United States Forces, Somalia
After Action Report

and

Historical Overview
The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994
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Introduction

The United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian relief. No such operation has proven as costly or shocking, however, as that undertaken in Somalia from August 1992 to March 1994. Greeted initially by Somalis happy to be saved from starvation, U.S. troops were slowly drawn into inter-clan power struggles and ill-defined “nation-building” missions. The American people woke up one day in early October 1993 to news reports of dozens of our soldiers killed or wounded in fierce fighting in the streets of the capital city, Mogadishu. These disturbing events of a decade ago have taken on increasing meaning after the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001.

The Army began by assisting in relief operations in Somalia, but by December 1992 it was deeply engaged on the ground in Operation RESTORE HOPE in that chaotic African country. In the spring of the following year, the initial crisis of imminent starvation seemed to be over, and the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) turned over the mission to the United Nations, leaving only a small logistical, aviation, and quick reaction force behind to assist. The American public seemed to forget about Somalia. That sense of “mission accomplished” made the events of 3–4 October 1993 more startling, as Americans reacted to the spectacle of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets by cheering Somali mobs—the very people Americans thought they had rescued from starvation.

This after action report, prepared shortly after the U.S. withdrawal by a working group including Lt. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery, Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia, provides an excellent summary of the series of events that drew us deeper and deeper into Somali internal affairs. It is preceded by a short historical overview of the U.S. involvement in Somalia written by Dr. Richard W. Stewart, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and a veteran of Somalia. The after action report concludes with a number of timely and insightful observations and lessons. We believe that this absorbing report will stimulate further interest in and study of this extraordinarily important U.S. operation.

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Historical Overview
The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994

by

Dr. Richard W. Stewart

Americans consider themselves to be a compassionate people, and the United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian relief operations both within and outside the continental United States. Never has this humanitarian impulse proven more dangerous to follow than in 1992 when the United States intervened to arrest famine in the midst of an ongoing civil war in the east African country of Somalia. Ultimately hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but unintended involvement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of thirty American soldiers, four marines, and eight Air Force personnel and created the impression of chaos and disaster. How could a mission that had accomplished so much have ended in such unhappy circumstances?

The Army’s humanitarian relief efforts have generally been less complicated and more successful. Soldiers provided vital support to the stricken city of San Francisco in 1906 as it struggled to recover from the great earthquake and subsequent fires. National Guard units in communities across the nation frequently rush to the scene of communities hit by hurricanes, tornados, fires, or floods. In 1992, soldiers from the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, deployed to restore order and bring in supplies in the wake of Hurricane Andrew, which destroyed large sections of Miami, Florida. U.S. Army personnel have also been involved in many overseas disaster relief and humanitarian operations, generally as part of joint task forces. In Operation SEA ANGEL in 1991, American soldiers assisted relief efforts in Bangladesh as it recovered from a disastrous cyclone. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, also in 1991, U.S. Army special operations soldiers rescued almost 400,000 Kurds from imminent starvation in the mountains of northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. The national impulse to intervene—to help—is a powerful one, and the U.S. military forces are uniquely suited to bringing to bear their skill, manpower, and logistical power anywhere in the world.

Strategic Setting

American interest in the Horn of Africa region dates back to the Cold War when both the Soviet Union and the United States competed to gain allies and influence throughout the world. In the early 1960s the United States established a presence, including communications listening posts, in the northern part of Ethiopia and backed the traditional regime of Emperor Haile Selassie. The Soviets, on the other hand, replaced the weakened Italian influence in neighboring Somalia and supported the authoritarian regime of Somali strongman Mohammed Siad Barre, who took power in 1969. (Map 1)

After Siad Barre precipitated a disastrous war against Ethiopia over the status of the Ogaden region in 1977, the situation in Somalia grew worse. Western aid dried up, and Barre was forced to grow ever more repressive to maintain his grip on power. He began a policy of systematic kidnapping and murder against rival clan leaders that increased in ferocity over time. Finally, antigovernment riots led to overreaction on the part of Siad Barre’s bodyguards, who killed 65 civilians and seriously injured over 300 in 1990. His legitimacy in shambles, the army and the people turned against him in a prolonged series of riots, political maneuvers, and violence. Siad Barre was forced to flee the country in January 1991 with some of his closest supporters. Almost immediately, a resurgence of clan violence led to the virtual destruction of any central government and to economic chaos.
As Somalia lapsed into sectarian and ethnic warfare, regional warlords drew upon clan loyalty to establish independent power bases. This situation led to a struggle over food supplies with each clan raiding the storehouses and depots of the others. Coupled with a drought, these actions brought famine to hundreds of thousands of the nation’s poor. Although private and volunteer relief organizations established refugee camps to try to prevent widespread deaths from starvation, they could not handle the massive amounts of aid and the requisite security structure that were needed. International relief organizations paid protection money to the warlords as they tried to distribute what donated food supplies did arrive. More often than not, such supplies never reached the hands of those who needed them but instead were confiscated by the warlords who distributed or sold them to enhance their own power and prestige. The general misery was only compounded by the brutality of the Somali clans toward their rivals and the sporadic outbreaks of actual fighting. The most visible elements of the suffering—pictures of starving, fly-covered children—appeared nightly on American television screens. Fresh from its triumph in Operation DESERT STORM, the administration of President George H. W. Bush felt it could not ignore the situation, despite the obvious risks of intervening in a country still at war with itself.

The United Nations reacted to the worsening plight of Somalia in early 1992. On 24 April it approved Resolution 751, which authorized humanitarian relief operations in the stricken country and established the United Nations Operations in Somalia, or UNOSOM. Almost immediately, a small group of peacekeepers deployed to the country and tried to sort out the confusing array of clans, private armies, and relief organizations, all competing over the distribution of food relief supplies. While some progress was made in the major cities, it was apparent that significant amounts of the supplies destined for the interior were being hijacked by the armies of the clans or by the relief organizations’ security guards, hired by the UN and the relief agencies to guard the convoys of food. Since UN and private volunteer organizations were generally prohibited from hiring armed security forces, they instead hired local tribesmen as technical assistants—hence the nickname “technicals.” The technicals were armed bodyguards, often driving pick-up trucks or land cruisers with machine guns or other heavy weapons mounted.
Operations

U.S. Relief Efforts

In response to the worsening famine, the United States decided to assist the relief efforts by airlifting food from nearby Kenya to remote airfields in the interior of Somalia for distribution, thus bypassing congested ports and reducing the need to send out easily looted convoys. For this purpose, the United States launched Operation PROVIDE RELIEF on 15 August 1992. The actual ground distribution continued to be accomplished by the international relief organizations already established in the country. PROVIDE RELIEF was thus a limited attempt to use U.S. expertise in logistics to help the relief effort without engaging American military forces on the ground.

Problems of distribution within the country continued to hamper the relief effort. In the countryside, lawless gangs seized relief supplies and used them to buy local loyalties while letting thousands starve. In the cities, the warring political factions, supported by their private armies, amassed food stockpiles as bargaining chips and signs of their power. These rival entities, often barely controlled by their clan leaders, terrorized the international organizations, stealing food and killing whoever did not pay protection money.

Because of the increasingly chaotic situation on the ground, as a security measure U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers from the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, accompanied many of the relief flights. In the process they assessed the dangers of various regions, conducted a low-key reconnaissance of the airfields, and gathered basic information that would be useful for any possible future U.S. ground involvement.

That involvement was not long in coming. Unable to explain to the world why the United States, the “sole remaining superpower” and leader of the “new world order,” was not able to stop the starvation, President Bush ordered U.S. forces to deploy to Somalia. Their mission was to ensure that relief supplies reached the people who needed them and thus to “break the cycle” of starvation and save lives.

RESTORE HOPE

The operation, code-named RESTORE HOPE, began on 8 December 1992 under the direction of a Unified Task Force, or UNITAF. The I Marine Expeditionary Force from Camp Pendleton, California, formed the bulk of the headquarters, with augmentation from all the services. Commanded by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, UNITAF included U.S. and allied troops working together in one task force, but under U.S. and not UN direction. And, like all modern humanitarian operations, it was a joint, combined, and interagency effort. The role of the U.S. State Department was critical. Once Ambassador Robert B. Oakley was appointed as President Bush’s special envoy to Somalia, he and General Johnston moved quickly to establish a close working relationship. Although the United Nations continued to play an important part in the politics within the country, especially in the delicate negotiations between rival Somali factions, its role was soon overshadowed by U.S. military and diplomatic power. Security Council Resolution 794, passed on 3 December, endorsed the U.S.-led operation and gave it its international flavor and legitimacy, but the UN simply lacked the logistics, command and control, or intelligence capabilities to undertake such a complex mission.

Marine Corps and Navy special operations elements moved into Somalia in the early morning hours of 9 December, with the first 1,300 marines coming in by helicopter directly to Mogadishu airport. Emerging from the ocean surf in the predawn hours, the Navy Seals were immediately hit with the blazing lights of forewarned media crews. Luckily, the diplomatic groundwork had been laid for U.S. troops to arrive with no Somali resistance. Thereafter, Somali warlords quickly agreed to cooperate with each other (at least for a time) and work with the U.S. troops to establish a relatively benign and secure envi-
The technicals and all Somali heavy weapons began to be moved into cantonment areas by the end of the month, and by mid-February most heavy weapons were either in such secure cantonment areas or moved out of Mogadishu and hidden to avoid confiscation or destruction.

The U.S. Army component of UNITAF was Task Force Mountain, initially commanded by Brig. Gen. Lawson William Magruder III, the Assistant Division Commander, Maneuver, of the 10th Mountain Division, based at Fort Drum, New York. He remained in command until 22 December when the division commander, Maj. Gen. Steven L. Arnold, replaced him. TF Mountain was built around the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, and at its peak consisted of approximately 10,000 soldiers including two infantry battalions, an aviation brigade, and division artillery and support assets. It was a sizable and effective military force that overawed the poorly armed Somali militia.

Coalition forces including large components from France, Italy, Belgium, Morocco, Australia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Canada soon joined U.S. forces. During the course of RESTORE HOPE, some 38,000 soldiers from 23 different nations and representatives from 49 different humanitarian relief operations worked together to put food into the mouths of the starving people of Somalia.

The main challenge to the smooth flow of relief supplies continued to be the rivalry between feuding warlords, particularly between the forces of General Muhammed Farah Aideed of the Habr Gidr subclan and Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the Abgal subclan in Mogadishu. Aided, previously a general in dictator Siad Barre's army and a former ambassador to India, now headed the Somali National Alliance (SNA) with pretensions to ruling the entire country. His opponent, Ali Mahdi, was a former businessman and farmer with little military experience and only an ad hoc militia. Their feud had led to open conflict from November 1991 to February 1992 and only added to the tragedy of Somalia by killing thousands of innocent Mogadishu citizens. Backed by overwhelming U.S. and allied power, Ambassador Oakley effectively established a cease-fire between the two forces as a precondition to establishing a military and relief presence in the interior of the country. However, it was not in the UN charter, nor in the U.S. mission guidance, to disarm or attack either faction. Ostensibly, the UNITAF forces were neutral and there only to ensure that relief supplies flowed. They achieved this mission by late December, as the port and the airport reopened and relief supplies began moving quickly ashore. Over 40,000 tons of grain were off-loaded by the end of December along with 6,668 vehicles and 96 helicopters for the military forces.

While Mogadishu maintained an uneasy calm, UNITAF forces began to move into the countryside. To aid in coordination, the southern part of the country, the area most marked by drought and famine, was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). U.S. Marine Forces (MARFOR) concentrated on Baardheere (Bardera)¹ and parts of Mogadishu while the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) of UNITAF focused on providing security, often in conjunction with allied forces, in four sectors: HRS Baidoa, HRS Balli Dooge (Baledogle), HRS Merca (Marka), and HRS Kismaayo. (Map 2)

Movement of U.S. units into their sectors occurred in a variety of ways. Some U.S. Army units flew first into Mogadishu and then moved out to their assigned relief sectors. On 28 December, TF 2–87, an infantry battalion task force, conducted a combined air assault operation with the 1st Canadian Airborne Battle Group from their base in Mogadishu into the town of Beledweyne (Belet Uen), some 180 miles north. Other units, such as TF 3–14, another infantry battalion task force, flew directly from the United States to the main airport in its sector, in this case Kismaayo, 250 miles southwest of Mogadishu. Rapid changes in plans and missions caused many delays in deployment, shifts in the airflow, and last minute modifications to aircraft load plans as units added, deleted, and changed types of equipment and quantities of supplies. However, by early January most of UNITAF was in place and conducting security operations throughout the nine relief sectors.

¹ Place names in this pamphlet reflect the Board of Geographic Names preferred spellings. Equivalent British spellings, which were carried on 1:250,000 maps widely used during the operation, are provided in parentheses at first mention.
While conventional forces concentrated on major cities and regions, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) moved quickly to establish a presence in the rest of the countryside, place liaison cells with allied forces, and conduct civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP). In early January, Special Operations Command Central, a major subordinate unit of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), deployed a small element to Mogadishu to assume command and control of all special operations forces in theater. This headquarters, known as Joint Special Operations Forces—Somalia or JSOFOR, was responsible for planning and conducting special operations in Somalia in support of all UNITAF humanitarian relief efforts, not just those in the U.S. sector. The main operational objectives of SOF in Somalia were to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders, provide information to UNITAF on potentially hostile forces to aid in force protection, and provide area assessments to assist with planning for future relief and security operations.

The JSOFOR was initially task organized with its headquarters in Mogadishu, five Operational Detachment A (ODA) teams from the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)—each consisting of approximately twelve cross-trained Special Forces soldiers—in Beledweyne (the Canadian sector), and another detachment in Baardeheere (the U.S. Marine Forces sector), 200 miles to the west of Mogadishu. By late February three additional detachments were in Kismaayo (the U.S. Army sector) and one in Baidoa (the shared Australian-U.S. Army sector).

Army civil affairs and PSYOP forces, other elements of the special operations team, also provided critical support to U.S. relief operations during Restore Hope. The 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) deployed a civil affairs tactical support team and six CA direct support teams that provided support to both Army and Marine forces. They interacted with numerous international and private aid organizations, staffed humanitarian operations centers throughout Somalia, conducted medical and engineer assessments of local facilities, and coordinated medical and engineer civic action projects.

Psychological operations were also used extensively to support operations in Somalia. UNITAF established a Joint PSYOP Task Force made up primarily of elements of the 4th Psychological
Operations Group (Airborne) from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to ensure that information operations were effectively integrated into all plans and operations in theater. PSYOP troops ran a local newspaper (called Rajo—the truth) and set up a radio broadcasting system. They also provided tactical loudspeaker teams to U.S. and international forces. In addition, the task force designed, printed, and distributed more than 7 million copies of 49 different leaflets, posters, and handbills.

On the whole, the relief mission proceeded well, with few incidents of violence from February to May 1993. It seemed that life was assuming some measure of normalcy. Markets reopened, travel became more common, and there was even some hope of restarting a Somali national police force with promising initial results. However, clan rivalry and U.S. reluctance to engage in long-term “nation-building” operations soon doomed the effort.

Daily soldier life settled into a routine. Troops conducted mounted and dismounted patrols throughout the cities in their sectors with occasional brushes with bandits and unruly crowds. Carefully written UNITAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) limited their responses by reminding the soldiers that this was not a wartime environment, that all persons were to be treated with dignity and respect, and that only the minimum force necessary for the mission was authorized. These ROE did not in any way, however, interfere with the right to defend oneself or one’s unit. In one instance a noncommissioned officer shot and killed a young Somali who ran up to his vehicle carrying a small box that the sergeant believed might be a bomb. Despite the tragic nature of the event, charges against the soldier were dismissed under legitimate self-defense grounds. However, in another instance, a sergeant shot and killed an individual who had stolen his sunglasses. His claim of self-defense was rejected, and he was convicted at a general court-martial. On the whole, however, U.S. Army soldiers behaved with care and restraint. By April the situation had stabilized enough that the U.S. administration determined that it was time to turn the mission over to the United Nations entirely.

Despite some setbacks and incidents, Operation RESTORE HOPE succeeded in its goal of bringing an end to mass starvation. The heavily armed UNITAF units quickly established security in their sectors, and an uneasy truce kept the peace between the factions. There were some warning signs on the horizon, however, as UN diplomats began to press for a more active role of the military in confiscating weapons and in forcing some kind of political settlement. “Mission creep” began to enter the vocabulary of those serving in Somalia, and soon after the United States turned over the mission completely to the United Nations in May, the situation began to unravel.

UNOSOM II: Operation CONTINUE HOPE

While U.S. and allied forces maintained the peace in Somalia, U.S. leaders were working hard to push the United Nations into establishing a new mission in Somalia to take over the majority of the responsibilities for running the relief effort while allowing the United States to reduce the size of its committed forces and handle only limited aspects of security and logistics. On 26 March 1993, the United Nations passed Resolution 814 which considerably broadened its mandate to intervene in another country’s affairs. The UN was now intervening militarily in a peacemaking role under Chapter VII of its charter. The more frequently used Chapter VI addressed only the deployment of peacekeeping troops to reinforce a previously agreed upon settlement between warring parties. But Chapter VII dealt with peace enforcement and not merely peacekeeping. The resolution underlined the charters of the first UNOSOM mission and Operation RESTORE HOPE and that of the new mission, UNOSOM II.

Turkish Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir was appointed commander of the UNOSOM II force, with U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Montgomery as his deputy. General Montgomery also retained his position as commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM) under Marine Corps General Joseph P. Hoar, CENTCOM commander in chief. Thus the U.S. forces retained their own national chain of command while
inserting themselves into the UN structure. Only if the forces were committed to any combat operation would U.S. units fall under the tactical control (TACON) of the United Nations. Even in those circumstances, however, with the deputy commander of the UN force an American, U.S. national interests would remain protected. By October 1993 UNOSOM II consisted of over 16,000 peacekeepers from 21 nations. This number would jump to 29,732 soldiers from 29 nations by mid-November with the arrival of over 17,000 additional U.S. personnel as part of a U.S. joint task force.

The slow passage of Security Council Resolution 814 left all parties with little time to plan for an orderly transition, set for 4 May. It took time to fill the UN positions for the new force and, by all accounts, the handover of the mission was poorly done with only 30 percent of the UN staff in place on the date of transfer. However, despite the challenges of transition, General Bir assumed command of forces in Somalia on 4 May 1993 as UNOSOM II assumed the mission. In support of UNOSOM II, the United States provided a substantial logistics structure (consisting of about 2,600 troops) and a small special operations element. The U.S. military also provided a 1,100-soldier ground-based quick reaction force (QRF) for UNOSOM II, consisting of a brigade-level headquarters from the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum. Jonathan Howe, a retired U.S. admiral, was appointed the new UN envoy to Somalia with wide-ranging powers.

It quickly became apparent that Aideed had little respect for the new organization, the UN, or Admiral Howe. On 5 June 1993, his Somalia National Alliance forces ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers assigned to UNOSOM II. Another 44 were wounded. The following day, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 837 adopting a more aggressive military stance toward Aideed and asking member states for more troops and equipment. It also directed UNOSOM II to apprehend those responsible for the ambush. In Mogadishu, Pakistani and Italian forces conducted heavy armored patrols throughout the city, concentrating on the areas near the ambush site. Also on 6 June, General Hoar asked the Joint Staff to send four Air Force AC–130 gunships, special C–130 cargo planes modified for direct ground support, to carry out air strikes against the Somalis. The gunships deployed on 7 June and remained until 14 July, flying a total of thirty-two interdiction, reconnaissance, and PSYOP missions in support of UNOSOM II. Eight of those missions were combat sorties flown over the streets of Mogadishu between 11 and 17 June. As part of the initial strike against Aideed, three gunships flew over Mogadishu on 11–12 June and used their 105-mm. and 40-mm. cannons to demolish two weapons storage facilities and cripple Radio Mogadishu, Aideed’s propaganda station, by destroying its transmission capability. On 13, 14, and 17 June several additional AC–130 missions concentrated on destroying weapons storage areas and vehicle compounds belonging to Aideed and his key supporters. On 17 June, after being advised by a UN panel of jurists that Aideed and his SNA were behind the ambush of the Pakistanis, Admiral Howe issued a warrant for Aideed’s arrest and authorized a $25,000 reward. This only served to harden the political lines in Mogadishu. Skirmishing between UN and U.S. elements and Aideed’s Habr Gidr subclan continued, and on 12 July, in a direct challenge to Aideed’s leadership, the American QRF attacked a major Aideed compound with helicopter gunships. After the raid, a hostile crowd near the compound killed four western journalists covering the action, displaying their bodies for the world to see.

Immediately, UNOSOM II Force Command focused its intelligence and operational capability on locating, capturing, and arresting Aideed and any of his supporters whom it deemed responsible for the attacks of June and July. U.S. Task Force 3–25 Aviation was designated the command and control element and established three teams to conduct operations to capture Aideed: Team Attack, Team Snatch, and Team Secure. Composed of attack, scout, and cargo helicopters with snipers and a scout platoon, they were to conduct continuous intelligence surveillance of Aideed, leading to an attack on his escort convoy when he was traveling around the city and most vulnerable. Team Attack would destroy the lead and trail vehicles, Team Snatch would then capture Aideed, and Team Secure would provide ground security by occupying blocking positions to prevent civilians from entering while keeping targeted individuals in the ambush site. However, despite several alerts, Aideed began lowering his profile in the city and was seldom noted moving around.
Aideed did not take this personal threat to him lying down. On 8 August his forces detonated a mine under a passing U.S. Military Police (MP) vehicle on Jialle-Siaad Street in Mogadishu killing four U.S. MPs. As the military situation worsened, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked the new U.S. administration of President William J. Clinton to assist him in capturing Aideed.

On 22 August 1993, the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, directed the deployment of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by Aideed supporters upon American and UNOSOM forces and installations. The JSOTF, named Task Force Ranger, had the mission of capturing Aideed and his key lieutenants and turning them over to UNOSOM II forces. The task would prove extraordinarily difficult, for Aideed had gone underground after the AC–130 air raids and ground assaults on his strongholds in June and July.

The command and control structure of TF Ranger evolved during its time in theater. It eventually was a carefully worked out arrangement that ensured coordination of American elements on the ground without compromising its security or U.S. national interests. In accord with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the unified commander (in this case, General Hoar) had command and control over all U.S. military resources in theater, including the units supporting UNOSOM II and TF Ranger. However, TF Ranger did not report to General Montgomery, the U.S. commander on the ground in Somalia who was dual-hatted as the UNOSOM II deputy commander. Instead, General Hoar had the TF Ranger commander, Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison, report to him directly. Thus, TF Ranger, as a strategic U.S. asset, did not fall under the UNOSOM II commander but rather remained strictly under American operational command and control. For his part, after an initial misstep during a poorly coordinated mission that hit a UN compound, General Garrison worked to ensure that he coordinated all TF Ranger operations with General Montgomery. He also closely tied in his force to the U.S. QRF by exchanging liaison officers.

All major elements of TF Ranger were in Somalia by 28 August. The task force consisted of special operations ground forces, special operations helicopters, U.S. Air Force special tactics personnel, and U.S. Navy Seals. During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were tactical successes, although in one instance the task force members mistakenly raided an unlisted UN facility and temporarily restrained some UN employees. The raids were launched by day and night and used both helicopters and vehicles to reach their targets. During one of these operations, a raid near Digfer Hospital on 21 September, Osman Atto, one of Aideed’s closest advisers and his chief financial aide, was captured. The operation went smoothly, but for the first time the U.S. Rangers received massed rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire from nearby Somali militia. Although Aideed himself remained free, the cumulative result of these efforts was to severely hamper his movements and effectiveness. However, his forces were also showing a greater willingness to engage TF Ranger elements with heavy small arms and rocket fire.

The situation in Mogadishu worsened even as the raids continued. In one of the most violent and costly incidents, on 8 September U.S. and Pakistani soldiers were clearing roadblocks near a site known as the Cigarette Factory when they were attacked by Somali militia using 106-mm. recoilless rifles, RPGs, and small arms. It took extensive fires from ground and aviation units to suppress the enemy fire. Later that same day, near an abandoned allied checkpoint, the same clearing element was again attacked by militiamen, this time joined by a mob of approximately 1,000 Somali civilians. Six UNOSOM II soldiers were injured. On 16 and 21 September two roadblock-clearing teams were attacked on 21 October Road. The team attacked on 21 September was a Pakistani element, and it lost an armored personnel carrier and suffered nine casualties, including two killed. On 25 September a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter was shot down and three soldiers killed: one from the 25th Aviation Regiment, Fort Drum, and two from the 101st Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. U.S. and Pakistani forces secured the area and evacuated the casualties under fire. Particularly unsettling was the fact that the Somalis shot down the helicopter using simple RPGs, normally used to attack armored vehicles. This fact did not bode...
well for the helicopter raids of TF Ranger.

On 3 October TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aideed’s stronghold in the so-called Black Sea slum district, near the Bakara Market, to capture two of his key lieutenants. Helicopters carrying assault and blocking forces launched around 1530 from the task force compound at the western end of Mogadishu airport, with a ground convoy moving out three minutes later. By 1542 the ground forces had arrived at the target location, near the Olympic Hotel. (Map 3) The blocking force quickly established perimeter positions while the assault force searched the compound for Aideed’s supporters. Both came under increasingly heavy enemy fire, more intense than during previous raids. The assault team captured twenty-four Somalis and was about to load them onto the convoy trucks when a circling MH–60 Black Hawk was hit by an RPG and crashed about three blocks from the target location. Almost immediately, one six-man element of the blocking force, as well as a small MH–6 assault helicopter and a modified MH–60 Black Hawk carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, went to the scene. The MH–6 crew arrived first, landed in a narrow alley in the middle of a firefight, and evacuated two wounded soldiers to a military field hospital. Next, the six-man Ranger blocking element arrived on foot, followed by the CSAR helicopter. As the last two members of the search and rescue team were sliding down the fast ropes to the crash site, their helicopter was also hit by an RPG, but somehow the pilot kept the helicopter steady until the two reached the ground safely and then nursed the helicopter back to the airport.

The situation now worsened. Ground fire struck two more MH–60s, with one going down less than a mile south of the first destroyed helicopter while the other limped to safety at the airport. A Somali mob overran this second crash site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except one of the pilots, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders at this location, M. Sgt. Gary Gordon and Sfc. Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for their sacrifice.

Meanwhile, after loading the detainees on the ground convoy trucks, the remaining assault and blocking forces moved on foot to the first crash area, passing through heavy fire that wounded a num-
ber of soldiers, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter. There they established defensive positions, laying down suppressive fire to hold the Somalis at bay, and treated their wounded while working to free the pilot’s body from the wreckage. Taking a different route, the ground convoy force with the detainees loaded in trucks attempted to reach the first crash site from the north. Unable to find it among the narrow, winding alleyways, they came under withering small arms and RPG fire. Finally, after suffering numerous casualties, losing two 5-ton trucks, and sustaining substantial damage to the other vehicles, the convoy commander decided to return to the airfield.

