Cover: U.S. Army 1st Lt. Steven Robinson conducts a dismounted patrol with his soldiers in Hor Al Bosh, Iraq, 18 July 2008. The soldiers are assigned to the 25th Infantry Division, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment.

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# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND BUDGET</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganizations and Realignments</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. PERSONNEL</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Strength</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Personnel</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Personnel</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Personnel</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. FORCE DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONAL FORCES</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Force Generation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modular Transformation</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Development</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Aviation</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed Operational Forces</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Change</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Readiness</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and Maintenance</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. LOGISTICS</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management and Planning</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, Development, and Acquisition</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. SUPPORT SERVICES</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier, Health, and Family</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morale, Welfare, and Recreation</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army and Air Force Exchange Service</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Works</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Programs</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Audit Agency</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX:** Organization of the Department of the Army
(After 1 June 2008) ........................................ (inside back cover)

| BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE | 51 |
| ACRONYMS | 53 |
| INDEX | 55 |
Tables

No.
1. Total Obligation Authority, FY 2008 and FY 2009 ........ 7
2. Army Enlisted Accession Data, FY 2008 ................ 10
3. Enlisted Active Army Retention Data, FY 2008 .......... 11

Diagram

The ARFORGEN Model................................. 16

Illustrations

General George W. Casey Jr. .............................. 1
General William E. “Kip” Ward ............................. 4
Robert M. Gates ............................... 6
Preston M. “Pete” Geren III .......................... 8
Pfc. Ross A. McGinnis .............................. 14
M. Sgt. Woodrow W. Keeble .......................... 14
FM 3–0, Operations ................................. 19
UH–60M Black Hawk helicopter ......................... 21
Reserve soldiers take oath of enlistment ............... 23
Mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles ............. 35

All illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense.
In fiscal year (FY) 2008, the U.S. Army struggled with the demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and extensive modernization, restructuring, and expansion programs, at a time of great economic difficulties at home and government divisions over key policy issues. While it was the last year of President George W. Bush’s administration, it was the first year of General George W. Casey Jr.’s tenure as chief of staff of the Army. After taking office in April 2007, Casey and his staff had spent a few months analyzing the Army’s development in relation to world history since the end of the Cold War, and how the service and the planet might change over the next couple of decades. They determined that the world was in the midst of an “era of persistent conflict,” and that because of population growth, the increasing interconnectivity of cultures due to information technologies, and competition for scarce resources, the Army could expect no diminution in the demand for its services. In addition, because of the increased pace of operations since terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the Army was currently “out of balance,” with insufficient recovery time for personnel, families, and equipment; inadequate training for missions other than counterinsurgency; and an overtaxed reserve component.

To address these problems, the Army leadership decided to focus on four imperatives: to sustain the force through recruiting incentives and programs to improve the quality of life; to prepare it through better training and equipment; to reset it by providing more stability in deployments and dwell time; and to transform it through expanding its size and modernizing its equipment and structure.
On 19 December 2007, the Army announced a major stationing plan that combined the requirements of three ongoing transformation programs: the “Grow the Army” initiative to add 74,200 personnel across the entire force by FY 2010; the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) directive to close and consolidate military installations around the world; and modular transformation, an Army effort begun in 2004 to convert the force from a fixed division-based structure to one of smaller, interchangeable brigade-sized units. The service’s leaders expected the combined changes to result in the re-stationing of nearly one-third of the Army’s total force by 2011. This was the service’s largest reorganization since World War II. Under the plan, the Army was creating six new active-component infantry brigade combat teams, bringing the service’s total to forty-eight. It also planned to relocate two larger formations from Germany to the continental United States by September 2011: the 1st Armored Division, which would move to Fort Bliss, Texas, and the 1st Infantry Division, which would relocate to Fort Riley, Kansas, and to Fort Knox, Kentucky. In the short term, the Army expected to replace the divisions with two new heavy brigade combat teams between 2012 and 2013. In addition to combat units, the Army also planned to create eight active modular component support brigades and re-station two others.

In response to the growing strategic importance of Africa, on 1 October 2007 the United States created a new subunified combatant command for the continent, Africa Command, or AFRICOM, which was slated to become a fully operational combatant command by October 2008. The new command included a small staff under the leadership of U.S. Army General William E. “Kip” Ward, former deputy commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and it was temporarily headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, while it looked for a permanent location. The facilities in Stuttgart were owned and operated by the U.S. Army, and the secretary of defense had made the Army responsible for the $250 million in expected costs during the year.
In creating AFRICOM, the U.S. government hoped to improve military coordination in the region. It also wanted to relieve EUCOM and Central Command (CENTCOM), which had been shouldering most of the U.S. civil and military operations on the continent, while struggling to balance their significant duties in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new command was expected to devote significant resources to non-military activities, such as stability operations and training partnerships with local forces. Many of these activities had been overseen by EUCOM and CENTCOM before FY 2008 but were being reassigned to AFRICOM during the year.

Unlike other combatant commands, AFRICOM was not expected to have any dedicated military forces. Instead, the command was supposed to function as a staff headquarters and to request manpower from the Department of Defense for exercises and missions. Defense officials had planned to assign about thirteen hundred people to its headquarters staff, with each service providing between one hundred and two hundred personnel, but by the end of the fiscal year it had only been able to fill three-quarters of these slots. In addition, the command could use thirty-five hundred U.S. forces already on the continent, including four hundred forty Army personnel from Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa with headquarters in Djibouti.
Budget

The Bush administration submitted its FY 2008 budget request to Congress in February 2007. The budget included $130 billion in total obligation authority for the Army, $19.9 billion more than in FY 2007. Along with this amount, the administration submitted a supplemental request to help fund its operations in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), principally related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. That request came to $83.4 billion, $7.2 billion less than the year before. The budget focused on the service’s requirement to provide trained and equipped forces to combatant commanders, while balancing the needs of soldiers and their families and continuing to reorganize and modernize the force to meet immediate and future demands. Among its important priorities were to increase significantly the Army’s end strength for all components; to provide pay raises for uniformed and civilian personnel; to transform units into modular design; to re-station units as required by national strategic needs; to stabilize rotation schedules for soldiers; and to improve support services for them and their families. The budget also emphasized improvements in training; efforts to align Army National Guard and Army Reserve units to make them modular and interchangeable with those in the active component; modernization of equipment through programs such as the Future Combat Systems (FCS) and Army aviation; maintaining and recapitalizing equipment; and developing a force capable of a full spectrum of operations, including counterinsurgency.

Despite these needs, when FY 2008 began the Army did not have an appropriation. Because of differences within Congress over fiscal and Iraq War policies, the legislature passed a temporary measure to fund the Department of Defense for forty-five days at FY 2007 levels. Army leaders, however, pushed hard for a permanent budget, noting that the service based most of its equipment and support services on long-term contracts. The lack of regular funding, they added, made it difficult to do advanced planning and cost the service money.

On 13 November, just days before temporary funding was set to expire, Congress passed the president’s base budget request for the year and an additional $11.6 billion to purchase mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles. The base budget, however, did not include $189.3 billion that the administration had requested between February and October 2007 to fund all U.S. activities as part of the Global War on Terrorism. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates warned in a press conference on 15 November that if the additional funds were not provided by mid-February 2008, the Department would have to cease war operations and furlough nearly two hundred thousand civilian employees and contractors. In addition, on 20 November the Department had to transfer $4.5 billion from
other accounts to the Army and to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization—a Department of Defense group that looked into innovative ways to deal with improvised explosive devices—to keep both operating.

On 26 December, Congress completed work on a broad appropriations bill that included $86.8 billion of the Bush administration’s $189.3 billion request for GWOT. To compensate for the shortfall, the Bush administration submitted an emergency request on 2 May 2008 for a $70 billion bridge fund to cover these expenses through the end of the fiscal year. Congress, however, reworked the legislation and added another $65.9 billion to cover war operations for all the services through about July 2009 to provide the next presidential administration with enough funds while it developed its policies on Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress also added a number of domestic provisions to the bill and funding for new educational benefits for veterans. The president signed the appropriation on 30 June.

On 4 February 2008, the Bush administration submitted to Congress its FY 2009 budget request of $515.4 billion for day-to-day operations of the Department of Defense. Congress reworked the Defense Department base budget and authorized $477.6 billion, which it incorporated into the FY 2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster and Continuing Appropriations Act (Public Law 110–329). President Bush signed the bill on 30 September.

Table 1 details the actual Army appropriations for FY 2008 and FY 2009, including the approved base and supplemental funds.

Management

The Army continued its efforts to expand strategic leadership and business practices across the service. Two organizations—the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1, Human Resources Command, and the Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information System—produced a memorandum of agreement to cooperate on installing the Department of Defense’s new military personnel and pay management system for the Army, the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System. It was
Table 1—Total Obligation Authority, FY 2008 and FY 2009
(Billions of Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>FY 2008</th>
<th>FY 2009</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medicare-Retiree Contribution</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
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<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<td>Total Procurement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>(5.9)</td>
<td>(6.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>(2.4)</td>
<td>(2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles</td>
<td>(9.4)</td>
<td>(6.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td>(2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Procurement</td>
<td>(40.5)</td>
<td>(21.2)</td>
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<td>Research, Development, Test and Evaluation</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Construction</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Family Housing</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>Total, National Guard</td>
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<td>17.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>(9.2)</td>
<td>(8.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>(6.9)</td>
<td>(6.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare-Retiree Contribution</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
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<td>Total, Army Reserve</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>(4.7)</td>
<td>(4.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
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<td>(2.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
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<td>(0.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medicare-Retiree Contribution</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
<td>(0.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
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<td>Chemical Demilitarization</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Working Capital Fund, Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Security Forces Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq Security Forces Fund</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funda</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalb</td>
<td>250.6</td>
<td>237.1</td>
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</table>

Note: Subtotals are in parentheses.

aPakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund was a new account included in the 2009 supplemental and bridge budgets.

bTotals do not add exactly because of rounding.

expected to free financial personnel from payroll functions and to allow them to focus on their core financial management missions. It was also expected to provide more security, accuracy, and flexibility, and to assist the Army in its conversion to a modular force. The offices conducted tests of the system during the year and planned to fully implement it in March 2009, making the Army the first service to do so. The Army also worked toward establishing the General Fund Enterprise Business System, a Web-enabled planning tool that will allow the Army to share financial, asset, and accounting data among more than seventy-nine thousand users at more than two hundred Army financial centers around the world. The Army planned to field the system first at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in October 2008 and to expand it to all of its southeastern U.S. installations during FY 2009.

To ensure that the force was acquainted with modern business methods, in August 2007, Secretary of the Army Preston M. “Pete” Geren III had established the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations to examine the contracting lessons learned from the U.S. military’s deployment to Iraq. The commission was headed by Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. In October, the commission issued its report, *Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting*, which detailed many problems with the Army’s contracting system. In response, the Army established the U.S. Army Contracting Command in March 2008 to oversee the service’s contracting practices and to implement the commission’s recommendations. By the end of the year, the service had implemented all but one of the recommended changes, and it was working on implementing the last, to add four hundred military and one thousand civilians to the contracting workforce.
Army Strength

By the end of fiscal year 2008, the Army’s total force stood at 1,097,050, an increase of 36,678 from 2007. Of this sum, 49 percent or 539,675 were in the active component, an increase of 21,892 soldiers from the end of FY 2007. The component consisted of 72,928 commissioned officers, 14,682 warrant officers, and 452,065 enlistees. Reflecting the diversity of the force, African Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and other minorities made up 37.3 percent of the active members, and women represented 13.6 percent.

The Army National Guard also grew. By year’s end, the component had added 7,644 members to achieve a total strength of 360,351, roughly 33 percent of the Army’s total force. The component contained 31,685 commissioned officers, 7,061 warrant officers, and 321,605 enlistees. As with the Regular Army, the Guard was also diverse: 25.6 percent of guardsmen were from minorities and 14.1 percent were women.

At 197,024, the Army Reserve comprised 18 percent of the Army’s overall force at the close of the fiscal year, and it had increased its membership by 7,142 since 2007. Of the total, 33,184 were commissioned officers and 2,837 were warrant officers. The Army Reserve had an even higher proportion of minority members than its sister components, 40.3 percent, and a larger share of women, 23.8 percent.

