History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army

John C. Sparrow
HISTORY
OF
PERSONNEL DEMOBILIZATION
IN THE
UNITED STATES ARMY

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FOREWORD

The primary object of this study is to provide a work of reference for general staff officers and for students in the Army School System. Its value to the thoughtful civilian as an aid to comprehension of basic problems of national security has been a major consideration. It is also expected and hoped that the work done herein will stimulate further research by providing students of politico-military problems with a guide to demobilization records.

While time did not permit an exhaustive study of all demobilizations of the United States Army it is felt that this work will fill a void in United States military historical writing. If at the conclusion of any future war an additional volume on the subject is prepared the continuing value of this study will be enhanced.

The decision to prepare this study was made in early 1948. The original request came from the Director, Personnel and Administration, General Staff, United States Army (now the AC of S, G–1). When it was decided that such a study would be prepared, all interested agencies agreed that the selection of an author would be based on a number of requirements: he had to be an officer of the regular establishment with permanent grade not higher than captain; a graduate of the Command and General Staff College or its predecessor, the Command and General Staff School; and the holder of a graduate degree in one of the social sciences. Maj. John C. Sparrow, who qualified in all respects, was selected for the task and with this study has completed his assignment.

Washington, D. C.  ORLANDO WARD
June 1951  Major General, USA
Chief, Military History
PREFACE

This study is essentially an historical treatment of the personnel aspects of United States Army demobilization. The original desire was to provide a narrative that would tell the story of all phases of World War II demobilization. However, this task was too comprehensive for one volume and consequently only the personnel aspects were covered. A great contribution to military historical knowledge could be made if a history of matériel demobilization were written.

The author has been allowed the same freedom of expression and access to records that is accorded to scholars. His superiors have consistently upheld him in the position that the narrative must be a truthful account, void of bias, and must be objective. No one has attempted to influence his interpretation of facts. For this, he is truly grateful.

The writer has received much help, beginning with the original outline and continuing through the stages of researching, writing, and editing. Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, USA-Ret., Chief, Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, contributed many valuable suggestions to the original outline and has offered constructive criticism and guidance throughout the writing of the manuscript. Miss Edith Poole co-operated with the author for more than a year in researching countless documents and preparing portions of the story in Chapters I, II, and III. Mr. L. V. Naisawald collaborated in the researching and writing of the World War II planning. Capt. Rocco Paone, CE USAR, likewise assisted in the preparation of the manuscript dealing with Congressional reaction. Miss Margaret Tackley has been extremely helpful in selecting cartoons and photographs for use in the printed edition. It has been enjoyable to work with Miss Lucy Weidman who has edited the manuscript.

References in the footnotes give only partial credit to the many persons who have been called on to give information that had not previously been made a matter of record. More than thirty individuals have reviewed all or portions of the manuscript; their comments and criticisms have been invaluable. The author, however, takes responsibility for all statements of fact.

Washington, D. C.
June 1951

JOHN C. SPARROW
Major, GSC
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Illustrations are from the following sources:

- p. 105—San Francisco Chronicle
- pp. 149, 163—The Evening Star
- All others are from Department of Defense Photos.
CHAPTER I
A GENERAL BACKGROUND TO UNITED STATES MILITARY DEMOBILIZATION

Introduction

In studying the demobilization¹ of the Army of the United States following the defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II, it is necessary to examine first the process of mobilization² and the conditions that brought it about. The American people hoped in 1940, just as they had in 1916, that the Nation would escape participation in armed conflict. At the same time, the war in Europe contributed greatly to the potential mobilization of the United States because its industry was receiving more and more orders for munitions, not only from warring nations but also for its own armed forces. But while Pearl Harbor was approximately one year away and many people talked about the relative merits of the doctrines propounded by “isolationists” and “interventionists,” the President had already, in the fall of 1939, authorized an increase in the enlisted strength of the armed services and declared a state of “limited national emergency.”³

In 1940, as the German armed forces continued to overrun Europe, the United States sent practically every aid, except troops, to those nations that were fighting Axis aggression; and on 16 September, two weeks after 60,000 National Guardsmen had been called into active federal service, the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 became a law. With the passage of selective service more and more Americans became involved in the activities of war preparation. Events in Europe, on the high seas, and at home contributed to President Roosevelt’s declaring in May 1941 that a state of “unlimited national emergency” existed. Three months before this country’s formal entrance into the war there were over 5,000,000 engaged in war work⁴ and practically every phase of American life was being affected by world events. With the beginning of 1942 the Nation

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1. DA SR 320-5-1, Aug 50 defines demobilization as “changing from a war footing to a peacetime or inactive footing.”
2. DA SR 320-5-1, Aug 50 defines mobilization as “assembling and organizing troops, matériel and equipment for active military service, in time of war or other national emergency; changes from a peacetime to a wartime basis.”
was well on its way toward the most complete mobilization it had ever undertaken, a condition which continued for almost three and one-half years.

Even while mobilization was in progress a small group of Army planners, working in the Special Planning Division, War Department Special Staff, was giving its attention to the problem of demobilizing the Army of the United States at an appropriate time following cessation of hostilities. Similar plans for other activities were being made by other governmental and private agencies. All governmental planning was being coordinated by a single agency, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, with ex-Supreme Court Justice (later Secretary of State) James F. Byrnes at its head. As early as November 1943 a draft entitled "Demobilization Regulations 1–1" was issued by the War Department. By the time the German signatories surrendered to the Supreme Commander of the Western Group of Allies at Rheims in May 1945, the United States had plans to reduce the Army to a size commensurate with its obligations in the Western World and capable of further and more vigorous prosecution of the war against Japan. After the defeat of Japan, troops were to be redeployed to this country for demobilization. The army of the future was yet to be determined, on the basis of international commitments in accordance with the plans of the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), and by Congress.

The small group that planned the demobilization of the World War II Army had to return to the United States the largest number of individuals this country had ever mobilized. In all the conflicts in which the United States had previously engaged, those of 1861–65 and 1917–18 provided the best guidance to Army planners. The Revolutionary War and the War with Spain, however, contributed something to our experience. Of the earlier conflicts only in the Civil War and World War I were more than 1,000,000 men under arms at the termination of hostilities. Little, if any, objective material on demobilization is available on wars prior to the Civil War.

Pre-Civil War Experience

The Revolutionary Army was composed of Continentals and militia. The demobilization of large numbers of men that fought this war was a continual process during the time of actual hostilities. "Three-month men who had answered the roll of the drum after Lexington left in droves; only the massive patience of General Washington kept any sort of army in the field through this our longest war."5 In the whole Revolutionary struggle

there was a total enrollment of approximately 400,000, of which it has been estimated that 232,000 were Continental troops and 164,000 were militia. The largest force that Washington, the leading military figure of the struggle, commanded in battle was 17,000. In the battles at Trenton and Princeton his effective strength did not number 4,000 troops. This was due largely to the fact that soldiers were allowed to return home on completion of enlistment, desertions were frequent, the Continental Congress did not have supreme authority over all troops, it was difficult to move large bodies of troops from one section of the country to another, and men were often discharged or sent home after a successful campaign or victory. After the cessation of hostilities the Continental Army was almost completely disbanded. Men were allowed to return to their homes without receiving medical examinations or treatment and were often discharged from their organizations without payment or with a small amount of the practically worthless currency. An example of how one member of the Virginia Militia, Joseph Jared, was twice discharged will illustrate some of the methods used in demobilization. Jared, in 1833, appeared before a court in Tennessee for the purpose of applying for a pension and declared under oath:

... our term of three months, the time for which we had volunteered, had expired ... the regiment was review'd by General Stuban [sic]; after which the General complimented the soldiers for their patriotism, ... called us good boys, and then dismissed ... [us] from further service at that time, saying that we must come out again at a moments warning if we should be wanted.... We received no written discharges. Volunteering again in 1781, he joined the

... command of General Washington, here we remained ... util [sic] sometime after Cornwallis surrendered [sic] [we then guarded prisoners until] we were again dismissed from service without receiving any written discharges ... [he] has no documentary evidence of his services, never having received any written discharges from any of his officers, nor does he know of any person by whom he can prove his said services.

Apparently demobilization was a relatively simple and easy process in those days and the soldiers were left to get home as best they could, for Jared was some distance from home when discharged.

7. Ibid., p. 65.
The War of 1812 lasted for almost three years; and while it fostered the first real feeling of nationalism in America, the war was fought without the united support of the American people. Particularly opposed were the commercial elements of New England, who viewed it as a war fought in the interest of other sections.* At the beginning of the war the strength of the regular establishment consisted of two regiments of dragoons and seven infantry regiments, and the war never made any great demands on the manpower and economic resources of the country. The total number of troops enrolled from time to time was approximately 527,000 and of this number not more than one soldier in twenty was actually present in the field for duty at any one time. As in the Revolutionary War there was a constant stream of men being inducted into active service and at the same time large numbers of men being discharged because they had served their terms of enlistment, extending from one to twelve months. An examination of militia records reveals that many state organizations were enrolled and discharged from service two or more times. When active hostilities had ceased, an act of Congress approved 3 March 1815 permitted those who had enlisted for the war to be discharged from the regular establishment, while those who were serving under longer enlistment were allowed to be discharged or were transferred to active regiments. The Army was returned to a peacetime basis by disbanding all excess regiments and consolidating remaining ones with regiments of the Regular Army. The demobilization of the wartime army repeated the same mistakes made in the Revolutionary War disbandment and contributed very little that could be used in large-scale demobilization planning.

The Mexican War was a short conflict that failed to gain the support of large segments of the people. The manpower and economic resources of the country were only minutely affected, as less than 105,000 were mustered into federal service. The Army was composed largely of volunteers and militia under 3-month and 1-year enlistment. At one time during operations in Mexico, General Scott lost approximately 40 percent of his

*The Hartford Convention of 1814 is an outstanding example of the unpopularity of the war in that section of the country.
10. Upton, op. cit., p. 137.
12. New Jersey Adjutant General, op. cit., pp. 3-148. See also: Kentucky, Federal Writers Project, Military History of Kentucky (Frankfort, 1939), pp. 79-96. (Located in Army Library.)
13. Adjutant and Inspector General’s Office, GO, May 17, 1815. (National Archives.)
army because of the expiration of enlistments. It was not until the latter stages of the war that the President was authorized to enlist volunteers for the duration. An army organized in this manner and fighting under these circumstances does not furnish proper conditions for studying demobilization policies.

The Civil War

Immediately following the Civil War the average American citizen reacted to the news of peace with the thought that this Nation should immediately demobilize the personnel of the armed forces. But the cessation of hostilities found the Army without a detailed demobilization program. Demobilization was accompanied by delays, waste, individual injustices, mass confusion, and the penalties of improvisation.

During the Civil War, little thought was given to the disbandment of Union troops when the fighting ended. While the war was in progress large numbers of troops were discharged at various times after completing short-term enlistments, just as they had been during all previous wars. Planning for disbanding Union troops was begun after the surrender of Lee on 9 April 1865, when the Secretary of War charged Thomas M. Vincent, an Assistant Adjutant General, with the problem of releasing 1,034,000 federal troops. For the first time in the Nation’s history, war had drawn heavily upon manpower resources with nearly one-half of the men eligible for service in the North having been enlisted or re-enlisted in the Union forces.

After the Secretary of War had directed that plans be drawn up for disbanding the Union Army, four days elapsed before the drafting and recruiting offices were closed, and it was not until 28 April, when Lee’s and Johnston’s Confederate armies had already begun their dispersion, that the Adjutant General promulgated the first demobilization directive. Subsequent demobilization directives were published, beginning on 1 May.

17. Until April 1865 total Federal enlistments and re-enlistments were approximately 2,100,000. The enrollment of April 1865 showed 2,245,063 able-bodied men (those available for military service) at their homes. Thus, the northern states had approximately 4,300,000 able-bodied men and of these nearly one-half (2,100,000) were enlisted. See: Greene, op. cit., p. 308.
19. WD GO No. 77, 28 April 1865. See also WD GO 94, 15 May 1865, for muster out of Volunteers.
20. WD GO No. 79, 1 May 1865. See also *Report of the Secretary of War 1865*, pp. 27-28. (Operations of a minor scale continued until the capture of Kirby Smith, 26 May 1865.)
The Union plan provided for the movement intact of corps (or at least the divisions thereof) to nine rendezvous areas within the South and in the northern border states. Men most often marched to the rendezvous point, an outstanding example of which was Sherman's army that, after the surrender of Confederate General Joe Johnston, marched from Raleigh to Richmond (156 miles) in 5½ days. Meade's and Sherman's armies formed the first large group to reach its rendezvous, and on 20 May this group of about 200,000 men was camped outside Washington.  

At these camps, muster-out rolls and pay-rolls were prepared, containing the following information about each man: rank and age; where, when, and by whom enrolled; when, where, and by whom mustered in; when last paid and to what time; how far he had traveled; what subsistence and forage he had furnished; what equipment and clothing he had received; and his absences, special duties, promotions, wounds, and illnesses. After this administrative work had been performed, corps and divisions were inactivated. Each lower command was mustered out of Federal service and the men forming the organization were sent to their home state and camp of organization for individual muster-out.  

In the final movement of individuals at regimental or lower level, transportation was provided by various means. Sometimes these movements were accomplished by changing from rail to boat to wagon to foot and back again before reaching the camp where the individual was to be mustered out.  

Defects in the system quickly developed. There was no provision for recreation or organized activities during a period of waiting. Boredom, combined with homesickness, contributed to a wave of desertions. At the rendezvous, records were often negligently compiled or lost, thereby complicating the adjustment of veterans' claims against the government. Many soldiers were suffering from wounds and service-incurred disease and, while physical condition was not neglected by standards of that day, there was no organized effort to restore the soldier to prewar health.  

Payment of volunteer troops being mustered out was not uniform in the different states. This unsystematic way of handling financial matters furnished the basis for many complaints. In some states troops were paid to include day of individual discharge or muster-out, while in others, notably Illinois, troops were only paid to include the date that they had arrived in the

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22. WD GO No. 94, 15 May 1865.  
state rendezvous. This was not made uniform until late in November 1865 when troops were paid to include the last day in Federal service.\textsuperscript{24} When the war was over, there was much complaint about being kept in the army. The reasons were many: some felt that they had performed their duty, families needed men at home, and men wanted to return home where they could make more money.\textsuperscript{25}

General U. S. Grant in October 1865, while discussing the demobilization of the Union Army stated:

The surrender of the rebel armies and the collapse of the rebellion rendered a large part of our military force unnecessary, and immediate steps were taken to reduce it by stopping enlistments, discharging non-effectives, and the muster out of men and regiments whose terms of service expired before given dates. . . . On the 1st of May, 1865, the aggregate of the military force of the United States was 1,000,516 men \cite{24} [afterward ascertained to have been 1,052,038, regulars and volunteers].

On October 20 this had been reduced, as it is estimated, to 210,000, and further reductions are still being made. These musters out were admirably conducted, 800,000 men passing from the Army to civil life so quietly that it was scarcely known save by the welcomes to their homes received by them. . . . The apprehensions felt by some, of disturbance and disorder at so vast a force being suddenly thrown upon the country to resume the occupations of civil life after having been so long absent from them, proved entirely unfounded, the soldiers showing by their conduct that devotion to their country in the field is no disqualification for devotion to it at home.\textsuperscript{26}

An objective study of the demobilization of the Confederate Army should prove interesting and useful to students of military history as it would provide information regarding the reaction of Americans to defeat. In general, Lee's army stacked arms, signed a printed form of parole not to take arms against the United States, and marched home without payment. News of Lee's surrender traveled slowly, and Confederate troops, particularly in Texas, simply deserted rather than sign a formal parole paper. No hard and fast provision could be made for the Rebel troops. Some were allowed by the Federal commanders

\textsuperscript{24} Illinois, Report of the Adjutant General, 1861-1865 \cite{24} (Springfield, 1900—Revised), Vol. I, pp. 80-85. (Located in Army Library.)

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 120-24.

\textsuperscript{26} War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies \cite{26} (Washington, 1900), Series III, Vol. 5, p. 125. For other remarks by Secretary of War Stanton, General Grant, and others of the Adjutant General's Office, see pp. 126, 135, 516-518, 1012, 1031, 1047.
to keep their horses, some received pay, and in some instances the Union Army furnished river transportation to Rebel soldiers who lived beyond the Mississippi.\textsuperscript{27}

The Civil War did provide useful experience for future demobilization planning. For the first time in the Nation's history large bodies of men had been sent long distances from their homes and consequently had to be returned for discharge. The general plan for the demobilization called for use of existing agencies and personnel that had inducted the army, thereby eliminating duplication of effort. The statistical account of the mustering-out of Union troops is shown in Appendix I.

**War With Spain**

The American Army that was mobilized for the War with Spain was principally a volunteer one. However, most of the fighting was done by regular units. The governor of each state or territory was requested by The Adjutant General, War Department, to enroll or recruit volunteers for regiments by quota based on the census of 1890.\textsuperscript{28} In addition to the volunteer regiments from the various states and territories, there were three regiments of volunteer cavalry and two of volunteer engineers organized from the Nation at large. Ten regiments containing individuals supposed to be immune to tropical diseases completed the volunteer army.\textsuperscript{29} The War with Spain was of short duration and placed very little strain on the manpower resources of the Nation. The Army was expanded to a strength of only 280,500\textsuperscript{30} of which 216,256 were volunteers as of 31 August 1898.\textsuperscript{31}

With the cessation of hostilities there arose in various parts of the country a clamor by the public to bring home the troops immediately. Pressure was exerted on Congress and the Executive Department to muster out the volunteers in the Army. A group of Kentucky citizens petitioned the War Department for the return of the 1st Kentucky Regiment from Puerto Rico. The commanding officer of the regiment was a native Kentuckian, a volunteer, and a former Confederate officer. In response to the petition he wrote The Adjutant General, War Department: "... Friends in Kentucky have no authority for asking that the First Kentucky be relieved from duty. These men are soldiers.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} WD GO No. 30, 30 April 1898.
\item \textsuperscript{29} WD GO No. 44, 13 May 1898.
\item \textsuperscript{31} WD Annual Reports, 1919, I, p. 462. (Located in Army Library.)
\end{itemize}
The government will determine when the regiment is no longer needed. . . ."32

The first directive providing for demobilization of the volunteer forces was issued on 20 August 1898.33 Records of soldiers were to be completely prepared at Federal camps before transporting the organizations to their respective state camps. After arrival within the state, organizational commanders accomplished final payment and men were mustered out without furlough. This system had been in effect only ten days when new procedures were announced.34 Under the new method organizations were moved to state camps where records and other administrative details were prepared. While these administrative procedures were being performed soldiers were given furloughs for 30- and 60-day periods. On completion of the furlough men returned to their organization rendezvous and were mustered out.

The system of demobilization put into effect on 30 August 1898 resulted in many abuses. It led to the multiplication of absentees and increased the number of rendezvous points, which in turn increased expenses and required a much greater number of Regular Army officers to assist in mustering-out in state camps. From the over-all viewpoint results were much less satisfactory than under the original plan. The 30 August system was later amended by providing extra pay to all ranks instead of granting furloughs. The mustering-out of the volunteer forces terminated on 22 June 1899.35

Some interesting sidelights developed with the demobilization of the volunteer forces. All soldiers eligible for honorable discharge were permitted to retain their arms and accoutrements, if they so desired. The value of the retained supplies was charged to the individual on the muster-out role at standard rates.36 Soldiers who belonged to volunteer regiments that were being demobilized, but who were serving sentences of a court-martial other than dishonorable discharge, were paroled during the period the organization was on furlough. When the unit returned for final muster, the unexecuted portion of the soldier's sentence was remitted as of the date his company was inactivated or mustered out.37

32. A copy of Col. Castleman's letter can be found in Kentucky, Federal Writers Project, op. cit., p. 287.
33. WD GO No. 124, 20 August 1898.
34. WD GO No. 130, 30 August 1898.
35. WD Annual Reports, 1919, I, p. 462.
36. For standard rates see: Chief Musterer Officer, Ohio, Orders and Instructions Concerning the Muster Out of Volunteers (Columbus, 1898), pp. 11-12. (Located in the Library of the National War College.)
37. Ibid., p. 4.
A great deal of difficulty was encountered in discharging men who had been confined in federal hospitals during and after the time their regiments were being mustered out. This had also been true at the end of the Civil War. Many men found new homes in the states where their hospitalization occurred. Other men were sent to their homes by the particular Army hospital. Many states and local communities financed the return of soldiers to their home state for further hospitalization or convalescence. For example, the Governor of Kentucky borrowed $3,000 and directed the State Adjutant General to "equip hospitals, trains, and bring home sick Kentucky soldiers from Fortress [now Fort] Monroe and Camp Thomas, Chickamauga Park." As a result of the directive, seventy-five soldiers from Thomas and one hundred from Monroe were returned either to their homes or to hospitals in Kentucky.

Neither the length of the war nor the numbers of men involved in the struggle were of sufficient magnitude to provide useful conclusions for large-scale demobilization planning, but some valuable experience was gained. A report to The Adjutant General, War Department, on the demobilization invited attention to the following lessons that could be learned:

1. Clerical and other administrative procedures relating to demobilization of personnel should be performed while organizations are under federal control at stations in the field. Individual records could not be completed while men were on furlough from their state camp. It required four and one-half days longer to demobilize a regiment at its state camp than at a Federal station, even though administrative work continued while the majority of the troops were on furlough.

2. Thirty- and sixty-day furloughs granted to troops produced evils. Some of these were:

   a. The uncertainty of the time of discharge made it difficult for an individual to obtain permanent employment.

   b. Large numbers of men were unable to support themselves properly on their pay and commuted subsistence during extended furlough periods.

   c. Sudden changes of climate produced much sickness and discomfort because men, anticipating muster-out on their return from furlough, did not want to draw additional clothing.

   d. Volunteer soldiers did not accept the furlough as a reward.

Men would have preferred to be discharged and then be given the additional pay of the furlough period. 40

Because of the difficulties involved in suppressing the Philippine Insurrection, the cessation of hostilities with Spain did not bring a complete peace until 1902. In the next fifteen years a series of events followed that had a pronounced effect on the military establishment: During the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, when Elihu Root was Secretary of War, Congress passed legislation that established the Army General Staff; the year 1903 also saw the passage of the Militia Act or so-called Dick Bill which established the National Guard in a more modern relationship to the federal government; by 1914 Congress had approved legislation that defined the composition of the land forces; 41 in 1916 President Wilson called many units of the National Guard into federal service for use in the Punitive Expedition; and before the end of the year a National Defense Act was enacted.

**World War I**

The United States Army was faced with an unprecedented situation when, on 11 November 1918, World War I came to an abrupt end. The small military force of 291,880 which was in existence on 1 April 1917 had, in the succeeding nineteen months, been supplemented by well over 3,000,000 "emergency" troops; and now that hostilities had ceased the emergency troops were eligible for discharge.

Although the war had ended, the Army was not prepared to demobilize. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, writing to Senator James A. Reed some months later, said: "The collapse of the Central Powers came more quickly than even the best informed military experts believed possible." 42 In fact, planning for eventual demobilization had begun only a month before hostilities ceased. At that time an informal note was sent to the head of the Army War College, who was also Director of War Plans Division, suggesting that: "There are one or two questions it seems to me should be studied and worked out so that you shall be good and ready for any contingency. The first of these is the plan for demobilization and musters out. . . . I do not want to advertise it too much at present as it might be thought to be peace propaganda." 43

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41. The Army Act of 25 April 1914, sometimes called "Volunteer Act."
42. Ltr, SW to Senator James A. Reed, 3 April 1919, no sub. C of S file 370 (Demobilization), Case 163. National Archives.
43. Ltr, Ch of Ops, GS, to President, AWC, October 1918, no sub. C of S files, WPD No. 9481-1. National Archives.
A few days later, a short official memo addressed to the Director, War Plans Division, arrived. "It is desired that the War Plans Division study and report upon the project of demobilization of the military establishment as it is organized for the existing emergency." With this impetus the War Plans Division initiated action for demobilization planning. Its War Plans Branch assigned the problem to Col. C. H. Conrad, Jr., making him solely responsible for planning and impressing upon him the necessity for speed and secrecy.

It is interesting to note that only one person was given the responsibility of planning World War I personnel demobilization for the War Department, while a whole special division was set up to plan World War II demobilization and its attendant postwar problems. Colonel Conrad, in preparing his study, exchanged ideas with the Navy and Marine Corps concerning demobilization, but the Army, with its drafted personnel, had a much greater problem than did either of the other branches of service. Most men in both the Navy and Marine Corps were under voluntary enlistment. The approved plan, with recommendations of the War Plans Division, was forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 22 November 1918—eleven days after the Armistice had been signed.

Gen. Peyton C. March, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff at the end of World War I, in speaking of the planning for the demobilization said, "... There were no precedents afforded by the experience of our former wars which were of value in determining policy." And not only was the demobilization unprecedented as far as numbers and mechanics were concerned but even the economic situation that soldiers faced on discharge following World War I differed from that after previous wars. Men that were separated from the Army after the Revolutionary, 1812, Mexican, and Civil Wars were afforded opportunities due to economic and territorial expansion of the nation. The number of men released after the War with Spain was so small in comparison with the total population that it did not present an economic problem of any magnitude. Taking the welfare of the nation as well as that of the Army into account, the demobilization planners considered four distinctly different ways of demobilizing the emergency troops: Soldiers could be separated by

44. Memo, C of S for Director, WPD, 14 October 1918, sub: Demobilization. C of S file 50, Case 7. National Archives.
length of service; by industrial needs or occupation; by locality (through the use of local draft boards); or by military units. The first of these, discharge by length of service, was considered impractical for two reasons. First, the United States had been at war too short a time to warrant such a plan. Most overseas troops had been abroad less than six months, and many of the service troops who took care of the camps had served much longer than many of the combat troops. Second, this plan would have entailed much labor and delay because each individual's record would have to be checked. Not only the men themselves but also their friends and relatives wanted no demobilization delay. The policy of releasing men by trade or occupation received a great deal of consideration by planners, and it was the method adopted at first by the British. However, the British were forced to give up this plan after a short trial because it seemed to lend itself to abuse. Winston Churchill reported in his book, *The Aftermath—1918–1928*, that in January 1919 he had taken over administration of the War Office because the "temper of the Army and the problem of demobilization caused increasing anxiety."  

Describing the industrial demobilization plan, Mr. Churchill remarked that it was adopted in the summer of 1917, "mainly in accordance with civilian opinion... In June, 1917, the scheme had been referred to General Headquarters and it was immediately criticised by Sir Douglas Haig as 'most objectionable and prejudicial to discipline.'" Haig's predictions proved quite true when, a month or so after the demobilization got under way, riots occurred throughout the British forces. As soon as he took over the War Office, Mr. Churchill made it his job to alter the scheme of demobilization so that men would be released according to their length of service rather than by industrial need. The new plan was very successful, causing Mr. Churchill to say, "within a fortnight of the new Proclamation the discipline of our immense though melting armies all over the world had regained its traditional standards."  

Before the British found the plan to be unworkable, Robert C. Clothier, a member of the United States Committee on Classification of Personnel of the Army, had, in the Spring of 1918, gone to England to study their demobilization plans, and he returned convinced that the United States should adopt some form of this plan. The plan was particularly popular with civilian advisers, just as it had been in England, and even the Secretary of War advocated it, saying, "The thing we must do is to demobilize the

49. Ibid.  
50. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
men in this country, and all others, with reference to their occupational opportunities so as to return them back into the normal life of the country without filling the country with unemployed men.\textsuperscript{51} The plan was finally rejected on the grounds that, besides impairing military efficiency by breaking up units, it would require complete occupational records of every soldier; a regional survey of local labor supply and demand; a centralized clearing of that supply and demand; and the administration of release and allocation by the United States Employment Service.\textsuperscript{52} The fact that many of our key men had been deferred because of their occupations also altered the situation. It might be added that the press of time made it impossible to implement such a complicated plan.

The third possibility—that of discharging men through the local draft boards—had the energetic support of the Provost Marshal General, who had worked rather closely with these boards during the administration of the Selective Service Act. The plan was rejected as impractical because local boards did not have proper facilities for processing personnel for release; and with 4,648 local boards involved, no uniformity could be expected. It is impossible to say whether the delay was intentional or not, but the Provost Marshal General’s memorandum, submitted to the Chief of Staff on Armistice Day, did not reach the Director of Operations, War Department General Staff, for review until 26 November, several days after the unit plan had been announced.\textsuperscript{53}

The War Plans Division favored adoption of the fourth method, discharge by unit. WPD felt that this plan was more flexible and would result in discharge of a cross section of personnel. The War Plans Division’s formal report was not submitted to the Chief of Staff until 22 November, but the decision, based on their findings, to use the unit method was made on 16 November and announced to the press. The Secretary of War, describing the plan in his report for 1919, said,

\ldots the policy adopted was to demobilize by complete organizations as their services could be spared, thus insuring the maximum efficiency of those organizations remaining, instead of demobilizing by special classes with the resulting discontent among those not given preferential treatment and retained in the service, thus lowering their morale and efficiency and dis-

\textsuperscript{51} Memo, Chief, Ops Br., for C of S, 22 November 1918, sub: Demobilization. C of S file 370. National Archives.
\textsuperscript{52} Memo, Director, WPD, for C of S, 22 November 1918, sub: Demobilization. C of S file No. 50, Case 7. National Archives.
\textsuperscript{53} Memo, PMG for C of S, 11 November 1918, sub: Demobilization. C of S file No. 50, Case 19. National Archives.
rupting all organizations with the attendant general discontent.\textsuperscript{54}

The Secretary of War's policy did not entirely apply to Regular Army units. In Europe the Regular Army divisions were the last to be returned home. While these units were composed largely of Selective Service personnel, they nevertheless contained a large number of Regular Army men. These organizations ultimately received appreciable numbers of men enlisted after February 1919. By 1922, however, even those organizations that survived inactivation were reduced for the most part to nothing more than training cadres.

Discharge of troops was largely accomplished at demobilization centers throughout the country, where camp personnel conducted physical examinations, made up the necessary papers to close all records, checked up property, adjusted financial and other accounts, and generally gathered up the loose ends. Many organizations remaining in the zone of interior were not immediately inactivated. Men were needed to man the ports of debarkation, the convalescent and demobilization centers, the supply depots, the base and general hospitals, and the garrisons along the Mexican Border and bases outside of the United States. Accordingly many men assigned to these duties were retained in service for many months.

All general instructions regarding demobilization were assigned the code word "Dean," followed by a number, which insured prompt delivery to the proper person. When the demobilization program began, camp commanders were ordered to fill their own camp organizations with personnel to carry on demobilization, proceeding to discharge certain units as they could be declared unessential. There could be no uniformity in a system thus operated, and the program was further hampered because the demobilization centers were widely scattered and were designed primarily to handle troops returning from overseas. Skilled personnel were not available in sufficient numbers at demobilization centers because planning had started too late to allow time for selection and training of discharged technicians. In May 1919, it was found advisable to create Demobilization Groups, composed of specialists at the job; and this resulted in an improved program almost immediately. The instructions, designated Dean 18–a, which set up the Demobilization Groups, contained a chart showing the group organization and the number

of personnel required.\textsuperscript{55} It is obvious that such a scheme should have been instituted as soon as demobilization began.

There were several basic policies that operated during the demobilization.\textsuperscript{56} Soldiers were discharged at camps nearest their homes; no one was to be discharged while there remained a possibility of improving his physical condition; each officer was given an opportunity to qualify for a commission in the Reserve Corps; all personnel were encouraged to go directly to their homes; the ex-soldier's prospects as a civilian were to be furthered; and, most important, the processes of demobilization were to be as rapid as conditions would permit. Three groups—coal miners, railroad employees, and railway mail clerks—were discharged immediately; and instructions were issued specifying the order in which various organizations should be demobilized, beginning with the replacement battalions in the zone of the interior and ending with the combat divisions. It was General Pershing's job to say who should return from Europe and when.

When a soldier was discharged he received all pay and allowances due him, plus a bonus of $60.00. Each enlisted man was also given a uniform, shoes, and overcoat, if the weather was cold, otherwise a raincoat. It is interesting to note that men returning from overseas were allowed to retain their gas masks and helmets as souvenirs. When a soldier had been paid his allowance he was marched directly to a place where he could purchase a railroad ticket to his home. This encouraged men to return directly to their homes instead of squandering their money and lingering in large urban areas. As an additional incentive railroads offered reduced rates to discharged personnel returning home.

With speed the most important consideration, the War Department became more and more lenient with discharges as the program went along. The 21 November circular\textsuperscript{57} became the excuse for almost anybody to be separated; and by February 1919 the Chief of Staff had issued orders that all troops, except Regular Army, medical personnel, and administrative detachments used in demobilizing, who were in this country on 11 November 1918 were eligible for discharge. Administrative personnel complained so bitterly over being retained that in March the War Department found it expedient to replace them with civilians.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} Memo of TAG to all CG's, Demobilization Grs, 28 May 1919, sub: Creating Demobilization Grs. AG 324.122 (10-26-21). National Archives.
\textsuperscript{57} WD Circular 77, 1918. This circular provided for emergency discharges for qualified individuals.
\textsuperscript{58} Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Bulletin No. 784, p. 58.

*For statistical summary of World War I Demobilization, see Appendix II.
The demobilization of the emergency Army was scarcely under way before the War Department became the target of attacks and criticism not only from the public but also from Congress. On 30 November 1918 Operations Branch sent a memo to the Chief of Staff, the subject of which was “Publicity Concerning Discharge of Soldiers with a View to Diminishing Correspondence.” It pointed out that the flood of letters from private individuals and Congressmen regarding demobilization was interfering with other work and recommended that steps be taken to remedy the situation. It suggested that the press be informed of demobilization procedure and that a personal letter be sent to each member of Congress requesting his co-operation in this matter. In spite of this effort, complaints continued to pour in and the demobilization progress was criticised on the floors of Congress. Secretary of War Baker frequently wrote long, explanatory letters to these critics, mincing no words as he presented the War Department's side of the story. Much of the criticism was prompted by individual selfishness, but some of it was offered in a sincere desire to be helpful.

Communities having a labor surplus due to closing of munition industries protested the influx of large numbers of discharged soldiers who either returned to their homes in these localities or who chose to make these places their new domicile, thus adding to the unemployment problem there. The Department of Labor, in analyzing the situation, commented: “These complaints and the tenor of the replies reflect the haste with which the reversal from mobilization to demobilization was undertaken and the desirability of a program from the outset which would have combined the best elements of the several policies proposed.”

Most of the letters suggesting changes favored substituting the industrial demobilization plan, which was at that very time being abandoned by the British. Secretary Baker and Chief of Staff March explained over and over their reasons for using the unit plan. On 13 March 1919 the Acting Chief of Staff wrote to Harvey H. Smith, an attorney in West Virginia, “It is most unfortunate that the American public have not been fully informed on this subject [demobilization]. The War Department has repeatedly given the true facts to the Associated Press, but the newspapers do not seem to consider these facts as being interesting reading, and they either publish them in the corners of back pages or omit them entirely; while on the other hand the complaint of a single individual in the local community is

60. BLS Bulletin No. 784, p. 13.
headlined so as to give the impression that the whole emergency army is being retained in useless military service."

The War Department, hoping to stem the tide of criticism of the demobilization system, issued an Official Bulletin on 24 March 1919, in which it again outlined the demobilization process and the General Staff's reasons for choosing one method rather than another. The bulletin ended with an appeal for tolerance: "If the people of the country would evoke the same splendid patriotism that enabled us to triumph so gloriously and, realizing the necessities and difficulties still confronting us, counsel patience on the part of their loved ones, and practice it, they would render the Nation still another distinct and patriotic service."

Aside from the public pressure which complicated demobilization of the Army, World War I records reveal other problems that arose. Overseas commanders sometimes reported the composition of units incorrectly, causing men to be sent to demobilization centers far from their homes. Unrest along our southern border resulted in demands for large garrisons of troops there, while other demands for getting men separated immediately made it impossible. Even such matters as allowing liquor to be sold to soldiers and the disposition of abandoned mascots confronted the Army. The most difficult of solution, however, was the one having to do with voluntary enlistments and establishing a Regular Army. During the early months of the demobilization no man, regardless of his desires, could enlist in the Army, leaving no alternative but discharge. Some few were retained on the grounds that there was no civil employment available to them, but most men felt that they might as well accept a discharge when it was proffered as they had no assurance that an acceptable enlistment bill would be passed. The War Department urged Congress to correct this situation, reiterating the need for permanent personnel as often as possible. The urgency of the problem is evident in a letter that Secretary Baker wrote to Senator McKellar on 3 February 1919. It discussed Senate Joint Resolution 196, a resolution seeking to alter the demobilization plan, and stated that our military needs demanded personnel. He added: "To hold the Army responsible for the Army's proper functioning and to destroy its organic integrity by such legislation is to impose a duty with one hand and take away the means for its performance with the other." Congress finally passed the desired act on 28 February 1919.

61. Ltr, Acting C of S to H. F. Smith, 13 March 1919, no sub. C of S file 370 (Demobn), Case 146. National Archives.
Frederic L. Paxson characterized World War I demobilization in the following terms: “Before the full implications of the word 'mobilization' had been digested, demobilization was upon the United States, more completely without foreknowledge than mobilization had been nineteen months before. There were moments in the history of mobilization in which the government of the United States looked like a madhouse; during demobilization there was lacking even the madhouse in which the crazy might be incarcerated. They were at large.”

It is true that the United States Army, as well as the country as a whole, was unprepared to demobilize, but the faults of the demobilization were not inherent in the plan. Regardless of General March’s reasons for acceptance of the unit plan for demobilization, it proved to be a wise choice when considered from the viewpoint of military necessity. The enemy had accepted an armistice and had not surrendered unconditionally; German military units were practically intact; the Allies had no assurance that the German government would accept the terms of peace treaty; and the Western Allies had not invaded German soil. Allied units were kept in readiness for an advance into Germany. In addition military units could be retained as a whole at ports of embarkation and debarkation, hospitals, demobilization centers, and wherever needed. Speaking of the demobilization in later years, General March wrote, “I assume personal responsibility both for the system of demobilization adopted and the speed of its execution; and I have made the record here somewhat detailed, as I believe it is a method which should be adopted in any future demobilization of our forces, should we be unfortunate enough to have to engage again in a war of major dimensions.”

World Situation of 1945

In order to understand some of the problems facing the Army prior to its full-scale demobilization after World War II, it is necessary to consider the world political situation as it existed at the time of V-J Day. The Axis partners, Germany, Italy, and Japan, had collapsed and surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. Italy had capitulated in September 1943 and by the middle of October had joined the Allied cause as a co-belligerent; Nazi Germany had surrendered on 7 May 1945; and Japan

stopped fighting on 14 August 1945 and signed the articles of surrender on 2 September (V-J Day).

In England the wartime coalition government had been replaced with an elected labor government that stood for building homes, nationalizing certain key industries, and national health insurance. The new labor government in its foreign policy advocated: Support of Republican Spain; self-government for India; and complete disarmament of Germany. In spite of French and Polish claims, England desired that German territory stay intact, and favored allowing the defeated nation to manufacture goods, so long as they did not compete with British industry. On the Continent hundreds of thousands of persons displaced from their homes because of war and persecution presented a challenging problem to the Allies. Most of Europe's industrial output had been smashed. France, as well as all of Europe, was economically unstable. The French Provisional Government of DeGaulle, supported by Socialists, Communists, the General Federation of Labor, and the Resistance Forces, favored a clean sweep of wartime collaborators, while the Radical Socialists stood for less drastic action. The House of Savoy, that had backed the Fascist Regime of Mussolini, still held the throne—Italy had not yet chosen to become a socialized republic. Belgium was also involved in a crisis regarding the return of King Leopold. Spain remained an international problem.

Soviet Russia had been co-operative in the broad essentials of military effort during the conduct of the war in Europe. It had eventually carried out commitments by declaring war against Japan. This was done, however, only after the Japanese had attempted to negotiate peace through the Soviet Nation and the United States had dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan. Russian accomplishments in World War II were impressive. It had absorbed the Baltic States, a large portion of eastern Poland, and some of East Prussia. The USSR controlled and was developing its own system of government in Romania and Bulgaria and to a lesser extent in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In the Far East, although Soviet Russia had been in the war against Japan only for a matter of days, it had obtained possession of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin and was also in occupation of Manchuria and that part of Korea north of the 38th parallel. The USSR was beginning to develop signs of a hostile attitude toward its wartime allies. At the same time Russia pressed for help from the United States in problems of economic rehabilitation.

The United States had emerged from the War as a world
leader, whether its people wanted this or not. America had built, deployed, and fought the greatest military machine the world had ever known. Its admirals and generals had played prominent roles on every war front except Eastern Europe. Beginning in 1944, the United States had been involved in negotiations vital to future prospects for both peace and security. As regards the United Nations and the regional arrangements for the Western Hemisphere, these negotiations had been fairly successful. On 8 August 1945 the Charter of the United Nations had been ratified by the Senate and signed by the President. This Nation had also subscribed to international organizations for trade, banking, food, agriculture, and monetary funds. After the defeat of Germany a partial demobilization of the United States Army was coupled with redeployment\(^67\) of large forces from Europe to the Pacific war. With the defeat of Japan the President announced that the Nation was terminating Lend Lease Aid to wartime allies.

The United States had accepted international responsibilities. At Yalta, President Roosevelt had met with Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin and agreed upon a blueprint for Germany and the postwar world. Mr. Truman, the new President, was the American representative at the Potsdam Conference where a plan was agreed on for the rebuilding of Europe. Great hopes were placed on future meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. American troops were performing occupational duties in Germany and in Japan. There was even the possibility that this country would be called on by the United Nations to furnish a large quota of men and matériel for an international police force. On the other hand, important United States interests in the field of negotiations, namely security in the Pacific and stability in Europe, were yet to be accomplished.

When the Army began the partial demobilization of its ground and air forces on 12 May 1945,\(^68\) it consisted of approximately 8,290,000 individuals;\(^69\) and as of 1 September its total strength was approximately 8,020,000.\(^70\) The United States Navy started its demobilization as of V-J Day and at that time its aggregate

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\(^67\) DA SR 320-5-1, Aug 50 defines redeployment as "transfer of a unit, an individual or supplies deployed in an overseas theater to another theater, or to another location within the theater, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment."

\(^68\) WARX 79439, book message from Marshall to all major commanders, 8 May 1945. (Microfilm copies of message are available in DA OCS Staff Communications File.)

\(^69\) TAG, Strength of the Army 1 June 1945. This figure does not include cadets in USMA.

\(^70\) Ibid., 1 September 1945.
strength was approximately 4,060,000.\textsuperscript{71} The distribution of United States Army forces as of 1 September 1945 can be found in Appendix III.

Beginning officially on 12 May 1945 and ending on 30 June 1947, the demobilization of the Army of the United States was carried out. In spite of its previous experience, its prior planning, and a desire to deal justly with its wartime soldiers as individuals, the Army was faced with a gigantic task as it prepared to reduce to an interim and then to a peacetime strength. For the benefit of future demobilization planners and the Army Educational System this study will attempt to relate the story of the World War II personnel demobilization of the Army—how it was planned; the way in which it was executed; the problems that arose; and some of the effects it had on American life.

\textsuperscript{71} Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1945, The Secretary of the Navy to the President of the United States, dated January 10, 1946. Note: These strengths include Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. (A copy is located in the Army Library.)
CHAPTER II
PLANNING FOR THE DEMOBILIZATION

Introduction

The study of the history of demobilization of the Army of the United States after World War II would not be complete without considering the background of planning for its execution, not only by the Army, but also by other federal government agencies whose post-war activities would be affected. Planning for World War II demobilization started soon after the entry of the United States into the war. The experience gained in the aftermath of World War I had not provided a blueprint for World War II because the latter presented larger and more complex problems, but World War I had taught the lesson that demobilization planning should be started before the end of a war.

During the interim between World Wars I and II there was very little thought given to the problem of demobilization planning by the Army. There was some limited thinking on the subject by the General Staff. In the fall of 1921 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, co-ordinated the compilation of a brief study entitled "Description of War Department's System of Demobilization in 1918-1919." This staff paper consisted of three parts—a general description of demobilization in World War I, a report of the operations of a typical demobilization group, and instructions of the Adjutant General creating demobilization groups at demobilization centers. The study was furnished to corps area and department commanders and commanding generals of the War College and the General Service Schools "for your information and possible use in future problems."\(^1\) The description of the Army's 1918-1919 demobilization system was generally confined to the mechanics of the problem.

During the period between World War I and World War II the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, WDGS, had primary staff responsibility for demobilization planning. Research for this study, however, did not reveal any formal demobilization plans that were made by the General Staff during this period. Following World War I, an officer in G-3 was given the assignment of writing both mobilization and demobilization studies. This proved too large a task and as a consequence he devoted his efforts only to mobilization.\(^2\)

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1. For copy of study see AG 324.122 (10-26-21). National Archives.
2. Ltr, Col. C. C. Early to Maj. John C. Sparrow, 14 Jan 51. HIS 350.05 Sp StU Demob (11 Jan 51).
The curricula of the higher service schools devoted very little attention to demobilization. The subject was not considered within the instructional scope of the Command and General Staff School; students at the Army Industrial College listened to lectures that gave only passing attention to it; and the records of the Army War College indicate that during the period 1920–1940 the problem was on the agenda of but eleven different courses. Instruction at the latter institution was handled by committee studies, conferences conducted by students, and lectures delivered by officers and civilians. Since many of the War College studies were prepared for General Staff use, it is evident that there was some thinking on the subject being done by that staff.

In December 1932 the War Department published its first Mobilization Regulations but these and succeeding changes made no reference to demobilization. Following the publication of the 1921 study, "Description of War Department's System of Demobilization in 1918–1919," demobilization as a subject was mentioned only once in regulations of various types, circulars, and instructions to subordinate commands. In 1923 a regulation was published that defined the word as:

... the loss by unit (or headquarters) of its separate identity as such by either—

(a) Complete discontinuance, coupled with the loss of all its personnel.

(b) Change of designation, either of its name or number.

(c) Consolidation, or merger, with one or more existing units to form a new unit.

**Early World War II Federal Government Planning**

The National Resources Planning Board was the first federal agency to begin aggressive planning for World War II demobilization and attendant problems of reconversion. The President in a message to Congress, 14 January 1942, stated that the board was the planning arm of the Executive Office and was "charged

3. 2nd Ind, AWC to OC/Mil His, SSUSA, 26 Jan 51, on OC/Mil His ltr to C&GSC, 8 Jan 51. HIS 350.05 (8 Jan 51). The studies, now located in the Army War College, include:


4. AR 345-55, 26 Apr 23, Sec. V, par. 27.
with the preparation of long-range plans for the development of our national resources and stabilization of employment. At my direction, it is correlating plans and programs under consideration in many Federal, State, and private organizations for post-war full employment, security, and building America.\textsuperscript{5} By November 1942, the board had published a Post-War Agenda that outlined problems to be faced at that time if the Nation were to attain its objectives in the post-war world. The Agenda was divided into several sections: plans for demobilization; plans for private enterprise, general plans for public activity, plans for Social Security, population, and manpower; plans for financing and fiscal policy, plans for regional, state, and local participation; plans for effective administration, and plans for international collaboration. The Agenda did not outline as a problem the Nation's post-victory political objectives and the relationship of these to military posture, pending their attainment.

Shortly after the beginning of 1942 various civilian groups and individuals evinced a great amount of interest in post-war readjustments and opportunities for discharged service personnel. In June the American Council on Education invited the Army and Navy and other interested governmental agencies to attend conferences for discussing plans on post-war readjustments. The conferences were so successful in stimulating interest and aroused such widespread interest that the President, on 6 July 1942, authorized the National Resources Planning Board to appoint an informal conference to study the post-war readjustment of civilian and military personnel. The members of the conference represented the Veteran's Administration, War Manpower Commission, Department of Labor, Navy Department, War Department, and other federal agencies. After several months of study and deliberation the conference submitted a report to the board, which in turn selected the items believed to be most significant and incorporated them into a final report to the President.\textsuperscript{6} The report, entitled Demobilization and Readjustment, was submitted 30 June 1943 and was made public by the President on 31 July. The report was primarily aimed at an orderly and efficient readjustment of national economy by a planned reabsorption of war-specialized personnel into the normal economy. Certain phases of military demobilization were discussed in some detail but in a subordinate relationship to broad post-war social and economic problems.

The report stated that "The ideal objective of plans for military

\textsuperscript{5} Message of President (Roosevelt) to Congress, 14 Jan 42.
\textsuperscript{6} National Resources Planning Board, Demobilization and Readjustment, June 1943. Note: Copies of this are available in the Army Library.
objectives for military demobilization should be to effect a rapid
and orderly status and to restore them to their homes and families
and peaceful occupations. This ideal objective, however, will be
influenced by a variety of practical considerations. Important
among these are:

(1) The continuing need of the country for the preservation
of armed security.

(2) The availability of transport facilities and their effect
on repatriation.

(3) The organization of facilities and methods for the
demobilization of members of the armed forces and for their
assimilation into civilian life.

Specific proposals affecting the armed forces include the fol-
lowing:

For those leaving the armed forces immediately upon defeat
of the enemy:

1. Three months furlough at regular base pay (not to exceed
$100 a month, however), plus family allowances.

2. Unemployment insurance for 26 weeks for those who
registered with the United States Employment Service.
This insurance benefit to become effective only after the
three months furlough period.

3. Special aid and counsel regarding readjustment to and
rehabilitation in civilian life.

4. Special provision, including tuition and moderate allow-
ances, for those who wish to pick up the broken threads
of their education or follow some special course of train-
ing.

5. Establishment of veterans’ credit for old age and sur-
vivor’s insurance on a basis of service in the armed
forces.

6. Opportunities for agricultural employment and settlement
for a limited number of qualified service men only.

7. All benefits to discharged service people were to apply
without discrimination on the basis of sex.

The conference report continued by stating specific recom-
endations for demobilization procedure of service personnel.
Separation should be carried out so as to avoid local concentra-
tions of ex-service personnel disproportionate to the size of the
community or to its capacity to provide opportunities for em-
ployment. Precedence of demobilization of individuals should
be made on the basis of character and length of service, domestic
status, occupation, and continuation of training before mustering
out. To meet the needs of military personnel the report sug-
gested the creation of special demobilization centers strategically
located and fully equipped. Services provided at the centers should be available to the men at the time they were being released from active duty.

Another item of particular interest to the military establishment was that of national service. A particular form of national service was not recommended but three possibilities were suggested:

1. National service involving all young men and women of certain age groups, of which national military and naval service would form a part.

2. Universal national military and naval service required of all able-bodied young men in certain age groups.

3. National military and naval service under a selective service system comparable to the operation of the Selective Service System prior to this Nation's entry into World War II.

By the summer of 1942, the supply of physically acceptable men for the Army was becoming dangerously low, and still proposals for lowering induction ages for Selective Service were met by opposition and concern throughout the Nation. In the fall, however, Congress passed a bill providing for extension of Selective Service to males 18 and 19 years of age and thus provided an added stimulus to planning for demobilization and post-war readjustment problems of service personnel. As a result of concern over the induction of younger men, President Roosevelt at the signing of the bill, November 1942, said:

I am causing a study to be made by a committee of educators, under the auspices of the War and Navy Departments, for the taking of steps to enable the young men whose education has been interrupted to resume their schooling and afford equal opportunity for the training and education of other young men of ability after their service in the armed forces has come to an end.

The President appointed the Armed Forces Committee on Post-War Educational Opportunities for Service Personnel with Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Frederick H. Osborn, Director, Special Service Division, Army Service Forces, as chairman. The

7. Public Law 16, 78th Congress.
8. HR Doc 128, Pt 1, 78th Congress, p. 9.
9. Frederick H. Osborn was for many years associated with several large corporations in various executive capacities. He is the author of several books dealing with population studies. On 9 Jan 41, SW Stimson appointed him Chairman of the War Department Committee on Education, Recreation, and Community Service (later Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation). Osborn was appointed a Brigadier General (temporary) on 5 Sep 41 and in this capacity became Chief of the Morale Division of the Army (later Special Services Division, Army Service Forces). He was promoted to Major General (temporary) on 15 Sep 43 and later became Director of Morale Service Division, Army Service Forces.
committee correlated its activities with related studies of the National Resources Planning Board. The findings of the Post-War Educational Opportunities Committee resulted in a number of bills being introduced into Congress which were finally merged into one resolution that became the law more popularly known as the G. I. Bill of Rights.\textsuperscript{10}

The plans outlined in the National Resources Planning Board's \textit{Demobilization and Readjustment} had a tremendous effect on federal demobilization policies as many of the proposals were subsequently adopted \textit{in toto} or with modifications. The report was, in reality, the first draft blueprint in the federal government's plan for demobilization and reconversion of civilian and military personnel. However, the role of the National Resources Planning Board in demobilization was short-lived because Congress did not approve its annual appropriation for the fiscal year 1944.\textsuperscript{11}

The Office of War Mobilization was the executive agency of the Federal Government that became the successor to the National Resources Planning Board in coordinative planning for demobilization and post-war problems. This agency had been established in the Office for Emergency Management in May 1943 "to provide for the more effective coordination of the mobilization of the Nation for war."\textsuperscript{12} The functions of this office were to develop and unify programs and issue directives pertaining to the conduct of the war on the home front. By the end of 1943 the federal government was confronted with problems of cutting back certain production activities no longer needed on a full production scale. The reduction and modification of these production activities necessarily had attendant manpower problems involving reductions and balancing of personnel in various labor areas of the Nation. Based on the necessity for cutting back production and the recommendation of the informal conference report, \textit{Demobilization and Readjustment}, the President requested Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock to prepare a study on current and post-war adjustment policies. Messrs. Baruch and Hancock were integrated into the Office of War Mobilization as

\begin{thebibliography}{12}
\bibitem{10} Public Law 346, 78th Congress.
\bibitem{11} A Senate committee had been established by resolution (Sen Res 102, 12 Mar 43) to consider post-war problems. By the time the National Resources Planning Board was dissolved, the committee was not active because of difficulties in obtaining a staff, and committee members were occupied by immediate problems that seemed more pressing. In November 1943 the committee became actively interested in demobilization and post-war problems and started hearings on contract cancellations, surplus property, and other phases of industrial demobilization. The House established a similar committee commonly known as the Woodrum Committee because its chairman was Representative Woodrum of Virginia.
\bibitem{12} Ex O 9347, 27 May 43. 8 FR No. 107, p. 7207.
\end{thebibliography}
the Advisory Unit for War and Post-War Adjustment Policies. In February 1944, the Advisory Unit recommended the establishment of a work director in the Office of War Mobilization "to unify the forces of the Executive Branch and to work with Congress on the whole human side of demobilization."\(^{13}\)

By the end of the summer of 1944 there was still no governmental agency with statutory authority to coordinate post-war planning. Finally in early October the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was established as the result of Congressional action.\(^{14}\) The act provided for a board, appointed by the President with Senate approval, to advise and recommend to the Director on matters of war mobilization and reconversion. The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion was headed by former Supreme Court Justice (later Secretary of State) James F. Byrnes. This new agency took over the function of the Office of War Mobilization and the following agencies were required to function under the supervision of Byrnes' organization: Office of Contract Settlement; Surplus Property Administration and its successor, the Surplus Property Board; and the Retraining and Reemployment Administration, the successor to an agency of the same name that had been established by executive order.\(^{15}\)

The Start of Army Planning

There was no actual directive from the President to the Army to begin demobilization planning. The earliest correspondence from the Executive Office pertaining to demobilization and post-war planning, that was directive in nature, was a letter sent in late October 1942 by the Chairman, National Resources Planning Board to the Secretary of War. The communication invited Mr. Stimson's attention to the fact that the board "has been asked by the President to serve as his agent in collating the post-war plans and programs of public and private agencies for consideration. We must appreciate ... that the War Department must today concentrate all its efforts upon the successful prosecution of the war. However, it may be that in various parts of the Department some attention is already being given to problems that will arise after victory is achieved."\(^{16}\) The message continued with a brief discussion of the composition and size of the post-war Army, rapid discharge of personnel after

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13. Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock, Report on War and Post War Adjustment Policies, 15 Feb 1944. WDSSP 319.1 (Demob) (18 Feb 44). DRB, TAG.
15. Ex O 9427, 24 Feb 44. 9 FR No. 46, p. 2199.
16. Ltr, Frederic A. Delano, Chairman, NRPB, to SW, 23 Oct 42. AG 334.8 (NRPB) (10-23-42) (1). DRB, TAG.
the cessation of hostilities, and the "procedure and speed with which procurement contracts are cancelled." Mr. Delano, the board chairman, stated that he would keep the War Department informed of the progress of "post-war planning of various agencies" and requested that the National Resources Planning Board be kept informed as to the status of any post-war planning activities of the Department.17

Mr. Stimson replied in early November to Mr. Delano stating that the War Department was devoting some attention to post-war problems. Specific reference was made to: the appointment of Brig. Gen. John McA. Palmer, USA-Retired, and an advisory board of officers in June 1942 to plan for the post-war military establishment; the work of the Special Services Division, Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces); and the status of the cancellation of procurement contracts.18

General Marshall had General Palmer recalled to duty in November 1941 after an absence of fifteen years from the active list, because he wanted Palmer "merely available to me [Marshall] for consultation in the matter of Army organization as pertaining to the citizen forces. . . ."19 In January 1948 General Palmer recollected:

When General Marshall wrote this, I knew, and he knew much better than I did, that I was in no sense qualified to advise on the purely military aspects of organization as affected by the enormous changes in weapons which had taken place since my retirement. . . . He called me back to active duty because he knew that I had given many years of study to the evolution of the politico-military institutions of the United States and he therefore hoped that I might be able to contribute toward the formation of a peace establishment consistent with American tradition and one which might be expected to receive the continued support of the American people and their Congress.20

In June of 1942, The Chief, Historical Division, Army War College, wrote the Chief of Staff suggesting several studies that could be made by the Historical Section. These studies would be based on World War I experience and as such would probably assist the General Staff in solving current and future problems.

17. Ibid.
18. Ltr, SW to Chairman, NRPB, 2 Nov 42. WDGPA/160-(10-27-42). See Hq ASF, Spec Serv file 324.71 (9-15-41) (1) DRB, TAG.
20. Ibid.
One of the suggested topics concerned demobilization. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, requested that the demobilization study be made. The study was completed about the middle of August and was sent to G-1, who circulated it with the notation, "Each Branch—To note then to G-1 file." Although the study proved useful at a later date, the branches followed the directive to the letter by noting and filing in six days.

The Army Chief of Staff decided in late 1942 that demobilization planning should start at an early date. Marshall's decision was based largely on the advice of General Palmer that one of the main causes of delay in an orderly demobilization after World War I was a lack of early planning.

By January 1943 the Army Service Forces had begun work on demobilization planning. At that time a study was made on an "Outline of Proposed Demobilization Plan." In preparing this study the author referred to War College Studies, Civilian and World War I reports, and memoirs of famous men that had participated in World War I, both in a civilian and military capacity. In February the Director, Military Personnel Division, requested the Historical Section, Army War College, to furnish "such information [demobilization] as you consider to be appropriate from historical record of the World War." The War College Historical Section prepared a study for Army Service Forces by late February. By 9 April a study was presented to the Commanding General entitled "Demobilization as a Current Problem." This paper incorporated much of the "thinking" from a personnel point of view in that headquarters.

The Army Ground Forces was also devoting time to demobilization planning in early 1943. At the beginning of March an officer had been directed to make a "study of demobilization procedures by such Branch or Branches, or by such officers of the Division [Mobilization] as you may designate." And at the same time the Army Air Forces was beginning to study the problem in its Special Projects Office. It is apparent that in early 1943 there were some officers in the Army's three major subordinate commands who were studying the problem of de-

22. Ibid.
23. Memo, Marshall for Norman Davis, 28 Jul 43. WDCSA 370.9 (28 Jul 43), OCS files. DRB, TAG.
24. Ltr, Col Alan Richardson (Inf, USAR) to Maj John C. Sparrow, Hist Off, 3 Feb 50. HIS 350.05.
26. Memo, Reynolds for Somervell, 9 Apr 43, sub: Demobn. SPGAA 370.01 (Gen) (4-9-43) (4). DRB, TAG.
27. See AGF 370.01, Bdr #1, Concentration, Mobn, and Demobn, Entry No. 1. Ibid.
mobilization even though there had been no directive from the General Staff.

In early April 1943 Palmer forwarded a memorandum to the Chief of Staff that pointed out that there could be only partial demobilization following the defeat of the Axis and that careful planning would be necessary in coordinating the Army post-war interim forces and the permanent peacetime military establishment. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, agreed with the views expressed by General Palmer and recommended that a special organization be established to study the problem, research past mistakes, prepare plans, and propose legislation. He further recommended that planning be done by Army Service Forces and that both the personnel and logistical aspects of demobilization be considered. On 14 April 1943 General Marshall directed the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to “initiate preliminary studies exploring the field of basic policy and broad planning for demobilization” of the Army “after the cessation of hostilities.” The directive suggested a “special group, small at first not involved in current operations, be composed to define the problem, research the experience and mistakes of the last war, and as the subject develops, submit their conclusions and recommendations in broad outline for my approval as a basis for subsequent detailed planning.” Secrecy in connection with this early planning was emphasized, but the memorandum stressed that “the General Staff should be kept fully informed” in order that operations would be correlated with demobilization planning.

The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell, directed his Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, Maj. Gen. George Grunert, to assume charge of demobilization planning. Grunert soon submitted to Somervell a recommended plan of organization for the ensuing work that provided for a new organization to be established in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands with an assigned primary function of planning. The plan was immediately approved and a new division was formed in Grunert’s office. The new organization was named the Project Planning

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28. Memo, Brig Gen John McA. Palmer for Marshall, 5 Apr 43. CofS file 370.9, Dr 114, DRB, TAG.
30. Memo, CofS for CG ASF, 14 Apr 43, sub: Demohn Planning. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
33. Memo, Dep Chief of Serv Comds. ASF, for CG ASF, 19 Apr 43, sub: Orgn and Functioning of the Office of DCoFS for Serv Comds. Ibid.
34. Approved by CG ASF in a 1st Ind to Grunert’s memo, cited above. Ibid., TABS B and C.
Division and Brig. Gen. W. F. Tompkins was selected as its director.

The Director, Project Planning Division, very quickly began the organization of his office and by May 1943 had issued a directive on demobilization planning to the members of his unit. This communication indicated the direction that planning should take, the general method of operation, and the detailed activity to be taken in the first month of planning. The memorandum also contained the guiding principles that were followed throughout the existence of the division and its successor, the Special Planning Division, War Department Special Staff. In substance, they were:

1. Existing agencies and machinery were to be used whenever possible.
2. Operations were to be decentralized to Service Commands to the maximum.
3. The division was to be a small group. Detailed plans were to be made by existing agencies.35

The final paragraph of the memorandum announced that by “June 12, it is proposed to draw up a study for the Chief of Staff, defining the problem and submitting conclusions and recommendations for his approval as a basis for subsequent detailed planning.”36

The *Survey of Demobilization Planning* was completed on 18 June and submitted to the Chief of Staff. The introduction brought out the fact that present demobilization problems would be of far greater magnitude than those of World War I, but there were “some favorable elements” such as this country’s experience in the aftermath of the First World War, the work of the Veteran’s Administration, better centralized governmental control, and the “consciousness of the need for advance planning.”37 The report recommended that planning should be based on four assumed premises:*

1. This Nation would emerge as the world’s foremost mili-

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35. ASF memo, signed by Brig Gen W. F. Tompkins, 8 May 43, sub: Demobn Planning. See OCMH Acc No. 522.
36. Ibid., Par E.

*These were in accord with premises set forth in a Special Army Committee Report, “Survey of Current Military Program,” 15 March 1943 (revised 28 April 1943). The committee recommended that continuing studies should be initiated covering the military aspects of the following:
(1) Armistice, disarmament, and peace terms.
(2) Demobilization.
(3) Establishment of a peacetime force.
(4) Universal Service.
(5) International military force.
(6) Global air bases.
tary power and would be prepared for action in many parts of the world.

2. The war in Europe would terminate before the Japanese surrender.

3. The United States would furnish an important share of large-scale occupation troops.

4. Public opinion would demand a rapid demobilization.

The broad problems underlying demobilization were two, manpower and industry. The survey pointed out that it was neither possible nor practicable to announce all assumptions for detailed planning at that time. When it became necessary to use additional calculated assumptions the Project Planning Division would present them for approval. As problems were defined in the light of approved assumptions, they then would be assigned to existing War Department agencies or ad hoc committees for solution.38

The *Survey of Demobilization Planning* recommended that the problems of demobilization as outlined be approved as a basis for detailed planning and that the Project Planning Division be authorized to request all War Department agencies for such data, information, and assistance that might be required in connection with its studies. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson reacted favorably to the Army Service Forces’ planning survey and in a memorandum to the Under Secretary of War and the Army Chief of Staff said:

...I am convinced that the time has now come to coordinate all demobilization planning ... in one over-all group ... [which] should be responsible to and report to the Under Secretary who will ... consult with the Chief of Staff on military aspects. ... The final determination of so many plans ... will ultimately have to depend on governmental policies formulated outside the War Department. ...

Stimson further directed that contact with other governmental agencies be conducted through the staff of his office. Additional steps to accomplish demobilization planning were left to the discretion of Under Secretary Patterson and General Marshall.39

The Commanding General, Army Service Forces, recommended to the Chief of Staff that demobilization planning then being done by the Army Air Forces be consolidated with the work of the Project Planning Division, which would thereafter report to the Under Secretary of War while remaining under Army

38. Approximately thirty problems had been assigned by 15 June 1943 to various echelons of the War Department Staff Divisions for solution; by the end of the month the total was sixty-six.

39. Memo, Henry L. Stimson for the USW and CofS, 7 Jul 43. SW 387. DRB, TAG.
Service Forces for administration. Previous to this General Somervell had emphasized and recommended an over-all demobilization plan for the federal government to which the plan of the War Department could have been geared. Marshall did not take action on this recommendation because he felt that the President would not favorably consider it at that time. Instead, the Chief of Staff notified the President that work on Army demobilization had been going on since November 1942 and that the War Department hoped to reach a point where it "would be ready whenever you [the President] so directed to submit this [demobilization] data to whatever civilian agencies were coordinated to meet the general problem."

The Under Secretary (then Acting) of War, on 22 July 1943 directed the establishing of a Special Planning Division of the War Department Special Staff with General Tompkins as Chief. Tompkins was to report to the Secretary of War through the Under Secretary on industrial demobilization and to the Chief of Staff on matters relating to military policy. The division was charged with the preparation of demobilization plans covering the transition from a war to a peace status of the military and industrial activities of the War Department including the preparation of procedures and legislation required to implement these plans. A functional type of organization was selected for the Special Planning Division because it was thought that this would best meet the needs of future demobilization planning. The organization as it appeared in June 1944 is shown in Chart I.

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40. Memo, Lt Gen Brehon Somervell for CoS, 10 Jul 43. SPDCP 380. DRB, TAG. Note: Somervell's recommendation to keep planning under the administrative control of ASF was logical in that it offered a ready means of maintaining secrecy of the work; also many of the demobilization problems were logistical.
41. 1st Ind, CG ASF to CoS, 19 Jun 43, on Memo of Maj Gen George Grunert to Lt Gen Brehon Somervell, 17 Jun 43. SPDCP 380 (SPD chronological file for June 43).
43. Memo, Acting SW for Director, SPD, 22 Jul 43, sub: Orgn and Functions, SPD, WD. Ibid.
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION CHART
SPECIAL PLANNING DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT SPECIAL STAFF

DIRECTOR
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON BRANCH

SERVICE OPERATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION BRANCH

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

ORGANIZATION BRANCH

MATERIEL BRANCH

RESEARCH BRANCH

FISCAL BRANCH
Concurrently, the commanding generals of the Air and of the Service Forces issued instructions that permitted workable relationships between these commands and the Special Planning Division; liaison was quickly established between the division and the Ground Forces; and planning units or activities were established in the major echelons of the War Department. The work of these demobilization planning agencies was initiated with the assignment of problems or studies by the Special Planning Division. In addition, Tompkins' division was to monitor these assigned problems. There was, however, one exception to this general procedure. Problems that were peculiar to the Air Forces were solved by an inter-locking arrangement with that command. The Chief, Special Projects Office, Army Air Forces, was appointed as Deputy Director, Special Planning Division, in late August.

Some Aspects of Early Planning, June–September 1943

The initial Survey of Demobilization Planning contained a list of 135 broad problems that confronted the War Department. One of the civilian assistants to the Secretary of War suggested that these problems be classified for consideration as follows:

Group I—Problems that could be developed and finally settled within the War Department.

Group II—Problems that required coordination and cooperation with other Federal agencies; the ones that required legislation; and those that might require Presidential approval.44

This method of classification enabled planners to obtain a clearer conception of problems studied.

An analysis of the problems was made that substantiated the need for an over-all federal plan by disclosing that less than half (approximately 50) could be finally settled within the War Department, with the possibility of little or no outside reference and legislation. The remaining ones (85) needed outside coordination, including approximately 30 that required legislation.45

Almost all of the industrial problems belonged to Group II.

Previous to World War I the major conflicts that this Nation's Army fought (Revolutionary and Civil Wars) occurred on the North American land mass. A large portion of the troops that fought these wars had been mustered through the state militia.

44. Memo, Tompkins to George L. Harrison, file SPDC 380 (5-29-43), no sub, 29 June 1943. SPD files. DRB, TAG.
45. Memo, Tompkins to Grunert, file SPDCP 380, no sub, 28 June 1943. SPD files. HRS, TAG.
system or through short voluntary enlistments. Most organiza-
tions were formed before coming into federal service and were kept separate and distinct from regular units. At the conclusion of these major wars the non-regulars were usually returned to the state and locality of their muster for disbandment. Regular units remained intact until a decision had been made as to the composition of the post-war army. World War I was the first major conflict in which the terms of service of all Army personnel extended for the emergency. At the end, Regular, National Guard, and National Army units contained individuals from all components of the Army. Even though this Army was demobilized by units there was an immediate clamor "to send the boys home." However, the War Department had a logical reason to withstand this pressure. Large numbers of the World War I Army had been transported to Europe by allies and in neutral bottoms. At the end of the war these allied powers used many of their passenger vessels to return their own colonial troops, leaving the United States with far less maritime capacity to return its expeditionary forces than was available to take them to war. Thus, while proceeding at a fairly rapid rate, demobilization in World War I was regulated to a degree by the availability of shipping.

Early mobilization of the World War II Army resembled that in the first world conflict. By the summer of 1943 individuals, particularly enlisted personnel, of the Army of the United States had almost completely lost their identity as regulars, national guardsmen, and selective service inductees. Many enlistees acquired commissioned status and many officers held Army of the United States temporary commissions. Added to this was the fact that the Army was on every continental land mass. By the middle of June 1943 it was apparent to the Project Planning Division that the demobilization of such forces would require more thought than the problem had received in past wars when planners simply waited until war's end and announced the traditional demobilization by unit.

The Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, was requested to make "a study and recommendations for the problem:

The basis of demobilization, i.e., by unit, civilian skill, length of service, or some combination of methods."  
A special committee consisting of fifteen members from the three major commands was appointed to consider the problem and make recommendations.

46. Memo, Tompkins to Dalton, file SPDCP 350.06 (6-14-43), sub: Demobilization Planning, 14 June 1943. SPD files. DRB, TAG.
The committee held three formal meetings at which the representatives of the three major forces presented the views, if any, of their headquarters. Formal views, as such, were not given by the air representatives because General Arnold had not officially expressed his opinion on the subject. The ground force commander favored unit demobilization. The Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, expressed his commander's views:

... He [McNair] states that demobilization in the last war [WWI] was one of the best things done. It was done very effectively. ... he would follow the method prescribed by General March ... demobilizing the troops by complete organizations in order of their availability for this choice.47 The service force's views were mainly confined to problems likely to arise with an Axis collapse in Europe followed by a partial demobilization in which selected units would be demobilized as their services would not be required against Japan.48 Reports on the subject were given by representatives (not members of the committee) of Selective Service, Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, Project Planning Division, and The Adjutant General.

The demobilization committee prepared its report containing recommendations to be submitted through the Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces. These proposals were approved by the senior representative of each major command. The committee:

... held to the principle that any degree of demobilization must be predicated upon decisions indicating the strength and type of the force required for continuance in service ... the method selected must serve military necessity, contribute to domestic requirements, and possess elements of impartiality.49

The committee considered demobilization by:

a. Units;
b. Skills;
c. Length of Service;
d. Age;
e. Dependents.

As units are now composed, they represented a cross section of skills, length of service, age, and dependency. [*] Thus

47. M/S, AGF, Chief of Staff to G-1, sub: Demobilization, 26 June 1943. AGF 370.01, Entries 1 to ... (sic) DRB, TAG.
48. Memos, AGF, McClure to G-1, 25. and 30 June and 7 July 1943. Ibid.
49. Memo, Dalton to Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands, sub: Demobilization, 14 July 1943. G-1 files, SPD Study #30. DRB, TAG.

[*] This committee held only three formal meetings, the first on 25 June and the last on 7 July 1943. Its report was not substantiated by inclosures, statistics, or studies. It would have been almost impossible to have measured skills, length of service, age, and dependency objectively in the time allotted.
demobilization by units can be expected to satisfy the demands of pressure groups while simultaneously serving the best interests of the Army in terms of military necessity and administrative simplicity. It is possible that partial demobilization may result only in a curtailment of mobilization to the degree necessary to provide replacements. It is also possible that, as occurred after World War I, there may be inescapable demands for the release of men of various categories. Therefore, the War Department should be prepared to meet the most pressing of these demands by a plan to combine unit demobilization with the release of such special groups as it may approve.\textsuperscript{50}

The committee made the following specific recommendations:

1. That for either partial or final demobilization, tactical and administrative units be released \textit{in toto}.

2. That on the basis of decisions by the War Department as to the strength and type of force required for continuance in service, the commanding generals of theaters, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces designate the specific units to be demobilized.

3. That the War Department be prepared to release certain groups on the basis of numbers which will not impair military effectiveness and with a proviso that no such individual is to be released from a unit to be retained unless an acceptable replacement is found.\textsuperscript{51}

The Army Service Force's report was held in abeyance pending study of other aspects of personnel demobilization planning.

Just after the service forces had started to work on their "basis of demobilization" problem, the Project Planning Division asked the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff (OPD), to make a study and to submit recommendations on the total strength and composition by type units of the emergency interim forces required after cessation of hostilities for:

a. European—Africa Area;
b. Pacific—Asiatic Area;
c. Continental U.S. and outlying possessions with overhead;
d. In-training and Strategic Reserve.\textsuperscript{52}

OPD furnished a detailed reply to the Project Planning Division on 3 July.\textsuperscript{53} The Operations Division had drawn up two sets of figures, given as appendices; the first set dealt with troop

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Memo, Tompkins to Handy, sub: Demobilization, 21 June 1943. OPD 370.9, Case 1. DRB, TAG.
\textsuperscript{53} Memo, Handy to Tompkins, sub: Demobilization, 3 July 1943. OPD 370.9, Case 2. Ibid.
strength, divisions, and air groups needed for the period after Germany's defeat but prior to Japan's, and the second for the period after the defeat of both had been accomplished. An estimated 5½ million men would be needed for occupying Europe and fighting Japan. In terms of units this was 78 divisions and 260 air groups. For the last set OPD estimated approximately 3 million, or 58 divisions and 150 air groups, for occupational duties in Europe and the Pacific area.\footnote{54 Ibd.} \footnote{55 Ibd.}

In working out these estimated figures OPD's planners used as references the Survey of Demobilization Planning and the report by the Special Army Committee, Current Military Program, 15 March 1943 (revised 28 April 1943).\footnote{55} These papers contained only broad assumptions on which to work. Yet the OPD reply of 3 July to Project Planning Division was based on certain more specific assumptions which were like those furnished by Tompkins on 8 July.* It appears that prior to the formal forwarding of these, officers from the Project Planning Division and OPD worked these out informally for planning purposes.\footnote{56}

The assumptions of this 8 July paper were briefly:

a. The war in Europe would be won a year prior to Pacific victory.

b. Partial demobilization would begin with victory in Europe.

c. The force required for U.S. share of the emergency interim forces was [left blank].

d. The U.S. would probably furnish a share of International Police Force, largely air power.

e. In demobilization the principle of discharge to men of longest service was to be the guide.

f. Some form of universal training would be maintained by the U.S.

In a reply to Tompkins' 8 July memorandum the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, commented that for assumption c the figure 3,070,000 could be inserted. He recommended that d and f be considered separately from the troops required for the emergency interim forces.\footnote{57}

\footnote{54 Ibd.}
\footnote{55 Ibd.}
\footnote{*The ACofS, OPD, wrote Director, Project Planning Division, 9 July 1943, "Assumptions similar to those in a, b, and c, of your July 8 supplement to your memorandum of 21 June 1943 . . . were used as a basis for the study of Demobilization Planning . . . ." Memo, Handy for Tompkins, 9 July 1943, subj: Planning. OPD 370.9, Study 2. DRB, TAG.}
\footnote{56 Unsigned yellow tissue, typed title "Chief of Staff" at bottom, 8 July 1943. OPD 370.9, Case 2. DRB, TAG.}
\footnote{57 Memo, Handy to Tompkins, sub: Planning, 9 July 1943. OPD 370.9, Case 2. DRB, TAG.}
OPD's study of 3 July, meanwhile, was forwarded to the Chief of Staff. After examining it General Marshall requested that Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy review it. Marshall did this because he felt the figures too high and knew McCloy had an intimate knowledge of post-war [WW I] Germany and Italy. McCloy's "rough comments" were returned on 12 July. OPD had recommended 29 divisions and 50 air groups for occupying Europe. The Assistant Secretary felt these figures altogether too high in view of the fact that we would be occupying a beaten nation, and one whose air arm would probably have been obliterated. "Fifty American groups operating over a grounded country, together with English and no doubt Russian groups, does not seem to me to be realistic." In view of the preponderance of Allied air might, "20 divisions in toto would be all that would be needed to garrison Germany." McCloy thought that Africa should not be considered, that Italy needed not more than 2, and that it should be a hands-off policy in the Balkans. Likewise, he felt Pacific forces to be excessive and concluded that OPD's study had not given enough consideration to:

a. Position of Russia after German defeat;
b. Potentialities of China;
c. Power of U.S. and British Navies;
d. The comparative power of U.S. air-might to grounded nations;
e. The possibility of a rearmed Belgium, Holland, France, etc., assuming occupation obligations.

Marshall sent Mr. McCloy's comments to the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, with instructions to look them over and comment direct to him [Marshall].

