations. Now, with the Iron Curtain dismantled, USAFE’s remaining historians are focusing on the new challenges unleashed by the end of the Cold War.

While we should no doubt resist becoming nostalgic for the Cold War, we must recognize that it (like World War II) did help spur the United States to push forward the limits of science and technology. Some look back at this “Arms Race” as an entirely bleak episode in American history—when the military-industrial complex distorted our economy and society. Yet, without the motivation posed by the Cold War, would we have reached the moon in 1969? Would we have reached it even today, a quarter century later? Would we have had safe Jet passenger planes in the 1950s? Main frame computers in the 1960s? CD-ROMs in the 1980s? Precise space-based navigation in the 1990s?

Of all the American armed services, the Air Force has most emphasized the importance of science and technology—in both its budget and its culture. This was also reflected by its organization, particularly the establishment of the Air Force Research and Development Command in 1950 and its expansion into Air Force Systems Command (also responsible for procurement) in 1961. At Systems Command’s headquarters, laboratories, product divisions, and test centers, its historians (your speaker among them) tried to keep a record of this fast-paced technology. Many of their internal studies and monographs focus on the weapon systems that System Command developed, others on the technologies, management initiatives, and organizational structures involved. Many of the fighters, bombers, missiles, and other equipment developed by the command never made it to the production line, but each of them helped advance the state of the art.

As with SAC, however, the end of the Cold War meant the end of a separate Air Force Systems Command. Without the Soviet threat to drive operational requirements, there were fewer and fewer new systems to develop. In the interest of economy, AFSC was merged with Air Force Logistics Command in 1992 to create Air Force Materiel Command.

**Headquarters Air Force Historians**

While most of the work of field historians focuses on preserving the record of and meeting the needs of their immediate headquarters, the Air Force Historian supervises two small historical agencies that—among
other functions—write studies and books on topics of Air Force-wide interest, many for general publication The Center for Air Force History at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., publishes this material (some of which is contributed by the previously mentioned Air Force Historical Research Agency in Montgomery, Alabama). These and their predecessor organizations have prepared numerous unclassified monographs, studies, articles, and books pertaining to the Cold War period. In addition, the program has produced classified monographs and studies that consider part or all of the Cold War years.

Although the Air Force History Program has not sponsored a separate Cold War series, major volumes in various book series deal with the major issues of the Cold War. During the decade of the 1980s, it published four major books, on widely divergent subjects, set against the background of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The first of these books was Herman S. Wolk's, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force 1943–1947, a policy and administrative history which necessarily dealt with the pressure that the evolving Cold War placed on the Air Force leadership. As previously noted, the beginnings of the Cold War in fact played a central role in the events leading to the creation in 1947 of the United States Air Force. Prelude to the Total Force: Air National Guard, 1943–1969, by Charles J. Gross, chronicles the evolution and buildup of the Air National Guard against the backdrop of the intensification of the Cold War in the 1950's and 1960's. The advance of technology during the cold war years is detailed in Jacob Neufeld's, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force 1945–1960. This volume concentrates on the first generation of ballistic missiles: Atlas, Titan, and Thor. The story of the Air Force's defensive response to the Soviet Cold War military buildup has been published in Kenneth Schaffel's, The Emerging Shield: The Evolution and Development of USAF Forces for Continental Air Defense to 1960. George M. Watson's, The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. 1947–1965, depicts the Air Force civilian leadership's reaction to many events of the Cold War.

Additional Cold War issues are discussed in several Proceedings of the USAF Academy Military History Symposia. Among these are Air Power and Warfare, 1978; Military Planning in the Twentieth Century, 1984, and The Intelligence Revolution, 1988.

Forthcoming publications of the Center for Air Force History that deal with Cold War themes include Walton S. Moody's, Building a Strategic Air Force. 1945–1953, which considers the Air Force's buildup of nuclear capabilities through the end of the Korean war. Mark Grandstaff's study of
the evolution of the enlisted force through 1956 portrays the struggle of the career enlisted force and how it met the challenge of increased professionalism during the Cold War.

Gerald Cantwell's, History of the Air Force Reserve, chronicles the ebb and flow of the USAF reserve force as it responded to cold war confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Included are detailed descriptions of key mobilizations between the end of World War II and the conflict in Southeast Asia.

The Center's volume of Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment Operations, edited by R. Cargill Hall, features a chapter by Steven Rearden on the development of strategic nuclear doctrine and strategy during the cold war. It emphasizes the increasing Soviet nuclear threat, as viewed by American officials.

Also, amongst research now underway in the Center is a history of the development of USAF war planning after World War II.

As mentioned, during the Cold War years the Center for Air Force History published classified monographs which considered cold war topics. These so-called "blue cover" studies, researched and written in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's by the Center's historians, covered such subjects as the evolution of the Air Force's overseas base system; research and development; structuring Air Force budgets; the USAF and National Security policy; the Air Force and the concept of deterrence; the Air Force's response to the Cuban missile crisis; and separate monographs on such cold war crises as Suez, Taiwan, Lebanon, Laos, and the Middle East.

Conclusion

Ironically, the twilight days of the Cold War gave the United States Air Force the chance to apply against Iraq many of the forces and technologies built and maintained to fight World War III with the Soviet Empire. Air Force enlisted historians deployed and recorded Operation Desert Storm, and Center for Air Force History historians have been writing the preliminary official histories of air power in the Gulf War. But, as should be obvious from this discussion, one cannot understand what happened there without looking back into Air Force history during the Cold War.

The same might be said about much of the Air Force's evolution in the foreseeable future. For those who wish to understand both the United States Air Force as an institution, as well as some important aspects of how the United States dealt with the Cold War, the Air Force's historians have left a lasting legacy.
Even before 1946, when Winston Churchill delivered his now famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, it was recognized that a new relationship, a "cold war," existed between the western powers, particularly the United States, and the Soviet Union. The various actions Russia took in late 1945 and after gave no doubt of that. Since the end of World War II, the United States Marine Corps has been involved in two hot, shooting wars with the surrogates of the Soviet Union—North Korea and North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong, the latter's agents in South Vietnam. On the Cold War side, the Marine Corps was overtly involved in U.S. actions taken in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the affair of the Dominican Republic in 1965, amongst others.

Since the end of World War II to 1991, which serves as a convenient date, U.S. naval forces have played a major role in at least 207 United States responses to international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Although this paper focuses solely on Marine Corps responses to Cold War matters, it is not intended to obscure the fact that the other Services and other instruments of U.S. military and nonmilitary policy played significant roles in American crisis management activities.

The Marine Corps was also directly involved in such events as the Lebanon crises of 1958 and 1982, the Mayaguez affair in 1975, and Grenada in 1983, in all of which, if Russia's hand was not directly seen, its fingerprints or the hand prints of its proxies were. Since 1948 in the post-World War II era, Marines have been in the Mediterranean in at least battalion strength. During the crisis in Greece in 1948, President Harry S. Truman ordered the 8th Marines—an infantry regiment—at one-battalion strength, to join the Sixth Fleet as its landing force. In more recent years, following the establishment of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force concept, Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU), each consisting of a MEU headquar-
ters, a battalion landing team, a composite helicopter squadron, and a service support group have acted as the Sixth Fleet's permanent landing force. The presence of a MEU in the Mediterranean gave it an opportunity to conduct amphibious landing exercises with similar units representing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies situated in the Mediterranean littoral. In addition, the MEUs participated in extensive NATO exercises in the northern tier, i.e., Norway and Denmark, where Marines figure in NATO contingency plans, all of which related to Russia, the Warsaw Pact countries, and the Cold War in toto.

In 1952, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) was established in face of the long-term commitment of the United States to bolster European defense under the treaty obligations incurred by membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In addition, EUCOM was given additional U.S. national responsibilities for crisis management, contingency operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, security assistance, humanitarian aid, and intelligence, to support U.S. forces and national policies in the NATO of operations. Marine Corps involvement during the Cold War period was in support of NATO and EUCOM requirements. Marine forces were designated as SACEUR strategic reserves and were available for commitment anywhere in the NATO area. As a matter of fact, Marine units conducted operations in the area of many of the U.S. national responsibilities noted above. It can be validly said that while U.S. Army and Air Force units were on the cutting edge of the Cold War while stationed in Europe, Marine Corps expeditionary units served as fire brigades to put out the blazes where they might occur in the NATO and EUCOM areas. During the Cold War, Marine forces were a critical element in regional war plans because of the inherent flexibility and the forcible entry capability of a Marine amphibious task force.

The Marine Corps has maintained a standing commitment of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) in the Mediterranean, participation in annual NATO and EUCOM exercises, and frequent deployment of Marine forces for training in both Northern and Southern Europe. Some examples of major exercises in which Marine forces have participated are: TEAMWORK, BONDED ITEM, COLD WINTER, BAR FROST, ANORAK EXPRESS, DRAGON HAMMER, DYNAMIC IMPACT, NORTHERN WEDDING, DISPLAY DETERMINATION, and BOLD GUARD. To provide a single Marine Corps point of contact for the U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in the planning for and employment of Marine forces in the European area of responsibility, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force Europe (Designate) was established in London.
Of the 207 events recorded, Marine Corps units of varying sizes were committed 113 times, and of this number, 46 may be considered to have been linked to the Cold War as either Communist nations and/or the substitutes of the Soviet Union were the protagonists. Material concerning these deployments may be found in the files of the Reference and Archives Sections of the Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC. Further material related to these Marine Corps Cold War face-offs may be found in the transcripts in the Marine Corps Oral History Collection of interviews with individuals who either served in the Cold War deployments or were at a command or senior staff level of involvement in each case. With reference to the role of the Marine Corps in the Cold War, the Marine Corps History and Museums Division has published a number of works. Some of the publications regarding other events during the Cold War period deal with Marine Corps operations in hot, shooting wars, such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars as well as Marine Corps involvement in the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965, landings in Lebanon in 1958 and 1983, and the landing in Grenada in 1983, for example. There are also the five-volume *U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, 1950–1953* series and *Victory and Occupation, Volume V, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, in which is an extensive section dealing with the United States Marines in North China, 1945–1949. In addition, the History and Museums Division has published 15 titles in its coverage of Marine Corps operations in Vietnam. There remains one more volume to be published in this series which will cover operations in 1968.

While the Cold War may be considered to have ended, the Marine Corps History and Museums Division will continue to chronicle and collect records of Marine Corps assignments and deployments whenever and wherever they occur.
Beyond the Green Books: A Prehistory of the U.S. Army in the Cold War Series

Dr. Edgar F. Raines, Jr.

On 19 October 1992, the Director of the Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Charles E. Dominy, approved the initiation of a new historical series: the U.S. Army in the Cold War. The initial concept calls for ten volumes divided between two subseries, four volumes on the U.S. Army and national security, and six regional volumes dealing with the overseas deployed Army and regional military assistance programs. Three authors have already been assigned volumes, which they will take up when they finish the projects on which they are currently working. One of them, Dr. William Hammond, is currently working on a monograph in the period of the early Cold War—the U.S. 24th Infantry Regiment during the occupation of Japan and the Korean War. This new initiative represents the fourth attempt by the Center of Military History to write a history of the U.S. Army in the Cold War. An examination of the three earlier abortive efforts illuminates some of the difficulties involved in starting such an ambitious new series and suggests some of the pressures with which Dr. Hammond and his colleagues will have to contend.

The U.S. Army Center of Military History traces its lineage back to the War College Division’s Historical Section established during World War I and the Historical Branch, G–2 Division, War Department General Staff of World War II, which merged in 1946 to become the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff. Four years later it was redesignated the Office of the Chief of Military History. More importantly, the office derives its intellectual heritage from the collaborative effort that represents its great triumph, the writing and publication of the seventy-seven volumes of The U.S. Army in World War II (known colloquially as “the Green Books”), the last volume of which, Mary Ellen Condon-Rall’s and Albert Cowdrey’s The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan, is currently being edited. The U.S. Army in World War II was the
American Army’s first major, sustained attempt at narrative history. Most of its previous major historical efforts had focused on the publication of collections of documents. World War II thus gave the Center of Military History the mission of the researching, writing, and publishing narrative accounts of the U.S. Army’s recent experience in war and peace.²

The historical effort that went into *The U. S. Army in World War II* was, in its own sphere, almost as massive as the war itself. The Historical Branch organized historical programs in the overseas theaters. In addition it sent teams overseas, giving the historians involved access to records available only in the theaters and an opportunity to interview participants in order to flesh out the documentary record and close any gaps that might exist. Out of these labors came *The American Forces in Action* series, fourteen pamphlets published by the Historical Branch and its successor, Historical Division between 1943 and 1948. The project was first proposed by the wartime chief of staff of the U. S. Army, General George C. Marshall, Jr., who intended that the pamphlets should explain to enlisted men, particularly those wounded in the actions described, how their individual experiences fit into the larger operations against the enemy. The last two manuscripts intended for this series were of such length and high quality that the Historical Division changed their publication format; they became the first two combat volumes of *The U. S. Army in World War II.*³

During the war, each division of the staffs in the War Department and the major commands prepared historical reports of their activities. Major commands also maintained sizable historical offices where uniformed historians prepared monographic studies on issues of import. Some of these were of very high quality indeed. Sixteen monographs prepared at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, lightly edited, and published in 1947 and 1948, became the first two volumes of *The U. S. Army in World War II*. The presence of so many monographs meant that the authors of the “Green Books” could authoritatively summarize many important but narrow topics without any additional research. In addition, German and Japanese records fell into Allied hands as did the personal papers of German and Japanese commanders, to say nothing of the commanders themselves. Both the postwar European and Far East Commands, for which the chief of staff of the Army served as executive agent, maintained historical programs that exploited these sources, interviewing defeated commanders and even hiring enemy officers to prepare monographs on the campaigns in which they had participated. The Historical Division created a Foreign Studies Section (subsequently expanded to a branch); historians with the requisite language capacity produced monographs on the enemy’s plans, organization for combat, and operations that paralleled the
American accounts and became the basis for the discussion of these issues in the "prestige volumes," as one of the historians referred to the Green Books. The Department of the Army published selected foreign studies—some by former German Army officers, others by members of the Foreign Studies Branch—as a series of pamphlets beginning in 1950. They had a major impact on the evolution of Army tactical doctrine.4

Historians in the Historical Division (redesignated the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1950) wrote the volumes dealing with War Department policy, plans, logistics, and overseas operations. Historians in the technical services' history offices—Quartermaster, Transportation, Medical, Engineers, Signal, Chemical Warfare, and Ordnance—prepared manuscripts on the activities of their respective branches. Each of the volumes produced in the 1940s and 1950s was the product of a team, although only one name, that of the senior historian, commonly appeared on the title page. Many of the senior historians, especially those working on operational volumes in the European and Mediterranean Theaters, were assisted by bilingual research assistants. In addition, from time to time, junior historians, who served a twelve-month apprenticeship before undertaking their own volumes, aided the senior historians. The chief historian acted as the substantive editor for the entire series—both the volumes written within the Historical Division and those written outside it.5

Between 1945 and 1951 The U. S. Army in World War II was the primary, at times the only, publication effort of the Historical Division. Faced with declining support from the Army (a reflection of the bare-bones budgets of the Truman administration), the division shunted aside and finished off as soon as was decently possible the World War I documentary series, the main mission of the War College Historical Section since 1919, with a truncated, unindexed collection of documents without maps pertaining solely to operations in France. The seventeen volumes ignored the minor theaters, the continental United States, logistics, mobilization, and training; they contained only about two-thirds of the operational documents originally projected. Publication costs drove this decision and threatened The U. S. Army in World War II before it was well launched. The decision in June 1947 by Assistant Secretary of War Howard Peterson to set aside $4 million in unappropriated funds (part of the commissary receipts of World War II) allowed the project to proceed.6

The series represented, in the words of the chief historian, Kent Roberts Greenfield, "a young man's view of World War II." He might have said with more accuracy "a young person's view" as some of the historians were women. With only a few exceptions the "senior historians" were, at the end of World War II, all in their twenties or early thirties. The volumes
they produced were monographs in the classic sense (as opposed to the Department of the Army definition)—exhaustively researched and thoroughly documented treatises covering a small area of a field of learning. They brought to their subject the insatiable curiosity and inexhaustible energy of young men and women with a sense of mission—not only to make their own individual scholarly reputations but also to document the experiences of a generation, their generation. Many of the historians working on the overseas theaters had the inestimable advantage of having organized the records before their return to the United States. Through their personal experience they had an idea of the important issues before they began research, and they already knew the records well enough to know where to look for the pertinent documents, a great benefit given the size of modern collections. By 1954 some 20 volumes were in print; by 1961 57 were either published or in press. They were well received by both the public (despite the lack of publicity surrounding the publication of books by the Government Printing Office) and the scholarly community. One volume, *The Fall of the Philippines* by Louis Morton, was judged one of the best books of 1953. Briefed to the Army Staff before publication, they could and occasionally did influence Army policy. Ray S. Cline’s *Washington Command Post: The Operations Branch* persuaded the G-3, Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bole, of the need for his agency to serve as the executive agent for the chief of staff in the event of war, which it did when the conflict broke out in Korea. The Green Books’ real target, however, was the up-and-coming generation of Army officers as they matriculated in the Army schools and served as action officers on the Army Staff.7

*The U. S. Army in World War II* received support from the chief of staff from 1945 until 1948, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, his successors, and the rest of the chain of command. Ironically, at the same time many younger Army officers viewed traditional historical studies of the kind associated with the training of general staff officers by the German Army as old-fashioned and irrelevant. The new policy sciences were much more in vogue in the Army school system by the late 1950s and early 1960s, as they were in academia. (History did not regain its pre-World War II emphasis in the professional education of U. S. Army officers until after the Vietnam War.) World War II, however, retained pertinence for most senior officers “as the last war” and hence full of lessons for future conflicts even when that description was no longer chronologically accurate. Korea was fought with World War II-style units using, with only a few exceptions, World War II equipment. Thus, it was a one theater World War II-style war, hardly likely to displace the far larger conflict of but half a decade earlier from the collective imagination of American
Army officers. Moreover, Korea's outcome was much more ambiguous—and hence distressing to Army officers—than the earlier conflict. Equally relevant was the consensus among Army planners of the likely course of a general war with the Soviet Union. From the late 1940s through at least the mid-to-late 1950s Army planners envisioned an initial atomic exchange followed by full mobilization and extended conventional campaigns. The conduct of World War II was very germane to the second phase, the decisive phase as far as Army planners were concerned. *The U. S. Army in World War II*, despite its failure to have a major direct impact upon the Army education system, served as a treasure-trove of validated facts for both the devotees of the policy sciences and war planners. 8

Over and above these objective considerations, the same psychological factors that affected the historians writing about the war influenced at least three generations of Army officers—those like Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower who held high command during the conflict, field-grade officers who commanded battalions and rose to rank and influence during the late 1950s and 1960s such as Gen. William C. Westmoreland, and junior officers and non-commissioned officers who reached the top in the 1970s and early 1980s, such as Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr. For most of them World War II was the "big war" of their experience; it was their actions and those of their generation that were being memorialized. There was also a wider institutional context. World War II was quite simply one of three conflicts (the other two were the American Revolution and the American Civil War) in which the very existence of the nation depended upon the battleworthiness of the U. S. Army and its predecessor, the Continental Army. 9

These external circumstances created the opportunity for the series to succeed, while factors internal to the Historical Division—not the least of which was the very considerable skill of the historians—ensured that it did. The success of the series created within the Office of the Chief of Military History what might be called the Green Book paradigm—a view of the nature of military history and a standard approach to researching and writing it, combined with a standard of excellence against which all subsequent series and independent studies would be judged. But the Army interest and budget resources that made *The U. S. Army in World War II* possible have never been available for subsequent publications.

*The U. S. Army in World War II* was the Historical Division's sole publication series for only a short time. From the very inception of the Historical Branch, historians provided information to support the ongoing operations of the War Department General Staff and subsequently the Army Staff. Since 1943 the products of such efforts have varied in size over the years from a few pages to several hundred, including sever-
al published studies. They appeared under a variety of names, including applied history, demand studies, staff support papers, and analytical studies. The first concerted effort to support the staff began in 1949. The chief of military history, then Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony, organized an Applied Studies Group, subsequently a division, headed by Brig. Gen. Paul McD. Robinett, U. S. Army (Retired). A severe wound suffered in Tunisia had forced Robinett's premature retirement but had not impaired his intellectual acumen or his interest in his profession. He hoped to use officer-historians to produce extensively but not exhaustively researched studies of closely defined topics that covered long time periods—the Department of the Army definition of a monograph. The monographs were long, some of them in excess of 350 printed pages, but not nearly so long as the Green Books and not restricted to World War II. Beginning in 1950, the Department of the Army published some of them as "pamphlets." One of these, John C. Sparrow's History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army, focused on demobilization following World War II and thus was the first study at the Office of the Chief of Military History to treat a Cold War-era topic. These officers were located in the Pentagon where they had easy access to the Army Staff. The remainder of the office operated out of a building on Capitol Hill at 119 D Street, S.E. 10

Robinett had in mind for his group a German General Staff model for educating Army officers. He wanted to attract young officers identified as "comers" and teach them historical method by having them do historical research and writing. Officers in his view could not acquire the analytic skills required of a historian—and apply those skills to other areas of the military profession—simply by reading history. Unlike the classic German model, Robinett's program meant that officers acquired their historical skills by writing policy, rather than operational, studies. 11

While he had a keen appreciation of the value of history in officer education, Robinett did not have a great deal of respect for civilian historians who wrote military history. Dr. Greenfield had a heart attack in 1949 that required an extended convalescence. During his absence, Robinett convinced the new chief of military history, his old division commander from North Africa, Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, to remove the studies prepared in the Applied Studies Group from the purview of the acting chief historian, Dr. Stetson Conn. Greenfield returned to work with no loss of zest for or skill in bureaucratic in-fighting. The heart of their dispute, however, was their conflicting approaches to writing military history. Greenfield and Robinett were locked in a conflict over the chief historian's prerogatives when the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950. 12
The fighting in the Far East forced the first major change in the Office of the Chief of Military History's long-range publication program. Initially, the office responded slowly due to both internal and external factors. The chief of the European Theater of Operations Section of the World War II Division, Dr. Hugh M. Cole, prepared a memorandum of information for the G–3, Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bollé, on Russia's historic interest in the Korean peninsula within days of the dispatch of American ground troops. Ward, at Robinett's request, created a Current History Section in the Applied Studies Division; Robinett assigned one of his officers, Lt. Col. Joseph Rockis, to the section with instructions "to prepare a current history of the Korean incident." Bollé authorized Rockis to attend the daily operations briefing and gave him a desk in the G–3 Division. Soon another officer from the Applied Studies Division, Maj. Edward J. Callahan, temporarily joined the G–3 Division to help officers there prepare a study on Korea for Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr. While this was going on, General Ward in August and September succeeded in avoiding a further diversion of resources to prepare a series of volumes on the postwar occupations advocated by the High Commissioner of Germany, John J. McCloy. As assistant secretary of war during World War II, McCloy had been one of the original sponsors of the Green Books.

The kind of history that Rockis could attempt was little more than a narrative chronology based on the sources at hand—message traffic to and from the theater and some policy documents generated by the staff. Despite the shortcomings of the evidence, such a study had both immediate and long-term advantages. With the beginning of war, Far East Command "froze" the movements of officers scheduled to rotate back to the continental United States. The North Korean offensive—widely believed by Army officers to signal the start of World War III—caused U.S. European Command to take similar action. Officers, however, continued to rotate overseas, and, within weeks of the outbreak of the conflict, the Army Staff was short 250 officers. The only way to make good the deficiency was to call up reservists. The accounts prepared by Rockis and Callahan provided a quick way for the new staff officers to become familiar with the Korean conflict. At the same time their work contributed a starting point and a framework—one that would admittedly be much modified on the basis of detailed research—for historians who would write a definitive history of the Army's role in the war.

The Office of the Chief of Military History would attempt a definitive history—that was implicit in an extensive reorganization of the agency that General Ward directed in October 1950—but one limited to the war itself. He upgraded the Current Histories Section to a branch and shifted it
to the World War II Division, which he redesignated the "War Histories Division." The circumstances that had depleted the Army Staff had also played havoc with General Robinett's organization. He lost many of his officers—who earned General Staff credit during their tours—to the Far East. The Regular Army officers he had favored had to fight the war, not write about it. To replace them, Robinett had to depend upon reserve officers recalled to active duty, many of whom had experience in the World War II history program. Virtually the only difference between them and the historians writing the World War II series, the men and women whose competence Robinett had questioned, was that they were on active duty and their World War II counterparts were not. Ward's decision to place them in the War Histories Division, and consequently unequivocally in Dr. Greenfield's province, represented the result of a certain irresistible logic. The conflict in the Far East thus precipitated Greenfield's victory in the local bureaucratic war, but the chief historian's success required some months. In fact, in November 1951 the chief of staff of the Army, General J. Lawton Collins, approved rotating staff officers through the office for preparation of the type envisioned by Robinett, but this directive was honored more in the breach than in compliance. This unresolved internal situation contributed to the failure of the Office of the Chief of Military History to mount more than a minimal historical effort during the first months, which encompassed some of the bloodiest fighting of the entire struggle.¹⁵

Planning for a Korean War series, tentatively titled *The U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict*, proceeded simultaneously. In December General Ward submitted a formal proposal to General Collins for a five-volume program. He approved the new series on 5 February 1951, to which an additional volume was added in May. The series included two headquarters volumes; a combat volume; and a casebook of small units in action. By 1952 the series had been altered to include a headquarters volume consisting of two parts: one written from a Department of the Army perspective and the other from the viewpoint of the Far East Command. Other volumes included a collection of special studies, a counterpart to the small unit combat volume focusing on "technical service units in action," a logistics volume, a second tactical volume, and two volumes of photographs. This was approximately the coverage planned at the time for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in the World War II series, although some of the Korean volumes were rather less substantial than the Mediterranean ones. In August 1952 the Office of the Chief of Military History published the first of the Korean volumes, *Korea, 1950*, with an extended narrative by Lt. Paul C. McGrath (and a major rewrite by John Miller, Jr.) based upon the Rockis chronology. Like the
Army Forces in Action series, the book was intended for free distribution to hospitalized veterans of the conflict.16

In 1950 the Chief of Staff of the Army acted as the executive agent for the Far East Command, which meant that the Office of the Chief of Military History exercised technical supervision over the history effort of the Far East Command, which was handled by a branch in the command’s G-2 division. The theater commander, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, had a well deserved reputation for jealously protecting (and burnishing) his public image. No one was a more zealous guardian of that image than his G-2, Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby. In June 1950 Ward was engaged in delicate negotiations with Willoughby to obtain copies of monographs on the World War II Pacific campaigns written for the Far East Command Historical Branch by Japanese officers. Ward’s concern for the success of The U.S. Army in World War II thus gave him ample reason for not attempting to “force” historical detachments on the theater. Even if this justification had not existed there was a real question whether such an option existed in a practical sense despite the fact that Ward’s formal authority made it possible. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, junior officers when MacArthur was Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1930s, permitted the theater commander the widest possible discretion.17

Ward did not have any historical detachments immediately available that he cared to use. The only historical detachment in the Army Reserve consisted entirely of historians in the Office of the Chief of Military History working on World War II volumes. By the end of 1950 the office would have published only the first six volumes of The U.S. Army in World War II, but many more were in prospect in the next few years if Ward could prevent the disruption of his World War II team. Consequently, he gave Far East Command primary responsibility for documenting combat actions in the theater and promised to provide historical detachments if Willoughby so desired. When Willoughby requested the detachments, Ward organized them by pulling out of the replacement stream the best qualified men available at the moment. At the same time he convinced General Willoughby to accept historians from the Current Histories Branch on extended assignment. Two of them, Capt. Russell A. Gugeler and Maj. Roy E. Appleman, were already tabbed as authors of volumes in the new series.18

The original version of the Korean Conflict series did not include any volumes by the technical services comparable to those in The U.S. Army in World War II series, possibly because the technical service historians were in the main far behind their contemporaries in the Office of the Chief of Military History in their work on the World War II program. While this
situation was entirely understandable given the relatively small size of those offices and their staff support responsibilities to their agencies, adding additional volumes was definitely not the way to enhance their productivity. Ward, however, was not a free agent. President Harry S Truman issued an executive order, modeled on Franklin Delano Roosevelt's order of World War II, that all executive agencies would prepare histories of their experiences during “the current national emergency,” which included a major build-up in Europe as well as the fighting in the Far East. Entitled “Summary of Major Events and Problems,” the series as implemented in the Department of the Army included annual histories by Army staff agencies, major zone of interior commands, and technical services. The summaries represented the first step in the evolution toward the current annual histories prepared by all major Army commands. Truman's order also led the chief of staff in January 1953 to approve an entirely new historical series, The U.S. Army in the Current National Emergency, with the operative phrase “current national emergency” interpreted to mean the Cold War.¹⁹

This new series consisted of four books to be prepared in the Office of the Chief of Military History. Ward assigned the logistics volume formerly in the Korean Conflict series, somewhat imprecisely titled Time and Space, to a reserve officer, Maj. James A. Huston. It now covered logistics “during the cold war—on a world-wide basis.” Projected, but with authors not yet assigned, were a volume on manpower mobilization during the Cold War and two monographs: The Chief of Staff in the Cold War, conceived as a study of the impact of the Army Organization Act of 1950 on the Office of the Chief of Staff, and a History of Military Advisory Groups, 1945–1953. The Office of the Chief of Military History had six reserve officers working on Korean Conflict studies and one, Huston, working on the Cold War, a fair indication of the priority attached to each. With the end of the war in June 1953 the history offices of each of the technical services received responsibility for a volume covering the period 1945 to 1953. Only three, the Transportation Corps, the Chemical Warfare Corps, and the Signal Corps historical offices, actually began books. The others were still immersed in their World War II volumes.²⁰

Over the next eight years senior historians in the Office of the Chief of Military History attempted to refine the Cold War series without a great deal of success. The first major review occurred during the spring and summer of 1954. Dr. Greenfield advocated and the participants agreed upon a start date of 1947 for all the studies. The rationale for the selection of the start date is not spelled out in the planning documents—but such a date coincided with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. As a prac-
tical matter 1947 allowed the historians to avoid the exceedingly complex issue of demobilization, which they may have considered tangential to a series focused on U.S.-Soviet rivalry. They could not concur on an end date, although Greenfield favored 1953. (One historian subsequently referred to the end date as “God knows when.”) Apparently, Greenfield also favored expanding the two monographs to the status of major volumes. The chief of staff volume, tentatively assigned to Dr. Maurice Matloff, then completing the second of two global strategy volumes on World War II, was to be modeled on Mark S. Watson’s volume on the Office of the Chief of Staff prior to Pearl Harbor. In the fall of 1954 the goal of the meetings shifted: to find a single unifying theme in the post-World War II series. As a result of these discussions the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans on 30 September 1955 approved the new plan for a single unified series, The U.S. Army in the Conflict with the Communist Powers. The Korean War subseries once again contained a logistics volume. The Combat Forces Press had published Gugeler’s *Combat Actions in Korea* and Capt. John G. Westover’s *Combat Support in Korea* in 1954 and 1955 respectively; they were no longer considered part of the series. 

In March 1957 a long-range planning committee, chaired by Dr. Conn, estimated that with a reasonable increase in the size of the staff the historians could complete drafts of all the World War II volumes assigned to the office by 1960. Appleman had already completed a draft of the first Korean War combat volume; he had returned to civil life but was making requested revisions of the manuscript on his own time, after hours, a slow and tedious process at best. Lt. Col. James F. Schnabel had almost completed his *Policy and Direction* manuscript, after which he would rotate to another post, creating the same difficulties in preparing the manuscript for publication. In fact, *Policy and Direction* faced substantial declassification problems that helped delay publication until 1972. Nevertheless, the committee recommended the creation of a new series, *The U.S. Army in War and Peace*, designed to trace the development of certain topics—such as tactics, logistics, strategy, and intelligence—from the American Revolution to the present. This proposal reflected an analysis of the kinds of staff support requests that the office had received. The committee emphasized that the office needed to give greater emphasis to demand topics from the Army Staff. General Robinett secured the committee’s endorsement of his views of the role of history in officer education.

