Battery A, 2d U.S. Colored Light Artillery, Department of the Cumberland, 1864

"Our most intelligent men deserve a chance to prove their ability and serve their country in the artillery branch of the service."

Emmett J. Scott, March 1907
When Congress reorganized the Regular Army after the Civil War, it created six segregated regiments comprising black enlisted men—two cavalry and four (later reduced to two) infantry. Although black soldiers had served competently in both heavy and light artillery units during the war, no black artillery regiment was included in the postwar Army. Over the next half century, a secretary of war, various senators and congressmen, some senior Army officers, and prominent African Americans sought to remedy this shortcoming without avail. Army leaders maintained that only Congress could add another black regiment to its rolls, and many officers considered the artillery branch too technical for African Americans to master. As race relations deteriorated at the start of the twentieth century, white Southerners displayed strong opposition to the idea of black artillerymen serving at their seacoast fortifications, although ironically, the only black artillery unit at this time was a militia battery in Savannah, Georgia. Black artillerymen thus did not reappear in the active force structure until World War I.

The Civil War

All but a few of the black volunteer units that served during the Civil War belonged to the United States Colored Troops. One hundred thirty-seven infantry regiments comprised the bulk of these black troops, but they also included 6 cavalry and 13 heavy (or foot) artillery regiments, along with 10 light artillery batteries. More than 25,000 black artillerymen, recruited primarily from freed slaves in Confederate or border states, served in the Union Army during the Civil War. The only black artillery regiment raised north of the Mason-Dixon Line was the 11th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, which began its service as the 14th Rhode Island Colored Heavy Artillery and served out the war in Louisiana. Federal military authorities armed and equipped the soldiers in these twelve-company heavy artillery regiments as infantrymen and ordinarily used them to man the larger caliber guns defending coastal and field fortifications located near cities and smaller population centers in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, and North Carolina. The 3d U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery spent most of the war at Fort Pickering, Tennessee, which was part of the defenses of Memphis, while the 8th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery served on garrison duty at Paducah, Kentucky. The 10th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery spent its entire service in New Orleans. Combat for the black heavy artillerymen was rare, but four companies from the 6th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery were serving at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, in April 1864, when Confederate forces commanded by Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest attacked. The ensuing "massacre" of almost two-thirds of the black soldiers, many of them after they had surrendered, was decried in the North, and "Remember Fort Pillow!" soon became a battle cry of the U.S. Colored Troops.²

In late 1863 black light (or field) artillery batteries were organized from freed slaves in Louisiana and Tennessee. The horse-drawn guns of light artillery batteries accompanied infantry and cavalry formations on their campaigns, and as a result of their excellent performance in the Mexican War, light artillery units had earned the prestige of an elite arm. According to the Instruction for Field Artillery (Philadelphia, 1863), its men were supposed to be "intelligent, active, muscular, well-developed, and not less than five feet seven inches high." Each light artillery battery was authorized 3 officers and 141 enlisted men. The twenty to thirty cannoners and drivers who were assigned to each "piece" (gun), its limber, and two caissons (ammunition storage vehicles) constituted a platoon, led by a sergeant. Two platoons constituted a section, led by a lieutenant, and under ideal circumstances three sections—right, center, and left—formed the battery.
which also was equipped with a traveling forge and a wagon. In early 1864 nine batteries from around the South were designated as elements of the 2d Regiment, U.S. Colored Light Artillery, but, as they were never intended to serve together as a regiment, no regimental headquarters was organized for them. The three batteries that already existed in Louisiana were redesignated as Batteries C, D, and E, while the Memphis Light Battery (African Descent) became Battery F. Two more batteries in Tennessee (A and I) and one each in Arkansas (H), South Carolina (G), and Virginia (B) were also organized. The letter K should have been assigned to the tenth battery to be organized, but Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton designated it as an independent battery instead. The Independent Battery, U.S. Colored Light Artillery, began recruiting in Leavenworth, Kansas, in July 1864, and by order of Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, commander of the Department of Kansas, all three of its officers were African Americans. They were the only light artillery officers of their race commissioned during the war, and the battery was the only unit in the Union Army to have no white officers.

The Independent Battery spent the rest of the summer recruiting in eastern Kansas, enlisting many runaway Missouri slaves. During the fall of 1864 Confederate Maj. Gen. Sterling Price led a 12,000-man mounted force into Missouri from Arkansas and then headed west toward Kansas City and Fort Leavenworth. To stop Price’s raid, General Curtis quickly organized the Army of the Border, and a two-gun section from the Independent Battery was ordered to the Kansas City area, where it was attached to the four-gun 9th Wisconsin Independent Battery, Light Artillery. Commanded by 2d Lt. Patrick H. Minor, this section of two ten-pounder Parrott guns helped to defeat Price in the Battles of the Big Blue and Westport on 22 and 23 October, and it joined the federal force that pursued his retreating army back toward Arkansas. The Independent Battery completed its recruitment in December and was then officially mustered into the Union Army. Under the command of Capt. H. Ford Douglas, the unit spent most of the remaining days of the war manning guns on the bleak knob of Fort Sully, a series of fortifications that had been constructed hastily on a hill on the western side of Fort Leavenworth to help defend the post from Price. After seven eventful months of service, “Douglas’s Battery” was mustered out of federal service in July 1865. In spite of the fact that light artillery’s intended role was to accompany troops to the field, most of the other black light artillery batteries also spent the war performing garrison duty. Battery A, 2d U.S. Colored Light Artillery, however, fought in the Battle of Nashville in December 1864, and Battery B participated in the siege of Petersburg. Battery F fought in the Battle of Brice’s Cross Roads, Mississippi, in June 1864, and one of its sections had also been present at the Fort Pillow massacre.