Maj. Gen. T. T. Handy, the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, must have defended his division's study adequately in his talk with Marshall, for his memorandum of 15 July [not delivered until 24 July], explains OPD's position. His grounds were:

a. OPD had based this with regard to emergency interim and not permanent peacetime forces.

b. OPD worked on the basic assumptions of the two "Survey" papers, the last of which provided a variable: namely, that the U.S. would provide a large enough force to protect

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid. [With attached note from Marshall to Handy.]
its interests at the peace table and during the reconstruction period.\footnote{61}

As General Handy said, the assumption here "thus added a variable requirement over and above the strictly military garrison required for internal security in conquered and disputed territories."\footnote{62}

Furthermore, the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, reasoned, this interim force was to have been the maximum, subject to downward scaling as needs, diplomatic and military, decreased. At the same time this force could have been used as an "escape valve" for American industry. As for Russia, its position at best appeared vague. Continuing to defend OPD’s study, point by point, against McCloy’s comments, General Handy said the figures on the large and widespread air groups were based on the assumption that the U.S. would transfer some of them to the International Police Force. He further defended his Air figures on the basis that Air now, not the Navy, was the Nation’s first line of defense, and should therefore be kept at M-day level.\footnote{63}

The Chief of Staff realized that rather than an idealistic force, we needed one that could satisfy national needs and at the same time meet the clamor for rapid demobilization which would no doubt arise. Thus he requested Handy to re-examine OPD’s figures on the basis of purely military needs, leaving out all political and economic factors. On 28 July a new memorandum was sent to Marshall embodying those changes which dealt primarily with the size of the occupation forces after the defeat of the Axis powers. Briefly these revisions foresaw a deployment during the peace negotiation period (occupying all Axis territory) as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Divisions (35,000 ea)</th>
<th>Air Groups (3,300 ea)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European-African Area</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>379,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific-Asiatic Area</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>467,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>846,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>725,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grand Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The deployment for the same period in the original estimate of 3 July, was:\footnote{64}

\footnote{61. Memo, Handy to Marshall, sub: Demobilization, 1943. \textit{Ibid.}}
\footnote{62. \textit{Ibid.}}
\footnote{63. \textit{Ibid.}}
\footnote{64. Memo, Handy to Marshall, sub: Demobilization, 28 July 1943. SPD 350.06, Study 33. DRB, TAG.}
\footnote{65. Memo, Handy to Tompkins, sub: Demobilization, 3 July 1943. OPD 370.9, Case 2. DRB, TAG. [Also cited in note 56]}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Air Groups</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European-African</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>925,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific-Asiatic Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>905,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total**

3,070,000

Thus estimates were lowered by 30 divisions and 45 air groups or 1 1/2 million men.

Estimates for the period V-E Day to V-J Day were given to the Chief of Staff on 29 July. This revision and the 3 July estimate are shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 July Estimate</th>
<th>29 July Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divs.</td>
<td>Air Gps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This represents a downward scaling of 21 divisions and 30 air groups or approximately 1,096,000 men. In addition, estimates were projected to a point six months after V-J Day. These projections were the same as shown in the 28 July memorandum (1,571,500 men).

The post V-J Day estimate was based on the assumption that when victory in Europe was achieved (September 1945) 4,400,000 would be in that area. The Transportation Corps had given an informal calculation that of the estimated monthly total shipping capacity of 675,000; 340,000 per month could return to the U.S. “Thus it will be possible to reduce the European garrison to the estimated Interim Force of 379,000 within twelve months.”

A new and important office agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was soon to appear on the scene. And the role it played was one that greatly influenced all demobilization planning. On 30 July, Marshall notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the demobilization planning program, with the statement that such plans “can only be made in coordination with the Navy Department.” The Army Chief of Staff outlined proposed assumptions “for preliminary consideration by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.” They were:

1. That the war in Europe will come to a successful conclusion about one year prior to victory in the Pacific.

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66. Memo, Handy to Marshall, sub: Demobilization, 29 July 1943, SPD 350.06, Study 33. DRB, TAG.
67. Ibid.
2. That partial demobilization may begin with victory in Europe.

3. That the United States will furnish a share of the emergency interim forces required to maintain order and to guarantee adequate considerations of American peace aims. This force (Air and Ground) in the European theater a year after the conclusion of hostilities is estimated at 400,000 men. On the same date, at the assumed moment of victory in the Pacific theater, 2,200,000 Army troops, [omitted] Marines and [omitted] Navy personnel will be involved.

4. That the United States will furnish a share of an international Police Force (probably largely air).

5. That in Demobilization the principle will be followed of giving earliest discharge to men of longest service. The recently inducted men will be sent overseas as replacements for this purpose.

6. That some form of universal training will be maintained in the United States.

Note. Factors such as the total strength of the U.S. Air Forces, Ground Army, the Navy, and the possible necessity of delaying demobilization in order to avoid economic upsets in the U.S., etc., are not to be considered in the foregoing assumptions. These questions are reserved for later determination.

General Marshall formally outlined his proposals to the Joint Chiefs 3 August, by stating:

... At the end of the last war there was three months' delay in announcing a demobilization policy with untoward [unfortunate] effects upon morale. The point involved was largely the status of our armed forces which could be anticipated over a period of years after the war, as well as the serious transition from war to peace. . . . The military problem must first be clear-cut and there is need for approval of the basic assumptions. The concurrence of the President, at least orally, to the basic assumptions is essential. [\*] As a preliminary it was felt that the concurrence of the Navy Department would be sought.

Marshall suggested for the purposes of demobilization planning that the assumptions be approved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred the paper to their Joint Strategic Survey Committee for study.

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68. Memo, Marshall to Joint Chiefs of Staff, sub: Demobilization, 30 July 1943. OPD 370.9, Case 4. DRB, TAG and JCS 431, 30 July 1943.

\*The same list of assumptions had been previously drawn up by the Army Chief of Staff to send to the President for approval. However, General Marshall submitted them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, instead.

The report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee did not agree to the approval in toto of Marshall's assumptions. The JSSC offered a number of proposals to replace those not favorably considered. Among the committee's reasons for suggested changes were the views of the State Department toward "post-war conditions in Europe and U.S. obligations as to maintenance of occupation and police forces therein...." At that time these views appeared to be:

1. One year after the close of hostilities in Europe indigenous governments of at least a provisional character will have been established in countries formerly occupied by Germany.

2. By that date the only American combat forces remaining in Europe would be those necessary for occupation of a zone in western Europe....70

The report also stated that after the defeat of the Axis in Europe a partial demobilization was possible. The problems of a partial disbandment "would differ basically from those... after Japan. Military considerations... will be fundamental in the former but will have less weight in the latter, in which discharge on length of service may well be given greater weight...."71 The committee did not confirm the figure of 2,200,000 troops for deployment in the Pacific as it believed this a matter to be reviewed (quarterly) by the Joint Staff Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the proposals and recommendations of the JSSC with two exceptions: Quarterly estimates would be furnished to the War and Navy Departments only (not to interested civilian agencies as proposed); and that the demobilization to follow the defeat of Germany would be outlined as a partial one. 72

The approved basic assumptions were:

1. That after the termination of the war in Europe, the successful conclusion of the war in the Pacific will require at least one additional year.

2. That after victory in Europe and prior to the defeat of Japan, partial demobilization will be possible.

3. That the U.S. will furnish a share of the emergency interim forces in Europe required to maintain order and to guarantee adequate consideration of American peace aims. This

70. JCS 431/1, sub: Demobilization, 21 September 1943, pp. 8-9.
71. Ibid., p. 8.
*The Joint Staff Planners reviews were incorporated into the JCS 521/ series, "Deployments."
force (Air and Ground), in the European theater a year after the conclusion of hostilities, is estimated at 400,000 men.

4. That in Africa, the Middle and Near East, South America and the Atlantic, all United States forces except those required in connection with air transport routes or other contributions to the Pacific war will be withdrawn or reduced to a peacetime status.

5. That possible requirements for a future International Police Force may be disregarded for the purposes of present demobilization planning.

6. That demobilization discharges will be based on the following factors:
   a. Requirements of the military forces;
   b. Physical condition (wounds, sickness and age);
   c. Length of Service;
   d. Combat service;
   e. Dependency.

7. That some form of universal military training will be maintained in the U.S. The adequacy of the system to meet our immediate postwar military requirements, can be assumed for present planning purposes. However, plans based on this assumption must be reviewed from time to time in the light of current developments.\(^7\)

The approval of the assumptions was important to the Army. It not only meant the coordination of plans on the highest military levels, but it presented the need of positively integrating demobilization planning with the State Department. The sixth approved premise definitely obligated the Army to use a system of individual demobilization based on more than one factor.

**Mustering Out Payments**

Experience after World War I had proved that a discharge allowance was necessary. In late February 1919, Congress passed a law authorizing several categories of personnel being discharged under honorable conditions to be paid the sum of $60.00 each. The dischargee received this sum in addition to all other amounts that were legally due him.\(^4\) With this $60.00, plus the small amount of pay usually due, the average discharged serviceman could purchase little more than a suit of clothes. Little money was left to assist the men in purchasing basic needs between the time of discharge and the securing of a job. Many veterans, their families, and friends became resentful of these conditions. As a result of this and accompanying economic conditions Congress

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73. JCS 431/1, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
74. PL 234, 65th Congress.
passed the Adjusted Compensation Act. This Act provided for a bonus payment in the form of insurance at a long future date. Although the law was a liberal gesture of a grateful government, it did not assist in meeting immediate needs of many ex-servicemen.

The Special Planning Division took this World War I experience into consideration and decided that the "Determination of a War Department Policy Concerning Payment of a Separation Allowance" should become the subject of a study. The problem was assigned to Army Service Forces, 8 June 1943. The study was completed and submitted 30 July 1943.

In July of 1943 there were already available a number of benefits to servicemen having honorable service in World War II. Among these were: National Service Life Insurance; medical care and treatment and domiciliary care to be furnished by the Veteran's Administration; pensions under laws administered by the Veteran's Administration; vocational rehabilitation for those having disabilities incurred in or aggravated by the service; and certain reemployment rights after discharge.

The report submitted by the Military Personnel Division contained a number of recommendations bearing on separation allowances and accompanying problems of responsibilities to the veteran. It stated that the War Department must assume "a minimum responsibility" on winning wars that must include: Demobilization of the Army as the "world situation permits" and consistent with the "orderly entrance" of discharged personnel into "the civilian economy"; return of all discharged personnel to civilian life in the "best possible physical and mental condition"; acquainting veterans with their rights and privileges; and "by classification procedures . . . determine the arts or skills possessed by each individual and inform government agencies, such as the United States Employment Service, to facilitate employment." The report urged that the "War Department sponsor discharge allowance." The recommendations included certain allowance for all military personnel, except general officers, having less than three months' service; extra allowances were to

75. PL 120, 68th Congress.
76. Memo, Tompkins for Director, Military Personnel Division, file, SPDCP 350.06 (6-8-43), sub: Demobilization Planning. SPD files, Study No. 1. DRB, TAG.
77. Memo, Reynolds to Tompkins, file SPGAA 240 (30 July 43), sub: Discharge Allowances. Ibid.
78. PL 2, 73rd Congress.
79. PL 144, 78th Congress.
80. PL 16, 78th Congress.
81. Section 8, Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended.
82. Memo, Reynolds to Tompkins, file SPGAA 240 (30 July 43), op. cit.
83. Ibid.
be paid on basis of additional service and dependency; payments
to enlisted men and officers were to be on the same scale and
range from $150 to $900, if single, or to $1320, if with depend-
ents. These allowances would be in addition to final pay and
other allowances prescribed by law.

In mid-August the Executive Officer, Office of the Under Secre-
tary of War, requested the Special Planning Division to com-
ment on a proposal for mustering-out pay for members of the
armed forces. The proposed bill briefly provided for muster-
out pay to all personnel honorably discharged or transferred to
inactive duty after 31 August 1940. Such pay would be equal
to the last three months of active duty pay but not to exceed
$300 and to be payable in three monthly installments. An ad hoc
committee was appointed to study the problem and submit recom-
mandations. Members were from the Special Planning Division,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, and the Military
Personnel Division, Army Service Forces.

The ad hoc committee submitted its report to the Under Secre-
tary on 27 August. There was general agreement with the
content of the bill but the committee felt that the draft was too
general and would not fulfill the requirements desired by the
President. The presidential views were in substance those
shown in a recent National Resources Planning Board report.
The Mustering Out Committee did not favor a bonus or reward
for service. It was for a program that would have as “its prime
aim and purpose the reasonable economic security of the demobil-
ized soldier for a sufficient length of time to allow him to re-
establish himself during a period of what will probably be
greatly distorted economic conditions.” In accomplishing this,
“payment [tax free] should be an equal amount for all, irrespective
of rank” with extra amounts for dependents. Eligibility for pay-
ment should be determined by the President and Congress because
a soldier discharged at that time [August 1943] would have little
trouble finding employment, while a soldier demobilized at a
later date “may have difficulty finding suitable employment and
need sometime to re-establish himself. . . . No demobilized soldier
should receive concurrent government subsidies.” The report
concluded by stating:

84. Memo, Greenbaum to Tompkins, 19 August 1943. USW files. DRB, TAG.
85. Copy of the proposed bill located in Special Planning Division Study 7, SPD
files. DRB, TAG.
86. Ibid.
87. President Roosevelt, 28 July 1943, broadcast his views on a Mustering-Out
Program, 28 July 1943. Nothing to Fear, The Selected Addresses of Franklin Delano
88. National Resources Planning Board, Demobilization and Readjustment, 30
June 1943.
It is the belief of this committee that the proposed bill, or any similar one on the same subject, must be considered merely as one part of the broad program of post-war rehabilitation and resettlement. Any legislation on mustering-out pay must be carefully integrated with other plans and legislation for matters such as educational allowances and unemployment insurance.\(^8^0\)

Early in October the Director of the Special Planning Division received a recommendation from his Personnel and Administrative Branch expressing views on mustering-out pay as well as previous action taken by the War Department on the subject. It suggested that Army should prepare a statement of policy on the subject. This statement could be used in the event Congress should ask for recommendations on future legislation, even if the War Department “may not have wished to volunteer a recommendation. . . . This Branch is now preparing a suggested plan . . . for submission to you.”\(^9^0\) A recommended policy was prepared and submitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, for concurrence.

The proposed policy concerning payment of separation allowances “recognized that final determination of this problem will be in the hands of Congress and is, in fact, not a direct responsibility of the War Department.” However, both the Senate Military Affairs Committee and the Executive Office [Samuel Rosenman] had informally requested WD recommendations on proposed legislation. In the future there loomed the possibility that the Army might be called on for suggestions by the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Therefore, there should be a definite War Department attitude toward the subject so that a uniform and official presentation might be made.\(^9^1\) The proposed plan “was consistent with the report of the conference on post-war readjustment of civilian and military personnel authorized by the President . . . and with the President’s radio statement of 28 July 1943 on mustering-out pay.”\(^9^2\) Specifically the Special Planning Division recommended [both at partial demobilization and final demobilization]:

\(a.\) The War Department recognizes that this matter is primarily a responsibility of Congress.

\(b.\) The basic aim of any separation payment which is part of an over-all rehabilitation program should be to assist the demobilized soldier through the uncertain period of transition

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\(^8^0\) See n. 84, above.

\(^9^0\) Memo, Macon to Tompkins, sub: Determination of the War Departments Attitude, 1 October 1943. SPD files, Study No. 7. DRB, TAG.

\(^9^1\) Memo, Tompkins to Chief of Staff, sub: Determination of a War Department Policy, 16 November 1943. SPD files, Study No. 7. DRB, TAG.

\(^9^2\) Nothing to Fear, op. cit., p. 375.
from military to civilian life which is almost sure to occur at the time of a general demobilization.

c. Payment should be in monthly installments.

d. The size of each monthly payment should be sufficient to offer a reasonable standard of living to the veteran. An extra amount for each dependent should be added to a fixed flat basic sum.

e. The number of monthly payments should allow the veteran sufficient time to re-establish himself in a civilian job.

f. General officers and officers of field grade should not be eligible for any separation pay. Separation allowance should be the same for all company grade officers and enlisted men.

g. Eligibility for separation pay and the total amount thereof should not be based on length of service but rather on the sole fact of demobilization during the post-war period of uncertain employment. However, men discharged at that time with three months or less of service should receive a fixed lump-sum payment substantially less than the aggregate paid to the others.

h. To be eligible for separation pay a veteran must have been in service at the time of general, partial or final demobilization.

i. No veteran should receive concurrent government allowances, with the exception of disability allowances, nor should officers and men drawing retirement pay be eligible for separation pay.

j. Separation pay should be secure from seizure, and upon the death of the veteran, any unpaid balance thereof should continue to eligible dependents.

k. Officers of the Regular establishment who remain in the military service should not be eligible for separation pay. Eligible enlisted personnel should receive it though remaining in the military service after general demobilization or re-entering before all installments are paid. Separation allowance should never be paid more than once to any individual.

l. Any procedure for payment of separation allowance should recognize the fact that entitlement must be absolute and unconditional, and there should be no direct or indirect benevolent controls.93

The AC of S, G–1, concurred in the action recommended by the Special Planning Division in establishing a definite War

93. Memo, Tompkins to Chief of Staff, sub: Determination of a War Department Policy, 16 November 1943, op. cit.
Department policy. However, the policy "should include a statement that the War Department is definitely opposed to legislation which provides separation pay for personnel separated prior to the time of general demobilization." The Special Planning Division did not concur in G–1's suggested amendment and the proposed policy was presented to the Chief of Staff. At the same time bills were introduced in both the House and Senate providing for mustering-out pay. The proposed War Department policy was never formally approved by the Chief of Staff, but it was used as the basis for the testimony of the War Department representatives before the Senate and House Military Affairs Committees and also for the written views of the Secretary of War to the chairmen of these committees. The bills introduced before the Congress were agreed on by both the House and Senate and passed as the "Mustering-Out Payment Act of 1944" in January. The bill was approved by the President on February. On the whole the law as passed was most acceptable to the views of the War Department. By early planning based on lessons learned from World War I, the Army was able to efficiently present its opinions to Congress on the necessity of a muster-out payment to honorably discharged personnel.

Demobilization Planning Schedule

A large portion of demobilization planning became involved with determining what Army strength should be during three phases: the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan; the period following the defeat of Japan but prior to the attainment of normal peace-time conditions; and the third period in which the Army would be composed of permanent military personnel. Until planning premises had been formulated and approved covering the size and type of this Nation's military forces for the aforementioned three phases, there could be no reasonably sound basis for planning demobilization of personnel and disposition of war supplies and industrial activities. By late August 1943 it was necessary to start preparation of tentative troop bases that were made available to planners about 1 October. The preparation of these troop bases was hastened by

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94. D/F, G-1 to SPD, file WDGPA 240, sub: Discharge Allowance, 22 November 1943.
95. Senate 1543 and House 3742, 78th Cong.
96. See: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, House, on HR 3742 and HR 3799, 78th Cong., pp. 31-51; Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate on S. 1543, 78th Cong., pp. 24-25.
97. See: L&LD file on S 1543, 78th Cong. General Records Section, TAG.
PLANNING FOR THE DEMOBILIZATION

the advice of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, that 1 September 1944 was believed to be the earliest date by which the enemy could be defeated in Europe. This information influenced the Director, Special Planning Division, to announce a demobilization planning schedule, primarily for the purpose of developing plans for industrial readjustment against a uniform assumed date. The schedule required plans in a skeleton form for partial demobilization after defeat of Germany to be ready by 31 December. Beginning 1 January 1944 the efforts of the division were to be devoted to completion of the partial demobilization plan by the projected date, 1 September 1944, and of the plans to be used after the defeat of Japan. The planning schedule was changed when the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, announced an estimate of the earliest possible date that a German collapse could be expected would be 1 March 1944 and the earliest probable date of the collapse 1 September 1944. These amended estimates of German defeat were approved for planning purposes by the Deputy Chief of Staff on 6 January 1944, and a revised planning schedule announced that plans for partial demobilization should be finished to “every possible extent” by 1 March. After that date planners would devote their efforts to: completion of partial demobilization plans; necessary revision of plans; and bringing forward plans to be used after a complete Axis defeat. Due to assumptions used in planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff the schedule was changed to expect the probable collapse of Germany as 1 October 1944, and the 1 March planning date was changed to 1 May. When October 1944 arrived, General Tompkins took no further steps to amend the planning schedule because he felt that the demobilization plan that had been coordinated and supervised by his division was in a state of readiness and constant effort should be devoted in keeping it up to date.

Despite General Marshall’s wishes to keep demobilization planning as secret as possible, realities necessitated the removal of some classified restrictions. During the summer of 1943 there were rumors of peace talks that had an adverse effect on Army

99. Memo, Strong for Tompkins, 16 August 1943, sub: Planning. WDSPD 380 (12 Aug 43). DRB, TAG. Note: General Strong termed the selection of 1 September 1944 as nothing “more than an educated guess.”

100. Memo, Tompkins for Branch Chiefs, 24 August 1943 and amended 8 September 1943, sub: Schedule. WDSPD 380 (12 Aug 43). DRB, TAG.

101. Memo, Tompkins to Deputy Chief of Staff, 5 January 1944, sub: Schedule. WDSPD 380 (12 Aug 43). DRB, TAG.

102. Ibid., Note: This was published as a Special Planning Division memorandum, 10 January 1944.

103. Memo, Tompkins for Branch Chiefs, 11 February 1944, sub: Schedule. WDSPD 380 (12 Aug 43). DRB, TAG.
procurement because of a resultant fear of industry that they would be faced with war-end termination accompanied by financial disaster. Representatives of Army Service Forces and the Special Planning Division recommended at a conference that by "letting industry know what constructive steps are being taken . . . with current termination . . . it would probably be helpful once plans are reasonably formulated." At the same time coordination with other governmental agencies was necessary and Congress was preparing to hold hearings on pending reconversion and allied post-war matters, which would make complete secrecy no longer possible. As a result of these conditions and thinking the Acting Secretary of War removed the secret classification from industrial demobilization planning.

**Troop Bases and Deployments**

An important factor in demobilization planning was the size of the post-war permanent military establishment. Lengthy correspondence and a series of plans were begun on the subject (by the Special Planning Division) in the summer of 1943. A study of this reveals that the planners were trying to provide some system of gradual transition to an interim and then to a peacetime status.* A Special Army Committee's report, "Survey of Current Military Program," (dated 15 March 1943 and revised 28 April 1943) contained the recommendation that a force of 1.5 million be set up for the post-war permanent Army. Based on this report the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–1, G–3, G–4, and OPD, consented to the Special Planning Division's using a total of 4.5 million (1.5 million as an active Army and a reserve of 3 million) as a tentative and reasonable figure for planning purposes.107

The crux of demobilization planning lay in evolving realistic troop bases for the interim period. The troop bases were needed for the supply program for that period and for an estimate of the men that could be discharged. For planning purposes the interim was divided into two periods:

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105. HR 3022 and S 1268, 78th Cong.


*Secretary of War Stimson noted (July 1943) on one of the earlier plans: "But the only hope I see of getting anything approaching it, as a peacetime foundation, is to gradually slide our plan of demobilization into the permanent plan."

Period I—One year following the conclusion of hostilities in Europe and coincident with the day Japan is defeated.

Period II—Six months following the defeat of Japan.

The troop bases were obtained by taking troop strengths and deployments furnished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to OPD and breaking them down in terms of units. In late September 1943 the Joint Chiefs agreed to furnish troop deployments by quarters. Pending the availability of these deployments, the Special Planning Division prepared a list of emergency interim forces to be used primarily for matériel demobilization planning. These troop bases were prepared from information furnished by OPD, AAF, and ASF. The 1 October 1943 Special Planning Division troop basis was as follows:

### PERIOD I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
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<th>Air Groups</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific-Asiatic</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
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### PERIOD II

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<th>Strengths</th>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,196,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>109 2,458,577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Detailed breakdown of troop units by deployments was shown in Appendices. The date of Germany’s defeat was assumed to be 1 September 1944.

In addition to being used for matériel demobilization planning purposes these troop bases were used in computing a Special Army Supply Program for Period I. This special army supply program could not be recomputed until the troops required for Japan had been estimated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

By late November the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not formally approved the quarterly estimates. Pending their receipt, SPD sent its informal 1 October troop bases to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, and requested that he undertake a study of them, coordinating with OPD, and prepare revised troop bases by 1 February 1944. The G–3 Division took a dim view of the

108. JCS 431/1, 28 September 1943.
109. Memo, SPD Branch Chiefs, 1 October 1944, sub: Emergency Interim Forces. SPD Study #33, Section 1. DRB, TAG.
110. Memo, Tompkins for G–3, 24 November 1943, sub: Troop Bases. DRB, TAG.
entire matter, feeling it had been by-passed originally, and advised the Chief that “Troop Bases planning, for both mobilization and demobilization, properly is a function of the G-3 Division.” To avoid confusion and duplication of effort, G-3 suggested that it continue to make such plans and that SPD furnish G-3 “with whatever broad deployment (in terms of divisions and Air Force Groups) is planned for the several postwar phases.”

Then the G-3 Division could prepare balanced troop bases which would be sufficiently firm to warrant their use as a basis for further preparations of the special Army Supply Program. G-3’s recommendations were approved.

In mid-December Tompkins began to press the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, for revised deployment estimates based on studies of the JCS. The Special Planning Division was advised that these figures would not be available until about 15 January 1944.

Proceeding without the Joint Chiefs of Staff deployments, SPD continued their planning using the old figures. The AAF planners did not help matters when they changed the number of air groups from the original figure furnished to SPD and which had been used in the 1 October informal troop bases. Upon questioning, Air Forces rejoined SPD to wait until the approved JCS figures appeared.

Again in late January 1944 SPD advised OPD that the Special Planning Division had made troop bases with the assistance of OPD, AAF, and ASF, for Periods I and II, using 1 September 1944 as the earliest possible date for Germany’s defeat. These bases used the figures of 400,000 in Europe for Period I. For the forces to defeat Japan they used 2.2 million, a figure the JCS had not approved and were not only to revise but review quarterly. Nothing had been received in SPD along these lines. Complete plans for partial demobilization were to be ready by 1 September 1944. In view of this fact, certain revisions were contemplated for Period I, particularly in air groups. Tompkins asked for these as quickly as possible with deployment schedules extended to 1 September 1945 for Period I, and 1 March 1946 for Period II.

To strengthen his formal request Tompkins wrote Handy a
personal letter in which he explained that these troop bases "are the very foundation of our demobilization planning." What was needed was a revision or reaffirmation of "your excellent memorandum of 3 July." Handy was unable to give Tompkins the deployment information needed. He told the SPD Director that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed OPD that the estimates would be available about 15 February, "that is, in time for the meetings with a British planning team due to arrive about that time." One of the main reasons for delay, according to Handy, was the deadlock that had developed between the Army Air Forces and Navy Air Forces on deployment in Pacific areas. In view of the fact that the JCS would soon announce their deployment estimates, Handy questioned the value of furnishing Tompkins with an interim set, "which very probably will be superseded within a matter of a week or so."

Through February and early March the Special Planning Division continued trying to obtain the necessary troop deployments but without success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not approved projected quarterly estimates beyond Germany's defeat. In early February the SPD Director informed the Chief of Staff that demobilization planning was being severely handicapped by the lack of revised troop deployment figures. While Tompkins appreciated their difficulties, the Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces were continually stressing the fact that "the lack of these troop bases is the greatest obstacle to further detailed planning." He continued, "all necessary steps should be taken to insure that they will be furnished prior to 1 March 1944." Again in early March SPD appealed to OPD for the promised JCS deployments for Period I; the special supply program, due 1 May, could not be completed and would have to be postponed to September 1944 (Deadline of V-E Day plans) unless these estimates were obtained.

About the middle of March the Joint Staff Planners made recommendations (JPS 193/5) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on

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117. Ltr, Tompkins to Handy, 26 January 1944, no sub. OPD 370.9, Case 9. DRB, TAG.
118. Ltr, Handy to Tompkins, 26 January 1944, no sub. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Memo, Tompkins for Marshall, 8 February 1944, sub: Troop Bases. OPD 370.9, Case 12. DRB, TAG.
121. D/F, SPD to OPD, 7 March 1944, sub: Troop Bases. SPD Study #33, Section II. DRB, TAG.
Armed Forces deployments following the defeat of Germany. Their Army estimates were based on a total deployment strength of 7.7 million. The Special Planning Division furnished these recommended Period Army deployments to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, for making detailed troop bases through September 1945 (German defeat 1 October 1944). G–3 proceeded to use these figures for a troop basis until the JCS formally approved strategic deployments based on assumptions that Russia would collaborate in the Pacific War and that Germany would be defeated either 1 July or 1 October 1944. G–3 then finished these Period I Troop Bases. Deployments were projected to the end of September 1945 even though the JCS had only approved these through June of that year. In view of SPD's urgent plea for these bases, the G–3 Division furnished them with copies, without formal General Staff approval "in order to give . . . sufficient time to use this data in connection with the Special Army Supply Program for demobilization planning. . . ." In making these troop bases, G–3 received assistance from the Operations Division in the "breakdown" of 2.8 million strength for the Asiatic and Pacific operational areas. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, made the tabulation for non-operational areas based on the following assumptions: that by 30 September 1945, 1.7 million men would be ready for demobilization; 400,000 would be required in the European and African Theaters; and 760,000 would be required for a mobilized strategic reserve in the United States.

The plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (521/5) envisaged that the Army would remain at approximately the same strengths for nine months following the defeat of Germany. Using one of their assumed V-E Days, 1 July 1944, the total Army strength of that date was 7.7 million. But the same figure appears as the 30 June 1945 total. The same was true for the 1 October 1944 assumption. Thus the only demobilization that could have taken place under this plan would be the difference of the 7.7 figure and any resulting overage between losses and accessions.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, submitted these troop bases to the General Staff for comment and concurrence. G–1 concurred; G–4 concurred with a few minor recommendations; but OPD did not concur. General Handy gave OPD's views by stating that no provision had been made in the troop bases for Germany's
defeat other than 1 October 1944. Furthermore, no "strategic reserve" of equipment had been taken into consideration as was then authorized in the Victory Troop Basis. G–3's Period I Demobilization Troop Bases' "strategic reserve" only applied to mobilized units in the Zone of the Interior, thus ignoring a reserve of equipment. OPD flatly recommended that the document not be used for procurement or contract cancellation or for supply disposal. The Special Planning Division adequately defended the troop bases as it stood on the grounds that it was a purely planning document and that due to the tremendous calculations required only one date (1 October 1944) for Germany's defeat had been used. The Deputy Chief of Staff approved the troop basis, 13 May.

The approved troop basis was entitled "Troop Schedule for Demobilization Planning for the Special Army Supply Program." Later revisions were made by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, based on amended deployments and strengths approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 521 series of plans. Very soon after the troop basis had been issued, Army Service Forces questioned whether its use was limited to the Special Army Supply Program. SPD immediately clarified the issue by stating:

... The reduction in army strength and curtailment of the Army Supply Program are mutually dependent and obviously the same Demobilization Planning Troop Basis must be used in securing coordinated planning of the demobilization of both our military and industrial activities.

By the end of May 1944 the problem of a Period I Demobilization Planning Troop Basis was settled.

Immediately following the approval of the Period I Demobilization Planning Basis representatives of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–3 and G–4, and the Director, Special Planning Division, discussed the necessity of providing a provisional troop basis for the post-war military establishment. Such a document was needed in planning for future war reserves and surplus property. With Germany's defeat large quantities of property and equipment would undoubtedly become surplus to further requirements of the war. A criterion was needed for determining what should

125. OPD comments on memo from G–3 for C/S, 15 April 1944, sub: Troop Bases. SPD Study #33, Section II. DRB, TAG.
126. SPD comments on G–3's S/S cited in note 124.
128. Memo, ASF for SPD, 18 May 1944, sub: Demobilization Planning. SPD Study 33, Section II. DRB, TAG.
129. Memo, SPD for ASF, 23 May 1944, sub: Demobilization Planning. Ibid.
be retained for use by the peacetime Army and what property and supplies could be declared surplus.

In these discussions the G-3 representative stated that since the Special Planning Division was preparing plans for the post-war military establishment, it could incorporate G-3's troop basis, if approved, into the plan. The G-3 proposal was accepted and SPD furnished the general assumptions on which the provisional troop basis was to be made. The assumptions had been previously agreed to from time to time by the General Staff or had been approved in outline form by the Chief of Staff. The following are the assumptions which were given to the Operations and Training Division:

a. The Regular Army would consist of 1.5 million men. Of this number, 870,000 would be regular troops and 630,000 would be trainees under universal military training.

b. The Active Reserve would have a strength of 3 million. These men would be obtained from graduates of universal military training and from discharged WW II service personnel who had been placed in the Active Reserve.

c. The post-war military establishment would be organized in accordance with "Outline of Post-War Military Establishment" (Approved by Chief of Staff, 15 April 1944). SPD advised G-3 that it would be necessary to make separate troop bases for the Regular Establishment and the Active Reserve.

The G-3 Section made a Provisional Post-War Troop Basis that was sent on 24 June to interested staff divisions and the three major commands for study. The main comments received from ASF, AAF, and AGF were incorporated into a second proposed plan providing for a Regular Establishment of 1.7 million of which 630,000 were trainees. No change was made in the over-all figure or the estimates for the Active Reserve. This troop basis was sent to interested agencies and commands of the War Department in August. The War Department Budget Officer then made a study on the estimated annual cost of the post-war military establishment. These figures were intended primarily for the use of the President and the Congress. As a result of recommendations received from SPD, ASF, AAF, and AGF a plan was made for deployment of the Post-War Troop Basis and by early November 1944 the prospect of the troop

130. Memo, SPD for G-3, 31 May 1944, sub: Provisional Troop Basis. Ibid.
132. Memo, SPD to G-3, 31 May 1944, sub: Provisional Troop Basis. Ibid.
133. D/F, G-3 to SPD, 24 June 1944, sub: Provisional Troop Basis. Ibid.
basis being accepted for planning appeared excellent. However, the Chief of Staff directed that the whole problem be re-examined. General Marshall's attitude can be best explained by quoting from his directive:

... I gave instructions for the recall of the Minutes of the General Council which gave the estimates of post-war troop and air strength and the probable costs... because it appeared... that the estimates were so unrealistic—or rather, improbable of accomplishment, however desirable... it would do great harm to the entire... post-war program—particularly Selective Service, if any rumor of such conception were to get abroad.

... the estimates of officers on post-war military set-ups have gotten considerably out of focus by reason of the present influence of dealing in the tremendous numbers and unlimited appropriations that are now available. ... the estimates are not based on a sound appreciation of the world situation we should envisage, assuming that the terms of the peace are reasonably within our present desires.

Following an Armistice, and over a period of a year or two... we probably of necessity will be maintaining a rather large force... [because] we cannot either evacuate the troops from overseas theaters... rapidly... or the local conditions in the overseas theaters for the time being make it necessary to hold the troops longer than would otherwise be necessary.

I wish that the entire matter of post-war strengths be resurveyed, having strictly in mind the debilitation of the Axis powers, the huge resources for a long period of years that we shall possess in the form of Army and Navy matériel, and the vastly increased power which will be given us by an annual program of universal military training—something we have never previously enjoyed.¹³⁵

On the basis of Marshall's memorandum all copies of the troop basis and the deployment were immediately recalled by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3.

General Marshall objected to the strengths that were proposed in the August troop basis. He also would not accept the cost estimates of such an organization that had been prepared by the Budget Officer. The August strengths were in reality two separate alternatives—the first based on the assumption that universal military training would be enacted and the second that it would not. The strengths for each plan were as follows:

¹³⁵. Memo, Marshall for Actg Dir, SPD, 13 November 1944, no sub. Ibid.
### HISTORY OF PERSONNEL DEMOBILIZATION

#### Plan I Plan II

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<th>Component</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>(1) Regular Army (1,093,050)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Training cadre with trainees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trainees (Universal Service) (630,217)</td>
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<td>AAF, extended on the job training (over 1 year)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Normal training (12 mos.)</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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#### (2) Other Components

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<td>Organized Reserve</td>
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<td>ROTC</td>
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<td>Officer Candidates</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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*981,237 Regular Army and 69,999 AAF Trainees undergoing extended on-the-job training make a total of 1,051,236.

**Not included in Reserve Army. Senior Units only.**

A committee, composed of representatives from all General Staff Sections, Special Planning Division, War Department Budget Office, and the three major commands, was formed to restudy the problem of a post-war troop basis. The Deputy Chief of Staff directed that the work be done under the auspices of the Director, Special Planning Division, rather than the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3. The committee began its work by re-evaluating basic assumptions, incorporating additional premises, and creating a work schedule or time-table.

In late December the committee presented its views in an outline plan. In preparing the outline of the over-all Army structure, the committee considered the two major limiting factors—estimated appropriations and maximum expectancy of volunteers. The plan provided for a Regular Army of 275,000 under a budget of $1.1 billion and an annual class of 630,000 trainees with a training overhead of 110,000 of whom one-half would be regulars and the other half reservists. The budget for universal military training was estimated at $1.5 billion per year. The National Guard, Organized Reserves, and ROTC would cost approximately $200 million. The total cost was estimated at $2.8 billion, with the possibility that this figure might be reduced by 10 percent.

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136. Ltr, WDBO to Admin Asst to SW, et al., 4 October 1944 (and change 1, 12 October 1944), sub: Estimates. SPD Study 33, Section III. DRB, TAG.
137. SPD M/R, 17 Nov 44, sub: Rpt of Conference. Ibid.
in the first years of the post-war period by having the Army live off surpluses remaining from the war.\textsuperscript{138}

In reviewing the outline plan Gen. John McA. Palmer commented, "It seems that the assumption of 275,000 officers and men as the maximum probable strength of the regular army [sic] proper is a fair basis to work on. . . . To one who entered the regular army [sic] when its per capita cost was $1,000 per year, the estimate by the Budget Officer of the War Department that its post-war per capita cost will approximate $4,000 is startling—though apparently justified in the explanatory note. . . ."\textsuperscript{139}

The outline plan was formally presented to the Chief of Staff, 26 January 1945 after concurrences had been obtained from all General Staff Divisions, The Budget Officer, Army Service Forces, and Army Ground Forces. The Army Air Forces could see little realism or value in the plan and did not concur.\textsuperscript{140} Disregarding the views of the AAF, the Deputy Chief of Staff approved the study, 19 February 1945,\textsuperscript{141} and it appeared that the committee could proceed with plans for a complete post-war troop basis.

The Special Planning Division took immediate steps to plan for the allocation of the approved post-war strength between the three major components—air, ground, and service. When this had been accomplished a complete post-war troop basis would be made. But the Air Forces did not retract the position it had taken on the re-survey of the troop basis maintaining that the outline as approved 19 February was unrealistic and unsound. Basically, the difference of opinion arose because of a misunderstanding by AAF of the fact that this proposed plan was based on assumptions that would, if accomplished, provide a fully stabilized peacetime world with an effective world security organization. The Air Force seemed to have interpreted the plan as one that would cover the interim period, at a time when conditions were still unsettled. The sixteen tactical groups allotted the air component under the plan were totally inadequate to accomplish the Air Force mission of providing a M-Day striking force capable of expansion.

Operations Division was fully aware of this understanding and it pointed out the "following dangers" to the Deputy Chief of Staff:

a. Assumption tend to become forgotten. SPD assumptions define an idealistic world situation which may not obtain for \textit{many years}, if ever.

\textsuperscript{138} SPD memo for CofS, 27 Dec 44, sub: Rpt of Progress. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{139} Memo, Palmer for OCoF, 18 Dec 44, sub: Rpt of Progress. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{140} S/S, SPD to CofS, 25 Jan 45, sub: Re-Survey of the TB. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid.} See approval of p. 2.
b. ‘Approval as a basis for further detailed work’ has tended to become straight ‘approval,’ having effect of WD decision.
c. Informal conversation may lead Congress or WD authorities to accept a planning figure, disregarding assumptions on which based, just as firmly as if it were a WD commitment. . . .142

The Deputy Chief of Staff wrote the Commanding General, Army Air Force, and pointed out that the plan approved in February would not apply to an unsettled period. The outline merely represented realistic planning for the period when the Army would be “faced with much the same conditions as after the last war.”143 In conclusion, Handy remarked that “Joint Planning on a realistic Initial Post-War Military Establishment should proceed after the San Francisco Conference* in order to provide the basis for our Post V-J Day demobilization. Planning for the ultimate or Permanent Post-War Military Establishment should be undertaken on a Joint level as soon thereafter as practicable.”144

V-E Day came on 6 May. In spite of the initial planning that had been done and the approval of an outline, the War Department still did not have a troop basis for post-war planning that met with the approval of its three major commands.

Preparation of the V-E Day Personnel Demobilization Plan

The “War Department Plan for the Readjustment of Military Personnel After the Defeat of Germany,” more commonly known as War Department Readjustment Regulation 1-1 (RR 1–1, germinated from a chart entitled “Demobilization Stages and Processes in Each” prepared by the Special Planning Division in July 1943. The first actual draft of a plan appeared in August under the title of “Demobilization Regulations 1–1.”145 The scheme, written in very general terms with operations confined to three levels—War Department, overseas, and the United States—recognized that there might be one or more partial demobilizations and ultimately a final one. The War Department was to designate the number and type of units that were to be inactivated, and the commanding generals of major commands would designate the more specific units.146 Actual determination

142. S/S, OPD to DCofS, 14 Apr 45, sub: TB. Ibid.
143. Memo, Handy for Arnold, 5 May 45, sub: Resurvey of TB. Ibid.
*The San Francisco Conference (25 April—26 June 1945) was the scene of the drawing of the United Nations Charter.
144. Ibid.
145. “Personnel Demobilization Regulations,” 14 August 1943. SPD files, 370.01 (14 Aug 43). DRB, TAG.
146. Ibid.
of eligibility for separation was treated in a superficial manner because at that time the basis for personnel demobilization had not been decided, though efforts were then being directed toward surveys of soldiers' opinions.

The planners evidently feared that large-scale unemployment might result from pouring discharged personnel onto the existing civilian economy. To counter this, they included a proposal that the rate of release for enlisted men would be left largely to commanders, but the War Department, from time to time, might establish maximum separation rates for the purpose of coordinating releases from service with employment opportunities. In the release of officers, efficiency ratings were to be one guide, with consideration given to those officers who established the fact that they were more important to industry than to the Army.

The August draft that was distributed to the General Staff and the three major commands contained a colored schematic diagram that vividly portrayed demobilization, when put into effect, as the reverse of mobilization. And as still another aid, a copy of the chart, "Demobilization Stages and Processes in Each," changed by a few minor details from the original June conception, was included.

One of the most significant comments on the August draft came from the Director, Special Service Division, ASF, Brig. Gen. F. H. Osborn. He took issue with that portion of the plan which favored controlling the rate of demobilization to safeguard against unemployment. By doing this the Army would be "making itself into a sort of preventative W.P.A. [Works Progress Administration]."147 Such a policy would prevent many men from entering into fair competition with civilians for available jobs. Osborn proposed that the demobilization rate be contingent solely on military necessity and availability of transport, but with some provision for government employment on a civilian basis. In the event an ex-serviceman was unable to secure employment he should have the option of returning to the Army.

One of the other major criticisms offered by the Special Services Division was the plan's lack of information on the types of personnel who would be demobilized first. In view of the certainty that full publicity and debate would eventually be given the plan, the War Department should be prepared to announce which types of personnel would be released first. Failure to make a priority plan which the great majority of soldiers felt was

147. Memo, Osborn for Tompkins, 15 September 1943, sub: Personnel Demobilization Regulations. SPD files, 370.01 (14 Aug 43). DRB, TAG.
just as fair as the Selective Service System might “easily lead to a catastrophic drop in morale among the men who must still face enemies in combat, as well as among those who will be kept overseas for garrison and police duties.”\textsuperscript{148} At this point the memorandum called attention to the fact “that the order in which men were inducted into the Army may not be the same order in which they are demobilized.”\textsuperscript{149} The fairest way would be to plan a program that would discharge first the men whom the soldiers themselves thought should be discharged first. This could be done objectively by conducting a survey of soldiers in all theaters, not just the United States, to obtain their views on the problem. The Special Planning Division accepted the latter suggestions and the survey was commenced under the supervision of the Special Services Division.\textsuperscript{150}

The approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 September, of basic demobilization assumptions gave the Special Planning Division an authoritative and firm basis on which to work. Among those affecting personnel demobilization were:

a. After V-E Day a partial demobilization would be possible.

b. Discharges would be based on the following factors:
   1. Requirements of the military forces;
   2. Physical condition;
   3. Length of service;
   4. Combat service;
   5. Dependency.\textsuperscript{151}

These factors were essentially the same as those given in a June report to the President by the National Resources Planning Board.\textsuperscript{152}

In November a second draft proposed that a category system be used in ascertaining units to be demobilized after Germany's defeat. Units could be placed in the following categories:

I—Units to be transferred to an active theater (On arrival in the new theater the unit would go into Category III).

II—Units and installations to be retained in an inactive area.

III—Units and installations to be retained in an active theater.

IV—Units and installations to be inactivated.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{151} JCS 431/1, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{152} National Resources Planning Board, \textit{Demobilization and Readjustment}, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
The November scheme did not include policies for determination of priority in separating officers and enlisted men because the research had not been completed. The draft merely stated that inactivation of units would render a number of officers and men surplus. More detailed instructions regarding the processing of personnel records, maintenance of morale, staging of personnel, organization of staging areas and overseas ports of embarkation and separation were included. These details of execution were designed somewhat after the War Department Rotation Policy.\(^{154}\)

By January 1944 the results of the surveys conducted among enlisted personnel on the subject of discharge priority were commencing to bear fruit.* In a survey of enlisted men in the European theater and Southwest Pacific Areas the consensus of opinion was that men who had served overseas or those with dependents should be released first.\(^{155}\)

Further study of the November draft brought out more clearly that the period following V-E Day would be one characterized by many readjustments, not only of personnel but also of supplies and matériel. Therefore, the title “Demobilization Regulations” was discarded and in its place “War Department Plan for Readjustment” and later “Readjustment Regulations” was used to designate the personnel demobilization plan. On 11 March a revised plan was issued; it was quickly supplanted by an amended version on 21 April marked “Final Draft.” Summaries of the March and April schemes and comparative differences between them are given in Table 1. [See p. 69.]

In the April proposal enlisted men would be designated as eligible for release on the basis of length of service, or first in, first out, with additional constructive credit added for parenthood. The only credit given for overseas and combat service was mentioned in a sentence stating that theater commanders “may be allotted a greater percentage of the determined total personnel reduction than will result from the scheduled inactivation of units in the respective theaters. . . . theater Commanders and the Commanding Generals of the Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and Army Air Forces will undertake to give priority in sequence of release as follows:

(a) Sick and wounded (after completion of . . . medical attention . . .).

\(^{154}\) Ibid.

\(^{155}\) Preliminary surveys had been conducted among troops in the United States as early as August 1943.

Special Planning Division, Progress Report, January 1944. Note: These surveys were conducted in November 1943 by field teams of the Army Service Forces. Less than 7% of the men polled considered other factors more important.
(b) Parents.
(c) Those with the longest or most arduous service.
(d) Those who have heavy dependency responsibilities other than children.
(e) Single men and women.\textsuperscript{156}

One principal objection to the April draft came from Operations Division. It believed that in one instance the plan was "unnecessarily detailed for a War Department directive to a theater commander, or a commander of one of the major commands. . . ." while in another instance it was too inflexible.\textsuperscript{157} Comments from other staff agencies and the three major commands indicated that this was not to be the "final draft."

The Director of Morale Services Division (formerly Special Services), ASF, submitted a memorandum to SPD calling attention to the morale problem that was bound to arise after V-E Day, and made some recommendations for changing the April draft. Osborn pointed out that a tremendous morale problem was likely to develop after the defeat of Germany because of the "necessity of sending men into further combat and keeping them overseas despite their intense desire to return home."\textsuperscript{158} As evidence he cited the fact that men who had been overseas, and particularly combat veterans, already possessed an overwhelming desire to come home before the war was over. Furthermore, men overseas had the belief, whether right or wrong, that there were millions of men still in the States who could relieve them. And the overseas veteran could not understand why it was impossible to send him home. After World War I, AWOL rates, VD, and serious disciplinary violations had skyrocketed to dangerous levels, and the "final morale report submitted to General Pershing stated that 'the desire to return home dwarfs all others (in the minds of the troops) and has apparently become in some parts of the Army almost a mania.'"\textsuperscript{159}

Thus the Morale Services Division felt that when the War Department's plan for readjustment following World War II was announced, it would be viewed with strong skepticism by soldiers, their families, and Congress. It seemed imperative that Army morale problems and outside criticism be kept to a minimum. The War Department plan, as it stood in late May 1944, was deficient because:

\textsuperscript{156} "War Department Plan for Readjustment" (Draft), 21 April 1944. SPD files, Study 128, Sec I, Pt 1. DRB, TAG.
\textsuperscript{157} Memo, OPD for SPD, 10 May 1944, sub: WDPD. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} Memo, Osborn for Tompkins, 31 May 1944, sub: Suggested Changes in War Department Plan. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
Table 1.—Comparison between 11 March 1944 and 21 April 1944 Drafts for Personnel Readjustment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>11 March</th>
<th>21 April</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Implementation Plans</td>
<td>Theater and major commands to prepare them.</td>
<td>Theater and major commands to prepare them and submit to WD for approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Categories</td>
<td>I. Those units to be transferred from one theater to another or from US to theater.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II. Those to be retained for service in an inactive theater or US.</td>
<td>II. Those to be retained for service in theaters, overseas commands, or in the US.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>III. Those to be retained for service in an active theater.</td>
<td>III. Those to be inactivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV. Those to be inactivated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Eligibility</td>
<td>(a) Officers: The theater CG's would only designate those officers surplus to theater needs and return them to US (under control of major command) and make such inter-theater transfers as might be prescribed by the WD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Enlisted: To be released on the basis of length of service. Parents were to receive an additional credit. Overseas and combat service were recognized only through the provision that theater CG's might be allotted a greater percent of the determined total personnel reduction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Time to Separate</td>
<td>3 days.</td>
<td>2 days.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Copies of drafts are located in SPD Study #128, Section I, pt. 1. DRB, TAG.

a. The use of length of service as the first and principal criterion of eligibility for release was directly contrary
to what more than 96 percent of the enlisted men thought. Length of service was found to be the least important of any factor considered.

b. There was no specific provision for wounds and combat service, which overseas men felt exceedingly important.

c. The term “military necessity” was not clearly defined.

d. The plan as it stood was “so complex and involved that skilled writers long experienced in preparing explanatory materials believe it impossible to explain the plan to G.I.’s or civilians in terms that either will understand.”

General Osborn’s conclusions were that the length of service method of determining eligibility for separation be replaced by a single “Service Score” which combined five factors, as shown in Table 2 below, and that “upon determination of separation quotas for various branches of service within the several theaters, the eligible men with the highest service scores be selected for release, thus forestalling any charges of favoritism or arbitrariness in operation of plan.”

The Morale Services Division’s recommendations received the full agreement of the Director of Personnel, ASF, who made the suggestion that the “service score card” be termed “adjusted service rating” or something comparable in order to avoid the implication of competition, and that action be taken to remedy the beliefs of the men that there was no reason why the Army couldn’t send home all men after eighteen to twenty-four months overseas.

Table 2.—Morale Services Division Suggested Service Score Card

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>John Doe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serial Number</td>
<td>146836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Co. B 123 Inf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Service Credit</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Multiply by</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Number of months in Army* (Since Jan. 1, 1941)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Number of months overseas*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number of months in combat zone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Number of wounds received (as recognized by award of Purple Heart)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Number of children (under 18 years of age)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Service Score 87

*After determining number of months, give credit for complete month if there are additional days left over.

160. Ibid.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid. 1st Ind, Director of Personnel, ASF to Deputy Director, Plans & Operations, ASF, 1 June 1944.
Meanwhile SPD had received information on the views of Osborn and ASF. As a result of this AGF and AAF were requested to send representatives to a conference, 6 June, to discuss the suggestions.\footnote{Memo from SPD for CG's AGF and AAF, 2 June 1944, no sub. SPD Study 128, Section I, Pt. 1. DRB, TAG.} The meeting was held and representatives of the three major commands, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and SPD were in attendance. After discussing the matter the Military Personnel Division of ASF was asked to develop an "Adjusted Service Rating Card" similar to the one recommended by General Osborn. The following factors were to be incorporated.\footnote{3rd Ind, Tompkins to Plans & Operations, ASF, 8 June 1944, on Osborn's Memo, 31 May 1944, cited in n. 157.}

1st—Service Credit—To indicate the length of service by months, from 16 September 1940. To have a multiple of one.

2d—Overseas Credit—Number of months overseas. Multiple of one.

3d—Combat Credit—Credit for decorations and battle stars. Multiple of three. (G-1 listed the following as applying: Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Legion of Merit, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Purple Heart, Distinguished Unit Badge, Combat Infantryman Badge, and battle participation stars).

4th—Parenthood Credit—Twelve points for each child (maximum of three children).

This request was followed by a memorandum from Tompkins' office, eight days later, in which General Tompkins stated that the Under Secretary of War (Patterson) had discussed the proposed Adjusted Service Rating system with him, and that while the latter was in favor of the method he felt that parenthood credit was too high and combat credit was too low.\footnote{Memo, SPD to ASF, 16 June 1944, sub: Adjusted Service Rating Card. SPD Study 128, Section I, Pt. 1. DRB, TAG.}

On the basis of the Under Secretary's criticism the Morale Services Division prepared a new version of the card and sent it to the Special Planning Division. This second card differed from the first in the following ways:

1. It was called "Adjusted Service Rating Card."
2. It had four essential factors instead of five. Items three and four of the original version were combined into one factor for combat credit. The number of months in the combat zone was virtually eliminated as a factor.
3. The multiples for parenthood were reduced from 12 to 8 and for each combat decoration or bronze service star increased from 3 to 4.

Osborn recommended that the weights to be used should be determined at that time to permit explanations in the booklet and movie ("Two Down and One to Go") then being prepared. Developments between that time and the defeat of Germany would not affect the weights.* While agreeing that an over-all explanation of the demobilization procedure was unwise before the coming of V-E Day, General Osborn felt that explanatory materials should be prepared and available for that day.\(^{166}\)

In July SPD accepted the final draft of the ASR card and approved tentatively the credits of 8 and 4 for parenthood and combat.\(^{167}\) The Army Ground Forces was responsible in part for the final version of the Adjusted Service Rating Card. After studying Morale Services Division's original card AGF was of the opinion that the heavy weighting for overseas and combat credit would cause the loss of a vast number of seasoned troops, thus impairing the Army's effectiveness against the Japanese. On the Ground Forces' recommendation, overseas credit and combat zone credit were combined.\(^{168}\) And through the efforts of that command, battle credit was recognized by granting five points for each campaign star.\(^{169}\)

The question of the weights to be used on the ASR card came up again in October 1944. Information and Education Division (I & E), ASF, had compared a set of weights proposed by SPD with their own. These were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>I&amp;E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length Overseas</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Experience</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Per Campaign)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tomkins had written a special memorandum to the Deputy Director, Plans & Operations, ASF, 16 June, expressing the opinion that as the war continued the attitude of the troops might change or intensify toward certain factors. Thus he asked ASF to maintain a periodic check on the attitude of troops overseas and in the U.S. on this problem.

166. 6th Ind, Osborn to Tompkins, 1 July 1944, on Osborn's Memo, 31 May 1944, cited in n. 157.
167. Memo, SPD for ASF, 7 July 1944, sub: Suggested Changes in WDPR. SPD Study #123, Section I, Pt. 1. DRB, TAG.
169. Memo, AGF for C/S, no date, sub: Suggested Changes in the WDPR. SPD Study #128, Section I, Pt. 1. DRB, TAG. Note: A copy of the suggested AGF card is attached to this memo.
The proposed weights of Special Planning Division and Information & Education Division were statistically applied to a sample cross-section of 6,000 men. The results showed that “among the 20 percent of the men who would be let out of the Army first in the 1-1-5-8 plan, over seven-eights of the same men would be among the 20 percent to be let out of the Army first under the I&E recommendation.” I&E felt that its proposal more nearly conformed with the wishes of the soldiers.

Opponents of the I&E plan argued that military necessity was not adequately taken into account, and therefore too much weight was given to overseas and combat service. However, General Osborn was of the opinion that this was not valid. He explained that an experienced non-commissioned officer could be lost just as easily under either plan, according to I&E analysis and tests. If there was to be a control for military reasons, it would have to be in the form of exempting certain military occupational specialists (MOS’s) from the plan, or by setting different release quotas for the various MOS’s. This weighing of credit was not settled and continued as a matter of discussion until the Spring of 1945.*

A fourth draft of the War Department Personnel Readjustment Plan was completed on 30 June 1944. It was written following actual testing of the April plan in the Caribbean Defense Command. The June scheme incorporated the Adjusted Rating Card in lieu of the length of service principle of determining eligibility for the release of enlisted personnel. There was no change in the officer release policy.172

When the plan was tested in the Caribbean, it was found to be workable. Representatives of SPD witnessed the plan’s execution and brought back to the War Department suggestions of the Caribbean Defense Command’s staff. Among these was one by the Chief of Staff, Caribbean, that it would “be difficult for commanding generals of major elements to develop sound implementing plans unless they are furnished the best available statement of what their new missions will be subsequent to the defeat of Germany.” OPD was advised of this comment, but took

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170. Memo, I&E for SPD, 2 October 1944, sub: Weights to be used, and Memo from I&E for SPD, 4 October 1944, sub: Further Consideration of Weights. SPD Study 128, Section I, Pt. 1. DRB, TAG.
171. Ibid.
172. Draft WDPR, 30 June 1944. Ibid.
173. Memo, SPD to OPD, 26 July 1944, sub: WDPR. Ibid.

*Final decision was based on a statistical study made by an officer in the Office of the AC of S, G-I, WDGS, which ascertained on a “least squares” basis the consensus of opinion of the 30-odd representatives of the General and Special Staffs. Thus, the final scores were the results of a scientifically measured compromise.
no action, its feeling at that time being that any such move would only "result in baffling the theater commanders."  
Representatives of all General Staff Sections, except G-2, and the three major commands attended a conference and discussed the proposed plan. As a result of this conference the June scheme was withdrawn and another plan was presented on 2 August. The major differences between the two plans are shown in Table 3.

When the plan was distributed for comments and recommendations it met with acceptance. The Operations Division concurred with the plan except for a few minor points. G-3 did likewise, provided some minor changes in wording and phraseology were made, and that it was "clearly set out in the plan that surplus units in active theaters can be declared and reported only after the arrival of suitable replacements." Both G-1 and AGF generally concurred. ASF recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize "the necessity of readjusting the scheduled deployment to the time lag introduced by the personnel demobilization plan so as to make the most efficient use of available shipping." Army Air Forces informally advised SPD of their intended acceptance by advising "if General Arnold approves* it was [is] their intention to concur" and made a few recommendations revolving around the handling of AAF combat crew personnel at Reception Stations.

The Director, Special Planning Division, had advised OPD on the views of Caribbean Defense Command regarding their post V-E Day mission. Representatives of the European Theater emphasized that they could not proceed intelligently on a theater implementation of the readjustment plan until information on the theater's new mission and a revised troop basis was furnished to General Eisenhower. SPD recommended to OPD that this information be given, even though tentative in nature, before the defeat of Germany.

The Operations Division replied that theater troop bases were being made, but new missions should not be determined at that time.

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174. Memo, Gen Roberts to AGC Staff OPD, 5 August 1944, sub: WDPR. OPD 370.9, Case 24, DRB, TAG. Note: The June draft of WDPR contained the statement (Sec II) that when a readjustment of the troop basis became possible, the WD would advise the CG's of theaters and major commands of: (1) their new mission, (2) their proposed new troop basis.
175. Draft WDBPR, 2 August 1944. SPD Study 126, Section I, Pt. 1. DRB, TAG.
176. D/F, G-3 to SPD, 12 August 1944, sub: WDPR. Ibid.
177. 1st Ind, ASF to SPD, 14 August 1944, on SPD memo, 9 August 1944, sub: WDPR. Ibid.
179. Memo, SPD to OPD, 18 August 1944, sub: WDPR. Ibid.
Table 3.—Comparison between 30 June 1944 and 2 August 1944
Drafts for Personnel Readjustment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>30 June</th>
<th>2 August</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Categories (Units).</td>
<td>I. Those units to be retained for continued service in current command. II. Those to be transferred from one theater to another or to the US, or from US to a theater. III. Those to be reconstituted into different types of elements and upon completion fall into I or II. IV. Those to be inactivated.</td>
<td>I. Those to be transferred from one theater to another or from US to a theater. II. Those to be retained for service in theaters, overseas commands, or in US. III. Those to be inactivated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Eligibility</td>
<td>No allotment system. The revised troop basis would render a surplus. Determination of essentiality would be made in the US by CG’s of AAF, ASF, and AGF from those determined surplus by theaters and major commands. Officers would be declared surplus on the basis of need for their services.</td>
<td>Allotments were given by WD to theaters and major commands and CG’s, AAF, ASF, and AGF indicating the number of personnel to be designated for separation. Theaters would designate only those officers who were surplus to theater needs and return them to the US to the control of appropriate major command who in turn would designate those to be separated. Enlisted in accordance with allotments would be designated nonessential by their CG’s on basis of ASR cards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
manders." If, after the War Department Personnel Readjustment Plan had been distributed, it was found necessary to restate post V-E Day missions, joint agencies could prepare the necessary plans for approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In spite of OPD's refusal to furnish new troop bases and missions, the Special Planning Division presented the plan for personnel readjustment to the Chief of Staff for approval. The covering recommendation stated that an adequate plan for demobilization required a single statement of policy by means of which many interrelated considerations might be fused. This had been accomplished in the proposed scheme. The plan was based on:

a. Recognition of military necessity with emphasis on continuing the war against Japan.

b. Latitude to Commanding Generals of theaters and major commands.

c. Demobilization by individuals rather than units.

d. Simplicity and elimination of irritants.

e. Maximum utilization of existing policies.

f. Demobilization at the most rapid pace consistent with military necessity and available shipping.

g. Continuation of mobilization to meet losses.

h. Explanation to troops and public of demobilization plan.

i. Full knowledge by the troops of their demobilization standing.

The plan was further recommended because it could be used under existing law. In addition the plan had been found to be clear and practicable when reviewed by the Caribbean Defense Command and a representative of the European Theater of Operations. The Deputy Chief of Staff approved the scheme, 23 August 1944, and it was printed as Readjustment Regulation 1–1 (Draft).

There is evidence that the idea existed in September 1944 to use the Adjusted Service Rating Card to reduce the overstrength of the Army. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–1 and G–3, and the Director, Special Planning Division, were directed to prepare a proposal to inaugurate the system on a limited basis. SPD was not in favor of such a move. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff V-E Day estimates were correct, the immediate action was not necessary and the overstrength could be allowed to continue. The Readjustment Plan would be

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180. Memo, OPD for SPD, 18 August 1944, sub: WDPR. Ibid.
181. Ibid.
182. Memo, SPD for C/S, 17 August 1944, sub: Personnel Demobilization Plan. SPD Study 128, Section I, Pt 2. DRB, TAG.
in effect within two or three months, according to the estimates of German defeat. If a rapid reduction of the Army were desired there were better alternatives which could be used.  

The basic plan for readjustment of military personnel after the defeat of Germany provided only in a general way for the demobilization of officers. To implement that portion of the scheme dealing with the release of officers, warrant officers, and flight officers, SPD drew up procedures that became known as Readjustment Regulation 1-5. The plan provided that military necessity was to be the primary consideration. However, the ASR card was to be taken into account to determine those to be released as surplus, and to a certain extent, the personal desires of the individuals would be considered.

The Army Air Forces gave notice on 26 September 1944 that they would not concur in the draft which incorporated the features mentioned above. Instead of using the ASR Card system in determining officer surpluses, Air Forces wished to release those officers with low efficiency ratings, using their “Officer Evaluation Report” as a basis. In late October, the AAF wrote again to SPD outlining a proposed system of their own and asking if their plan, as outlined, could be accomplished within the provision of RR1-5.

The Air Force scheme was based on retention of all flight officers, temporary officers, and warrant officers best qualified, and all of those whose services were considered most valuable by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. Based on recommendations contained in each man’s Officers Evaluation Report, there would be five categories:

a. Recommended for, and desiring Regular Army Commissions or Warrants.

b. Recommended for, and desiring Organized Reserve Corps Commissions or Warrants.

c. Required for continued service by military necessity (All those in a and b, but not requesting such commissions or warrants).

d. To be retained if military necessity requires. (Border-line between essential and unessential, who would revert to inactive status if any substantial reduction was made in the AAF Troop Bases).

e. Surplus to all requirements. (Least essential officers).

The Air Force plan stated that it was not contemplated that

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183. Memo, SPD to G-1, 28 September 1944, sub: Reduction of Overstrength. SPD Study 128, Section I, Pt 1. DRB, TAG.

184. AAF Memo for SPD, 26 September 1944, sub: Pol. & Procedures for Readj. of O’s after V-E Day. Ibid.
individual desires would be considered as a major factor in determining retention, nor was the ASR Card to be used, except when individuals in the same grade and in an MOS declared surplus were to be released.185 The Special Planning Division felt that in general the AAF plan could be accomplished within the provisions of RR1–5, as then drafted, except that the ASR score would be used as a secondary factor, other considerations being equal for determination of surpluses and of essentiality.186 All General Staff sections generally concurred in the SPD draft, but the question still remained for G–1 to decide whether they wished "to compel the AAF to use the same efficiency indices as the rest of the Army or whether the Air Forces shall be permitted to use their officer evaluation data."187

A revised draft was submitted in the first week of December to the General Staff and the major commands for their comment or concurrence. This brought forth a lengthy, detailed restatement of the Air Forces stand against RR1–5.188 According to Army Air Forces, the second draft of RR1–5 inferred a considerable volume of officer demobilization after V-E Day. This did not initially apply to the AAF because of their small and delayed troop basis reduction, and meant that officer reassignments would have the primary objective of placing the best qualified man on each job, regardless of demobilization factors. Military necessity was to be that command's prime factor, and if a man's MOS or personal qualities required his retention he would be declared essential.

The lack of essentiality or of desirable personal qualifications was the second factor under the AAF scheme. Under this they could relieve from active duty marginal officers, surplus officers on limited service, and men over age in grade. Personal desires would be a third factor, but only if the officer in question were surplus or ineligible for integration into the Regular Army.

The AAF was opposed to the use of the ASR Card for officers for the following reasons:

a. They believed that war effort would be better served if officers were retained on the basis of ability rather than by other standards. They recognized the existence of the ASR score as a secondary factor only, but felt its

185. AAF Memo for SPD, 20 October 1944, sub: RR1-5, SPD 128, Section 3.
186. SPD Memo for AAF, 1 November 1944, sub: RR1-5. Ibid.
187. Memo, Col Macon, P&A Br, for Tompkins, 16 November 1944, sub: Status of RR1-5 and RR1-6. Ibid.
188. D/F to GS Divs & AAF, ASF, AGF, 8 December 1944. Ibid.
very existence would cause it to be over emphasized, with resulting detrimental effect.

b. Officers of marginal ability, realizing they would fare better financially in the Army than as a civilian, would use ASR scores as an argument for their retention. (AAF claimed that this fact was borne out in recent officer reclassification and evaluation).

c. The ASR Card was designed initially for enlisted men, embodying to a certain extent the principles of Selective Service. It was also based on the theory that one enlisted man was replaceable by another with like MOS, whereas officers voluntarily accepted responsibility beyond that of Selective Service philosophy. Thus there should be no restriction in retaining officer personnel.\(^\text{189}\)

Based on these reasons, the AAF again recommended that they be excluded from those provisions of RR1-5 regarding use of the ASR Card. These comments were passed on by SPD to the various General Staff agencies, with the notation that SPD did not concur in the AAF recommendation.\(^\text{190}\)

The reactions of the General Staff Divisions were unanimous: they disagreed with the Air Forces. Of the commenting agencies, G-1, G-3, G-4, and OPD, G-1’s retort was the strongest.\(^\text{191}\) G-1 felt that within RR1-5 certain principles were set forth. Among these were: (1) the war against Japan took first priority and, as such, military necessity would dictate the needs of the Army; (2) it was the intent of RR1-5, within the limits of military necessity, to prescribe standards and methods for selection and separation of surplus officers who had performed satisfactory or better service. This included the use of an ASR Card somewhat similar to the one prescribed for enlisted men; and (3) RR1-5 would not be used as a substitute for existing methods of disposing of unsatisfactory officers.

G-1 then took the AAF objections point by point and countered them. The Personnel Division agreed with the AAF statement of not having a very large initial demobilization. But G-1 felt it was a certainty that large numbers of officers would be separated as the program was accelerated after V-E Day. Another strong counter-argument put forth by G-1 was that the War Department had to establish a procedure that would provide for the release of those who most deserved it. The AAF plan, however, was open to all of the errors of human judgment, with no uniform standard but rather local subjective evaluation. Thus

\(^{189}\) AAF Memo to SPD, 8 December 1944, sub: RR1-5. Ibid.
\(^{190}\) D/F to WDGS Divs, 9 December 1944, sub: RR1-5. Ibid.
\(^{191}\) D/F, G-1 to SPD, 21 December 1944. Ibid.
the way was open for bias, either conscious or unconscious, and outright favoritism.

G–1 felt that RR1–5 provided a fair solution. For the sake of combat efficiency it was essential to replace battle-exhausted and battle-weary troops. Public opinion would not favor releasing those who least deserved it. This was a civilian army in which no man was indispensable, not even officers. If a good officer had a high ASR score but still wished to stay in he could do so under the system.

Still another non-concurrence to RR1–5 came from the Commanding General, ASF.\textsuperscript{192} He objected to a provision which would result in personnel trained and commissioned by the technical services, and who were declared surplus, coming under jurisdiction of Army Ground Forces if such officers had last served with units of the AGF; OPD, G–1, G–3, and G–4 did not agree with the objection by ASF.\textsuperscript{193} Both dissenting organizations were told to incorporate their arguments in the form they wished so that the draft of the scheme bearing the concurrences of the General Staff divisions and the non-concurrences of ASF and AAF could be presented to the Chief of Staff for approval.\textsuperscript{194}

But approval did not come until nearly a month later. The 26 March draft was rejected, then resubmitted in a modified form on 25 April.\textsuperscript{195} The cover sheet stated that the new version differed from the original in that it no longer included provisions for critical scores for officers. The reason given for this change was that the Chief of Staff and his Deputy felt it “desirable not to inhibit or make difficult the release of the least effective officers.”\textsuperscript{196} Thus the Air Forces won their point.

The Chief of Staff and his Deputy further hoped that by putting in a clause providing for close monitoring by the War Department two desirable objectives would be accomplished: first, the bulk of the released officers would be those with the longest and most arduous service (which in their minds meant that strong consideration would be given to the ASR Card); and, second, that the major commands could release their least effective officers. This version received official approval and appeared in printed form as the 30 April 1945 edition of RR1–5. It will be recalled that Army Service Forces was also a dissenter to the draft of RR1–5. However, their objection was over-ruled and the Source Major Force plan was incorporated in the final

\textsuperscript{192} Memo SPD for C/S, 30 March 1948, sub: RR1-5. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{195} D/F SPD to C/S, 25 April 45. \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Ibid.}
approved version of RR1–5. This approved version of RR1–5 was a compromise. The document endeavored to set up definite standards for release of officers, with fixed procedure for selection, yet it left the door open to the major force commanders to actually determine individual essentiality.

In the summer of 1944 an agreement had been reached whereby combat credit would be weighted on the Adjusted Service Rating Card by allotting points for battle participation stars and combat decorations. The Special Planning Division stated the purpose of this credit, "The principle behind this factor of combat credit is to give extra credit toward demobilization to those individuals who have undergone actual combat." However, SPD acknowledged that there was something wrong in the operational end of this theory, since service and headquarters troops were entitled to wear battle stars and thus receive the same number of points as the combat soldier. To remedy this situation the Special Planning Division asked ASF and AGF for their views on credits for the Combat Infantryman's Badge and the Bronze Arrowhead keeping in mind the possible disadvantages of creating resentment among service troops.

AGF expressed no opinion at that time but ASF felt that neither the Combat Infantryman's Badge nor the Bronze Arrowhead should be included in the list of awards used in computing combat service. Giving credit for the Bronze Arrowhead would be administratively impossible; since it was a retroactive award, there was the possibility of inaccuracy. Recognition of the Combat Infantryman's Badge would be at the expense of others, such as company medical aide, performing equally hazardous duty but not eligible for the Badge.

In the meantime SPD dispatched a radio to Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur requesting their views on this question. The reply from MacArthur's command recommended against giving credit to either of the two awards, on the grounds that to do so would increase discrimination against service troops; would provide double credits for one act which they felt would not be received favorably by the majority; and lastly, that they had already begun printing their ASR cards on which changes would only confuse rather than benefit personnel. However, the

197. US Army in WW II, AGF, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 443-446. These pages treat with this debate thoroughly and clearly for those who wish further information on the question.
198. Memo, SPD to ASF and AGF, 12 January 1945, sub: Additional ASR Credit. SPD Study 128, Section I, Pt 1. DRB, TAG.
199. Ibid.
200. Ibid. 1st Ind, 20 January 1945. Ibid.
201. WARX CM-OUT-22192, 16 January 1945. Ibid.
European Theater took an opposite view. Eisenhower felt that not only should the Campaign Service Star and Combat Infantryman’s Badge be given credits, but also the Distinguished Unit Badge when authorized to the individual as a permanent part of the uniform.203

The Operations Division made known their views by emphasizing that battle stars represented participation in named campaigns, and that the term “participation” was purposely given wide boundaries for morale reasons. These stars were not a true measure of combat time. They proved their point by citing the records of some five divisions. For example, the 88th Division had spent, as of 15 February, 376 days in the combat zone but had only one star, whereas the 4th Division had 254 days in the combat zone, as of 15 February, and had three stars. OPD suggested two alternatives. First, each man would receive credit for the number of days in the combat zone divided by a common denominator. The second plan was to grant a relatively large credit for the first star and a small credit for each succeeding one. This was recommended as “the more practical solution.”204

OPD’s suggestions were discussed by a committee made up of officers from G–1, SPD, AAF, ASF, and AGF, but they were not adopted. The committee rejected them because either alternative would further complicate a system that had to remain simple. In addition, the second proposal, by giving different weights to battle stars, would cause resentment.205

Numerous proposals and counter suggestions on the weighting of combat credit were offered in February and March without agreement. SPD felt that, though their proposed system had its distinct weaknesses, it was the best that could be found at that time. On 3 April 1945, they prepared a memorandum for the Chief of Staff.206 This memorandum suggested the system of five points per star and decoration, twelve points for parenthood and one point for each month of service plus an additional point for each month spent overseas. The General Staff and the three major commands concurred in the proposal. SPD’s memorandum received the approval of the Chief of Staff on 21 April and of the Secretary of War on 23 April.207

Instructions contained in Readjustment Regulation 1–1 required each theater commander to submit a plan for his command that would implement the War Department Readjustment Plan.
Before the middle of September 1944 copies of the War Department scheme were sent by air mail to the various theaters with instructions that the implementations be completed and returned by 1 October 1944. The 1 October date was selected because demobilization planning had been based on Germany's defeat as of that date. This date proved to be premature for in some instances the plan arrived late.

By November plans had not been received from the following commands:

1. Greenland Base Command;
2. European Theater of Operations;
3. India-Burma Theater;
4. China Theater;
5. Army Forces in the Middle East;
7. Southwest Pacific Area.

The European Theater still had not sent its plan by January 1945. The reason for this delay lay primarily in the questions which related to redeployment and readjustment. In view of this the Special Planning Division offered to send an officer to assist that command but the theater declined the offer as it was sending an officer to Washington on the matter. SPD then informed Operations Division that the implementation plan had not been received from ETO, the most important theater in the scheme. While SPD did not object to Eisenhower's sending a representative to the War Department, it felt that two officers, one from OPD and the other from SPD, should first be sent to Europe to work with and assist the planners there. The Operations Division replied that there was already an officer from ETO in Washington on this problem; therefore, it was advisable to wait until that officer returned to his theater before sending War Department representatives. After Eisenhower's representative had returned, SPD sent one of its planners first to ETO and then to MTO in late February.

Plans for the China Theater and India-Burma Theater were received and approved in early February and one from the Army Forces in the Middle East was received in late March. However, the latter scheme was unacceptable and a copy of an approved plan was sent to them as a model. By April plans for the Mediterranean Theater had not been approved although this head-

208. See: SPD Study 123, Sec IA, for copies of cables to theater commanders.
209. Memo, SPD for OPD, 19 Jan 1945, sub: Implementation Plans. SPD Study 128, Sec IB. DRB, TAG.
quarters advised the War Department on 4 April that their plan was then being revised.211 In a teletype conference with the War Department, MTO expressed the belief that “we cannot make an intelligent plan or put such a plan into operation without having the adjusted service rating multiples from you [WD] now or in lieu of that, adopting multiples of our own for initial use with resulting subsequent confusion and serious morale effects when War Department multiples are announced.”212 The Mediterranean Planners were told that “early release multiple factors . . . [were] now under consideration by WD for planning purposes.”213 The multiples were approved 23 April and furnished very shortly afterward to theater commanders with the warning that these multiples were confidential and care should be taken to restrict knowledge of them.214 The last theater plan to be approved was that of the European Theater, 2 May 1945.215

The approval of the European Theater's implementing scheme ended the planning phase for the personnel demobilization to follow Germany's defeat. The plan for readjustment of personnel had taken almost two years to complete. The basic War Department Plan was published as: War Department Readjustment Regulations 1–1, “Plan for Readjustment of Military Personnel After the Defeat of Germany.” (Short Title RR 1–1.) This blueprint was implemented by five sub-plans published as RR's* Only the basic scheme has received detailed discussion in the text. The five subsections, with the exception of RR 1–5, could have been treated likewise but were not because they were prepared largely by Army Service Forces.

Preparation of the V-J Day Personnel Demobilization Plan

Approximately two years were spent in developing a plan to handle the personnel readjustments necessary after the defeat of Germany. The plan was designed to apply only during the period between Germany's defeat and V-J Day. Designed with the object of pursuing the war in the Pacific to the utmost, the plan

placed "military necessity" over all other considerations. It recognized that some reduction in over-all Army strength would occur after V-E Day, and as a corollary to this, made an attempt to relieve men with long combat service from further combat duty. To meet the drastically changed situation resulting from Japan’s defeat, an entirely new plan, patterned after the first, would be used. The Special Planning Division, aware that an early defeat of Japan was possible, stated that, should this occur prior to completion of a new plan, the existing readjustment regulations would be used, modified as necessary.216

As a preliminary step in formulating the new plan, a set of basic assumptions were made: (1) There would be an 18-month period between the date redeployment began (R-Day or 12 May 1945) and V-J Day. (2) The strength of the Army as of V-J Day would be 6,900,000 (later revised to 6,970,000). (3) For a 2-year period after the war the United States would maintain occupation forces, and the strength of the Army for this period would be approximately 2,400,000. Therefore, 4½ million men would have to be demobilized, and, of this number, 2.8 million would have to be returned to the United States for demobilization. (4) The demobilization process would require about twelve months, using the same individual “selection-out” system in use at that time. (5) Legislative action would be necessary to prevent uncertainties as to the maximum term of service that could be required of men.