The committee did not address in any detail the relationship of the new series, whose coverage presumably extended to the mid-1950s, to the Cold War series. It simply noted that the Cold War Series was “adequate”
in the topics it addressed. The committee therefore left moot whether the
_U. S. Army in Peace and War_ duplicated, supplemented, or complimented
the earlier series. "We were confused," remembered one member. At the
same time the committee recommended the creation of a single research
and writing division upon Robinett's retirement from the Civil Service.
The consolidated division, designated the Histories Division, became
effective in 1959.22

By 1958 the Cold War series was not progressing well. Huston, who
had left the office in 1953 upon the expiration of his active duty tour, had
completed _Time and Space_ as two volumes—one covering the broad field
of logistics organization and operations from the Department of the Army
level; the other on logistics in the Korean War. The office decided not to
publish either. Dr. Robert W. Coakley, completing the _World War II_ series' second global logistics volume, which he had coauthored with Richard M.
Leighton, became a logical candidate to undertake the Korean logistics
volume. At the same time, the deputy chief of the old Current History
Branch, now called simply Branch II, recommended an almost complete
revision of the Cold War volumes. The approved functional Cold War vol­
umes, argued Dr. Louis Morton, did not begin to cover all the important
issues, such as Department of the Army organization, Army aviation,
research and development, weapons evaluation, and occupation policies.
Moreover, Dr. Matloff, whose proposed volume had been changed to
_Strategy and the Army_, argued very effectively that the subseries as cur­
rently conceived would ignore "the seedtime" of the Cold War from the
Yalta Conference until 1947. Morton consequently argued for a shift to a
chronological approach. Matloff would prepare the 1945–47 volume; Leighton, soon to become available, was to take up the 1947–50 volume;
the third volume covering 1950–53 would have to wait until a suitable his­
torian became available. Morton had Walter G. Hermes in mind, until
recently the junior historian assigned to the Matloff volume. But Hermes
had just taken up the third Korean War combat volume, so he would not
become available until sometime in the early 1960s. Morton proposed
making no changes with the fourth volume in the Cold War subseries—
Byron Fairchild was well along with _The Army and Military Advisory
Groups_.23

Although the chief of military history approved the Morton proposal,
there was substantial support among several senior historians to return to a
functional approach, albeit in a much expanded series. Not only did a
functional approach appear more useful for the Army Schools and the
Army Staff but it would also permit the retention of certain specializations
developed during the work upon the _World War II_ series. The contrary
arguments were that the functional approach involved needless duplication and that the long time periods envisioned would require much more extensive research than the World War II volumes. The Quartermaster Corps historical office had recently completed a history of the corps from 1775 to 1939 that had taken a team over ten years to research and write; this was the kind of time scale that critics averred the functional volumes might require. Matloff, who led the efforts to restore the functional approach, in effect said that such arguments were beside the point. Historians were not going to write those volumes because they were not going to obtain the documents they needed to see: the files of the National Security Council, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the other services. And even if they saw those records, the security classifications on the documents were going to prevent them from publishing what they had discovered. Matloff's solution was to retain functional Cold War volumes, but for the moment concentrate upon monographs, perhaps published in a classified form, that would eventually support the "prestige books" when the historians had the necessary access and permission to publish them. The Korean volumes would once again become a part of a separate subseries, *The U.S. Army in the Korean War*. Dr. Conn, who had succeeded Greenfield when he retired as chief historian in October 1958, proposed putting both the Cold War and the Peace and War volumes in the same series, the Army Historical Series.²⁴

These considerations informed the deliberations of the Robinson Committee (named for its chairman Col. Leonard G. Robinson) which in 1960 reviewed the Army historical program as a whole for the chief of military history. The committee report became the basis for a decisive reorganization of the program to include placing greater emphasis on contemporary events and to establish the requirement for the writing of annual historical reports by all major commands. The report thus laid the basis for a logical and systematic program in place of the confusion, *ad hoc* solutions, and working at cross purposes that characterized much of the historical effort in the 1950s. In this context it recommended adoption of the Matloff proposal as modified by Conn. The chief of military history, Brig. Gen. James A. Norell, adopted the report but implementation fell largely to his successor, Brig. Gen. William H. Harris.²⁵

Just how realistic this third iteration of the program actually was remains open to question. Conn wanted to give priority to the seventeen volumes already in preparation in *The U.S. Army in World War II*, seven technical service volumes, the four Korean War volumes, five miscellaneous volumes which he advocated placing in the *Army Historical Series*,
and two volumes dealing with German operations in Russia. In all, the incomplete projects were more than double the number of historians available in the Center. Those partially completed volumes without authors often represented projects in which difficulties had developed; simply making a historian available did not necessarily mean unhindered progress to a relatively quick completion as Conn and the planning committee assumed. Conn, like all other witnesses who testified before the planning committee in 1960, favored emphasizing contemporary history topics when initiating new volumes. His support, however, may have been only rhetorical. The titles he proposed and the priorities he placed upon them suggest that he gave greater weight to long term functional volumes of the type previously included in *The U. S. Army in Peace and War*. At the very least, he wanted the office to produce volumes that it could publish. (His own books on hemispheric defense in the World War II series were held up approximately one decade by classification considerations.) Retaining the Cold War volumes permitted the Office of the Chief of Military History to justify historian positions to personnel managers, while consolidating both series in a single Army Historical Series allowed it to obfuscate the fact that little work was being attempted on the Cold War volumes—as opposed to monographs.26

In a space of nine years the Office of the Chief of Military History had produced three different concepts of a Cold War series, but without any publications to show for the planning. The fluidity of the concept was, in fact, only possible because so little work had been done. The one volume that stayed in all three versions, the study of the Military Assistance Program, did so because the assigned author was making substantial progress—Dr. Fairchild had completed seven chapters by 1960. Then he lost his job in a reduction in force and that volume also stalled. In fact, the Office of the Chief of Military History had declined from a peak strength of 220 in 1951, including 30 writing historians, to 77 and only 17 writing historians in 1957. The reduction of writing historians by almost half understates the problem because the earlier figure represents 30 teams headed by a senior historian while the latter figure represents 17 individuals. Then the office lost two more people in government-wide reductions in force in 1957 and 1960. It was all that the office could do to remain on-track with the World War II series and begin the publication of the first of the large narrative volumes on Korea. The Cold War books had always had a lower priority than these volumes.27

A number of factors contributed to slowing down the publication of the older series. Lack of adequate production funds was a major factor. *The U. S. Army in World War II* proved much more costly in terms of time
and money than first expected. By the late 1950s the unappropriated funds from the World War II commissary sales had been largely exhausted. The Department of the Army declined to establish a similar fund to support the Korean War series. This meant that the World War II and Korean volumes had to compete with one another for appropriated funds. In addition, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's abolition of the offices of the chiefs of technical services in 1962—and with them their history offices—meant that historians at the Office of the Chief of Military History had to shepherd a wave of just completed World War II technical service manuscripts through the editorial and publication process at the expense of their own volumes. Historians so engaged were not available to take up Cold War volumes. 28

Abolition of most of the technical services, of course, also stopped work on their Cold War histories with only two manuscripts complete. The chief historian judged the Transportation Corps manuscript "too narrow," a real problem for the entire series given the undeveloped state of the historiography at the time and intellectual inhibitions imposed by the widely accepted Cold War shibboleths of the period, such as "monolithic Communism." The Chemical Corps volume was excellent, in the chief historians view, but so highly classified that it could not currently be published. 29

Both the 1956 and 1960 planning committees emphasized that the Office of the Chief of Military History needed to pay closer attention to the requirements of the Army Staff. As early as 1957 the chief of military history assigned Dr. Coakley to temporary duty in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, where he collected documents that allowed him to write an account of the Army's role in the integration crisis at Little Rock, Arkansas. Again late in 1960 Coakley was dispatched to the Office of the Secretary of the Army to collect documents to allow him to write an account of the four-year tenure of outgoing Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker. The Robinson Committee report (Coakley was the author) recommended creating a permanent liaison officer in the Office of the Chief of Staff. Lt. Col. James Schnabel became the first holder of the post. Coakley's Little Rock monograph and a similar study by Paul J. Scheips on the use of federal troops at the University of Mississippi in 1962 eventually led to the programming of three volumes in The Army Historical Series on the role of the U. S. Army in domestic disturbances. But for the moment, however, demand projects threatened to overwhelm Branch II, redesignated the Post-World War II Branch and later Current Branch. Eventually, it divided. One portion became the Vietnam Branch, focused on the major contemporary preoccu-
pation of the Army Staff in the 1960s, while the other became the Staff Support Branch, which handled all other projects of immediate relevance to the staff. The historians assigned there retained responsibility for major volumes but worked on them only during lulls between papers for the staff.30

Some historians were able to work on Cold War volumes and monographs during the 1960s. The war in Vietnam and the Office of the Chief of Military History's attempt to foster a historical program in theater and preserve records of the Army Staff sufficed to once again delay concentrated and systematic work on the series. None of the volumes proposed in 1960 were ever published. One book, James E. Hewes's From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963, published in 1975, bore a striking resemblance to one of the volumes proposed by Dr. Conn in 1960. However, the Hewes study was never considered part of the Cold War series. It started as a short monograph that grew to book-length and was published in the new Special Studies series. The influence of the earlier work on Hewes was purely intellectual, particularly evident in the kinds of questions he addressed. Similarly, the impact of the old U.S. Army in Peace and War on Dr. Huston's, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953, published in 1966, was attenuated but real. It began as a contract volume for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics which he wrote while teaching at Purdue University. Historians at the Office of the Chief of Military History critiqued it several times before publication. The approach, however, was very much in line with the logistics volume proposed for the discontinued series.31

This story of The U.S. Army in the Cold War, the series that never quite was, is instructive in a number of ways. First is the persistence with which both the Army Staff (which approved the early shift in concept) and the Center of Military History have sought to tell the story of the Army's role in the Cold War. This persistence, however, always had to defer to the need to produce histories of the Army's role in the latest war. This suggests that an account of recent combat is inherently more important to professional soldiers than successful deterrence—and indicates one set of conditions that might abort the current attempt at a Cold War series at some point in the future. The story of what happened to the Post-World War II Branch when the discontinuance of the Applied Histories Branch removed its insulation from the Army Staff is a cautionary tale of another problem—acquiring too great a reputation for good work. An institution the size of the Army Staff can bury any historical office with requests for timely studies on issues of immediate importance. Something like this occurred to the Post-World War II Branch and its successors in the 1960s,
but this was one of the costs associated with the reorientation of the office deriving from the Robinson report. The shift to the functional approach in 1960 (to make the series more useful to the staff) also appears to have made any attempt to produce a Cold War series impossible in the near term. Modern archival records are massive, a condition that needs to be taken into account when designing research projects. This is but one example of a larger phenomenon—the perfect being the enemy of the good. A suspicion lingers that this might have happened to the Huston volumes as well; a commercial publisher recently issued his books. The successful series examined in this account had distinctive titles and had volumes published fairly early after their inception. By making the fact of the series public knowledge, these early volumes provided a subtle pressure on both the Office of the Chief of Military History and the Department of the Army to carry the series through to completion.\(^\text{93}\)

Overriding all else in the failure of the series, however, was the lack of consensus on how to define it and how to mesh it with other series—especially the Korean War volumes and the U. S. Army in Peace and War, the failure to give in-depth consideration of the audience it was intended to reach, and confusion about the purposes it was intended to achieve. Granted that these confusions mirrored the larger institutional problems besetting the program—declining resources, the philosophical differences dividing Greenfield and Robinett, and the higher priority accorded the World War II and Korean War volumes—but this lack of clarity also meant that it was easy to drain off resources, initially intended for the Cold War series, to other projects.\(^\text{33}\)

The thought of how close the series came to fruition only to collapse is a cause for anguish (the idea of missing a volume by Maurice Matloff on “the seedtime” of the Cold War is particularly distressing), but in a larger sense the very lack of definition carried a positive benefit. It meant that the Office of the Chief of Military History had to constantly revisit the question. In the process of debate a consensus emerged, embodied in the Robinson report, that stressed a functional approach to meet the needs of the Army Staff. This included not only the major Cold War volumes and the monographs supporting them but also occasional monographs such as those on Little Rock and the University of Mississippi. In a sense the report represented a synthesis of the views of Greenfield and Robinett: professionally trained historians conducting in-depth research to write studies of interest to the Army Staff and schools. The Office of the Chief of Military History entered the 1950s oriented around the production of the official history of the U. S. Army in World War II. It began the next decade focused on the concept of supporting the Army and its current con-
cerns. This was not the inconsiderable legacy of the debate over the first Cold War series.

ENDNOTES


5. Kent Roberts Greenfield, “Remarks of Dr Greenfield [to the Secretary of the Army’s Historical Advisory Committee],” Mar 56, HRC 201 (Greenfield, Kent Roberts), HRB, CMH; Conn, Historical Work in the United States Army, 184. Charles F Romanus and Riley Sunderland constituted a significant exception to this pattern. Romanus was a brilliant researcher but an indifferent writer, Sunderland an accomplished writer. They debated interpretation back and forth. Both men received author credit for the three volumes of the China-Burma-India Theater subseries.


10. DA Pamphlet 20–210, Jul 1952. Sparrow discussed pre-1941 demobilizations in the first 22 pages and devoted the succeeding 276 pages to the World War II demobilization. On the organization of the Applied Studies Group, see TD 400–116, OCSA, 31 Dec 49,
sub: Historical Division, Special Staff, US Army. On Robinett, see Conn, *Historical Work in the United States Army*, 176–184; Diary, Lt. Col. E. M. Harris, XO, OCMH, 9 Nov 50, HRC 314.81 (OCMH Diary, 1950), HRB, CMH; Memo, Stetson Conn et al, LRP Committee, for C/MH, 8 Mar 57, sub: Report of the LRP Committee, OCMH, Tab C, sub: Projects Report, HRC, 314.72 (Long Range Plans) (4 May 56), HRB, CMH; Comment, Robert W. Coakley, [c. May 94], on earlier draft of this article, author’s files.


12. For the background of the Robinett-Greenfield feud, see Conn, *Historical Work in the United States Army*, 182–186; Diary, Lt. Col. E. M. Harris, 13 Nov 50, HRC 314.81 (OCMH Diary, 1950), HRB, CMH.


14. Diary, Harris, 26 Jul 50.

15. Adm Memo 65, OCMH, 23 Oct 50, sub: Reorganization of Office of the Chief of Military History, attached to MacDonald, “Growth and Accomplishments of the Army Historical Program”; Diary, Harris, 11 Oct 50, 16 Oct 50. For the Collins directive and the noncompliance, see Draft Memo, Dr. Louis Morton, DC/Branch II, for Col J. Rockis, C/Branch II, [Jan 58], HD Files, CMH.

May 51, sub: Historical Coverage of General Staff Activities, CSA Decimal File, 1951-52, 314.7 (5 Jan 51), (1 May 51), RG 319, NA. Korea, 1950 (Washington: OCMH, 1952). On the authorship of the text for Korea, 1950 see Comment, Coakley, [May 94]. The time and space manuscript was printed in offset and given only limited circulation.


18. Diary, Lt. Col. E. M. Harris, 16 Oct 50; Diary, Lt. Col. H. R. James, actg XO, 21 Sep 50, 27 Dec 50. Appleman and Gugeler along with James M. Burns and John Stevens had written Okinawa in the US Army in World War II. On the reserve unit, see Conn, Historical Work in the United States Army, 166.


20. Memo, sub: Current History Program (Approved by CoS 23 Jan 53); Draft Memo, Morton for Rockis, [Jan 58]; Intv, Dr. Paul J. Scheips by E. F. Raines, Jr., 13 Feb 94. Dr. Scheips was assigned the Cold War volume in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer before the disestablishment of the bureau chiefs’ offices. At a later date the Corps of Engineers historical office began a Cold War volume. It was never published.

21. Tab C, subj: Projects Report, Tab E, subj: The Need for Additional Civilians and Military Historians, incl in Memo, Conn et al for C/MH, 8 Mar 57; Memo, Dr. L. Morton, DC/Branch II, for Col. J. Rockis, C/Branch II, [Jan 58], HD Files, CMH. OCMH reprinted Combat Actions in Korea as part of the Army Historical Series in 1970; CMH reprinted Combat Support in Korea in 1987; Comment, Conkley, [May 94].

22. Memo, Maj. F. J. Del Bene, Asst XO, 4 May 56, subj: Committee on Long-Range Plans; Memo, S. Conn et al, for C/MH, 8 Mar 57, sub: Rpt of the Long Range Planning Committee, OCMH, HRZ, 314.72 (Long Range Plans) (4 May 56), HRB, CMH; TD 81-8538, OCMH, 30 Jun 59, incl in Charles B. McDonald, “Growth and Accomplishments of the Army Historical Program,” [c Dec 61], HRC, 319.1 (Harris Report) (1961), HRB, CMH. For further comments on the problems facing the Schnabel manuscript, see Minutes, Program Committee To Study the Future of OCMH Up To 1970, 12 Oct 60, HRC 334 (Committee, Military History, Long Range Planning), HRB, CMH.

23. Memo, Dr. L. Morton, DC/Branch II, for Col. J. Rockis, C/Branch II, [Jan 58], HD Files, CMH. In point of fact, Leighton left the office the following year to join the faculty of the Industrial War College. Surviving documents do not indicate why the Huston volumes were not published. The initial assessment was quite favorable. Memo, Dr. Stetson Conn, Deputy Chief Historian, for Maj. James A Huston, 8 Sep 53, sub: Critique of Time and Space, OCMH, HSD, Publications, Unpublished Manuscripts, and Supporting Documents, Time and Space, “Other Volumes,” file, RG 319, NA.

24. Memo, K. R. Greenfield for Staff of OCMH, 10 Oct 58, sub: Taking Leave, HRC, 201 (Misc) (Greenfield, Kent R. Dr.) (CMH) (Farewell Message), HRB, CMH; Memo, 1 Nov 60, sub: Status of Current Projects, incl w/ Rpt, Col. L. G. Robinson, C/HD, et al, 1 Dec 60, sub: Rpt of Committee to Study Present and Future Writing Program of OCMH, HRC, 334 (Long Range Planning) (1 Dec 60), HRB, CMH. The Quartermaster Corps his-


26. Memo, Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian, for 1960 Program Committee, 13 Oct 60, sub: Recommended Writing Program for OCMH for the Next Ten Years, Memo, Dr. Robert W. Coakley, sub: Summary for Committee on Future Program, HRC, 334 (Committee, Military History, Long Range Planning), HRB, CMH.


28. Memo, Conn et al, for C/MH, 8 Mar 57; Appdx, Dr. Stetson Conn, [Dec 61], sub: Review and Analysis of the Current OCMH and Technical Services Historical Programs, Appdx, Dr. John C. Miller, Jr., [Dec 61], sub: Relationship of OCMH and the Technical Services, to Memo, Harris for DCSOPS, 29 Dec 61; Intv, Scheips by Raines, 13 Feb 94.

29. The Corps of Engineers and the Medical Corps remained unaffected by the 1962 reorganization. Appdx, Conn, [Dec 61], to Memo, Harris for DCSOPS, 29 Dec 61; Intv, Scheips by Raines, 13 Feb 94. Harry B. Yosphe and Joseph Bykofsky, *Transportation for Defense in the Current National Emergency, 1946–1954*, U. S. Army in the Conflict with Communist Powers (Washington: Office of the Chief of Transportation, nd). I have been unable to locate the Chemical Corps study to which Conn refers, and it was in fact never published. Because of its classification, OCMH may not have retained a copy. Conn obviously had read it. I have been unable to locate the completed chapters from the Scheips volume on the Signal Corps. It suffered the additional problem of being very detailed.


31. Huston’s study was part of The Army Historical Series. He had apparently been thinking about such a volume for years. There is an undated outline for just such a volume in the *Time and Space* backup documents which probably dates from 1953, given the dates of the other material in the file. See Outline, sub: History of U.S. Army Logistics, OCMH, HSD, Publications, Unpublished Manuscripts, and Supporting Records, 1943–1977, *Time and Space*, “Other Volumes” Outlines and Seminars” file, RG 319, NA. Hewes’s book inaugurated a new series, Special Studies. It is possible to trace the progress of each study beginning in 1962 with the introduction of the annual *Army Historical Program*: US, Department of the Army, *Army Historical Program FY 1963*, HRC 300.8 (OCMH Hist Prog) (ARMY HISTORICAL PROGRAM FY 63), HRB, CMH. Comment Coakley, [May 94].


33. Comment, Coakley, [May 94].
SECTION XI

Writing The History Of The Cold War:
Western Europe
1. The Military History Research Office—“Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt” (MGFA)

The German General Staff, as it existed until the end of World War II, included a Department of War History. Its major task was to analyze previous campaigns and to evaluate what might be learned from them with regard to the conduct of the next war. Such a conception of military history did not include political, economic, or social parameters. It avoided analytical and critical approaches. Therefore, it achieved only very limited results.

When the Military History Research Office was set up in Langenau near Ulm on 1 January 1957 (it moved to Freiburg in October 1958 and Potsdam in October 1994), it was recognized from the beginning that the social context of military history had changed profoundly. New developments in the methods and aims of historical research in general could not go unnoticed, nor could the changed public attitude towards the military as such fail to have its effect. As a consequence, the Office’s aim was from the beginning to research and to present the results of its work along the lines and standards of contemporary historiography. This meant a farewell to a conception of history oriented solely towards the examination of organizations, operations, or individual events. “Military history” as understood by the Office is the analysis of the role of the military as an integral part of the overall political, economic, and social processes within a national and international framework of reference. The Office’s work is, therefore, part of the general process of historical research.

Historians working in the Office enjoy full freedom of academic research as guaranteed by Article 5 of the Federal German Basic Law (constitution). The result is that there are no “Official guidelines” as to
what the results of research should be. On the contrary, controversial opinions on specific points, even between historians within the Office, are accepted. They are taken as an indication of the fact that the Office operates within a liberal political and social structure.

The Office has the status of a Central Military Agency of the Bundeswehr (the Federal Armed Forces). As such, it is subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces. Today, it is both the largest historical research institute and the sole official institute for military history in the Federal Republic of Germany. Its research section is currently working on three long-term projects:

a. A history of World War II from a German perspective, planned to consist of ten volumes, two of which are now available in English (from Oxford University Press) as "Germany and the Second World War." Six volumes have been published in German, and the entire work is now nearing completion.

b. A history of the Origins of West German Security Policies, of which three volumes have been published, and the last is forthcoming, and

c. A history of the "Origins and Problems of the Atlantic Alliance until 1956", scheduled to contain eight volumes, of which the first should be out by 1995.

It is necessary to go into this organizational detail in order to illustrate some of the determining factors for future research in the Military History Research Office. The fact that the World War II research project is nearing its final stage will probably mean that the other two working groups will still have sufficient manpower to continue their research, even if further reductions in the overall strength of the German Armed Forces will require even more manpower cuts in the Military History Research Office.

2. Beginnings of West German Security Policy

Since 1970, the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office has been tasked with writing and publishing a history of the origins of the Bundeswehr itself. After all, the Bundeswehr has been in existence far longer than any other German army in the 20th century and in 1995, it will be 40 years since it was founded.

It was realized very early on that the Bundeswehr’s origins were marked by three characteristics which set it off clearly both from its predecessors and the other armies allied to it in the framework of NATO:

a. The German Armed Forces were conceived from their very beginnings as an army within an alliance. The origins of German national
military forces can only be analyzed properly within this international perspective. Political, strategic, and operational concepts as well as the armaments policies resulting from these were conceived in close cooperation with, and under close scrutiny of the major Western Allies.

b. Secondly, as opposed to the first attempt at a German republic in 1919, the development of political and military structures did not occur simultaneously, but consecutively. In contrast to Weimar, Bonn’s political and social structures were fairly stabilized by the time military forces were beginning to be organized. Therefore, the military organization was established, from the very beginnings, within the constitutional framework of the Grundgesetz, the Federal Basic Law.

c. Lastly, the political collapse of Germany as a national state as well as the moral shame provoked by national socialist crimes made for another important difference in comparison with the Western democracies. The German Armed Forces could not continue without questioning the military traditions established by previous German armies. The origins and beginnings of the Bundeswehr were subject to strident criticism from the public, and strict civilian controls.

The demands made by the alliance, the constitutional framework and the public control of the fledgling German military were not only external conditions, they permeated post-World War II West German military history on all levels.

Realizing these pre-conditions of German re-militarization, the Office decided that a mere organizational history of the Bundeswehr could not meet the requirements of modern research. Instead, it was agreed that a comprehensive history of the origins of German security policy had to be written.

The history of the German military after 1945 should not be divided into phases which would correspond to the political eras, i.e.—marked by the changes of government. Rather, the different eras of the North Atlantic Alliance should be taken as a guideline. This leads to the following pattern:

a. The years 1945–1955 marked the development of a West German political entity and its gradual transformation from an object of occupation to an ally with limited sovereignty; within the context of the Cold War this meant giving up the concept of complete demilitarization of Germany in favor of rearming both parts of Germany.

b. The years 1955–1967/68 saw the build-up and consolidation of the Bundeswehr in the context of the ongoing Cold War, and of the nuclearization of allied strategic thinking.

c. From 1967/68 through 1990, West German policy aimed at both security and detente, again following trends initiated by the Western
alliance. At the same time, the armed forces were modernized and adapted their internal structures to the concept of flexible response.

d. Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, the armed forces have had to adapt to the new conditions in a re-united Germany. The context is no longer a bi-polar world system, but one of evolving new challenges to national security.

The history of the first period has largely been written. Volumes 1–3 of the series Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956 have been published. Volume 1 (From Surrender to the Pleven Plan) was published in 1982 and deals with:

a. Germany within the international confrontation, 1945–1950 (Wiggershaus);

b. Allied strategic planning for the defense of Western Europe, 1947–1950 (Greiner);

c. The decision in favor of a West Germany defense contribution 1950 (Wiggershaus);

d. Domestic aspects of West German security, 1947–1950 (Foerster);

e. The situation of German military elites, 1945–1950/51 (Meyer);

f. Definitions of the role of future German armed forces (Rautenberg).

Volume 2 (The EDC Phase), out since 1990, contains chapters on:

a. The international debate about West German rearmament within the EDC (Maier);

b. The domestic dimension of Adenauers security policy during the EDC phase (Volkmann);

c. Planning the West German defense contribution within the EDC framework (Meier-Dörnberg);

d. Financial and economic aspects of German EDC membership (Köllner/Volkmann).

Volume 3 (The NATO Option) was published as recently as 1993, and covers the following subjects:

a. German membership of WEU and NATO in the context of block formation and detente, 1954–1956 (Thoß);

b. Domestic debate about the Paris Agreements and the defense clauses in the constitution, 1954–1956 (Ehlert);

c. German membership in the WEU and NATO military structures, 1954–1957 (Greiner);

d. The Bundeswehr’s internal development until 1960/61 (Meyer).

Volume 4 is scheduled for 1994 and is expected to contain chapters about:
a. Sovereignty and security: the developing status of the Federal Republic in international law, 1945–1955 (Schwengler);
b. The armaments and economic framework for a West German re-armament within the NATO-Option (Abelshauser).

The entire project is expected to be finished by the end of 1994. Preparatory work on a history of German security policies until the end of the Adenauer era, more likely until 1967/68, has now begun. Fields for research could be:

a. The German question during the period of consolidation of two German states and of disengagement;
b. Political and military integration into the alliance;
c. The further development of the constitutional framework;
d. Further development of the military organization;
e. The forces within a democratic society;
f. The internal structure and morale.

However, while these are still preliminary deliberations, some single volumes covering aspects of the period are already being written. One of them will be a biography of General Adolf Heusinger, who served in the operations department of the General Staff in 1944, became the first Inspector-general of the Bundeswehr, and ultimately the Chairman, NATO Military Committee in permanent session, until his retirement in March 1964. Another study will analyze the mutual influence of allied nuclear strategy and national conventional forces upon each other.

An initial volume on aspects of East German security policies has been published in 1994. It verifies the assumption that the basic decisions in East German military policy and strategy were taken in the very early years, i.e. between 1948 and 1952. The Soviet Union’s policy of arming its own zone of occupation ended up strengthening the position of those in the West who called for a rearmed West Germany—and was therefore counterproductive. A bibliography on the military and security policy of the Soviet Zone/GDR is currently being prepared.

3. Origins and Problems of the Atlantic Alliance Until 1956

As said before, a history of the German Armed Forces cannot be written without reference to its NATO dimension. However, while this is being done in the research project described above, another research team is working on a history of NATO which is meant to describe the alliance from a supra-national point of view.

The overriding importance of NATO for German, European, and even world-wide history makes a comprehensive history of NATO one of the most exciting objectives in post-World War II military history. When this
The project was initiated in the mid-1980s, no similar research was being undertaken elsewhere; most historians working on this period concentrated on individual aspects or special questions of NATO history.

The project will cover the period from 1945 roughly until 1956. In fact, while the initial years of the emerging Cold War will be covered, the emphasis will be on the period beginning with the Western Union, i.e.—1947/1948. The year 1956 marks the first major conflict within the alliance; also, this is when the process of establishing the alliance and its organization comes to a first conclusion (German membership and “Committee of Three”). In some instances, the years up to the beginning of the second Berlin Crisis in 1958 will be covered.

A history of an alliance is necessarily complex; it will have to cover diplomatic, domestic, military, economic, and social aspects as well as the security policies at least of the major allies. Not least, the organizational structure created by the alliance will as such form an object of analysis.

It is planned to view the alliance as an organization for security, policy and economy cooperation, both in a worldwide political context and “from the inside.” The East-West balance of power, the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union form part of our subject as much as the relationship between the super power ally, the other two major powers, and the smaller, but sovereign, partners. Another important aspect should be the nuclear cooperation between the allies and the effect it had on the cohesion of the alliance.

NATO was something entirely new: an alliance of modern, mostly democratic, industrial nation states which, although remaining sovereign, conferred parts of their military and economic freedom upon a quasi-supranational authority. Research will therefore not be limited to traditional diplomatic history; it will aim at encompassing economic, military, and political history, but also elements of political science methodology such as decision making, structural, and national interest analysis.

A major drawback is that NATO still has not agreed on a joint policy regarding the declassification of archival documents. However, members of the project have been granted access to the registry of the International Staff (IS), the International Military Staff (IMS), both in Brussels, and of SHAPE, Mons. Many of the documents, however, are still classified and must not be quoted from. Others are not being made available, in particular where internal matters of the IS or IMS are concerned. However, the International Staff are working on a solution to this problem.

Most valuable are the documents held in the National Archives, Washington. Other US archives consulted are the Harry S Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower Libraries and the National Security Archives. The
US Freedom of Information Act has provided historians with a means of contesting the withdrawal of any document, if necessary in court. The result is that most US documents are accessible. Large numbers of documents have also been made available to researchers by publication in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series.

The situation is somewhat similar in Britain and France, although both countries do not make the documents of their respective NATO departments available. The reason is probably that they are studded with documents originating in NATO which have not been declassified by NATO, and cannot therefore be made available. However, the Public Record Office at Kew is now beginning to make some of their Western Organizations Department documents available to the public. In any case, the bulk of all other material, both of the cabinets, foreign ministries, and defense authorities is available, providing a wealth of sources.

Another country whose archives have provided most valuable insights is Canada. Canadian documents are widely available, and they allow a look at NATO from the perspective of a “smaller partner.” In addition, Canada was traditionally keen on stressing the non-military aspects of NATO; Canadian documents are more explicit and more detailed than others on activities in the fields of economic, political, social, and ideological cooperation.

The documents of most German authorities are available to researchers working on this project, even if they are still classified. This includes the Chancellor’s office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and most parliamentary documents, supplemented by a host of private collections such as the papers of Herbert Blankenhorn, Germany’s first ambassador with NATO. However, as a rule, classified papers must not be quoted. The research project enjoys the encouragement and support of eminent officials involved in formulating German policy at the time, among them Generals (ret.) Ulrich de Maiziere, head of the German military delegation at the EDC talks, and Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg, first German LANDCENT.

To lay the ground for this project, a conference on “Beginnings of European military integration,” was held at Freiburg in December 1985. Contributions were subsequently published as *Die Westliche Sicherheitsgemeinschaft 1948–1950. Gemeinsame Probleme und gegen­sätzliche Nationalinteressen in der Gründungsphase der Nordatlantischen Allianz. “Im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes,”* ed. by Norbert Wiggershaus und Roland G. Foerster, Boppard 1988 (*Militärgeschichte seit 1945, 8*), translated into English and published as *The Western Security Community, 1948–1950. Common Problems and
Conflicting National Interests during the Foundation Phase of the North Atlantic Alliance, ed. by Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster, Oxford 1993 (Studies in Military History).

Another conference was held in September 1990, again in Freiburg, to present and discuss interim results. It attracted a number of international contributors, among them General Dr. Jean Delmas (Paris), Dr. Rolf Tamnes (Oslo), Professor Leopoldo Nuti (Florence), and Professor John Gillingham (St. Louis). The papers presented at this conference were published as Das Nordatlantische Bündnis 1949–1955. "Im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes," ed. by Klaus A. Maier und Norbert Wiggershaus, Munchen 1993 (Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte, 37).

It is hoped that the result of this effort will consist of eight volumes, each of about 300 pages, and organized in two series. The first series will consist of five volumes, analyzing the alliance within the global structure. It was the aim of the sovereign member states to coordinate their respective reconstruction programs, economic recovery, and the preservation of their respective power position, not least their colonial role, while at the same time retaining their military security and political sovereignty. Military policy is important in this context, but by no means a primary objective.

The second series will discuss the internal problems of the alliance, and the means by which the alliance managed to stay together despite these problems. The aim is not so much an organizational history as an analysis of specific problems.

Starting from the major war conferences, volume I, called Founding the North Atlantic Alliance, will relate the transformation of the wartime coalition into a worsening East-West confrontation. It will discuss the Treaty of Dunkirk, 1947, and the creation of the Western Union, 1948. They both served as preliminaries to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, but at the time, the latter was by no means the certain outcome of those two treaties. Even at this stage, national, in particular French, interests threatened Western cohesion and presaged later crises. For a number of topics, outside historians have been asked to contribute; this volume will be written jointly by Professor Donald Cameron Watt (London) and Lt.-Colonel Dr. Gero v. Gersdorff from the Military History Research Office.

Volume II will treat the patterns of confrontation as perceived by the alliance. The threat perceptions of the individual member states varied to an astonishing degree, in particular after Stalin's death in 1953, leading to varying degrees of urgency in implementing national defense programs (Schmidt/Wiggershaus/A. Fischer).
Volume III will be unique in this series, in that it will not be written by members of this research team. The Military History Research Office realized at an early stage that the national alliance policies could not be presented sufficiently by German historians, if only because that would have necessitated an enormous amount of archival research in countries whose language nobody on the team speaks. Therefore, contributors from each of the 15 nations which formed NATO at the time were invited to contribute articles on their respective country's foreign and alliance policies. A third conference, held at Potsdam in November 1994, was the forum for the presentation of these contributions. Participants included Professors Lawrence Kaplan (Kent State University, Ohio), Georges Soutou (Paris), Olav Riste (Oslo) and Paul Léourneau (Montréal) as well as a number of other distinguished historians.

Volume IV will discuss patterns of reaction to the perceived threat. This will involve economic cooperation (Krüger), concepts of military strategy (Greiner), the enlargement of the Alliance (membership of Greece, Turkey, and Germany), as well as the consolidation of the military organization (Rebhan).

Volume V will analyze the relation with the adversary, i.e. — mainly the Soviet Union (Lambrecht, Potsdam), and with nonmember states (Ruddy, St. Louis). Also, it will provide an opportunity to round off the entire series by assessing NATO's contribution to the preservation of peace in the early 1950s.

The second series will begin with a volume discussing internal problems of the alliance organization. This will entail a discussion of how this organization evolved (Rebhan, Pedlow [SHAPE], Léourneau [Montréal]), of its economic dimensions and cooperation with the OEEC (Würzler, Dinslaken), and of its relation to the EDC, the Brussels Treaty and the Western Union (Meier-Dörnberg, Hamburg).

Volume II of the second series is devoted to nuclear cooperation within NATO. Admittedly, source material is very scarce in this field, compared with the wealth encountered in other areas. However, the author Lt.-Colonel Dr. Maier, is confident that he will be able to collate sufficient unclassified sources to come up with an accurate and reliable account. The other aspect discussed in this volume will be cooperation in the economic and armaments fields (Abelshauser, Bielefeld).

The second series is rounded off by a third volume discussing disintegrating factors, such as the Trieste crisis and the attempt to rope in Yugoslavia with the Western alliance, the emerging tensions between Greece, Turkey and Britain over Cyprus, Portuguese colonialism, the question of Spanish or Irish membership, and the first case of communist cabi-
net ministers in NATO (Iceland, 1956), together with the call for withdrawal of the US troops (Heinemann).