Enlisted Personnel

FYs 2005 to 2007 had been difficult years for Army recruitment and retention. Historically low U.S. unemployment rates, negative news about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and war-related stresses, such as unusually lengthy and multiple deployments as well as increased casualties, had drawn people away from the service. Additionally, the Army had begun an ambitious expansion effort in 2007, requiring it to increase its recruitment and retention quotas at a time when fewer people were joining or remaining in the service. By the beginning of FY 2008, however, the Army had implemented a number of policies to reverse these downward trends. The service added twenty-five hundred recruiters to identify and locate potential enlistees, increased its advertising budget, raised the maximum age for enlistment from thirty-five
to forty-two, loosened some personal grooming standards, and doubled the basic enlistment bonus to $40,000. The service also increased the portion of waivers for recruits who had been convicted of offenses prior to enlisting, such as drug use, traffic violations, misdemeanors, or felonies, from 12.5 percent in FYs 2003 and 2004 to 22 percent in FY 2007. These efforts, combined with a downturn in the economy in 2008 and a reduction in the pace of operations in Iraq, enabled the Army to exceed its recruiting goals for all three components, as shown in Table 2.

Another way the Army managed to maintain troop levels through 2008 was by stop-loss, a rule under which the service could retain a soldier who is within ninety days of his or her discharge if the soldier’s unit was scheduled for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Under the rule, the soldier would then be obligated to remain in the service until ninety days after his or her unit redeployed to its home station. The policy was controversial and added to morale problems within the Army. The use of stop-loss increased after the Bush administration decided in January 2007 to send five additional combat brigades to Iraq. The number of soldiers retained under the policy increased from 8,540 in May 2007 to 12,230 in May 2008. Army leaders hoped to discontinue stop-loss once the size of the force increased and operational demands decreased.

Along with its recruiting successes in 2008, the service also began reversing a decline in quality. In FY 2007, only 79 percent of active-component recruits had high school diplomas and only 61 percent scored above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (a standardized test given to enrollees and high school students). A year later, 83 percent of the new recruits had diplomas and 62 percent scored above average on the qualification exam. The Guard also saw improvements. The number of new members who scored above average on the qualifications test increased from 57 percent in FY 2007 to 59 percent, and those with a high school diploma went from 83 percent in FY 2005 to a steady 91 percent from FYs 2006 to 2008. In a countervailing trend, the number of Army Reserve

**Table 2—Army Enlisted Accession Data, FY 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Percent of Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Army</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>80,517</td>
<td>100.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>65,192</td>
<td>103.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>39,870</td>
<td>106.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

recruits with high school diplomas remained steady between FYs 2005 and 2008 at 88 percent, and those scoring above average on the qualifications exam decreased from 67 percent in 2005 to 58 percent in 2008.

Beside recruitment, the service experienced a shortage of noncommissioned officers during 2008. This was due in part to its expansion under the 2007 Grow the Army initiative, its need for more noncommissioned officers to man brigade combat teams as the force transitioned from a division-based to a modular structure, and a rise in the number of experienced soldiers leaving the Army between 2005 and 2007. To redress this shortage, the service reduced some of the requirements for promotion to and within sergeant ranks. In 2005, it made soldiers at the rank of E–4 automatically eligible for promotion after seven years of service. In April 2008, it placed all E–5s who had served at least seven years in the service and at least one year as an E–5 automatically on the promotion list to E–6. Commanders were responsible for screening out unqualified soldiers from the various promotion lists. As a result, while 40,000 to 45,000 soldiers on average received promotions to the ranks of E–5 to E–9 prior to 2005, some 52,400 enlisted personnel did so in 2008.

The Army also retained more soldiers in FY 2008. Table 3 shows retention rates for initial-term soldiers (those serving their first enlistment, regardless of length), mid-career soldiers (those in second or subsequent enlistments with less than ten years of service), and career soldiers (those in second or subsequent enlistments with ten or more years of service).

### Table 3—Enlisted Active Army Retention Data, FY 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Achieved</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial-term</td>
<td>27,900</td>
<td>31,866</td>
<td>114.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-career</td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td>24,455</td>
<td>113.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>17,592</td>
<td>112.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>73,913</td>
<td>113.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


recruits with high school diplomas remained steady between FYs 2005 and 2008 at 88 percent, and those scoring above average on the qualifications exam decreased from 67 percent in 2005 to 58 percent in 2008.

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### Officer Personnel

The active component added 7,494 officers and 1,632 warrant officers in 2008. The Army National Guard brought on 4,053 officers and 993 warrant officers, while 3,992 officers and 396 warrant officers joined the Army Reserve.
The Army’s retention rate for lieutenants and captains in FY 2008 was similar to its average, about 92 percent, but the service’s leaders believed they would need an additional 3,500 captains and majors to meet their force expansion goals. In addition, the stresses and long deployments created by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were expected to hamper officer retention. The need was most acute for captains, who would be required to help man the Army’s newly forming modular units. To entice more mid-grade officers to remain in the force, the Army initiated a program in September 2007 known as the Officer Retention Menu of Incentives. It targeted 17,309 captains who received their commissions between 1999 and 2004 and served in the following branches: adjutant, air defense, armor, aviation, chemical, engineering, field artillery, finance, infantry, military police, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and transportation. Based on military specialty and induction year, the program offered officers one of five options in exchange for service obligations of one to three years: a cash bonus of $25,000–$35,000, the ability to attend the Army Ranger School or the Defense Language Institute, one’s choice of home installation, full funding for a graduate school program, or the ability to transfer to a branch or function area of one’s choice. By the end of the fiscal year, the service had approved nearly 15,000 captains for the program, most of whom chose the cash bonus option. In addition to the captain incentives, the Army continued a program begun in 2006 to allow cadets at the U.S. Military Academy and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps to select a branch or post, or to attend graduate school in exchange for an additional service obligation of three years. Nearly 4,500 candidates had participated by the end of 2008.

Civilian Personnel

During FY 2008, the Army maintained a large civilian corps that provided critical services to the force and the nation. At the close of the fiscal year, it employed 261,488 civilians, an increase of 15,889 from the same time the year before. This total included 7,553 foreign nationals hired directly by the Army and 16,649 foreign nationals that it employed through contracts or special agreements with other countries. Total civilian pay exceeded $60 billion, including a 2.5 percent across-the-board salary increase in January 2008 that, with adjustments for local salary scales, averaged 3.5 percent in the continental United States.

In the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the Department of Defense to consider converting both new and existing functions performed by contractors to civilian slots, a process termed “in-sourcing.” It also instructed the department to focus
on converting positions that had been performed by civilians at some point over the previous decade, that were inherently governmental, that had been handled under noncompetitive contracts, and that had been performed under contracts that were excessive, costly, or had provided inferior quality. By July, the Army had created 585 positions under the new rules, each position saving about $48,000 per year.

On 11 July 2008, the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff chartered the Army Civilian University to improve functional and leadership training and education for civilians. Initially, the Army made the university an element of Headquarters, Department of the Army, but it planned eventually to make the university a subordinate element of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), where it would report to the commanding general of the Combined Arms Center. The new institution, with headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, was manned by twenty-one professionals. It would be responsible for implementing the Army’s Civilian Education System, a collection of five leadership courses offered concurrently at the Fort Belvoir and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, campuses; it would oversee the development of online training programs; and it would work to incorporate other civilian development programs into its own. It also established governance forums for each aspect of civilian training and education, and it created a standing council of Army Senior Executive Service executives to oversee the development of continuing education curriculum for senior executives.

The Department of Defense, including the military services, scaled back efforts to restructure the civilian personnel system. In 2005, the Department had begun planning to convert the existing system, which was based in part on seniority, with one that the secretary of defense and Bush administration officials believed would emphasize merit and would allow managers more flexibility to hire, fire, transfer personnel, limit collective bargaining rights, and restrict the ability to appeal disciplinary actions. This plan was called the National Security Personnel System. The plan ran into problems almost immediately. A coalition of federal workers groups filed suit against the plan, forcing the Department to delay implementation. In addition, reports in the press and from Congress in 2008 indicated that the new system, as the Department was implementing it, had favored certain groups over others and that many employees felt it was unfair. Finally, in January 2008, Congress included language in the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act that restored collective bargaining rights. As a result, in September the Defense Department announced that it would only convert 205,000 nonunion personnel to the new system, leaving most of the remaining 475,000 civil servants under the existing rules.
Two Medals of Honor were awarded in 2008. On 28 June, Pfc. Ross A. McGinnis, 1st Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, received the award posthumously for his actions during combat operations in Adhamiyah, northeast Baghdad, Iraq, on 4 December 2006. On that day, Private McGinnis was manning an M2 .50-caliber machine gun when a grenade was thrown through the gunner’s hatch. The nineteen-year-old McGinnis shouted to alert the crew and then used his body to smother the grenade against the vehicle wall and protect his four crewmates from death or serious injury. He died of his injuries.

On 3 March, M. Sgt. Woodrow W. Keeble was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for actions during the Korean War. On 20 October 1951, on Hill 765 near Sangsan-ni, Korea, Sergeant Keeble, an acting support platoon leader in Company G, 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, saw the company’s lead platoon become pinned down by fire from three fortified enemy positions. Acting on his own, Keeble moved forward to join the platoon. He then proceeded single-handedly to attack each of the positions in turn, eliminating them and opening the way for the company to seize its objective. He was the first full-blooded Sioux Indian to receive the medal. He died on 28 January 1982.
Army Force Generation, more commonly known by the acronym ARFORGEN, was a readiness, training, and deployment model that the Army had introduced in 2006. In contrast to the “tiered readiness” concept of the Cold War era, in which the service allocated personnel, equipment, and training to units based on their priority levels in a preset campaign plan, ARFORGEN called for all units to go through predictable cycles of deployment, reset, and readiness. (See Diagram.) In this way, the Army would have a set number of units ready for deployment to a variety of missions at any given time. It would also provide soldiers and their families with a few months’ notice of their next station, thereby affording them more stability in their lives. By FY 2008, the model included the following three cycles:

1. Reset/Train Force Pool—units redeploying from theater would repair and update their existing equipment and receive new items, they would be assigned new personnel, and they would begin training. The units would also be available to support civil authorities for national emergencies.

2. Ready Force Pool—units prepare for their upcoming missions and conduct collective training. They would be eligible for deployment in case of unanticipated contingencies or other operational requirements.

3. Available Force Pool—units would be fully retrained and reset and would be available for worldwide deployment.

Because of the increase in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since the program began and Army enlargement efforts, the service was not able to implement ARFORGEN fully in FY 2008. Instead of receiving two years at home stations for every year deployed, as originally conceived, service members were getting one year at home for every twelve to fifteen months in theater. To adjust the model to these demands, in December
2007 General Casey directed the service to begin a series of “reset test pilots” to determine if it could fully reset active-component units with fresh and restored equipment, new personnel, and proper training within six months, and if it could do the same for Guard and Reserve units within twelve months. As of the end of the fiscal year, thirteen units that had redeployed from theater—eight from the active component and five from the Guard and Reserve—were involved in the pilots. Additionally, the Army was working to improve its training facilities and to synchronize their schedules with the ARFORGEN model. It also had begun developing mobile training teams to bring instruction in military occupation specialties, the Army’s Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course to individual unit home stations.

**Modular Transformation**

In 2004, then—Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker ordered the service to begin converting its division-based force structure, with large fixed formations of 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers, to a smaller, more nimble force based on specialized modular brigade combat teams of less than 3,900. Commanders could assemble these brigades together for specific joint or international missions. As of 2008, the Army was
planning to convert 300 units by the time the process was to end in 2019, including 73 combat brigades and 227 multifunctional and functional support units. In 2008 alone, it formed thirty-two new modular brigades, seven in the active component and twenty-five in the reserve component, and it converted fourteen older brigades (five active and nine reserve) into modular form. The converted brigades were included in the new stationing plan that Army leaders had announced in December 2007.

**Electronic Warfare**

On 18 July 2008, the U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard A. Cody, approved a plan, known as a Force Development Update, to upgrade the service’s own electronic warfare capabilities. Before then, the Army had to rely on the Air Force and Navy to conduct offensive electronic operations, such as jamming an enemy’s radio spectrum, suppressing its radar, or disabling its global positioning system satellite technology, while the Army had a small program that trained a limited number of soldiers in techniques to counter improvised explosive devices. Under the plan enacted in July, the Army expected to create a 29-series career field for electronic warfare operators and officers, and to train over fifteen hundred soldiers from sergeant grades and above in the art. The new field would be divided into three categories: Electronic Attack, Electronic Protect, and Electronic Warfare Support. A new field manual (FM) 3–36, *Electronic Warfare in Operations*, was in preparation to provide the doctrinal underpinnings of the new career field.