After the fighting ended in 1865, the soldiers in U.S. Colored Troops units were mustered out of federal service much more slowly than were those in white volunteer units, perhaps because the latter could vote, while the former were almost all disenfranchised. Only four of the heavy artillery regiments and seven of the light batteries mustered out by the end of the year. The 14th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, which had begun its service as the 1st North Carolina Colored Heavy Artillery, remained close to friends and families, manning Fort...
Macon on the coast from June to December 1865, when it mustered out. The remaining black artillery units performed garrison duty across the South until they finally mustered out in 1866, or, in the case of the 10th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, in February 1867. Battery B, 2d U.S. Colored Light Artillery, served along the Mexican border in Texas from May 1865 until its muster-out in March 1866. That same month the New York Times reported that the “general conduct of the various bodies” of black troops in the South had been “in the main, exceedingly good.” It also noted that it was evident that “negroes [could] do efficient work in all arms of the service.”

Meanwhile, the future of black artillerymen was being debated in Washington, where Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, was crafting legislation that would, upon its enactment in July 1866, add six black regiments to the Regular Army. Thanks to an early life of poverty and hard labor, Wilson sympathized with “the downtrodden and underprivileged” and had a long history of looking out for African Americans. In 1844, as a young Massachusetts legislator, he had tried to amend state militia laws to remove racial barriers. In December 1861 Wilson had introduced legislation to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and four months later it was signed into law. Along with his state’s abolitionist governor, John A. Andrew, he had urged the Lincoln administration to enlist black troops in the Union Army. He then fought to equalize the pay of black and white soldiers and persisted until this was accomplished in 1865. In addition to creating black cavalry and infantry regiments, the initial version of the “Wilson Bill” to increase the “military peace establishment” provided for organizing two new artillery regiments—one black and one white—but Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant objected to this provision. Responding to Senator Wilson’s request that he look over the Army reorganization bill, Grant observed, “I am not in favor of black artillery regiments, because I regard our artillery in time of peace merely [sic] as an artillery school for time of war . . . and in time of peace I think the efficiency of the artillery as a school will be higher if composed solely of white troops.” Grant’s opinion carried a lot of weight, and the provision for black artillerymen was quickly dropped from the bill, but the fact that the white artillery regiment was deleted as well suggests that economy was also a factor in determining that outcome.

Veterans of the U.S. Colored Troops initially comprised about half of the men that enlisted in the Army’s six new black regiments, with more than 500 of them receiving early discharges to accomplish that end. African Americans who had served as artillerymen during the war had no choice but to join the infantry or cavalry. Three of the 208 enlisted men who had served in Douglas’s Battery enlisted in the 10th Cavalry, which began to recruit at Fort Leavenworth in August 1866. At least 137 of Louisiana’s 10th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery veterans enlisted in the Regular Army in the fall of 1866.

The First Black Officer in the Civil War?

William D. Matthews (1827-1906), of Leavenworth, Kansas, was one of only three black light artillery officers to serve during the Civil War and appears to have been the first African American to function as an officer in that conflict. He raised a company in the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Infantry and commanded it as a captain from August 1862 to May 1863, but that service was not recognized by the federal government, as the regiment was organized before it sanctioned the use of black troops. In July 1864 Matthews was appointed as a first lieutenant to recruit for the Independent Battery, 2d Regiment, U.S. Colored Light Artillery. In October, while on a recruiting trip to Fort Scott, Kansas, Matthews was commended for organizing a local black militia force to assist in protecting the Union military complex from the Confederate army with which Maj. Gen. Sterling Price had invaded Kansas. After the Independent Battery was finally mustered into federal service in December, Matthews was its second-in-command until the unit mustered out at Fort Leavenworth in July 1865.

After the war "Captain" Matthews remained in Leavenworth and was able to secure a pension for disabilities related to a loud gun discharge at Fort Scott. He also sought congressional assistance in securing nine months of back pay as an officer in the First Kansas Colored, but at least eleven bills introduced between 1869 and 1902 failed to get that money for him.
Artillery veteran. In 1881 Maj. Frank M. Welch was elected to command Connecticut's 5th Battalion (Colored). Welch had been a lieutenant in both the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry and the 14th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery.11

During the Gilded Age the only black artillerymen in the United States were members of the Georgia militia, which was segregated into the all-white Georgia State Troops and the Georgia State Troops, Colored. The latter had an authorized strength of almost 2,100 officers and men. In 1878 the black citizens of Savannah organized the Georgia Artillery, and Capt. George McCarthy, a barber, was elected to command the battery. He was succeeded by John C. Simmons in 1881. When a lieutenant from Savannah's white Chatham Artillery inspected the unit in 1886, he found two officers and twenty-three enlisted men who had drilled or paraded fifty times over the previous year. The battery had two three-inch rifled cannons with limbers, and the men were individually armed with sabers. These arms were maintained in excellent condition, and the inspecting officer observed that "This is a fine body of colored troops, deserving much credit for the interest taken by them in military matters."12