These eight volumes are an ambitious project, and it is, and has been, open to the criticism that too much may be attempted at once. At the same time, it has also been accused of leaving out important aspects. The research team has tried to counter the critics by inviting scholars from outside the Military History Research Office to contribute chapters on various aspects. For example, no specialist for economic history has been assigned to this project by the Office; Professor Abelschauser (Bielefeld) and Dr. Krüger (Bundesarchiv) have agreed to fill this gap. Even so, it must be admitted that some aspects will not be dealt with to the extent they would deserve. For example, the legal aspects of NATO are not being treated in a separate chapter.

It is hoped that the first volume will go into print during 1995, and that the entire project will be concluded in 1997. It may be accompanied by a third series which would publish some of the essential source documents; a decision on this has not yet been taken.

4. Effects of German Unity on Research Work

The rapid succession of events in Germany since the autumn of 1989 has not failed to have an effect on the Military History Research Office, and on research conducted there. The move to Potsdam in the summer of 1994 will impede work for some time. A number of historians will retire in the near future, leading to a loss of experienced staff. The military archives, which are being held by the Ministry of the Interior, will remain at Freiburg. This will mean long and tedious journeys to consult documents, although it must be admitted that research for the NATO project does not depend too heavily on documents held in the military archives. Research for the history of German security policy, however, will be seriously affected.

The shrinking of the German Armed Forces has led to a number of early retirements, sometimes of officers who were still involved in writing their papers. While ways and means have been found to enable them to finish their contribution, shrinking manpower figures will force the Office to limit the scope of its activities, and concentrate on essentials in the medium term.

Another aspect of the manpower question is the inclusion of former East German historians. While no officers from the East German Military History Institute have been taken into the Bundeswehr, a few civilian historians are now working with the Military History Research Office. They provide a valuable insight into the way West German and NATO policies
were perceived in the East, they are acquainted with Eastern European archives (including Russian archives), and they have a knowledge of Russian which few of their Western counterparts can rival.

As for the fields of future research, a history of East German security policy may be tempting (the term "security policy" as such is of course debatable when talking about a member of a military pact with sizeable offensive potential and ideology). However, it remains to be evaluated to what extent German sources permit this to be done. In fact, for the time being the question remains open whether there was a specific German security policy within the Warsaw Pact. Some historians feel that East German security policy was dictated by Moscow to such an extent that an account based mainly on German sources would be totally inadequate. As long as historians from the Office will not be able to consult Russian archives as freely as, say, the US National Archives, any history of East German security policy will remain inconclusive.

A history of the East German army (Nationale Volksarmee, NVA) may prove more attractive. However, it will not be the central theme of the future. The NVA will go down in history as an episode, while the Bundeswehr continues to exist. While the military history of East Germany will not be neglected, the main effort will be made in the field of West German history.

The same considerations are valid for future research in the history of international security relations. A history of the Warsaw Pact may need to be written at some stage in the future, but at the moment, the situation in the respective archives as well as capacities at the Office do not seem to allow this. It is hoped that a history of NATO from the mid-1950s up to 1967/68 may be feasible after 1995. This might include the second Berlin Crisis, the Cuban missile crisis, the beginnings of detente during the Kennedy administration, the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as NATO's reaction and attitude to the US entanglement in Vietnam or the Seven Days' War in 1967. Within NATO, this period saw the military coup in Turkey, the ongoing conflict over Cyprus, and the colonels' regime in Athens. It was the period of large-scale de-colonization, particularly in Africa, and therefore of a re-definition of security interests by a number of important NATO partners such as Britain and France, Belgium and Portugal. On a strategic level, the 1960s brought about the change from massive retaliation to flexible response, and led to corresponding changes in force levels and command structures. Finally, the Harmel report set new tasks for the alliance which remained valid until the end of the Cold War. Altogether, this would be a tempting field for future research, but at the moment, it is not yet clear if the German Armed Forces Military
ENDNOTES

1. This chapter draws heavily on material provided by colleague, Dr. Bruno Thoß, who is currently laying the ground for a study of East German security policies.

2. This chapter is based on several draft papers provided by colleagues, most notably Colonel Dr. Norbert Wiggershaus, in charge of the research project, and Lt.-Colonel Dr. Gero v. Gersdorff, one of the contributors.
Looking Eastward:
The Royal Netherlands Army, 1945–1990

Dr. Benjamin Schoenmaker

The 10th of March 1994 was an important day for the Military History Section of the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA). On this day, the Section presented its most recent book to Prime Minister R.F.M. Lubbers and Defence Minister A.L. Ter Beek. The title of this publication is translated freely, Looking Eastward: The Dutch Army in the Cold War, 1945–1990.1 The book has received considerable attention from the Dutch press. In my opinion, this unusual level of attention for an historical work has two causes. In the first place, since the “collapse” of the Berlin Wall a certain social need has arisen to look back upon the period of East-West opposition and to analyse this period critically. Since Europe is no longer divided into two heavily armed camps, it has become possible to look at the former situation more objectively. Now that the dichotomy is over, it has become less self-evident and gives rise to an increasing number of questions. In our opinion, Looking Eastward offers the first critical analysis of this period of armed peace from the Dutch perspective.

The second reason for the interest in our book is connected with the fact that earlier Dutch publications on aspects of the Cold War were mainly written from a political point of view.2 Our book, however, puts the role of the armed forces, and especially the army, in a central position for the first time.

It is unfortunate that as long as no English or other translation is available, our book is not directly accessible to readers who do not understand Dutch.3 Therefore, I should like to present the main points of Looking Eastward in this paper. I have chosen the following structure for this. Firstly, I shall discuss the research, the source material consulted and the problems which arose from the use of this material. Next I shall describe the nature of the book and review the subjects it covers. I refer to the latter as the thematic demarcation of the book. Finally, I shall discuss the main
conclusion, as well as the new research questions which originate from it. Although by doing so I will focus my discussion on one book, I am nonetheless of the opinion that I will thereby meet the objectives of the Conference on Cold War Military Records and History simply because, apart from this book, not much other Cold War research has yet been conducted in the context of military history in the Netherlands. In other words, my co-author and I were pioneers in this area. In our more imaginative moods we sometimes felt like two surveyors of the United States Army who had to map out a large, unexplored area for the first time.

Firstly, I would like to make a few remarks concerning our research and the source material we used. Towards the end of the 1980s, the Military History Section began a research project on the postwar history of the Royal Netherlands Army. Until then the only subject from this recent era which had been studied in depth was the decolonization war against Indonesia, the former Dutch East Indies. We thought it was high time to start work on the rest of this period as well. The first objective of our new research project was to publish a ‘manual-like’ overview of the period 1945–1990 within a few years. This manual was intended to serve as a starting point for more specialised research and to stimulate the already increasing interest in military history at Dutch universities.

The source material available to us consisted in part of printed and published government records, such as the so-called Defence White Papers which were published once every five to eight years. These White Papers give a general outline of the defence policy to be implemented. Parliamentary records were also useful. This was particularly true for the 1970s and 1980s, because the formulation of defence policy was much more public than had been the case in the preceding decades. Nonetheless, the parliamentary documents only give a limited insight and even then only on a limited number of aspects of defence policy, such as materiel and personnel policy. Other aspects, however, have always been kept from public decision-making and regular parliamentary control. This applies particularly to operational aspects and the whole area of intelligence.

This limited usefulness also applies to the other public, and therefore readily accessible, sources. This category includes, for example, the military magazines which we consulted. The most important military magazine in the Netherlands is the Militaire Spectator (Military Spectator), which is similar to, for example, the American Military Review in terms of content and academic level. The volumes of this magazine are also worth studying from a historical perspective but do not answer all the questions. Since in the so-called free world, just as anywhere else, the formulation of
defence policy takes place largely behind closed doors, a thorough study of this policy necessitates the use of classified material.

Classified source material which was particularly useful to us included the so-called confidential annual reports (Jaarverslagen), which were drafted over the years by the various units of the Royal Netherlands Army. These reports, which are kept in the Documentation Centre of the Military History Section, were drafted to serve as building blocks for "official histories" which were to be written at a later date. As a result, they proved to be a valuable source for us. In particular they provide many specific facts and figures, such as the precise order of battle and the equipment of an armored infantry battalion at a specific point in time or the precise exercise and training schedule of such a unit. These annual reports also have their limitations, however; they are succinct, enumerative and provide little analysis. Furthermore, we unfortunately do not possess complete series of annual reports for most units. Unit commanders frequently were not convinced of the benefit of such historical reporting and put an end to this activity in their unit.

The archives of the Ministry of Defence and of the Royal Netherlands Army were our most important source. It would be going too far to give an overview of all the archives available. I only wish to mention one particular collection which was especially important for us: the collection of reports of the Army Council, until recently the highest executive body within the Royal Netherlands Army. Since the Minister of Defence or one of his Undersecretaries was a member of the Army Council, this board was the ideal forum for exchanging ideas between the military leadership and the politicians responsible for defence policy. In other words, this council was the place where the military and political communities met and occasionally collided.

During our research of the archives, we were confronted with the usual problems associated with research in twentieth century government archives. The amount of material is so large that it is only possible to work through a small part of it. Constant decisions have to be made as to what you do or do not wish to see. Often the recent archives have not yet been systematised and inventoried, adding to the problems of their accessibility. A more surprising problem was that we also encountered serious gaps amongst the piles of archive material. Modern bureaucracies rapidly proceed with partial destruction of the reams of paper they produce. This process of selection sometimes leads to costly losses. For example, in the Netherlands it is a general rule that documents relating exclusively to policy implementation do not need to be stored. Part of the operational plans drafted by the Dutch Army over the years in the context of NATO defence
had apparently been destroyed on the basis of this selection criterion. As a result the question, "How did the Dutch Army plan to wage the defensive battle on the North German Plain?" could no longer be answered on the basis of original documents. Fortunately, we were able to fill these gaps by means of several conversations with retired generals.

These interviews were isolated incidents. There is no program in the Ministry of Defence or the Royal Netherlands Army in which departing officials give an exit interview, although there now exist plans to start such a program in the near future. Neither is there an oral history program. The historians of the Military History Section certainly recognise the benefit of such projects but also recognise the fact that they are time-consuming and require a large amount of manpower. Even without such projects the Military History Section has an overly full schedule.

As civil servants employed by the Ministry of Defence, we had access to even the most recent classified records. However, it was impossible for us to publish everything that we found. Some issues, it will not surprise you, had to remain confidential for reasons of national security or of privacy. The most important question in this respect was who decided what could be published and what could not. This question is so important because it determines exactly how freely and independently "official historians" can do their job. Over the years the following procedure has been developed within the Military History Section. Routinely it is the head of the Military History Section who sets the guidelines as to what can be published. In sensitive matters he may decide to consult his superiors, i.e., the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff. As a result of this dialogue usually some sort of compromise is worked out. However, we always make sure that such a compromise does not violate one important principle: "If you cannot write about something frankly, then don't write about it at all." In other words, we would rather keep something in the closet than bring it out in a false and distorted way.

Another important principle for the Military History Section is that we never sent the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff or the Minister of Defence a draft of our manuscripts in order to get their approval. They learn of the contents of our books only after they are published. The large amount of freedom that the Military History Section enjoys is based upon trust; trust of the Army leadership in its historians. It is our task not to betray that trust but at the same time it is our task to make sure that we do our jobs as openly and freely as possible. There is always tension between those two tasks. The ground we maneuver on is slippery.

While writing Looking Eastward we were able to quote from many documents and to refer to them in our annotation. The sudden end to the
Cold War and the completely altered security situation in Europe which resulted from this were the cause of the freedom available to us. For example, we could give a detailed description of how the Dutch Army intended to defend its assigned section in the NATO defence line in the 1980s. These plans, which were highly classified until fairly recently, have now become history. Prime Minister Lubbers’ first comment on the book was, “In this book I find things disclosed about which I have often been told to keep my mouth tightly shut.” This freedom did not apply, however, to the NATO-classified documents in our department. Just like the other member states, the Netherlands is not authorised to declassify and release NATO documents unilaterally. This limitation did not cause significant problems in practice, however, because we were usually able to find documents with a national classification which rendered reference to specific NATO documents unnecessary.

In general, we were in a favourable position when compared to researchers outside the Ministry of Defence. Officially, government documents are released and open to the general public after 50 years. At this moment an amendment to the Archives Act is being prepared which will reduce that period of time to 20 years. Ahead of this formal change researchers are now already given almost unlimited access to documents which are older than two decades. However, an exception to this 20-year rule can be made where state security or the unity of the Crown is concerned. It is also possible to keep documents closed to the public for longer than 20 years in the interest of the privacy of persons concerned. Documents classified by NATO, regardless of their age, are completely unavailable to researchers from outside the Ministry.

I have now reached the second part of my discourse on the nature, the subjects, and the thematic demarcation of our book. Looking Eastward provides an overview of the postwar history of the Royal Netherlands Army and of the tasks assigned to the organisation. Because there was peace in Europe during the period 1945–1990, the emphasis has been placed on task preparation rather than actual task performance as is the case in operational historiography. Attention has been paid to personnel and materiel policies and to their financial foundation. Other important subjects are training policy, formulation of doctrine and exercises. The key question we asked ourselves while dealing with these aspects was: in the period under review, did the sum of these aspects result in armed forces with sufficient combat power and credibility to perform its assigned tasks?

By far the most important task of the Dutch Army was to make a contribution to the NATO-organised defence of Western Europe against a possible attack by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. The
Dutch government put one army corps consisting of three divisions at the disposal of NATO in order to perform this task. During the 1950s, this corps, which was part of the Northern Army Group, defended an area on Dutch territory behind the Rivers Rhine and IJssel. Extensive flooding was intended to provide significant strengthening of this defence line. Inundation was a traditional method of defence frequently used in the Netherlands. In the context of the Forward Defence Strategy, the Dutch army corps was later assigned a sector located just behind the Inner German border.

The political necessity of Forward Defence was a major problem for the Dutch Army. During peacetime, the corps assigned to NATO was largely billeted in the Netherlands. Due to the short military warning time anticipated, this corps was in danger of not reaching the Inner German border to organise its sector for defence on time. The troops had to travel approximately 300 kilometers to their war location. A foreign observer once phrased this reaction time problem as follows, "The greatest problem facing the Dutch will be getting to the war." Incidentally, the reaction time improved over time, partly as a result of large investments in flat cars. This railway equipment would enable rapid transportation of tanks and other armoured vehicles to the area.

Not only the NATO task is discussed in our book. The other tasks performed by the Royal Netherlands Army during the Cold War are also described. For example the first chapter, covering the period 1945–1950, largely concerns the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Almost the entire Dutch Army was fighting in Indonesia at the time. Because the East-West confrontation in Europe was becoming more direct at this time, a strong tension could be felt in Dutch defence policy during these years between, on the one hand, the wish to protect the colonial interests outside Europe and, on the other hand, the need to attend to the defence of the territory in Europe. Needless to say, this tension was not a typically Dutch problem. Countries such as France and the United Kingdom also struggled with this problem.

Unlike its larger European ‘sisters,’ the Netherlands was able to concentrate virtually all its attention on its NATO task in Europe following the loss of Indonesia as early as 1950. A great advantage of this clear choice for NATO was that, as a result, the Netherlands became eligible for large-scale military assistance from the United States. Although the NATO task, therefore, had the highest priority after 1950, the tensions just mentioned nonetheless remained a characteristic of security policy. It became clear that every overseas effort, no matter how small, such as in New Guinea, was detrimental to the NATO task in Europe. When the Dutch
government agreed, in 1979, to assign a battalion to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the army command was not entirely pleased with this new task. After all, a battalion for Lebanon meant a battalion less for the defence of the sector on the North German Plain.

Our book has what may be called a Western perspective. We did not use Soviet archives or archives of other former Warsaw Pact countries. As a result, we only had Western evaluations of the intentions and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact available to us. These Western evaluations of the threat from the East are incorporated in our book. The threat posed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal was enormous. In our book we included a map based on data from 1969 that indicates which locations on our small territory were, according to the Dutch intelligence services, viable nuclear targets. Those services counted no less than a hundred of those targets. The question as to how justified or how exaggerated and distorted all of these Western threat perspectives might have been is not dealt with in our book. Neither do we discuss questions such as, “How did the Warsaw Pact countries evaluate the security situation in Europe? How threatening did they find NATO’s military efforts? How did they estimate the combat power of the NATO forces, in particular those of the Netherlands?” In other words, we discuss the East-West conflict from only one perspective in our book. This one-sided Western perspective is a clear demarcation.

In our book, we pay close attention to the relationship between the Netherlands and NATO and the other member states of the alliance. After all, the policy lines set out by the alliance, such as the Lisbon agreements of 1952 or the later Long-Term Defence Programme, were important frameworks for national defence policy. NATO strategy and its changes, such as the transition from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response in 1967, are dealt with extensively. NATO strategy was, after all, the operational framework within which the Dutch armed forces were expected to operate.

Incidentally, for a long time the Dutch Army did not consider itself capable of effectuating the Flexible Response strategy. Due to the substantial conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, the operational plans of the Dutch Army in the 1970s were still based on the use of nuclear weapons at an early stage during a conflict. Once again, these plans make it painfully clear what has traditionally been the largest problem for the whole NATO alliance: an overly strong nuclear dependence. Only in the course of the 1980s did the conventional combat power of the Dutch Army seem sufficient to make a non-nuclear defence possible to some extent. This development was the result of a number of major modernisation programmes.
implemented during the early ‘80s. Ironically, at the time this conventional reinforcement was more or less kept from the public because the defence debate in Western Europe was, during those years, almost completely monopolised by the issue of modernising the intermediate range nuclear missiles. The hesitant position of the Netherlands in this INF debate led to doubts about the Netherlands as a credible NATO partner. The term ‘Dutch disease’ was used at a time when, I repeat, the Royal Netherlands Army was dramatically increasing its conventional combat power.

Despite this allied dimension, our book has a predominantly national Dutch perspective. This approach is logical and even necessary because NATO defence has always been the sum of rather isolated national contributions. The fact that the Dutch corps would be placed under NATO command in wartime detracts little from this. The funding, materiel, personnel and training of this corps, in short all the preparations for performing the NATO task, were primarily a national responsibility. Although the main points of national defence policy were admittedly established in consultation with NATO, the Dutch government ultimately determined the exact size and quality of its contribution to the alliance. Just like every other member state, the Netherlands went its own way. Even the formulation of doctrine was a national matter.

Incidentally, this is not to say that NATO had no influence on national defence policy. Criticism from Brussels was most definitely incorporated in national decision-making. Sometimes, when a military issue had reached an impasse in domestic politics, the opinion of Brussels was even the deciding factor. This happened, for example, in 1974 when a fierce debate was taking place in the Hague political arena concerning a proposal to reduce the Dutch corps from three to two divisions. Eventually it became clear that a majority could only accept this reduction proposal on condition that the other NATO allies agreed with it. It should come as no surprise that the allies did not support this reduction in the Dutch contribution to NATO and consequently provided a victory for the domestic opponents of the proposal. This course of events is exceptional. In general, NATO proposals were not as well received. If they found little support in national politics, they did not stand a chance. For example, for many years the NATO member states have unavailingly urged the Netherlands to post more troops in Germany in order to solve the aforementioned problem of reaction time.

A final theme which runs through our book is the relationship between society and the armed forces. The Cold War years are a unique period because never before had such a large majority of Dutch society felt exposed to one and the same external threat for such a long time. Once again, I do not wish to comment on whether this evaluation was correct.
Based on this consensus, there was widespread support for NATO and the tasks of the armed forces in the Netherlands. In this respect these years were "easy" for military personnel. Doubt was rarely cast on the *raison d'être* of their organisation and their legitimacy was not questioned.

Despite the widespread belief in the necessity of the armed forces, strong tensions nevertheless existed between the army and society in the Netherlands during the Cold War. This was especially true during the 1960s and 1970s. A wave of democratization flooded civilian society at the time and broke the prevalent and still rather authoritarian relationships of authority. These were replaced by the right of participation and increased personal freedom and responsibility. These developments did not stop at the barracks gate. The unions of conscript personnel in particular insisted on adapting the military way of life and working conditions to the civilian-social relationships. They demanded far-reaching liberalization of the rules and regulations. The army command attempted to resist this pressure because it feared a regression in discipline and, consequently, in combat power. The battle was in vain. The soldiers' unions achieved one victory after another, thanks to the strong support they received from society. The obligation to salute was abolished, military criminal and disciplinary law was liberalized, the freedom of expression was enhanced and hair style became free. From the beginning of the 1970s, homosexuality no longer constituted grounds for discharge.

Compared to other countries, the liberalization of the Dutch army went a very long way indeed. The long-haired Dutch soldier especially attracted much attention outside the Netherlands. The Dutch Army was given the unedifying nickname, "The Hippie Army." Many foreigners did not hide their doubts concerning the combat power of this army. In 1973 the American magazine *Newsweek* put it in no uncertain terms, "The average Dutch recruit makes the Good Soldier Schweick look like a Waffen-SS eager beaver." Such moral judgments based solely on the appearance of a soldier showed very little understanding. Much more important than the effects on appearance is that liberalization gave the Dutch serviceman not only more freedom but also a greater personal responsibility. The mature and usually well-educated Dutch conscripts have, by now, amply proven that they can well manage both this freedom and this responsibility. Our judgment of the liberalization is consequently largely positive.

Finally, I wish to discuss the most important conclusion of our research. It is an answer to the question regarding the extent to which the Dutch Army has succeeded in completing its tasks, especially its NATO task. Due to a number of reasons it was impossible to answer this question with an unequivocal yes or no. In the first place, the ultimate test case in
which the RNLA could show its ability to perform its tasks did not occur. Fortunately, the war in Europe for which preparations were made with painstaking detail for many years never broke out. This means that one can only speculate on the course of such a conflict and on the performance of the Dutch Army. In the second place, as I mentioned earlier, we do not yet have sufficient information regarding the intentions and the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. It would also be of great benefit to research how exactly the countries of the Warsaw Pact currently evaluated the combat power of the NATO forces, especially of the Dutch army. In other words, much more internationally-oriented research is required.

Although no clear answer can therefore be given, we can nonetheless give an explicit judgment of the combat power of the Royal Netherlands Army. This judgment is not uniform for the entire period 1945–1990. On the contrary, we noticed a significant fluctuation in the level to which the Dutch land forces appeared capable of performing their tasks. In closing, I wish to give you a brief outline of this fluctuation. After the phase of reconstruction was completed, a certain faith was placed in a defence to be carried out behind the Rivers Rhine and IJssel in the course of the 1950s. The gradual effectuation of Forward Defence then led to doubts about the possibility of a successful defence. The mechanization of the armed forces and the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons did not remove these doubts. The assumed conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact was the most important reason for this. Not until the end of the 1970s did confidence gradually increase. This was largely the result of a drastic modernization of the Netherlands Army. The introduction of complicated weapon systems did, however, cause large equipment-logistic problems. Many teething troubles had to be overcome before the deployability of these systems was ensured. Nevertheless during the 1980s, the combat power and the credibility of the Dutch Army increased.

We would find it very interesting to place these developments in the Royal Netherlands Army in a comparative context. Were the “ups and downs” typically Dutch or symptomatic of trends taking place in the armies of all the NATO allies or even in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact? In other words, and this seems to me a good way to end this paper, this is once again a plea for more internationally-oriented research.

ENDNOTES


3. The Military History Section is considering either an abridged or unabridged English translation. However, there are no concrete plans yet, and the needed funds still have to be found.


6. The _Militaire Spectator_, a monthly, is published by the _Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap_ (Royal Society for the Study of Military Science). The head of the Military History Section is one of the editors.

7. Researchers, who are interested in using Dutch archives, are always welcome to ask the Military History Section for advice and assistance.

8. The unity of the Crown requires that documents that reveal a difference of opinion between the head of state (queen/king) on the one hand and the cabinet or one of its members on the other remain classified.


10. A recent publication on this topic is I. Megens, _American Aid to NATO Allies in the 1950's: The Dutch Case_ (Groningen, 1994).


SECTION XII

New Dimensions In The History Of The Cold War:
Hungary And Poland
In the Shadow of the Kremlin: Hungarian Military Policy in the Early Period of the Cold War, 1945–1956

Dr. Imre Okváth

After the Second World War, Hungary, as a defeated country, fell into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the USSR played a decisive role in her future political life. During the first one-and-a-half years, the Soviet leadership did not strive to carry out “sovetization” immediately. Instead they planned to effectuate it in 10 to 15 years. Their interests were secured not only by the forces of the Red Army stationed in Hungary, but also by the Allied Control Commission, the Hungarian Communist Party, and the State Security Authorities. As a consequence of this slightly “open” policy, a pluralistic political system was allowed to form in Hungary with free and open elections and with different parties in the opposition. These could exist and work together in civilian institutions, and all of this pointed toward the development of a bourgeois-type society.

So far as the principles of military policy are concerned, throughout this period it was commonly accepted that the national security of Hungary, a theoretically independent country after the future peace treaty, was to be based on a kind of a collective security system, an outcome of the co-operation of the Great Powers. The Hungarian political and military leadership tried to secure the sovereignty and security of the country relying on the United Nations’ Organization and on its future international armed forces. On the supposition that Hungary, as a future member of the United Nations’ Organization, would be a member of the international armed forces and would take part in its work, the Hungarian leaders thought the formation of a new army legitimate and lawful. As a permanent source of danger they presumed possible attacks from neighboring countries. To prevent these they planned to create a kind of “defensive” army, strong enough to repulse the individual or simultaneous offensives.
of the neighbors and before the armed intervention of the international forces. To assure peace and security in the Danube Basin and within Hungary and because of the superior military potential of its neighbors, the Hungarian political and military leadership thought that the regulation and supervision of the armed forces was necessary to acknowledge the equality of rights at the same time.¹

From Autumn 1947, as a result of changes in the international situation, Stalin gave up the practice of a “differentiated” foreign policy, accelerated the “bolshevization” of the Central and Eastern European countries in the sphere of the Soviet Union, and urged their integration into a strict system of military alliance. The antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union grew, and the mutual feelings of the threat of war precipitated Europe’s division into two camps and hastened the development of the Cold War. The two great powers concentrated on security policy. The Soviet Union, in order to prevent an unexpected attack and to keep the field of operations at a distance from Soviet territories (and to carry the principle of “advanced defence” into practice), increased the forces of the Red Army in Central and Eastern Europe and redoubled its efforts to create a military security system with the participation of the countries in the Soviet sphere of interest by way of bilateral military treaties. This buffer zone was planned to serve the security of the Soviet Union. The satellite communist parties, following the instructions of Stalin, hastened the formation of stronger armies in their countries.

In the climate of the Cold War, Hungary’s political and military policy changed radically. In the name of internationalism, the new military doctrine took shape in lieu of the former concept of the discord between neighboring countries over questions of state borders and the national minorities. The United States became the main source of danger. In contemporary Hungarian judgment:

... the only way that leads to security for Hungary is the close and clear-cut alliance with the democracies of Eastern Europe and with the greatest power of the peace camp, the Soviet Union first of all.²

The leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party tried to meet Stalin’s new requirements quickly. The delegates, having returned from the session of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties (COMINFORM), submitted a memorandum to the Political Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party in which they urged the accomplishment of the proletarian dictatorship through the sovietization of the society and the revision of the former views regarding a very small army. On 11 December 1947, the Political Committee created a commission with the task to work out the principles of the progressive development of the
armed forces and to direct the progress. The suggestions of this commis-

sion were accepted at the session of the Political Committee on 29 January

1948. This plan for development took the economic possibilities of the
country into consideration and proposed to establish the army in four
years, from 1948 to 1952. The standing army, according to the terms of the
peace treaty, meant a peacetime footing of 70,000 men. So far as the or-
ganization was concerned, eight brigades were planned in four army corps.
The expenses were estimated at 12 billion forints (1.025 billion U.S.
Dollars).³

Hungary was not the only country within the Soviet sphere of interest
to develop its armed forces: the Yugoslav leadership was also anxious to
meet the demands of the Soviet leaders. They hoped that in return for their
loyalty and active part in creating the Information Bureau, Stalin would
accept Yugoslavia as “Number One” among the allies.

Hungary adhered to the Soviet security system and signed the
Hungarian-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.
The contracting parties pledged to provide for each other’s security and to
give mutual military assistance in case of military conflicts.⁴ The designat-
ed members of the delegation of the Hungarian government entered into
special negotiations with the Chief of the Soviet General Staff and dis-
cussed questions regarding the four-year plan for the development of the
Hungarian Army. These dealt with needs concerning arms and equipment,
the education and training of Hungarian officers in military academies in
the Soviet Union, the cession of Soviet licenses for the use of Hungarian
war industry, and the mission of Soviet consultants in Hungary.

The first group of Soviet consultants (eight men) arrived at the
Ministry of Home Defence on 1 October 1948. Their task was to prepare
the Hungarian Army for a third world war and to build up a mass army on
the basis of Soviet training principles. The development of the Hungarian
Army was a part of the Soviet military doctrine, which meant that they
were sure that the “West” would start a war in Autumn 1948. From this
time onward, the Soviet Union urged its allies to accelerate the develop-
ment of their armies in order to reach full military potential, great enough
to defeat any attacks from the Western countries—and from Yugoslavia
starting in the Autumn of 1949.

The Hungarian party leaders, after a number of modifications in the
program, would create a mass army strong enough to satisfy Soviet
demands. The effective force of the army was quintupled between the
beginning of 1949 and the end of 1952 (from 41,500 to 210,000 men) and
the number of officers increased tenfold (from 3,000 to 32,000). The order
of battle of the Hungarian Army was three rifle army corps and one mecha-
nized/motorized army corps; this meant 13 rifle and one armored divisions altogether. The artillery numbered three divisions and five brigades. Additionally, the forces were strengthened by seven independent regiments, eight independent battalions and other (ancillary) brigades. The anti-aircraft units (seven divisions) and the units of the air force (five air divisions and two air regiments) also belonged to the effective force of the army.5

Relying on operational plans agreed upon with the Soviet General Staff in 1950-51 concerning the organization of Hungary’s defense, the utmost attention was paid to Yugoslavia. It was supposed to be the direction from which “a direct attack was threatening in any minute”.6 The Hungarian General Staff considered two major possibilities of the military conflict; according to the first theory, if an attack developed from the West, Yugoslavia would probably attack from the South on her own; whereas the other thought was that the Western countries would use Yugoslavia as the means to unleash the Third World War. As stated by the evaluation of the General Staff in 1952,

The Imperialists along with Tito’s band are supposed to provoke a war against us and extend the war under the pretext of the assistance of Yugoslavia. If this be the case, we must reckon with the intervention of the English-American Imperialists in a very short time since the Imperialists are aware of the fact that Yugoslavia by herself is unable to wage war against the popular democratic block led by the Soviet Union.7

Hungary’s strategic position was considered of prime importance. Therefore, in case of an attack launched against Hungary, the strategic objectives of the enemy were supposed to run as follows:

a. Hungary’s territory would serve as a starting point to attack the Soviet Union directly;

b. A successful attack developed from the South or South-West against the country would provide an opportunity to cut the communication lines leading to Austria and turn the flank of the Soviet occupation army in Austria;

c. Along with the occupation of Hungary, it would be possible to drive a wedge into the Allies as well as to cut the communication lines between Czechoslovakia and Rumania and an attack against Czechoslovakia from the South could also be executed.

With respect to these facts, the organization of the defense of the country was strengthened in the South and South-West and at the same time the chance of a possible offensive from the West was also taken into consideration.

In order to repel the attack expected from the South and South-West against Hungary, two options were considered: a sudden, unexpected
offensive by the enemy or clear warning of attack preparations. In the former case the border-guard units would have been the first to join the combat and then alarm the so-called “full-force” refueled “A” units of the Hungarian Army including the air force as well. After the enemy broke through, the activated “A” divisions would occupy their positions determined and prepared beforehand. After this, the “B” units arranged in the first echelon would be mobilized too. The personnel and material resupply of these units would have taken about 4–5 days. After the concentration of troops, a counterblow would be executed to repel the attack of the enemy.

In the case of a warning of the offensive preparations of the enemy, the “A” units would occupy the positions established beforehand whereas the mechanized army corps would stand by for action in the area of Kecskemét or Székesfehérvár, depending on the direction of the attack.

Together with the elaboration of the organizational and operational plans, the principles of the military mobilization were worked out as well. The mobilization plan counted on the formation of two additional rifle and one mechanized army corps, and thus the military strength of the army would have been 435,000 men. Hungary planned to set up three armies in the case of war. Altogether 850,000 men could have been mobilized for the army, but, in case of emergency, it was possible to set up an army with one million men.8

Simultaneously with the development of a mass army, the formation of the management system of the Hungarian Army within the political establishment was also elaborated which was to stay in operation with some smaller modifications until the revolution in October 1956. The most characteristic feature of the system was that the supreme decision-making and executive power was exercised by exclusive bodies operating without legal authorization of the Communist Party (the Hungarian Workers’ Party—MDP) and whose names were changed periodically. Neither the legislative body (Parliament) nor the elected party organizations had any right of control.

As for military and home defense affairs, it was the MDP State Security Committee, founded in early September 1948, that played the primary role in decision-making and whose president was Mátyás Rákosi,9 the Chief Secretary of the Communist Party. All the decisions and commands of the committee concerning the army were executed by the Minister of Home Defense and the Chief of General Staff subordinated closely to the minister. With the help of advisory councils, the minister prepared suggestions necessary for the higher party leadership to take measures and work out its decisions. The Collegium of the Minister of Home Defense was established on 18 February 1949, and its members
were appointed by the minister. The Minister of Home Defense, Mihály Farkas\(^{10}\) defined its central objective as follows:

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\ldots \text{to make decisions in all the military matters of fundamental importance or present the more significant issues to the Party and discuss them there. Furthermore, if either the Party or the Collegium of the Minister of Home Defense has come to a decision, it has to execute it. It is to give a hearing to reports on certain labor branches and labor areas and address criticism to the work performed. The Collegium of Home Defense, therefore, is a permanent consultative, decision-making and controlling organ of the Minister of Home Defense.}\]

The majority of the collegium members were appointed by the minister with respect to their political reliability since most of them had no military qualifications at all.

As the communist dictatorship strengthened, the army and the leadership of the country took over the Committee of Home Defense, whose members were Mátyás Rákosi, Ernő Gerő\(^{12}\) and Mihály Farkas. The main aim of the committee was to coordinate far-reaching tasks. The Central Board of the MDP did not know about the formation and operation of this committee. In reality, this committee, which lacked legal full power or any control, was totally responsible for all the political, economic and military issues of the country. In accordance with the principles of the cult of personality, Rákosi was not only the wise leader of the Party and the People but also the Supreme Commander of the People’s Army.

