Cover: A soldier from the 82d Airborne Division keeps watch over his sector, providing security as fellow soldiers search a compound in Afghanistan for weapons and suspected Taliban fighters.

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All illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense.
Introduction

Fiscal year (FY) 2003 was a pivotal year for the U.S. Army. Even as it laid the groundwork for a more distant future, the Army began to change in significant ways. The second year of the Global War on Terrorism that saw American troops fighting in two theaters spurred new initiatives and accelerated existing ones, as Army leaders adapted to meet short-term needs and learned to manage the practicalities and repercussions of large overseas commitments that would not soon end.

During the year, the Army continued to supply troops for operations in Afghanistan and, after building up a sizable force in the Persian Gulf region, played a key role in defeating Iraq’s military and ousting Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. The increasing violence against American soldiers that followed the end of major combat operations, however, posed challenges for Army leaders and raised questions about the advisability of rapidly drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq as the administration of President George W. Bush had originally planned. All told, the Army deployed approximately two-thirds of its active and reserve combat formations during the fiscal year. More than twenty-four of the Army’s thirty-three active component brigade combat teams and five of its reserve component enhanced separate brigades deployed.

To deal with the personnel requirements of the two conflicts, the Army issued stop-movement and stop-loss orders that kept thousands of soldiers from transferring to new duty stations or leaving the Army. Special bonuses retained soldiers needed for current operations. During the summer, Army leaders announced that henceforth overseas unit deployments would last one year rather six months. Late in the year, the new U.S. Army chief of staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, accelerated the implementation of a new unit manning initiative and began restructuring Army forces in accordance with fundamentally different force design concepts. Throughout the year, the Army’s morale, welfare, and recreation staff shipped sports equipment, reading materials, and other supplies overseas for deployed soldiers and ran Family Assistance Centers and other services for the loved ones they left behind. Growing concerns about the impact of lengthy deployments on the mental health of soldiers led Army leaders to set up a new reintegration program and additional support services for
troops and their families. The Army also launched a ground-breaking mental health study after a number of soldiers in Iraq committed suicide.

At the same time, the Army achieved key objectives in a process that then Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki had set in motion in 1999 to transform the service to make the most of new technologies and respond to the changed conditions and requirements of a post–Cold War world. The Army continued to reorganize, establishing organizations to oversee Army installations, network operations, and contracting. U.S. Army Forces Command certified the first of the service’s new medium-weight units, the first Stryker brigade combat team, as ready to deploy. The Army also invested heavily in forward-looking science and technology initiatives aimed at changing the way the Army’s force of the future would operate. Most significantly, the service accomplished an important goal in its Future Combat Systems program, which was tasked with developing a networked system of vehicles, munitions, and sensors that would equip the Army’s future combat units and help create a lighter, more rapidly deployable force. A favorable decision from the under secretary of defense permitted the existing science and technology program to become a formal acquisition program.
FY 2003 brought significant changes in the senior leadership of the Department of the Army, as the service’s top civilian official and top military leader both departed. On 25 April 2003, Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White submitted his resignation at the request of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. Following Secretary White’s departure on 9 May, Under Secretary of the Army Romie Leslie “Les” Brownlee served as acting secretary of the Army. President George W. Bush nominated Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche to succeed White; however, by the end of the fiscal year, the U.S. Senate had not yet confirmed Roche as the Army’s new secretary.

On 11 June, General Shinseki’s term as chief of staff of the Army came to an end. During the weeks that followed, Vice Chief of Staff General John M. Keane served as acting chief. On 31 July, the Senate unanimously confirmed General Peter J. Schoomaker as General Shinseki’s successor, and General Schoomaker was sworn in as the thirty-fifth chief of staff of the Army the next day. General Schoomaker had retired from the Army in December 2000 after serving as the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. He returned to active duty at Secretary Rumsfeld’s request.

In keeping with the service’s transformation objectives, Army leaders continued to implement a sweeping reorganization program initiated in FY 2001. In May 2001, Secretary White had created a Realignment Task Force to review Army organizations and offer recommendations for streamlining decision-making processes, improving resource management, and achieving other efficiencies. The task force worked in three phases. Phase I concentrated on the headquarters of the Department of the Army, Phase II on field operating agencies, and Phase III on major commands. The Army had begun carrying out many of the task force’s Phase I recommendations in FY 2002, but FY 2003 also brought important changes.
In accordance with General Orders 4 signed by Secretary White in August 2002, the Army activated the new Installation Management Agency (IMA) on 1 October 2002. Previously, the Army’s fifteen major commands had been responsible for providing base support, and there were no common standards for garrison support, housing, or morale, welfare, and recreation operations. Consequently, installation commanders often diverted sustainment, restoration, and maintenance funds to augment insufficient training and operational funds, which resulted in variable quality of life at installations. Army leaders now assigned responsibility for the service’s 184 installations worldwide to the IMA, which would operate through seven subordinate regional commands. The Army established the new agency as a field operating agency under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, with Maj. Gen. Anders B. Aadland as its first director. Its mission was to provide equitable, efficient, and effective management of all Army installations in order to support readiness; enable the well-being of soldiers, civilians, and family members; improve infrastructure; and preserve the environment. With the new agency in place, the Army planned to transform its installation management operations gradually over several years.

On 1 October 2002, the Army also redesignated the U.S. Army Signal Command as the Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)/9th Army Signal Command. The new command integrated tactical and strategic units from the Signal Command with major offices from the Army Chief Information Officer’s staff and information management personnel from various Army commands and functional agencies. The Army established the new organization to create a single authority to operate and manage its information technology resources. NETCOM was to operate, maintain, and defend the service’s communications networks and to assume responsibility for technically integrating the capabilities for command, control, communications, and computers.
(C4) throughout the Army. Maj. Gen. James C. Hylton became the first commander of NETCOM, which was headquartered at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, but also maintained a strong presence in the National Capital Region.

Designed to work closely with both IMA and NETCOM was yet another new organization. On 1 October 2002, the Army formally activated the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) as a field operating agency under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. The new agency took on a broad range of contracting-related responsibilities. It consolidated into one authority all contracting activities from the Military District of Washington, United States Military Academy, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Seventh Army, Third Army, Eighth Army, U.S. Army South, and U.S. Army Pacific. It provided installation contracting for designated U.S. Army Materiel Command and U.S. Army Medical Command installations, the Army Chief Information Officer, NETCOM, and certain program executive offices. In support of the new IMA, the ACA supplied base operations contracting support for major installations worldwide. The Army also assigned the agency responsibility for contingency contracting operations. A subordinate entity, the Information Technology, E-Commerce, and Commercial Contracting Center, was to handle purchasing of common-use information technology and commercial items for the entire Army. Army leaders expected the ACA to eliminate redundancies, improve the quality of Army contracts, ensure an emphasis on small businesses, consolidate purchasing to exploit economies of scale, and maximize efficiencies by reducing management overhead and realigning personnel.

Secretary White announced reorganization decisions resulting from the realignment review’s Phase II and Phase III deliberations on 30 January 2003. Key among these, five major commands would lose their major command status and become direct reporting units
to Army staff principals. The U.S. Army Medical Command would report to the Surgeon General; the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command would report to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G–2; the Military District of Washington would report to the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army; NETCOM would report to the Office of the Army Chief Information Officer/G–6; and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command would report to the Provost Marshal General, a new position on the headquarters staff. Although Army leaders had also reached preliminary decisions regarding the realignment of other major command headquarters, they were awaiting feedback from the commands before announcing details. Only the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command were to remain unchanged. The Army expected to implement most of the initiatives in FY 2004.

On 9 April 2003, Army leaders announced plans to create a single command to perform the functions of both the active Army’s Total Army Personnel Command and the Army Reserve Personnel Command. They intended to combine the two organizations into one field operating agency under the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G–1, with the goal of providing integrated and interoperable personnel policies and procedures for active and reserve personnel. The Army National Guard would also integrate functions where feasible, and Army leaders expected the Civilian Personnel Operations Center Management Agency to merge into the organization at some future date. These reorganization plans resulted from a recommendation made by the Human Resources Integrated Process Team that Army leaders had convened in 2002 as part of the service’s realignment review to examine ways the Army could streamline its management of uniformed and civilian personnel. Army leaders would officially establish the new agency, the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, on 2 October 2003.

In other reorganizations during FY 2003, U.S. Army South relocated from Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. U.S. Army Forces Command continued to serve as the Army service component command of U.S. Joint Forces Command, but also became the Army component and Joint Force Land Component Command of the newly formed U.S. Northern Command. The Department of Defense activated U.S. Northern Command on 1 October 2002. Responsible for homeland defense, its area of operations included the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, parts of the Caribbean, and waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles from the shore of North America. The new combatant command achieved full operational capability on 1 October 2003.
Management

In October 2002, Secretary White approved a plan designed to privatize certain Department of the Army jobs by enabling private firms to compete for all “noncore” Army positions, that is, positions not directly related to a unit’s mission, such as accounting, maintenance, and communications. At the time, more than 154,000 civilians and 58,000 military personnel performed these jobs. The Army commands were to formulate plans for opening all noncore positions to private competition and to provide a rationale for exempting selected functions, with the secretary to approve all of the plans by March 2003. As part of the review process, Army leaders also intended to identify jobs that could be converted from military to civilian positions, so that they could shift trained soldiers to duties requiring military skills. The Army called the initiative the “Third Wave,” in reference to two previous outsourcing efforts in the 1980s and 1990s, and cited three reasons for it: to obtain noncore products and services from the private sector to permit Army leaders to focus on the service’s core competencies, or those functions the Army performed better than anyone else; to support President Bush’s management agenda; and to free up resources for the Global War on Terrorism. The initiative stalled, however, when Secretary White resigned in April, and the Army had launched no major outsourcing programs by the end of the fiscal year.

Budget

In the budget request it submitted to Congress in February 2002, the Army requested $91 billion in total obligation authority for FY 2003, an amount that was nearly $10 billion more than Congress had appropriated to date for FY 2002. Army planners believed this sum would support the current authorized end strengths of the service’s active and reserve components, while providing for a 4.1 percent pay raise for military personnel and allowing for targeted raises by grade and years of service. The budget also covered increased housing allowances to reduce out-of-pocket expenses for military personnel from 11.3 percent in FY 2002 to 7.5 percent in FY 2003, in accordance with Army plans to eliminate average out-of-pocket costs completely by FY 2005 for soldiers and families who resided off post. The budget supported readiness by funding training, critical training enablers, and ongoing operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Army leaders also planned to purchase vehicles for the Army’s third Stryker brigade combat team and to invest heavily in the Comanche helicopter, the (later canceled) Crusader self-propelled howitzer, and unmanned aerial
vehicles. They intended to apply 97 percent of all Army science and technology funding toward the design and development of the Army’s transformed force of the future, known as the Objective Force, and enabling technologies, and believed that this level of funding would permit them to begin fielding the Objective Force before the end of the decade. President Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–314) on 2 December 2002.

The FY 2004 budget request submitted by the Army to Congress in February 2003 as part of the president’s budget asked for $93.9 billion in total obligation authority, or $3 billion more than Congress had appropriated to date for FY 2003 (Table 1). The “central theme” of the budget, the Army explained, was “meeting today’s threats while preparing for tomorrow’s challenges.” It funded a “balanced plan” that supported winning the war on terrorism, maintaining readiness, taking care of people, and transforming the Army. In addition to funding the Army’s authorized end strength for active and reserve forces, the budget would finance an average pay raise of 4.1 percent for military personnel. Increases in housing allowances would further reduce out-of-pocket expenses for military personnel from 7.5 percent in FY 2003 to 3.5 percent in FY 2004. Key provisions of the budget supported continued training activities, financed operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and funded vehicle purchases for the fourth Stryker brigade combat team and further development of the Comanche helicopter. The budget allocated more than $1.8 billion to the service’s top research, development, and acquisition priority, the Future Combat Systems program. Committed to its transformation strategy, the Army reported that it planned to be selective in its modernization and recapitalization efforts for the current force, while still retaining efforts sufficient to satisfy essential readiness requirements. It intended to terminate twenty-four programs and restructure twenty-four others during the FY 2004 to FY 2009 timeframe and to reinvest the $22 billion in savings in higher-priority programs associated with Army transformation. In FY 2004, cancellations would yield $1.6 billion and restructuring efforts $600 million.

There was much that was not included in the FY 2004 president’s budget. Most importantly, the Defense Department’s budget covered only a portion of the homeland defense activities performed by the Army as part of Operation Noble Eagle and included no funding for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan or for potential operations in Iraq. Army leaders, moreover, believed that the shortfalls went beyond this. When congressional leaders subsequently asked for the services’ annual assessment of unfunded requirements, General Shinseki suggested that the FY 2004 budget request left the Army underfunded.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appropriation</th>
<th>FY 2003</th>
<th>FY 2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel, Army⁵</td>
<td>27,088</td>
<td>37,389</td>
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<td>24,965</td>
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<td>Procurement</td>
<td>12,280</td>
<td>10,755</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>(2,061)</td>
<td>(2,128)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>(1,642)</td>
<td>(1,459)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>(2,248)</td>
<td>(1,641)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>(1,159)</td>
<td>(1,310)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Procurement</td>
<td>(5,169)</td>
<td>(4,217)</td>
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<td>Research, Development, Test and Evaluation</td>
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<td>9,123</td>
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<td>Military Construction, Army</td>
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<td>Environmental Restoration, Army</td>
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<td>Army Family Housing</td>
<td>1,405</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>(1,122)</td>
<td>(1,043)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>(283)</td>
<td>(359)</td>
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<td>Reserve Components</td>
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<td>National Guard</td>
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<td>5,131</td>
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<td>Operations</td>
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<td>Construction</td>
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<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>Operations</td>
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<td>Construction</td>
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<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
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<td>Chemical Demilitarization</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>1,650</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Working Capital Fund, A</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>219</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong>⁶</td>
<td><strong>90,978</strong></td>
<td><strong>93,903</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Subtotals are in parentheses.

⁵The FY 2004 President’s Budget consolidated the military personnel appropriations of each service.

⁶Totals may not add due to rounding.