Like many militia units, black and white, the Georgia Artillery spent much of its time engaged in social activities—marching in parades (including President William McKinley's 1901 inaugural parade in Washington, D.C.), staging "entertainments," and sponsoring excursions to nearby attractions to raise the funds that the unit required to cover its expenses. The battery periodically fired its guns on special occasions, such as 1 January, Emancipation Day. In a May 1887 ceremony celebrating the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, a gunner was fatally wounded when he removed an unexploded cartridge from one of the guns and it blew his arm off. Three years later the state's Military Advisory Board recommended disbanding the unit, but Governor John B. Gordon, supported by prominent citizens of Savannah, disapproved the proposal. By 1891 the unit's enlisted strength had grown to forty-six, but an armory fire that year destroyed all of the battery's equipment. Within a year, however, the citizen-soldiers had raised enough money to purchase two brass cannons from Philadelphia. Savannah's black newspaper, the Tribune, boasted, "Savannah should feel proud of the fact that it has the only colored artillery company in the United States.”13

In 1897 the battery raised enough money to fund an August encampment at nearby Flowersville. Twenty-seven men mounted guard, drilled, and received military instruction during their eight-day camp—a first for Georgia's black militiamen. The Tribune commented, "The step taken by the command is an heroic one, and should put the state to shame for the penurious manner in which the colored troops have been treated."14

Although many of Georgia's black militiamen were eager to serve during
the Spanish-American War, the governor refused to include them in his Volunteer Army troop quota. In May 1898 Captain Simmons learned about another opportunity for military service—a new force that Congress had authorized of 10,000 enlisted men "possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates." Believing correctly that some of these men would be African Americans, Simmons wrote President McKinley to request that one or more light artillery companies be included "among the immunes." After pointing out that the Georgia Artillery had "the honor of being the only colored artillery company in the United States," Simmons stated that "to maintain our identity and to perpetuate this branch of the service in the history of our race, we pray your favorable consideration." The War Department did not accept Simmons's proposal.15

In 1899 the state reduced its black militia units to one seven-company infantry battalion, also headquartered in Savannah, and the artillery battery. A year later the state's adjutant general reported that the administration of the units was good, and "the[ir] drill is all that could be asked." Nevertheless, he recommended disbanding the black units, because he failed to see where they "are or can be of any service to the State, from a military standpoint." In 1904 the state's inspector general expressed the same sentiments, noting that "the colored troops . . . could not be used to suppress riot where white men were engaged without aggravating the affair and it would be a doubtful experiment to use them on a mob composed of their own race." The Georgia Artillery's annual inspection did not go well; it was placed on probation, and in April 1904 it was finally disbanded, followed sixteen months later by the state's remaining black infantry companies.16

The Regular Army

Meanwhile, most of the Regular Army's artillery was assigned to coast defense. Some field artillery was used in the Indian campaigns in the West, but infantry or cavalry details almost always manned the guns. In late 1884 only 11 of the Army's 60 artillery batteries (5 regiments) were located west of the 100th meridian, and 10 of them were stationed at the coastal forts guarding San Francisco harbor and the mouth of the Columbia River. Thirty-one other batteries were stationed along the Atlantic and Gulf coastlines, including 10 guarding New York harbor, 5 at Fort Adams near Newport, Rhode Island; and 5 at the Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia.17

The records of the Army's black cavalry and infantry regiments were excellent, but in 1877 the New York Times reported that their white officers felt the units were unjustly treated. Because the Army believed that black troops were better suited to service in hot climates, the black regiments had, their officers complained, been "exiled . . . at the most disagreeable and unhealthy posts in the United States," and many of these officers supported opening all units to black enlistment to end this discrimination. That same year Senator Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, a Civil War major general, introduced a bill to remove color restrictions on enlistments, but it never became law. Although he preferred having white troops, Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman also supported integrating the Army. In his 1880 annual report he commented, "All men should be enlisted who are qualified, and assigned to regiments, regardless of color or previous condition. Such has been the law and usage in the Navy for years, and the Army would soon grow accustomed to it."18

In spite of the fact that the Army allowed black soldiers to serve outside the cavalry and infantry as post hospital stewards and ordnance, quartermaster, and commissary sergeants, it refused to accept either individual black artillerymen or black artillery units. There was, however, some high-level interest in the latter subject. In an annual report submitted to Congress in December 1889, Secretary of War Redfield Proctor noted that the Army's commanding general wanted to raise two more artillery regiments and observed that "Whether one or both of these new regiments may not be of colored men is worthy of consideration." Proctor pointed out that the record of the four black regiments "is excellent" and that the African Americans "are neat, orderly, and obedient, are seldom brought before courts-martial, and rarely desert." This last characteristic was especially attractive in a year when roughly one out of every nine soldiers went "over the hill." The secretary also noted that black soldiers "would seem to be especially well adapted for service at some of the sea-coast fortifications, and the discipline and instruction received would benefit them and be a public good." President Benjamin Harrison specifically endorsed Proctor's recommendation that the Army's artillery force be increased in the State of the Union message he sent to Congress on 3 December.19

Later that month Republican Senator Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut, chairman of his body's Committee on Military Affairs, introduced a bill to reorganize the artillery. Hawley had been an antebellum abolitionist; commanded a brigade that included a black infantry regiment at the Battle of Olustee, Florida, in February 1864; and received a brevet promotion to volunteer major general before mustering
out of the Union Army in 1866. In 1884 the Petersburg, Virginia, Tribune had noted that “the colored people... had[...a] few warmer friends.” Hawley’s bill proposed increasing the number of artillery regiments from five to seven and included a provision that “the president, in his discretion, may authorize the enlistment of such proportion of colored men for service in one or more of said seven regiments of artillery as the interests of the service may demand.”