On the way, the returning convoy encountered a second convoy consisting of the task force’s internal quick response force. This pick-up force of Ranger and Special Forces support personnel had left the airport in hopes of reaching the site of the second crash. It loaded some of the casualties of the first convoy onto its vehicles and both returned to base. About this time, part of the ground element of the U.S. QRF for the UN, a company of the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, also tried to reach the second crash site, but the soldiers were pinned down by Somali fire. After a tough, dismounted firefight near the K–4 traffic circle, the commander of that element, Lt. Col. William C. David, also commander of the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, was compelled to move his small and outgunned force back to the safety of the airport to regroup and work with task force personnel on a coordinated rescue plan.

While these elements moved back and forth through the suddenly lethal streets of Mogadishu, the TF Ranger soldiers at the first crash site were running short of critical supplies. They received a resupply of water and ammunition from a helicopter that evening, but that MH–60 was also hit with RPGs and barely managed to power back to the airport before breaking down completely.

The relief column was slowly being formed first at the airport and then at the New Port area of the city. It took some time to assemble tanks and armored vehicles from the Pakistani and Malaysian forces nearby, explain the plan to them, and integrate their forces with the 2–14th Infantry elements. The period spent in coordination was vital, however, for such a complex, multinational force operation. Time was available, however, since General Garrison personally assured General Montgomery that the Rangers were not in immediate danger of being overrun and were being resupplied with ammunition and medical supplies. Armor was essential as well, given the numerous roadblocks and RPGs flying across the streets of the city. Finally, after hours of planning and collecting forces, the sixty-plus vehicle convoy of the 10th Mountain Division and attached elements moved out of the New Port area north to National Street, the Pakistani tanks in the lead. Closely followed by circling AH–1 Cobra gunships, command and control UH–60s, and reconnaissance OH–58A helicopters, the convoy moved in fits and starts along National Street toward the crash sites. Accidentally, two of the Malaysian armored personnel carriers with soldiers from the 2d Platoon, Company A, 2–14th Infantry, turned south off National and were ambushed. The soldiers moved quickly into the cover of nearby buildings. It would be four hours before they were rescued. The rest of the convoy continued up National and turned north on Shalalawi Street past the Olympic Hotel toward the first crash site. The 10th Mountain “Lightfighters” in the Malaysian armored personnel carriers broke through to the site at 0155 on 4 October. The combined Ranger–Special Forces–mountain infantry force worked until dawn to free the pilot’s body, receiving grenade and small arms fire throughout the night. Close fire support by AH–6 and AH–1 attack helicopters, in some instances firing 2.75-inch rockets, helped keep the enemy at bay during those long hours of darkness. Company A, 2–14th Infantry, less its second platoon, reached the second crash site, but no trace could be found of the lost soldiers and aviators. As dawn broke, all the casualties from the first site were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers; the remainder of the force moved rapidly on foot south along Shalalawi Street to National Street in what became known as the Mogadishu Mile.

General Montgomery had discussed additional mechanized and armored units with CINCCENT in August and had formally requested a mechanized infantry team with a platoon of tanks and an artillery battery in early September. However, CINCCENT deleted the artillery before forwarding the request to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and, despite the chairman’s recommendation for approval, Secretary of Defense Aspin disapproved the request in late September.
With the armored personnel carriers providing rolling cover, the run-and-gun movement began at 0542 on 4 October. Somalis continued firing at the convoy while U.S. helicopter gunships raked the cross streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the so-called Pakistani Stadium in the northeast section of the city by around 0630. Medical personnel gave emergency treatment to the wounded, and all personnel were prepared for movement to the hospital or the airfield. Thus ended one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the Vietnam War.

Casualties were heavy. TF Ranger lost 16 soldiers on 3–4 October and had another 57 wounded, with 1 other killed and 12 wounded on 6 October by a mortar attack on their hangar complex at the airport. The 2–14th Infantry suffered 2 Americans killed and 22 wounded while the Malaysian coalition partners had 2 killed and 7 wounded and the Pakistanis suffered 2 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties between 500 and 1,500.

The battles of 3–4 October were a watershed in U.S. involvement in Somalia. The already complex mission and difficult environment took a dramatic turn with those events. The situation required constant innovation and rapid decisions from all the troops and commanders involved, under conditions that did not allow the American soldiers to take advantage of their great technological superiority. Experience, common sense, group cohesion, and superior tactical training were the virtues that made survival in the new environment possible as the decision-makers in Washington grappled with what to do next.

The Withdrawal from Somalia

In the aftermath of the 3–4 October battle, U.S. military presence in Somalia increased significantly, although temporarily. A company from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was immediately dispatched from Fort Stewart, Georgia, with Bradley fighting vehicles along with an attached platoon of M1 Abrams tanks. They were soon joined by the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, with additional support assets. Another unit of the 10th Mountain Division—the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry—arrived in Somalia soon after, along with a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) and additional special operations personnel including more AC–130 gunships. These forces were organized under a new Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia under the command of Maj. Gen. Carl F. Ernst who was placed under General Montgomery’s tactical control but remained under the operational control of the theater commander, General Hoar. In December, General Montgomery left his UN post and took direct command of the JTF in addition to commanding USFORsom to execute the withdrawal. This clarified and unified the command relationships that heretofore had been somewhat murky.

However, it soon became clear that the Clinton administration was focused on using those forces to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops rather than use them to punish Aideed. General Montgomery had clear guidance: protect the force, protect the UN, and bring the force out with a minimum of casualties. In a national security policy review session held in the White House on 6 October, the president directed the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David G. Jeremiah, to stop all actions by U.S. forces against Aideed except those required in self-defense. He also reappointed Ambassador Oakley as special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker a peace settlement and then announced that all U.S. forces would withdraw from Somalia no later than 31 March 1994. Shortly thereafter Secretary Aspin stepped down, taking much of the blame for what was deemed a failed policy. For all intents and purposes, the United States was now determined to withdraw from Somalia as quickly as possible. All additional forces sent would be used solely for self-defense of U.S. soldiers rather than for further offensive operations.

Ambassador Oakley arrived in Mogadishu on 9 October, determined to obtain the release of U.S. helicopter pilot CW2 Michael Durant, captured at the second crash site by Somali forces loyal to Aideed. After intense negotiations, Aideed agreed to release the wounded Durant and a previously captured Nigerian soldier on 14 October as a “goodwill gesture.” Despite this gesture and a unilateral cease-fire
declared by Aideed, it quickly became apparent that the U.S. role in Somalia was ending and that the UN would receive no substantive cooperation from the warlord and his clan.

After several months of comparatively limited activity and few further instances of violence, U.S. forces began withdrawing. Most of the American troops were out of Somalia by 25 March 1994, ending Operation CONTINUE HOPE, the follow-on mission to RESTORE HOPE. Only a few hundred marines remained offshore to assist with any noncombatant evacuation mission that might occur in the event violence broke out that necessitated the removal of the over 1,000 U.S. civilians and military advisers remaining as part of the U.S. liaison mission. All UN and U.S. personnel were finally withdrawn almost a year later in March 1995.

All attempts to reconcile the Somali factions had proven futile, and the international community gradually lost its patience with the total lack of political results. Operation UNITED SHIELD, the final UN withdrawal from Somalia, was completed on 3 March 1995. The United States, as part of the international community, had made major contributions to the Somalia humanitarian operations for over two years. Starvation had been stopped and hundreds of thousands of lives saved. The U.S. had accomplished much in the initial stages of the operation, but the political situation had unraveled even as the food supplies increased, allowing Somalia to slide backwards into disorder and anarchy.

Analysis

The United States entered Somalia in December 1992 to stop the imminent starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. Although it succeeded in this mission, the chaotic political situation of that unhappy land bogged down U.S. and allied forces in what became, in effect, a poorly organized United Nations nation-building operation. In a country where the United States, perhaps naively, expected some measure of gratitude for its help, its forces received increasing hostility as they became more deeply embroiled into trying to establish a stable government. The military and diplomatic effort to bring together all the clans and political entities was doomed to failure as each subelement continued to attempt to out-jockey the others for supreme power. The Somali people were the main victims of their own leaders, but forty-two Americans died and dozens more were wounded before the United States and the United Nations capitulated to events and withdrew. American military power had established the conditions for peace in the midst of a famine and civil war, but, unlike later in Bosnia, the factions were not exhausted from the fighting and were not yet willing to stop killing each other and anyone caught in the middle. There was no peace to keep. The American soldier had, as always, done his best under difficult circumstances to perform a complex and often confusing mission. But the best soldiers in the world can only lay the foundation for peace; they cannot create peace itself.

This after action report (AAR) is nearly identical to the original document completed in 1995 except for some minor reformatting and pagination, a few corrected typographical errors, and the removal of some paragraphs. The original document was classified secret, and twelve classified paragraphs had to be removed or modified so that the bulk of the report could be presented in an unclassified mode. In most instances the classified paragraphs referred to the capabilities of the military forces of other countries. A working group at the Army War College prepared the AAR shortly after the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia was complete. General Montgomery was closely involved in that working group and provides the foreword for the report. The AAR covers the full gamut of U.S. operations in Somalia with specific emphasis on the UNOSOM II period, Operation CONTINUE HOPE. It includes an executive summary followed by chapters that discuss the significant activities and actions there and the lessons that might be drawn from those events. A critical examination of our role in Somalia and the reasons behind the failure of the mission to save Somalia from itself is long overdue. Indeed, such an endeavor should be exceedingly valuable and provide the Army with useful tools to assist in future peacekeeping or humanitarian commitments.
Additional Readings


Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE are examples of the new kind of missions America’s Army might be called on to perform in a volatile and dangerous world. In 1992—for the first time—the United Nations (UN) invoked its own charter to conduct a peace enforcement intervention in Somalia, then considered a “failed nation-state.” The safe and effective provision of humanitarian assistance to the population was the original task. The armed forces of the United States were key players in this unique operation.

This After-Action Report (AAR) is the result of the hard work of the USFORSOM Staff together with the many people who made up the Somalia After-Action Review Committee. It is therefore not solely my report as the U.S. Commander in Somalia but it clearly reflects my own views. The Committee’s objective was to develop a balanced and comprehensive analysis of a difficult and complex operation. The conclusions and lessons learned presented in this report represent the results of our discussions and the general consensus of the Committee.

This report suggests how the Army—as part of a joint and coalition force—often in support of supra-national and nongovernmental organizations, can improve the conduct of these “Operations Other Than War.” I sincerely appreciate the time and effort of all who contributed so much to the preparation of this comprehensive review of our participation in the United Nations intervention in Somalia, UNOSOM II.

The world situation today continues to be characterized by uncertainty. The Army can neither predict nor pick its next mission, its next fight. What is certain is that we must prepare for the diverse and demanding missions that range across the continuum of conflict. This report can contribute to our preparation. America’s Army is a learning organization because we analyze our experience and we learn more from our experience. The result is a more capable, more versatile Army—trained and ready to accomplish any mission.

THOMAS M. MONTGOMERY
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Former Commander, USFORSOM
# VOLUME I

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

On 3 December 1992, the United Nations took an unprecedented step to resolve the problems of starvation, famine, and lawlessness in Somalia. It was significant in two regards. It was the first attempt by the international community to deal with a new post-Cold War phenomenon referred to as the “failed nation state.” It has further significance in that the United Nations expanded its traditional role of Chapter VI peacekeeping operations to a more ambitious Chapter VII peace enforcement intervention authorizing participating states of the coalition to use “all necessary means” to execute the parameters of Security Council mandates.

The international intervention in Somalia will ultimately be judged, in large part, by the specific evidence of the good works accomplished by the civil and military team which responded to the cries of its dying people. In an unparalleled effort, U.S. and UN forces built 23 schools, donated more than 20 tons of school supplies, completed two major field irrigation projects, constructed twenty dikes to control flooding in the fertile Juba River Valley, built or reconstructed over 200 kilometers of roads, repatriated over 6,000 refugees, delivered nearly 80,000 tons of relief material provided by participating nations, provided medical treatment to more than 500,000 Somalis (an average of 25,000 per month) and helped to establish regional and city councils in much of the area of operation. However, the Somalia experience presents a number of crucial lessons for U.S. policy makers, military planners, and operators should the United States endeavor to play a future role in peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter.

Purpose

The purpose of this Executive Summary (EXSUM) is to summarize major events and circumstances surrounding the U.S. military’s participation in Chapter VII operations in Somalia as outlined in the USFORSOM After Action Report. It will also summarize the findings of the Somalia After Action Review committee. To fully understand this participation, the EXSUM will review the background and setting that led to transition with the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). This review will encompass UNOSOM II’s mission, concept of operation, command and control structure, major operations, accomplishments, and shortcomings. In a similar manner, U.S. Forces, Somalia (USFORSOM), will then be examined in the context of its supporting role to the broader UNOSOM II effort. Key policy decisions and issues will then be assessed to understand their connectivity to and impact on the mission. Finally, the EXSUM will offer observations on key lessons learned that could assist future U.S. participation in UN Chapter VII operations.

Methodology

The EXSUM was designed to reflect operational and strategic insights of operations in Somalia. To this end, a Somalia After Action Review (SAAR) Committee, was convened at the U.S. Army War College in May 1994. The Chief of Staff of the Army directed the committee to conduct a formal review of U.S. force participation in support of UNOSOM II. The purpose of the review was to record the history of the action, identify appropriate lessons learned, record observations or conclusions and recommend applicable solutions. Participants included: former members of U.S. Forces, Somalia (USFORSOM), and United Nations Operation, Somalia II (UNOSOM II); representatives from the Office of Secretary of Defense, Department of State, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; personnel from the Joint Staff, Department of the Army, U.S. Central Command, Army Center for Lessons Learned, U.S. Special Operations Command, First Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF), and Amphibious Squadron 3.
This report is the result of the discussions and general consensus of the participants who made up the “Somalia After Action Review Committee”, which completed its work in June 1994. It does not, however, reflect the official position of the agencies the participants represented.

The conclusions and major lessons learned in the areas of policy, command and control, and Title X implications were drawn from a review of official USFORSOM/UNOSOM II records, discussions held within each panel of the Somalia After Action Review Committee, comments from plenary sessions, and interviews conducted with key senior personnel from the agencies or activities represented. The final conclusions and major lessons learned represent the consensus of this committee. A summary is provided here and addressed in more detail in Volume II of this report.

Organization of the EXSUM

The EXSUM consists of three sections:

- Section I, Historical Summary:
  — Provides both an historical accounting of the key events in Somalia and an analysis of their effect on the course of UNOSOM II and USFORSOM operations;
  — Highlights many of the significant challenges which faced civilian and military senior leaders. The accounts in Section I are based on the information contained in the official records and files of UNOSOM II Force Command and USFORSOM. First-hand accounts of participants also served as an information source.

- Section II, Policy Review:
  — Captures the observations of the Somalia After Action Review committee on key policy issues;
  — Attempts to demonstrate the effects of policy decisions on the strategic and operational execution of the mission.

- Section III, Implications:
  — Highlights the major lessons learned;
  — Draws, from these lessons learned, implications for U.S. and UN participation in future Chapter VII operations. A more detailed account of lessons learned is in Volume II of the After Action Report.

SECTION I—HISTORICAL SUMMARY

To understand the accomplishments and shortcomings of USFORSOM, it is necessary to study USFORSOM in the context of its supporting role to the broader UNOSOM II effort. For that reason, this document begins with a review of UNOSOM II operations. The review begins with an examination of the events leading up to the transition between the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and UNOSOM II. The mission of UNOSOM II is then examined, and is followed by a review of the military concept of operation, its command and control structure, and major operations. An assessment is then made of UNOSOM II’s accomplishments and shortcomings. Against this background, a similar analysis of USFORSOM is conducted.
Early United Nations Efforts

Vivid, live television images of starvation, famine, lawlessness, and gun-wielding thugs, by-products of civil war in Somalia, compelled the United Nations to intervene in mid-1992 in an attempt to save the war-torn country. As these same images bombarded American television screens, they had a profound effect on the American consciousness and eventually on U.S. policy makers. The experiences of the first under armed and undermanned Pakistani units sent to Mogadishu in mid-1992 made it clear that the traditional UN Chapter VI style peacekeeping operation would not be the answer to anarchy and violence in Somalia. In late November 1992, the U.S. proposed to the United Nations a plan designed to stabilize the security situation in Somalia in order to avert mass starvation. A U.S. led coalition, limited in mandate, time, and geographic scope, was directed to create the security conditions necessary for providing humanitarian assistance to Somali citizens.


The decision to send an intervention force into Somalia was unique in that it was the first time the United Nations elected to intervene in a nation where it was not invited under the authority of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The force sent to Somalia under this mandate was in stark contrast to that of UNOSOM I, which began operations in Somalia in August 1992 under the provisions of Chapter VI. Operations under Chapter VII (peace enforcement) recognize that hostilities and armed conflict may threaten UN operations. Consequently, forces dispatched in compliance with UNSCR 794 were combat units, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct combat operations, if necessary. Concurrent with the decision to authorize the deployment of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was a requirement for the Secretary General to submit a plan “to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfill its mandate upon the withdrawal” of UNITAF.

On 4 December 1992, in a letter to the Secretary General, President Bush emphasized that the coalition’s mission was limited and specific. The U.S. mission was to create security conditions which would permit the feeding of starving Somalis; the letter foresaw the early transfer of this security function to a UN peacekeeping force. The President also stated that as soon as these U.S. objectives were met, the coalition would depart Somalia.

UNITAF

The U.S. led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) landed in Somalia on 9 December 1992, and by the end of December had secured all geographic objectives in an effort to provide a secure environment for humanitarian relief. It was recognized that lasting peace in Somalia could only be achieved by disarming the warlords and assisting in the restoration of basic social order and societal infrastructure. However, these goals exceeded the President’s intent for U.S. participation in the intervention. Therefore, critical tasks such as disarmament and the introduction of law and order for Somalis fell to the United Nations coalition force, United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), when it assumed responsibility for the former UNITAF area of responsibility on 4 May 1993.

Although initially a U.S. dominated effort, UNITAF evolved into a multinational force consisting of troops from twenty-one nations, with a peak troop strength of approximately 37,000. While the local population initially accepted the presence of UNITAF soldiers, within 24 hours of UNITAF forces arriving in Mogadishu, there were incidents of armed conflict between UNITAF and suspected militia and bandits.
These incidents, which ranged from sniping at patrols to deliberate attacks by suspected militia, continued throughout UNITAF’s involvement in Somalia.

UNITAF’s principal efforts were to establish an effective presence in a selected area of operation (predominantly southern and south-central regions of Somalia) and to provide much-needed security to humanitarian relief operations. While sanctioned under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, UNITAF did not perceive its mandate to include disarming militia, unless the action directly assisted in the restoration of humanitarian relief. This led to an environment approaching “respectful coexistence” between UNITAF and the militia, enforced by dialogue and the presence of significant U.S. firepower. This would markedly change under UNOSOM II. UNSCR 814, which established UNOSOM II on 26 March 1993, specifically addressed the disarmament and demobilization of militia. This provision in the new mandate would ultimately put UNOSOM II Force Command in direct confrontation with warlords and criminal elements who sought to retain pre-UNOSOM II levels of influence in Somalia.

While continuing to pursue weapons confiscation, ostensibly to protect humanitarian relief operations, UNITAF (in line with its more restricted mandate) conducted limited disarmament operations. For example, the Canadian Airborne Brigade declared Belet Uen “pacified” in April 1993. This pacification was accomplished by forcing the withdrawal of militia and bandit elements rather than by disarming them which, it was felt, could lead to a power vacuum in the region. While this approach lessened the probability of inter-clan fighting resulting from an imbalance in power, it also failed to eliminate weapons available for future use against UNITAF and, ultimately, UNOSOM II forces.

During the first sixty days after the start of the intervention, UNITAF sharply reduced hostile attacks against humanitarian relief agencies and convoys. Tangible evidence existed that massive starvation was over; the death rate fell to one-third of the pre-December figures. However, as February approached, banditry against civilians increased; inter-clan and factional conflict continued in the interior; and political pressure increased for UNITAF to turn over the Somalia mission to UN forces. As the UNITAF operation began its third month, its commander assessed “...all areas [were] stable or relatively stable.” On 22 February 93, LtGen Bir, the designated UNOSOM II Force Commander, arrived 1992 in Mogadishu to begin the transition process.

**UNOSOM II**

UNOSOM II was a coalition force of 29,732 soldiers from twenty-nine nations at its peak strength in mid-November 1993. The nations in the coalition were Australia (staff only), Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada (staff only), Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand (staff only), Nigeria, Norway (HQ support only), Pakistan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United States, and Zimbabwe. The approximate sizes of the largest force contributors were India (5000), Pakistan (4500), Italy (2600) and the United States (4200, 1100 of which made up the QRF). On 4 May 1993, however, when UNOSOM II assumed control of the Somalia Theater of Operations, it was a coalition of only twenty-one nations with an approximate strength of 17,200.

**UNOSOM II Mission**

The mission of UNOSOM II, Force Command, was based on the mandate outlined in UNSCR 814, adopted on 26 March 1993. UNSCR 814 directed the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to “assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment, taking account of the particular circumstances in each locality, on an expedited basis in accordance with recommendations contained in his [the Secretary General’s] report of 3 March 1993, and in this regard to organize a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.” Following a detailed analysis
of UNSCR 814 and the Secretary General's report of 3 March 1993, the Force Commander approved the mission of UNOSOM II Force Command as published in UNOSOM II OPLAN 1, dated 2 May 1993.

“WHEN DIRECTED, UNOSOM II FORCE COMMAND CONDUCTS MILITARY OPERATIONS TO CONSOLIDATE, EXPAND, AND MAINTAIN A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AID, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AND POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN SOMALIA.”

**UNOSOM II Operational Concept**

Force Command’s operational concept for the military campaign in Somalia was based on tasks and guidance provided by UNSCR 814 and the direction outlined by the Secretary General in his report of 3 March 1993. The United Nations envisioned four phases during UNOSOM II operations in Somalia. Phase I was the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Phase II was the consolidation and expansion of security. Phase III was the transfer of military functions to civilian institutions. Phase IV was the redeployment of military forces.

United Nations planners in New York, in consultation with the UNOSOM I staff, estimated that the mission in Somalia would require a five brigade force of 20,000 soldiers and officers to complete the four phases of operations, with 8,000 additional personnel for logistics support. The United States made a quick reaction force available to the Force Commander at his request. The quick reaction force was initially land based, to revert to an “over the horizon” force by the end of the summer 1993.

As the UNOSOM II staff in Somalia compared its mission to its force structure, shortfalls in forces became apparent. The staff developed an operational concept that considered geography, existing infrastructure, host nation support, and force limitations, particularly the lack of logistics forces, transport and storage capability, and engineer forces needed to maintain the main supply routes. The concept initially envisioned concentrating resources in brigade areas of responsibility in southern Somalia to disarm militia and establish an environment suitable for the transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali Police. Force Command would then conduct economy of force operations in the southern regions (former UNITAF area of responsibility), while freeing forces for expansion operations.

UNOSOM II Force Command’s campaign plan envisioned an end state in which:

- The disarmament process was completed in accordance with the March 1993 Addis Ababa agreement;
- Basic social order had been re-established;
- Somali National Police, capable of maintaining stability and security in the country, had been re-established;
- Emergency humanitarian relief was no longer necessary.

Force Command planned to execute its campaign in six phases, each with a clearly defined end state, which paralleled the four phases outlined in UNSCR 814. The Command intended to take a regional approach, concentrating resources in one region of the country, while conducting selected operations in others as appropriate. The phases were not viewed as sequential in nature, but overlapping.

Force Command anticipated having a military presence throughout Somalia by August 1994, and an appropriate security environment for withdrawal of UNOSOM II military forces by January 1995. UNOSOM II continued to use this operational concept to guide tactical operations throughout the year.
However, resources, security, and political factors severely limited the execution of this campaign plan. By January 1994, UNOSOM II began to reexamine its political and military strategy in Somalia.

The major factors which derailed UNOSOM II’s campaign plan were lack of appropriate forces, lack of humanitarian and development resources to support political and economic growth, and the political environment. These shortcomings forced UNOSOM II to take risks in Mogadishu and other areas such as Kismayo in order to maintain security in the former UNITAF area of responsibility; they also forced reduction in the scope of the planned expansion into Central and Northeast Somalia.

From the outset, UNOSOM II’s political, humanitarian, and military strategies were not integrated. Force Command developed its operational concept, the basis of its campaign plan, without an overarching political strategy from its civilian leadership. The political strategy, which was not forthcoming until mid-May, failed to consider the resource constraints of Force Command and the UNOSOM II Humanitarian Division.

The political environment in the international community crippled Force Command in a number of ways. Contributing nations significantly limited the Force Commander’s freedom to employ the forces available to meet the operational and tactical requirements in Somalia. Some national governments refused to permit their forces to be placed under the tactical control (TACON) or operational control (OPCON) of another national contingent commander. Other national governments placed constraints on the locations where their forces could be employed. This inability to integrate and task organize the force compelled the Force Commander to serve as both an operational level and tactical commander. It further reduced his ability to concentrate adequate combat power where and when he needed it.

UN Command and Control

Strategic level command and control for UNOSOM II ran from the Secretary General, through the Special Representative, down to the Force Commander. Operational (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) were established as the working command relationships used to control forces in Somalia. All national contingents were, in theory, under the operational control of the Force Commander. He intended to exercise command and control of those units by placing them under the operational control of a brigade level headquarters in each Area of Responsibility (AOR). Actual execution proved to be much more difficult. Some national contingents refused to subordinate their forces under operational control of another contributing nation. On numerous occasions operational and tactical orders issued by the Force Commander to national contingents required approval from national governments. As time progressed, it readily [became] apparent that some contributing nations did not fully understand the implications of the mandate of this Chapter VII force. Furthermore, when faced with a choice between competing U.N. missions and national agendas, the contingent commander had to go with instructions from his national chain of command. This conflict of interest prior to and during combat operations became quite disruptive and dangerous on some occasions.

UNOSOM II Operations

UNOSOM II operations in Somalia are separated into five periods. Each period is identified by a major course change, triggered by a key event or decision which significantly affected the direction of military operations.

Transition, the first period, began with the arrival of the Force Commander and concluded with the UNOSOM II assumption of the UN mission on 4 May 1993. Although UNITAF had prepared a comprehensive transition plan, the transfer of responsibility for the Somalia theater was not as simple or smooth as anticipated. Incomplete staff manning, lack of organic communications and administrative equipment,
and differences in standard operating procedures and headquarters structure at the Force Command territory headquarters at times frustrated the process.

Reception and Consolidation, the second period, focused on the withdrawal of UNITAF forces, reception of UNOSOM II forces and consolidation into brigade areas of responsibility (AORs). This period began with a show of force in Mogadishu and throughout the UNOSOM AOR from 3 through 9 May. Elements of the QRF and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) participated with coalition forces in military demonstrations. The intent of these operations was to show that a seamless transition had occurred and that the same level of security would continue under UNOSOM II. This second period ended on 5 June with the ambush of UN peacekeepers. COMUSFORSOM, in accordance with the Terms of Reference (TOR), directed the employment of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force to support the ambushed UN forces. This marked the first time that U.S. combat forces under UNOSOM II were employed in ground operations against militia forces.