*Source: FY 03 and FY 04/05 President’s Budget Highlights, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, Feb 2002 and 2003, p. 7.*
by some $6.2 billion, citing, especially, shortfalls in funding for readiness accounts such as base operations support activities, depot maintenance, and training ammunition procurement. In his 4 March letter to House Armed Services Committee leaders, General Shinseki also warned that the Army’s FY 2004 budget problems would be made worse, with long-term repercussions, if Congress did not approve a supplemental spending bill for FY 2003 very soon. Shortly after combat operations in Iraq began on 20 March, Army officials estimated that they would exhaust the service’s FY 2003 operations and maintenance account by mid-May and expend all of the year’s personnel funds by mid-June, even though a recent omnibus appropriations bill had provided the Army with almost $2 billion in additional funding for operations support and personnel.

On 16 April, President Bush signed a supplemental appropriations bill that guaranteed the Army an additional $24.6 billion for FY 2003 and put $15.7 billion in a new discretionary transfer account, the Iraq Freedom Fund, from which the Defense Department could allocate additional funding to the services and others for specific purposes (Table 2). On 17 September, the Defense Department also submitted a FY 2004 supplemental budget request to Congress that included $25 billion for the Army. When FY 2003 ended, the president had not yet signed the FY 2004 defense appropriations bill recently passed by Congress, and Congress was still considering the Defense Department’s FY 2004 supplemental spending request.

**Table 2—Actual Total Obligation Authority, FY 2001—FY 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
<td>29,263</td>
<td>32,365</td>
<td>44,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement</td>
<td>27,781</td>
<td>31,182</td>
<td>51,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, Development, Test and Evaluation</td>
<td>11,883</td>
<td>11,597</td>
<td>15,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>6,263</td>
<td>7,018</td>
<td>7,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Housing</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>2,510</td>
<td>2,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolving and Management Funds</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>1,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78,047</td>
<td>86,099</td>
<td>122,268</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes supplemental funding

The active Army’s strength in September 2003 totaled 493,563: 67,953 commissioned officers, 11,913 warrant officers, and 413,697 enlisted soldiers. This was an increase of 9,012 over its FY 2002 final strength. Minorities constituted 40.7 percent of the active Army, while women comprised 15.2 percent. Army personnel were stationed and deployed throughout the world, as shown in Table 3.

The Army’s final strength was well over its budgeted end strength of 480,000, exceeding even the 2 percent surplus permitted by Congress. This was due in part to stop-loss policies the Army implemented to meet readiness needs during initial combat operations in Iraq. Stop-loss is a program that enables the service to retain soldiers who are deemed essential to national security on active duty beyond their scheduled date of retirement or separation. Nearly all of the soldiers retained under the stop-loss program in FY 2003 were expected to leave the Army during the first quarter of FY 2004.

The Army National Guard’s strength in September 2003 totaled 351,089: 29,572 commissioned officers, 7,271 warrant officers, and 314,246 enlisted soldiers. This was an increase of just 11 over its FY 2002 final strength. However, the number of commissioned officers increased by 549, while the number of warrant officers and enlisted soldiers decreased by 155 and 383, respectively. Minorities made up 26.5 percent of the Army National Guard. Women constituted 12.6 percent.

The Army Reserve’s strength in September 2003 totaled 211,890: 37,615 commissioned officers, 2,682 warrant officers, and 171,593 enlisted soldiers. This represented an increase of 5,208 over its FY 2002 final strength. Minorities constituted 41 percent of the Army Reserve. Women comprised 24.3 percent.

Enlisted Personnel

In FY 2003, the active Army met its recruiting goal, while the Army Reserve exceeded its objective by 2 percent. The Army National
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Area/Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States and Territories</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental United States&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>367,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>6,327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>15,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transients</td>
<td>5,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total—United States and Territories</td>
<td>395,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>58,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia (includes Kosovo)</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total—Europe</td>
<td>66,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Former Soviet Union</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Asia and Pacific</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>31,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total—East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>32,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Africa, Near East, and South Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (see Operation Iraqi Freedom below)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The active Army surpassed its intelligence and aptitude objectives for new recruits. The Department of Defense has two principal qualitative goals for recruits to the nation’s armed forces: at least 90 percent of all recruits who have no prior service should be high school graduates and at least 60 percent should score in Categories I to IIIA—that is, at or above the 50th percentile—on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). In FY 2003, 92 percent of the Army’s recruits were...

### Table 3—Active Duty Army Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Selected Countries (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Area/Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total—North Africa, Near East, and South Asia</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total—Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undistributed (includes some Operation IRAQI FREEDOM)</td>
<td>2,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (data subject to change)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total—in/around Iraq as of 30 September 2003</td>
<td>152,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Service members deployed to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM are included in these country figures.*


Guard, however, achieved only 87 percent of its goal, missing its target by more than 7,500 recruits, as shown in Table 4.

The active Army surpassed its intelligence and aptitude objectives for new recruits. The Department of Defense has two principal qualitative goals for recruits to the nation’s armed forces: at least 90 percent of all recruits who have no prior service should be high school graduates and at least 60 percent should score in Categories I to IIIA—that is, at or above the 50th percentile—on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). In FY 2003, 92 percent of the Army’s recruits were...

### Table 4—Army Enlisted Accession Results, FY 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Army</td>
<td>73,800</td>
<td>74,132</td>
<td>+332</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>54,202</td>
<td>-7,798</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>40,900</td>
<td>41,851</td>
<td>+951</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

high school graduates, 73 percent scored in Categories I to IIIA on the AFQT, and less than 0.4 percent scored in Category IV on the test, the lowest category still allowed to enlist.

In addition to successfully recruiting new soldiers, the active Army exceeded its enlisted retention targets, as shown in Table 5. Although the Army’s FY 2003 budget contained significantly less funding for reenlistment bonuses than its FY 2002 budget, bonuses still helped the service to achieve specific retention goals. The Army continued its Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) and Targeted SRB programs, which were aimed at retaining soldiers in critical occupations or with special skills who might be tempted to move to the civilian workforce. The Bonus Extension and Retraining Program offered eligible soldiers the chance to extend their enlistments for retraining in shorthanded military occupational specialties and then to reenlist in their new specialties. The Army also addressed needs generated by current operations. In the fall of 2002, it began offering Critical Skills Retention Bonuses to certain Special Forces noncommissioned officers who were eligible for retirement but had fewer than twenty-five years of service. Additionally, the Army introduced a new temporary SRB in mid-September 2003 when it faced a potential reenlistment shortfall of some 6,000 soldiers late in the fiscal year. The $5,000 lump-sum, tax-free bonus was available to active-duty initial-term and mid-career soldiers who reenlisted while stationed in Korea or deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait. To receive the bonus, soldiers in Korea had to extend their overseas assignment an additional six months. Those in Southwest Asia had to complete their deployment with their current unit. All had to reenlist for a minimum of three years. Altogether, the Army spent $102.6 million on selective reenlistment bonuses, including Critical Skills Retention Bonuses, in FY 2003, compared with $127.8 million in FY 2002.

### Table 5—Enlisted Active Army Retention, FY 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Obtained</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial-term</td>
<td>19,821</td>
<td>21,838</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-career</td>
<td>18,422</td>
<td>19,509</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career</td>
<td>12,757</td>
<td>12,804</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>54,151</strong></td>
<td><strong>106</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Army’s success in recruiting and retaining soldiers in recent years also prompted a change in the service’s reenlistment policy in FY 2003. At the beginning of the year, the Army reinstated a policy requiring soldiers to reenlist twelve to three months prior to their separation date. Starting in October 2000, the service had relaxed the requirement and permitted soldiers to reenlist up to the day of separation. During the intervening two years, however, some 8 percent of all soldiers, including a large number of career soldiers, had waited until the final three months to reenlist. Personnel officials believed this was too many soldiers who waited until the last minute. Earlier notification facilitated the programming of replacements for departing soldiers.

**Officer Personnel**

During the fiscal year, the Army twice changed its time-in-service requirement for promotion to captain. In recent years, the Army had experienced a shortage of captains because it had not accessioned enough lieutenants in the early 1990s and later lost a portion of them to a thriving economy. The FY 2002 Defense Authorization Act therefore had allowed the Army to lower the existing promotion requirement of forty-two months. In October 2002, the service began promoting officers to captain after just thirty-eight months of service. On 1 April 2003, however, Army officials initiated an incremental return to forty-two months by raising the time-in-service requirement to forty months. The Army had surpassed its goal for the number of captains on active duty and preferred the longer time frame to prepare junior officers for their additional responsibilities. Army officials attributed the proliferation of captains partly to the stop-loss program, but primarily to the accelerated promotion of first lieutenants, an increase in the number of captains returning to active duty, and higher retention rates. Since October, some 700 more captains had decided to remain in the Army than had done so in past years.

In January 2003, General Shinseki approved three major initiatives to revamp the service’s Officer Education System. The initiatives resulted from recommendations contained in a 2001 report prepared by an Army Training and Leader Development Panel, which General Shinseki had directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to convene in 2000 to review, assess, and provide recommendations regarding the development and training of Army leaders. The overhaul of officer education was intended to better equip the Army’s leaders for a post–Cold War operating environment and was aimed at two formative periods in an officer’s career: initial entry, when
an officer learned to lead small units, and selection to major, when
training prepared an officer for field-grade responsibilities.

First, the Army planned to convert its existing Officer Basic
Courses to a three-phase Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) that
would offer lieutenants rigorous, standardized, small-unit leadership
training. A future officer would receive precommissioning training, or
BOLC I, at the United States Military Academy, at Officer Candidate
School, or in the Reserve Officer Training Corps. BOLC II would
provide new lieutenants with initial-entry field leadership experience,
while BOLC III would be the branch technical and tactical training
phase (the former basic branch course) and be taught at branch service
schools. Army leaders expected the Basic Officer Leader Course to be
fully implemented in the third quarter of FY 2006.

Second, Army leaders intended to replace the current Officer
Advanced or Career Courses and the Combined Arms and Services
Staff School (CAS3) Staff Officers Course with a sequence involving a
Combined Arms Staff Course for staff officers and a Combined Arms
Battle Command Course for company, battery, and troop commanders.
The new courses were to provide assignment-oriented training for staff
officers and for company commanders and would be required at points
in a captain’s career when they would supply directly relevant training
immediately before a captain assumed a duty position. Army leaders
anticipated that the new courses for captains would be fully imple-
mented by the second quarter of FY 2006.

Third, the Army planned to introduce what it called Interme-
diate Level Education (ILE), which would provide all majors the
same common core of operational instruction, as well as tailored
educational opportunities linked to the requirements of their specific
career field, branch, or functional area. Army policies in 2003
permitted just 50 percent of all majors to attend resident instruc-
tion at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, while the remainder completed this education
through nonresident courses that were considered inferior. Educa-
tion therefore impacted an officer’s future career prospects. Under
the new ILE concept, 100 percent of the Army’s majors would receive
tailored resident instruction either at Fort Leavenworth or at various
“satellite” campuses.

The three-month common-core curriculum would be offered in resi-
dence at Fort Leavenworth for active and reserve component officers in
the operations career field, selected officers from other armed services,
and international officers. Information operations, operations support,
installation support, and special branch officers would receive their
common-core training from qualified Command and General Staff
College instructors at separate-but-equal distance-education campus sites. Reserve component officers would be able to obtain their instruction through The Army School System (TASS) classrooms or by means of an advanced distributed learning course. Officers in the operations career field would attend a follow-on seven-month Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course at Fort Leavenworth, which would center on planning and executing full-spectrum operations at the tactical and operational levels. Other officers would participate in functional area qualification courses. Some might also attend civilian schools as part of their education.

In August 2002, the Army had begun a pilot course of the ILE core curriculum at Fort Leavenworth for 256 officers in the operations career field, with a follow-on Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course. In the spring of 2003, the service launched a pilot of the distance-education campus site concept at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and Fort Lee, Virginia. Army leaders planned to offer pilot courses until the ILE was fully implemented in FY 2005.

Civilian Personnel

In FY 2003, the Army’s civilian personnel strength was approximately 222,500. Army civilians worked in fifty-four countries. Nearly 2,000 deployed to Southwest Asia in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and the Global War on Terrorism.

In February 2003, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel issued a report on Army civilians. Previous reports had addressed officers, noncommissioned officers, and warrant officers. For its civilian personnel assessment, the panel had gathered information from more than 40,000 Army civilians, soldiers, and senior leaders using written and online surveys, focus groups, and personal interviews. The scope of effort produced the most thorough study of civilian training and leader development the Army had ever conducted. Overall, the panel concluded that there was “no well-developed and executed, integrated, systemic approach for civilian leader development for the Army.” Current policies fell short of Army plans and did not meet the expectations of civilian employees. The panel also predicted that the future operating environment for Army civilians would require them to be more adaptable and self-aware.

In its report, the panel presented forty specific recommendations that supported twelve general recommendations grouped into four categories: accountability, lifelong learning, interpersonal skills, and Army culture. In particular, the panel emphasized five basic recommendations. It urged the Army to (1) make civilian training, education,
and leader development a priority; (2) integrate civilian and military individual training, education, and development, where appropriate; (3) improve the relationship between officers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and civilians; (4) create a training and development paradigm that incorporated lifelong learning; and (5) make the development of interpersonal skills a priority. An Implementation Process Action Team subsequently narrowed the recommendations down to twenty-seven and identified three lead agents—the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G–1, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, G–3, and TRADOC—to manage them.

Wartime Personnel Actions

During the first half of FY 2003, Army leaders prepared for possible military operations in Iraq by issuing a series of personnel directives designed to sustain unit readiness. On 22 January 2003, the Army announced a stop-movement order that suspended permanent change of station moves and temporary duty assignments, including training assignments, for most enlisted soldiers, warrant officers, and commissioned officers serving in selected active component units. Those scheduled for a move or for temporary duty within sixty days of the order’s effective date of 31 December 2002 were permitted to continue to their new assignments. Units affected included all of those either on alert for deployment or already deployed overseas that the Department of Defense expected to use in potential operations in the Persian Gulf region. Although Army leaders publicly announced the order, the specific units involved remained classified. The stop-movement order eventually affected more than 100,000 troops.