In January 1890 Republican Congressman Byron M. Cutcheon of Michigan, a Civil War colonel and brevet brigadier general, introduced the identical bill in the House of Representatives. Cutcheon was chairman of his chamber’s Committee on Military Affairs, and his bill passed the House in April 1890. It was only approved in the Senate on 28 February 1891, however, after it had been amended to reorganize the Army’s infantry regiments, expand its engineer battalion into a regiment, and increase the Army’s authorized strength from 25,000 men to 30,000. These provisions drew vigorous rebuttals from some Democratic congressmen, who sought unsuccessfully to prevent the bill from going to a conference committee. During the debate on the amended bill, Cutcheon explained that the administration planned “not to exceed one regiment of colored troops to garrison the seacoast fortifications in the extreme South.”

When the conferees reported a compromise military reorganization bill that would expand the artillery to seven regiments, allow for the enlistment of colored artillerymen, and authorize the formation of infantry battalions within the existing infantry regiments, opponents in the House continued to attack its costs and its infantry reorganization provisions. On the last day of the lame-duck session the Senate approved the conference report but the House rejected it by a vote of 48–54. Most of the opposition to the amended bill concerned its provisions adding officers and men to the Army. The extent to which racial politics contributed to the bill’s ultimate failure will probably never be known.

Nine months later the issue of black artillerists again surfaced on Capitol Hill. In December 1891 Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont, who had resigned his position as secretary of war a month before, introduced an artillery reorganization bill with the same provision for black enlistment. In April 1892 the Senate passed a military reorganization bill containing these artillery provisions, but the House failed to approve it. Senator Charles Manderson of Nebraska introduced a similar bill in August 1893 that would allow the president to enlist African Americans in one or more artillery regiments, but this time it did not emerge from committee.

Senator Hawley introduced a new bill to expand the artillery to seven regiments in December 1897, but this bill made no mention of enlisting black artillerymen. Perhaps the bill’s supporters doubted that African Americans could provide the “highest class of skilled labor” they deemed necessary to effectively operate the new coast artillery guns installed during the 1890s. As the United States moved closer to war with Spain, the Senate approved the bill, 58–4, on 22 February 1898, and the House soon followed suit, after debating the bill under a procedure that prohibited any amendment. Black Congressman George H. White, a Republican from North Carolina, nevertheless won loud and prolonged applause when he “appeal[ed] to American patriots to remove all statutory barriers now prescribed” against African Americans and to allow one of the new units to be “colored.” Henry V. Plummer, former chaplain of the 9th Cavalry, made the same suggestion to President McKinley on 8 March, when the president signed the bill into law. Plummer “earnestly request[ed] that one of the regiments be recruited from the Negro race,” but the War Department reserved the new units for white artillerymen.

On 11 March S. G. Hubert of Palmyra, Virginia, offered another suggestion for black participation in the artillery. Hubert, who was a teacher in the “higher colored schools” of Fluvanna County, Virginia, proposed to Senator Hawley that black men native to “malarious localities [be] trained to man the cannon used in defense [sic] of same.” To accomplish this, he suggested establishing a training station at Newport News, Virginia, to train African Americans to “skillfully” handle ordnance for mortars and heavy cannons. On 14 March Senator Hawley passed Hubert’s suggestion to Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Flagler, the chief
of ordnance, but no action was taken on the matter. 25

During the Spanish-American War, when Capt. Henry H. Wright of the 9th Cavalry was asked why there were no black artillerists, he bluntly replied that if they were allowed to "enlist in the artillery our shooting would... resemble the... marksmanship of the Spaniards." All of the Army's black regiments served in Cuba, and, in spite of Captain Wright's concerns, some of their men functioned as artillerists during the brief Santiago campaign. Sgt. Horace W. Bivins of the 10th Cavalry, a noted Army marksman, was put in charge of a battery of four Hotchkiss guns during the assault on San Juan Hill. Other 10th Cavalry troopers capably served as temporary gunners with Lt. John H. Parker's Gatling gun detachment. 26

In 1899 the seven artillery regiments were each expanded from twelve to fourteen batteries, with two field artillery batteries per regiment. Two years later Congress expanded the Army again, and an 'Artillery Corps' of 30 field artillery batteries and 126 coast artillery companies replaced the 7 artillery regiments. Black citizens in Illinois and Kansas responded to the latter act by sending identically worded petitions to President McKinley saying "that the time has now arrived when the Afro-American [sic] should be admitted and represented as soldiers into all the branches of the Armies of the United States." The citizens "earnestly petitioned" the president to organize two black batteries—one light and one heavy—but the War Department restricted all of the fourteen new artillery batteries authorized in 1899 and fifty-six new artillery batteries and companies authorized in 1901 to whites. 27

Three years later two departmental commanders—Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Barry, commander of the newly restored Department of the Gulf, and his immediate superior, Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, commander of the Atlantic Division and the Department of the East—raised the question of black enlistment in the coast artillery. In his annual report Barry observed that white artillerists rarely reenlisted for sea-coast posts, many of which were "undesirable by reason of prolonged and excessive heat, isolation, mosquitoes, and bad water." The general saw black enlistment as a solution to this problem:

The enlistment of colored men for the artillery and their assignment to the companies serving at these stations [sea-coast posts] suggests itself. There would seem to be ample authority for their enlistment under the law... These men would be content at the stations referred to, can be obtained in any number desired, and in time will master the requirements of the Coast Artillery Service, and there would be no difficulty at all times in maintaining the organizations at their authorized strength. 28

General Corbin's annual report noted that the "great labor" of caring for sea-coast guns was "so severe" that men refused to reenlist in the artillery. He thus recommended "the transfer to the Artillery Corps of sufficient trained men from the colored cavalry and infantry." He argued the black soldiers "would in a very short time make good artillerists" and that "they would very soon, by their aptitude and love of the service, commend themselves to the artillery officers," just as they had to the officers of cavalry and infantry. 29