Like UNITAF, UNOSOM II underestimated the intentions and military capability of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) leadership. Both believed that the worst case scenario to be expected consisted of street riots in Mogadishu and clan on clan confrontations in the Kismayo area. Although UNOSOM II expected to be tested by the warlords, the ferocity and nature of the 5 June ambush against UN peacekeepers was not anticipated. The ambush on 5 June ushered in a new period in Somali operations.

Combat Operations, the third period, ran from 5 June through the arrival of the U.S. Army Task Force Ranger in August 1993. UNSCR 837, passed on 6 June, called for the arrest of those responsible for the murder of UN peacekeepers and authorized the neutralization of Radio Mogadishu (also known as Radio Aideed). This marked the beginning of a military campaign to regain control of the city, neutralize the USC/SNA militia, and destroy militia weapon and ammunition storage sites. Although authorized to arrest those responsible for the deaths of UN peacekeepers, UNOSOM II did not move expeditiously on that task, due to inadequate UN military capabilities to execute such a mission.

The military campaign began on 7 June with a combined Moroccan and Pakistani clearing operation on 21 October Road, the area of one of the major ambush sites used on 5 June. On 12 June, U.S. AC–130 gun ships and QRF attack helicopters began aerial attacks to destroy Radio Mogadishu, militia ammunition cantonment sites and caches in Mogadishu, and key targets in the Aideed Enclave. These operations were a prelude to a combined operation to clear the Aideed Enclave conducted by Italian, Pakistani, Moroccan, and French forces on 17 June. The QRF provided air support and the “ground” reserve for the operation.

Although the operation was successful, it marked the last major combined operation conducted by UNOSOM II. The reaction to the violence and casualties of early June began to take their toll in national capitals around the world, as the combat nature of Chapter VII operations became clear. During the rest of June and July, the USC/SNA and UNOSOM II became embroiled in urban guerilla warfare in Mogadishu. Contributing nations became more and more reluctant to conduct the offensive operations necessary to protect the force and maintain a secure environment in Mogadishu. Unity of effort within the coalition suffered.

The lack of aggressiveness among coalition forces in Mogadishu put U.S. logistic forces and bases at risk. Seeking to protect U.S. forces and bases, COMUSFORSOM sought and received approval from CINCCENT to employ the QRF ground forces in force protection operations around U.S. facilities as necessary.

The Search for Aideed, the fourth period, began with the arrival of Task Force (TF) Ranger in August 1993. With a suitable force to conduct snatch operations, this marked the only time that UNOSOM II
truly concentrated on the arrest of Aideed and his top advisers. Unfortunately, the operations of TF Ranger drew a high press profile as the world news media focused on the search for Aideed. Raids conducted in September netted a number of top Aideed advisers but also drove him further underground. Many believed (reportedly, including Aideed) that his capture was just a matter of time. However, time to capture the warlord ran out on 3 October when a raid in the Olympic Hotel area of the city resulted in 18 U.S. soldiers killed and 75 U.S. soldiers wounded. In the aftermath of this raid, the United States announced its intent to deploy a Joint Task Force to reinforce U.S. forces in Somalia and withdraw all its forces by 31 March 1994.

**Strategic Reset**, the final period, ran from the cessation of combat operations up to the redeployment of U.S. forces on 25 March 1994. The U.S. announcement to withdraw also included a decision to augment U.S. combat forces in theater to enhance force protection of U.S. and UN forces. This led to the deployment of Joint Task Force Somalia, (JTF-SOM) in October 1993. While the JTF provided an immediate increase in force levels and capabilities for UNOSOM II, the overall effect of the U.S. decision to withdraw led to similar announcements by Germany, Korea and Morocco. This forced the UN to review and revise its strategy in Somalia and effectively brought to an end the Chapter VII operation there, although Chapter VII authority was not withdrawn from the mission.

**UNOSOM II Logistics**

Logistics support for UNOSOM II was provided by the United Nations Logistics Support Command (UNLSC). This initial 3000 man force from the United States provided theater level general support logistics and direct support logistics to those contingents that did not have organic transport, engineer, and storage capability. This was particularly true in the case of Class I (rations), water, and Class III (fuel), and construction engineering. Although some national contingents such as Belgium, France, Italy and Morocco were essentially capable of self-sustainment level II logistics, most were not. Consequently, UNLSC provided the bulk of the long haul transportation requirements, much of the local haul transportation, and almost all of the engineer work on the main supply routes.

The combination of bad roads, lack of intra-theater airlift, insufficient level II logistics units, and lack of adequate numbers of construction engineer units stretched logistics to the maximum. Even with the Korean Engineer Squadron, and the one U.S. engineer Combat Support Element, UNOSOM II could not adequately maintain its main supply routes. Consequently, logistics became a much more limiting factor for UNOSOM II than it had been for UNITAF.

**UNOSOM II Force Command Contributions**

Force Command contributed significantly to UNOSOM II successes. In addition to combat operations, Force Command played a major role in the humanitarian relief and development efforts in Somalia. When resources were scarce in the humanitarian division, UNOSOM II military forces assumed the lead. AOR Commanders used military resources and assets to repair schools, dikes and roads, and to provide medical assistance to local communities. In addition, the Commanders restored basic order and societal structure within their AORs. These actions, although lacking uniformity in execution, included the further reestablishment of local police forces begun by UNITAF and support for the political effort to set up district and regional councils made up of the local elders.

Force Command clinics and hospitals treated more than 500,000 Somalis, averaging 25,000 patients per month. Force Command units assisted local NGOs in starting 23 schools in southern Somalia, donated more than 20 tons of school supplies and education materials, and constructed desks and chairs. In addition, Force Command units working with local Somalis completed two major field irrigation projects and a series of dikes (20) on the Lower Juba River; they dug numerous new wells in areas suffering from water shortages.
Force Command engineer units, in addition to the work of UNITAF, built over 105 kilometers of new roads and repaired more than 100 kilometers of existing roads. UN forces rehabilitated key airfields in Baidoa, Belet Uen, Kismayo and Mogadishu, and repaired or upgraded many buildings for orphanages, police stations, and district councils.

Force Command also pioneered many back-to-work projects for local Somalis. AOR Commanders worked closely with NGOs and local elders to start “Food For Work” programs. These programs enabled Somalis to get food and water in exchange for their labor to repair local infrastructure, such as roads and buildings. Materials were provided by NGOs, UN agencies and contingent forces. In addition, many Somalis were employed to work on camp maintenance projects.

UN forces took an active part in humanitarian relief. They assisted in the repatriation of over 6000 refugees to the Bardera, Belet Uen and Buale areas, providing both security and transportation. They also delivered more than 80,000 tons of relief food and water that had been contributed to the various participating forces by their home countries.

**UNOSOM II Shortcomings**

While UNOSOM II succeeded in many areas in its first year, it also had many shortcomings. These included the lack of an integrated strategy, disagreement on an approach to disarmament, and failure to achieve unity of effort. The most significant failure was the inability of the UNOSOM II staff to formulate an integrated strategy to address the issues of national reconciliation and reconstruction. Some of this can be attributed to the inherent inertia associated with forming an international staff. However, there appeared to be an inability by UN headquarters in New York to muster the resources (dollars, forces, and skilled staff) to meet operational requirements in theater. UN budget and resource procurement systems and procedures proved cumbersome and incapable of meeting the needs of a fast-moving Chapter VII operation.

Another significant shortcoming occurred in the area of disarmament. The March 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement set the course for disarmament. While both UNITAF and UNOSOM II seized, cantoned, or destroyed thousands of weapons and munitions over the course of the year, clans and factions still had not been disarmed. UNOSOM II had neither the money nor the military forces necessary to accomplish the Security Council mandates to disarm the factions and clans and enforce an arms embargo in Somalia. The monetary resources needed in May and June to provide the incentive and training packages for demobilizing the militia and supporting the voluntary disarmament program only began to become available in January 1994 after the strategic reset of the mission. Beginning with transition from UNITAF, UNOSOM II never had the land, sea, and air forces necessary to enforce an arms embargo of Somalia or adequately secure militia demobilization sites.

Unity of effort was a major shortcoming in both the military and civilian components of UNOSOM II. Contributing nations were not fully prepared to subordinate their forces to the operational control of the Force Commander. Consequently, the Force Commander lacked the authority to assign new missions or tasks, deploy forces, and retain or delegate operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) as deemed necessary to accomplish the mission. This condition at times paralyzed UNOSOM II operations, as many contingents routinely went back to their national governments to secure approval of UNOSOM II missions or tasks before agreeing to carry them out.

A similar problem existed in the civilian component of UNOSOM II. The SRSG lacked the authority to direct the efforts of United Nations Relief and Developmental Agencies, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operating in Somali. In the case of both type agencies, in-theater directors reported to their home offices for instruction, not the SRSG. Consequently, he could not fully concentrate the relief and development resources in theater where they could have the most effect. This made it very difficult to develop an integrated strategy for meeting humanitarian needs.
USFORSOM Contributions

U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) significantly contributed to UNOSOM II’s success during its first year. U.S. forces supported UNOSOM II military and humanitarian operations in a wide variety of ways.

Humanitarian Contributions

The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) adopted a local orphanage, provided school supplies, clothing, and the materials and troop labor to repair the facilities. Logistics Support Command (LSC) units assisted local inhabitants in neighborhood clean up projects and did most of the construction work on the more than 105 kilometers of new roads built, and the 100 kilometers of roads repaired by UNOSOM II engineer units. U.S. soldiers on the UNOSOM II staff provided construction and material support to a local school in North Mogadishu.

Joint Task Force, Somalia (JTFSOM), which arrived in theater in October 1993, further contributed to the humanitarian support of the Somali people. Medical personnel from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC) treated 910 people in Marka and Qoryooley, and 899 people in North Mogadishu in MEDCAP/DENCAP operations conducted in November and December 1993. In addition, JTF soldiers and marines repaired a local orphanage in North Mogadishu, provided books to a local school, and delivered food stuffs and more than 2500 gallons of purified water to local Somalis. These operations also included joint and coalition security operations and training.

Military Contributions

U.S. forces played a key role in UNOSOM II military operations. The U.S. QRF provided both ground and air support for UNOSOM combat operations in Mogadishu from June through October 1993. Coalition forces came to depend on the support of the QRF’s attack helicopters in all of their operations. Aerial observation was key to real-time intelligence gathering and convoy security. Force protection and cordon & search operations conducted by U.S. ground forces in Mogadishu from July through September were essential for U.S. force protection and contributed significantly to what little stability existed at that time. These U.S. operations enabled UNOSOM II to prevent the USC/SNA militia from completely seizing the initiative in Mogadishu, when coalition forces lacked the will to act aggressively in the city. U.S. forces also assisted coalition forces in unit level training. The 24th MEU provided riot control training to Pakistani forces in June. The QRF provided training to Pakistani and Malaysian forces in military operations in urban terrain, call for fire, clearing obstacles and convoy security. The JTF and SOCCE provided sniper training to coalition forces in Mogadishu.

The U.S. contingent of UNOSOM II played a vital role in establishing and operating the UNOSOM II Force Command Headquarters. U.S. officers arrived in Mogadishu in early April 1993 designated to work as coalition staff members. They formed the nucleus for UNOSOM II’s military staff and were key to UNOSOM II’s ability to assume control of the Somalia Theater of Operations from UNITAF. U.S. staff members, with those limited coalition staff members available early on, assumed responsibility for setting up Force Command Headquarters and establishing standard procedures for planning, coordination, and staff operations. Finally, members of the U.S. contingent played a large role in day-to-day and long-term decision making and operations of the UNOSOM headquarters.

Logistics Support Command (LSC) and the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) provided the backbone of UNOSOM II’s logistics and intelligence capability respectively until they departed theater in January and March 1994. The LSC served as the theater level general support unit for UNOSOM II and assumed an additional mission to provide direct support for the many national contingents which deployed to Somalia without organic logistics support assets. U.S. transportation units provided UNOSOM II both its long haul and local transportation capability. Until the arrival of the Irish Truck
Company in August 1993, LSC was the only source of transportation assets in theater. The same was true for engineer capability. The engineer company assigned to LSC was the only engineer force in theater available to maintain UNOSOM II’s vital lines of communications and outlying airfields until the arrival of the Korean Engineer Squadron (company) in July 1993.

The CISE provided the only source for intelligence collection management and production in the theater of operations. Unlike LSC, whose functions were completely assumed by civilian contractors, a small residual cell remained in theater with the U.S. Liaison Office and UNOSOM II after the departure of U.S. forces in March 1994.

While benefiting from the association with the other coalition partners, U.S. forces served as the backbone for UNOSOM II operations in the first year of this historic Chapter VII operation. The training and flexibility of U.S. soldiers and units served as a model for other coalition forces. U.S. units, like their coalition counterparts, proved to be resiliently tough, versatile, and compassionate. It was not unusual for military forces to conduct security or combat operations one day, and humanitarian relief work the next. The diversity of tasks in this theater demonstrated the unique challenge of Chapter VII operations and the requirement for high quality soldiers and leaders.

**USFORSOM Mission**

The mission of U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) was defined by the Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces Somalia, dated April 1993, and CENTCOM OPORD Serial 001 (Operations CONTINUE HOPE). The CENTCOM OPORD directed COMUSFOR Somalia to support UNOSOM II in implementing the provisions of UNSCR 814, in accordance with the U.S. and UN Terms of Reference. USFORSOM was to provide a Deputy Force Commander, selected headquarters staff personnel, limited combat support, service support, intelligence, and a quick reaction force. The Terms of Reference constituted “an agreement between the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT) and the Commander, United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for staffing, organization, and operation of U.S. Forces Somalia.” Under the Terms of Reference, USCINCCENT tasked USFORSOM to “perform duties as assigned by USCINCCENT and Commander, UNOSOM II pursuant to UNSCR 814.” In essence, the mission of USFORSOM was to:

“**CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA IN SUPPORT OF UNOSOM II TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AS OUTLINED WITHIN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE.**”

The Terms of Reference further outlined specific tasks for the major subordinate elements comprising USFORSOM: the Support Command, Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE).

Logistics Support Command was tasked to:

- Provide combat service support to UNOSOM II until relieved by UNOSOM II donors or UN contract services;
- Provide command, control, and theater level management of common item logistics support;
- Provide selected common item support /common user services support, and distribution of bulk POL;
- Other logistics functions as outlined in paragraph 7 of the Terms of Reference.
Although intended to provide theater level general support, the mission of the support command soon expanded to include direct support of UNOSOM II forces. Many nations failed to provide their forces with an organic direct support logistics capability as required by the “UN Guide to Contributing Nations.” This was particularly true in terms of transport capability. Logistics Support Command, as the only unit in theater with those capabilities, had to make up for those shortcomings.

The QRF provided “a U.S. combat capability for rapid response in support of the Commander, UNOSOM II to counter specific threats that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II units.” The unique capabilities of this force made it an essential part of most operations conducted by UNOSOM II forces in Mogadishu. While the ground force usually was held in reserve, except when the mission was otherwise approved by CINCCENT, UN forces came to rely heavily on QRF attack aviation assets. The QRF’s attack helicopters provided a instant “force multiplier” to all coalition ground operations. In effect, the existence of the U.S. QRF served to give the coalition confidence.

The CISE provided intelligence support to UNOSOM II and USFORSOM. It served as the sole source of all U.S. intelligence information for UNOSOM II and USFORSOM. The CISE and U.S. members of the UNOSOM staff provided the only reliable and consistent intelligence collection, management, and analysis capability in theater.

The CINC’s intent as outlined in the CENTCOM order was to ensure successful UNOSOM II operations within the UNITAF AOR, and to draw down the level of U.S. troop commitment from an initial strength of 4000 to 1400 by end of 1993, with all U.S. forces gone by January 1995. Logistic forces were to draw down as civilian contractors or UNOSOM logistics units assumed support responsibilities.

The draw down plan was envisioned in four phases (These did not necessarily coincide with the UNOSOM II campaign plan). During Phase I, UNITAF would transfer command and control to UNOSOM II, deactivate and redeploy. UNOSOM II Deputy Force Commander would assume command of all U.S. forces remaining in theater as COMUSFORSOM. USFORSOM would support UNOSOM II operations in the former UNITAF AOR and, when directed, transition to an offshore QRF in Phase II. During Phase III, U.S. forces remaining in theater would continue to support operations in the UNOSOM AOR, and reduce forces as civil institutions or other forces took over. The fourth and final phase would center on redeployment of remaining forces as contracts or other UN contributing nations assumed the logistic missions.

With modification of U.S. policy in October 1993 and the arrival of the Joint Task Force Somalia (JTF-SOM), USFORSOM revised its mission. USFORSOM OPLAN 001 stated the mission as follows:

“COMUSFORSOM CONDUCTS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO HOSTILE THREAT AND ATTACKS THAT EXCEED UNOSOM II MILITARY FORCE CAPABILITIES; PROVIDES FORCE PROTECTION FOR U.S. FORCES AND LOGISTICS BASES; AND ASSISTS UNOSOM II FORCES IN SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATION.”

The priority mission for Joint Task Force Somalia was U.S. force protection and preparation for redeployment, then providing support to UNOSOM II. The intent was “not to expand military operations in the interest of seeking a military solution in Somalia, but rather to minimize U.S., UN, and Somali casualties while supporting the political process as it continues to move towards a solution.” Accordingly, he ruled out the expansion of military operations “unless it contributed directly to the political solution.” Likewise, in accordance with NCA directives, offensive operations without provocation to attack installations, logistics sites and hostile force caches could not be undertaken by QRF assets without CINCCENT approval in advance. This restriction did not apply to legitimate quick-reaction force missions as outlined in the Terms of Reference. This change in mission and direction, and the President’s announcement to withdraw all U.S. Forces by 31 March 1994 had profound effects on UNOSOM II operations.
USFORSOM Organization

USFORSOM consisted [of] the Support Force, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) when directed, the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) when directed, and other augmentation forces, as required and when approved by USCINCCENT, to support the Commander, UNOSOM II. The Support Force consisted of personnel assigned to the UNOSOM II headquarters staff, and the combat support/service support personnel assigned to the Logistics Support Command Somalia (LSCS). The LSCS was subsequently referred to as the United Nations Logistics Support Command (UNLSC). The QRF consisted of the combat units, the special operations forces, and other support units assigned or attached to the QRF. In addition, a Tactical Airlift Control Element (TALCE) and a Medical Support Team (MST) were also assigned to support airlift and MEDEVAC requirements.

Obviously, the force package provided by the United States to UNOSOM II was not as robust or heavy as UNITAF. This was particularly significant for the Logistics Support Command, UNLSC, which essentially had the same mission as its predecessor, LSCS, but did not possess the same capability. Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 3 transport units were sent to Somalia to replace the fully manned transport units of UNITAF. Military Police assets were reduced from a military police battalion to a reinforced company. Due to the troop shortages followed by increased force protection and base security requirements after the 5 June attacks against UNOSOM, as much as 40% of the UNLSC’s available transport sat idle due to a lack of drivers. Engineer capability was also significantly reduced. A reinforced Combat Support Engineer (CSE) company replaced UNITAF’s engineer brigade.

The QRF and CISE were both tailored to meet the reduced mission of U.S. combat and intelligence units in Somalia. The QRF, which provided the rapid response capability demanded in the Somali Theater of operations, was well tailored for its mission. It consisted of a light infantry battalion, an aviation task force with six (6) cobras, eight (8) scout helicopters, fifteen (15) Blackhawk helicopters, and a support battalion.

As the combat situation escalated in June and July, force protection became a significant concern for COMUSFORSOM. According to policy level authorities, after the passage of UNSCR 837 and in consultation with UNOSOM II Force Command, the UN requested that the United States provide additional forces to assist UNOSOM in addressing the deterioration of security in Mogadishu. After extensive consideration by the USG, the request was at first denied. By August, COMUSFORSOM assessed that the situation required heavy forces (mechanized infantry units) in order to provide adequate force protection to U.S. logistics convoys and installations. COMUSFORSOM sent the DCINC a fax message proposing the requirement for a mechanized infantry task force with: 3 Bradley companies, 1 light infantry company, a headquarters company with organic fire support element, scout, mortar and maintenance Platoons, civil affairs teams, 1 combat engineer company, 2 additional counter-intelligence teams and an air cavalry troop with 4 AH-1 and 6 OH-58 aircraft. COMUSFORSOM was told that CINCCENT would discuss this during his forthcoming trip to Somalia. In early September COMUSFORSOM, in consultation with CINCCENT, prepared another request. This request however, asked for a smaller, yet acceptable force. On 14 September, COMUSFORSOM submitted this second request for heavy forces (1 Bradley company, 1 tank platoon, 1 105mm howitzer battery in lieu of 107mm mortars and a direct support logistics package) as the level of violence and sophistication of USC/SNA militia attacks escalated.

According to policy-level authorities, this request was brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 23 and was the subject of later discussions between them. The Chairman made the Secretary aware that CINCCENT had deleted the request for artillery. In accordance with Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman recommended that the request be approved after receiving recommendations on both sides of the issue from appropriate members of the Joint Staff. He also discussed the issue with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially the Chief of Staff of the Army, who concurred with his recommendation.
After consulting with the Chairman, the Secretary elected not to approve the request at that time. At the time, U.S. policy in Somalia was to reduce its military presence and its role in UNOSOM, not increase it. This particular request, which was characterized as providing additional troops and equipment for force protection tasks, was not considered essential by policy level authorities to carrying out the mission. This assessment in Washington differed significantly from that of the Commander in the field. As a result, this request was not approved at the policy level until the President’s decision to deploy additional combat forces was made after the Task Force Ranger raid of 3–4 October.

**USFORSOM Command and Control**

The Terms of Reference specified the command relationship for U.S. forces under UNOSOM II. COMUSFORSOM was given operational control (OPCON) of the U.S. Logistics Support Command, also known as UN Logistics Support Command (UNLSC), and the members of the U.S. contingent serving on the UNOSOM II staff. The U.S. Quick Reaction Force and CISE, on the other hand, remained OPCON to CINCCENT. The QRF was then designated TACON (tactical control) to COMUSFORSOM for specific missions and operations, while the CISE was in direct support. This command relationship modified standard command relationships as outlined in Joint Pub 1-02. Joint Pub 1-02 states that the CINC has inherent operational control of U.S. forces in his theater, as the combatant commander. This gives him “the authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations...to accomplish missions assigned to the command.” Normally the combatant commander exercises OPCON “through the commanders of subordinate organizations.” TACON, defined as “the detailed and, usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned,” is much more restrictive.

The published non-standard command relationship established for the QRF, however, was not implemented in practice. CINCCENT in effect exercised OPCON of all U.S. forces, to include the QRF, through COMUSFORSOM. However, missions for U.S. forces exceeding those outlined in the Terms of Reference had to be approved by CINCCENT before execution.

The terms of reference provided adequate flexibility for COMUSFORSOM to employ the QRF in emergency situations. Tactical control (TACON) of the QRF was automatically delegated to COMUSFORSOM in two situations per the terms of reference: (1) “Deployment for normal training exercises within Somalia;” and (2) When “situations within Somalia...exceed the capability of UNOSOM II forces and require emergency employment of immediate combat power for a limited period or show of force operations.” Any tasking for the QRF beyond these guidelines required approval of CINCCENT.

When it came to the conduct of critical, yet non-emergency combat operations, which exceeded either the capability or will of UNOSOM II forces, the TOR proved quite restrictive. The requirement to gain approval from CINCCENT, in some instances, had the effect of temporarily paralyzing UN ground operations in Somalia. During the months of June, July, and August, the coalition began to lose its will to carry out the necessary offensive actions (i.e., patrols, cordon and searches) to protect the force and maintain a secure environment in Mogadishu. It became increasingly important to authorize the QRF to perform these “routine” type operations in the immediate areas of U.S. bases in order to protect U.S. forces. In addition, coalition forces throughout this period also came to depend on QRF aviation support for operations they did conduct. The situation eventually reached the point where coalition forces would not conduct an operation without QRF aviation support. These factors combined with rising levels of violence increased the profile and signature of U.S. forces in Somalia. Seeking to maintain a low U.S. profile, military authorities above COMUSFORSOM became more reluctant to approve QRF operations at the time he believed they were needed to prop up the coalition.

The CISE provided direct support to UNOSOM II, consistent with U.S. requirements on releasing information and intelligence. CISE assets were retained under U.S. supervision and control at all times.
This relationship, which proved very effective, was facilitated by the assignment of U.S. officers in key intelligence positions on the UNOSOM II staff. Their presence helped provide releasable information to UNOSOM II.

Although the command relationships actually practiced in Somalia were in line with Joint Pub 1-02, the contradiction between what was in writing (the terms of reference), and what was executed clouded lines of control, and created friction within the command. On arrival, Commander, Joint Task Force Somalia (COMJTFSOM) assumed OPCON of the QRF and all ground combat elements deployed ashore. The UNLSC and U.S. members of the UNOSOM II staff remained OPCON to COMUSFOR-SOM. Like the QRF, JTFSOM was OPCON to CINCCENT and TACON to COMUSFOR-SOM in accordance with the terms of reference. However, the CINC’s intent to continue to exercise OPCON of all U.S. forces through COMUSFOR-SOM may not have been clearly understood. It appeared that JTFSOM initially operated in accord with the command relationships outlined in the terms of reference. This gave the appearance of parallel lines of command and control especially at the staff level. This situation resolved itself when COMUSFOR-SOM relinquished his UN responsibilities and assumed direct command of JTFSOM.

SECTION II— POLICY REVIEW

This section captures the observations of the Somalia After Action Review committee regarding key policy issues. It attempts to demonstrate the effects policy decisions had on the strategic and operational execution of the mission. The entire scope of operations in Somalia was reviewed by the Somalia After Action Review attendees. In the course of the participants’ discussions, several deficiencies in policy and strategic guidance were highlighted which affected COMUSFOR-SOM’s ability to effectively execute his mission. These included:

- A decrease in interagency attention paid to the operations after transition to United Nations control;

- An apparent dichotomy in guidance (commander’s intent) given to COMUSFOR-SOM;

- A lack of a coordinated UN political strategy for Somalia which further hampered the development of an UN integrated political, military, and economic (humanitarian) strategy;

- And an interagency assessment process that was slow to come to a decision regarding the deteriorating situation on the ground in Somalia.

Each circumstance alone was not necessarily significant enough to inhibit the successful execution of the UNOSOM II mission, but the combined effects of all of them, capped by the events of 3 October 1993, ultimately led to the decision to end U.S. participation. The U.S. decision was followed by similar assessments by other nations which led them to withdraw from Somalia as well.