In late January, the Army also issued a stop-movement order affecting troops assigned to U.S. Army Europe. The order applied to some 7,000 soldiers scheduled to transfer to new duty stations or to attend school between 1 March and 30 September 2003, as well as to about 300 officers scheduled to transfer between 1 March and 31 May 2003. The Army wanted to ensure that its units in Europe were as close to full strength as possible in case they were needed to support operations in Southwest Asia or elsewhere.

Although troops stationed in South Korea were not deployable, preparations elsewhere for a possible war with Iraq had repercussions there. Stop-movement orders affecting other Army units limited the number of soldiers available to rotate into units in South Korea. In February, Army officials therefore involuntarily extended by ninety days the tours of nearly 3,000 soldiers, or more than a tenth of the approximately 27,000 Army troops stationed on the peninsula, who
PERSONNEL

Personnel were scheduled to depart between 1 and 31 May. In early May, the Army announced ninety-day involuntary extensions on the tours of an additional 1,800 officers and enlisted soldiers who were scheduled to leave South Korea between 1 June and 30 August 2003.

Early in 2003, the Army also instituted a new stop-loss policy. Starting in December 2001, the Army’s leadership had issued a series of open-ended stop-loss orders affecting active and reserve soldiers in fifty-seven military occupational specialties deemed critical to the war on terrorism. The Army had modified this program in September 2002 to limit how long soldiers could be involuntarily retained, permitting them to separate or retire after completing twelve months of additional service dating from the end of their original obligation or, for those who had completed their original obligations, from the date they were placed under stop loss. Two months later, the Army also lifted the restrictions on warrant officers in two specialties and on enlisted soldiers in six specialties. But on 14 February 2003, the assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve affairs, Reginald J. Brown, approved a much broader stop-loss directive applicable to all active component units deployed to or alerted for deployment to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The Army’s deputy chief of

Soldiers of the 3d Infantry Division board a civilian aircraft at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, in January 2003 to deploy in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
staff for personnel, G–1, Lt. Gen. John M. LeMoyne, defended the policy by explaining that it “supports the stability and strengthens unit cohesiveness and teamwork” of deploying active component forces and would “bolster the trust and confidence of our soldiers as they prepare to deploy.” The policy had no termination date and was to remain in place until the combatant commander determined that operational conditions no longer required it. The Army specified that in cases where soldiers were already affected by a twelve-month stop-loss policy, the earlier measure would control when they might separate or retire from the Army. For security reasons, Army leaders did not name the units involved or identify the number of soldiers affected when they issued the order.

On 14 May 2003, following what was believed at the time to be the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the Army began a phased elimination of the stop-movement restrictions on soldiers in the Persian Gulf region. On 27 May, the service also lifted the stop-loss order governing active component units in the Operation Iraqi Freedom area of responsibility, as well as those which had been alerted for deployment. At the same time, the Army began removing military occupational specialties from the twelve-month skill-based stop-loss program. By late July 2003, only two specialties remained in the program. Because federal law required that separating and retiring soldiers receive predeparture counseling at least ninety days prior to leaving and Army policy required soldiers to receive counseling and attend transition workshops and briefings under the Army Career and Alumni Program, the service did not immediately release the soldiers concerned. Instead, Army personnel officials established a phased system that provided for the separation or retirement of all affected soldiers during the period from October through December 2003.

Operations in Iraq nevertheless continued to influence Army personnel policies. On 23 July 2003, Acting Chief of Staff of the Army General Keane announced a unit rotation plan for Iraq and indicated that all future tours of duty for both active and reserve units serving in Iraq would last one year, rather than the usual six months for overseas deployments. Army leaders assumed that they would need to maintain current force levels in Iraq until at least March 2004 and had concluded that the service could not continue to meet its worldwide obligations unless it required longer tours. At the time, the Army had in excess of 368,000 troops deployed to 120 countries. More than 232,000 were active component soldiers. Of these, 133,000 were on the ground in Iraq and another 34,000 were in Kuwait. Twenty-four of the Army’s thirty-three active component brigades, or 73 percent, were deployed overseas.
Soon after General Keane’s announcement, military leaders at U.S. Central Command asked the Department of Defense to institute a rest and recuperation (R&R) program for individuals serving one-year tours that would allow them to return home for a period during their deployment. On 23 September, the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness approved a leave program for all personnel serving in the Central Command area of responsibility in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Two days later, the command launched an Interim R&R Program for all active and reserve service members and deployed civilians that gave them two weeks of chargeable leave between their third and eleventh month in theater and let them fly free from Kuwait to Atlanta, Baltimore, Dallas, or Los Angeles, or to Frankfurt, Germany. Subsequent travel was to be at their own expense. On 29 September, the Office of the Secretary of Defense designated the Army as the executive agent for the R&R program.

In addition to personnel management challenges, the Army’s operations in Afghanistan and Iraq generated concerns about the mental health of soldiers. During the summer of 2002, a series of murders and suicides at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, had left seven soldiers and Army spouses dead. In three cases, soldiers had killed their wives after returning from service in Afghanistan. Army investigators subsequently
determined that these homicides had resulted partly from the fact that the three had come home directly from a combat zone with little time for decompressing and had encountered preexisting marital problems. Army officials also pointed to the stigma attached to seeking voluntary mental health assistance for marital, financial, or psychological problems. Soldiers feared their careers would be hurt. In response to these developments, the deputy chief of staff for operations, G–3, Lt. Gen. Richard A. Cody, formed a Tiger Team to examine the impact of stress caused by deployments, with the aim of mitigating adverse effects associated with extended deployments. The team advised the Army to devote greater attention to successfully reintegrating soldiers and deployed civilians into their home environments. In March 2003, the Army shifted responsibility for this effort to the deputy chief of staff for personnel, G–1, who conducted a conference with relevant staff agencies and Army command representatives at Fort Bragg in April 2003. The following month, the G–1 released a plan for a Deployment Cycle Support Program designed to decrease the potentially negative impact of lengthy deployments on soldiers and their families.

The Army began implementing the plan immediately. Mandatory for all active component and Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers, the reintegration program included assessments of soldiers by their supervisors and by medical personnel, as well as workshops and counseling for soldiers and family members on issues ranging from suicide prevention and stress reduction to marital communication and medical benefits. Soldiers completed parts of the program in theater and the remainder after their return to their home stations or demobilization stations. In August 2003, the Army also introduced a twenty-four-hour, seven-days-a-week, toll-free phone number called Army One Source. Soldiers, deployed civilians, and their families could use the number to talk to trained counselors or to obtain information and educational materials.

The Army also initiated a ground-breaking mental health study after five soldiers deployed to Iraq committed suicide in early July 2003. This number of suicides was perceptibly higher than the two reported each of the preceding three months, which had been consistent with the Army’s historical rates. Accordingly, in late July the Office of the Surgeon General, in cooperation with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G–1, established the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) to evaluate OIF-related mental health issues and services and to provide recommendations to the OIF medical and line commands. The team’s charter tasked it with assessing and making recommendations regarding possible organizational and resource deficiencies related to four developments: the
increased incidence of suicide; an upsurge in the number of behavioral health patients flowing from Iraq to the United States through the Army’s Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany after May 2003; stress-related issues in the Iraqi theater; and deployment-related behavioral health issues among 3d Infantry Division soldiers at Fort Stewart, Georgia, which was one of the Army’s major deployment platforms. In particular, the team was to consider command and control issues, communications, resource support, and Army policies.

The MHAT began its work almost immediately. From late August to early October 2003, a team of twelve military and civilian psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and combat stress experts met with behavioral health and medical care providers, unit ministry staffs, and unit leaders in Iraq and Kuwait. They also held small group discussions with troops and surveyed 756 deployed soldiers. This was the first time the Army conducted a mental health assessment of this kind in a combat zone. The MHAT was expected to report its findings in FY 2004.

Manning Initiatives

During FY 2003, long-standing weaknesses in the Army’s personnel management system, combined with challenges posed by the operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, led the service to make significant changes in how it manned units. For nearly a century, the Army had mainly used the individual replacement system, which moved soldiers in and out of units as individuals even when a unit was deployed overseas. The few exceptions in recent decades had included unit rotations in the Sinai, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans during stability and support operations; in Kuwait as part of the effort to deter Iraq; and in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Critics of the Army’s individual replacement system argued that it impeded training, weakened unit cohesion, and undermined readiness because about a third of a unit’s personnel changed each year. Even before the United States launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, therefore, senior Army leaders were discussing the possible benefits of transitioning to a unit manning system. Under such a system, soldiers would be brought together in units for a fixed duration and would arrive, train, and deploy together. Proponents contended that unit manning would not only reduce personnel turbulence within units and thereby improve readiness and combat effectiveness, but it would also provide stability and predictability for commanders, soldiers, and their families. Secretary of the Army Thomas White, in particular, pushed the Army to change its approach, citing the need to modify personnel management practices to remain in step with other transformation initiatives. Army transformation was intended to improve the service’s ability to deploy rapidly, in part by utilizing new technologies and equipment. And stable, well-trained teams would be especially important for employing advanced technologies effectively. Additionally, under the existing system only a few special operations units were able to respond quickly to crises. All other units remained at a low level of readiness, and building up and training the remainder of the force was expensive and time-consuming. This situation conflicted directly with the goals of transformation.

In August 2002, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G–1, had organized an informal study committee to look at the problem of personnel turnover and turbulence in Army units. Based on its recommendations, the Army chartered a Unit Manning Task Force in October 2002 to assess the potential ramifications of a unit manning system and to consider how such a system might work. The G–1 group worked in close cooperation with a Rotation Task Force recently set up within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, G–3, which was developing a new rotation policy and identifying related force structure changes needed to permit the Army to sustain the war on terrorism. The following spring, in May 2003, the Army announced that it had selected the 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate), Forts Wainwright and Richardson, Alaska, to be the first
unit to change to a unit manning system. This transition began during the summer as part of the unit’s already scheduled conversion from a light infantry brigade to a medium-weight Stryker brigade.

In August 2003, however, the Army decided to make changes on a wider scale more quickly. The Army’s senior leaders recognized that the service would be deploying large numbers of troops overseas for the foreseeable future and, under the individual replacement system, thousands would face back-to-back deployments as a result. They also believed that high personnel turbulence and low morale would impair readiness. Incoming Chief of Staff General Schoomaker was committed to keeping units together. Accordingly, soon after his arrival, Army leaders ordered that the unit manning system be applied immediately to units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan and introduced to all of the Army’s thirty-three brigade combat teams over time. Depending on the type of unit, its mission, and other factors, the life cycle of each unit would range between two and four years.

Already in late FY 2003, the Army began using elements of the unit manning system to prepare some of the units scheduled to deploy in early calendar year 2004, including the 1st Cavalry Division, which was headed to Iraq for twelve months, and the 2d and 3d Brigades of the 25th Infantry Division, which were slated for six-month tours in Afghanistan. The new approach obviated the need to rely on stop-loss and stop-movement policies to man the units for the length of their deployments in order to sustain readiness. The Army also began employing a form of unit manning to reconstitute brigades and divisions returning from Southwest Asia and continued to utilize the system in building the third Stryker brigade combat team in Alaska.

General Schoomaker’s commitment to unit manning also led him to make it one of his key focus areas—now included under a broader topical rubric he called “force stabilization”—when he assumed his new duties. In September, as the end of FY 2003 approached, he stood up Task Force Stabilization to carry on and expand the work of the Unit Manning Task Force. The new organization would eventually formulate a plan for the Army designed to both keep unit members together over a set period of time and retain soldiers at their home bases longer. Army leaders believed these changes would increase unit readiness while also supporting the well-being of soldiers and their families.

Special Topics

In January 2003, U.S. Army Personnel Command replaced all soldier email addresses in its database with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) addresses as AKO became the official email for all soldiers.
Army personnel officials made the change to ensure that every officer and soldier was accessible to them. Previously, the Army’s personnel database contained a variety of personal and unit addresses. Some of these remained current, but others were not updated after soldiers moved away from an installation. Soldiers would now have one email address for their entire lives.

In August, the Army migrated the active Army from its existing personnel management computer system, Standard Installation/Division Personnel System–3 (SIDPERS-3), to a new Electronic Military Personnel Office (eMILPO) system. The Army intended the eMILPO system to provide near real-time, Army-wide visibility on personnel information via a Web-based application. The system, which was simpler to use than SIDPERS-3 and accessible twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, assisted administrators in ensuring the accuracy and currency of all personnel records and enabled soldiers to monitor most elements of their personnel file, including pay changes and assignment data. In addition, commanders and other authorized users could draw on eMILPO to obtain data of importance to their unit or mission. The Army system was meant to be an interim step toward the fielding of a larger, multiservice, integrated personnel and pay management system called the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System.

The American Correctional Association accredited the new U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in May 2003. To be accredited, the facility had to meet or exceed several hundred standards established by the association relating to tasks such as in-processing, moving, and feeding prisoners. Having opened in September 2002, the new barracks in May housed 436 prisoners with an average sentence of about nineteen years. Forty-two prisoners were serving life sentences, nine were serving life sentences with no chance for parole, and six were on death row.

During FY 2003, the Army expanded its involvement with professional motorsports to help raise awareness among racing fans of opportunities available with the Army. In 2000, the service had launched a successful partnership with Don Schumacher Racing, sponsoring National Hot Rod Association (NHRA) Top Fuel champion driver Tony Schumacher. In July 2003, three-time NHRA Pro Stock Bike world champion Angelle Savoie and her teammate Antron Brown signed on with the U.S. Army Racing NHRA team. The Army also inaugurated a relationship with the National Association for Stock Car Racing (NASCAR), announcing in November 2002 that it was partnering with MB2 Motorsports on the Winston Cup racing circuit to become the principal sponsor of the team’s Pontiac, driven
by NASCAR veteran Jerry Nadeau. Painted black and gold and bearing the new number “01,” in reference to the service’s “Army of One” slogan, the car made its Army debut at the 2003 Daytona 500. In January 2003, the Army became an official sponsor of NASCAR as well and committed to spend at least $16 million across several levels of the stock car circuit. The commitment was the largest sports sponsorship for any branch of the U.S. armed forces. In addition to advertising during race broadcasts and sponsoring an award for NASCAR’s Weekly Racing Series, the Army set up mobile recruiting stations at racetracks that included interactive areas where fans could test their marksmanship, drive simulated tanks, and fly simulated helicopters.
In 1999, General Shinseki had articulated a vision for transforming the Army into a fundamentally different kind of land force: a lighter, more mobile, information-based force. His ideas for change built on the work of predecessors, who had investigated how a post–Cold War Army operating in the information age might look and operate, and carried implications for virtually every aspect of the Army, including force design, doctrine, leader development, training, logistics, and materiel.