Two months after General Barry submitted his report to the War Department, Southern newspapers picked up the story and, as the Atlanta Journal reported, "a storm of opposition" arose. Norfolk's Virginian-Pilot argued that the Southern people would prefer their ports "to look out for themselves" rather than have black artillerists. The Charleston News and Courier published part of Barry's report in a front page article headlined "Degrading the Artillery." The newspaper labeled the general's suggestion "very unfortunate and unwise" and said that it would "probably run all white men out of the artillery." An editorial stressed "how peculiarly offensive to the Southern people such a course of conduct" would be. Mayor Herman Myers of Savannah wrote his senators and his congressman to encourage them to protest Barry's recommendation. The mayor suggested that if black artillerists were to be utilized, "the trial should be made at the posts along the coast of New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts or other Northern states." 30

Mayor Myers's letter energized Congressman William G. Brantley of Brunswick, Georgia, to inform Secretary of War William Howard Taft that the citizens of Savannah were concerned about the possible impact of Barry's recommendation on the manning of Fort Screven on nearby Tybee Island. Brantley argued that it would be a mistake for the recommendation to be carried out, "and I write to join in the hope that you will make careful investigation and give most careful consideration to same before reaching a favorable conclusion with reference thereto." A month later Senator Augustus O. Bacon of Georgia wrote the assistant secretary of war to "file [his] objections to the proposed plan." Senator Bacon stressed that Tybee Island was a popular seaside resort, rather than an "unhealthy and disagreeable place," and stationing black

![General Barry](https://www.usma.edu/Courtesy-of-the-West-Point-Museum)
Scott wrote Roosevelt in March 1907, asking him to order that six field artillery batteries and at least eighteen coast artillery companies "be recruited with colored men." Scott presented five reasons to justify this "favor" for African Americans: their proven bravery in combat (including their use of four Hotchkiss guns during the War with Spain), their proven good marksmanship in the cavalry and infantry, their "sufficient intelligence," their low desertion rates, and finally that "our most intelligent men deserve a chance to prove their ability and serve their country in the artillery branch of the service the same as white soldiers of similar qualifications do." Scott also said:

I have been informed that the War Department in the past has been of the opinion that colored men with sufficient intelligence to make good artillerymen cannot be found. This was doubtless true in the '60s and in the period immediately following, but does not hold good now as a trial, I am sure, will show. Whenever given an opportunity, as at Las Guasimas [in Cuba] in 1898, they have acquitted themselves creditably. ³⁴

Scott closed his letter to President Roosevelt by noting that although the size of the Regular Army had increased significantly since the Civil War, there had been greater black representation in its ranks before the first six regiments were consolidated into four in 1869. He correctly pointed out that "the Negro people since the first six regiments were authorized, have received no favors at the hands of congress or the War Department." ³⁵

The president passed Scott's letter to the War Department and asked for a report from the General Staff. The Army's chief of staff, Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, directed his office's Military Information Division to determine whether African Americans could qualify for artillery service and to recommend "what portion of the new artillery force should be composed of negroes" in the event a decision was made to include them. The division's chief, Lt. Col. Thaddeus W. Jones, a cavalryman who had served with black troops for nearly three decades in the West, in Cuba, and in the Philippines, prepared a response cautiously favoring the incorporation of African Americans into the artillery, a proposal that, he observed, had the support of all but one member of his division. ³⁶

Colonel Jones first responded to Scott's justifications, acknowledging the bravery and lower desertion rates of black troops but pointing out that there was no link between small arms and artillery marksmanship. He also argued that the capacities of black soldiers for clerical work and leadership had developed more slowly than had those of white soldiers. Citing census data indicating that a smaller percentage of black males than native white males born of native white parents were engaged in a number of categories of skilled labor, Jones wrote that unless a higher proportion of skilled black workers wanted to serve in the military "there would be difficulty in filling the more important positions in an artillery organization composed wholly of negroes." He determined that the 1900 census showed that 10.42 percent of the militia age male population was...
black, so 18 of 170 coast artillery companies and 4 of 36 field artillery batteries would be a fair distribution of black artillery units. Jones recommended, however, that the Army organize no more than eighteen black coast artillery companies and six black field artillery batteries (preferably mountain), each with a “skeleton” of volunteer white artillerists to fill the more important positions demanding special aptitude and training. If black soldiers later demonstrated the ability to occupy those positions, they could advance to them as vacancies arose. If not, the assignment of blacks to the artillery should cease.37

Two General Staff officers submitted reports dissenting from the views expressed by Colonel Jones. Maj. Cornelis DeWitt Willcox, a career artilleryman who had entered the service from Georgia, took a much harsher view of Scott’s justifications. He maintained that bravery was “not of itself a reason” why black soldiers “should be selected for a particular kind of service,” and that artillery marksmanship required good teamwork rather than individual shooting skills. Willcox asserted that the “negro race” was “inferior to the white race in intelligence and mental ability,” a matter he claimed was “recognized by many negroes themselves.” Their lower desertion rate would not help the artillery, Willcox argued, if the soldiers remaining were “unintelligent and unfitted for their duties.” As far as Scott’s argument that black soldiers deserved the chance to prove their ability as artillerists, Willcox simply said, “We fail to see the bearing of this argument.” After detailing the highly skilled nature of modern artillery range finding and the complexity of coast artillery mechanisms, Willcox judged that it was “fairly to be concluded” that African Americans were “not fitted for the modern technical artillery service, either field or coast.” He stressed that the “late disturbance at Brownsville” illustrated what may be expected in the South if this plan of negro companies be insisted on. Finally Willcox pointed out that the “Artillery Bill” had just recognized coast artillery as a branch, and the new branch had many unsolved problems before it. Enlisting black coast artillerists now would divert part of “the energies of the coast defense from its proper function to a race question. To enlist negroes is deliberately to open a running sore that may never heal.”38