The UN Security Council Resolution Review Process

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) directing Chapter VII operations should define realistic political and military objectives, an achievable end state and a viable exit or hand-off strategy that all contributing nations can support from the outset. This was not the case in Somalia and is unlikely to be the case in the future. Despite the usual ambiguity of such instruments, the mandates for UNITAF and UNOSOM II were clearly and substantially different. The essentially narrow focus of UNITAF under UNSCR 794 was to provide security for humanitarian relief efforts to rescue a starving population. Conversely, UNOSOM II’s stated mission in UNSCR 814 was to establish a secure environment for the continuation
of humanitarian relief; achievement of national reconciliation and the establishment of a transitional government; and advancement of economic rehabilitation. Significant tasks included disarmament of the factions and the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. These objectives and tasks implied two distinctly different end states with very different implications for the military forces committed in Somalia.

The most striking difference in end states was UNOSOM II’s mission to prevent the resumption of violence and to disarm the militia and political factions. In retrospect, this fundamental difference and its more ambitious implications were not clear to contributing nations. Clearly, given the differences in military capability between UNITAF and UNOSOM II, the more demanding, potentially explosive mission was given to the less capable force.

UNOSOM II’s expanded mission can be traced, in part, to a fundamental disagreement between the UN Secretary General and the United States over the scope of UNITAF’s mandate. This disagreement, voiced in an exchange of letters between Boutros Boutros-Ghali and President Bush in December 1992, focused on two key issues: disarmament and geographic coverage. With regard to disarmament, Boutros Boutros-Ghali believed the U.S. led UNITAF coalition must undertake comprehensive, and if necessary forcible, disarmament in Somalia. Otherwise, the initiative could be lost to the warlords, and the mission would be much more difficult for follow-on UN forces. The United States, by contrast, insisted on keeping UNITAF’s mission narrowly defined to humanitarian relief and to pursue disarmament “as necessary” for force protection and to accomplish its primary mission of securing the delivery of humanitarian relief. UNITAF never had comprehensive disarmament as a military objective.

On the question of geographic scope, Boutros Boutros-Ghali wanted UNITAF operations to cover all of Somalia. By contrast, the United States believed that UNITAF, in keeping with its mission to secure humanitarian relief, should focus only on southern and central Somalia—the main areas of famine. Although apparently fully supportive of the broader mandate, the U.S. more restrictive interpretation of UNITAF’s mission left much for the UN to accomplish with UNOSOM II.

Mission Dichotomy

The United States voted to approve UNOSOM II’s mandate, knowing that the objectives in UNSCR 814 would be difficult to achieve. The U.S., believing that a benign environment would continue to exist, expected the UN to be able to obtain and tailor forces for this enhanced mission. Participants in the U.S. inter-agency process reportedly believed that the U.S. role in UNOSOM II would be limited and short-term, and would take a supporting rather than a leadership role. The U.S. government viewed these objectives as UN objectives for which the U.S. would not necessarily be responsible. There was no reassessment of the marginalization policy toward the warlords, begun during the UNITAF/UNOSOM I period, given the nation building nature of UNOSOM II’s mission. UNSCR 814 tasked UNOSOM II to disarm the factions and clans, but was ambiguous on the issue of coercive disarmament.

Throughout most of 1992, USC/SNA factional leader Mohamed Farah Aideed opposed UN intervention in Somalia. His grudging last-minute “acceptance” of the UNITAF deployment to Somalia was no doubt based on his desire to avoid a confrontation with the potent U.S. force. However, his refusal to share power with others after the overthrow of the dictator Siad Barre was known to be one of the key factors that plunged Somalia into civil war. Aideed and his allies were generally recognized to be a potential risk to UN operations in Somalia. Yet, the UN provided no clear guidance regarding what it wanted done with warlords who directly opposed UN intervention. Despite the critical nature of this issue, the U.S. focused primarily on getting the resolution passed as quickly as possible so that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II could be concluded, and the majority of U.S. troops could be withdrawn from Somalia. This situation underscores the vital importance of realistic end state and hand off strategies for future missions and the pitfalls of unrealistic ones.
Prior to assuming command, COMUSFORSOM was given broad guidance to do what was necessary to ensure UN success in its mission, while avoiding continued U.S. dominance. This was probably only possible in a benign environment. In retrospect the guidance given to COMUSFORSOM appears to have been flawed from the outset. During the breathing spell provided by UNITAF’s presence, Somalis began to rebuild their lives, while the warlords were being increasingly marginalized. Eventual violent confrontation with one or more warlords appeared increasingly likely with the departure of UNITAF. However, the accords reached by factional leaders at Addis Ababa in March 1993, when they agreed to reconciliation and disarmament, and UNITAF’s belief that the greatest threat against UNITAF or UNOSOM II at the time of transition consisted of large scale riots in Mogadishu similar to those organized in February, may have led U.S. government policy makers into believing that the new mandate might be achievable in a fairly benign environment with the forces provided. The events of 5 June proved otherwise.

UNOSOM II began to implement the new mandate with political and disarmament measures after 4 May. Despite the Addis Ababa accords, during the weeks that followed, the anti-U.S. and anti-UN radio and leaflet campaign sustained a fever pitch in Mogadishu. On 4 June the USC/SNA was informed in advance that an inspection would be made on 5 June of their several declared weapons storage sites. Planners recognized the possibility of resistance and company-sized UN forces therefore escorted the inspection teams. Nonetheless, when UN peacekeepers were ambushed on 5 June, all parties were caught by surprise.

The rush to justice demonstrated by UN Security Council Resolution 837 would seem to have benefited from the existence of a standing high-level crisis response cell that could have assessed a fuller range of options to execute the tasks of the proposed resolution, considering the military and political implications of each. In the wake of the violent attack on the Pakistani Peacekeepers, the United Nations and member states needed to quickly demonstrate their resolve to prevent future attacks and take strong action in response to this criminal act. According to policy level authorities, an interagency meeting in which the Joint Staff and OSD participated was held on June 5. UNSCR 837 was approved on Sunday, June 6.

The language and tenor of UNSCR 837 supported a more aggressive military approach rather than a diplomatic one. The resolution in essence, mandated: the neutralization of the radio station, implementation of the disarmament of all Somali factions, and use of all necessary measures against those responsible for the attack of June 5th, to include: arrest, detention, prosecution and punishment. The resolution further called on member states to contribute armored personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters to provide UNOSOM II the capability to “confront and deter armed attacks directed against it.” The U.S. was among those nations that responded to this request by: immediately providing AC–130 gunships to support the operations of UNOSOM II during the months of June and July. The resulting operations undertaken by UNOSOM II Force Command were very much offensive in nature as mandated by UNSCR 837, and set a decisively different tone for operations in Somalia from that point on.

The hunt for USC/SNA leaders added a dimension to the situation beyond the capabilities of UNOSOM forces. However, an increase in U.S. forces would have been contrary to keeping a low U.S. profile and accomplishing the desired movement of the U.S. QRF over the horizon by the August time frame. Consequently, the U.S. decided to stay the course militarily but not increase its presence. For this reason there was only a modest reinforcement by U.S. AC–130 aircraft in June and a declaration of a successful mission complete by the President following the UN led attack on the Aideed enclave in late June. Further U.S. participation was not reassessed prior to approval of the resolution. This failure to perform a thorough reassessment of U.S. political and military objectives at the time UNSCR 837 was considered led to a series of incremental increases in U.S. participation in military operations, including the eventual deployment of Task Force Ranger.
Contribution Factors

Lack of an Integrated Strategy

The confrontation with the USC/SNA was partly attributable to the lack of a coordinated over-arching theater level strategy that integrated the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power in Somalia. Political, humanitarian, and military strategies were developed independently. There was no senior-level UN strategy group charged with developing a coherent, integrated approach to operations in Somalia that encompassed the entire mission.

The UN political strategy by itself was exceedingly ambitious. The apparent UN political goal to marginalize the warlords could be described as a bottom-up approach. It called for the establishment of district and regional councils before the creation of a transitional national council. The goal was to empower communities and local leaders while the country was under UN protection, thereby countering the efforts of warlords to monopolize the political arena and to profit from the presence of humanitarian agencies. This was motivated by the belief that because the warlords permitted the widespread starvation crisis to occur in 1991, they would be repudiated by the Somali people if the people were permitted a political voice.

The bottom-up approach was not shared by career UN officials in theater. The career UN staff in Mogadishu operated from a traditional UN Chapter VI mentality, i.e. working with the evident power structure, the warlords. The Deputy SRSG, who was delegated the political negotiating lead in Somalia by the SRSG and who was the principal UN facilitator of the Addis Ababa Accords in March 1993, believed in a top-down political approach. This required working with those in power (the warlords) to come to consensus on a loose confederation in which, ideally, power could be shared. Although efforts were made to define a coherent political strategy by the SRSG, no clear political strategy was articulated to the Force Command by the UN political staff. It was generally believed that UNOSOM II would be challenged by the warlords after transition. This was anticipated due to the weakness exhibited by UNOSOM I and to rising Somali dissatisfaction with the U.S.-led UNITAF at the end of its deployment. However, as earlier noted, the worst case threat scenario consisted of demonstrations and riots similar to those experienced by UNITAF in February 1993. This assessment was provided by the outgoing UNITAF commander to the new UN Force Commander in April 1993 and became UNOSOM II's assessment as well.

In an effort to demonstrate UNOSOM II's strength during the days immediately following transition, show of force demonstrations were carried out in Mogadishu which included visible armored patrols and helicopter overflights. When the first test came, it did so in an outlying area with the attack in Kismayo which engaged Belgian forces. Somali Patriotic Movement - Somali National Alliance (SPM/SNA) forces (headed by Omar JESS—Aideed's lieutenant) were soundly defeated. A similar attack in the near future was not expected and no organized threat of this kind was seen in Mogadishu.

In the absence of a concept for a specific political end state, and given the diverse views in the UN civilian leadership on the exact political approach to be taken, Force Command did not pursue a complementary strategy to support "marginalization" of the warlords. The Force Commander was instead urged by the SRSG to prepare a military strategy for expansion into the Central Region at the earliest possible time. In May and June, Force Command was engaged in the execution of Phase II of its six phased concept of operation—consolidation. Consolidation was intended to first ensure control of all UNITAF territory before any expansion effort. [It] was a necessary phase because of the delayed arrival of promised UNOSOM forces, especially the Indian brigade, and the need to operate for some time in an economy of force mode. In-theater forces had to be used to fill the voids left by the departing Australian and Canadian brigades. In so doing, Force Command accepted some risks in the city of Mogadishu.
Lack of Inter-agency Crisis Response Cells

With the 5 June ambushes that killed 24 Pakistanis and the passage of UNSCR 837, the situation in Somalia substantially changed. The mission was altered to include arresting those responsible for the June 5 ambushes. The call to now arrest those responsible for the ambushes changed the nature of the mission. The operation now clearly took on a combat role. AC 130 gun ships were approved for deployment and use in mid-June, and the number of attack helicopters increased. According to political authorities, additional requests by the United Nations for resources were considered, but denied. However, the risk to U.S. service members increased. As the situation worsened in August, the Commander, USFOR-SOM, requested additional assets to assist the UN in the execution of its combat missions.

One of the principal issues, of course, was that after transition to UNOSOM II, the operation appeared to drop in priority within the U.S. government. The thought appeared to be that now it was a UN led operation therefore, it was appropriate to reduce the visibility of resources devoted to Somalia in the U.S. government. It also became increasingly difficult for COMUSFORSOM to obtain additional U.S. resources and employ existing ones, as he deemed necessary to either accomplish the U.S. and UN goals or respond to emergencies when they arose after 17 June.

When the 5 June attacks occurred, everyone was surprised by the intensity and savagery of the Aideed militia’s attacks. Some experts suggest that a standing high-level U.S. interagency response cell (similar to that in being during the UNITAF period) designed to study and advise U.S. and UN leaders on the full range of options to execute the proposed resolution (SCR 837) and their military and political implications may have led to a different approach.

Effects on the UN Coalition

The rush to approve and implement UNSCR 837 also failed to gain consensus with the UNOSOM II contributing nations, most of whom were not members of the Security Council. Marginalization of the warlords was neither a shared political strategy by the nations nor was there a mechanism at UN New York, outside of the Security Council, to review possible military options with their corresponding military and political implications. As combat operations continued in Mogadishu, many coalition members simply chose not to execute, or selectively executed, the orders of the Force Commander. Capabilities of many third world nation forces were insufficient to overmatch the threat in the urban guerilla warfare of Mogadishu and this caused them to hesitate or simply not aggressively execute tactical missions in the city. The national capitals of some of the more capable forces located outside Mogadishu would not allow their forces to be committed to combat operations in the city. It was becoming clear that, if the UN was to make progress, U.S. forces would need to play a larger role or a revitalized political dialogue with the USC/SNA was needed.

The growing timidity of the coalition increased the likelihood of the U.S. QRF being called on to support UN operations. U.S. QRF assets were used not only to supplement coalition force operations, but at times with CENTCOM approval, used unilaterally to ensure U.S. force protection or selectively strike USC/SNA military targets. Other contingents would not perform ground operations without observation and attack helicopter coverage provided solely by the U.S. QRF. Force protection search and raid operations by the QRF around key U.S. facilities also were required due to inadequate coalition operations. This greater activity by the U.S. QRF created a higher U.S. profile, especially in media reports and may have been detrimental to the long-term cohesion of the UN coalition.

The attack on the Abdi House on 12 July strengthened UNOSOM II’s military position in Somalia by severely damaging the command and control structure of the SNA militia. It also exposed a weakness preventing the coalition from capitalizing on its success. The violent, sudden, and unilateral nature of the attack disturbed some coalition partners, many of whom saw the attack as likely to bring
on USC/SNA reprisals against UNOSOM II forces. Attacking the command center without warning was perceived by some as too provocative an act and an escalation of the violence. In addition, the raid received greater press attention when several international journalists, invited to the scene by the USC/SNA, were killed by angry mobs. The unilateral attack on the Abdi House implicated the coalition partners by association. Without prior consultation, their governments were ill-prepared to respond to press and public criticisms received from this operation. The Abdi House raid may even have influenced the decision by one of the major troop contributing nations to announce the withdrawal of its forces from UNOSOM II.

As a result of the concern over the press and the coalition response to the Abdi House attack, CENTCOM approval for use of QRF air assets became increasingly more difficult to obtain. CENTCOM had not received a change in guidance and continued to emphasize the need for a reduced U.S. role and a more aggressive coalition role.

Seeds of Policy Change

The deteriorating security situation in Somalia following the murder of the Pakistanis caused senior interagency officials to form and dispatch to Somalia a 10 person interagency assessment team led by Ambassador David Shinn. In Somalia from 20 to 27 July 1993, the team assessed the overall security situation and progress towards political reconstruction and economic development. Following its return to the U.S., the team noted that the UN’s security (military and police forces), political and humanitarian/economic development operations appeared to be developing in isolation from one another; it recommended linkage and subsequent implementation in a coordinated manner. Additionally, the team recommended in early August that the UN develop a comprehensive strategy for restoring political institutions. This included a “bottom-up” approach by creating district councils and progressing upwards to a transnational council.

Given the conclusions of the interagency assessment team, an interagency working group was formed in mid-August to monitor events in Somalia and provide recommendations to senior decision-makers. The first public indication of this U.S. refocus on the political, rather than a military solution in Somalia was a major policy speech given by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin on 27 August 1993. In it, he stated that the recent deployment of the Rangers had a “much too narrow” focus on the military aspects of the situation and that “if there is a solution to Somalia’s problems, it must be much more than [just] a military solution.” He posed the rhetorical question “how will we know when we have succeeded” in Somalia and, echoing the recommendations of the interagency assessment team, outlined criteria for success that included progress in the economic, political and security elements of the “Somali problem”. Before U.S. combat troops could be withdrawn, however, he noted three conditions: (1) the security problem in South Mogadishu (Aideed’s) would have to be “settled” (2) real progress needed to be made towards taking heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords and (3) credible, neutral police forces had to be operating in major population centers.

In September, as Task Force Ranger was beginning its training in Mogadishu, various U.S. government agencies continued the reassessment of the U.S. mission in Somalia. The fact that consideration was being given to a renewed political approach had not been conveyed to USFOR Somalia in Mogadishu. At the same time, CINCCENT forwarded an updated strategy assessment to CJCS. The CINC viewed the increase in U.S. military operations in Mogadishu as an unjustified expansion in the mission, i.e., “mission creep.” While USFOR Somalia was using the QRF within the limitations of the published “Terms of Reference,” for force protection and to meet emergency situations beyond UNOSOM II capabilities, CINCCENT was concerned about limiting the U.S. signature. Should the course of events have continued, CINCCENT saw no end to U.S. participation in the mission. With the deployment of TF Ranger, CINCCENT thought it necessary to receive clarification on the role of U.S. forces in Somalia. The CINCCENT assessment called for a review of the UN strategy that would either require the UN to “scale back its objectives” or require the
U.S. to significantly “increase its commitment to underwrite this operation for an indefinite period.” This appears to be the first time a reassessment was called for to examine the two conflicting alternatives.

On 6 September, the U.S. State Department Liaison Office (USLO) in Mogadishu recommended to SECSTATE that additional U.S. forces in addition to TF Ranger (which was already in theater) were required in order to “counteract the continuing politico-military damage being absorbed by UNOSOM.” This message generated a great deal of controversy at State. Viewing an apparent lack of support by the U.S. government for the added forces, U.S. Special Envoy Robert Gosende proposed a new “disalignment” strategy. It outlined “a way to negotiate this recalcitrant group (SNA) out of the way at least temporarily if not...completely.” It called for a cease-fire; the formation of an international commission to reinvestigate the events of 5 June (two commission members being representatives from Aideed’s own clan); an agreement by Aideed to go into exile—not house arrest - until the investigation was completed; and should a trial be recommended by the commission, then the trial would take place in Somalia; and lastly it called for the USC/SNA leadership to reconfirm its acceptance of the Addis Ababa accords (complete cease-fire, immediate cantonment of heavy weapons, and demobilization of militia).

Inter-agency players apparently gave favorable consideration to this new strategy and called for the UN to promote a political dialogue in this direction. According to policy level authorities, during this same period, the SECDEF, after consulting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, elected to not approve COMUSFORSOM’s request for reinforcements, but to stay the course militarily in accordance with U.S. policy at the time.

COMUSFORSOM and CG, TF Ranger were unaware of the specifics of the policy review. Guidance from CENTCOM had not changed. TF Ranger operations continued and eventually ended with the Olympic Hotel raid on 3–4 October 1994. Following the raid, it was clear that U.S. force participation in Somalia had lost consensus in Congress and with the American public. Events moved rapidly. U.S. policy changed and Ambassador Oakley was sent to Somalia to re-initiate the political dialogue with Aideed.

Shift in Strategy

Events of 3 October also resulted in a split in policy between the United States and the United Nations. Following the President’s declaration to withdraw all U.S. forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994, U.S. policy shifted from a policy perceived to be supportive of coercive disarmament to one of a negotiated withdrawal. This was distinctly at odds with the UN Secretary General’s perspective. In a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State on 25 September, the Secretary General indicated that he recognized the erosion of support in the U.S., but was encouraged by a meeting held with major contributing nations on 16 September. He went on to suggest that to pull out of Somalia or surrender control of South Mogadishu to Aideed condemned Somalia to anarchy, and humbled the efforts of the United Nations and others for peace. Such a turn of events would have a devastating effect on UN efforts to develop and strengthen its capacity to contribute to a better world. After the costly 3–4 October events, the U.S. chose to reduce its losses and reevaluate its support to multinational intervention.

Aideed himself recognized the U.S. policy change in early November 1993 when he stated that he would not attack U.S. forces unless forced to do so and that he was willing to allow the U.S. time to negotiate and mediate. In reality, Aideed’s unilateral cease-fire was required because of the high casualties sustained in his recent campaign especially in the 3–4 October conflict and strong questions over his leadership from within the SNA.

Further evidence of the weakening of U.S. commitment to UN operations in Somalia was demonstrated by the substance of the Oakley mission to Somalia in October–November 1993. According to a CENTCOM report at the time, the mission’s objective was to get Aideed and Ali Mahdi to deal with one another. The mission would stress the need to adhere to certain UN guidelines by removing roadblocks
and technicals and permitting free movement of UN convoys. Both warlords would be instructed that if they failed to agree to this minimum requirement then the additional U.S. deployed forces (JTFSOM) would be used to ensure the LOCs were opened and safe. There was an implication that the UN political effort was not to hinder the new U.S. initiative to create the needed political compromise inside Somalia. The U.S. appeared to be prepared to shift the political effort from the UN to other African nations and work through them for a solution if required.

This 180 degree “shift” of policy and the announced U.S. withdrawal resulted in virtual military and political paralysis in Somalia. With the U.S. now assuming a dominant political role, no firm direction came from UN New York or the SRSG. The Force Commander was essentially placed in a position of accepting a unilateral cease-fire and reverting to purely defensive activities in Mogadishu and support missions in the other AORs.

In order to facilitate an orderly withdrawal by the date selected by the President, the U.S. dispatched Joint Task Force Somalia (JTFSOM) to augment forces in Somalia, with a mission to protect U.S. troops and bases, secure essential lines of communications and deter future militia attacks. Although the President indicated his resolve to use U.S. forces to “open lines of communications,” the UNOSOM staff and coalition forces considered the likelihood of U.S. forces being employed in any operation against USC/SNA militia areas was extremely low. The high profile of the Oakley negotiations with the USC/SNA, and the emphasis on avoiding military confrontations with factional forces were taken as clear signals that U.S. forces would not participate in offensive combat operations. This, along with the announced withdrawal date was seen as a loss of U.S. commitment in Somalia and further eroded the will of coalition forces to undertake any operations. As a result, UNOSOM II increasingly adopted a bunker mentality.

The paralysis of UNOSOM II Force Command can be directly attributed to UNOSOM’s weakening strategic center of gravity, namely the unity of the coalition to accomplish the mission called for by the UN charter and the pending withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the coalition.

The most significant long-term consequence of unilateral U.S. withdrawal on UN operations in Somalia, however, was its effect on other contributing nations. Without a continued U.S. presence, Italy, Germany, and Korea also announced their intent to withdraw from Somalia before 31 March. Withdrawal of these forces, especially the Germans and Koreans, significantly reduced UNOSOM’s capability to sustain its forces throughout the UNOSOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) through 1995. Further, the pending presence of only Third World countries in Somalia raised the question of force credibility and increased logistics problems for UNOSOM, as the last of the self-sustaining nations withdrew.

SECTION III—IMPLICATIONS

This section highlights the major lessons and implications for U.S. and UN participation in future Chapter VII operations. A more detailed account of lessons learned is in Volume II of the After Action Report.

Reality of Chapter VII Operations

Chapter VII operations are forcible, armed interventions which are most severely tested in chaotic “failed nation state” situations. UN forces will often be uninvited by the internal parties. Their presence may be resented, and, in some cases, violently opposed by some of the belligerents. UN traditions of impartiality and strict neutrality may be incompatible with peace enforcement operations. Until the conditions are right for political reconciliation, the UN force may have no choice but to take action against one or more belligerents openly opposed to UN presence. It is highly likely that UN military forces will be tested by one or more belligerents. Such interventions will always require forces pre-
pared and equipped to conduct combat operations for deterrence, force protection, and enforcing the mandate.

Nations participating in peace enforcement operations must be committed to stay the course, deal with the inherent potential for violence, and accept the fact that casualties may result from combat operations. This will be true regardless of any humanitarian aspects of the mission. In the “failed nation state,” the humanitarian effort is only the initial phase in a mission designed to provide viable political and social institutions required for nation building. Facilitating political renewal can be a long-term process. As the mission progresses, the humanitarian component will find itself supporting the more complex tasks related to nation building activities. This evolution may tend to highlight the more volatile areas of political reconciliation and long term economic development. The attendant shift from humanitarian relief, which benefited all parties, to humanitarian development, which could appear to favor some elements, could alienate one or more of the internal parties. The shift could create an increasingly dangerous environment for all forces and organizations identified with the intervention.

Much more work needs to be done to educate the American public and Congress on the risks involved in peace enforcement operations. U.S. doctrine categorizes peace enforcement as a “military operation other than war (MOOTW).” The definitions for MOOTW are currently misleading and should be revised. Peace enforcement operations do not fit the environment described in FM 100-5 as one “that may not involve combat.” More accurately, in a Chapter VII, peace enforcement operation, combat should be anticipated and prepared for. Our own doctrine should acknowledge peace enforcement as a combat operation falling along the continuum of military operations depending on the threat expected.

Future U.S. Participation

The most important lesson of OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE is that the United Nations is not properly constituted to lead a coalition Chapter VII intervention at this time. It is arguable whether sufficient reforms can be achieved to allow it to do so in any mode other than through a lead nation or established alliance. For the immediate future, Chapter VII operations sanctioned and funded by the UN should be led by a single nation or an established military alliance. DESERT SHIELD/STORM may be a model for such interventions.

The Security Council should provide mandates with clearly defined, realistic political and military objectives, an achievable end state, and a viable exit or hand-off strategy. It should then designate a nation or alliance to lead the operation. The Secretary General with his staff should work to gain international consensus for the operation and solicit national contributions. The lead nation or alliance should execute the mission, frequently reporting progress in the achievement of mandate objectives and tasks to the Security Council. In such single nation or alliance led operations, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) should act as a liaison between the lead nation or the alliance and the UN to coordinate support from UN agencies and identify impediments to that support.

Challenges for the UN

Single nation or alliance led UN interventions may not be practical in the long term. Therefore, the community nations should carefully examine the challenges the UN faced in Somalia and seek reforms that would enable the UN to lead such an operation in the future.

The collapse of central authority in Somalia, a lingering civil war, and the effects on the Somali people of widespread displacement and starvation presented new and unfamiliar challenges to the United Nations whose previous experience had been limited to Chapter VI operations. The establishment and management of a Chapter VII coalition force representing 28 nations highlighted significant deficiencies
in procedures and structures developed during nearly forty years of Chapter VI operations. The civilian component of the UN operation, never fully staffed, was unable to provide the effective, integrated humanitarian, political, and security direction required for success in peace enforcement operations. On the administrative side, the elaborate procedures developed over time to support Chapter VI operations proved to be unsuitable for the demands of fast-moving political, economic (humanitarian) and military operations in a frequently hostile Chapter VII environment.

Peace enforcement operations, such as Somalia, remind us that the UN is not a sovereign nation. The Secretary-General serves the Security Council; he may have his own agenda, but he must first achieve consensus and then obtain a mandate before he can act. He has no direct control over the activities of UN specialized agencies, a situation that inhibits establishing unity of effort and command and control as understood by the U.S. Lacking authority to establish policies and to direct UN agencies in country, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) must, therefore, serve at various times as head of mission, administrator, international fund-raiser, and negotiator with donor nations and international developmental and relief agencies.

The deficiencies of the UN’s organizational culture and bureaucratic processes are most apparent in the coordination of military operations. At the highest level, United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) are mandates which represent a consensus of participating Security Council members. UNSCRs, by their very nature, require significant interpretation before their broad statements of purpose yield military objectives and conditions for determining an end state for the intervention. Contributing nations subsequently negotiate their participation in UN operations bilaterally with the United Nations. The UN invariably compromises on mandate provisions and individual member states’ participation, equipping, and missions. All member nations—not just the U.S.—are notably reluctant to grant UN force commanders full authority over national military contingents. Each of these intrinsic problem areas affected the Somalia operation.