The leadership for the war preparation of the country became the privilege of the Committee of Home Defense from the end of 1952 onward. No government or party ruling regarding its organization or competencies had been made; therefore, its position, role and legal status were clarified by neither the Party nor the State. The leader of the committee was always the president in power, its members were the Minister of Home Defense, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Chief of the General Staff and three members appointed by the Presidential Council (the successor organ of the republican presidential office).

The consultative organ of the Minister of Defense had also been changed. From August 1953 onward, its name became Military Council of Ministry of Home Defense.\(^{13}\) Its central role was the professional preparation of ministerial commands. Apart from this it had to present proposals concerning military subjects to both the Party and the government and it had to decide in any important issues like organizational, training, discipline questions, protective constructions, military engineering and appointments. The Military Council did not discuss operational and mobilization issues since the Committee of Home Defense was responsible for
these matters. The Military Council consisted of the president (the Minister of Home Defense) and eight full members, and it held sessions once per month. The Soviet professional consultants of the subject under discussion took part in the meetings of the council every time just like in the sessions of its predecessors, the Collegium.

Referring to the overall picture outlining the management and control of the army, the following summary can be drawn up. Creating the forms provided by constitutional law in the management and control system of the Hungarian Army did not succeed in preventing the development of a party-controlled army. After the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship (1948–1949), the supreme organs of the communist party that also made decisions in military affairs became the State Security Council, the Committees of Home Defense and then the Council of Home Defense. Their decisions were executed by the Minister of Home Defense. It was the Collegium and later the Military Council as consultative bodies that gave assistance to the Minister. It was an important feature of the system that Soviet consultants took part in the leadership of the army in an active way, which ensured the realization of the goals of the Soviet party leadership and general staff concerning Hungary. Because of this, it is not possible to talk about an independent Hungarian leadership of the army between 1948–1956.14

Apart from the higher leadership of the army, the Soviet consultants were present side-by-side with the Chief of General Staff, the branch commandants, the chief section heads of the Ministry of Home Defense, the section heads of the General Staff, the corps, the division, the brigade, and the independent regimental and the battalion commandants. As a consequence there were more than one hundred consultants acting in the Hungarian Army. Beside the army there were Soviet consultants in the war industry, too: they were present at most of the firms engaged in war production.

But the system of consultants was only “a slice of the cake.” One must not forget about the units of the Red Army, which were also present in the country and “defended the security” of Hungary. Their presence was sanctioned by the peace treaty of 10 February 1947 which authorized the Soviet Union to garrison troops in Hungary in order to maintain communications with Soviet forces in Austria. However, the strength and location of these units were not regulated by any conventions. On the basis of research, it seems probable that the aforementioned “communications” task was done by a mechanized/motorized rifle division of about 12,000 men with its headquarters located at Szombathely.

As a result of the disagreements with Yugoslavia and at the request of Mátýás Rákosi, Chief Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, a new
division was sent to Hungary in August 1949. The rifle, armored, and artillery regiments of the 15th Division (at a strength of about 11,000 men) were garrisoned mainly between the Rivers Danube and Tisza in the neighborhood of the Hungarian-Yugoslav border. From the beginning of the 1950s, in order to secure the supply lines of the “Central Army Group” in Austria, more and more military bases, refuelling stations, and ammunition depots were built. In addition to the ground forces, two divisions of the Soviet Air Force settled down in seven Hungarian airports.

The ratification of the Austrian peace treaty in May 1955 abolished the legal conditions for the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. However, the politicians thought the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 would solve this problem permanently. The air force, a rifle division, and a reconnaissance regiment, withdrawn from Austria, were fused with those already garrisoned in Hungary under the supervision of the commander of the Soviet Air Force. With the integration of the air and land forces, a Special Corps was formed in December 1955, subordinated directly to the General Staff in Moscow. Later in 1956 this Special Corps played an important role in the defeat of the Hungarian revolution.

The Hungarian public was not informed for decades about the actions or cost of the Soviet troops and consultants in Hungary. It was one of the most carefully kept secrets of the party leadership. All the measures and commands concerning this matter were considered strictly confidential and only a limited group of people had the right to look into these documents. For instance, interpreters were forbidden to make notes while they were working with Soviet troops and everything mentioned about joint conferences was ordered to be immediately forgotten.

Concerning the price of the consultants and the Soviet troops, two reports have been found so far and these reports make it possible to draw some conclusions regarding the size of the overall costs. The settlement of accounts of eight consultants who were the first to arrive (1 October–31 December 1948) is known, and it lists all the items that together amount to Ft 5,139,300. The building costs were the largest amount, about Ft 2.5 million. The list also contains the costs of 3–5 room flats, tennis courts, swimming pools, and gardens. The chief consultant’s salary reached Ft 5,000 per month, and it was complete with additional fringe benefits: 30 per cent was the cost-of-living allowance, Ft 1,000 was intended for clothes, and Ft 300 for food. Altogether the monthly income amounted to Ft 7,800. However, the consultants who had the rank of colonel were given just Ft 4,800 per month. Having arrived in Hungary, each consultant was paid an allowance for moving and the chief consultant was entitled to Ft 25,000 per year, the consultants Ft 15,000. Apart from this, a cost-free flat, car,
water, electricity and heating were at their disposal. As a comparison, at that time the Hungarian Minister of Home Defense was paid Ft 1,611 per month, whereas a university professor with high qualifications had a salary of Ft 1,250.

The first comprehensive report on the expenses of the Soviet troops in Hungary was submitted to the Minister of Home Defense in 22 May 1953 by the head of the military supply service. This report rendered an account of the expenses between 1949–1953. It is remarkable that he made a proposal regarding a governmental agreement since, according to contemporary phrasing, the supply of the “guest troops” was governed by no rule or regulation. According to comprehensive returns, Hungarians paid Ft 216 million for investments in buildings, Ft 72 million for maintenance costs (water, electricity, gas, rail and postal transportation, food, fruits, wine), Ft 18 million for bed, bedding, barracks, and furniture. All this amounted Ft 306 million.

Of this amount, the Soviet Central Army Group reimbursed Hungary Ft 35 million—therefore its debt ran Ft 271 million. Moreover, the report mentioned a 50 per cent allowance given for water, gas and electricity on the basis of the Hungarian charges. Certainly, the proposed inter-governmental agreement that would have regulated the presence, supply, and actions of the Soviet troops in Hungary was never concluded.

Although the consultative institution was changed in 1963, only its name was altered; its representatives became the delegates of the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Treaty in Hungary, and they continued their service until the elimination of the Warsaw Treaty.

The development of a mass army, the strong increase of war preparations, and the purchase of arms and equipment consumed an enormous sum of money. The country was able to pay it only by restricting domestic consumption, reducing living standards, and holding back other branches of the economy. The whole sum of defense expenditures was Ft 42.439 billion between 1950 and 1953 (US dollars 3.569 billion). This figure of about 43 billion was 13.9 per cent of the national income in 1950, 15.7 per cent in 1951, 25.5 per cent in 1952 and 24.3 per cent in 1953.

In spite of these enormous sums of money invested in the army, neither its arms and armament nor the qualifications of the officer corps were suitable for the requirements. Within the land forces the ratio of the rifle troops was the highest, to the detriment of the armored and artillery units; the air force was considerably smaller than the land forces. Moreover, there were serious problems with the aircraft provided by the Soviet Union, especially with the Yak–9, which as a result of improper storage after the war, were mostly unserviceable. The other and more modern
planes (MIG-15, Yak-11, Yak-18) had special problems, too: technical insufficiencies and the lack of spare parts caused permanent troubles.

The technical supply service also was far from being sufficient for the armored troops: the number of tanks/ armored fighting vehicles was only 55 per cent of the required stock.

Infantry weapons (rifles, submachine guns, light machine guns and machine guns) and field artillery (guns and howitzers) reached 100 per cent of the required stock although their ratio was very disadvantageous. Two-thirds of the weapons of the rifle troops, the "backbone" of the army, was the Russian M1896 magazine rifle. The greatest infirmity in the development of the army was the chronic lack of heavy arms and the low level of motorization.

The professional incompetency of "the officer corps of a new type" developed as a result of the rapid buildup of the army and became a serious problem as well. The strength of the officer corps increased tenfold in three years, which could be ensured only by sacrificing quality military education and reducing professional requirements to a minimal level. The 32,210-member officer corps of the mass army of 210,000 soldiers was characterized by the following features:

a. Political reliability seemed to be of first importance—70 per cent of the officers (22,457) belonged to the Communist Party and 22 per cent (7,166) were Young Communists; 100 per cent of the generals (26) and 83 per cent of the chief officers (1,460) had Communist Party cards. The majority of the non-party soldiers made up 8 per cent (2,561) of those who had lower military ranks.¹⁹

b. Low levels of education and general knowledge was another significant characteristic—60 per cent of the officer corps had between a 6th and 8th grade primary education, 35 per cent obtained secondary school qualification and 5 per cent had a degree; 31 per cent of the generals had completed the 6th grade in primary school, 54 per cent had some secondary education and 15 per cent had a degree, usually a B.Ed.

c. Incomplete and low military competence must be also pointed out as one of the features—32 percent of the higher leadership of the Hungarian Army, including the chief section heads, the section heads, the branch commanders and their deputy officers, had finished a higher level military course whereas the others had completed 1-3 month courses qualifying sub-department or regimental commandants or branch schools. Commanders including the corps, division, and brigade, i.e., the military leaders of higher ranks guiding military forces on the fronts, had slightly better military educations—58 percent had higher level experience of command whereas the rest (42 per cent) had finished courses qualifying as
regimental or battalion commanders or 1–3 month officer candidate schools. In military schooling, the circumstances seemed to be the worst in the case of company and battery commanders, since only 26 percent of them possessed the proper qualification. Only the platoon-commanders had solid military expertise—99 percent of them acquired the necessary knowledge in one- or two-year officer schools. Due to the strictest requirement, absolute political reliability, there were hardly any officers in the army who had started their careers in the former Hungarian Royal Army. In the beginning of 1953 there were 1,883 of these officers, which meant only 6 percent of the officer corps.

d. In establishing the officer corps, the higher party leadership intended to alter the class structure that had been characteristic until then. Developing the new officer corps from the urban industrial and agricultural workers was the ideal solution. However, needs quickly surpassed the supply. Therefore, apart from the soldiers of worker (32 percent) and of peasant (39 percent) origin, the following social classes were also allowed to join the officer corps: the so-called “employee” layers (17 percent), the lower middle-class (10 percent) and white collar (2 percent). Due to this political selection, the strength of officers from worker-peasant origins increased from the 5 percent (1949) to 91 percent (1953).

As an outcome of the accelerated buildup of the army, the officer corps was unable to fulfill its primary function, i.e., controlling and managing the army, although the Hungarian officer corps met the most important requirement dictated by the party leadership—political reliability and class origin.20

On the basis of the aforementioned facts, one can venture to remark that in case of a presumed third world war, taking the air power, nuclear weapons, firepower and mobility of the opposing forces into consideration, the Hungarian losses would have been extremely heavy. According to some preliminary calculations, Hungarian losses could have reached 41 percent of the mobilized army of 470,000 men, and this means about 200,000 dead.

In 1953, however, it was no longer possible to continue either the organizational or financial buildup of the army without jeopardizing the political system. Changes in the international situation also demanded modifications in the development. The Soviet Union started to consider cooperation, or at least a kind of co-existence, with the Western countries and Yugoslavia, and in this new situation Hungary’s stability became very important. This is why the alignment of Imre Nagy came into the political foreground. Imre Nagy insisted upon reducing the mass army and strived to form an army on a smaller footing and of moderate organization. By the
Summer of 1956, as a result of successive reorganizations, the strength of the Hungarian army was reduced from 210,000 to 130–140,000, or a reduction of approximately 30 percent. The number of officers was reduced to 26,231 from the former 33,184, a reduction of about 15 percent. The rate of discharges and pensioning was the quickest in 1955. The majority of officers were removed from the rifle, armored, and artillery troops.

The smaller and smaller peace time establishment of the army was in line with the real economic possibilities of the country and moderated her burdens. The firepower and striking power of the troops increased, and the degree of technical supply progressed. The organization of the army also became more homogeneous: the two rifle corps were composed of two rifle and one mechanized/motorized rifle divisions each. However, the order of battle remained unchanged, so the cadres became more or less nominal. This is why in the Summer 1956 there were no higher units to put into action without mobilization.21

The accelerated buildup of the army, forced by the Soviet Union, heavily overburdened the economy of Hungary and brought about the economic, social, and political tensions that ended with the 1956 revolution. The withdrawal from the Soviet alliance was one of the most important political aims of the revolution, but, as is well known, there were certain reasons which made it impossible at that time.

ENDNOTES

2. Honvéd (The Soldier), 1948, No 7, p. 56.
3. HL, A honvédskép felügyelőjének iratai (Papers of the Supervisor of the Army), Batch No. 4, Appendix No. 8, pp. 100–101.
5. HL 1956. Hadműveleti csoportfőnökég (Operational Staff). Box No. 7, p. 25.
6. HL, Honvéd Vezérkari Hadműveleti csoportfőnökég tájékoztató jelentése a Magyar Honvédésgről (An Information Report of Operational Staff of General Staff of the Army on the Hungarian Army), 1 January 1952, Box No. 102/05/153, pp. 1–2.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Mátéyás Rákosi (1892–1971): Communist politician. Between 1924–40 he was imprisoned for communist and illegal organizing action, then he emigrated to the Soviet Union. He became the Chief Secretary of the Communist Party [Hungarian Communist Party (MKP), Hungarian Workers’ Party (MDP)] after 1945. Keeping this office as well,
he was the Hungarian prime minister between 1952–53. In Hungary he was the central figure of the Stalinist dictatorship and violations of law. He was relieved of his office in the Summer of 1956. Until his death he lived in the Soviet Union.

10. Mihály Farkas (1904–1965): Communist politician. After 1945 he acted as the secretary of the Central Committee of MKP and MDP as well as deputy secretary-general. He was the Minister of Home Defense during the period of 1948–53 representing and serving Soviet interests. He was one of the initiators and the main leader of the unlawful suits within the army which resulted the executions of many generals. For this action he was expelled from the party and sent to prison for 16 years in 1957. In 1960 he was placed on probation and from that time on he worked as a literary adviser in a publishing house of the Party.

11. HL 102/05/1 pp. 1–8.
12. Imre Gero (1898–1980): Communist politician. During the 1930s he acted as an agent of the Communist International and the Soviet Security Service in France and in the Spanish civil war. After 1945 he became the central leader of Hungarian economic policy, deputy prime minister. After Rákosi’s dismissal he was the chief secretary of MDP from 17 July to 25 October 1956. He lived in the Soviet Union until 1960, then acted as a translator in Hungary until his death.

13. HL 102/05/1.
20. Imre Okváth,”The Hungarian Officer Corps During the Cold War,” Hadiőrőnömi Közlemények (Military History Review), Vol. 107, No. 4 (December 1994).
The Role of Poland in the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1981

Colonel Adam Marcinkowski

The involvement of Poland and many other countries in the Cold War politics of the Eastern Bloc resulted from a great variety of historical, ideological, political, and strategic factors which were beyond their control. In spite of its significant military contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany and despite the existence of the Polish government in exile in London, the Polish nation did not have a chance to make decisions concerning its future after World War II. On the contrary, the totalitarian political system imposed on the Polish society from the outside had nothing to do with its love of freedom and democratic traditions.

Resolutions that were adopted in 1945 in Yalta and Potsdam gave Stalin a de facto right to make decisions concerning Poland’s political system after the war and her place in the arena of international politics. The process of making Poland dependent on her eastern neighbor was initiated during the war, and it continued after World War II ended.

One of the factors that had a significant impact on this process was the political change that took place in the world after the war. Stalin skillfully took advantage of the new position of the Soviet Union as a member of the victorious coalition to strengthen its imperialistic control. As a result, a worldwide Communist system was created that included, besides the U.S.S.R. and China, countries or parts of countries occupied by the Soviet Army. It inspired and supported all pro-communist and anti-colonial movements.

The coalition of democratic nations headed by the United States, now covering a much smaller territory, was forced to face this new threat. Postwar cooperation within the Big Three became impossible, and the world entered a phase of confrontation between different political systems, at the basis of which lay the Marxist-Leninist theory of expansionism.

As a result of these external factors, Poland became a part of the Communist system and as such was drawn into the Cold War policy of the Communist Bloc.
The acquisition of Poland was very important to the Soviet Union because of her great potential in regard to population, raw materials, highway and railroad systems, manufacturing potential, military infrastructure, and mobilization capabilities. Another significant factor was Poland's geographic situation. From a strategic point of view, Poland occupies a very important spot in the middle of Europe which has been the focus of attention of various states and coalitions for centuries. The territory of Poland constitutes a natural bridge between Eastern and Western Europe, lies in the belt of great European plains stretching from the Pyrenees to the Ural Mountains, and has terrain suitable for army operations.

Therefore, the territory of Poland had a great strategic significance to the Soviet Union as a connection between its troops stationed in Germany and where its reserve forces, magazines, and fuel bases were located. With the creation of the Warsaw Pact, this region was especially important as a bridge between the first strategic group of the Unified Armed Forces and the consecutive groups and reserve forces situated in the European part of the Soviet Union. The territory of Poland played a very important role as an area where military operations were initiated, an area of transit for the military forces being sent into action and withdrawn, and as a support for the forces fighting on the external front.

The legal basis for Soviet control over the territory of Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe was created during the first post-war decade, when bilateral treaties of mutual aid and cooperation were signed. Poland entered into such a treaty with the U.S.S.R. on 21 April 1945. The treaties created a system of agreements binding the countries of that region on the "anyone with everyone" basis. Consequently, all parties were initially obligated to provide one another with military aid in the case of German aggression or that of a country allied with Germany. They were also obligated not to enter and participate in any alliance directed against the other party.

Later, however, as the confrontation between the political blocs was intensifying, *casus foederia* was broadened to include not only cases of German aggression but also the so-called "forces of imperialism and retaliation," which stood for the United States and its allies. Thus, the defensive anti-Nazi and anti-German nature of the bilateral treaties was modified to include "anti-imperialistic" alliances which were created not only to protect individual countries of the Soviet Bloc and their authorities but also to protect and expand Communism on a global scale.

The adoption of this interpretation coincided with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as plans made by the West to take advantage of
Germany's economic and military potential in its own interest. These events, which took place in the first half of the 1950s, set the general direction in the foreign policy of the Soviet Bloc countries for many years.

Poland suffered enormous losses during World War II, with more than 6 million of her inhabitants killed and 38% of the national resources destroyed. Consequently, all plans aimed at the remilitarization of Germany gave rise to alarm. They were subsequently publicized and one-sidedly commented upon by the official propaganda, thus creating a credible argument in favor of armament plans that were far beyond the economic capabilities of the nation weakened by the war.

However, it took some time before Poland was forced to put them into practice. In fact, right after the war, the Polish military force was reduced from 400,000 soldiers in May 1945 to 140,000 soldiers by the end of 1948. At the same time, peacetime structures of the armed forces were developed and military technology began to play a greater role. Additionally, 16,926 officers of the Red Army serving in the Polish military headquarters and detachments during and after the war were dismissed. They were replaced by POWs coming back to Poland or officers who had served in the Polish Armed Forces in the West. Despite all these changes, however, in the beginning of 1949 the Polish Armed Forces still included more than 400 high ranking Soviet generals and officers. They held key functions in the General Headquarters of the Polish Armed Forces and were in command of particular types of the armed forces and their divisions. In those rare cases where the commanders were Polish, their deputies were usually Russian. These positions taken by the Russian generals and officers in the structure of command of the Polish Armed Forces made it possible for the Red Army Headquarters to control and subordinate the Polish troops.

The turn of the '40's and '50's brought a radical change in Polish domestic and foreign policy. Politicians and Party activists closely associated with Władysław Gomułka, then leader of the Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers' Party, PZPR), were removed from power and the Soviet model became obligatory in all spheres of life. The new measures were implemented with all severity and thousands of people, including Gomułka, suffered as a result of Stalinist repressions.

The new Cold War oriented policy could not be without influence on the armed forces. In November 1949, the Minister of Defense, Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski and his First Deputy Minister, General Marian Spychalski, were removed from power and later arrested. The new Minister of Defense was a Russian marshal of Polish origin, Konstanty Rokossowski, who also became Deputy Prime Minister in the Polish gov-
ernment. As a result of the atmosphere of political hysteria created by the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party, the process of "cleansing" the officer corps began with the intention to remove all "antagonistic and foreign elements" that were "demoralized" and could not serve the cause of building socialism in Poland. Based on these "criteria," between 1949 and 1954 more than 9,000 professional officers were dismissed, all of them with connections to the prewar Polish armed forces, Polish Armed Forces in the West, or the Home Army (the Polish underground army associated with the emigré government in London). More than a 1,000 officers were sent to prison, show trials were organized against 135 of them, and 37 officers were sentenced to death after groundless accusations of conspiracy (21 sentences were carried out).

The new minister of defense soon brought to Poland an additional 13 generals and officers of the Red Army who replaced Polish officers on the highest levels of command. Simultaneously, the structure of the Polish Armed Forces and the function of their systems were reorganized to make them more compatible with Soviet military doctrine and strategy. This new staff policy was responsible for the introduction of new rules and regulations governing military service which were foreign to Polish tradition. It caused a reaction in the whole armed forces. Soldiers were clinging to Polish officers, preserving a distance between themselves and Russian officers. Polish officers kept their relations with their Russian superiors to the minimum. Passive resistance against the newcomers from the East was growing.

New plans to accelerate the development of the armed forces and military infrastructure were imposed on Poland and, consequently, had a disastrous effect on her economy. The armament expenditure increased with arithmetical progression and in certain years it was from two to six times higher than that initially adopted in the Six-Year Plan for economic development (1950–1956), and passed by the Seym (parliament) on 21 July 1950.\(^4\)

Rokossowski personally brought from Moscow plans for the development of Polish military potential and started their implementation at a rapid pace. Expenditures for the growth of the armed forces were four times higher than spending on national defense allowed by the Six-Year Plan. As a result, the Polish Armed Forces reached more than 420,000 soldiers in 1953. Economic barriers impeded further development of the manpower of the armed forces. However, the process of improvement continued with the perfection of organizational structures, modernization of weapons and equipment, and intensive combat training lasting more than six months a year.
The biggest quality changes occurred in the army and air force. The percentage share of the army in the armed forces decreased from 87 to 72 percent. Its striking power depended on the armored and mechanized forces. Between 1949 and 1952 the Soviet Union provided 570 tanks, 492 self-propelled guns, 808 cannon, 50 rocket launchers, 282 anti-aircraft guns, and 7,695 vehicles. The costs of acquiring this equipment became a heavy burden on the Polish budget. Only a portion of this amount was repaid by providing for the Soviet troops stationed in Poland.

By the end of 1940s, the Polish arms industry was beginning to be more involved in the production of armament for the Polish armed forces. That included the production of guns and munitions as well as heavy weapons and aircraft in increasing numbers. Utilizing Soviet technology, in 1951 Poland produced 50 artillery cannon, and in 1952 the production reached 611 cannon, 1,400 mortars and 225 anti-aircraft guns. In 1953 the production of the T–34 tank was started, and by 1955 the army received 1,115 tanks made in Poland.

Besides armored and mechanized forces, artillery was also strengthened, especially heavy anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. The corps of engineers was expanded and provided with modern equipment. Military communications were significantly developed, creating various wire and radio communications divisions.

Railroad and highway troops were created to secure the smooth transit of military forces utilizing the railroad and highway system. As far as the quartermaster corps are concerned, many new magazines, depots, and workshops were created. The number of military hospitals increased.

The army of 1955 was divided into five army corps and two armored corps. The first consisted of nine infantry divisions and three mechanized divisions. The two armored corps consisted of four armored and one mechanized divisions. Two divisions acted independently.

The first half of the 1950s saw a rapid development in the air force. Within a short period of time nine tactical air force units and four independent squadrons were created. They were gradually equipped with jet fighter planes. Between 1949 and 1952 more than 300 were purchased from the U.S.S.R. From 1952 until the end of 1955, the Polish arms industry provided the air force with a total of 602 MiG–15 airplanes. The ground-attack air force was equipped with the Il–10 piston-engined aircraft, whereas the bomb squadrons were gradually equipped with the Il–28 jets which had double the speed and range and its bomb carrying capacity was three times higher than that of the Pe–2 and Tu–2 planes, both still used by the air force at that time.

The networks of airfields, command systems, ground support and provision systems were developed accordingly.
The combat air force was divided into fighter corps and ground-attack corps, each consisting of three divisions. Additionally, one division of bomber aviation and three divisions of fighter aviation acted independently in the Obrona Powietrzna Kraju (National Air Defense, OPK) system.

In comparison to the rapid transformation that was taking place in the army and air force, the changes occurring in the navy seemed more modest. In 1954 Poland had two destroyers, three submarines, three escort vessels, 12 minesweepers, 13 motor gun boats, eight torpedo boats, and 21 landing ships and auxiliary vessels. The coast guard consisted of three anti-landing brigades, an improved system of coast artillery, and a more expanded navy air force. 10

Staffing needs of the rapidly developing Polish Armed Forces were satisfied by schools and courses for officers as well as by four military academies. In 1953 their attendance reached more than 16,000 cadets and officers. The majority of commanding officers in those schools were Russian. A considerable number of teachers were also Russian, especially in military academies and technical schools.

Further development and improvements in military technology were secured by institutes and research centers created for all types of military forces between 1949 and 1955.

The above paragraphs briefly describe the condition of the Polish Armed Forces at the time when the Warsaw Pact was created. As has been demonstrated, Poland’s contribution to this alliance was a strong military potential, second only to that of the U.S.S.R., which could be at least doubled in the case of a military conflict. It was made possible thanks to the well-trained reserves and mobilization capabilities of the state. Therefore, Poland’s significant role in the Warsaw Pact was determined not only by her strategic situation in Europe, but also by her high military potential, well-developed metal and arms industry, network of railroads and highways running east and west, system of airfields, magazines and military depots.

The political system in Poland, dominated by the Marxist-Leninist party, was well-developed and stable—at least officially. The Polish economy was connected to the economy of the Soviet Union, as it was dependent on Russian technology and raw materials (the U.S.S.R. supplied almost 100% of the oil and iron ore). Since 1949 Poland was also a member of the Moscow-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

Polish natural resources played a significant role in the general economic and military balance within the Warsaw Pact. Poland’s main natural resource is coal, which for many years has been her most important export
material. Poland is also one of the largest producers and exporters of copper, refined metals, lead and sulphur. Within the first postwar decade Poland managed to recover from the war damage and expanded her heavy industry, as well as engineering and chemical industries, and all this according to the doctrine of a war economy imposed on the country from the outside. Poland has always been self-sufficient with regard to the power engineering industry. As an agricultural as well as an industrial nation, Poland was a very important food producer for the Warsaw Pact.

As has been indicated, Poland was a country with a great economic potential. At that time Polish industry was capable of manufacturing ocean-going ships, airplanes, automobiles, tractors, railway engines and cars, all types of machine tools, construction and agricultural machines, as well as many other metal products and structures. The chemical industry was based on domestic and imported materials and included coking plants, refineries, sulfuric acid and other chemical production plants, fertilizer plants, and synthetic rubber, plastic and pharmaceutical plants. The Polish textile and garment industry has a long tradition and has always had great production capabilities. There were also new industries emerging, such as electronics, which had a great influence on the military potential of the country.

Based on these economic and industrial capabilities, the Polish arms industry was capable since the late 50's of supplying the Polish Armed Forces with basic armaments, such as ships, tanks, armored personnel carriers, vehicles, airplanes, helicopters, artillery equipment, guns, engineering equipment, electronic equipment, anti-aircraft defense equipment, munitions and various equipment used by quartermasters' corps. The production of this equipment was almost entirely launched with the help of Russian specialists and was based on Russian technology. However, with the development of science and technology, Polish scientific and engineering achievements became a bigger part of the production process.

Poland's contribution to the Warsaw Pact was her economic and military potential, second only to that of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Poland took second place in this alliance with regard to population, territory, natural resources, manufacturing potential and production as well as to manpower for the armed forces and its armament and mobilization capabilities. Because of the above factors, as well as her strategic situation in Europe, Poland was an object of particular interest to the Soviet Union.

The creation of the Warsaw Pact took place during the period of a reduced tension in international relations. Stalin had died and the Korean War had ended in an armistice in 1953. Europe, however, still remembered the victims of World War II and the damage caused by Nazi Germany and,
therefore, plans for the remilitarization of Germany caused alarm. It was an entirely objective phenomenon which had nothing in common with the ideological division of the European continent. It allowed the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland to convince Polish society to carry the burden resulting from heavy military spending. Simultaneously, Polish authorities stressed the importance of the political changes in Poland in protecting her borders. It was maintained that, thanks to socialism and for the first time in her history, Poland adjoined friendly nations that could guarantee the inviolability of her borders.

It was true from the point of view of the officially binding treaties. However, the fact that Poland was surrounded by other Communist nations was the main obstacle restricting the Polish aspirations for independence. It became clear in 1956 when, for the first time since the end of World War II, the Polish nation stood up for its right to freedom and decent living standards. The unrest that took place in Poznań was suppressed by the Polish militia and armed forces and accompanied by active movements of the Russian troops. It showed the tragic situation of the Polish people deprived of their democratic rights and governed by the Communist Party whose leadership had closer ties with Moscow than with its own nation.

The events in Poznań played a very important role in the international as well as domestic political situation. Together with the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and the Hungarian Revolution, they resulted in the softening of the policy of confrontation which characterized the Cold War policy of the Soviet Union and the whole Communist Bloc in international relations. They resulted also in changes in the leadership of the Polish United Workers’ Party, rejection of its dogmatic Stalinist policy, condemnation of the crimes committed under Stalin’s rule, relaxation of restrictions in domestic policy and adoption of a new course towards building socialism, i.e., the course that would include Polish traditions, cultural heritage, and the role of the Catholic Church in the social life of the country.

As a result of the events of 1956, Poland gained wider autonomy within the Soviet Bloc. Scientific and cultural life revived, the idea of forcing farmers into joining collective farms was abandoned, and private ownership was officially accepted with regard to manufacturing consumer goods and providing services.

Poland’s foreign policy was based on the idea of peaceful coexistence of the two political systems. With that in mind, Polish diplomats initiated efforts aimed at restoring good relations between Poland and other nations, especially the United States, France and Great Britain. The foundation of those efforts lay in the fact that any military conflict in Europe would put
Poland in danger, and the goal of Polish diplomacy was to create a consolidated system of security in Europe, disarmament, arms reduction and normalization of the relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

One of the most significant Polish initiatives was the so-called Rapacki Plan, submitted by the Polish government on 14 February 1958 and suggesting the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe which would include both German states, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The idea of a nuclear-free zone submitted by Poland was never put into practice in that part of Europe, but it generated interest among international public opinion and was eventually implemented in other parts of the world.

In 1954 the so-called Gomulka Plan was submitted. It provided for an arms freeze in Central Europe, but neither was this initiative put into practice. Still another Polish proposal ended in success. On 14 December 1964 during the session of the UN General Assembly, Poland submitted a proposal to organize a European conference on security and cooperation. It was finally signed in August 1975 in Helsinki, after eleven years of efforts and consultations. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe obligated all parties to respect one another's independence and sovereignty, develop cooperation among nations, and restrain from using military force.

After the period of "thaw" under Khrushchev, Poland's activities in the international arena came under the control of the governing bodies of the Warsaw Pact. The center for such consultations was the Advisory Political Committee. This practice was later strengthened by the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine." The final step of this process came in 1976 with the creation of a new body within the Warsaw Pact—the Foreign Ministers Committee—which, on the one hand, made it possible to coordinate activities in the international arena, but, on the other hand, severely limited any possibility of independent action among the Warsaw Pact members.

During the first years of the Warsaw Pact its military structures were not fully developed. This factor, as well as the relaxation in the Russian dictatorship and the new course adopted by the Polish authorities, further promoted the strengthening of the national character of the Polish Armed Forces and implementation of reforms.

Beginning in 1956 the atmosphere in the armed forces was clearly averse to the presence of Russian generals and officers. This pressure exerted by the lower ranks forced the new Party leadership headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka to dismiss Marshal Rokossowski from his position as Minister of Defense in November 1956. His Russian associates were also forced to leave the country. In 1957 there were 23 Russian generals and officers serving in the Polish Armed Forces, in 1958 this number
decreased to nine, and in 1959 there were only two Russian generals remaining, both having served in Poland since 1943.

In the wake of that transformation in the armed forces, a number of generals and officers, who were victims of repressions in the early 50s, were called upon. Among them was General Marian Spychalski, who became the next Minister of Defense. Under their leadership, the Polish Armed Forces began the process of defining basic principles of Poland’s defense policy and initiated a comprehensive reform of their organizational structures.

First, Poland reduced the number of soldiers by 200,000 to reduce the heavy financial burden imposed on the nation’s economy between 1955 and 1958. The organizational structure of the armed forces underwent a radical transformation. Those changes affected not only operational troops designated to act within the structures of the Warsaw Pact but also, first of all, the forces of territorial and civil defense which had been so far neglected. Informacja Wojskowa (Military Information), an institution responsible for violations of the law and terror in the armed forces, was dissolved, as it was acting more like a political police rather than conducting counterespionage.

The chain of command was simplified by removing a corps-level and dissolving a dozen tactical units. At all other levels efforts were initiated to create an optimal organizational structure, improve the system of command, modernize armament and equipment, and raise the level of education among the professional military personnel. Careful consideration given to the implementation of those reforms allowed Poland to avoid overburdening the state budget.

Polish military authorities made an attempt to gain further operational independence within the allied forces of the Warsaw Pact. The idea of the “Polish Front” reappeared in the early ‘60’s, and it allowed the Polish Armed Forces to act independently utilizing the total military power of their troops in a designated direction. In this way Poland wanted to avoid a separation of her troops and inclusion of particular operational and tactical units into Soviet forces. The idea of the “Polish Front” was accepted by the Soviet General Headquarters. According to their plans, Polish troops were to operate on the Northern flank of the Western Theater of Military Operations, along the Baltic Coast, heading towards the Jutland Peninsula. Their task was to cooperate with the Baltic Fleet of the Warsaw Pact in capturing Jutland and the Danish Straits.