A second minority report came from Major “CJB,” evidently Maj. Charles J. Bailey of the Third Division, the war plans section, of the General Staff, who was a coast artillery officer. He similarly argued that “the average negro recruit is not fitted by nature, disposition or training to acquire technical knowledge” and “an organization composed entirely of negroes will not become efficient for many years, if ever.” Instead, Bailey recommended integration, or “sending the colored recruit to any [artillery] organization where a vacancy exists.” Only those who could qualify for the more technical higher positions would be promoted to them. This would parallel the practice of the Navy, which was appropriate because “The higher duties of enlisted men in the Coast Artillery are more analogous to those in the Navy than to any branch of the land service. The experience, therefore, of the Navy with the negro should be considered, rather than that of land forces, and no other comparison should be made.”39

Booker T. Washington also talked with Secretary of War Taft, who asked for his “opinion in regard to the advisability and wisdom of organizing a colored regiment of field artillery.” Washington wrote Taft in late May 1907 that, after consulting with several people he respected and considering the criticism the move might arouse, he had nevertheless decided to “recommend strongly that the regiment be organized.” Washington pointed out that in most states the “colored state militia had been abandoned” and this had discouraged African Americans. He also hoped to repair some of the post-Brownsville damage to the Republican Party: “The organization of this regiment will stop much of the senseless and useless criticism that is now in the air and will let the country see and feel that the President and the administration are in favor of doing the right thing by all races regardless of praise or blame.”40

Washington wrote Taft again in January 1908, because he had heard that the Army’s six new field artillery regiments, which had been organized
in May and June 1907, were already filled and "consequently there seemed to be no chance for a colored regiment to be organized." He pointed out, "Colored men as a rule are anxious to enlist in the service, while I understand white men are difficult to get." The black educator suggested that this offered an adequate reason to justify organizing a black regiment "at the proper time."41

Secretary Taft replied to Washington nine days later. He said that he had seen President Roosevelt about the matter and "he seems favorably inclined toward the creation of a colored regiment of artillery" but prefers to first await the report of the Senate Investigating Committee on the Brownsville affair. Taft added that he had "always been in favor of having one of the regiments consist of colored men." The secretary of war wanted to be the Republican presidential candidate in 1908, however, and he apparently feared the political backlash from creating a new black unit. As he explained to Washington, "I had just about decided to give the order to organize one of the new artillery regiments with colored men when the Brownsville affair suddenly took a political turn." Taft thus decided to postpone his decision. He told Washington, "I had not quite decided as to the order to organize one of the new artillery regiments with colored men when the Brownsville affair suddenly took a political turn." Taft thus decided to postpone his decision.

Taft's somewhat disingenuous reply failed to address the point that if he were to be fair to African Americans and order the organization of a black artillery unit, he would have to make room for it by mustering one of the new white artillery regiments out of service. Taft clearly was not willing to go out on a limb on this sensitive issue, either as secretary of war or later as president, nor was the Democratic administration of President Woodrow Wilson that took office in 1913. Thus, serious consideration of organizing black artillery units died until after the United States entered the First World War.

World War I

Six months after the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, the War Department announced that it had decided to organize a black division. The 92d Division had its own 167th Field Artillery Brigade, while a later black formation—the 93d Division (Provisional)—comprised only two infantry brigades or four regiments, three of which were formed from black National Guard units, without organic artillery or trains. The 92d Division's 167th Field Artillery Brigade, initially commanded by Brig. Gen. John E. McMahon, a former president of the Field Artillery Board, was authorized just over 5,000 men. The brigade comprised three regiments—the 349th, 350th, and 351st Field Artillery regiments—and the 317th Trench Mortar Battery, with smaller medical, ordnance, and veterinary units. The 349th and 350th were each eventually armed with twenty-four 75-mm. guns, while the 351st had twenty-four 155-mm. howitzers, and the 317th had a dozen 6-inch trench mortars.

All three regiments were constituted on 24 October 1917 and organized by 2 November, the 349th and 350th at Camp Dix, New Jersey, and the 351st at Camp Meade, Maryland. Obtaining black officers posed an immediate problem. On 20 October Col. P. D. Lochrige, acting chief of the War College Division of the Office of the Chief of Staff, had sent a memo to the chief of staff, General Tasker H.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Maryland</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Florida</td>
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<td>Alabama</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In April 1918 Col. Daniel W. Ketcham, acting director of the War Plans Division, informed the chief of staff that the brigade's commander, Col. William E. Cole, considered the state of training of the black lieutenants of the 349th and 350th to be unsatisfactory and had suggested that many of them were "not mentally capable of becoming efficient officers." Ketcham explained that they were the only officers who had been assigned to National Army field artillery regiments without previous artillery training and "without undergoing elimination on the ground of mental or other incapacity for artillery work." Colonel Cole recommended either not using the black officers or sending them through a training camp for field artillery officers, and Colonel Ketcham endorsed the second option.46