**Training and Development**

On 21 December 2007, General Casey signed a memorandum establishing an Army Leadership Development Program, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. The program was to improve the quality of leader development and to improve the coordination of curricula and resources across the service. The charter designated the commanding general of TRADOC as the single responsible official for all leader development initiatives throughout all parts and components of the Army.

Along with leader development, the service’s four Army Combat Training Centers provided joint and combined arms collective training. The Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth focused on leader development for corps, division, and brigade commanders and their staffs. At Fort Polk, Louisiana, the Joint Readiness Training Center primarily developed infantry brigade combat teams. The National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, worked primarily with mechanized brigade combat teams. In Hohenfels, Germany, the Joint Multi-National Readiness Center
trained brigade combat teams in Europe. Since 2003, the centers have been reconfiguring to replicate conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, adding improvised explosive device lanes, tunnel and cave complexes, walled compounds, buildings and shantytowns populated with Iraqi or Afghan natives, and forward operating bases. In 2008, the Army approved several initiatives, including creation of overseas and stateside-based training teams equipped with the latest training equipment to prepare those brigades that were unable to attend one of the training centers. Also, the service restructured the Brigade Combat Training Center Program, including twenty simulation-driven exercises for combat headquarters, twenty-one support brigades, and fifteen theater/expeditionary support brigades.

**Doctrine**

The Army issued a number of major doctrinal publications during the fiscal year. One of the most important was a revision of its fundamental guidebook, FM 3–0, *Operations*, which it released on 27 February and had last been updated in June 2001. Reflecting lessons learned since 2003 from Operations IRI ALI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, as well as the humanitarian response operations to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the revised edition made post-conflict stability operations coequal to offensive and defensive operations, and it provided details on how to conduct specific tactical tasks to accomplish these missions, such as civil security and governance, developing infrastructure, and restoring basic services. In a break with the earlier edition, which instructed soldiers to avoid population centers, the new manual assumed that soldiers would have to fight among civilians, and it instructed them to use carefully calculated amounts of force for each task and to emphasize precision over destructive power. It also stressed the importance of cooperating with other government institutions and indigenous forces; the need for soldiers to be able to handle complex, full-spectrum operations; and the need to find non-military answers to conflicts. Along with FM 3–0, on 28 January the Army released FM 3–0.1, *The Modular Force*, which updated a 2004 edition and reflected how implementation of full-spectrum operations and the experiences of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would affect modular brigades. By the close of the year, the service was also nearing completion of FM 3–07, *Stability Operations*, which would provide personnel with a more detailed delineation of how to conduct stability missions.

The service issued a number of other significant doctrinal publications. FM 1–01, *Generating Force Support for Operations*, was released in April and provided the fundamental definitions and principles, and identified the operational capabilities the Army would use to generate force. Issued on 29 August, FM 6–01.1, *Knowledge Management Section*, provided
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to manage and use data from numerous sources, including digital networks, in operations at the brigade, division, and corps level. The Army was also nearing completion of FM 3–36, *Electronic Warfare in Operations*, part of a broader effort to automate spectrum synchronization and to improve the coordination of jamming activities. Finally, FM 7–0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, provided soldiers with a training regimen that allowed them to maintain their core capabilities while preparing for specific missions, such as stability operations and irregular warfare. Along with its work on the new field manuals, the Army was deeply involved in a government-wide review of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, a seminal doctrinal publication it first issued in FY 2005. The review was slated to yield a new directive focused on irregular warfare dealing with counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. Some in the Army leadership strongly disagreed with the idea of including stability operations under the rubric of irregular warfare, arguing that the two were distinct and required different doctrine, equipment, and personnel. As of the end of the fiscal year, the debate remained unresolved, forcing the Defense Department to postpone publication.

*Army Aviation*

In 2008, the Army Aviation Branch continued to modernize its program, to convert units to modular design, and to develop doctrine for full-spectrum operations, all while flying over 2.3 million hours in support of combat operations in the Global War on Terrorism. Using funds from the Comanche program, an armed reconnaissance and attack helicopter that the service terminated in 2004, Army Aviation acquired and developed a number of new systems, including the light utility helicopter, the joint cargo aircraft, and the extended range/multipurpose (ER/MP) Sky Warrior,
an unmanned aircraft system. It also acquired the UH–60M, an updated version of the Black Hawk four-blade, twin-engine, medium-lift utility helicopter; and an improved CH–47F Chinook heavy-lift cargo helicopter. The Army also decided to upgrade its Apache fleet of helicopters to what was known as the block III standard, which would improve its digital interconnectivity and thereby its ability to control unmanned aerial vehicles. The changes would also improve the vehicle’s range sensors, weapons, and performance, along with reducing its operations and support costs. Aviation also helped establish a program budget for the small unmanned air vehicle. Along with weapons platforms, the branch converted eleven active component and eight reserve combat aviation brigades to modular design, and it fielded an aviation element for every brigade combat team and Stryker unit in the service. In addition, it continued to establish theater aviation commands and to expand Army Special Operations Aviation, and it began converting four Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depots to the Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group. Army Aviation also worked with other services to develop Joint Future Theater Lift and Joint Multi-Role helicopters. Along with these accomplishments, it made significant changes to its training and doctrine, revising all its base field manuals, and having all its initial-entry rotary-wing students participate in a new training program known as Flight School XXI, in which students spend more time training on the aircraft they will be designated to fly as pilots and less time on older-generation craft.

**Deployed Operational Forces**

Operation **IRAQI FREEDOM** underwent dramatic transitions in FY 2008. As the year began, operations reached levels not seen since the end of major combat in 2003. By September, however, troop levels had dropped considerably along with the levels of violence. One factor in this change was the Bush administration’s decision in January 2007 to launch a fresh approach to the war, the “new way forward.” The approach included a “surge” of additional U.S. forces and an array of new tactics to help stem rising levels of internecine fighting between Sunni and Shi’ite groups, along with increasing attacks against U.S. and international troops that were there to help maintain peace, to train indigenous forces and police, and to help stabilize the Iraqi government. The bulk of the surge forces came from five U.S. Army brigade combat teams. Troop levels for all services increased from about 164,700 at the time of the announcement to a peak of around 218,500 in October 2007. Of this total, roughly 138,500 came from all three Army components.

Tactically, along with the surge in troops, the “new way forward” implemented counterinsurgency methods focused on population security.
The military began making extensive use of concrete barriers, checkpoints, curfews, and biometric technologies for identification, including fingerprinting and retinal scans to divide fractious areas within the country and to track individuals. In addition, whereas the coalition had consolidated its forces in large forward operating bases outside of population centers to ensure their protection up through 2006, beginning in 2007 it began moving to smaller outposts within local communities to maintain closer contact with the populace and work more closely with their Iraqi partners. As of January 2008, for example, Multi-National Division–Center had established fifty-three such bases in their restive area south of Baghdad.

Once all surge forces had deployed to Iraq, operations under the “new way forward” began in earnest in June 2007 and continued into FY 2008. Working with Iraqi counterparts, Multi-National Division–Baghdad, led by the 4th Infantry Division after December 2007, launched a series of operations called Phantom Thunder, Phantom Strike, and then Phantom Phoenix to clear Baghdad of extremists, neighborhood by neighborhood, hold these areas with a street-level military presence, and have Iraqis maintain day-to-day security thereafter. U.S. Special Operations Forces were also closely involved.

Multi-National Division–North, led by the 1st Armored Division, focused during the year on clearing and holding areas north and east of Baghdad and Al Anbar, particularly the Diyala River Valley and the northern Tigris River Valley in Ninewah Province, where al-Qaeda of Iraq affiliates had sought refuge after being driven out of the capital. In January,
U.S. forces supported the Iraqi 5th Army Division in a successful drive against extremists in Muqdadiyah, by staging blocking operations and by providing air, logistics, and engineering support. Between January and May 2008, Iraqi and some coalition troops undertook operations against al-Qaeda in the Mosul area, but the offensive had mixed results, and by the end of the year Multi-National Corps–Iraq was making plans to follow up on the Iraqi’s efforts in the region.

In the restive area south of Baghdad, Multi-National Division–Center, led by the 3d Infantry Division, drove Shi’ite and Sunni extremists into more focused pockets, including Salman Pak and Arab Jabour. On 25 March 2008, Iraqi security forces undertook their major operation in Al Basrah, Sawlat Al-Fursan (Charge of the Knights). Multi-National Force–Iraq officials, however, believed the undertaking was ill-conceived. Ultimately, U.S. embedded transition teams had to step in to assist with advice and support, including air strikes and airlifts. A focus of the fighting was Sadr City, from which militia forces loyal to the Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr had been launching rocket attacks into Baghdad. The battle ended in May 2008 when al-Sadr agreed to allow Iraqi forces into the area.

In addition to military operations, another key mission for U.S. personnel was training and advising Iraqi security forces. Progress in this effort, however, was mixed by the end of the year. In 2008, the U.S. military made increasing use of embedded “transition teams” that lived and worked with Iraqi units, and “unit partnering,” in which coalition maneuver units worked alongside Iraqi units of equal or larger size. In addition, roughly four hundred civilian international police advisers served in the theater, supported by a U.S. military police brigade, and about 183 military transition teams worked with Iraqi Army units from battalion to division level. The Army also created a joint service military training program under the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, with follow-on training in Kuwait and Iraq.

Underlying the transitions in forces and tactics was a looming transformation of U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic relations. The legal basis for presence of the multinational force in Iraq was United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1790, which had been passed in December 2007 and was set to expire a year later. The Iraqi government indicated that it wanted to replace the UN mandate with a U.S.-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement that would potentially cover such matters as U.S. military operations in Iraq, Iraqi control of its airspace, each nation’s rules and procedures for detainee operations, and how both countries would handle the legal jurisdiction for military and civilian personnel and contractors. Negotiations had begun in the spring and were reportedly nearing completion at the end of the year.
There were also important innovations in joint force operations in Iraq during the year. Until 2007, improvised explosive devices—small roadside bombs made from easily available materials—had been a leading cause of coalition casualties. Multi-National Corps–Iraq, working with experts from the Defense Department’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, responded by creating dedicated cells to share intelligence and train forces in the latest countering techniques. As a result, coalition forces reduced the number of attacks from about one hundred ten in September 2007 to about twenty-six incidents a year later. In addition, small interservice and interagency teams, working with Special Operations Forces, collaborated to share intelligence and sophisticated technology to successfully kill or capture key extremist leaders and destabilize their organizations.

From its peak of 218,500 military personnel committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom in October 2007, the United States began withdrawing surge forces and by the end of June 2008, it was down to 183,100. At the close of FY 2008, the total had increased some to 190,400. About 121,500 of these troops were Army personnel from all components. Reflecting the preponderance of Army forces in the country, the service suffered 315 out of the 366 total U.S. casualties for the year (both killed
Noting some successes from the “new way forward” policies, President Bush announced on 9 September 2008 that he would redeploy more troops over several months, including about 3,400 combat support forces by November and a Marine Corps battalion and an Army brigade combat team by February 2009.

U.S. operations in Afghanistan also intensified in FY 2008. At the close of the year, nearly 32,300 U.S. military forces from all services were involved in operations under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, an increase of 7,060 since October 2007 and a buildup of nearly one-third since 2006. About 21,100 troops in September 2008 came from Army components. The U.S. Army suffered 123 of the 162 total U.S. casualties (both killed in action and accidents), and 678 of the 900 total U.S. wounded.

The United States had sent the additional forces to the country to help quell elevated levels of violence, mostly from the Taliban, fundamentalist Muslim insurgents primarily from Pashtun tribes. Military officials estimated that two thousand to three thousand full-time insurgents were operating in the country, with another seven thousand to eight thousand irregulars. Since 2006, the insurgents had adopted and effectively implemented some of the same tactics as Iraqi insurgents, such as suicide attacks and roadside bombs. In addition, many Afghans, particularly from the Pashtun regions in the east and south of the country, had grown disillusioned with the lack of visible improvements in governance and living conditions.