In particular, Shinseki envisioned a future force, what the Army termed the Objective Force, which would consist of smaller and more easily deployable standardized units that could respond faster and more effectively to a larger number of missions than the Army’s existing heavy and light units. Eventually, the service would be able to deploy a combat-ready brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. In place of tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and many other current weapons systems, the Objective Force would employ the Future Combat Systems, a “system of systems” composed of manned and unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned air vehicles, sensors, and munitions all linked by a digital information network. The new system would substitute superior information for weight and mass: units would see and hit the enemy first, rather than relying on heavy armor to withstand a hit. In the near term, the Army would create an Interim Force that would use commercially available digital command and communications technologies and medium-weight armored vehicles. The Interim Force would test concepts for the Objective Force while also providing the Army with medium-weight brigades that could deploy more quickly than existing heavy brigades but that would be more lethal and have greater tactical mobility than current light brigades. While the service tackled the challenge of designing the Objective Force, developing Future Combat Systems, and fielding the Interim Force, it would invest sufficiently in
its existing force, the Legacy Force, to enable it to maintain readiness for current missions.

**Stryker Brigade Combat Teams**

Progress continued in FY 2003 on the development of the initial Interim Force brigades, known since July 2002 as Stryker brigade combat teams, after their newly christened medium-weight wheeled vehicles. During FY 2002, the Army had begun equipping the first unit, the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, at Fort Lewis, Washington, with Strykers and had launched an effort to certify it. In early 2003, officially approved doctrine for the brigade emerged with the completion of new field manuals. More than fifty different manuals were in circulation by the start of the year, either in final draft or completed form, and TRADOC published manuals on company operations in January 2003, on brigade operations in March, and on battalion operations in April. All had to be validated in the field. In early April, a brigade exercise at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, simulated mid-to-high-intensity combat. The exercise offered the first opportunity for the entire unit to conduct operations with all of its Strykers, though some of the vehicles were still lacking critical items. From March through May, the brigade conducted a deployment exercise designed to evaluate its ability to execute strategic and tactical deployments by air, land, and sea. A key part of the exercise involved transporting the unit’s personnel and vehicles from Fort Irwin to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. In late May, a certification exercise at Fort Polk tested the brigade’s soldiers in a mid-to-low intensity combat scenario that included both small-scale contingency operations and a stability and support operation. After the unit successfully completed the three exercises, U.S. Army Forces Command certified that it was ready to deploy, and, in late July, Acting Chief of Staff General Keane announced that the first Stryker brigade combat team would be among the units that would soon replace units returning from Iraq. The brigade was scheduled to deploy in FY 2004.

Despite this record of success, as the brigade prepared to deploy the Army was forced to devise a solution for a vehicle problem that had materialized: the Stryker was vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenade antitank systems, which by the summer of 2003 Iraqi insurgents were using frequently against U.S. troops. To help the vehicles withstand attacks, the Army decided to add slat armor—an encircling grid of hardened steel bars—to the hulls of the Strykers, in order to make incoming rockets detonate before they hit anything vital. The extra protection, which was added after the vehicles arrived in theater, added
weight and girth that affected the vehicle’s maneuverability in urban areas, but the Army had no immediate alternatives.

During the fiscal year, the service was also converting the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, at Fort Lewis to a Stryker brigade combat team. It began the conversion of the 172d Infantry Brigade (Separate) at Forts Wainwright and Richardson in the summer.

The Objective Force and Future Combat Systems

In December 2002, the Army released The Objective Force in 2015 White Paper, which captured the Army’s vision of what the Objective Force would look like and how it would operate in 2015. Several months earlier, the Army’s senior leadership had met for an update and assessment of efforts toward fielding initial Objective Force capabilities within the decade and an opportunity to approve proposed concepts and offer guidance. Dissatisfied when he learned that the planning for the Objective Force was focused primarily on the next ten to twelve months, General Shinseki had asked the Army’s Objective Force Task Force to look farther ahead. To help refine its definition of the Objective Force and the path for achieving this goal, he suggested the task force pick a date in the future, figuratively “stand on the mountain,” look around and back, then plot a course to reach that point. The white
paper describing the character of the Objective Force in 2015 was one result of this suggestion and was to serve as a target for Army planners. It addressed eighteen functional areas, including training and leader development, human resources, battle command, information operations, sustainment, equipping, and installations. Following the paper’s release, the Army developed more detailed plans for each area which contained milestones, “inchstones,” and timelines. Lt. Gen. John M. Riggs, director of the task force, expected the white paper to be a “living document” that the Army would update when the national and strategic focus of the United States shifted or available resources changed.

Developing and fielding the Objective Force was nevertheless the Army’s modernization investment priority. In February 2003, the service completed a Future Years Defense Plan for FYs 2004 through 2009 in which it proposed to invest nearly 98 percent of its total science and technology (S&T) funding in programs needed to develop Objective Force technologies. In addition, 70 percent of its planned research, development, and acquisition funding was to support the development and fielding of the Objective Force. Central to this investment strategy were S&T efforts to explore, identify, and develop the technologies required to bring to fruition the Future Combat Systems (FCS), which would equip the Objective Force and help determine its capabilities and doctrine. FCS represented 29 percent of all of the Army’s S&T investments.

The FCS program achieved several interim goals during the fiscal year. Both the Army Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the FCS Operational Requirements Document, which explained in detail the system the Army proposed to develop based on the results of work completed during the concept and technology development phase of the program. The FCS Operational Requirements Document described a set of eight manned systems and ten unmanned vehicle, sensor, and munition systems, as well as the requirements for the battle command network that would link them. The FCS program referred to its proposed configuration as the 18+1+1 design, to emphasize the importance of both the network and the soldier to the successful functioning of FCS. Due to funding concerns and questions about technological maturity, General Shinseki in the spring of 2003 directed the Army to defer fielding four of the systems so that the service might still meet its target of attaining initial operational capability for the first FCS-equipped unit during 2010. The service also modified the program schedule. Initial operational capability was redefined as fielding just one FCS-equipped maneuver battalion, alongside two legacy battalions, in the first brigade-sized FCS unit.
Full operational capability would not be achieved until late 2012, with the fielding of two additional FCS-equipped battalions.

During the spring of 2003, the FCS program also underwent a Milestone B decision. At Milestone B, major acquisition programs are evaluated to determine whether an S&T program has progressed sufficiently to permit advanced development of the weapons system and, if the decision is positive, the program becomes an acquisition program. Given the complexity and cost of the FCS effort, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in March requested that an independent panel assess the Army's program prior to the Milestone B decision, which was scheduled for May. Retired Air Force General Larry D. Welch of the Institute for Defense Analyses chaired a panel composed of retired Defense Department executives and senior retired officers from all of the services, supported by researchers from the institute and high-ranking advisers from the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Its task was to review the projected capabilities of the Objective Force and its FCS components, the existing assessments of critical technologies, and the FCS acquisition management plan to evaluate the program's readiness for Milestone B approval.

In April, the panel issued a generally favorable report, even as it acknowledged that producing the FCS family of systems would be complex and challenging. The Army was on a “logical track” to develop into a more agile and lethal force, the panel concluded, and it validated the service’s FCS concept. It noted that development of FCS would require extensive support from Army and defense agencies outside of the actual program, that several key technologies were not mature, and that the program was not meeting weight goals necessary to enable swift deployment. Nevertheless, it maintained that the program was on a sound institutional basis and possessed plans to mitigate risk in critical technologies. The panel asserted that providing network service within FCS-equipped formations, between FCS formations and the rest of the force, and with joint and combined forces stood out as the most critical challenge to the FCS concept, and that software development presented the greatest cost and schedule risk to the program. The panel nonetheless judged the program as feasible.

During a 14 May 2003 meeting of the Defense Acquisition Board, the Army received a favorable Milestone B decision from Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Edward “Pete” C. Aldridge Jr., permitting the program to proceed to system development and demonstration. The Milestone B decision also marked the transition of FCS from a joint science and technology program between the Army and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to a purely Army acquisition program.
To assist in the transition to system development, Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee on 1 July 2003 commissioned General Welch to form a second panel, which he tasked with examining the organizations and processes that would affect the service’s ability to achieve at least minimal Objective Force capabilities by the close of the decade and advising Army leaders on the most effective and efficient means to attain their objectives. To this end, he asked the panel to review the service’s business practices, its acquisition and requirements generation processes, and the roles, missions, and functions of pertinent Army organizations. The resulting recommendations focused mainly on the management of the FCS program. Key among these, the panel proposed that the commanding general of TRADOC be named the single designated authority for force design and doctrinal development in support of FCS, the Objective Force, and joint force integration and that he be assisted by a new “Futures Center” at TRADOC headed by a three-star officer. This structure would work together with the FCS and Objective Force elements of the Army’s acquisition community. The panel similarly recommended that the Army establish a deputy assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics, and technology for FCS acquisition, a three-star position reporting directly to the Army acquisition executive, to oversee the FCS program and ensure integration and synchronization with complementary Army programs.

In July, the Defense Acquisition Board approved the transition of the Warrior Information Network–Tactical (WIN-T) program to the system development and demonstration phase as well. Separate from the FCS program, but one of several vital complementary programs, WIN-T was to be the integrating communications network connecting various levels of command within the Objective Force.

In August, incoming Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker redesignated the Objective Force as the “Future Force.” The new term signaled a change in emphasis, from fielding an ideal Objective Force unit some ten years in the future and attempting to modify the Army’s entire force structure, to fielding useful capabilities to the current force as soon as they became available, with less focus on the character of the end state of the force.

**Modularity**

In making plans for his tenure as chief of staff during the summer of 2003, General Schoomaker was attuned to both the changed national security requirements in a post–September 11 world and the challenges the Army now confronted. For much of its recent history, the
Army had been a force forward deployed in Germany and Korea and designed to fight a large-scale conventional war. Now it had troops on the ground not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in the Balkans and the Sinai, and was participating in counterterrorism operations around the world. Adapting the Army to these conditions was General Schoomaker’s priority. In doing so, he drew in part on radically new force design concepts Army planners had been developing for the service’s Objective Force. Fundamental to these was the idea of modularity, that is, the creation of standardized, expandable Army elements capable of being tailored to accomplish virtually any assignment. The new units would be as capable as the existing brigades, divisions, corps, and armies the Army’s planners envisioned they would replace. But the units would also be adaptable enough to assume whatever form was necessary to meet a broad range of missions.

At General Schoomaker’s direction, in September 2003 the Army began converting itself from an organization centered on divisions numbering from 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers to a modular force based on brigades totaling at most 3,900. The chief of staff believed the conversion would enable the Army to better support current operations and help it to respond more quickly to the needs of combatant commanders when future contingencies arose. In recent years, the brigade, rather than the division, had become the main tactical echelon in the Army’s planning for overseas deployments. Senior commanders in Iraq, moreover, had been responding to various tactical problems by tailoring units into temporary and permanent groupings. This meant that even when a division deployed to Iraq, it might soon relinquish operational control of some of its brigade combat teams while assuming control of other nondivisional elements. Smaller units, meanwhile, were sometimes rendered incapable of performing their full missions due to insufficient manpower or expertise. Schoomaker also saw the conversion as a chance to increase the number of brigade combat teams. The current force, comprising thirty-three division-based brigade combat teams in the active Army and thirty-six in the National Guard, was not large enough to permit adequate intervals between deployments. Schoomaker wanted new unit designs that would allow the fielding of between seventy-seven and eight-two brigade combat teams with a temporary increase in the active Army’s strength of only 30,000. Finally, he knew that the Army could expect solid support for the change from Secretary Rumsfeld, who was an outspoken advocate of transforming the Army into a more readily deployable, digitized organization.

General Schoomaker took a two-pronged approach to designing the new modular brigades. First, he asked Maj. Gen. William G. Webster Jr., the incoming commander of the 3d Infantry Division
General Schoomaker talks to Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa personnel during a visit to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.
(Mechanized), to prepare the division for its second deployment to Iraq by developing a plan to convert its three brigades into five heavy units using only the soldiers and materiel it already possessed. Second, he directed TRADOC to organize both the 3d Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) into prototype modular organizations, but to avoid augmenting the two divisions in any way. Instead, it was to utilize their existing soldiers and materiel. TRADOC subsequently organized Task Force Modularity under Maj. Gen. Robert W. Mixon at Fort Monroe, Virginia, to tackle this assignment.

The chief of staff expected the Army to move quickly. He set a January 2004 deadline for delivery of the new heavy and infantry brigade combat team organizations, with designs for support brigades and higher echelons to be completed later in 2004. The Army was also to reorganize both divisions before the end of 2004 and their scheduled deployment to Iraq in 2005. Schoomaker recognized that the new units would not be perfect and believed the Army could make changes as necessary over time. However, he established three goals the initial brigade combat teams had to meet. They had to be as capable as current units. They had to be easier to deploy than current units. And they had to be configured in a way that permitted the service to duplicate them without having to seek an increase in manpower.

Training

The Army issued two new training manuals in FY 2003. After twenty-one months of development and input from officers and noncommissioned officers at all levels, the Army published Field Manual (FM) 7–0, Training the Force, in October 2002. The new manual replaced FM 25–100, which had the same name. As the service’s capstone, overarching training doctrine, FM 7–0 outlined the Army’s training management cycle and offered guidance on how to plan, execute, and assess training and leader development. It covered training in three separate, but related, domains—operational, institutional, and self-development—and was applicable to all units, at all levels, in all components of the Army. The manual integrated lessons learned from recent military operations and differed from its predecessor in combining training and leader development in one program; establishing joint, multinational, and interagency training as a priority; and synchronizing training doctrine with the full spectrum of Army operations, including offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

Where FM 7–0 focused on training management, the complementary FM 7–1, Battle Focused Training, centered on the specifics of training. Published in September 2003, FM 7–1 replaced FM 25–101 bearing
the same name. As the service’s doctrinal foundation for how to train, it defined the Army training system, outlined who was responsible for training and training support, and described how to conduct training. The manual’s stated goal was “to create leaders who know how to think and apply enduring training principles to their units and organizations.” Army leaders believed that the two manuals, taken together, provided a “top-to-bottom understanding of training” that was critical for linking the three training domains and for the successful execution of training.