This relative independence in controlling military forces gained by Poland between 1955 and 1965 allowed Poland to decide which of her troops were to be included in operational units and which of them were to stay in Poland defending her territory.
Poland was aware that in the case of a military conflict she would become a victim of a massive assault, including a possible nuclear attack. Therefore, it was essential to find ways of defending the nation against such a possibility and keep losses to the minimum. It was also necessary to design a way in which the state and national economy could function during a military conflict. With regard to these issues, Poland produced her own solutions. In 1959 the Komitet Obrony Kraju (Committee for the Nation’s Defense, KOK) was established as a collective body responsible for all defense issues. The Zarzad Obrony Terytorialnej Kraju (Territorial Defense Headquarters, ZOTK), established in 1959 as a part of the General Headquarters of the Polish Armed Forces, was then transformed into the Główny Inspektorat Obrony Terytorialnej (Chief Inspectorate for Territorial Defense), an independent entity within the structures of the Ministry of Defense. In 1962 it initiated the creation of provincial and local headquarters with the goal to prepare the Polish population, administrative bodies, and industry for self-defense in the event of a military conflict. All ministerial and local bodies were involved in the defense program.

However, the margin of freedom that Poland enjoyed still remained narrow. In the mid-1960s, for example, the commanders of the air force and air defenses submitted a proposal to the Soviet General Headquarters, and, when it was not accepted, both of them had to pay for their independence by early retirement from the service. It was possible for the Russians to impose such decisions on the Polish authorities practically anytime. Therefore, the Polish military reforms never went beyond the limits established by the leadership of the Warsaw Pact. Poland was still governed by the Polish United Workers’ Party and its leaders regarded close ideological ties with other parties and Communist nations to be of supreme importance. All bilateral and multilateral treaties signed by the government of the Polish People’s Republic were still binding. Even Gomulka himself, who initially demanded respect for the Polish national interest, gradually turned into a conservative Communist activist and easily came under the influence of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader.

The Polish military doctrine prepared for the first time in the mid-1960s left no doubt as to the role of Poland in the Communist Bloc. Its priority was a strong alliance with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Warsaw Pact. It accepted all principles of the military doctrine of the alliance, although in reality they belonged to Soviet military doctrine. Thus, Poland was drawn deeper into the Cold War policy of her eastern neighbor and, consequently, was forced to bear the costs of the policy of confrontation.12
This policy resulted in a series of international crises in the 1960s. In 1961 there was a confrontation between Soviet and American tanks in Berlin. In 1962 the world faced the possibility of a war caused by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Communist forces in Vietnam supported by the Kremlin forced the United States to engage its troops in that conflict. The war of 1967 in the Middle East and the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 also contributed to creating a tense atmosphere in international relations.

Under these circumstances, Moscow intensified pressure on the dependent nations to increase their military potentials. Poland was also forced to give in to those demands.

As a result of those Soviet instructions, in the late 1960s Poland’s military forces had at their disposal 362,000 soldiers. This number remained constant, with only minor changes, until the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. According to data from 1 July 1968, the operational forces consisted of 148,000 soldiers, and according to mobilization plans, this number could be increased to 400,000 in the event of war. The troops were equipped with 2,324 tanks, 2,325 armored personnel carriers, 48 missile launchers, 1,044 guns and mortars, 505 anti-tank guns, 74 anti-tank missiles, 529 anti-aircraft guns, six anti-aircraft missile launchers, 489 fighter planes, 123 helicopters, and 63 combat ships of different classes.\(^{13}\)

Territorial defense troops had more than 206,000 soldiers (464,000 in the event of war) and were equipped with 523 fighter planes, 183 anti-aircraft missile launchers, 442 anti-aircraft guns, 34 combat ships, and 14 auxiliary ships, as well as 50 coastal guns.\(^{14}\)

According to Warsaw Pact plans, the Polish Armed Forces were to operate utilizing three army units, one air force unit, and the navy. Within her operational troops Poland had fifteen divisions, ten of which were standing by ready for combat (five armored divisions, three mechanized divisions, one airborne division, and one amphibious assault division). There were also three brigades of operational and tactical missiles, three artillery brigades and a regiment, one missile regiment, and three anti-aircraft artillery regiments. The air force consisted of two fighter divisions, one fighter/ground-attack division, a bomber brigade, three reconnaissance regiments, two communications/sanitary regiments, and one transportation regiment. They were supplemented by numerous auxiliary forces.\(^{15}\)

The unified air defense system of the Warsaw Pact countries consisted also of the Polish territorial defense forces, i.e., the troops of the National Air Defense (OPK), including fighter planes, missile units, anti-aircraft artillery, and radar units.
Poland's contribution to the military potential was then considerable, and it kept growing in spite of the fact that the number of troops remained relatively unchanged. This was possible thanks to the modernization of armament and equipment as well as to the creation of optimal organizational structures and command systems.

The Polish Armed Forces, like other forces belonging to the alliance, were subordinated to the Soviet General Headquarters through the structure of command within the Warsaw Pact. For the insiders it was obvious that the Soviet headquarters were superior to the governing bodies of the alliance. Consequently, in the event of a military conflict, not only the army but also the air force, air defense, and navy would have operated under direct Soviet command. The only forces remaining under the command of the Polish headquarters would have been the troops of territorial defense.

That subordination was equally strong in peacetime, and it took place on different levels of bilateral relations, such as the constant influence exerted by the political and military bodies of the alliance. Poland, as well as other members of the Warsaw Pact, remained under the constant domination of Moscow, forced to choose interests of the Communist Bloc over their own national interests. Poland and her armed forces provided the Soviet Union with great support in its imperial pursuit of global power.

As a result of the tragic events in Budapest in 1956, Hungary was the first nation to discover the fact that the interests of Communism and the Soviet Union were always to dominate over interests of a nation. The people of Czechoslovakia also learned it the hard way. In both countries, brutal military interventions prevented political and social reforms supported by their citizens. Their basic right to make decisions concerning their own future was violated. At this point it has to be noted, not without sorrow, that the Polish Armed Forces participated in the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Their participation was not a result of any arrangements within the Warsaw Pact or any bilateral agreements, nor was it in accordance with the Polish national interest. The intervention was a result of the perfidious "Brezhnev Doctrine" which secured the imperialistic interests of the Soviet Union.

Poland's participation in the infamous intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrated also that Władysław Gomułka's political views had undergone a deep transformation, to the extent that towards the end of his rule he was the opposite of the Gomułka of 1955.

Polish authorities were forced actively to participate in Moscow's policy of confrontation between political systems. It included the duty to defend socialism anywhere if it seemed to be endangered. This applied not
only to Czechoslovakia but also to Poland's domestic situation. Since the
beginning, the Polish Armed Forces remained under the “special care” of
the Communist Party. Following Lenin’s idea of creating an armed forces
of a new type, the Party tried to penetrate everywhere into their structures.
It recommended politically reliable candidates for high-ranking positions
and actively conducted indoctrination of military personnel. Armed forces
were regarded as an instrument for use by the Party not only to defend the
country but also, and perhaps above all, to defend the so-called revolution­
ary achievements of the working masses.

Therefore, the functions of the armed forces acquired a political
dimension. The so-called external function was defined as a duty to
defend the socialist nation against external danger, which in practice
meant readiness to participate in the Soviet policy of expansionism. From
the beginning, this function was realized in connection with the Soviet
forces and other countries of the Warsaw Pact. The so-called internal func­
tion was described as involvement of the armed forces in political and
social issues of the country, which the Party determined.

According to the Communist leadership, the armed forces were not
only an institution strengthening the country’s political system and increas­
ing the number of its supporters, but also a weapon that could be used
against its enemies. The Armed forces were then supposed to protect the
Party against its own people, who were dissatisfied with the totalitarian
system and the constantly deteriorating prospects for national develop­
ment.

This interpretation of the role of military forces led to the tragic events
in Poznań (1956) and in Gdańsk (1970), where Polish troops were used in
the bloody suppression of social unrest, and was also responsible for the
subjugation of the whole nation in 1981. The troops were misused to pre­
serve the Party’s political monopoly and to suppress the aspirations of the
Polish people for sovereignty, democracy, and decent living standards.

Those actions, however, did not bring the desired effects and evoked
protests in society as well as military circles. They also strengthened the
animosity of Polish society against Communism, the Party, and institutions
which remained under its influence. With the decrease in popular support,
the Polish United Workers’ Party began to attach more significance to its
control of the security forces, legal system, mass media, state administra­
tive bodies, and armed forces. In the 1970s the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of Poland was modified by an amendment stating the superior
role of the Party in relation to the state and the obligation to maintain
friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The oath of the armed forces was
also changed to include their responsibility to defend the country’s politi­
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Some can still remember the words of General Jaruzelski: “We will defend socialism just like we would defend our country.”

In spite of this assurance and constitutional changes, Poland was gradually becoming an unreliable link within the Warsaw Pact system. The time of trial came in 1980–1981, when for the first time in the history of the Eastern Bloc, Polish workers won the right to form trade unions that were free and independent of the Party. Within a short period of time, “Solidarity” reached almost 10 million members. This and its initiatives to conduct radical, democratic reforms in Poland were interpreted as a serious threat not only to the leadership of the Polish United Workers’ Party but also, and even more so, to the Soviet Union and its imperialistic interests in this part of the world.

Currently, a discussion is being held in Poland about whether Poland had a chance to free herself from Russian dominance at that time. Opponents of General Jaruzelski accuse him of declaring war against his own nation. They maintain that the Soviet Union was too deeply involved in the war in Afghanistan to even consider a direct military intervention in Poland. General Jaruzelski insists, however, that the danger was real and the imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981 and dissolution of “Solidarity” conducted by the Polish forces were the lesser evils. His decisions protected Poland from a military intervention by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, and prevented heavy loss in human life. There is no doubt that a military intervention in Poland could have been easily prevented by the West. It seems, however, that the spirit of Yalta was still deeply rooted in the policy of the United States and its European allies.

The surrounding countries, as well as the Russian troops stationed on the territory of Poland, were ready to start a military intervention. Poland was a very important link in the military system of the Warsaw Pact and Russian leaders headed by Brezhnev could not afford to lose her. The plan of intervention was ready by the end of 1980.

On 1 December it was introduced to the representatives of the Polish Armed Forces in the General Headquarters of the Soviet Armed Forces in Moscow. Under the pretext of military exercises “Sojuz 80,” the following forces of the Warsaw Pact were going to be sent to Poland: three Soviet armies of fifteen divisions, one Czechoslovak army of two divisions, and one East German division. Their operations were to be supplemented by the sea blockade by the Baltic Fleet of the Soviet and East German navies.

Fortunately, the military intervention planned for December 1980 did not take place, thanks to the negotiations held in the Kremlin on 5
December 1980 between Stanislaw Kania (at that time First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party) and General Wojciech Jaruzelski and also because of the diplomatic intervention of the United States.

In the face of stern warnings directed to the Soviet Union from the West, Moscow decided that a military intervention could prove costly, and it was more convenient for the Soviet Union to have the Poles do the job, even if it required more time.

Preparations for the imposition of martial law in Poland began on 22 October 1980 and lasted for a year. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union tried to bring about the suppression of “Solidarity” by all possible means. Marshal Victor Kulikov was a regular guest in Warsaw, the number of delegations from the General Headquarters of the Soviet Army was considerably higher than normal, and there was no end to Soviet military exercises in Poland. Russian observers were introduced into the central institutions of the Ministry of Defense, military headquarters, and divisions. That proves that the Soviet Union was exerting pressure on the Polish authorities, but it also demonstrates how easily they succumbed to the Soviet dictatorship. However, above all, it also proves that in 1981 the Soviet Union was still able to influence events in Poland and prevent the implementation of democratic reforms.

Eventually, the way the “Polish rebellion” was suppressed turned out to be very advantageous for the Soviet Union. Poland remained a member of the Warsaw Pact and still followed its political guidelines. Her population, economy, and military potential were still an important factor in the Cold War confrontation between the Eastern Bloc and the West. The efficient way in which martial law was imposed by the Polish forces saved the U.S.S.R. from a direct military intervention in Poland. It also allowed the Soviet Union to maintain that the events in Poland were a domestic issue solved by lawful Polish authorities and according to the law of the country.

There is evidence that this course of events in Poland was welcome in the West. When a high-ranking officer of the General Headquarters involved in the preparations for martial law, Colonel Ryszard Kulkiński, defected in November 1981, the United States kept this fact a secret. That probably convinced General Jaruzelski that his was the right decision, as it would not draw the West into a dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The subjugation of the Polish nation in 1981 was the last “success” of the Brezhnev Doctrine. However, the Polish spirit of resistance against the Communist regime was not broken. It was also helpful in strengthening the resistance of other Warsaw Pact nations. With the passing of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, it was time to change the policy of the Soviet Union.
Union with regard to its allies as well as in the international arena. As a result, Poland and other countries of Eastern and Central Europe gained independence and a chance for free, democratic development. With the fall of Communism in those countries, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved.

Poland was an essential part of the Warsaw Pact throughout its existence, but it was also the country that caused the most problems for the Kremlin. The Polish nation never recognized the division of the postwar world approved in Yalta; it did not accept the Communist system; and it was not a willing participant in the Soviets' dangerous policy.

Today the expectations and aspirations of the Polish nation have been finally satisfied. Poland became an independent and democratic nation rebuilding its economy following the example of the West. The Polish people value all its achievements and remain determined to further develop and strengthen its accomplishments. Therefore, faced with the revival of imperialistic tendencies in Russia, Poland wants to protect herself by joining the political, economic and military structures of the West.

ENDNOTES

3. Ibid., p.121.
7. Ibid., p.61, 64.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
13. CAW, 1498/12, Meldunek szefa Zarządu Organizacyjnego Sztabu Generalnego o stanie sił zbrojnych na dzień 1.07.1968 r.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 36.
SECTION XIII

New Dimensions In The History Of The Cold War:
The Czech And Slovak Republics
Research of Cold War Military History in the Czech Republic: Its Present State and Perspectives

Dr. Jaroslav Hrbek

Cold War history in general and Cold War military history in particular are topics rather new in Czech historiography. In the recent past such topics were, of course, a part of politics and propaganda; as such they were not seriously researched by official Communist historiography. Historians working in dissent were, on the other hand, hardly permitted to work in the archives at all and records of the Cold War were naturally closed to them. Therefore, only a small group of historians working in exile could do any real research in the field of Cold War history and of contemporary Czech history in general as well (Vojtěch Mastný, Karel Kaplan, Vílem Prečan, to name some). The sources for Czech history in the period after 1945 were hardly accessible as far as archival collections were concerned, as a 50-year waiting period was strictly applied for most of the documents. Military records were subject to special measures for the sake of keeping secrets, which became an obsession for representatives of the Communist regime.

After the change of regime in 1989, many historians supposed that all the records of the former Communist regime would be opened for research, so that the public could see the evidence of the criminal character of the Communist rule. Those historians were of the opinion that the past regime had no moral right whatsoever to maintain protective periods and that the secrets of the old Warsaw Pact were no longer secret. One of the reasons for such a supposition was the fact that, after the unification of Germany, all the secrets which could be found in Czech records were already in the possession of Germany and, so they presumed, of NATO planners.

Such an opinion did not, however, prevail, and there was no opening of records at large in Czechoslovakia nor in the Czech Republic as well. There was even strong support for the idea of retaining the 50-year limit
for general access to the records. After much discussion this was changed, as you can see from the paper of my colleague, Dr. Pilat.

Most collections of military records are, of course, classified, and that poses as many problems as there are no binding rules of declassification. To declassify the documents is always the task of the agency where the documents originated, and for them, unfortunately, the simplest way is not to declassify the documents at all. Much, therefore, depends on the directors of individual archives, who are responsible for granting access into the files. Such procedures might prove an advantage as well as a disadvantage, as it is possible that you might get access to some documents of a military agency included in the 30-year period in one archive and not be permitted to work with much older files of the same agency in another one. There are also different grades of clearance for working in the current collections, but in general we may say that only army historians would get them. The conclusion we can draw from the above-mentioned facts is that in military archives you must never take the access for granted. You always have to make sure in advance, during negotiations with the responsible director, that you are actually given permission to work with those collections in which you are interested.

So much for the accessibility of military records and archives in general. Now let us go on to other questions. To assess the value of Czech or Czechoslovak military records for historical research of the Cold War, one must always bear in mind that Czechoslovakia was, in the period from 1948 to 1989, a puppet state, a satellite of the Soviet Union. Therefore the value of Czech records is limited and they cannot, even if everything would be accessible, provide answers to all the questions of the Cold War as it was waged from the East. For complete answers to crucial questions we must turn to Moscow, to the Russian archives.

Therefore, as far as such questions as strategic policies, alliance politics, decision-making, organization of the armed forces, doctrine, operations, tactics, etc., are concerned, in Czech military records one can find answers which concern only the Czechoslovak Army as an army of a satellite state, and even those answers would mirror the decisions made in Moscow. The Czechoslovak Army as an army of the Warsaw Pact was modeled on the Soviet Army. During the 40 years of the Cold War, its resemblance to the Soviet model of course varied, but in all the important issues its subordinate position was always clear. Czech military records are therefore significant only for the state of preparedness, level of training, personnel, equipment, organization, etc., of the Czechoslovak Army as a part, and I must stress that, of the Warsaw Pact. Only for such questions as these the can answers be found in the three
As far as political-military relations are concerned, the most important records are those of the Communist Party. In pre-1989 Czechoslovakia, as in all omnipotent Party states, all important decisions were made by the Central Committee of the Party or by its Politburo. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, in the period just before the party archives were taken into the care of the Central State Archive, where they are kept now, some of the Party records were “mysteriously” lost. And, of course, among them was the whole collection of documents of the 13th Department of the Central Committee, which was the one department dealing with security and military affairs. Investigation led nowhere, and today we have no knowledge of the whereabouts of the records. We do not even know if they were destroyed, are still on the territory of our state, or abroad. Why they are missing is obvious.

At present there is no official history, in any sense of the term, of the Cold War era written in our institute. The last two volumes of the six-volume official Military History of Czechoslovakia, dealing with the postwar era were not published, as they were written during the Communist regime and their value was rather limited because of their ideological bias. The idea of rewriting them was rejected, and now official histories are out of favor. Studies concentrate on individual topics, and there is still much research to be done before it will be possible even to discuss the idea of a general history of the Cold War era, one dealing with all aspects of the problem.

As far as histories of military units and agencies are concerned, there do exist some from the past, but there is too much ideological ballast in them and their value is limited. At best they can be taken as documents of the time of their origin. Unfortunately, almost no documents or interviews were collected or made at the unit level. Not even the memoirs of the highest commanders of the army were collected systematically.

The only theme involving a systematic collection of documents is the crisis of 1968. A government commission was set up in 1989, and much work was done. The documents comprise about 150,000 typewritten pages and include interviews with key persons still alive, including former Soviet representatives, both civilian and military. The documents are now in the possession of the Institute for Contemporary History of the Czech Academy in Prague. There is a project to publish an edition of the documents in several volumes. Military aspects of the Soviet invasion were already analyzed, and the results of the research were published in a number of studies; the military influence of the crisis on international affairs is
being researched at present. Many books and articles have been published, of course, of varied value and reliability, including scholarly works.

In the last four years, which have been the only period when serious research of Cold War problems was done, the efforts of the Historical Institute of the Czech Army (before 1993 the Historical Institute of the Czechoslovak Army) concentrated on various fields of history of the Czechoslovak Army in the last half-century. The most prominent were the topics of the destruction and repression of the old officers corps after the Communist Putsch in February 1948, including the show trials of officers and generals, the history of the penal units in the army of the 1950s, the position and role of the army and its officers in the crisis of 1968, and the planned actions of the army against the revolution in November 1989. Much work was done on the problems of Czechoslovak military aid to Israel in 1948, Czechoslovak participation in the Korean War, and Czechoslovak measures taken during the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. Work on some of the above-mentioned projects still continues.

Present research plans comprise Czechoslovak activities in the Armistice Commission in Korea, the forming of the Communist army at the beginning of the 1950s, then history of the Czechoslovak Army in the first stage of the Cold War, and the history of the army in 1945–48. Most of the projects include editions of basic documents.

The Cold War era is naturally the subject of research by other Czech institutions as well. Foremost among them are the Institute of Contemporary History of the Czech Academy, the Institute of International Politics of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University, and the Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the number of historians researching the problems of the Cold War in the Czech Republic is limited, the cooperation of various institutions is necessary.

The most crucial problems facing our Institute at present are, of course, financial. The most pressing is the lack of funds for research abroad. For example, it would be of paramount importance to study in Russian archives, which contain many records directly concerning Czechoslovak history, for example, the Czechoslovak Legions in Siberia during the Civil War in Russia, documents of the COMINTERN concerning Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, collections of documents concerning Czechoslovak soldiers and civilians in the Soviet Union during World War II, including the files of the NKVD, and naturally the files of Soviet decision-making bodies for the whole period of Communist rule. Because of shortage of funds, our possibilities of working Russian archives are limited, and copying of the records is practically impossible. To a lesser degree,
the same is true for other archives. Also the library of the Institute is in ter-
rible shape, as we cannot afford to buy even basic reference books.

In spite of limited resources, Czech military historians are pushing
forward the research of the Cold War era and are eager to open new fields
of research. They are prepared to cooperate, as far as it is possible for
them, in future international research projects regarding Cold War military
history and participate in the opening of new perspectives for international
research of the military records in both the West and the East.
The Military Occupation of Slovakia in August 1968 and Its Consequences

Major Miloslav Pučík

Developments following World War II were characterized by striking changes in the patterns of political power not only throughout the world but also in Europe. The power positions of the United States and the Soviet Union were characterized not only by basic adjustments but also by their mutual endeavors to push into the power vacuum that developed in Europe after the war.

The Soviet Union rather strangely interpreted the growing influence of the United States in Europe, which it considered to be its sphere of interest, to be a threat to its own power position. Later, the Soviet Union and the United States went through a strikingly different transformation process as they assumed the roles of superpowers.

During the postwar years, the huge number of soldiers, weapons, and combat equipment positioned in Europe constantly increased the potential for military conflict. Current studies are certain that the strategic force distribution of the first echelons of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, as well as the territorial conditions for effective defense with regard to their necessary commitments, were unfavorable for NATO.

The NATO forces were subdivided into three operational sectors—"Northern Europe," "Central Europe," and "Southern Europe"—according to the military strategy of a united defense against the Warsaw Pact. Theoretically, the "Central Europe" operational sector constituted an important geo-strategic area in which the anticipated "aggressive strike against the countries of the socialist bloc was to be carried out in part."

Czechoslovakia was in this geopolitically and geo-strategically important area, in the buffer zone between two blocs, through which ran the main axis of any major operation. Slovakia held a strategically important position along the line of contact with the potential NATO enemy. This
line, which was called the main defense line, began in the northwest with
the so-called East German defense line, ran through the territory of
Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, and continued in the southeast with the
so-called Hungarian defense line.

From the viewpoint of Slovakia, Bohemia, and Moravia, there was no
obvious strategic military axis that ran through their territory in spite of
the Warsaw Pact’s constant preparation for war and of Czechoslovakia’s
location in the middle of the potential European theater of war. The geo­
strategic significance of its location was that this territory both separated
and yet connected the European strategic axes in the north and south
strategic directions through the so-called Moravian Gate.3

The control of the Czechoslovak territory facilitated a looser and more
flexible style of maneuvering along the main strategic directions. In con­
trast to Czechoslovakia, the Czech Lands (Bohemia and Moravia) found
itself located in the area of the strategic-operational direction of Prague-
Nürnberg-Strasbourg-Dijon and vice-versa. According to military defense­
oriented thinking, the situation of Czechoslovakia was unfavorable
because the theoretical value of its defense was diminished by the state’s
length (475 miles east-west) as a whole and by the total length of its
boundaries with the neighboring countries.3

From the geo-strategic viewpoint, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
had been separated into two relatively independent parts by the military
strategists of the unified command of the Warsaw Pact: the Czech-
Moravian and the Slovak geo-strategic areas. The two areas were connect­
ed by the Zahorie. That area is a part of the so-called Carpathian arc. In
some approaches, the “Zahorie” area was taken out of the Slovak area and,
for strategic reasons, was integrated into the Czech-Moravian area. The
Czech-Moravian geo-strategic area was considered difficult to defend
because it created favorable geographic conditions for mounting vast mili­
tary operations.

Looking at it in geographic terms—where the configuration of the ter­
rain plays a large role—the Slovak geo-strategic area was considered to be
more effectively defensible. In this area, the military strategists ruled out the
idea of conducting comprehensive ground or air operations. The military­
strategic studies at that time recommended parts of central and eastern
Slovakia as optimum areas. In general, parts of southwestern, southern, and
eastern Slovakia were considered to be the most vulnerable sectors. At the
time Czechoslovakia was fully integrated into the so-called East Bloc, so
“the attack of the NATO troops” was actually expected. This is why most of
the military strength was concentrated along the western and southwestern
boundaries that came into contact with the “imperialist world.” With a total
strengthening of fifteen divisions, the Czechoslovak People's Army (Československá Lidová Armáda, CSLA) could mount military operations in its territory. Indeed, more than 80% of its manpower, weapons, and combat equipment was deployed in the vicinity of the imaginary dividing line.

The decade-long effort to build up the army as a front line force for the first echelon of the Warsaw Pact troops showed that there was no real Czechoslovak government military doctrine and that the questions of deployment, organization, equipment, training, etc., were subordinated to the interest of the bloc, that is to say, to Soviet interests. Under pressure from the leaders of the Soviet satellites, Czechoslovakia maintained the maximum level of military manpower per inhabitant. Because of its strategic location and integration into the Warsaw Pact, the army was deliberately and systematically prepared for an invasion from the west in the context of “NATO aggression” and to counterattack such an invasion with a thrust to the west.

During the 1960s, the military concept of the Warsaw Pact was based on the idea that it would be possible to employ several tank armies quickly and offensively and that they would be deployed for operations to the West. The main effort in staging the planned operations was to lie in the “Central European” area and particularly in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The operation was planned in three simultaneous phases. The location of Czechoslovakia remained the priority consideration when it came to the calculations of Soviet political and military strategists. Soviet leaders had been trying since the beginning of the 1960s to station a part of the Soviet troops in Eastern Europe in Czechoslovakia. Later, they exerted powerful pressure to obtain this goal. They first wanted to station special units employed in secret and secure radio communications and later ground forces.

The strategic exercises of the Warsaw Pact armies that were conducted during the 1960s reflected the military strategy of the Soviet Union that had remained largely unchanged, in its basic principles, since the end of World War II. As a result of the work done by the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Soviet Union’s military strategy was gradually modified and improved starting in the middle of the 1950s. Basically, the idea was to mount a nuclear strike at the right time during the operations in cooperation with the offensive operations that were derived from the general experiences of the Soviet troops during World War II.

The gigantic maneuvers of the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact, under code names “OCTOBER STORM” (1965) and “MOLDAU” (1966), were similar in regard to the tactics employed. The Soviet political and military circles were of the opinion that it would be possible to deploy the units of the so-called northern zone in northern and central Europe, or at least
select non-specifically designated troops, in cooperation with the Soviet Union so that they could mount an offensive and also be ready for planned defensive operations against NATO. The model situation of the “OCTOBER STORM” exercise was an expression of the ideas held at that time by the Soviet military strategists and the representatives of Soviet military science regarding model exercises and coping with a flexible counter-strike for the so-called nuclear pause.\(^9\) To put together modeling situations and prepare theoretical studies in the future, it was necessary to have reliable, non-Soviet military structures belonging to the satellites of the East Bloc in the area of the anticipated front. The strategic plans worked out by the Soviet General Staff assigned to the Czechoslovak People’s Army the mission of absorbing the anticipated first strike by selected NATO troops and simultaneously insuring support, cooperation, and the employment of additional operational-strategic echelons of the Soviet troops.\(^9\)

These maneuver exercises demonstrated not only the troop strength of the Soviet Union and its satellites but also the basic change in Soviet military concepts with respect to the so-called western wing of their sphere of interest. The combination of Soviet foreign policy with Soviet troop strength was expressed by the Brezhnev Doctrine of “limited sovereignty.”

On the basis of the doctrinal decisions at that time as well as the strategic-operational mission of the army, the command of the Czechoslovak People’s Army decided to take extraordinarily comprehensive and economically demanding redeployment and reorganization measures.\(^10\) By the end of the first half of the 1960s, these measures involved ninety units and installations of the First Army, the Fourth Army, the Second Defense District, the Seventh Army of the country’s air defense, and the air defense army.\(^11\)

In terms of deployment, the armored infantry and tank divisions were distributed over the entire territory of Czechoslovakia in a rather uniform fashion during the time prior to the intervention of troops from the Warsaw Pact in August 1968. In connection with bloc doctrine, the maximum concentration was placed along the border with the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria. This involved a troop strength of nine divisions, including five motorized rifle and four tank divisions. One tank division was stationed on the territory of Slovakia. This division was organized in 1966 after the reorganization of a motorized rifle division.\(^12\)

The Eastern Defense District underwent a specific development in the context of the Czechoslovak People’s Army. In September 1965, it was assembled from the previously existing Second Defense District.\(^13\) According to information dating back to 1 October 1950, the district had a strength of six infantry divisions. The army corps was dissolved in the reorganization in 1958, and only one division remained in Czechoslovakia.
Conditions in the Eastern Defense District also reflected redeployment and reorganization changes made within the Czechoslovak People’s Army. There were essential changes during the reorganization in the middle of the 1960s. A striking reduction in the duty establishment of the command of the Eastern Defense District and of peacetime personnel strength of its major and minor units forced the district command to submit many requests. The National Defense Ministry rejected the demands of the command of the Eastern Defense District to increase the peacetime active duty strength arguing that “the justified requests of the command of the Eastern Defense District” could not be implemented because that would exceed the planned strength of the army by about 4,000 to 5,000 personnel. In connection with the requests that increased the number of officers in the Eastern Defense District, the appropriate agencies of the particular section in the defense ministry adopted a rather negative attitude. They argued that the military school system could not handle the personnel increase, the number of officers would rise very much compared to some of the armies of the Warsaw Pact, and that the number of enlisted personnel, according to figures at that time, was “already at the very limit of what was possible in Czechoslovakia.” Finally, the reorganization process, the attendant inactivation of some divisions and units, and the partial redeployment of divisions and units to the territory of Bohemia and Moravia meant that the Eastern Defense District was fundamentally reorganized. It became an agency of territorial defense to be operational on the territory of Slovakia and the northern Moravian section.

Four sections were integrated into the territory of the Eastern Defense District, representing 60,074 square kilometers, in other words, 46% of the surface of the national territory with 6,035,135 inhabitants, or more than 40% of Czechoslovakia’s population. For example, the data as of 23 July 1968 confirm that a total of 9,259 enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers, and officers and generals were on duty in the Eastern Defense District. The required combat equipment strength—1,059 tanks and 899 armored personnel carriers—was not achieved in reality. The defense district had 935 tanks (32 T-54s, 734 T-34s, 169 SD-100s) and 378 miscellaneous types armored personnel carriers.

Only one tank division was stationed in Slovakia, and it resulted from the reorganization of the motorized rifle division. Looking at its development, one can document the demanding process which the entire Eastern Defense District went through. The renewed reorganization in October 1965 meant above all a rather essential reduction in the enlisted and non-commissioned officer personnel strength from 2,031 to 780, plus a reduction in the number of ensigns and officers from 815 to 445. The combat
equipment inventory grew so that the division had 2.1 tanks per tank driver, and 32 armored personnel carriers per armored personnel carrier driver (all armored personnel carrier drivers were concentrated in one tank regiment). Moreover, 9.3 automotive vehicles were available for every wheeled-vehicle driver.18

A major adjustment in peacetime strength requirements did not come until 1966–1967. The number of enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers was then increased by 333, and the number of ensigns and officers was increased by 120. The division became the logistics and training base, holding a certain special position in the context of the Czechoslovak People's Army. The division at the same time carried out extraordinarily demanding mobilization tasks. As part of reserve training, it carried out reserve exercises for two divisions each year. During 1967, the largest number of command exercises, and tactical exercises, and so-called war games in the Czechoslovak People's Army was planned and carried out for the division. Underscoring the rather heavy exercise load was the fact that 757 pieces of equipment recorded a total mileage of 3,221,500 km.19

The army establishment was highly sensitive to domestic political developments and reacted specifically to their dynamics. The policies of the Novotný leadership and some of his supporters failed. Changes in the leadership were a consequence of the crisis in the prevailing ideology that encompassed all segments of development, the ever more serious problems of an economic and national character, and the power struggle in the decisive centers of influence. These factors and others determined domestic political developments and, during the first third of 1968, they accelerated so that the conservative groups of the heterogenous satellite power centers, the so-called East Bloc, were shocked.

The speed and depth of social change in Czechoslovakia triggered attempts in the power centers of the Warsaw Pact states to exercise various kinds of economic, political, psychological, and even military pressures. These alternatives were often combined, and they exercised permanent and heavy pressure on the official Czechoslovak power organs. The rather long-standing indecision of the advocates of the so-called “hard line” course against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic led to the rise of heterogenous or homogenous coalitions—that were limited in terms of time and purpose—not only in the Soviet power center and in the East Bloc, but also in the heterogenous opposition against Novotný. After the fall of Novotný and his group, the opposition, which had been formed specifically to work against Novotný, fell apart rather quickly into various groupings, blocs, or coalitions. These groupings differed from each other internally and arose and then fell apart with the depths and dynamics of the
Czechoslovak problem. The pressure of blocs, groupings, and coalitions that were inclined toward the extreme variant, that is to say, military intervention, gradually grew stronger.

After January, the continuing political changes raised a series of problems that previously had been taboo and unsolved. These developments were also reflected positively in the army's organization and created an opportunity to solve the problems. A stream of criticism was aimed at the army top leadership; exposed the conditions in the defense ministry; offered room for discussions about the basic concepts of army build-up, the absence of and the need to draft a Czechoslovak state military doctrine, the position and function of the army in society, and about the Slovak question in the Czechoslovak People's Army, and so on. The process of drafting the "action program of the Czechoslovak People's Army" in its final version offered possibilities for solving many problems in the army.

The high command of the Eastern Defense Sector, which was preparing the objections to the submitted "draft of the action program of the Czechoslovak People's Army" for the Eastern Defense District as a whole, proposed that the entire deployment of the Army be reassessed. The Eastern Defense District was to include Moravia and Silesia. This deployment would vary the maximum numbers of draftees from Slovakia who would then serve with the units in Slovakia.