These assumptions were circulated to the various General Staff agencies for comment or concurrence. All agencies concurred generally, though G-1 felt that twelve months in which to complete demobilization was insufficient and recommended the inclusion of age as a factor to be considered for discharge.217 G-3 corrected the Special Planning Division’s figures for the Army’s strength as of V-J Day from 6,900,000 to 6,970,000, leaving a total of 4,690,000 to be demobilized.218 The final assumption set the number of men to be demobilized at 4,438,000.219

Incorporating the recommendations of the General Staff Divisions, the assumptions were dispatched to the Chief of Staff on 25 June 1945. The Chief of Staff was informed that the then-current regulations would be used in the event of an early defeat of Japan with recomputation of the ASR score the only major change. It was hoped that the new plan would be ready by mid-September.220

217. D/F, G-1 to SPD, 22 Jun 45. Ibid.
218. D/F, G-3 to SPD, 12 Jun 45. Ibid.
219. SPD S/S to CofS, 25 Jun 45. Ibid.
220. Ibid.
The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff questioned OPD about the figures contained in the study. Operations Division confirmed them, explaining that the change from the original was the result of revised divisional deployment. The basic assumptions were approved on 8 July.

On 20 July an outline of the so-called "emergency plan" to be used in the event of an early Japanese capitulation was completed. It described the mission of the Army after V-J Day in detail, summarizing it as two-fold: (a) redeployment and (b) demobilization. (Actually, this was the same as for the period following V-E Day, except that emphasis was switched from redeployment to demobilization.)

According to the emergency plan, if V-J Day occurred on or about 30 September 1945, the Army would total 8,408,459. This figure, less the proposed strength of 2,532,000 after one year, left 5,876,459 men to be demobilized. One of the assumptions for post V-J Day planning was that, if an emergency plan were needed, the existing set-up would be continued, with a recomputation of the ASR score. To meet this eventuality, the outline proposed certain modifications in the then current RR's:

a. A new date on which qualification for discharge would be determined.

b. Enlisted qualifications for discharge would be:
   1. Scores based on the four factors as in current RR1–1.
   2. Age (the exact age not specified).

c. Officers' qualifications would be the same as enlisted, except that the four factors stated in the then current RR 1–5 would be used.

d. The determination of qualification and right to discharge would be automatically determined by the qualifications stated in b and c above.

e. The multiples would remain unchanged; critical scores would be determined by G–1 in coordination with G–3 and OPD.

f. "Military necessity" would be very strictly curtailed and limited in scope. An officer, not of a critical MOS, might be retained for a period of not more than 120 days solely because of the absence of a replacement. An officer whose MOS appeared on the WD List of Critical Officer Specialties might be retained for not more than 12 months. 

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221. OPD S/S to CofS, 1 July 45. Ibid.
enlisted men retention was limited to 90 days and 12 months, respectively.

g. The “List of Critical Specialties in effect at the time of the application of the plan would be continued in effect in an interim sense but be immediately reviewed by the Commanding Generals, Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces and either entirely eliminated or revised downward.”

The concluding section of the outline recognized that problems might arise in units having large proportions of their personnel qualified for discharge, but it saw no justification for allowing the “eligibles” to hamper performance of the units’ functions. Non-availability of transport and the arrival of replacements would regulate this situation, but senior commanders should be warned to anticipate it.

On 28 July 1945 the new Director of the Special Planning Division, Major General Ray E. Porter, announced that completion of the new plan was expected by 1 October. He further stated that it was not intended to change any of the factors or multiples under the emergency scheme which would be used in case of an early Japanese defeat, as it was felt that the validity of every score would be destroyed; a new world-wide computation would have to be undertaken; and the flow of returnees would therefore be interrupted. The new plan, when completed, would incorporate changes in factors, multiples, and mechanics of operation, but until such time as it went into effect, Special Planning Division felt that no changes in the old plan should be made.

SPD pointed out that at the time of transition from the first plan to the second, it would necessary to specify that all men eligible for release would remain so, even though under the recomputation they were not so justified. The new critical scores could be computed on the basis of a statistical sampling by G–1, and thus the new plan could be working within thirty to forty-five days after release.

The emergency plan would require simple instructions to theater commanders. Basically the same demobilization process as was then in operation would continue, only at an increasingly accelerated rate, the rate being geared to the increasing availability of transport, port facilities, ZI installation capacities, etc.

As a matter of information, the Deputy Chief of Staff was told that apparently the Revised Readjustment Regulations would differ from the old in that age would be added as a factor; a

223. Ibid.
different method of evaluating combat and overseas service would be used; and the credit limit of 3 children would be removed.

In the meantime work continued on the new plan. Following the approval of its basic assumptions by the Chief of Staff, SPD dispatched copies to all the General Staff Divisions, except G-2, and to the three major force headquarters requesting their reaction to certain fundamental aspects. Expressing fear that Congress might declare an end to the war or the emergency, thereby limiting the time the Army could retain its non-regular personnel to six months after such date of termination, SPD said a "plan to meet . . . [such an] adverse situation . . . will be presented subsequently."²²⁵

As of 31 July 1945, planners still expected demobilization to take twelve to eighteen months. Over 5,000,000 would have to be released if Japan fell before the V-E Day demobilization was completed; otherwise, the number would be reduced by about 1,000,000.²²⁶

The Special Planning Division hoped to correct in the new plan certain basic weaknesses that existed under the old system. For example, officers were, under the first plan, uncertain as to their exact status. The new plan, in which military necessity would no longer be the paramount factor, would make it possible for an officer to estimate his status as his essentiality would be determined by his score, except in the case of those whose MOS was on the War Department List of Critical Officer Specialties. In this case the officer might be retained indefinitely. Also, key personnel, even without critical MOS’s, might be retained for 120 days. In addition, it was realized that provision for an officer corps for the interim-period Army must be made. A corps with maturity in age and military experience, initial and subsequent high standard of training, and adequate numbers in each grade and skill within each arm or service would be needed. It was apparent that these needs would not be met by volunteers. Therefore, certain officers would have to be retained against their will, and so it was felt "wise to have clear-cut and automatic criteria for differentiating between those to be retained and those to be separated."²²⁷

The difference in requirements after V-J Day as compared with those after V-E Day required a review of discharge factors. Planners felt that enlisted personnel of the interim Army, as

²²⁵. SPD Memo for G-1, 3, 4, OPD, AGF, AAF, ASF, 11 July 45, sub: Basic Considerations To Be Used. . . . Ibid.

²²⁶. Copy of Memo for the President, 31 July 45, sub: Status of Demobn Plans. This memo has no signature, but a pencilled note on an attached paper indicates it was delivered by Marshall to the President at the Potsdam Conference. Ibid.

²²⁷. Ibid. TAB A, "Basic Considerations—Officers."
well as officers, should have certain qualities. As a consequence, Special Planning Division requested the Statistical Branch, G–1, to provide statistical estimates showing the composition of the 6,970,000-man army, by age, length of service, length of overseas service, and dependency (the latter indicating men with children separate from those with collateral dependents). Thus it appeared that some of the factors which might be considered were:

1. Length of service;
2. Overseas service;
3. Combat service;
4. Children;
5. Collateral dependents;
6. Age;
7. Civilian skills;
8. Holders of the Medal of Honor;
9. Limited service;
10. Wounds;
11. Recovered PW’s.\(^{228}\)

It was the Special Planning Division’s opinion that factors 5, 7, and 10 should be dismissed for the same reasons they were omitted originally. As for number 11, SPD favored handling recovered prisoners of war under existing regulations, modified if necessary. Age and combat service were factors worthy of retention, according to the planners, though they knew of no way to improve the combat service factor. The separation system evolved included the following considerations:

a. All men over ____ years of age plus those in c as they attained ____ years of age.
b. Holders of the Medal of Honor.

c. Those under ____ years of age, who did not have the Medal of Honor, on a basis of points derived from length of service, overseas service, combat duty, parenthood, and a graduated age factor.

d. Results of survey on status of limited service men.
e. Critical MOS men to have separate critical scores.

These same factors would apply to officers, except that those dealing with age and limited service might vary.

There was one major difficulty—disposition of limited service personnel who totaled one-eighth of the Army’s strength, or about one million. Some of these men were eligible for overseas duty while others were not. Under the new Army strength, they would total 750,000. At that time they could be used, but when the Army was cut to the 2 million figure, there would be a tre-

\(^{228}\) Ibid. TAB B, “Basic Considerations Enlisted Men.”
mendous surplus of these men who could not be usefully employed. Yet, through no fault of their own, these men were prevented from acquiring large point scores. It was estimated that some 470,000 limited duty men had to be released.

Various agencies were requested to comment on the latest proposed factors. Between 17 and 31 July the reactions of the General Staff Divisions and the three major forces were received. A survey of all of their replies indicates that generally most of them:

a. Were in favor of entering age as a factor.

b. Did not favor giving limited service men any special criteria.

c. Favored removing combat credit and placing more emphasis on overseas credit, though AGF was definitely opposed.

d. Favored removing the limit of 3 on the number of children a man could receive credit for.

e. Favored giving holders of the Medal of Honor some special consideration. 229

ASF and AAF went so far as to outline their own versions of separation criteria. 230 The formula as recommended by ASF was as follows:

1. All holders of the Medal of Honor;
2. Those over _____ years of age;
3. Those with over _____ months of service;
4. Those with over _____ months service overseas;

The Air Forces opposed any system that relied on the ASR Card or any such scheme in releasing officers, preferring their own system of utilizing Officer Evaluation Reports. As for enlisted personnel, they outlined a proposed set-up for discharge in which men in the following classification were to be released:

1. Recovered PW’s who had undergone long illness and were now fully recovered;
2. Holders of the Medal of Honor;
3. Those over 35 years of age;
4. Limited service men not qualified for overseas duty;
5. Men with a substantial number of children. 231

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229. Ibid. The separate replies to SPD’s memo of 11 July are listed below:
D/F, OPD to SPD, 17 July 45
ASF Memo for SPD, 19 July 45
D/F, G-4 to SPD, 20 July 45
AGF Memo for SPD, 21 July 45
AAF Memo for SPD, 24 July 45
D/F, G-1 to SPD, 27 July 45
G-3 Memo for SPD, 31 July 45

230. Ibid.

231. Ibid.
For those not included in the above, an ASR score would be established based on:

1. Length of service; and
2. Length of overseas service, in ratio of 2:3;
3. Parenthood—1 point per child;
4. Awards—both valor and stars;
5. Age—1 multiple for each year past 18th birthday.

Furthermore, the AAF felt they should have two critical scores, one for combat personnel, and one for non-combat personnel.

On the basis of these comments the Special Planning Division prepared another plan and again submitted it to the Staff Divisions and major forces for comment. It was requested that any non-concurrence be in a form suitable for transmission to the Chief of Staff. 232

The basic principles on which this 4 August 1945 version was prepared were:

1. Simplicity and removal of irritants to troops.
2. Full explanation to the Army and public.
3. Demobilization at the most rapid rate consistent with availability of transport, etc.
4. Demobilization by individual selection-out.
5. Essentiality of both officers and enlisted men automatically determined.
6. Within each theater, defense command, major force, rather than on an Army-wide basis, personnel qualified would be separated in sequence of relative standing under the point system.
7. A continuation of inductions.

Demobilization planners had endeavored to create a scheme in which military necessity was drastically curtailed as a means of keeping men in the service. The proposed new score card incorporated the factors of: 233

- a. Length of service;
- b. Overseas service;
- c. Decorations for valor and Purple Heart;
- d. Parenthood credit for all children under 18;
- e. Age—a credit for each year over 18 (This factor not applicable to officers).

The Bureau of Public Relations' reply contained a very significant statement, "The success of this or any other program of..."
demobilization will depend on how quickly it moves in getting men out. Unless the process is swift, and men are released as promptly as they return to this country, no system will meet with popular support.”

The President of the War Department Manpower Board also made a very worthwhile comment. He realized that after V-J Day there would be a sharp curtailment of activity within the Zone of the Interior. As of 30 June 1945, there were 1,346,000 men in the ZI, doing housekeeping and training. The troop bases for Period II (After V-J Day) reduced this to 449,000 by V-J Day plus 12 months, a mandatory drop of 897,000. Of this last figure only 87,000 had 85 points or more. Of the 810,000 remaining, 395,000 might be eliminated on grounds of being over 35 or physically unqualified for overseas duty; but that still left 515,000 men. Anticipating the public reaction to such a situation, the War Department Manpower Board suggested that a study on this problem be undertaken.

The Army’s Legislative and Liaison Division pointed out that the power to induct under the Selective Training and Service Act would cease if Congress saw fit to declare an end of hostilities. This it could do with or without the approval of the President. Based on other controversies over the size of the Army, this Division believed it would be very difficult to persuade Congress to continue inductions for any great length of time after V-J Day. Therefore, the advisability of adding the new factors of credit for age and total number of children to the ASR score was questioned. By so doing, the way would be opened to pressure groups for specific categories such as railroad men, doctors, miners, students, etc.

The Legislative and Liaison Division proposed a solution whereby the age question could be largely solved by dropping the limit to 35 or such figure as G-1 saw fit. Where men had more than three children and a severe hardship existed, they could obtain release under existing regulations. Further, it appeared that at V-J Day the critical score would be somewhere around 72. If after that date the Army undertook a vigorous program of releasing all unessential men, the score might be lowered still further. “We may then be able to discharge several million individuals in a short time. With such a program in effect, we shall certainly eliminate from the Army, under our present system many . . . individuals who would receive, under

234. BPR Memo for SPD, 8 Aug 45, Re SPD’s Memo of 4 Aug 45. Ibid.
the proposed system additional credits for age and for additional children over three in number."\textsuperscript{236}

L&LD also objected to elimination of the factor of combat credit in view of the Secretary of War's press release of 2 August 1945, in which he had stated that under the new revision there would be an obvious advantage given to men with Pacific battle and overseas credit, this being the wish of the soldiers themselves.\textsuperscript{237}

The cataclysmic effect of the bombs of August 6th and 9th precluded the finishing of the new plan. All of the concurrences or comments from other interested agencies had not even been received when it was learned that Japan was suing for peace. Hence, the new plan was invalidated and an emergency plan was transmitted to the Chief of Staff on 13 August 1945, the day before Japan accepted surrender terms.

This emergency plan presented on 13 August expanded the 20 July outline. Generally, it recommended abolishing "military necessity" except in the cases of officers and enlisted men on the War Department list of critical specialties. The ASR scores were to be brought up to date from 12 May 1945, though the factors remained unchanged. Those men with an old score of eighty-five or above were to have first priority for discharge, and thereafter new critical scores for enlisted personnel would be established periodically by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1. The initial score was to be eighty. The paper had also recommended allowing men of 38 or over to be released. However, this recommendation was struck out and the following vague statement substituted: "Further consideration will be given to reduction in present age requirement of 38 yrs. (Over 35 yrs. with 2 yrs. service.)"\textsuperscript{238}

With regard to officers the plan was amended to read that, subject to the concurrence of The Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces Pacific (CINCAFPAC) and approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff, critical scores would be announced and then lowered progressively. The plan, as thus amended, was approved by Brig. Gen. H. I. Hodes on 1 September 1945, with the notation that all references to officers were subject to the concurrence of CINCAFPAC and the approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{239}

The 13 August paper was designed to be the basic plan, and, even before its approval, papers dealing with its implementation began to make their way toward the Chief of Staff's office. On

\textsuperscript{236} L&LD Memo for SPD, 10 Aug 45, sub: Pers Readj After Defeat of Japan. Ibid. 237. Ibid. 238. SPD Memo for CofS, 13 Aug 45, sub: Pers Demob. G-1 file, OCS 370.01. 239. Ibid.
27 August, G-1 dispatched a paper in which approval for certain specific actions was requested, i.e., announcement of a new critical score of eighty for enlisted men and forty-one for enlisted women, and recomputation of all scores using current multiples and factors in order to allow credits for the period 12 May 1945 to V-J Day. In addition, G-1 recommended that an attached message covering operation of the plan be dispatched to all theaters, defense commands, and major forces, and that an attached press release be approved. This message contained new detailed instructions regarding the plan for enlisted personnel, but RR 1-5 was to remain temporarily in effect for officers. However, priority would be given officers with long combat and overseas service.

This paper bore the concurrences of G-3, G-1, OPD, SPD, and WDBPR, and the non-concurrence of the Legislative and Liaison Division of the War Department. The latter objected to inclusion of the press release since Generals Henry and Edwards, G-1 and G-3 respectively, were scheduled to appear before the House Military Affairs Committee on 28 August to present a comprehensive picture of the personnel demobilization problem. It was deemed inadvisable to make any prior statement and, besides, the Division felt that the press release was poorly worded and incomplete since it contained no reference to officer discharges. G-1, apparently after a conference with the Chief of Staff's office, agreed to withdraw the press release, with the understanding that the Bureau of Public Relations would draft a more appropriate one. However, G-1 held out for approval of its message on the plan to all theaters, major forces and defense commands.

G-1 on 29 August drafted a memorandum for the Commanding Generals, Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces, containing instructions for the release of officers. It outlined the critical scores for all grades of officers other than general officers, though the effective date was purposely left blank; explained the handling of specialists; and contained a statement to be signed by every non-regular officer who desired to remain on active duty. Such statement terminated all eligibility for release from the date of signing to the duration of the emergency plus six months.
Two days later, following a conference with G–1, ASF, AAF, and AGF representatives, a list of scarce categories of officer specialists was prepared and forwarded to The Adjutant General for release.245

On the same day a cablegram was dispatched to General MacArthur, advising him of the contemplated plans for officer release and asking him if any major difficulties would arise as a result of this plan.246

It will be recalled that on 27 August, General Henry requested the Chief of Staff to approve a message to all theaters, defense commands, and major forces outlining the proposed plan. On 1 September a revised message containing specific criteria for officer separation (Cols. thru Majs.–100; Capts. thru 2 Lts.–85; WO’s–80) was prepared for the approval of the Chief of Staff.247

The broad plan, dated 13 August, contained the provision that all references to officers were subject to the concurrence of General MacArthur and approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff. MacArthur’s reply to the wire of 31 August requesting his views on the contemplated officer demobilization set-up did not arrive until 6 September.

Apparently feeling that something should be dispatched to the field, a third version of this same radio was transmitted to all theaters, defense commands, and major forces on 2 September.248

The dispatched version closely resembled the 26 August version, in that certainty toward new officer release procedures and standards were omitted. In its stead, the message stated that pending further instructions, RR 1–5 would continue in effect. Meanwhile, priority of return would be based on the following: first, those with arduous combat service; and second, length of overseas service. But instructions were issued to recalculate ASR scores to reflect changes from 12 May 1945 to 2 September 1945. Commands were also advised that those officers who desired to remain on active duty could do so by signing a statement to the effect that they were waiving any and all readjustment rights from the date of signing to the duration plus six months.

In addition the cablegram advised commanders that effective 2 September demobilization of personnel would be conducted in accordance with existing RR’s, subject to modifications; that the new critical score for enlisted men would be 80; and ASR scores would be recomputed to reflect changes since 12 May.

245. Ibid.
246. CM-OUT-58071, 31 Aug 45. Ibid.
One can only surmise that severe pressure caused the War Department to transmit a radiogram on 3 September to all areas advising of new standards of release for officer personnel and new critical scores, even though concurrence from General MacArthur had not been received.\textsuperscript{249} It appears that General Marshall, since his office had inserted the amendment requiring MacArthur's concurrence, now disregarded it and authorized the release of the message,\textsuperscript{250} before receipt of MacArthur's concurrence.

General MacArthur's reply arrived in Washington on 6 September.\textsuperscript{251} It was his opinion that the planned officer release set-up would present severe difficulties unless replacements were received for a very large proportion of those officers who were returned. He also objected to requiring officers who desired to remain on active duty to sign away their readjustment rights for the duration plus six months.

On 7 September, as a result of public and Congressional criticism, all theaters were notified that due to large excesses of personnel in the U.S. with scores below the critical score the War Department had decided to lower the critical score for enlisted men from eighty to seventy by 1 October, and to sixty by 1 November.\textsuperscript{252}

A further modification of the plan for release of officers was forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 14 September. The study of 5 September had stated that critical specialist officers might be held for a maximum of six months following dates critical scores were announced. All others, except for volunteers remaining on active duty, whose scores were equal to or greater than the critical score would be reported for separation not later than 60 days following publication of critical score. It also contained the statement that officers desiring continued service could sign, but by doing so they would lose all readjustment rights until six months after termination of the emergency.\textsuperscript{253}

General MacArthur had advised that the provision dealing with those desiring to remain on duty be modified to permit officers to remain for shorter periods. This opinion was shared by the Mediterranean and European Theaters.\textsuperscript{254} Therefore, G–1 recommended that current policy be amended to authorize a delay

\textsuperscript{249} CM-OUT-60240, 3 Sept 45.
\textsuperscript{250} There is a triple-spaced draft of this message bearing General Marshall's initials "GCM" with an "OK" above them. [G–1, OCS 370.01] However the staff study incorporating this message, S/5, G–1 to CofS, 5 Sept 45, "Release of Officers," did not receive formal approval from the Deputy Chief of Staff until 6 Sept. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{251} CM-IN-4297, 6 Sept 45.
\textsuperscript{252} CM-OUT-61379, 7 Sept 45.
\textsuperscript{253} Coversheet G–1—CofS, 5 Sept 45, "Officer Release Plan." G–1, OCS 370.01.
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.
beyond the 60-day period for reporting those key officers, eligible for separation, who were needed and willing to remain on active duty, but unwilling to sign a statement relinquishing all rights for the duration and six months. But no such officer would be held beyond six months from his date of eligibility. This modification was approved by the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff.  

The Preparation of Troop Bases for Period II

The Special Planning Division had realized, early in its existence, that troop bases for Period II and for the Permanent Post-War Military Establishment, as well as for Period I, were a necessity. However, actual planning for Period II bases was deferred during 1944 and early 1945 because planners at joint levels did not furnish the deployments necessary for planning even a Period I basis. As soon as the post V-E Day basis was approved, planning efforts were devoted to making a Post-War Army troop basis. Once the post-war Army had been decided on, then a troop basis could be made that would scale the Army down from its Period I size to its post-war size. However, due to the Chief of Staff’s restudy of the post-war strength and expenditures, a demobilization planning Period II troop basis was deferred until the spring of 1945.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, approached the matter of Period II Troop Bases when he commented on a memorandum from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, in April 1945. In regard to a military establishment during the early post-war period, he stated that “both AAF and SPD indicate need for approach based on analysis of requirements.” Furthermore, he felt that the proposal “to develop an Initial Post-War Army Troop Basis should be initiated as soon as [an] acceptable starting point for planning has been reached. . . .” This would probably be after the San Francisco Conference. This basis would then be modified following Germany’s defeat, and in light of future developments.

The comments of the OPD Chief, although disappointing to the planners in SPD, nevertheless were based on an analysis of the situation as it existed. Less than a month before Germany surrendered the Chief of the Strategy Section of OPD attended a number of conferences where problems relative to the size and

256. S/S, ACoS, OPD to DCofS, 14 Apr 45, sub: Troop Bases. SPD Study 33, Sec 3, DRB, TAG.
257. Ibid.
258. S/S, OPD to DCoFS, 14 Apr 45, sub: TB for Post-War Army. Ibid. See also: SPD memo for SPO, AAF, 1 Jun 45, sub: Supply Planning for Per II, in which it is stated that the Period II troop bases were expected soon.
composition of the post-war Army were discussed. He made a report containing recommendations on the subject to Brig. Gen. G. A. Lincoln, Chief of the Policy Group, which stated that as of 10 April 1945 no study existed that showed "our minimum requirements for satisfactory security, projected as far into the future as present planning techniques justify." Lincoln forwarded the report to Maj. Gen. J. E. Hull, AC of S, OPD, and commented:

In my opinion this partial solution of a very difficult problem, which the Strategy Section has worked out, is the best we could do at this time. Among the difficulties besetting this planning for the post-war Army, there stand out:

a. The number and involved nature of assumptions connected with the different studies.

b. The lack of consideration of any joint factors, for the obvious reason that the War Department alone cannot undertake such consideration.

c. *The lack of guidance from the President, State Department or even the JCS* [author's italics] and the lack of pick-and-shovel studies in the JCS and the War Department from which to step off on estimates. When the JPWC [Joint Post War Committee] was formed, it was my thought that they would be producing some of these estimates, but this appears unlikely the way that committee has developed.260

The Special Planning Division wanted an early completion of these bases, as a heavy percentage of all of their planning for Period II and later periods depended on them. In addition to the troop bases themselves, as drawn up by G-3, SPD needed OPD's troop deployment, made from G-3 estimates, and a supply supplement by G-4, also drawn from the G-3 tabulation.

A meeting was held on 13 June 1945 with representatives from SPD, G-3, G-4, and OPD present. It was decided that G-3 would prepare a troop basis that would be revised according to comments received from the General Staff and the three major forces. OPD would use these revised figures to construct a deployment. However, Operations Division would make preliminary plans for deployment prior to receipt of G-3's revised figures. It was hoped that this would be accomplished by 15 July.261

259. Memo, Col Max S. Johnson for Ch, S&P Grp, OPD, 10 Apr 45, sub: Cons as to Size and Composition of Post-War Army. ABC 092 (1 Apr 44) Sec 1. DRB, TAG.
260. Memo, Lincoln for Hull, 15 Apr 45, sub: TB for Post War Army. Ibid.
261. M/R on Preparation of TB, Deployment, and Supply Sup for Per II, 14 Jun 45. Ibid.
The G–3 troop basis was published as of 1 July and was sent out for review about 10 July. SPD reviewers concluded that the strengths were too high to obtain Congressional support, and the Chief of Staff informally agreed. Therefore, SPD decided to make a study for the Chief of Staff, recommending that the Troop Basis be revised before the figures were furnished to OPD. However, the study was never made, largely because of the advice given by the Acting Chief of SPD’s Organization Branch. This officer presented a memorandum to his Director in which he predicted public pressure for rapid demobilization and possible Congressional investigations of demobilization and the size of the interim army as well as the strategic concepts on which it was based. It was the opinion of his branch that the Army’s strength estimates would receive a more sympathetic hearing by Congress if they were accompanied by “integrated State Department accord and coordination.” Enlarging on this, he stated, “While a close integration with the State Department may [italics author’s] now exist in such matters, the same does not appear conclusive at Organization Branch levels.”

Shifting his attack, the officer stated that it was time that troop basis planning should become firm, particularly in view of a possible early termination of the Japanese war. He stated that his branch felt that such “planning as now conducted follows no definite or logical procedural scheme.” As was then the pattern, G–3 evolved a basis on uncorrelated and unintegrated data, after which a deployment was drawn up.

The Organization Chief was in full accord with the downward revision of the troop basis and recognized that limited appropriations would affect post-war planning. However, the War Department should be prepared to recommend a minimum figure below which neither interim nor permanent troop bases should fall, regardless of cost.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, presented his Tentative Troop Basis for Period II to Operations Division without revising his 1 July estimates. OPD compared the estimates with its deployments and found them to be in general agreement. The major combat elements (thirty divisions and seventy-six air groups) were based on the estimates of OPD, G–3, and SPD with-
out the benefit of "high-level strategic guidance." The basis did not provide for universal military training. Operations Division clearly recognized on 5 August that:

... [since] this Tentative Troop Basis for Period II is for supply and demobilization planning only, and is based upon our ability to bring troops back to the U.S. from overseas theaters, it may be radically revised later. At present a number of related studies are being made which will provide necessary information for a revision of the Period II Troop Deployment and Troop Basis. These studies are:

a. Postwar Military Policy;
b. Postwar Over-all Strategic Plan;
c. A Study of personnel shipping capabilities for a series of V-J Days;
d. An over-all plan for the occupation of Japan;
e. Postwar Military Base Requirement.

... Data is not available upon which to base a decision as to how long occupational troops will be required in Germany and Japan.269

When Japan was defeated, the G–3 Tentative Troop Basis for Period II was being used by the Army for demobilization planning because of a lack of approved assumptions on which revised estimates could be made.

Summary

The plans for the Army's demobilization were not made in a military vacuum. Informal exchanges of information were begun with the Navy Department early in August 1943,270 and in September of that year the Under Secretary of War sponsored a meeting at which representatives of the War and Navy Departments, the Maritime Commission, and the Defense Plant Corporation were present. It was decided to create an informal interdepartmental group to consider mutual matériel demobilization questions.271 Later in October the Joint Contract Termination Board was created by the Office of War Mobilization to formulate policies on contract termination and related problems. On this board were representatives of the Navy, Commerce, Interior, Attorney General, Labor, Treasury, Army, Bureau of the Budget,

268. G-3 memo for OPD, 30 Jul 45, sub: Tentative TB. SPD Study 33, Sec 2, 1945. DRB, TAG.
269. OPD M/R in file with OPD Memo for G-3, 5 Aug 45, sub: Tentative TB. ABC 370.01 (7-25-42), Sec 4. DRB, TAG.
270. SPD memo for Actg CofS, 14 Sept 43. OCS 370.9. DRB, TAG.
271. SPD, Status of Demobilization Planning, 31 December 1943, p. 57.
Federal Reserve, Maritime, and War Production Board, as well as other government agencies.\textsuperscript{272}

From almost the beginning of demobilization planning the Army had kept the State Department informed of its actions in this connection. The Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, and his assistant, John J. McCloy, had informal conversations with their counterparts in the State Department. In addition, there were informal exchanges of information between the officers in the Operations Division of the War Department and personnel holding responsible positions in the State Department.\textsuperscript{273} Diplomatic factors were sometimes considered. However, extensive research on this study has revealed no positive integration of demobilization planning with post-war national policy before the surrender of Japan.

The Special Planning Division studied the military demobilization of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada in World War I. In addition, exchanges of World War II demobilization planning information were made with Great Britain and Canada throughout this period.

The Army's policy during this time was to keep all interested government agencies confidentially informed on planning progress. Also representatives of the War Department appeared on numerous occasions before Congressional Committees for the purpose of giving demobilization and post-war information. This testimony was given in both open and executive sessions.

Demobilization plans used by the Army after the defeat of Germany were more complete than those for use after V-J Day. Almost two years had been devoted to preparing the V-E Day plan that was so closely connected with redeployment. The defeat of Japan, coming much earlier than had been anticipated,\textsuperscript{*} forced the Army to use many emergency plans. These plans, in many instances, had not been completed due to reluctance on the part of the War Department General Staff to turn its attention away from current operations. Nevertheless, for the first time in its history, the United States Army had prepared plans for demobilization before the defeat of the enemy.\textsuperscript{**}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[272] Memo for files, 19 Oct 43, sub: Termination of Contracts. WDCSA 370.9. DRB, TAG.
\item[273] Ltrs, Col G. A. Lincoln to Maj John C. Sparrow, 22 Nov 50 and 2 Jan 51. HIS 330.14 (3 Nov 50).
\item[*] The Joint Chiefs of Staff had estimated October 1946 as the earliest probable date of the defeat of Japan.
\item[**] Changes in the plan for personnel demobilization made after V-J Day will be discussed in Chapter IV.
\end{footnotes}
CHAPTER III
EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILIZATION

Introduction

On 5 September 1944 the War Department issued a statement outlining broad phases of the Army's redeployment and demobilization policy. Almost simultaneously the War Production Board disclosed its plan for reconversion of industry from a wartime to a peacetime basis. The timing of these announcements was significant for with the Nazis retreating in Western Europe the defeat of Germany appeared imminent. In Eastern Europe, Soviet Russia was driving the invader toward his homeland.

The announcement was made by the War Department after representatives of the Army and Selective Service had explained the plan before a closed session of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives. Very soon after the presentation of the plan to the members of the committee, Maj. Gen. S. G. Henry, AC of S, G-1, WDGS, urged that the Bureau of Public Relations of the War Department release details of the plan to counteract rumors and speculations. Henry suggested that "... releases should also carry definite statements, that demobilization will be a lengthy and continuing process and that considerable time must elapse before any appreciable numbers of men can be selected and processed for discharge." [For statement of WD, see Appendix IV]

There was widespread publicity given to the statement, both by the large new agencies and the national radio chains. Publication of the entire text or explanations of the statement in by-lined articles characterized most of this publicity. It spread the word throughout the Nation that the "average GI has slim chance to get out," "plans meet the soldiers' wishes," "men with families—overseas vets first out"; and there was an occasional warning that "military necessity would govern discharges." There was very little editorial reaction to the Army's demobilization plan as announced, but most of it was favorable. A San Francisco Chronicle editorial stated: "The logic of the Army's demobilization plan is clear. It represents an attempt to be utterly fair to each individual soldier...." Continuing with a discussion of the plan and its operation, the paper warned that it was impossible to conduct a war with justice to everyone but said every effort should be made

1. Memo, G-1 for WDBPR. 4 Sep 44, sub: Publicity concerning WD Pers Readjustment Plan. WDGPA 370.01. DRB, TAG.
to be as fair as possible to the men who were called to serve. 
"... Yet it would be unfortunate if an attempt at extreme fairness
should get so tangled up with itself that the result would be less
justice than could be obtained by some more rough-and-ready
method. . . ."

The Communist Daily Worker also treated the demobilization
plan and the War Production Board reconversion plan favorably:

The Army and the War Production Board have made impor-
tant proposals for preparing the country for the moment when
the Nazi beast is finally transformed into a carcass. . . .

The system of demobilization worked out by the army is ex-
tremely sensible and democratic. Within the limits of the na-
tion's military requirements, it certainly is about as humane and
considerate a program as could be projected. . . .

The year 1944, which saw America and its allies make tremen-
dous military and naval gains in Europe and the Pacific, also
witnessed an American presidential election. With millions of men
in the armed services, there was a possibility that their votes
could decide the 1944 election for President. The conventions of
the two major political parties, Democratic and Republican, chose
as their nominees, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Thomas E. Dewey,
both of New York. Roosevelt had broken the American "two-term"
tradition when he was re-elected to the presidency in 1940. Dewey
was well known as a young "racket-busting" district attorney who
had been elected to the governorship of the Empire State. Mr.
Dewey began his campaign with a speech at Philadelphia, 7 Sep-
tember 1944, in which he refuted the Roosevelt contention that the
administration should not be changed during the midst of a large-
scale war by saying that the next President would serve largely
in peacetime. He attacked the New Deal's domestic economic pro-
gram and suddenly declared that the administration was planning
to demobilize the Army, but very slowly. The Republican candi-
date used as the basis of this assertion a statement that had re-
cently been made by Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director of
Selective Service; Dewey claimed that it represented New Deal
demobilization policy.

Dewey's attack on demobilization was quoted in newspapers and
in magazines with national circulations. Some newspapers, such
as the Chicago Tribune, New York Herald Tribune, and the Kansas
City Star, commented favorably on the Philadelphia speech with-
out specifically mentioning the demobilization attack. Others, in-
cluding the Colorado Springs Gazette, vigorously supported

2. San Francisco Chronicle, 7 Sep 44, p. 12.
3. Daily Worker, 8 Sep 44, p. 6
Dewey's campaign by attacking the administration for its demobilization plan. On 12 September 1944, the Gazette carried a lengthy editorial, scoring various phases of the government, with one section of the editorial devoted to the demobilization plan. While its intent was to indict the administration, it actually managed to give a very bad impression of Army planning:
Within a few days Selective Service [sic] has announced a plan for progressive demobilization of the Army following defeat of Germany. So far as it is revealed, it appears to be a sound plan. Men will be released on basis of an arbitrary rating determined by four factors: length of service, length of service overseas, combat record, and number of dependents.

The fact that details are lacking, and that there is, in truth, no real promise that large numbers will actually be released, suggests that the plan was trotted out hurriedly. Indeed, until Governor Dewey began talking about reasonable speed, the Washington planners had stuck to their theme of a long, long war even after Germany collapsed and of the need for maintaining huge armies overseas as occupying forces.4

The San Francisco Chronicle shared the Gazette’s feeling regarding Mr. Dewey’s stand on demobilization, saying: “...Governor Dewey justly seized upon General Hershey’s declaration that the men ought to be kept in the Army a good while after the war because it will be cheaper to take care of them so than by a dole agency...”5

Taking quite the opposite view from that of the Gazette and the Chronicle on the demobilization plan, and particularly on Mr. Dewey’s methods in attacking it, The New York Times of 8 September carried a powerful editorial called “Mr. Dewey at Philadelphia.” It said this about his remarks on demobilization:

Less persuasive is Mr. Dewey’s charge that because the Administration now fears a return of large-scale unemployment it intends to keep men in the Army even after their services are no longer needed. He bases this accusation on a remark attributed to the Director of Selective Service that “we can keep people in the Army about as cheaply as we could create an agency for them when they are out.” Assuming this to be the case, it does not follow that this is the accepted policy. As it happens, Mr. Dewey’s speech, which may have been prepared a few days ago, was actually delivered on the same day on which there was published the War Department’s excellent plan for a prompt partial demobilization of the Army, following the defeat of Germany. We see no reason to doubt the good faith of Secretary Stimson when he promises that demobilization, guided

5. San Francisco Chronicle, 9 Sep 44, p. 12.
... by no political considerations, will take place as rapidly as men are not needed. . . . 6

The (Louisville) Courier-Journal also deplored Dewey's attitude toward demobilization and accused him of taking advantage of the people's yearning for their loved ones in the armed services:

... the demobilization plan which he recklessly and baselessly criticized as a product of the Roosevelt administration's fear of peace is actually a product of the same military leadership which he [Dewey] solemnly promised in his acceptance speech in Chicago he would not disturb... Better a little longer under arms now than to have to be recalled to arms later or to bequeath to still another generation a rendezvous with death. 7

Except for some comments from politicians, the War Department's demobilization plan received little attention near the end of September and the beginning of October; however, over-all planning for the return to peace was accelerated. With headlines like "Russians Reach Sea, Splitting Baltic Enemy" and "First Army Breaks Through North of Aachen, Streams Two Miles Past Gap In Siegfried Line" 8 appearing in print, the time of victory in Europe seemed quite near. On October 10 the first of three meetings on demobilization problems was held in Times Hall, New York, N. Y., with speakers from various fields, including Gen. W. F. Tompkins for the Army. General Tompkins was opposed to holding the conference as "... such a forum would lead too many people to feel that the war is over..." 9 However, he agreed to attend when informed that The New York Times was holding the meeting regardless of War Department participation.

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6. The New York Times, 8 Sep 44, p. 18. In connection with the remark of the Director of Selective Service, "we can keep people in the Army about as cheaply as we could create an agency for them when they are out," made at a press conference in Denver, Colo., 21 Aug 44, it is interesting to note that this was not the first time that Gen Hershey had put the War Department "on the spot" by his statements. On 11 Jan 44 he addressed the National Conference on Social Security of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States at which time he emphasized the necessity of providing jobs for returning servicemen and implied that the Army should hold men until this was done. As a result of this, Maj Gen W. F. Tompkins of SPD sent Maj Gen A. D. Surles, WDBPR, a memorandum on 14 Jan 44 in which was said, "The proposal to hold men in the Army until jobs are found for them is contrary to War Department plans which are to release men as fast as military necessity will permit. . . . To sum up, the War Department's policy has been not to discuss demobilization publicly. Therefore, its views are not known to the public. Such talks as General Hershey's tends to influence public opinion along lines which are contrary to War Department plans. Please advise what, if anything you can do to prevent further statements by him on how the Army should demobilize." WDS PD 380 (14 Jan 44).

9. Memo, Tompkins for Greenbaum, 7 Aug 44, no sub., and Greenbaum's reply, 9 Aug 44. WDS PD 337 (Conferences). DRB, TAG.
Service newspapers and magazines carried the text of the plan, stories, and editorials to American soldiers who were fighting or were stationed all over the globe. The Army magazine *Yank* carried an account of the War Department plan as its leading article in the 29 September 1944 issue. The article was published under a Washington dateline and was titled “Plan for Demobilization.” The first paragraph stated: “Demobilization is all set to go. X-day, that is the day resistance ends, has been officially designated as the starting gun. So it is possible that by the time some GI’s in outlying bases read this story, the process of discharging surplus soldiers and sending them home may actually have begun” [Italics author’s]. The article continued by quoting an Associated Press dispatch: “as many as 200,000 monthly will be discharged between the fall of Germany and the defeat of Japan.”

Then there were some warnings that military necessity would govern, but further on was the statement, “... the first surplus shipment from Europe bound for the States and Separation should be shoving off in a month or two after the Nazis are defeated” [Italics author’s]. The article explained, “Some Ground Forces soldiers in the European Theater of Operations, even including those who have had combat, may [Italics author’s] have to be shipped to the Pacific.”

Throughout November and the early part of December the press had cheerful news to report; and many people believed that victory in Europe might come before the end of the year. Little reference was made to Army obligations or to the prospect of release for personnel after V-E Day, but Secretary Stimson reputedly said in Miami Beach, “No country need ever fear a United States Army of occupation—our boys want to get home.” The time of their return suddenly receded when, about the middle of December, news from our western front announced that Germany had opened a big offensive in two major sectors and was making a last desperate bid for victory. The two following weeks were fearful: the Germans pushed the Allies back in Belgium and Luxembourg; they penetrated the Ardennes; they entered Bastogne; they massacred American prisoners at Malmedy. Gloom filled the newspapers until the German advance was stopped and the Americans launched a new drive as 1944 ended.

11. Ibid., p. 4.
12. Ibid., p. 4.
Announcement of the Demobilization Plan to Soldiers in the Mediterranean—7 September 1944.

After the American Army had somewhat recovered from the December disasters, the United States began again to hope for a quick victory and the return of the veterans. Secretary Stimson
feared the effects of over-optimism on the war effort and the occupation and as early as February 1945 refuted a statement by General Hines, Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, regarding the release of many troops, "All speed consistent with the situation will be applied in returning men who can be released from the Army from overseas. But any suggestion that large numbers will be coming home for discharge immediately after the fighting stops in Europe can only lead to cruel disappointment."\(^{14}\)

General Hines' statement to the House of Representatives' Appropriations Committee that 200 to 250 thousand men per month would be discharged following Hitler's defeat spurred the Special Planning Division to prepare a proposed statement on the rate and speed of demobilization. SPD cited the results of a poll that had been taken in an infantry battalion fighting in the Gothic Line shortly after the release of the Army's partial demobilization plan in September 1944. The results of the poll showed that 67% of the men interviewed believed that they would be returned to civilian life six months after Germany's defeat.\(^{15}\) Special Planning Division felt that Hines' statement and Stimson's denial "may have caused confusion among the troops as to the time factor with respect to rate and speed of repatriation after the defeat of Germany."\(^{16}\) However, SPD's suggestion was not adopted, largely because of the objections of the Director, Bureau of Public Relations. He maintained that "The question of morale in a theater is primarily the problem of the theater commander, and it is not believed that any action in this respect should be taken until there is some indication from the theater commander that he needs War Department assistance."\(^{17}\) Very shortly after this the Under Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff gave instructions to the Bureau of Public Relations through the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, to the effect "that a publicity campaign concerning demobilization of forces upon the defeat of Germany, be instigated and pursued by the War Department."\(^{18}\) The Bureau of Public Relations held to its views that it would be inadvisable "to disseminate to the troops and public information on the expected slow return from overseas of individuals eligible for discharge."\(^{19}\) However, its Director gave the go-ahead sign to Public Relations Officers in

\(^{14}\) For Hines' statement see Washington Post, 28 Feb 45, p. 9. For Stimson's denial see WDBPR, Press Release, "Statement by the Secretary of War," 28 Feb 45. SPD Study 128, Sec. 1, Pt. 3 (Feb-Mar 45). DRB, TAG.

\(^{15}\) WD, "What the Soldier Thinks," No. 10. 10-25 Nov 44. OCMH, Gen Ref Br.

\(^{16}\) Memo, SPD for C of S, 9 Mar 45, sub: Release of Publicity. SPD Study 128, Sec. 1, Pt. 3. DRB, TAG.

\(^{17}\) D/F, WDBPR to SPD, 12 Mar 45, sub: Release of Publicity. Ibid. For earlier coordination of public relations see SPD 014.13, 5 Aug 44. DRB, TAG.

\(^{18}\) D/F, OPD for WDBPR, 17 Mar 45, sub: Publicity Campaign. SPD Study 128, Sec. 1, Pt. 3. DRB, TAG.

\(^{19}\) SPD Memo for the files, 27 Mar 45, sub: Release of Publicity. Ibid.
the theaters to start a slow pressure campaign based upon information contained in the Press Release, subject: Readjustment Plan, dated 6 September 1944. At that time Special Planning Division closed the matter because it was felt that "sufficient publicity from unofficial sources is being disseminated to the public and troops to cover the purpose of the problem." 

Just prior to the surrender of Germany there was an indication that the War Department's relations with Congress had "adversely changed in recent months." The Chief, Legislative and Liaison Division, warned the Chief of Staff, "The attitude of Congress is beginning to approach that which exists toward the military establishment in normal times of peace. . . ." The warning continued:

The present congressional attitude is the natural and expected by-product of the approaching victory of our armed forces. The mood of Congress during 1942-1944, the years of doubt, is no longer its mood in 1945, with victory assured. Until recently Congress has responded to the Army as the desperate householder, whose home is in flames, welcomes the Fire Department; drive over the lawn, chop down the doors, throw the furniture out the window, but save the home. Now, with the flames under control, the Congress, like the householder, is noting for the first time the water damages and thinking that if the Fire Department had acted differently, the lawn would not be torn up, the doors smashed, and the furniture broken. Failure by the War Department to adjust itself to this Congressional revulsion will seriously prejudice its obtaining its future legislative needs and the passage of Universal Military Training legislation.

* * * * * *

The following are the principal factors which are turning the Congress against the War Department:

a. Underlying, traditional fear in America (and in the Congress particularly) of military ascendency over civilian government, combined with an increasing Congressional conviction that the Army, despite the approach of peace, is seeking to retain the dominant role it has necessarily assumed during wartime.

b. Intention by Congress to reassert and exercise its prerogatives, which have been long in abeyance in wartime. This is evidence of the inevitable back-lash [sic] of sentiment against the dominant position of the military in time of war. In past history, this revulsion has resulted in the near emasculation of the Army at the end of each war.

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
c. Growing doubt as to the integrity of War Department, because of:

(1) Army activity in forming legislation essentially of a civilian nature; like the administration of the "work or fight" program.

(2) Consistent Army defense of the correctness of all its past actions: like cost plus contracts.

(3) Army departure from what the Congress believes were express or implied agreements with large groups, as for example, volunteer officer candidates, Civilian Pilot Trainees, Members of the Army Specialized Training Program and the colleges conducting their training, 18 year old inductees.\(^{22}\)

**Reaction to Partial Demobilization**

On 4 May 1945 the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, and the Director, Special Planning Division, appeared before an executive session of the House Military Affairs Committee and explained the Army's plan for redeployment and partial demobilization. Fragmentary accounts of the meeting were "leaked" to the press, whereupon the Army decided to release* its redeployment plan officially to the press.\(^{23}\) This disclosure of information concerning demobilization angered Representative Andrew May of Kentucky, Chairman of House Military Affairs Committee. The *Washington Post* commented editorially that as long as no comfort was given the enemy there should be no possible danger in relieving the soldiers and their families by telling them "that demobilization is expected to get under way speedily and proceed on a fairly broad scale after Germany's surrender." The more "we know about the Army's demobilization plans and the sooner we know it, the better it will be for everybody concerned."\(^{24}\)

The actual operation of the Army's plan for partial demobilization was explained by the Secretary of War at his press and radio conference, 10 May 1945 (Appendix VI). Point values and the mechanics of the problem were handled by the Director, Special Planning Division.\(^{25}\) Following this, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, held a press conference at which the follow-
ing problems connected with redeployment and partial demobilization were explained in detail:

1. The Logistics Job,
2. Requirements,
3. Procurement,
4. Shipping and Transportation,
5. Handling of Returnees,

It was only to be expected that there would be a rash of editorials and newspaper columns devoted to the point plan as announced after V-E Day. The coverage was generally favorable as newspaper headlines all over the country featured the plan. However, the favorable reaction took different forms. The Washington Post of 12 May 1945 said the plan set up "safeguards against individual favoritism and by means of carefully weighed rating standards gives release priority to those soldiers who have the strongest claim to preferment. . . ." Another Washington paper, The Evening Star, said "... it is doubtful that there could be a better or fairer plan for military deployment and demobilization than the one just announced by the War Department." The Los Angeles Times commented editorially, "... It is apparent that a vast deal of thought and effort has been given to this plan. . . . Obviously the most important consideration had to be military necessity . . . [the] job of beating Japan." The editorial continued by discussing the working of the plan. "This seems to be about as fair an arrangement as could be made. With all the care in the world there will be mistakes and injustices in individual cases. But the War Department promises that all such will be rectified as fast as they are called to attention."  

Among those commenting unfavorably was The Boston Post which said on 7 May:

Plan announced by the War Department for cutting the size of the Army . . . undoubtedly . . . [has] been studied by competent Army officers with the view of sending men back to civilian life . . . according to their individual merits.

If this plan . . . were fairly administered no doubt the married men with children, who had been overseas for a long time and had excellent records in combat would get first consideration in being discharged. The question is, however, would that plan be fairly administered?

26. ASF, "ASF Press Conference," not date. WDGPA 370.01 (19 May 45). DRB, TAG.
29. Los Angeles Times, 11 May 45, Sec. II, p. 4.
There is a yawning gap between an Army regulation and the enforcement of an Army regulation. . . .

The present plan . . . is not practical and it is not fair. If it is put into effect it will surely result in discontent in the ranks and bitterness at home. Following Secretary Stimson's 10 May announcement the Post concluded "... it seems to satisfy most of the men in uniform, and that is the most important point." The Associated Press on 14 May carried a statement by Edgar G. Brown, Director of the National Negro Council, which charged that the point system represented "the rankest kind of discrimination" against Negro troops because most were segregated into work and noncombat units and could not receive points for combat work. Brown charged that "Negroes in overseas armies will be last to return home." The Pittsburgh Courier also scored the plan as being unfair to Negro troops.

While some newspapers around the Nation were discussing the fairness and logic of the point system, one paper, the Kansas City Star, sounded a note of warning in an editorial of 20 May 1945, entitled "Bases for Peace." The editorial discussed the United Nations at San Francisco and pointed out that major powers stand:

... with blocks of small nations snuggling up to them for protection. This pattern for the immediate future clearly indicates that the part the United States is to play in the years ahead will depend upon how strong this nation maintains itself in the decade or two following final peace.

If, when the real V-day comes, we start letting our navy, our air force, and our army disintegrate, then our voice for peace in the future will carry little weight. . . .

The direct opposite of this attitude is found in that of the Chicago Daily Tribune. Choosing the proposed number of troops to be retained as a point of attack, the Tribune proceeded, in an editorial of 28 May 1945, to lambast the Army. It charged that men were being kept in service in order to assure retention of temporary rank by officers and pointed out that "... we find our military leaders planning to concentrate against a single enemy more than 11 million men, whereas they decided in 1941 that only 1½ million more men than that were sufficient to fight a two front war on both sides of the globe against six nations and their auxiliaries." The paper went on to suggest that the solution was
simple — confirm the officers in their temporary rank and let the boys out. "The army and its officer hierarchy cannot expect the country to endure without complaint a roster that seems to have less reference to military necessity than to a padded political pay roll in a whoopee era."  

A statement appearing in the New Orleans *Times-Picayune* pretty well summarized the position of most papers at this time: "At best the return and mustering-out process will seem painfully slow to the impatient homefolks. But all of us should keep in mind the fact that the war is far from over and the mighty struggle in the Pacific needs everything we can put into it."

An indication of the public's thinking is often reflected in the results of public opinion polls. One poll published in early May 1945 had posed the question, "After Germany is defeated, do you think American soldiers in Europe who are no longer needed there will be sent home to stay, or do you think most of them will be sent to fight against Japan"? 

- Will be sent to fight Japan: 74%
- Will be sent home to stay: 15%
- No opinion: 11%

Another public opinion poll published in late June asked the question, "Do you think the point system for releasing men from the Army is fair"?

- Yes: 72%
- No: 15%
- No Opinion: 13%

If public opinion polls have anywhere near a high validity, it would be safe to assume that the American people as a whole accepted the point system of discharge early in its operation.

However, by the middle of June there were signs of discontent arising from various groups. One such sign is reflected in a memorandum from the Under Secretary of War to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1:

I have your memorandum of June 12th, relative to Army policy on discharge of personnel.

I have been showered with letters protesting the retention in the Army of men in the upper 30s. The points that are made in these letters are these:

1. Selective Service has announced that, in general, men in the 30s will not be drafted; (2) men in the upper 30s are not

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35. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. It should be noted that the approximately 70% approval is about the same proportion as approved the Selective Service System and about as large as had ever been found on a vital national issue.
as useful to the Army as younger men; (3) these older men are usually not sent overseas and therefore have great difficulty in getting a score of enough points for discharge under the point system; (4) these older men will have a harder time getting jobs in civilian life than is the case with younger men.

These points are all valid. On the other hand, the discharge of men in large numbers merely on the basis of age would tend to disrupt or impair operation of the present "point system."

Mr. Patterson continued by suggesting a way for eventual discharge of men over 37 years of age and concluded: "Action of this sort, taken voluntarily by the War Department, would go far toward taking off the pressure from Congress to release all men of 35 and over."

A world-wide survey of a cross-section of American enlisted men was conducted in late May and early June 1945 by the Army. One of the questions asked was: "In general, what do you think of the Army Score Card plan (the point system)?" The results are shown in Table 4.

Table 4—World-Wide Cross-Section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANSWERS</th>
<th>All men</th>
<th>Men with 85 points and over</th>
<th>Men with less than 85 points</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not good at all</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so good</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly good</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Men with less than 85 points were not eligible for discharge 12 May-2 Sep 45.

ANSWERS BY THEATERS (ALL MEN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANSWERS</th>
<th>Overseas returnees</th>
<th>No overseas service</th>
<th>ETO</th>
<th>MTO</th>
<th>POA</th>
<th>IB</th>
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<tr>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so good</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40. Memo, Patterson for Henry, 19 Jun 45, no sub. WDGPA 370.01, (23 June 45). DRB, TAG.
41. ASF, Progress Report, Sec. 10, Jul 45, sub: "World-Wide Attitudes Toward Further Service and Toward Redeployment." OCMH, Gen Ref Br.
EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILIZATION

ANSWERS BY COLOR (ALL MEN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANSWERS</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Negro</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not good at all</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not so good</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly good</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(For soldier criticism of the point system see Appendix VII.)

"Two Down and One to Go"

Soldier opinion was influenced by a War Department plan to orient each individual on the problems to be faced after Germany's defeat. This program was personally initiated by the Chief of Staff. Remembering the bitter experience of World War I, General Marshall was inflexible in his desire to have a prepared statement on demobilization available for release at such time as hostilities might cease.

Following the 1918 armistice with Germany, troops remaining in this country had been sent home faster than they had been mobilized. This was not true of the overseas forces due mainly to lack of transport. A contemporary historian wrote that men while awaiting transportation home from France had tried to write 'doggerel' that reflected the spirit of the time:

We drove the boche across the Rhine,
The Kaiser from his throne.
Oh, Lafayette, we've paid our debt
For Christ's sake, send us home.42

In late December 1942 and early 1943 the Chief of Staff discussed the matter with Brig. Gen. John McA. Palmer. "I am concerned to have the matter well thought out so that in the event of a sudden armistice the War Department within twelve hours can flash a broad outline of the [demobilization] policy... particularly as to the return of men from distant and isolated overseas stations."43

General Palmer advised the Chief of Staff that he believed that preparation of such a statement was impractical at that time,

43. Memo, Marshall for Palmer, 4 Apr 43, SPD 370.01 (13 Jul 43).
reasoning that there was bound to be a period of "mopping up" and transition between the surrender and the establishment of a peaceful world order. Commenting on the possibility of a partial demobilization, Palmer said, "If Germany should surrender before Japan, this partial demobilization might be in two stages." Thus he concluded that he did not see how such a statement could be prepared until the problem had been "settled how the officers and men for the emergency forces are to be drawn from the existing war army."  

This matter of drafting a statement was further considered until August 1943, at which time the Special Planning Division, which had undertaken several drafts of such a statement, decided to drop the affair for the time being "unless the matter is brought up by higher authority."  

Nothing was done until February 1944 when SPD again attempted to draft a statement, but the War Department's demobilization plan still had not been decided on; the statement therefore could not be written. When the final version of the plan received approval in August 1944, Special Planning Division took the position that any such public statement for issuance by the Chief of Staff "should properly be prepared by the Bureau of Public Relations along with the statement of other War Department officials of that day."  

Early in January 1944 Col. Frank Capra, eminent film director and producer on duty with the Signal Corps, conferred with the Chief of Staff and Brig. Gen. W. E. Tompkins on the advisability of producing films to be used in explaining personnel demobilization. Such an idea had been discussed between officers of the Morale Services Division, ASF, and Special Planning Division sometime in late 1943. The idea was accepted and Special Planning Division on 10 January gave Capra permission to make arrangements to produce such a film based on the regulations which they hoped to send him by 1 February.  

Colonel Capra suggested that there be two films: the first an inspirational message from General Marshall to all officers giving a dramatic opportunity to thank them for their devotion to duty and fine work and to inspire them with the necessity of continuing

44. Memo, Palmer for Marshall, 5 Apr 43. Ibid.
45. Memo, Tompkins for Sexton, 6 Aug 43. Ibid.
46. Memo, SPD for WDBPR, 5 Sep 44, sub: Statement of the CofS. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. SPD Memo for Dir, Army Pictorial Service, Attn: Col Frank Capra, 10 Jan 44, sub: The Employment of Moving Pictures as a Medium for Explaining Personnel Demobilization. SPD 082.2, "Two Down and One to Go" (10 Jan 44).
49. Ibid.
their leadership; the second would be a film explaining all the ramifications of the demobilization program.\textsuperscript{50}

Capra’s memo was referred by General Marshall to the Bureau of Public Relations and Special Planning Division for their views. The former commented that the problem might be better handled if two films were prepared—a demobilization film to be shown to units scheduled for release, and a second type for organizations that would remain as occupational troops or be redeployed to the Pacific.\textsuperscript{51}

General Tompkins took a similar stand. He did not favor the idea of the “inspirational” film for officers but agreed it might be well to have the film on demobilization preceded by a brief one in which the Chief of Staff expressed his appreciation of the European victory. The drawback, though, lay in the fact that the picture could not be completed until some decision had been arrived at regarding the method of release of soldiers, a decision they were then striving to reach.\textsuperscript{52}

Capra began work in March on the first of the two planned films. This one was to generally describe readjustment and redeployment; the second was to be a continuation of the first, to be shown to those men designated as eligible for release, illustrating the separation process and benefits to be offered them by the War Department and civilian governmental agencies.

A rough draft script for the first movie was forwarded to General Marshall on 16 March for his remarks.\textsuperscript{53} In this draft General Marshall was to have appeared throughout most of the 10- to 15-minute film. The Chief of Staff objected, feeling that the film would seem less “canned” if he were only in that part which gave the plan of readjustment, priorities for release, and the War Department decisions thereto.\textsuperscript{54} Marshall also pointed out that the Pacific theater should in no way be relegated to a secondary role in the film but receive equal emphasis, and that lack of shipping should be emphasized as a reason for the slow rate of repatriation of eligible men.\textsuperscript{55} These views were shared by several officers in the Morale Services Division, ASF, the Bureau of Public Relations, and the Army Air Forces.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{50} Memo, Capra for CofS, 10 Jan 44, sub: Outline of Two Demobilization Films. Ibid. A pencilled notation in Marshall’s handwriting attached to this file reads: “I suggested par. 3, [film on demobilization explanation] Capra par 2. [officer film]”

\textsuperscript{51} Memo, Col Stanley Grogan, Actg. Dir, BPR for Sec., 24 Jan 44. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} Memo, Tompkins for Marshall, 27 Jan 44, sub: Personnel Demobilization. Ibid. This decision was not reached until Aug 44.

\textsuperscript{53} Memo, Tompkins for Marshall, 16 Mar 44, sub: Film on the Readjustment of the Army Upon the Defeat of Germany. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Informal notes on memo pad paper of OCS, attached to letter referred to in previous footnote. See also Memo, Tompkins for Capra, 25 Mar 45, same sub. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{56} Pers Ltr, Von Schrader to Capt David Miller, Signal Corps, Photographic Center, Los Angeles, Calif, 23 Mar 44. Ibid.
The battle of terminology had begun. The script went through numerous revisions, each one endeavoring to incorporate the comments received from interested agencies on the previous draft. The over-all theme of the film remained, but agencies devoted their criticism to choice of words, phraseology, and an effort to see that their own major force was not over shadowed by another.

Owing to the peculiarities of the Air Forces’ plans in the readjustment and redeployment scheme, it was decided to have Gen. H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces, narrate that portion of the film that dealt with AAF readjustment and redeployment. In the final version General Somervell appeared in the film to emphasize the ASF part, and the obvious omission of Army Ground Forces was remedied by the inclusion of Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair to speak to the men of his command.

Once the film had been produced, General Marshall sought a distribution system that would insure that all personnel, even those on the remotest station, would see the film soon after the day proclaimed for its release. In addition to Army-wide circulation, the Chief of Staff sought a similar distribution for civilian theaters. But the general was insistent that every precaution be taken to prevent premature disclosure. It was decided that Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Company, selected by the film industry to distribute this picture, would hold 400 prints under seal in its various exchange centers. Strict instructions were to be given by the president of the company that these seals would not be broken until the word of release was given by the Chief of Staff. These prints could then be “delivered to ‘first run’ theaters for exhibition within a maximum of 24 hours after such release date.” Moreover, two weeks after the release date an additional 350 prints could be directed to civilian theaters after they had completed their circuit of Army installations. It was estimated that on this basis “... 50% of the ultimate total attendance will be served within the first month of release; 95% within 3 months of release; and the balance within 4 months.”

It was contemplated that overseas Army-wide distribution would be handled by Air Transport Command shipment under seal to film exchanges and training film libraries. Theater commanders were to be advised of all shipments and requested to release the picture on advice from Washington. Troops in the Zone of Interior would be covered by prints circulated by the commercial film distributor and Service Command Central Film Libraries.

57. Memo, Tompkins for Marshall, 5 Oct 44, sub: Demobilization Motion Picture.  
58. Ibid.  
59. Ibid.
Special Planning Division's memorandum to the Chief of Staff, 5 October 1944, outlining the distribution plan, recommended a pre-release of the film to overseas planning staffs and the publication of a War Department Circular to insure expeditious handling of the film. The memorandum was approved by Marshall, 60 but the General expressed his concern that copies of the film would go to the isolated garrisons and posts. It was his idea that this film was so important that all copies of it should be in continuous use from early morning until late at night on the day of release and in the days following; special means of transportation should be used to transport copies from place to place; 61 furthermore, when the time came, there was to be no delay in showings because of print shortages. 62

The Special Planning Division prepared a draft circular, covering the handling and showing of the film, directing the most expeditious screening, and giving this precedence over all other troop activities except combat. 63 It also forwarded a draft of a proposed radio to all theater and continental commands for release of the film on the specified day.

General Marshall was not satisfied with the proposed circular, feeling it needed a statement to the effect that immediate showing of the film after the armistice would be a vital stimulus to morale. The idea would be to show it in a matter of a few hours, or at most a few days. Any delay beyond that would render it ineffective. He realized that the circular, of necessity, was rather general, but he expressed his desire that Tompkins "keep a close eye on this matter personally and see to it that nothing is spared to insure immediate showing to our troops everywhere. For example, I consider this exhibition of sufficient importance to justify the use of a special airplane to carry prints from island garrison to island garrison in the Aleutians." 64

The Special Planning Division submitted another version of the circular, which also was rejected by the Chief of Staff on the grounds that it was too routine and "might easily be misunderstood—or rather overlooked, by some individual with most unfortunate consequences." 65 No reference was made to sealing the films or parking them at especially isolated stations.

A third version, dated 20 October 1944, was accepted by the General ten days later. In this communication SPD recommended that, though a War Department circular's wide distribution was

60. Memo, Col Pasco for Tompkins, 18 Oct 44. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Inked note, Col McCarthy to Texter, no date. Ibid.
63. Memo, Tompkins for CofS, 20 Oct 44. Ibid.
64. Memo, Marshall for Tompkins, 22 Oct 45. Ibid.
deemed necessary, a personal letter from Marshall attached to a
copy of the circular should go to all theater commanders em-
phasizing the Chief of Staff’s special interest in the project. With
a few minor changes, he accepted SPD’s idea.  

The Adjutant General was directed to issue instructions [War
Department Circular No. 428, 2 November 1944]. General Mar-
shall sent personal letters to his theater commanders expressing
his concern over expeditious handling, complete coverage, and
security, prior to release date. These were dispatched from his
office on 11 November 1944.

As a supplement to the film, it was proposed to publish a small
pamphlet under the same title, “Two Down and One to Go,” to be
given to each soldier when he saw the film. This booklet was
to emphasize and clarify the whole readjustment program. The
preparation of the booklet was begun in February 1945, but was
not completed until early May. The defeat of Germany came so
suddenly that the War Department was not prepared to distribute
the booklets on a world-wide scale with the film, thus defeating
the original purpose of the pamphlet as far as some overseas areas
were concerned.

In addition to the film and its accompanying booklet, it was
planned to discuss the demobilization and readjustment scheme
in the Information and Education orientation hour. An Army
Talk entitled “The Army Plan For Redeployment and Readjust-
ment” was prepared and distributed in the Western Hemisphere
as a special V-E Day issue. This Army Talk was used as a basis
of discussion even though the soldiers had seen the film, “Two
Down and One To Go.” Thus the readjustment and redeployment
plan was explained to the soldier by three media:

1. Film “Two Down and One To Go”;
2. Pamphlet “Two Down and One To Go”;
3. Army Orientation Hour.

In the world-wide survey conducted in late May and early June
1945 other questions were asked a cross-section of enlisted men
in addition to the one shown in Table 4. These dealt principally
with soldier reaction toward the Army’s scheme of informing
the soldier on the subject of readjustment and redeployment and
on the point system. Below are listed some of the principal re-
actions.

When asked if they (enlisted men) had received some official
Army explanation of the redeployment and readjustment plan
(even as late as two to four weeks after its announcement), the
following results were obtained:

83% said they had seen the film “Two Down and One To Go.”

43% said they had read the pamphlet “Two Down and One to Go.”* (An additional 20 percent said they had seen the pamphlet but had not read it.)

43% said they had heard the plan fully explained in an Army Orientation Hour. (An additional 15 percent said it was mentioned but not fully explained in their orientation hour.)

There was some variation in information coverage from theater to theater at the time of the survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Seeing or Hearing Some</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reading Pamphlet</td>
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<td>Orientation Hour</td>
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<td>IB</td>
<td>89</td>
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</table>

*x Distribution of the pamphlet was not begun in IB until after the survey was completed.

xx This question was not asked in IB since previous studies had indicated that few men received regular orientation hours.

Note. The European Theater ranked lowest in both the percentage of men seeing the film and the proportion who heard orientation. This theater played the most prominent part in the readjustment and redeployment program before the defeat of Japan.

Another question was asked troops stationed in the United States who had seen the film: “How good a job do you think the film Two Down and One to Go does in explaining the . . . plan.”

Percentage that saw the film

| Very good job | 64 |
| Fairly good job | 31 |
| Pretty poor job | 4 |
| Very poor job | 1 |
| Total | 100 |

By late June 1945 the Special Planning Division was considering the possibility of preparing such a film as “Two Down and One to Go” for use in explaining the personnel demobilization plan to be used after Japan’s defeat. The proposed film would be shown to both military personnel and the general public. The

*In the ETO the pamphlet was distributed as a supplement to “Stars and Stripes.”

67. ASF I&E Report No. B-160, 24 Jul 45, sub: “Two Down and One to Go.” (Copy located in author’s file.)
Commanding Generals of the Army Air, Ground, and Service Forces and continental defense commands, and the theater commanders were requested to express their opinion by 1 August as to the "efficacy of 'Two Down and One to Go' and their recommendations with regard to the preparation of a similar picture in explanation of the forthcoming personnel readjustment plan. . . ." 68

Although replies were received during July as requested, they arrived too late for the preparation of a new film. However, the answers are important for historical and future planning purposes. In general, comments received from the zone of the interior and less active commands and bases were very favorable and those received from theaters and other commands that had seen combat operations were less favorable and sometimes critical. 69 The following are taken from some of the answers and represent the divergence of views:

. . . it is believed that the picture . . . was of material value in presenting to the American soldier and the public a picture of the situation as it existed after the defeat of Germany . . . .

It is recommended that a picture be prepared for showing after the defeat of Japan. [Army Ground Forces]

. . . the use of this film was valuable for the following reasons: . . . [it] met an urgent need for authentic information. . . .

Principle criticisms . . . are the following:

. . . it was frequently released to civilian audiences before military personnel had an opportunity to see it. . . . Newspaper publicity in advance of the film deprived it of freshness and some instances offered conflict in minor points of information . . . [it] did not sufficiently emphasize 'military necessity' as having first priority . . . did not give adequate attention to probable delays in discharging men. . . . [Army Service Forces]

. . . [the] film was an accurate and effective presentation of the . . . plan, but . . . it placed insufficient emphasis on . . . military necessity . . . in active theaters. As a result, there was distinctly detrimental lowering of morale when releases were necessarily delayed due to lack of replacements and to the immediacy of tactical demands. [Sixth Army]

The reaction to the film . . . was uniformly wholesome and realistic. . . . The film would have been more effective had it not been for the following circumstances:

. . . Radio and press releases . . . had partially educated the

68. AG Ltr to CG's, AGMP-M 062.2 (26 Jun 45) OB-P-WDCSA, 26 Jun 45, sub: Motion Picture, "Two Down and One to Go." WDSSP 062.2 (10 Jan 44) Pt 2. DRB, TAG.

69. The replies have been taken from the file cited in n. 68, above.
soldier concerning the point system prior to the showing of the picture. Generally these releases stressed the number of points that would be needed for discharge, and the estimated number of men eligible for release.

These news releases, which have continued to be circulated, did much to encourage the wishful thinking the film was designed to eliminate. . . . emphasis was not placed on . . . plans to marshall every soldier and every piece of equipment that could be used . . . to speed victory over Japan. [Twentieth Air Force]

. . . the film was a considerable aid in insuring a full, authoritative understanding. Taken in conjunction with the great volume of explanatory publicity which accompanied the release of the plan, the film insured complete comprehension of both the mechanics . . . and military consideration. . . . [Greenland Base Command]

The Carribean Defense Command recommended that any future films include: "Spanish dialogue or Spanish subtitles. . . ."

A research survey conducted in this theater showed that military personnel who say the film . . . had a slightly better idea of redeployment and the . . . point system than those who did not. . . . It also made more of them realize that military necessity might require men with . . . scores higher than the critical average to remain in the theater as Category I troops or be sent to the Pacific for duty. . . . The efficacy . . . was not great, but the beneficial results would seem to be sufficient. . . . [European Theater of Operations]

All recommendations received were unanimous that a film somewhat similar to "Two Down and One to Go" should be prepared to assist in explaining the personnel demobilization plan to be used after Japan's defeat. These replies differed as to the methods to be employed in explaining the plan. Commanders insisted, however, that any supplementary literature that might accompany the proposed film should be available at the time of projection and should not arrive later as had been the case of the pamphlet "Two Down and One to Go."

Pre V-J Day Reaction

The first rumblings of discontent with the Army's partial demobilization and redeployment plan were beginning to make themselves heard by the end of June 1945. Pressure was exerted within the executive branch of the government. Groups both organized and unorganized were exerting pressure on the Congress and the Army to obtain modifications in the Army's personnel
demobilization plan. There was also discontent within and without the Army from groups complaining that the plan was not being fairly applied.

A Senator wrote the War Department and transmitted a letter written by "a former student of mine" [now an officer]:

Dear Senator . . . :

I have several questions. . . . Let there be no mistake about this complaint. I hold no brief for my own case as officers' demobilization depends primarily on military necessity and not upon points. However, the thousands of men who mentally join with me herein should be entitled to some long-awaited consideration. The questions follow:

1. [Who in ground forces was consulted on the plan's fairness? Doubts if combat troops were polled.]

2. [Accuses the Army of misinforming public with] . . . misleading statements on how plan favors the combat infantrymen. . . .

. . . it is a distortion of fact to state that the combatant is thereby favored, as less than 10% of those men receive awards regardless of the hazards or merits of their services. . . .

3. Likewise, the points (5) for participation in campaigns are available to service as well as combat troops. . . . Therefore, for all practical purpose, combatants are not favored. . . .

[No points are given for the combat infantry badge.]

4. Why are 12 points given for each dependent child under 18 years of age (up to 3 children)? True, from an economic standpoint, perhaps men with children should be first demobilized to facilitate employment. If that is the reason, why not discharge all men with children and disregard the other factors? [Twelve points is too much.] . . . Many men in my company have 37 months overseas now, and the majority and the balance have 28 months. Other comparative newcomers with 10 or 15 months overseas and a child or two, will be discharged first. . . . Simple mathematics will prove the point. . . .

[Proposes what he believes to be an equitable modification to the plan.]

In closing, let me add that there is not one of us who wants to shirk his duty. If military necessity so dictates, we will stay until the end, but if military conditions permit discharge of combat troops, it should be upon the democratic and equitable basis of first demobilizing those who have contributed the most to the common cause. . . .

70. File AG 370.01, Case 2 (13 Jun 45). DRB, TAG.
A staff Sergeant serving with an Army Air Forces Service Group wrote his Senator:

... A man who does the engine changes on our planes is in the Service Group and gets no stars, but the man who drives the gas truck to fuel the planes is in the Bomb Group and gets four (4) stars. A man who keeps a 2½ ton truck of the Service Group in top condition to haul bombs and other vital needs [sic] rates no stars; a man who keeps a 2½ ton truck of the Bomb Group in top condition to haul these very same needs rates four (4). A man who cooks and serves meat in the consolidated mess hall on Tuesday is in the Bomb Group and for his participation is given a two paragraph commendation which for discharge credit is worth less than the paper on which it is mimeographed. A Bomb Group man in headquarters is handed 20 points; a Service Group man at the next desk, doing the same work, is handed, it would seem, a gold braided TS [Army slang meaning tough situation] ticket. Communications supplies and food, flight control, technical shops AD INFINITUM depend on the Service Group man but apparently all those things are quite unimportant. ...

A constituent wrote her Congressman and suggested:

... In all fairness to those men who are over thirty five [sic] years old, many of whom are husbands and fathers, and who have been in the service over two years, I am asking why not put through a bill which would automatically release all men over thirty five [sic] years of age, who do not volunteer for more overseas service, and place them back in U.S. Service, where they can once more, at intervals at least see their love ones, [sic] and give their much needed advice in home problems, which have been a great hardship in many cases. ...

An Army corporal wrote to a member of the Senate:

I am writing you in regard to the point system, and its chances for a discharge. Regarding it’s fairness, I think it a long ways from being fair. This is not only my opinion, but almost every GI you talk to, so when you read that old baloney about it is the way that the GI’s wanted it, then it burns you up, as I have not yet run into a GI that was ever asked before the point system was put into effect.

[He proceeds by praising the English system for discharge as being ‘fair.’ He complains that the men in the states are receiving better treatment and are rarely inducted over 33. (The corporal was 37 years of age, had 2½ years service with 18 months overseas). More credit should be given for overseas

71. File AG 370.01, Case 6 (8 Jun 45). Ibid.
72. File AG 370.01, Case 2 (19 Jun 45). Ibid.
there are several million physically fit men between the ages of 23 and 40 in the U.S. that are holding down good jobs. They say they are essential, and I guess they are, but all of us would be glad to change places with them, and be glad to work for our room and board just to go home. . . . We have put in our time, now it is their turn. We can make the munitions, planes, tanks, as well as they can.

* * * * * * * * * * *

Mr. [Senator’s name] . . . we want to come home and now. It can be done, and should be done. . . .

In the middle of July a syndicated newspaper columnist lambasted the demobilization, charging the Army Air Forces with letting out hundreds of lieutenants while enlisted men with the required points sat in the Army and waited. He also pointed an accusing finger at the number of generals in the Army, at the practice of retaining men of 40, and at the principle of holding men, regardless of points, who were declared “essential.”

This article, published as it was while the war was still in progress and before the demobilization plan had been given a fair trial, was particularly dangerous because the column was carried in papers throughout the country and thus influenced a great many people.

In late June and July pressure was brought to bear on the Army by some members of Congress, industrial groups, and various governmental agencies to release men in the upper 30’s age group and in certain industrial categories. These men, if released, could be used to fill labor shortages in the coal mines, railroads, textile mills, hard-rock metal mines, tire factories, and about forty other industries. The largest pressure centered about railroad workers and coal miners then in the Army.

The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission wrote to Secretary of War Stimson in late June:

At a meeting called this week by the War Manpower Commission and attended by representative of the Office of Defense Transportation, Railroad Retirement Board, Association of Railway Executives and Association of American Railroads, the information developed confirmed the views of all in attendance that the heavy load of troop movements and war freight for the Pacific War cannot be successfully sustained without manpower assistance of immediate and extraordinary nature. This meeting was called as a result of a discussion on the acute manpower shortage of the western railroads. . . .

Of the several solutions proposed, all were in accord with one

73. File AG 370.01, Case 3 (16 Jun 45). Ibid.
EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILIZATION

proposal, that the War Manpower Commission request the War Department to give consideration to the immediate demobilization of soldiers who were formerly railroad employees, eligible for release under the point system so as to make them available as quickly as possible to the jobs for which they are so urgently needed in railroad work. These include such occupations as...

Secretary Stimson stood by on his policy of not allowing exceptions* and replied to the War Manpower Commission:

... The immediate demobilization, however, of soldiers who were former employees in a particular industry or activity, eligible under the point system of discharge, is not considered consistent with current... policy.

... military personnel with railroad experience are scattered all over the world and their immediate demobilization, because of the mechanics involved, would not be possible.

Stimson’s letter to the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission did not settle the matter of immediately releasing all former railroad workers who were eligible for discharge consideration. Shortly afterwards the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation charged that the War Department had not properly coordinated with him the transportation of soldiers returned from Europe who were to be eventually redeployed to the Pacific Front. In addition, the War Department was not cooperating in releasing former railroad workers who were eligible for discharge.

The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was requested to appear before the Senate’s Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program for a hearing on various phases of the war transportation problem. There he reiterated his charges that the Army had not kept him properly informed on numbers of troops to be returned to this country. He had asked the Army, with the approval of the War Manpower Commission, to furlough 10,000 troops, but they had only agreed to furnish 4,000. After this the military had given fine cooperation but only about 2,500 had reported to the railroads and of that number approximately 1,000 had no railroad experience.

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75. Ltr, Paul V. McNutt to Henry L. Stimson, 23 Jun 45. 370.01 (demob) (23 Jun 45). GRS, TAG.

*The Army had just previously consented (10 June) to furlough 4,000 men for a 30-day period for work on railroads.