There are also deficiencies in the UN headquarters structure itself that inhibit its ability to manage the many competing demands of a Chapter VII operation. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25 provides initiatives which would substantially improve the UN’s capability to conduct Chapter VII missions in the future. The initiatives are directed at methods to strengthen UN management; they direct U.S. support for strengthening the UN’s planning, logistics, information, and command and control capabilities. The U.S. should continue to examine and identify impediments to UN reform, recommend solutions, and act in concert with like-minded nations to eliminate them. The U.S. should still selectively contribute unique capabilities to UN led Chapter VI operations to enhance their probability for success and to broaden the experience base of the U.S. military in UN peace operations. Such a policy will help to ensure that the U.S. remains an active participant in the development and refinement of multi-national peace operation doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, until the essential Presidential Decision Directive-25 initiatives are adopted by the UN leadership, the U.S. should limit its participation in Chapter VII operations to U.S. led coalitions (i.e., UNITAF and DESERT SHIELD/STORM) or to participation with competent regional organizations such as NATO.

There is no substitute in Chapter VII operations for strong and imaginative leadership by both the designated Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Force Commander. Therefore, U.S. participation in the identification and designation of the SRSG and senior military leadership is an essential step to create conditions for success. There may be situations where the U.S. government wants to provide one or both of the senior leaders in a Chapter VII operation to underscore U.S. commitment. However, each circumstance and mission is unique. Appointment of both a prominent U.S. civilian and a senior military officer to lead a peace enforcement operation could create the perception that the U.S. alone is calling the shots. This perception could adversely affect the spirit of cooperation among the various national military components.
Just as Somalia produced many valuable but sometimes painful insights for each participant, the experiences of the UNOSOM II Chapter VII coalition operation had a substantial effect on the United Nations’ leadership. There are indications that the institution is gradually adapting to the special requirements of Chapter VII operations. But specific initiatives to increase UN capability and provide a reasonable assurance of mission success—such as outlined in PDD-25—should be implemented before the U.S. considers participation in any future UN led Chapter VII mission.

The Mandate Process

Besides institutional reforms, the world community must also review the UN procedures for initiating peace operations. The Security Council should clearly outline its intent, objectives, and end state conditions in resolutions directing Chapter VII operations. The UN Directorate for Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) should develop and provide clear political, military, and economic (humanitarian) objectives for the Head of Mission and Force Commander based on the mandate outlined in the Security Council Resolution. UNDPKO must also define a clear exit or hand-off strategy, as appropriate. UNDPKO is currently too understaffed to effectively perform this function. The U.S. should assist UN New York in the outline of its intent, objectives, and end state conditions in new resolutions involving peace operations.

Presidential Decision Directive-25 provides criteria to the U.S. inter-agency process for determining when the U.S. should support or participate in UN peace operations. The criteria outlined in Presidential Decision Directive-25 should be weighed in deciding our votes on UN Security Council Resolutions. At a minimum, the decision process should include a clear analysis or assessment of the root causes and dynamics of the situation as well as the requirements for a successful operation. The review should ensure that mandates clearly define realistic political and military objectives, an achievable end state, and a viable exit or hand-off strategy. Every effort should be made to ensure end state and exit or hand-off strategies are realistic and not just politically expedient.

An Integrated Strategy

To accomplish mandate objectives, a Chapter VII operation requires a single integrated theater strategy that links the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power in a coherent approach that establishes unity of effort. The SRSG, assisted by senior civilian and military staff members, should be responsible for developing and overseeing the execution of an integrated theater strategy for the Chapter VII operation. Senior staff members assigned this task must be identified and brought together as early in the process as possible.

This over-arching strategy is the basis for developing and supporting individual political, economic (humanitarian), and military strategies and operational plans. The SRSG should have the requisite authority to establish priorities for and task UN agencies. This is not possible given the current structure of the UN. Therefore to achieve unity of effort in executing an integrated strategy, the SRSG must emphasize a consensus and team building approach among UN developmental and relief agencies. At an early stage in the process of developing the theater strategy, those UN developmental and relief agencies and NGOs considered most appropriate to meeting strategic requirements should be actively drawn into consultation. At the discretion of the SRSG their inputs should be acknowledged and, to the extent possible, incorporated into the final theater strategy.

UN Command and Control

There should be a process established to develop, gain, and sustain consensus in the international community, especially with force contributing nations, on the military, political, and economic (humanitarian) objectives and tasks to be undertaken by the designated Force Command. UNDPKO should cre-
ate a mechanism in UN New York to review the strategic and operational direction of Chapter VII operations and of peace operations in a hostile environment. This mechanism could be in the form of a standing or consulting political-military committee that meets periodically to review all initiatives and progress, especially when there is a major shift in strategic direction. The committee must be able to expeditiously resolve concerns of participating nations regarding the direction of operations or employment of their forces. It could also serve to obtain their views on the strategy.

Parallel lines of authority and communication among UN forces and their respective national authorities will exist and may cause command and control problems. In any future Chapter VII operation, such parallel lines of authority will be a reality for any force commander and should be anticipated. This underscores the importance of defining clear, achievable objectives, and tasks in building a UN mandate and building a consensus on a coordinated strategy among contributing nations prior to the deployment of their forces to the theater of operation. It also emphasizes the need to avoid hasty course changes that prevent thorough policy assessment, mission analysis, and revalidation of a consensus among the contributing nations. This consensus building process should not limit the Force Commander’s discretionary authority to take necessary measures, to include offensive operations, to protect UN forces when threatened.

The United Nations must identify and adequately define the terms of the Force Commander’s authority in writing. Participating nations should accept the terms of the Force Commander’s authority prior to deployment into the mission area. The Force Commander must have, in every case, the flexibility to task organize smaller contingents into major force formations.

The United Nations should identify and adequately define standard terms outlining acceptable command relationships among coalition forces. Participating nations should accept these standard terms prior to deployment into the mission area. Until command relationships are developed by the UN, sufficient time must be built into the planning process to permit negotiation and consensus building between the various forces.

In addition to reforms required for the UN, there are implications and lessons that should be reviewed to improve U.S. force participation in future peace operations.

**U.S. Command and Control**

Contradictions between published command relationships designed for USFOR Somalia and those intended and practiced may have clouded the lines of command and control among U.S. forces in theater. Standard command and control relationships described in our Joint doctrine (Joint Pub 1-02) are adequate for future Chapter VII operations. Terms of Reference (TOR) similar to those used in Somalia can limit the role or employment of U.S. forces and ensure that the CINC or other appropriate U.S. military authority retains command during UN operations.

The U.S. command and control structure for peace operations should be tailored (sized, manned, and equipped) to command and control committed forces. The JTF staff model should be used for peace operations. It not only provides a robust capability, but also the necessary flexibility to size the staff to meet mission requirements through augmentation packages.

A JTF staff, designed to support peace operations, should have its core formed from a headquarters possessing the requisite operational level resources, doctrinal focus, training, and seniority. Experience in Somalia has demonstrated that “ad hoc” staffs require a ramp-up or preparation period that may not always be available.

To conduct MOOTW, the doctrinal force headquarters, a JTF, by definition requires joint manning. The Joint Staff should develop a JTF staff manning model that standardizes the manning and training
levels for all JTF staffs. The guidance set forth in Joint Publication 5-00.2 should be expanded to include specific guidance for the make-up, structure, and function of JTF staffs. The CJCS should consider creating an external evaluation program designed to train, assist, and ensure that CINC staffs have the ability to man, train, deploy, and support a JTF headquarters.

**Title X Implications**

The U.S. experience in Somalia holds a number of implications for the military services in terms of force structure, doctrine, and training as well. The UN bureaucracy and world community demonstrated the capability to mobilize to relieve famine. But in Somalia, they have proven to be relatively ineffective and lethargic in providing the resources and expertise to rebuild a “failed nation state.” Military forces deployed to conduct peace operations, particularly Chapter VII peace enforcement, must possess the capability to conduct security operations and support “nation building.”

Civil affairs, PSYOP, and engineer forces were conspicuously absent from Somalia under UNOSOM II. Army and Joint force structure for these type forces, as well as military police, transportation, water production, air and sea port handling units and other combat service support forces to support peace operations should be examined. The bulk of these forces are also in the reserve component. In the case of Somalia, ready access to the reserves through partial call-up was either not considered or was determined to be “too hard” to do.

Increasing demands for military forces to support peace operations around the world and declining Services’ force structures may indicate a need to reevaluate the base force. Requirements generated by MOOTW for command and control headquarters and specialized combat support and combat service support forces could quickly consume active forces available for Major Regional Contingencies (MRC). The Joint staff may want to review its Illustrative Planning Scenarios used to determine the base force and factor peace operations in the scenario process.

While there is much work to be done in the area of force structure, doctrine and training appear to be a success story in OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE. However, the experience in Somalia highlights the need to ensure that we do not lose sight of the fact that peace operations can rapidly escalate into ground combat, including classic urban guerrilla warfare. We should ensure that our emerging doctrine on operations other than war incorporates our war fighting principles. In addition, we need to focus a portion of the doctrine on how to work within a coalition as a participant versus leadership role.

The successes enjoyed by U.S. forces in Somalia can be directly attributed to the superior level of our soldiers’ individual and collective training. The fundamental soldier skills which units routinely train in the execution of their Mission Essential Task List (METL) training served our forces in Somalia very well. Collective training packages much like the training initiatives on-going at the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) can serve as the model for building an easily exportable training program that a unit can execute quickly to assist in its train-up for a MOOTW mission.

Individual professional development and training for MOOTW missions should start at the very basic levels of military education with simple exposure to the concepts of MOOTW missions. The objective would be to familiarize our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and young officer leaders with the peculiarities of peace operations. This will help more senior leaders work through the leader challenges in peace operations where coalitions pose interpersonal challenges and operational restraint can be confusing to our soldiers.

In Somalia, our military leaders found themselves not only leading U.S. forces, but also building support among coalition forces, and helping Somalis re-establish social order and civil services at the local
level. Our leader training should include skills such as consensus building, techniques to overcome coalition command and control problems, PSYOP, and civil affairs skills. In no case should these additional requirements detract from the basic imperative that U.S. forces must be trained, equipped, and prepared to win our nation’s wars.

Somalia challenged our soldiers and leaders to perform simultaneously as humanitarians and as war fighters. They clearly met that challenge. The average service man or woman today is intelligent, motivated, and able to handle much of the complexity inherent in peace operations. We must continue to resource our services to recruit top quality men and women into our armed forces.

**Conclusion**

On 3 December 1992, the United Nations took an unprecedented step to resolve the problems of starvation, famine, and lawlessness in Somalia. It was the first attempt by the international community to deal with a new post-Cold War phenomenon referred to as the “failed nation state.” It was also the first attempt by the United Nations to conduct a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation and execute the parameters of Security Council mandates. However, the “failed state” appears not to be a phenomenon but a trend for the near future.

The United States in its world leadership role may not be able or willing to avoid participation in operations that attempt to prevent, contain, or resolve similar conflicts. Properly constituted, peace operations can be a useful tool to advance United States national interests and pursue our security objectives. However, the U.S. cannot afford to participate as a lead nation in every instance, nor should it try. It is clearly in our interest to strengthen the UN’s capabilities to become an effective instrument for collective security. Presidential Decision Directive-25 initiatives are a start point to help put the UN on the correct footing. Lessons learned from UNOSOM II, and specifically from USFOR-SOM, validate the need for these reforms. The U.S. should encourage similar initiatives from allies, friends, and others in the international community.

It is not in our interests to simply continue to criticize the United Nations for its shortcomings. What is in our interests is to provide constructive leadership and garner support to make this great institution a more effective tool for world peace and stability. Only then can the burdens of leadership be more equitably shared by the entire world community.
CHAPTER I

OPERATIONAL SETTING

Strategic Background

Severe conditions of famine, starvation and civil war in Somalia compelled the United Nations to intervene in early 1992. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751 created United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) on 27 April 1992. UNOSOM (later named UNOSOM I) was authorized under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter to secure the humanitarian relief effort. It soon became clear that UNOSOM I, bound by the more traditional observer/defensive nature of other UN peacekeeping operations, was not able to establish a secure environment in Somalia. A more decisive course of action needed to be taken.

Beginning in early December 1992, the United States government elected to intervene in Somalia. This intervention was sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council on 3 December 1992. The resolution passed by the Council (UNSCR 794) authorized the United States to send a force of 30,000 troops into the theater of operations to protect relief supplies and create “a secure environment.”

This decision was unique in that it was the first time the United Nations intervened in a nation where it was not only uninvited, but warned not to intercede by the local antagonists. The intervention was authorized under the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VII (peace enforcement) authorizes the use of air, sea and land forces to restore peace and security. Consequently, the forces sent to Somalia under Unified Task Force (UNITAF) were military units organized and equipped to conduct combat operations, if necessary.

Concurrent with the decision to authorize the deployment of UNITAF, the Secretary General was required to submit a plan which would allow UNOSOM to fulfill its mandate upon the withdrawal of UNITAF. U.S. forces were destined to play a key role in UNOSOM’s ability to accomplish its mission in Somalia.

GEOGRAPHY

Somalia is the eastern most country in the continent of Africa. Resembling a large figure “7”, it caps the region known as the Horn of Africa. Its area of approximately 246,000 square miles shares frontiers with Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The country ranges from unproductive arid desert to semi-arid sparsely wooded savanna, and fertile agricultural plateaus and lowlands.

The coast of northern Somalia is mostly desert plain with rugged hills and mountains within sight of the beaches. To the east, extensive escarpments mark the coastline. Farther inland, the plains turn from very arid semi-desert in the north to arid plains in the Mudugh region. Land more suited to agriculture is found in the south. Southern Somalia consists of extensive undulating plains, with isolated hills that rise to 100 meters on a gentle 2 percent grade.

Southwest of the Mudugh plain, the land descends to the Schebelli-Juba lowlands that lie between the country’s only perennial watercourses. This is the most fertile area of Somalia and is its agricultural center. To the north of this low plain rises the dissected Schebelli-Juba plateau, which ascends to the Ethiopian frontier. This area is primarily seasonal pastureland for migrating herds. West of the Juba River, between the farmland and the Kenya border, lies the area known as the Trans-Juba. Northwest of the river the dissected plain is pasture.
Rivers, streams, and irrigation canals are mainly seasonal. Only two rivers, the Juba and the Schebelli, carry water all year. Both are in the southern region, and only one reaches the ocean. The country’s primary river, the Juba, originates in the high mountains of Ethiopia and is fed by three principal tributary streams before reaching Somalia. The Juba enters Somalia at Dolo and flows south through low hills entering the Indian Ocean at Giumbo, having descended along its 500 mile course to sea level from an elevation of 725 feet. The Juba seldom reaches a depth of over 2 feet. However it does have high-water periods during the two monsoons, when it reaches a width of more than 500 feet and a depth of approximately 6 feet. Normally the river begins rising in April and continues through May, reaching its peak flow in September and again in November. The low-water period begins in December and the river becomes critically low in March. Even in the driest year, however, water always flows in the Juba. Widths during the dry periods vary from 60 to 250 feet and the depth rarely is over 2 feet.

The Schebelli, like the Juba, originates in the mountains of Ethiopia. It enters Somalia near Ferfer, where the 45th meridian intersects the Ethiopian frontier. From there it follows a southerly course, paralleling the Juba. Approximately 15 miles north of Mogadishu, the Schebelli turns to the southwest, flowing parallel to the coast for approximately 140 miles before disappearing in a series of sandy coastal depressions. The Schebelli is a perennial stream only as far south as Balad. From there to its terminus, the river is usually dry during the months of December and January. Two flood seasons occur each year. The first is in May and June, the second from September through November.

These two rivers, along with wells dug throughout the country, are the principal sources of water. Available water is often contaminated, contributing to the spread of disease in Somalia, particularly in rural areas. Between 150 to 250 wells were drilled between the mid 1950’s and mid 1960’s. These are mostly deep wells except those located in the northwest. Numerous seasonal wells are drilled around...
cities which may contain potable water. Water is sold in many places by the gallon. The price rises sharply during the dry season. Piped water is rarely found except in wealthier parts of large towns.

The hostile climate and lack of adequate water sources make the wells critical from a political, economic and military perspective. The clans and political factions have routinely fought over these vital sources of water, and used them to gain and maintain control over the people of the region. Both UNITAF and UNOSOM II recognized the importance of the water sources, and took steps to ensure access to all people. However, in some areas of Somalia, warlords continue to control access to water sources, using it as a tool to gain political and economic power.

CLIMATE

Somalia is hot and arid for most of the year. The climate ranges from conditions of tropical heat to periods with sub-freezing temperatures. The mean daily maximum temperatures throughout the country range from 85 to 100 degrees Fahrenheit, except at the higher elevations and along the eastern coast. Mean daily minimum temperatures usually vary from the mid-sixties to the high eighties (Fahrenheit scale). In the southern region, the UNOSOM II area of operations, the hottest season begins in February and ends in April. Coastline temperatures are typically 10 to 15 degrees cooler than inland temperatures.

Annual rainfall is low and irregular throughout Somalia, varying from 1-5 inches along the northern coast, to a maximum of 25 inches in the southern region between the Juba and Schebelli Rivers. The rainy season varies by region. Bardera has two rainy seasons, March to May and October to November. Belet Uen also has two rainy seasons, April to May and October to November. Kismayo usually has one from April through July. Generally speaking, the heavy rainy season occurs from March to May and the light rainy season occurs from September to December.

There are four seasons in Somalia, two wet and two dry. The seasons are marked by northeast and southwest monsoon winds and the lulls that occur between them. The first season begins in late December or early January and is marked by hot, dry and dusty northeast monsoon winds. It is considered the harshest season of the year. The second season runs from March through May and is the lull between monsoon seasons. It is the hottest period of the year in southern Somalia even though it is cool in northern Somalia. This is the season of heaviest rainfall and is referred to as “gu” by Somalis. The third and longest season begins with the southwest monsoon and extends from June through August. In the South, cool sea breezes from the Indian Ocean pleasantly temper the heat. Light rainfall can be expected for short periods of time. In northern Somalia, it is the hottest period of the year with temperatures that can soar to 120 degrees Fahrenheit. The fourth and last season of the year runs from September through December and is another lull that occurs between the monsoons. Heat and humidity can be expected to occur with the intermittent rains. Somalis call this season the “dayr.”

INFRASTRUCTURE

There is very little in Somalia in the way of national infrastructure. With no railroad and only the lower portion of the Juba River suitable for inland water traffic, the highway system is the principal means of land transportation. Approximately 32% of the country’s road network is all weather, covered with bitumen, crushed stone, coral and gravel. The remainder of the roads are made of loose surface materials and dirt. The conditions of the roads in Somalia are marginal at best. With the exception of the main supply routes in southern Somalia, they have received virtually no maintenance. Road surfaces range from 3.0 to 7.9 meters in width. Road shoulders, when they are present, are 0.9 to 1.5 meters in width.
The main transnational highway is the bituminous road connecting the northern port cities of Berbera and Bossasso with Mogadishu in the south. It is the backbone of the road network in Somalia. The portion of the road extending north from Belet Uen, known as the China Road, is still in good condition and in places can be traveled on at speeds up to 100 Km/hr. From Belet Uen south to Mogadishu the condition of the road is quite a different story. The road passes through the flood plain of the lower Schebelli, where bypass conditions may be difficult. It then passes north through a region of steep escarpments from Bundo Barde to Belet Uen, where bypass conditions may become extremely difficult. The poor road conditions make this roughly 300 km trip a two and one-half day adventure. During the rainy season the road often times becomes impassable for two or three days at a time. UNOSOM II engineers have undertaken the task of repairing and upgrading this vital line of communication.

Other roads, which are extensively used and maintained by UNOSOM II, include: Mogadishu to Afgoye to Baidoa; Baidoa to Bardera; Baidoa to Oddur and Wajid; Afgoye to Marka; and Kismayo to Jilib. These routes were a virtual lifeline to UNOSOM II forces scattered throughout southern Somalia. All of them are slow-going and from time to time impassable. UNOSOM II's lack of engineer assets hampered plans to continuously improve these roads. Instead UNOSOM II had to be content with just maintaining them. As a result, UNOSOM often relied on air assets to conduct resupply operations.

There are approximately 36 usable airfields in Somalia. The airfields in Mogadishu and Kismayo are capable of handling C–141 and smaller aircraft. Baidoa, Bardera, Baledogle, Belet Uen, Hargesia, Garowe, Gardo, and Bossasso all have C–130 capable airfields. The airfield at Galcayo could be upgraded to receive C–130 aircraft with some work. The remainder of the airfields can only support smaller aircraft. Except for Mogadishu, airfield services are non-existent and facilities are limited, even
in Mogadishu, if they exist at all. Air traffic control, for the most part, is only provided by military air traffic controllers at Mogadishu and Kismayo. UNOSOM II is transitioning to civil air traffic controllers in Mogadishu. The process should be completed by early 1994.

Seaports exist at Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo. Mogadishu is the only port that can handle ocean going shipping. The others can handle low draft coastal freighter shipping. Mogadishu is also the only port with an established port authority and supporting infrastructure, although it is limited. Ports at Berbera, Bossasso and Kismayo could be dredged and upgraded in time. The southern ports are hampered by wrecks and obstructions which limit their efficiency.

**DEMOGRAPHICS**

The population of Somalia was estimated at 6.5 million in 1992, with 98.8% being Somali and 1.2% Arab/Asian. Somali is the dominant language with Arabic, Italian, and English spoken by a small percentage of the population. Almost the entire population is Sunni Muslim.

The Somalis have a very homogenous culture. They are bound by a common language, traditions, and the Islamic faith. Despite this apparent commonality, there is no real sense of nationalism. The clan system is the central tenet that binds Somali society together. This is clearly born out by the following Somali proverb.

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Me and Somalia against the world,
Me and my Clan against Somalia,
Me and my family against my Clan,
Me and my Brother against my Family,
Me against my Brother.
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It is against this backdrop that UNOSOM II attempted to fulfill its mandate.

The clan system has existed since the middle ages. There are six major clans in Somalia, with numerous sub-clans. The major clan families include: the Hawiye, Ishaak, Darod, Raharwein, Dir, and Digil. The clan structure emphasizes loyalty to, and from, its members. Constant fighting over political and ethnic differences has been the hallmark of Somali society. But, when threatened, Somalis will band together against the common enemy, much like the Somali Proverb says above. As a result, coalitions and alliances were very fragile and no one was ever politically neutral. The U.S. Army Restore Hope Soldier Handbook highlighted two key points that soldiers going to Somalia had to remember. The first point was that “Somalis did not need to take direct responsibility for their own actions, nor were they responsible in any moral sense for the well-being of those not bound to them by kinship ties.” Secondly, “political neutrality was not part of the Somali world view.” Both points were clearly born out in the UNOSOM II experience. Labor disputes, clan violence, protests and refusal of various clans and sub-clans to work with UNOSOM II punctuated efforts by the international community to remain neutral and impartially serve the Somali people.

**ECONOMY**

Somalia was one of the world’s least developed countries. In more peaceful times, agriculture was the most important sector of the economy. Livestock accounted for almost 40% of the GNP and about 65% of export earnings. Almost 50% of the population were Nomads who depend on livestock for their livelihood. Nomadic clan families viewed themselves as the true Somalis and hence believed they had a higher status in Somali society. Crop production generated only 10% of the GNP and employed about 20% of the work force. The main export crop was bananas. Sugar, sorghum, and corn were grown for the domestic market. The small industrial sector was based primarily on processing agricultural products.
Since the start of the civil war in 1988, commercial agriculture and a viable economic system had been virtually non-existent. The limited industrial base and food distribution system, as well as much of the infrastructure, had been destroyed when U.S. forces were deployed in December 1992. UNOSOM II undertook the arduous task of restoring Somalia’s economic system. From its arrival, UNOSOM II had provided the security and assistance necessary for some economic life to return to Somalia. Farming and livestock raising had begun by the summer of 1993. In August/September 1993, farmers from Afgoye brought their surplus to Mogadishu for sale in the markets, the first time in over two years. While great strides had been made, there continued to be much more to do. The single largest challenge seemed to be the need to provide jobs to displaced people and to an armed, idle society. There were never enough work alternatives for bandits and idle militiamen.

Military Environment

Although initially a U.S. dominated effort, the UNITAF intervention transformed into a multinational force consisting of troops from twenty-one nations and a total troop strength of approximately 37,000. It experienced armed conflict with militia or bandits throughout its existence. On 9 December 1992, the first UNITAF troops came ashore in Somalia. While initially accepted by the local population, there were incidents of armed conflict between UNITAF and suspected militia/bandits within 24 hours of UNITAF forces arriving in Mogadishu. Similar incidents continued through the remaining days of the month. The intensity of the incidents ranged from sniping at patrols to deliberate attacks.

UNITAF’s initial mission in Somalia was to maintain an effective military presence in its area of responsibility (predominantly southern and south-central regions of Somalia) and to provide much needed security for humanitarian relief operations. However, “providing security” was a relative term, allowing UNITAF to undertake a range of actions designed to limit the power of factional militia leaders (warlords). The UNITAF charter did not include the disarmament of Somali antagonists. In short, while sanctioned under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, UNITAF did not perceive its mandate to include disarming militia, unless the action directly assisted in the restoration of humanitarian relief. This critical provision of policy guidance was clearly stated by Commander, UNITAF as early as 13 December, and was confirmed by the United States government on 15 December 1993. It is one of the most important distinctions between military operations conducted under UNITAF and those conducted by UNOSOM II Force Command in the months to follow.

Attacks on relief convoys decreased dramatically as UNITAF forces completed the expansion into areas such as Baidoa, Bardera, Kismayo, and Belet Uen. However, January brought continued clashes between UNITAF and the warlords. These confrontations occurred for several reasons. First, UNITAF indicated the intention to begin to confiscate weapons. This represented a direct threat to factional militia, as well as those individuals who had previously been earning their livelihood by providing “technical” services (security) to relief organizations. Second, UNITAF began expanding into the interior of Somalia, which had previously been considered a redoubt of the warlords’ militia. This restricted the freedom of maneuver of factional militia and bandits. Larger scale military operations were also initiated in the Mogadishu area by UNITAF troops. One operation, conducted on 7 January, was directed at a USC/SNA weapons site located in northwestern Mogadishu. The following day, UNITAF conducted weapons sweeps into the Bakara Market.