By 1 May 1918 Secretary of War Newton Baker had directed that all of the black officers in the 349th and 350th be sent to the next divisional officers' training camp and required to "come up to the established standard for Field Artillery officers." Those officers who failed to meet that standard would go to infantry, labor, or stevedore units and be replaced in the 349th and 350th by white field artillery officers. At least a half-dozen black officers completed officer training at Fort Sill and served with the brigade in France until the Armistice.47

The artillery brigade's problems mirrored those of the 92d Division as a whole. Because the War Department wanted to minimize potential conflicts between black soldiers and white Southerners, the division's units had been distributed among seven camps outside the South—from the divisional headquarters at Camp Funston at Fort Riley, Kansas, to Camp Upton in Suffolk County, New York. This reduced the division's useful training time during the winter and, as the only division to be so fragmented during its training, prevented it from developing a level of divisional cohesion and esprit equal to those of other divisions. As the 92d prepared to deploy overseas, it was, in the words of the
foremost recent historians of African American service in World War I, "reluctantly conceived, superficially trained and inexpertly led." 48

After the 167th Field Artillery Brigade arrived in France in June and July 1918, it continued to train in rear areas at Montmoryllon and La Courtine. Thus it did not join the rest of the 92d Division in August and September 1918 in occupying a 25-kilometer-long sector of the French Seventh Army's defensive line north of St. Dié in the Vosges Mountains. Many of its officers were still poorly trained, and much of its equipment was missing. A month after arriving in France, the 351st Field Artillery, which had no black officers, still had not fired its 155-mm. French howitzers. 49

The 92d Division moved in early October to a sector of the forward defensive line just east of the Moselle River near Pont-à-Mousson, south of Metz. Its artillery brigade joined it there on 20 October, but the division retained the assistance of one white artillery regiment until the Armistice. When the 167th Brigade moved into this sector, it was finally equipped with the tractors and motor vehicles that made it a completely motorized unit. The brigade then capably supported the 92d Division's attacks during the final two days of the war. Brig. Gen. Malvern Hill Barnum, a career cavalryman who led the division's 183d Brigade in these attacks, reported that the divisional artillery supported the infantry advances with rolling barrages that "were very well laid and proved effective. It also rendered valuable work in placing heavy concentration fire on enemy strong points and machine-gun nests. Its counter-battery work was excellent." The black artillerists also received congratulation from General John J. Pershing, who told them, "You men acted like veterans, never failing to reach your objective, once orders had been given you. I wish to thank you for your work." 50

Since it had spent only a short time on the line, the 167th Field Artillery Brigade had very few casualties—only twenty men from the three regiments were wounded in action and none died from their wounds. The brigade joined the rest of the 92d Division in returning to the United States in February and March 1919, and its regiments were speedily demobilized at the posts where they had been organized. 51

In spite of General Pershing's commendation, other senior Army leaders were critical of the black artillerymen. In March 1920 Col. Charles C. Ballou gave a mixed evaluation of the merits of the 92d Division and its black officers. Ballou had commanded the division as a major general and had earlier served as lieutenant colonel of the black 24th Infantry in Pershing's Punitive Expedition into Mexico and as commander of the black officers' training camp at Fort Des Moines. He stated that his divisional artillery "did very good work—though few colored officers ever qualified at the School of Fire, and efficient noncoms were hard to find." Ballou concluded, "Few negroes can qualify as artillerists." 52

Conclusion

In evaluating the limited experience of America's black artillerymen from the Civil War through World War I, it is obvious that their greatest enemy was always racial prejudice. The Army's senior leaders generally preferred white soldiers and were satisfied to limit the participation of blacks to the branches Congress had opened to them in 1866. They maintained that only further legislation could authorize black artillery units, but fair-minded senators and congressmen, such as Joseph R. Hawley, Byron M. Cutcheon, Redfield Proctor, and George H. White, were unable to convince both houses of Congress to enact such laws. Cutcheon's bill to increase the artillery did come extremely close to authorizing black artillerymen during the closing hours of the 51st Congress. The Army and Navy Journal noted that those were "hours of great possibilities for the line of the Army," and it could have correctly added "and for increased black participation in the Army." 53

Influential Army officers argued that most African Americans were not smart enough to master the technical aspects of the artillery branch. Moreover, Southern communities were not amenable to the possibility of assigning black artillery units to nearby coastal forts and used congressional pressure to dissuade the Army from attempting such an experiment. This Southern attitude was expressed in a 1904 Savannah newspaper editorial, "There is nothing the government could do that would tend more to increase race friction than the garrisoning of Southern army posts with Negro soldiers." 54 The accusations raised against black soldiers in Brownsville, Texas, in 1906 exacerbated the South's distaste for black troops, and neither President Roosevelt nor President Taft was willing to authorize black artillerists to help make amends for the former's highly questionable decision to order
We Can Do It: The 503d Field Artillery Battalion in Korea

Although President Harry S. Truman issued in 1948 an executive order designed to lead to the integration of the armed forces, racial segregation persisted in the Army until the Korean War. When fighting broke out in June 1950, seven of fifty-eight active Regular Army field artillery battalions were manned by black artillerymen. Among the African American combat units that deployed to Korea was the 503d Field Artillery Battalion. This unit traced its lineage to the 1st Battalion, 351st Field Artillery, which fought with the 92d Division in France during World War I, and to the 351st Field Artillery Battalion, which served in Europe during World War II.