76. Ltr, Stimson to McNutt, 7 Jul 45. Ibid.

77. Ltr, Fred M. Vinson to SW, 18 Jul 45. Copy in Hearings... Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program United States Senate (Hereafter cited as the Meade Committee), 79th Cong.: “Investigation of the National Defense Program,” Pt 31, p. 14883, Exhibit 1479.

78. Ltr, James M. Meade and Rudolph Healey to Col J. Monroe Johnson, 18 Jul 45. Copy in Meade Committee Hearings, Pt 31, p. 14873, Exhibit 1478.

79. See Meade Committee Hearings, Pt 31, pp. 14886-14887.
War Department presented its side of the story and admitted that it had not previously (in May and June) given the detailed information to the Office of Defense Transportation that was now (in July) being furnished. The committee proceeded and heard the War Department’s views on releasing former railroad workers who were eligible for discharge. During this part of the hearing the chairman criticized the military by stating that the Army should not refuse requests for manpower by “saying we can’t even discharge those who are eligible under the point system.” The Army spokesman testified that the War Department wanted to maintain the “integrity of the discharge system.” If an exception was made to one industry, then the Army would be criticized for not doing the same for others. This long and involved hearing was finally ended when all the government agencies concerned agreed on the suggestion of the committee chairman to coordinate manpower problems more closely. However, the publicity given the matter did not increase the prestige of the military.

At the same time the Army was also on the defensive because of the coal mining manpower shortage. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, acting in his additional capacity as Solid Fuels Administrator insisted that the only solution lay with the Army and that the military was the only source whereby miners could be obtained. Ickes contended that there would be a shortage of coal both for domestic consumption and for use in restoring the economy of Europe unless the Army released 30,000 ex-miners by 1 October. However, the Solid Fuels Administration readily admitted that if ex-coal miners were released from the Army there was no guarantee they would return to the mines. The Deputy Administrator cited several examples to prove his point. A joint resolution was introduced in the Congress that provided for the immediate release of 10,000 ex-miners then eligible under the point score plan and the furlough of 20,000 additional miners. The Acting Secretary of War immediately objected and stuck by the Army’s policy of not favoring industrial groups. The official organ of the United Mine Workers commented:

Under Secretary of War Patterson has fought the proposal all the way. He has insisted from the very start that if the Army released coal miners from service the entire point discharge
system would break down under pressure from other industrial groups.

The brass hats and burrocrats [sic] cannot be made to comprehend the necessity for adequate facilities and manpower on the home front to keep the Army and Navy in motion on the battlefront... The attitude of Patterson has evidently resulted from the failure of the War Department to achieve its pet work—service legislation which would have regimented the American workers.\textsuperscript{88}

An agreement between the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the Army, the War Manpower Commission, and other interested government agencies provided that the Army would rush the release of ex-coal miners in the United States who were eligible under the point system. Other points of agreement were obtained but they are not pertinent to this study. Again the \textit{United Mine Workers Journal} commented in an editorial:

John W. Snyder, director of the Office of War Mobilization has come through with a program which merely proposes a faster release of miners from the armed forces. But the Army as usual will go ahead and do as it damn pleases for the simple reason, as has been demonstrated over and over again, that the Army can always find a way to evade orders from any Government agency as well as the United States Congress, whenever it desires to do so.\textsuperscript{89}

The agreement to hasten the discharge of ex-miners, coupled with the sudden capitulation of Japan, seemed to remove the question of their release as a major problem of the Army. The joint resolution was never voted on and finally was removed from the congressional calendar in the spring of 1946.

The War Department by late July was very much awake to the fact that it had become the target of attack from several groups. The Under Secretary, recognizing this situation, informed the Deputy Chief of Staff:

There are at the present time thousands of men with more than 85 points at posts, camps and stations in this country who are being retained in the Army to perform routine tasks of little or no importance, retained on the excuse that there is no replacement immediately available and that the tables of organization entitle the unit to such a man. I can think of no situation more calculated to destroy the confidence of the soldiers, the public and Congress in the integrity of our merit system for dis-


charges. Unless this situation is speedily corrected, we shall be unable to hold the line against pressure for changes in the discharge system to give weight to age, occupational skills, etc.

I know that both you and General Marshall are determined to see to it that nothing stands in the way of the release from the Army of those men who have earned the right to leave through long and dangerous service overseas. We owe it to our troops and to the public to live up to the promise we have made, even if it means some temporary inconvenience at some military posts in the Zone of Interior. I do not underestimate the many serious problems involved in finding replacements for those men who are genuinely essential, but this description must not be applied to men cutting grass, washing windows, driving staff cars or doing other relatively unimportant jobs.90

The Deputy Chief of Staff very quickly informed the Under Secretary that this matter had been under discussion for over a month.* Early in July a directive had been issued to the three major commands stressing the fact that enlisted men retained temporarily for military necessity must be used efficiently. Secondly the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, was making use of a board of officers, then inspecting installations, to determine how high-score men were being used. Thirdly, the three major commands had submitted their programs for releasing high-point men then on operating jobs, but only the plan of Army Ground Forces had been found acceptable; the whole problem of release of eligibles could not be completed until June of 1946 because there weren’t sufficient low-score personnel in the country to meet operating needs. Finally, the Inspector General had been directed to make a survey to see if commanders in lower echelons were conforming with the spirit of War Department directives pertaining to essentiality of job assignments, “and what additional measures . . . should be taken to insure that high point men are not retained in the service to perform non-essential duties.”91

The Deputy Chief of Staff took additional steps by adding this warning at the next meeting of the General Council [paraphrase]:

... this is open season for attacks on the Army by a number of civilian groups and individuals . . . these groups have little or no responsibility for the conduct of the war. [They believe that the end of the European phases] terminated the war, or

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90. Memo, USW for D CofS, 24 Jul 45, no sub. WDCSA 370.01, Sec IV, Case 45, DRB, TAG.

*General Marshall believed that the “Failure to discharge all eligible personnel at the earliest possible date will not only result in a loss of confidence by the soldier in the Army, but will also develop an unfavorable opinion which could well result in a loss of the good will built up by the Army in its successful campaigns.” General Council Minutes, 14 May 45.

91. Memo, Handy to USW, no date, no sub. Ibid.
they completely lack conception of the magnitude of the tasks facing us. [We should] see that our house is in order and that we keep it in order.

[There has been pressure to release] airplane pilots, doctors, railroad men and miners, [A small number of doctors will be released along with railroad men having scores of 85 or above] ... are being shipped home and released as rapidly as possible. This will assist Pacific redeployment. The Under Secretary of War has agreed to expedite discharge of coal miners in the United States having a score of 85 or more.

* * * * * * *

The best way to prevent additional pressures is to make certain that no man who is eligible for discharge is retained on duty in the United States a day longer than is absolutely necessary. . . . There must be a definite requirement for the skill of the individual and that skill should be necessary to effect redeployment.92

The War Department, recognizing that enlisted men with eighty-five or more points and stationed in the United States constituted a special morale problem, made a survey among a cross-section of these men late in July. The results of this survey showed that 80 percent of the enlisted men in the United States with over eighty-five points thought the system of discharge was a good one, but of this number 66 percent thought the Army was not carrying out the plan well; 58 percent of these men in the Army Air Force and 33 percent in the other two commands reported that their officers had not given them any reason for the delay in separation; only 7 percent in Air Forces and 13 percent in AGF and ASF had been given a reason for delay which they accepted as justifiable. The zone of interior survey showed that there was very little criticism of favoritism or partiality on the part of unit commanders in using the discharge system. Another significant result disclosed that:

Company grade officers of the units containing one or more men with at least eighty-five points, when queried, tend to admit that they themselves do not know what the story is or tend to be critical of current policies. Half of the officers think shortage of replacements is a factor, and a fourth of the officers think "no real effort is being made" to get replacements. A fourth of the officers also think that discharge of eighty-five point men is being delayed "because unit commanders are trying to hold their good men." In free comments officers are partic-

ularly critical of the alleged lack of clear statement of policies and alleged local abuses of "essentiality."\textsuperscript{93}

In addition to surveying the cross-section of enlisted men on prepared questions, each man was also asked to write in his own comments. The following are samples:

I thought the point system was very good prior to May 12. Since my discharge was turned down I am completely disgusted with the Army. Any rookie that can type poorly can replace me. What does the word essential mean? As I said before, I know a lot who are called essential here that could be replaced by unexperienced men. Why hold us, I've been overseas 39 months, then I get a dirty deal like this.

* * * * * * * * *

My officers say they haven't been authorized to release any one. I think somebody is pulling a fast one. There are 30 men in my Co. all of whom have over 100 points and no effort has been made to release any of them.

* * * * * * * * *

The point system is fine but the "essential" business sure knocks the heck out of it. A lot of us are stuck. Any 15 year old could do what I'm doing and learn it in 2 or 3 days. I have plenty of points but am classified essential and held. Certainly something should be done about men being called essential.

* * * * * * * * *

My MOS keeps me in but most of us here with 85 points or over aren't doing a damn thing except waiting to get out. I don't intend to do a damn thing for the Army, for I am convinced my job is not important enough to warrant my being held over.

* * * * * * * * *

I've been replaced six weeks ago and the other day I was interviewed to be reassigned again. For some unknown reason this camp doesn't like to release men. When you do try to find the reason you run up against a stone wall.

* * * * * * * * *

All any soldier knows is what he reads in papers and hears on radios. So I have to believe the separation centers are too crowded at the present time. But that can continue indefinitely.

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Too much stress is being placed on MOS titles. Classifications are made to fit the TO not the actual duty assignments.

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\textsuperscript{93} ASF, I&E Rpt No. B-164, 31 Jul 45, sub: "Attitudes Toward Demobilization Operations." (Copy located in author's file.)
I have 92 points and have just been laying on my a—for three months doing nothing.

* * * * * * * *

I think things stink as far as this Service Command is concerned. In plain words, I think we are taking a general f—— because other service commands let men out. But what can we small people do about it?

* * * * * * * *

The officers in my company are not interested whether men with critical scores get out or not.94

* * * * * * * *

Shortly after this poll of enlisted men had been made The Inspector General conducted the survey on the use of enlisted men for military necessity that had been directed by the Deputy Chief of Staff. The report of The Inspector General presented the demobilization operations of the Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Service Forces separately because each force had different problems.95

The Army Ground Forces had from the beginning delegated to subordinate commands the responsibility of deciding what personnel was to be separated. Essentiality was based on the availability or the necessity for suitable replacements, and as a result of these policies the Ground Forces had been able to separate high-score personnel very rapidly. In the command’s favor was the fact that only a small number of ground troops were classified as possessing critical skills listed by the War Department for retention. Most of the soldiers retained for reasons of military necessity were used as instructors at replacement training centers and the work done by them produced “obvious military result.”96

The Army Air Forces' problem was entirely different. Just prior to Germany’s defeat the Air Forces had approximately 200,000 men in the United States who were qualified for movement to ports and had never been overseas. Since combat personnel had been rotated back to this country throughout the war, Air Force commands now had to send their low-score men overseas to replace high-point men that were eligible for discharge on their return home. At the same time the Air Force was only allowed

94. Ibid.
95. Memo, TIG for D/CofS, 31 Aug 45, sub: Use of Enlisted Men for Military Necessity. WDCSA 370.01, Sec IV Case 45. DBB, TAG. While the survey was being conducted a decision was reached that all male and female enlisted personnel having attained the then critical score should be sent to separation centers for discharge not later than 31 Aug 45. Only four MOS's were made exception to this. This went into effect 15 Aug 45 and made an appreciable difference in the conclusions of The Inspector General.
96. Ibid.
one-half enough inductees to fill Zone of the Interior operating jobs. Therefore, a large number of men returning from overseas and eligible for discharge consideration had to be held in the service. This was accomplished by making approximately two-thirds of all Air Force Military Occupational Specialties “essential.” The Commanding General maintained centralized control over total number of separations giving discharge quotas to major subordinate commands, who in turn allocated them to bases and other installations. Thus each installation commander was allowed to report for separation no more eligibles than were required to fill his quota. If he had less than the specified quota, he still could not report personnel with less than eighty-five points. Centralized control had placed local commanders in an almost untenable situation. The most glaring example was found at Sioux Falls Air Base where 23,000 overseas veterans, many of them eligible for discharge consideration, had been assembled. In the air base overhead were also about 600 eligibles, yet the total quota for separations for the month of August was only 100.\textsuperscript{97}

The Inspector General’s report continued by stating that similar cases (but not in such large numbers) were found at other Air Force installations. If the base commander could not report sufficient men for discharge, he then of necessity had to assign them to non-essential jobs. The majority of men were aware that they weren’t being used as specialists because of military necessity.

The policy of the Army Service Forces for the separation of personnel was different from the other two commands. In addition to the War Department list of 19 military occupational specialties that were to be retained in the service, this command had added, at least temporarily, sixteen more. This temporary list contained such “skills” as cooks, clerks, drivers, and military police because such personnel would be needed in redeploying and discharging troops. The process of determining the essentiality of the individual was left to each service commander. Only one service command released eligible personnel on the basis of need. The remaining 8 commands arbitrarily kept all men whose military occupational specialties were on the War Department essential list and on the ASF temporary list. In addition, if a man’s primary specialty was not on the list but his secondary one was, or if his primary one was related to a MOS on either list, he would be retained because of military necessity. For example, first sergeants were retained because they had usually been company clerks at one time or another. A non-commissioned officer was retained because his specialty was related to either a duty non-com or an administrative NCO. Unfortunately, many of the

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
Service Force men retained because of military necessity were assigned to separation activities where they often came into contact and assisted in the separation of enlisted men having adjusted service ratings much lower than theirs. Generally, the problem as viewed by Army Service Forces commanders was a manpower one. To the commander a job of cutting grass, cooking, driving, or being a clerk was one of military necessity, but to the soldier with 120 to 140 points it was “getting a dirty deal” or “being kicked around.” The Inspector General pointed out some examples, “... one corporal with a Silver Star was found driving a garbage truck, and a private with two Purple Hearts was discovered tending a hot water heater in a WAC barrack. Practically every man interviewed at a ASF installation was disgruntled over his treatment. ... In fact, everything considered, they appeared more of a detriment to the service than an asset.”

The problem of the different interpretations of the plan was linked closely with that of the actual separation of the men. After a local installation commander in the Zone of the Interior declared a man available for discharge to the separation center serving his post, it would take from ten to forty-five days before the discharge would be issued. This was due to a number of factors such as an over-load on a particular separation activity and lack of personnel to accommodate peak loads. Thus the eligible soldier would sit and gripe and “cuss” Army “red tape.” Another cause of resentment among men having been sent from their ZI unit to a separation center was that they couldn’t be discharged before their old outfit and buddies with the accompanying parade and commendations.

The Inspector General made three conclusions. These were:

(1) That the manner in which the point system operated up to and including 15 August 1945 was not equitable, and subject to a considerable amount of justifiable criticism.

(2) That future discharges should be in accordance with one War Department policy, including not only the number of points required for separation but also the period of time in which those separations should be accomplished.

(3) That the discharge of eligible personnel on duty within the Zone of Interior should be accomplished by local commanders, leaving Separation Centers the task of discharging from the service those individuals returned directly from overseas.

August was a month of much celebration because of victory over Japan and the end of World War II hostilities. But before V-J Day actually came, additional pressures were being brought to...
bear on the War Department. Parents were beginning to wonder why their sons weren't returning at once; why troops continued to be redeployed from Europe to the Pacific; and why soldiers with no overseas duty were not being sent to the Pacific to replace combat veterans. Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D-Colo.) launched a violent attack against what he called Army hoarding. On 5 August, the New York Times ran an article on a letter from Johnson to Stimson requesting immediate reduction of the Army. The article, which revealed the extremely critical attitude of the Senator, repeated his statement that there was "a widespread feeling in Congress and in the country now that the War Department is tenaciously holding millions of men it does not need and whom it cannot use."  

On 8 August, a column in the Times presented the Army's side of the case pointing out that Congress had actually approved the Army's plans when it had appropriated money to implement them.

Early in August 1945 the Chicago Daily Tribune failed to see the necessity of a long occupation and declared that the "burocracy [phonetic spelling] can be counted upon to delay demobilization." On 23 August an editorial in the Tribune stated that the final say as to who may be demobilized belonged to the Army. The editorial was inspired by the efforts of some members of the 95th Division to avoid going to Japan. The editorial said, among other things: "As between all these different claimants, General Marshall and the War Department are more capable to judge than any civilian. . . . Whatever it is, it will be unpopular with the men who have to stay in, and their friends and relatives." This attitude of approval did not last long, however; on 28 August there appeared an editorial entitled "Has the Army Heard of Peace?" which accused the Army of keeping huge occupation forces unnecessarily.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer commented editorially on the protest of some members of the 95th Division, saying:

104. The WW II Commanding General of the 95th Division recalled in Jan 51, "After the Division's arrival in the U.S. there was a continuous and growing opposition to being ordered to the Pacific. A very disturbing situation arose approaching open sedition and mutiny. The principal disturbing elements were centered among high-point men who had been transferred into the Division prior to departure from Germany. These men openly and vigorously expressed the view that they had come home for discharge—that they had done their share of fighting the war, and it was the turn of those who had not had overseas service to do their bit. This most difficult situation, in my opinion, was attributable directly to the system of demobilization by individuals." Demobilization Questionnaire completed by Maj Gen Harry L. Twaddle, USA-Ret, 29 Jan 51. HIS 350.05 Spec Stu, Demob (25 Jan 51). OCMH.
106. Ibid., 28 Aug 45, p. 10.
The impatience of the members of the 95th to return to civilian life is understood by everyone. However, military assignments cannot be the subject of plebiscites. If this were done, there would be no army. There is hardly a man in uniform who could not build a strong case for exempting himself from further duty.107

And even earlier, on 16 August 1945, the Plain Dealer, anticipating the growing pressure for returning men home, had warned: "It behooves all of us to keep our shirts on and not be swayed by short sighted or demagogue appeals to disband the Army and scrap the Navy now that hostilities have ended."108

Quite a different view was taken by The Wheeling Intelligencer. Claiming that the development of the atomic bomb required complete revision of national defences, the Intelligencer said that a large Army was no longer needed and "it seems the height of folly to talk about peace-time conscription, the training and maintenance of a vast reserve of fighting men who could be blown into oblivion in a few seconds' time by half a dozen men in an airplane."109

At the end of August 1945 the Army of the United States had a total strength in excess of 8 million, largely composed of officers and men who had left civilian occupations to assume military duties that were regarded as merely temporary. Many a soldier thought these duties were now concluded and felt that he should be permitted to return home as speedily as possible. Immediately before the surrender of Japan, the Regular Army consisted of less than 16,000 officers and enlisted men (including ground, air, and service forces). The total number of men under current three-year enlistment was less than 100.110 At the same time the Navy had approximately 300,000 men (excluding non-regular enlistees) under voluntary enlistment.111 Out of a total Marine Corps strength of approximately 485,000 when Japan surrendered, "there were 71,640 Marines serving under current four-year regular enlistments."112 The Army entered a very critical period of

110. WD TAG STM, 1 Aug 47, pp. 69 and 74. Although Congress had passed a law allowing the Army to enlist men for 3-year periods in their present grade the law was not implemented and put into effect by the Army until 16 Aug 45. (WD Cir 249, 45).
occupations, world-commitments, and subsequent reduction to a peace-time status with its foundation built on sand.

Since 1939 the American Government had shelved its age-old policy of isolation for one of active cooperation with the hard-pressed democracies of Europe. It is doubtful in the light of later events that the part to be played by the armed forces in this new internationalism had been clearly portrayed to the Congress by the post-war administration. Congress as a whole did not understand the importance of preserving an effective military organization that would lend weight to American proposals. At the same time, the Chief of Staff in his report to the Secretary of War clearly indicated that the postwar foreign policy of the United States required "man power" and strong American forces abroad to protect the fruits of victory. Yet he was forced to admit that it was the "policy of the nation to completely demobilize the war time Army as rapidly as possible." Marshall also stated that the United States was committed to "maintain occupation forces in Europe and the Pacific; prepare for a possible contribution of forces to a world security organization" and "to maintain national security" in an unstable world. The Chief of Staff perceived the necessity for a strong military force to support the role of the United States in postwar world affairs and he made plans for a demobilization which would still keep a reasonably large police force in existence until such time as Congress would provide for a large Regular Army.

President Truman, in agreement with General Marshall, advised the House Military Affairs Committee in August 1945 that a large postwar Army was essential to the security of the United States. He estimated that the size of the postwar Army had to be well above 1.2 million, since the estimates of Generals MacArthur and Eisenhower for their own needs were 1.2 million, "exclusive of the numbers required for supporting troops in the United States and other areas." President Truman advised that according to the present rate of induction "there will not be more than

113. Richard Hofstadter, American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York, 1948). For an analysis of the Roosevelt Foreign Policy, see Franklin D. Roosevelt, [Comp. by Douglas Lurton], Roosevelt's Foreign Policy, 1933-41 (New York, 1942), and Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making (New Haven, 1946), which is a sharp critique of the Roosevelt foreign policy. See also Peace and War; United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), and Walter Lippman, United States Foreign Policy (Boston, 1943).


115. Ibid., pp. 115-116. Also see National Defense Act of 1916 as Amended to January 1 1945, giving to the Chief of Staff the authority to demobilize the Army of the United States.

800,000 non veterans and volunteers in the Army next July." This
would fall far short of the necessary goal desired by the military
leaders of the United States. Therefore, continued the President,
"The difference between the 800,000 non veterans and volunteers
and whatever total strength is required must be made up by hold-
ing additional numbers of veterans in the service." In the
interim the Army had prepared plans requiring 2.5 million troops
by June 1946.* This figure, said Maj. Gen. S. G. Henry, Assistant
Chief of Staff, G–1, to the House Military Affairs Committee "and
\ldots is\ldots according to our present shipping estimates and over-all
capabilities for separation—the lowest strength we can attain by
that date." President Truman did not object to this War Depart-
ment figure; therefore his acquiescence was assumed. Thus the
Chief Executive of the United States agreed with the Army
leaders that a large army—the largest peacetime Army in the
history of the United States—was essential to the national security
of the United States. Unless Congress provided for a large
Regular Army, demobilization would have to be a slower process
than that estimated and desired by the American people.

Reaction to Demobilization

Immediately following the surrender of the Japanese on 2
September 1945, the War Department was faced with a multi-
plicity of problems; the largest of these was demobilization. The
Deputy Chief of Staff aptly described the situation at the 17 Sep-
tember meeting of the General Council:

\ldots the operation of the demobilization system continues to
be the major problem.\ldots The chief difficulty now is the opera-
tion of the system in the field. Individual cases of delay in
discharge gain much more publicity than the fact that large
numbers of men are being returned to civilian status.\ldots It does
the Army little good to emphasize that we are discharging over
a hundred thousand a week if individual commanders retain
men who are no longer needed or in any way delay their
separation.

Last week Congressmen had a backlog of some 80,000 letters
from individuals and were receiving thousands more each day
on the subject. The War Department also receives thousands
of letters each day citing cases where the writer believes an in-
justice is being done to an officer or enlisted man. The Adjutant
General has had to organize a large Congressional Corre-
spondence Section to assist Congressmen in preparing their
replies to constituents.

117. Ibid., p. 2.
118. Ibid., pp. 24-5.
Unless personnel management in the field—in the lower echelons—is improved, this correspondence will continue. Commanders of all echelons must give constant attention to this problem to insure that the individual sources of criticism and complaint against the War Department—the “sore spots”—are removed.\textsuperscript{119}

Members of Congress answered the demands of their constituents by initiating investigations into the policy of demobilization that had been adopted by the military authorities. Every effort was made to speed demobilization progress. Congressmen were converted into “harried errand boys at a time when other vital questions” demanded “their time and their best abilities as statesmen.”\textsuperscript{120} This prompt response to popular clamor made many of these hard-worked legislators lose sight of the international commitments made by the Chief Executive with their evident implications of military support.

Congress viewed the whole situation in a manner of mixed alarm and resentment. Many of the Congressmen felt that they had an obligation to their constituents at home to press the Army to release the men quickly; that the demobilization was too slow and that the military leaders were too autocratic. Others felt that since Congress enacted laws to induct the men into the services, it should also enact laws to demobilize them. A minority group of Congressmen thought that the Army was doing a good job and Congress should not interfere. Part of this latter group felt, too, that Congressional interference would increase the confusion of demobilization and that Congress would be blamed for the slow demobilization.\textsuperscript{121} The Congress was critical of the military policy of demobilization, yet it did not promptly enact legislation that would transfer control of military personnel demobilization from the military to the National Legislature. At the same time the Army was seeking a Congressional allocation which would set up a “long range program for the Military Establishment.”\textsuperscript{122}

Until the beginning of September Congress was too involved in the process of winning the war to show reaction to the announced

\textsuperscript{119. WD Gen Coun Min, 17 Sep 45, pp. 1-2. Official Department of the Army files did not, in 1950, reflect the fact that thousands of letters were received daily. See AG 370.01 (Demob). DRB, TAG. The special correspondence section mentioned by Gen Handy was authorized by USW Patterson 7 Sep 45. See file WDGFA 370.01 (28 Sep 45). DRB, TAG.}

\textsuperscript{120. Congressional Record, Vol 91 (hereafter referred to as Congr Rec 91A) p. A3933. Representative Homer A. Ramey, of Ohio, inserted this apt description into the Congressional Record. It was taken from an editorial in the Christian Science Monitor and apparently represented the opinion of Mr. Ramey.}

\textsuperscript{121. Congressional Record, Ibid., pp. 9476-9478.}

\textsuperscript{122. Hearings . . . Committee on Military Affairs U.S. Senate (hereafter cited as SMAC), 79th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 1356. “A Bill to Provide for the speedy Return of Veterans to Civilian Life, for the Immediate Military Needs of the U.S., and for Other Purposes,” p. 7.}
Army policy of demobilization. True, some questions concerning the Army policy of personnel demobilization had been raised and hearings on the demobilization of the Army had been carried on, but Congress, in general, did not object to the policy or even sharply criticize it until after V-J Day. Senator J. H. Bankhead (D-Ala.) had objected to the retention of farm workers in the armed forces and Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D-Colo.) had criticized the Army as being too slow with demobilization and too extravagant in its expenditures. Both Senators were satisfied temporarily with the reply from the office of the Secretary of War promising to reduce the Army strength “as rapidly as our military needs will permit.”

With the advent of V-J Day came an examination of Army demobilization policy by many Congressmen. These men had in mind the immediate return of the men to their homes and were well intentioned. However, as Congressional discussion on military demobilization proceeded after V-J Day, the case of the returning soldier became not only a moral and economic issue, but also a political one.

Despite the fact that many Congressmen considered demobilization as the first order of business, Congress, as a whole, thought it best to allow the Army to execute its own demobilization. During the months of September and October 1945, numerous bills on military personnel demobilization were introduced in Congress, but were never reported out of committee during the session. Congressman D. A. Reed (R-N.Y.) introduced one that would automatically release everyone from the service who had had 18 months of service. This bill was never reported out of committee, but Reed filed a petition, known as petition No. 8, with the Speaker of the House. However, he was unable to obtain the 218 signatures necessary to bring the bill to the House floor. Seemingly Congress was not ready to assume the responsibility for demobilization, and decided therefore to follow the Senator Walsh policy of bringing “pressure—as I am trying to do today—on the Army and Navy authorities to act more quickly, and concentrate with greater effort upon returning the men to their homes.”

This policy split the Congressional opinion into three main groups:

123. Ltr, Bankhead to USW, 3 Aug 45, and Patterson to Bankhead, 7 Aug 45. WDCSA 370.01, Case 158, Sec VII, Cases 100-220. DRB, TAG.
126. Some of these bills were H.R. 3909, 3917, 3931, 4010, 4340, 4423, 4434, 4467, 4498, 4514, 4511, 4515, 4518, 4532. These bills provided for quicker demobilization of the armed forces with some including suggestions for speeding up enlistments.
128. Ibid., p. 9477. Sen David I. Walsh (D-Mass.) was chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee and usually a defender of the demobilization policy.
those who reasoned that control of demobilization should be a Congressional function; those who asserted that the Army was doing as efficient a job as possible under the circumstances; those members of Congress who regarded existing processes of demobilization as inefficient but were still of the opinion that the job belonged in the hands of the Army. The criticism was directed against the methods that were in operation.

In the interim many letters continued to be sent to Congress by men and women still in the armed forces and by their relatives. To quote from any but a few would take an unlimited amount of time. However, some of them were especially important as illustrations of the way in which pressure was applied to Congress:

... Quit playing with the office boy and go to the boss. That boss is Congress. Tell the members of Congress that if he wants to keep his job he’d better "get those troops out of the sun." The G.I. can’t tell the War Department what to do, he can tell Congress. ... Have your families keep the heat on Congress.

... Tell your Representative and your Senator that his continued tenure of office depends on how fast you get home. ... In the same vein of thought, men wrote to Representative Reed of New York from the Philippines:

... the men over here now do not intend to forget who their Congressmen are who have let them down. Our aim over [here] is to write everyone we know telling them how and why we are being detained and also what should be done in the next elections to see that such injustices are not carried out again. ... Representative Schwabe (R-Okla.) received the following letter from Manila:

* * * * * * * *

We are thoroughly convinced that the Army can no longer be trusted. ... My buddies and I hold you and other members of the House of Representatives and Senate responsible for our predicament. You put us in the Army and you can get us out. Either demobilize us or, when given the next shot at the ballot box, we will demobilize you.

These letters, threatening the Congressmen with loss of re-election unless they executed action to demobilize the Army quickly, were representative of many received by Members of Congress. They had a profound influence on many of the legislators

who began to sharpen their cudgels in preparation for attack on
the military policy of separating the men from the service. Led by
such efficient leaders as Representatives Reed of New York, Miller
of Nebraska, Johnson of Indiana, and Senator Wherry of Ne-
braska, all Republicans, the two-party system of checks and bal-
ances went into effect and the attention of the American people
became centered on the Administration's policy of demobilization.

Representative Reed led the assault by introducing his bill and
asserting that our men "have fought this great war and have won
it, and they cannot just understand why they are being held in
remote corners of the world." Johnson of Indiana complained,
with justification, that: "Many bills have been introduced to speed
up demobilization, but they have all been kept bottled up in com-
mittee." He declared that the Administration majority "cannot
dodge the responsibility for keeping these bills in committee and
thus prevent action by Congress." Representative Lemke (R-
N.D.) kept the attack going by accusing the services of "deliberate
stalling" and threatened to discover "who is responsible." 132 Many
Senators and Congressmen joined the attack by accusing the
military authorities of designed delay in executing discharges
and by expressing the fear that the military was using the draft
law as an instrument to force compulsory military training on
the country. 133

The reaction of Congressmen became even more pronounced
when General MacArthur announced on 15 September 1945 that
he would probably need only 200,000 men in the future for occupa-
tion purposes in the Far East. This statement, made at a time
when administration and military leaders were striving for a
2,500,000-man army and made public without any prior notifica-
tion to the office of the Chief of Staff, was interpreted by the
people as meaning that all MacArthur needed in the Far East were
the services of 200,000 men. The result was not only embarrass-
ment for the administration, but also additional material for
political blasting. Both Reed and Senator Wherry were quick to
seize this opportunity to demonstrate inconsistency within the
administration. Reed told Congress that "... it is apparent that
the administration is attempting to discredit General MacArthur
by disputing his statement that it requires only 200,000 to occupy
and control Japan..." The inspiration gathered in considering
the General as possible Presidential timber on the Republican
ticket forced the Representative from New York to say, "General
MacArthur from the day he left the Philippines and said he would
return to liberate them has made good... with a minimum of men,

planes, and ships until the close of the European war.” Reed then accused the Democrats of never having had “a practical plan of conversion. It never has had the ability to create jobs through the private enterprise system,” he continued, “... from 1933 to the present time it has sought to replace private enterprise through doles, W.P.A. [Works Progress Administration], and other programs of makeshift expedients.”

Senator Wherry quickly followed up the Reed theme by suggesting a resolution in the Senate “which will terminate the war, and the draft, and bring about a demobilization of the military forces just as rapidly as possible.” Representative Corbett (R-Penn.) told the House that “the Army and the Navy have been doing a progressively better job of demobilization.” However, demobilization was still too slow and could easily be speeded up by the services. “To think otherwise would be to ignore their recent efficiency records.”

Senator Revercomb (R-West Va.) agreed with the Reed-Wherry theme but added a constructive thought by suggesting that “more facilities should be placed in every camp so as to release the men from the camps as rapidly as possible, instead of moving them into demobilization centers.”

An increased celerity in demobilization progress was noticed by some Congressmen who came to the defense of the Army execution of soldier discharges. Representative Short (R-Mo.) told the House that the question of demobilization was “very difficult and complex” and that soldiers had been so anxious to get home after World War I that they did not bother to have their disabilities recorded on discharges and ever since they had hounded him, trying to establish service connections. Representative Thomason (D-Texas) declared that the rate of demobilization was “a pretty good showing” and on 24 September Congressman May reported that the demobilization processes at Ft. Devens and Camp Dix were “encouraging.” Representative Clare Luce (R-Conn.) supported the retention of a large army with this statement, “Our foreign policy is certain to be undermined unless we fulfill our postwar military requirements.” At the same time Senator A. B. Chandler (D-Ky.) warned against a too speedy demobilization as “a new retreat into isolationism.” Representative A. J. May (D-Ky.), Chairman of House Military Affairs

136. Ibid., p. 9106.
137. Ibid., p. 9476.
138. Ibid., pp. 8631-2, 8744.
139. Ibid., pp. 8629, 8923.
Committee, hoped that “my colleagues in the future will be discreet and temperate in their remarks with respect to the Army.”

Representative Walter (D-Penn.) urged Congress to “permit those people who are charged with demobilizing our armed forces to do it in accordance with the well-thought-out plans they have proposed.” He warned that Congress had yielded too readily to public pressure and that “Further yielding to pressure will inevitably result in the slowing up of the program” of demobilization. In the same vein Senator Walsh (D-Mass.) had previously urged Congress to allow “the Army and the Navy to finish this job as satisfactorily as it had finished the fighting job...” Senator C. O. Andrews (D-Fla.), a member of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, agreed with Walsh that “demobilization had been conducted as expeditiously as is practicable under the circumstances.”

While no actual demobilization measure, as such, was ever voted on by the Congress, discussion in the Congressional Record reveals that those proponents of the Army’s demobilization plan were for the most part Democrats, just as the leading opponents of the Army policy were for the most part Republicans. The Congressmen who followed party lines were not specific in their defense or criticism, but confined their remarks to generalities. Congressional discussion on the subject did not result, therefore, in constructive plans which would speed up demobilization. Many Congressmen read soldiers’ “gripes” or took a stand on demobilization merely for the “record.” However, an analysis of the Congressional Record does show that a group of Congressmen urged that Congress obtain control of the execution of the demobilization. These men felt that the military was lax in releasing men, but that Congress, too, was lax in its duties by its lack of action.

Early efforts to have Congress introduce demobilization legislation had been unsuccessful. As 1945 came to a close, Congressional criticism of its own inaction with regard to demobilization increased. On 8 November, Representative Johnson (R-Ind.) bitterly attacked the Congressional majority, saying: “many bills” have been introduced to speed up demobilization, but they have all been “bottled up in committee.” He asserted that since the administration had a majority in both branches of Congress it “cannot dodge the responsibility” for keeping those bills in committee and thus prevented action by Congress. Hence he concluded that criticism of Congress as a whole is not justified, but
should be directed to the Administration majority which has prevented Congressional action.\textsuperscript{143}

Congressman J. Harry McGregor (R-Ohio) reminded Congress: “It is time for Congress to once again become a truly legislative body governed only by the people as a whole and not by one group or a few individuals.”\textsuperscript{144} Miller of Nebraska told the House that it would be “derelict in its duty unless it does take some steps” to legislate for speedier demobilization.\textsuperscript{145} Representative Voorhis (D-Calif.) joined his Republican colleagues and not only criticized Army demobilization as too slow, but asserted: “In the end Congress will be held responsible for what is being done, and, personally, I am ready to vote on legislation that would set forth the policies to be followed.”\textsuperscript{146}

Senator Wherry apparently agreed with the prevailing Republican opinion that Congress had been lax and asked the Senate if it were not “dilatory in our duties” with respect to demobilization. “Shall we continue to rely upon the military and not interfere by legislating, and at the same time expect our military forces to expedite the demobilization of the forces”?\textsuperscript{147} Wherry asked Senator Walsh of Massachusetts for a resolution which would provide for the termination of the war and the draft and for quick demobilization. The Senator from Massachusetts replied: “If I or the Senator from Nebraska were to submit a resolution declaring that the war emergency was over, we would be accused of interfering with the orderly ending of the war, as well as with leaving the Army and the Navy up in the air and crippling the necessary work of preserving the property of the Army and Navy, and getting our ships back to America.”\textsuperscript{148}

Meanwhile various groups among the public and the armed forces kept pressing for a quicker demobilization. In spite of this pressure a public opinion poll published in late September indicated that Army demobilization was proceeding fast enough. In making the poll this question was asked, “Do you think that men in the Army should be released faster than they are, or do you think they are being released fast enough”? The results of the poll are shown in Table 5.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{143} Congressional Record, Vol. 91, pp. 19544-45.
\textsuperscript{144} Congressional Record, Vol. 91, pp. A5033-34, 9501.
\textsuperscript{145} Congressional Record, Vol. 91, p. 8997.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., p. 9316.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., pp. 9477-78.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p. 9477.
**Congressional Reaction—September 1945.**

Table 5. The Gallup Poll

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VIEWS OF GENERAL PUBLIC</th>
<th>Army should release men faster</th>
<th>23%</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Release rate fast enough</td>
<td>56%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>No opinion</td>
<td>21%</td>
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**VIEWS OF PEOPLE WITH RELATIVE IN ARMY**

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<th>Army should release men faster</th>
<th>29%</th>
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<td>Release rate fast enough</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>16%</td>
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</table>

When asked the same question regarding the Navy the persons questioned reacted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VIEWS OF GENERAL PUBLIC</th>
<th>Navy should release men faster</th>
<th>24%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Release rate fast enough</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
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**VIEWS OF PEOPLE WITH RELATIVE IN NAVY**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Navy should release men faster</th>
<th>38%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Release rate fast enough</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Judging by newspaper editorials published in the fall of 1945, the press was projecting its thinking on the question of demobilization farther into the future than the special interest groups advocating a rapid demobilization. This was not a unanimous view of the members of the “fourth estate,” but on the whole newspapers did not advocate too rapid a demobilization. During this period it was not uncommon to find demobilization news on the front page of a paper, as reported by a press service, in which the armed services were cast in an unfavorable light and to find (in the same issue) an editorial upholding military and naval demobilization policies. An examination of some editorials will assist in understanding the sentiment of the press.

*The Kansas City Star* stated: “The world conditions of tomorrow must be the gauge of what is done on the whole proposition of this country’s military strength. The single condition is and must be that we shall remain so powerful that we will be in no danger of attack from any source in the world.”

*The Burlington (Vt.) Free Press* emphasized: “Having assumed a place of leadership among the nations of the world, we cannot escape the responsibility which that imposes upon us. We have to keep the pledges which we have made to do our share in policing and reconstruction. As the world is today, that can be accomplished only through military and naval establishments.”

Continuing with advisory sentiment against a too deep decrease in our armed forces, the editorial warned: “We must not make the mistake we made before this war of insisting on retaining islands in the Pacific but refusing to fortify and garrison them adequately, so that our men who occupied them were sacrificed like pawns on a chess board. If we are going to stay in the Pacific, we must maintain adequate military and naval establishments there.”

On 21 September an editorial entitled “Too Slow Demobilization” was published by *The Wall Street Journal*. The paper discussed recent statements issued by the President and the War Department on the rate of discharge and the number of men to be released. The *Journal* estimated that the Army alone would have “more than 6 million men” by the end of 1945. The article continued:

On the basis of any information available to the public that is a policy which is perfectly idiotic. If the United States saw any other country pursuing a similar policy we would be crying to high heaven about ‘militarism’ and what not.

152. Ibid.
We should like to have an explanation of why it has taken the Army so long to reach a stage where it can discharge at the rate of 650 per hour. When one considers the clerical help that the Army has available and the number of centers which could be used for discharge operations, the conclusion is that the Army is deliberately pursuing a policy of 'gradual' demobilization. The alternative would be that it was unable to organize for a relatively simple job.

We wonder if anyone in Washington has any adequate idea of the resentment that is being built up in this country. We wonder if they think that attitude will be anything but harmful in arriving at a future foreign policy and military policy.\(^{153}\)

The Emporia Gazette remarked in an editorial that the return of servicemen had "the makings of one of Congress' biggest post-war headaches. Getting the boys home and out of uniforms while finishing the war job may be more than headache—for Congressmen it may be political dynamite."\(^{154}\)

The widely read Chicago Daily Tribune criticized the Army for reducing its over-all strength by only 50 thousand since 1 September 1944.

There is nothing to explain this outrage except as the product of incompetence and selfishness. Either the Army command hasn't the capacity to demobilize promptly, which we find difficult to believe, or the military burocrats [sic] don't want to do so. It often has been pointed out that the more rapidly the Army is reduced from its war-time strength the more rapidly its higher officers will be reduced in number, rank, and influence. It would be hard to imagine a worse reason than this one for keeping millions of men in the Army, but what other reason is there?\(^{155}\)

The Wyoming State Tribune published in an editorial a letter which a soldier's wife had written to the War Department. This letter is typical of many that were written; however, most of them were not quite so humorous and some were not so polite.

He's fat, sway backed—with a crick in the sway—chipped elbows, has several teeth missing and hobbles into age 38 this month. . . . But he has a nice smile—with what teeth he has left—and I love him. So why don't you send him home.\(^{156}\)

In an editorial in early October The Daily Oklahoman stated that a reported one hundred thousand letters had arrived in Washington since V-J Day from Oklahoma constituents "asking for

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information concerning when 'our boys' will be permitted to return home or positively demanding that they be sent home at once." The paper stated: "Such letters are understandable. Even more than that they command our positive sympathy. ... We saw how it was in 1918. When the shooting stopped, every parent of a boy overseas wanted him to come home on the first liner." It became a political issue and raised the slogan "'get our boys out of Europe and keep them out.' We got them out alright, and Europe proceeded to go to the bow wows. Now we are insisting once more that the boys be brought home even if the whole world goes to the bow wows. We are magnificent fighters but mighty poor administrators."  

The Oregon Statesman in an editorial in mid-November 1945 gave a warning relative to "The scramble to get out of the military service. ... But this is typical of Americans. They rush in on threat of trouble; but once the show seems to be over they rush out, eager to get home and into civilian life. In this case the rush for the exits is helped along by the pressures of relatives and Congressmen for release of servicemen and women. Some try [as] hard now to get out of service as once they tried to get commissions in the service.

With the earth still full of trouble and with seeds of more trouble ready to sprout in many fertile soils we should maintain a competent army and naval force. ... For this disintegration the responsibility does not rest with the high command primarily, but with the people and with those in political office and with newspapers and radio reporters who have abused the war and navy departments unmercifully for the slowness of discharges. It is understandable that men almost perish from boredom in an army or navy outpost with nothing to do. But we can ill afford to let our military might wither thus suddenly.  

Representatives of the War and Navy Department made numerous appearances before Congress in the fall of 1945. Most of these appearances were before committees that were conducting hearings on demobilization, voluntary enlistments, and universal military training. These armed services representatives also made remarks to joint groups of the Congress on various military subjects including demobilization. The remarks of the Chief of Staff, 20 September 1945, on "Demobilization of the Army" were

157. The Daily Oklahoman, 1 Oct 45, p. 16.
158. The Oregon Statesman, 17 Nov 45, p. 4.
159. See Hearings on S. 1355, 79th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., Pts. 1, 2, and 3 and Hearings on S. Res. 188 and S. Res. 200, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., SMAC.
particularly significant. Many of the 300-odd Senators and Representatives that were present had been bitterly critical of the slowness of demobilization.160 "General Marshall spoke for fifty minutes extemporaneously . . . and the legislators listening . . . applauded heartily."161 Before Marshall spoke, his Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, explained the details of the demobilization system. In concluding his remarks General Henry declared: "Let's stop this hysteria of everybody getting out of the Army and nobody going into the Army."162 The Chief of Staff emphasized at the start: "The rate of demobilization has been determined by transportation facilities and by the availability of trained personnel to carry its administrative requirements out. It has had no relationship whatsoever to the size of the Army in the future. . . ."163

Marshall continued by telling the assembled Congressmen that the critical point score would be lowered from 80 to 70 on 1 October and to 60 points on 1 November. He also stated that he hoped that the Army by late winter could discharge men on the basis of two years' service. The Army should release 450 thousand in September, 550 thousand in October, and thereafter 700 to 800 thousand monthly until next spring.164 "The reaction of the Congressman, who had been feeling the sharp edge of constituent opinion on the demobilization problem, was mixed but generally favorable."165 Among those who favorably received the Chief of Staff's remarks was Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, a consistent critic of the Army's policies; the House Republican Whip, Leslie Arends of Illinois; and the House Democratic Whip Robert Ramspeck of Georgia.166 In spite of this, Congressional criticism was silenced only for a short while.

Ever since the capitulation of the Japanese in mid-August the Army had been on the defensive where demobilization was concerned. This present criticism was the outgrowth of attacks that had started in late June. The War Department had planned to inform the public on its demobilization program after Germany's defeat, but research has not disclosed any integrated Army program to inform the public that after the defeat of Japan a balanced demobilization was necessary to support United States
Criticism of the demobilization was particularly heavy during late September and early October when the Council of Foreign Ministers was meeting in London.

Connected with this criticism of the military was the Army's failure to properly disseminate demobilization information to the field and even within the War Department itself. This was not corrected until early October 1945 when the Chief, Legislative and Liaison Division, recognized this omission and informed the Director of Information:

* * * *

The effective dissemination to the operating echelons in the field of new regulations on this subject necessarily lags behind the release of War Department news summaries. The reproduction and distribution of thousands of copies of official circulars, etc., is a time consuming process and the lag is reputedly sometimes two weeks behind initial publication. This accounts to some extent for critical articles in the press charging that the War Department is misleading Congress and the public. Army personnel in the field, reading news accounts of new regulations go to their unit clerks, or to first sergeants, etc., and receive a flat "no"—because the lower echelons have not received any official information.

War Department personnel, many thousands of whom have frequent civilian social contacts among civilians in public and private life, are often uninformed or even misinformed. Their conversations are often taken by friends as having a semi-official flavor. The impressions thus created often confound the general confusion.

The Legislative and Liaison Chief recommended that digests of late directives be given a "high-speed distribution" to all units within the United States and be placed on organization bulletin boards. Such digests should be made required reading by commanders and their staffs and all military and key civilian military personnel. In addition, such information should be made readily

167. A search was made of the following files to determine if there was such a program: Under Secretary of War; AC of S, G-1, G-3, and OPD; Special Planning Division, WDSS; and the War Department Bureau of Public Relations. This research was performed during the period Jan 49-May 50.

In fairness to the reader it must be stated that the Army Chief of Information insisted in Feb 51, "Officers then on duty in BPR [Bureau of Public Relations] inform this division there were definite plans, but political consideration over which the military had no control prevented the implementation of such a detailed plan. . . . "Unfortunately, records are not available of much of the work and planning done by individuals and individual branches of BPR during the period covered by . . . [the demobilization study]." Comment #1 to 9 Dec 1951 OC/Mil His D/F. OCMH.

168. Memo, Ch, L&LD, for Dir of Information, 2 Oct 45, sub: Dissemination of Information. WDGPA 370.01 (28 Sep 45). DRB, TAG.
available to the "nation's press and radio." The suggestion was adopted and subsequent demobilization information was given faster and wider dissemination.

Early in October 1945 the radio program The American Forum of the Air presented the question "Are We Demobilizing Effectively?" The question was debated on a non-partisan basis by four Congressmen. Portions of the summary arguments of the forum are quoted below:

SPARKMAN [Representative John J. Sparkman (D-Ala.)]:

... I am convinced that those in the War Department who are charged with the responsibility of discharging these fellows, demobilizing our armed forces, are doing all that they possibly can. We have now in operation, or will have within the next few days, 201 different separation centers throughout the United States. We are discharging at the rate of practically 30,000 a day, or a million a month. That is just about as fast as they can possibly be processed, with the personnel that we have and with the centers that we have available.

Every means of transportation possible is being used to bring these people back here from overseas. We have set up—when I say "we," I mean, of course, those in charge of the demobilization program—a kind of priority system. That may not please me and it may not please you as to what particular group should have the highest priority, but nevertheless the effect has been to line them up in the order in which they are entitled to a discharge. They are being discharged in just that order. The points are being recomputed from time to time. They were reduced just yesterday to 70. On the 1st of November they will be reduced to 60. Within three or four months every person in the Army with as much as two years' service will be discharged, and we are proceeding just as fast as I think we could possibly hope to do.

I have been well pleased with the progress that has been made. It is far beyond the expectation when the program was originally set up.

BUFFET [Representative Howard H. Buffet (R-Nebr.)]:

* * * * * * * *

The question on this demobilization runs about as follows: Is demobilization satisfactory to the GI? There I think the answer must be no.

Is the demobilization plan satisfactory to the families, the loved ones at home, the wives and sweethearts who are waiting for these boys? The answer obviously is no.

169. Ibid.
Has the demobilization plan commanded the confidence and respect of the nation at large? There again the answer must be no.

Is demobilization channeling men effectively back into business and industry and getting them ready for reconversion? I think the answer up to date must be no.

Now this question: Is the demobilization proceeding satisfactorily to the "swivel chair" Army, the generals and admirals who benefit from the maintenance of large-scale armed forces? There I think the answer is yes, but that answer does not impress the American people.

No, the job has been done correctly, it has not been done efficiently, it has got under way late, it has been slowed down through the energies and the management of old General Too Little Too Late, and as a result of that situation, the people of this country have been disturbed, they have been shocked, they have been upset, and everyone concerned has had a very unhappy experience, but that condition will be ended if Congress will do its duty at this time and keep on the backs of the people in the Pentagon until the boys are home.\textsuperscript{170}

Pressure mounted for a more rapid demobilization, but in spite of this a public opinion poll's results showed that the "public" had not entirely deserted the Army. A group of people having relatives in the Army were asked the question, "Do you think the Army system of releasing men is fair, or do you think it needs some changes?" Here are the results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army release system is fair</th>
<th>50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes needed</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the same time a similar question was asked regarding the Navy's demobilization program. The results obtained:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy release is fair</th>
<th>35%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes needed</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>17\textsuperscript{1}27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In December 1945 the Army conducted a survey among a cross-section of troops in the United States. The poll was designed to reflect the attitude of soldiers toward demobilization. Dissatisfaction with the operation of the point system was the most pronounced since these polls had been conducted. There had been reports and rumors that men in the Army Air Forces were being


\textsuperscript{171} American Institute of Public Opinion Gallup Poll taken from Washington Post, 23 Nov 45.
EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILIZATION

released faster than men in other commands. Soldiers in ASF and AGF installations who had heard these rumors tended to be more dissatisfied with the demobilization plan than enlisted men who had not heard them. Here are some results of the survey shown in comparison with similar findings obtained previously:

_How Many Men Were Dissatisfied?_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May-June, 1945</th>
<th>July, 1945</th>
<th>October-November, 1945</th>
<th>December, 1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question: "In your opinion, how hard is the Army trying to speed up discharge of enlisted men?"

_Ground and Service Forces_  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>October-November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trying its best</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trying some, but not hard enough</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly trying at all</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Men in the Ground and Service Forces who felt that the AAF was not using the same discharge system as the rest of the Army were more critical of both the point system and the way it was being carried out.172

Among men who say:

|                           | % saying that point system was "not so good" or "not good at all." | % saying the point system was "not being carried out the way it was supposed to be." |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|********************************************************************************|
| AAF uses same discharge plan | 38                                                             | 48                                                                           |
| AAF does not use same discharge plan | 50                                                             | 60                                                                           |

During December there was increasing criticism by a large number of newspapers because the Army was not informing its men why their continued service overseas was necessary to implement national policy. Typical of this criticism was the comment

172. WD I&E Report B-179, 19 Jan 46. (Copy located in author's file.)

*The question asked was: "In your opinion is the point system being carried out the way it was supposed to be?" Except in the May-June survey when it was worded: "In your opinion will the point system be carried out the way it is supposed to be?"

**The question asked was: "In general, what do you think of the point system?"
of the Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Argus-Leader. “From the far outposts of the Pacific comes a rising crescendo of complaint from service—complaint which is becoming increasingly bitter as the days and the weeks and the months pass.” The editorial cited an example of men being constantly misinformed as to their return home. “These men deserve better than they are getting. If they are not to be brought home soon, they should be told.”

Just after Christmas the Argus-Leader published another editorial in which the complaints of servicemen were discussed:

To criticize the soldiers for their griping would be out of order. They are displaying a natural inclination to express themselves to do so with typical American vigor and candor. And to assume that the military leaders are 100 percent right in their attitude and their performance is out of order. One shortcoming in their program, it seems, is a failure to be more informative. Because they have said so little, rumors of all kinds—many of them without foundation circulate freely throughout the barracks.

If more facts were available and the picture is fully presented to the soldiers, there would be more understanding.

This criticism was not restricted to newspapers alone. There was a tremendous effort exerted by groups both organized and unorganized in waging a campaign to “Bring the Boys Home by Christmas.” For example, The Adjutant General of the Army received on 17 December 1945 an estimated 60,000 postcards. These cards were addressed to the President and bore this message:

Dear Mr. President,

I urge you as Commander-in-Chief to press into service every ship flying our flag to bring back our troops by Christmas.

Ships for private commerce, ships laid up in U.S. ports and U.S. meddling in China are keeping GIs from being reunited with their families.

I urge every ship be made a troopship.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature of sender]

(This card provided by Greater N. Y. CIO)

Earlier in November the National Maritime Union, Congress of Industrial Organization, had taken a positive stand “to bring home all servicemen not needed in occupation forces.”

174. Ibid., 28 Dec 45, p. 4.
175. See file WDGPA 370.01 (1 Nov 45) 6 Dec 45. DRB, TAG.
176. The CIO News, Nov 12, 1945, p. 6. See also Nov 19, 1945, p. 5.
Many wives and mothers played an important role in “pressure campaigns” for the return and discharge of their husbands and sons. In late December 1945 the Mayor of Tacoma, Washington, wrote a letter to Chief of Staff Eisenhower in which the part played by some members of the female sex is well described. Here is the story of the Mayor:

* * * * * * * *

Two weeks ago I met with three representatives of a national organization which bears the name, ‘Service Fathers’ Release Association.’ Its members are wives and mothers of servicemen and the objective they seek to achieve is the immediate release from the armed services of combat men and all fathers, regardless of age, rank, length of service or number of children. They want all soldiers, sailors and marines who fit this category to leave the services not in a year's time, or in six months, but right now. The SFRA [Service Fathers' Release Association] claims branches in more than three hundred cities in thirty-nine states. Other small groups and thousands of individuals are working this campaign in cities where branches have not been organized. Besides the SFRA there are four other national organizations working for the release of fathers from the armed services.

The three wives and mothers in question requested my help; they want me to do something, to add my voice to the high sounding endorsements from Americans in high political places which fill an over-crowded brief case, and they wanted immediate action from me as they had gotten hastily written letters of encouragement and endorsement from so many others in my business.

After listening to their story I flatly refused to concur in their wish and desire for another approving letter. I further told them that in my opinion their efforts, nationwide, were further adding to the confusion, uncertainty and lack of purpose which seems to be gripping America in this year what we call Victory and the winning of our peace. I tried to determine from these mothers and wives the nature of your War Department plan for the return of fathers and other servicemen as well. They had no accurate information but they did have letters of positive encouragement from Senators, Representatives, Governors, Mayors and other elected officials. They thought such letters stood for proof of the rightness of their cause. I thought they stood for absolutely nothing aside from indicating the alarming, shocking willingness of men possessed
of power and influence to curry cheap favor and to run from the realities of our day.

* * * * * * * * *

Isn’t it about time our leaders, both military and civil, clearly define and explain our national needs and demands? It’s time we knew how large the military services of tomorrow should be. It’s time we were plainly, even bluntly told which servicemen were coming home, when, how and why. It’s time we quit insulting our potential and actual ability to get things done. We won a war by doing what sometimes appeared to be impossible. We are defeating a return to sanity and normalcy by appearing to be completely stupid and absolutely devoid of the power to devise a plan which makes sense.

* * * * * * * * *

If you or anyone else in high authority will only tell us what you want done, in a way we can understand, your program and plans will be strictly supported and obeyed. [italics author’s] If, for example, it doesn’t make sense to release fathers immediately, let us know and we will stand firm in the face of natural, human individual wishes of wives and mothers to the contrary. If they are to be released we want to know when in order that we can discourage sincere women from soliciting meaningless but political pressure notes from those who ought to have sense enough to ask questions which would provide facts and positions worthy of consideration. If we are tearing down our military machine too rapidly, as it appears to me, I hope that someone possessed of sufficient moral strength will stand up and say so. There are millions of us who will support what no one has taken the time or trouble to explain, our national problem and plan of defense.177

* * * * * * * * *

In spite of the attention which Congressmen were able to focus on the Army execution of demobilization, discharges proceeded unhindered by political discussion. The Army was well ahead of its own schedule of separations as 1945 came to an end, and many Congressmen quietly dispersed to celebrate the Yuletide in the comfort of their homes and “to mend their fences.” Congress as a whole apparently felt that the Army was doing as well as could be expected. But the serenity was not to last long.

177. Ltr, Mr. Harry P. Cain to Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, 27 Dec 45. WDSCA 370.91 (27 Dec 45) Sec I, Part A, Case 18. DRB, TAG.
On 4 January 1946, the War Department announced [See Appendix VIII] that there would be a slow-down in demobilization and gave no indication that men with two years or more of service would be released by late winter, a hope that had been expressed by General Marshall in his demobilization remarks to Congress on 20 September 1945. This unexpected announcement restored the question of demobilization to fever heat and caused so much confusion in the minds of the men in the Army that disorders occurred within the ranks of American forces stationed in Western Europe, India, China, Korea, and the islands of the Pacific. Telegrams were dispatched to Congress and paid advertisements were inserted in newspapers urging and demanding an immediate demobilization of the Army. Editorial comment on the 4th of January announcement and the subsequent soldier reaction was heavy. Congress quickly embarked upon a series of sharp discussions on the newly arisen conditions in respect to demobilization; General Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, were invited to explain the demobilization policies of the Army and the Navy and investigations into the question of demobilization were accelerated.

In January 1946 the words of Congress were much more pointed and sharper than before. This time the Republicans were joined by an increased number of Democrats in denouncing the Army execution of demobilization. Representatives Mansfield (R-Ohio) and Gillie (R-Ind.) both thought that the Army announcement of January 5 was a clear "breach of faith with those who served us so well," and Representative A. H. Andresen (R-Minn.) said: "For the War Department policy makers to break their word with the men who have done so much to win the war, without giving a satisfactory explanation, smacks of military dictatorship which will not be tolerated by the people." Gillie went further in an attempt to arouse greater political intensity over demobilization when he stated: "The Administration controls our occupation policies. But what are they? What is our policy in China? What is our policy in Germany? How long are we going to stick our fingers into far off countries without the public's knowing what is going on?" Gillie, expressing a thought held not only by some Members of Congress, but by many American
citizens as well, wanted to know: "Why does not the Administration forthrightly tell us why we continue to occupy the jungles of the Pacific?"\footnote{180}

Congressman Emanuel Celler, a staunch Democrat from Brooklyn, New York, could not comprehend the need for American soldiers in such a place as India. He wanted the boys to be "brought home forthwith, and special ships should be utilized for this purpose."
\footnote{181}
Representative Rankin, dean of the Mississippi delegation in the House, joined Mr. Celler and Mr. Gillie. "The war is over. We do not have an enemy on earth that would dare bat an eye at us today." He asked: "Why should we have an Army of occupation in the Philippines?" He repeated this in connection with Egypt, England, and France.\footnote{182} Representative Rees (R-Kans.) stated that "the plan of demobilization has bogged down." This was because of "the failure on the part of those in charge of our armed forces to tell the people and the men in the service more about their plans with respect to the question of demobilization."\footnote{183}

Just before the War Department's announcement of the demobilization slow-down, Secretary of War Patterson embarked on a combination "rest trip" and inspection tour of the Army's outposts. When he reached Hawaii, the Secretary held a press conference where numerous questions were asked about Army demobilization plans. Members of both the civilian and soldier press were at the conference. The Secretary of War was quoted as saying that he didn't know that an enlisted man's accumulation of points under the Adjusted Service Rating stopped as of V-J Day. The story as written by a \textit{Stars and Stripes} reporter was picked up by an American press organization and received wide publicity not only among the soldiers overseas but in the United States as well. Patterson later acknowledged that he had answered the reporter's questions in such a way that they could have come to the conclusion that points could be accumulated after V-J Day; however, the Tokyo edition of \textit{Stars and Stripes} reported that Patterson had admitted that the reporter could have "misunderstood" him.\footnote{184} The lack of knowledge attributed to the Secretary of War coupled with the announcement of the demobilization slow-down resulted in an immediate reaction.

\footnotetext[180]{\textit{Congressional Record}, Vol. 92, pp. A16 and A141.}
\footnotetext[181]{Ibid., p. A265.}
\footnotetext[182]{Ibid., pp. 20 and 347.}
\footnotetext[183]{Ibid., p. 107.}
\footnotetext[184]{Pacific Edition (Tokyo) \textit{Stars and Stripes}, 6 Jan 46, p. 1. Patterson quickly admitted that he answered a question in such a way that the questioners could have interpreted his reply incorrectly. Interview between Brig Gen A. Robert Ginsburgh and Maj John C. Sparrow, 21 Nov 50. HIS 330.14 Spec Stu Demob (20 Nov 50). OCMH.}
The main reaction took the form of mass meetings and gatherings of American military personnel in various parts of the world. When Secretary Patterson arrived in Guam there were various soldier demonstrations and Mr. Patterson was on one occasion burned in effigy. The Secretary then proceeded to Japan where the Supreme Allied Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, assigned a senior field grade officer to be an aide and public relations adviser to the War Department head. This officer remained with the Secretary for the remainder of his world tour. There were no demonstrations by soldiers on Honshu or Kyushu while Secretary Patterson was in Japan, but there was one abortive attempt that resulted in failure because of the quick thinking and courageous action of an officer. The Secretary then proceeded to Seoul, Korea; Shanghai, China; Manila, Philippines; and New Delhi, India where he met with soldier committees and answered questions on demobilization. These meetings were arranged by soldier groups through the Commanding General in the

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particular locality. Mr. Patterson's public relations adviser held a preliminary meeting with each group before it met with the Secretary of War. These preliminary meetings assisted both the committees and the Secretary in bringing out essential points regarding demobilization. This technique worked successfully and did much to provide authentic information and to ease the tenseness of the situation.¹⁸⁶

Before Mr. Patterson arrived in the Philippines a series of demonstrations occurred in Manila on 6 and 7 January 1946. The larger of these was estimated at 8,000 to 10,000 men. Their complaints dealt primarily with their dissatisfaction over conflicting statements by War Department officials and urged that pressure be brought to bear on Congress and the public to reduce overseas garrisons required for occupational duties and disposal of surplus property.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ When Secretary Patterson arrived in Korea the American Commander, Lt Gen John R. Hodge, told Mr. Patterson that a committee of soldiers had requested an interview with the Secretary. Gen Hodge had agreed to this interview if the Secretary were willing. The Secretary and his party were unprepared for the reception of the committee but since Gen Hodge had consented to an interview, it was decided to proceed. First, Mr. Patterson was to be given a few hours to get acquainted with the general situation in Korea, and second, if there was an interview it would not be accompanied by a soldier demonstration. Before the interview the Secretary's public relations advisor, Col A. Robert Ginsburgh, and another officer met with the soldier committee and asked the committee to state the questions they wanted to ask the Secretary of War. The soldier representatives asked all the questions they wanted. Then, after it appeared that the questions were exhausted, Col Ginsburgh pointedly asked each soldier present: "Is that all you want to ask?" When no more questions were forthcoming, Ginsburgh and the other officer looked over the questions and found about six essential points to be brought out. These points were read to the committee and it was asked "Is this what you want to know?" These questions, with suggested answers, were given to Secretary Patterson. The committee then met with the Secretary; no reporters were allowed as this was in a measure a privileged communication between the Secretary of War and his men—somewhat as a lawyer has the privilege with his client. Minutes were kept of the meeting and the soldier committee was allowed to talk to civilian reporters after the meeting. In addition, the reporters were allowed access to the minutes of the meeting. This technique was repeated in the places mentioned in the context.


¹⁸⁷ CM-IN-1309, 7 Jan 46. OPD 370.01, Sec 1A, Case 4. DRB, TAG.
Soldiers Protesting Demobilization Slow Down—January 1946.
Lt. Gen. W. D. Styer, Commanding Army Forces in the West Pacific, broadcast an address to all soldiers in the area, including the estimated 8,000 to 10,000 assembled at the City Hall, in which he called attention to the fact that in four months the Army had demobilized two-thirds of his command which had taken two and a half years to build. He told the men that the Army could not continue to reduce at such a rate, that recruiting and Selective Service replacement flow could not maintain the minimum strength required to protect property, prevent wastage, and carry out proper disposal of surplus supplies. Styer reported that there was no violence or disorder in these Manila gatherings, and no disciplinary action was taken against any of the demonstrators. General MacArthur, Army Commander in the Pacific, approved the way in which the matter had been handled. 188 [See Appendix IX]

Within the following ten days similar mass meetings, though smaller in numbers, occurred in Hawaii, LeHavre, Paris, Rheims, Mourmelon, Frankfurt, London,* New Delhi, Shanghai, and California. The general tone of all of these meetings seems to have

188. Copy of Memo for The Pres, 8 Jan 46. (Not Used). Ibid. See also WD Press Release for Jan 46. The text is located in Appendix IX.

*For reaction of a U.S. delegate in UN Assembly, see Appendix X.

Protesting Soldiers Outside Manila Office—January 1946.
been that (1) the men could not reconcile this slow-down with previous statements made by General Marshall and President Truman and regarded it as a broken promise; (2) the release of low score men in the United States before release of higher score men overseas seemed unjust, when it was admitted that scarcity of shipping was no longer the determining factor; (3) the soldiers desired a definite program and policy for a progressive release system based on either points or years' service, or a combination of both.

Most reports made to the War Department state definitely that these affairs were spontaneous* and without violence, incident, or bitterness toward individuals in authority. Charges that these demonstrations were directly inspired by Communists were not substantiated by official reports of commanders.\footnote{189. Reports on demonstrations are contained in P&O file 370.01, Sec 1-A, Case 4. DRB, TAG.} There is evidence to support the fact that individuals and organizations with Communist sympathies attempted to promote discontent among American troops during this period. Beginning in the late summer of 1945 and continuing into the winter of 1945–1946 the Communist Party of the United States took advantage of the human desire of many Americans for the return of their loved ones by pressuring for the immediate return of servicemen. This was conducted in such a way by the Communists that it was made to appear to be a natural impulse of the people as a whole. The Communists accused the government of retaining troops overseas, particularly in the Far East, for the purpose of “imperialist intervention.” The Communist mouthpiece, the \textit{Daily Worker}, urged that the American people do everything possible to let the President know that the people desired to bring American troops home and to use every ship flying the American flag to accomplish this. The Communist Party line also advocated that the United States be accused of intervening in China's internal affairs. In addition, another accusation was made to the effect that soldiers were being retained in the Caribbean to help make profits for American interests. The party line hurled the taunt that American troops were being retained in the Philippines to suppress that country's freedom and to support the presidential candidacy of a man who the Communists alleged was a traitor to the Philippine people. The Communists were accusing the United States government not only of suppressing freedom in the Far East but also of attempting to deny to the Philippine people their independence. The party line also advocated the return of American troops from the Far

*It should be noted here that there were similar demonstrations and "sit-down" strikes in the Royal Air Force in India, Egypt, and Palestine during January 1946.
East but it said nothing about Soviet Russia doing likewise with its armed forces.\textsuperscript{190}

The New York \textit{Herald Tribune} carried a lengthy editorial entitled “The Troops Go On Strike” that presented a clear analysis of the situation on a non-partisan basis. The paper felt that the men in the Army couldn’t be blamed for their actions when the Nation as a whole was setting an example “of an orgy of strikes, factionalism, selfish pressure politics and general post-war ‘let down’. . . .”\textsuperscript{191} The Army at that time was not the Army that had fought the battles; most high-point men were already out. The disgruntled Army of January 1946 was composed primarily of men drafted late in the struggle, who received intensive training for battle and then were left with no battles to fight nor any adequate explanation of what was now expected of them. The editorial continued by stating that this wave of rebellion was the fault of politicians and publicists who responded to one set of pressures by failing to establish some form of universal military service, who answered another set by insisting that the men be brought home immediately, who responded to still another by committing us to large military obligations in Europe and Asia, and who now blame the Army “brass” as a scapegoat for their own folly and insipidness.\textsuperscript{192}

The reaction of the press as a whole seems to have been that the Army was negligent in not fully explaining all of the ramifications of the demobilization problem. The Louisville \textit{Courier-Journal} said: “The military authorities have never faced frankly or intelligently with the men the fact that all the forces could not be discharged overnight.”\textsuperscript{193} This paper three days later charged: “There is, in short, an appalling accumulation of evidence that our Army as a whole has learned little of its function as a political force in the world.” The editorial continued:

Americans understand without being told the upsurge of school-boy exasperation behind these demonstrations. American generals knew precisely how to gauge their importance as symptoms of an impending general breakdown of morale and apparently are not seriously worried. But not one European in a

\textsuperscript{190} The most prominent and widely known mouthpiece of the Communist Party in the United States is the \textit{Daily Worker} of New York, N. Y. What this newspaper prints is a direct reflection of the party line. The discussion in the context is partially based on research of the \textit{Daily Worker} for the period beginning Aug 45 and ending Apr 46. If the reader is interested in specific references to the Communist party line and the views of that party toward World War II demobilization he may profitably examine the following issues of the \textit{Daily Worker}: 3, 5, and 10 Dec 45 and 2, 8, 9, 13, and 17 Jan 46. See also file HIS 350.05 (23 Dec 49) Spec Stu Demob. OCMH.

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{New York Herald Tribune}, 10 Jan 46, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{193} Louisville \textit{Courier-Journal}, 8 Jan 46, p. 6.
hundred, not one German or Japanese in ten thousand, can judge this juvenile irresponsibility in its correct context. . . . A mid-western journal said that American soldiers in Manila, being dissatisfied with demobilization, blamed Army "brass hats," and their viewpoint was understandable. The War Department order slowing down demobilization was "abrupt and peremptory" and "was certain to be provocative. . . . If the order was justifiable . . . a factual explanation of the necessity should have been apparent." Said The Emporia Gazette: "... the real blame for the discontent is in government or Army circles which have not taken the trouble to explain the need for troops overseas. . . ."

In an effort to obtain an explanation of the postwar occupation policy as well as of the execution of military personnel demobilization, the Chief of Staff was invited to appear before Congress. On 15 January General Eisenhower gave a detailed account of Army demobilization to members of Congress gathered in the auditorium of the Library of Congress. He spoke slowly, clearly, and to the point. The Army was ahead of the demobilization schedule; and if the fast rate of separations continued "we would literally run out of Army. That is the reason for the slowdown." He asserted that "there is no change in policy—there is no change in plan." The Army had been delegated "by higher authority" to perform certain occupation missions in Europe and the Pacific, including the disposal of much American property. The General asserted that the Army could not meet these "commitments and obligations" unless it kept an adequate force, even though he hoped to reduce it to 1,500,000 by June 30, 1946. He concluded by stating that he hoped "that the Army which did so much to win the victory will be left fit to preserve it." Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, followed General Eisenhower and presented remarks on Navy demobilization.

The speech was well received in Congress and placed the minds of many Congressmen at ease. Representative Bradley (R-Calif.) at the next meeting of the House stated: "I think the fog of demobilization has been clarified considerably by the presentations of General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz." Bradley suggested that Eisenhower digest his speech to about 30 minutes and "go on a national and world-wide hook-up to explain the situation to these boys as he did to us so ably this morning." Representative May (D-Ky.), Chairman, House Military Affairs Committee, suggested

194. Ibid., 11 Jan 46, p. 6.
196. The Emporia Gazette, 10 Jan 46, p. 4.
that Congressmen be as clear with their constituents as Eisenhower was with them and warned “that we can still lose the peace unless we act with discretion.” He also hoped that Congress would “pull together for the good of our common country.”

Representative Rankin (D-Miss.), however, was not so impressed with General Eisenhower’s explanation. He asserted that “we have approximately 7,000,000 men scattered throughout the world, standing around largely in uniformed idleness and begging to come home.” Rankin thereupon urged Congress “for the passage of a measure to release from the armed forces any man who has served continuously for 18 months or more, or who has dependents at home who require his attention, or who desires to return to school.” Representative Bulwinkle (D-N.C.) quickly rebuked Rankin and rose to the defense of the armed forces and the Chief of Staff. He stated that we all trusted Eisenhower during the critical years of war “and believed then what he said, then pray tell me what has he done to merit your disbelief now?” Bulwinkle asserted that “the officers in the Army and Navy have done a great job. I would like for some of you who criticize them to have been in their place and see what you would have made out of it, because when you are bringing home men at the rate of 1,250,000 a month you are doing a magnificent job.”

General Eisenhower made the first firm statement of Army policy regarding its part in world affairs, and it did much to quiet criticism from Congress, the public, and the press. Also, as the peak of demobilization was reached and the 2-year policy of release was adopted, fewer people were left to complain. After June 1946 no evidence of criticism of demobilization is found in the Congressional Record, and whatever pressure was exerted elsewhere was that of individuals.

Against this background of criticism from various sources, the Army carried on its program of separations, which we shall now examine, within commands and installations.

Demobilization In An Overseas Theatre—Europe*

The plan for the readjustment of military personnel after the defeat of Germany was approved by the Chief of Staff on 23 August 1944, printed, and sent to all theater commanders and the commanding generals of the major commands in the continental

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198. Congressional Record, Vol. 92, p. 20. General Eisenhower later broadcast a digest of the demobilization plan to the Army.
199. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
200. Ibid., p. 21.

*The European Theater of Operations was chosen as the “type” because it had the longest experience in demobilization.
United States shortly thereafter. Each major command was requested to submit its implementing plans by 1 October 1944, but as was mentioned in Chapter II, some of the commands and theaters were unable to comply in the allotted time. And, on 19 January 1945, General Tompkins informed OPD that "... to date the plan of the European Theater of Operations (ETO), the most important of all, has not been received." 201 Tompkins continued with the statement that several questions regarding redeployment and readjustment seemed to be holding up the plan, and he proposed that representatives of the Special Planning Division and OPD be sent to Europe to assist in the planning. OPD concurred in the suggestion but informed General Tompkins: "In view of the fact that a representative of the European Theater of Operation is currently in the War Department to obtain information on readjustment and redeployment, it is believed that a mission as outlined in your memorandum . . . would be more appropriate subsequent to the return of this representative to his theater." 202 A representative of the Special Planning Division was sent to Europe in late February to advise the demobilization planners there.

While great concern was being shown in the War Department over the slowness with which ETO was submitting the requested information, there was actually an organized effort being made in that theater to produce an implementation plan. This planning for redeployment was initiated in November in the Planning and Control Section of G-4 Division, and on 27 November 1944 a Redeployment Planning Group was established as a special staff section of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. 203 Using the War Department's RR's as the basis for its planning, the Redeployment Planning Group issued Redeployment Planning Directive No. 1 on 6 January 1945. This was actually an outline to direct theater-level planning. It proposed that each general staff section chief and the Inspector General submit in writing a list of questions concerning the application of the redeployment plan to his own section. Armed with these questions, the Chief of the Redeployment Planning Group went to Washington to get the answers. It was during this officer's rather extended stay there that General Tompkins wrote his memo regarding the lack of an ETO plan. While the Chief of the Redeployment Planning Group was obtaining answers to their questions at the War Department, the section chiefs and the Inspector General were to continue with planning

203. GO 118, ETOUSA, 27 Nov 44.
for the various phases of redeployment, their plans to be completed by 10 February 1945. However, before their recommendations could be compiled, the Redeployment Planning Group was replaced by a new agency called the Redeployment Planning Committee, headed by Brig. Gen. George S. Eyster, AC of S, G-3. This new agency was created on 8 March 1945, two weeks before the European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment was completed. The result of work done by the original planning group, the Basic Plan simply expanded War Department instructions and prescribed basic procedures and policies governing the action of the major commands. It was distributed only to general and special staff divisions and major commanders, all of whom were to submit their revisions of the plan to General Eyster by 9 April 1945. The plan was not to be submitted to combat units below army group for comment because the Theater Commander had directed that nothing was to interfere with combat operations. This not only left many combat units with no knowledge of redeployment plans but deprived the planning committee of suggestions from combat commanders.

General Eyster had set 1 June 1945 as the deadline for completion of the ETO redeployment plan, but his agency completed the plan more than a month before this deadline. The Tentative European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment was issued on 21 April after Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, had personally flown from Paris to Reims to have it approved by the Chief of Staff.

Realizing that V-E Day was imminent, the April plan was declared in effect, pending War Department approval, and major commanders were ordered to complete their detailed planning by 15 May, and then by 10 May 1945. Again the plan was not submitted to units lower than army groups. The tentative plan was flown to Washington for submission to the War Department on 26 April and was approved in a General Staff conference on 30 April, with the understanding that it incorporate recently published War Department regulations. These changes were made in the plan, and it was published on 15 May 1945 as the European Theater of Operations Basic Plan.

There were many problems that had to be solved in planning

204. GO 30 ETOUSA, 8 Mar 45. Since Gen Eyster was Theater G-3 and chairman of the planning it was assumed from the beginning that he would direct redeployment.
205. Statement of Gen Eyster to Maj Sparrow, His Div, 25 Feb 50. HIS 350.05 (25 Feb 50) Spec Stu Demob. OCMH.
206. ETOUSA Memo Lt Gen Clay to Gen Eisenhower thru ACofS, G-3, 25 Apr 45. DRB, TAG.
207. OPD M/R, 30 Apr 45. OPD 370.9, Sec IV-A, Case 44.
the ETO redeployment program, but the two that caused the greatest discussion were those of categorizing units and establishing assembly areas. The War Department redeployment plan had set up four categories for units.

Category I.......... those units to be retained as occupational troops.

Category II......... those units to be transferred to an active theater, either directly or indirectly through the United States, or transferred to the United States to be placed in strategic reserve.

Category III........ those units to be converted or reorganized (to include necessary activations and inactivations) and upon completion thereof to fall under Category I or II.

Category IV......... those units to be demobilized.