While continuing to pursue weapons confiscation, ostensibly to protect humanitarian relief operations, UNITAF (in line with its more restricted mandate) conducted limited disarmament operations. For example, the Canadian Airborne Brigade declared Belet Uen “pacified” in April 1993. This pacification was accomplished by forcing the withdrawal of militia and bandit elements rather than by disarming them which, it was felt, could lead to a power vacuum in the region. While this approach lessened the probability of interclan fighting resulting from an imbalance in power, it also failed to eliminate weapons available for future use against UNITAF and, ultimately, UNOSOM II forces.
Concurrent with increased military operations, Somali warlords attempted to reach agreements on disarmament and national reconciliation at discussions in Ethiopia. UNITAF announced on 9 January that it was well ahead of schedule and hoped to turn over the mission to the UN within weeks. This assessment was contested by UN officials in New York who intimated that the turnover process might take up to six months. In fact, clashes between UNITAF and militia elements continued through January, expanding into other critical areas such as Baidoa and Kismayo. UNITAF continued to increase weapons searches with sweeps into Afgoye, Jowhar, Mogadishu and Kismayo.

During the first sixty days after the start of the intervention, UNITAF sharply reduced hostile attacks against humanitarian relief agencies and convoys. Tangible evidence existed that massive starvation was over; the death rate fell to one-third of the pre-December figures. However, as February approached, banditry against civilians increased; inter-clan and factional conflict continued in the interior; and political pressure increased for UNITAF to turn over the Somalia mission to UN forces. As the UNITAF operation began its third month, the commander assessed “...all areas [were] stable or relatively stable.” On 22 February 93, LtGen Bir, the designated UNOSOM II Force Commander, arrived in Mogadishu to begin the transition process.

**Political Environment**

The political arm of the United Nations in Somalia remained active during the UNITAF period. Its main focus was to establish the conditions for a smooth transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It was hoped that this could be accomplished without detracting from the imperative of national reconciliation. In passing UNSCR 794, UN officials attempted to take the lead in reestablishing a rudimentary level of societal infrastructure concurrent with controlling widespread banditry and clan violence.

Throughout the period of December 1992 through February 1993, political officials in New York and Mogadishu promoted regional initiatives aimed at advancing national reconciliation and attempted to marginalize those who influenced the population through intimidation, violence, and force of arms. It was believed that in order to reestablish order throughout Somalia, a more aggressive approach to UN military operations might be required. While this was theoretically the most practical approach to the problems of weapons proliferation and clan/factional violence, it proved difficult to implement in concert with parallel political planning.

An example of this can be found in the Addis Ababa conferences of 4–15 January 1993. The political branches of the UN and UNOSOM I, assisted by military representatives of UNITAF, arranged for an informal meeting of fourteen Somali factions, eleven of these were also referred to as the “warring” factions. The factions reached agreements on cease-fire and modalities for disarmament, convening a national reconciliation conference at Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993, and establishing an ad hoc committee to determine criteria for participation at, and agenda for, the national reconciliation conference. While these political advances were noteworthy, and partially resulted from UNITAF success in December and early January, they were not indicative of any shift in the positions of the Somali warlords. A review of the number and frequency of clashes, which continued to occur between UNITAF and factional militia or bandits during this time period, is evidence of this continued entrenchment.

The talks in Ethiopia had an even more significant impact in the UN operation in Somalia. The Addis Ababa conferences established a political agenda for UNOSOM II which readily exceeded the military capabilities of the force already on the ground (UNITAF) to support. Specifically, the meeting of the factions on 15 January resulted in a deadline for disarmament by 1 March 1993. The participants called for the handover of all heavy weaponry to a cease-fire monitoring group for safekeeping until such time as a legitimate Somali government could take them. It further required simultaneous encampments of militia throughout Somalia, supported by the international community. Other armed elements (bandits, etc.) were to be disarmed immediately. Using the initial UNITAF disarmament concept, UNOSOM II would
have had to simultaneously secure all weapons and militia encampments. This would have required Force Command to have troop concentrations throughout Somalia immediately upon its assumption of theater responsibility. This was a capability it did not possess.

**Humanitarian Environment**

The international community’s intense interest in the Somalia situation resulted in a rejuvenation of the humanitarian relief operation severely curtailed by banditry and factional militia conflict. During UNITAF, up to 52 various agencies were involved in providing emergency relief, or were involved in organizing humanitarian relief. The consensus worldwide was that the operations conducted by UNITAF to secure its area of responsibility in Somalia resulted in an improved ability of NGOs and UN relief agencies to deliver much needed supplies. However, there was also a predominant feeling that, while initial efforts to reverse clan and factional violence were effective, events in January and February indicated that the level of tension remained high in certain critical relief areas within the UNITAF area of responsibility. This is evidenced by attacks on UN relief workers in Kismayo and Mogadishu.

To help the Somalis rebuild their society and rehabilitate their national infrastructure, the UN with the active participation of Somalis, UN agencies, ICRC, and NGOs put together a new Relief and Rehabilitation Program for Somalia. At the Conference for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia from 11–13 March 1993 in Addis Ababa, the program was adopted. It included activities in 10 priority areas: reestablishment of local administration; reestablishment of national and local police forces; support services for women; development of a food security system; establishment of a basic health care system; increasing the availability of potable water and sanitation; expansion of agriculture and enhancement of livestock; work opportunities for the unemployed; reestablishment of primary education and vocational training; and return of some 300,000 refugees and over 1 million displaced persons. Donor nations pledged over $130 million towards the program that was estimated to cost $166.5 million from March through December 1993. It was anticipated that additional resources would be forthcoming as the implementation of various projects gained momentum. However, the fiscal reality (limitations) soon experienced after transition would be a major concern for UNOSOM II throughout the remainder of the year.

Facilitating the voluntary return of refugees, and implementing a jobs program for the general Somali population were daunting challenges for UNOSOM II. In December and January 1993, there were already incidents of “spontaneous relocation.” These uncontrolled movements by large numbers of Somalis placed relief operations, security operations, and the Somalis’ individual safety at risk. Spontaneous movement tended to destabilize regional political balance that renewed factional fighting. Any increase in clan or faction tension could, and normally would, limit the activities of relief agencies in that area. The jobs program to reintroduce thousands of armed militia, gangs, and “technical security” crews to normal and legal lifestyles, as well as to employ the Somali population in general required tremendous investment. Some thought was given to developing large-scale programs that benefited the greatest number of people as opposed to focusing on specific segments of the population.

The reestablishment of national and regional institutions was another major challenge for the humanitarian division. Emphasis was placed on incorporating into the planning process Somali “institutional memory” (former civil servants and local leaders). The thinking was that this could accelerate the organizational process of societal infrastructure. The reestablishment of the country’s education system that had almost completely collapsed was also a concern. Most agencies thought that achieving progress in the educational system would help eliminate the violence resulting from gangs and banditry.

As the time approached for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the Relief and Rehabilitation program received greater attention. This document was significant in that it projected a plan of action for
the remainder of the year and addressed most areas of the country. However, the plan did not reflect an understanding of the factors that were limiting the military and political components of UNOSOM II. Specifically, it did not reflect the decreased operational tempo in southern Somalia that could occur upon changeover from UNITAF. Furthermore, the plan did not address the time required to raise and deploy sufficient resources (dollars) and troops throughout the areas of Somalia where the humanitarian division expected to operate.
CHAPTER II

KEY PLAYERS

GENERAL

This section identifies the key players (UNITAF, UNOSOM II, major Somali clans, and political factions) affecting UNOSOM II operations in Somalia. It includes a discussion of their organizations, capabilities, limitations, and objectives. Also addressed are those individuals who, through personal charisma or power, had a significant impact on events in Somalia.

UNITED NATIONS FORCES

UNITAF and UNOSOM II Force Command were the controlling headquarters for United Nations forces committed in Somalia. UNITAF, which served in Somalia from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993, was a twenty-one nation coalition consisting of approximately 37,000 soldiers. UNOSOM II Force Command relieved UNITAF on 4 May 1993 with approximately 17,000 soldiers and grew to a peak strength of 29,732 soldiers by mid November 1993. UNOSOM II was supported by a U.S. Joint Task Force, consisting of approximately 17,000 soldiers, sailors and marines from mid October 1993 through mid December, when the U.S. began its withdrawal from the Somalia theater of operations.

UNITAF

UNITAF was a U.S. led coalition consisting of a U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF) made up of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, and forces from nineteen (19) other nations. The countries contributing forces to UNITAF included: Australia, Botswana, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Zimbabwe. The United States comprised the bulk of the forces (21,000 of UNITAF’s 37,000 man force) and provided a homogenous U.S. headquarters staff for UNITAF.

UNITAF possessed very potent command and control, communications, operations, and logistics capabilities. The U.S. Joint Task Force staff, under LtGen Johnston, served as the theater level headquarters for the conduct of UNITAF operations in Somalia. From UNOSOM’s perspective, this homogenous staff, with common doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and staff training enabled the UNITAF staff to operate with great efficiency. U.S. communications equipment and supporting national systems provided by other coalition forces linked UNITAF to the outlying Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSs). The U.S. Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) system provided the backbone for the UNITAF communications system. The UNITAF command, control and communications system was further enhanced by the composition of forces in the HRSs. With the exception of Morocco, the forces operating in the nine HRSs were either U.S. forces or nations with whom U.S. forces have long been allied with in NATO. The only HRS not occupied by a homogenous force was Mogadishu, where a U.S. Marine headquarters had operational control of a number of small coalition units. As a result, a standard of uniformity existed throughout most of the UNITAF area of responsibility with respect to the conduct of military operations.

Logistics support was a national responsibility. National contingent forces which were equipped and manned to sustain themselves with level II logistics (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Morocco, and the United States) deployed into the eight HRSs outside of Mogadishu. Those not equipped or manned to sustain themselves over great distances were deployed in Mogadishu where transportation and storage support requirements were not as demanding. This, combined with the intra-theater airlift capability of UNITAF forces, provided a very robust logistics capability.
The combat and construction engineer forces available to UNITAF further enhanced its logistics support capability. Belgium, France, Canada, Italy and the United States deployed forces to Somalia with organic engineer units. The United States, with a U.S. engineer brigade, provided the bulk of the engineer capability. Given this construction engineer force, UNITAF was capable of repairing, upgrading and maintaining the main supply routes, air and sea ports necessary to sustain operations in Southern Somalia. Due to the tactical situation throughout the UNITAF period, minimal engineer effort was dedicated to force protection measures.

UNOSOM II

At its peak in mid November 1993, UNOSOM II was a coalition force consisting of 29,732 soldiers from twenty-nine nations. The nations making up the coalition consisted of Australia (staff only), Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada (staff only), Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand (staff only), Nigeria, Norway (HQ support only), Pakistan, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Turkey, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, the United States, and Zimbabwe. The largest force contributors were India (approx 5000), Pakistan (approx 4500), the United States (approx 4200, 1100 of which made up the QRF) and Italy (approx 2600). However, when UNOSOM II assumed control of the Somalia theater of operations on 4 May 1993 it was a coalition of only twenty-one nations with an approximate strength of 16,000 personnel.

The UNOSOM II staff was manned at approximately 25% of its authorized strength of 300 when it assumed control of the Somalia theater of operations. The UNOSOM II staff was comprised of coalition officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers from contributing nations. It was formed from scratch with no SOPs, or organic equipment or supporting infrastructure such as computers, office supplies, or communications systems. The presence of NATO officers from Belgium, Canada, France and Italy on the staff facilitated the introduction of STANAG procedures and formats for orders and staff planning. However, there were many members of the staff who were unfamiliar with the STANAG.
Consequently, UNOSOM II Force Command was required to simultaneously receive and train members of the staff, while planning and conducting tactical operations. Staff officers and clerical staff continued to arrive piecemeal throughout the month of June. The staff in January ’94 was manned at 84% strength, with its officer strength at 98%.

Strategic-level command and control for UNOSOM II extended from the Secretary General through the Special Representative to the Force Commander. UNOSOM II Force Command established operational and tactical control as the working command relationships for forces in Somalia. All national contingents were under the operational control of the Force Commander. He intended to exercise operational control authority of contingent forces through the brigade commanders in each area of responsibility (AOR). In practice, these command relationships and the UNOSOM II command and control structure proved weak.

Some national contingents would simply not serve under the operational control of other contingent commanders. Instead, they would prefer to work “in coordination with” or “in cooperation with” other contingent forces. On numerous occasions, operational and tactical orders issued by the UNOSOM II Force Commander to national contingent commanders would not be acted upon until the contingent commanders acquired the approval of their national governments. In some instances, the Force Commander’s orders were countermanded by national governments. As time progressed, it became readily apparent that contributing nations did not fully understand the mandate of a Chapter VII force and that, in some cases, national objectives were opposed to those of the United Nations.

The command relationship between UNOSOM II and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was prescribed by Commander, U.S. Central Command and outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces in Somalia. The QRF, located in Somalia, was under the operational control (OPCON) of CINCENT. Tactical Control (TACON) of the QRF was delegated to Commander, USFORSOM (Deputy Force Commander) for “normal training exercises within Somalia”, and “in situations within Somalia that

**UNOSOM II Contributing Nations—4 May 1993**

- **21 Nations**
- **16,000 Soldiers**
- **4,309 U.S.**
- **11,691 Coalition**
exceed the capability of UNOSOM II forces and required the emergency employment of immediate combat power for a limited period or show of force operations.” Any tasking for the QRF outside of these guidelines required explicit USCINCCENT approval. The terms of reference provided adequate flexibility for the UNOSOM II Deputy Force Commander to employ the QRF in emergency situations. However, to conduct critical, yet non-emergency, combat operations which exceeded the capability of UNOSOM II forces, the terms of reference proved to be quite inflexible. This was a particular concern when coalition forces were unwilling to act aggressively.

During the months of June, July, and August, the coalition began to lose its will to carry out the necessary offensive actions (i.e., patrols, cordon and searches) to protect the force and maintain a secure environment in Mogadishu. It became increasingly important for the QRF to perform these “routine” type operations in the immediate areas around U.S. bases in order to protect U.S. forces. Coalition forces throughout this period also came to depend on QRF aviation support for operations they did conduct. The situation eventually reached the point where coalition forces in Mogadishu would essentially not conduct operations without QRF aviation support.

These factors combined with rising levels of violence increased the profile and signature of U.S. forces in Somalia. Seeking to maintain a low U.S. profile, military authorities above COMUSFORSOM became more reluctant to approve QRF air operations at the time he believed they were needed to prop up the coalition.

The initial UNOSOM II communications system consisted of a rudimentary telephone system in Mogadishu, and a point to point HF radio net linking the Force Headquarters with outlying AOR Command Centers. Had it not been for the PCM system left in place by the United States, linking the AORs with the Force HQ, command and control of military operations would have been almost impossible. It was months (Jan–Feb 94) before the UN system came on line.
Logistics capability within UNOSOM II was primarily centered in the United Nations Logistics Command (UNLSC). This 3000 man force from the United States provided what amounted to theater level general support logistics and direct support logistics to those contingents which did not have the requisite organic transport, engineer or storage capability. This was particularly true in the case of Class I (rations), water, and Class III (fuel), and construction engineering. Although some national contingents such as Belgium, France, Italy and Morocco were capable of self-sustainment level II logistics, most were not. Consequently, UNLSC supported the bulk of the long haul transportation requirements, much of the local haul requirements, and almost all of the engineer work on the main supply routes. This situation continued until the UNLSC was reinforced by the German Composite Force Somalia (GECOMPFORSOM), the Irish Truck Company, and the Korean Engineer Squadron in early August.

The combination of bad roads, lack of intra-theater airlift, lack of adequate level II logistics units, and lack of adequate numbers of construction engineer units stretched theater logistics to the maximum. Even with the Korean Engineer Squadron and one U.S. engineer Combat Support Element, UNOSOM II could not adequately maintain its main supply routes. Consequently, logistics became a significant limiting factor for UNOSOM II.

The absence of other “combat multipliers” further limited UNOSOM II's operational capability in Somalia. The United States provided intelligence and combat aviation assets (attack helicopters and medium lift helicopters) to support UNOSOM II operations. While the intelligence assets could be adequately tasked to support operations, the use of aviation assets was bound by the terms of reference when it came to non-emergency combat operations. Other combat multipliers such as PSYOP, civil affairs, aviation, and electronic warfare (jamming assets), engineers and logistics units were visibly absent from the force structure of UNOSOM II. Clearly, these assets would have significantly enhanced Force Command’s ability to carry out its mandate.

**Somali Political Factions/Militia**

There are fourteen recognized political factions in Somalia. Of these fourteen factions, eleven were considered to be “warring factions.” These eleven factions possessed the largest militia and were responsible for most, if not all, of the residual violence which existed from 1992 to 1993. Following the Addis Ababa Conferences of January 1993, the most active militia were the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA), United Somali Congress (USC-Mahdi), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Patriotic Movement/Somali National Alliance (SPM-SNA), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM-Gabio), Somali National Front (SNF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM).

**USC/SNA**

The USC/SNA is one of the most powerful factions in Somalia. Situated predominantly in the Central region of Somalia, it retained influence over seventy percent of Mogadishu (concentrated in the southern and western areas of the city). Strength estimates of militia ranged from 5,000 to 10,000 personnel throughout the USC/SNA area of influence (about 1500 in the Mogadishu area). Weapons systems available to the USC/SNA included mortars, recoilless rifles and possibly artillery and armored vehicles. During the initial intervention by international forces under the control of UNITAF, USC/SNA elements may have been involved in hostile fire situations with UNITAF troops. (This is based on the locations of the incidents and the dominance of the faction in the area.)

From March 1993 to May 1993, the USC/SNA did not commit to the agreements of Addis Ababa. Although the USC/SNA agreed to the voluntary cantonment of heavy weapons, it never submitted any figures to either UNITAF or UNOSOM II for verification. As a result of the ambush of UN peacekeepers in Mogadishu on 5 June 1993, the USC/SNA became involved in combat operations against United Nations forces in Somalia. The Habr Gedir Clan is the primary clan aligned with the USC/SNA.
Key figures in the USC/SNA:

— Mohamed Farrah Hassan AIDEED. Aideed is the Chairman of the political arm and certainly served as its sole militia leader. Aideed had directed militia operations since the civil war with Siad Barre. He was considered anti-UN and is an extremely proficient political and media manipulator. He has consistently emphasized the same political agenda since the introduction of UN troops in August 1992. His ultimate goal being to force the withdrawal of UN forces and position himself as the dominant leader in Somalia.

— Oman Hassan Ali ATTO. Atto was considered the second most powerful and influential man in the USC/SNA. He had acted as Aideed’s personal envoy and was considered one of the prime candidates to eventually succeed Aideed in the position of Chairman. A wealthy man, Atto had bankrolled the militia for Aideed for some time. During the period March through May 1993, Atto was believed to be financing militia and bandits in the Kismayo area, where Aideed was attempting to regain lost influence. Following the ambush of the Pakistanis on 5 June 1993, U.S. forces, in support of UNOSOM II Force Command, conducted an attack against Atto’s garage in South Mogadishu. The attack resulted in many secondary explosions and fires, confirming the presence of large quantities of munitions on the property and providing further evidence of Atto’s role as an SNA arms supplier. During a security operation conducted in September 1993, Atto was captured by members of U.S. Task Force Ranger.

**USC (MAHDI)**

USC (MAHDI) controls or influences those areas in Mogadishu not under USC/SNA (Aideed) control (predominantly North Mogadishu). This faction influenced only a small area north of the city. The faction’s militia was approximately the same strength as the USC/SNA (5,000–6,000), however they were not as well equipped. Their ability to field large weapons was limited. USC (Mahdi) predominantly relied on “technicals” versus former Somali Army weapons. It could not be confirmed whether USC (MAHDI) elements had ever been involved in skirmishes with either UNITAF or UNOSOM II forces. The primary clan associated with the USC (MAHDI) is the Abgal.

Key figures in USC (MAHDI):

— ALI MAHDI Mohamed. Ali Mahdi has controlled the USC since the civil war with Siad Barre. Once aligned with Aideed during the civil war, Mahdi split with his former ally upon assuming the position of Interim President after Barre’s defeat. He is a wealthy businessman, who has been known to broker alliances to achieve his own ends. He influenced up to 8000 militia in areas to the north of Mogadishu. Considered pro-UN, he would not support any move which might benefit his rival, Aideed. As such, his cooperation with the UN and coalition members was always qualified.

**SPM/SNA**

The SPM/SNA is a political faction closely aligned with the USC/SNA. Primarily operating in the Lower Juba area in the southern part of Somalia with a strength of approximately 2000, the SPM/SNA had been involved in every major inter-clan/faction conflict occurring in the Kismayo area. During the UNITAF period, the SPM/SNA controlled the town and immediate area around the port city of Kismayo. After the initial Addis Ababa conferences in January 1993, fighting erupted in the Kismayo area between the SPM/SNA and elements associated with SPM (Gabio), led by General Morgan. This fighting continued intermittently until mid-March, when an assault on the town resulted in the SPM/SNA losing its foothold in the Kismayo area and being forced north towards Jilib and the entrance to the Lower Juba River Valley.
On 6 May 1993, the SPM/SNA launched a night attack to dislodge Morgan’s forces from Kismayo and regain control of the town. In the ensuing fight, SPM/SNA militia engaged UNOSOM forces (Belgian Para battalion) on the outskirts of the town. The militia were quickly defeated. Two Belgian soldiers were wounded in the fight and an estimated forty Somali casualties resulted from the encounter. The SPM/SNA also conducted supporting operations for the USC/SNA subsequent to 5 June 1993. There was evidence that elements of SPM/SNA militia had moved north in support of combat operations in Southern Mogadishu. The primary clan aligned with the SPM/SNA is the Ogadeni subclan of the Darod.

Key figures in the SPM/SNA:

— Ahmed OMAR JESS. Omar Jess served as the field commander of the SPM/SNA and the Chairman of the political arm of the faction. He suffered a major setback when the SPM/SNA lost control of Kismayo to his long-time rival Morgan. Jess had been considered anti-UNOSOM II and remained a destabilizing influence in the Lower Juba area. Jess also openly supported Aideed during combat operations in Mogadishu in the June to October 1993 timeframe.

SSDF

The SSDF is the second largest political faction in Somalia. Operating primarily in the northeastern region of Somalia, the SSDF maintained a strength of approximately of 2,000 to 5,000 militia. These were split among three groups: one led by Abdullahi Yusuf; one led by Mohamed Abshir; and one pro-Islamic fundamentalist.

The SSDF had been successful in maintaining a semblance of order in the northeastern area, as well as maintaining ties with the southern areas around Kismayo and the Lower Juba. This area holds historic relevance to the primary clan associated with the SSDF, the Majertain. Despite being able to place together a loose regional administration, internal conflicts of the organization (generally between Abshir and Yusuf) precluded the SSDF from more aggressively pursuing their program of national reconciliation between clans/factions. One notable exception was the SSDF attempt to “voluntarily” disarm its militia. Following the outbreak of combat operations in Mogadishu between UN forces and the USC/SNA, the SSDF leadership (principally, Yusuf) approached the UN leadership in Mogadishu and offered to “immediately and completely disarm.” During the period of June through October 1993, the SSDF established weapons concentration sites in Gardo, Garowe, and Galcayo where the UN had verification access. Unfortunately, the concentration plan had only qualified backing within the SSDF and apparently was not supported by local clan and village leaders. By early November, reconnaissance indicated that most concentration sites were being disestablished and systems were being redeployed.

The SSDF maintains its commitment to disarmament and the desire for national reconciliation is strong. But, the SSDF (and the northeast region) continues to view the USC/SNA, the SNM in Somaliland and the Islamic fundamentalists as a major threat.

Key figures in the SSDF:

— Abdullahi YUSUF. Yusuf is considered an experienced, but sometimes brutal field commander. One of the original founders of the SSDF, Yusuf had been extensively trained in Italy and the former Soviet Union (Frunze Military Academy). A commander in the Ogadeni war with Ethiopia, Yusuf led an aborted coup against Siad Barre after Somalia lost the war. He escaped to Ethiopia where he helped found the SSDF. After returning from Ethiopia, he found the SSDF under the leadership of Abshir Musse. Since that time they have split power within the faction.

Yusuf is adept at making political accommodation, only to break his word when it benefits him. An example of this is the reported treaty with Aideed in June 1993. After the outbreak of hostilities with the
UN, Yusuf contacted the UN and offered to disarm his militia. Although he directed actions which indicated cooperation with UN officials, only minimal disarmament has been accomplished.

— Mohamed Abshir Musse. Abshir is the former Somali Police Commissioner appointed at the time of Somali independence in 1960. Following Siad Barre’s coup in 1969, he was arrested and imprisoned until the mid-70’s. After his release, he remained under house arrest until Barre’s overthrow. He assumed the leadership of the SSDF after Yusuf was imprisoned in Ethiopia. He is considered a moderate, and pro-UN. Abshir is reportedly honest and incorruptible.

**SPM (GABIO)**

SPM (GABIO) is one of three splinter groups which comprise SPM. Primarily located in the southern areas of Somalia, SPM is affiliated with the former government of Siad Barre. Notably, its leadership includes Mohamed Siad Hersi “Morgan,” the former dictator’s son-in-law. SPM (GABIO) activities appeared to concentrate around Kismayo, and were primarily oriented on maintaining control of the Lower Juba’s critical economic infrastructure. SPM (GABIO), through the activities of Morgan, did not appear directed against UNOSOM II. However, the militia actions seemed to be an attempt to leverage UN force disposition and policy. Primarily Ogadeni in make-up, SPM (GABIO) was a threat to regional stability in the south.

Key figures in SPM (GABIO) include:

— Mohamed Siad Hersi “Morgan.” Morgan is a charismatic leader of the SPM who is an arch-rival of the other SPM principal military leader, Omar Jess. Having held major command in the former Somali National Army, Morgan is most remembered for his infamous assault on Hargeisa in the 80’s. Pro-western in personal and professional style, Morgan attempted to leverage UN troops and to position forces in the southern regions to benefit his faction. In early 1993, Morgan conducted assaults against Jess’s positions in Kismayo, ultimately forcing Jess to evacuate to the Jilib area. During combat operations in Mogadishu between USC/SNA and UNOSOM II, Morgan made limited forays into Jilib and the Lower Juba Valley to consolidate his position in Kismayo.

**SNF**

The SNF is primarily made up of former members of the Barre Somali National Army. Operating in the vicinity of the Ethiopian and Kenyan border areas, the SNF’s desire to return Siad Barre to power has resulted in continued conflict with USC, SPM and SDM militia. However its geographic disposition in the Central region (buffered between the USC/SNA and SSDF) has allowed it to survive as a result of the ongoing conflict between the SSDF and USC/SNA. The SNF has the largest concentration of conventionally trained militia. Principally Marehan in makeup, the SNF militia approached 2000 personnel.