The U.S. troops were part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization–led force, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with headquarters in Kabul. U.S. Army General Dan K. McNeill commanded ISAF up through 2 June 2008, and U.S. Army General David D. McKiernan commanded it through the remainder of the fiscal year. ISAF’s U.S. combat element was Combined Joint Task Force–82 (CJTF-82), with headquarters at Bagram Air Base north of Kabul. Up through April 2008, it was commanded by U.S. Army Maj. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, who also served as the commander for Regional Command–East, one of ISAF’s four multinational regional subordinate commands. CJTF-82’s area of operation covered a 46.3-square-mile region in the northeastern portion of Afghanistan. It was the most heavily populated of the regional commands, with seven million to ten million inhabitants, mostly ethnic Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Hazaras. Rugged mountain ranges dominated the terrain, and most of the population resided in two arable river valleys that traversed it. CJTF-82 contained the division headquarters of the 82d Airborne Division, augmented to perform a joint task force role. It also commanded some non-ISAF forces. Of the two maneuver brigades, the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 82d Airborne Division had a large
Area of operations in the southern portion of the region, and the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team operated in the north.

In addition to its combat elements, ISAF included a multinational subordinate command, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, which oversaw the training and mentoring of Afghan military, border patrol, and police. Since July 2007, the command had been led by U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Robert W. Cone and had its headquarters in Camp Eggers, Kabul. Its training component, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Phoenix, was manned and led by U.S. Army National Guard units. From June 2007 to April 2008, it was known as CJTF Phoenix V, and it was comprised of elements of the 218th Infantry Brigade (South Carolina Army National Guard). From April through the end of the fiscal year, it was led by the 27th Brigade Combat Team (New York Army National Guard) and known as CJTF Phoenix VI. ISAF also included a special operations formation known as Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan, which included elements of the 3d Special Forces Group and the 7th Special Forces Group.

During the year, U.S. combat forces throughout Afghanistan were stretched thin, so tactical commanders chose to position small units, at most a platoon, in a large number of forward operating bases and combat outposts to disrupt the insurgents and to facilitate development efforts. Because of this, commanders had to continuously shift their combat power and the placement of these outposts to respond to changing tactical situations and the routine transition of units into and out of the country. Many of the smaller units were engaged in daily firefights. Battalion-sized maneuver forces conducted the bulk of the security or combat operations. They worked concurrently with provincial reconstruction teams, which included military civil affairs specialists and civilian experts in reconstruction and governmental affairs. The reconstruction teams did most of the development work and, along with the tactical units, performed information operations and improved the reach of the democratically elected government of Afghanistan.

Throughout the year, Army units cycled in and out of the country. A major transition occurred on 10 April 2008, when Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division, was replaced by Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, and the command was renamed Combined Joint Task Force–101. Along with the headquarters element, the division deployed several subordinate commands, including the 101st Sustainment Brigade and the 101st Aviation Brigade. Within Regional Command–East, the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team remained, and it was joined by the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division.

In one of the more significant battles of the year, nine American soldiers died while fighting a pitched battle in the village of Wanat in
Afghanistan’s Waygal Valley on 13 July 2008. An estimated two hundred militants launched a surprise attack on nearby Combat Outpost Kahler, which was manned by Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, and twenty-four Afghan National Army soldiers. After four hours of intense close-quarters combat, the coalition forces repelled the attackers.

In February 2007, the Army fielded its first Human Terrain team to theater. The team was an experimental concept, in which specially trained social scientists, working with military personnel, were deployed alongside Army brigades in forward operating bases and on missions. The teams were to compile social, ethnic, cultural, economic, and political information about villagers, using sophisticated mapping and information technology, and to provide their military colleagues with insights about local customs, language, and leaders. The Army hoped that the teams would enable its personnel to communicate and cooperate more effectively with local populations and to reduce the chances for violence. The teams typically consisted of an adviser to the commander, two social scientists, a research manager with an intelligence background, and a human terrain analyst, all with at least secret clearances. The information gathered by the teams was analyzed at two facilities, known as Reachback Research Centers, staffed with regional experts, one focused on Afghanistan at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and one focused on Iraq at Newport News, Virginia. In early 2008, the Department of Defense expanded the program by reallocating $49.5 million to it from the Iraq Freedom Fund. By the end of the fiscal year, seven teams were serving in Iraq and two in Afghanistan, and the Army was beginning plans to triple the size of the effort.

The program was controversial. Some professional anthropologists criticized it for violating their professional codes of ethics and accused the Army of using the information to target individual insurgents for capture or assassination. Adding to the controversy were the deaths of two social scientists by roadside bombs while on patrols during the year. Department of Defense personnel and some of the social scientists involved with the program countered that the members maintained their ethical codes, and that it had been successful in reducing violence.
By FY 2008, the Army National Guard had converted many of its units to modular designs. It was the most comprehensive force structure change in its history. To oversee this process, the Guard’s leadership established a separate modular coordination cell to manage national efforts with state-level cells and maintain information on deploying units. The new brigade combat teams were structured and manned like their active Army counterparts so that they could be more easily combined with other units or joint force elements. With the changes, the Guard was organized into eight divisions, twenty-eight brigade combat teams (seven heavy, twenty infantry, and one Stryker), seven fires brigades, sixteen maneuver enhancement brigades, nine sustainment brigades, six battlefield surveillance brigades, eight combat aviation brigades, four theater aviation brigades, one theater aviation group, thirty-eight functional brigades, and two special forces groups.

Along with its force structure, the Guard’s leadership underwent significant structural transitions during the year. The Empowerment Act, a major element of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, expanded the authority of the Guard by elevating the position of the chief of the National Guard Bureau from a three- to a four-star general, making it a joint activity of the Department of Defense and enhancing its advisory role to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No one was nominated to fill the four-star position by the end of the fiscal year.

The delays in passing the Defense Department’s base and supplemental budgets forced the National Guard to restructure its program funding during the fiscal year. Because the Guard’s leaders expected to get almost 30 percent of its total obligation authority from the supplemental budget, they allocated most of their available funds at the start of the year to critical, time-sensitive programs such as premobilization training, persistent conflict requirements, recruiting and retention, tuition assistance, schools, and funeral honors with the expectation that they would receive the resources they required in the supplemental budget to fund the Guard’s other programs. Ultimately, the strategy was successful because the Guard received a 2.5-percent increase in appropriation and was able to fund 99 percent of its total obligation authority.
Personnel Management

The National Guard added over 30,000 soldiers since mid-2005 and achieved an end strength of 360,351. In addition, the component increased its training pipeline to 43,484, reduced the number of soldiers who do not report for required training to 5,095, and greatly increased the number of combat veterans. Contributing to these successes was the Army National Guard’s Recruiting Assistance Program, which had enlisted 62,790 since it was implemented in 2005. Under the program, the Guard used civilian contract recruiters working in their own communities under performance-based subcontracts. Another factor in the recruiting success were the Guard’s bonus programs, which offered up to $20,000 for enlistments, and up to $15,000 for reenlistments, retention, and prior service.

The National Guard’s full-time support staff assisted in preparing units for missions at home and abroad, but remained significantly underresourced. In 2008, the component was authorized only 69 percent of its regular requirement of 42,329 military technicians and only 66 percent of its requirement of 42,471 for active Guard and Reserve soldiers. Guard and Reserve members who volunteered to serve in full-time, active-duty status provided administrative, recruiting, and instructional support to National Guard, Reserve, and active-duty units. Complicating matters further, these requirements were based on the Guard’s Cold War function as a strategic reserve, even though it was serving as an operational force due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response, National Guard leaders undertook manpower studies through the end of FY 2008 to develop new support requirement levels, and they advocated to national leaders to increase support levels at least to the Cold War numbers.

Soldier support was also an important Guard concern in 2008. The component provided more than three hundred personnel to help staff Community-Based Warrior Transition Units (formerly known as Community-Based Health Care Organizations). These facilities provided high-quality health care, administrative processing, and transition assistance for recuperating wounded soldiers (principally from the Guard and Reserve), while allowing them to live at home and to perform duties close to their families. At the end of the fiscal year, more than one thousand soldiers throughout the United States were being managed under the program. For soldiers’ families, the National Guard supplemented Army and Department of Defense programs with a number of their own. Included among these was the Family Team Building Program, which provided specialized training on deployment matters via computer modules and in-person classes; 325 Family Assistance Centers, which offered information, referrals, and outreach; and the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, which provided soldiers, their families, and their employers with
information, services, and referrals on mobilization, deployment, and reintegation. Since the Yellow Ribbon program’s inception in 2007, the National Guard had conducted 135 Yellow Ribbon events, it had provided states with $8,645,700 in funding, and it had established a $10,485,171 national contract to place full-time personnel within state headquarters. In July 2008, it held a nationwide workshop for these personnel.

**Training and Readiness**

In 2008, the National Guard was able to fund only 83 percent of the cost of operations and equipment maintenance, administration, and housekeeping supplies that it required for collective maneuver training. In addition, units left a significant amount of equipment in theater, creating shortages at the National Guard’s home stations and forcing the units to rely on existing items, which were rapidly aging. This continued a downward trend begun in 2005. Despite these difficulties, the Guard continued a rigorous training effort. Using $22 million in specially appropriated funds, it prepared units through its Combat Training Centers for National Guard Personnel, Army. It also coordinated support for sixteen active Army brigades at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, and at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. In addition, the Recruit Sustainment Program, implemented in 2005 and funded by states with supplemental congressional appropriations, provided realistic training for more than 3,800 soldiers from over twenty-five states.

**Mobilization**

Since September 2001, the National Guard has deployed 345,764 soldiers in support of the Global War on Terrorism. During FY 2008, a total of 9,001 guardsmen were deployed in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and 43,205 in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition, some 2,300 Guard forces were deployed during the year to the U.S.-Mexican border to assist U.S. Customs and Border Protection with border security under Operation JUMP START, which ended in July 2008. More than 17,000 Guard personnel across the nation had participated in JUMP START since its inception in 2006. At the end of the 2008, a total of 80,419 guardsmen were on alert for future deployments.

Domestically, the Guard continued to provide forces for disaster relief and security. In May, guardsmen from Wyoming deployed to help prepare for possible flooding along the Little Snake River. In June, guardsmen from Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin responded to historic flooding in their respective states, and 1,100 guardsmen from California fought fires in that state. In August and September, 40,000 guardsmen
served as relief forces to support civilian authorities; personnel from more than twenty states supported operations and local law enforcement officials along the Gulf Coast. Also in August, Texas Army National Guard soldiers served in active-duty status in response to Tropical Storm Edouard, and 18,000 soldiers from many states responded to Hurricane Gustav.

In addition to contingencies and disaster relief, the Guard provided 6,300 personnel and $23 million to support the U.S. European Command; 2,561 personnel and $12.2 million for the U.S. Southern Command; 2,100 personnel and $2.5 million for the U.S. Central Command; and 3,596 personnel and $13.2 million for the U.S. Pacific Command. Finally, the 19th and 20th Special Forces Groups and seven Special Operations Detachments supported combatant commands worldwide through the U.S. Special Operations Command.

Equipment and Maintenance

At the end of FY 2008, the Guard had available only 76 percent of its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) requirements. Since some of this equipment was being used to support mobilized and deployed units, only 63 percent of the Guard’s MTOE requirements was available to the nation’s governors. During the year, the Guard operated more than 56,000 facilities, including 3,087 readiness centers (armories) to sustain, restore, and modernize equipment. Additionally, depot maintenance received $343.6 million, a 49 percent increase over 2007, and overhauled 3,275 tactical vehicles. The allocation included a one-time addition for the Grow the Army initiative, funds to rebuild the component’s aged tactical wheeled vehicle fleet, and money to address near-term equipment readiness issues with M88A1 recovery vehicles, M109A6 self-propelled howitzers, and multiple-launch rocket systems. In contrast to previous years, Congress allocated $166.7 million directly to the Guard allowing it to conduct reset operations at home stations.
In FY 2007, Congress had appropriated $17.1 billion in supplemental funds to assist the Army in resetting equipment that had returned from theater, and it provided another $16.1 billion in FY 2008. This effort included replacing old, obsolete, and worn-out items; recapitalizing other items to extend their life spans; and repairing those items that could be overhauled to Army standards. To oversee the program and to ensure that the funds were being used effectively, the Army established the Reset Task Force at the Headquarters, Department of the Army. Since the program’s inception, the Army had reset twenty-three brigades and begun work on another fourteen by the close of 2008. As a result, it had ordered more than 52,000 items on contract and repaired more than 123,000 at the Army’s organic maintenance depots and commercial contractor facilities, bringing these services to their highest level of activity in thirty-five years.