In connection with this, G–1 Division of Theater Headquarters had suggested in December 1944 the essential weakness in classifying units on the basis of length of service overseas. Since many units long overseas had had large turnovers in personnel and many units overseas only a short while contained men with longer periods of service, G–1 Division recommended that units be placed in categories only after the critical adjusted rating score had been announced and the men’s scores analyzed. G–1 also recommended that units having the largest percentage of men with critical scores should be placed in Category II; and those units having the highest percentage with scores in the middle range in Category I. G–1’s main reason for recommending this plan of categorization was the fact that the War Department had made the commanding generals of theaters and major commands responsible for the maintenance of operational efficiency. G–1’s plan was sent to the War Department by cable but was accepted only in part.208 The War Department felt it essential to categorize units before announcement of the critical score so that unit redeployment could begin immediately after cessation of hostilities. A compromise was worked out between the proposals. All units to be shipped before V–E Day and within a month thereafter would be categorized according to length of service overseas, while those that were to ship at a later period would be categorized according to the G–1 plan.209

The War Department also established the following priority for

208. Cable, 18 Dec 44, ETOUSA to AGWAR. Ibid.
209. Cable, 24 Dec 44, AGWAR to ETOUSA; Cable, 5 Jan 45, ETOUSA to AGWAR. Ibid.
the demobilization of units: Army of the United States, National Guard, and Regular Army.\textsuperscript{210} With the announcement of these priorities, it was possible to plan the disposition of fighting units so that those selected for redeployment would be available.\textsuperscript{211}

The other major decision facing ETO planners concerned assembly areas. While the first planning directive had assumed that assembly areas would be used in redeploying troops, some general staff divisions in the Theater Headquarters felt there was no real need for them. In fact, G–1, the division that would be responsible for working out the details of their establishment, shared this opinion. It was the insistence of the AC of S, G–4, that convinced G–1 of the necessity of assembly areas to properly handle troops and equipment for redeployment to the Far East and the United States. In addition, an assembly area would regulate an even flow of troops to staging areas.\textsuperscript{212}

Having solved the major organization problems and received War Department concurrence on its redeployment plan,\textsuperscript{213} the ETO was ready to begin operations when V–E Day arrived. General Marshall was particularly concerned, because of the morale factor involved, with getting the program in operation immediately since:

\ldots I fear that the weight of public opinion in the United States will be such that unless the task is handled properly we may be forced to take measures that will interfere with redeployment and result in prolongation of the Japanese War.

Eisenhower shared Marshall's feelings in this matter and directed Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, Commanding General, Communications Zone, to see that fairness and speed be exercised to the fullest in carrying out the program.\textsuperscript{214}

Point values were announced to ETO on 8 May 1945\textsuperscript{215} and on 12 May 1945 all theater units filled out ASR score cards and turned them over to records units for consolidation and transmission to Theater Headquarters and in turn to the War Department. On 15 May the War Department sent to the Theater a list of military occupational specialties\textsuperscript{*} needed by the Army.\textsuperscript{216} Soldiers having one or more of these needed skills, regardless of their adjusted rating scores, were not eligible for discharge. In addition to the War Department list, the Theater found it nec-

\textsuperscript{210} Cable, 16 Jan 45, AGWAR to ETOUSA. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{211} Interview of Sparrow with Eyster. 314.7 (Demob). OCMH.
\textsuperscript{212} Redeployment (ETO history), pp. 23–24. OCMH, Gen Ref Br.
\textsuperscript{213} Cable, 16 Apr 45, Marshall to Eisenhower, ETO Hist. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{214} Ltr, ETOUSA, circa Apr 45, Eisenhower to Lt Gen John C. H. Lee. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} WD Cable, WX 70314, to ETOUSA and other commands concerned, 1 May 45.
\textsuperscript{*} These specialties are listed in Appendix XI.
\textsuperscript{216} Cable, WARX–82456, 15 May 45, AGWAR to ETOUSA. OPD 370.9.
necessary to declare certain other personnel essential. By the middle of June the shortage of office workers caused the stenographer (MOS 213) and the clerk-typist (MOS 405) to be put on the critical list;\(^2\) and by 2 July the court reporter (MOS 280), tabulating machine operator (MOS 425), and the power-house engineer (MOS 077) had been added.\(^2\) By the end of July 1945 twenty additional categories were listed by the Theater as essential.\(^2\) After the defeat of Japan the War Department list of critical military occupational specialties was reduced until it included only orthopedic mechanic (MOS 366), transmitter attendant, fixed station (MOS 798), and electroencephalographic specialist (MOS no number).

As pointed out above, the War Department redeployment plan had set up four categories for units. On recommendation of the Theater Commander, the War Department designated certain units to be inactivated. Notice of inactivation automatically placed a unit in Category IV. Thereupon, the Theater Commander ordered the transfer of all low-point men out of the unit, to be replaced by men with scores equal to or above the current critical score. In effect, the unit became merely a vehicle by which to return highscore personnel. Men who, for one reason or another, could not be incorporated into a Category IV unit moved as casuals in groups of approximately 1000 men to the Ground Force Reinforcement Depot instead of the Assembly Areas. At the Ground Force Reinforcement Depot they were subdivided and segregated into separation-center groups except that each of the 1000-men packets continued to travel as a shipment under the command of an officer designated as shipment commander. Instead of the detachment which formed the administrative cadre of a Category IV unit, escort personnel, both officer and enlisted, were assigned to each separation-center packet, the number varying in proportion to the number of personnel who were themselves eligible for separation and destined for the same separation center.

Processing by Category IV units as distinguished from casuals gave rise to some important considerations. Prior to V-J Day all personnel who left the Theater for the United States for demobilization were casuals; no Category IV units sailed before 10 August. Although Category IV units were carriers for the sole purpose of getting high-score personnel back to the States for discharge, they often contained personnel who were not eligible for separation or who had fewer points than others. The dif-

217. Cable, EX-57867, 16 June 45, Com Z to SHAEF.
218. Cable, EX-64129, 2 Jul 45, USFET Rear to Major Cmds.
219. Cable, EX-74413, 30 Jul 45, USFET to Major Cmds.
ficulties involved in readjusting the personnel was responsible. An example of this is found in the case of the 70th Infantry Division, which reported to the UK Base from Camp St. Louis on 26 September 1945. The scores of the personnel were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>85 and up</td>
<td>70 and up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74–84</td>
<td>13,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–69</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authority for such unit composition had been granted by Headquarters, Seventh Army, in its alert notification. This letter specifically stated that units would be filled with the highest point men available in Seventh Army and with a maximum of 800 personnel having scores below eighty-five (ASR) authorized per division. War Department orders that men below certain ASR scores would not be placed in demobilizing units so long as personnel with higher scores remained in the major commands had no effect in this particular case. Although discovered in time for correction, this situation was not rectified because of delays in transmitting information and misunderstandings between staff sections in higher headquarters. The Queen Elizabeth sailed on 4 October with the low-score personnel on board. Notice to withdraw the personnel under question, received at the port on 3 October, was ignored because it would have resulted in:

1. A delay of one day in sailing to unload baggage.
2. Rebilleting the ship.
3. Calling up replacements to fill the ship on short notice.
4. Taking twenty-four officers and over 500 enlisted men off the boat (with resulting morale problems worse than already existed).\(^{221}\)

The staging area was no place to delete men from shipping schedules, regardless of their points.

It was the experience of many persons that the system of movement by casuals rather than by Category IV Units was much more equitable and consistent with the point formula. Any movement by Category IV Units, no matter how carefully transfers of low-point and high-point men out of and into the unit were performed, inevitably resulted in a spread of points of those in the locality of the unit. This permitted, as in the case above, the movement of say seventy pointers in the unit while eighty pointers located elsewhere in the Theater and not available for transfer into the designated Category IV Unit remained behind. The directive to withdraw low-score personnel at staging areas merely

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221. Ibid.
caused confusion and extra work and lowered morale. Movement by casuals permitted fairness in returning personnel, eliminated the necessity of last-minute changes at the staging areas, and made transport loading much easier. The requirements of loading an entire Category IV Unit aboard ship and preserving the integrity of the unit complicated allocations of space and caused delays while casual packets of 1000 men or any separation center subdivision thereof could be easily loaded as shipping space became available. Nevertheless, the fact remains that movement by Category IV Units permitted retention of command organization, aided in transmitting orders, and allowed closer administrative control.

USFET issued movement orders to each redeploying unit, supplying the shipping number and Table of Organization, the port of embarkation, the amount of equipment to be carried, and other pertinent information. The order also set two dates—an Availability Date, by which time the unit had to be prepared for movement to the Assembly Area Command, and a Readiness Date, which was the time when the unit must be ready to leave the Assembly Area for the Staging Area. Upon receipt of movement orders the unit organized a small detachment whose duty it was to prepare records, handle supplies, and generally see the unit through the various steps of processing to the United States. Readjustment Regulations specified the number and type of officer personnel that would accompany any group. The unit disposed of its equipment at its home station retaining only minimum essential equipment; cursory physical examinations were given there; and all financial obligations of the unit were met. With these details taken care of, the unit was ready to move when the Assembly Area issued its call.

Insufficient shipping and administrative difficulties made it impossible for all men possessing the current critical score to leave the Theater at any given time. As a result of this situation, the Theater Headquarters instituted a quota system under which each Theater major command was assigned a given number which was scheduled for movement within a certain month. When the quota system first began functioning, the percentages were assigned on the basis of T/O strength of commands, regardless of the number of men within the command who had the required ASR scores for demobilization. Naturally, great inequities resulted. Late in August a congressman reported to the Under

222. Memo, Lt Col Edward F. Baumer to Chief, Policy Group, G-1, 17 Dec 45, sub: Obsn of the Opn of Demobn Program in ETO and MTO, and Tab C. WDGPA 370.01 (17 Dec 45).
Secretary of War that the 39th Evacuation Hospital in Amberg, Germany, had attached to it 153 men with scores running from 100 to 123. The War Department pointed out that the unit was Category IV and requested the Theater Commander to investigate the situation and make necessary adjustments. It was found that the quota system was responsible. The Theater Redeployment Coordinating Group report on the matter stated:

... In this instance although 123 of the highest score personnel of this unit are included in a "quota" for shipment in September, 62\(^*\) of its personnel with scores of 85 and over are to wait until the October "quota." In the meantime many individuals, with lower scores from other units in the Theater are going home. Result—Discontent.\(^{223}\)

The report characterized the quota system as currently operating the greatest potential source of trouble in the demobilization program and recommended that it in the future be based on a careful analysis of the numbers of persons of each ASR score in the various major commands. With the institution of these changes and a concentrated effort to release men with given ASR's when they became eligible, the quota system became what it was intended to be—an aid to the efficient processing of troops for demobilization.

### Assembly Area Command

As pointed out earlier, the desirability of establishing an Assembly Area Command was one of the biggest problems faced by the ETO planners; but the problem of deciding whether or not it should be established was nothing in comparison with the problem of getting it into operation. Since the Assembly Area Command was strictly for demobilization purposes, more space will be devoted to a discussion of it than to staging areas and ports.

The major purpose of the Assembly Area Command, according to the original ETO plan, was to complete preparation for overseas movement of troops for redeployment direct to the United States or through the United States to other theaters; but when demobilization replaced redeployment, the Assembly Area began to process Category IV units, becoming the intermediate step between the major command and the staging area at ports of embarkation.

On 7 April 1945 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, ETOUSA, wrote the Deputy Commander, Communications Zone, concerning the nomination of a commanding general for the Assembly Area Command and about the planning that would have to be done to

\(^{*}\)Pencilled note says "only 44 EM."

\(^{223}\) RCG Interim Rpt to DCofS, USFET, 6 Sep 45, sub: Quota System for Redepl.
get the Assembly Area into operation. This letter pointed out a number of pertinent facts: the Assembly Area would be developed to eventually take care of 270,000 troops; detailed planning should be begun immediately, under direction of the officer selected to command the Area; construction, under command of the Commanding General, Oise Section, was to be completed as follows:

- Facilities for: 70,000 troops by 1 May
- 150,000 troops by 1 July
- 270,000 troops by 1 August.

Communications Zone accepted the recommendations made in the above letter and on 9 April activated the Assembly Area Command, naming Maj. Gen. Royal B. Lord, formerly Chief of Staff, Communications Zone, as the commanding general. General Lord and his quickly-formed staff began work immediately on preparing plans for operating the Assembly Area Command.

About fifty miles wide and one hundred miles long, the Assembly Area Command was located in the vicinity of Reims, France. This particular section was chosen, not only because of its obvious advantages in the way of transportation, hospitals, and convenient location, but because it would not deprive the French of tillable soil. Within the Command there were four sub-areas—Mailly, Suippes, Sissone, and Mourmelon—which in turn were composed of seventeen camps. The camps, named for American cities, and their capacities follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mailly</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Suippes</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>17,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>17,250</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>17,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mourmelon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>17,250</td>
<td>Okla. City</td>
<td>17,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh*</td>
<td>17,250</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Headquarters, Communications Zone, issued a directive to Oise Section in late March which ordered its engineer troops to begin construction of camps in the area to be occupied by Assembly Area Command. The standard division-size camp, in conformity with War Department plans, was selected as the basic

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225. GO No. 48, Com Z, 9 Apr 45.

*Part of Camp Pittsburgh was reserved for females. In July it was established as a separate camp and named Carlisle.
camp for the program. This construction called for a tremendous amount of material which had to be brought from the United States and the United Kingdom as well as the Continent. The complete construction job called for 5,000 huts of various types; 33,000 tents; the laying of 8,000,000 square feet of concrete; 450,000 tons of rock for roads and hard standings; and 34,000,000 board feet of lumber.

Plans contemplated Phase III construction for ten camps and SOP 5A for the other eight. Phase III consisted of winterized tents for living quarters and huts for mess halls and administration buildings. It also provided for complete utilities and a system of roads, walks, and hard-standings for vehicles. However, the deluge of troops to be redeployed required utilization of all camps before construction could be completed and even though they barely met the SOP 5A specifications which called for tents or improvised construction. The planned standards were not reached until the end of September 1945 although the original target was to have six camps ready for occupancy by 1 June and twelve by 1 July. But by 28 June all camps were occupied to some extent.

On 29 June, Headquarters, Assembly Area Command, informed the four sub-areas and their camps that, since certain facilities were necessary in camps at once, they were to make available each day such troops as were necessary to aid Oise Section construction troops. Emphasis was added by saying that "Only those troops actively engaged in preserving and packing their equipment, having personnel being processed or undergoing training were not to be used."

The first personnel assigned to operate the Assembly Area Command, a group of headquarters staff, arrived in Reims from Paris on 27 and 28 April. Original planning for the Command specified 30,939 as the number of personnel required for operating purposes, and these were divided into divisional troops, other non-T/O troops, and T/O units. The latter were assigned after the section chiefs and studied the situation, decided what work would have to be done, and requested personnel. Non-T/O personnel in the following grades were authorized on 6 June by Communications Zone: 2,142 officers, 56 warrant officers, and 13,232 enlisted men. As part of these troops, the 75th Infantry Division was selected for assignment to the Assembly Area Command. One battalion was attached to each camp for opera-

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227. AA Comd Hist (MS), p. 20.
228. TWX, Hq AAC to CO's Subareas and Camps, 29 Jun 45.
229. AA Comd Hist (MS), p. 25.
tional control, and the battalion commander commanded all Assembly Area Command troops stationed in the camp (except the Camp Commander and his staff), in addition to his own troops. Some of the problems arising from the use of the 75th Division will be discussed in a later section. For the first three months of its existence the Assembly Area Command did not have a sufficient allotment of grades and ratings to permit promotions of deserving officers and enlisted personnel, with the result that the morale of the command suffered.

Plans estimated that when the Assembly Area Command reached capacity operations it would be processing 250,000 individuals at a time, with a daily flow in and out of the Command of ninety to one hundred units or approximately 18,000 persons. It was planned that, in general, all medical units, nurses, and other female personnel would go to Camp Pittsburgh; all Air Corps to Camp Detroit; heavy ordnance to Camp Washington; and divisions to the other camps. G-3 ran a Control Room to regulate these assignments, but the number of troops that converged on the Assembly Area Command made it impossible to adhere strictly to this system. The Chief of Staff, Assembly Area Command, noted the complications that were arising in this connection and commented to G-3: “It is desired that... prior to assigning groups of type units to camps or sub-areas other than originally intended, that such assignments be cleared with G-4 and G-1 Sections. In addition, it is noted that some camps have both direct and indirect redeployed units. They should only be mixed up as a last resort.”

Having been assigned to Assembly Area camps, Category IV units continued with preparations for shipping. Any major items of equipment that the unit still had were disposed of at this point; and a further check was made on ASR scores. Records of units and their individuals were put in order, with a system of records auditing teams being used. In addition to perfecting its personnel records, each Category IV unit prepared and included as a separate annex to each copy of its movement orders personnel rosters in the form of dual stencils showing a breakdown of all personnel by name, rank, branch of service, Army serial number, military occupational specialty, adjusted service rating score, and the exact separation center to which each individual was destined in the United States. With this accomplished it was possible to group men bound for the same separation center and prepare rosters accordingly. This did not mean that they were physically separated.

230. See note on p. 179 above.
231. Memo, CofS, AAC to G-3, 30 June 45. DRB, TAG.
into groups; they continued to travel as a unit until they reached Disposition Centers in the United States.

The Assembly Area Command, its planned construction finally completed and operating efficiently, ceased to be a separate command in September of 1945 and was assigned for operations to Oise Intermediate Section.\(^{232}\) It did continue to operate until the end of 1945 although some units by-passed it. The Assembly Area Command processed over 600,000 troops during its operation as a separate command. The table below shows the flow of redeploying troops in 1945:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL ARRIVALS (Cumulative)</th>
<th>TOTAL DEPARTURES (Cumulative)</th>
<th>REDEPLOYING POPULATION (Arrivals less departures)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 June</td>
<td>21,533</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June</td>
<td>108,804</td>
<td></td>
<td>108,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>172,816</td>
<td>16,470</td>
<td>156,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July</td>
<td>224,128</td>
<td>73,730</td>
<td>150,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July</td>
<td>270,976</td>
<td>106,743</td>
<td>164,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July</td>
<td>285,555</td>
<td>128,941</td>
<td>166,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August</td>
<td>331,703</td>
<td>159,564</td>
<td>172,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August</td>
<td>346,257</td>
<td>190,258</td>
<td>155,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August</td>
<td>349,408</td>
<td>229,105</td>
<td>120,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 August</td>
<td>369,115</td>
<td>266,529</td>
<td>102,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>*366,789</td>
<td>298,842</td>
<td>67,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September</td>
<td>380,306</td>
<td>299,771</td>
<td>80,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September</td>
<td>433,779</td>
<td>316,103</td>
<td>117,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 September</td>
<td>481,749</td>
<td>347,536</td>
<td>134,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October</td>
<td>600,298</td>
<td>406,116</td>
<td>194,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 October</td>
<td>623,130</td>
<td>451,014</td>
<td>172,116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(This figure is less than that of 22 August due to the deletion from the Cumulative Arrivals column of all units removed from the alert status up to that time. Also, this table makes no distinction between personnel for redeployment and for demobilization.) Source: AA Comd Hist (MS).

Difficulties Encountered in Assembly Areas

*Personnel:* The biggest and most enduring of all problems to be solved by the Assembly Area Command was that of static personnel. As mentioned above, there were T/O, divisional, and other non-T/O troops assigned to operate the Area; and it was the divisional troops—that of the 75th Infantry Division—that really complicated the procedure. When Communications Zone authorized about 15,000 non-T/O grades to the Assembly Area Command, it stated that an infantry division would be assigned to partly fill these requirements. However, it turned out that the 75th Division was attached to the Assembly Area Command for

\(^{232}\) GO 262, TSFET, 21 Sep 45.
administration and operational control and remained assigned to the XVI Corps, with the result that the Assembly Area Command was powerless to transfer any of the division's personnel. Furthermore, because the division retained its organizational integrity, a great many of its personnel were busy with normal divisional tasks although the division was charged against the bulk allotment of the Assembly Area Command. The 75th was intended as a housekeeping unit to aid in redeployment, but many of its personnel were totally unsuited to the assigned tasks. The crowning blow was that of requiring the Assembly Area Command to release 75th Division personnel to fill out shortages in redeploying units. This constant change in organization, the lack of qualified personnel, and the problems of administration were extremely difficult.

Storage Space: Since personnel going to the United States took only minimum essential equipment, the Assembly Area Command had few problems in connection with supplying them. However, in order to take care of any items that were turned in by those Category IV units and also other supplies that were on hand, the Assembly Area had to have storage space. And it was definitely lacking in a number of camps. At Camp Chicago there were no storage facilities; consequently, a warehouse at Sissone, three miles away, had to be used. Camp Brooklyn had to share the space at Camp New York, involving a 3-mile trip. The AAC Engineers provided three assembly tents at Camp Cleveland since there were no permanent storage buildings in the vicinity. Camps Philadelphia, St. Louis, Atlanta, New Orleans, and Miami were forced to use existing facilities at adjacent French Garrisons at Mourmelon-le-Petit and Mailly-le-Camp, which were as far as four and one-half miles away. Both Camps Norfolk and San Antonio solved their storage problems by using hangars and assembly tentage.

Troop Flow: ETOUSA had planned the movement of units so that they would arrive at certain points at definite times, but the pattern was not followed. Headquarters, Assembly Area noted as early as 20 June that, although units had been called according to prescribed procedures, a large number of units failed to arrive at the given time. This made it impossible to process units in time to meet their impedimenta and personnel readiness dates. Only 232, or 37 percent, of the 837 units called to the Assembly Area Command had arrived on time. Assembly Area Command attributed this laxness to one of two reasons: Higher echelons of command were not expeditiously transmitting call-ups to units.

233. MS, History of the Assembly Area Command, p. 59, DRB, TAG.
concerned, or movement orders had not been issued far enough
in advance to permit processing through channels. Assembly
Area Command complained of this situation to Communications
Zone, offering to establish courier service to assure delivery of
call-ups and coordinate movement of units. Communications Zone
informed the Assembly Area Command that it had the responsi-
bility of following up its calls to see that they were received and
to check on overdue units. So the Assembly Area Command
adopted the policy of issuing tracers when units failed to arrive
on schedule and requesting acknowledgement of all calls. Major
commands were telephoned from midnight to early morning to
rush movement.

Not only was it a problem to regulate flow into the Assembly
Area Command but it was also extremely difficult to control it out. Movement out of the Area depended on receipt of a port call.
The Assembly Area Headquarters had no objection to this, but it did object to the frequent changes in port calls with the resultant
confusion in the Area. In one instance, personnel of the Assembly
Area Command had stayed on duty eighteen hours a day in order
to pack equipment for a directly redeployed unit. The equipment
was to move out on 25 June. The port, however, did not issue
the call, and equipment piled up at the camps. Since equipment
was to be shipped thirty-five days ahead of personnel (in directly
redeployed units) in order that both would reach the theater at
the same time, the unit could not move on schedule. It remained
in the Assembly Area Command, occupying space that was to have
been used by a newly-arriving organization. Examples are found
(as in the case of the 87th Division) when orders were changed
as many as four times. When the Assembly Area Command
protested about the situation to the ports, it was told that these
changes were necessitated by new information and by the avail-
ability of shipping and space at the staging areas; and the ports
insisted that every effort was being made to issue calls only
when the date was firm.

This situation was never completely solved. Even after the
Assembly Area Command was dissolved, the problem continued.
In January 1946 a sergeant in France wrote Senator Forrest C.
Donnell:

... it's the 178th General Hospital with men from fifty-five
points up. They are formed and processed on or about the
20th of November 1945, and were given December 2nd 1945
as their sailing date, then the 10th of December; then the 20th

234. Ibid., p. 62.
235. Ibid.
EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILIZATION

of December; then the 28th of December; then the 2nd of January; and now postponed till the 18th of January. . . . 236

Emergency Assembly Areas

By 15 May 1945 it was discovered that the Assembly Area Command at Reims would not be completed in time to begin processing troops, so the plan of establishing an emergency assembly area was put into operation. Communications Zone designated the Normandy Assembly Area to be opened in the Le Havre Port area, pending the establishment of the ETO assembly area at Reims, France. 237 Camps Lucky Strike, Twenty Grand, and Old Gold, part of the old Red Horse Staging Area which had staged replacements for armies, were chosen as the installations for carrying out the program. The 89th Infantry Division moved from Germany to the area to process troops. The division remained under XVI Corps and was also responsible to the Normandy Base in redeployment matters. It had the job of assigning incoming units to camps, providing accommodations, replacing shortages of personnel and equipment of transient troops, assisting in packing and crating, etc. With a total capacity of about 11,000 the camps had processed a total of 343,733 troops just before V-J Day. 238 Camp Old Gold was closed out in August; the other two camps were held in reserve as staging areas until the end of the year. 239 A similar but smaller emergency assembly area was operated by the 66th Division in the Marseilles port area. This was known as the Delta Base Section, and operated at the port of Marseilles.

In this connection, it should be noted that troops deploying directly (prior to V-J Day) used the Delta Base Section. It was responsible for operation of the staging, assembly, and pre-storage areas, loading of convoys, and for full documentation of personnel in accordance with War Department requirements. Delta Base Section performed third and higher echelon repair on equipment since units called directly there had not checked theirs. Any missing items were replaced in order to insure full combat service-ability of all authorized items according to the requirements of the Theater of destination.

Port Areas: Following their stay at the Assembly Area Command, Category IV units were ready to move on to the Port Areas, when they completed processing and awaited shipping in Staging Areas. Each port area consisted of the port staging areas for

236. Ltr fm Sgt Eugene Ethridge to Sen Forrest C. Donnell. 12 Jan 46. 370.01 (Demob) (12 Jan 46) (12).
237. Cable EX-44273, 16 May 45, Com Z to NBS.
238. Normandy Emergency AA Hist. 314.7 (Demob).
239. Redeployment (ETO Hist).
supplies and equipment, staging areas for personnel, and the port of embarkation itself. The activities of these branches were co-ordinated and controlled by the Overseas Movement Division, which was under the direct control of the Port Commander.

There were originally four port areas on the Continent serving the European Theater of Operations. They were located at Le Havre, Marseilles, Antwerp, and Cherbourg,* of which the best-known was that at Le Havre. It now handled approximately 40 percent of the shipping from the Continent although when liberated on 12 September 1944 it was the scene of almost complete devastation. The U. S. Army Engineers took over and restored it to more than its normal shipping capacity so that within its first six months of rehabilitated operation it handled 1,253,000 tons and 920,000 passengers.

The Le Havre port had five staging areas under it. Named for popular cigarettes, these staging area camps were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philip Morris</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Tareyton</td>
<td>16,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pall Mall</td>
<td>7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wings</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Run</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just as sub-areas in the Assembly Area were slated to handle, in general, units of a given type (see p. 181), so were staging area camps. Of those serving the Le Havre Port, the following was true: Camp Herbert Tareyton staged critical score men and also those slated for redeployment to another theater; Camp Pall Mall, in addition to handling troops for redeployment to the United States, served as leave center for men going to the United Kingdom on leave passes; Camp Wings handled troops whose orders called for redeployment via the United Kingdom; Home Run, used during the war for processing troops on rotation leaves to the United States, chiefly handled advanced detachments of divisions, casualties, and individuals during demobilization; Philip Morris was the largest of all and handled the bulk of unit demobilization.

On arrival at the Staging Area railhead, troops were met by a representative of the camp to which they were assigned—for example, Camp Philip Morris—and a guide conducted the troops to the designated area. Immediately the unit commander attended an orientation conference to learn about the camp and its facilities. Within twenty-four hours after its arrival, the unit furnished a copy of its strength breakdown to Operations Division

*Some troops were shipped out through ports at Southampton and Glasgow in the United Kingdom.
of the Staging Area to be forwarded to the Planning Section, Movements Division, Le Havre Port of Embarkation Headquarters for use in assigning units to ships. The European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment specified that the Port Commander would set up an Overseas Movement Division to control movement and embarkation of personnel and matériel. Also within the first twenty-four hours, a list of officers, nurses, and warrant officers was submitted to Operations Division for the purpose of assigning first-class accommodations on the returning ships. Embarkation Personnel Rosters, or passenger lists, were completed immediately after a unit's arrival in the Staging Area. No unit could be considered ready for departure until these rosters had been forwarded to the Staging Area's Operations Division for reproduction. Any corrections on the list were made at the gangplank.

A number of other duties had to be performed at this point. Rosters were prepared which listed all men requiring booster shots, those who needed delousing, and those who had contagious diseases. Baggage checks were made, care being taken to see that the men's belongings had been correctly tagged, had the proper custom's clearance certificates, and contained no uncertified enemy matériel. Embarking troops were allowed not more than twenty-five pounds in excess of issued equipment. Foreign currency was also converted to American dollars, using rosters that had been prepared at the Assembly Area as a basis. When the rule that no 70-point men could leave the theater until every 80-point man was cleared, the Staging Area had the further duty of screening troops.

Five days prior to embarkation, the overseas commander reported by confidential radio to The Adjutant General and to the commander of the U. S. port at which debarkation was scheduled the following data:

(1) The vessel's current U. S. port serial number.
(2) The code designation of each unit to be embarked and the identity of each unit.
(3) Each reception station group's code designation.
(4) Strengths of units, groups, and other passengers to be embarked. Strength of Category IV units to be broken down by reception stations to which the personnel are dispatched.
(5) The number of enlisted personnel in each unit and group with scores above the critical score.

Receipt of this information made it possible for the port com-
mander to warn the personnel center commander involved and the Chief of Transportation.

Availability of shipping determined the length of time spent by units at Staging Areas, but the actual time spent in processing there required about seventy-two hours. Troops that had completed their processing, but were not scheduled to leave within the next forty-eight hours, were free to do as they pleased. The only requirement being that they must be in camp at taps each night.

Passenger lists were checked and corrected at the gangplank as the personnel embarked.

Problems Encountered in ETO

There were a number of problems that had to be solved in placing demobilization in operation. Since the unit category system was being employed, the interim policy of designating units according to “last units in, first units out” had to be changed. With ASR scores computed and the War Department designations assigned to units, constant changes had to be made. Early in June there were the difficulties connected with the widespread disposition of units; the confusion in accounting resulting from the shifting of units to meet new operational commitments in Germany; the impassable condition of many roads and bridges which created traffic bottlenecks and impeded movement of units out of Germany; and the congestion of communications facilities.

Recategorization of units after V-J Day and attendant difficulties continued through the next few months. By early August many units, in the Assembly Area Command or even in staging areas, suddenly found themselves being recategorized, pulled back, and put through processing all over again. This had a deteriorating effect on morale of those involved. As of 31 August, personnel in Category II units in the pipeline was approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staging Area</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delta Base Staging Areas</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Havre Staging Area</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly Area Command</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Elements of 35th and 45th Div. not included.)

With direct shipment to the Pacific discontinued, there seemed to be nothing to do but move these units back into the Theater, particularly since the War Department was insisting on the return first of high-score personnel. (There was no low-score quota for

240. Memo, Chief, RCG for DCoFS, USFET, 6 Sep 45, sub: Rpt on Readjustment and Redepl Activities. DRB, TAG.
ETO at that time.) An extreme example of the manner in which a unit could be affected is that of the 405th Fighter Group. This unit arrived at Camp Detroit on 7 July and on 6 September was still there, having been deleted from a port call dated 15 August.\textsuperscript{241} The Deputy Chief of Staff, USFET, realizing the morale factors involved, commented: "Those having seen blue water should go back to US."\textsuperscript{242} There was considerable confusion in the field also regarding the new categories of units, much of which might have been avoided if the rapidly changing situation had not prevented a faster re-categorization of units.

\textit{Morale Problems:} Morale, as it was reflected in the theater as a whole, is discussed in a section on public relations; but there are certain aspects that should be mentioned here. The morale of non-regular officers was low because they lacked information regarding their status in the postwar Army and the criteria for their discharges; many of these officers were under the impression that ASR scores applied to them. Needless to say, this situation, which could have been corrected by accurate and timely information, had a bad effect on morale in general as did the rapid development of the redeployment program. This rapidity meant that emphasis was, in general, concentrated on major units with little or no attention being given to small units because small units did not have commanders of sufficient rank to "fight their battles." The small units retaliated by writing to the President, to Congressmen, or to The Inspector General, demanding that they be given a fair chance at demobilization.

Considerable discontent was also manifested by combat men who had been transferred to Service Forces to replace men eligible for discharge consideration never suspecting that they might be retained in the Theater longer than their ex-comrades who remained in combat units. The size of the Service Forces could only be reduced to a very small degree because that organization did the actual work of redeploying the combat forces.

The publication \textit{What the Soldier Thinks} in November 1944 revealed the results of a survey that had been conducted on demobilization.\textsuperscript{243} At the time of the survey two out of three men in the European Theater of Operations expected to be out of the Army within six months after the defeat of Germany. To these men the phrase "duration and six months" was related to the end of hostilities in Europe—not to the war as a whole. With such beliefs prevalent, discontent and criticism of a demobilization pro-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{242} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{243} \textit{What the Soldier Thinks}, "When Do Men Expect To Be Demobilized?" 25 Nov 44, p. 11.
\end{itemize}
gram that did not confirm their hopes was inevitable. In January 1945 this same publication carried an article about influencing attitudes with information.\textsuperscript{244} It had conducted a series of tests determining the effect that knowledge of current affairs had on soldier's attitudes. To prove the effectiveness of the scheme, the men were quizzed on certain current events, divided into groups according to the scores they made, and given an attitude analysis. Those making the best information scores turned out to have the best attitudes about the war. Further corroboration of this conclusion was obtained by giving tests again—after men had been taught a number of facts about the questions involved. Results demonstrated that those who gained the most information during the period covered also displayed the most improvement in attitude. The concluding paragraph of the article pointed out: "Data of this type re-emphasizes the importance of supplying troops with the basic facts about the men and issues which are moulding the war and the peace."\textsuperscript{245}

The European edition of \textit{Stars and Stripes} could have been the instrument for disseminating correct information about the demobilization program but, according to major commanders, it proved to be extremely prejudicial to soldier morale by publishing demobilization facts prematurely and sometimes incorrectly. Soldiers who believed what they read were often doomed to disappointment. Others, of course, did not know what to believe. Hoping to correct certain inequities in demobilization of units and individuals, TSFET issued a circular that requested the Editor-in-Chief of \textit{Stars and Stripes} to forward to the major commanders or staff sections concerned portions of letters addressed to the "B-Bag."\textsuperscript{*} The identity of the writer was not disclosed, and it was expected that the commander would take action to clear up the complaints. The Redeployment Coordinating Group, in discussing this plan, said: "...it appears that a more appropriate means of insuring that injustices are brought to light and proper corrective measures taken, would be for individual reports to be submitted direct to the IG, rather than to the editor of a publication, and adequate corrective measures taken through command channels."\textsuperscript{246} Inquiry into cases actually printed in "B-Bag" often resulted in such findings as the following: Investigation of a com-

\textsuperscript{244} \textit{What the Soldier Thinks}, "Influencing Attitudes with Information," 20 Jan 45, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{*}A column in \textit{Stars and Stripes}.
\textsuperscript{246} Memo, RCG for DCofS, USFET, 6 Sep 45, sub: Rpt on Readjustment and Redep Activities. \textit{Ibid.}
plaint by personnel of the 44th Evacuation Hospital relative to their retention in the Assembly Area Command revealed that the unit had departed from Oise Intermediate Staging Area on 30 October, over two weeks prior to publication of the complaint on 18 November. Similarly, the complaint by a member of the 776th AAA (AW) Battalion disclosed that the unit had departed on 17 November, three days prior to publication of the letter on 20 November. Discovering these facts did not undo the damage done to morale by publication of such letters.

The inauguration in January 1946 of a radio program called "Round Table Discussions on Redeployment," under the direction of General Eyster himself, was definitely a step in the right direction. The chief of the Redeployment Coordinating Group, in his last report to the Deputy Chief of Staff, USFET, said:

During the visits throughout the Theater, it was found that the radio broadcast, "Round Table Discussions on Redeployment," have provided much needed information to the individual soldier. They were received with much enthusiasm and the opinion of all contacted on this subject was that more should be held. Although "Stars and Stripes" had long been the soldier's chief source of information, it has been found to be "unofficial" information, at times erroneous, and has resulted in conjecture and rumor. This situation does not exist in regard to the broadcasts. They have been accepted as fact by those contacted and officers indicated that their problems of explaining policies and status of redeployment were materially lessened after the broadcasts were begun.  

Supplies: Prior to V-J Day the principal ETO problem where equipment was concerned was that of packing, crating, and marking that which was to be shipped to another theater and finding storage space for that which was to be retained. With the victory in Japan, however, the situation became different. Almost immediately commanders had to solve the problem of disposing of equipment that had already been prepared for shipment. By early September the War Department authorized return of the equipment to Theater stocks and approximately 19,000 tons of force-marked equipment, shipped to Marseilles prior to V-J Day for Category II units, was returned to depot stocks by the end of October. No adequate basis existed to enable Category IV units to turn in organic equipment that was no longer required, prior to receipt of their movement orders. When the orders arrived, time was often too short to make proper disposition of the items

and frequently the units had been so reorganized and cut down in personnel numbers that it was impossible to take care of equipment. For instance, on 10 September one air force unit, the 27th Fighter Group, had been cut to a strength of eighty-nine officers and fifteen enlisted men, prior to the build-up to normal strength of over one thousand officers and enlisted men. Despite this drastic cut in strength, the unit still had all its organizational equipment, etc.

Temporary storage of vehicles proved exceptionally unsatisfactory in a few cases. Inspectors at Bremen and Columbus Quay discovered that there were broken boxes, unpacked parts, etc., within thirty feet of the water with no protection whatsoever. This was attributed to the lack of personnel to supervise and operate storage programs. Troops had been out-phased too much in advance of installations, supplies, and equipment. During December inspections of storage areas at Mourmelon revealed similar difficulties. Vehicles were found standing in as much as four inches of water; gum preventative had not been added to gasoline still in tanks; canvas for issue was damp and exposed to the weather; batteries had been removed from vehicles but very few had been placed in proper storage. It was also found that inspection records had not been maintained.248

**Personnel:** The problem of personnel with which to accomplish the task of demobilization and to perform occupation duties was the most perplexing one that faced the Army during this period. Civilian soldiers did not want to stay in the Army long enough to close out installations, process personnel more eligible than they for discharge, or perform the occupational duties that go with being the victor in a war. Demands from the War Department for personnel of a specific type, hysteria for quick demobilization, etc., complicated the situation.

Even before redeployment gave way to demobilization, special demands were being made on the European Theater of Operations for supplying personnel. The War Department's decision in July 1945 to return 7,000 doctors and nurses to civilian practice began the series of requests. Supplying these doctors and nurses taxed the medical units severely with the result that indirectly redeployed units had to return to the States without required professional personnel. Likewise, soldiers with Military Occupational Specialties as railroad workers were to be returned. It was estimated that there were 5,000 such troops in the Theater, and they had to be returned by air at the rate of 800 per week (with

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248. Memo, Chief, RCG to DCoS, USFET, 4 Jan 46, sub: Monthly Rpt of RCG.
Ibid.
the exception of 318 who had already departed). This again placed a tremendous burden on operating personnel in the Theater, delaying regular demobilization activities and increasing administrative difficulties.

And in addition to these two categories of personnel, Finance officers also were in great demand in the United States. This was the result of increased activity in demobilizing personnel in the States. The complicated problems of final payment, mustering-out pay, terminal leave, allotment cancellations, etc., made it necessary for more and more qualified personnel to be provided. Because of this the War Department on 13 August ordered the return of 335 officers and enlisted men from the European Theater of Operations.

Aside from the lack of special classes of personnel mentioned above, tremendous shortages in ordinary operating personnel began to show up very early in the demobilization program. The difficulties of the Assembly Area Command in maintaining static personnel have already been discussed. Port operations were also seriously hampered by lack of manpower and at Le Havre port alone, it was estimated that during September the following operating personnel would be lacking:

- 100 officers (company grade, including 20 with staff experience).
- 1,200 enlisted men (including 120 office personnel, 60 typists, and the rest qualified NCO's and enlisted men for checking and MP work). These people were needed in the processing of troops for out-movement from the Theater.

The critical state in which the occupation forces found themselves may be revealed by examining certain units. The 100th Division, performing occupation duties around Stuttgart, had at the beginning of November 1945 a total strength of 5,400, including all ranks, which was about one-third of the T/O strength. Seventh Army estimated that by 30 November its Category I and II units would be short 20,000 white and 6,400 colored enlisted men. The 305th Bomb Group (H) was approximately fifty percent understrength. The Oise Intermediate Section was short about 10,000 personnel. TSFET at this time estimated its potential shortage in Category I and II units as 2,531 officers and 44,038 enlisted men. Whether the lack of personnel to perform assigned duties were entirely due to decreasing personnel or the

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249. Memo, Chief, RCG for DCofS, USFET, 6 Sep 45, sub: Rpt on Readjustment and Redepl.
250. All above figures are taken from Memo, Chief, RCG, for DCofS, USFET, 1 Dec 45, sub: Monthly Rpt of RCG.
failure of the War Department to allow the Theater Commander to inactivate units and use their personnel as replacements is open to question.

The problem of readjusting Negro personnel proved to be difficult because the required skills and specialties were not readily available among these groups. This was a continuation of the problem that had plagued the Army throughout the war. Final adjustments, in most cases, had to be made on the basis of "body" rather than MOS. As replacements did trickle in, it was apparent that they were not qualified to perform the duties of those they were replacing. For example, of the 500 replacements received by IX Air Force Service Command early in December, the majority were aerial gunners and searchlight operators while the Command needed personnel to man communication facilities, provide weather information, maintain equipment, and perform administrative functions.

In addition to lack of operating personnel there was a serious shortage where maintenance crews were concerned. This made it impossible to meet the set standards for maintenance. One instance is given when the 17th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was moving five hundred miles. En route an excessive number of vehicles broke down, and the explanation was simply lack of qualified drivers and mechanics to perform first and second echelon maintenance during the previous three months. The report of this incident concluded that "proper standards to insure necessary care, maintenance and preservation of equipment and supplies cannot be attained under present policies. A slow-up of redeployment of personnel critical to the above needs or more rapid receipt of trained replacements is essential."

Redeployment Coordinating Group

The European Theater Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment laid the groundwork and designated areas of responsibility for putting the demobilization program into operation. Various stages of the program came under the direction of different commands, but there was one central control group, the Redeployment Coordinating Group, which was established by a general order on 24 April 1945. The Group was established by direction of the acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Lucius D.

251. Memo, Chief, RCG for DCoS, USFET, 2 Jan 46, sub: Monthly Rpt of RCG.
252. Ibid.
253. This entire section is based on a report of the Group's operations, dated 5 Mar 46. DRB, TAG.
Clay,* and operated directly under his office. The basic mission of the Redeployment Coordinating Group was to inspect and keep the Theater Commander informed as to the status of redeployment and readjustment. It also made recommendations for increasing the efficiency of these operations. The Redeployment Coordinating Group was small. It was originally authorized ten officers and six enlisted personnel, this number being increased by the addition of eight enlisted men and two drivers when it was found necessary in June 1945 to establish a forward echelon in Frankfurt. The Redeployment Coordinating Group at first expected to keep the Theater Commander informed of the status of redeployment by monitoring the cables, reports, and correspondence going through the headquarters; but it was soon apparent that this system would have to be supplemented by frequent field inspection trips. Written reports of observations and findings were submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff.

As the demobilization program got under way, most sections and subordinate commands had little knowledge of the existence of the Redeployment Coordinating Group and certainly no understanding of its duties. As a result most conferences, orientation meetings, and policy decisions were without benefit of the Redeployment Coordinating Group's presence. There were even instances when reluctance to provide information to its inspectors was displayed. However, these difficulties were removed as the Group gained recognition; and in September it was continued by a general order, which also gave it additional authority “to initiate appropriate corrective action where indicated.”** A letter of instruction to the chief of the Group amplified these instructions, saying that the Group would “informally initiate corrective action with the appropriate staff sections of this headquarters or the commander concerned when defects are discovered, furnishing a report to the Deputy Chief of Staff, this headquarters.” It also stated that “it is desired to emphasize that the guiding principle in the operation of demobilization in this theater will be the humanizing of all procedures as opposed to machine operation of a set system. The interests and welfare of the individuals must

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*The Group operated under four Deputy Chiefs of Staff before its termination in March 1946: Clay, April to July 1945; Maj. Gen. W. S. Paul, July to August 1945; Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, August to December 1945; and Maj. Gen. M. G. White, December 1945 to March 1946. In actual practice the group was the Theater Commander's special "eyes and ears" that reported information for the AC of S, G-3, to the Deputy Chief of Staff.

**The former theater AC of S, G-3, and Coordinator of Redeployment later recalled (in Jan 51), "It took a lot of pressure from me and constant demand by me to get the Redeployment Coordinating Group inspector's authority to correct on the ground. This authority should have been given much sooner and would have greatly helped redeployment because the operation was so fast, reports of delinquency and failure never caught up."
remain paramount.” In spite of its authority the Group very seldom initiated corrective action with the commander concerned. The usual procedure was to informally contact the interested individuals in the proper staff section of the headquarters.

According to the records left by the Redeployment Coordinating Group, the demobilization problems to which it paid particular attention were as follows:

The quartering and recreational facilities in assembly and staging areas.

Shipments of equipment direct to the Pacific Theater before V-J Day.

Documentation procedures for personnel shipments.

Effectiveness of orientation of enlisted and officer personnel on redeployment matters.

Rail movement of troops in the theater, with particular attention to rail movements of female personnel.

Recommendations for improved reporting procedures.

Methods of handling personnel who were away from assigned units when they became eligible for redeployment.

The Group was instrumental in investigating individual cases; furnishing demobilization information to the War Department; and escorting important visitors who were investigating demobilization.

From its wide experience during the period and a desire to improve any future demobilization, the Redeployment Coordinating Group made these conclusions and recommendations:

1. The “point system,” as employed in World War II demobilization, was unsatisfactory and an administrative impossibility.

2. The preparation of equipment for shipment to the Pacific (during redeployment operations) was inadequate, and it was only the end of the war with Japan that saved us from the consequences.

3. The documentation of personnel shipments was too involved to be accomplished expeditiously. Either it should have been simplified or machine records systems should have been applied.

4. A more simplified system of dissemination of demobilization instructions should be instituted.

5. The lack of replacements during the demobilization process was a serious impediment to the operation of military government as many units were made inoperative.

6. Inadequate I & E preparation, rapidly changing policies, the system of disseminating orders and instructions, and other
factors resulted in improperly oriented personnel during the demobilization, corrected only by the institution in 1946 of a radio information program.

7. A control group such as the Redeployment Coordinating Group, working from the highest command level to the field, is extremely helpful in making a program such as the demobilization one work.

**Procedures in the United States**

Troops returning from the European Theater of Operations usually arrived at one of three ports—Boston, Massachusetts; Hampton Roads, Virginia; and New York, New York. At each of these ports disposition centers for demobilization purposes were established. As soon as units arrived in the United States, the port commander at the place of debarkation notified by wire The Adjutant General, Operations Branch, indicating code designations and arrival date. It was then the duty of The Adjutant General to notify other agencies who would be concerned. Following this a representative of the port commander interviewed group and unit commanders to see whether any personnel changes had occurred during the trip from Europe.

Processing at port (disposition centers or staging areas) was under the supervision of the port commander. The processing included physical examinations and disease preventative measures; treatment of personnel with venereal disease before allowing them to proceed to reception stations; customs inspections; and checking records. Checking of records was particularly important at this point since it was the last one at which the unit records could be consulted. Category IV units received at the disposition centers were demobilized by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, regardless of their type (Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, or Army Service Forces).* Personnel from the units were formed into reception station groups; and if personnel from several demobilized Category IV units were bound for the same reception station, they were consolidated into one reception station group, and proper movement orders issued. Personnel arriving at port staging areas who had been formed into reception station groups overseas remained in those same groups, and new orders did not have to be issued. In order to keep staging areas fluid, ports were required to ship personnel out within 48 hours after arrival.

*Category IV elements arriving other than through Ports of Embarkation were assigned to posts, camps, or stations and demobilized according to the directions of the major command concerned.
RR1-2 provided that before sending groups to Reception Stations the port commander was to notify the commander of the Personnel Center concerned and await his confirmation. Very early in the demobilization, it was discovered that complications arose as a result of this system. Many times the ports received no answer to their messages, making it impossible for them to set up rail movements. To alleviate this situation, the Chief of the Transportation Corps' Movements Division recommended that the regulations be amended to provide that ports notify reception centers of the expected arrival of units, based on pre-embarkation messages. If the number of arrivals varied more than 25 or the date varied more than 24 hours, the port should correct the previous notification. It was also recommended that reception stations be required to notify the port within 12 hours if it was unable to receive the shipment so that the Transportation Corps could make other arrangements. ASF agreed to the recommendations but felt that a circular rather than a change in the RR would be sufficient.

**Service Command Operations**

The Service Commands, and their successors, Army Areas, performed very important functions in carrying out the demobilization of personnel in the United States. Realizing that they would play this important role, Army Service Forces at its semi-annual conference of Service Commanders in February 1944 explained the demobilization plans that had been made. At this time, Service Commands had already received the Project Planning Group's "Survey of Demobilization Planning" of 18 June 1943 and Tompkins' "Report on the Status of Demobilization Planning as of 31 December 1943." Service commanders were given a summary of plans that had been made and were informed of the various assumptions on which the Special Planning Division was proceeding. At this same meeting a tentative list of demobilization centers was furnished to the Service Commanders. This was for planning purposes; but when the actual regulations (RR1-2, 15 Sep 44) were published, the separation centers differed greatly in location and areas served. The locations of these centers are shown in Appendix XII. Female personnel, at the beginning of the program, were separated from Camp Beale, Fort Bragg, Fort Dix, Fort Sam Houston, and Fort Sheridan.

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254. Memo, Chief, Movements Div, TC, for CG ASF, 18 Jun 45, sub: Changes in Redeployment Regulations. SPGA 370.01 (Gen). DRB, TAG.
255. M/R, 2 Jul 45. Ibid.
256. Conference of CGs of Serv Comds, Dallas, Texas, 18-19 Feb 44. Somervell files (Demob). DRB, TAG.
257. Ibid.
258. RR1-2, 11 Apr 45.
Realizing that it would be possible to establish entirely new procedures and hoping to experiment with the problem before demobilization became the primary consideration, ASF activated the separation center at Fort Dix, New Jersey, on 30 April 1944. Key officers of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Service Commands were sent to Fort Dix for necessary training. The program developed and the lessons learned at Fort Dix were incorporated into the manual published on 20 September 1945, outlining Separation Center operations. It was estimated that the publication of the manual, based on the experience at Fort Dix, resulted in a 33 1/3 percent reduction of basic forms to be used during separation and cut down the time required tremendously. "Each day saved in the time required to process officers and enlisted personnel at separation centers will ultimately result in a savings of $34,402,500.00, assuming that the Army will be required to separate 7,500,000 enlisted personnel and 750,000 officers."

Planning for the demobilization within Service Commands took different turns. Each Service Command had an officer who was in charge of demobilization planning, and he could either form a section for the purpose or take care of the matter himself. Some of the Service Commands used the "demobilization planning data received from Washington . . . [as] a check-list for all the Staff Divisions." In such a case the officer in charge of demobilization planning personally coordinated construction, etc., working with the Army Service Forces, the Chief of Engineers, and the Service Command Engineer. Other Service Commands created Demobilization Divisions. Growing from small beginnings where the Demobilization Officer probably had only one clerk to help him, these divisions became, as in the case of the one in the Ninth Service Command, an Operations and Demobilization Division when the program got under way. The Division's duties were to analyze changing conditions, plan reorientation of the service command efforts, recommend assignment to the various staff and field agencies of responsibility for specific projects, coordinate their plans and actions, and exercise staff supervision over such projects as did not fall within the field of any other single staff element." With the program in full swing, the Demobilization

259. WD Cir 113, 1945.
261. Ibid.
262. This was true in the case of the Sixth Service Command. Ltr, Col George T. Shank, former Demob Officer, Sixth Service Command, to Maj John C. Sparrow, 23 Mar 50. HIS 350.05 Spec Stud Demob. OCMH.
263. Ltr, Col Earle H. Malone, former Demobilization Officer, Ninth Service Command, to Maj John C. Sparrow—April 1950. HIS 350.05, Spec Stu Demob. OCMH.
Division had numerous branches and sections that were concerned with such matters as activation and inactivation of service command units, disposition of excess personnel and matériel, the organization and operation of separation centers, and others. At all times it was the purpose of the Service Commands to carry out in detail the over-all plan prepared by Army Service Forces, and each Service Command published in some form a list of duties to be performed and the persons responsible during demobilization.

**War Department Returnee Advisory Board**

Early in 1945 the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, recommended that an agency be established at War Department level to “insure that its policies [regarding redeployment] are sound and that the major commands are effectively implementing these policies. . . .”264 Such a board, composed of one brigadier general representing AGF and two colonels, one for ASF and the other for AAF, was organized on 10 April 1945.* On 14 May 1945, G-1 recommended that the mission of the Board be changed to read as follows:

The mission of the Returnee Advisory Board is to insure intelligent handling of personnel under the readjustment plan including the utilization of returnees being retained in the service. It shall be the duty of the Board to recommend to the War Department changes in War Department policies when necessary and to submit periodical reports evaluating the effectiveness of major command action implementing these policies. Particular attention will be devoted to the conditions under which enlisted men entitled to discharge are being held, to insure that local commanders observe the War Department criteria of true military necessity.265

Although too small to cover the program thoroughly, the Returnee Board throughout the following months inspected War Department installations engaged in redeployment and demobilization. It performed somewhat the same function as that performed by the Redeployment Coordinating Group in the European Theater of Operations. The Board members did not act in the capacity of inspectors; they attempted to act as advisors, trying to solve problems they discovered on the lowest practicable command level. About the middle of November 1945 General Caffey speaking for the Board recommended that it be discontinued since it was now

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265. Memo, ACofS, G-1 for DCoFS, 14 May 45, sub: Mission of the WD Returnee Advisory Board. Ibid.

*These officers were Brig. Gen. B. F. Caffey, Col. K. B. Bush, and Col. C. M. McCorble. They were subsequently replaced by other officers.
superfluous. The Board felt that separation activities were functioning satisfactorily, except for the ever present problem of personnel replacements; and it felt that G-1 was the logical agency to carry on. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, concurred in this recommendation, passing it on to the Chief of Staff. The recommendation was disapproved three days later in the Chief of Staff’s Office, with a notation by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff: “... continue activities in Z/I for the present. Look into phasing down of separation activities and concentration when and where practicable.”

Early in January 1946 the Board reviewed its activities from its inception and pointed out certain recommendations regarding personnel problems. After V-J Day the Board placed emphasis on examining demobilization activities and inspecting separation centers. The general problems that it found continually were as follows:

1. The procurement, training, and maintenance of permanent party personnel. The continual dropping of separation point scores made this almost insoluble.
2. The organization and command of permanent separation center parties was below the desired standard because of the vast number involved.
3. Processing of individuals was slowed because of poorly processed records and untrained counselors.
4. Many separation centers were poorly located because of housing or transportation factors.

Readiness of Machinery for Operation

The Director of Personnel, ASF, reported on 15 May 1945 that it was exceedingly difficult to obtain “usable information” regarding expected loads for separation centers and reception stations. Inability to plan and lack of capacity was resulting in the build-up of backlogs of personnel. The available personnel center capacities at that time were as follows:

266. Memo, Brig Gen B. F. Caffey for CofS, 19 Nov 45, sub: Abolition of WD Returnee Advisory Board. Ibid.
267. Memo, ACofS, G-1 for CofS, 21 Nov 45, sub as above. Ibid.
268. Notation in ink of ADcofS, 24 Nov 45, on above. Ibid.
269. Ltr, Caffey to CofS, sub: WD Returnee Advisory Bd, 10 Apr 45-31 Dec 45. Ibid.
270. Memo, Director of Pers, ASF, for Gen Lutes, 15 May 45, sub: Redepl and Readjustment Regs. 370.01 (Gen). DRB, TAG.
### HISTORY OF PERSONNEL DEMOBILIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>Present Available (Authorized) Personnel Center Capacity</th>
<th>Additional Capacity Available to Personnel Center</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Devens</td>
<td>12,071</td>
<td>3,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Dix</td>
<td>24,560</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiantown Gap</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Meade</td>
<td>7,588&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0&lt;sup&gt;o&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bragg</td>
<td>8,550</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Gordon</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort McPherson</td>
<td>4,519</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Blanding</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Shelby</td>
<td>12,045</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Atterbury</td>
<td>17,385</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp McCoy</td>
<td>8,194&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Sheridan</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Grant</td>
<td>10,899</td>
<td>7,500 (Tents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson Barracks</td>
<td>7,430</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Logan</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckley Field</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Leavenworth</td>
<td>3,475</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Chaffee</td>
<td>6,637</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Bliss</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Sam Houston</td>
<td>10,483</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Douglas</td>
<td>2,738&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>500 + 1,500 (Tents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Beale</td>
<td>6,150&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort MacArthur</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Lewis</td>
<td>3,678</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Fort Devens—Conversion to provide classrooms and administration buildings will reduce capacity by an undetermined amount.

<sup>b</sup> Fort Meade—Allotted space being made available by AGF in increments. If another Personal Replacement Depot is established on West Coast, approximately 10,000 additional spaces may be made available to Personnel Centers.

<sup>c</sup> Substantial additional capacity will probably be available after R+3 months.

<sup>d</sup> For transients only. Space allocated to Personnel Center overhead not included.<sup>271</sup>

At the same time, an estimate of returnees from overseas theaters, Zone of Interior separatees, and those to be processed through reception stations and separation centers was given for May, June, and July.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Returnees&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Z/I Personnel&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Reception Stations&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Separation Centers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>137,268</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>122,000</td>
<td>51,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>311,800</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>263,100</td>
<td>101,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>363,100</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>445,700</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> This includes personnel from ETO, MTO, POA, Alaska, BI, China, etc. However, transportation authorized by Transportation Corps reduces the number of returnees from ETO-MTO by 90,000.

<sup>b</sup> Z/I separation load is based primarily on number in pipeline who are eligible for separation.

<sup>c</sup> The Reception Station load includes personnel (Category II) who pass through the Reception Station twice, i.e., those who go home one month for 30 days recuperation and return the next month to assembly areas.<sup>272</sup>

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid.
EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILIZATION

By the end of August The Inspector General, commenting on the backlog of personnel that had been built up and hoping to alleviate the situation, recommended that discharge of eligible personnel on duty within the Zone of Interior should be “accomplished by local commanders, leaving Separation Centers the task of discharging from the service those individuals returned directly from overseas.”

Two days after this recommendation had been received, the Deputy Chief of Staff vetoed it, saying:

Local commanders within the Zone of Interior cannot be authorized to discharge their personnel eligible for separation without recourse to Separation Centers because of the complicated requirements for the proper discharge of personnel imposed by law. A temporary exception has been made in the case of the Army Air Forces to permit the removal of the present backlog in certain air bases resulting from the early defeat of Japan. This authority extends only to 1 December 1945.

Pressure for speedier demobilization and the increasing backlog of Z/I personnel caused a hasty reversal of the decision, however, and the public received the good news on 13 September that four new Separation Centers (at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Camp Grant, Illinois; and Camp Fannin, Texas) would be opened by November 1 and that 155 new Separation Bases and Points would be in operation by September 24. In this connection it should be noted that the decision to open these new separation points had been made after conferences on 7 and 8 September. Eighth Service Command advised ASF on 7 September that it anticipated opening some of the separation points on or about October 1. ASF, on the following day, directed by telephone that the separation points be established without delay. The Service Command was further directed to separate at least one or two men at each point by September 10, so that it would be possible to report that the points were in operation.

Of the 155 new facilities 112 would be operated as Separation Points by the Army Service Forces, processing both Ground and Service personnel, and the remaining 43 Separation Bases would be operated by and for Army Air Forces. Such measures did not, of course, completely rectify the situation. As late as the middle of January 1946 the records indicate that zone of in-

273. Memo, TIG for DCoS, 31 Aug 45, sub: Use of EM Retained for Mil Necessity. WDCSA 370.01, Sec IV, Cases 14-45. DRB, TAG.
275. WD Press Release, 13 Sep 45, sub: Temporary Sep Points and Bases Set Up to Speed Release of High Point Soldiers.
terior personnel were forced to wait while returnees from overseas were separated. For example, a corporal and twenty-seven other enlisted men who had been assigned to a general hospital were eligible for separation on 31 December and reported for separation on 9 January. However, they were not ordered to report to Fort Knox for separation until 18 January. The Director, Military Personnel Division, gave the usual excuse in summarizing the situation: “The delay in separating these men resulted from the fact that it is Service Command policy to grant first priority in separation centers to eligible overseas returnees, and the numbers of such personnel arriving after 1 January interfered somewhat with the separation of continental personnel.”

On the other hand, by the middle of November 1945, a member of the Returnee Advisory Board reported that the Separation Bases at Mitchel Field, Grenier Field, Westover, and the Newark Army Air Base would like to have additional personnel for separation supplied in order to keep their facilities operating at full capacity. In February the Separation Bases were discontinued and personnel due for separation ordered to go through the regular Separation Centers.

By late January and early February even some of the Separation Centers were carrying such reduced loads that it was recommended that they be closed.

Separation Center Problems

A typical separation center was the one located at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, known as Separation Center No. 33. Originally activated at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, Separation Center No. 33 was transferred to Camp McCoy on 1 August 1945 to make room for a rapidly expanding language school at Fort Snelling. As early as May an attempt was made to build up a cadre of skilled personnel to operate the separation program, but the inevitable shortage of trained men that had haunted the Army throughout the war hampered demobilization preparations. During the latter part of June and early July 1945, while the separation center was still at Fort Snelling, the Air and Ground Forces released a number of men to work in personnel centers. Approximately 160 of these men came to Fort Snelling. Few of them had had

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277. D/F, Director, Ml Pers Div, for Chief, L&LD, 16 Jan 46. SPGA 370.01 Gen.
278. Memo, Heyduck for General Caffey, 13 Nov 45. WDGPA 334 (WD Returnee Advisory Board) (21 Nov 45). DRB, TAG.
279. See, for example, Arnold's report on the Separation Center at Camp Blanding, Florida. Ibid.
280. This description is taken from History of Separation Center No. 33, Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, 1 August 1945 to 31 July 1946. WD TM 12-222, Separation Center Operations, 20 Sep 45, outlines the general procedures to be followed at Sepn Centers.
any Army clerical experience; and while the Ground Force men remained with the Separation Center long enough to become well trained, most of the Air Force personnel had high ASR scores and were discharged within 120 days.

Based on War Department predictions, the physical set-up at Camp McCoy gave the Reception Station space six times that of the Separation Center. However, V-J Day, coming five weeks after the Separation Center began operating, switched the emphasis from redeployment to separation, and a second processing line for discharges had to be established. In October 1945, with both of the enlisted men's lines and a third one for officers operating, the Separation Center was prepared to handle 2500 to 3000 men daily.

A man entered the demobilization stream when he reported at the Arrival Station, officially known as Incoming Records Section of the Enlisted Men's Record Branch. The Arrival Station at Camp McCoy operated on a 24-hour basis throughout the entire period, employing 120 civilians and 138 enlisted men and women under the supervision of five officers. Among its other facilities the Arrival Station had a snack bar where men got coffee, milk, doughnuts, and sandwiches before they assembled to be briefed on the separation procedure. At this assembly the soldiers completed the first in a series of WD forms and then proceeded to the Initial Clothing Shakedown Section at which place they were relieved of all unauthorized government clothing and equipment. The Clothing Shakedown Section, like the Arrival Station, operated on a 3-shift basis, facilitating the rapid processing of the discharges.

From the Clothing Shakedown Section separatees were transported to their assigned processing company. At Camp McCoy, Separation Company No. 2, divided into five units—Orderly Room, Billeting, Supply, Mess, and Operations Sections—was in charge of all casual personnel processing for discharge. Separatees were fed, billeted, issued passes and furloughs, and kept informed by the company. Roster leaders from Operations Section, trained in separation procedure, conducted each group to formations, the first of which was an orientation lecture giving the details about separations, information regarding the facilities of the camp, and a pep talk about re-enlisting.

The fourth step in the separation process was the final physical examination. At first, Camp McCoy devoted three barracks-size buildings to this purpose—two for actual examinations and one in which to keep records. In October the load of discharges was so terrific that a second medical examination line was established.
Step 1—Incoming Records Section.

Step 2—Initial Clothing Shakedown.

Step 3—Orientation Lecture.

Step 4—Final Physical Examination.
EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILIZATION

Step 5—Counseling.

Step 6—Outgoing Records.

Step 7—Finance.

Step 8—Departure Ceremony.
As an example of how the processing worked, numerically, the following list shows the number of men examined at Camp McCoy during the months of August 1945 through May 1946.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August, 1945</td>
<td>6,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1945</td>
<td>16,158</td>
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<td>21,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1946</td>
<td>11,266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While in the Medical Processing Branch men were not only examined thoroughly but their complete medical history was made a matter of record. Should a man require further examination, he was sent to the Station Hospital. The last step in the medical examination was a final check at which time a board of four medical officers, one of whom was a psychiatrist, made the decision as to whether or not a man was fit for discharge. At this point men filed their disability claims. The Medical Processing Branch felt the loss of specialists acutely as this type of personnel was particularly hard to replace.

Having passed his physical examination a man was ready to go through the fifth stage of the separation—counseling. The Army had instituted counseling to assist the soldier in making a smooth transition to civilian life, to make known to him his rights and benefits as a veteran, and to offer vocational and educational guidance. At Camp McCoy, the counseling system was divided into enlisted men's and officers' sections with each section housed in an H-shaped building consisting of a general orientation room, an individual booth capacity of fifty, a library, a civilian agency office, and an administrative office. The original group of 19 counselors for enlisted men rose to 321 (plus the 30 officer counselors) at the height of separation activity. Counselors at first were graduates of The Adjutant General's Counseling School and had had experience in the work at other separation centers. When the demand for additional counselors became great, schools and on-the-job training courses were established and men with high AGCT scores, personnel experience, and college educations were enrolled.

Although formal counseling was the fifth step in being discharged, counseling of sorts had been going on all the time. Men had already been apprised of the benefits they could expect under
the GI Bill of Rights, the actions dischargees must go through in civilian life, and what to do about their National Service Life Insurance. With this information in mind, the soldier could approach his counselor with intelligent questions and could assimilate the new facts he learned.

When the soldiers were brought to the Counseling Branch, they were first given a quick summary of what they could expect there and were impressed with the importance of cooperating as much as possible—for their own good. After the brief orientation, soldiers passed to the counseling booths for individual attention. There particular emphasis was placed on filling out the Separation Qualification Record, with an account of all military and civilian education, training, and experience; and the rest of the interview dealt with awards, various GI rights, and job opportunities for returning veterans. In addition to the Army counselors, there were representatives on hand from civilian agencies, such as Red Cross, U. S. Employment Service, and the Veteran’s Administration, to answer questions and give advice. At all times an effort was made to have current information so that it would be as useful as possible to the veteran. The Awards and Decorations Section of the Counseling Branch issued Good Conduct Medals to qualified troops, gave detailed information regarding all medals,* awards, and decorations, and prepared medals for presentation at the Departure Ceremony.

The clothing issue warehouse and tailor shop operated under the Post Quartermaster’s supervision. The clothing issue warehouse at Camp McCoy was set up so that a man could enter at the side of the building; and then, proceeding down a guide rail, he collected the various items of clothing that were coming to him. A checker stood at the end of the line, making sure that the separatee had received the proper things. From this point the man continued to the near-by tailor shop for any necessary alterations, pressing, or sewing, which usually took no more than ten or fifteen minutes. Sometimes a soldier was of such extreme size that he could not be provided with proper clothing immediately, in which case it was forwarded to his home as soon as possible.

Some of the most essential functions performed at the Separation Center were those having to do with keeping records. From the standpoint of the dischargee, as well as the Army, it was extremely important that records be complete and accurate. At Camp McCoy the Enlisted Men’s Record Branch was divided into five

*Efforts to provide service medals for soldiers at time of discharge were fruitless because the War Production Board refused to allocate metal to the Army for that purpose.
operating sections—Incoming Records, Certificate Typing, Form No. 100 Typing, Outgoing Records, and Suspense—all under the supervision of the Administrative Section. The Administrative office handled all personnel records and correspondence of casualties discharged through Separation Center No. 33. Handling these incoming records required more personnel than any other job at the Center, with about 635 civilians and enlisted men working at it.

The Certificate Typing Section of the Enlisted Men's Records Branch was responsible for preparing WD AGO Forms No. 53–55, the Discharge Certificate. With a thousand or more discharges to be typed every day, a system approaching assembly line procedure had to be established. Coordinators worked constantly at separating and arranging the certificates according to rosters so that they would be typed and checked in the order desired. The Form No. 100 Section was the other typing section in the set-up, and it handled the Separation Qualification Record. This piece of work was very important as the form gave a resume of the soldier's education, training, and experience as a civilian and a soldier so that he could present it to a prospective employer, etc. In this same typing section was a large staff which devoted itself to filling out forms for men joining the Enlisted Reserve Corps.

The Suspense Section handled all incomplete or irregular case records. Since special care had to be used in this section, personnel was chosen for its skill and experience in working with records. They dealt with such cases as men retained for physical reasons or those whose records had been lost. While men with incomplete records were released on their affidavit after fourteen days, the Suspense Section kept the records of those retained for physical reasons until medical treatment was completed.

The Outgoing Records Section was the final coordination point for separatee's records. At this place each item was checked with the man involved, and he was asked to mention any mistakes or discrepancies so that they could be corrected at once. Ribbons were issued to the men here, their thumb prints were made on the discharges, and all the papers were assembled for the final discharge ceremony. It was here, also, that those who enlisted in the Reserve Corps took their oath.

At the Initial Clothing Shakedown separatees were relieved of all unauthorized items, and this process was repeated at the Final Clothing Shakedown, with men's uniforms being checked for neatness and fit also. Should any alteration, pressing, or sewing be required, the separatee received a priority slip entitling him to these services as soon as his discharge was complete. Lug-
gage was tagged for storage at this point until after the final ceremony.

At Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, it was the primary mission of the Finance Branch, Separation Center No. 33, to effect prompt and accurate payments to all officers and enlisted men separated there. The Section was faced with different problems where officers and enlisted men were concerned. Payments to officers included such complicated problems as muster-out, dependents' travel, and various other kinds of pay. Records had to be kept and terminal leave payments made, and Air Corps bonuses had to be mailed out at the end of the terminal leave. Enlisted men's pay was even more involved as the records from which it had to be figured were often inaccurate or incomplete. Great amounts of specialized equipment were required to carry out the Finance Section's mission, and it would have been much easier had personnel been trained to operate business machines instead of rifles, tanks, and machine guns.

The final step in the separation procedure was the departure ceremony. At this assembly the War Department had an opportunity to express in a dignified way its gratitude to the civilian soldiers for their service and to help them leave with a feeling of pride in themselves for doing a good job. Military and religious significance was given to the occasion by having both a field grade officer and a chaplain in charge. Begun with an invocation by the chaplain, the ceremony continued with a talk by the officer, who gave the soldiers a few pointers about returning to civilian life. At the same time the dischargees were praised for their loyal service in the Army and were given a pep talk on being good Americans when they became civilians again. When the speeches were concluded and decorations issued, the separatees filed past the officer in charge to receive their discharge certificates, the last step in the separation process.

Control of Troop Inflow into Separation Centers

The War Department estimated the troop flow into Separation Centers, taking into consideration their capacities. There was no guarantee, however, that the estimates would be at all accurate. Inflow of separatees from Z/I installations was controlled by the Separation Center. TWX requests for clearance were required from stations desiring to ship five or more individuals, and the separation centers could authorize arrival dates. On the other hand, the Separation Center had no control over the volume of arrivals of overseas returnees. With ports obliged to clear arrivals out within 48 hours and with the vast numbers of returnees debarking, the obvious result was a flood of personnel on
the Separation Centers. The number of troops arriving fluctuated greatly from day to day. For example, personnel received at the Indiantown Gap Separation Center over a 2-week period was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day of the Month</th>
<th>Rec'd for the Day</th>
<th>Processed for the day</th>
<th>Balance on Hand</th>
<th>Backlog</th>
<th>Total rec'd for month</th>
<th>Total processed for month</th>
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<td>222</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td>2417</td>
<td>2310</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>July 20</td>
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<td>331</td>
<td>365</td>
<td></td>
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<td>3088</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 21</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>421</td>
<td></td>
<td>3595</td>
<td>3359</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 22</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>626</td>
<td></td>
<td>4095</td>
<td>3654</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 23</td>
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<td>254</td>
<td>855</td>
<td></td>
<td>4578</td>
<td>3908</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 24</td>
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<td>827</td>
<td></td>
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<td>4278</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 25</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>413</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>265</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>711</td>
<td></td>
<td>807</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was discovered that while the monthly average per day might be 1000, actual daily arrivals might range from 500 to 6000, with an occasional blank day. The injustice of the system of refusing separation to Z/I personnel with critical scores in order to take care of the overseas personnel was the subject of a discussion by The Inspector General in August. Pointing out that the overseas personnel were accepted by the Separation Centers, processed, and discharged within 48 hours, The Inspector General stated that Zone of Interior personnel had to wait anywhere from 10 to 45 days for discharge after they were reported for separation.* Returning veterans were discharged regardless of the number of critical points possessed, providing they were 85 or more. It was quite possible for returning soldiers to be discharged while, at the same time, old comrades possessing a greater number of points, who had returned earlier and received assignments to duty in the Zone of Interior, were retained.282 This system was extremely unfair.

281. TAB E to Memo, TIG for DCoS, 31 Aug 45, sub: Use of EM Retained for Military Necessity. WDCSA 370.01, Sec. IV, Cases 14-45. DRB, TAG.

*Eligible zone of interior soldiers could be retained at posts, camps, and stations until the separation center could receive them. But troops arriving from overseas could not be kept afloat or in the air.

Personnel Problems in Separation Centers

The separation of soldiers as individuals according to the principles established by the War Department required highly trained personnel. An on-the-job training program was set up at Fort Dix. There, too, a Classification School under the jurisdiction of The Adjutant General was established. The War Department assembled trained personnel in the fields of personnel management, occupational and educational counseling, insurance, etc. Staff officers who were to set up and administer other Separation Centers went to Fort Dix to observe the training schools and separation procedures in action. As other Separation Centers were activated, Fort Dix furnished trained cadres. With all this prior preparation, however, the War Department was unable to meet the situation that arose as soon as separations began in great numbers. As early as May 1945 the Returnee Advisory Board reported that one of the three major problems facing Army Service Forces was ‘... lack of personnel in adequate numbers, grades and ratings in personnel centers.”

This report stated further that already, particularly in the Ninth Service Command, Separation Centers were unable to carry their load, ‘... which in turn causes complaints among personnel being discharged—the very thing the Chief of Staff desired to avoid.” The Returnee Advisory Board recommended that adequate personnel be assigned to personnel centers immediately and that their manpower ceilings be suspended.

Scarcely a week after the Japanese capitulation members of the Returnee Advisory Board, in touring the various separation centers, revealed the following in connection with the shortages of personnel that were evident just when the centers should have been geared for extensive operations. On 23 August 1945 Jefferson Barracks was carrying its capacity but would be unable to meet its December quota unless 75 to 100 company grade officers were assigned. On 22 August, Camp Atterbury needed approximately 100 good officers. Its “crying need ... [was] ‘counselors,’ ‘finance clerks,’ and ‘record clerks,’ ” in addition to the officers.

The Deputy Chief of Staff said in September that more thought should be given to training personnel for operation of the Separation Centers and that they could not be trained in a short time. “The personnel required for the functioning of these early in 1946 should probably be in training now either in schools or ‘on-

283. Memo of Returnee Advisory Board for DCofS, 31 May 45, sub: Returnee Problems. WDGPA 334 (21 Nov 45).
284. Ibid.
the-job.’ With the alleged surplus of personnel in the Z/I who are not eligible for overseas service, as reported by the major commands, there should be no difficulty in obtaining the personnel necessary provided the requirements are foreseen early enough and timely measures are taken to obtain and train the personnel.”

Early in October, when the Separation Points and Separation Bases had begun to operate, the Returnee Advisory Board reported on a number of them:

- **Bowman Field, Ky.**—“Could separate 2–300 per day with appropriate increase in overhead.”
- **Scott Field, Ill.**—“Doing good work but need more doctors.”
- **Lincoln AAB, Neb.**—“Desperate for some five hundred a/c mechanics to get AT–6s in shape to overcome 25,000 flying hours backlog for flying pay of rated officers.”
- **Lowry Field, Colo.**—“Needed 3 Finance officers, needed 6 more Doctors to go to 600 a day.”
- **Barksdale Field**—“I protested the use of Majors and Co. grade medical officers in taking medical history (For review, yes, but not for just asking and copying down routine questions which could be taught a soldier in some three days on the job).”

Even when replacements were forthcoming, they were often of the wrong type or were themselves eligible for discharge, soon thereafter. Even on-the-job training could not correct this situation. The Deputy Chief of Staff said on 22 October, “... The Inspector General points out that some personnel transferred to separation installations not only failed to have the necessary MOS’s but were potentially unqualified for the type of training required.”

An example of the rapid and extensive turnover of personnel is found in the Finance Section of the Separation Center at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, which, during the month of October 1945, had a 1000 percent personnel turnover. Investigators at McPherson, Gordon, and Blanding in August complained that high rank personnel with no separation processing background were being dumped at the centers, “causing a multitude of troubles.” To avoid receiving personnel with too high rank and too many points, it was suggested that forces transferring
EXECUTION OF THE DEMOBILIZATION

personnel into Service Forces should be limited as to percentages in grade and maximum number of points.291

Increasing attempts were made to fill vacancies with civilian personnel. Many installations were able to fill positions left by separating personnel with those same people in civilian status. But obtaining civilian help was not easy in certain localities. For example, in January of 1946 there were 289 civilians on duty at Camp Beale, California, and an effort was being made to increase that number to 600. But this was almost impossible. There was no housing on the post available to the civilians, and there was insufficient transportation to Camp Beale from near-by housing facilities.292

War Trophies

The problem of war trophies gave the separation center personnel cause for much extra work. Certain items were authorized to be kept by dischargees, provided they had the items certificated by their commanding officers before leaving their units. It was discovered, however, that many troops kept unauthorized articles—and even had no certificates for those which could have been authorized. Various reasons were offered by the men for this situation. Some of them claimed that they had known nothing about the arrangement to have trophies checked; others complained that officers were either too busy or not available to do the job. Whatever the reasons, the result was that unauthorized items showed up everywhere, and it was discovered that soldiers were throwing these trophies out the train windows as they approached camp, hoping to pick them up later without censure. Roadbeds had to be searched daily in order to pick up these discarded articles. Those who retained weapons were warned to register them with local police after discharge.