Key figures in the SNF:

— Ahmed WARSAME Mohamed HASHI. Hashi is an experienced military commander who has received training in Egypt and the former Soviet Union. A member of the Marehan (Barre’s sub-clan) he fought for Barre in the battle for Mogadishu. In late June 1993, he offered to turn his weapons cantonment site at Balem Balle over to UN control. This followed the UN’s seizure and destruction of the USC/SNA’s concentrated weapons in Belet Uen on 16 June 1993. While this disarmament effort was apparently an attempt to attract UN forces and dollars into the border areas of the SNF (thereby guaranteeing the SNF position in future reconciliation meetings), it caused some internal problems for Hashi with other Marehan who felt more vulnerable to clan/faction attack.
The SNM controls the northwestern areas of Somalia, and have declared themselves an independent country. One of the first factions to form and fight against Siad Barre, the SNM has consistently avoided any position which might be perceived as cooperating with the UN mandate for political reconciliation in Somalia. Considered one of the more heavily armed factions, the SNM political hierarchy does not exercise central control over the militia. As a result, banditry, and outright militia intimidation of NGOs has continued to occur. SNM is made up of predominantly Issaq clan members. It may number somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000 to 15,000 fighters.
CHAPTER III

TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM

GENERAL

The transition between the U.S.-led UNITAF and UNOSOM II began with the arrival of the Force Commander (FC), LT GEN Cevik Bir, and the Deputy Force Commander (DFC), MG Thomas Montgomery, on 22 February 1993. This period and the transfer of command proved to be quite tense and frustrating for the UNITAF staff, which believed its mission complete in January 1993. Despite the last minute efforts of the United Nations to extend the transition period, the transfer of command occurred on 4 May 1993. And, by 7 June, the last of the UNITAF coalition forces departed the theater.

The intent of both the Commander, UNITAF, and the Commander UNOSOM II, was to a “seamless transition”, which was event as opposed to time driven. Despite this, UNITAF planners established “not later than” dates for transfer of functional responsibilities and focused on a 1 May date to complete the transition. The relative insecurity of Somalia became readily apparent to the UNOSOM II Force Commander within 48 hours of his arrival. Street riots in Mogadishu and reports of inter-clan fighting in Kismayo made the complexity of his task crystal clear. These events prompted LT GEN Bir to identify four “cornerstones” or conditions which needed to be met for the transition to occur. First, UNOSOM II needed an effective operational command and control system, capable of responding to a crisis. This included: the transfer of HRS Marka and Mogadishu to an operationally ready Pakistani Brigade; the formation and relocation of the U.S. Quick Reaction Force, and the existence of a UNOSOM II headquarters staff capable of 24 hour operations. Next, it needed the minimum intelligence capabilities to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence. Third, UNOSOM required an effective logistics support system. And, finally, UNOSOM needed to have a medevac system capable of reaching its far-flung outposts. These conditions were described to the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), Admiral Howe, in a communication on 18 April 1993. They became the yardstick which the FC and United Nations used to gauge when the time was right for transition. The conditions for intelligence, logistics and medevac proved quite easy to meet. The Intelligence Support Element (ISE), Logistics Support Command (LSC), and the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) which made up U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) provided the forces capable to meet those conditions. Establishing an effective coalition command and control system proved to be quite difficult and was the source of most of the frustrations experienced by the UNITAF staff.

TRANSITION PLAN

The transition plan was developed by the UNITAF staff. According to UNITAF’s draft after action report on the transition, it was driven by four key principles. First, the transition should be done by function. Next, “not later than” dates (keyed to major events) were set to complete transitions with the UNOSOM staff. Third, staffs should try to complete transitions earlier than scheduled if possible. Finally, capabilities would be retained until replaced.

The transition plan envisioned three phases. During Phase I, UNOSOM forces assumed responsibility for UNITAF Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS). Belgium, Moroccan, and Australian forces (UNITAF coalition forces remaining after the U.S. JTF’s departure) secured Kismayo, Baledogle, and Baidoa. This enabled the JTF to draw down to two heavy brigades. Phase II centered on the arrival of the UNOSOM II staff and initial transfer of command and control responsibilities for all coalition forces. In addition, the Pakistani Brigade arrived, enabling the JTF to further draw down U.S. forces in Somalia. The end state for this phase envisioned a JTF with two light brigades, and UNOSOM II assuming command and control of the HRS. The third and final phase focused on complete transfer of all responsibil-
ities to UNOSOM II, withdrawal of all U.S. forces except those committed to UNOSOM, and the official change of command.

TRANSITION

Transfer of intelligence, logistics, communications, medical, and engineer functions went reasonably well. This was due in large part to the fact that these functions were transferred in large part to U.S. forces remaining in Somalia as part of USFORSOM. In addition, key positions on the UNOSOM II staff in these functional areas were held by U.S. officers. The deputy chiefs of logistics, communications and intelligence were U.S. officers. Key positions within these sections were also held by U.S. officers. The chief medical officer was also a U.S. officer. In the area of operations and command and control it was quite a different story. Outgoing UNITAF units in the HRS were being replaced by less capable units pledged by contributing nations. Although the Chief Operations Officer, head of the Disarmament and Ceasefire Division and two key positions in the plans shop were held by U.S. officers, the bulk of the operations staff were coalition officers. These two factors made the transition of the critical operations, and command and control functions quite difficult.

Transfer of the intelligence function went reasonably well. The CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) was organized, formed and trained at CENTCOM thirty days prior to deployment. Arriving in Somalia three weeks before turnover, the CISE had time to set up and become familiar with the area of operation. In addition, UNITAF left a small transition element behind for a few days of additional overlap. On the surface the transition was relatively smooth. However, an intelligence vacuum existed at transition. This was due in large part to the significant reduction in HUMINT collectors (50 under UNITAF J2, 5 under the CISE). This drop in capability was not offset by the coalition. With 60–80% of the usable intelligence information coming from HUMINT sources, this reduction in collection capability made it difficult for the CISE to identify indications of hostile intent among the factions.

The logistics transfer began in mid-December 1992, with the formation of JTF SUPCOM. The functions were transferred from the U.S. Marine Corp Force Service Support Group to the JTF SUPCOM, an Army force. Key functions transferred included: operation of the air and sea port in Mogadishu, line haul transportation, movements control, material management, fuel and water supply, subsistence maintenance and medical services. Sea port operations and airport operations were transferred on 15 and 24 January respectively, while all other services were transferred on 28 January. JTF SUPCOM drew down concurrent with that of U.S. forces under the JTF until it reached troop levels authorized for the Logistics Support Command (USFORSOM) under UNOSOM II. JTF SUPCOM provided support for both U.S. forces and non-self sustaining UNOSOM forces during the transition. Once the transition was complete, then the redesignated UN Logistics Support Command (UNLSC) was directed to provide logistics support to U.S. and UNOSOM II forces IAW the Terms of Reference until the function could be transferred to coalition logistics units or a civilian contractor.

UNLSC confronted a number of problems immediately following the transition which had both a near and long term effect. During the transition, the United Nations assumed the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract used by UNITAF. This contract did not fund the full range of support and services required to sustain UNOSOM II forces. In addition, the transfer of security requirements for civilian contractor personnel posed a problem, as they demanded U.S. soldiers. These tasks also fell to the Logistics Support Command. The contract was not expanded by UNNY until the President announced his intent to withdraw U.S. forces by 31 March 1994.

UNOSOM’s logistics problems were further expanded when contributing nations did not adhere to the UN’s “Guidelines to Governments Contributing Troops for UN Operations in Somalia”. Forces arriving in theater were not equipped or staffed for the mission in Somalia. Most arrived without suitable transport or the requisite level II logistics capability. As a result, UNLSC assumed both a theater level
general support and direct support mission. This, along with the UN’s failure to recruit logistics units, made it virtually impossible for UNLSC to draw down as intended. The initial difficulties confronting UNLSC in the days immediately following the departure of UNITAF were further complicated by the replacement of the 593rd Transportation Battalion with a unit manned at ALO 3. This placed a severe strain on the already fragile UNOSOM II logistics system, as a large portion of the truck fleet was parked in the motor pool without drivers.

The transition and draw down of U.S. communications began in late January/early February. The transition from Marine and the Joint Communications Support Element (JOSE) to U.S. Army signal units was completed by February. The intent from this point was to reduce U.S. communications systems in theater as UN systems were put in place. The transition from reliance on U.S. communications systems to a UNOSOM system was plagued by the UN's lack of organic communications systems readily available to UN forces and a complex contracting and procurement system. These factors delayed the draw down of U.S. communications systems until February/March 1994. As a result, U.S. signal units operated and maintained the primary long-haul command and control communications system for UNOSOM II from March 1993 through January 1994.

The communications transition plan was broken down into four phases. During the first phase (March through 4 May 1993), UNOSOM II relied on existing U.S. communications systems already in place. The United Nations was to procure and ship replacement satellite communications systems to Somalia. The primary means of command and control was the U.S. Multichannel System. A UNOSOM II High Frequency (HF) Radio System served as a backup. In May, the MICOM I HF radio system was added for redundancy and its reliability. In the second phase (4 May through 1 September), the UNOSOM II INTELSAT system was to be installed. During this phase, the U.S. multichannel system and the UNOSOM II system were to be integrated. As INTELSAT systems were installed and became operational, U.S. systems were to be withdrawn. However, delays in the acquisition and installation of the INTELSAT system forced the extension of this phase into December 1993. The final phase was to begin in September. The UNOSOM II communications system would be used exclusively. Initially pushed back till December, this phase was further delayed by contracting difficulties. As of the end of January beginning of February 1994 the UNOSOM system had not been fully installed.

Medical services were easily transitioned. The intended medical end state was a residual U.S. hospital and medevac assets capable of supporting USFORSOM elements remaining in theater after UNITAF's redeployment. Coalition Level III medical support was provided by the Swedish Hospital. The U.S. hospital could be used for coalition soldiers in emergency situations. The UNOSOM medical officer coordinated and ran mass casualty exercises involving both U.S. and coalition medical assets to establish standard procedures in the event of an emergency. The United Nations had no aero-medevac capability in theater. Consequently, aero-medevac assets attached to the QRF and French medevac assets were used in emergencies.

The engineer force end state for transition proved inadequate to support further operations in Somalia beyond UNITAF. Despite a study published by the JTF SUPCOM engineer staff identifying a 4 to 5 combat engineer battalion requirement to support UNOSOM operations, only a Combat Support Engineer (CSE) Company was left. UNITAF apparently defined the engineer work end state as: MSRs constructed to two-lane, fair weather minimum standard roads; coalition base camp vertical construction complete to minimum standard; approved civic action projects complete; Class IV materials purchased on the ground in theater; AM-2 matting accounted for and transferred to SUPCOM; and the SUPCOM engineer section properly staffed. At the time of transition, UNOSOM II did not have the engineer capability in theater to maintain the existing MSRs and airfields, let alone construct new ones as the force expanded into other areas in Somalia. In addition, there was no contributing nation willing to provide engineer forces to UNOSOM II. The U.S. CSE Company was the single force capable of maintaining MSRs and airfields. Its assets were clearly stretched to the maximum extent as requirements for force
protection and new road construction were added to its mission list in June and July. Relief did not come until the Korean Engineer Squadron arrived in August 1993. Even then the engineer capability in theater was woefully inadequate. The UNITAF Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract which UNOSOM II assumed did not include any engineer services beyond limited well drilling and electrical wiring. This severely limits UNOSOM II's ability to adequately maintain the roads and airfields needed to sustain the force, let alone go elsewhere in Somalia.

The transition of operations and command and control proved to be the most frustrating and difficult. Unlike other functional areas, there was no U.S. unit remaining in theater after UNITAF to assume the operations and command and control functions. This transition had to occur between the existing UNITAF operations staff and the UNOSOM II operations staff made up primarily of coalition officers.

The UNITAF transition plan outlined a procedure reflecting a typical U.S. relief in place operation for transferring the operations and command and control functions. Such procedures proved to be inappropriate for the transfer of responsibility from the fully U.S. manned UNITAF staff to an international UNOSOM II staff, primarily manned by coalition officers. The complications with such a transition, resulting from differences in training and staff procedures, were significantly more prevalent. This was due in large part to the fact that relatively few of the coalition staff officers had NATO or other experience working with U.S. forces. As a result, common inter-operability procedures and agreements such as those found in the STANAG could not adequately bridge the gap.

The transition and staff “twining” process sought by both staffs was further complicated by the piecemeal arrival of the UNOSOM II staff, and the lack of organic equipment and office supplies. The delay of both the UNOSOM II staff and equipment can be attributed to a number of factors. The most significant were the process used by the United Nations to build its military contingent, and the availability of monies to resource and acquire supplies for the staff. Manning and equipping the UNOSOM II headquarters was completely dependent on the timely passing of a UN resolution which provided both the mandate and authority to expend resources. This did not occur until the Security Council passed Resolution 814 on 26 March 1993. Without the Security Council Resolution, money could not be spent nor a UNOSOM II staff resourced and formed. This delay significantly impeded the deployment of UNOSOM II staff members to Somalia, as well as the acquisition of equipment, office supplies, and contributed to friction between the two staffs over the speed of the transition.

**POLITICAL ISSUES AFFECTING TRANSITION**

The disagreement over disarmament was the most significant factor in the delay in drafting UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 814. The disagreement arose over the difference between the United Nations position on disarmament versus that of the United States. Those close to the situation in Somalia understood that the success of the United Nations in securing a long term peace in Somalia was directly tied to disarming the warlords and political factions. The difference centered on who was to do it. The United States believed this task to be well outside of the humanitarian mandate of UNSCR 794, and the task of UNOSOM II. The United Nations, on the other hand, viewed it as a key task to be performed under UNITAF, clearly the more capable of the two forces. The Secretary General had made this point as early as 19 December 1992 in his report to the Security Council. According to a 21 February 1993 report from the UN Representative to Somalia, Ismat Kittani, the Secretary General also made this same point clear in correspondence with President Bush, saying:

"The first condition is that the Unified Task Force should take effective action to ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control. And that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed before the Unified Task Force withdraws."
According to Kittani, this task had yet not been accomplished, and if no other action was taken would be left to UNOSOM II. Despite the sentiments of the Secretary General, the United States held to its position that disarmament was beyond the scope of the humanitarian mission under UNSCR 794. The broad mission statement assigned to UNITAF in the resolution to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations” clearly left the point open to interpretation. This ambiguity was cleared up in UNSCR 814, which outlined in more detail the mission and tasks of UNOSOM II, to include disarmament.

When UNSCR 814 was passed on 26 March 1993, it put the disarmament issue to rest. However the delay in passing it prevented funding and ultimately the timely formal requests to contributing nations for officers and soldiers to staff the Force Headquarters. As a result, when UNOSOM II assumed control of the theater on 4 May the staff stood at 22%, there was little headquarters infrastructure, and command and control was exercised via an immature communications system. These factors raised serious concerns in the United Nations regarding UNOSOM II’s ability to assume control of the theater. In addition, in April the United Nations also became concerned about UNOSOM II’s capability to provide sufficient troops to occupy the UNITAF AOR. The scheduled departure of the Australian and Canadian Battalions in May and early June, and the delay in the arrival of the Indian Brigade, prompted the UNOSOM II Force Commander to state that he needed three combat battalions in theater by 15 May to fill the gap. These concerns were clearly articulated in a joint SECDEF/U.S. UN MISSION, New York message on 28 April discussing the Secretary General’s reservations regarding the May transition.

“Some of these dealt with the continuing need for logistic, engineering and chopper support. More serious was the fact that UNOSOM II would at best be in a position to cover only the former UNITAF Area of Operations, just 40% of the country, In addition, its capacity to cover this area might well be much weaker than UNITAF’s if suitable replacements were not found for the departing Australian and Canadian Battalions.”

The SRSG, Admiral Howe, had similar reservations. He was concerned that UNOSOM II would be more thinly spread on the ground than UNITAF, at the time when the warlords would most likely try to test it. The UNOSOM II force strength at the time stood at over 16,000. The Zimbabwe Battalion and Indian Brigade had not arrived, and would not until the end of June and September respectively. As a result, UNOSOM II assumed risk in Mogadishu at the end of May in order to replace departing Australian and Canadian Forces. The repositioning of the Nigerian Battalion and the reinforced Zimbabwe Company from Mogadishu to these sectors left the Pakistani Brigade to cover South Mogadishu with only three Battalions instead of the almost five which had previously done the job.

These concerns prompted the UN to request that U.S. delay withdrawal of its troops for a month. The U.S. did not support the UN request to extend transition beyond 4 May, and advised the U.S. Mission to the UN in a 29 April message. The primary reasons given for refusing the extension were:

(1) the public had been advised of the 4 May date, and any delay would lead to a loss in UNOSOM II’s credibility;

(2) the bulk of the U.S. combat forces had already been withdrawn, and could offer little additional combat capability;

(3) the over 16,000 coalition troops, along with the U.S. QRF and LSC were adequate for the job;

(4) the UNITAF mission was already done;
While not supporting the extension of UNITAF, the U.S. was committed to UNOSOM II’s success. In the same message advising the U.S. Mission to the UN of its refusal to accept the extension of UNITAF, the U.S. government offered to favorably consider other forms of support. These included providing; airlift support, Special Operations Force Planners, PSYOP/Civil Affairs personnel and equipment, diplomatic assistance to gain troop contributions, employment of QRF helicopters until moved off shore, contracting assistance, and the support of other U.S. forces located in the region if it became necessary. Over the course of UNOSOM II’s first year, the U.S. was called on to provide assistance in all of these areas, and did.

In retrospect, and from the perspectives of USFORSCOM and from panel discussions during the AAR Committee’s work, it appears that the U.S. policy for Somalia was changed in midstream. When U.S. forces were deployed to Somalia under UNSCR 794 in December 1992, the objective was to establish a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid in order to relieve the starving in Somalia. Once accomplished, U.S. forces would be withdrawn. This objective apparently did not include the intent to assist in nation building nor did it include disarming the warlords and factions. Although the United States voted to approve UNOSOM II’s mandate, it sought to limit its participation to a supporting role. In hindsight, it is questionable whether the objectives were realistic and within the capabilities available to the UN without the U.S. as a leading participant. Although many believed the objectives would be difficult to achieve, most planners felt that the relatively benign environment would continue, and that the UN force would be adequate. But, there was no reassessment of the marginalization policy toward the warlords given the nation building nature of UNOSOM II’s mission. UNSCR 814 tasked UNOSOM II to disarm the factions and clans, but was ambiguous on the issue of coercive disarmament. Throughout most of 1992, United Somali Congress factional leader Mohamed Farah Aideed opposed UN intervention in Somalia. His grudging last-minute “acceptance” of the UNITAF deployment to Somalia was no doubt based on his desire to avoid a confrontation with the potent U.S. force. However, his refusal to share power with others after the overthrow of the dictator Siad Barre was known to be one of the key factors which plunged Somalia into civil war. Aideed and his allies were generally recognized to be a potential risk to UN operations in Somalia. Yet, the UN provided no clear guidance regarding what it wanted done with warlords who directly opposed UN intervention.

UNSCR 814 launched the United Nations on its first Chapter VII intervention in history, and in effect authorized UN forces to undertake combat operations. In addition, this intervention would help to define the role of the UN and world community where conflicts arise within the borders of a nation-state like former Yugoslavia. The success of UNOSOM II was viewed by many to be critical for future UN operations and had far-reaching implications for a greater role for the UN in the post-Cold War Era. For the United States, this could help to redefine its role in international interventions with U.S. combat troops. The success of UNOSOM II could permit the U.S. to provide resources in support of international interventions instead of being the principal or sole contributor of combat forces.

Guidance to the COMUSFORSCOM, the U.S. commander in the field, was to do “whatever was necessary to ensure UN success in its mission,” while reducing the U.S. force signature. This objective was probably only possible in a peaceful environment. During the breathing spell provided by UNITAF’s presence, Somalis began to rebuild their lives. This was done at the expense of the warlords. Eventual violent confrontation with one or more warlords appeared increasingly likely with the departure of UNITAF. However, the accords by factional leaders at Addis Ababa in March 1993, when they agreed to reconciliation and disarmament, and UNITAF’s belief that the greatest threat expected against UNITAF or UNOSOM II at the time of transition consisted of large scale riots in Mogadishu similar to those organized in February, may have led U.S. government policy makers into thinking the new mandate might be achievable in a fairly benign environment.
The transition with UNITAF clearly emphasized the U.S. intent to reduce its profile in Somalia operations. The withdrawal of U.S. forces early in the UN intervention, perhaps at the expense of UN success, was also accomplished in order to prevent the UN from further delaying its assumption of the mission. Therefore, UNOSOM II began to implement the new mandate with political and disarmament measures after 4 May. During the weeks that followed, the anti-U.S. and anti-UN radio and leaflet campaign reached a fever pitch in Mogadishu. When UN peacekeepers were ambushed on 5 June, everyone was caught by surprise.

**SUMMARY**

Although the United States voted to approve UNOSOM II’s mandate, it was not fully confident that the objectives in UNSCR 814 were realistic and within the capabilities of the UN. The UN was expected to be able to obtain and tailor forces for this enhanced mission. However, some policy makers probably believed that a relatively benign environment would continue to exist, thereby creating a chance for success.

The concept outlined in the UNITAF transition plan was to draw down U.S. forces commensurate with the buildup of UNOSOM II forces. The objective was to ensure a seamless transition and prevent a significant loss in capability. Delays in the arrival of troops pledged by contributing nations, and the planned and executed departure of U.S. troops by early May created a significant underlap. As a result, UNOSOM II assumed control of the theater on 4 May with only 18,000 troops and an under strength staff. This forced UNOSOM II to assume military risks in Mogadishu in order to maintain security throughout the entire UNITAF AOR. This fact was clearly stated in a 28 April joint message released from SECDEF and the U.S.-UN MISSION in New York. This message highlighted both the UN Secretary General’s and the SRSG’s concerns regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops. But, by this time it was apparently too late. Clearly the “seamless transition” from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was not entirely seamless.
CHAPTER IV

REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF UNOSOM II OPERATIONS

General

The purpose of this section is to document and analyze events that affected UN operations or had a significant influence on decisions made by UN officials. These can be categorized into five periods: the first period contains events from the arrival of the Force Commander until assumption of the UN mission on 4 May 1993; the second period contains events during the first thirty days of UNOSOM II’s mission; the third period covers a period of combat operations from 5 June through the arrival of the U.S. Army Task Force Ranger in August 1993; the fourth period covers events during the August–October period, including the Ranger assault on the Olympic Hotel on 3 October; the final period is from the cessation of combat operations to the departure of the Force Commander on 20 January 1994. A review of these periods will provide background as to why significant decisions were made or why events may have occurred and their impact on UNOSOM II.

Force Command...In Review

Transition (February–May 1993)

The Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander arrived in Mogadishu on 8 and 9 March 1993 respectively. The first days in theater were spent receiving initial briefings from the UNOSOM II staff and beginning discussions with the UNITAF commander, Lt. Gen. Johnston. The relative insecurity of the Somali interior was readily apparent. During Lt. Gen. Bir’s earlier visit on 11 February, there were riots within Mogadishu and reports of inter-factional fighting in the southern port city of Kismayo, within 48 hours of Lt. Gen. Bir’s arrival. Almost concurrent with his arrival, the Force Commander was informed of
the SNM decision/announcement that UN troops would not be welcomed in the Northwest (Somaliland).

During the first month in theater, the Force Commander identified several concerns to the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG). The primary concern was that an effective, properly staffed headquarters needed to be established as quickly as possible. This headquarters, once functional, could begin work on three key projects. These projects were the structuring of the Force to include brigades, the quick reaction force, and the logistical support system for the theater; establishing a transition plan between UNITAF and UNOSOM II, and then expanding operational planning to include force expansion into the balance of the country; and studying the best way to achieve effective coordination between the civilian and military components of UNOSOM II.

The second concern was the consolidation of staff into a common compound area to facilitate operations and enhance security. In the initial days of the Force Command, staff members spent inordinate amounts of time traveling between UNITAF and the UNOSOM II civilian headquarters. This increased the difficulty in getting staff members together to work transition issues, (coupled with storage of UN support systems to handle a growing staff,) and led to delays and some confusion with the headquarters’ physical establishment.

The third concern was the degree to which the UNOSOM II could maintain pressure on the warlords to continue the political reconciliation process. To that end, the Force Commander and his staff wanted to establish a “seamless” transition with UNITAF and be well postured to handle any “testing” which might occur after UNOSOM II’s assumption of the mission.

As Force Command entered into April, certain planning imperatives were recognized and formed the basis of transition planning. These imperatives included: a seamless transition; establishing the transition from UNITAF as a “blueprint for Chapter VII operations; developing plans for “worse case scenarios”; maintaining the same degree of pressure on militia as had UNITAF; employing the force in theater to support future operations; keeping disarmament and cease-fire operations as a priority; identifying “force multipliers” and requesting them from UN New York; establishing and maintaining the logistics system and, concurrently accelerating the contractual processes; and assessing the refugee issue’s impact on Force Command operations.

The end state desired by Force Command leadership was a coordinated turnover of mission responsibility from UNITAF that was event driven versus calendar driven. It was felt that if planning could be accomplished in parallel with the civilian agencies of UNOSOM II, then a blueprint for future Chapter VII operations could be realized. Further, a seamless transition would ultimately achieve the requisite secure environment which would allow UNOSOM II to begin expanding to fulfill its mandate.

April activities centered around senior staff visits to field locations currently occupied by UNITAF forces. The purposes of these visits was to gain “ground truth”, and helped to focus the new UNOSOM II staff on key issues or conditions which would affect the future operations of Force Command. By the first week of April “staff twinning” was well underway, even though the UNOSOM II staff was manned at only 22% of its authorized strength.

UNITAF and UNOSOM II transition planning focused priority on transferring control of the Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS) from UNITAF forces to UNOSOM II. Operations staff concerns during these discussions were the time lines involved with OPCON of forces to UN control and the posturing of the force for future operations (expansion). Command intent was to change command simultaneously (Force Command Headquarters and all HRSs). At this time, the anticipated changeover date was 15 May 1993. This was a point of contention for the UNITAF commander and staff who felt that UNOSOM II should be prepared to assume the mission earlier.
The changeover and redeployment time lines were linked to several factors not controlled by the two commands. First, UNOSOM II could not assume control of the mission until it had a fully functional staff, capable of complete command and control within the theater of operations. Manning the headquarters was completely dependent on the timely passing of a UN resolution which provided both the mandate and authority to expend resources, including additional staff. This did not occur until 26 March 1993. Secondly, resourcing UNOSOM II in terms of personnel and equipment was totally dependent on UN New York’s ability to accelerate the bureaucratic processes of the administrative element in Field Operations Division in UN Headquarters. In a cable to UN New York, the Force Commander requested as early as 18 March 1993, to “…be released from the bureaucratic mud…” which impeded his ability to effectively establish and support his headquarters. He identified people and equipment as priority issues. He also stated he needed command latitude to develop aggressive, effective UNOSOM II military operations. Interestingly, it was the lack of UN staff in theater and the paucity of equipment which aggravated the UNITAF staff during the transition.

The delay of the UNOSOM II staff can be attributed to a number of factors. The most significant were the process used by the United Nations to build its military contingent, monies obligated to resource the staff and the running debate over disarmament. Without a resolution, money could not be spent nor a UNOSOM II staff resourced and formed. This delay significantly impeded the deployment and funding of the staff and units for UNOSOM II, thus limiting its operational and logistics capability.