The military council of the Eastern Defense District, in its comments of 23 March 1968, demanded that the roughly 70 kilometer-long sector of the district's southwestern boundary be covered by one motorized rifle division. At that time, the district had one armored division, two motorized brigades, two tank base facilities, one artillery installation, and also communications, operations, anti-tank, radiation, medical, and engineer units plus some other installations. The division was also to have sufficient artillery fire power and a detachment of R.60 tactical missiles. As part of the re-evaluation of the deployment of the Czechoslovak People's Army, the district's military council suggested that two major units be set up in Slovakia, including one training unit for service preparation, specifically in the garrisons nearest to the military exercise area. Another major unit and a tank base facility were planned for Moravia. Overall, three armies were to be organized so that optimum conditions were to be created for "Slovak national units."20

The increasing general social problems and the efforts to solve them triggered varying reactions from the top leadership of the individual satellites of the East Bloc. Room was gradually created for the solution of the so-called Czechoslovak problem, that is to say, military intervention. This resulted from crude pressure applied against the delegation of the Czechoslovak Communist Party during the negotiations with the leader-
ship of the Soviet Communist Party on 4 May 1968 in Moscow, the Moscow conference on 8 May 1968, and the so-called Dresden meeting in March 1968. These negotiations did not yield any final decision on the Czechoslovak problems, but they signalled a new trend in the formation of pro-intervention coalitions and blocs. The ratio of forces in the power centers changed strikingly in favor of intervention.

Both society and the army went through a dynamic polarization process. Following the conference of Communist Party’s county and district secretaries on 12 May 1968, there was a gradual change among some of the leading party functionaries toward the so-called conservative wing in the Party’s leadership. This change and the attendant movement is often referred to in a rather simplified fashion as the movement from “Dubček to Bílak.”

In the army, even after the May session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, work was continued on the actual program of the Czechoslovak People’s Army and on the draft of the reform of the political system. Czechoslovak state military doctrine was also clarified.

This above-mentioned movement disturbed the “Bohemian Forest” unit exercise that was to supply convincing proof that the Czechoslovak People’s Army was not in a position to carry out its operational-strategic assignment and that it did not guarantee the security of the portion of the western boundary of the East Bloc. It was expected that the leadership of the Czechoslovak People’s Army would arrive at the conclusion that there was a need for intra-bloc military coordination. In the end, that meant that mutual military assistance, “the assistance” of the troops of the Warsaw treaty, was expected.

The “Bohemian Forest” command post exercise was preceded in May by a considerable gathering of unexpected Soviet military “visitors,” and was held on the territory of the western Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. According to Defense Minister M. Dzur’s report, the exercise was carried out by two fronts (army groups). The leadership and the Czechoslovak People’s Army were integrated into one front. In spite of its proclaimed character, the exercise involved the participation of a comparatively large number of units, about two divisions, of which 2/3 were Soviet personnel. From the Eastern Defense District, a portion of the supply units with staff officers also participated, headed by the commanding general of the Eastern Defense Sector, General J. Valčík.

The first Soviet units of the 38th Army Corps entered Slovakia during the last days of May. Additional groups of Soviet officers and enlisted men came during June. Soviet officers, who had been organized for several dozen “visits” in the civilian sector, reconnoitered the domestic political situation
among some major units in the Eastern Defense District by intensively gathering information. One of these “visits” was conducted at the end of the official deadline of the unit exercise (20–30 June 1968) by the Supreme Commander of the Armies of the Warsaw Pact and the director of the exercise, Marshal Yakubovskiy, with his staff. In Bratislava, he conducted negotiations within the Slovak National Council with O. Klokoč and in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia with V. Bilák.

Official analyses and assessments of the exercise cast doubt upon the previously drafted political decision that the Czechoslovak People’s Army was not in a position to accomplish its assignments in such an important and strategically exposed area. In connection with the “Bohemian Forest” exercise, one often finds the view that this involved the organization of a general practice session for military intervention in August. The historian A. Benčík mentions that this realization “... was developed not only by our spies but also by West German and French spies, gradually, among other things, on the basis of a knowledge of the development that followed during the days of August.”

Military intervention was prepared as one of the alternate solutions, along with a political alternative. The summer months were marked by an increase and gradual completion of preparations and operations plans for individual military groupings that were already stationed in the states bordering directly on Czechoslovakia. At the same time, logistics units and installations that carried out various mobilization measures were exercising as part of the “NEMEN” exercise in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Latvia, and gradually also in Poland and the German Democratic Republic. A considerable military force was concentrated as a result of partial mobilization in those portions of the German Democratic Republic that bordered on Czechoslovakia and as part of the “Bratislava” exercise.

Remnants of Soviet units left Slovakia during the course of the Bratislava conference. The Bratislava session did not yet signify a final decision to solve the Czechoslovak problem. Instead, it was one of the attempts at a political alternative. As J. Valenta states, some of the official agencies of the NATO member states believed that the military alternative was unlikely at that particular time, although they did not rule it out completely.

Operations orders for individual army groupings in the assembly areas had already been approved immediately after the end of the practice session. After lengthy postponements Soviet military units remained throughout Czechoslovakia, and even after their departure, they stayed in the border regions that were used as assembly areas for the three army groups.

The authors of military intervention planned to use units from the Southern Group of Soviet Forces in the southern assembly area in
For ground forces, they had the following Soviet divisions: 93rd, 254th, and 48th Motorized Rifle Divisions, the latter from the Odessa Military District; the 13th Guards Tank Division; and Soviet special, logistic, and technical units. As for the Hungarian forces, the high command designated the 8th Motorized Rifle Division, supplemented by the 31st Tank Regiment from the 11th Tank Division (Rötség) and the 22d Artillery Regiment (Cegléd). The air units were as follows: 11th Guards Fighter Division, 1st Fighter-Bomber Wing, 727th Guards Bomber Wing, and other Soviet special and supply units that were supplemented with some Hungarian air units. The 103rd Guards Airborne Division was also assigned in the course of the intervention.

Following the agreement, Generals Ferenc Szücs, Gyula Reményi, and József Kálazi participated on the Hungarian side in the planning process and other preparations that were under way in the high command of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces. The plan envisioned various ways of crossing the Danube using the existing bridges; if the bridges were destroyed, the idea was to force the river crossing. Initial considerations called for using the Hungarian division in the first echelon, specifically in the area northeast of the Danube River.

The 8th Motorized Rifle Division, which had been designated for the operation, was put under the headquarters of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces. Its peacetime deployment area was in the southwestern Hungary (Zalaegerszeg-Nagykanizsa-Nagyatád) along the border with Yugoslavia. In his study, the historian Iván Pataky states that it is not known why that division was picked for the invasion. I assume that the 8th Division was made available to Army Group C of the invasion forces on the basis of the following factors:

1. The Hungarian People’s Army had not participated in any joint exercises since the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, that is, exercises that were carried out in Czechoslovakia. Hungarian units from the above mentioned divisions cooperated for the first time on Slovak territory only within the context of the “Moldau” exercise in 1966.

2. From the readiness viewpoint, the division as a whole got high marks and was one of the best in the Hungarian Army. The actual personnel level compared to the required personnel level was around 40% to 100% prior to the mobilization of the individual units.

3. They had modern weapons and combat equipment. New type tanks had replaced the old T-34s during the 1960s. Prior to the invasion, the tank units had modern T-54 tanks and the 31st Tank Regiment from Rötság even had T-55s.
The military occupation of Slovakia in August 1968

With a sufficient lead time before the final intervention deadline, the 8th Motorized Rifle Division was moved into the assembly areas that were located mostly in the Nógrád district. The assembly areas were deliberately selected outside populated regions and were determined by security and secrecy criteria. The assembly area of the division, apart from the 31st Tank Regiment, which was quartered in the Rötság-Boros-berény area, to the west of Terekeske, and the 14th Anti-Aircraft unit at Nagyçoszi, was north of Gödöllő-Aszód-Hatvan and west of Pásztó-Acsa. This area was strictly guarded by special units of the Ministry of Interior and some of the division’s own detachments. Here is what Ivan Pataky writes verbatim; “...Isolation from the outside world...” The division’s combat strength grew to a total of 10,372 personnel, 242 tanks and various types of armored personnel carriers, and 205 artillery pieces as a result of the mobilization of the subordinate divisional units. Air units, concentrated at the air bases of Tászár, Pápa and Kecskemét, provided air cover for the division.

Some matters were straightened out according to the prepared plans and their final version approved at division headquarters on 3 August 1968. In contrast to the planned employment, the division was to operate as a second-echelon to occupy Slovak territory covering about 10,000 square kilometers. A large percentage of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia were living in the designated area, and no major combat elements of the Czechoslovak People’s Army were deployed there. Thus, the plan figured on a rapid occupation of the region and takeover of the public administration with support of the Hungarian minority.

Although some representatives of the Hungarian People’s Army’s General Staff and the headquarters of the Fifth Hungarian Army (Székesfehérvár) did participate in the preparatory planning process in the high command of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces, they did not have any precise information about the overall deployment of the units and installations of the Czechoslovak People’s Army in Slovakia. They only knew in general about the combat strength of the military units of the Czechoslovak People’s Army that were located in the designated directions of the planned advance. They were also continuously flooded with misinformation about domestic and political developments that was based on information from the consulate-general of the Hungarian People’s Republic in Bratislava and other information sources.

As developments became more radicalized, the deployment and various material and technical measures were completed for armed military intervention in Czechoslovakia. A mechanism with broad consequences, which was difficult to anticipate, was now set in motion when General Shitemenko became Supreme Commander of the headquarters of the com-
combined units of the Warsaw Pact, General Pavlovskiy was designated commanding general of the intervention forces, and when a political decision was made to adopt the military solution to the Czechoslovak problem.

The intervention forces were concentrated on 18–19 August 1968 in three groups in assembly areas in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, and in the western Ukraine. This huge military force consisted of 165,000 troops, 4,600 tanks, and 700 aircraft.\(^\text{36}\)

The military occupation of Czechoslovakia was carried out by the following:

1. Army Group A, consisting of Soviet and Polish troops, launched the invasion from the area of Legnice-Krakow and advanced toward northern Moravia and northwestern Bohemia. Some of the units continued to advance through the so-called Moravian gate and entered Slovakia in the area of Žilina.

2. Army Group B, consisting of Soviet and East German troops, advanced from the area of Görlitz, Zittau, Dresden in the direction toward Prague and Klatovy.

3. Army Group C, made up of Soviet, Hungarian, and Bulgarian soldiers, advanced in several direction of Trenčín, Banská Bystrica, Košice, Prešov and Michalovce. The main direction of advance was designated as the direction from Győr to Bratislava and farther on, through southern Moravia, into the area of Klatovy. As a result of this maneuver, the southwestern border with Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany was blocked by units of Army Groups A, B, and C.\(^\text{37}\)

The units of the Hungarian People’s Army were included in Army Group C. The Hungarian 8th Motorized Rifle Division, that had been called up, was placed directly under General K.I. Provalov, the commanding general of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces. The occupation plan had two versions—one to respond to any armed resistance from the Czechoslovak People’s Army and the second in case there was no resistance. In that case, the 8th Division was placed outside the main advance and ordered to occupy and control a part of the territory consisting of the counties of Topolčany, Trenčín, Trnava, Galanta, Levice, Nitra, and Nové Zámky.\(^\text{38}\) The occupied territory covered an area of 10,000 square kilometers and was to be bordered by the line linking the cities of Vel’ký Kríš, Levice, Topolčany, Nové Město nad Váhom, to the west by the Váh River, and to the south by the cities of Sered, Nové Zámky, Stúrovo as well as the line of the Danube River. This is where the Hungarian minority of 250,000 lived.

The Hungarian occupation troops of the 8th Division were directed to advance and given their designated border crossing points into the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the evening of 20 August 1968. The division commander, General B. Lakatos, thought that the troops of the Czechoslovak People’s Army would offer armed resistance. The division was organized in three columns. The 31st Tank Regiment headed the main column, followed by the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 22d Artillery Regiment, the 93rd Anti-Tank Battalion, and the 14th Anti-Aircraft Battalion. The distance of the advance toward Verseg-Lev Ceritra-Hlohovec was 280 kilometers. The right wing consisted of the 14th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the advance toward Paszt6-Balassagyarmat-Nové Město nad Váhom was 290 kilometers. On the left wing, the 63rd Motorized Rifle Regiment advanced 95 kilometers from Gödöllő to Nové Zámky.

When the 31st Tank Regiment crossed the international boundary at 0015 on 21 August 1968 near the city of Sahy, it had to form a reconnaissance team of the 42d Reconnaissance Battalion. The Hungarian commanders did not have enough information about the Czechoslovak troops’ dispositions, their strength and equipment, transportation routes, and so on. Immediately after setting foot on Slovak soil, they established contact with the local population. They exchanged money, sold personal equipment, and some units even offered to work for wages. They tried to disarm the units of the Czechoslovak People’s Army. The headquarters of the Eastern Defense District and agencies of the Interior Ministry detected passive resistance in the behavior of the majority of the Hungarian population in the counties of Dunajská Streda, Komárno, Nové Zámky, Levice, and Nitra. This behavior on the part of the majority of the members of the Hungarian minority and among some Hungarian soldiers was unexpected and shocking.

Military intervention and the subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia confirmed the accuracy of the theoretical considerations and analyses H. Kahn, who, during the 1960s, worked out the 16-step “scale of escalation.” He asserted that in the context of this scale, there could be a demonstration of force in some European regions. Recently published studies of Sovietologists prove that the Soviet ruling circles placed extraordinary emphasis on effective military strength. The military historian, theoretician, and writer L. Hart arrived at some interesting conclusions on the basis of his theoretically-developed, practical experience summarized in his work, The Way To Win Wars. He stated: “In connection with the occupation of Czechoslovakia, I consider it important to stress one of the findings derived from it—the frequently and highly reputed mathematical ratio of military strength often appears to be worthless when it is divorced from moral, physical, and other factors.”
The stationing and organization of the Czechoslovak People’s Army resulted from the coalition defense put up by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact against the anticipated military aggression of NATO from a southwestern direction. The bulk of the forces of the Czechoslovak People’s Army was concentrated in this direction, in southwestern Bohemia and Moravia. The Czechoslovak People’s Army simply could not possibly have been prepared to defend against the intervention of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact of which it was a component. The intervention forces concentrated on occupying the most important political, economic, and military centers of the individual regions. They advanced in several directions and prevented the mobilization and development of independent, local centers of resistance. The army was shocked and waited for a reaction from the army high command that could only come too late in a strictly centralized management setup. Defense Minister M. Dzur issued two orders: one to all of the units in the individual defense districts, the other one to headquarters of the 10th Air and 7th Air Defense Armies. The orders contained a ban on the use of weapons and the instructions “to render maximum all-around aid to the Soviet troops.” The other components of the armed forces of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic were instructed in a similar manner. One of those elements, the Peoples’ Police had been put on a 100% alert during the night on 20–21 August 1968. All of its units were ordered “... to guarantee public order during the entry of the allied forces upon our territory...” The political decision, drafted by the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia demanded, “... to do everything for the preservation of calm ... any resistance to the troops would be senseless and tragic...” The terrain ruled out any possibility of conducting an area defense. Operational plans for an offensive in the western direction concentrated the logistical capacity mostly on the territory of Slovakia. The Soviet and Hungarian forces attacking from the south expected minimal resistance from the units that were directly under the Eastern Defense District.

The Eastern Defense District consisted of combat units, technical installations, logistics support elements, and facilities. Eighty-one units and installations were stationed on its territory, and they were directly under the Defense Ministry and its individual administrations, the headquarters of the 7th Air Defense and the 10th Air Armies. It accomplished extraordinarily difficult tasks. In case of mobilization, the following were to be formed from the major formations, troop units, and installations: the headquarters of the Eastern Defense District; the Reserve Army Command; 14th Tank Division; 32d Motorized Rifle Division; 6th Engineer Brigade; 42d Communications
Battalion, which after deployment was to form four telecommunications units; 2d and 20th Operations Battalions; while the 4th Motor-Transport Brigade was developed on the basis of Czechoslovak bus traffic; the military hospitals in Bratislava, Ružomerok, and Kočice were to form eighty-two medical organizations after deployment.

With its mobilization reserves, the Eastern Defense District supplemented the following: the Ministry of National Defense, the Western Defense District, the 10th Air Army, the 7th Air Defense Army, the railroad troops, and some units from the Interior Ministry. The total reserves in the Eastern Defense District consisted of 56,500 officers, 16,000 ensigns, and 730,000 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. According to the figures at that time, about 50% of the 802,500 reservists were “deployable.” The mobilization plans of the Eastern Defense District figured on a requirement of 12,000 officers, 6,700 ensigns, 123,000 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, that is to say, 17% of the total number of reserves and 30% of the “deployable” reserves.51

One can cite the following data from the mathematical strength ratios and the averages of the invasion forces without actually knowing the strength figures and averages of the units of the Bulgarian People’s Army and a part of the minor units that penetrated through the Moravian Gate into the area of Žilina:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Forces</th>
<th>Czechoslovak Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soviet Units</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hungarian Units</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Strength</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Missiles</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty &amp; Mortars</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT Guns</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft and Helicopters</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: According to the Hungarian historian, I. Pataky, the total number of Hungarian occupation troops came close to 20,000.

* The total figures do not include personnel from air force units.
The figures given in the above table bring out the overwhelming superiority of the invasion units. Only the numerical ratio of the tanks comes anywhere close to 1:1. I consider it necessary to stress that during the period analyzed here the northern Moravian area was part of the Eastern Defense District. Most of the tanks were of an obsolete type, and a considerable number of them were stationed at the tank base depot in that area. The invasion forces had the most modern types of tanks and enjoyed overwhelming superiority in air units, artillery, armored personnel carriers, and other equipment. Only a part of the forces of the 7th Air Defense Army and the 10th Air Army were stationed in the territory of Slovakia, but they covered only a part of Slovakia (the area of eastern Slovakia was not covered at all). The commanding general of the Eastern Defense District did not have any control over those forces.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia was made legal by the signing of the Moscow Protocol. On the basis of the Article 5 of that protocol, Party and government circles, together with the Minister of National Defense, had to solve a huge, complex array of problems that were connected with stationing the intervention force’s contingents. The representatives of the Czechoslovak People’s Army were briefed on these tasks during the conferences on 20 August and 1 November 1968. Minister M. Dzur informed the commanders of the army, the defense districts, the heads of the political administrations in the defense districts, and the first-ranking functionaries of the Defense Ministry about the response of the army as a whole to the critical days of domestic political developments during the intervention and immediately thereafter. At the end of August, the Defense Minister formulated “the line of procedure” that accommodated the occupiers. This change of attitude on the part of the overwhelming majority of the army high command, headed by the Minister, was clearly expressed by Order No. 012.

One of the problems that the army command had to solve to defend the “new line” was the previously mentioned question of deployment of the occupation troops. Minister M. Dzur ordered the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People’s Army to work out the project and the operations area. By virtue of the resolution of a plenary session of the Government of Czechoslovakia on 28 August 1968, an “operational group” of the central agencies of Czechoslovakia was formed under the VicePresident of Czechoslovakia, F. Hamouz.

The deliberations of the Czechoslovak and Soviet military delegations in Mukachevo (Ukraine) on 16–17 September 1968 constituted an important turning point in the entire problem of deploying the occupation forces. The Czechoslovak delegation, headed by Minister M. Dzur, submitted a
proposal that called for the deployment of the troop contingents, amounting to a maximum of 70,000–80,000, including equipment. (The initial estimates in the draft of the operations report figured on an upper limit of 1/10 of the total contingent of occupation forces.) This proposal meant the stationing of a Soviet army, including the headquarters units, directly subordinate army specialized units, and four to five divisions.54

The Soviet counter-proposal firmly demanded that the upper military personnel limit, as proposed by the Czechoslovak delegation, be raised to 100,000. Soviet soldiers with their equipment were to be stationed in seven “divisional areas,” including two in Slovakia.55 The counter-proposal furthermore contained a demand that the headquarters of an air army and five air wings be deployed and that four to five airfields be made ready. However, the Soviet military delegation abandoned some of its demands.56

After the meeting in Mukachevo, Vice-President F. Hamouz held a discussion with the representatives of all the County Peoples’ Committees of Czechoslovakia. On the basis of the preliminary agreement with the high command of the intervention forces, he stated: “... there is real hope of achieving the departure of a predominant portion of the troops from our territory, on the assumption that the following conditions would be met: (A) The wintertime stationing of a part of the army in the previously agreed upon areas that were designated for winter quarters; (B) The wintertime quartering of troops in a portion of the military garrison and barracks facilities. This must be construed as a temporary measure. ...”57 The Government of Czechoslovakia tried to gain acceptance of the variant in which the intervention forces would withdraw from the main population centers and their vicinity, that is, from Prague, Bratislava, Ostrava, Brno, and the county seats.58 The Soviet representatives rejected these arguments of the Government of Czechoslovakia.

The re-deployment measures commenced on 23 September 1968. Order No. 001089–13 of the Ministry of National Defense directed that the organizational and deployment changes were to be made in the area of the Eastern Defense District starting on 28 September 1968.59 On the basis of the above-mentioned order from the minister, the defense district commander issued Directive No. 004502 with the goal of clearing the designated garrisons and installations by 15 October 1968.60 Official transfer to the Soviet intervention units was planned for the period between 15–20 October 1968.61

In Czechoslovakia as a whole, the re-deployment and reorganization changes directly affected 100 units and installations of the Czechoslovak People’s Army. The total volume of changes can be documented by the fact that thirty-two garrisons were abandoned and that 1,200 tanks, 1,000
artillery pieces, and 700 armored personnel carriers were shifted. This affected the families of about 5,000 regular military personnel and roughly 900 civilian employees with consequences that are difficult to assess.

Next, 23 units and installations were redeployed in the area of the Eastern Defense District, while eight units were dissolved and another five were transferred to other command echelons. Overall, twenty-two garrisons (military posts) were cleared out in the Eastern Defense District.

The 13th Tank Division, called the "Kiev-Dukla-Ostrava Division of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship," was put under the headquarters of the Western Defense District. The division had originally been stationed near Prague and, according to the higher command echelons, it was especially this fact that put it "... in very intensive contact with various 'progressive' institutions." The Czechoslovak People's Army felt that the division was most heavily hit "... by the ideas of right-wing opportunism and revisionism." and the moral-political situation was to a great extent so decayed that the division was no longer combat-capable from that angle. There were some very frequent and rather radical personnel changes in the division. During 1967 and 1968, 85% of the division's officers were changed and the figure was more than 90% for the subordinate elements. The redeployment of the division to the territory of Slovakia increased the transfers of officers and ensigns to a total of 261 regular personnel (requests were submitted by 303 officers and 100 ensigns).

The General Staff of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the Ministry of National Economic Planning estimated the financial costs connected with redeployment in 1968 at 1–1.5 billion Crowns. The expenditures that were set aside for the redistribution of units and for the adaptation of facilities to meet the needs of the high command of the Soviet intervention forces, resulting from the implementation of the treaty of 16 October 1968 on the "temporary stay of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia," were included in the army budget for 1969. According to the data of the twelfth session of the Defense Security Committee of the National Assembly, dated 3 December 1968, the total budget of the Czechoslovak People's Army came to 15.805 billion Crowns.

The Soviet occupation forces, with a total strength of five divisions, were deployed at thirty-three posts and four airfields. Military equipment and other miscellaneous military material were stationed at army posts, 19 special depots, and six fuel dumps. According to information from the various commands, as cited by J. Madry, "the Warsaw Treaty troops had a total of forty-six divisions on Czechoslovak territory after the per-
manent stationing of Soviet formations against twenty-nine NATO divisions. . .70

The presence of the occupation forces increased tension especially in areas where they were heavily concentrated and there were clashes with the local population.71 Often, Soviet soldiers would suppress demonstrations and other expressions of displeasure with the occupation by taking brutal counter-measures.

Hungarian intervention units gradually left the territory of Slovakia during the Autumn of 1968.72 The resolution of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Movement, No. 3339/1968, dated 17 October 1968, noted ". . . that the Hungarian troops, deployed on the territory of Czechoslovakia for the sake of defending the cause of socialism, along with their allied armies, had accomplished their international mission. . ."73 On the basis of resolution No. 3339/1968, which was signed by J. Fock, the Defense Minister was ordered—under point 3A—"to withdraw the units of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division from the territory of Czechoslovakia and to organize. . . the festive welcoming of the troops. . . to ensure the necessary volume of publicity, to submit proposals for awards and decorations, and to take. . . measures to pay tribute to outstanding services in various forms. . ."74

The deployment of the units and installations of five divisions of the Soviet occupation army took place during the evacuation of a portion of the intervention forces of the Warsaw Pact from Czechoslovakia. The occupation of Czechoslovakia and the redeployment of Soviet elite divisions changed the strategic situation. The strategic operational axis of Prague-Dijon and vice-versa and also the territory of Czechoslovakia assumed a new strategic dimension. The Soviet leadership could draw up realistic plans featuring the potential exploitation of Czechoslovak territory to station tactical nuclear weapons, something that in the end could lead to the achievement of strategic superiority.

The Soviet military-strategic concept of a surprise launching of the nuclear missile war figured on the alternative of the creation of highly combat-capable, mobile first echelon of Warsaw Pact troops in the central European area. Their mission was to conduct and maintain a rapid attack tempo in ground operations. In this connection, Soviet units were relocated from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia to replace divisions of the First and Fourth Armies of the Czechoslovak People’s Army. The deployment of a part of Soviet occupation troops in Slovakia created optimum conditions for a possible military attack to the west in the southern strategic operations area, that is to say, through Austria. Even before the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Southern Group of Soviet Forces was deployed in Hungary.
The reality of the occupation of Czechoslovakia had various negative consequences in all areas of social and community life whose effects we continue to feel even to this day in various ways.

ENDNOTES

1. During the Seminar on Military Doctrines, held from January 16 to February 5, 1990, in Vienna, Austria, General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the United States, after World War II, faced the alternative of "either again being historically isolated, as after World War I, or accepting a worldwide security mission." *Vojenske rozhledy* (Military Magazine), 1993, No. 3, p. 7.


3. The length of international boundaries with the individual states in relation to the total numerical strength of the army plays a great role in terms of defense. According to past calculations, the defensive value in the Czechoslovak Republic was reduced by 25% and in the Slovak republic by 55%. *Vojenske rozhledy* (Military Magazine), 1992, Special Issue, pp. 32–33. After the collapse of the so-called Eastern Bloc—Poland, Czech Lands, Slovakia, and Hungary—wound up in a certain vacuum, ending up in the buffer zone that separates the NATO countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (Former Soviet Union). The buffer zone is about 600 to 800 km deep.

4. *Vojensky spravni archiv* (Military Administrative Archive), formerly the Archives of the Czechoslovak People's Army, Olomouc (hereafter cited as VSA), Fond (hereafter cited as F.) 0855, boxes 169 and 54.

5. VSA, F. 0855, box 204.


7. VSA, F. 0855, box 29.


9. The modeling situation of the so-called absorption was determined precisely as regards to the time span figuring on the employment of the strategic-operational reinforcement. The military operation of this so-called absorption was to last about for the seventy-two most critical hours. The entire plan suggested the stationing of the military strength of Czechoslovakia as follows:

1) First Army Group (Prague)
2) Second Army Group (Trenčín)
3) Corps: I Corps (Prague), II Corps: (Písek), III Corps: (Brno), IV Corps: (Banská Bystrica).

4) Tank divisions: 3d (Michalovce), 4th (Tábor), 14th (Olomouc), 15th (Martin).
5) Armored infantry divisions: 5th (Slatonín), 12th (Karlovy Vary), 11th (Plzeň), 2d (Sušice), 1st (České Budějovice), 8th (Kolin), 13th (Kroměříž), 6th (Brno), 7th (Opava), and 9th (Trnava).
6) Parachute division: 10th (Košice)

10. The expenses in 1963 connected with re-deployment and reorganization came to 451,029,000 Crowns. In 1965, the costs for the conversion of facilities for the redeployed and reorganized units came to 292,215,000 Crowns. VHA, F. Defense Ministry (Deputy of the Defense Minister of Czechoslovakia), 1963, 22–79.


12. VSA, F. 0855, box 157.
13. Several divisions, with about 60 subordinate units, were dissolved in the Eastern Defense District in 1957-1969. More than thirty units were gradually reorganized, about sixty were transferred, and eleven were newly organized. VSA, F. 0855, boxes 202 and 24.

14. VSA, F. 0855, box 169.

15. The age structure of the commanders of the Czechoslovak People’s Army developed rather unfavorably. Of all officers, plans called for 67.2% staff officers and only 32.8% junior officers. It is interesting to note that this structure compares as follows to that of other armies: German National People’s Army: 49% staff officers, 50.1% junior officers; West German Federal Armed Forces: 30% staff officers, 70% junior officers. According to the data in the organization and mobilization report of the general staff, the Czechoslovak People’s Army had been planning on two times more staff officers than in the East German National People’s Army, four times more than in the West German Federal Armed Forces, eight times more than in the ground forces of the United States. To correct this situation, an attempt was made to professionalize individual selected duty stations in the Czechoslovak People’s Army.

The share of officers of Slovak nationality in the Czechoslovak People’s Army was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that the number of Slovak officers increased only by 1.2% over a period of eighteen years, from 1951 to 1968. Additional supplementary data shows that out of five deputies of the Defense Minister, only one was a Slovak; of the chiefs of the various branches and of the independent sections only 14.2% were Slovak officers; there were 9.2% Slovaks in the office of the chief of the department of the Defense Ministry; there were 8.3% officers of Slovak nationality in the office of the chief of the group of the Defense Ministry. In the duty stations of the so-called technical agencies on the division, army, sector echelons as well as in the tank and motor vehicle services and in the Ministry, only 5% of the officers were Slovak nationality. VSA, F. 0885, boxes 41-42, and F. 0855, box 24.

16. VSA, F. 0964.

17. VSA, F. 0855, box 202.

18. VSA, F. 0964.

19. VSA, F. 0855, box 39.


21. The former deputy to the commander of the Eastern Defense District, General Ján Strečula, presented some interesting facts in his testimony to the Office of the Investigation of Unconstitutional Activities on the occasion of the visit by Marshall Yakubovskiy. “... allegedly, General Valeš, heading the delegation, and General Kodaj, refused to welcome ...” the high ranking Soviet official. Vasil Bíľák and General Strečula welcomed the delegation. As the witness testified further: “… During lunch, there was talk as to why this exercise (SUMAVA) was taking place in our territory and, of all times, now. Looking at it logically and militarily, the troops of Bulgaria, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic were not supposed to do their exercising in our territory but some place else. Yakubovskiy explained this by saying that these troops would be operating also in this area and that they had to get some practice.”


22. During the General Army Conference of the Communist Party, held in Bratislava on July 9-11, 1968, O. Černík reacted as follows to questions asked in the presence of Soviet
troops: "... A rather abnormal situation developed when, in the past, the Soviet soldiers were welcomed unenthusiastically by all Czechoslovak society and when nobody was bothered by the fact that they would stay here a week or two weeks longer; now some circles and even some segments of the army are extremely nervous because the Soviet soldiers stayed here several weeks longer. So, who could be bothered by the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia if one realizes that they will not interfere in our domestic affairs..." VSA, F. Celooarmádná konferencia komunistov v. Bratislave 9.11.1968, Protocol (Nekorigovaný vydálo), p. 3.


25. The Southern Group of Soviet Forces had a total of 64,548 military personnel, of whom 48,055 were employed during intervention. The gear and combat equipment consisted of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Employed during Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical missiles</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery and mortars</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery and mortars</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank guns</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft and Helicopters</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Historie a Vojenství (History and Military Affairs), 1993, No. 5, p. 56.


27. Work on the preparation of the "military exercise" done by the command and staff of the Southern Group of Soviet Forces that were deployed on the territory of Hungary, reached its climax at the end of July 1968. The units of the Hungarian 8th Armored Infantry Division were also to participate in this military exercise according to plan. On the basis of Hungarian archives, Ivan Pataky clearly brings out the total extent of the preparatory work done for the "exercise." He cites some interesting conclusions arrived at by the Chief of the General Staff, Hungarian People's Army, General Károly Csémi, which he uttered in connection with the plan for the deployment of the "military exercise:"

1. "The exercise covers the entire territory and a considerable part of the population."

2. "As of July 26, 1968, one can figure that the planned events might materialize at any moment."

3. "It is expected that there may be an armed struggle staged by the forces of the Czechoslovak People's Army." Új Honvédségi Szemle (Military Review), 1991, No. 8, p. 79.


29. Új Honvédségi Szemle (Military Review), 1991, Box No. 8, p. 80.

30. Ibid., p. 87.

31. The combat strength of the 8th Motorized Rifle Division upon mobilization was:

   a. Personnel strength:
      - Officers: 964
      - Ensigns: 659
      - Enlisted men: 8,749
      - Total: 10,372

   b. Tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs):
      - T-52 tanks: 142
      - APCs: 100

c. Artillery: 205 pieces

d. Special vehicles and motor vehicles: Total 1816

Új Honvédségi Szemle (Military Review), 1991, No. 8, p.81

32. Ibid., p. 87
33. According to data from 1969, 541,000 persons of Hungarian nationality lived in twelve districts and 675 communities. The majority of the Hungarian lived in 451 communities, that is to say, in 13.5% of all communities in Slovakia. More than 2 million inhabitants lived in the nationally mixed districts of southern and eastern Slovakia.

Data from 1961 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Slovaks</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dunajská</td>
<td>87,800</td>
<td>11,645</td>
<td>76,155</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streda</td>
<td>126,972</td>
<td>8,284</td>
<td>76,587</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galanta</td>
<td>102,050</td>
<td>29,129</td>
<td>72,921</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komáro</td>
<td>121,524</td>
<td>79,022</td>
<td>42,502</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levice</td>
<td>190,513</td>
<td>172,062</td>
<td>17,451</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nové Zámky</td>
<td>144,866</td>
<td>84,067</td>
<td>59,911</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


34. The information sources of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior called attention to the increasing activity of the representatives of the Hungarian national minority and the organization of the CSEMADOK. They demanded “... that teachers be taken out of the Slovak schools, that some citizens of the Slovak nationality leave territories with a predominantly Hungarian population...” On March 30, 1968, the resolution of the Plenums of the district committee of the CSEMADOK in Lučenec demanded: “… the formation of independent Hungarian districts. The candidate for a position in the peoples committee must live in the locality for twenty years... Leading functionaries in government, political, and economic agencies must also have a command of the language of the nationality... To recognize that the re-Slovakization in 1945-1948 was invalid, to repeal the articles from the government program of Kočíč, concerning the expulsion of Hungarian citizens who behaved dishonorably during World War II... To establish Hungarian facilities in the colleges...” VSA, F. 0855, box 29.