Lack of Information Regarding Demobilization Program

Instructions regarding demobilization were issued by the War Department by TWX or letter directive. Once the program got under way it was almost the invariable experience of Separation Center commanders to read the latest impending changes in demobilization criteria in the newspapers or to hear it over the radio, as released by the War Department Bureau of Public Information.293 This proved particularly embarrassing to military personnel responsible for interpreting separation policies, not only where their own troops were concerned but also with the press. Soldiers came to the officers in charge, demanding to know when

291. Ibid.
292. Memo, Travis to General Arnold,—Jan 46. Ibid.
293. See Demobilization Period Studies. OCMH, Gen Ref Br.
new regulations would be put into effect, and local newspapermen sought the same information. Having been left without official information, the officers were unable to give an authoritative answer. This led the soldiers to believe that they were being given the "run-around" and the press to make its own interpretations. Also, the time necessary to effect separations of a large number of persons after new criteria were announced made it appear that the Army was reluctant to accomplish separations known by the public to have been directed by the War Department.

Delays in Demobilization

The Director of the Military Personnel Division, in a memorandum to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, had this to say regarding bottlenecks in the discharge of personnel:

The principle bottlenecks restricting the capacity for processing men for discharge at separation centers have been the shortage of skilled personnel in typing, pay clerks, and counseling. To cover the over-all discharge problem, it must be noted that in the past men have been made eligible in numbers by reason of lowering the point score greater than it was administratively possible to separate them during one day, week, or month. Steps taken to remedy the first situation are on-the-job training and training in schools of clerks, typists, pay clerks, and counselors. These measures have increased the capacity of separation centers from 800 per day on 12 May to more than 20,000 per day or at a rate of 600,000 per month at the present time. There should be added to this capacity the ability of 127 separation points and 44 separation bases, with a combined present daily separation capacity of approximately 11,000. Also discharges for medical reasons at hospitals run about 1000 per day, giving a combined total rate of approximately 32,000 per day or a monthly rate greater than 900,000.294

But, aside from personnel shortages, other factors entered into the picture to slow down discharges. One of these was that of sending personnel to the wrong separation center. The Inspector General reported a case where approximately 300 Air Corps officers were sent to Fort McPherson because its separation center was the nearest to their last permanent station, notwithstanding the fact that their homes were in all parts of the United States. Since that particular station was, at that time, equipped to handle the discharge of only about sixteen officers per day, there was naturally a lag in the separation of this personnel.295 Had they

294. Memo, Director, Mil Pers Div to ACofS, G–1, 2 Oct 45, sub: Pers Demobn of the Army. WDGPA 370.01 (2 Oct 45).
295. Ltr, Brig Gen Erickson, 4th Serv Comd, to Somervell, 8 Jun 45. SPGA 370.01 Gen. DRB, TAG.
been sent to proper separation centers, this would not have occurred. And about the same time a case was reported to G-1 which showed that a shipment of troops was sent to Texas while several men in the group lived in the vicinity of New York. The situation was the result of an overseas commander's having changed the group's orders to read to the reception stations nearest the point of induction instead of that nearest the place of residence.²⁹⁶

Receipt of personnel without records was not unusual, lengthening their separation time as much as thirty days in many cases. Procedure followed in such cases varied with Separation Centers. At Fort Dix it was the general policy to search for or attempt to trace the missing records for not more than three days and then prepare temporary records. When it was apparent, however, that the records were not available, the preparation of temporary records would start immediately, as a morale measure.²⁹⁷ The occurrence of personnel's arriving without service records was particularly frequent during the period when, as a result of the congestion in West Coast staging camps, personnel processing machinery was not operating correctly. Sometimes entire train-loads of separatees arrived at personnel centers without service records.²⁹⁸

Even when the men arrived with their service records, it was discovered that they were incomplete. Officers had failed to bring them up-to-date before shipping separatees out. At Fort Dix such omissions or errors as the following were discovered frequently:

- Incorrect computation of Adjusted Service Rating Score
- Misinterpretation of separation criteria (which included failure to include time lost under 107th AW)
- Missing or incorrect Form 32
- Missing Insert Sheets
- Periods of service not covered by Indorsement
- Inadequate Remarks Financial
- Missing Board Proceedings
- Indefinite eligibility and missing papers in cases of restored general prisoners.²⁹⁹

Suspense on account of medical and dental defects also lengthened separation time. One particular medical delay was voluntary on the part of certain men who wished to complete treatments for venereal disease at Army rapid treatment centers,

²⁹⁶ M/R, 11 Jul 45. Ibid.
²⁹⁷ Demobilization Study, Fort Dix, New Jersey, 1 Mar 49, p. 25.
²⁹⁸ Demobilization Period History, 4th Army Area, p. 33.
rather than risk the stigma which they felt would result from reporting to local health authorities. They had a choice of being cured before receiving a discharge or reporting immediately to health authorities. Since hospitalization or further medical testing often consumed a great deal of time, various expedients were employed in the Separation Centers to ease the burden. At Fort Dix, for example, all cases requiring hospitalization were sent to the Tilton General Hospital, but it was soon discovered that approximately twenty-five percent of the patient population of the hospital were cases requiring only several days of observation or tests. Yet the hospital staff was so busy that such cases were sometimes required to remain two or three weeks. It was decided to retain certain types of cases in the Separation Center as "medical holds" for three days beyond the normal processing maximum. What was known as a Holdover Section was organized where cardiac, gastrointestinal, etc. cases were sent for observation under the jurisdiction of the Separation Center medical staff.\textsuperscript{300}

Other things, such as personnel being retained for board hearings regarding the type of discharge to be issued, soldiers absenting themselves during the separation process, etc., all contributed to the slowness with which troops were discharged.

**Congressional Investigations of Separation Process**

During September 1945 subcommittees of the House Military Affairs Committee made extensive investigations of the Separation Centers and Separation Bases and Points. In discussing the results of their visits, the following was reported in the General Council on 1 October 1945:

The Subcommittees of the House Military Affairs Committee last week all completed their visits to separation centers over the country (except the Far West) and returned to Washington. In general, the Subcommittees were pleased with the work being done and impressed with the real and orderly effort being exerted to discharge personnel. In its official report, the Subcommittee which visited Camp Dix [sic] expressed considerable anxiety over the increasing backlog at this point. The Subcommittee which visited Texas and Mississippi found conditions uniformly good except for one center where the situation was unhealthy but prompt action on the part of the War Department representative with the group in reporting this condition to the War Department by telephone permitted definite corrective steps to be taken even before the Committee's return.\textsuperscript{301}

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid., pp. 42-43.
\textsuperscript{301} WD Gen Coun Mins, 1 Oct 45, p. 9.
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The charges made by the Subcommittee which visited Fort Dix were investigated by the War Department; and the Director, Military Personnel Division, ASF, summarized action that had been taken to correct them. He admitted that conditions at Fort Dix were crowded but explained that a new separation line was being constructed in the old Reception Station which would greatly relieve the strain.302 Pending completion of the construction, Fort Dix inaugurated on 15 September 1945 processing between the hours of 0800 and 2400, seven days a week. “With few exceptions, the organization operated on a 24-hours daily schedule, the day’s work being completed and material for the next day being prepared between midnight and 0800.”303 The following breakdown of separations at Fort Dix indicates the enormous output it had and the great increase that occurred after V-J Day:

Monthly Breakdowns for Years 1944, 1945, 1946 to 15 May 1947

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Enlisted male</th>
<th>Enlisted female</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
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302. Memo, Chief, Mil Pers Div, for ACofS, G-1, 11 Oct 45, sub: Rpt of Subcommittee on Demobilization at Fort Dix, N. J., and Fort Devens, Mass. SPGA 370.01 (Gen.).
HISTORY OF PERSONNEL DEMOBILIZATION

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<td>3880</td>
<td>78561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTALS 1,041,897 29,103 111,118 1,182,118

The Chief, Military Personnel Division, ASF, also expressed the opinion that current facilities at Separation Centers should not be expanded, in spite of the fact that most of the centers had backlogs. It was believed that the backlog could be cleared out by the middle of November and that any expansion would not be ready for operation until January, at which time it would no longer be needed. It was also pointed out that those Separation Centers having backlogs of personnel were furloughing the men if the time lag were sufficient to justify it. However, since the time lag at Fort Dix was less than four days, furloughs were not granted to personnel there.\(^304\)

The other unfavorable situation discovered by a Subcommittee was at the AAF Redistribution Station in San Antonio, Texas. On 27 September 1945 the Distribution Center had on hand approximately 7,000 enlisted men and 4,000 officers, including about 4,200 former prisoners of war. The personnel had been at the Center for varying periods of time while the rate of separation was approximately thirty per day. The Subcommittee learned that there were few clerks and few finance personnel on hand to

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conduct processing. Records on the men were incomplete. General Caffey of the Returnee Advisory Board and the Commanding General, AAF Personnel Distribution Command, investigated the situation and discovered the following facts: In the summer of 1945 AAF Personnel Distribution Command took over the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center for a redistribution station. A sum of $1,000,000 was authorized for alterations and rehabilitation, but the War Department halted work in the middle of August because of the war’s end. On 26 August the PDC had 7,000 spaces available at hotel-type redistribution stations while personnel totaled some 36,000 individuals, most of whom were away on 90-day leaves or furloughs. With the war’s end, many of the men reported back hoping for immediate separation. In the latter part of August the War Department ordered restoration of hotel-type stations to their owners by 15 November. This necessitated removing personnel from these hotels in various parts of the country by 15 October in order to make inventories and repairs and approximately 5,000 of the men were sent to San Antonio. To take care of these the Commanding General, Personnel Distribution Command, by telephone requested and got permission from the Director of Personnel, ASF, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, to send men to Separation Centers on the same basis as those returning from overseas. About 20 September, however, the Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, informed the commanding officer of the San Antonio AAF Redistribution Station that the personnel there were Z/I and as such could not be accepted at the Separation Centers. A general officer arrived at San Antonio on 17 September and found conditions most unsatisfactory, with organization lacking in the headquarters and various echelons of command. The general decided to stop all processing for the week of 23–30 September while processing lines were centralized, records were filed, and all personnel were screened. However, in the middle of this week, on 26 September, the subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee arrived to investigate. Unfortunate as it was that the Committee found the situation, it was already well on its way to correction; and on 3 October the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces Personnel Distribution Command was able to report to the chairman of the subcommittee:

I reported to you our relief of 1,125 to be shipped to Greensboro; 675 of these have gone to date, with the last trainload of

305. Memo, Persons for Gen Berry, 27 Sep 45. WDGPA 334 (Returnee Advisory Board) (21 Nov 45).
225 to be dispatched on 4 October 1945. The Continental Air Forces have volunteered to take all those who believe themselves separable and for whom we have official records jackets at this station; 420 to be shipped on 4 October 1945, and 300 to be shipped on the eleven succeeding days, less 8 October 1945. My own separation plan was developed, checked, and approved through the different advisory boards and put into effect on Monday, 1 October 1945, with a starting capacity of 200 each day. Thus, this week I will separate here 600, less those found physically unseparable. The week 7–13 October, we expect to separate 1,400. At this time, we stop shipments to other stations as our backlog will be some 1,500, and we estimate we can separate them more expeditiously in our own line than by shipping them to other stations.\footnote{307}

Zone of Interior Problems at Posts, Camps, and Stations

The problems of personnel demobilization at posts, camps, and stations in the zone of interior were of three general classes because of the three major commands, Air, Ground, and Service, and personnel policies announced by the War Department were implemented in three distinct ways before the defeat of Japan. This remained somewhat true throughout the entire demobilization period. Therefore at a post containing a large number of troops it was quite possible to have a multiplicity of problems. For example, Fort Knox, Kentucky, was commanded by an officer of the Army Service Forces; on the post were troops of the Ground and Air Forces; all men who were eligible for discharge were sent to the same separation center. It was quite possible for an Army Service Forces soldier to appear at the separation center for discharge under one implementation of demobilization policy, while a man from the Army Air Forces came under another, and two soldiers from the Army Ground Forces could possibly be discharged under two additional implementations of policy. This was because there were troops at the Armored Center at Fort Knox who were under the command of the Army Ground Forces' Replacement and School Command, and the remaining Ground Forces' units at that post were under the jurisdiction of Second Army. The discontent that resulted from a three-way application of personnel demobilization has been previously discussed in this chapter under the heading of Pre-V-J Day Reaction.\footnote{308}

\footnotesize{307. Ltr of CG AAF PDC to Hon John J. Sparkman, 3 Oct 45. \textit{Ibid.} 308. See pp. 135-137 (Ch III).}
With the arrival of V-J Day, morale was at a very low ebb in zone of interior installations. This condition was attributable to a number of factors. There were large numbers of men eligible for discharge consideration who had been denied the privilege of separation because of military necessity. This was permissible under the personnel demobilization plan but there was no general uniformity in the meaning of military necessity among the three major commands. This contributed to discontent at large installations where soldiers of the three commands were stationed. Another factor contributing to low morale was the publicity given to changes in the personnel demobilization plan. It was not unusual for a unit commander to read about a change in the morning newspaper or hear it from a radio commentator but the commander did not receive official notice until several days had elapsed. He could not initiate action for the members of his command until he was properly notified. The commander also could not keep the members of his command currently informed on the plan's changes. This was difficult to explain to the soldier who had become eligible for discharge consideration under the new criteria. To the soldier it appeared as if the "Old Man" was intentionally depriving him of his discharge rights. A third factor contributing to the state of morale was the fact that when a zone of interior soldier was declared eligible for discharge he had to wait from a week to forty-five days before he could be received by the separation center serving his station. Many times the zone of interior soldier had to pass through his home community on his way to a separation center. Servicemen did not understand why they could not be separated from their own organization instead of travelling to a separation activity.

After the defeat of Japan, separation points were established at posts, camps, and stations to separate zone of interior personnel at their own installations. These separation points were established as a temporary expedient. At larger stations separation centers were established because of the steady increase in the number of available non-essential personnel. This action did much to relieve the separation backlog by November 1945.

The system of demobilization by individual had practically the same effect on zone of interior organizations and units as it had on those overseas. The key men of a unit were usually the first to go. This was particularly true among first sergeants, supply sergeants, mess sergeants, cooks, clerks, and mechanics. The system in operation struck at the very heart of an organization.

Commanding officers of posts, camps, and stations were responsible for the return of excess controlled items of Army
Service Forces equipment to the chief of technical service having storage and issue responsibility. Commanders of air bases returned this equipment, in the same way, if it had been declared excess to the whole needs of the Army Air Forces. In addition, accountable station supply officers were charged with the responsibility of determining whether controlled items turned in by demobilized units and organizations were serviceable and ready for reissue or whether they were unserviceable and in need of repairs. Instruction setting forth standards of serviceability were announced by chiefs of technical services from time to time.309 Supplies that were obviously scrap or salvage were turned in by the using organization to the station salvage officer.310 In many cases supplies could not be properly classified by the returnee and they were returned to station supply officers as “Unidentified-Unclassified.”

Excess non-controlled supplies of a purely military nature were evacuated from posts, camps, and stations to depots designated by chiefs of technical services. Shipments were accomplished by both railroad carload lots and less-than-carload lots. Sometimes depots directed that large quantities of supplies should be shipped to another station to fill an open requisition or that the excess should remain in storage at the particular installation under depot control and accountability. However, a depot commander could not direct the retention of excess stocks for storage at a station without the permission of the commanding general of the service command involved. If the service commander consented to this type of action he had to signify that storage space was available and that “adequate care, handling, guard, and fire protection . . . [could] be provided by the station.”311

Because of a lack of historical records dealing with World War II demobilization at the post, camp, and station-level a questionnaire was prepared and sent to a number of officers who served at such installations during the period. The purpose of the questionnaire was to ascertain the amount of early planning and how demobilization was executed at station-level. The answers to the questionnaire indicate that demobilization planning lacked a general uniformity. At some stations the program was executed in a commendable manner while at others the results dwindled to less than satisfactory. Here are some of the answers received from the questionnaire:

309. WD Cir 300, 15 Jul 44.
310. WD Cir 36, 6 Feb 46.
311. Ibid. Disposition of civilian type items and other types of supplies were covered by this directive.
Question: Previous to V-J Day (2 Sep 45) were there special plans made at your station for the turn-in of supplies to post supply and maintenance organizations by demobilized units? If so describe in your own words.

Only for the turn-in of training equipment to be replaced with overseas equipment. This included vehicles and tanks since new equipment was furnished. . . . [Director of Supply, Camp Cook, Calif.]

There were no special plans that I know of before 2 Sep 45. However, we had just completed the redeployment of 2 Infantry Divisions from Germany to Japan shortly before that time and had processes established for the turn-in of supplies for that operation. [Signal Officer, Camp Cook, Calif.]

No. . . . [Director of Supply, Camp Livingston, La.]

Considerable study was given to the turning in of supplies upon demobilization, their classification and returning to various depots and warehouses. The procedure adopted was reverse that of issuing. . . . [Director of Supply, Camp Crowder, Mo.]

The only special plans were those made by ourselves which because of personnel ceilings, lack of skills and so forth, and lack of knowledge of long term storage were woefully inadequate. Receipt of matériel from the hands of troops was mostly on our own in that we dragged it in ourselves. [Ordnance Officer, Fort Knox, Ky.]

Yes. To provide for the expeditious demobilization of returning units from the ETO a program was set-up at Campbell to assist units in turning in supplies and equipment. Each of the services QM, Ord., etc. provided a central point for turning in property. This was classified, in some cases made serviceable and sent to a depot or a central warehouse designated by the Chief of that service for the particular item, ie., Ordnance—The Chief of Ordnance ordered all small arms and ½ Ton Trucks to Camp Breckinridge, Ky. At Campbell vehicles above 2½ Ton were given 3rd and limited 4th echelon maintenance. . . . [Director of Supply, Camp Campbell, Ky.]

Not to my knowledge at Camp Hood as I did not arrive until Sept. 1945. [Director of Supply, Camp Hood, Texas]

Know of none—I was assigned to Meade after V-J Day. [Post Supply Officer, Fort George G. Meade, Md.]

Question: Describe as best you can the general condition of supplies and equipment returned to post supply organizations.

General condition of supplies and equipment returned was good taking into consideration the fair wear and tear. Understand that at Camp Hood general demobilization had not become
effective prior to my departure [April 1946]. . . . [Director of Supply, Camp Hood, Texas]

Units returning to a home station from combat for demobilizing usually have worn equipment. Supplies and equipment turned-in by units at Campbell during this period were above the average. [Director of Supply, Camp Campbell, Ky.]

Mostly clean from a standpoint of equipment in the hands of troops. Nothing was preserved for even short term storage. At that time the manpower gods had decided that two and one-half men per 100 pieces of equipment, artillery, armored, or general purpose was the criteria on which my personnel was based. [Ordnance Officer, Fort Knox, Ky.]

All supplies required classification, approximately 30% required renovation, repair or salvage, prior to return to stock or other disposition. [Director of Supply, Camp Crowder, Mo.]

The supplies and equipment that were turned in to post supply installations for processing generally indicated a lack of proper first and second echelon maintenance. . . . [Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Fort Lewis, Wash.]

Supplies and equipment were turned in and returned in fairly good condition . . . but, inadequate warehouses at camp and inability of Supply Depots caused serious problem of properly storing the property. [Director of Supply, Camp Swift, Texas.]

*Question:* In your own words describe the effect of the rapid discharge of soldiers and inactivation of units at your station upon supply and maintenance or the capability of your organization to perform its mission after the surrender of the Japanese.

I had to be discharged on points and so was not there during the worst part of the inactivation. [Director of Supply, Camp Cooke, Calif.]

Lack of facilities of storage was our big problem and also that of the Supply Depots. [Director of Supply, Camp Swift, Texas]

The rapid discharge of soldiers and the inactivation of units did not have too great an effect upon the supply and maintenance organization at post level for the reason . . . that these installations were operated primarily through the use of qualified civilian personnel and German PW's. [Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Fort Lewis, Wash.]

Supply and Maintenance channels were clogged most, about June and July 1946 than at any other time. This definitely due to the rapid discharge of officers and enlisted men, thereby prac-
tically abandoning field installations (Signal Corps) of all kinds. [Director of Supply, Camp Crowder, Mo.]

No appreciable effect at Camp Hood while I was there. [Director of Supply, Camp Hood, Texas]

It would be a paraphrase of all that has been said on the subject. However, by excellent cooperation of my enlisted personnel, I was able to stagger discharges so they would not wreck my system. . . . It was a difficult job but one well done by the men, many who worked day after day on long and tiresome shifts. German prisoners and civilians were of tremendous help. [Post Supply Officer, Fort George G. Meade, Md.]

The system, or utter lack thereof, combined with our inability to enlist many who wanted to stay in service, came very close to effecting chaos. I don't believe it was the system so much as the fact that the President took to the air and announced the separation criteria, without prior confidential information thereon to those in the field charged with the implementation thereof. . . . [S-1, Armored School, Fort Knox, Ky.]312

Historical materials that were researched in connection with this study indicated that there was a huge turnover of both officer and enlisted personnel at posts, camps, and stations. Post organizational rosters reflect this condition. It was the exception rather than the rule if unit commanders and principal staff officers continued on an assignment for more than three or four months. This had a resultant effect on administrative continuity that has been reflected in the scarcity of objective historical materials covering the period. When a commander lost personnel through discharge he soon learned that replacements became smaller and smaller. The Personnel Officer of the Armored School stated, "Our enlisted replacements were not too many, but were of good quality, being primarily men we reenlisted, and who had formerly been part of the school. The replacement job was primarily left up to the School. . . ."313 In March 1946 representatives of the Commanding General, Fourth Army, visiting the Harbor Defenses of Galveston discovered that 63 men were trying to take care of an installation designed for approximately 400. Here are some of the conditions the Fourth Army representatives found:

... Many requirements and regulations on maintenance, property accounting and food conservation were being violated or ignored. Supply personnel were, in general, untrained and not

312. These answers have been abstracted from the files of the OCMH. HIS 350.05 Spec Stud Demob (17 Nov, 1 and 5 Dec 50, and 20 Feb 51). OCMH.
313. Statement of Col George E. Lightcap, USA-Ret., 22 Feb 51. HIS 350.05 Spec Stud Demob (20 Feb 51). OCMH.
familiar with current supply regulations. To correct these conditions, an Ordnance Maintenance Team visited the installation to give instructions in all phases of ordnance maintenance, a complete file of current supply directives was forwarded, and schools were set up to give instruction on food conservation, maintenance, and supply procedures. ... 314

By the summer of 1946 demobilization had taken its toll of military personnel at zone of interior installations. With the exception of a small strategic reserve composed largely of the remaining elements of the 82d Airborne Division and the 2d Armored Division there were no tactical ground army troops as such. For commanders of posts, camps, and stations the problem became one of skeletonizing units to obtain sufficient personnel for housekeeping and other administrative duties.

Transition to a Length of Service Policy

This chapter has presented numerous problems that occurred during the demobilization of the Army following World War II. One large problem that has not been treated was that dealing with the transition from the Adjusted Service Rating Plan for discharge eligibility to demobilization of the individual soldier on the basis of a length of service policy. The succeeding chapter will present the main problems involved in the transition.

314. Demobilization Period History, Fourth Army, p. 52. OCMH.
CHAPTER IV
THE TRANSITION TO A LENGTH OF SERVICE POLICY

Introduction

With the defeat of the Japanese the Army began a large scale personnel demobilization. The plan was based on the Adjusted Service Rating method that made the individual soldier or officer eligible to be considered for discharge or to be returned to an inactive status. After V-J Day an eligible enlisted individual or officer could not be retained in the service because of military necessity.* Army planners realized by the middle of September that the point system scheme for discharge would sooner or later have to be integrated with a plan based on length of service. The Adjusted Service Rating plan was originally intended for use in reducing the size of the Army after the defeat of Germany and before the defeat of Japan. But the scheme that was amended and placed in operation following V-J Day did not provide for a clear-cut and long-range policy.

A combination of factors made it difficult to project the personnel demobilization program far in the future. Japan surrendered much sooner than expected. Although, the State, War, and Navy Departments had coordinated many post-war problems by means of a joint committee known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and through informal exchanges of information,¹ the Army had not formally received an estimate of the size, location, and length of time of the occupational forces it would have to maintain after the cessation of hostilities. There was no organization such as the National Security Council in which foreign, military, and economic policies could be coordinated. Even by the 15th of September 1945 the Army did not know what forces would be needed in the Pacific. The uncertainty of the continuation of Selective Service presented another obstacle to the problem. Finally, laws providing for enlistment and re-

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*There were a few exceptions involving men possessing certain military occupational specialties. There was also separate criteria for officers of the Medical Department. See Hearings ... Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives. 79th Cong., 1st Sess. "The Demobilization of the Army of the United States and Voluntary Recruiting for the United States Army," 28-31 Aug 45, pp. 77-91.

¹ See Special Planning Division files: 040 (State Department) 12 Oct 43, 2 Feb 44, 30 May 44 and 2 Aug 44. See also: Memo, Handy for Marshall, 27 Mar 44. WDCSA 370.01, Sec IV, Case 17. DRB, TAG. The reports of the State-War-Navy Committee do not reveal the problems of demobilization being discussed as such.
enlistment were not sufficiently flexible to attract large numbers of enlistees.*

**Directives of the Chief of Staff**

Immediately after the Japanese government made known its intention to surrender, the Chief of Staff announced his decision on demobilization. Following a discussion with the Chief of Naval Operations General Marshall directed "that all policies and procedures relating to demobilization . . . [be] coordinated and integrated wherever possible with similar activities of the Navy."² The Chief of Staff then announced the Army's mission for the period immediately following V-J Day:

a. To demobilize the Army and eliminate and curtail the activities of the War Department to the maximum extent and with the greatest rapidity consistent with national commitments for occupational forces.

b. To provide the occupational forces in conquered and liberated areas with sufficient trained personnel, supplies, and equipment to assure the proper performance of their missions and to assure their maintenance at standards befitting American soldiers.

c. To make reasonable provisions for fundamental post-war military requirements. Such provisions must not interfere with demobilization and the elimination and curtailment of War Department activities.

In the performance of its mission, the War Department will be guided by the following general principles:

a. Every expenditure which is not directly and vitally necessary to the performance of its mission must be eliminated. During the War Congress has been liberal in providing the War Department with funds. A serious obligation is now imposed on the Department to cut expenditures to the minimum. The current requirements must be met in the fullest possible extent with the supplies, equipment and facilities now available.

b. Every member of the Army will be treated as an individual. Primary emphasis will be placed upon the rapid discharge of military personnel in their order of priority as determined

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*PL 72, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1 Jun 45) allowed the SW to enlist and reenlist personnel then in the service or those who had been honorably discharged not more than three months prior to enlistment date. The term of enlistment was for three years. Total enlistments could not exceed "the total peacetime strength [280,000] of the Regular Army now or hereafter provided for." By the end of Aug 45 the Army had approximately 419,000 men whose term of enlistment had been extended for the term of the war plus 6 months by law. On 1 Sep 45 there were less than 100 men who had enlisted under the provisions of PL 72. See also WD Cir 249, 45.

² Memo, C/S for Ch's all WD GS and SS Div's and CG's all major Comds, 14 Aug 45, no sub. (Copy in author's file).
by their critical scores. Emphasis will be given to the educational programs and problems concerning personal readjustments to civilian life.

c. All officials will combat natural tendencies to continue activities, demand services, and retain personnel, supplies, equipment or facilities which are not clearly necessary to the announced mission of the Army and the War Department. This must be kept in mind in making all decisions.3

Army Personnel Position

As a result of the early defeat of Japan in August 1945 there arose an unanticipated Army personnel situation in the zone of the interior. Redeployment of units from the European Theater to the Pacific through the United States resulted in large numbers of troops with low Adjusted Service Rating Scores (ASR’s) being returned to this country. By the end of August there were an estimated 3.4 million male soldiers in the United States. Of this number approximately 1 million had ASR’s of forty-five or under and were less than 35 years of age; and of the total number approximately 400 thousand had never left the continental limits. In order to reach the anticipated Period II troop strength for Zone of the Interior operating personnel the total number of males would have to be reduced by approximately 100 thousand individuals per month. When the 400 thousand that had not been overseas left the United States they could be replaced for the interim by personnel having scores from forty-five to eighty. As thus planned, the medium score (forty-five to eighty) men would accomplish useful work while they awaited discharge and they in turn would be replaced by low score personnel to be returned from overseas. However, these low score overseas returnees would not come home until men with high scores had been returned from Europe which at the same time would assist the commander of our European Forces in achieving the reductions necessary for his Period II troop basis.4

The Chief of Staff realized that this problem of leaving large numbers of men in the United States with too few points for discharge and too many for shipment to the Pacific presented “an almost impossible public relation situation.”5 He therefore directed his European Commanders to send home first those men with highest scores. If it were necessary to send low score personnel they should be selected from men having ASR’s below

3. Memo, C/S for all WD GS and SS Div’s and CG’s all major forces, 15 Aug 45, sub: WD Policies for the Period Following V-J Day. (Copy in author’s file.)
4. Memo for Record. OPD 370.9, Sec 12, Case 305. DRB, TAG.
5. Draft Cablegram to CG’s ETO and MTO, 30 Aug 45. WARX 57162.
forty-five. To hasten the flow of troops home he directed the formation of casual detachment shipments and attachment of troops to major units returning to the United States.\textsuperscript{4}

American commanders in Europe also were confronted with personnel problems peculiar to their own commands. Personnel readjustments had been made in units scheduled for redeployment to the Pacific of which the majority of enlisted males had low ASR's. Many units were then loading or had been loaded, while empty ships to transport low score personnel to the United States and eventual movement to the Pacific were in European harbors, and large numbers of individuals were ready for embarkation on these bottoms. Troops and units had been readjusted for the war against Japan and Period I European occupational duties.

In the Pacific, Army personnel problems were different from those in the United States and in Europe. Large numbers of soldiers who were eligible for discharge consideration had been withdrawn from units; and infantry divisions such as the Thirty-second and Forty-first lost large numbers of their most experienced men with the result that many units had to undergo extensive training in the Philippines. With the fall of Japan General MacArthur had to use his shipping to carry large numbers of troops to places of occupation. Ships that carried units to occupational duties in Japan, Korea, and other places in the Far East were returned to the United States with personnel eligible for discharge. Replacements and additional troops for the Pacific in many instances had to await the arrival of these ships before they could be transported to their occupational duties.

On 31 August the Chief of Staff requested Generals MacArthur and Eisenhower to re-examine the forces they would need on 1 July 1946 for performing their assigned missions and to return an interim estimate within ten days. The European commander complied with the request in a very short time; he was in a better position to give an early answer because considerable planning had already been done on the European occupation problem. General MacArthur occupied a very unenviable position because at the time of the request Japan had not formally surrendered. The Army's Pacific commander was faced with the task of occupying a country containing many units that were intact and undefeated. Again on 14 September the War Department asked General MacArthur to furnish the estimates. The Chief of Staff was especially anxious for MacArthur to furnish the estimates because several members of Congress accused the military of "hoarding" large numbers of men just to insure high rank for many of its leaders.

\textsuperscript{6} WARX 57162, 30 Aug 45.
At the same time much of the War Department General Staff’s efforts were being devoted to personnel demobilization policies and plans, and some of the planning was being held in abeyance pending arrival of the Pacific estimates. On 17 September wire services carried MacArthur’s announcement that he could reduce his occupational forces to 200 thousand men within six months.7 On the same day press services reported that General MacArthur’s Eighth Army commander had stated that occupational forces would be unnecessary in Japan after a year.

These statements caused the War Department much embarrassment and were of great concern to the President and the State Department as well as the administration’s leaders in Congress.8 A number of members of Congress and newspapers immediately seized the Pacific commander’s announcement and used it to their own advantages. To many it appeared that General MacArthur was the only one of the Army’s high commanders who was willing to make a sizeable reduction in his command.* Finally on 19 September the Commander in Chief of the Army’s Pacific Forces furnished, under the highest security classification, the information that the Chief of Staff had requested on 31 August.9 The same figure, 200 thousand, that the press services had reported two days previously was the one stated as needed for occupational purposes.**

**Genesis of the Length of Service Policy**

By the middle of September 1945 the proponents of a rapid demobilization had aroused large numbers of people to a fever heat. It seemed as if demobilization no longer was considered rationally or coherently but became colored and dimmed by mass hysteria. The point system became the object of attack. There was great pressure to secure modifications in its application many of which would have aided special groups as well as certain individuals. Demobilization hysteria became so frenzied that the Chief of Staff was invited to explain informally his position and plans to the uneasy Members of Congress.

General Marshall, in accordance with his customary practice, directed various members of his staff to assist in the preparation of notes that formed the basis of his remarks. The Assistant

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8. CM-OUT 65406, 17 Sep 45. See also Memos, Pasco for Leahy and Actg Secy of State, no sub., 18 Sep 45, WDCSA 370.01 Case 7. DRB, TAG.
9. CM-IN 15334, 19 Sep 45. MacArthur’s personal reply is contained in CM-IN-14469, 18 Sep 45.
**Additional estimates were given for other duties.**
Chief of Staff, G–1, and other members of the General Staff believed that within a few months the point system would become obsolete because a lowering of the critical score would reach the point of diminishing returns. In addition, there were thousands of limited service men within the Zone of Interior who had accumulated only a small number of points. Many of these men had several years of service and as they were not allowed to amass additional points after V–J Day their plight seemed, at least for the time, hopeless. A decision would have to be reached when a length of service plan, preferably two years, would be used in conjunction with the point system of discharging men. The opportune time to reveal that such a change was being contemplated would be when the Chief of Staff appeared before the Members of Congress.

A statistical study of personnel was made in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1. The study revealed that if the Army was to meet its strength objectives men with two years service could not be released on that basis before the summer of 1946. This information was given to the Chief of Staff in a briefing held just prior to his leaving for the Library of Congress where he was addressing Congress.

General Marshall began his remarks by discussing the demobilization situation as it had occurred since Germany’s surrender. He outlined the redeployment program of the Army and told how personnel had to be readjusted in Europe for future warfare in the Pacific. The problems of General MacArthur in carrying the war to Japan’s homeland were highlighted. Just as the Army was getting straightened out for the task, he said, the Japanese capitulated on 14 August. Marshall continued by stating that the Army was planning to demobilize as rapidly as possible. It seemed as if the Chief of Staff was anticipating the questions of those Congressmen present and was attempting to answer them before the questions were asked. Suddenly he stated:

Further, as to the men of limited service: Specifically, we hope that by the late winter [author’s italics] we will have reached a stage in carrying out the point system—which is now the governing policy and which we must not emasculate unless we want a morale situation almost chaotic to develop—when, in effect the point system may be relaxed and 2 years of service

10. Statement, Mr. Austin J. Bonis to Maj John C. Sparrow, 26 Apr 50. HIS 330.14 Spec Stu, Demob (4 Oct 50), OCMH.
11. Ibid. and Statement, Brig Gen Robert W. Berry to Maj John C. Sparrow, 24 Apr 50. HIS 330.14 Spec Stu, Demob (3 Nov 50), OCMH.
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will be eligible for demobilization. This would take care of all the limited-service-men problem. General Marshall continued his talk by stating that by 1 July 1946 the demobilization situation would be more clarified and that troop requirements would have to be recomputed both at home and abroad.

The Chief of Staff's statement that there was hope that by late winter all two-year men could be discharged from the Army came as a complete surprise to the General Staff, particularly those members of its personnel section. Previous to the Chief of Staff's 20 September remarks there was no demobilization study that recommended a two year discharge policy by late winter.* Many Members of Congress desired to know the meaning of the term "by late winter." A representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, later explained that it would be the last day of winter, 20 March 1946.15

By late September the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-3, and OPD began studying the possibilities of a two years service demobilization policy by 20 March 1946. General Marshall, having gone on record that he hoped to have such a policy by late winter, placed his staff in a very delicate position during a time when tremendous pressures were being applied for rapid demobilization. On 23 October the Chief of Staff directed G-1 to "Prepare brief memo for President explaining transition from point system to 2 yr basis for discharge." The next day the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, presented a draft with the recommendation that it not be dispatched "pending agreement and approval of plan for transition from the point system to the two-year basis for discharge." G-3 and the Deputy Chief of Staff concurred with the G-1 action. General Marshall agreed to delay the sending of the message; however, he studied the draft and underlined a portion reading "finally on 20 March forty points or two years' service."

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13. Ibid., p. 8.
15. Ibid. See also Hearings on S 1355, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 205.
16. Marshall's note can be found in file WDCSA 370.01, Section VIII, Case 319, DRB, TAG.
17. Memo, Berry for C/S, 24 Oct 45, sub: Transition from Point System. Ibid.
18. The draft was actually retyped as a letter to the President and was signed by General Marshall However, it was never sent.
G–1 had been unable to obtain agreement on a proposed length of service plan for personnel demobilization.* Army Air Forces had objected strenuously to the adoption of a two-year policy until the fall of 1946. This command had been on record since early October and had consistently held to its viewpoint that if the two-year policy were used the Air Forces would be unable to man its portion of the occupational forces. OPD believed it unwise to "publicize figures on the strength of the Army or on planned separation procedure beyond March 1946." Furthermore, OPD would not concur in G–1’s proposal to amend the Joint Chiefs of Staff plans on deployment of the Army (JCS 521/19) because:

... a War Department Plan must be formulated indicating the breakdown of the Army between Air, Ground, and Service Forces... based upon information which will require a detailed estimate of the situation by the War Department General Staff. This... estimate should include consideration of the report of the committee on the permanent peacetime Army establish-

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*For a digest of the G-1 plan see Appendix XIII.
18. Memo, D/C of Air Staff to G-1, 5 Oct 45, sub: Screening of Shipments. WDGPA (24 Sep 45) DRB, TAG. Immediately following V-J Day the CG, AAF presented on 6 Sep 45 a plan of demobilization (in a memo) based on a gradual reduction in eligibility by ASR scores. Before G-1 and OPD had completed action on the proposal the C/S made his statement to Congress on the institution of the two-year policy and the memorandum was returned to AAF. On 27 Sep 45 the CG, AAF recommended to the AC of S, G-1, WDGS, that the two-year policy not be instituted prior to 1 Jul 46. The AAF had received a relatively small percentage of new inductees the past two years. G-1 recommended to G-3 and OPD (on 11 Oct 45) that the AAF memo of 27 Sep 45 not be favorably considered. In the meantime the CG, AAF personally forwarded a memo (16 Oct 45) to the C/S voicing objection to the two-year policy and reiterated AAF’s belief that the two-year policy should not be placed into effect before the latter part of 1946. The 16 Oct 45 memo was sent to G-1 by the Office of the Chief of Staff. G-1 cited its previous recommendations of 11 Oct 45 and further recommended that AAF’s 16 Oct 45 request not be approved. The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff [Hodes] had G-1’s recommendations on the 11 Oct AAF memo returned by hand with instructions to withhold action until a decision would be made on the two-year policy; and to design a complete discharge policy implementing the two-year plan by 20 Mar 46. By 5 Dec 45 the CG, AAF had not received an answer on his proposals because the basic decision on the two-year policy had not been made. See Memo for Record, Boyd for Paul, 5 Dec 45, sub: Demob of AAF. This is attchd to Memo, Paul for CG, AAF, 4 Dec 45, sub: Demob of AAF, WDGPA (6 Sep 45) 16 Oct 45, and OPD 370.8, Sec XIV, Case 368-Case 371, DRB, TAG.

The inconsistency in the AAF position should be noted. By 1 Nov 45 major commands (AAF, ASF, and AGF) were given permission to separate surplus personnel even though individuals falling in this classification did not possess sufficient points for discharge consideration. This was authorized by the War Department in order to make complete use of separation center capacity. The AAF authorized a new criteria of 50 points and 2 years’ service effective on 1 Nov 45 even though men in the AGF and AAF were being sent overseas with as high as 3 years’ service and up to 36 points. Naturally these overseas replacements protested vigorously. See Memo, Akers to Paul, 2 Nov 45, sub: Demob. WDGPA 370.01 (23 Oct 45) 2 Nov 45. DRB, TAG.

19. Memo, OPD for G-1, 24 Oct 45, sub: G-1 Summary Sheet. WDGPA 370.01 (23 Oct 45). DRB, TAG.
ment now in preparation and overseas commitments. State Department guidance will be required in resolving the latter...20

G-3 agreed with OPD's remarks and stated that G-1's estimates for 1 January 1947 strength* “will not be sufficient to meet this country's obligations for the occupational forces, garrison of other bases, and the Zone of the Interior.”21 Besides, G-3 wanted to recompute the requirements for pipelines and overhead before OPD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff revised minimum estimates for overseas commitments.

The Deputy Chief of Staff and the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, revised the memorandum that General Marshall desired to be sent to the President. OPD, while recommending that such a letter be sent, suggested some further changes in the proposed draft; G-3 felt that G-1 had not presented all the facts and that it would not be thoroughly understood by the President:

Acceptance of the principles and procedures ... will not permit the United States to carry out the commitments laid down [by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 521/19]. ... This reduction in our military potential should be called to the attention of the President and the State Department since it bears a vital significance to whatever commitments we now have or may make in the future.

Acceptance of the lower Army strength ... can be met only by:

(1) Further reduction in the occupational forces ... or
(2) Elimination of the presently approved Strategic Reserve, or
(3) A combination of both.

There is grave doubt that we can, at this time, slow up our demobilization. [Italics author's] ... therefore, [we must] ... shape our plans accordingly. The implications, insofar as the Army is concerned, which will result from the adoption of the discharge procedures proposed ... must be presented in detail to those who are responsible for formulating and implementing our foreign policy.22

A memorandum describing the transition from the point system of discharge to a length-of-service policy was approved by General Marshall 31 October. It was carried to the White House

20. Ibid. See also: M/R, 24 Oct 45, sub: Demobilization of the Army. WDGT 322 (23 Oct 45) in O&T 322, Oct 45 through Dec 45, Vol. #6. DRB, TAG.


22. Memo, G-3 for C/S, 28 Oct. 45, sub: Transition from the Point System. WDCSA 370.01, Sec VIII, Cases 221-320, Case 319. DRB, TAG.
by special officer courier. The message discussed these topics:

1. Need for length-of-service policy,
2. Future plan,
3. Effect of two-year tour-of-duty plan on total Army strength.

Specifically, the memorandum stated, "The War Department is presently committed to a two-year tour of duty plan by late March." And the "time was approaching" for such a change. "... the final decision... cannot be delayed beyond early January 1946." However, "... based on the current intake of personnel," a length of tour policy would place the Army in a position of not being able to meet its commitments both at home and abroad. Present plans were to use the point system as a basis of discharge through March. The Chief of Staff concluded:

Both the European and Pacific theaters are restudying their requirements, the operating requirements in the United States are being re-evaluated, and composition of the reserve is subject to analysis. Other unknown factors which influence the method and timing of the two-year policy are the ultimate strength and percentage of trained soldiers that can be obtained by voluntary enlistments and the future of inductions through the Selective Service Act. The next two months should give the War Department a much clearer picture than is available today upon which to base its tour-of-duty policy. I will keep you advised of our decisions as the situation develops. [For complete text, see Appendix XIV].

At the same time that the memorandum for the President was being prepared the Operations Division was considering further G-1's proposed length-of-service personnel demobilization plan. [Digest of plan in Appendix XIII]. The plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided for a total deployment of 1.95 million men (Army) by 30 June 1946. However, G-1 had estimated that there would only be 1.2 million usable individuals by that time. The Personnel Division had further estimated that there would probably be only 790 thousand usable troops by the end of 1946. If G-1's
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statistical estimates were reasonably accurate, OPD believed that there would be a shortage of troops for the air, ground, and service forces forming the strategic striking forces envisaged in the preparation of JCS deployments. It was obvious that "either political commitments requiring troops overseas must be reduced or, alternately, a plan must be prepared which provides more men in the Army as of the end of 1946."27 [Italics authors] In addition the continued readjustment of individuals would gravely impair the effectiveness of units. Political guidance should be obtained before a long-range demobilization plan could be made. The Operations Division prepared a memorandum containing a number of questions bearing on immediate politico-military problems* and recommended that it be sent to the Secretary of State. The recommendation was approved and the letter was signed by Secretary Patterson and dispatched to Secretary Byrnes on 1 November 1945.28

Along with the questions presented by political commitments and the maintenance of an Army-in-being the problem of recruiting and voluntary enlistment became an increasingly important element in length-of-service demobilization plans. Previous to 6 October the Army was bound by statutes that impeded the enlistment of volunteers. It was not until that date that legislation was passed relieving this situation.29 The statute permitted the Secretary of War to recruit and enlist individuals 17 years of age and older; enlistment contracts could be made for 3 years, 2 years, or 18 months; personnel in the service and those recently honorably discharged were permitted to enlist in their present grade or at the grade held at time of discharge; no limitation was placed on total numbers to be enlisted; and many other incentives were held up for enlistment.30 The passage of this legislation did much to aid in the attempt to form a long-range plan because, under previous statutes, the Army was limited to enlisting men for 3 years only, with a limitation on total number of 280,000.

In Byrnes' reply to the Secretary of War's inquiry on politico-military questions he expressed his deep concern over the loss of

27. Ibid.
*The questions are contained in Appendix XV. The problems of Army demobilization planning were made increasingly difficult at this time because Secretary of State Byrnes was reluctant to accept some of the previous agreements on Allied occupational forces for Japan that had been attained by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC 70/5). See WDCSA 370.01, Case 10. DRB, TAG. See also: Walter Millis, Editor, The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), pp. 105-107.
29. PL 190, 79th Cong.
30. See WD Cir 310, 45.
United States military strength: it was a time when "our country should be united and strong." The State Department head compared this Nation's experiences in the First and Second World Wars:

Twice in your lifetime and mine, the United States has, while engaged in a World War, demonstrated that our country can build up and effectively utilize military strength at a prodigious rate, perhaps faster than any other country has ever done in history. We seem to be in a fair way of demonstrating a second time that our country can demobilize and tear down its military strength more rapidly than any other country in the world.31

He further admitted that "it is not possible to answer some of the questions which you put to me as definitely as both of us would desire."32 However, he gave as complete an answer as was possible at that time.*

In the interim between the dispatch of the memorandum to the State Department and receipt of its reply General Marshall was succeeded by General Eisenhower as Chief of Staff (20 Nov. 45). The new Chief of Staff underwent hospital treatment immediately following his assuming office.** During this period of hospitalization Secretary Patterson directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to discharge at least 1.2 million men in December. Approximately that number had been separated in October and it appeared as if the same figure would be achieved in November. Furthermore the Secretary of War wanted the January discharge criteria and information as to when it would be possible to use length-of-service as a basis for discharge. Patterson's directive was unusual because he placed a deadline on the Deputy Chief of Staff's answer (8 December 45).***

Earlier in November the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, had recommended that a two-year length-of-service policy be placed in effect on 31 May 1946. This recommendation was contained in a plan which provided for a gradual transition from a combination of either 4 years service or 55 points in December to the separation of men with 2 years service by the end of May. OPD, G–3, the Director of Information, and L & LD concurred in the G–1 plan. However, the Personnel Division did not make specific recommendations for point scores beyond the end of January.

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31. Ltr., Byrnes to Patterson, 29 Nov 45, no sub. OPD 370.9, Sec. III, Case 20/2. DRB, TAG.
32. Ibid.
*The full text of both answers and questions are contained in Appendix XV.
**Gen Eisenhower was hospitalized during the period 24 Nov-3 Dec 45.
***For complete text of Patterson's memo see Appendix XVI.
Strength computations for the scheme were based on statistical information as of 30 June 1945. Later statistical information was being obtained which would be used in the preparation of a more detailed plan by February. The proposed policy allowed only the December and the January discharge criteria to be announced to commanders and to the public. The Deputy Chief of Staff approved the December discharge criteria as well as permitting its immediate release to commanders, but the January criteria was to remain classified until released to the public. The last day of May was disapproved by the Chief of Staff as the date for the beginning of the two-year length-of-service policy and no approved date was substituted. Thus, the length-of-service policy remained unanswered during the month of November.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, studied the questions proposed in Patterson’s memorandum and submitted on 3 December 1945 his recommendations to the Deputy Chief of Staff. The Personnel Division’s proposals were approved in toto. G-1 did not recommend a specific date for a two-years length-of-service demobilization policy because there was, at that time, insufficient information on which to base a decision.*

On return to duty the Chief of Staff was acquainted with the overall personnel situation. General Eisenhower “manifested extreme concern . . . , stating that he did not realize the situation was so critical.” He was also apprehensive that Congress might

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33. S/S, G-1 to C/S, 9 Nov 45, sub: Demobilization. WDGPA 370.01 (23 Oct 45). DRB, TAG. One officer in the Personnel Division (G-1) wrote the AC of S, G-1, “. . . Our problem of providing overseas replacements is particularly acute insofar as it pertains to length of service . . . . . . From our point of view, it is urgent that a decision regarding the two year policy be made at the earliest practical time. If the Army is to have a 2 year policy on 20 March or at any future date, we must plan an over-all effective strength of 1,200,000 as of 1 July and gauge our overseas shipments accordingly with a corresponding drop in Troop Basis for all theaters and the ZL. On the other hand, if we are to level off at 2½ years service we must make maximum use of all men with service between 2 and 2½ years, and if necessary send these men overseas. An early decision is essential to long range planning and we might just as well face up to the fact that we’ve got to go back on our commitments to the GI (soldier) or cut our Armies of occupation.” See also: Memo, Col Akers for Gen Paul, sub: Demob, 2 Nov 45. WDGPA 370.01 (23 Oct 45) 2 Nov 45. DRB, TAG.
34. Memo, Hodes for G-1, 10 Nov 45, sub: Demobilization. Ibid., and Brief, Hodes for Marshall, sub: Demobilization, 10 Nov 45, WDCSA 370.01 (24 Nov 45) Sec IX, Case 322. DRB, TAG.
35. S/S, G-1 to C/S, 3 Dec 45, sub: Demobilization. WDGPA 370.01 (23 Oct 45). DRB, TAG.
36. Memo, Craig for Hull, 6 Dec 45, no sub. OPD 370.9, Sec XIV, Cases 368- , Case 401. DRB. TAG.

*For the text of reply to SW see Appendix XVII. Although insufficient information was the reason given to Sec. Patterson for the inability to announce a 2-year policy the Chief, Control Group, G-1, informed the AC of S, G-1, “. . . . . . This paper . . . was rewritten to include separation criteria for December and January only and resulted in the conference with the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff in which the decision was made that a discharge policy for more than two months in advance would not be approved.” Memo, Boyd for Paul, 5 Dec 45. WDGPA 370.01 (6 Sep 45) 16 Oct 45. DRB, TAG.
pass legislation that would reduce the Army faster than it was being accomplished. General Eisenhower felt "that we were committed to the discharge of [men with two years service by April 1946] and if we did not meet the commitment Congress would accuse the War Department of bad faith and pass legislation which would require us to discharge these men in any event and other possible categories, such as fathers, college students, pre-med students etc."\(^3\)

The Chief of Staff considered the problem realistically. Army planners knew what manpower could be obtained through Selective Service and voluntary enlistments. He stated that they should compare these resources with requirements. These requirements were not a fixed quantity. First, minimum occupational forces and such training installations as were necessary to keep the occupational troops to strength had to be maintained. Other activities, both at home and abroad, would be second in priority. If there was not sufficient manpower available for the latter then these activities "would have to be pared to the bone."\(^3\)

Requirements had to be brought into line with resources.

General Eisenhower sent a personal letter on 8 December to his principal commanders, both at home and abroad, in which he directed new "rock-bottom" personnel estimates for the remainder of the fiscal year ending 30 Jun 46. The Chief of Staff plainly stated that the Army was running out of replacements and that commanders would have to perform their mission with fewer troops. After studying replies\(^3\) to the 8 December communication the Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD, recommended that personnel requirements for overseas theaters, zone of interior, General Reserve, and pipe lines\(^*\) not exceed 1.55 million. A summary of the OPD recommendation consisted of three main elements:

a. 1,550,000 strength be considered as effective 30 June 1946.
b. G–1 prepare discharge criteria to attain this strength by even monthly increments.
c. Present reduction of personnel survey be continued with a view to producing by May 1946 projected strengths through 31 December 1946.\(^4\)

On 29 December the Chief of Staff approved the OPD proposal and at the same time a G–1 scheme for a length-of-service discharge

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\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^*\) DA SR 320-5-1, Aug 50 defines pipe line as "The channel of logistics or a specific portion thereof, by means of which material or personnel flow from original sources of procurement to their ultimate point of use."

\(^4\) S/S, OPD for C/S, OPD 370.0 (29 Dec 45), 29 Dec 45. sub: Reduction of planned Army Strength. OPD 370.0 (), Sec III, Case 25. DRB, TAG. Memo for Record attached to Case 25. Ibid.
policy. The Personnel Division plan had been coordinated with the OPD recommended 1.55 million strength. The approved length-of-service policy provided that all non-volunteer enlisted men having from 2 to 3½ years service would be discharged on the following schedule:

1 January 1946—3½ years service
1 April 1946—2½ years service
(this was quickly changed to 30 April)
1 July 1946—2 years service

These new policies were considered of such importance by the Chief of Staff that he directed his Deputy to present them to the Secretary of War. Deputy Chief of Staff Handy* discussed the plans with Mr. Patterson. At the conclusion of the conference the Secretary of War gave his approval and expressed his views on the release of the information:

He [Patterson] felt that a brief announcement should be made about January 1st to the effect that shipping was no longer the governing factor in demobilization; that we had now reached a point where requirements for troops overseas has become the governing factor; that troops would continue to return to the U.S. in large numbers for discharge.

The Secretary of War felt that about February 1st a more comprehensive news release on the subject should probably be made. In the meantime the President will have made his report to the Nation which Congress will be considering and probably by February 1st the War Department would be in a position of having to make some public announcement. . . .

* * * * * * *

The Secretary of War feels that about March 1st announcement may have to be made to the effect that we are not putting the two-year service into effect as originally contemplated and reported to the Congress by General Marshall [on 20 September 1945] because we find we are unable to do it. The Secretary of War feels that it would be better to admit we have made a mistake than to try to qualify any announcement other than a straight statement that we are going to do it or we are not going to do it.**

The Chief of Information acting as spokesman issued a statement to the press and radio on 4 January 1946 that outlined the Army’s intention to slow down the rate of demobilization.** The

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*Gen. Handy was accompanied by the AC of S, OPD, and G-1, the Chief of Information, and the Chief of the Legislative and Liaison Division.
41. Lt Gen J. E. Hull’s Memo for Record, 29 Dec 45. Ibid.
**For full text of the statement see Appendix XVIII.
announcement followed a newspaper report that Secretary Patterson while talking to some enlisted men in various Pacific bases had failed to exhibit an understanding of the demobilization plan's essentials. The reaction to the statement and the allegation regarding the Secretary of War caused a widespread unfavorable reaction both at home and abroad.

The reaction became so intense that the length-of-service plan was announced to the Congress and the public on 15 January. However, theater and other major commanders were given complete information on the plan before the announcement.42 The explanation included an estimated number of replacements that each command would receive during the remainder of the fiscal year.43 Previously in the absence of definite instructions one theater commander (India-Burma) had made a plan and announced it to his command.44 On 14 January the War Department plan became effective and General Eisenhower immediately notified his commanders.45 In addition to a length-of-service and point score criteria the scheme provided that all enlisted men and officers for whom there was no military need would be immediately released.*

In explaining the problem to the Congress the Chief of Staff was forthright and "placed his cards on the table." In the latter part of his statement he said:

* * * * * * * * *

This has been the most rapid and broad-scale demobilization in history. I consider our July 1 figure [1,500,000] to be almost without a safety factor. It is the risk which, under any other circumstances than the vastly appealing one of reuniting men with their families, I should be unwilling to take.

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It certainly will indicate to you that should we fail to obtain the 1,500,000 men we require on July 1, something would have to break in the tight little net which we have now woven to perform our job in this country and discharge the nation's overseas commitments. If we are not relieved of the still huge supplies of Government property entrusted to our custody overseas, we shall have no choice but to abandon them where they lie. But even if you gentlemen should approve such action on

42. CM-OUT 92194, 9 Jan 46.
43. Ibid.
44. CM-IN 2858, 13 Jan 46.
45. CM-OUT 92852, 14 Jan 46 and WCL 37500, 15 Jan 46.

*No individual could be discharged if he had less service or smaller scores than outlined in the plan. See also: Chronology.
the choice between two evils, I know you would not tolerate the reduction of occupational forces below the levels required by General MacArthur and General McNarney to carry out their duties. There is no possible doubling up of work load which could enable us to accomplish that part of our present mission with fewer men. If that situation should develop, you gentlemen will have to decide what we must do. Other functions would have to be abandoned, too, with tragic results. . . .

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The Secretary of War cabled Eisenhower from India:

"Your speech to Congress on demobilization is splendid. Steps should be taken to get full text sent to all theaters as quickly as possible, with directions to give it widest distribution to troops. If this is not done, they will only get short excerpts and will miss the main points." Copies of the statement had been sent to all commanders on 15 January and when the Secretary of War cable arrived the Chief of Staff directed that his remarks be widely disseminated to all troops.

There can be many a slip in an organization between the announcement of a plan and its execution, and the Chief of Staff was determined that the new program would be properly executed in the field. Overseas commanders as well as those in the United States were allowed flexibility in carrying out the provisions of the scheme. However, General Eisenhower directed that all major zone of interior commanders would inspect every installation under their command to eliminate non-essential activities, to see if the new plan was properly executed, and to determine that personnel eligible as overseas replacements were reported as being available.* The Chief of Staff’s directive not only put “teeth” into the new demobilization plan but it also assisted in bringing out deficiencies. As a result of the inspections an important lesson was learned: men who possessed a thorough knowledge of the plan were the ones who complained the least. One commander published in a circular:

... The success of the demobilization program appears to be closely related to the extent information has been made available to the officers and enlisted men concerned.

It has been noted that few complaints arise at those installa-

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47. CM-IN 63549, 18 Jan 46.
48. CM-OUT 39321, 19 Jan 46. WCL 39321.
*For full text of directive, see Appendix XVIII.
tions where all are fully informed regarding the . . . plan for releasing individuals. In some commands, information has not only been made available orally but, in addition, lists have been posted indicating the date individuals will be reported for separation. While it may be impracticable to establish the exact date for each individual in all cases, an approximate date will permit the formulation of personal plans and provide assurance that releases are scheduled in order of merit.

Difficulty has been encountered at those installations where information has been withheld. . . .49

The Army’s personnel demobilization program became less and less a public issue after the beginning of February 1946. True, there were numerous complaints following General Eisenhower’s remarks to Congress, but they steadily diminished. Additional hearings were held by both the House and the Senate Committees on Military Affairs.50 Following these hearings, the Chairman, Senate Military Affairs Committee, sent Secretary Patterson the recommendations of the Subcommittee on Demobilization. These were:

One. ‘The rate of demobilization of the past few months must be continued until the approximately 2,000,000 surplus men now in the Army are discharged.’ . . .

Two. ‘The lapse of time should be shortened between induction and an actual replacement for the man in foreign military service.’ . . .

Three. ‘Right now fathers, other than volunteers, should be discharged as rapidly as possible, but in no event should any father be held in the Army after July 1, 1946, unless he agrees.’ . . .

Four. ‘Special Hardship cases should continue to have prompt attention, with particular emphasis on family responsibility and family needs.’ . . .

Five. ‘All idle soldiers should be assigned essential tasks or be discharged at once.’ . . .

49. ASF Circular 69, 46.
50. SMAC, Hearings on Demobilization of the Army, 22 Jan 46, and Hearings on S. 1355 (Part 3), op. cit.
TRANSITION TO A LENGTH OF SERVICE POLICY

Six. 'An enlistment campaign of Wacs to be used in separation centers to replace men should be instituted at once and prosecuted vigorously.'

Seven. 'The enlistment of Philippine Scouts to replace American soldiers should be pushed more effectively.'

Eight. 'Civilian personnel should be employed abroad and at home insofar as possible to replace men now in uniform engaged in the so-called Army housekeeping jobs.'

The Secretary of War's reply to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs was sent to the Chairman on 6 February. The Secretary took exception to two of the recommendations, the first and the third; it appeared that the Committee had misunderstood the War Department's testimony (16, 17, and 18 January) on its manpower problems. The reply stated what the military establishment was doing to accomplish the recommendations that both agreed on. The Secretary denied that there were 2 million surplus men;

In addition to the problems of caring for prisoners of war and surplus property referred to by the subcommittee, there are many other jobs to be performed by the Army between January 1 and July 1 which will be liquidated or considerably reduced by the latter date, but which require the service of many men in the interim. [separation centers, care of sick and wounded, closing out of theaters and installations, UNRRA and destruction of enemy munitions and war plants].

On the other point of disagreement, the letter explained the policy of the War Department giving special consideration to fathers.

In the point system 12 points' credit was given for each child up to and including 3. This credit per child is equal to 1 year's service in the zone of interior or 2½ battle campaigns. Under this system, of the 625,000 non-volunteer enlisted fathers in the Army January 1, 505,000 will have been discharged by July 1, leaving an estimated 120,000 still in the Army on that date. Under . . . [your] recommendation these . . . nonvolunteer enlisted fathers would also be discharged not later than . . . [1 July]. This would mean their discharge without regard to length of service or points, and without regard to the problem of

52. Ibid., p. 3.
filling the vacancies so created in our 1.5 million July 1 Army.53

Hearings on the subject of personnel demobilization, as such, ceased after January 1946. Following that date the problems of securing men to replace those being discharged became of increasing importance. Necessity dictated an Army-in-being.

Selective Service and Replacements

Although the Secretary of War had reinstituted voluntary enlistment before the surrender of Japan the Selective Service System was considered a principal source of replacement manpower. Requisitions or calls for inductees to be delivered in September and October were given to the Director, Selective Service System in July and August.* Originally the August and September calls had been for 80 thousand per month but the Secretary of War reduced this number to 50 thousand just after the dropping of the first atomic bomb.** In early September the AC of S, G–1, informed Selective Service that 50 thousand inductees would be needed for October.64 Usually induction calls were placed approximately two months in advance. However, for various reasons, including pressures exerted on the military establishment, the November figure was not approved until almost the end of September, and there was a possibility that Congress would stop inductions even before Selective Service expired in May of 1946.

At that time less than 5 thousand men had volunteered for enlistment and there was no sound basis on which to plan for the number of enlistments in the remainder of the fiscal year. It was obvious that personnel estimates had to be accurate. The Chief of Staff's announcement that the Army hoped to discharge all men with 2 years service by late winter tremendously increased the problem. Furthermore the Personnel Division (G–1) had insufficient information to "determine the number of men under 2 years' service due for discharge on [the] point system."55 In advising the Chief of Staff on the later approved figure of 50 thousand the Deputy G–1 wrote:

* * * * * * * * *

The switch to a policy of discharging veterans on completion of a 2-year tour of service, rather than on a point basis, by late winter, has caused major revision in personnel planning.

53. Ibid., p. 4.

*These were for residents of the continental limits of the United States only.

**For SW Stimson's ltr to Dir, SS, see Appendix XIX.

54. Memo, Henry for Dir SS, sub: Procurement of Enlisted Men, 5 Sep 45. WDGPA 327 (7 May 45). DRB, TAG.

55. Memo, G–1 for C/S, 27 Sep 45, sub: November Induction Call. WDGPA 327 (7 May 45). DRB, TAG.
Where before it had been anticipated that occupational forces and Z/I establishments would be adjusted first on a final critical score and then on a 2-year service basis, it is now necessary that we begin thinking in terms of 2-year service entirely as far as replacements are concerned. Many of the low-score people in ETO have more than 2 years' service. The result is that instead of the previous schedule of 135,000, it is now estimated that ETO must have over 200,000 replacements with less than 2 years' service before any rotation can begin.\textsuperscript{56}

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* 

Again in October the approved number of inductees needed for December was 50 thousand. This number was repeated principally for the reason that "at least another month will be required to assemble and analyze data on the probable number of volunteers and statistics on length of service."\textsuperscript{57} The induction call placed for January repeated the December figure. The 50 thousand man estimate was contained in a 2 years' service plan proposed by G-1 on October 23. Although the 23 October plan was never accepted the Deputy Chief of Staff approved the induction figure of 50 thousand for January.\textsuperscript{58}\textsuperscript{*}

The problem of maintaining an Army was not only connected with the Selective Service System but was also dependent on a program for voluntary recruitment. The General Staff waited until the Japanese had announced their intention of surrender before it began aggressive planning for a recruiting policy. A coordinated enlistment scheme involving the three major commands (AAF, AGF, and ASF) was approved just previous to V-J Day.\textsuperscript{59} A Military Personnel Procurement Service was established in the Office of The Adjutant General. The Director of this service was beset with a number of problems including a shortage of trained personnel to operate the program in the field, inflexible laws, and the reaction of the public both within and without the Armed Services:

Public sentiment was not conducive to a voluntary enlistment campaign due to the desire of Army personnel to return home, the traditional turn of the American people against military

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{57} S/S, G-1 to C/S, 1 Oct 45, sub: December 1945 Induction Call. WDGPA 327 (7 May 45). DRB, TAG. 
\textsuperscript{58} S/S, G-1 to C/S, 26 Oct 45, sub: January 1946 Induction Call. WDGPA 327 (7 May 45). DRB, TAG. 
*Calls placed on the Selective Service System and the number of inductees furnished during the period Sept 45 to the discontinuance of the system are shown in Appendix XX. 
\textsuperscript{59} Memo, G-1 for D C/S, 21 Sep 45, sub: Recruiting Plan. WDGPA 345. DRB, TAG.
service, and the disastrous speed of demobilization. ... 60.

The Congress enacted more favorable recruiting legislation in early October* and the Army began an unprecedented campaign to secure volunteers. By the end of 1945 in excess of 400 thousand had volunteered for terms of service extending from 1 to 3 years. And at the same time (Sept–Dec) approximately 130 thousand were inducted through the Selective Service System. In addition to these, a small number of enlisted reservists were called to active duty. Totals of enlisted accession from September through December 1945 (excluding Philippine Scouts) are shown in the table below:

Table 6—Enlisted Accessions 1 Sep–31 Dec 45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Enlistments</th>
<th>Inductions</th>
<th>Reservists</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>13,657</td>
<td>41,209</td>
<td>2,999</td>
<td>57,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>94,106</td>
<td>34,576</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>130,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>188,189</td>
<td>33,826</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>223,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>106,768</td>
<td>20,526</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>127,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>402,720</td>
<td>130,137</td>
<td>6,491</td>
<td>539,348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sep figure includes 93 EM from Aug.

216 EM were separated for various reasons by 31 Dec. This figure has not been deducted.

Source: STM—30 (TAG). 1 Aug 47.

Before Japan surrendered the Chief of Staff believed that there would be a transition through a period of demobilization to a peacetime establishment. This change would not always run smoothly because of problems involving many things such as individuals, transportation, matériel, and world commitments. The peacetime organization was to be composed of a comparatively small Regular Force, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserves. Although there were alternate War Department schemes the main plan was predicated on the assumption that Congress would authorize some form of universal military training. By the end of 1945 the Army resigned itself to a rapid demobilization and ascribed this fate as representing the “spontaneous expression of the will of the American people.” At the same time the War Department hoped to strengthen this Nation’s weakened military security by clinging tenaciously to the presumption that universal military training would be adopted. This attitude and hope is reflected in an exchange of letters between

60. TAG, MPPS, Historical Report for the Period 15 August 1945-15 September 1947, p. 2. OCMH.

*See WD Bull 19, 22 Oct 45, for text of the Armed Forces Voluntary Recruitment Act.
the wife of a young lieutenant and Chief of Staff Eisenhower. She wrote:

... The rapid demobilization of both the army and navy has alarmed me. We made that mistake in the last war and should not be making it again. We, so far have made a poor effort to "secure that peace." It is my wish that the war department [sic] demobilize our army only as fast as the security of peace warrants. My husband ... has been across in the thick of the fight but I would a whole lot rather be separated from him again now than have another war....

I wish there was some accurate way of your knowing what we want. Selfishly, you must know, we all want our men home. These are the people who will write to you too, I'm afraid. ... 61

The Chief of Staff replied:

... I appreciate the soundness of your thinking and can state that, in general, I am in agreement with your point of view. However, we both recognize that the present rate of demobilization, while it may have been accelerated beyond that degree desirable for security, still represents the spontaneous expression of the will of the American people.

While I share with you your concern on this phase of our security, I feel strongly that the adoption by our Congress of a well-integrated plan of universal military training will do much to assure an adequate security for our nation. ... 62

*       *       *       *       *       *

At the beginning of 1946 the prospects for obtaining replacements was anything but bright. When Congress reconvened on 14 January* the principal War Department staff officer on legislative matters advised that relations with the Congress were "probably at the lowest point they have reached in recent years." 63

The announced demobilization "slowdown" caused many critics to state that it had been motivated by the Army's desire for passage of Universal Military Training. 64

There was an increasing trend in the Executive Branch to lower budgetary requirements; the pendulum was swinging back from "win the war at any cost." Despite the rapid demobilization of the Army and Navy the President was reported as desiring further

61. Ltr. Mrs. A. H. Nickless to Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, 19 Dec 45. WDCSA 370.0.I, Sec IX, Case 440. DRB, TAG.
62. Ltr, Gen Eisenhower to Mrs. A. H. Nickless, 31 Dec 45. Ibid.
63. WD Gen Coun Mins, 15 Jan 46, p. 9. OCMR, Gen Ref Br.
64. Ibid., 22 Jan 46, p. 9.
economies in the armed services. Following a visit to the White
House on 10 January Acting Secretary of War Royall related:

The President said that he had been trying for some time to
get a figure out of the War Department for the strength of the
Army for the fiscal year 1947. He stated that in his opinion
an over-all strength of 2,000,000 for all the armed forces (in-
cluding the Coast Guard) was sufficient. He stated that this
would mean about 1,000,000 for the Army, including the Air
Force. Further, he said that the absolute maximum cost for
all the defense forces for the fiscal year 1947 would not exceed
$15,000,000,000.65

The Deputy Chief of Staff quickly pointed out to Mr. Royall
that the Army's minimum "bedrock requirements for July 1, 1946
were approximately 1.55 million and that figure . . . might be re-
vised downward later, for July 1, 1947 . . . [to] approximately
1,300,000."66 The 1.55 million figure had already been announced
to the public by 5 January.* The Acting Secretary "directed that
a study be initiated to carry out the President's views and
wishes. . . ."67

The first extension of the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940, as amended, was to expire on 15 May 1946. The Presi-
dent indicated to the Congress** that the Act must be continued
if the armed services were to fulfill their demobilization promises
and at the same time meet their commitments. Chief of Staff
Eisenhower and the Director of Selective Service had already
made similar appeals to a subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Military Affairs.68

The problem of supplying overseas replacements became so
acute that the War Department publicly announced on 15 January
1946 that the basic training cycle for an overseas replacement
was being reduced from 17 weeks to 13 weeks. And this was again
changed on the last of the month from 13 weeks to 8 weeks.
Demobilization had proceeded so fast that the United States was
using soldiers with approximately 2 months training to support
its foreign policy.

In planning strengths and deployments of troops it is always
necessary to take into consideration the amount of money ap-
propriated in the budget for the military establishment. The

65. OCS M/R, 10 Jan 46. Initialed by H [Gen Thos Handy, D C/S] and DE [Gen
Eisenhower, C/S]. WDCSA 320.2 (1946) Case 14. DRB, TAG.
66. Ibid.
*See Appendix VIII.
67. Ibid.
**State of the Union Message, 21 Jan 46.
President’s budget recommendations to the Congress are also a
determining guide for planning troop strengths. Following the
President’s Budget Message the General Staff revised its esti-
mates for 1947 (fiscal year) strengths:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Army Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 46*</td>
<td>1,550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Dec 46*</td>
<td>1,281,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 47*</td>
<td>1,070,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After a closed meeting with the House Committee on Military Af-
fairs during which Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of
State Byrnes urged the retention of Selective Service,** the War
Department announced on 13 March its estimated needs for
1947.70

When the overall 1947 estimated strengths for the Army (in-
cluding Air), Navy, and Marines were presented to the Senate
Committee on Military Affairs the totals were 2,216,000 men on 1
July 1946 and 1,736,000 on 1 July 1947. An average*** of these
totals indicated that the armed services were adhering to the
figure that the President had expressed on 10 January. Here
were the minimum needs of the services for 1947:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 46</td>
<td>1,550,000</td>
<td>558,000</td>
<td>108,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jul 47</td>
<td>1,070,000</td>
<td>558,000</td>
<td>108,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2,216,000

The Secretary of War appeared before the Senate Committee
on Military Affairs, 3 April, and pleaded for the continuation of
Selective Service. Mr. Patterson stated that in order to study the
strength required for 1947 he had surveyed the responsibilities
placed on the Army for that period. These responsibilities are
“part and parcel of the same emergency ... that prompted pas-
sage of the Selective Service Act in 1940. ... [the emergency] is
still with us, 6 months after cessation of active fighting. ... it will
be with us during 1946 and 1947.”72 He enumerated the seven-fold
task:

1. The occupation in Europe, Japan, and Korea.

69. Memo, OPD for Budget Officer, 16 Feb 46, sub: Strength of the Army. WDCSA
320.2 (1946) Case 55. DRB, TAG.
*All figures in thousands.
**A similar meeting was held by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 21
Mar 46.
70. See: US Senate Com on Mil Affairs, Legislative Calendar, 79th Cong., Final
Edition (No 16), p. 73 and The 4th Report of the Director of Selective Service
***An average of the totals amounts to 1,976,000.
72. Ibid., p. 118.
2. The training of new men to replace long-service men overseas.

3. The maintenance of lines of communication and supporting installations in the United States for the occupation forces.

4. The provision of forces which will be available to the United Nations Organization.

5. The maintenance of the key points in our national security structure, such as the Panama Canal, Alaska, and the air bases along the approaches to the United States.

6. The maintenance of an adequate program of intelligence and research and development.

7. The overriding requirement to preserve the peace of this country in a world which is still far from settled.\textsuperscript{73}

Secretary Patterson continued by stating that in planning strengths to carry out these missions the War Department had proceeded on a number of assumptions. These were:

We have assumed that in spite of the decrease in our forces, the occupied peoples will remain tractable; in other words, that there be increased stabilization in the occupied areas overseas.

Second, that Germany will continue to be controlled and occupied as at present in four zones . . .; and that with regard to the occupation of Japan, The British Empire, the Chinese, and the Filipinos will eventually take part . . .

Third, that to meet our manpower requirements overseas, we will continue to use civilians, foreigners . . .

Fourth, that disposal of Army surplus property will be expedited.

Fifth, that we will be relieved of occupation responsibilities in Austria and in Italy in the course of this period by the conclusion of peace treaties affecting those territories . . .

Finally, that the United Nations Organization will become increasingly effective in the maintenance of world security.\textsuperscript{74}

The Congress, refusing to be rushed into continuing the Selective Service System, took its time. There were other pressing issues which could be debated interminably to the end that consideration of politically unpalatable Selective Service could be delayed. Many lawmakers, sensing the approaching 1946 election, wondered whether voluntary enlistments might not furnish the

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., pp. 118-119.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 120.
necessary replacements to the armed services.\textsuperscript{75} Finally, having delayed and procrastinated and temporized up to the last minute, the Congress could stave off the inevitable no longer; twenty-four hours before its expiration, Selective Service was extended,* but even in this last-minute action the dose was sweetened to a degree that weakened its therapeutic value. The principal adulterous changes in the legislation reduced the age limits for induction from the previous 18 to 44 bracket to 20 to 29; provided that after 14 May no father** could be inducted without his consent; and extended the life of Selective Service for only six weeks instead of the initially recommended one year.

The reduction in the manpower availability pool and the alarmingly brief life expectancy granted by this legislation aroused the President to denounce the measure as bad. He signed it, reluctantly, only because of his expressed "conviction that conditions would be worse without it."\textsuperscript{76} Then to augment the nearly drained manpower pool, the President authorized the Secretaries of War and Navy to call upon Selective Service for the induction of men up to the age of 30.\textsuperscript{77} The action of the President thus raised the age limit for induction from 26 to the Congressional limits, a group he had previously stopped drafting in August 1945. [See Appendix XIX].

Congress reexamined the problem of extending Selective Service early in June. A group of conferees, appointed to resolve differences between the House and Senate, finally agreed, by 20 June, on a compromise. The main "bone of contention" was the minimum age for induction which the compromise had resolved at 19 years of age. The conference report was filed in both houses by the 21st of the month.

In a reply to Representative R. Ewing Thomason (D-Texas) the Secretary of War stated: that the War Department "is not endeavoring to get conscription established as a part of the permanent military policy of the Nation"; and that the War Department was conducting an intensified recruiting drive during the

\textsuperscript{75} An excellent and detailed account of this period may be obtained by reading the complete text of the \textit{Hearings} originally cited in note 71 of this chapter and the legislative history of S. 1823, S. 2057, S.J. Res 159 and H.R. 6064 in U.S. Sen Com on Mil Affairs, Legislative Calendar, 79th Cong., op. cit., pp. 58, 64 and 73 and 101-102. See also: \textit{Congressional Record}, Vol 92, Part 13 (History of Bills and Resolutions).
\textsuperscript{76} SMAC, Legislative Calendar, op. cit., p. 64.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 64.
\textsuperscript{78} For text of the report, see House Report 2319, 79th Cong.
summer; and that he had "therefore, directed that no requisitions be made on the Selective Service System for the months of July and August."* Mr. Thomason inserted the letter into the records and commented forcibly:

... It is a time to be constructive and place the welfare of our country above every other consideration. We are living in a sick and chaotic world. Communism is on the march all over Europe and in most of Asia. Our delegates, from Secretary Byrnes on down, are this minute sitting around the peace table in Paris, and we might as well be frank about it, they are not making much progress. We all long and pray for lasting peace, but we must at all times be prepared for any eventuality.

The absolute truth is, and the record will show it, that Russia today has an army of 6,000,000 men. During the past year she has drafted 1,500,000 men, including teen-agers. She has compulsory universal military service, not just training. [Reviews steps taken by Great Britain, France and Yugoslavia] ... We can take no chances. Not one peace treaty has yet been agreed upon.78

On 25 June Congress finally passed an act extending the Selective Service System for a period of nine months.** If the previous extension could be likened to a sweetened dose, surely this one was watered. The principal changes, so far as the War Department was concerned, were:

1. Age limits of liability were enlarged from the 20 to 29 limits to the 19 to 44 age bracket.

2. The number of men in the Army (active training or service) on July 1, 1946 "shall not exceed one million five hundred and fifty thousand ... this number shall be reduced consistently month by month so that the Army's strength shall not exceed one million and seventy thousand on July 1, 1947."

3. The armed services were required to consider enlistments before placing induction calls.

4. Men having either active overseas service or active service of six months could be inducted, but only with their consent.

5. A man previously inducted and having a child or children dependent on him for support, "shall, upon his request after

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*For text of SW Patterson's reply, see Appendix XXI.
78. Congressional Record, Vol 92, p. 7479.
**PL 473. 79th Cong.
August 1, 1946, be relieved from his period of training under this Act.*

6. A man was not to be considered as a part of the Army's strength if he had the following status:

   (1) on terminal leave;
   
   (2) a member of the detachment of patients to be discharged or relieved from active duty without being returned to an active duty status; or
   
   (3) being processed following completion of his period of service, for discharge or relief from active duty.