As part of the 2005 BRAC recommendations, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) was expected to relocate around 11,000 employee positions by 2011. One of the most significant moves involved the command’s headquarters, which in 2008 began a five-phase plan to relocate from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to the Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama. The move would involve the transfer of 1,100 positions. By the end of the year, about 100 employees had already made the move to Redstone, and the command had awarded a $114 million contract to design a new headquarters building there. Another major move within AMC involved the Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command, which began relocating its 7,000 employees from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Construction in Maryland began in March 2008 on a new $477 million complex. In addition to these changes, the command began to close four ammunition plants, three of which were producing ammunition; it shuttered three chemical depots that were actively demilitarizing weapons; it was consolidating the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command’s Integrated Materiel Management Center and moving it to the Detroit Arsenal; and it was transferring responsibility for procuring items that could be overhauled and repaired,
HISTORICAL SUMMARY: FISCAL YEAR 2008

along with managing consumables, to the Defense Logistics Agency, thereby making the process more centralized and efficient.

The AMC also underwent a historic leadership change in FY 2008. On 28 June, Lt. Gen. Ann E. Dunwoody, who had been serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4, U.S. Army Headquarters, was appointed as the AMC’s deputy commanding general. She was the first woman to hold the position. One month later, she was promoted to four-star general, the first woman in the service to hold that rank, and she received an assignment to begin serving as the AMC’s first woman commanding general beginning in the fall 2009.

Indicative of the AMC’s achievements in management and efficiency, in 2008 six of its activities received the Shingo Prize for Excellence in Manufacturing, a Utah State University award that Business Week magazine coined the “Nobel prize of manufacturing.”

Research, Development, and Acquisition

The role of the Army’s research, development, and acquisition (RDA) programs is to identify and develop new and emerging technologies and materiel, and to acquire new equipment to replace worn and antiquated items. In FY 2008, the Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) portion of these programs increased from $11.4 billion in FY 2007 to $12.6 billion in FY 2008. It accounted for roughly 8 percent of the Army’s total base budget in the president’s FY 2008 budget proposal. This allocation covered a wide variety of activities, including independent laboratory research, avionics, ballistics, engineering, information technology, medical technology, and test ranges and facilities. In terms of outlay, the twelve most expensive programs were the Future Combat Systems, Stryker Interim Armored Vehicles, Apache Longbow Attack Helicopter (AH–64) Modifications, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, Black Hawk Utility Helicopters (UH–60), Chinook Cargo Helicopter Modernization (CH–47), Abrams Tank Upgrade (M1A1 and M1S2 System Enhancement Package), High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters, Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles, Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense, and Joint Network Node-Network.

Procurement included five separate funds—aviation, missiles, weapons and track combat vehicles, ammunition, and other items. It covered such activities as purchasing fully developed systems, modifying existing ones to enhance their capabilities and extend their life span, acquiring spare parts, and improving facilities involved in manufacturing and modifying equipment. As with the RDT&E, procurement funds increased from $43.1 billion in 2007 to $65.5 billion in 2008. Altogether, procurement accounted
for roughly 18 percent of the Army’s total base budget in the president’s FY 2008 budget proposal.

Begun in FY 2003, the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) was an Army effort to furnish all deploying soldiers with equipment tailored for their specific missions using existing programs, lessons learned from ongoing operations, and commercially available technology. TRADOC was responsible for regularly updating the equipment lists. RFI quickly became the largest equipment fielding effort since World War II. Although it was originally scheduled to end in FY 2007, the Army decided to extend it indefinitely. In 2008, the Army continued to refine and streamline the program to make it more efficient. One initiative it implemented was known as lean fielding, under which soldiers who were on repeat tours could decline to accept items that they already had. The initiative saved $28.5 million.

As a complement to Rapid Fielding, in FY 2003 the Army created the Rapid Equipping Force as a staff support agency under the Army G–3/5/7, Headquarters, Department of the Army, and is located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Its mission was to identify commercially available technologies that could be sped to deployed troops outside of the traditional acquisitions process. The agency canvassed members of the military, industry, academia, and the science community for their insights into existing and emerging technologies. It also deployed teams to work with soldiers to identify their needs, and it coordinated with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group. By 2008, the agency had introduced 550 types of equipment, fielded more than 75,000 items to deployed units, and transferred 70 projects to acquisition program managers or to the Army Materiel Command. Among its key developments had been the Sniper Defeat System, which developed capabilities to prevent, react to, and survive sniper attacks; the Ballistic Protection Experiment that developed armor designed to defeat Explosively Formed Penetrator Improvised Explosive Devices; the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery to provide energy independence to isolated battlefield locations; and the Enhanced Logistics Support Off-Road Vehicle to provide support to soldiers over rough terrain.

In 2003, the Army began a program to develop a complex collection of highly sophisticated, manned and unmanned weapons systems linked by an overarching computer network to equip its brigades—the Future Combat Systems or FCS. At the time, the service selected two contractors, Boeing Company and Science Applications International Corporation, to be the lead systems integrators, giving them unprecedented authority to oversee the project and all the subcontracts. The Army initially expected the project to cost about $91.4 billion, making it the largest and most expensive modernization effort since World War II. The weapons were expected to be lighter than the Army’s principal systems at that time—the
M1 Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, and Stryker vehicle—and to be better able to project power. The system was also supposed to be air-transportable by Air Force C–130 aircraft.

By FY 2006, costs for the program had escalated beyond the Army’s original estimates, bringing it under increased media and congressional scrutiny. Concerned about the cost, competing materiel demands from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, progress delays, and skepticism by some experts about its feasibility, Congress cut more than $789 million from the project between FYs 2006 and 2008 and instituted a rigorous set of reporting requirements for the Army. In response, by March 2007 the Army scaled back the project from its originally envisioned eighteen weapons platforms to fourteen, and it slowed the procurement schedule to one brigade a year between 2015 and 2030 until it had a full fleet of fifteen. The service also adjusted its projections for what it referred to as “spin out one” technologies—equipment to be used to update existing brigade combat teams in 2014 as an interim step to the full FCS modernization. It reduced the number of technologies from four to three, but it increased the total number of brigades that would get them from three to six. Army leaders projected that these changes would save $3.4 billion through 2015, leaving the total estimated cost at around $230 billion.

Once fully developed, the restructured FCS would include eight types of air-transportable combat vehicles based on a common platform. They were the Mounted Combat System, capable of direct and beyond-line-of-sight fires; the Infantry Carrier Vehicle, capable of transporting a nine-man infantry squad; the fully automated Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon; the Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar, with a 120-mm. mortar and a dismountable 81-mm. mortar for indirect fires; the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle, with advanced sensors to identify distant targets under all conditions and unmanned vehicles; the Command and Control Vehicle that would serve as the center for battlefield coordination; two types of medical transport vehicles; and a recovery and maintenance vehicle.

The FCS ground vehicles would deploy a number of sophisticated subsystems, including unmanned aerial and ground vehicles for surveillance and fires; two models of unattended ground sensors to serve as expendable, low-cost devices for perimeter defense, surveillance, target acquisition, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons detection; and a new family of missiles in a container launch unit—the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System. Critical to operating the entire complex of weapons, soldiers, and sensors was the overarching, interactive computer network. It would be based on commercially available hardware that could translate Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and allied messages into a unified format, and it would be able to handle all aspects of mission planning and preparation.
In FY 2008, FCS remained the Army’s biggest RDA program, involving more than 550 contractors and subcontractors in 41 states and 220 congressional districts, but it still experienced a number of contractions. In April 2008, the Army revised its total cost down by 1.6 percent. In June, it restructured the program again. Whereas the service originally had intended to begin fielding full systems in FY 2014, principally to heavy brigades, it refocused on developing “spin out one” technologies that it would field to ten infantry brigade combat teams scheduled to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan between 2011 and 2013. The program, however, did achieve a number of milestones during the fiscal year. By August, the Army Test and Evaluation Command and TRADOC began preliminary tests of the equipment for the infantry brigades. In September, the FCS successfully fired the first artillery projectile from the Manned Ground Vehicle, Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon prototype. As FY 2008 drew to a close, the Army was considering a plan to accelerate the fielding of prototypes by transferring more than $2 billion from funds used to maintain its older systems, most notably the M1 Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, and Stryker vehicle, to the FCS, but even as these changes were under discussion, Congress was debating additional cuts to the program and increasing its oversight.

Mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles, more commonly known by the acronym MRAP, were heavily armored, wheel-based personnel carriers with a blast-resistant underbody designed to protect the crew from...
mines, fragmentary devices, and some direct-fire weapons. In May 2007, following public and congressional pressure, the secretary of defense made purchasing MRAPs the Department’s highest priority acquisition program, and in September 2007 the Department issued a requirement for 15,374 vehicles, of which 11,953 would go to the Army. By year’s end, the Army fielded 7,000 of the vehicles. In mid-July 2008, the Army issued a request to the vehicle production contractors to propose a lighter, more maneuverable design with the same or better survivability to meet emerging theater requirements.

In 2008, the Army had three varieties of MRAPs. Category I could carry six people or more, and it supported operations in an urban environment and other restricted/confined spaces, including mounted patrols, reconnaissance, communications, and command and control. Category II could carry ten people or more, and supported multimission operations, such as convoy lead, troop transport, explosive ordnance disposal, ambulance, and combat engineering. Category III supported mine and improvised explosive device clearance operations and explosive ordnance disposal.
When General Casey became chief of staff in April 2007, he made improving the Army’s support to its soldiers and their families one of the keystones of his effort to rebalance the force. In FY 2008, to demonstrate the service’s commitment to this goal, senior Army leaders visited Army installations throughout the world and signed a document called the Army Family Covenant, which pledged the service to devote $1.4 billion to improve soldier and family life. One of the programs supported by these funds was the Army Family Action Plan, in which delegates from various installations met to discuss issues important to soldiers and families, and to provide recommendations on these matters to Army leaders. Through the program, the Army had enacted 107 legislative changes, 154 new or revised policies, and 170 programmatic improvements.

Another initiative was the Soldier and Family Action Plan, headed by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management. Under the plan, the Army had created an online resource, Army OneSource; established Soldier and Family Assistance Centers for wounded soldiers and their families; expanded survivor outreach services; improved on-post housing through the Residential Communities Initiative, a military housing privatization program; funded seventy-two child development center construction projects and eleven new youth centers; expanded community-based outreach services in forty-two states to children and youth through the Operation Military Kids program; increased educational opportunities in eleven states through the Interstate Compact on Educational Opportunity for Military Children; and worked with thirty-five states to pass legislation allowing military family members to receive in-state college tuition rates.

Other Army programs aided families. The Army hired one thousand new Family Readiness Support Assistants, who worked at the unit level to provide support services to deployed soldiers and their families, and it provided the program with $45 million. In addition, the service budgeted $1.162 billion for the Army Family Housing program, which built, maintained, and operated a worldwide inventory of 30,907 owned
and 12,486 leased units at installations where suitable quarters were not available for soldiers and their families.

Beginning in February 2007, the Army was stung by a string of press revelations about wounded soldiers receiving inadequate care, and in March the Army Inspector General issued a report that confirmed some of the allegations. The Inspector General found that outpatient cases had nearly doubled from 2002 to 2006 due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the Army’s medical care system had been unable to cope with these additional burdens. In June 2007, in response to the findings, the service issued the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). The plan was to centralize and standardize medical care across the service.

At the hub of the Army’s new plan was the Warrior Transition Unit (WTU). This unit was fully staffed with trained medical and Army personnel to provide injured soldiers with what the Army called a “Triad of Care”—a primary care manager, usually a physician; a registered nurse who coordinates and monitors options and services; and a squad leader, usually a noncommissioned officer, who provides direct oversight of the service members and ensures that they attend medical and administrative appointments. By the beginning of FY 2008, the service established thirty-two such units in the continental United States, one each in Alaska and Hawaii, and three in Germany. During FY 2008, the Department of the Army Inspector General conducted inspections of the new WTUs to identify problems and to improve their functioning.

In addition, the Army instituted a new policy in January, under which WTU personnel were required to develop individual plans, known as Comprehensive Care Plans, for each wounded soldier within thirty days of when the soldier first entered the unit. These plans would cover all aspects of the soldier’s recovery—medical, mental, housing, and vocational.

Despite the Army’s efforts during the fiscal year to staff the WTUs with trained personnel, the service was unable to keep up with increased numbers of wounded Iraq and Afghanistan veterans. In June 2008, the service found that twenty-one WTUs had insufficient personnel to meet patient-to-staff ratios that the service had established under AMAP. To address the shortfall, in July the Army directed commanders at the various installations to staff the units using personnel from their other medical facilities. Within a month, all but four had met staffing requirements. Between March 2007 and the end of FY 2008, the service had dedicated more than 3,200 personnel to AMAP, provided $900 million in funding, and treated nearly 8,500 soldiers.