35. (a) The July conference of the Government Committee for Nationality Questions of the Slovak Socialist Republic, held in Hrusovo, district of Dunajská Streda, was also attended by representatives of CSEMADOK who demanded:

“... That all communities, with more than 10% citizens of Hungarian nationality, be redesignated as bilingual... In all districts where citizens of the Hungarian nationality constitute the overwhelming majority, Hungarian-Slovak is to be introduced as the official language... To establish colleges in all subjects for the citizens of Hungarian nationality. If there is a shortage of teachers, request teachers from Hungary... To make sure that, in each ministry of the Slovak Socialist Republic, there will be one representative of the Hungarian nationality or one minister... Until 1972, they agreed with the federation and after 1972 they demanded independent autonomy with iron self-administration...” Archives of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava (hereafter cited as AKH SR), F. Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, 78th Assembly of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, July 28, 1970.

(b) The CSEMADOK met for its session in Galanta in April 1968. It approved a 26-page resolution that furthermore demanded the establishment of a Hungarian “federative territory” that was to extend from Bratislava to Stúrovo. The capital of that territory was to be Dunajská Streda. At the same time, leaflets and signs with appeals appeared in some districts in southern Slovakia: “Hungarians, rise up, the fatherland calls you, beat the Slovaks, now or never is the time”; “Slovaks go into the mountains, the Hungarians are going to win”; “We Hungarians, we must also do something, we demand an union with Hungary...” Archives of the Interior Ministry of the Slovak Republic, Levoča (hereafter cited as AMV SR), F. V. PL, Inventory No. 526.

(c) The Consulate-General of the Hungarian Peoples Republic, located in Bratislava, in its regular information bulletin, described the development of the domestic
political situation in the republic in an untrue and distorted fashion. The Slovak area was characterized by “... Strong expressions of nationalistic feelings and moods: they were being whipped up against the Czech nation and also against the nationalities living here...” AKV SR, Consulate General of the Hungarian People’s Republic, No. 1/7/1968.

36. Vojaci a “Prazskejava” 1968, p. 48
37. VSA, F. 0855, box 24.
38. VSA, F. 0855, box 29.
40. Ibid., p. 49.
41. VSA, F. 0855, box 155.
42. VSA, F. 0855, box 157.
43. VSA, F. 0855, box 156.
44. VSA, F. 0855, box 155.
45. VSA, F. 0855, box 157.
46. AMV SR, F. R–013, Inventory No. 6.
47. Ibid.
48. VSA, F. 0855, box 157.
49. Combat units: 14th Tank Division—10th Tank Regiment, 64th Tank Regiment, 55th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 63rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 49th Artillery Regiment, 10th Anti-Aircraft Battalion, 10th Communications Battalion, 10th Medical Battalion, 10th Engineer Battalion, 10th Reconnaissance Battalion, 14th Technical Repair Shop; 220th Anti-Tank Regiment, 6th Engineer Regiment, 52d Pontoon Regiment, 42d Communications Battalion, 2d Air Intelligence, 92d Pontoon Regiment, 2d Self-Propelled Gun Battalion.

Rear Echelon Units: 3d Motor Transport Brigade—6th, 9th, 19th, 73rd, and 74th Motor Transport Battalions, 164th Fuel Tank Battalion; 4th Motor Transport Brigade—16th, 18th, 71st, and 72d Motor Transport Battalion, 76th Fuel Tank Battalion; fuel dump, equipment depot, equipment repair shop, medical service depot, epidemiological defense district department, military hospitals.

Technical units and installations: 2d Tank Base, 6th Artillery base, engineer and communications depot, repair shop, chemical depot, defense district depot for tanks and motorized equipment. VSA, F. 0855, boxes 22 and 155.

50. VSA, F. 0855, box 189.
51. VSA, F. 0855, box 157.
52. VSA, F. 0855, box 25.
53. V. Paulik, a member of the “Commission of the Czechoslovak Federated Republic Government to Analyze the Historical Events of 1967–1970,” on the basis of the conversation with General V. Picek, the then Deputy Chief of the Operations Administration, stated that General K. Rusov asked General V. Picek that they draft a project for the deployment of Soviet occupation troops along the northern border of the Czech Lands and in northern Moravia. J. Paulik, Ceskoslovenská armáda po srpnu 1968 (The Czechoslovak Army after August 1968), manuscript, p. 48.
54. The Czechoslovak delegation was made up as follows: Minister Colonel General M. Dzur, General K. Rusov, General M. Smoldas, General J. Lux, General B. Dvorak and General P. Kalicky.
55. The Soviet delegation was made up as follows: General I.S. Maryakhnin, General N.V. Ogarkov, General P.S. Kutakhov, General M.M. Kozlov, General A.M. Yamschikov, headed by Minister of Defense and Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A Grechko.
56. The delegations, led by ministers M. Dzur and A.A. Grechko, agreed on the areas mentioned in which they planned to deploy a part of the Soviet forces: (a) for ground forces—north of Prague, northeast of Pardubice, northwest of Ostrava in Olomouc and in central Slovakia; (b) for air units—Hradchin, Milovice, Olomouc and Slané; (c) for logistics—fuel dumps and military hospitals. VHA, F. Defense Ministry—Military Counsel, 1968, 1/23–4.

58. One of the arguments that was used by the government was the order given by General Pavlovskiy that pertained to all units of the Warsaw Treaty on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The order among other things directed the following:

"... The areas where Czechoslovak troops are to be left. Small cities must be left completely and units must deploy outside them. Refrain from blocking the party and government agencies. Do not block the banks and facilitate their normal activity..."

VSA, F. 0855, box 182.

59. VSA, F. 0855, box 25.

60. Schedule for evacuating the garrisons in the Eastern Defense District:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Garrison</th>
<th>Date of Deadline</th>
<th>To be cleared</th>
<th>Soviet demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bruntál</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frenštát pod Radhoštěm</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelšava</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesenik</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komárno</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krnov</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lešť Maneuver Area</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Město Lidava</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olomouc</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nové Zámky</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rožňava</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruzomberok</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td></td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimavská Sobota</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td></td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šumperk</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sliac</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td></td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Štúrovo</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zvolen</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td></td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VSA, F. 0855, box 157.

61. After the protocol was signed, the high command of the Soviet occupation forces demanded modification of installations in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Garrison</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia (Millions of Czech Crowns)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bruntál</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelšava</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesenik</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olomouc</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nové Zámky</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rožňava</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruzomberok</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VSA, F. 0855, box 157.


63. VSA, F. 0855, box 153.
64. VSA, F. 0855, box 6.
65. VSA, F. 0855, box 41.
66. VSA, F. 0855, box 153.
67. VSA, F. 0855, box 41.
68. VSA, F. 0855, box 6.

70. Historie a vojenství (History and Military Affairs), 1982, No. 5, p. 128.
71. During the talks with J. Kádár, on May 15-16, 1969, G. Husák noted that he discussed the problems arising from the presence of Soviet troops with L.I. Brezhnev. The resolution of these problems was based on the political agreement between Husák and Brezhnev as follows: "... Regarding questions of stationing Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia ... the military aspects ... were to be discussed with Marshal Grechko ... " The re-deployment of the occupation forces into the "Czechoslovak-West German zone ... " among other things, dealing with the public at large, "... was to explain the real causes for the state of Soviet troops ... " AKH GKSR, "Report to the Political Bureau on talks with G. Husák held on May 15-16, 1969," Hungarian original, p. 5.

72. In the course of the previously mentioned talks between J. Kádár and G. Husák, May 15-16, 1969, the Hungarian representatives said the following regarding the occupation of Czechoslovakia: "... We believed that the action by five countries was an unavoidable, necessary, and forced step. Basically, it would be inconceivable for Hungary not to participate in this effort but other countries would have done the job anyway and, at that time, there would have been a Hungarian problem also in addition to the Czechoslovak problem. But that would have introduced an entirely new quality into the situation. Participation in the action of August 20 was something that we, among other things, considered necessary also so that we could continue to influence events in the future ... " AKH GKSR, ibid., p. 8.


74. AKH GKSR, ibid., p. 2.
SECTION XIV

New Dimensions In The History Of The Cold War:
Poland And Romania
A True Beginning of the Cold War: The Polish Point of View

Dr. Andrzej Ajnenkiel

Winston Churchill’s famous address at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946 is considered to have been the official proclamation of the Cold War. However, the real Cold War started much earlier. One can even risk the assessment that Poland was the first victim of Soviet Cold War policies in Central Europe. Practically speaking, these policies had their origins in the period immediately after Bolsheviks came to power in Russia. It was then, in the Autumn of 1918, that the Red Army began preparations for the “target” operation aimed at carrying the revolution “on soldiers’ bayonets” to Central and later to Western Europe. The Bolsheviks thought that the best conditions to spread the communist revolution were in Germany, then prostrate from defeat in World War I. It was believed that Soviet Russia, as well as the growing communist movement in Europe, would provide Germany with direct aid, including armed intervention.

Poland, restored to independence after World War I, was seen as an obstacle which should be destroyed in the interests of the Soviets and the international communist revolution. That is how the Soviets perceived the aim of their political activities, which started in the final stages of World War I and developed into a Polish-Soviet conflict in early 1919, and were accompanied by a systematic and intensive propaganda campaign against Poland.

For Poland, the war with the Soviets proved necessary to defend her independence and sovereignty. Jozef Pilsudski, Head of the State and the Commander-in-Chief, attempted to use military and political means to accomplish a broad program to aid other nations closely linked with Poland which also had been previously under Russian domination and to support their aspirations for independence. This concept, later termed a federation, presented a potent political threat to Soviet Russia. This was another reason why the Soviets wanted to defeat Poland.
As for our western neighbor, Germany, its attitude appeared to favor the Russian intentions. The German authorities and the society at large wanted to regain the lands which had been returned to Poland under the Versailles Treaty. That is why, in spite of official neutrality during the Polish-Soviet war, they provided secret aid to the Soviets. It was a consequence, as one might suppose, of a very naive belief that the Red Army would loyally stop on the former Russian-German border once it had defeated "White Poland." During the Polish-Soviet war, Poland was a target of exceptionally intense propaganda attacks, carried out by various political circles, from international leftists inspired by Bolsheviks to some conservative centers.

The victory in the war meant not only that Poland would remain an independent state on the political map of Europe. It also guaranteed independence for the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and it restrained Soviet pressure on Romania. Pilsudski, however, was unable to establish his federal concept in Central Eastern Europe.

A peace treaty signed with the Soviets in 1921 ended the armed conflict between the two states. Both countries recognized each other by establishing diplomatic relations. They also accepted the borders established after World War I. Nevertheless, a situation developed which can be described now as a kind of "cold war." Poles, including Marshal Pilsudski, whose influence on our politics was enormous, were deeply apprehensive of the advantages to be gained from embarking on a peaceful policy and defending the status-quo of the peace treaty.

Over the whole inter-war period, Poland was conscious of all the threats arising from the Soviet-German cooperation directed against her. This cooperation, whose importance was disregarded by the victorious coalition powers, was aimed at violating the political settlement in Europe after World War I. Any attempts to impair the settlement might result in a lack of stability and a new armed conflict, perhaps on a European scale. For the Soviets, the destruction of Poland would make the situation unstable and provide a good starting point for spreading the revolution, then called "building socialism in one country." Irrespective of the actual priorities of Soviet policy, the idea of a world communist revolution became for the Soviets a main object of their activities. Communist parties in capitalist countries became dependent on and formally subordinated to the Communist International (COMINTERN) controlled from Moscow. Those parties continued a systematic agitation against the Polish state.

In 1922, as is well known, Germany signed a treaty with the Soviets in Rapallo. This began a secret German-Soviet cooperation which was a threat to Poland's security. In all analyses concerning our situation held by
A TRUE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR

Marshal Pilsudski, the danger of a Russian attack against Poland was considered the most genuine threat. Even several agreements signed with the Soviets did not change this attitude. In 1929, Poland signed the so-called Litvinov Protocol with the Soviets. It was understood that both parties excluded war as a possible means in bilateral relations. Three years later, in 1932, the two states signed a Non-Aggression Pact. In 1934, the pact was extended to 31 December 1945. Until that time, the agreement prohibited either party from hostilities against the other or commitments to a third party.

A convention on aggression signed in 1933 was of substantial interpretative importance. According to it, an aggressor was the state which would be first to carry out the following actions: declare war on another state, invade the territory of another state with its armed forces even without declaring war, and provide armed support for bandits invading the territory of another state. Under the convention, no political, military, economic or other reasons could justify or excuse aggression.

When Hitler came to power the Soviets changed their attitude towards Poland, although only temporarily as it turned out. However, after the Munich conference in September 1938 they departed from the new political style and followed the old track. On 23 August 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact between Soviet Russia and Germany was signed in Moscow. It went down in history as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. It has been only recently that the Soviets disclosed details of the secret protocol in which Central Europe was divided into spheres of influence. The assumption that an independent Poland would cease to exist lay at its core. Therefore, the protocol called for an armed partition of Poland, with the frontier line between future partitioned parts running initially in central Poland along the Vistula River through Warsaw. The signing of the agreement with the Soviet Union had a decisive influence on Hitler's ultimate order to attack Poland on 1 September 1939.

Seventeen days later the Soviets, who had acted as loyal German allies from the beginning of the war, attacked Poland. From the very first day of their aggression, they treated Poland as a non-existent state in violation of international laws and the Soviet-Polish agreements. At present in the Polish Military History Institute, three volumes of Russian source materials concerning the Soviet aggression against Poland in 1939 are being prepared for publication. Moreover, there is additional work being done compiling source materials on about 200,000 men taken prisoner by the Red Army.

In 1991, the Russian authorities made available to historians Soviet documents relating to the decision in March 1940 by the Politburo of the Soviet Party, and directed to the NKVD, to treacherously shoot 21,000
Poles, a majority of whom were officers. At the same time hundreds of thousands, if not over one million, Polish citizens, Jews, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians, were deported to the East in severe conditions. A great many deportees died during transport or due to harsh conditions in Soviet camps; many were brutally murdered.

The Soviet attack against Poland was an act of aggression against the Polish state. Irrespective of all international norms and laws, the Soviets annexed over half the Polish territory inhabited by 13 million people, five million of whom were Poles. In 1939 the Soviet authorities carried out an election under pressure, falsifying its results. The “elected” delegates voted for incorporation of the annexed territories into the Soviet Union. After that time, the territories were officially considered Soviet areas and their inhabitants, even refugees from other parts of Poland, Soviet citizens. In practice, from the Soviet point of view, they could be as equally ill-treated as any other Soviet citizen.

Specific martial law orders against Poles were lifted when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The two totalitarian states, of course, ceased to cooperate. Thus, the Soviet Union was automatically allied with Great Britain and Poland against Germany. Henceforth, a new stage of cooperation between Poland and her allies, Great Britain and later the United States, started. From the first day of the German-Soviet war, Great Britain demanded that Polish authorities improve their relations with the Soviet Union so that the rapprochement between Moscow and London would not be strained. The pressure had already been evident during the talks which led to the agreement between Sikorski and Maiski signed on 30 July 1941. Before the talks, the Soviet side declared its intention to form the Polish Committee and Polish military troops on Soviet territory. Such an attitude was regarded as a veiled threat by Soviet authorities ignoring the existing exiled Polish government and creating a new, subordinated, substitute state.

In the Sikorski-Maiski Agreement, the Soviets officially recognized the Polish state and its legal authorities. It meant, at least, a verbal departure from the Kremlin’s policy in this respect. However, the agreement approved the idea of organizing in Soviet territory a Polish Army under Polish command. The army was to be under operational supervision of the High Command of the USSR. The agreement, though, did not take into account Polish claims for the restoration of the pre-war Polish borders. It only nullified all the Soviet-German treaties signed in 1939 concerning territorial changes. This gave the Soviets an opportunity to support the view that all Soviet internal regulations relating to the Polish territories incorporated in 1939 had legal force.
The signing of the Polish-Soviet treaty was seen as signaling a period of ostensible cooperation between Poland and the Soviets, who still refused to return the territorial conquests. This fact, though not manifested for some time, became a source of conflict. Another source of conflict were problems relating to the Polish Army organized in the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet authorities were not interested in the formation of Polish troops subordinated to the Polish government in London. They might have also been afraid of problems, if not threats, caused by Polish units in case the truth of the murder of several thousand Polish officers was disclosed. In consequence, the Soviet authorities agreed to the evacuation of the Polish Army through Iran in the Summer of 1942. The evacuation was politically expedient for the Soviet authorities. The Soviets had refused to supply the Polish units with armament, equipment, and food and ruthlessly persecuted them. This also gave rise to a propaganda campaign against the Polish Armed Forces who were accused, without reason, of being reluctant to fight the Germans. In May 1992 the Political Studies Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences published a volume of Soviet documents from the NKVD archives concerning the Polish Army in the Soviet Union prior to evacuation.

Another source of conflict, originating from general Soviet restrictions, was the right to Polish citizenship. After political relations between the Polish Republic and the Soviet Union had been established, the Soviets acknowledged that only people of Polish nationality could be recognized as Polish citizens. People of other nationalities, who had been Polish citizens before the war, were refused Polish citizenship. Polish Jews were most often victims of that unilateral, unlawful viewpoint.

With this in mind, one should look at the crime of murder of two political leaders who were Polish Jews, Wictor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich. They both were well-known politicians of the Jewish socialist party, the “Bund.” They represented the party in the Warsaw City Council. In 1939, they were arrested by the NKVD on Soviet-occupied territory. Accused of cooperation with the Germans, they were sentenced to death. Later, the sentence was changed to 10-year imprisonment in a labor camp. After the Sikorski-Maiski Agreement had been signed, they were allowed to leave the camp and start work at the Polish embassy in the Soviet Union.

However, the Soviets soon arrested them again even though they had Polish diplomatic passports. The arrest, which seems very symptomatic, took place when General Sikorski, the Head of the Polish government in exile and the Commander-in-Chief, arrived in Moscow to talk with Stalin. The arrest of the two politicians and their later fate might have been a Soviet warning that the rapprochement between Moscow and the Polish
government had a limited scope; it was a good test of international opinion and its acceptance of future Soviet crimes. Despite Polish authorities intervening in the matter, the two politicians were not released from prison. The pressure of international opinion was equally unsuccessful. Even Eleanor Roosevelt and Albert Einstein wrote to Stalin. The U.S. State Department also intervened. Only after several months, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Maxim Litvinov, wrote in a letter to the Chairman of the American Federation of Labor, William Green, that Alter and Ehrlich had been shot on a charge of collaboration with the Germans. For fear that the execution would damage the unity of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, the American press did not publicize this totalitarian crime. It was only disclosed in a paid announcement published by the “Bund” in the New York Times. The information on the shooting of these two politicians, whom the Soviet authorities illegally maintained had not been Polish citizens, coincided not accidentally with another move of the Soviet Cold War policy against Poland. In January 1943, the Soviet authorities made an official statement that they would no longer consider people of Polish origin as Polish citizens. This meant a return to the situation after the 1939 attack on and occupation of Poland when the Soviet Union stopped recognizing the Polish state. Polish citizens, forced to carry Soviet passports, would not be allowed to leave the Soviet Union after the war. This would bring a dramatic change for the worse in their already severe situations.

In April 1943, the Germans let the world know that they had found graves of Polish officers murdered in Katyn. The Polish government appealed to the International Red Cross to investigate and called on the Soviet authorities to account for it. In its reply, Moscow accused the Polish government in exile in London of giving credence to German propaganda and broke diplomatic relations with Poland, as it had done before in 1939. This signalled the beginning of an exceptionally slanderous campaign against Polish authorities, full of all kinds of charges. Stalin took advantage of the fact that the world had been informed about the crime of mass extermination by the authorities of the Hitlerite Reich, who had been charged with no less cruel crimes, especially the Holocaust. In this way, Stalin not only tried to hide the crimes of his regime. What is more, this attack against the Polish government, the government of the state which from the first days of the war had vigorously fought against Nazi Germany, was a step toward subjugating Poland, and, in consequence Central Europe, to Soviet totalitarianism.

It was soon officially announced that a Polish military unit, independent of the Polish authorities, was being formed in the Soviet Union. The unit, gradually extended and ultimately developed into a Polish Army
within the Red Army, was controlled by people dependent upon Moscow and who seemed good instruments for keeping Poland subordinated to the Soviets.

The Soviet move and their propaganda activities directed against Poland was not opposed by the Western powers. This attitude was clearly manifested during the conference of foreign ministers in Moscow in October 1943 and then the Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin meeting in Teheran, 28 November–1 December 1943. The Western powers were inclined to accept the Soviet point of view concerning the Polish-Soviet borders and helped to impose it on Poland. They believed that a Polish-Soviet compromise would not mean that the Polish Republic would become a satellite of the Kremlin after the war. Stalin’s viewpoint and actual Soviet practice differed.

The year 1944 provided Stalin with a possibility to implement most of his plans. Eastern areas of the Polish Republic were incorporated into the Soviet Union, and this time the loss appeared to have been permanent. The territory to the west of the Curzon line was to be governed by a group of people subservient to Moscow. Then, the elimination of political and military structures controlled by the legal Polish government in London followed. The combined effort of the Polish Home Army units and the Soviet Army, fighting together against the Germans, did not influence their fate. Disarming and deportations to the East began and eventually totalled 50,000 people, many of whom never returned home.

On 1 August 1944, the Warsaw uprising began, the longest Polish battle for sovereignty during World War II. Ousting the German invader from the capital city by our own forces was to be a test for the underground authorities and their ability to act openly. It was with great effort that some of the military objectives were achieved. About half of the area of Warsaw was captured by Poles after three days of fighting. The political goal of the uprising, however, appeared to have been viewed much differently by Stalin. The Soviets decided to stop the hitherto successful advance of the Soviet Army and, furthermore, to withdraw close air support from the battle for a long 40-day period, which ultimately proved decisive for the fate of the city. The Germans could, in effect, destroy Warsaw by attacking its defenseless areas.

New documents have been recently disclosed revealing once again how the Soviet Army disarmed and killed Polish partisan troops marching from the east to assist Warsaw. The Soviets refused to recognize the Warsaw partisans as combatants, although the Western Allies honored them. The war of nerves between London and Moscow lasted over a month. The British, supported by the Americans, decided to put pressure
on the Soviets to obtain permission for access to their airfields for aircraft transporting supply drops to Warsaw. The conflict over the matter finished with a single Soviet concession. The controversy over this issue between the Western Allies and Moscow has been considered by some historians as the beginning of the Cold War.

With the crushing of Warsaw by the Germans and the consequent deaths of about 200,000 of its inhabitants, all hopes for Polish sovereignty were killed after the successful conclusion of the war. Almost simultaneously, special NKVD units, one division strong, were organized on the territory liberated by the Soviet Army to fight the Polish underground. The NKVD units, at least 20,000 strong, carried out their operations all over Poland, within the country’s borders established after the war, until mid-1946—that is one year after the hostilities ceased. Many thousands of people became victims of the fighting, in direct clashes or as a consequence of pacification operations. Tens of thousands were arrested with a great many deported to the Soviet Union.

The end of World War II came in May 1945. And what about Poland? Let me remind you. The state which struggled against the Germans from the first to the last days of the war shared, in practice, the lot of the defeated enemy. It was forced to accept, against its own law and the treaties signed with the allies, a government dominated by people who were Moscow’s subordinates. The following fact may serve as a symbol of our fate. In Moscow, representatives of Great Britain and the United States were accepting, more or less under pressure, the new system of political reality imposed on Poland. At the same time, in the Spring of 1945, official representatives of the legal Polish authorities, invited to Moscow for political talks on the question of Poland’s new government, were arrested. The Commander of the Home Army, which was a legal armed force fighting in the German-occupied Poland, the President of the Underground Parliament, and the Prime Minister of the country’s Council of Ministers were given lenient sentences by Soviet standards. None of them, however, ever left Soviet prisons alive. Thirteen other Polish politicians were tried and sentenced with them.

Before Poland had been forced into Cold War structures designed and directed from Moscow, she had to suffer much more pressure. The armed underground carried out the fight over two long years. Polish society, tired of war and the invader’s crimes, rebuilt the destroyed country. At the same time, a great part of the nation, even a majority for a long time, resisted the forced regime. The Communist Polish Army was considered an unreliable organization by Moscow. Therefore, the army’s high command posts were saturated with Soviet personnel. Hence, there were mass investigations and
prosecutions which resulted in hundreds of executions. The number of victims of Stalin's purges should be increased to include those who were killed by the Nazis during the Warsaw uprising. The victims were also those displaced persons, the hundreds of thousands of soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces who did not return home after the war in fear that they might suffer the same fate as thousands of their colleagues in the east.

These are some Polish aspects on the origins of the Cold War.

ENDNOTES


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National Interest in Romanian Politics During the Cold War

Dr. Constantin Botoran

The history of Romania during the Cold War should elucidate or at least attempt to address the complex questions which during the period were incompletely, erroneously, or even falsely presented. I am referring, for instance, to the Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods, and Romania's contribution to worsening or improving relations on the continent and in the world. Neither historians, politicians, nor economists had access to archives to study documents from these periods. Communist censorship prevented them from tackling these questions; therefore wide "blank areas" exist in western responses to eastern phenomena such as the "internationalist" or "integrationalist" drives or of "specificity" and "limited sovereignty." A notable attempt to write the history of Romania during the Cold War was made by emigré historians, who published important studies that contradicted the false assertions in the works eulogizing the communist regime.

In the last few years, censorship was abolished and free access was granted to the archival records related to that period; therefore research of the communist period in the history of Romania will certainly lead to viable conclusions and cast light on the events during those years. However, the limited amount of information that could be studied and analyzed thus far has made us confine this paper to the tentative attempts made by the Romanian decision-makers to reassert Romania's national independence, which was greatly restricted at the close of World War II and in the immediately following years.

It is known that during the inter-war period, 1919–1939, Central and Eastern European countries, situated at the border between the expansion and dominant interests of the two great revisionist powers, Germany and Russia, managed to preserve their independence and even territorial integrity (except Austria and Czechoslovakia) due to a policy of balance or
to the “alliance with the strongest.” They received relative support from Great Britain and France. At the end of the period, both the “alliance with the strongest” and the “balance” between the two Great Powers proved to be insufficient. The decisive factor, as is well-known, from this viewpoint was the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 and the secret protocols which established the spheres of influence of the two Great Powers in Eastern Europe. These agreements decided on the disappearance of Poland and the three Baltic States from the map of Europe and the annexation of parts of Finland and Romania. Through this pact, Hitler gave up the German interests in the vast area stretching from the Baltic to the Danube, interests that the Germans had steadily claimed for centuries, in exchange for the freedom of fighting on a single front. “That expensive division of the spheres of influence with Russia,” Grigore Gafencu, the Romanian foreign minister noted, “is the price Mr. Ribbentrop paid to turn this slogan into real fact. Or, to be more precise, it is the price to be paid at the expense of the neighbors, who thereby contributed to the German victory [in the West].”

Actually, one year after the signing of the agreement, its provisions were put into effect in their entirety by the use of force (Poland, Finland) or threat of force (Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Thus a German-Soviet hegemonic condominium was set up over Eastern Europe. The northern flank of the condominium became formal through the pact of August 1939 and the agreement of “friendship and boundary treaty” of 29 September of that same year. In regard to the southern flank of the states included in the Balkan Entente, the spheres of interests had not been decided on. The area was open to competition which eventually led to the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. As Germany had fundamental economic (raw materials) and strategic interests in the Balkan peninsula, the Berlin government endeavored to make Moscow acknowledge them, offering in exchange to recognize Iran and the Persian Gulf as Soviet areas of interest (talks between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Molotov in November 1940 in Berlin). But the Soviets turned down the offer and, moreover, supported the anti-German tendencies in Yugoslavia. By 22 June 1941, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria had joined the Tripartite Pact, making the German hegemony official, while Turkey, which benefitted by an agreement with Great Britain (October 1939) and by an understanding with the USSR (1925) stayed neutral. However, Germany was to use the rich chrome ores from Turkey for the needs of the war.

The German hegemony over Eastern Europe and the Balkans was perpetuated throughout the war, as long as the German troops occupied the territories of the respective states. In 1944–1945, with the advance of the
Soviet troops, the German hegemony was replaced by the Soviet one, the latter action being acknowledged by the coalition’s western partners.

In April 1945, during a talk with the Yugoslav delegation headed by Tito, Stalin told his guest, “This war does not resemble the wars in the past, as anyone who occupies a territory will impose his own social system there. Each will impose his system as far as the army can advance. It cannot be otherwise.” The intention to advance beyond the frontiers of the Soviet empire not only to defeat the German troops but also to create a vast area of Soviet influence in Europe was obvious. Declarations like those made by Molotov on 2 April 1944, according to which the Soviet Army, when advancing into Romanian territory, “does not contemplate to acquire any part of the Romanian territory or to change the social order in Romania,” and the advance was “exclusively dictated by military needs” were sheer propaganda, being meant particularly for the London and Washington governments. In real fact, the USSR exported its own socio-political system (the dictatorship of the proletariat and one party system, state-ownership, command economy, etc.) to its sphere of influence. From an economic standpoint, by making use of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the communist states and satellites of Moscow succeeded in gaining notable results due to the Soviet resources (particularly energy) and the huge market. But integration attempts—a common market, a single currency, economic specialization in states or trans-state areas—were doomed to failure. Nevertheless, the Soviet endeavors to set up an integrated military system were successful. During the first stage, the armies of East European satellite states were Sovietized through the destruction of the national military establishments. Then starting in 1955, when the Warsaw Treaty Organization was set up, the rapid military integration of the Soviet hegemonic sphere occurred with a single military doctrine, standardized combat technology and weapons—all Soviet made, joint exercises and maneuvers, etc. Socio-political and military uniformity helped turn the Soviet satellites into prisoners of the Soviet empire proper and any attempt to “escape” the camp, such as with Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, were severely punished.

Worth mentioning also is the fact that the western Allies acknowledged the claims of the Soviet empire to a hegemonic sphere in Eastern Europe. The plans for the organization of the postwar world drawn up at the Foreign Office and State Department stipulated that a Great Power, like the Soviet Union, with a massive contribution to the war against Germany, must benefit by a “strategic glais,” a security belt, made up of more-or-less client states, promoting policies in agreement with the interests of the Soviet Union. The outlook of the British and American leaders took con-
crete shape in the “percentage agreement” between Churchill and Stalin in October 1944, which recognized Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria as part of the Soviet sphere of influence. Yugoslavia was recognized as an East-West condominium (50%-50%) while Greece was “ceded” by Moscow to the Western Allies. The questions still pending (relating to Poland, the occupied areas in Germany, the status of Austria) were to be decided on at Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July 1945).

Therefore, Eastern Europe, deprived of the Western “umbrella,” fell under German and then Soviet hegemony, the latter lasting for nearly half a century.

The fate of Romania, just like that of other Central and South-Eastern countries, was decided at the end of the war. “Give us a free hand in Greece,” Anthony Eden told the Soviet ambassador to London on 5 May 1944, “and you shall have a free hand in Romania.” Then the famous agreement on the “spheres of influence” in the Balkans was negotiated, and Romania was placed in the Soviet area of influence. On the same day that the British Prime Minister eulogized the Soviet government in the House of Commons “for strictly keeping its promise” (27 February 1945), Andrei Januarevitch Vishinski arrived in Bucharest. He went directly to the Royal Palace, which was surrounded by Soviet tanks, and challenged the Romanian King to dismiss Prime Minister Radescu, who was charged with plotting against the USSR. On 6 March 1945, a government dominated by communists ascended to power.

The events of 27 February 1945 at the Royal Palace were depicted in a telegram sent by Burton Berry, the American representative to Romania, to the Secretary of State on the following day. “Looking at his wrist watch, [Vishinsky] said, ‘You have exactly two hours and five minutes to make known to the public that General Radescu has been dismissed. At 8 o’clock you have to inform the public the name of his successor’... and then Vishinsky suddenly left the room, slamming the door.” The ascent to power of Petru Groza’s government was not a mere change of government but a change of an entire political regime.

On the next day a secret meeting in Bucharest of the COMINTERN—which had been allegedly dissolved in 1943, but was fairly active after that date—and the representatives of the Romanian communists worked out and discussed the plans of Romania’s Sovietization and communization.

Upon learning what had happened in Bucharest, the State Department protested and demanded that Moscow restore legality and order in Romania. Asked to intercede, Churchill answered Roosevelt that he was puzzled by the fact that the Russians had succeeded in setting up by force and false declarations a minority communist government. However, as far
as the British were concerned, they could not protest because in October 1944 they had struck a deal with the Russians to give them the upper hand in Romania. The percentage agreement of October 1944 deprived London of the possibility of a violent reaction to any events that could take place in Romania. In the end, Roosevelt agreed with the British Prime Minister since, as the President pointed out, “I also think Romania is not a good ground to measure ourselves with the Russians.”

After Romania had entered the Soviet sphere of influence as a result of the Churchill-Stalin percentage agreement and its occupation by the Red Army, the country was governed by a team of people who totally complied with the instructions received from Moscow. During 1946–1947, when disputes and rivalries between the former Allies signalled the beginning of the “Cold War,” Romania essentially was reduced to the status of a province of the Soviet Union, unable to pursue its national interests.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, Romanian diplomacy sought to change some of the provisions of the peace treaty that seriously reduced Romanian’s independence and territorial integrity, but to no avail. The Great Powers took little notice of Romanian interests. However, Romania was given one reason for satisfaction: the acknowledgement of the legitimate right to Transylvania through the abolition of the Vienna Diktat of August 1940. The Peace Treaty signed by Romania on 10 February 1947 sanctioned some of the territorial losses suffered by Romania in 1940: Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, the land of Hertza and southern Dobrudja. This dealt a heavy blow to what the Romanian nation had achieved in 1918.

The “excommunication” of Yugoslavia from the Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM) in June 1948 resulted in smothering any initiative of the “people’s democratic” states in south Europe. During the period 1947–1949, Romania concluded friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance treaties with Yugoslavia (denounced after Yugoslavia was expelled from the COMINFORM), the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary and starting in May 1955 was included in the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Soviet domination was at its fullest. The leadership team established in Bucharest by Moscow subordinated Romanian interests to the interests of the Soviet Union. Irrespective of whether they belonged to the autonomous group or came with the Red Army, the Romanian communist leaders acted, with few exceptions, as subservient instruments of the Kremlin.