7. Limited an inductee's period of service to 18 consecutive months.

While the Selective Service extension act (PL 473, 79th Cong.) limited the Army's strength to 1.55 million on 1 July 1946 and 1.07 million on 1 July 1947, it excluded counting those on terminal leave, in process of separation, and many of those in hospitals. Moreover, there was no provision in the budget for any overstrength that might occur. The strength of the Army on 1 July 1946 totaled 1,889,690, an excess of 339,690 as provided for in the budget. The 339,690 figure did not represent a correct overstrength because a portion of this number were excluded under Public Law 473. The Deputy Chief of Staff was informed on 2 August that there was an estimated 111 thousand deductible under the provisions of the Selective Service law, thus leaving an estimated overstrength of 228,690.80

Meanwhile on 9 July the Acting Director, Personnel & Administration, WDGS, had placed a call on the Director, Selective Service System for 25 thousand men** to be inducted during September. The Director of Selective Service submitted a call, by states, for 35,200 men. Selective Service reasoned that the 35,200 figure was necessary because the Regular Army enlistments accepted in armed forces induction stations for July, August, and September were applicable toward the fulfillment of the induction call. In order to obtain a net 25 thousand total of inductees

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*In actual operation the law permitted former general prisoners, dishonorable discharge suspended or executed to not be held in service for more than 18 months, counting service before and after dishonorable discharge, exclusive of time lost under 107 AW (MCM 1948). In addition, no restored general prisoner with a dependent child or children could be held for training or service after 1 Aug 46 if he requested relief from such service.

79. STM-30. 1 Aug 47. OCMH, Gen Ref Br.


**This was later changed to 24,500.
from civil life the figure 10,200 had been added to cover enlistments.\textsuperscript{81}

Additional calls were placed on Selective Service for the months of October and November. The October requisition was given to Selective Service on 20 August.\textsuperscript{82} Before the November call was placed a number of factors were considered. In late September it became apparent that the Army would have to discharge approximately 94,000 one-year enlistees by 31 December. For the remainder of the fiscal year the discharge rate would be accelerated because of the policy of including terminal leave in the enlisted man's normal tour of duty.

Induction calls totaling 59,500 had been placed for September and October and of this number the War Department would probably receive a total of 30 thousand. At the same time volunteer enlistments should approach a 55 thousand figure. The Army calculated it would need 265 thousand additional enlisted persons to reach an effective strength of 1.07 million by 1 July 1947. However, experience had shown that the War Department could only plan on 150 thousand enlistments during this period. Therefore 115 thousand men would have to be inducted between 1 November and 31 March 1947, the date of Selective Service expiration. Based on this reasoning the Deputy Chief of Staff, 23 September, approved a November call of 15 thousand.\textsuperscript{83} In less than a month these calls were cancelled.

The Army had accomplished almost the impossible by enlisting in excess of 1 million men* between 1 September 1945 and the first week of October 1946.\textsuperscript{84} Largely as a result of this and the fact that the Army hoped to reduce its size to 1.31 million by 31 December, the induction call for October was cancelled as of the 15th of that month and the November requisition was also withdrawn. Selective Service was notified that no December call would be placed.\textsuperscript{85}

In early December the War Department was nearing the halfway mark in achieving the reduction to the 1.07 million strength.


\textsuperscript{82} Memo, Maj Gen Paul for Dir SS, 20 Aug 46, sub: Proc of EM for the Army during Oct 46. WDGPA 327 (13 Jun 46). G-1 Cur File.

\textsuperscript{83} S/S, Maj Gen Paul for C/S, 20 Sep 46, sub: Nov 46 Induction Call. WDGPA 327 (13 Jun 46). G-1 Cur File.

\textsuperscript{*}Congress had, in late June, passed PL 474 (79th Cong.) raising the pay of various members of the armed services. This measure combined with the many advantages of the "GI Bill of Rights" served as added inducements to voluntarily enlist.

\textsuperscript{84} TAG, MPPS, Hist Report 15 Aug 45-15 Sep 47, op. cit., p. 6. OCMH, Gen Ref Br.

At the same time planners had to consider the problem of calling on Selective Service for January inductions. The basis on which draft calls were determined was the difference between the required and authorized strengths of the Army and the success of the Military Procurement Service in meeting these requirements. There were other variables such as the effect of discharge criteria. These factors prevented the General Staff from accurately ascertaining the expected strength to be obtained on 31 December. After studying the elements of the problem and wishing to comply with the spirit of the Selective Service Act, the AC of S, G-1, notified the Director of Selective Service that no call would be placed for January 1946.86

The War Department finished the calendar year of 1946 with a total strength of 1,319,483 as compared with its target of 1,310,000. As far as the Selective Service Act was concerned, 155,246 of the total strength could be classed as non-effective personnel.87 In further reducing to the 1.07 million strength by 30 June an additional factor appeared on the scene, the forthcoming preparations for the 1948 fiscal year budget.

In January 1947 a new Congress convened. The 80th was a Republican Congress—the first since the Seventy-First had expired on 3 March 1931. The Chief Executive no longer represented the party in the majority. His budget recommendations would undergo the closest examination. After consultations between the President, the State Department, and the War Department it was decided that the War Department plan for the coming fiscal year would be based upon a force of 1.07 million. However, the Bureau of the Budget required the Army to absorb approximately 80 thousand non-effective individuals within the 1.07 million ceiling.88

The Chief of Staff decided not to place further calls on Selective Service during its current extension ending 31 March 1947. The decision, made on 14 January, was principally based on the reason that the military establishment had to reduce to the 1.07 million figure by 30 June.89 General Eisenhower emphasized that “we must take drastic action” to stay within the “Pay of the Army”

86. Memo, G-1 for Dir SS, 5 Dec 46, sub: Draft Call for Jan 47. WDGPA 327 (13 Jun 46). G-1 Cur File.
87. STM-30, 1 Jan 47 and 1 Aug 47. OCMH, Gen Ref Br.
89. See Eisenhower's notes on Memo, Brig Gen A. G. Trudeau for C/S, 14 Jan 47, sub: Manpower Requirements, WDGPA. CSUSA 320.2 (14 Jan 47), Case 34. DRB, TAG. The memo was prefaced: “The conference on the above subject held Monday, 13 January 1947, pointed up several problems on which further action should be taken. Your decisions are requested to these questions and suggested answers.”
budget for the balance of the fiscal year. If necessary, G-1 should “release inductees with 1 yrs. service” and “Release RA [Regular Army]—EM [Enlisted Men] nearing discharge.” The Chief of Staff indicated his decisions by making pencil notations on a G-1 memorandum which had concluded with these recommendations:

... If Selective Service is accepted as dead, let's release all inductees by 30 June 1947. There are about 100,000 left of whom 80,000 would go between July and December, 1947, anyway. This will definitely get us to 1,070,000, but we can’t wait long to get out instructions as we must be close to 1,070,000 strength by 1 April 1947 to stay within the budget.90

The End of World War II Demobilization

The reduction of the Army to a 1.07 million strength presented a number of problems, chief of which was the question: where could the reductions be accomplished. The Chief of Staff held a meeting on 7 February for the purpose of discussing the facts concerning the strength dilemma. The Directors of Organization and Training, Service Supply and Procurement, and Plans and Operations; a representative of the Director of Personnel and Administration; and the head of the Chief of Staff’s Advisory Group were present. Following a presentation of the problem by the Director, Plans and Operations, the Chief of Staff decided that:

a. The Army would be reduced to the 1.07 million strength.

b. “The reduction would be accomplished as promptly as possible, consistent with military and logistical requirements and in an orderly manner.”

c. The total strength of overseas commands (other than Air) would not be reduced by 30 June.

d. The program for the 1948 fiscal year must be determined by 1 July 1947, “taking into consideration developments and changes in requirements as of that date.”91

General Eisenhower’s decision to not reduce overseas ground strengths necessitated a further examination of authorized strengths of the Army Air Forces (world-wide) and those of the zone of the interior. The Director, Organization and Training, restudied the problem and recommended that 30 June 1947 strengths be deployed as follows:

90. Ibid.
91. Report of meeting in C/S’s Ofc atched as Tab “B” to S/S, O&T to C/S, 13 Feb 47, sub: Deployment. WDGOT 370.01 (13 Feb 47). At the meeting it was also accepted that approximately 25 million dollars would be needed as a deficiency appropriation for “Pay of the Army.” WDCSA 370.01 (1947) Case 2. DRB, TAG.
**TRANSITION TO A LENGTH OF SERVICE POLICY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ARMY AIR FORCES (world-wide)</td>
<td>364,000*</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZONE OF INTERIOR (other than Air)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZI operating</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Reserve on ZI operating requirements</td>
<td>33,000</td>
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<td>General Reserve Task Force</td>
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<td>Pipeline (other than Air)</td>
<td>90,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Effective (other than Air)</td>
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<td><strong>Total ZI (other than Air)</strong></td>
<td>356,000</td>
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<td>War Department Operating Reserve</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL DEPLOYMENT</strong></td>
<td>1,070,000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes all AAF pipe lines and Non-Effectives.

**This was a reserve in training. Its main units were: 1 Armored Combat Command, 1 Infantry Division (less 1 Regimental Combat Team (RCT)), and 1 Airborne Division (less 1 RCT).

The O&T deployments had been obtained by reducing strength allocations to the Army Air Forces and the General Reserve. The AAF authorizations were not only reduced from 401,362 to 364,000 but this command had to absorb its world-wide non-effective strength. Zone of interior operating had been augmented by placing 56 thousand of the General Reserve's allocation on zone of the interior operating requirements. Thus, the total actual General Reserve was to consist of an authorized 30,000 strength.* The Chief of Staff approved the deployments on 17 February.93

After consulting the Secretaries of War and Navy the President sent a message to Congress on 3 March 1947 in which he notified them of his decision "not [to] recommend extension of the . . . [Selective Service Act] at this time." He stated his reasons:

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* The reader should bear in mind that as a general rule actual strengths seldom equal authorized strengths. Although the AAF had lost approximately 35 thousand authorizations O&T had predicted that Air strength on 1 July 47 would be about 335 thousand. Similarly the assigned strength of the General Reserve was not expected to be the authorized 30 thousand.

92. See Tab "C" Ibid.
93. Stamp of approval on S/S, O&T to C/S, 13 Feb 47, cited in n. 91.
Personnel losses from the Army through separation during fiscal year 1948 can be computed with a reasonable degree of accuracy. They will reach a total of 360,000, or an average of 30,000 per month. Gains, on the other hand, cannot be so accurately determined. A recruiting campaign for volunteers for the Army was initiated in September 1945, but shortages in recruiting have heretofore forced the War Department to fill the gap through Selective Service. The last 2 months of 1946 provided an average of 18,000 recruits per month. During January 1947, however, they arose to some 35,000 enlistments and during the first 2 weeks of February were about 13,000. Giving weight to the fact that past records prove January to be the best recruiting month of the year, it is estimated by the War Department that if present effort to obtain volunteers are continued, it can count with a fair degree of certainty on an average of 20,000 enlistments and reenlistments per month during the coming fiscal year. If only 20,000 recruits per month are obtained, the deficit in required strength will be about 120,000 by July 1, 1948. However, there is a reasonable expectation that better results may be obtained.

The War Department is now engaged in reducing the Army to the strength 1,070,000 on June 30, 1947, provided for in the budget. In effecting this reduction it will shortly direct the discharge of all nonvolunteers.

The Navy Department is also reducing the Navy to the strength provided for in the budget for the next fiscal year...

The Army and the Navy are still reducing their forces, and the Army is not using inductees for the full term the law allows; consequently, an extension of selective service at this time would be solely on the basis of predicted shortages during the next year. With a recent brightening in recruiting prospects this appears to be the logical time to shoulder the risks involved.94

* * * * * * * * *

The President concluded by stating that he had made the decision not to recommend extension, "but with the understanding that—"

First, the War and Navy Departments will request the reenactment* of a Selective Service Act at a later date if they are unable to maintain... [their authorized strengths] through voluntary enlistments.

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94. Taken verbatim from the Congressional Record, Vol 93, p. 1682. See also: H. Doc 162, 79th Cong., for text.

*Following the Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia (March 1948) the President appeared before the Congress on 17 March 1948 and recommended immediate legislation authorizing universal military training and/or to reinstate a selective service system. See US Sen Com on Armed Services Hearings: "Universal Military Training," Mar 17-Apr 1, 1948 and Sen Report 1440, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
Second, the Army and Navy be authorized from appropriated funds to employ temporarily the necessary civilian personnel over and above those specifically authorized and appropriated for by the Congress to the extent necessary to balance any shortage of enlisted personnel when strength may fall below the required levels.95

Immediately following the receipt of the President's message by the Congress, the Chief of the Manpower Group, Personnel and Administration Division, GSUSA, authorized sending a cable that directed the separation of all non-volunteer enlisted personnel by 30 June 1947.96 The message had originally been intended for dispatch on 10 February but it had been held in abeyance until the President announced his decision not to request extension of selective service.

The Army completed its demobilization on 30 June 1947 with the discharge of the last non-volunteers.* The total strength of the military establishment on 1 July 1947 was 989,664.97 The effective strength was only 925,163.** General Eisenhower and his commanders had succeeded in reducing the Army to its authorized 1.07 million. True, the demobilization was over but its effects continued.

95. Ibid.
96. WCL 26052, 3 Mar 47. WDGPA 370.01 (10 Jun 46) Part V. G-1 Cur rle.
*Personnel undergoing medical care or hospitalization were separated after disposition of their cases.
97. STM 30, 1 Aug 47.
**Total strength 989,664, minus 74,501 non-effectives equals 925,163. STM 30, 1 Jul 47 and 1 Aug 47.
CHAPTER V
THE EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II
PERSONNEL DEMOBILIZATION

Introduction

The reduction of United States military and naval forces following cessation of hostilities in World War II affected many phases of American life. Primarily, it permitted millions of men and women in uniform to resume civilian pursuits. Many returned to the quiet and comfort of their homes, others relocated in new communities, while thousands remained in hospitals, the aftermath of war. The impact of the demobilization was also felt in colleges and universities, in the Veterans Administration, and especially in the national economy. These effects will not be discussed in this work but the study of any or all should prove a challenging task to future historians.

The remainder of this chapter will deal more specifically with the major results of Army demobilization after the surrender of Germany and Japan in May and September 1945. By 1951 there is still no single standard that can be used to objectively measure the effects of demobilization. However, there are various indications and trends that can be used to show the consequences.

Strength Reduction

When the Army began the partial demobilization of its air, ground, and service forces on 12 May 1945 it consisted of approximately 8,290,000 individuals; as of 1 September 1945 its total strength was approximately 8,020,000; and by the end of 1945 this strength had been reduced to 4,228,936. At the end of the fiscal year 1946 the total 1,889,690 represented a decrease of 6,133,614 in the nine-month period that followed V-J Day, but the huge decline in over-all strength had begun to subside into a more gradual decrease. At the end of World War II demobilization on 30 June 1947 the total strength was 989,664 of which the effective strength was only 925,163.1 Chart II gives an indication of the rapid loss of total military personnel during the period of its greatest decline.

1. STM-30, 1 Jul and 1 Aug 47. OCMH. Total strength 989,664 minus 74,501 non-effectives equals 925,163. The statistics in the context may be subject to future correction, but are believed to be the most accurate compilation available in 1951.
Decline of Combat Effectiveness

As demobilization progressed, the decline of combat effectiveness was not in proportion to the reduction in total strength. Rather, it diminished at a progressively faster rate than the members of military personnel decreased. By the Fall and Winter of 1945–1946 the armies and the air forces that had been victorious in Europe and in the Pacific were no longer a closely integrated military machine, but rather had disintegrated to little more than large groups of individual replacements.

Shortly after the surrender of Japan the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made an estimate of American military position as it existed at that time, 9 October 1945, “... a year or more would be required to reconstitute our military position at a fraction of its recent power.” The JSSC recommended that the JCS direct the Joint Staff Planners to examine “... our present and prospective capabilities....” The recommendations of the JSSC were informally approved by the JCS on 15 October 1945.2

The Joint Staff Planners proceeded to prepare an estimate of the military capabilities of the United States armed forces at that time and for the end of the 1946 fiscal year. The Commanding Generals of Army Forces in the Pacific and in Europe were asked to assist in the preparation of the study and submitted their estimates of military capabilities to the War Department. A memorandum which reflected the views of the Pacific and European Commanders was then prepared for the Army Chief of Staff. This communication revealed the swift and disintegrating effects of World War II demobilization as of 15 November 1945. The European Commander further estimated that in an offensive his troops, ground (including service) and air “could operate in an emergency for a limited period at something less than 50% normal wartime efficiency.” European ground troops could operate somewhat better in a defensive situation but this was not true of air units. General Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff was reported as having said that “This estimate is frankly optimistic, based on assumptions themself optimistic, and does not consider morale and fighting spirit, which he ... [believed to be] lacking.”3 General MacArthur’s Pacific ground forces (including four Marine divisions) were estimated as being able to operate both offensively and defensively “at something more than 50% normal wartime efficiency except in amphibious operations.” Supporting air elements “could operate at something less than 50% efficiency.”4

2. JCS 1545, 9 Oct 45. ABC 384 UN (14 Jul 44) 1-C. DRB, TAG.
3. Memo, JEH (Hull) for C/S, 21 Nov 45, sub: Combat Efficiency. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
Chart II - Strength of the Army
31 August 1945 - 30 April 1947*

* Includes Air Force
Source: Strength of the Army (STM-30)
Additional estimates of what Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur believed that their combat effectiveness would be as of 30 June 1946 were received by the War Department. These were based on optimistic assumptions that did not materialize and were so inaccurate that they do not warrant discussion. In early September 1946 the Plans and Operations Division, WDGS, using data supplied by General MacArthur and his subordinate commanders estimated that the combat efficiency of all Army units (ground and air) in the Pacific was approximately 25%. This percentage of effectiveness may well be used as a liberal criteria of the combat efficiency of the Army during the last months of the demobilization.

Effects on Air, Ground, and Service Units

Commanders in the field were the first to feel the consequences of the rapid demobilization. This was particularly true of the Army Air Forces. Early in October 1945 the Deputy Commander of the Continental Air Forces, Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, courageously wrote the Commanding General, Army Air Forces an accurate account of what was happening in the AAF:

I realize that with the many problems which confront you and your headquarters daily it is quite possible that the implications of what is happening to the AAF today would become clear in the field much sooner than it would in higher headquarters. Accordingly, I feel that my remarks in connection with what is actually happening to our Air Forces under the impact of our national hysteria to demobilize might be apropos.

It is clearly apparent that the emphasis on demobilization has served to obscure the fact that we will have soon reached a point, if it has not been reached, at which the Army Air Forces can no longer be considered anything more than a symbolic instrument of National Defense [Italics author's]. . . . Our Zone of Interior potential, because of the "willy-nilly" discharge of trained maintenance specialists and key men, is rapidly becoming impotent to provide anything in the form of units approaching the combat capacity which would be required in the event of any emergency. The attitude of Russia, if gleaned from no other source than the newspapers, should serve to jar any complacency we might now have as to a final and entirely satisfactory settlement of the Peace.

My chief concern, therefore, arises from the fact that, although we have gone overboard to demobilize the Army under

5. See P&O file ABC 320.2 (3-13-43) TAB 521/23. DRB, TAG.
a system which to me is not only unsound but positively dangerous, we are not coppering our bets. . . . We will have a potpourri of warm bodies inadequately seasoned by too few regular army officers and enlisted men. The basic structure of what has been our Air Force will have dissipated.

I think we have gone beyond the point where even though we stem the tide of demobilization in the interest of retaining some semblance of a balanced military organization the action will not be politically or psychologically practicable. The only alternative, therefore, would seem to be the immediate reinstatement of our training system to prepare the men who are going to be left with us for the job that we are going to expect of them.

I realize that I am probably beating a broken drum that the tide of demobilization cannot be stemmed, and that legislation will be required to offer the future people of the Air Forces a new charter with certain security for the future, but I feel that you should know of the picture that is rapidly being painted before our eyes here in the Continental Air Forces.6

Although the Deputy Continental Air Commander warned of the danger in connection with national policy, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, General H. H. Arnold, treated the matter primarily as a problem of flying safety, training, and maintenance. General Arnold referred the problem to his Deputy, Lt. Gen. I. C. Eaker, with this comment: "I am also very disturbed over the trend we are now following in connection with demobilization. . . . One thing I am certain is that we should do some very, very careful planning and extensive thinking about this whole matter, not only maintenance but also other phases of it, in order to secure a satisfactory solution with the least delay."7 He also sent a personal memorandum to the Chief of Staff on 16 October 1945 voicing objection to the demobilization program, particularly that pertaining to a two-year discharge policy.* However, an answer to Arnold's memorandum was not dispatched until 5 December 1945.8

The results of the rapid demobilization were felt throughout the Army Air Forces (AAF) which later became the United States Air Force (USAF). General Carl Spaatz, second Commanding General of the AAF and the first Chief of Staff of the USAF, aptly presented the consequences of the too-rapid demobilization

6. Ltr, Maj Gen St. Clair Streett to Gen H. H. Arnold, 8 Oct 45, no sub. Cy in author's file. See also Ltr, Streett to Ward, 6 Apr 51, no sub. HIS 350.05 (6 Apr 51). OCMH.
8. For a detailed discussion, see p. 236 and note 18 of Chapter IV.
8. See Context of Chapter IV that is documented by note 18.
in a report to the Secretary of the Air Forces dated 30 June 1948. Spaatz stated that by the end of 1945 "such drastic reductions had been accomplished that overseas commanders had insufficient personnel to carry out the responsibilities assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Speaking of the shortage of replacements, he said "... In January 1946 basic training had to be reduced from thirteen to eight weeks in order to speed up the retarded flow of personnel into technical training installations." Reporting more specifically on the reduction of the Air Force, he stated:

The loss of personnel, with consequent effect on the training organization and on the availability of men trained for aircraft maintenance, had inevitable impact on the units that comprised the AAF. On V-J Day there were 218 effective combat groups. By the end of 1945 rapid deactivation had reduced their number to 109.

The halving of the V-J Day Air Force in a four-month period meant far more than a halving of its strength. During the confusion of the rapid disintegration of the Air Force no accurate reports of operational efficiency were rendered, but it is certain that few of the 109 groups could have been effective. A year later the Air Force had been reduced to 55 groups, and operational efficiency reports were disturbing: only 2 groups were effective. During the first six months of 1947 some progress was made along the road back toward an Air Force adequate for its peacetime mission. By 30 June the Air Force had 11 effective groups, and the reactivation of 15 groups brought the total to 70, although many existed in a little more tangible form than a Headquarters record.

The system of demobilization caused huge turnovers of officers and men in the ground divisional units retained during the demobilization period. There was a constant shuffling of men in and out of organizations with many divisions being used as "clearing houses" for personnel. The famed 1st Cavalry Division was a typical example of this and was "handicapped by the rapid decrease in both officer and enlisted personnel due to the speedy re-adjustment program." By the end of May 1947 all non-volunteers had left the division and the demobilization was over. The division AC of S, G–1, made the following report of the accessions

10. Ibid., p. 11.
11. Ibid., p. 13.
12. 1st Cav Div Opns Rpt, Jan 46. DRB, TAG.
and losses the organization encountered during the demobilization period beginning 1 July 1945 and ending 31 May 1947:

PERSONNEL TURNOVER IN DEMOBILIZATION PERIOD, 1st CAVALRY DIVISION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Redeployment Losses</td>
<td>1675</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34,396</td>
<td>36,111</td>
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<tr>
<td>Replacement Accessions</td>
<td>2143</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37,134</td>
<td>39,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Turnover</td>
<td>3818</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71,530</td>
<td>75,411</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The grand total of 75,411 personnel changes, both losses and accessions, tells the story of the disintegrating effects of demobilization on ground units.

The demobilization was quickly felt in technical service type units that were organic components of combat divisions. Less than one month after V-J Day units of this type in the 88th Division were unable to perform their missions so far as a reasonable degree of proficiency was concerned. A few excerpts gleaned from the G-4 section of its operational report give an indication of the effects of individual demobilization on the technical service activities of the division during September 1945. "... The 313th Engineer Battalion, due to redeployment, was cut down to eight Officers, and fifty-six Enlisted Men. ..." The organic ordnance company "was reduced to a strength of eighteen (18) men for the most of the month" thus making it "impossible to operate a 3rd Echelon shop." The division signal company was so reduced by the redeployment of high-score personnel that "Enlisted men were transferred from infantry units to the ... company in order to keep communications operating at division headquarters." Even by the end of January 1946 "there were only five officers in the [signal] company who had been with ... [that unit] more than two months; three of them were due to leave in February.  

Demobilization as it affected ordnance activities was typical of the conditions existing in technical service units and organizations both in the zone of interior and in overseas commands. Ordnance personnel were discharged in such numbers that by 1 December 1945 practically every overseas commander had reported immediate need for technically trained ordnance replacements. For

13. Ibid., May 47, G-1 annex.
14. 88th Div Opns Rpt, G-4 Hist Rpt, Sep 45. 388-4 (9789) Opns Rpts, TAG. DRB, TAG.
15. Ibid., Jan 46.
example, the American commander in the Mediterranean stated his urgent requirement for trained soldiers for technical services: ... Redeployment of trained ordnance technicians, both commissioned and enlisted, has placed ordnance in such a position that we do not have sufficient technically qualified individuals to supervise. ... So acute is the problem that on the job training cannot be conducted. ... As an example of the depleted technical personnel the 605th Ordnance Base Armament Bn will, in a few days, have only a commanding officer and five second lieuts. The second lieuts not only are carrying on insofar as is physically possible, the shop operations, but also administrative duties as company commanders in addition to placing a tremendous burden and responsibility far beyond the physical capabilities of the officers. They are inexperienced in shop work and in company administration. The battalion commander has no exec, no shop officer, no supply officer, and no maintenance officer. The example cited is typical of the ordnance position now in Italy and it is prevalent in the maintenance supply and ammunition organizations.16

In addition to the rapid return of technically qualified men to civilian life the situation existing in service troops and organizations was attributable to a shortage of trained replacements. This dearth of trained manpower could be traced to a number of contributing factors. Selective Service requirements had been reduced to 50,000 men per month but even that number could not be furnished. Several basic training centers were eliminated and some technical services were required to give inductees basic training before they could be trained technically. Training centers were authorized to keep up to 20 percent of their output as replacements for loss of high score personnel. Lastly, requisitions made on training centers for various zone of interior organizations resulted in large numbers of men being assigned before they had completed technical training. For example, during the period 17 September through 16 November 1945 a total of 886 men were withdrawn from the Ordnance Training Center before they completed training and given the following assignments:

49 to Counter Intelligence Corps
300 to Military District of Washington
282 to New York Port of Embarkation
177 to Service Command Activities
68 to Red River Ordnance Depot for packaging activities
10 to Contract Terminations Services17

16. See incl to study "Utilization of Manpower," 7 Dec 45. WDGPA 370.01 (3 Nov 45) 18 Dec 45. DRB, TAG.
17. Ibid.
Also contributing to this lowering of efficiency in air, ground, and service units was an Army-wide general let-down in morale and responsibility. General Eisenhower, shortly after he became Chief of Staff, expressed particular concern over the morale situation existing in the Army, and he told those gathered at the 3 December 1945 staff and command conference:

... We know, for example, that many of our troubles in the theaters and, I have no doubt, here at home, arise from that fact that great groups of officers, nearly all of them citizen soldiers (since we didn't have many regulars at the battalion and company levels), are just as anxious to go home as is the GI. In many instances they have just quit. Our own efforts, directed through commanders of all sorts, ought to be shaped so as to restore the sense of responsibility and the morale of these officers. Through personal inspections I have encountered this demoralized attitude very, very definitely—a major saying, 'What the hell, I want to go home. What can you do to me? You can Class B me and throw me out.' and that is what he wants. So I think that all of us recognize that this situation does exist in many instances, and that it's a perfectly normal and human feeling as an aftermath of war; but if we can restore morale and responsibility among that group, I think it will greatly lessen the troubles we are having in the enlisted group.¹⁸

One sentence taken from the testimony of General Eisenhower before the House Committee on Military Affairs, 22 January 1946, sums up the effect of World War II demobilization. He was asked why an over-all Army of 1.5 million was needed on 1 July 1946 and replied as follows:

Under the point system, most of our noncommissioned officers, our specialists, have gone out, and units that we call units, are really [not units]—they are capable only of the limited jobs that we now give them, and in the technical services they are not capable of that.¹⁹

**Effect on Munitions**

The rapid dismantling of forces directly affected the supply, maintenance, and storage of munitions. The World War II system of individual demobilization usually made those in charge of supply and maintenance activities one of the earliest groups to be

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¹⁸. See Eisenhower policy in OPD 008 ABC (22 Nov 43) Case 20. DRB, TAG. Copies of the C/S's remarks were prepared as memo for all Gen and Spec Staffs, 10 Dec 45, sub: Responsibilities of Staff Officers: Scope, Approach and Execution. ¹⁹. Ibid.
eligible for discharge consideration. The administrative personnel of units suffered less casualties than those who served in close combat, and as a result there was very little turnover in the administrative type of jobs while there was large-scale replacement of soldiers among riflemen, ammunition handlers, reconnaissance personnel, etc. After the defeat of Japan, if men were eligible for discharge consideration, they were demobilized and those soldiers that remained in the unit took care of the equipment as best they could. Maj. Gen. J. M. Gavin, former commander of the 82d Airborne Division which was one of the principal ground units in the strategic reserve during World War II demobilization, forcibly related, "Only those present in units at the time will know the disastrous effects of the demobilization program on supply and maintenance activities. Before we were through officers were performing the duties of mechanics and everybody was doing what they could to save the situation. . . ." Maj. Gen. Roscoe B. Woodruff, commander of I Corps during demobilization stated, "... maintenance became increasingly difficult. This was painfully apparent when units were actually inactivated. It was out of the question for the limited personnel available to adequately prepare, even for temporary storage, the tremendous amounts of material in their commands. This was particularly true of weapons and motor transport." General Carl Spaatz in his 30 June 1948 report related the crippling effects of demobilization on supply and maintenance activities of the Army Air Forces. He not only told what happened to munitions that were in the hands of troops but also gave an indication of the wastage of material that should have reverted to war reserves:

The demobilization of highly trained technicians and the gradual but progressive disorganization of the AAF drastically affected aircraft maintenance and the consequent serviceability of aircraft. Airplanes were stranded in all parts of the globe for lack of maintenance personnel to repair them. Thousands of reparable engines, bombsights, guns, and instruments ceased to flow through maintenance shops. Serviceable and even new aircraft, equipment and matériel were left to deteriorate for lack of personnel to prepare them for storage.

By 31 October 1946 the world-wide readiness of first-line combat aircraft had dropped to 18 percent, and maintenance personnel had declined to 8 percent of the number available in
January 1945. . . But one prefers not to speculate on what might have happened only one year after V-J Day, when the combat readiness of AAF first-line planes had dropped very low, if our Air Force had been called upon to resist a new aggression or to suppress a recurrence of combat activity from an uncontrolled element in one of the occupied countries.\textsuperscript{22} [Italics author's]

In December 1945 and January 1946 the Overseas Subcommittee of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (the "Meade Committee")\textsuperscript{*} made a world-wide inquiry into surplus property. During the investigation the subcommittee heard various statements that indicated the effects of personnel demobilization on munitions located in large commands. On 13 January 1946 the AC of S, G-4, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, testified, "... we do not have the skilled or experienced personnel or the manpower to thoroughly go over a piece of equipment, coat it with thin film greases or similar pre-

\textsuperscript{22} Report of the Chief of Staff USAF . . . 30 Jun 48, op. cit., p. 11.

*Earlier in the war this committee had been referred to as the "Truman Committee."
servatives and place it in a condition for continued storage....”\textsuperscript{23}
Later in the same month the Ordnance Officer of the Service Forces in the European Theater explained how surplus vehicles in poor mechanical condition were transferred to the State Department’s Foreign Liquidation Commission. A Senator questioned, “Do you have mechanics to put them in good condition if you have the parts?” The ordnance officer replied:

We do not at the present time. The personnel of all technical branches had high points. That is due to the fact that combat personnel had a rapid turn-over of personnel through casualties, and so forth. As a result at cessation of hostilities, a great many of the soldiers and officers in technical services had high points and were discharged in large blocks for which we have received no replacements.\textsuperscript{24}

In answer to another question he later said:

... We have insufficient covered storage to store all supplies. Present deterioration of equipment stored in the open, artillery, vehicles, tanks, and so forth, is serious. Due to the speed of redeployment, much equipment was received by Ordnance parks unprepared for storage. The parks themselves were unable to properly prepare it. ... \textsuperscript{25}

The Commanding General of the United States Air Forces in Europe submitted a special report to the Senate subcommittee. One part of the report stated:

The main difficulty in the supply field experienced now and since V-E Day has been the shortage of personnel to adequately move, segregate, store and maintain our supplies and equipment. ... it has put the Command considerably behind in the salvage of combat aircraft and spares and it prevents the placing of disposable aircraft in best sellable condition. Only limited quantities of sellable aircraft can be kept ready for flight and demonstration and the balance must be placed in storage. ... \textsuperscript{26}

The hasty demobilization tremendously impeded the efforts of the Foreign Liquidation Commission to dispose of surplus munitions in overseas areas. This agency was greatly handicapped by “upset political and economic conditions” in many areas where the surpluses were located. This hindrance was “perhaps outweighed by the redeployment of troops ... and the rapid demobilization ... after V-J Day.”\textsuperscript{27}

Here are the views of a Foreign Liquidation

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\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., pp. 20192-93.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., pp. 20194-95.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., See Exhibit 146, p. 20707.
\textsuperscript{27} Dept. of State, The Printed History of Foreign Surplus Disposal (MS). Vol III, Pt I, Ch VI. Dept of State, Lend-Lease and Property Staff of the Office of Financial and Development Policy.
Commission historian on some of the results of the World War II system of demobilization:

The Army-Navy 'point system' used in establishing priority for return of troops automatically sent back to the United States the more experienced and technical personnel who had the qualifications for preparing inventories accurate enough to be useful. . . . This shortage of trained personnel due to demobilization remained one of the most serious handicaps faced by the . . . [Foreign Liquidation Commission] in its disposal operations.

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The well formulated 'roll-up plan,' [in the Pacific] which envisaged moving supplies to bases close to the Services and suitable markets, was an excellent one, but the rapid depletion of armed forces created such difficulty that it was never carried out except to a very limited extent.28

**Effects on Semi-Military Functions**

The execution of semimilitary duties has always been a frequent mission of the military in peacetime. For many years the Army has furnished assistance when disasters such as floods, fires, and earthquakes have ravaged large areas; in the 1930's the military was in charge of the operation of the Civilian Conservation Corps. During World War II demobilization the Army occupational units, in addition to demobilizing and demilitarizing the enemies' military and naval potential, had to be ready to suppress any disturbances, riots, or insurrections that might occur. The effectiveness of occupational units became dangerously low because of rapid application of the system of demobilization. One corps located in Japan reported that by the end of 1945 the shortage of trained soldiers "became so acute that the units could no longer be rated as 'Excellent' . . ."29 Many of the replacements sent to units were not interested in their new organization and wanted most of all to return to the United States. One division commander said, "Most of the replacements had seen little or no combat, were young and lacking in discipline and the sense of responsibility required of American soldiers."30 Another division commander said the system of individual demobilization made it "... very difficult to perform our occupation mission in Japan.

28. Ibid.
29. IX Corps Ops Rpt, Oct 45. 209-0.3 (20112) Ops Rpts. DRB, TAG.
30. Questionnaire, Maj Gen Clift Andrus, 24 Jan 51. HIS 350.05 (22 Jan 51) Spec Stu Demob. OCMH.
It was a constant fight to have a well-disciplined unit capable of performing efficient guard duty. I was very much concerned about the division's combat efficiency in case of a large riot or insurrection."31

In many instances civil affairs and military government in overseas areas were administered by officers and men in the American Army. The most urgent need for military government personnel and units came after the cessation of hostilities when the homeland of the enemy was occupied. Military personnel assigned to military government and civil affairs accumulated points the same as others in uniform and large numbers of these specialists were demobilized at the very time they were most needed. At the beginning of August 1945 approximately 7 percent of all enlisted men assigned to military government units in the Third Army Zone of Occupation in Bavaria were eligible for immediate discharge consideration. As discharge criteria were lowered, more and more men became eligible. By the time that hostilities had ceased in the Pacific approximately 25 percent of the officers assigned to these units in Bavaria had sufficient points for return to an inactive status.32 At the same time, when practically all of Northern Italy was under the governmental control of the Allied Commission, "The efficiency of military administration was ... rapidly decreased by the reduction of staffs due to the release of experienced personnel who were required..."33

In 1946 a Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, United States Senate (Meade Committee), held a series of hearings, in executive session, on the subject of military government in Germany. Maj. Gen. O. P. Echols, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, appeared before the committee on 5 April 1946. He had been an assistant to Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Deputy Governor, United States Military Government in Germany. General Echols was asked a number of questions relative to personnel problems in military government. Although his answers more specifically pertained to the situation as it was in Germany they generally describe how demobilization affected military government in other occupied areas. General Echols stated:

... that personnel picture ... is badly confused as a result of redeployment. As you know, when they trained these people,
we didn't expect to lick the Japanese until the end of the year and the things were pretty well plotted and planned on that basis. . . . When Japan quit in August every man in the Army got the idea it was time for him to come home. As a result of that, we lost a lot of our good trained military government officers.

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. . . The most difficult problem in connection with all of this redeployment thing is continuity. I call up Frankfurt, and complain about something one day, and the man says, 'You can't expect anything when the fellow that dictates the letter is never here to sign it.' . . .

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A new man would come in, and he would do the same work that the other fellow did, and by the time he could do something on his own he disappeared and another man took his place. That happened time and time again. . . .

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I had specific cases of people whom I took over there [Germany]; they begged me to take them over. They had been there 4 months and when V-J Day cracked they came around with an identical story that a big job was offered to them, that the wife was sick, and I looked at that fellow for a month and I felt I was going to kill him if I had to look at him for another day. I didn't want him around.34

The original plan for the trial of Japanese war criminals provided for ten war crimes courts, but this number was not reached until June 1947. Only a small number of cases could be tried at one time because of the "Inability of the prosecution to supply prepared cases in quantity. [One of the major factors contributing to this was] . . . the rapid turnover of personnel during the Army redeployment and readjustment program. . . ."35

A Soviet-American conference met at Seoul, Korea beginning 16 January 1946 for the purpose of considering problems affecting both North and South Korea and establishing coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States and Soviet commanders. During the period 6 to 16 January 1946 unrest among American soldiers over demobilization policies was at its height. This condition of unrest was present among Amer-

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35. Eighth Army, 10th Info & Hist Unit, War Crimes Trials. (MS), p. 8. File 8-5.4-AA12. OCMH.
ican troops in Korea as well as among those stationed in other parts of the world. The United States Commander in Korea, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, was reported to have commented at the beginning of the conference that “they (the Russians) would take great pleasure in our embarrassment and unwillingness to continue as soldiers.” When the meeting ended the results were disappointing to the United States representatives in that no settlement was reached on major issues.

**National Policy and Security**

The failure to positively integrate demobilization plans with those of national policy was evident at the beginning of the period of partial demobilization and redeployment that followed the defeat of Germany. On 25 May 1945 the American Ambassador to Italy, Alexander C. Kirk, sent a strong protest to the Department of State on the publicity that was being given to the reduction and withdrawal of American forces in Europe. Ambassador Kirk pointed out there were elements in Europe that were seeking to destroy the Allied victory. He warned that United States' withdrawals should be slower and scored the importance of American military strength in Europe and its effect on the implementation of foreign policy. This warning was soon followed by another cabled report to the Secretary of State which this time was sent in the name of the American Ambassador to France. The report, like Kirk's, stated that there was concern in diplomatic and military circles over the publicity given to American withdrawals from Europe which publicity further weakened the United States diplomatic position. The cable suggested that the matter be taken up with the War Department in order to avoid the publicity. It was evident that there was a lack of understanding regarding what was being done in the way of partial demobilization and redeployment.

The first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London in September and early October 1945. This meeting ended in almost total failure so far as the United States' position was concerned because of the uncompromising attitude of Soviet Russia. At the London meeting the Soviet representatives showed

36. *History of Occupation of Korea.* (MS), Ch IV, Pt II, p. 125. File 8-5.1 BA V2. OCMH.
37. Ibid. p. 92.
38. A paraphrase of Ambassador Kirk's protest can be found in OPD 000.7, Sec I, Case 9/4. DRB, TAG.
39. See OPD 000.7, Sec I, Case 9/2. Also see CM IN 3222, 4 Jun 45; CM OUT 11857, 5 Jun 45; and CM IN 6469, 7 Jun 45. Investigation later disclosed that although the report was sent in the name of Ambassador Jefferson Caffery he did not send the report. It was sent in his name by an assistant of Mr. Robert Murphy, American political adviser to Gen Eisenhower.
a defiance of their war-time allies by making such demands as trusteeship rights in Africa, the stabilization of the Soviet position in the Balkans, and a coordinate position in the occupation and administration of Japan.  

Following the failure of the London Conference the Joint Strategic Survey Committee became alarmed at the declining American military position and on its own initiative prepared a report on that subject. On the recommendation of the JSSC the JCS on 15 October directed the Joint Staff Planners to examine, with haste, “our present and prospective capabilities, and determine those world areas in which such capabilities would suffice to resist successfully an attempted . . . aggression.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff also adopted the recommendations of the Strategic Committee that the Staff Planners should submit the study to the Secretaries of War and Navy with the recommendation that “they be integrated with the views of the Secretary of State for further submission to the President.”

The Joint Staff Planners began their examination as directed but the committee never made a formal report of its study. On 25 March 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their permission to discontinue the project. The reason given for this action was that the Secretaries of War and Navy and other leading government officials had made various “public utterances” which had informed political authorities of the effect of demobilization on our military posture. This is perhaps true, but research on this study has failed to reveal any forthright “public utterances” other than those on Universal Military Training. The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy, and the Chief of Staff, United States Army, before a joint meeting of Congress on 15 January 1946 took the most positive stand against the rapid demobilization. However, the October 1945 report of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and the estimates obtained by the Joint Staff Planners gave an indication of the almost unbelievable and swift decline of American military position at a time when Soviet Russia was exhibiting an uncompromising and aggressive attitude toward her wartime allies.

On 20 November 1945 Secretary of War Patterson briefly described the effect of Army demobilization to a meeting of the

40. Senate Document 123, 81st Cong, 1st Sess., A Decade of American Foreign Policy, pp. 51-58. See also JCS 1545, 9 Oct 45.
41. JCS 1545, 9 Oct 45.
42. JCS 1545/1, 25 Mar 46. For a published digest of the Committee of Three’s discussion of demobilization on 16 Oct 45, see Walter Millis, Editor, The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), p. 102.
43. For complete discussion, see that portion of Chapter III documented by footnote Number 197.
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. Patterson stated that in addition to a numerical decline of forces the loss in fighting prestige was even greater. He related contemplated plans for the Spring of 1946 and the early part of the fiscal year 1947 when troops in occupied countries would become merely police forces. Patterson further said that he realized that these forces were not sufficient to have an effective influence on overall United States national policy. Mr. James F. Byrnes who had become Secretary of State between V-E and V-J Days expressed concern over the contemplated reduction and deployment of forces during the period described by Patterson which he said would unquestionably reduce American influence. The informal minutes of The Committee of Three (Secretaries of State, War, and Navy) indicate that this was the first time that demobilization of personnel as such was discussed.

Further indications of the lack of integration of demobilization with national policy appeared at other times. In September 1946 Secretary of State Byrnes, while in attendance at the Paris (France) Peace Conference, was informed of the contemplated further reduction of American troops in Europe. A general officer present at the time that Byrnes received this information recorded in a memorandum for record: "Mr. Byrnes was concerned and almost alarmed when told of our contemplated action in Europe. He wanted to know if forces could not be found someplace to obviate the drastic reduction..." The reduction of troop strength still continued, however, because of the necessity of attaining the figure of 1.07 million by 30 June 1947. These reductions left the United States Army with a general reserve task force, in training, approved for a total of 30 thousand troops.

Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall while addressing the National Preparedness Orientation Conference which met at the Pentagon in Washington, D. C., on 30 November 1950 made some very forceful remarks on the effects of World War II demobilization. Recalling the Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in March and April 1947 which failed principally because of the Soviet attitude on the status of Germany and Austria and the question of reparations, Secretary Marshall told the orientation conference:

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44. Minutes (paraphrased), Meetings of the Secys of State, War, and Navy, 20 Nov 45. WDCSA 337 (28 Dec 45). DRB, TAG.
45. Ibid.
46. Copies of the 1945 informal minutes of The Committee of Three can be found in WDCSA 337 (28 Dec 45). Ibid.
47. Memo for Record, 3 Oct 46, initiald by GAL. P&O file ABC 320.2 (3-13-43) TAB 521/23. DRB, TAG.
I remember, when I was Secretary of State I was being pressed constantly, particularly when in Moscow, by radio message after radio message to give the Russians hell. . . . When I got back, I was getting the same appeal in relation to the Far East and China. At that time, my facilities for giving them hell—and I am a soldier and know something about the ability to give hell—was 1 3/4 divisions over the entire United States. That is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody with over 260 and you have 1 3/4rd. We had nothing in Alaska. We did not have enough to defend the air strip up at Fairbanks. . . .

Thus the United States Army which had been one of the world’s finest had by 30 June 1947 dwindled to a state of near-impotency. This military disintegration coupled with the rapid demobilization of the United States Navy weakened the prestige of our national policy and seriously endangered the security of the Nation.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

A demobilization of armed forces usually occurs at the end of a campaign or on the cessation of hostilities. Forces are dismantled mainly because of economic and political factors, both domestic and international; but also contributing to the necessity of demobilization is the fact that large-scale forces are no longer needed. Only a nation that finds itself in actual possession and control of its armed forces has a demobilization problem.

In the Revolutionary War demobilization of men and units was a continual process with very few formalities observed in the discharge of the militia. At the end of the war the Continental Army was destroyed, and the remnants became little more than a group of caretakers. For one thing, the government that existed up to 1789 could not afford an army. Also, there was a feeling of fear and distrust toward standing armies during times of peace.

During the War of 1812 men and units were continually being discharged, principally because of short-term enlistments and the completion of campaigns. Because of the lack of communications it was often impractical and many times impossible to shift troops from one region of the country to another. At the end of the war regular regiments which the federal government believed to be superfluous were either disbanded or consolidated with those that remained active.

In the early stages of the Mexican War the Army was composed of regulars, militiamen, and volunteers. But as the war progressed the federal government placed its dependence on the regular and volunteer troops. These volunteers were usually under one year terms of enlistment. As in the two previous wars demobilization was a continual process throughout the war period. After the cessation of hostilities unit demobilization was employed as it had been in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 to disband the war-time Army. The Mexican War contributed little to the demobilization experience of the United States Army.

In the Civil War the Regular Army was small, and large numbers of volunteer and militia troops were furnished by the states. Throughout the war men and units were continually being discharged as had been the case in all wars in which the United States Army had been engaged. When the enlistments of those composing the volunteer and militia units had expired, these or-
ganizations were disbanded. The demobilization of units became less and less frequent, however, after a draft was finally installed. At the end of the war demobilization was once again accomplished by the unit method.

The United States Army that fought in the War with Spain was composed of regular and volunteer troops. This was a foreign war and the brunt of the fighting was performed by regular units. During the conduct of operations against the enemy no volunteer units were mustered out of federal service. Although some volunteers were used in the occupation of enemy territory and in the Philippine Insurrection most non-regular units were as a usual procedure quickly returned to the state of their origin and were demobilized.

The World War I Army was originally composed of regulars, national guardsmen, and national army troops. Before the end of the conflict these three categories were discontinued and the military forces were consolidated in the United States Army. For the first time during a war all troops of the Army were under enlistment for the duration of the emergency. Following cessation of hostilities the traditional method of unit demobilization was followed. Before a few weeks had passed a wave of criticism was directed at the War Department by organized and unorganized groups of the public and by certain Members of Congress. This hastened the War Department action to discharge individuals before their units were inactivated and large numbers of soldiers were discharged before their units were demobilized. The amount of transportation available for returning men from overseas was a major factor which helped to prevent an avalanche of demobilization by individuals.

Throughout all the wars in which the United States participated up to World War I there was an utter lack of planning for the demobilization of the wartime army. In World War I the planning began only about a month before the Armistice; World War I taught the lesson that demobilization planning should be started before the end of a war.

During the period between World Wars I and II the War Department General Staff devoted very little attention to the subject of demobilization; in fact, it was almost totally neglected. Except in the curricula of the Army War College the subject received little attention in the Army School System and even War College students did not study the subject during the years just preceding World War II, 1937-1938 through 1939-1940.

At the beginning of World War II the Army was composed of regular, national guard, and Army of the United States units
and personnel. As the war progressed the identity of personnel and units became less and less associated with particular components of the military establishment. Formal planning for World War II demobilization started more than two years before the defeat of Germany. For the first time in the history of the United States Army the demobilization of wartime forces was primarily on the basis of the individual. World War II provided the experience for a number of lessons. One of these is that large-scale reduction of military forces should be planned in peacetime. For every mobilization plan there should be a demobilization plan.

**Systems of Demobilization Used by the United States Army**

One of the most controversial questions resulting from the World War II demobilization was that of unit demobilization versus individual demobilization. The September 1943 decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which cast the die for the individual method was based on several factors. The natural outgrowth of this method was the Adjusted Service Rating or "point system." If there are a combination of non-predominating factors entering into a man's discharge these have to be weighed in some way. The evaluation was arbitrarily called the "point system"; from the standpoint of the individual it could just as well be named the "most equitable system."

The unit method of demobilization has been the type most often used by the United States Army. Where a war or emergency is of a short duration there is no doubt that this is the best system for demobilizing military forces. If it is used following a long war it allows units to retain their integrity and combat effectiveness. The United States has a large investment in every soldier and the unit method permits the greatest dollar economy in the employment of the trained man. A third advantage of the system is that its administrative operations are comparatively simple. On the other hand it has a number of disadvantages. In a long war such as World War II the great mass of troops was mobilized as individuals. Following such a conflict there was the prospect of a long-term occupation. The units of the Army consisted of men with very long as well as very short service, together with all gradations in between. Thus, after the defeat of Germany and Japan, had the decision been made to demobilize the 1st Division, send the 2d Division to the United States as a member of the strategic reserve, and employ the 3d Division as an occupation force the unfairness which would have been committed is apparent. This is particularly true in view of the system used
in World War II wherein combat units were kept in the line for long periods of time while individuals were furnished them to replace combat losses.

The individual system of demobilization as its name implies gives primary recognition to the individual. Its proponents in World War II argued that this was the method that the Army should employ for its demobilization because the great mass of soldiers was inducted as individuals. In addition, a democracy placed emphasis upon the "individual rights of man." If the individual system is made subject to the limitations of military necessity it is greatly strengthened. The disadvantages of the individual method are in general the advantages listed for the unit system.

The proponents of the Adjusted Service Rating system of individual demobilization were divided. One group believed that there should be a constant accumulation of points. The second felt that points should not be allowed to accumulate after the defeat of Japan. While Secretary of War Patterson was perhaps the most prominent member of the first group, he shared the opinion with large numbers of enlisted men and newly-commissioned officers. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, favored the second method which was the one actually used. When Secretary Patterson returned from his round-the-world trip in early 1946 he asked the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, to prepare a study on "Why Point Score Accumulation Stopped on V–J Day." No doubt Patterson had been further influenced in his opinion after he had met with the soldier committees in Seoul, Shanghai, Manila, and New Delhi. A lengthy reply to the Secretary of War was prepared in the Office of the AC of S, G–1.1 This study presented both sides of the question in a very factual and objective manner, but it did not convince Mr. Patterson. He wrote Maj. Gen. W. S. Paul, AC of S, G–1:

I think that a mistake was made last fall freezing the credits as of V–J Day. There was no logic in the decision. The decision was made, however, and definite commitments have been made upon that system of points. I recognize that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to change the system at this time and still carry out the commitments already made, and I think that the present system should, therefore, stand.2

The point system was originally designed for reducing the Army after the defeat of Germany and before the surrender of Japan. The planners were generally in agreement that this

2. Memo, Patterson, for Paul, 20 Feb 46, no sub. WDGPA 370.01 (11 Feb 46). DRB, TAG.
would take a long time—perhaps a year or more. During this interim the flaws that developed in the system could be eliminated and the system would undergo considerable revision before being used after final victory. The employment of the point system was an attempt to be objective and to remove favoritism. Even at the height of its criticism only a negligible number of soldiers accused the system of showing preferential treatment. Finally, the fact should be borne in mind that this system was designed to establish a criteria or priority to be used in determining eligibility for discharge consideration. The point system did not prescribe the rate for demobilization although it is very doubtful that the Army as a whole understood this.

**Demobilization and National Objectives**

Beginning with the Revolutionary struggle and continuing through every armed conflict up to World War II there has been an utter void in the co-ordination of the demobilization of the United States Army with national objectives and security. Americans have been great supporters of military forces when there has been a shooting war but when the firing ceases their interest lags. This has been as true of those holding high office as it has been of the man on the street. The traditional American viewpoint was ably expressed in January 1903 by Secretary of War Elihu Root, "Whenever the enlarged army of the United States finds the duty of the hour accomplished it melts back into the mass of the people unnoticed."

During World War II while the Army and Navy were planning their demobilization other departments and agencies of the government were also planning for the post-hostilities and post-war periods. At the same time in the military establishment there was the feeling that nothing should stand in the way of the prosecution of the war and the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Demobilization planning was "tolerated" by many members of the War Department General Staff only because it had been directed by the Chief of Staff. Although this planning was conducted with a comprehensiveness heretofore unknown to the United States Army, the organization charged with this function was a Special Staff agency and lacked the strong co-ordinative powers inherent in the General Staff.

Concurrently with the preparation for military demobilization the Department of State was making preparations and plans for a general international organization for the collective main-

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tenance of international peace and security. During the time that a system of general security was being planned representatives of the United States held many consultations with their counterparts from those United Nations opposing Axis aggression. Beginning in the late summer of 1944 the United States became involved in actual negotiations vital to both peace and security. By the time Japan had formally surrendered, the negotiations for the United Nations Organization and regional arrangements for the Western Hemisphere had been achieved with a fair degree of success. But security in the Pacific and stability in Europe had not been accomplished. In the latter part of the war there had been a rapid succession of Secretaries of State. Mr. Cordell Hull was succeeded by Mr. Edward Stettinius who resigned in the summer of 1945 shortly after the San Francisco Conference; Stettinius was succeeded by former Supreme Court Justice James F. Byrnes in July 1945 just before the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference. By the end of August 1945 almost every responsible official holding high public office was of the opinion that the future would be an era of “peace and good will.” Back of these events and feelings was the vague thought that the perfection of new weapons, particularly the atomic bomb, would replace or greatly reduce the necessity for United States armed forces. In addition, the defeat of Japan came practically a year sooner than the most optimistic predictions.

These conditions furnished the general setting and background during the time that the demobilization of the United States World War II Army was being planned. There were general exchanges of information and informal conversations concerning the demobilization of the military establishment between various persons in the War Department and the Department of State; but there was no formal integration of demobilization plans with those of national policy. It was not until November 1945 that demobilization was given the serious thought and attention on the highest levels that it should have been given months before. By that time it was too late. The United States had been engaged since the cessation of hostilities on 2 September 1945 in liquidating its vast military machine. Due to political pressures and other causes earlier demobilization plans were constantly revised. These changes were made only with the idea of rushing the dismantling of the military machine. Officials in high office in the War Department were admitting, both publicly and privately, that there was no relation whatsoever between the rate of demobilization and any future plans for the Army.

It is essential that demobilization plans should be soundly based
and should serve as a buttress to national policy and security. This study has shown that World War II demobilization was not soundly based on the attainment of national objectives and that moreover it contributed to the confusion.

During a war allies may have the same military objectives but their political ones may be in conflict. History teaches that wartime allies do not necessarily remain on the best of terms after cessation of hostilities. After World War II, as United States military and naval posture became progressively weakened by demobilization, this Nation's relations with Soviet Russia became less and less amicable. Demobilization planners should bear this in mind in the co-ordination of their plans with national objectives.

**Relationship of Manpower to an Effective Force**

Experience in World War II demobilization has shown that mere numbers of men in the Army do not necessarily insure an effective military machine. Less than two months after the surrender of Japan there were millions of men still in uniform but the combat effectiveness of most units had declined from fifty to seventy-five percent although their authorized strengths had declined only a small percentage. The rapid reductions of the Army to the 1 July 1947 ceiling strength of 1.07 million left it with the largest peacetime force in history. However, this authorized strength could not be used as an index of an effective military force.

**World War II Personnel and Matériel Demobilization Planning**

One of the weakest links in the planning and operation of World War II demobilization was the failure to correlate the discharge of soldiers and the return of individual and organizational supplies and equipment to proper storage. There was a recognition of the inseparability of men and matériel on the part of those planning the personnel phases of demobilization. For reasons unknown, the Readjustment Regulations did not co-ordinate the personnel and matériel angles of demobilization. It is true that the application of "military necessity" between V-E and V-J Days aided in the preservation of munitions in the hands of troops. After the defeat of Japan if the men of an organization were eligible for discharge consideration they were demobilized and those soldiers who remained took care of the unused equipment as best they could. Future planners will perform a great service if they consider more carefully the problem of the return of serviceable supplies and equipment to war reserves.
Miscellaneous Factors Contributing to a Rapid Demobilization

World War II demobilization was accelerated by a number of factors including the lack of men under voluntary enlistment, a decreasing budget, the non-workable selective service extension of 1946, and the terminal leave act of the same year. When V-J Day arrived there were less than one hundred men under current enlistment in the Regular Army. A recruiting service was established and Congress quickly passed a more workable enlistment law in early October 1945. The recruiting service enlisted over one million in approximately a year's time with the terms of enlistment varying from one to three years. This remarkable feat had never been previously achieved. However, those who performed the promotional work and the actual recruiting often promised more than commanders in the field could deliver which sometimes contributed to a state of low morale. If Congress had declared the war emergency over during the fall of 1945 the Army would have found itself with very few enlisted personnel.

The uncertainty of budget authorizations or the control of the purse string by Congress and the President should be considered in all demobilization planning. Until the fall of 1945 allotment of money was only indirectly considered in Army demobilization planning; it was more directly studied in connection with post-war planning. For an indication of this planners have only to investigate what happened to the Army during the fiscal year 1947. At the beginning of July 1946 the actual strength of the Army was slightly less than 1.9 million. This figure represented an overstrength of about 340 thousand as provided for in the budget. If the ceiling placed on the Army by the 1946 extension of the selective service law was considered then the average was approximately 230 thousand. Owing to a time lag in personnel accounting and other factors the correct overstrength was not determined until about 1 August 1946. The excess then carried on for a number of months. Beginning in December 1946 and continuing throughout the remainder of the fiscal year demobilization was further speeded because of lack of money for the operation of the Army.

The Communists and World War II Demobilization

Following the cessation of hostilities in World War II Communists and their fellow travellers used demobilization as a wedge to attack and undermine American prestige and national policy. Their campaign was particularly effective in December 1945 and January 1946 when the followers of the party line unleashed an attack to "bring the boys home by Christmas." Many well-mean-
ing individuals and organizations having a human desire for the return of American troops joined in and unknowingly danced to the tune that was played by the Communists. No doubt there were those in the Kremlin and others in the hierarchy of the Communist Party of the United States who were delighted when the soldier committees protested the demobilization “slow-down” in early January 1946.

National policy with its international obligations and commitments tends to be vague and impersonal, but the problem of getting home after a war is real and personal. A longing for home, the state of low morale, the absence of an announced long-range demobilization policy, and a lack of leadership in many instances made many well-intentioned soldiers unknowingly receptive to the propaganda of subversive organizations. During January 1946 large numbers of American soldiers gave support to the Communist party line and were not even aware of it. This is evident from the study of various activities of the well-behaved soldier committees and representations of countless upright individuals to Congressional committees and members of Congress. For example, in the preliminary meetings which were held with soldier committees in the Far East there would emerge occasional interspersed questions on foreign policy. There was a similarity in the questions in Seoul, Shanghai, Manila, and New Delhi. Here are a few that were typical of that type of question: “Are we out here to protect Wall Street?” “Is this Yankee Imperialism?” “Did you bring the 86th Division to suppress the aspirations of the Philippine people?” and “Are we protecting the British Lion?”

Soon thereafter the Overseas Subcommittee of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program made a world-wide inquiry into surplus property abroad. During the conduct of these hearings in the Far East the committee listened to a number of soldiers present complaints on the Army demobilization program. A private soldier read a prepared statement which contained this sentence: “It is the belief that the policy obliging men to remain overseas for the purposes of training foreign armies does not have the cognizance of the American people.” He later said “. . .the main thing that we want to emphasize is the China policy that exists today.” The next day a non-commissioned officer presented a statement on behalf of a soldier committee. He stated that the demobilization

6. Ibid., p. 19840.
protests of 6 and 7 January 1946 (Manila time) were attributable to a number of events. One of these was "An announcement by ... [the] Chief of Staff of the 86th Division, to the effect that the ... Division would undergo training along battle lines to exert American influence in prospective disturbances in the Philippines. ..." In his conclusions he stated: "Is it your opinion that it is a mission of the United States Army to maintain order in the coming Filipino election? Is it your wish as individual Senators that the United States Army in the Philippines be used to maintain vested interest in property and jobs in the Commonwealth."8 A second non-commissioned officer appeared before the subcommittee and speaking of his unit related "The men in that battalion maintain that they are not being used for any purpose other than being kept here in Luzon as a potential strike-breaking force."9

After cessation of hostilities in World War II several million Americans were anxious to get home. Although this was a natural and very human desire it was seized upon by the Communists. The followers of the Kremlin played on this American weakness by inciting resentment against American armed forces. The Communists had but one obvious purpose, they wanted the United States to become impotent through a rapid reduction in its military, naval, and air strength and to withdraw from occupied areas, in which communism would have an unopposed and fertile field to work. After the cessation of hostilities in any future war this technique of playing upon the traditional American longing for home could be used by any country, whether it be ally, enemy, or neutral, if it opposed the national objectives of the United States.

Congressional Relations

Immediately following the two World Wars relationships between Congress and the military have worsened. During these wars Congress subjugated itself on many issues to the military and naval establishments. This was done in the interest of winning the war. But by the end of the wars the representatives of the people were eager to exercise their prerogatives that had been held in abeyance because of military necessity. Although the attitude of the lawmakers has returned to one of less opposition it almost emasculated the military establishment after World War I and it reached dangerous proportions after World War II.

Before the cessation of hostilities in World War II representatives of the War Department presented and explained the per-

7. Ibid., p. 19918.
8. Ibid., p. 19920.
9. Ibid., p. 19925.
sonnel demobilization plan, in executive session, to both the House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs. The appearance before the Senate Committee was in absentia but the chairman was given a complete statement of the approved plan. An elaborate, very complete, and frank disclosure was made to the House Committee on Military Affairs. Committee members also gave a full expression of their viewpoints and asked detailed questions concerning the plan. The House Committee concurred in the scheme and gave the military establishment active support when it was applied. Many pages of the *Congressional Record* indicate the support given on the floor in the late summer and fall of 1945 by both the majority and minority members of the House Committee on Military Affairs.

Members of Congress are elected by the votes of the people. They not only serve their states and districts in legislative matters but they also represent their constituents by acting as Washington liaison officers with various departments and agencies of the federal government. A Member of Congress must generally serve the wishes of the people who have elected him. If he does not he must answer to the voters.

**Demobilization and Public Relations**

During the past demobilizations of the United States Army there has been a hue and cry to “bring the boys home.” With the widespread use of our improved communications system large groups of the population more and more have made their wishes known toward the return of troops at the end of war. Throughout World War II this clamor increased although the United States had achieved a position of foremost importance in world affairs.

Demobilization is a public relations problem. The Army should profit by past mistakes, especially that of World War II when the public was not informed as to just what a military demobilization meant. The public must know that the dismantling of wartime forces involves a great deal more than the mere mechanics of the separation process. The public is entitled to know and it must be told the relationship between military posture and the objectives of national policy. Doubtless there are reasons why this information was not disseminated before the cessation of hostilities in World War II. In the first place, there was no positive integration of demobilization with national policy. Secondly, the Office of War Information, the agency whose purpose it was to achieve a co-ordinated governmental war-information program, was terminated by the President on 31 August 1945,
just two days before V-J Day.\textsuperscript{10} Even if the Office of War Inform-
formation had been retained there is doubt as to the degree of success this Office would have achieved in informing the people. Such a program cannot await the cessation of hostilities.

Intensive research on the reaction to World War II demobiliza-
tion indicates that the editorials published by the majority of the objective newspapers in the United States reflected a long-
range view of the value of armed forces. The thoughts of the editors on the implications and effects of demobilization were farther ahead than any other group that placed itself on record. The vast majority of those contributing to the editorials realized the value of military and naval forces as instruments of national policy.

Commanders in the field must also be kept informed. They cannot fulfill command responsibilities unless this is done. The situation that often occurred in the early phases of World War II demobilization where commanders read about changes to plans in newspapers or heard them announced by radio commentators before they received official instruction handicapped their posi-
tions tremendously.

Soldiers must be kept constantly informed. The vast majority of troops in a wartime army are non-professionals. These citizen soldiers have performed magnificently in past wars. When hos-
tilities cease they are desirous of knowing what plans affect their future. If a man is to be discharged tomorrow or in a year he likes to obtain authoritative information about it. One serious fault of the World War II demobilization program during its execution in 1945 was that no one in uniform, unless he had been made eligible by the last separation directive, had any definite knowledge of his approximate date of release. The 15 January 1946 announcement of the War Department governing demobilization through the remainder of the fiscal year was the initial step in correcting this deficiency. Unfortunately, this information was not released until after the soldier demonstrations of that month. This tremendous soldier reaction to the announced demobilization “slow-down” of 4 January 1946 teaches an important lesson that is well known to sports enthusiasts: Do not change the rules in the middle of a game without conditioning the participants.

Planners must be prepared to face the fact that mobilization and demobilization plans have usually been a compromise between conflicting interests. Compromises very seldom completely satisfy

\textsuperscript{10} EX O 9608, 31 Aug 45, FR, Vol 10, p. 11223. The actual termination date was 15 Sep 45.
anyone. There is the commander in the field and he must perform his missions. On the other hand, there is the claimant who says he has done his job and should be returned to civilian life immediately. As in World War II, while the demobilization plan was agreed to be a fair one, it was totally and whole-heartedly accepted by no one. In any future demobilization those in charge of the plan's operation must be prepared to withstand the waves of abuse and criticism that will follow unless the plan provides for the return of every non-volunteer to civilian life within a day or two after the end of the war. Such a plan is inconceivable if there is to be adequate support of national policies.

When future scholars evaluate the history of the United States during the first-half of the twentieth century they will list World War II demobilization as one of the cardinal mistakes.
### APPENDIX I

#### CIVIL WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of officers and men mustered out</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1865</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1 to Aug 7</td>
<td>640,806</td>
<td>640,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 8 to Aug 22</td>
<td>78,532</td>
<td>719,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 23 to Sep 14</td>
<td>21,769</td>
<td>741,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 15 to Oct 15</td>
<td>44,098</td>
<td>785,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 16 to Nov 15</td>
<td>15,758</td>
<td>800,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 16 to Jan 20</td>
<td>117,759</td>
<td>918,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1866</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 21 to Feb 15</td>
<td>33,730</td>
<td>952,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 16 to Mar 10</td>
<td>15,435</td>
<td>967,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 11 to May 1</td>
<td>18,895</td>
<td>986,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2 to Jun 30</td>
<td>23,888</td>
<td>1,010,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1 to Nov 1</td>
<td>12,351</td>
<td>1,023,021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A few volunteers were retained in service for special reasons after November 1, 1866. The last volunteer organization was disbanded 30 December 1867.

*WD Annual Rpts., 1919, Rpt of CofS, p. 461.*
## APPENDIX II
### WORLD WAR I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>No. of officers and men mustered out</th>
<th>Cumulative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 11–30</td>
<td>43,593</td>
<td>43,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>646,043</td>
<td>689,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>381,563</td>
<td>1,071,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>277,913</td>
<td>1,349,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>274,479</td>
<td>1,623,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>310,185</td>
<td>1,933,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>397,622</td>
<td>2,331,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>404,588</td>
<td>2,735,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>377,404</td>
<td>3,113,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>166,986</td>
<td>3,280,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>81,716</td>
<td>3,362,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>41,690</td>
<td>3,403,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>12,284</td>
<td>3,416,066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** The strength of the Army on 1 July 1919 was approximately 953,581. On 30 June 1920 it had been reduced to 209,901. This information has been obtained from the Annual Report of the Secretary of War 1919, p. 17, and the Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Fiscal Year Ending 1920, pp. 25–28.
APPENDIX III

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY
(In thousands) 1 September 1945

1,565
Pacific

8,023
Total Army

And So. Atlantic

V324
Misc. & Enroute

ETO & WTO

Africa

Middle East

North Atlantic

Caribbean

And So. Atlantic

Indo-Burma China

231

1,565
Pacific

8,023
Total Army

46
Alaska

3,400

44

15
2,312

2.1
The Army has adopted a plan for the readjustment of military personnel after the defeat of Germany and prior to the defeat of Japan calling for a partial and orderly demobilization from its present peak strength.

When the war against Germany had ended, the military might of the United States will be shifted from the European area to the Pacific area. Military requirements in the European and American areas will be drastically curtailed, while tremendous increases will be essential in the Pacific.

To defeat Japan as quickly as possible, and permanently, the United States will have to assemble, readjust and streamline its military forces in order to apply the maximum power. Military requirements to achieve this end, involving men, weapons, equipment, and shipping, have been set forth by the combined Chiefs of Staff. These requirements are the determining factors of the readjustment and demobilization plan adopted by the War Department.

Military necessity decrees that sufficient men suited to the type of warfare being waged in the Pacific must remain in service as long as they are essential. Certain units of the Army also, of necessity, will have to be retained in the various theaters where action has ceased in order to fulfill such occupation duties as are necessary. Other elements, no longer needed in the theater in which they are assigned, will be transferred to other areas, reorganized and redesignated to meet current military requirements in the theater, or they will be inactivated.

Within each element of the Army thousands of individuals may become surplus to the needs of the theater or major command in which they are serving. But more thousands will be required for further military service.

First priority in this readjustment program will be the transfer of elements from theaters no longer active to the Pacific war zone, or from the United States to the Pacific war zone. All available transportation will be utilized for this tremendous undertaking.

The readjustment and demobilization plan developed by the War Department after months of study takes into account all of these variable factors. Briefly, the plan for the return of non-essential soldiers to civilian life will start with the assembly in the United States of men declared surplus to the needs of each overseas theater and to the major commands in the United States. From among these men some will be designated as non-essential to the new military needs of the Army and will be returned to civilian life according to certain priorities.

As an example, the Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations will be informed by the War Department of the types and numbers of his units which will be needed in the Pacific, and the types and numbers of his units which will remain as occupation troops, and the types and numbers of his units which are surplus.

The simplest plan of demobilization would have been to return these surplus units to this country and discharge their personnel intact.
Such a method, however, would operate with great unfairness to many individuals who have had long and arduous service but are not assigned to one of the units declared surplus. If only units in Europe were considered, this basis of expediency would work unfairly to units long in the Pacific or at outpost bases in the American theater. It would operate unfairly to men who have seen extended combat service both in Europe and the Pacific and have been returned to this country for reassignment. It would release men only recently assigned as replacements to units long in combat and would discriminate against veterans of many campaigns in units not selected for return.

Consequently, it was determined that the fairest method to effect partial demobilization would be through the selection of men as individuals, rather than by units, with the selection governed by thoroughly impartial standards.

For the standards, the War Department went to the soldiers themselves. Experts were sent into the field to obtain a cross-section of the sentiments of enlisted men. Thousands of soldiers, both in this country and overseas, were interviewed to learn their views on the kind of selective process they believed should determine the men to be returned first to civilian life. Opinions expressed by the soldiers themselves became the accepted principles of the plan.

As finally worked out, the plan accepted by the War Department as best meeting the tests of justice and impartiality, will allow men who have been overseas and men with dependent children to have priority of separation. Ninety percent of the soldiers interviewed said that that is the way it should be.

As part of the plan adopted, an "Adjusted Service Rating Card" will be issued to all enlisted personnel after the defeat of Germany. On this card will be scored the following four factors that will determine priority of separation:

1. Service Credit—based upon the total number of months of Army Service since September 16, 1940.
2. Overseas Credit—based upon the number of months served overseas.
3. Combat Credit—based upon the first and each additional award to the individual of the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Legion of Merit, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Soldier's Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Purple Heart, and Bronze Service Stars (battle participation stars).
4. Parenthood Credit—which gives credit for each dependent child under 18 years up to a limit of three children.

The value of the point credits will be announced after the cessation of hostilities in Europe. In the meantime, the point values will be kept under continuous study. The total score will be used to select surplus men from the theaters overseas and in the United States. The score also will be used when a certain portion of all these surplus men will be declared nonessential and returned to civilian life.

In all cases, however, the demands of military necessity and the needs of the war against Japan must first be met. Regardless of a man's priority standing, certain types of personnel can never become surplus as long as the war against Japan continues.

As an example of how the plan will work, assume that there are four infantry divisions in the European Theater. One is declared surplus. Men in all four divisions are rated according to the priority credit scores. The top fourth is selected and those not essential for retention in service by
reason of military necessity are designated as surplus. Men in the surplus division who are marked for retention by reason of military necessity are then shifted into the active divisions. All of the men designated as surplus are shifted to the surplus divisions, which now will serve as a vehicle for eventually returning them to the United States.

No man in a unit that remains in service can become surplus until a qualified replacement is available. If military necessity should entail the immediate transfer of a unit to the Pacific, there may conceivably be no time to apply the plan to men of that unit before the emergency transfer is made. Consideration will be given these men when they arrive in the new theater.

The active units needed against Japan will be shipped to the Pacific. Those units required for occupation duty in Europe will be sent to their stations, and surplus units will be returned to the United States as quickly as possible.

In the United States, the men of these surplus units will revert to a surplus pool in the Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces and Army Air Forces. These surplus pools will include surplus men from all overseas theaters and surplus men from the continental United States.

From these surplus pools the reduction of various types of Army personnel will be made. The number to be returned to civilian life as no longer essential to over-all Army needs will be chosen from among those with the highest priority credit scores.

It is emphasized that the rate of return of surplus men from overseas will depend upon the number of ships available. Thousands of ships will be required to supply the Pacific theater. The Pacific theater will have No. 1 priority. All else must wait. To it will be transported millions of fighting men, millions of tons of landing barges, tanks, planes, guns, ammunition, and food, over longer supply lines than those to Europe.

This means that most of the ships and planes that were used to supply the European theater will be needed to supply the Pacific theater. The majority of ships proceeding to Europe will continue on to the Pacific laden with troops and supplies for that distant campaign. Very few will turn around and come back to the United States. The Army, therefore, will not be able to return all surplus men to the United States immediately. It may take many months.

While the process of selecting and returning men from the European theater is taking place, the plan for readjustment and partial demobilization also will be applied in active theaters, like the Southwest Pacific. Individuals in those theaters will be declared surplus to the extent that replacements can be provided. Naturally, since the Pacific will be the only active theater, there will be no surplus units of any type. Military requirements there will demand an increase rather than a decrease in fighting units. Nevertheless, troops in the Pacific area will benefit by the reduction of the Army, not as units, but as individuals.

Commanders in the Pacific area will be told the number and types of men who can be replaced. They then will select these men, using the same standards as apply in inactive theaters and in the United States. These men then will be returned to the United States as rapidly as replacements of the same type become available and as the military situation permits.

As an example: Normally there will be a great flow of men needed to build up and maintain an offensive against Japan, but say that several thousand men, over and above the required number can be shipped to the Pacific each month. Then, a corresponding number of men in the Pacific
with the highest priority credit scores can be declared surplus and returned to the United States, where their scores and military necessity will determine whether they are among the personnel no longer essential to the Army.

Simultaneously with the selection and return of men in the overseas theaters, the same selective formula will be applied among troops stationed in the Continental United States. Troops in the United States, however, will serve as the main reservoir of replacements for the overseas theaters. For in general, their priority scores will be lower than the scores of men who have served overseas and have seen combat duty.

Any man who may have been declared nonessential under this plan who wished to remain in the Army, provided he has a satisfactory record, will not be forced out of the Army if he can be usefully employed.

In the case of officers, military necessity will determine which ones are nonessential. These will be released as they can be spared.

Priority of release for members of the Women's Army Corps will be determined in the same way as for the rest of the Army, but treating the Corps as a separate group. However, in the case of all female personnel of the Army, those whose husbands have already been released will be discharged upon application.

The plan as now adopted will provide some reduction in the Army's Ground Forces and initially considerably less in the Service Forces and in the Air Forces.

Following Germany's defeat, the Air Forces will have to move combat groups and supporting ground units from all over the world to the Pacific areas. The nature of the Pacific area dictates that Service Forces personnel will be needed in great numbers to carry the war to Japan. Long supply lines, scattered bases, jungles, primitive country, all contribute to the importance and necessity for Service Forces personnel. Therefore, the reduction in its strength will be slow at first.

As replacements become available from the Ground Forces and from new inductees, the Air Forces and Service Forces will discharge a fair share of men proportionate with the Ground Forces.

Surplus individuals declared nonessential to the needs of the Army will be discharged from the service through Separation Centers. Five Army Separation Centers are already in operation and additional ones will be set up when the need develops. A total of eighteen in all parts of the country are contemplated. Their wide distribution will enable us to discharge soldiers close to their homes.

The readjustment and demobilization plan applies only to readjustment and demobilization in the period between the defeat of Germany and prior to the defeat of Japan. It sets forth the principles and responsibilities involved during the period. Theater commanders and commanders of all other major commands of the Army will put the plan into operation in as simple a manner as possible based on these principles and responsibilities.

The War Department has determined that the successful operation of the plan requires that the troops themselves, as well as the public, be kept fully informed.

The size of the military establishment that will be needed after the defeat of Germany has been calculated with the same exactness as the size of the Army needed up to now. No soldier will be kept in the military service who is not needed to fulfill these requirements. No soldier will be released who is needed.

It must be borne in mind always that the war will not be won, nor the peace enjoyed, until Japan has been completely crushed.
As the end of the war in Europe approaches, public interest is turning to the problems involved in defeating Japan and the size of the Army required to accomplish this job. Yesterday members of the War Department General Staff appeared before the House Military Affairs Committee to discuss our plans in executive session fully and frankly. The information presented has appeared in the press in partial and garbled form, therefore as it is of the most intense interest to every soldier and to our citizens generally, the following statement is released. The War Department desired to delay making any public statement in this matter until after several basic factors had been cleared with overseas commanders and the plan presented to the entire Congress by Admiral King and General Marshall.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consultation with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, have made a preliminary estimate of the troops and equipment needed to crush Japan in the shortest possible time and with the smallest cost in American lives. Similar calculations were made for the forces provided General Eisenhower.