The Army continued to face a daunting problem with suicides in FY 2008. By the end of August 2008, ninety-three active-duty soldiers had taken their own lives, and the Army expected the rate per soldier to reach levels not seen since the Vietnam War. Army leaders blamed the problem
primarily on stresses brought about by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To address the problem, the Army added more resources to existing programs and launched a number of new initiatives. One new program was called Ask, Care, Escort, a comprehensive program of refresher courses for Army trainers in suicide prevention techniques. On 11 February 2008, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel met with the Army Surgeon General, the Chief of Chaplains, and the Director of Human Resources Policy, G–1, to assess the Army’s existing programs and ways to improve them. The group determined that the service would have to take a multidisciplinary approach to suicide prevention. It would also have to reduce the stigma for personnel who seek mental health care, to improve access to behavioral health providers, to instruct junior leaders on intervention skills, and to keep field commanders informed about the latest prevention techniques and mental health trends within their commands. The Army also created the General Officer Steering Committee for suicide prevention to assess policies. In September, the service held National Suicide Prevention Week, during which it tried to raise awareness of the problem, and it rolled out a number of new tools, such as an interactive DVD that enabled soldiers to practice techniques they could use to help suicidal colleagues. By the end of the fiscal year, the service had hired 191 new mental health providers at direct-care facilities such as Army medical centers, and it had brought on about 2,800 more through TRICARE.

Along with suicide prevention, the Army and the Department of Defense also looked for innovative ways to identify and treat soldiers suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A RAND study released in 2008 estimated that around three hundred thousand military personnel who had deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan were suffering from PTSD or major depression. To help address this problem, the service conducted outreach efforts to soldiers, stressing that there was no shame in seeking help for PTSD and other mental health issues.

Because of an increase in the number of brain injuries among soldiers due to the nature of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, in 2007 the Army Surgeon General had created the Proponenty Office for Rehabilitation and Reintegration and assigned it the responsibility to develop and implement measures to improve diagnosis and treatment of traumatic brain injury (TBI). In FY 2008, the service dedicated $122 million in supplemental funds to increase access to care, to improve the quality of treatment, and to develop better screening techniques. The Army could now staff each of its medical treatment facilities with a traumatic brain injury program manager who emphasized primary care and family-centered rehabilitation. In conjunction with the Army’s efforts, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs issued a standard definition for the disorder and a gauge for its severity, and created a uniform process for reporting cases.
The Department of Defense began including screening questions for the disorder in the post-deployment health assessments given to personnel. In addition, it worked with the Veterans Administration to develop clinical guidelines for mild cases of traumatic brain injury for deployed and nondeployed personnel. Finally, the Office of the Surgeon General of the United States released guidelines to establish and standardize screening, treatment, and rehabilitation.

Both PTSD and TBI research received a special one-year boost in funding in FY 2007 that provided the basis for investigations into innovative diagnosis and treatment techniques through FY 2008. Under Public Laws 110–28 and 109–289, Congress provided $151 million for PTSD research and $150 million for TBI research to the Office of the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRP). Together the appropriations represented the largest one-year expenditure for military medical research since 1993. Founded in 1992, CDMRP was run by the Army as a research area directorate within the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Its mission was to bring together military, government, and private experts to identify and fund innovative research on medical issues through a rigorous peer-review process. Because CDMRP was not considered a core mission of the Department of Defense, the Department did not request funding for it through its annual budget submission; instead, Congress provided it with money to address certain medical matters and attached the funds to the Department’s annual appropriation bill. The special appropriations were used to fund the Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury Research Program, which oversaw 171 research efforts in FY 2008. For PTSD, in addition to new forms of talk therapy and medication, the program funded research into myriad unconventional treatment techniques, including acupuncture, yoga, meditation, animal therapy, and biofeedback using video games. For TBI, it looked into new medications and special eyeglass-like devices that can detect brain injuries.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are designed to improve soldiers’ readiness by promoting their mental and physical fitness and well-being. The programs support military communities by providing sports and fitness activities, recreation centers, library services, educational opportunities, entertainment programs, leisure travel services, special activities for single soldiers, restaurants, catering, lodging, housing information, and post exchange services. Among the programs that were improved and expanded in FY 2008 were Warrior Adventure Quest, which provided redeploying soldiers with high-adrenaline activities to help relieve
post-deployment stress; General Libraries Information System, which provided Web-based access to library services; an effort to upgrade fitness equipment; and the Armed Forces Recreation Machine Program, which offered phones, Internet access, cable television, and laptop computers to soldiers at Army lodges or in Army-supported billets. In addition, the Army deployed twelve personnel to Iraq to develop sports, fitness, and recreation programs, and it provided free or discounted admissions to MWR activities for the family members of deployed soldiers. Finally, it opened a new Armed Forces Recreation Center at Fort Story, Virginia.

Army and Air Force Exchange Service

In FY 2008, the mission of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) continued to provide active-duty soldiers, airmen, National Guard members, reservists, retirees, and the families of service members throughout the world with services and brand-name goods at competitive prices. AAFES increased its total sales to nearly $10 billion, an increase of about 3 percent from FY 2007. Its total earnings were $376 million, and it provided $264.5 million in dividends to MWR programs. Altogether, AAFES operated more than 3,100 facilities, including 1,765 name-brand restaurants like Burger King, Starbucks, Subway, and Taco Bell, and it ran more than 5,100 concessions. In addition, 400 of its more than 43,000 employees voluntarily deployed to support service members in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the year, AAFES expanded its Web site to include over 18 million items, and it continued a $1.2 billion, five-year effort begun in FY 2005 to build and renovate retail outlets. AAFES also completed a transition to a high-technology program called Oracle Retail. This program enabled AAFES to improve allocation of its products and to set prices. To better serve the needs of service members and their families, it introduced thirty-six new sale items under its Exchange Select program that were 20–50 percent less expensive than comparable national brands. These items included health and beauty aids, household cleaning products, office supplies, and photographic equipment. It also increased the number of energy-efficient appliances to 35 percent of its total stock, and implemented a new program, Operation Be Fit, which promoted health and fitness products and services.
Special Functions

Civil Works

The Army Civil Works Program is one of the four primary missions of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. It includes such activities as development and management of water resources infrastructure; protection, restoration, and management of environmental resources; disaster response and recovery; and engineering services and program and project management. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) provides oversight and policy direction. The program is funded by the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, by contributions from state and local project sponsors, and through reimbursement from agencies supported by the Corps of Engineers.

In FY 2008, the Army Civil Works Program oversaw the operation of over 600 dams, 900 ports, 12,000 miles of commercial inland navigation channels in 41 states, 240 navigation lock chambers, and 383 major lakes and reservoirs. In addition, it managed 75 hydropower projects and produced about 70.9 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. This amounted to 24 percent of all U.S. hydropower and 3 percent of all U.S. electrical capacity. It also issued some 53,472 Clean Water Act permits. The program was also responsible for managing on average 11.7 million acres of real estate and served as the nation’s principal provider of outdoor recreation, with more than 350 million visitors. In financial terms, the program prevented about $19.6 billion in property damage from floods and provided support to more than 70 federal agencies, including $946 million to the Federal Emergency Management Agency; $316 million to the Department of Homeland Security, Directorate of Border and Transportation Security; $266 million to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; and $108.9 million to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Along with these funds, the Corps of Engineers supplied more than $2.1 billion in engineering and technical support to more than 70 federal, state, local, and international agencies.

Environmental Programs

The U.S. Army Environmental Command (USAEC), a subordinate command of the Installation Management Command, oversaw the service’s
environmental protection programs and provided advice to Army leaders on these matters. The organization was comprised principally of biologists, chemists, engineers, lawyers, and researchers. It worked on the civilian side with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment). In July 2008, Col. Maria R. Gervais replaced Col. Michael P. O’Keefe as USAEC commander. Gervais, a highly decorated chemical officer and brigade-level commander with extensive operational experience, was the first woman to lead the organization.

Throughout the year, the Army operated a wide range of programs focused on enhancing and protecting natural resources; restoring areas contaminated from previous military activities; complying with federal, state, local, and host-nation regulations; and preventing pollution. It budgeted $437.7 million for these efforts. By 2008, it had created sustainability plans for over twenty installations to improve energy efficiency, increase the use of recycled products, and reduce pollutants. It had also worked with state, private, and local authorities to preserve over eighty thousand acres of buffer zones around its training facilities. The service also continued an effort begun in 2001 to reduce carbon emissions by 30 percent by 2015, using such innovations as spraying foam insulation on tents at overseas bases and more carefully monitoring its equipment and facilities. To this end, in January it began operating a two-megawatt solar array at Fort Carson, Colorado, that it expected would produce enough power for 540 homes. The Army also began releasing information on its use of resources and its emissions of pollutants under the Global Reporting Initiative’s internationally recognized standards; and it formed the Army Energy Security Task Force to oversee its efforts to comply with Executive Order 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management (2007), which established rigorous goals for reducing energy consumption. As a testament to its commitment to the environment, the Army acquisition community received an award from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its reduction of ozone-depleting substances in weapons systems.

Undergirding many of these environmental efforts was the Army’s Environmental Management System (EMS). Begun in 2003, EMS mandated individual Army-directed installations to work with all of their tenants, subinstallations, contractors, activities, products, and services to develop plans to build environmental protection practices and resource efficiencies into their regular operations. The plans also were to include reporting and outreach requirements with local communities and organizations, and to adhere to objectives in Executive Order 13423. The installations were to base these plans on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard, an internationally recognized approach that allowed organizations to establish their own systems, goals,
and monitoring programs. This flexibility would permit the Army to improve its environmental practices while maintaining its readiness requirements. By FY 2008, upwards of 149 Army facilities were implementing EMSs, and the service was planning to be in full conformance with ISO 14001 by the end of FY 2009.

Despite the Army’s achievements, during the year the EPA, federal legislators, and a number of state governments accused the Army, along with the other services, of making insufficient progress in remediating sites on the EPA’s National Priorities List of highly polluted locations. The Army had been responsible for thirty-three of these. In June, the EPA issued “final orders” to the Pentagon for three locations, including the Army’s Fort Meade, Maryland, site, which established rigid timetables for the cleanup. The Army responded that it had worked voluntarily with the agency to complete remediation efforts at thirty-one sites, the most recent being Fort Eustis, Virginia, in March, and that it would continue these voluntary efforts. At Fort Meade, according to the service, it had spent more than $84 million since 1984 in remediation. Also, in September, the EPA proposed adding Fort Detrick, Maryland, to the cleanup list, initiating a sixty-day period for public comments before it would render a decision.

Legal Affairs

The active Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps included 1,647 attorneys, four more than in FY 2007. Five of these attorneys were general officers. The organization also had another fifty-eight officers who were attending law school under the Funded Legal Education Program. Indicative of the diversity of active Army attorney population, 678 were either minorities or women. In addition, the reserve component Judge Advocate General’s Corps had 1,970 attorneys and the Army National Guard had 574. Another 90 warrant officers, 515 civilian attorneys, and 1,484 enlisted paralegals supported legal operations worldwide. Altogether, 610 personnel had deployed during the year.

To help ensure the professionalism of this force, by 1 October 2008 the Judge Advocate General had expected to fully implement changes begun in 2006 to add ten weeks of training beyond the Officer Basic Course for newly commissioned judge advocates from all three Army components. The new training included the Direct Commissioned Officer’s Course and Branch Immaterial Basic Officer Leadership Course. Furthermore, the new judge advocates would have to complete twenty hours of online training known as the Judge Advocate Tactical Staff Officer Course within their first two years of service. In addition, the Criminal Law Department of the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, Virginia, increased the amount of advocacy instruction provided, and
incorporated references to a new Article 120 rape statute of the Uniform Code of Military Justice that became effective 1 October 2007.

The Judge Advocate General implemented several significant military justice actions in FY 2008. He directed brigade combat teams and Offices of the Staff Judge Advocate to refine rating schemes and duty positions to ensure that commanders had proper and sufficient trial counsel services, and he had both organizations initiate a new skill identifier program to provide them with four graduated levels of professional recognition. In addition, as part of a new Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program initiated by the Army in September 2008, the Judge Advocate General identified judge advocates to fill five Trial Counsel Assistance Program positions and fifteen new Special Victim Prosecutor positions; as well as seven Highly Qualified Experts to improve prosecution and defense of sexual assault offenses.