**Deployed Operational Forces**

At the beginning of FY 2002, the United States had launched Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center towers. Although American forces and their Afghan allies quickly toppled the Taliban government that had provided a safe haven for the al-Qaeda terrorist group behind the attacks, at the start of FY 2003 U.S. troops were still locating and destroying elusive residual Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, coordinating humanitarian initiatives, strengthening the new Afghan government, and performing other necessary tasks. Responsibility for reconstruction, political-military issues, and assistance to the government lay with Combined Joint Task Force–180 (CJTF-180) led by the commander of the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeill, and comprised of personnel from his headquarters, augmented by staff from the other services and the coalition partners of the United States. Combined Task Force–82 (CTF-82), made up mostly of elements of the 82d Airborne Division and commanded by the division’s commander, Maj. Gen. John R. Vines, served as the tactical headquarters for combat operations.

In September 2002, General Vines had decided to change how CTF-82 deployed its units. Where previously the task force had maintained most of its forces at the Bagram and Kandahar airfields, it now began constructing forward operating bases in a number of locations in the southern and southeastern provinces of Afghanistan and closer to the porous border with Pakistan. This change carried the risk of Afghan resentment, as coalition forces were much nearer to the population, but it also enabled the coalition to operate more effectively in areas where the enemy had sought refuge. From these bases, American soldiers carried out security patrols, sent civil affairs and psychological operations teams into cities and towns, and responded to recurring harassment from enemy small arms and indirect fire. They supplemented these activities with a succession of larger operations designed to locate hostile forces and uncover
weapons caches, including Operation Mongoose in January 2003, which targeted the Adi Ghar Mountains south of Kandahar, and Operation VIPER in February 2003, during which U.S. forces searched villages in the Baghran Valley of Helmand Province. For FY 2003 casualty information, see Table 6.

The goals of the United States and its coalition partners required noncombat-oriented operations as well. Mostly notably, U.S. troops were engaged in reconstruction operations and an effort to build an Afghan army, both of which also supported the larger aim of legitimizing the new central government and increasing its influence in the provinces. Significant in the sphere of reconstruction was the establishment of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). In early 2002, the Army had set up small Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells in different parts of Afghanistan. Encompassing just a handful of civil affairs soldiers, their mission was to assess humanitarian needs,
implement small-scale reconstruction projects, and establish relations with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and non-governmental organizations in the area. In early FY 2003, CJTF-180 sought to expand and improve this civil affairs effort by developing PRTs, which were to be staffed by both civilian and military personnel, as well as by representatives of the Afghan government, and have enhanced force protection. Their major goals would include facilitating reconstruction, improving security, and extending the authority of the Afghan central government. The first PRT opened in Gardez in January 2003. Collocated with U.S. Special Forces "A" team members, the PRT also had soldiers from the 82d Airborne Division supplying security. A civil affairs team provided daily contact with local Afghans and tribal leaders. When the PRT became fully operational, the only U.S. agency with a civilian representative on site was the Department of State, but representatives from the Agency for International Development and the Department of Agriculture later joined the team. Similar PRTs began operations in Bamian and Kunduz during the spring, and in July, a PRT opened in Mazar-e Sharif with the United Kingdom serving as the lead country. New Zealand took over the lead in Bamian in September.
During the fall of 2002, responsibility for overseeing the training of the fledgling Afghan National Army belonged to the Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan (OMC-A), a small and underresourced cell in the U.S. Embassy, while a battalion from the Army’s 3d Special Forces Group conducted the actual training mission. When Maj. Gen. Karl W. Eikenberry became the new chief of OMC-A in October, it was facing substantial challenges. A coalition plan, which Afghan interim president Hamid Karzai endorsed in December 2002, called for expanding the Afghan army from its current size of less than 3,000 soldiers to nearly 70,000 men. Yet recruiting in Afghanistan was difficult and attrition rates for soldiers were high. Moreover, the coalition would need to build the army’s infrastructure, organization, and leadership, as well as train troops. To handle this effort, General Eikenberry soon enlarged his staff, turned to coalition allies for training assistance, and in May 2003 formed Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, composed of the headquarters of the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, and its subordinate 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, to help with training.
The establishment of PRTs and the expanded Afghan army training program were signs of a change in the way the coalition was approaching its campaign in Afghanistan. Prior to the summer of 2003, CJTF-180 had viewed its campaign as still centered on decisive combat operations to rid the country of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. In keeping with General McNeill’s original plans, however, by May the task force had transitioned to the next phase of its campaign, namely, humanitarian assistance and support to the new government. While visiting Afghanistan on 1 May 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld declared that major combat operations had ended and that U.S. forces had moved “to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities.” Shortly afterward, General McNeill and most of his staff from the XVIII Airborne Corps left Afghanistan and, on 27 May, command of CJTF-180 passed to General Vines. Soldiers from CTF-82 had begun returning to the United States in April, and the 10th Mountain Division headquarters and other combat and support elements from the division started arriving in May. The 10th Mountain Division headquarters became the staff for CJTF-180, substantially reducing the size and capabilities of the senior military command in Afghanistan.

Throughout the fiscal year, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan remained relatively small, hovering near 10,000. This was due in part to the buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf region for Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the first half of FY 2003, the Army made ready for possible operations in Iraq, even as Bush administration officials attempted to use diplomatic means to neutralize the threat they saw in Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction they believed he was hiding. To increase pressure on Saddam and prepare for an invasion, the 3d Infantry Division began deploying to Kuwait in late 2002, followed in February and March 2003 by the 101st Airborne Division and the 82d Airborne Division’s 2d Brigade Combat Team and division headquarters. The 4th Infantry Division was alerted for deployment in January as well and loaded its equipment on ships bound for Turkey. But the Turkish government would not permit American troops to cross into Iraq from its territory, and the division remained stateside until receiving orders in March to deploy to Kuwait. As of 31 March 2003, more than 269,000 active duty and reserve soldiers were deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

After President Bush determined that diplomatic efforts had failed to achieve the administration’s goals, he issued an ultimatum on 17 March telling Saddam Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq within forty-eight hours or face military repercussions. The dictator refused and combat operations began. The visible start of the war occurred on 20 March, although
Central Intelligence Agency operatives had been active in Iraq for some time and had helped to lay the groundwork for special operations forces that also had already entered the country. Coalition ground forces crossed from Kuwait into southern Iraq on the night of 20 March, following missile and air strikes on key political and military targets. The ground campaign was led by Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, commanding general of the U.S. Third Army, which was serving as U.S. Central Command’s Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). The campaign involved a two-pronged push north from Kuwait to Baghdad. The I Marine Expeditionary Force, supported by the 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division and a small contingent of Polish forces, was responsible for the eastern route, while the Army’s V Corps led the main effort west of the Euphrates River under the leadership of Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace. Spearheading the western push was Maj. Gen. Buford C. Blount III’s 3d Infantry Division, which moved quickly toward Baghdad, reaching Saddam International Airport on 4 April. The 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, and elements of the 82d Airborne Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., followed on the heels of the 3d Infantry Division, clearing resistance in southern Iraqi cities and securing the corps’ lines of communication to facilitate its rapid advance to the capital. By 9 April, organized resistance
to coalition forces in Baghdad had ended, and the statue of Saddam Hussein in the city’s Firdos Square was toppled, an action many observers interpreted as signifying the end of the dictator’s rule.

In northern Iraq, some 1,000 soldiers from the 173d Airborne Brigade parachuted into the country on 26 March. They secured an airfield and were soon joined by additional troops. Subordinated to the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–North (CJSOTF-North), which included members of the Army’s 10th Special Forces Group, they worked with the Special Forces soldiers and Iraqi Kurdish troops to expand the northern front of coalition operations. In western Iraq, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–West (CJSOTF-West), including soldiers from the Army’s 5th Special Forces Group as well as British and Australian commandos, provided intelligence on Iraqi forces, secured military sites, and destroyed enemy elements they encountered. Throughout the campaign, soldiers also supported the I Marine Expeditionary Force, providing military policing, engineer, psychological operations, and air medical evacuation capabilities, among others.

In accordance with the coalition’s original war plans, U.S. forces continued to flow into Iraq even after the collapse of the regime.
By the beginning of May, Army units were distributed throughout the country. The 101st Airborne Division had established itself in northwestern Iraq, while to its southeast the 173d Airborne Brigade assumed responsibility for the city of Kirkuk and its surroundings. The 4th Infantry Division set up operations in the area between Kirkuk and Baghdad. The 3d Infantry Division and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment began operating in Al Anbar Province in western Iraq. The 1st Armored Division, eventually augmented by the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Brigade Combat Team of the 83d Airborne Division, moved into Baghdad. Hunting for high-value targets and conducting reconnaissance and psychological operations across these areas of responsibility were special operations soldiers from the new Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Arabian Peninsula, created from the merger of CJSOTF-North and CJSOTF-West.

On 15 June 2003, the coalition redesigned its command and control architecture. Combined Joint Task Force–7 replaced CFLCC as the coalition military headquarters in Iraq, allowing CFLCC to return to its role of supporting land operations throughout Central Command’s area of operations, including in Afghanistan. The headquarters of V Corps, now led by Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, became the core of the new task force, necessitating the transformation of the Army headquarters into a joint and combined organization responsible for the
theater-strategic and operational levels of war as well as for ground operations at the tactical level.

Although major combat operations ended relatively quickly in Iraq, the Army immediately confronted new challenges there. As the fighting subsided, U.S. military forces began assisting the civilian organizations created by the Bush administration to administer Iraq, first working with the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and, after early May, with its successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority. The primary responsibility of coalition forces was to provide security, but coalition leaders interpreted this mandate broadly, believing it encompassed tasks such as helping to rebuild Iraqi infrastructure and establish local governing organizations. More traditional security actions undertaken by American soldiers included conducting cordon and search operations, killing or capturing adversaries, setting up checkpoints to control population movements, and training new Iraqi security forces. Over time, however, it became clear that the defeat of Saddam’s military had not ended the threat to U.S. troops in Iraq, as can be seen in Table 7. Late in the fiscal year, American forces faced a growing number of attacks from opponents who used what the incoming commander of U.S. Central Command, General John P. Abizaid, described in July 2003 as “guerrilla tactics.”

Table 7—U.S. Army Casualties in the Operation Iraqi Freedom, FY 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Killed in Action/Died of Wounds</th>
<th>Accidents/Other Deaths</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
<th>Wounded in Action</th>
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<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>222</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number of casualties includes Army Reserve and Army National Guard.*

Reserve Components

Organizational Change

On 16 May 2003, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, announced a major effort to transform the nation’s disparate National Guard elements into a more cohesive, joint force. Reducing the number of headquarters throughout the United States from 162 to 54 was integral to this plan. At the time, the District of Columbia and each state and territory had three National Guard headquarters: a state office, an Air Force office, and an Army office. These would now be consolidated into one joint headquarters in each area. The changes, General Blum argued, would better prepare the National Guard to address current realities and future threats. They would make the National Guard more efficient and responsive and more accessible to its active-duty colleagues, who did not always understand how to interact with the National Guard. “We will have a joint command that will look, smell and sound like what the active duty [military] is used to working with,” the state adjutant general of Kansas later explained. In addition, the changes would improve the ability of Guard troops to operate in a joint arena. “We fight jointly,” said Blum. “We need to train and operate on a daily basis in a joint environment so that we can make that transition very quickly.” Transforming existing National Guard headquarters into joint headquarters would also increase the number of joint billets available to reserve component officers, which could improve their prospects for promotion.

At a conference of the Adjutants General Association of the United States, National Guard leaders from fifty-four states and territories unanimously endorsed General Blum’s plans. By the end of the fiscal year, the headquarters consolidation process was under way, with the state adjutants general setting up single joint force headquarters in each state that would begin operations in October 2003.

As part of the transformation effort, the National Guard Bureau itself also reorganized. Formerly comprised of a joint staff and separate Army and Air Force directorates, the bureau became a joint headquarters. The director of the Army National Guard, Lt. Gen. Roger
C. Schultz, and his counterpart in the Air National Guard, Lt. Gen. Daniel James III, became deputy chiefs of the National Guard Bureau.

The U.S. Army Reserve likewise renamed and refocused its regional support commands during the fiscal year. The primary type of headquarters unit providing command and control to reserve units throughout the continental United States, the regional support commands had over the years increasingly devoted time and resources to functions such as computer network operations, facilities management, real estate transfers, and the like. In FY 2003, as part of the Army headquarters realignment effort, the Army Reserve transferred these information and installation management functions to NETCOM and the Installation Management Agency, both of which the Army had activated on 1 October 2002. On 16 July 2003, the Army Reserve redesignated the regional support commands as regional readiness commands and returned their focus to training, readiness, mobilization, and leader development.

The Army Reserve also worked to merge its operations with those of the active Army in two areas. First, it pursued efforts to combine the Army Reserve Personnel Command with the Total Army Personnel
Command to create the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, which the service activated on 2 October 2003. Second, on 25 June 2003, the chief of the Army Reserve and the Army’s chief information officer signed a memorandum of agreement that dissolved the separate Office of the Army Reserve Chief Information Officer staff and merged it with the Office of the Army Chief Information Officer/G–6 organization. The merger integrated Army and Army Reserve information management policies, procedures, and operations under the G–6.

Personnel Management

In September 2003, the Army Reserve’s strength exceeded its congressionally authorized end strength of 205,000 by nearly 7,000. During the fiscal year, the Army Reserve surpassed its 40,900 goal for new accessions by almost 1,000.