Nevertheless, the scope and strictness of Soviet control and exploitation entailed some response and resistance. The Romanian statesmen who had taken action to draw Romania out of the Reich’s domination continued
to believe that the British and American governments would not abandon Romania to the mercy of the Soviet empire.

That was the reason why the leaders of the National Peasant Party and the National Liberal Party (Iuliu Maniu, Bratianu, Mihalache) openly demanded that the Romanian State preserve its independence with support from the Western countries. “At all the levels of the Romanian society,” noted General Schyler, the American representative in the Allied Control Commission, “there is great distrust of the Soviets.”10 “The Americans are coming!” was not merely a slogan but a political credo of these parties during the period 1945–1947. But the support rendered by the Western countries was far smaller than Soviet support to the forces rallied around the communist party. This was because the British-American strategic and political interests in Romania were not great enough to entail a more resolute intervention. They supported “friendly” governments in the countries bordering the Soviet Union, which they recognized as an area of Soviet military security and political influence. This also explains why the Anglo-American leaders never informed the Romanian statesmen, actuated by the ideals of democracy, that Romania had been included in the Soviet sphere of influence.

The attempt of King Michael on 20 May 1945 to remove the Groza government and the “Royal strike” that followed (the King’s refusal to sign the decrees submitted by the government) brought about the decision taken by the conference of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union in Moscow from 16 to 26 December 1945 to include in the Bucharest government two ministers without portfolio from the National Peasant Party and National Liberal Party. However, their presence in the government did not alter the reality of communist control. The American historian Paul Quinlan noted that the Moscow agreement “marks the end of western hopes in creating a democratic Romania.”11

The resistance movement against the Sovietization of the country also embraced part of the army cadres. The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party of January 1946 was informed that leaflets reading “Out with the Red Army!” were found in army garrisons. The communists in charge of political activity in the army explained that “most of the cadres—officers and noncommissioned officers—are hostile to the communist regime: some due to their very background, some due to their convictions, and a great part of them live under the permanent influence of reactionary circles.” At that time the strength of the armed forces amounted to 150,000 soldiers, 17,000 officers, and 27,000 NCOs. In addition to the active duty military, there also were reserve officers and NCOs “who during conscription are educated in a
reactionary spirit which they maintain among the peasants and workers in the towns and villages where they live.” The plenary session also pointed out that the army and the military should be won over to thoroughly support the regime out of political conviction, while those with anti-communist views had to be isolated, neutralized and finally banned from the army through manpower reductions. Many respected military leaders established anti-communist armed resistance groups which took action in the hilly and mountainous areas and were supported by the local population. An important role was played by the National Resistance Movement led by General Aldea.

But all attempts to avoid complete subordination to Moscow were doomed to failure. There was not a single field of public life—economic, political, social, cultural, etc.—that escaped Soviet surveillance and intrusion. The principles of Romania’s development “on the socialist road,” relying on the Soviet experience in this field, had been actually put forward at the National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party of October 1945. Shortly afterwards the main industrial, banking, transportation, and insurance enterprises and companies were placed under state ownership (11 June 1948). The state thus owned the overwhelming part of the national economy. Against this backdrop, measures were taken to forcefully develop industry in total disregard to the principles of economic profit and efficiency, and to plan the output and market at the central level. The almost complete neglect (until the early ‘80s), even theoretically, of quality and economic efficiency led to a structural crisis of the national economy.

In 1949, the forced collectivization of agriculture was started. The process was completed in 1962. Over 80,000 peasants who refused to join the collective agricultural cooperatives were arrested.

Political life was characterized by the dissolution, prohibition, or disappearance during 1946–1953 of all political parties and organizations, irrespective of their ideology or attitude to the program and goal of the communist party.

As for cultural life, according to the Soviet model and making use of Soviet methods, the destruction of national traditional cultural values was started. Cultural relations with western Europe were completely severed. Reputable professors and men of culture were subjected to repression or marginalized. Soviet advisors penetrated the structure and fabric of the entire Romanian society from the Council of Ministers and ministries to leadership of economic and commercial enterprises, to transportation companies, the mass media, the armed forces, the police, and secondary and higher education institutions. The sovereignty of Romania was seri-
ously impaired by the presence of the Soviet troops, which during 14 years of occupation (allegedly “to ensure liaison with the Soviet occupation army in Hungary and Austria”) represented the main instrument for Romania’s subordination to Moscow. Supported by the Soviet armies and the Moscow authorities, the Romanian Communist Party, although initially weaker than the communist parties in the other Eastern European countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, managed to monopolize political power and turn the state and the entire institutional system into instruments of its domination.

A defining feature of the Stalinist regime in Sovietized Romania was the steady strengthening of the party and state under the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Under the pretext of permanent “sharpening” of class struggle, it was possible to practice wide-scale political terrorism through the “Securitate”—an institution set up in 1948 and employing agents from Moscow. Thus, the Communist Party eliminated and liquidated its political opponents, who were labelled “enemies of the people.” The number of people arrested from 1944 until 1964 (when political prisons were abolished) seems to have amounted, according to some estimates, to at least half a million. Among the victims were officials of the previous regime, peasants hostile to collectivization, intellectuals opposing the Russification of culture, military personnel who attempted to organize the resistance against the regime, and even communists with patriotic views. Under these circumstances the national interests of the Romanian State were almost eliminated, while directions from the Kremlin took precedence over the national interests.

The deep hostility of the majority of the population to the communist regime led the communist leaders, headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, to resort in 1954–1956 to a tactical change in domestic and foreign policy. They tried to escape Moscow’s tutelage and break away from the communist bloc, but without abandoning the model of Soviet communism. The first step was to re-establish normal, “good neighbor” relations with Yugoslavia in 1954. “As a result of negotiations carried on by both parties in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, a series of problems of interest for both countries have been resolved in a positive manner. The situation at the Iron Gates, on the Danube, was resolved through a convention between the two states. A frontier convention was concluded and Romanian–Yugoslav joint commissions were set up to analyze, settle, and prevent border incidents. Likewise, a mutually advantageous agreement was reached to resume railway transportation. Diplomatic relations between Romania and Yugoslavia were normalized through an exchange of ambassadors. A directive of 18 November 1954 of the Central
Committee of the Romanian Communist Party demanded that all party cadres “avoid any behavior that might imperil the establishment of normal relations between the two countries,” such as a hostile tone or offending language concerning the political regime in Yugoslavia, Yugoslav statesmen, or the circulation of books, caricatures, inscriptions of a like character, etc. Ten years later Gheorghiu-Dej was to publicly admit the mistakes in the policy towards Yugoslavia after 1948. “It is not right to call them [the Yugoslav leaders] a gang of assassins and traitors,” Gheorghiu-Dej said at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the party of 15–24 April 1964, “It was I who held the report (referring to Yugoslavia’s note) in Budapest in 1949, but the title and many things it comprised had been indicated by our comrades [the Soviets]. We had no source of our own information. Everything came from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We could not check the facts. We took for granted everything that came from them, and we took this attitude against Yugoslavia. We learnt something and gradually we reached the belief that things were done wrong.”

However, starting in 1956, the situation began to change more substantially under the impact of two events: the de-Stalinization process launched by N.S. Khrushchev and the revolution in Hungary. Once the cult of Stalin’s personality was denounced, the nationalist current in the communist party began to strengthen, rallying around Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

After Stalin’s death, the main threat to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s authority no longer came from the inside (the pro-Moscow group had been annihilated in 1952 when it was banned from party leadership), but from Moscow. During his de-Stalinization process, Khrushchev intended to denounce the communist leaders who had been compromised during the Stalinist epoch and for that matter, Gheorghiu-Dej. In August 1955 Khrushchev paid a visit to Romania during which he insisted on the necessity to separate the party and state offices to prevent Dej from acquiring too much power. The solution Dej resorted to must have certainly irritated the Soviet leader. In October 1955, Dej “elected himself” first secretary of the party and appointed Chivu Stoica, a subservient man, as prime minister. Gradually, the relations between Khrushchev and Dej were strained as the Romanian leader strengthened his independent attitude towards Moscow. The events in Poland and Hungary (September–November 1956) strained the political and social climate in the country, the same causes that compelled the Poles and Hungarians to rise to fight were present in Romania as well. In Bucharest, Cluj, and Timisoara, students showed their solidarity with the Hungarian revolution and demanded, among other things, that they be no longer be compelled
to study Russian and Marxism in universities and that there be a general improvement in living conditions.\textsuperscript{15} Intelligence reports sent to the Army Main Political Directorate in October–November and December 1956 described the state of mind in the Romanian Army. A great number of military personnel and civilians in the army listened to the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and radio broadcasts from London and Paris, and then discussed with their comrades not only the events but also the way the regime’s propaganda tried to control information and distort the facts in Hungary and Poland, particularly the causes that brought about the two rebellions. A report of 3 November 1956 read, “Most of the hostile attitudes related to the events in Hungary are harbored by officers. Between 3 October and 2 November 1956 alone, in the Third Military Region, out of the 51 hostile attitudes, 26 belonged to officers, 20 to civilians, 9 to recruits and 6 to sergeants hired on a contract basis.”\textsuperscript{16} Some of them said the Hungarians and Poles demanded that the Soviet troops leave their countries. “Romanians, what are we waiting for? Why don’t we do what the Hungarians and Poles have done?”\textsuperscript{17}

Officers of the 285th Regiment of Oradea asked questions such as, “Why is the Soviet army staying in our country? Why are the Soviet advisors staying here? Can’t we train by ourselves? Why do they get their supplies from our country and not from the Soviet Union?”\textsuperscript{18} Other officers considered that the occasion had to be used to trigger similar movements in Romania as well. At Sibiu, leaflets appeared in a military unit reading, “Ladies and gentlemen, be ready for the removal of the Romanian People’s Party from leadership. Long live King Michael!”\textsuperscript{19} At the School for Engineer Officers of Ramnicu Valcea, Captain Smeu Petre said that “It was very good that the Hungarians have raised the workers against communism and this will happen in our country as well and the rebels will receive weapons and ammunition from the soldiers.”\textsuperscript{20} At the Bucharest Technical Academy, the military demanded that the Russians leave the country and the communists be called to account to the people. At military units in Bacău, Buzău, Constanța and Timișoara, there were hot debates concerning the moment when “what has happened in Poland and Hungary will occur in our country as well.”\textsuperscript{21} In conclusion, one of the NCOs of Regiment 54 said, “The events in Hungary confirm the fact that the communist regime is rotten, not supported by the people and if in Hungary the Russians hadn’t intervened, the communists would have gone to hell.”\textsuperscript{22} Other informative notes pointed to the fact that the Hungarian army refused to shoot at the people who demonstrated.

“The military in Hungary did not shoot at the people,” Captain Gheorghe Dobra said, “because the rebels were right. If something like
that happened here, I would not shoot at the rebels, either.” Captain Croitoru Marin demanded that “the Russians leave that country because there’s no reason to mingle in the domestic affairs of the Hungarians.” Most comment and blame was focused on the brutal intervention of the Soviet Army in quelling the revolution.

An intelligence report of 1 November 1956 referred to the “inimical acts” and the “tendentious questions” of some military and civilian employees in the Romanian armed forces, over which the political and military authorities worried a great deal.

They were related to the following issues: “the presence and involvement of Soviet troops in the events in Hungary; the promotion of liberal ideas as regards the leadership of the democratic popular state; the tendency to regard the right to national and state independence and sovereignty of the countries in the socialist camp as anti-Soviet actions and statements; the rebirth of nationalism, chauvinism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Sovietism under various forms; support to the activities of counter-revolutionary and fascist gangs (the revolutionary forces) in Hungary, which are considered as possible of occurring in other people’s democratic states, the Romanian People’s Republic included.” These conclusions forwarded by army intelligence services to the political and military decision-makers could not fail to produce results. Many of the “inimical elements” in the ranks of the intelligentsia, student population, and the military were arrested in 1956.

Opposed to de-Stalinization, frightened at the ease with which Moscow had changed over several months and the change in leadership in Budapest (Rakosi, Gero, Nagy, Kadar), and concerned about the discontent in the country, Gheorghiu-Dej realized that as long as Romania was a Soviet satellite, his power was threatened. To ensure his power was the goal originally motivating his separation from Moscow, which started in 1956 and continued with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the country in 1958.

According to the Paris Peace Treaty (1947), Soviet troops were to remain in Romania until a neutrality treaty was concluded with Austria. After the Austrian State Treaty was concluded, the Soviet troops withdrew from that country (Geneva 1954), a new juridical basis was immediately provided to allow the stationing of the Red Army in Romania through the setting up of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

In August 1955, during the official visit to Bucharest of the first-secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Emil Bodnárs, the minister of the Romanian Armed Forces, asked out of the blue, “What is your opinion about your troops’ leaving Romania?” At this, according to Gheorghiu-Dej’s memoirs, Khrushchev “jumped to his feet, very red in the
face, and called us all nationalists, anti-Soviets, and said, "so far you have felt well under the wing of the Soviet Union and now you kick her out?" He left very nervous and went to the airport. 24 Several months later, in November 1955 when a Romanian delegation was in Moscow to attend the 7 November celebration, Emil Bodnăras, the head of the delegation, was invited to see Khrushchev and the latter told him (Bulganin, the president of the government was also present), "Comrade Bodnăras, we have decided to withdraw the Soviet troops from Romania’s territory. But this is not as a result of the fact that you raised the question, but because we reached the conclusion that we have to withdraw." The withdrawal took place during the period 15 June–15 July. In the departure garrisons and in the frontier posts—Braila-Galati, Focsani, Ramnicu Sarat, Iasi—big rallies were organized in which speeches were made by Romanian state and party leaders and by commanders of the Romanian and Russian troops. In the railway stations, honor companies from the Romanian armed forces, with flags, paid honor to the departing trains. 25

The departure of the Soviets from Romania was equivalent to a semi-liberation from the “allied occupant” and was followed by gradual action to achieve national independence. This explains the new demarches in Romanian foreign policy to expand diplomatic relations and develop economic ties outside the socialist camp. In this context we should refer to the message addressed by the Romanian government on 10 September 1957 to the governments of the Balkan states, inviting the representatives of these states to hold a top-level conference to discuss the most important problems inhibiting the relations between some of them and implicitly the general political climate in the area. 26 Mention should also be made of the Romanian initiatives at the UN, such as, “Regional Actions To Improve the Relations Between States with Different Social Orders” (August 1960), the conclusion of an understanding between the European members of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact (1960), measures to increase East-West international trade, the reduction of tariffs (1964), and others.

The Romanian foreign policy actions were hindered, however, by the great eastern neighbor who would not accept even moderate forms of sovereignty from a country that had escaped the pressures of the occupation army. In order to offset Soviet pressures, Romania tried to promote rapprochement with China. The Chinese communists chose the Romanian capital as the venue to express a very powerful anti-Soviet attack (1960) and then sent to Romania several economic and political delegations (1962, 1963). In early 1964 Gheorghiu-Dej offered to mediate in the Chinese-Soviet conflict and sent emissaries to Beijing for this purpose (March). Friendship between Romania and China undermined, according
to Soviet views, the European-Soviet structure which the Soviet had strictly controlled until the early ‘60s. At the plenary session of the Central Committee of the RCP of 17 February 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej referred to a meeting with some American personalities, who opening a talk about his intercession with the Soviet and Chinese to settle their issues, asked him, “What do you think, Mr. Dej. This conflict and the state of affairs between China and Russia are going to push Russia closer to us, aren’t they?”

The Chinese schism gave rise to a new element in Romanian-Soviet relations and allowed Bucharest to take a large step forward on the road to a policy in keeping with national interests. In April 1964 the “Declaration of the Romanian Communists” was published, asserting the need to ground relations between the Socialist countries on the principles of observing independence, equal rights, non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, and mutual respect and advantage. The declaration also rejected any encroachment on national independence, any impairment of territorial integrity, and any practices that undermined the fundamental attributes of state sovereignty. Romania demanded the acknowledgement of national specificity, of diversity of conditions and goals of development. Western political commentators noted that the “April Declaration” was equivalent to a true “declaration of independence,” an unequivocal answer of the Romanian government to Moscow’s plans of economic integration, and, more precisely, plans to integrate the Eastern European communist states in an economy controlled by the Soviets. In fact, it was an answer to any new attempt to subordinate them to the USSR.

According to the international division of labor and to the Valev plan, Romania was to have an “exclusively agrarian” role. In the face of such a prospect, Bucharest reacted promptly and effectively. As Western analysts admitted, the “April Declaration” of 1964 “was partly an effort to discourage Moscow to further initiate any campaign regarding supernational organization and unequivocally asserted national control over Romania’s economic and political affairs.” The debate occasioned by the Declaration redefined the relations between Romania and the Soviet Union.

Therefore, starting in 1965, the year when Gheorghiu-Dej died, it can be argued that Romanian foreign policy embarked on a new course, asserting the country’s independence and its difference from the course the other East-European countries were pursuing. The “Iron Curtain” was raised and multiple links with the Western countries were established. Economically, Romania opposed the integrationalism and specialization demanded by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and asserted its determination to promote rapid industrialization, particularly with Western support. At home, although the domestic structures were not essentially
different from the Soviet ones, a timid liberalization was inaugurated, as
the party cautiously allowed small attempts to restore and rehabilitate the
Romanian traditional values.

All this proves that there was an objective and progressive overlapping
between the interests of the leadership team in Bucharest and Romanian
national interests, first and foremost in regards to the regaining of national
independence. Any step toward escaping the Kremlin's smothering tute­
lage was seen as an act in the service of the national interest, even if the
leadership was rather more concerned with preserving its power than with
promoting the national interest.

Nicolae Ceausescu, Gheorghiu-Dej’s successor, more consistently pur­
sued this policy. In the outlook of the new leader, the first element of the
above-mentioned triad of independence, security, and prosperity enjoyed
absolute primacy. The period between 1965 and 1974 witnessed spectacu­
lar Romanian diplomatic initiatives which earned Romania the respect of
the international community and a special status in the socialist camp.
Prominent leaders such as de Gaulle (1968), Richard Nixon, and Gerald
Ford came to the Romanian capital to discuss questions of international
interest and to show Western good will and economic support. The limits
of Soviet tolerance were greatly tested as the Romanians continued to fur­
ther preserve their neutrality in the Russian-Chinese dispute, to promote
rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and to resolutely defend the Dubchek
experiment—which nevertheless they avoided putting into practice—and
the right of the Czechoslovak communists to implement the reform pro­
gram they contemplated.29

As a matter of fact, Romania was the only Warsaw Treaty member
which did not take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Rapprochement with Bonn and the initiation of diplomatic relations
with West Germany in 1967 at a time when no socialist country had such
ties; the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Israel after the Six-Day
War; the refusal to participate in Warsaw Pact military exercises and to
allow such exercises to take place on Romanian territory and the concur­
rent upholding of the idea of the simultaneous dissolution of military
blocs; the economic agreements with West Germany (1966); adhesion to
GATT (1971), the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (1972),
and a preferential commercial agreement with the Common Market (1973)
were singular, courageous Romanian deeds which irritated the Kremlin.

“We were going through a period of political and intellectual openness
towards the West, and therefore of economic, technological and scientific
development, beneficial for the country,” Ion Iliescu recollects. It may be
said that during that period Romania was in the vanguard of the countries
of the socialist bloc as regards emancipation from Soviet tutelage and the search for ways to reform the system. When in 1968, Romania openly and categorically condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and defended "communism with a human face," divorce with Soviet hegemony was overt and convincing, and around the RCP there was a real national cohesion.

However, mention should be made the fact that, although annoying to Moscow, Romania's independent policy essentially did not damage the interests of the Soviet Union, which was concerned rather with preserving the socialist system as a whole. The Soviets were more upset by the domestic changes in Poland and Czechoslovakia than by Romania's defiance, which did not jeopardize the general interests of communism. Indeed, while the Bucharest regime defied Russian tutelage several times, the domestic communist structures were preserved almost intact throughout those years. Moreover, foreign policy proved to be a paravane behind which Nicolae Ceausescu and his team skillfully established a dictatorial regime of unprecedented totalitarianism in Romania.

The aggravation of the megalomaniac leadership negatively affected the third component of national interest—prosperity. While industrialization was initially a means to change Romania's condition as an agrarian country, the building of industrial giants for which the country had neither the raw materials nor the necessary technologies, brought about imbalances in the national economy. They were worsened by the simplistic perception of economic independence as the lack of any foreign debt, Ceausescu's resolution to pay off foreign debt quickly, and his vanity to rapidly build an industrial base, all greatly affected the fragile economic balance. The Romanian people were subjected to many privations, which naturally triggered hostility towards the regime. The increasingly repressive character of the domestic policy, the pronounced personality cult, and the failure to find solutions for the economic crisis, gradually reduced the political standing of the dictatorial team which found itself more and more isolated both at home and in the international arena.

With the onset of the perestroika, Moscow's repeated demands that the whole socialist camp should start to reform the malfunctioning socialist system were seen in Bucharest as a reformist variant of the Brezhnev doctrine which had to be repudiated. Thus, while social renovation was underway in most of the socialist countries to shape their European identity and personality, the regime in Romania continued to remain adamant against reforming ideas.

Therefore, unlike the hopeful openness of the '60s when it was somewhat in the vanguard of South-East Europe, Romania came to be one of
the most closed and “Stalinist” societies, a caricature of the detested model. She made up by herself a “bloc” within the eastern “socialist bloc,” an immobile island in a world which was nevertheless moving and asking great questions about the rights and freedoms of people. Romania, autarchic up to the point of suffocation, became more and more isolated. But a dictator is blind to the signs of history.

During the ‘80s Ceausescu did his utmost to keep Romania out of reach of the great changes in Europe. We may even say that during these years the repressive and dictatorial features of the Romanian regime deepened. This was probably due to the absence of reform forces able to lead the discontented population and put pressure on the decision-makers, as well as to a powerful and numerous internal police which barred and annihilated any attempt at change, however small, in the policy of the regime.

To conclude, we may say that in the late ‘80s Romania was in the midst of a general crisis in which any reform or progress was obstructed by the anti-popular policy of Ceausescu’s totalitarian regime which pursued but a single goal—to preserve power. All the structures of Romanian society—economic, political, social, cultural, institutional—showed signs of stagnation. Ceausescu’s refusal to engage in reform brought him into conflict with both Moscow and Western Europe. Isolated internationally and faced with the hostility of the great majority of the population, the fall of the Romanian dictator and the totalitarian regime he had set up became inevitable. The Revolution of 1989 marked the beginning of a new period in the history of Romania characterized by deep changes of renewal that are aimed at building a free, democratic and prosperous society.

ENDNOTES

1. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Record Group 71 (Romania), vol. 8, Promemona drawn up by Grigore Gafencu, 13 July 1940.
5. See Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu, Dupa hegemonie, Patru scenari de securitate pentru Europa de Est in anii ’90 (Bucuresti, 1993), p. 68.
13. Arch.MND, Records of Army Higher Political Directorate (hereafter ANPD), microfilms, reel P II 5.1066, c. 130, 131 (Directives of the CC of the RPP of November 18, 1954).
15. Arch.MND, reel P. II 5.1148, c. 104 (Intelligence report No. 29, October 29, 1956); P. II 5.1147, c. 176 (Intelligence report of November 22, 1956).
17. Ibid., c. 113
18. Arch.MND, reel P. II 5.1147, c. 111 (Intelligence report No. 126 of November 2, 1956).
19. Arch.MND, reel P. II 5.1147, c. 174 (Intelligence report No. 139 of November 20, 1956)
20. Arch.MND, reel P. II 5.1147, c. 736 (Intelligence report No. 139 of November 8, 1956)
22. Arch.MND, reel P. II 5.1148, c. 107 (Intelligence report No. 122 of October 31, 1956)
26. "Scintea" of 17 September 1957. Romania’s proposal was received in various ways. Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia agreed with the idea of a top-level conference and of the regional understanding; Greece and Turkey rejected the Romanian proposal and the Conference never took place.
27. Arch.MND, record group No. 121, microfilm reel 205, c. 45 (Stenograph of the Plenary Meeting of the CC of the RPP of February 17, 1964).
28. Ion Petcu, op. cit., p. 151
29. For further details, see Titu Georgescu, Romania intre Yalta si Malta (Bucuresti, 1993), pp. 177–195.
31. "Tribuna economica," No. 10, 9 March 1990, pp. 4–5,
List of Contributors

AJNENKIEL, Andrzej. Director, Military History Institute of the Polish Armed Forces, Warsaw, Poland. Dr. Ajnenkiel has a doctorate in History and Law. He has written extensively on modern Polish history and has served as the President of the Polish Historical Society (1988–1991).

BARTNIK, Colonel Andrzej. Chief of the Central Military Archive, Warsaw, Poland. Colonel Bartnik is a Polish Air Force Colonel and has served on the Polish Armed Forces General Staff. He has a master’s degree in economics and archives. He has published several articles concerning the Polish Central Military Archive.

BOTORAN, Constantin. Senior Researcher, Institute for Military History and Theory, Ministry of Defense, Bucharest, Romania. Dr. Botoran received his doctorate in history in 1972 from the University of Bucharest. He has numerous publications on Romania in the inter-war years and has been an associate professor of history at the University of Bucharest.

BRILEV, Colonel N.P. Chief, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Podolsk, Russian Federation. Colonel Brylev served on the former Soviet General Staff and since the breakup of the Soviet Union has served previously as Deputy Director of the Central Archive before assuming his current position. He has published several articles in Russian periodicals.

CAMPBELL, Isabel. Senior Archival Officer, Office of the Director of General History, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada. Ms. Campbell has a master’s degree in history and library science. She has served previously as the Acting Head of Manuscript Division of the National Archives of Canada and has published several articles on the Canadian military during the Cold War.

CAVALCANTE, Bernard F. Chief, Operational Archives Division, U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Mr. Cavalcante received his bachelor’s degree from Georgetown University and served for 6 years in the Marine Corps. Mr. Cavalcante has been working with the archives of the Naval Historical Center for 35 years.
FRANK, Benis M. Chief Historian, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Mr. Frank is a graduate of the University of Connecticut and served as a Marine in World War II and the Korean War. He has been an historian with the Marine Corps since 1961, becoming Chief Historian in 1991. He is the author of numerous books and articles on the U.S. Marine Corps.

GRABOSKE, Frederick J. Head Archivist, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Mr. Graboske received his master's degree in American history from Catholic University and worked at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. for 16 years. He became Head Archivist at the Marine Corps Historical Center in 1992.

GUELTON, Lieutenant Colonel Frédéric. Head of the History Department, St. Cyr Écoles de Coëtquidan, France. Lt. Col. Guelton has a doctorate in history and has taught history at St. Cyr since 1989.

HARDING, John. Historian and Deputy Head of the Army Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London, U.K. Mr. Harding received his master's degree in history at King's College and worked in the National Army Museum and the Imperial War Museum in London before joining the Army Historical Branch in 1979. He also served as an officer in the British Territorial Army.

KEHRIG, Manfred. Director, Military Archives, Federal Archives of Germany, Freiburg, Germany. Dr. Kehrig received his doctorate in history from the University of Cologne. He served twenty years in the Bundeswehr including four years as an historian with the Military History Research Office. Dr. Kehrig has been Director of Military Archives since 1980.

HEIMDAHL, William C. Chief, Reference Division, U.S. Air Force Historical Office, Washington, D.C. Mr. Heimdahl received his master's degree from George Washington University and has worked as an historian and archivist at the Naval Historical Center and the National Archives. He joined the Air Force Historical Office in 1978.

HEINEMANN, Major Winfried. Historian and editor, Military History Research Office, Potsdam, Germany. Major Heinemann received his master's degree from London University and has served in the German Army since 1983. He joined the Military History Research Office in 1986 where he is an historian and the editor of two military periodicals.
HORVÁTH, András. Chief Archivist, Military History Institute and Museum of the Hungarian Army, Budapest, Hungary. Dr. Horváth received his doctorate from the University of Budapest and has worked as an archivist for over twenty years. He has written many articles and books on aspects of Hungarian history.

HRBÉK, Jaroslav. Deputy Director, Research Branch, Historical Institute of the Army of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic. Dr. Hrbek eventually completed his doctorate in history in 1985 at Charles University in Prague after being expelled by the communists in 1976. He has written books and articles on diverse historical subjects such as the Falklands War and the Battle of Kursk.

KAPLAN, Lawrence S. Professor Emeritus of History and Director Emeritus of the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies at Kent State University, Ohio. Dr. Kaplan received his doctorate from Yale University and is the author of several books on NATO history. He is currently preparing a study of Robert S. McNamara's first four years as Secretary of Defense for the series, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

LANDA, Ronald D. Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. Dr. Landa received his doctorate in history from Georgetown University in 1971. He has taught at College Misericordia in Pennsylvania and at George Washington University. He was a member of the U.S. Department of State for fourteen years before joining the Historical Staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1987. He is currently working on a study of U.S. policy toward the Polish Underground during World War II.

MAKOVSKII, Colonel V.B. Deputy Chief of the Historical Archives and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Moscow. Colonel Makovskii is a military historian who has held key historical posts in the former Soviet Army and the current Russian Federation. He has served as chiefs of the Historical Division and the Military Science Directorate, General Headquarters. He has also written extensively on the Great Patriotic War.

MARCINKOWSKI, Colonel Adam. Chief, Contemporary History Branch, Military History Institute of the Polish Armed Forces, Warsaw, Poland. Colonel Marcinkowski is a Polish Air Force officer with a doctorate in history. He has written extensively on Poland during the Cold War and the role of Poland in the Warsaw Pact.
MAROLDA, Edward J. Chief, Contemporary History Branch, U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. Dr. Marolda received his doctorate from George Washington University. He has served with the Naval Historical Center since 1971 and has written extensively on the U.S. Navy during the Vietnam War.

MENNING, Bruce W. Instructor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Dr. Menning received his doctorate from Duke University in Russian history, taught at Miami (Ohio) University for twelve years, and has been with the Command and Staff College since 1984, including five years as the Director of the Soviet Army Studies Office. Dr. Menning has written extensively on Soviet/Russian military history including a book, *Bayonets Before Bullets: the Imperial Russian Army, 1861–1914*, published in 1992.

MUKHIN, Colonel V.V. Chief, Historical Archives, Historical Archives and Military Memorial Center of the General Staff, Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Moscow. Colonel Mukhin has served in a wide variety of military and historical posts in the Soviet/Russian Army. He has written on many aspects of Soviet military history in World War II, including wartime cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

OKVÁTH, Imre. Research Fellow, Military History Institute and Museum of the Hungarian Army, Budapest, Hungary. Dr. Okváth received his doctorate from the University of Budapest. He has written extensively on Hungary during the Cold War.

OSCA, Lieutenant Colonel Alexandru. Chief, Archives Department, Ministry of Defense, Bucharest, Romania. Lt.Col. Osca is a graduate of the Romanian Military Academy and has served on the history faculty of the University of Bucharest. He has written articles on the Romanian military in World War I and during the Cold War.

PEDLOW, Gregory W. Chief, Historical Office, Supreme headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Brussels, Belgium. Dr. Pedlow received his doctorate in history from Johns Hopkins University and taught at the University of Nebraska. He served as an historian with the Central Intelligence Agency for over three years before assuming his current position in 1989. Dr. Pedlow has written a number of books and articles on U.S. intelligence operations and on modern European history.

PILAT, Vladimir. Head, Department of Contemporary History, Historical Institute of the Czech Army, Prague, Czech Republic. Dr. Pilat received his doctorate from Charles University in Prague and served with the Historical Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences until 1991. He has written extensively on modern Czech history.
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

POOLE, Walter S. Chief, Joint Staff Historical Branch, Joint History Office, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. Dr. Poole received his doctorate in history from the University of Pennsylvania and has served as an historian on the Joint Staff for over 25 years. He has written several volumes in the series, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*.

PUČIK, Major Miloslav. Researcher/Historian, Institute of History, Slovak Army, Bratislava, Slovak Republic. Major Pučik received his degree from University of Bratislava where he also taught history. He has written articles and books on the military history of Slovakia.

RAINES, Edgar F., Jr. Historian, Histories Division, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. Dr. Raines received his doctorate in history from the University of Wisconsin and has worked at the Center of Military History since 1980. Dr. Raines has written extensively on U.S. Army history and is currently completing a book on Army aviation.

SAMPSON, Charles S. Chief, European Division, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. Dr. Sampson received his doctorate from the University of Massachusetts. He has worked as an historian with the State Department for many years compiling and editing volumes in the *Foreign Relations of United States* series concentrating on U.S.-German relations from 1948–1963.

SCHOENMAKER, Benjamin. Historian, Historical Section, Royal Netherlands Army, The Hague, Netherlands. Dr. Schoenmaker received his doctorate from Leiden University where he also taught European history. Dr. Schoenmaker is a Dutch Army reserve officer and has written extensively on the Dutch Army during the Cold War.

SIBILLE, Claire. Archivist, French Army Historical Service, Paris, France. Ms. Sibille is a trained archivist and has served with the French Army Historical Service since 1992. She has published several archival articles in French historical periodicals.

THOMPSON, Edwin A. Archival Consultant to NATO. Mr. Thompson was the Director of the Records Declassification Division at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration for 18 years prior to his retirement in 1990. He became an archival consultant to NATO in 1991.

TROTNOW, Helmut. Director, German Historical Museum and Project Director, Allied Museum, Berlin, Germany. Dr. Trotnow received his doctorate from the London School of Economics. He has served with the German Historical Museum in Berlin since 1987. He has written extensively on modern German history and on Berlin during the Cold War.
VAN SWERINGEN, Bryan T. Command Historian, United States European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. Dr. Van Sweringen received his doctorate in political science from the Free University in Berlin. He has served as an archivist in the National Archives and as a Command Historian in two other major commands before assuming his current position in 1991. He has authored official command histories and written on intelligence and psychological warfare during World War II and the Cold War.

WOLK, Herman S. Senior Historian, Center for Air Force History, Washington, D.C. Mr. Wolk served as an historian for seven years with the Strategic Air Command before joining the Center for Air Force History in 1966. He is the author and editor of several books on Air Force history.

YASAMEE, Heather. Head, Historical Branch, Library and Records Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, U.K. Mrs. Yasamee received her degree from Oxford University and has been an historian with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 1973. She has edited many volumes of the official British post-war series of diplomatic documents: Documents on British Policy Overseas.

ZOLOTAREV, Major General V.A. Director of the Institute of Military History, Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation, Moscow. General Zolotarev received his doctorate in history from the Academy of Natural Science of Russia. He has served in a wide variety of posts in the Soviet/Russian Army as well as in the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact. He has also written some 120 articles on Russian military history.