Their estimate of the needs in Europe and Africa was quite accurate, the last division to arrive in Europe having gone into action on April 1.

Our Army is now 8,300,000 strong. Under the approved plan we are now engaged in working toward an Army strength of 6,968,000 a year from now. That will give us all the strength we believe we can deploy effectively against Japan and will also enable us to meet our occupation responsibilities in Europe and to maintain the necessary training and supply force in the United States.

Although we were able to hold to the plan we made for the war against Germany, developments in war are a matter which cannot be mathematically predicted with accuracy. Our best judgment is that we can defeat Japan quickly and completely with an Army which a year from now will be 6,968,000. This figure is given to the American people with the assurance that they will be told later on of any changes that the progress of the war makes possible or necessary.

The Japanese have a military force of more than 4,000,000 men and many millions more men that can be utilized for service forces or for combat, if need be. The numbers we can deploy in the Pacific, with the limitation of shipping and base facilities, would not appear on the face of it sufficient to insure that preponderance which brings victory swiftly and with low casualties.

But the Japanese forces are divided. Some are in the home islands; some in China; some in Manchuria. They have remnants of garrisons in many parts of the Pacific and the East Indies. Our control of the sea and the air makes it possible for us to keep these forces apart and to choose the time and place of our attacks. We have opportunity to strike with overwhelming power as soon as we get our bases established and our armies deployed.

It is our aim, together with our Allies, to give the men under General

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MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz all the help we can give them just as rapidly as we can move it into the Pacific.

We can meet only part of the needs of this Pacific war from men still in this country. Many of the troops now in Europe must also go to the Pacific to take their place beside those who have driven the Japanese back from the threshold of Australia to the inner zone of their own defenses.

Every physically fit soldier in the United States who has not yet served overseas will be assigned to foreign duty when he completes his training or, if he is performing an essential administrative or service function, as soon as he can be replaced by a returning veteran. The War Department has been making a systematic and successful effort since the start of the war to get all qualified men overseas. There have for several months been no combat divisions left in this country and few smaller tactical units of any character.

Moving our forces from Europe to the Pacific involves the greatest transportation problem that has ever been undertaken in war. The distances are tremendous. From Europe to Manila by way of Panama is 14,000 miles. From San Francisco to Manila is 6,771 miles. And speed is essential for it is vitally important that we do not give the enemy time either to rest or reorganize his defenses.

Consequently many troops will go straight from Europe to the war against Japan. As many as can be taken through the United States without reducing our pressure on the enemy will be brought through this country and given furloughs en route. Some must be given retraining after their furloughs, for fighting the Japanese is different from fighting Germans.

The need is particularly great for service troops to build the communications, harbors, bases, and airfields essential to sharply expanded combat operations. Many of the service troops will have to go direct to the Pacific to prepare the way for the full application of our ground and air strength.

More than half of the men to go to the Pacific will go by way of the United States. The proportion will be substantially lower than this among service units attached to air and ground operations, and higher among combat units. The great bulk of the combat units will be staged through the United States.

Still others of the troops now in Europe will have to remain there for occupation duty to make certain that the menace of Nazi aggression is permanently eradicated and that the seeds of a new war do not take root even before this one is ended. The number assigned to this duty and the length of time they will be needed will depend on the situation in Europe and the nature of our international commitments. For a considerable period of time the actual number of our soldiers in Europe will exceed the requirements due to limitations in shipping.

We are mindful of the desire in the heart of every soldier and every citizen to have as many of our soldiers as can be spared without diminishing the force of our blows against Japan, return to civilian life, as soon as possible. The War Department fully shares this desire. The Department strongly urged the Congress to provide in the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act of 1944, that no one should be retained in the armed forces after he was no longer needed for the prosecution of the war. This requirement is now the law of the land, and the War Department will live up to it in every respect.

The reduction in the size of the Army from 8,300,000 to 6,968,000 represents a drop of a little over 1,300,000 in total strength. This will not be
sufficient to permit the early discharge of all the men we consider should be returned to civil life as a result of their extended overseas and combat service.

Consequently, it is planned to hold Selective Service calls after V-E Day at a level above that necessary to replace men lost through battle and normal attrition and thus make it possible to release more men with a record of long and arduous service. This procedure of releasing the maximum number of veterans and their return to civil life will permit the call into service of those men who have heretofore been deferred for one reason or another.

We will at the same time continue to release men because of sickness, wounds, age and such other factors which prevent their effective use in the service. During the last twelve months discharges from all these causes totaled about 450,000. It is expected that discharges of this kind, in addition to those made of men with long overseas and combat service, will result in the release from the Army during the next year of about 2,000,000 men.

With the exception of the men to be released for specific disabilities, those who will leave the Army in the next year will be selected from all parts of the world, the Pacific as well as in Europe, on the basis of impartial standards recommended by the enlisted men themselves.

The whole aim of the system that has been developed is to insure that those men who have been overseas longest and have fought hardest and those who have children, get first consideration in demobilization. That is the way our soldiers believe it should be and that is the way it will be, subject only to the continuing necessity of keeping in service until adequate replacements can be found those men needed to defeat Japan.

A preliminary survey made by the War Department on the basis of a one-sixth demobilization of the Army indicates that all but two percent of the men to be released will be men who have served overseas and that these two percent will be fathers who have been in the Army a long time.

About half of the 1,300,000 men who will be eligible for release from the Army due to extended and arduous service are now in Europe and about one-third are in the Pacific. Most of the others are now in this country, having been returned under rotation after serving full tours of duty overseas.

How soon the men to be demobilized can be brought home will depend on the availability of shipping and air transport after the requirements of the war against Japan are met. The transportation of those eligible for discharge must be considered in connection with the whole transportation problem. In the last war it took a year to bring back the 2,000,000 men in the AEF, with no problem to meet in the Pacific save for a small force in Siberia. Today we have the problem of moving out of Europe almost double that force, a large number of whom must be transported over 14,000 miles of ocean to the far reaches of the Pacific.

We must transport to the Pacific vast stores of equipment and supplies both from the continental United States and from Europe so that our forthcoming operations may be carried out in accordance with our standard practice of using ammunition, air power, and material to the utmost to save lives. The soldiers who fight Japan will have all the superiority in fire power and equipment we can provide, but it will impose a heavy strain on shipping to give it to them. The supply lines to the Orient are so long that it takes three cargo ships to do the work one was able to do in supplying our troops in Europe.
We have about 70 combat divisions in Europe at the present time, exclusive of hundreds of thousands of combat troops assigned to Corps and Armies and a huge force of supply and service troops. It takes 15 Liberty ships to move the equipment of a single armored division. It takes 75 trains to move it to the port. That gives you some idea of the transportation problem we are up against.

First priority must be given to the troops and equipment going to the Pacific if we are to win that war in the shortest time and with the smallest cost in casualties. Otherwise, we must slow down the pace of our offensives and run the risk that the enemy will have an opportunity to reorganize for renewed resistance. We will not ask any American soldier to lay down his life in order that another American soldier may return home a few days sooner.

However, it is not the intention of the War Department to push demobilization to one side during the many months it will take to transfer our main strength from Europe to the Pacific. Demobilization will proceed at the same time as redeployment, although it will be necessarily secondary in terms of urgency. We will do everything that can be done consistent with the effective prosecution of the Japanese war to see that men eligible for discharge do get back home in the shortest possible time.

Every ship that can be pressed into service from any quarter will be used. Arrangements have already been completed for returning soldiers with long European service in converted cargo and grain ships. It is estimated that nearly half a million men can be brought home in such ships by the end of the year. Regular passenger ships and troop transports, including the famed British “Queen Elizabeth,” “Queen Mary,” and the “Aquitania,” will also be operating on a gigantic shuttle system. There will be 800 transport planes assigned to this task. Fifty thousand men a month will be brought back to this country by air. To the maximum possible extent, these planes will bring men from combat troops in the very heart of Germany—men with the longest periods of combat service and most remote from the ports. This process will begin promptly after Germany is defeated.

It is our expectation that, by ship and plane, we shall be able to bring home from Europe all the men to be discharged in about a year's time.

Equal attention is being given to the problem of bringing veteran troops back from the Pacific at the same time that the mass movement of additional forces into that theater is under way. The War Department is now shipping to the Pacific every replacement for whom shipping space can be found. By this means a surplus of replacements is being built up there so that men of long service can be sent home. Naval ships are being used wherever possible to assist in the return of men from this theater. Unfortunately, while the fighting goes on, the rate of return of men from the Japanese war will be governed by the extent to which we can bring in troops above actual battle replacement needs. No man can be released until another man is available to take his place.

The main facts of the redeployment as far as it concerns manpower are that:

(1) We believe that a program which gives us an army of 6,968,000 in 12 months from now will provide an adequate force to defeat Japan.

(2) About 2,000,000 men will be returned to civilian life during the next 12 months.
(3) About two-thirds of the combat units will come through the United States and have furloughs.

(4) The larger proportion of service troops urgently needed in the Pacific will go there directly.

(5) Transportation shortages, even with the 800 transport planes being used, will not get the last of the men who are to be discharged back to the United States before twelve months.

The problems involved in transferring our strength to the Pacific and bringing home those men who are no longer needed are more complicated than any we have experienced before. We cannot expect every phase of our plans to work to perfection. We count heavily upon the American people to continue to meet with courage and understanding the tests that lie ahead, as they have worked, prayed and suffered for the great victories in Europe.

For some the end of the war in Europe will mean joyous reunion, but for many more it will mean a new period of sacrifice and anxiety. None of us can afford to relax our efforts until that anxiety is terminated for every American at home and abroad.

Our great mission today is to mass against our enemy in the Pacific the largest force that can be effectively employed, with every resource and power we can put at its disposal. That process has already begun. It will not stop until we rid the world permanently of this menace.
The Secretary of War, the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, issued the following statement today at his press and radio conference:

"It is the earnest desire and the firm intention of the War Department to restore the men who have come into the Army in this emergency to their homes and families as rapidly as the military situation permits.

"The defeat of Germany gives us our first large-scale opportunity to do this, and we have developed a program based on the principle of justice and equity for each individual to select those soldiers who are entitled to leave the Army first.

"The citizen-army that is carrying us to victory in this global war was recruited through a selective process, in which all physically-fit men of military age were treated equally. It has been our conviction that the selective process should operate with equal comprehensiveness and impartiality in the designation of those eligible for release from the Army in the period between the unconditional surrender of Germany and final victory over Japan.

"Even before the first American soldier set foot anywhere on the continent of Europe, the War Department began formulating a program that had two objectives: First, to determine what standards the enlisted men themselves believed should be taken into account in establishing priority of separation from the Army, and second, to see to it that these standards were applied on a basis that would actually insure the release of men of [sic] individuals in the fairest manner.

"Troops in all parts of the world were interviewed, and, by overwhelming vote, expressed the belief that men with extended and arduous service overseas and fathers should receive preferential consideration.

"The system of points that has been adopted by the War Department is designed to accomplish this. All branches of the War Department—the General Staff, the Army Air Forces, the Army Service Forces, and the Army Ground Forces—have cooperated in developing the basic factors and the specific point values, and the product of their joint efforts has been checked and rechecked to make certain that it achieves the desired end.

"Obviously, our program will not satisfy everyone. There will be some who feel other factors should have been taken into account or greater weight assigned to one point than another. But we are confident, after the most diligent examination, that it would not have been possible to devise a system that would operate with greater justice to each individual soldier or that would more accurately reflect the desires of the soldiers themselves.

"Their feeling that the men who have served longest, have fought hardest and who have children are the ones who should leave the Army first is the touchstone of our program.
"The reduction in the size of the Army will enable us to release 1,300,000 officers, men and members of the Women's Army Corps during the next twelve months, in addition to those who will leave through wounds, sickness, age, and such other factors of normal attrition. We plan to increase this number and release more men with long and hazardous service by maintaining Selective Service calls at a level higher than that necessary for actual replacements.

"These releases will be made in accordance with the principles I have just outlined. They will not interfere in any way with the attainment of our determination to give our troops in the Pacific all the help in men and matériel that can be used effectively against Japan.

"Major General William F. Tompkins, Director of the Special Planning Division of the War Department Special Staff, who has had an active part in the formulation of this system from the very beginning, is here this morning. He will give you the specific point values and explain the mechanics of the program. All of this material is available for release not earlier than noon today. It will be given to troops throughout the world at the same time."

* * * * * * *

The standards that will control priority of separation from the Army will apply equally to soldiers all over the world and they embody the desires of the soldiers themselves, as expressed in polls taken by the War Department among thousands of enlisted men in this country and overseas. More than 90 percent of the men interviewed said they believed the men to be released first should be those who had been overseas and in combat longest and those with children.

Accordingly, the program to be followed provides for the issuance to each enlisted man and woman of an Adjusted Service Rating Card. Separate point totals will be entered on this card covering each of the following four factors:

1. Service Credit—1 point for each month of Army Service since September 16, 1940. This is the same as 12 points per year.

2. Overseas Credit—1 point for each month served overseas since September 16, 1940. This, too, is the same as 12 points per year.

3. Combat Credit—5 points for the first and each additional award of the following for service performed since 16 September 1940:
   a. Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Soldier's Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Purple Heart, and Bronze Service Stars (battle participation stars).
   b. Credit will also be given for the following decorations awarded by the Navy Department: Navy Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Silver Star Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross, Navy and Marine Corps Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal and Purple Heart Medal.
   c. Credit will be given for those awards and decorations of a foreign country which may be accepted and worn under the War Department regulations in effect when the Readjustment Regulations are placed in operation.

4. Parenthood Credit—12 points for each child under 18 years up to a limit of three children.
To illustrate how the point system works, let us suppose that a soldier has been in the Army thirty-six months, has served overseas for eighteen months, has won the Silver Star and Purple Heart and participated in three major campaigns and is the father of a child under 18. He would receive 36 points in service credit, eighteen points in overseas credit, twenty-five points in combat credit and 12 points in parenthood credit. His total score would be 91 points.

The men with the highest point totals will become eligible for release from the Army, except where considerations of military necessity make it impossible to let them go until qualified replacements can be obtained. This exception applies particularly to men possessing special skills required in the war against Japan and to men in units that will have to move into the Pacific so swiftly that no opportunity is provided for replacing men with high scores until they reach the new theater.

The Army wants to be absolutely certain, however, that any such cases which arise represent true military necessity and not military convenience. Therefore, the theaters have been instructed to establish a reviewing authority at an appropriate level to consist of selected mature officers who will pass on every case where an individual with a score equal to or above the Critical Score is to be retained by reason of military necessity.

I know many of you are wondering how we know whether the point credits we intend to use will actually achieve the desired effect of permitting those soldiers who have seen the longest and most arduous service away from home and those with children to leave the Army first.

A preliminary survey made by the War Department on the basis of a one-sixth demobilization of the Army indicates that all but two percent of the men to be released will be men who have served overseas and that these two percent will be fathers who have been in the Army a long time.

The significance of this figure becomes clearer when you consider that sixty-eight men out of every hundred now serving in the Army have served overseas, whereas ninety-eight out of every hundred to be returned to civilian life will be overseas veterans.

How well will the system succeed in providing preferential treatment for men with combat experience? Men who have been in combat constitute 35 percent of the Army, but 73 percent of the men who will get out are men from this group. Put another way, men with combat experience make up a little over one third of the Army, but constitute nearly three quarters of the number to be released.

Fathers represent 19 percent of the Army and 26 percent of the group returning to civilian life. In other words, one soldier out of five is a father but one man in every four to be sent home will be a father. Since we did not begin drafting fathers until the war was well advanced, it is apparent that our system is operating heavily in their favor.

I think these statistics make it clear that the point system carries out the desire expressed by our soldiers in the polls and gives first consideration to those most entitled to receive it.

After the Adjusted Service Rating Cards have been filled out, the number of soldiers with each point total in every theater will be reported to The Adjutant General's Office here in Washington and a certain point total will be established as the Critical Score. This Critical Score will represent the minimum number of points with which an enlisted man or woman can be released from the Army. There will be one Critical Score for all enlisted men in the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces and
another for all men in the Army Air Forces. A third Critical Score will
be calculated for members of the Women’s Army Corps. The three Critical
Scores are designed to effect equality of treatment for enlisted personnel
in all branches of the service.

It will take about six weeks before these Critical Scores can be computed
and announced. However, the War Department has no intention of
delaying releases until this computation is finished. An Interim Score of
85 points has been established for Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces
enlisted personnel. All soldiers who have this many points or more will
be considered as eligible for release in accordance with the plan, and men
will start moving to Separation Centers for discharge early next week.
For members of the WAC, an Interim Score of 44 points has been set up.
Only points scored as of Saturday, May 12, 1945, will be taken into con-
sideration in determining eligibility for release. The only credits which will
be given after that date will be for decorations and battle participation
stars earned prior thereto. Likewise additional credit will be given for
children born on or before May 12 but whose birth was not known to the
father at the time the scores were prepared.

Enlisted personnel who desire to remain in the service and have a satis-
factory record will be retained.

Because of the requirements of the war against Japan, the strength of
the Army Service Forces and the Army Air Forces will be reduced much
less than the strength of the Army Ground Forces. As a result, the
initial rate of release will be more rapid among ground troops than among
those assigned to Air Forces or Service Forces. However, through trans-
fers of some low-score men from the Ground Forces and new trainees,
a proportionate share of men will be released from all three forces as rapidly
as practicable.

In this whole program the Army has put the emphasis on the individual
because we felt that was the only fair way in which to carry out demobili-
ization. From the operating viewpoint, it would have been much simpler
to bring surplus units home for demobilization and release their personnel
intact without worrying about whether all the men in them were entitled
to priority of separation from the Army.

Such a method, however, would operate with great unfairness to many
individuals who have had long and arduous service but are not assigned to
one of the units declared surplus. If only units in Europe were considered,
this method would work unfairly to units long in the Pacific or at outpost
bases in the American theater. It would operate unfairly to men who have
seen extended combat service both in Europe and the Pacific and have
been returned to this country for reassignment. It would release men
only recently assigned as replacements to units long in combat and would
discriminate against veterans of many campaigns in units not selected for
return.

Consequently, it was determined that the fairest method to effect partial
demobilization would be through the selection of men as individuals, rather
than by units, with the selection governed by thoroughly impartial standards.

The carrying out of this program will not affect the continued release
of enlisted men over 42 years of age, which was started recently. Dis-
charge of these men, upon application, will continue without regard to
other factors.

Holders of the Medal of Honor will also be eligible for release upon their
own request.
In addition, married members of the WAC will be released, at their own request, if their husbands have been separated from the armed forces and returned to civilian life.

Now I would like to explain the method we will use in releasing officers. It is tougher than the plan for enlisted personnel primarily because officers have received additional training, have heavier responsibilities, and have developed specialized skills and leadership capacity. They must be handled more on an individual than a group basis. Therefore, although officers will have an adjusted service rating score based on the same multiples as for enlisted personnel, this factor will be secondary to the prime requirement of military necessity.

The expression "military necessity" as applied to officers means consideration must be given on an individual basis to the relative utility of an officer, need for his specialty, and the availability of assignments which will make the best use of his capabilities. Officers with lengthy overseas service and long and hazardous service in combat will be given special consideration for release. An officer's desire to remain in the service at this time will be another factor to be given consideration.

The return of officers to the United States will be controlled by theater commanders who will use the foregoing principles in making their decisions. However, I wish to emphasize that the determination of whether or not an officer is to be released from the Army, as opposed to simply being returned to the United States, will be made by the Commanding Generals of the Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces acting under the general supervision of the War Department.

In other words, if an officer is declared surplus by his theater commander, he may still be retained if he is needed by any unit of the AAF, AGF, or ASF.

When individuals who are surplus to overseas theaters arrive in this country they will proceed from ports to a reception station close to their home area. Twenty-two of these reception stations will be placed about the country in order that the Army may bring individuals as close to their homes as possible. Seventeen of them are already in operation and the remainder will begin operations during June. Here in the reception station those individuals with scores equal to or above the Critical Score will be screened once more to determine whether they are essential to the Army as a whole or are nonessential and can therefore be returned to civilian life. Again let me emphasize that an enlisted man whose score entitles him to release will be held in the Army as essential only if his skill is so important to the Army and so scarce that he cannot be spared. Individuals of this type who do have to be held will be replaced as rapidly as the Army can train and make available replacements with the proper skills.

An individual who is found nonessential at the reception station is immediately transferred to a separation center, located at the same post, for processing for release from the Army. The complete process in a separation center will take about forty-eight hours after which the individual is on his way to his home as a civilian. As you know, at the separation center, every possible assistance is given to prepare the soldier for his return to civilian life. We want those who are separated from the Army to know that their services are greatly appreciated. We are certain, too, that they will prove themselves to be as good citizens as they have been soldiers and as soldiers they have shown themselves to be unexcelled. The many citizen
soldiers who must remain in the service have a tough job ahead. Their accomplishments so far indicate that they will more than measure up to that task. They may be assured that when the job is done procedures will be ready to insure their prompt return to civilian life.

Through the same reception stations, which I have just mentioned, pass the individuals returned to this country in units which will be required for continued service against the Japanese. These individuals will have in almost every case scores below the Critical Score. They will be brought from the ports to these reception stations in order to get them close to their home areas. Here they are given travel time to and from their homes plus up to thirty days furlough for rest and recuperation. After that they report to the designated point where their unit is to be reformed for continued active service.
APPENDIX VII
WORLD-WIDE ATTITUDES TOWARD FURTHER
SERVICE AND TOWARD REDEPLOYMENT
(Source: ASF. I&E Report No. B-199, 30 June 1945)

Attitudes Toward the Point System

To help control such an expected let-down in morale after VE-Day and to provide an orderly procedure for reducing the size of the Army, the Army after VE-Day announced its redeployment procedure, of which the point system is an integral part. The point system received general support in the American press, and a Gallup poll showed that it had the approval of 70 percent of the public—about the same proportion as approved the Selective Service System, and about as large a majority as is ever found on a vital national issue.

What do the soldiers themselves think of the point system? Although, as shown above, the majority of soldiers are not at all eager for long service in the Army, a decisive majority throughout the world—in every theater surveyed—are favorable to the point system.

Only eight percent say that the point system is "not good at all," and another 17 percent say it is "not so good." Five percent are undecided or express no opinion. 70 percent are favorable, divided between 49 percent who say the point system is "pretty good" and 21 percent who say it is "very good."

Soldier critics of the point system fall into three main types:

(1) A small and perhaps irreducible minority of men who are so disaffected in general that they probably would complain about any plan which did not release them at once. Among these men are an undetermined number who claim their physical condition is such as to make them eligible for medical discharge, a personal judgment which does not jibe with the opinion of Army doctors. Data on this point are presented later in this report.

(2) A group not necessarily opposed to the point system as such, but who are frankly skeptical about whether the Army will carry out the plan as announced. Faith in the Army's promises, based on the soldier's past experience, is associated with favorable attitudes toward the point system. It is found, for example, that among the men who believe the plan "will be carried out the way it is supposed to be" only 16 percent say it is "not good at all" or "not so good." Dissatisfaction with the plan rises to 23 percent among men who are undecided about whether or not it will be carried out, and 49 percent among men who believe it will not be carried out.

The relationship shown by these figures suggests that future trends in attitudes toward the point system will depend on the Army's proving, through appropriate information media, that the plan is being executed in good faith. Such information would be nullified, of course, if the redeployment plan breaks down seriously, especially at the unit command level. No figures such as those in the above paragraph can prove whether skepticism about the actual working of the plan is responsible for disapproval of it, or whether disapproval of the plan is responsible for lack of faith in the way the Army will handle it. They suggest, however, that at least
some of the criticism of the point system stems not from objection to the point scores, but from doubts as to how the plan as announced will be put into effect. This relationship assumes considerable importance in view of the additional fact that more than one-fourth of the men with 85 points or more distrust the manner in which the plan will actually work out.

(3) Men who feel that the point system is unfair in certain specific details. Obviously, the soldiers who voice complaints about the point system comprise but a rather small fraction of the Army. Nevertheless, it is of considerable importance to examine the nature of their complaints in some detail. For one thing, some of these men in themselves constitute a “morale problem” group. In addition, there is always some danger that the attitudes of men who nurse dissatisfaction may carry over to other men with whom they come in contact. The following groups among the men who feel the point system itself is unfair are the source of most of the complaints.

(a) Ground troops who are veterans of actual combat against the enemy. The majority of these men favor the point system, but there is disapproval and even bitterness in a minority, accounting for nearly a third of all the critics of the point system. These men complain (1) that a campaign star is not an adequate measure of combat, (2) that they get little if any advantage in combat credit over troops in their theater who have not been in combat,* and (3) that the number of points for children is too high as compared with combat and overseas credits. Among troops actually engaged in combat, with less than 85 points, 42 percent think the point system is “not good at all” or “not so good,” as contrasted with 27 percent among all soldiers with less than 85 points. Also it may be noted that the more campaigns the combat man has fought through, the more he tends to disapprove the plan.

(b) Men 35 and over. Actually, the older men are much less likely to be critical of the point system than the combat veterans. In any given theater, for example, a young combat veteran is more likely to criticize the plan than an older non-combat veteran. Among men 35 and over, with less than 85 points for discharge, 33 percent are dissatisfied, only six percent more than the 27 percent among all men with less than 85 points. Although men over 35 comprise less than ten percent of the Army, complaints about no credit for age have been one of the principal criticisms in continental United States. Even among men over 35 who have no overseas, combat or parenthood credit, the majority favor the point system.

(c) Men with dependents other than children. This group principally comprises married men without children. As in the case of the older men, the married non-fathers also are not generally dissatisfied with the point system, although a good many say they would like credit for wives. Among such men, with less than 85 points for discharge, 32 percent say the plan is “not good at all” or “not so good,” compared with the general average of 27 percent. Some criticisms also were voiced by men who want points for dependent fathers or mothers.

*In ETO the average field force combat veteran surveyed had 3 campaign stars as did also the average field force man who had not seen combat. The average Comzone had 2 campaign stars. Decorations added relatively little to the combat man’s combat credit, on the average.
(d) Men in the Army more than three years. As would be expected, preference for a “first in, first out” policy in place of the score card system is strongest among this group of men with greatest longevity. Even in this group, however, the proportion of men with less than 85 points who disapprove of the point system is only 30 percent—a scant three percent higher than the general average. The extent of dissatisfaction among groups of men with different longevity does not vary markedly because men with less than three years' service are more apt to raise objections to factors other than the weight given to length of service.

(e) Miscellaneous non-combat groups overseas. Here the most frequent complaints are (1) from men who feel, like the combat troops, that points for children are too high as compared with credit for time overseas; and (2) from rear area troops who did not receive campaign stars although non-combat troops in forward areas received them through what seemed to many of the men a mere technicality. A special case of dissatisfaction are air service squadrons in Europe, whose men did not get campaign stars while ground crews of bomb squadrons at the same bases did. In ETO, for example, 39 percent of the men in service squadrons (with less than 85 points) are critical of the point system, as contrasted with only 13 percent of the ground crew men and only six percent of the flyers. No example has been found, however, in which a majority of men failed to approve the plan.

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APPENDIX VIII

TROOP REQUIREMENTS GOVERN RATE OF OVERSEAS DEMOBILIZATION

(War Department Press Release 4 January 1946).

Demobilization of the Army has progressed to the point where troop requirements overseas, rather than shipping, have become the governing factor in the rate at which the Army can return men to the United States for discharge, the War Department announced today.

Because troop requirements overseas during the next six months will exceed the rate at which the Army is capable of maintaining them through replacements, it will be necessary to slow down the rate of demobilization and in some cases to delay the return to the United States of men eligible for discharge until replacements can take their places. In no case, however, should this delay any man in the theaters more than three months beyond the time he becomes eligible for discharge.

Demobilization, which has already returned nearly 5,000,000 men and women to civil life, will continue with a gradual lowering of discharge criteria until all men who are eligible have been returned from overseas. Troops will be brought back at an average of approximately 300,000 men a month for the next six months until the Army reaches a planned minimum overseas strength of 797,000 on July 1, 1946. If all shipping now available were used to the maximum, all men overseas who will become eligible for return could be brought back in three months, but such a program would cripple the Army in carrying out its occupational duties and those incident to closing out various supply and other installations overseas.

Every effort has been made by the War Department to obtain sufficient replacements, but they have not been obtained fast enough to permit immediate return of every man who becomes eligible for discharge without endangering the Nation's occupation role. Our overseas forces would be dangerously understrength in occupying hostile countries if all eligible men were to be returned before sufficient replacements arrived.

There will be about 1,553,000 men to be shipped home over a period of six months rather than three months, which would be possible with the amount of shipping presently available. Approximately 800,000 men will be discharged in January.

To utilize shipping now on hand, the War Department may now begin to carry out our obligation to return war brides and other dependents of American soldiers. The shipment of these dependents will not be permitted to delay any soldier who would otherwise be ready for return.

Several factors have kept replacements from meeting present needs. One has been the rapid pace at which the demobilization program has progressed — exceeding all advance estimates. The enlistment program, while breaking all prior records, has not kept pace with replacement requirements. Furthermore, all newly-enlisted men must undergo a period of training and since the enlistment program began in September the first of these men are just reaching their overseas stations now. Reenlistment furloughs, as well as emergency furloughs and men traveling, account for another 200,000 men a month who are prevented from performing overseas duties. And in
spite of continuing efforts of the Selective Service System to meet Army requirements of 50,000 men a month, actually an average of only 37,000 men have been procured monthly since V-J Day.

All overseas commanders have been directed to reduce their requirements to the bone and successive revisions, both for the overseas army and the forces in the United States, have resulted in a planned strength of 1,550,000 (including Air Forces) for July 1, 1946. This represents a reduction of about 400,000 from estimates of September, 1945.

The proposed distribution is as follows:

**Overseas**

- Europe (including Italy) 335,000
- Pacific 375,000
- Other Areas 87,000
- Filipinos Undergoing Training 50,000

**Continental U. S.**

- Supply, hospital, and other operating personnel 360,000
- Personnel undergoing training and in transit to theaters and a small strategic reserve 343,000

Total 1,550,000

Forces in Continental United States include troops engaged in training replacements, and in the operation and maintenance of Army installations, including depots, schools, ports of embarkation and debarkation, hospitals; personnel engaged in recruiting and discharging activities; personnel engaged in surplus property disposal and contract termination; personnel engaged in the supply of forces overseas; selectees and enlistees undergoing basic training and enroute from induction stations to training installations and to overseas stations; hospital patients; personnel being discharged, men on reenlistment and emergency furloughs; and a small strategic reserve.

The Army is continuing its efforts to make further reductions in its manpower requirements. For example, 50,000 Filipino troops are being recruited and trained and will be used to replace a like number of American soldiers in the Philippines in late 1946.
The President has received the following memorandum from the Chief of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, on the subject of soldier demonstrations in Manila:

"It is my understanding that you have requested information concerning the soldier demonstrations in Manila, 6-7 January 1946, which have recently been reported by the press. In order that you may have an accurate picture of what has taken place, I have obtained a report from Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding General, Army Forces, Western Pacific in direct command of the Philippines, which is summarized for your information.

"On the 6th and 7th of January a series of demonstrations were held in the Manila area. The only one of these of any magnitude was a mass meeting of from 8,000 to 10,000 soldiers held at the City Hall. Here the soldiers voiced dissatisfaction with recent conflicting statements by War Department officials, and urged that pressure be brought to bear on families and congressmen in the United States to reduce overseas forces to those required for occupation of Japan and Germany and disposal of property. General Styer broadcast an address to all the troops of the area including those assembled at the City Hall.

"In his address General Styer explained that in four months the Army has demobilized two-thirds of his command which it took two years and six months to build. For the entire Pacific Area it has been found necessary to deploy an Army of 375,000 Army troops, including Air Forces, to perform our occupational and post-war garrison duties, as of 1 July 1946. Our forces cannot be permitted to demobilize at such a rate that the flow of replacements from the recruiting program and selective service cannot maintain that minimum [sic] strength. Further, supplies assembled in the far flung bases must be protected to prevent wastage, deterioration and theft.

"General Styer reported by radio to General MacArthur that no mass disciplinary action has been initiated by responsible commanders because there have been no acts of violence or disorder. General MacArthur replied giving his approval to the method of action proposed by General Styer and stated that the discontent has been 'primarily caused by acute homesickness aggrevated by the termination of hostilities. These men are good men who have performed magnificently under campaign conditions and inherently are not challenging discipline or authority'.”
APPENDIX X

LETTER FROM ELEANOR ROOSEVELT TO
GENERAL EISENHOWER, 12 JANUARY 1946

United States Delegation to the
General Assembly of the United Nations
London, January 12, 1946.

Dear General Eisenhower,

A group of some ten boys came to see me yesterday, representing the soldiers in this area. They were very well behaved and, I thought, very logical.

They said that the men with points below 45 realized that they had to stay here and were entirely reconciled; those with more than 60 had gone home; but those in between were very anxious to have a definite policy announced. A great many of them feel that more men are kept in the area than are really needed for the work and that this is done by officers who find their jobs not too unpleasant and like to have a good number of men under them.

One boy said he would give anything to do one good day’s work. I have had that said to me by a number of men, and written to me by a number of them; and of course their living conditions are not as pleasant as the officers’. I think, however, if it is possible for the War Department to give them some kind of a definite answer as to the plans made for bringing them home, it would make a great difference. One boy told me he had been six years in the Army; he had volunteered for a year, here, after being in the Pacific, but he had been here a great deal longer than that and was now anxious to get home. They do feel that there is some injustice in the way people are sent home and I know that is difficult to eliminate in any great big undertaking. But certainly a clear and definite policy could now be formulated, and I am writing you in the hope that something can be done. They are good boys but if they don’t have enough to do they will get into trouble. That is the nature of boys, I am afraid, in any situation.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

/s/
Eleanor Roosevelt

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Washington, D. C.
APPENDIX XI
LIST OF WAR DEPARTMENT CRITICAL MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES

SSN       Military Occupational Specialty
077       Powerhouse engineer (with at least 2 years civilian experience in power station or as substation operator)
080       Marine engineer
187       Repeaterman, TP
267       Translator (Asiatic languages)
320       Interpreter (Asiatic languages)
306       Orthopedic mechanic
538       Voice interceptor (Asiatic languages)
543       Radio intelligence control chief
709       Traffic analyst (radio)
739       Intercept operator (signal)
760       Radio operator, AACS
790       Weather observer—TT technician
798       Transmitter attendant, fixed station
799       Intercept operator, fixed station
801       Cryptographic repairman (Classes I and II)
808       Cryptanalysis technician
852       Radar mechanic, RCM
952       Radar repairman, gun-laying equipment (instructor)
953       Radar repairman, reporting equipment (instructor)
...       Acoustic technician (hearing aid specialist)
...       Electronecephalographic specialist
013       Diesel mechanic
039       Cable splicer, TP and TG
042       Camera repairman
095       Central office repairman
096       Installer repairman, TP and TG
098       Instrument repairman, non-electric
166       Powerman
206       Sound projector repairman
207       Sound recording equipment maintenance man
237       Teletypewriter operator
238       Lineman, TP and TG
239       Teletype mechanic
338       Instrument repairman, electrical
581       Signal supply technician
646       Telephone and telegraph equipment repairman
648       Radio repairman
649       Radio repairman, fixed station
650       Telephone switchboard operator
805       Cryptographic technician
806       Code clerk
### APPENDIX XII

#### SEPARATION CENTERS ARRANGED

**ALPHABETICALLY INDICATING AREAS SERVED**

(Source: RR 1-2, 11 Apr 45)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Separation center</th>
<th>States served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camp Atterbury, Ind.</td>
<td>Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Beale, Calif.</td>
<td>California (north of 35th parallel of latitude)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Blanding, Fla.</td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bliss, Tex.</td>
<td>Arizona, New Mexico, Texas (west of 100th parallel of longitude)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Bragg, N. C.</td>
<td>North Carolina, South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Chaffee, Ark.</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Dix, N. J.</td>
<td>Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Douglas, Utah</td>
<td>Utah, Idaho, Nevada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Gordon, Ga.</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Grant, Ill.</td>
<td>Iowa, Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson Barracks, Mo.</td>
<td>Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Lewis, Wash.</td>
<td>California (south of the 35th parallel of latitude)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Logan, Colo.</td>
<td>Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. MacArthur, Calif.</td>
<td>Alabama, District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp McCoy, Wis.</td>
<td>Texas (west [sic] of 100th Parallel of longitude)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. McPherson, Ga.</td>
<td>Louisiana, Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Meade, Md.</td>
<td>Michigan (Upper Peninsula), Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Sam Houston, Tex.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Shelby, Miss.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. Sheridan, Ill.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX XIII
PROPOSED PLAN OF DEMOBILIZATION OF
THE ARMY

1. . . . . .

2. There will be no change in the factors announced . . . until 1 December 1945.

3. In December 1945 a new policy which combines ASR score and length of service will be instituted. The factors effective 1 December 1945 will be:
   Male Officers (excluding Medical Dept)—ASR 70 or 4 years service
   WAC Officers—ASR 37
   Medical Dept Officers—no change for present
   Male Enlisted—ASR 50 or 4 years of service
   Female Enlisted—ASR 32

   In addition all enlisted fathers who have three or more children under 18 years of age will become eligible for discharge irrespective of length of service or adjusted service rating score if they so request. Likewise all married members of the WAC who enlisted prior to V-E Day become eligible for discharge if they request.

4. Effective 1 January 1946 the factors will be as follows:
   Male Officers (excluding Medical)—ASR 65 or 3 years 9 months service
   WAC Officers—ASR 37 or 3 years 3 months service
   Medical Officers (to be announced at a later date)
   Male Enlisted—ASR 45 or 3 years 6 months of service
   Female Enlisted—ASR 32 or 2 years 6 months of service

5. The factors effective 1 February will be:
   Male Officers (excluding Medical Dept)—ASR 65 or 3 years 6 months service
   WAC Officers—ASR 37 or 3 years 3 months service
   Medical Dept Officers—to be announced
   Male Enlisted—ASR 40 or 3 years service
   Female Enlisted—ASR 32 or 2 years 3 months service

6. The factors effective 1 March 1946 will be as follows:
   Male Officers (excluding Medical Dept)—ASR 65 or 3 years 6 months service
   WAC Officers—ASR 37 or 3 years 3 months service
   Medical Department Officers—to be announced
   Male Enlisted—ASR 40 or 2 years 6 months service
   Female Enlisted—ASR 32 or 2 years service

7. Factors effective 20 March:
   All except male enlisted—same as 1 March
   Male Enlisted—ASR 40 or 2 years service

8. Length of service as it pertains to this policy will mean total active service (commissioned plus enlisted) since 16 September 1940 which total
will increase with the passage of time. For WAC’s length of service includes service in the WAAC.

9. There will be no consideration of “military necessity” except for those individuals whose Military Occupational Specialty appears on the lists of scarce categories (WD Memo 605-45 and 615-45). Personnel whose MOS appears on these lists may be retained in the service for a maximum of six months after date of eligibility. Those held under each specialty will be limited to requirements for that specialty selected so as to retain only those least qualified for separation.

10. Officers who become eligible under this policy will be reported available for separation within 60 days of date of eligibility unless they have volunteered to remain in the service under existing regulations. Enlisted personnel must be declared available for separation immediately upon eligibility unless they have volunteered under the provisions of change 2 of RR 1-1 or have enlisted in the Regular Army. Any command which requires retention of enlisted personnel for not more than 60 days after date of eligibility as expressed in this radio in order to continue operations directly connected with demobilization of the Army may request authority to retain such personnel for not more than 60 days by furnishing War Department with details as to number of men involved, reasons why replacements are not available, and demobilization operations which will be adversely affected if authority is not granted.

11. To implement this policy effectively it is incumbent upon all commanders to take immediate steps to utilize to the maximum extent possible all available personnel who will not become eligible for separation. This will necessitate retraining within the command and requisitioning from the War Department only that personnel which it is impossible to provide or train from sources within the command.

[Personnel estimates of this plan are shown below.]

**ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF THE ARMY**

(1) Based on planned demobilization outlined above.

(2) Assuming adoption of 18 Month Service Policy (on 1 Oct 1946) to coincide with expiration of enlistments Under WD Circular 310 6 October 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:  
SUBJECT: Transition from the Point System to a Length-of-Service Policy.

Need for Length-of-service policy

The present point system gives priority discharge to those with lengthy service overseas and long and hazardous service in combat. The time is approaching rapidly when over-all length of service should become an additional basis for discharge. Definite periods of service are authorized for enlistments; this is the normal peacetime method of procuring men for the Army and it is most acceptable to the men themselves as it constitutes a firm commitment on which they can plan.

Future plan

On 1 November enlisted men with 60 or more points will become eligible for separation. By 1 December the criteria will probably be lowered to 50 points, or a total of four years’ service; by 1 January to 45 points or three and one-half years’ service; by 1 February to 40 points or three years’ service; and by 1 March, 40 points or two and one-half years’ service. The next step logically would be to drop to a two-year tour of service, the last week in March. However, it appears that the release of men of two years’ service would carry the Army below the numbers required for present occupation force commitments unless allied troops relieve a number of our troops in Japan and the release of troops involved in liquidating our huge supply depots in France can be expedited, etc.

Under the plan separations will continue at the present accelerated rate of more than 1,000,000 a month during November and December, dropping to approximately 800,000 in January and February, and 600,000 in March. This will result in the Army having a total strength on 1 April of approximately 1.9 million, including about 400,000 who will be eligible for discharge (overseas, enroute home or being processed here at home).

The foregoing figures represent rough estimates based on the assumption that 40 points or two and one-half years’ service are the discharge criteria through the month of March. They will be affected by changes which may occur in the discharge rate, shipping schedules, voluntary enlistments and inductions. While we have the broad plan and end to be accomplished thoroughly in mind, the transition will of necessity be a step-by-step process in accordance with current developments so that we retain the men necessary to meet our commitments and care for the tremendous quantities of equipment now on hand.
Our present overseas requirements, operating requirements in the U.S. and the strategic reserve total approximately 1.6 million. Since this figure may be reached early in April instead of July, as originally anticipated, and it is essential to plan at least three months in advance, the final decision on the tour-of-duty policy cannot be delayed beyond early January 1946.

**Effect of two-year tour-of-duty plan on total Army strength**

The War Department is presently committed to a two-year tour of duty plan by late March. Adoption of the plan in March may result in an inability to take care of millions of dollars worth of equipment and supplies. This point remains to be determined, being dependent primarily on the rate of disposal of surpluses by liquidation agencies.

Based on the current intake of personnel, a two-year policy will not permit the U.S. to meet overseas commitments and Zone of Interior requirements as now known. First, the efficiency of the Army, particularly the Army Air Forces, will be greatly impaired for many months after the adoption of the two-year plan due to the lack of the trained technicians essential to effective combat units. Secondly, present estimates are that the available manpower will be insufficient to man the Army units required to fulfill our commitments. According to our present estimates, either political commitments requiring troops overseas must be reduced after mid-1946 or alternately, provision other than that now in sight must be made for maintaining the strength of the Army.

It is too early to say that presently estimated Army manpower requirements represent the irreducible minimum or that a two-year policy suitably modified could not be placed in operation by late March without jeopardizing U.S. over-all commitments.

Both the European and Pacific theaters are restudying their requirements, the operating requirements in the United States are being re-evaluated, and the strength and composition of the reserve is subject to constant analysis. Other unknown factors which influence the method and timing of the two-year policy are the ultimate strength and percentage of trained soldiers that can be obtained by voluntary enlistments and the future of inductions through the Selective Service Act. The next two months should give the War Department a much clearer picture than is available today upon which to base its tour-of-duty policy. I will keep you advised of our decisions as the situation develops.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

cc: Adm. Leahy
    G–1
    G–3
    Gen. Handy
    CS
    RR
    OPD
APPENDIX XV
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM NOVEMBER 1, 1945 FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Question: 1. Is it your estimate that as of 1 July 1946, 1 Jan 1947, and 1 July 1947, the situation will require occupation forces in the countries listed below? If you so estimate, what will the functions of these forces be in each listed country?

Answer: a. Europe:

(1) Germany: It is anticipated that occupation forces will be required in Germany on July 1, 1946, January 1, 1947 and July 1, 1947. The precise functions of these forces in Germany on the indicated dates are difficult to determine at this time. If by these dates considerable progress has been made in the Control Council on the reestablishment of German agencies, the possible transition from military government to a general supervisory civilian control, it is conceivable that a police type force of occupation would be sufficient. It is understood that the War Department is already developing plans for this type of occupation force.

If this system can be developed, the functions of the occupation forces would presumably be limited to the maintenance of order and the many functions of military government now in effect could be transferred to German agencies and to Allied civilian control. This transition in the occupational system of Germany will, however, require negotiations with the other powers represented on the Control Council in Berlin and will no doubt require a modification of the present agreement on control machinery for Germany. The Department of State cannot predict with any certainty at this time when or exactly how this transfer of functions may be effected.

(2) Austria: The Department of State expects to initiate discussions shortly with the War Department for the purpose of presenting proposals in the Allied Council at Vienna for a reduction of Allied occupation forces in Austria.

We shall require military advice as to how this proposal can most effectively be presented. The Department of State would like to obtain agreement in the Allied Council in the near future for a material reduction of occupation forces in Austria. It would certainly be desirable to have the occupation forces in Austria transposed into a police type by July 1, 1946 and, if possible, withdrawn entirely by January 1, 1947. The qualified recognition which has now been extended to the Renner Government in Austria is the first step in this direction.
(3) **Czechoslovakia**: The American Government and the Russian Government have now agreed that American and Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia by December 1, 1945.

(4) **Italy and Venezia Giulia**: The Italian campaign was initiated and carried through as an Allied campaign. Allied Military Government was set up in the liberated territory as a joint organization, and both British and American forces have been used for the maintenance of order. There would appear to be at least a moral obligation on our part to maintain American forces for AMG as long as required.

The establishment of Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia, as a disputed area, and the continuation of AMG in that area, and perhaps in Bolzano as well, until the final peace settlement, was approved by the President on September 19, 1944. This approval was confirmed to the Secretary of War by the Acting Secretary in a letter dated April 26, 1945, in which it was also stated that participation of American forces in these areas was a "sine qua non" in British agreement to the establishment and maintenance of AMG.

On April 28, 1945, the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended that the forces necessary in Venezia Giulia be provided jointly by the US and UK, and a directive in this sense was dispatched to SACMED on April 30, 1945.

b. **Far East: Japan**

(1) Occupational forces will be needed on a fairly wide scale on July 1, 1946. By January 1, 1947, if progress continues at the same rate as at present toward achievement of the objectives of the occupation, it should be possible for the occupation forces to be concentrated in a few important strategic places and their numbers perhaps reduced in comparison with the forces maintained on July 1, 1946. Occupation forces will continue to be required on July 1, 1947. If the same tendency as mentioned above continues in Japan, it may be that a further reduction by July 1, 1947 will be possible. Perhaps by that time a minimum number of mobile occupational units will be needed to assure the continued control over Japan, but that, of course, depends upon developments.

The functions of the occupation forces, after the complete disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese forces is completed, will be to assure that Allied policies, as implemented by the directives of the Supreme Commander, are carried out. These forces will act primarily as enforcement agencies and may also be required to carry out the inspection of Japanese industry to prevent the growth of Japan's war-making power.

**Far East: Korea**

(2) It is hoped that by July 1, 1946 an international trusteeship will be in operation in Korea. If so, only those armed forces requested by the High Commissioner for Korea
(provided for in the trusteeship draft) and approved by the proposed Executive Council for Korea for the maintenance of internal law and order will remain in Korea. The same answer applies to occupation forces as of January 1 and July 1, 1947. Since it is hoped that native police and a native constabulary will, to an increasing degree, assume responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in Korea, it should not be necessary for the High Commissioner to request that large numbers of troops be made available to assist him.

Question: 2. a. Forces presently planned to be available in Europe on and after 1 January 1946 will be capable of policing Germany and enforcing surrender terms. These forces will not be capable of making a show of force to implement political policies should a firm stand against a militant power prove desirable. Are these military capabilities in consonance with foreign policy of our government?

Answer: a. It is undeniable that the presence of large numbers of United States forces in Europe gives tangible evidence of the interest of our Government in European affairs and lends authority and support to the position taken by our Government on political questions. This is true even though no conscious effort is made, or should be made, to create "a show of force". It seems unlikely that the size of the occupation force in Europe by next July (probably under 200,000) will be large enough to be impressive in providing support for our political policies. The situation would not be greatly improved if the size of the force were double that figure next July. The important thing is that our Country must have sufficient military strength at home and abroad to give evidence of a determination to back up the policies of our Government anywhere that may be necessary. Our influence and prestige throughout the world are to a large extent dependent on this. Our military potential, demonstrated in 1917–1918, was not enough to keep us out of World War II.

Question: b. (1) What is the maximum proportionate military participation which the U.S. will allow our Allies in the occupation of Japan? The composition of Allied occupational forces depends upon the answer to this question.

b. (2) In connection with granting our Allies certain rights in Japan, what, if any corollary involvement in continental affairs in the Fast East do we foresee and accept? From a military point of view, this determines what military steps must be designed against unacceptable aggression in the Orient. For instance, it would be most valuable to have a clear cut statement of minimum interests from which the U.S. will not retreat in the event of a clash of interests in the Far East, particularly concerning Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, North China and Korea.

Answer: b. (1) In a memorandum from the JCS to the SWNCC of October 24 it is stated:
“General MacArthur considers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur, that if the United States is to maintain the controlling voice in the occupation of Japan, U.S. participation in the occupation forces must be at least equal to that of all other nations combined.”

The Department feels that it is essential for the United States to maintain the controlling voice in the occupation of Japan. The proportionate United States military participation in the occupation necessary to maintain this position is considered to be primarily a military question. Therefore, in accordance with General MacArthur's view, the Department feels that the maximum proportionate military participation which the United States should allow our Allies in the occupation of Japan is not more than fifty per cent.

b. (2) In the absence of any indication as to the character of "certain rights" which we might grant to our Allies in Japan, it is difficult to answer this question. If the reference is to stationing of military contingents by our Allies in Japan, we do not understand how such stationing of contingents would give rise to any corollary involvement by the United States in continental affairs in the Far East.

As to your request for a statement of minimum interests from which the United States will not retreat in the event of a clash of interests in the Far East, the Department might determine in advance the military steps to be taken against possible aggression in the Far East. It is believed that the problem posed by your question in regard to this Department's contribution of political guidance to the Armed Forces can best be met by consistent and close cooperation between the Departments concerned.

Question: 3. Are there any U.S. requirements other than military which will necessitate continuation of the operation of ATC facilities by the War Department in occupied areas or on foreign routes? If so, what are those requirements in detail, including length of time and specified operation to be continued?

Answer: 3. We do not know of any U.S. requirements other than military which will necessitate continuation of the operation of ATC facilities in occupied areas or on foreign routes. It seems likely that military requirements will for sometime necessitate operations by the ATC to Berlin and certain other places in Europe. Since our only means of communication with Berlin is over ATC service it is our hope that it will be continued until regularly scheduled commercial services are instituted. The same situation applies at various other places in Europe and in the Far East. In these circumstances it is hoped that the War Department will confer with the Department of State informally in advance before reaching a decision to terminate important ATC services to Europe and the Far East.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, NOVEMBER 24, 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:
SUBJECT: Rate of Demobilization

The Army's record on demobilization in October, when 1,270,000 men were discharged, was very good. From the figures on the discharges in the first half of November, it appears that the record in November will be equally good. It is important that we continue approximately the same rate of discharge in December. Please take such steps as may be necessary to assure the discharge of at least 1,200,000 men in December.

I should like to have submitted to me, not later than December 8, the proposed reduction in the point score for the month of January, and data on the estimated rate of discharge for that month. At that time, I would also like to have a statement as to the time when it will be possible to discharge men on the basis of two-years service without regard to other factors. You will recall that General Marshall, in his appearances before the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees, stated that this change would be effected late in the winter.

(Sgd) Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of War.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
SUBJECT: Rate of Demobilization

December 8, 1945

I am entirely in accord with the view expressed in your memorandum of 24 November 1945 that we must maintain a high demobilization rate in December. However, our preliminary estimate that approximately 1,000,000 men would be separated in December remains unchanged.

Measures already taken to separate non-essential personnel in advance of their normal date of eligibility have eliminated surplus personnel and the only practical step that can be taken to produce another 200,000 separations in December would cut deeply into our only resources of specialized operating and trainer personnel by forcing the Ground and Service Forces to declare them surplus at a time when they can least be spared.

It is planned to reduce the separation criteria for male enlisted personnel to 3½ years or ASR—50 on 1 January 1946. The estimated rate of discharge for January will be about 650,000. Although such a reduction would normally produce a separation rate nearer to 800,000, some of those to become eligible will have been discharged as surplus and returns from overseas will be retarded during late December and January in order to maintain adequate strength in the overseas theaters to meet liquidation force requirements.

The question of discharging personnel on the basis of two years service by a date late in the winter has not yet been resolved. It is too early to say that presently estimated Army manpower requirements represent the irreducible minimum or that a two-year policy suitably modified could not be placed in operation by late March without jeopardizing U.S. over-all commitments.

(Sgd) Thos. T. Handy
THOS. T. HANDY
General, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff
APPENDIX XVIII
MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR
FORCES AND OTHERS 17 JANUARY 1946

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

17 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY GROUND FORCES
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
COMMANDING GENERAL, EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND (To OPD for action.)
COMMANDING GENERAL, WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND (To OPD for action.)
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
PRESIDENT, WAR DEPARTMENT MANPOWER BOARD

SUBJECT: Demobilization

The Chief of Staff directs the following:

1. The commanders listed above will immediately, by the use of their Inspectors General assisted by such Acting Inspectors General as may be necessary, inspect every installation and agency under their control to insure that without delay all surplus personnel are disposed of as directed by the Demobilization Directive issued 15 January 1946 and by other pertinent War Department instructions. All military personnel, particularly junior officers and enlisted personnel, will be given the opportunity to present their individual complaints to the Inspectors General in the manner authorized by regulations. Every individual will be given a chance to tell why he thinks he is not essential. To the maximum extent practicable corrective measures will be taken on the ground and at the time of inspection.

All personnel found eligible for overseas service under the provisions of WD AGO letter 370.01 (11 Dec 45) OB-S-A-M, subject: "Screening of Personnel for Overseas Movement," 12 December 1945, and changes thereto, will be reported available and action taken to process them for overseas shipment in accordance with the priorities established in War Department Circular 383, 1945. Previously approved diversions from the replacement stream are rescinded. Restatement to the War Department of justification of requirements for continuance of these diversions may be made to the War Department with complete justification therefor.

All surplus personnel not eligible for overseas service will be reported for disposition in accordance with current War Department instructions.
Special attention will be given to large headquarters, including those in the Washington area, with a view to the elimination of non-essential activities and personnel at once.

A report is desired by 1 February 1946 and monthly thereafter of the results obtained by the procedure above together with any pertinent recommendations requiring War Department action.

2. The Inspector General will make "spot" checks of installations and agencies in the Zone of the Interior to determine the manner in which the Demobilization Directive is being carried out and will submit appropriate recommendations to the War Department. The Inspector General will furnish all assistance practicable to the commanders mentioned in carrying out the directions in paragraph 1 above.

3. The War Department Manpower Board will continue to give high priority to its recent instructions to determine and to make appropriate recommendations concerning non-essential agencies, installations and functions in the Z/I, and to continuously survey and take appropriate action on the manpower requirements for those that are considered essential.

(sgd) H. I. Hodes

H. I. HODES
Brigadier General, GSC
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff

Copies to:

All WD General and Special Staff Divisions
Acting Secretary of War
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
APPENDIX XIX
LETTER FROM HENRY L. STIMSON TO GENERAL HERSEY 14 AUGUST 1945

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

14 August 1945

Director of Selective Service
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Hershey:

In view of the Japanese surrender, the Army desires to reduce inductions through Selective Service to a figure which will provide only sufficient men to support the forces which will be required for occupational duty and to permit the relief of the long service men overseas to the maximum extent transportation will permit. It is our plan to reduce the Army's strength, starting at once and as expeditiously as practicable. It is estimated that we will arrive at a strength of approximately two and a half million men within the next twelve to eighteen months, and thereafter to continue the decrease in accordance with the situation as it develops. To avoid the retention of men on occupation duty for long periods of time, the Army will require from Selective Service men a month in the proportion of 45,000 white and 5,000 colored.

To keep the requirement for military service in the age groups which contain the fewest family men and the fewest industrially skilled experts, the Army will accept hereafter only men below 26 years of age. With this in mind, the presently placed calls for the months of August and September should be reduced from 80,000 to 50,000, and it is requested that you fill them exclusively with personnel under 26 years of age.

This matter has been discussed with the President, and he has approved.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War
## APPENDIX XX

### TROOPS FURNISHED BY SELECTIVE SERVICE

**AFTER DEFEAT OF JAPAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and month</th>
<th>Calls on Selective Service</th>
<th>Percent of Inductions to SS calls</th>
<th>Total Inductions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>82.42</td>
<td>41,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>69.15</td>
<td>34,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>67.65</td>
<td>33,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>41.05</td>
<td>20,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>64.02</td>
<td>32,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>59.27</td>
<td>29,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>57.91</td>
<td>28,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>32.73</td>
<td>40,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>28.42</td>
<td>14,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>12.08</td>
<td>6,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>51.65</td>
<td>12,654</td>
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<tr>
<td>October&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No calls placed in 1947.

<sup>a</sup>Original September call was 25,000 of which 500 were cancelled. October call of 35,000 was cancelled 15 October 1946.

Source: WD Strength of the Army (STM-30), 1 Aug 47.
LETTER FROM ROBERT P. PATTERSON TO HONORABLE R. EWING THOMASON,
24 JUNE 1946

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

Hon. R. Ewing Thomason,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Thomason:

This is in reply to your recent inquiry concerning the requisitions of men which the Army anticipates making on the Selective Service System during the next few months when the Selective Training and Service Act is extended beyond July 1, 1946.

As you know, it is the earnest hope of General Eisenhower and myself that the manpower requirements of the Army will, in the not-too-distant future, be filled solely through voluntary enlistments. Both of us want an all-volunteer army. The War Department, I assure you, is not endeavoring to get conscription established as a part of the permanent military policy of the Nation. As I have previously stated, the War Department does not desire to have a single man drafted into the military force unless he is actually needed to fill an existing or anticipated shortage. In fact, the bill to continue the Selective Training and Service Act, as recommended by the conference committee, specifically precludes the Army from requisitioning men from selective service unless they are required to meet such a shortage. That prohibition is in accord with the War Department's views on this matter. General Eisenhower and I have urged the continuance of the Selective Service System only for the purpose of insuring that the Army will be able from month to month to carry out its occupational commitments in enemy lands and to maintain the strength necessary for our national security. There should not be any doubt or uncertainty as to our ability to perform these duties.

The War Department is conducting an intensified recruiting drive this summer. If aided by substantial increases in pay, such as those contained in H. R. 6084, this drive may produce sufficient volunteers to meet the Army's requirements for replacements for the next few months. I have, therefore, directed that no requisitions be made on the Selective Service System for the months of July and August.

Inasmuch as 1-year enlistments begin to expire at a substantial rate in October, and under the terms of H. R. 6064 we must discharge men with 18 months' service beginning at that time, there is serious risk that a shortage will then develop. As it is necessary to give men a minimum of 8
weeks' military training before they are effective replacements, it is not possible to project at this time whether or not we will be able to meet our requirements without requisitions on selective service after September 1. However, I can assure you again that the War Department will limit these requisitions to the numbers actually needed to meet the manpower requirements as set forth in H. R. 6064.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Secretary of War
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC of S</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>American Expeditionary Forces (1917-1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>Army Ground Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulations</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>Army Service Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>Army of the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCAFPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Commanding General</td>
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<td>Departmental Records Branch</td>
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<td>ETO</td>
<td>European Theater of Operations</td>
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<td>G-1</td>
<td>Personnel Section of divisional or higher headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
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<td>Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>JLC</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLPC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPS</td>
<td>Joint Staff Planners</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPWC</td>
<td>Joint Post-War Committee</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Public Law</td>
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<td>Report</td>
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<td>Sen Doc</td>
<td>Senate Document</td>
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<td>S&amp;P</td>
<td>Strategy &amp; Policy Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSUSA</td>
<td>Special Staff United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>Secretary of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWNCC</td>
<td>State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>The Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIG</td>
<td>The Inspector General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USW</td>
<td>Under Secretary of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-E Day</td>
<td>8 May 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-J Day</td>
<td>2 September 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDCSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDGPA</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel &amp; Administration, United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDSS</td>
<td>War Department Special Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The bibliography that follows does not include the Department of the Army records that comprise the source for more than ninety percent of the study. Most of these documents which are cited in the footnotes can be found in the Departmental Records Branch of The Adjutant General's Office.* An examination of the citations will best indicate the principal records and their locations.


Cline, Ray S. See *United States Army in World War II.*


*In addition, planners and students in the Army School System might find an item of interest and benefit in a painting that depicts the demobilization furore of January 1946. Painted by Robert Graham, it is entitled "Demonstration for Demobilization." In 1951 it was under the control of the Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History (Ref P35.5.46).
Ohio, Chief Mustering Officer. *Orders and Instructions Concerning the Muster Out of Volunteers*. Columbus: Privately printed, 1898.


The Great Demobilization and Other Essays. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941.


United States Army (or War Department). *Annual Reports, 1919; Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff, 1943-45; Compilation of Circulars Containing Information and Instructions Relating to Demobilization of the Army, 1918-19; Readjustment Regulations 1-1 to 1-6, 1944-46.*

United States Army in World War II, volumes as follows:


United States Congress, Senate. *Demobilization and Transportation of Military Personnel*. (Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs on


Watson, Mark Skinner. See United States Army in World War II.
Wiley, Bell I. See United States Army in World War II.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 Apr</td>
<td>Army Chief of Staff Marshall directed the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, to initiate preliminary studies exploring the field of basic policy and broad planning for demobilization of the military organization after the cessation of hostilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Jun</td>
<td>Chief of Staff Marshall notified President Roosevelt that secret demobilization studies were going on in the War Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jul</td>
<td>The Special Planning Division was established by Direction of Acting Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson as a part of the War Department Special Staff. The division was charged with &quot;those duties and functions which relate to the planning for post-war military and related industrial demobilization.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jul</td>
<td>President Roosevelt made public a report of the Conference on Post-War Readjustment and Military Personnel which concerned demobilization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sep</td>
<td>Italy signed formal surrender terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sep</td>
<td>Congress concurred in the Fulbright Resolution expressing &quot;itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation of the United States therein through its constitutional processes.&quot; (House Concurrent Resolution 25, 78th Cong.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Sep</td>
<td>The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that Army demobilization after the defeat of Germany would be on the basis of the individual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-30 Oct</td>
<td>Moscow Conference. Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom, and of the Soviet Union met to discuss the problems of war and post-war collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-26 Nov</td>
<td>Cairo Conference. President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill agreed upon future military operations against Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Nov–1 Dec</td>
<td>Tehran Conference. President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin agreed that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jan</td>
<td>Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced that two-thirds of the United States Army would be overseas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
by the end of the year, and that the total army strength had been set at 7,700,000.

3 Feb The President approved a law providing for payment of mustering-out pay to members of the armed forces. (PL 225, 78th Cong.)

6 Jun Allied forces invaded France.

15 Aug Allied forces landed in Southern France.


23 Aug The Chief of Staff approved a War Department plan for partial readjustment and demobilization.

1 Sep Chief of Staff Marshall announced that he favored a small professional Army supplemented by trained citizen-reserves chosen by a selective draft system. He opposed a large standing army and proposed universal military training.

6 Sep The War Department announced plans for the demobilization of over one million soldiers when the war with Germany ended.

3 Oct The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion established pursuant to an act of Congress.

5 Oct Secretary of War Stimson said that no "political or economic factors" figured in the Army's plan for partial demobilization of its forces after Germany's defeat. The extent of forces needed to defeat Japan and the amount of shipping available would be the only factors governing demobilization.

1945

6 Jan President Roosevelt in his annual message to Congress urged enactment of a national service act, drafting of nurses, and universal military training.

4–11 Feb The Crimean (Yalta) Conference. President Roosevelt, Premier Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill agreed (1) to crush Nazism and German militarism; (2) to establish popular governments in liberated countries; (3) to make Germany pay reparations in kind for war damages; (4) to set up occupation zones in conquered Germany; (5) to call a United Nations Conference at San Francisco, April 25; and (6) to broaden base of Polish and Yugoslav governments.

12 Apr Franklin D. Roosevelt died and Harry S Truman became President of the United States.

25 Apr – 26 Jun United Nations Conference on International Organization met at San Francisco, California and prepared a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.
8 May V-E Day. Germany capitulated making partial demobilization possible.

12 May Adjusted Service Rating Scores were computed. Partial readjustment and demobilization began.

21 May The War Department announced—
(1) that enlisted men 40 years of age or over were eligible for discharge from the Army on their own application, but that commanders would be permitted to retain for a period of not more than 90 days any man for whom a replacement was not available at the time he requested discharge.

(2) that, when the military situation permitted, further reduction in the age limit would be made; and

(3) that the provisions of the current discharge policy for age had been made applicable to enlisted women of the Women's Army Corps who had been on active duty for 1 year or more.

17 Jul- Potsdam Conference. President Truman (U.S.), Prime Minister Churchill (U.K.), and Premier Stalin (U.S.S.R.) met to draw up a peace settlement for Germany and peace treaties for the smaller European countries.

21 Jul The Special Senate Committee for Investigation of the War Effort investigated redeployment transportation and Chairman Meade accused the War Department of inadequate planning.

22 Jul The War Department announced that discharge points for soldiers would be reduced from the present 85 points before the end of the month.

28 Jul The United States Senate consented to ratification of the Charter of the United Nations.

2 Aug Secretary of War Stimson said the Army's 85-point discharge minimum would not be revised until next year. In answer to pressure for speeding of releases, he said: "We shall not let any man go whose going jeopardizes the life of the men who remain to fight." He criticized the special demands, saying "our first duty is to give General MacArthur the men he needs to win the war," and promised that the Army would release 2,000,000 men and women by June 1, 1946. Many men with over 85 points "will have to wait for replacements in their units" before discharge.

6 Aug United States Army Air Forces dropped first atomic bomb on Japan.

8 Aug Soviet Russia declared war on Japan. President Truman signed the Charter of the United Nations making the United States the first nation to complete action.

14 Aug Japan accepted Allied unconditional surrender terms.
14 Aug Army Chief of Staff Marshall directed that “all policies and procedures relating to demobilization of the Army are co-ordinated and integrated wherever possible with similar activities of the Navy.”


3 Sep The War Department announced—
(1) that enlisted personnel 35 years of age or over who have had a minimum of 2 years of honorable military service would be released from the Army upon application;
(2) that reduction of the age limit in no way affected the policy of discharging, upon application, all enlisted personnel 38 years of age or over, regardless of length of service; and
(3) that the score for discharge of enlisted men was reduced from 85 to 80 points and of enlisted WAC's from 44 to 41 points.

11 Sep- 2 Oct First meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers in London, England. This was the first of a series of conferences on the World War II peace settlement. Secretary of State Byrnes reported that because of the objections of the Soviet Delegation “agreement became impossible and further meetings were useless.”

17 Sep General Douglas MacArthur said the “smooth progress” of the occupation of Japan made possible a “drastic cut” in the number of troops originally estimated. “Within six months the occupational forces, unless unseen factors arise, will probably number not more than 200,000 men, a size probably within the framework of our projected regular establishment and which will permit complete demobilization of citizen Pacific forces which fought so long and so nobly through to victory. Once Japan is disarmed this force will be sufficiently strong to insure our will.” [MacArthur's statement was made without co-ordination with either the Department of State or the War Department.]

18 Sep Henry L. Stimson resigned as Secretary of War and President Truman designated Robert P. Patterson as his successor.

19 Sep President Truman assured the Nation “There will be no padding in our armed forces,” and that men were coming back home “as fast as the services can get them out.” He said “no one can accurately forecast” our future needs for occupation and other forces and that estimates were being revised constantly.

20 Sep General of the Army George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, speaking in the auditorium of the Library of Congress to Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, revealed that the score for discharge of enlisted men would be reduced from 80 to 70 points on 1 October and to 60 points on 1 November. Marshall also stated that he hoped that by late winter the Army could discharge men with two years’ service.
23 Sep The War Department announced that as of 2 September enlisted men with 36 points or who were 37 years of age would be exempt from overseas service. Also exempt were men 34 years of age with more than one year's service.

25 Sep President Truman asked Congress to slash more than $28,500,000,000 from War Department appropriations, and said he expected the Army to be reduced to 1,950,000 men by June 1946.

27 Sep Robert P. Patterson was sworn in as Secretary of War. He warned that the required amount of military strength was necessary to enforce the surrender of Germany and Japan, but pledged not to keep any more men than needed in the service. "If future events permit it" the Army would be reduced even lower than the 1,950,000 total presaged by President Truman for July 1, 1946.


7 Nov The War Department announced that enlisted men with 50 points who were then on furlough or temporary duty from overseas work in this country would be released as they reported back to the Army.

15 Nov General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander of American Forces in Europe, advocated a year of compulsory peacetime military training before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives.

16 Nov War Department announced changes, effective Dec. 1, 1945, in the Army discharge system as follows:

(1) Male enlisted personnel would be eligible for discharge if they had (a) 55 points as computed on Sept. 2, 1945, or (b) 4 years of honorable military service, or (c) 3 or more children under 18 years of age dependent upon them for support.

(2) Enlisted women (WAC's) would be eligible for discharge if they had (a) 32 points as computed on Sept. 2, 1945, or (b) were married, regardless of when, and had enlisted prior to May 12, 1945.

(3) Male officers (excluding Medical Department) would be eligible for discharge if they had (a) 73 points as computed on Sept. 2, 1945, or (b) 4 years, 3 months of honorable military service.

(4) WAC officers would be eligible for discharge if they had (a) 37 points as computed on Sept. 2, 1945, or (b) were married, regardless of when, and had enlisted prior to May 12, 1945.

20 Nov Appointment of General Eisenhower as Army Chief of Staff and Admiral Nimitz as Chief of Naval Operations was announced by President Truman.

16-27 Dec Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union held interim meeting at Moscow.
The War Department announced changes, effective Dec. 31, 1945, in the Army discharge system as follows:

1. The critical score required for separation on adjusted service rating score would be reduced by 5 points (to 50) for enlisted men and 3 points (to 70) for male officers.

2. The length of service required for separation would be reduced by 6 months (to 3 years and 6 months) for enlisted men and by 3 months (to 4 years) for male officers, other than Medical Department officers.

3. The critical score required for separation on adjusted service rating score would not be reduced for WAC personnel, but

4. For the first time, length of service would be considered for WAC personnel, as follows: Enlisted WACs would be separated after 2 years and 6 months of service and WAC officers would be separated after 3 years and 3 months of service.

President Truman asked Congress to combine Army and Navy into a department of national defense under single cabinet officer.

1946

The War Department announced—

1. that because troop requirements overseas during the next 6 months would exceed the rate at which the Army was capable of maintaining them through replacements, it would be necessary to slow down the rate of demobilization;

2. that there would be about 1,553,000 men to be shipped home over a period of 6 months rather than 3 months; and

3. that all overseas commanders had been directed to reduce their requirements to the bone, and successive revisions had resulted in a planned strength of 1,550,000 (including Air Forces) for July 1, 1946, as follows:

**Overseas:**
- Europe (including Italy) ............ 335,000
- Pacific .............................. 375,000
- Other areas ......................... 87,000
- Filipinos undergoing training ........ 50,000

**Continental United States:**
- Supply, hospital, and other operating personnel ............... 360,000
- Personnel undergoing training and in transit to theaters and a small strategic reserve ..................... 343,000

Total ......................... 1,550,000
6 Jan Estimated 20,000 American servicemen demonstrated against demobilization slowdown, claiming the "Philippines are capable of handling their own internal problems." Other demonstrations followed in various parts of the world.

15 Jan General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, in an address to Members of the Congress, in the auditorium of the Library of Congress, stated—

(1) that by April 30, 1946, all enlisted men (except volunteers) with 45 points as of September 2, 1945, or with 30 months' service as of April 30, 1946, would be separated from the Army or aboard ship returning home;

(2) that by June 30, 1946, all enlisted men (except volunteers) with 40 points as of September 2, 1945, or with 24 months' service as of June 30, 1946, would be separated from the Army or aboard ship returning home; and

(3) that by June 30, 1946, the strength of the Army would be approximately 1,500,000.

23 Jan Senate demobilization inquiry demanded more speed and warned against a "draft army" in peacetime. Claiming Army now had 2,000,000 surplus men, it proposed release of all 2-year men by 20 March and all fathers except volunteers by 1 July.

24 Jan Sit-down strikes by Royal Air Force crews from India to Ceylon, Egypt, and Palestine reported, in protest against demobilization delays.

13 Mar The War Department announced that the Army's planned strength for July 1, 1947, was 1,070,000 officers and men, of whom 400,000 would be in the Air Forces; that this would require a reduction of almost 500,000 from the July 1, 1946 Army of 1,550,000; and that there was no assurance of meeting the obligations assigned to the Army without a continuance of selective service.

14 Mar War Department announced that all Army officers with 24 months of service as of August 31, 1946—except Regular Army, volunteer, and Medical Department officers and officers in certain scarce categories—would be separated from the service or en route home by that date.

18 Mar President Truman asked extension of Selective Service for one year.

25 Apr-16 May First session of Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris, France, to discuss terms of peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania. A month's recess was voted because the conferees were unable to agree upon any basic issues.

14 May President Truman reluctantly signed stop-gap legislation to extend the Selective Service Act; this act banned induction of fathers and 18- and 19-year old youths.
The act as passed was enacted against the advice of the President and the War Department.

15 Jun–Second part of Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in Paris, France.

29 Jun War Department announced a reduction in discharge criteria for enlisted personnel, following the President's approval of Public Law 473, sec. 3 which provided that any nonvolunteer enlisted man who had completed 18 months' service might apply for discharge after October 1, 1946, and that the commanding generals of all overseas theaters and all major commands within the United States had been directed that the following regulations would govern the demobilization of nonvolunteer personnel:

(1) By September 30, 1946, all nonvolunteer enlisted fathers would be separated from the Army.

(2) By September 30, 1946, all nonvolunteer enlisted men who had completed 20 months' service would be separated from the Army.

(3) Beginning October 1, 1946, all nonvolunteer enlisted men who have completed 18 months' service by November 30 would be eligible for separation from the Army and would be discharged by November 30.

(4) After November 30, 1946, all nonvolunteer enlisted men would be separated from the Army by the last day of the month in which they accumulated 18 months' service.

(5) The criteria described above would apply to enlisted personnel of the Women's Army Corps until September 30, 1946. The WAC would go on an entirely volunteer basis October 1, 1946, and all remaining nonvolunteers would be separated during the month of October, regardless of length of service.

3 Jul The War Department announced that, effective October 1, all WAC enlisted personnel would be reported for separation or be aboard ship returning to the United States not later than October 31, 1946, except volunteers who signed class I, II, and III statements and those who volunteered for duty wherever needed until June 30, 1947, or for the duration plus 6 months and that, by September 30, 1946, all nonvolunteer enlisted women who have completed 20 months' service would be separated from the Army.

16 Jul War Department suspended Army enlistment of Negroes (except certain specialists) because Negro recruits enrolled at rate of 1 to every 5 white recruits, exceeding Army's 1 to 10 ratio.

23 Jul The War Department announced that the following provisions now govern demobilization of Army enlisted personnel:
(1) All nonvolunteer enlisted fathers would be separated by September 30, 1946, regardless of length of service.

(2) All nonvolunteer enlisted men with 20 months of service as of September 30 would be separated by that date.

(3) Beginning October 1, all nonvolunteer enlisted men with 18 months of service as of November 30 would be eligible for separation and would be separated by November 30.

(4) All nonvolunteer enlisted men who have accumulated 18 months of service in any month subsequent to November would be separated by the last day of the month in which they have accumulated 18 months of service.

(5) Until September 30, the same discharge criteria would apply to enlisted women as to enlisted men.

(The new criteria applied only to enlisted personnel, the previously announced discharge criteria for officers remaining unchanged.)

29 Jul–15 Oct

Council of Foreign Ministers reconvened in Paris, France.

25 Sep

The War Department announced that, because of budgetary limitations, and because of the desirability of having a completely volunteer officer corps, new separation criteria had been established to permit the release of all officers of the WAC, with the exception of certain Medical Department officers, critical specialists, recent officer candidate school graduates, and officers with dependents overseas or en route overseas.

27 Sep

The War Department announced that the following non-Regular Army enlisted personnel, within 6 months of eligibility for discharge, would be discharged:

(1) who were stationed in the United States but whose services were not required at their stations, or

(2) who had arrived in the United States for permanent stations, or

(3) who, both in the United States and overseas, had presented evidence in writing of their acceptance during that period by accredited colleges or universities.

10 Oct

The War Department informed the Director of Selective Service that because enlistments had exceeded the numbers anticipated, the remainder of the 25,000 September call and 35,000 October call was canceled, and no call would be made for December.

17 Oct

The War Department announced that all men inducted into the Army during 1945 would be discharged by the end of 1946, and that 8,700 non-Regular officers would be discharged because of lack of funds.

4 Nov–12 Dec

Third meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in New York, New York. Texts of Treaties of Peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland were
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Dec</td>
<td>President Truman proclaimed the cessation of hostilities of World War II, effective 1200 hours, this date.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Mar</td>
<td>The War Department, acting on President Truman's recommendation that the Selective Service System expire 31 March, ordered all domestic and overseas commanders to prepare for release of all draftees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Mar–24 Apr</td>
<td>Fourth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, USSR to discuss plans for peace settlement with Germany and Austria. The meeting adjourned without an agreement on any of the major issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar</td>
<td>Selective Service Act expired.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 Jun</td>
<td>The end of World War II demobilization in the United States Army.</td>
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A LIST OF PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENTAL OFFICERS
PERTINENT TO WORLD WAR II DEMOBILIZATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRETARY OF STATE

Cordell Hull, March 1933—November 1944
Edward R. Stettinius, November 1944—June 1945
James F. Byrnes, July 1945—January 1947
*George C. Marshall, January 1947—January 1949

WAR DEPARTMENT
SECRETARY OF WAR

Henry L. Stimson, January 1940—September 1945
Robert P. Patterson, September 1945—July 1947

UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR

Robert P. Patterson, December 1940—September 1945
Kenneth C. Royall, November 1945—July 1947

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR

John J. McCloy, April 1941—November 1945
Howard C. Petersen, December 1945—July 1947

CHIEF OF STAFF

*Gen. George C. Marshall, September 1939—November 1945
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 1945—February 1948

*Listed under both State and War Departments.

* U.S.G.P.O. 366-437/1302-560