The Army National Guard exceeded its congressionally authorized end strength of 350,000 by more than 1,000 in September 2003. It initially established an accessions goal for the fiscal year of 64,112, but reduced this to 62,000 because of its continuing success managing losses. It exceeded its retention objectives for both first-term and career soldiers and had an overall attrition rate of just 16.7 percent during the year. Of a first-term eligible population of 21,003, the Army National Guard reenlisted 14,399, surpassing its target of 13,652. Of a career-eligible reenlistment population of 43,812, it reenlisted 38,433, exceeding its 37,243 goal. Despite lowering its accessions objective, however, the Army National Guard achieved only 87 percent of its goal. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the Army’s high operating tempo hindered recruitment. Potential recruits and their parents were concerned about the possibility of long deployments and war service. At the same time, Army stop-loss policies reduced the number of soldiers leaving the active Army and joining Army National Guard units. The Army National Guard programmed non-prior service and prior service accessions at a 53 percent to 47 percent mix and ended the year with 55 percent non-prior service recruits and 45 percent prior service recruits.

In November 2002, at the urging of reserve component leaders, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs Reginald Brown signed a stop-loss policy designed to improve unit readiness in the reserve components. Army leaders recognized that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were principally tasked with providing mobilized units in support of ongoing Army operations, rather than with providing individual replacement fillers for active units. Furthermore, when reserve units needed to fill empty billets
and soldiers were not available from the Individual Ready Reserve, the service’s mobilization pool of reservists not assigned to units, the units were forced to use individuals from nonmobilized units. These circumstances had gradually degraded reserve component unit readiness. Under the new policy, which also covered units that were already mobilized, the Army placed all reserve units in stop-loss status from the date they were alerted for mobilization until ninety days after demobilization. Exempted were soldiers approved for disability retirement, those being separated involuntarily, and those who faced mandatory retirement due to age or length of service.

In FY 2002, the Army had issued stop-loss orders affecting soldiers in certain military occupational specialties in both the active and reserve components and set a limit on the additional time they would be required to serve, specifying that they could separate or retire twelve months from the end of their original obligation or from the date they were placed under stop loss. In issuing its new unit stop-loss policy in November 2002, the Army stated that this skill-based stop-loss program would remain in effect. Affected soldiers would be permitted to retire or separate voluntarily only upon completion of their twelve-month period of stop loss or ninety days after the demobilization of their unit, whichever was later. In late May 2003, after major combat operations in Iraq had ended, the Army began removing military occupational specialties from the skill-based stop-loss program and just two were still included by late July. Accordingly, Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers who had been retained under this program and who were not subject to the unit stop-loss order were able to separate or retire. The unit stop-loss order remained in effect.

Training and Readiness

The Army National Guard continued to manage its overall readiness by prioritizing its limited resources, with Force Support Package units normally receiving the highest priority because of the types of units they were and their need to deploy quickly. Many were mobilized to support Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. Resourcing these units adequately, however, negatively affected the Guard’s ability to fund its enhanced separate brigades and divisional units, which degraded their readiness.

The Guard’s divisions successfully met mission requirements and supported the war on terrorism during FY 2003. But the increased number of mobilizations and deployments, a shortage of full-time support, and funding shortfalls led to a decline in the personnel and training readiness of the Guard’s divisions. Due to this decline, post-
mobilization training levels and the overall readiness of these units remained below acceptable levels. Unit resources and training levels within the Army National Guard’s eight divisions dropped 10.6 percent during the year because of decreases in skill qualification levels, equipment serviceability, and training readiness.

Mobilization

At the start of October 2002, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve had nearly 35,000 soldiers mobilized. A year later, more than 127,000 troops from the reserve components were mobilized.

During the fiscal year, the Army National Guard provided ready units in support of an array of overseas and domestic missions and was busier than it had been at any other point since the Korean War, when it mobilized eight divisions. Traditionally, the Army National Guard had employed approximately 10 percent of its force overseas to support the requirements of combatant commanders. In FY 2003, 21 percent of the force provided support, mainly in combat operations.

Soldiers from the Pennsylvania National Guard patrol an area in Sekovici, Bosnia.
The Army National Guard deployed over 38,000 soldiers, including seven infantry battalions from enhanced separate brigades, in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition to participating in combat operations, guardsmen performed logistical, military intelligence, military policing, explosive ordnance disposal, medical, civil affairs, and engineering tasks. More than 8,000 troops also supported Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, force protection missions in Europe, and detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In Afghanistan, Guard troops helped to train the Afghan National Army and conducted Special Forces operations. In the Balkans, 2,814 soldiers from twenty-two states were engaged in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, while 1,781 soldiers from twenty states supported peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The Army National Guard supplied two military police units to protect U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and an infantry battalion for force protection support to air defense artillery units in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Guard units conducted the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai Peninsula.

At home, the Army National Guard expended 419,463 man-days in assistance to civilian authorities. Guard soldiers distributed water, removed debris, and supplied security and traffic control services following Supertyphoon Pongsona in Guam. They also assisted state
and local officials following Hurricane Lili, Hurricane Isabel, and other destructive weather events in the continental United States. In the wake of the Space Shuttle *Columbia* disaster, hundreds of Guard troops from five states helped to recover and safeguard shuttle debris that was strewn across parts of Texas and Louisiana. The Army National Guard also continued to help with homeland defense operations, assisting local law enforcement at special events throughout the country and guarding airports, bridges, tunnels, and nuclear sites. Some 17,000 Guard troops provided force protection support to U.S. Army installations, as well as to 148 U.S. Air Force, Air Reserve, and Air National Guard installations. The Army National Guard’s thirty-two weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams responded to seventy-four requests for support from civil authorities for actual or potential WMD incidents.

**Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative**

The Army Reserve launched a major restructuring effort in FY 2003. The Army’s heavy reliance on reserve units in the Global War on Terrorism placed great demands on reservists and revealed weaknesses in a reserve mobilization system and force structure designed during the Cold War for large-scale combat operations. In mid-2003, the chief of the Army Reserve, Lt. Gen. James R. Helmly, described recent mobilizations as “lethargic, slow, cumbersome and weighted with redundancies and multiple stops along the way.” Mobilizing reservists had encountered other problems and inefficiencies as well, including last-minute notices regarding upcoming deployments. Because many high-demand combat support and combat service support capabilities—among them, medical support, military police, and civil affairs—were found primarily in reserve units, the Army had also mobilized some reservists multiple times in a short span of time.

To address these problems, General Helmly introduced the Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative to transform the Army Reserve. The initiative had six parts or “imperatives.” First, the Army Reserve planned to reengineer the mobilization process. An important change would alter the process used to mobilize units. Under the existing system a unit was alerted, mobilized, trained, and then deployed. In the future, the Army Reserve intended to match the active component deployment process, which followed a train-alert-deploy pattern. Units would complete all administrative, medical, logistical, and training requirements prior to receiving an alert to mobilize and therefore would be able to deploy more quickly. Second, the Army Reserve intended to develop a command and
control structure that produced ready soldiers and units. It began work on this imperative already in 2003 when it replaced its regional support commands with regional readiness commands focused on training, readiness, mobilization, and leader development. Third, it planned to restructure units, eliminating types of units that were rarely or never mobilized and reorganizing them into units necessary to meet expected mission requirements for the continuing Global War on Terrorism. Fourth, the Army Reserve planned to improve its human resources. Among other initiatives, new personnel centers at each of the regional readiness commands would enable reservists to deal with personnel issues directly, rather than working through their individual units and chains of command. Fifth, it intended to implement a predictable and sustainable rotation based on depth in capability. Army Reserve leaders hoped to build a capability-to-need ratio that would ensure that a reservist would only have to deploy once every five years. Sixth, the Army Reserve planned to improve individual support to combatant commanders by increasing the number of trained and ready soldiers in critical military occupational specialties available for deployment as individual augmentees.

*Materiel and Aviation*

During FY 2003, the Army National Guard made significant progress in modernizing its fifteen enhanced separate brigades, particularly in fielding the M1A1 Abrams tank, M2A2ODS Bradley fighting vehicle, and M109A6 Paladin howitzer. But Guard divisions still had significant shortages of tactical wheeled vehicles, Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radios, rotary wing aircraft, night-vision devices, and engineer equipment, among other items.

The Army National Guard’s aviation modernization and transformation efforts were focused on completing extensive changes to unit organizational designs. The Army National Guard also continued to turn in obsolete UH–1 and OH–58 helicopters and to field modern UH–60 Black Hawks and AH–64 Apaches. It added eight UH–60s and seventeen AH–64s, including two of the advanced AH–64D Apache Longbow models, to its net inventory of modernized aircraft. The total number of these aircraft remained below the level the Army wanted to attain, however. In addition, most of the supporting and corrective actions scheduled and funded for FY 2003, such as the acquisition of more special tools and spare parts, were effectively negated by the increased requirements of contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
During FY 2003, the Army National Guard mobilized units in several states to support homeland defense and the Global War on Terrorism, and some of these units needed to improve their readiness ratings. To alleviate shortages, the National Guard repaired equipment, shared equipment between states, and used National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation procurements. The annual National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation from Congress provided funding for the direct procurement of equipment and therefore afforded the Guard the flexibility to address critical shortfalls and modernize high-priority units. By contrast, the majority of Army equipment procurement for the National Guard filled shortages for force structure changes. The Army National Guard valued the new procurement offset at approximately $70 million.

**Family Assistance and Employer Support**

In February 2003, the Army National Guard was operating 208 Family Assistance Centers throughout the country, but concluded that 400 centers were necessary to meet the needs of all families with deployed soldiers. Accordingly, it transferred $13 million of its Operations and Maintenance funding from other internal programs to finance this critical need. By the end of the fiscal year, the Army National Guard had added 190 new Family Assistance Centers, for a total of 398. Family assistance was intended to ease concerns and help solve problems, with an institutional goal of establishing contact with all family members affected by a deployment or mobilization.

The Army National Guard budget for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve increased from $4.2 million to $9.7 million in FY 2003. These funds supported a variety of programs at the local level, including employer outreach events such as Briefings with the Boss, Statement of Support signings, and annual awards banquets recognizing supportive employers.
On 1 October 2002, the Army Materiel Command created a new provisional major subordinate command, the Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM), to guide and align the Army’s science and technology programs. When formally established as a permanent entity in FY 2004, the new command encompassed the Army Research Laboratory, the Army Research Office, and the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, as well as the research, development, and engineering centers of all the Army Materiel Command’s major subordinate commands. Army leaders sought to achieve three primary goals in creating RDECOM: to supply soldiers with emerging technologies more quickly; to enable the service to rapidly take advantage of technological opportunities wherever they arose; and to better integrate research, development, and engineering across all areas of the Army and expand working relationships with other Army elements and outside interests, such as industry and academia.

On 7 July 2003, the Army Materiel Command completed the deployment of the first phase of its Logistics Modernization Program (LMP), which was designed to modernize the Army’s national-level logistics business practices and supporting information technology. By modernizing and integrating some thirty existing logistics databases that relied on old technologies, LMP was to provide an automated system with real-time capabilities for managing wholesale and retail inventories. When fully implemented, it would offer a single point of entry for the recording, reporting, and analysis of inventory and related financial data.

The new program was a key element of the Army’s transformation campaign, and service officials expected it to improve readiness. They believed the program would reduce the time soldiers in the field had to wait between ordering supplies and delivery and would help to ensure that items were in stock when ordered. Moreover, orders would be visible from start to finish, resulting in fewer lost orders. The Army also expected LMP to improve logistics planning and to enable the service to spend less on buying and storing items, as items could
be more easily ordered direct from the factory. In addition, it would decrease the number of personnel required for logistics management and operations.

The service deployed LMP to twelve pilot locations in the first phase. These included the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, the Army Materiel Command's headquarters and staff, the Tobyhanna Army Depot, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the field office of the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command in Philadelphia.

**Operation Iraqi Freedom**

The logistics aspects of the war in Iraq began during the summer of 2002 with the movement of weapons systems, ammunition, and other materiel, mostly from pre-positioned stocks abroad. In December, the Army also launched an information systems initiative to swiftly field a new logistics capability to support current operations and, as a result, in February introduced the Logistics Common Operating Picture (LCOP), a system to provide commanders with near real-time logistics asset management and decision support tools. The LCOP integrated three existing concepts: in-transit visibility, which provided movement tracking of supplies from the continental United States to the theater and on to support activities; the Integrated Logistics Analysis Program, which served as a data warehouse, combining supply, finance, maintenance, and distribution information from legacy systems at hundreds of locations; and the Joint Deployment Logistics Model, which provided automated analysis to permit modeling, data mining, and graphical representation of information.

In addition to relying heavily on digitization in logistics support during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army for the first time used significant quantities of pre-positioned stocks of combat equipment and supplies to fight a war. Department of Defense reliance on pre-positioned reserves had grown after the end of the Cold War when the United States could no longer plan on having a large forward troop presence. The Army and the U.S. Marine Corps had stored pre-positioned stocks on ships and on land in Southwest Asia and other regions of the world to enable a rapid response to conflicts, since only troops and a small amount of materiel would need to be transported when they deployed units to a conflict area. These reserves now provided a substantial portion of the combat equipment employed by the Army during major combat operations in Iraq. The service used almost all of its pre-positioned ship stocks and its ashore stocks in Kuwait and
Qatar, and it also drew some stocks from Europe. Altogether, these stocks included more than 10,000 pieces of rolling stock, 670,000 repair parts, 3,000 containers, and thousands of additional pieces of other equipment.

Pre-positioned stocks were a key factor in the Army’s success in Iraq. The stocks generally proved to be in good condition and performed well. Problems did surface, however, though they were not insuperable. Some equipment was outdated and therefore required units to adapt or to bring along their own. The stocks included 1960s-vintage trucks, for instance, which were harder to repair than modern trucks and had manual transmissions, posing challenges for maintenance personnel and drivers accustomed to automatic transmissions. Additionally, the Army had shortages of trucks, spare parts, and other items. These contributed to supply-and-distribution problems, which were further magnified when soldiers were unaware of what pre-positioned sustainment stocks were available in theater.