The Criminal Law Division, which advises the Judge Advocate General on military justice policy, legislation, opinions, and related criminal law actions, responded to 13 White House and 132 congressional and other inquiries; it handled 6 clemency petitions, 31 officer dismissals, and 131 Article 69 and other reviews; and it processed 18 Freedom of Information Act/Privacy actions.

The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals/Office of the Clerk of Court received more than 900 records of trial and over 1,900 motions and briefs, while the Office of the Clerk of Court closed over 1,500 courts-martial cases. The Trial Judiciary tried nearly 1,200 courts-martial in FY 2008, a 10-percent decline from 2007, and Army trial judges presided over 130 general and special courts-martial in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan, for a total of over 650 since May 2003. In addition, the first court-martial of a civilian contractor accompanying an armed force during a time of declared war or contingency operation pursuant to the newly enacted Article 2(a) (10) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was completed in Baghdad, Iraq. The accused pleaded guilty to wrongful appropriation, obstructing justice, and making a false official statement and was sentenced to five months of confinement. Finally, five trial judges were selected to preside as military judges for the military commissions convened in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

The U.S. Army Trial Defense Service defended soldiers facing the entire range of allegations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This included 1,272 courts-martial, 461 administrative boards, 41,227 nonjudicial punishments, and 34,620 consultations (Table 4).

The U.S. Army Government Appellate Division filed 1,067 briefs and 14 oral arguments with the Army Court of Criminal Appeals. It also filed 19 briefs with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, along with 461 petitions and 25 oral arguments. The Defense Appellate Division provided
representation to qualifying soldiers, handling 900 new cases. Before the Army Court of Criminal Appeals, it filed 1,032 cases, 220 miscellaneous pleadings, and orally argued 18 cases. Before the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, it filed 464 supplements to petitions for review, 13 final briefs, 153 miscellaneous pleadings, and it orally argued 16 cases. In addition, it filed 3 petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. Cases of note included United States v. Balboa, in which the division filed an extraordinary writ challenging the constitutionality of Article 120 relating to sexual assault of an impaired victim; and United States v. Mr. Muhammad Alaa Ali, in which the division filed an extraordinary writ on behalf of Mr. Ali, a Canadian-Iraqi tried at court-martial under the new Article 2, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 United States Code, Section 802(a)(10).

**Army Audit Agency**

With roughly six hundred professional employees divided into seventeen functional audit teams in FY 2008, the U.S. Army Audit Agency provided the Army with objective and independent reviews and analyses of its functions and organizations, thereby allowing them to make informed decisions and to satisfy their statutory and fiduciary responsibilities. During the fiscal year, the agency published 270 reports, made over 727 recommendations, and identified more than $404 million in potential monetary benefits. Among some of the agency’s more significant activities during the fiscal year was an audit it conducted of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency’s chemical demilitarization program, a $29 billion

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**Table 4—Courts-Martial Statistics, FY 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Courts-Martial</th>
<th>Tried</th>
<th>Convicted</th>
<th>Acquittals</th>
<th>Rate Compared to FY 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad Conduct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharge Special</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Bad Conduct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discharge Special</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>+2.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

operation that received a high level of congressional and international attention. The Army Audit Agency found that while accounting procedures under the program were generally adequate, those for toxic chemical munitions and bulk agents were not always accurate, and internal processes for records management were not fully effective. The agency also reviewed Army Travel Charge Card—Centrally Billed Accounts and found that some Army activities were not making efficient use of new technologies to avoid delinquent payments. As a result, the Army was losing special discounts from its contractors. One of the agencies more significant ongoing audits was one of the military construction requirements under the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The agency issued recommendations during the year to update cost estimates, standard designs, automated systems, and military construction guidance. Finally, the agency assessed how the Army was implementing policies concerning the use of non–Department of Defense contracts. It found that many offices did not know about the policy or did not fully understand it. In response, the agency recommended that the secretary of the Army reissue guidance on the policy to give it greater visibility, and that the service recommend changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation to deal with interagency contracting.
The Army weathered many adversities during FY 2008. The nation was engaged in a heated presidential election campaign, and while its political leaders fervently debated how to address a faltering economy and how to prosecute wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the men and women of the U.S. Army continued to serve in those theaters and others. They and their families dealt with the stresses created by repeated and lengthy deployments, the loss of loved ones, and serious combat-related mental and physical injuries. The Army as an institution also struggled to cope with these personnel pressures while it attempted to maintain and improve its equipment, and to enhance its readiness to respond to all spectrums of conflict. Complicating the situation further, the nation’s leaders were unable to agree on annual appropriations in a timely manner, forcing the service to scramble to find the funds it needed.

Even with these imposing obstacles, the U.S. Army made progress on a number of its pressing issues. For soldiers and their families, it expanded existing programs, and it instituted a number of innovative approaches to address mental and physical care. The service also made marked improvements in recruiting and retention, and it implemented policies to regularize deployment schedules to provide service members and their families with more predictability. Organizationally, the Army began a major plan to re-station units that brought together ongoing efforts to create a more nimble modular force structure, to expand its soldier base, and to consolidate installations and programs. It also began tests of a new force generation model, ARFORGEN, that it expected would provide a predictable stream of well-trained and well-equipped troops for all of the nation’s contingencies. Doctrinally, the service issued a host of major publications, including FM 3–0, Operations, which codified the concept of preparing the force for a full spectrum of operations. The service also made great strides in developing new weapons systems, such as FCS, and accelerated the fielding of associated technologies to deployed soldiers. It fielded new MRAPs to provide better protection for deployed forces against roadside bombs, and it continued unprecedented efforts to repair and replace equipment worn in operations. Operationally, new counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq helped decrease insurgent and sectarian violence in the country, allowing for a significant reduction in U.S. force levels there by the year’s end. In Afghanistan, the Army worked
with its coalition partners to hold the line against a growing insurgency. Finally, it worked to convert the Guard and Reserve from a strategic to an operational reserve. All of these issues showed the Army’s continued commitment to improving readiness and support for the soldier while conducting significant overseas combat operations and preparing the force for any future contingencies.
The *Department of the Army Historical Summary* is based largely on official U.S. Army documents and reports. Key resources include the *Army Modernization Plan*, the *Army Posture Statement*, and the budgetary materials produced by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller. An unofficial source of value is *Inside the Army*, a weekly newsletter published by InsideDefense.com that covers Army programs, procurement, and policymaking. Also useful are *Army* magazine, particularly its October Green Book issue, and the *Army Times*.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAFES</td>
<td>Army and Air Force Exchange Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAP</td>
<td>Army Medical Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Army Materiel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Base Realignment and Closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDMRP</td>
<td>Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>Environmental Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>U.S. Environmental Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Future Combat Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO</td>
<td>International Organization for Standardization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modified Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAP</td>
<td>Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (Vehicle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWR</td>
<td>Morale, Welfare, and Recreation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Posttraumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Research, Development, and Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDT&amp;E</td>
<td>Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Rapid Fielding Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBI</td>
<td>Traumatic Brain Injury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAEC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Environmental Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTU</td>
<td>Warrior Transition Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 31
Abrams tank, 32, 34, 35
Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, 16
Afghanistan war, 1, 24–26, 49–50
Army National Guard forces in, 25, 29
budget, 5, 6, 7
casualties, 25–26, 38
courts-martial in Afghanistan, 46
Future Combat Systems (FCS), 34
Human Terrain teams, 26
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 18, 24–26, 29
reconstruction teams, 25
recruitment and retention issues stemming from, 8, 12
“spin out one” technologies and, 35
stop-loss policy and, 10
suicide rates and, 39
training, replicating conditions in, 18
Africa Command (AFRICOM), 3–4
Air Force, 17, 34, 41
Airborne Divisions
  82d, 24–25
  101st, 25
Al-Qaeda, 21–22
American Indian recipient of Medal of Honor, 14
Apache helicopters, 20, 32
Armed Forces Qualification Test, 10
Armed Forces Recreation Center, 41
Armed Forces Recreation Machine Program, 41
Armored Division, 1st, 3
Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), 41
Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 33
Army Audit Agency, 47–48
Army aviation, 5, 19–20. See also specific aviation equipment and craft.
Army Civil Works Program, 43
Army Civilian University, 13
Army Combat Training Centers, 17
Army Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command, 31
Army Contracting Command, 8
Army Corps of Engineers, 43
Army Court of Criminal Appeals, 46, 47
Army, Department of. See Department of the Army, fiscal year 2008.
Army Energy Security Task Force, 44
Army Environmental Command (USAEC), 43–44
Army Family Action Plan, 37
Army Family Covenant, 37
Army Family Housing program, 37–38
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), 15–16, 49
Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 45–46
Army Leadership Development Program, 17
Army Materiel Command (AMC), 31, 32, 33
Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP), 38
Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, 40
Army National Guard, 27–30
  19th and 20th Special Forces Groups, 30
  27th Brigade Combat Team, New York, 25
  218th Infantry Brigade, South Carolina, 25
ARFORGEN, 16
budget, 27, 29, 30
Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, Afghanistan, 25
conversion from strategic to operational reserve, 28, 50
deployed operational forces, 25, 29–30
legal affairs and services, 45
manning, recruitment, and retention initiatives, 28, 29
materiel and equipment, 30
modularity and interchangeability with active components, 5
organizational changes, 27
personnel, 9, 10, 11, 28–29
support services, 28–29
training and readiness programs, 29
Army OneSource, 37
Army Ranger School, 12
Army Reserve
ARFORGEN, 16
conversion from strategic to operational reserve, 28, 50
modularity and interchangeability with active components, 5
personnel, 10, 11, 28
quality issues, 10–11
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, 12
Army Special Operations Groups. See Special Operations Forces.
Army Special Operations Aviation, 20
Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, 31
Army Test and Evaluation Command, 35
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 13, 17, 33, 35
Army Travel Charge Card—Centrally Billed Accounts, 48
Army Trial Defense Service, 46
Articles 2 and 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 46, 47
Ask, Care, Escort program, 39
Aviation Classification Repair Activity Depots, 20
Aviation equipment and units, 5, 19–20. See also specific types of equipment.
Awards and medals
EPA award for reduction of ozone-depleting substances in weapons systems, 44
Medal of Honor recipients, 14
Shingo Prize for Excellence in Manufacturing, 32
Ballistic Protection Experiment, 33
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act (2005) and Commission, 3, 31, 48
Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, 16
Battle Command Training Program, 17
Be Fit program, 41
Border security, U.S., 29
Bradley fighting vehicle, 34, 35
Branch Immaterial Basic Officer Leadership Course, 45
Brigade Combat Training Center Program, 18
Budget, 5–6
Army Civil Works Program, 43
Army National Guard, 27, 29, 30
FCS, 33–34, 35
Human Terrain teams, 26
logistics, 31, 32–33
traumatic brain injury and posttraumatic stress disorder, 39, 40
total obligation authority (FY 2008 and FY 2009), 7
Bush, George W., 1, 5, 6, 10, 13, 20, 24
C–130 aircraft, 34
Casey, General George W., Jr., 1, 16, 17, 37
Cash bonuses, Officer Retention Menu of Incentives, 12
Casualties, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 23–24, 25–26, 38
Central Command (CENTCOM), 4, 30
Chemical demilitarization program, 7, 31, 47–48
Chemical Materials Agency, U.S. Army, 47–48
Chief of Staff of the Army. See Casey, General George W., Jr.; Schoomaker, General Peter J.
Civil works, 43
Civilian Education System, 13
Civilian personnel, 12–13
Clean Water Act, 43
Cody, General Richard A., 17
Cold War, 1, 15, 28
Combined Arms Center, 13
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Afghanistan, 24–25
Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, 4
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), Afghanistan, 25
Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, 25
Command and Control Vehicle, 34
Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 8
Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command, 31
Community-Based Warrior Transition Units, Army National Guard, 28
Comprehensive Care Plans, 38
Cone, Maj. Gen. Robert W., 25
Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs (CDMRP), 40
Consolidated Security, Disaster and Continuing Appropriations Act (2009), 6
Contracting and contractors, 8, 12–13, 35, 46, 48
Contracting Command, 8
Countersurveillance and counterterrorism, 5, 19, 20–21, 49
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 46, 47
Court of Criminal Appeals, U.S. Army, 46, 47
Courts-martial, 46–47
Customs and Border Protection, U.S., 29
Defense Department. See Department of Defense.
Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, 6–8
Defense Language Institute, 12
Defense Logistics Agency, 32
Department of the Army (fiscal year 2008), 1, 49–50
Army Audit Agency, 47–48
budget, 5–6. See also Budget.
civil works, 43
environmental programs, 33, 43–45
force development, 15–26. See also Force development.
Headquarters, 13, 31, 33
legal affairs and services, 45–47
management, 6–8. See also Management methodologies.
organizational changes and realignments, 3–4, 27, 31, 48
personnel, 9–14. See also Personnel.
readiness, rebalancing, and stabilization of forces, 1, 15–16, 29, 31, 37
support services, 37–41. See also Support services.
Department of Defense
AFRICOM and, 4
Army National Guard and, 27
budget and funding, 5–6
civilian personnel and, 12–13
Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, 19
Human Terrain teams initiative, 26
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, 6, 23, 33
Deployed operational forces, 20–26, 29–30, 35. See also Afghanistan war; Iraq war.
Detroit Arsenal, 31
Direct Commissioned Officer’s Course, 45
Disaster relief and security, 18, 29–30
Doctrinal publications, 18–19, 49
Dunwoody, Lt. Gen. Ann E., 32
Edouard (tropical storm), 29
Electronic warfare program, 17, 19
Empowerment Act (2008), 27
Enduring Freedom, 18, 24, 29. See also Afghanistan war.
Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, 43
Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of, 43
Enhanced Logistics Support Off-Road Vehicle, 33
Enlisted personnel, 9–11
Environmental Management System (EMS), 44–45
Environmental programs, 33, 43–45
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 44, 45
Equipment and materiel, 1, 5, 15, 30. See also Logistics; specific types of materiel and equipment.
European Command (EUCOM), 3–4, 30
Exchange Select program, 41
Executive Order 13423 (Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, 2007), 44
Explosively Formed Penetrator Improvised Explosive Devices, 33
Extended range/multipurpose (ER/MP) Sky Warrior, 19
Families and family life, 1, 5, 15, 28, 37–38, 39, 41, 49
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, 32
Family Team Building Program, Army National Guard, 28
Field Manuals
1–01, *Generating Force Support for Operations*, 18
3–0, *Operations*, 18, 19, 49
3–0.1, *The Modular Force*, 18
3–07, *Stability Operations*, 18
6–01.1, *Knowledge Management Section*, 18–19
7–0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, 19