Activated in 1947 at Fort Lewis, Washington, the 503d was the 2d Infantry Division Artillery's general support battalion. The unit deployed with the division to Korea, arriving in Pusan in mid-August 1950. Four days later the 503d's eighteen tractor-drawn 155-mm. howitzers fired their first rounds at North Korean units attacking the Pusan Perimeter. In September United Nations forces broke out of that perimeter and began an advance that would cross the 38th Parallel into North Korea. There they encountered large Communist Chinese formations and were forced to retreat south. In late November Chinese forces intercepted the 2d Infantry Division near Kunu-ri, about fifty miles north of Pyongyang, inflicting heavy losses on the Americans. The 503d lost almost half its authorized strength, all of its howitzers, and most of its other equipment. The Army replenished the battalion's personnel and equipment during the next three months, enabling it to continue to support the division, which earned a Presidential Unit Citation for its stubborn stand against a new Chinese offensive in May 1951. The 503d played an important role in this action, firing 6,898 rounds.

Meanwhile, high rates of African American enlistment and reenlistment caused the Eighth Army's black units to become overstrength—the 503d was 37 percent above its authorized strength by the end of May—so the Army began assigning black personnel to previously all-white units. In November 1951 the Army finally integrated the 503d. The Army recognized the unit's wartime achievements by consolidating its lineage with that of the 12th Field Artillery Battalion, which had served with the 2d Division in both world wars. During its fifteen months in Korea the 503d suffered 453 casualties, and its men received over 100 decorations, including 19 Silver Stars. Its actions reflected its motto: "We Can Do It."

The Author

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NOTES

The author would like to thank Anthony Gero of Auburn, New York, and Budge Wideman, project manager of the Civil War Conservation Corps at the National Archives, for their superb assistance.


2. Dyer, Compendium, pp. 1630, 1718, 1721–22. The 9th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery had four companies. For details on the Fort Pillow massacre, see Andrea Trumpbour, Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil War, 1862–1865 (Boston, 1998), pp. 156–69. About one-third of the fort's white defenders were also killed. Two weeks after the battle the regiment was redesignated the 7th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, and in January 1865 it became the 11th U.S. Colored Infantry.


5. Cunningham, "Douglass's Battery," p. 208; Dyer, Compendium, p. 1672. At the Battle of Westport one of Minor's guns, sighted by the 9th Wisconsin Battery's commander, hit a Confederate gun and broke its carriage. Because the Independent Battery was still recruiting and would not muster into the Union Army until December, it received no official credit for participating in the battle.

6. Cunningham, "Douglass's Battery," pp. 211–15; Dyer, Compendium, pp. 1722–23. During the war artillery batteries were usually referred to by their captain's surname.


31. Lt. Brantley to Secretary of War, 10 Oct 1904, and attached clipping from the *Savannah Morning News*, 6 Oct 1904, in Doc. file #932159, and Lt. Bacon to Assistant Secretary of War, 5 Nov 1904, Doc. file #942632, both in RG 94, NA. By 1906 three coast artillery companies, each authorized 10 enlisted men, were assigned to Fort Screven.


35. Ibid. On 30 June 1907 the total strength of the four black regiments was 2,925, having declined by more than 2,000 since the turn of the century. As a portion of total Army strength, the enlisted strength of its black regiments had fallen from over 12 percent. It was 7.5 percent in 1900 but just under 5 percent in 1907. See Schubert, *On the Trail*, p. 509; Heitman, *Historical Register of the Army*, 2: 626; and for 1907, Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York, 1967), p. 568.

36. Memo, Chief of Staff for Military Information Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, 6 Apr 1907, reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, *Blacks in the Armed Forces*, 3: 336. After graduating from West Point in 1872, Jones served in the 18th Cavalry through the Santiago campaign of the Spanish-American War, commanded the black 10th U.S. Volunteer Infantry (July 1898–March 1899), and was lieutenant colonel of the black 48th U.S. Volunteer Infantry (September 1899–June 1901), a unit raised for the Philippine War. Jones’s father, a Union Army veteran, represented western North Carolina in Congress in 1868–71.


40. Lt. Washington to Taft, 27 Jan 1908, in ibid., p. 448; the dates and places at which the regiments were organized are detailed in Janice F. McNally, *Field Artillery: Regular Army and Army Reserve, Army Lineage Series* (Washington, D.C., 1985), pp. 7, 29, 39, 59, 68, 85.


44. Mooney, loc. cit., p. 127. Units of the National Army mustered in 1907, primarily due to the Militia Act of 1903, which made it more difficult for states to discriminate against their black units. Rather than comply with this legislation, several states simply opted to disband their black units.

45. Memo, Ketchum for Chief of Staff, 20 Apr 1918, reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, *Blacks in the Armed Forces*, 4: 127–28, quotations, p. 127. Units of the National Army (primarily comprised of draftees), the Regular Army, and the National Guard formed the U.S. Army in World War I.

46. Memo, Brig Gen William S. Graves for the Adjutant General, 1 May 1918 (quotation), and Memo, Maj Gen Peyton C. March, Acting Chief of Staff, for the Adjutant General, 21 May 1918, reproduced in ibid., pp. 129 and 132, respectively; Charles H. Williams, *Side-lights on Negro Soldiers* (Boston, 1923), p. 173.


49. *American Battle Monuments Commission*, 92d Division, pp. 33, 34. Fearing racial problems between black soldiers and French civilians, the Army’s senior leadership ensured that the 92d went home quickly.


**National Guard Museum Opens in Washington, D.C.**

On 17 March 2003 the National Guard Association of the United States opened the new National Guard Memorial Museum in the association’s headquarters building at 1 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. The museum explores the history of the militia and the National Guard in the United States from the first British American militia muster in 1636 to the response of the National Guard to the attacks of 11 September 2001. The museum is open from 1000 to 1600 hours, Monday through Friday.