Army logisticians ultimately provided operational forces in Iraq what they needed, despite lines of communication stretching more than 400 kilometers from Kuwait to Baghdad, and major combat operations were a success. But early analyses nevertheless pointed to significant logistics
support problems in theater, both during and after major combat operations. The U.S. General Accounting Office, for example, was completing a preliminary study of defense logistics as FY 2003 ended and cited the following issues: “a backlog of hundreds of pallets and containers of materiel at various distribution points”; “a discrepancy of $1.2 billion between materiel shipped to Army activities in the theater of operations and the amount of materiel that those activities acknowledged they received”; “the cannibalization of vehicles and potential reduction of equipment readiness due to unavailability of parts that either were not in [the Defense Department’s] inventory or could not be located”; “the duplication of many requisitions and circumvention of the supply system”; and “the accumulation at the theater distribution center in Kuwait of hundreds of pallets, containers, and boxes of excess supplies and equipment that were shipped from units redeploying from Iraq without required content descriptions and shipping documentation.” The study suggested that a combination of conditions were to blame for the problems, including the Defense Department’s “[in]adequate visibility over all equipment and supplies transported to, within, and from the theater of operations in support of [Operation Iraqi Freedom]”; “insufficient and ineffective theater distribution capability”; “failure to apply ‘lessons learned’ from prior operations”; and “other conditions, such as insufficient quantities of certain items, inadequate configuration of prepositioned inventory to meet Army unit requirements, and ineffective management of shipping containers.” Defense Department logistics officials generally concurred with these findings.

The Army relied heavily on civilian contractors for logistics support during FY 2003. Due to the rapid expansion of operations in the Persian Gulf region, the Army used its Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) on an unprecedented scale. LOGCAP is a multiyear, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract, held at the time by Kellogg, Brown & Root, which the Army uses to provide logistics support to its deployed combat forces. Under LOGCAP, the contractor has the right to sell goods and services to the Army during a fixed period of time at prices within a negotiated range, with the service issuing specific task orders as needs arise. FY 2003 began and ended with LOGCAP being employed for the first time on a truly global basis. The Army utilized it at multiple locations in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the continental United States, and around the Pacific Rim. Stated in dollar terms, its use in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom alone topped $5 billion. At the end of the fiscal year, dollar projections for all LOGCAP customers in the aggregate exceeded $10 billion. The dramatic rise in expenditures resulted from expanding requirements, rather than from rising costs
or rates. For example, as U.S. Central Command’s Combined Forces Land Component Command rotated support units back to the United States, they were replaced with contract capabilities.

Research, Development, and Acquisition

During the fall of 2002, the Army’s Program Executive Office Soldier (PEO Soldier) launched a new program, the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI), which fielded gear and equipment to deploying soldiers more quickly than the Army’s traditional acquisition and fielding process. Reports from Afghanistan earlier in 2002 had indicated that existing Army fielding plans were not meeting soldier needs, which led soldiers to purchase supplemental equipment and clothing with their own funds. At the direction of Vice Chief of Staff General Keane, PEO Soldier investigated and determined what items soldiers thought were most needed. Disregarding normal Army procedures, the office in October and November procured a supply of fifteen items—primarily off-the-shelf equipment from commercial suppliers and government sources—sufficient to equip some 3,000 soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division. PEO Soldier distributed these items to the unit immediately, in mid-November, prior to its December deployment to

Food service specialists with Coalition Joint Task Force–7 work inside a containerized kitchen in Iraq.
Afghanistan. Items fielded included the Advanced Combat Helmet, boots with sturdier soles than the Army’s current-issue version, and improved wind and dust goggles and lightweight long underwear that the service had previously only issued to special operations units. The success of the initial action, which cost the Army $11 million, led the service to continue to refine its list of RFI items and to equip seven additional deploying brigades during FY 2003.

During the summer of 2003, General Schoomaker also expanded the mission of the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF) and made the provisional organization permanent. Where the RFI attempted to better equip soldiers before they deployed, the service had established the REF in FY 2002 to meet unforeseen, immediate operational requirements of deployed units, such as the ability to search caves and wells. The organization dealt only with materiel solutions that it could send to the field, evaluate, and assess within ninety days, and it achieved this goal by relying primarily on technologies that were already commercially available. The new chief of staff now tasked the REF with also identifying Objective Force capabilities that the Army could put in the field immediately, years before they were scheduled for production. As the director of the REF, Col. Bruce D. Jette, explained, “He instructed us to take a look at the Army’s future force, examining concepts, technologies, surrogates and threshold capabilities to determine if they can be inserted onto the battlefield right now, rather than later.” At the end of FY 2003, the organization was developing a new charter that incorporated these responsibilities.

Among the Army’s conventional acquisition programs, two of the most important saw major developments during the fiscal year. Late in 2002, the Army began restructuring its RAH–66 Comanche helicopter program for the sixth time since FY 1988. The Comanche was the service’s next-generation armed reconnaissance helicopter and the first helicopter designed and developed expressly for this mission. Under development since 1983, it was to replace the Army’s existing fleet of AH–1 Cobra light attack and OH–58 Kiowa Warrior reconnaissance helicopters. Continuing performance, cost, and schedule problems, however, led the Army to revise the program once again in the fall of 2002. In October, Edward “Pete” Aldridge, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, signed an acquisition decision memorandum endorsing the Army’s revised program. The memorandum granted the service permission to continue the engineering and manufacturing development stage of the program and authorized the purchase of 650 helicopters at a rate of up to 60 per year. This number was just over half the Army’s previous goal of 1,213 total aircraft and was also 169 fewer than the Army now believed it
needed to satisfy newly defined Objective Force requirements. Instead, the 650 helicopter figure reflected the influence of a recent Defense Planning Guidance study which recommended that the Army employ the Comanche primarily as a reconnaissance asset and abandon current plans to also use it as a replacement for the service's main attack helicopter, the AH–64 Apache. With this in mind, Aldridge also directed the Army to “analyze extending the life of the Apache helicopter for the heavy attack mission.” To compensate for a smaller fleet of Comanches, Aldridge instructed the service to submit a plan for funding the development of a companion unmanned aerial vehicle system for the aircraft. In December, he signed a program decision memorandum allocating funding from the Comanche program to the unmanned aerial vehicle effort and an Apache upgrade project.

Looking further into the future, the Army’s FCS program significantly expanded its contracting base during the last quarter of the fiscal year. The lead systems integrator team for the program, a partnership of Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), announced the selection of twenty-one industry partners to lead FCS program development areas during its system development and demonstration phase. The program development areas ranged from classes of unmanned air and ground vehicles to system support packages. Each partner was to function as its own “lead
technology integrator,” working with Boeing-SAIC and the Army to assess proposal packages for subsystems within its area, but ultimately making its own selections.

Seeking to utilize biotechnology in innovative ways, the Army in August 2003 also announced the establishment of a new university-affiliated research center at the University of California at Santa Barbara. The Army Research Office awarded a grant worth up to $50 million over five years to a partnership among researchers at the university, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the California Institute of Technology to establish the Institute for Collaborative Biotechnologies. The institute would conduct unclassified research aimed at understanding biological mechanisms and applying that knowledge to the design and fabrication of new and enhanced materials, devices, and systems.
Given the frequency and duration of troop deployments in FY 2003 and preceding years, supporting the immediate needs of soldiers and their families was the paramount concern of Army morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) personnel. During the fiscal year, twenty-eight emergency-essential civilian specialists managed MWR programs at twenty-four locations in the Balkans, while seven civilian specialists deployed to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: one in Uzbekistan, two in Afghanistan, three in Kuwait, and one in Qatar. In addition, the Army Community and Family Support Center purchased and delivered $13.5 million worth of MWR equipment, supplies, and services for soldiers and civilians deployed in support of operations in Southwest Asia. The equipment helped commanders to outfit fitness and recreation facilities at forty-two sites in Iraq and eight sites in Afghanistan. Large MWR kits, for units of 1,000–1,500 soldiers, included free weights, basketball goals, board games, and other interactive components. Small unit kits, for units of 100 personnel or less, included footballs, basketballs, exercise bands, board games, and cards. Each month, 800 paperback book kits were delivered to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM units, along with audiobooks, magazines, music CDs, and the Army Times.

At home, Army Community Service personnel helped to set up Family Assistance Centers and conducted predeployment briefings and training for Rear Detachment commanders, Family Readiness Group leaders, and Family Assistance Team members. They coordinated community support from key support agencies such as chaplains, Army Emergency Relief, and TRICARE; managed volunteer networks; and provided installation-wide homecoming, reunion, and counseling services.

In FY 2003, $1.4 billion in total appropriated and nonappropriated funding supported MWR operating and capital requirements. This represented a decrease of $46 million from FY 2002. A $20 million reduction in appropriated funds was due mainly to a sizable
cut in Army military construction funds, offset by an increase in Army operations and maintenance funding. The reduction in nonappropriated funds was chiefly the product of decreased Army and Air Force Exchange Service payments to the Army and a decline in gross revenue from the Army Recreation Machine Program. The largest share of MWR funding—53 percent—went toward personnel costs.

**Installations and Infrastructure**

To maintain its warfighting readiness, the Army traditionally had accepted substantial risk in infrastructure. A decade of chronic underfunding, however, had produced a situation in which more than 50 percent of Army facilities and infrastructure were in such poor condition that in FY 2002 commanders rated them as “adversely affecting mission requirements.” In recent years, Army leaders had begun to address this problem through improved funding and new business practices, and FY 2003 saw a continuation of this trend. The Army’s FY 2003 budget request funded sustainment, restoration, and modernization at more than 90 percent of requirements. The service’s request for FY 2004 increased funding for facilities sustainment to 93 percent of requirements.

In FY 2003, the Army also changed how it managed its installations. During the year, funds for installation maintenance and improvement went directly to the service’s new Installation Management Agency (IMA), rather than to the major commands that previously ran the installations. Moreover, these funds could no longer be migrated to other accounts to make up training or operational funding shortfalls without Department of the Army approval. As a result, only about $5 million was moved to cover operational shortages during the fiscal year, compared with several hundred million dollars the year before. To reduce inequities among installations, the IMA also developed and issued common standards for services (Army Baseline Services) and infrastructure (Installation Design Standards). The design standards were to provide a framework for a design guide for each installation, which would be a key component of installation master planning. Finally, under the new structure, garrison commanders and their staffs, rather than the senior mission commander on site, had responsibility for managing installation support services, freeing up mission commanders to focus instead on the operations of their units.

To improve housing for soldiers and their families, the Army partnered with the private sector. In 1996, the Military Housing Privatization Initiative Act authorized the military services to obtain private-sector capital and expertise to operate, manage, maintain, improve, and build military housing in the United States. In response, the Army had
introduced a Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), which enabled the service to enter into contracts with private real estate developers to build integrated communities that included both redeveloped older housing and new houses constructed to private-sector standards, as well as community centers, pools, retail concerns, and town squares. The program had begun with pilot projects at Fort Carson, Fort Hood, Fort Lewis, and Fort Meade, and on 1 August 2003, the Army transferred responsibility for on-post housing at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to a private-sector firm. At the end of FY 2003, the RCI process was also under way at twenty-one other locations, with partners selected and transfer dates scheduled for ten of them. Together, the fifteen projects the Army had awarded to private firms to date accounted for more than 51,000 new or renovated housing units.

The Army also made progress in its utilities privatization program, which involved transferring ownership, maintenance, and repair of utility infrastructure to qualified municipal, regional, or private providers. During the fiscal year, the service privatized twenty additional systems, including seven electric, five natural gas, four water, and four wastewater systems. By October 2003, the Army had transferred
ownership of 215 of 589 systems in Europe and 83 of 351 systems in the United States. Negotiations were ongoing regarding nearly 100 other systems. These figures, however, fell well short of the service’s original goal of completing all privatization efforts by that time. It had therefore also established a tiger team, the Army Utilities Privatization Team, to streamline the process and help maintain the program’s forward momentum.

Of 250,000 acres of land remaining for divestiture as a result of past Base Realignment and Closure initiatives, the Army transferred 130,000 acres to public or private use during the fiscal year. This amount was more than the total number of acres the Army had turned over since 1988.

Safety

The Army lost 261 soldiers to accidents in FY 2003, sixty more than during FY 2002. The greatest killer continued to be accidents involving personally owned vehicles, which accounted for 110 deaths, or 42 percent of the total. Thirty-six deaths resulted from Army motor vehicle accidents and sixteen from Army combat vehicle accidents, tripling the numbers recorded in each category during the previous fiscal year. Thirty-four deaths resulted from aviation operations, or twice as many as the year before. Other accidental deaths included fifty-seven from personal injury accidents such as falls and recreation incidents.

The Army reported 2,107 Class A, B, and C accidents in FY 2003. Aviation accidents accounted for 130 of these, or one less than the previous year. These included 29 Class A accidents (involving damages of $1 million or more, destroyed or missing aircraft, or injury or illness resulting in death or permanent total disability). Ground accidents accounted for 1,977 of the total, including 257 Class A accidents. While the number of ground accidents increased by just forty-four over FY 2002, this figure included seventy-three additional Class A accidents, forty-nine additional Class B accidents, and seventy-eight fewer Class C accidents.

Of the 227 soldiers who died in ground accidents, 100, or 44 percent, were on duty at the time, compared with forty-five of 184 soldiers, or 24 percent, in FY 2002. The director of the Army Safety Center, Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Smith, attributed the rise in on-duty accidental deaths partly to the number of troops moving in and out of various theaters, which increased the likelihood of accidents. At the end of the fiscal year, the center was undertaking studies to ascertain the reasons for the rise.
Army and Air Force Exchange Service

The Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) operated under a different fiscal year system than the Army. During its FY 2002, which ended on 1 February 2003, AAFES’ total revenue was $7.3 million, with net earnings of $415.5 million. Dividends to the Army’s morale, welfare, and recreation programs totaled $132 million, down $14 million from the preceding year. The exchange service’s total revenue rose to $7.9 million during its FY 2003, which ended on 31 January 2004. Net earnings for the period totaled $485 million, while dividends to the Army’s morale, welfare, and recreation programs improved to $137 million.

AAFES expanded its presence in Qatar, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and eventually Iraq from twelve stores to more than seventy-five during FY 2003. Overall, the organization’s sales increased as a result of operations in Southeast Asia. In FY 2002, approximately $52,569, or 0.7 percent, of its net revenues derived from sales to U.S. troops stationed in the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM regions. The following year, some $415,610, or 5.3 percent, of its net revenues came from this source.
The Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Program provided for nationwide water resources development and management. The program carried out investigations and surveys, engineering and design, construction, and the operation and maintenance of flood control, navigation, environmental restoration, and hydroelectric power projects, as well as recreation sites. The Corps of Engineers regulated the discharge of dredged and fill material into waters of the United States and supported improvements in flood control, storm damage prevention, and navigation. It also cleaned up contaminated defense sites and supplied disaster relief services.