Firefighting, 29
Flight School XXI, 20
Floods, 29

Force development, 15–26
ARFORGEN, 15–16, 49
aviation equipment and units, 5, 19–20
deployed operational forces, 20–26. *See also* Afghanistan war; Iraq war.
doctrinal publications, 18–19, 49
electronic warfare program, 17, 19
leadership development, 17–18
modular transformation, 3, 5, 16–17, 18, 19, 27, 49
training, 1, 5, 15, 16, 17–18

Force Development Update, 17

Foreign nationals, as civilian personnel, 12
Fort Belvoir, 13, 31, 33
Fort Bliss, 3
Fort Carson, 44
Fort Detrick, 40, 45
Fort Eustis, 45
Fort Irwin, 17, 29
Fort Jackson, 8
Fort Knox, 3
Fort Leavenworth, 13, 17, 26
Fort Meade, 45
Fort Monmouth, 31
Fort Polk, 17, 29
Fort Riley, 3, 22
Fort Story, 41

Funded Legal Education Program, 45
Future Combat Systems (FCS), 5, 32, 33–35

Gansler, Jacques S., 8
Gates, Robert M., 5, 6
General Fund Enterprise Business System, 8
General Libraries Information System, 41

General Officer Steering Committee for suicide prevention, 39
Geren, Preston M. “Pete,” III, 8
Germany, 3, 17–18, 38
Gervais, Col. Maria R., 44
Global Reporting Initiative, 44
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 5, 6, 19, 29
Grow the Army initiative, 3, 11
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 46
Gustav (hurricane), 30

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 13, 31, 33
Health care, 28, 37–40, 41
Heavy Tactical Vehicle family, 32

Helicopters
AH–64 Apache Longbow, 32
CH–47F Chinook, 20, 32
UH–60M Black Hawk, 20, 21, 32
Armed Reconnaissance, 32
Joint Future Theater Lift, 20
Joint Multi-Role, 20
light utility, 19

High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, 32

Housing and infrastructure, 37–38

Human resources. *See* Personnel.

Human Terrain teams, 26
Hurricanes, 18, 30

Improvised explosive devices, 17, 23, 33
In-sourcing, 12
Infantry Carrier Vehicle, 34

Infantry Divisions
1st, 3, 14, 22
3d, 22
4th, 21
24th, 14

Infrastructure and housing, 37–38

Integrated Materiel Management Center, 31
Interagency contracting, 48
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard, 44–45
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 24

Interstate Compact on Educational Opportunity for Military Children, 37
Iraq Freedom Fund, 26
Iraq war, 1, 20–24, 49
  Army National Guard forces in, 29
  budget, 5, 6, 7
  casualties, 23–24, 38
  contracting lessons from, 8
  courts-martial in Iraq, 46
  FCS budget and, 34
  Human Terrain teams, 26
  Medal of Honor recipient, 14
  morale, welfare, and recreation
    (MWR), 41
  “new way forward,” 20, 21
  Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 18, 20–24, 29
  Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX, 21
  Operation PHANTOM STRIKE, 21
  Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, 21
  Operation SAWLAT AL-FURSAN (Charge of the Knights), 22
  recruitment and retention issues
    stemming from, 8, 10, 12
  “spin out one” technologies and, 35
  stop-loss policy and, 10
  suicide rates and, 39
  “surge,” 20, 21, 23
  training, replicating conditions in, 18
  transition teams, 22
  U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic relations, 22
  Iraqi 5th Army Division, 22
Irregular warfare, 19
  Joint cargo aircraft, 19
  Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, 6, 23, 33
  Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense, 32
  Joint Multi-National Readiness Center, 17–18
  Joint Network Node-Network, 32
  Joint Readiness Training Center, 17, 29
  Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 45
  Judge Advocate Tactical Staff Officer Course, 45
JUMP START, 29
Katrina (hurricane), 18
Keeble, Sgt. Woodrow W., 14
Korean War, 14
Leadership development, 17–18
Lean fielding, 33
Legal affairs and services, 45–47
Logistics, 31–36
  budget, 31, 32–33
  management and planning, 31–32
  research, development, and acquisition (RDA), 32–36
M1 Abrams tank, 34, 35
M1AA1 and M1S2 System Enhancement Packages, 32
M2 .50-caliber machine gun, 14
M88A1 recovery vehicle, 30
M109A6 self-propelled howitzer, 30
Management methodologies, 6–8
  Army National Guard personnel management, 28–29
  logistics, 31–32
Manned Ground Vehicle, Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon, 35
Manning, recruitment, and retention initiatives, 1, 9–11, 12, 28, 29
Marine Corps, 24, 34
Materiel and equipment, 1, 5, 15, 30. See also Logistics; specific types of materiel and equipment.
McGinnis, Pfc. Ross A., 14
McKernan, General David D., 24
McNeill, General Dan K., 24
Medal of Honor recipient, 14
Medical care, 28, 37–40
  medical research and Materiel Command, 40
Medical Research and Materiel Command, 40
Medical transport vehicles in FCS program, 34
Medium Tactical Vehicles, Family of, 32
Mexican-U.S. border security, 29
Military police, 22
Mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle, 5, 35–36, 49
Minorities in the Army and Reserves, 9, 45
Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) requirements, Army National Guard, 30
Modular transformation, 3, 5, 16–17, 18, 19, 27, 49
Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR), 40–41
Mounted Combat System, 34
Multi-National Corps–Iraq, 22, 23
Multi-National Division–Baghdad, 21
Multi-National Division–Center, Iraq, 21, 22
Multi-National Division–North, Iraq, 21
Multi-National Force–Iraq, 22
Multiple-launch rocket system, 30

National Guard. See Army National Guard.
National Security Personnel System, 13
National Suicide Prevention Week, 39
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, 17, 29
Native American recipient of Medal of Honor, 14
Natural disaster relief and security, 18, 29–30
Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon, 34, 35
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, 34
Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar, 34
Noncommissioned officers, 11, 16
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 24

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–1, Human Resources Command, 6
Officer Basic Course, 45
Officer Retention Menu of Incentives, 12
Officers, 11–12
O’Keefe, Col. Michael P., 44

Operations
BE FIT, 41
ENDURING FREEDOM, 18, 24, 29. See also Afghanistan war.
IRAQI FREEDOM, 18, 23, 29. See also Iraq war.
JUMP START, 29
PHANTOM PHOENIX, 21
PHANTOM STRIKE, 21
PHANTOM THUNDER, 21
SAWLAT AL-FURSAN (Charge of the Knights), 22
Organizational changes and realignments, 3–4, 27, 31, 48

Pacific Command, 30
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 503d, 26
Payroll management, 6–8
Persistent conflict, 1, 27

Personnel, 9–14. See also Support services.
civilians, 12–13
deployed operational forces, 20–26, 29–30, 35. See also Afghanistan war; Iraq war.
enlisted, 9–11
manning, recruitment, and retention initiatives, 1, 9–11, 12, 28, 29
Medal of Honor recipients, 14
National Guard, 9, 10, 11, 28–29
noncommissioned officers, 11, 16
officers, 11–12
payroll management, 6–8
pressures on, 49
quality issues, 10–11
strength and distribution, 9, 10
Petraeus, General David H., 23
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 39, 40
Program Executive Office, Enterprise Information System, 6
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury Research Program, 40
Rape statute (Article 120), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 46, 47
Rapid Equipping Force, 33
Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI), 33
Reachback Research Centers, 26
Realignments and organizational changes, 3–4, 27, 31, 48
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle, 34
Reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, 25
Recovery and maintenance vehicle, FCS program, 34
Recruit Sustainment Program, Army National Guard, 29
Recruitment and retention, 1, 9–11, 12, 28, 29
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 31
Reorganization, restructuring, and realignments, 3–4, 27, 31, 48
Research, development, and acquisition (RDA), 32–36
Reserve. See Army Reserve.
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, 12
Reset Task Force, 31
Residential Communities Initiative, 37
Retention and recruitment, 1, 9–11, 12, 28, 29
INDEX

Rita (hurricane), 18

Sadr, Moqtada al-, 22
SAWLA T AL-FURSAN (Charge of the Knights), 22
Schoomaker, General Peter J., 16
Secretary of the Army. See Geren, Preston M. “Pete,” III.
Secretary of Defense. See Gates, Robert M.
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, 46
Shingo Prize for Excellence in Manufacturing, 32
Sky Warrior, 19
Sniper Defeat System, 33
Soldier and Family Action Plan, 37
Soldier and Family Assistance Centers, 37
Southern Command, 30
Special Forces Groups
  3d, 25
  7th, 25
  19th, 30
  20th, 30
“Spin out one” technologies, 35
Stability operations, 18, 19
Stop-loss policy, 10
Strategic leadership and business practices, 6
Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle, 32, 34, 35
Suicides, 38–39
Support services, 37–41
  Army National Guard, 28–29
  families and family life, 1, 5, 15, 28, 37–38, 39, 41, 49
  health care, 28, 37–40
  housing and infrastructure, 37–38
  legal affairs, 45–47
  MWR, 40–41

Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery, 33
Taliban, 24
Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, 31

Terrorism
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, 5, 19, 20–21, 49
GWOT, 5, 6, 19, 29
Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group, 20
“Tiered readiness” concept, 15
Training, 1, 5, 15, 16, 17–18, 29
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 13, 17, 33, 35
Transformation programs, 1, 3
Traumatic brain injury (TBI), 39–40
Trial Defense Service, 46
TRICARE, 39

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 46, 47
United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1790, 22
United States v. Balboa, 47
United States v. Mr. Muhammad Alaa Ali, 47
Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting (2007), 8
U.S. Air Force, 17, 34, 41
U.S. Army. See entries at Army.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 29
U.S.-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement, 22
U.S. Marine Corps, 24, 34
U.S. Military Academy, 12
U.S. Navy, 17, 34
U.S. Special Operations Command, 30
U.S. Special Operations Forces, 25, 30

Veterans Administration, 40
Ward, General William E. “Kip,” 3, 4
Warrior Adventure Quest, 40–41
Warrior Transition Units (WTUs), 28, 38
Women in the Army and Reserves, 9, 32, 44, 45
Wounded soldiers, 28, 37–38

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, Army National Guard, 28–29