The Corps executed its civil works mission through eight regional divisions and thirty-eight of its forty-one districts, employing more than 25,000 people. Ninety-five percent of these employees worked at the district level and most were civilians. The Civil Works Program contracted out all of its construction and roughly 50 percent of its design work to civilian companies, indirectly employing as many as 150,000 additional people. Funded not by Defense Department dollars, but by congressional appropriations for civil works projects, the program received $4.738 billion in direct appropriations for FY 2003.

In February 2003, the program established an Office of Homeland Security to carry out numerous responsibilities associated with civil emergency management and critical infrastructure protection programs. Key among these was the office’s responsibility for coordinating Corps of Engineers support with elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the Army in conducting the overall homeland security mission.

In September 2003, the Corps assigned 228 employees to its disaster response effort for Hurricane Isabel, the largest hurricane of the fiscal year. Packing maximum sustained winds of a hundred miles per hour, the hurricane caused widespread power outages in the District of Columbia, Virginia, Maryland, and New Jersey. The Corps’ Norfolk District provided the primary contribution to the emergency operation
within its Civil Works boundaries in Virginia. The Baltimore District had similar responsibilities in Maryland and Washington, D.C.

**Environmental Protection**

During the spring of 2003, Army leaders approved two documents intended to guide the service’s future environmental cleanup efforts. In April, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment Mario P. Fiori signed the Army Environmental Cleanup Strategy, which provided the Army with a roadmap to realize its environmental cleanup vision. The service’s vision statement affirmed that it would be “a national leader in cleaning up contaminated land to protect human health and the environment as an integral part of its mission.” In May, Maj. Gen. Larry J. Lust, Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), signed the Army Environmental Cleanup Strategic Plan, which described targets and success indicators to make certain that objectives contained in the strategy were being achieved.

This was the first time one strategy document identified common objectives to ensure consistency and accountability across the service’s various cleanup programs. These objectives included ensuring prompt action to address imminent and substantial threats to human health, public safety, and the environment; complying with applicable statutes, regulations, and other external requirements; ensuring that Army regulations and policies were developed within the framework of the strategy; planning, programming, budgeting, and executing cleanups in accordance with Defense Department and Army directives using validated, auditable, site-level data; developing cleanup partnerships with appropriate authorities; promoting public stakeholder participation in the cleanup process and making site-level cleanup information available to the public; supporting the development and use of cost-effective cleanup approaches and technologies; and performing semianual reviews of cleanup progress and periodic reviews of sites where contamination remained in place.

The strategic plan was organized around seven cleanup program areas: Army Active Installation Restoration, Army Excess Installations Restoration, Army Base Realignment and Closure Cleanup, Formerly Utilized Defense Sites, Army Compliance-Related Cleanup, Army Special Installations Cleanup, and Army Remediation Overseas. It assigned management responsibility for all cleanup program areas under ACSIM to the Office of the Director of Environmental Programs, Environmental Cleanup Division, and was to be implemented by program managers within five organizations, including the U.S. Army Environmental Center, the Base Realignment and Closure Office within ACSIM, the Corps of Engineers, the Installation Management Agency, and the Army National Guard.
Legal Affairs

In FY 2003, the number of courts-martial decreased to the lowest level since FY 1999, after five years where both the number of courts-martial and their complexity had trended upward. Table 8 shows the sentences adjudicated during FY 2003. The Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps attributed the decline largely to the ongoing operations associated with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The number of nonjudicial punishments imposed under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was 43,037, for a rate of 87.1 per thousand.

Overseas operations influenced legal work in the Army in other ways as well. The U.S. Army Trial Defense Service supplied assistance to deployed forces around the world, including those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait. To provide a management and supervisory attorney structure for defense services in Iraq, the Judge Advocate General approved the establishment of a provisional U.S. Army Trial Defense Service Region XI in July 2003. At the end of the fiscal year, twelve defense attorneys and ten enlisted paralegals were deployed to various areas of Iraq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Court</th>
<th>Tried</th>
<th>Convicted</th>
<th>Acquittals</th>
<th>Percentage Rate of Increase (+)/Decrease (-) Compared to FY 2002</th>
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<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bad Conduct Discharge Special</td>
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<td>Summary</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>46</td>
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</table>

Overall Rate of Increase (+)/Decrease (-) Over Last Report -1.6

Military judges presided over the trials of all special and general courts-martial worldwide. Eighteen active duty and fourteen Army Reserve judges tried courts-martial in remote locations, including Kuwait and Iraq, as well as in military courtrooms throughout the United States, Europe, Japan, and Korea. The Army called three Army Reserve judges to active duty to assist with anticipated caseload increases caused partly by the call to active duty of Army Reserve and Army National Guard personnel. Trials of soldiers in Iraq and Kuwait began shortly after major combat operations ended there and increased in number over the summer and fall. The Army also called two judicial clerks to active duty to assist in preparing materials for possible use in trials by military commissions and in courts-martial of enemy prisoners of war.

**Chemical Demilitarization**

In 1985, the U.S. Congress had directed the Defense Department to destroy the nation’s stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions and tasked the Army with carrying out this mission. Seven years later, Congress had instructed the service to plan for destroying U.S. nonstockpile chemical munitions as well. During FY 2003, the Army reorganized its management apparatus for these efforts. Secretary of the Army Thomas White transferred overall responsibility for the chemical demilitarization program from the assistant secretary of the Army for installations and environment to the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics, and technology, effective 18 February 2003. The Army also created a Chemical Materials Agency, which combined under a single activity the chemical weapons storage functions formerly handled by the U.S. Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command and the demilitarization functions of the service’s Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization. The director of the new agency was dual-hatted, reporting to the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics, and technology, for acquisition functions relating to the construction of demilitarization facilities and reporting to the commanding general of the Army Materiel Command for functions relating to the storage and destruction of chemical munitions.

During the fiscal year, the Army also reached key milestones at two facilities. The accelerated neutralization of the bulk chemical agent stockpile in Aberdeen, Maryland, began in April 2003, and in August 2003 an incineration facility began destroying chemical munitions stored at the Anniston Army Depot in Alabama.

In October 2002, Congress assigned the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) program responsibility for destroying
chemical munitions stored at the Army’s Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado and at the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky. Congress had established the ACWA program in 1996 to identify and demonstrate technologies other than incineration for destroying assembled chemical weapons. The program operated separately from the Army’s demilitarization effort and reported directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In July 2002, the Defense Department had approved a new destruction technology, neutralization followed by biotreatment, for the chemical weapons stored in Colorado, and in early February 2003, it approved the use of neutralization followed by supercritical water oxidation for the destruction of the chemical weapons stored in Kentucky. Although the ACWA program was responsible for these operations, the Army’s new Chemical Materials Agency received authority to ensure the secure storage of the nation’s entire chemical weapons stockpile, including weapons stored at the Colorado and Kentucky depots.

Army Audit Agency

During FY 2003, the Army Audit Agency published 369 reports with 860 recommendations that represented $798 million in potential monetary savings for the Army. Key activities during the year were the agency’s audits in the areas of third-party claims and distance-learning courseware development and facilities. Audits, for instance, showed that Army medical centers needed to improve procedures both for identifying and billing for outpatient care and ancillary services and for collecting, following up, and resolving unpaid third-party claims. Audits also showed that TRADOC needed to improve processes for prioritizing and developing distance-learning courseware and, together with the National Guard Bureau, for determining the requirements for distance-learning training facilities.

In addition to providing auditing services, the Army Audit Agency had supplied consulting services to the Army since the late 1990s. However, recent changes in the General Accounting Office’s Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards now limited audit organizations from providing auditing and nonaudit services to the same client. The agency therefore issued its last consulting services report in 2003.

Smallpox Vaccinations

Concerned that adversaries would use the smallpox virus as a biological weapon against the United States or its deployed military personnel, President Bush announced the creation of a national smallpox vaccination program on 13 December 2002. The president assigned responsibility for
implementing the program’s military component to the Department of Defense, which appointed the Army to oversee these activities. The Army’s Military Vaccine Agency developed clinical guidelines for the Defense Department, and the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency’s Distribution Operations Center coordinated the distribution of the smallpox vaccine within the department.

Defense officials carried out the vaccination program in three stages. During December 2002, medical officials initiated a pilot program in which they vaccinated and monitored health care personnel at four Defense Department sites, including Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. In January 2003, they began a full-scale implementation of the program in two stages based on priority. Health care providers were vaccinated during the first stage. During the second stage, medical officials expanded their efforts to include critical mission and support personnel, namely, those who were deployed or assigned overseas, those who would be expected to deploy in a contingency, and those who supported contingency forces when they deployed. Due to deployments
to the Persian Gulf region, the two implementation stages overlapped and health care providers vaccinated thousands of military personnel in a short period. By early summer, they were vaccinating only about 1,000 military personnel per week, targeting hospital staffs and troops scheduled to support operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. As of early October 2003, the Army had inoculated 225,869 individuals.

**September 11 Memorial**

After the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act provided authority for the secretary of defense to establish a memorial for the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon, the Corps of Engineers had signed an agreement with the Defense Department’s Washington Headquarters Services according to which the Corps would provide the necessary planning, site selection, design, and related technical services. In June 2002, the Corps had therefore launched an international design competition for the memorial, which was to be built on the Pentagon Reservation near the site where American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the building causing 184 deaths. In October, after reviewing more than 1,100 entries, an eleven-member jury that included artists, architects, former defense secretaries, and a victim’s
family member chose six finalists. On 3 March 2003, Terry Riley, chief curator of architecture and design at the Museum of Modern Art in New York and chair of the jury, announced that architects Keith Kaseman and Julie Beckman had won the competition. Their design called for 184 benches, each engraved with the name of a victim and mounted over an illuminated reflecting pool. The benches would be arranged in age lines, starting with the youngest victim, and maple trees planted nearby would eventually produce the feel of a park.
During FY 2003, the Army continued to plan for its long-term future, but also took steps toward becoming a very different force in the present. The service carried on with its transformation process, spelling out what the Army of 2015 would look like, preparing to deploy its first Stryker brigade combat team, and investing heavily in science and technology and research and development programs intended to equip its future force. However, the immediate demands of two conflicts in Southwest Asia and a growing recognition that large numbers of active and reserve forces would be deployed overseas for the foreseeable future increasingly impacted Army priorities and decision making. Army leaders introduced new personnel policies and programs for soldiers and offered additional assistance to families challenged by the long-term deployment of loved ones. As the year drew to a close, even more significant changes were in the early stages, as the Army began to implement a new manning system and launched a plan to redesign its forces.

In late July, General Schoomaker described the nation’s Global War on Terrorism as “a war that reaches to the furthest corners of the world—a war for the very survival of our way of life.” This war, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee at his confirmation hearing, would be a long one. Under these conditions, the Army would see both change and continuity, and it would need to adapt. “We must adjust our priorities,” he argued. “We may even need to change our culture. In a world where the strategic environment is transformed, we should be prepared to even reexamine our fundamental way of thinking.” During the fiscal year, the Army began to make strides in this direction.
Bibliographical Note

The *Department of the Army Historical Summary* is based largely on official U.S. Army documents and reports. Key resources include the *Army Modernization Plan*, the *Army Posture Statement*, and the budgetary materials produced by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller. An unofficial source of value is *Inside the Army*, a weekly newsletter produced by InsideDefense.com that covers Army programs, procurement, and policymaking. Also useful are *Army* magazine, particularly its October Green Book issue, and the *Army Times*. 
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAFES</td>
<td>Army and Air Force Exchange Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Army Contracting Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSIM</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACWA</td>
<td>Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFQT</td>
<td>Armed Forces Qualification Test</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKO</td>
<td>Army Knowledge Online</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOLC</td>
<td>Basic Officer Leader Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Land Component Command</td>
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<td>CJSOTF-North</td>
<td>Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force--North</td>
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<td>CJSOTF-West</td>
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<td>CJTF-180</td>
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<td>CTF-82</td>
<td>Combined Task Force--82</td>
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<td>eMILPO</td>
<td>Electronic Military Personnel Office</td>
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<td>FCS</td>
<td>Future Combat Systems</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILE</td>
<td>Intermediate Level Education</td>
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<td>IMA</td>
<td>Installation Management Agency</td>
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<td>LCOP</td>
<td>Logistics Common Operating Picture</td>
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<td>LMP</td>
<td>Logistics Modernization Program</td>
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<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Logistics Civil Augmentation Program</td>
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<td>MHAT</td>
<td>Mental Health Advisory Team</td>
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<td>MWR</td>
<td>Morale, Welfare, and Recreation</td>
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<td>National Association for Stock Car Racing</td>
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<td>NETCOM</td>
<td>Network Enterprise Technology Command</td>
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<td>NHRA</td>
<td>National Hot Rod Association</td>
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<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation IRAQI FREEDOM</td>
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<td>OMC-A</td>
<td>Office of Military Cooperation–Afghanistan</td>
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<td>PEO</td>
<td>Program Executive Office</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;R</td>
<td>Rest and Recuperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCI</td>
<td>Residential Communities Initiative</td>
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<td>RDECOM</td>
<td>Research, Development, and Engineering Command</td>
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<td>REF</td>
<td>Rapid Equipping Force</td>
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<td>Rapid Fielding Initiative</td>
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<td>S&amp;T</td>
<td>Science and Technology</td>
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<td>SAIC</td>
<td>Science Applications International Corporation</td>
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<td>SIDPERS-3</td>
<td>Standard Installation/Division Personnel System–3</td>
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<td>SRB</td>
<td>Selective Reenlistment Bonus</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIN-T</td>
<td>Warrior Information Network–Tactical</td>
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- ASA Manpower and Reserve Affairs
- ASA Installations and Environment
- ASA Civil Works
- ASA Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology
- ASA Financial Management and Comptroller
- General Counsel

Army Staff

- G-1 (Personnel)
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management
- Chief of Engineers
- G-4 (Logistics)
- G-8 (Programs)
- G-2 (Intelligence)
- G-3/5/7 (Operations)

Note:

- SECARMY = Secretary of the Army
- USA = Under Secretary of the Army
- CSA = Chief of Staff of the Army
- VCSA = Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
- ASA = Assistant Secretary of the Army