The disagreement on disarmament was the most significant factor in the delay in drafting UNSCR 814. The disagreement arose over the difference between the United Nations position on disarmament versus that of the United States. Those close to the situation in Somalia understood that the success of the United Nations in securing a long term peace in Somalia was directly tied to disarming the warlords and political factions. The differences centered on who was to do it. The United States believed this task to be well outside of the humanitarian mandate of UNSCR 794, and the task of UNITAF. The United Nations, on the other hand, viewed it as a key task to be performed under UNITAF, clearly the more capable of the two forces. The broad mission assigned to UNITAF in UNSCR 794, to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations” left the point open to interpretation. This ambiguity would be cleared up in UNSCR 814, which outlined in more detail the mission and tasks of UNOSOM II, to include disarmament.

Delays in passing UNSCR 814 prevented the funding and ultimately the requests to contributing nations for officers and soldiers to staff the Force Headquarters. As a result, on 4 May the staff stood at 22%, there was little headquarters support infrastructure, and command and control was exercised via an immature communications system. The hesitancy on the part of UN officials in the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and the frustration of a UNITAF headquarters which viewed its mission complete at the end of January 1993, should be no surprise to anyone.

By mid-April, Force Command was requesting from the SRSG priority information regarding force deployments from UN New York. In order to effectively coordinate with UNITAF and complete its own planning, Force Command required accurate information regarding positions/decisions taken by member nations regarding movement of forces into the theater. Force Command was concerned not only about the lack of information forthcoming from New York, but also the lack of timely liaison by contingent advanced elements. (This lack of liaison may be the result of an ill-defined requirement.)

Additionally, in a communication to the SRSG, Lt Gen Bir requested that the United States provide a Special Operations Planning Cell to augment the Operations Branch. The purpose of deploying this cell into theater would be to effectively plan for future use of special operations forces (SOF) during expansion. This was the first indication that Force Command would attempt to leverage the unique capabilities of SOF in theater. SOF assets would prove to be one of the few “combat multipliers” available to the Force Commander to enhance his operational capability.
Force Command was planning to assume the mission with four of its five required brigades on the ground. This was done as a matter of reality. The fifth brigade identified for expansion operations was the Indian Brigade. In a memorandum to the SRSG, Lt Gen Bir determined the timely dispatch of this organization into theater to be “critical.” In fact, Force Command wanted the Indian Brigade Headquarters and one battalion in theater by 15 May 1993. Anything less would “...degrade the effectiveness of operations...” The Force Commander’s ultimate goal was to replace the Canadian contingent in the Belet Uen area by 31 May 1993.

In fact, the Indian Brigade would not come to Somalia until September 1993. While not having an effect on transition, this delay would upset strategic and operational time lines, preventing expansion into the Central Region, limiting Force Command to maintaining security for political reconciliation and development only within the original UNITAF AOR, and accepting risk in Mogadishu by thinning the force levels there to be able to cover the entire UNITAF AOR.

In late April, identifying force requirements and managing the flow of newly assigned forces remained the utmost priority. It was a well recognized fact that the transition to UNOSOM II from UNITAF would not be an easy task. In a communication to the SRSG on 18 April 1993, the Force Commander identified four “cornerstones” that needed to be in place before he could recommend transfer of responsibility:

- First was the establishment of effective command and control which included accomplishing the following tasks:
  — Approval of the transition concept from UN New York; transfer of the Marka and Mogadishu HRSs to the Pakistani Brigade;
  — Formation of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF);
  — Securing sufficient staff to establish a 24-hour monitor and response capability in the Force Command headquarters operations center;
- Second was the development of a minimum intelligence capability that could collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence;
- Third was the establishment of basic logistics support. This was achieved through a mix of JTF SUPCOM and UNOSOM II’s Chief, Administrative Office assets;
- Fourth was the establishment of a MEDEVAC planning capability and MEDEVAC assets in theater.

While not considered a cornerstone, the lack of personnel continued to be an issue with the senior leadership of Force Command. The Force Commander believed that, while the numbers of staff in place were not necessarily the key to a successful transition, the quality of personnel in the proper positions which supported the four cornerstones would ultimately determine the efficacy of the transition process.

Resolution of on-going force requirements was not limited to battalion-sized units. Ensuring the Force subordinate commands were adequately staffed was essential as well. On 22 April, the Force Commander notified UN New York that the Belgian Brigade in Kismayo would require staff augmentation in order to effectively command and control the Botswana Battalion, which it would be responsible for. He also requested a reinforcement of the Egyptians to ensure they were prepared for security operations at the airport.
As the month of May approached, there was some concern in UN New York as to when Force Command would assume theater responsibility, and if it was premature to establish the command. All parties involved in the transition process had a position on the subject. UNITAF, seeing its mission as completed, wanted the transition to occur as expeditiously as possible. It was the Force Commander’s belief that they were “...extremely aggressive in their insistence on a 1 May 1993 deadline for transition...” They did not “...share an understanding of the constraints...” of the UN in terms of resource procurement. This lack of understanding led to tense periods between a fully functioning staff waiting to go home and an under-resourced staff waiting to assume a new mission. UNOSOM II’s position was that the transition should occur based on the capabilities of Force Command to assume the mission and effect what was agreed to by the commanders—a seamless transition.

There was also the threat situation to consider. Commander, UNITAF, assessed the worst case scenario as street riots. As such, Force Command believed that the transition should occur after the Pakistani Brigade was operational in the city. With the time line for their deployment and initial train up in theater expected to be complete the first week in May, Lt Gen Bir believed an appropriate turnover might occur during the period 7–14 May 1993. The imperative would remain that the turnover would not occur so as to present an unacceptable risk to mission performance.

UN New York, after hearing of the Force Command tentative window in early May, wanted assurances from the SRSG regarding the Force’s ability to accept the mission. In a cable sent on 22 April 1993, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping asked if the Pakistani Brigade would be mission capable by the first days of May. Secondly, he wanted an assessment as to any operational impact which might exist if the Indian deployment in theater did not occur by the transition date. Third, UN New York wanted reassurance that Force Command, with the reduced manning of the headquarters, could effectively command and control the force. Fourth, UN New York wanted an assessment as to the logistics arrangements in theater and the effectiveness of those arrangements.

In response to the questions posed by UN New York, the Force Commander assessed the time line of the Pakistani Brigade to be supportive of an early May turnover. He also stated that with the equipment augmentation received from the U.S. POMCUS stocks, the Pakistani Brigade would be more than adequately prepared for their mission. He stated he did not believe that a delay in the arrival of the Indian Brigade would adversely affect the turnover. With regard to the manning issue and logistics assessments, the Force Commander believed both issues were being addressed by UN New York (and the mission Chief Administrative Officer (CAO)) as expeditiously as possible. Therefore they did not pose a constraint to turnover. Finally, UN New York was notified that it was Force Command’s intention to assume theater responsibility from UNITAF on 4 May 1993.

**Reception and Consolidation (4 May– 5 June 1993)**

With the assumption of theater command and control, Force Command had entered into a new series of challenges. Still working to overcome the challenges of an incomplete staff (still only manned at approximately 25% of its authorized strength), Force Command continued to address with both the SRSG and UN New York the issues of force requirements in theater to support the strategy of expansion into the Central Region. Concurrently, it was broadening its participation into other new policy challenges presented by the mandate of 26 March 1993, and waiting to gauge the reaction of the Somali population to the turnover from UNITAF.

As the transition date approached, Force Command received indications that certain elements within the factions were looking to test the resolve of UNOSOM II at the first opportunity. This “test” would apparently gauge UNOSOM II’s strength and willingness to act militarily to threats. The Somalis previous experience with a UN force was with UNOSOM I, a smaller force with a restrictive Chapter VI charter. One of the first actions taken by the UNOSOM II leadership was to reissue punitive restraint letters originally
issued by the UNITAF commander to General Morgan and Omar Jess. These letters came about after the Morgan attack on Kismayo in March 1993. To further restrict the militia activities in the Lower Juba, UNOSOM II also issued letters of restriction to the principal lieutenants of Morgan and to Ali Osman “Atto,” Mohamed Farrah Aideed’s lieutenant in the USC/SNA. He had long been suspected in bankrolling the SPM/SNA activities in the Kismayo area. The letters restricted these individuals from entering the city of Kismayo, or approaching any closer than 90 kilometers from the town.

In order to present a clear picture of UN resolve, the Force Commander directed a show of force in and around Mogadishu using elements of 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and armored elements of the Italian Force. Concurrently, each AOR commander was initiating similar operations throughout the UNOSOM II area of operation until 9 May, to include increased patrolling and checkpoint operations. The intent of these operations, as described by the Force Commander, was to clearly show that a seamless transition had occurred between UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Additionally, it was to demonstrate to the Somali people that the “...process of security, humanitarian relief, and political reconciliation... would continue and grow under UNOSOM II.” These operations included an expanded public information campaign designed to emphasize the mission, resolve and ability of UNOSOM and the world community to help rebuild a safe and secure country.

While this show of force was executed in a near flawless fashion, its effect on the populace was uncertain. Less than seventy-two hours after the assumption of command from UNITAF, and in the middle of the show of force, UNOSOM II faced its first major test. It occurred not in Mogadishu where it was most expected, but in Kismayo, the southern port city and seat of the resource-rich Lower Juba River Valley.

During the last hours of 6 May and extending into the morning hours of 7 May 1993, a band of approximately 150 armed men attacked the city of Kismayo. In the process of doing so, they engaged elements of the Belgian Para Battalion. During the engagement, one Belgian officer was wounded. An estimated forty Somalis of the attacking force were either killed or wounded. The attack was a coordinated, three pronged assault oriented along the Jilib-Kismayo road. Weapons employed in the assault included automatic assault rifles (AK-47 type) and some rocket propelled grenades. During the course of the assault, some infiltrating militia attempted to envelop the Belgian defenders. On several occasions, Belgian paratroopers found themselves receiving fire from multiple directions.

The Force Commander, after consultation with the SRSG, dispatched a Ceasefire Investigation Team to Kismayo. The team consisted of two Ceasefire and Disarmament Division officers, two international military staff officers and three Somali Ceasefire Committee members representing Somali factions not involved in the incident. The team conducted a two day field visit which resulted in a finding that the SPM/SNA had attacked the town in an apparent attempt to drive the pro-Morgan SPM out of the city. Upon returning to the city, the investigating team interviewed Omar Jess, the militia leader suspected of having ordered the attack. While Jess denied any complicity in the attack, he inferred that UNOSOM II was supporting Morgan and attempting to isolate the SPM and the Ogadeni out of their rightful place in the city of Kismayo. He also stated that the attack was caused by “…spontaneous infiltration with natural organization…” After a day of deliberation, the team reported its findings to the SRSG and ultimately the United Nations. It found that the weight of evidence pointed to an organized militia attack against Kismayo. Second, by virtue of motive, it was concluded that the militia which conducted the attack was SPM/SNA.

Following the attack on Kismayo, UNOSOM II attempted to remain focused on the reception of incoming forces. The intent was to build required combat power and offset what was perceived to be a tenuous force strength in the southern part of the area of responsibility. Additionally, a debate started within the various agencies as to where the priority of effort should be with force deployments.
Early in May, the UNOSOM II political staff forwarded a paper to Force Command which outlined what was perceived to be opportunity for early commitment of forces into the Central Region. This paper, titled *Galcayo as Keystone*, offered an assessment of multiple factions eagerly awaiting UNOSOM II deployment into the Central Region. These factions (the SSDF, USC/SNA and SNF) represented both a challenge and an opportunity, according to the author, to place "...a permanent UNOSOM II force stationed in the town of Galcayo to ensure its demilitarized status..."

At the surface, this observation was harmless. It was apparently in line with the Force Command plan to consolidate operations in the current area influenced by UNOSOM II. Once consolidation had been achieved, a gradual buildup could occur into the area around Galcayo. However, rather than being an "azimuth check" for all agencies, the document became a banner to which the political arm rallied. Plans for a methodical, controlled build up of forces (capabilities) gave way to guidance to determine how soon a deployment could be made. Therefore, rather than expansion being a capabilities and event-driven process, it was being pressured into a time or opportunity-driven process.

Concurrent with the new political effort toward expansion was the increased effort by the USC/SNA to verbally attack UNOSOM through Radio Aidedd. Throughout the month of May, the airwaves were filled with a vicious diatribe directed at the goals of UNOSOM II and against the efforts of the international coalition. Ironically, it was during this time that Aidedd requested UN through the DSRSG to support Peace Conference for the Central Region. Aidedd would sponsor the conference while the UN would agree to pay transportation and hotel costs for the participants. The principal parties were the SNA and the SSDF. Aidedd’s interests appeared to be an attempt to neutralize the threat presented by his persistent enemy the SSDF in the central region. This would allow him to bring back into Mogadishu the militia and military equipment he had sent there for safekeeping prior to the arrival of UNITAF. Being faced with media attacks against its mission and despite the fact that such a conference could enhance the stature and capability of Aidedd, UNOSOM II agreed to the proposal. The U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) received word about the conference from the SSDF regional representative in Addis Ababa who was visiting Mogadishu at the same time. USLO was informed that the former Somali National Police Force Commander, Mohammed Abshir Musse, now SSDF chairman, had not been invited to the conference. Instead, Aidedd’s choice to represent the SSDF was his old comrade and cell mate in jail during the regime of Sied Barre, SSDF Abdullahi Yusuf. By not inviting the head of the SSDF, Aidedd may have astutely found the means to split that party and introduce discord in the northeast.

USLO informed UNOSOM II of its concerns for the Aidedd central region conference. This effort succeeded in turning UNOSOM around and the DSRSG went back to Aidedd and informed him that the UN could not pay for a conference that was not UN sponsored. Reportedly, Aidedd agreed to go ahead with what would become a UN sponsored event. Sponsorship of the peace conference became a double edged sword. It was a planning and resource challenge. If the conference failed, then UNOSOM II would be blamed for the failure as the principal sponsor. However, if it succeeded, then UNOSOM II could claim to have facilitated a major diplomatic coup and perhaps reduce instead of enhance Aidedd’s influence.

Force Command’s position on the conference was mixed. The USC/SNA wanted UNOSOM II to spend money on conference support, but leave the conference mechanics (security, agenda, etc.) to the control of Aidedd’s faction. This was unacceptable to UNOSOM II. While understanding the need for seeking opportunity in the political arena, the Force Commander was reluctant to assume partial or shared responsibility for conference security. Further, if those terms had been accepted, the military and political agencies of UNOSOM II would appear to be supporting Aidedd. Faced with that prospect, UNOSOM II informed the SNA that it would sponsor the conference but would actively pursue the formulation of an agenda and it would not share responsibility for conference security. The SNA reluctantly agreed.
The Galcayo Peace Conference proved to be a major irritant between the USC/SNA and UNOSOM II. Initially programmed to last from 19 to 27 May, the conference started on 21 May and lasted in some form until 2 June. During this period there were near continuous conflicts between Aideed and UNOSOM II on issues such as agenda, conference location, security, participants and numbers of participants. In one case the senior conference site officer was requested by the senior delegate of the SSDF, Mohamed Abshir, to obtain the release of some forty SSDF delegates held incomunicado by SNA “security” at a local hotel. When it became apparent to Aideed that he was being opposed at every turn by the UN, he sought to hijack the conference by meeting with aligned leaders in a secret location within Mogadishu. By doing this, he served notice to all that there were still two agendas: the UN agenda and Aideed’s agenda. Ultimately, the Galcayo Conference did little to aid the central areas in Somalia. It did, however, help the Lower Juba area. Specifically, it served to start the Kismayo reconciliation process under the auspices of the UNOSOM II Zone Director. However, it left the SNA and Aideed extremely frustrated over their inability to control the political process.

As the Galcayo Peace Conference was winding down, another event was spinning up that would signal the first major shift in UNOSOM II Force Command operations in Somalia. As the events of May were occurring, Aideed’s USC/SNA began to escalate its use of the radio station complex in Mogadishu to transmit anti-UNOSOM II messages throughout the country. Force Command and the civilian leadership began to view these messages as both a threat to humanitarian development operations and the deployed military force. Concurrent with the increase in propaganda came reports from human intelligence sources as well as aircraft overflights that Aideed’s authorized weapons storage sites (AWSS) were becoming active.

Under UNITAF, Aideed and Ali-Mahdi arranged to canton their heavy weapons and technicals. This was agreed to for several reasons. First, the weapons policy of UNITAF placed the weapons at risk if not cantoned. Secondly, by participating in the weapons control program, the local warlords were “legitimizing” themselves by demonstrating compliance with the January Addis Ababa agreements on disarmament. Aideed’s USC/SNA established five independent sites. These sites were located at former Somali National Army compounds along 21 October Road (Sites 1 and 3), at a former Somali Air Force ammunition storage site along the Afgoye Road just outside of Afgoye (Site 9) and the facilities of Radio Mogadishu (now referred to as Radio “Aideed”) (Sites 4 and 5). Ali-Mahdi establish two sites at former hotel complexes in North Mogadishu.

At the time of transition from UNITAF, both the Military Information Office (U2) and the Chief, Ceasefire and Disarmament Division (U3) were informed by UNITAF that the USC/SNA AWSS were controlled by clan militia and that the AWSS had been inspected a number of times since their establishment by elements of the UNITAF J2. Additionally, they were informed that these inspections had, on occasion, been conducted on the “spur of the moment.” Reports that weapons and technicals that had been reported as present under UNITAF were not seen in the sites as of the end of May were somewhat worrisome. If they had been moved without coordination or approval of the UN, the action would constitute a violation of the disarmament agreement outlined at Addis Ababa. A decision was reached within Force Command that the sites should be inspected. This would accomplish two things. First, and most importantly, it would confirm the types and numbers of weapons located in the sites. In short, the purpose and primary reason for the inspections was to validate the UNITAF inventories. Secondly, Force Command had strong reason to believe that the sites were not weapons storage facilities. It was believed that Aideed declared them as AWSS only to ensure his exclusive use of a national broadcast facility by all. By verifying the real use of the facilities, UNOSOM would be able to recommend the disestablishment of the site, if necessary.

Planning for the AWSS inspections began in late May 1993. With storage sites located in two brigade areas of responsibility, the Italian Brigade and the Pakistani Brigade were directed to prepare plans to support the inspection of sites. Allowing the brigades to plan and execute the inspections accomplished
several things. First, it freed the Disarmament Division of Force Command to act solely as a UN monitoring agency. Therefore, if any disagreement arose between the militia and UN forces over validity of the inspections and resulting inventory of weapons stocks, the Disarmament Division could function as a disinterested element of the inspection. Second, having the brigades plan and execute the inventories ensured that the responsible ground commander had the maximum latitude to accomplish the mission.

The Force Command plan was to inspect the AWSS sites of both Aideed and Ali-Mahdi concurrently. The process would involve four to six man inspection monitoring teams from the Ceasefire and Disarmament Division (U3), augmented by weapons specialists and explosive ordnance inspectors from UN Logistics Support Command. The teams would proceed at a predetermined time to their assigned sites. Accompanied by security elements from the brigades, the teams would enter and record their observations of the site inventories by note and photo. Once the brigade inspections were completed, each team and its accompanying security element would withdraw. No weapons were to be seized.

Force Command was primarily concerned with the five sites in South Mogadishu controlled by the USC/SNA and situated in the Pakistani Brigade AOR. These sites supposedly contained the largest amount of cantoned weapons with two of the sites being the facilities of Radio Mogadishu (Aideed). As planning continued, the brigade commander provided several interim operations briefings to the Acting Force Commander. These briefings focused on outlining the brigade concept of operation, tasks to subordinate battalions and any resourcing concerns. It was anticipated that the force could be resisted or that trouble was possible given the worst case scenario of armed street riots. Force Command wanted to be prepared for any reaction. On two occasions, the Acting Force Commander discussed the brigade’s task organization and emphasized the need to “worst case plan” to be prepared if there was resistance. Accordingly, the Pakistani commander reinforced his supporting forces by providing one company at each inventory site, directing each battalion involved to form an internal reserve, and establishing a brigade reserve. Further, the brigade internally task organized to ensure their limited number of armored personnel carriers were distributed to support each AWSS inspection. Scout and Attack helicopter teams were made available to provide airborne observation and fire support, if required. Additionally, the U.S. QRF ready company was to act as the Force Command reserve.

On 2 June 1993, the SRSG was briefed on the Force Command plan to inspect the weapons sites. One concern of the political and military leadership was the issue of notification prior to inspection. One school of thought was that no notification would ensure a more accurate inventory. No advanced notification would eliminate the opportunity to “seed” the sites with weapons previously removed and provided the greatest degree of security to the inspecting soldiers. However, no notification might be seen as escalatory; or an attempt to seize the weapons. Another school of thought was to provide approximately 7 days notice. Again, the amount of time might allow Aideed to either reinforce the sites, or to remove those weapons in place. In either case, if advanced notice was given, Force Command would be required to watch the sites prior to entry. Given the various concerns, the Force Command staff recommended that advanced notice of 24 hours could be given without compromising the inspection process. The Pakistani brigade commander supported this option. The SRSG concurred.

During a final briefing of the operation conducted on 2 June 1993, the Italian Brigade notified the Cease-fire and Disarmament Division (U3) that the Ali-Mahdi sites had been disestablished in March 1993. The decision to disestablish the sites was made by the AOR Commander. Apparently, UNITAF had not been informed. Moreover, the status of the sites was not conveyed to UNOSOM II at the time of transition. The fact that UNITAF still believed the sites operational is evident in the active AWSS files which were turned over to the UNOSOM II U2 section. The files indicated not only the location of the weapons cantonments, but also the amounts of weapons, types held, and ammunition present.

Despite the Italian announcement, Force Command made the decision to continue with the inspection of the USC/SNA AWSS. Force Command decided that it needed to verify the weapons contained in
the sites and the desire to initiate some focused disarmament operations outweighed the possibility of a perceived unbalanced approach to handling Aideed and his weapons. Additionally, with Ali Mahdi sites disestablished by UN forces, an imbalance existed within Mogadishu. It seemed more important to ascertain what the levels of weapons were held by Aideed’s elements in Mogadishu. Final reconnaissance was conducted on 3–4 June 1993.

At 1400 hours on 4 June 1993, the Chief, Cease-fire and Disarmament Division (U3), accompanied by the Deputy Military Information Officer, attempted to deliver notification letters to a designated senior member of the USC/SNA. A total of six letters were prepared and expected to be delivered. One letter announced the intention of UNOSOM II to conduct periodic weapons site inventories in line with the Addis Ababa Agreements of January 1993. Additionally, the letter advised that the USC/SNA would be notified in advance of its intent to inspect. The remaining five letters were to serve as formal notification that the site identified in each letter would be inspected on 5 June 1993. They also invited the Site Commander to accompany the team during the inspection to assist or answer any questions that might arise.

The initial attempt to deliver the letters was unsuccessful. The representative identified in the letters was unavailable. The officers attempted to deliver the letters personally to Aideed but were told he was unavailable. Unavailable meant that he was participating in the “shadow” peace conference in Mogadishu. Asked when a proper representative might be available, the officers were told to return at 1500 hours.

After returning to the Aideed enclave at the agreed time of 1500 the UNOSOM II representatives were taken to a separate residence to meet with the SNA’s Minister of Internal Affairs. Upon delivering the first letter, the UNOSOM II party was thanked and told that the USC/SNA would evaluate the letter and give its response soon. At that time, the Chief of the Cease-fire Division explained that the letter was not a proposal, but a declaration. He presented the other five letters and explained that UNOSOM II would conduct the first inspections the following day. This represented the first direct confrontation between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA. The SNA’s Minister of Internal Affairs became quite agitated about the upcoming inspections. He informed the UNOSOM II officers that “...this will start the war tomorrow...”

While this statement, taken alone, seems extreme and a key signal of the events which followed, it was interpreted by the UN as typical factional bluster by the USC/SNA. Throughout his relationship with the UN, Aideed and his designated representatives made extreme statements that were not acted on. As early as 1992, people aligned with Aideed had said that if armed troops were sent to Somalia, coffins should be sent as well. However, this threat was never executed. During the early UNITAF period when Marine forces moved against a weapons site which served as a sniper position, Aideed restrained his militia. Again, during the Galcayo Peace Conference, the same individual, who received the AWSS inspection letters on 4 June, threatened to close down the conference registration site, insisting Aideed would never register with UNOSOM II officials. However, the site remained open and Aideed registered the next day.

As a result, the worst reaction UNOSOM II expected to result after the AWSS inspections was possible rioting in South Mogadishu like that experienced by UNITAF in February. This conclusion was based on Aideed’s demonstrated behavior since the arrival of UNITAF and the intelligence available at the time. All brigade commanders in the city were aware of this assessment and concurred. Planning therefore was based on armed riots being the most likely “worst case scenario.”

Prior to their departure, UNOSOM II representatives again assured the USC/SNA Minister of Internal Affairs the intent of the inspections was to catalog weapons amounts and indicated that they expected the USC/SNA would continue to support the peace process and be cooperative in its dealings with the UN.
Later in the evening of 4 June 1993, the Chief, Cease-fire and Disarmament Division was notified that recent photo imagery obtained from AWSS overflights in the afternoon showed the possible presence of newly installed heavy machine guns placed to cover the approaches into AWSS 4 (Radio Mogadishu Retransmission Site). After briefing the Acting Force Commander, the officer was directed to update the Pakistani commander involved. At approximately 1800 hours, he met with the commander of 6th Punjab at the unit headquarters. Copies of the photos were provided to the unit and they were advised of the SNA reaction and to continue to plan for the possibility of an opposed entry.

At 0615 hours, five teams departed the U.S. Embassy complex to link up with their Pakistani security escorts. Elements of three Pakistani battalions were being employed (6th Punjab, 10th Baluch and 7th Field Frontier). All teams reached their sites at or before the designated time of 0700. Upon reaching the site, the security element commander, accompanied by the inspection team chief, approached the site and contacted the militia representative. All teams had Somali interpreters accompanying them. Following brief discussions at the entry points to the cantonments, access was gained without force. This was significant as it was the intent of UNOSOM II to conduct the inspections by force, if necessary.

All sites were inspected within a two and one-half hour period. At about 0930, while the final team located at Site 3 was completing its inventory, UNOSOM II began to experience its first periods of resistance. At AWSS 5, the main offices of Radio Mogadishu/Aideed, a very vocal crowd started to form at approximately 0830. The crowd responded to the agitation of two individuals who claimed to members of “Aideed’s government.” Pakistani soldiers of 7th FF, responding to the crowd’s attempt to push into the compound, reacted with warning shots in the air. After almost clearing the compound, the Somali agitators moved more women into position between the Pakistanis and the exit gates. This was the first experience of the USC/SNA using women or children as “shields.” At approximately 0930, after having one of its members hit by a rock, the UNOSOM II inspection team departed the site.

Having completed the inspection by 1030, the majority of the security company at AWSS 3 initiated movement from the site to the 10 Baluch Battalion area in the soccer stadium. While en route the convoy was ambushed by Somalis firing automatic and anti-tank weapons. At least two vehicles were struck immediately. The balance of the company (a platoon) was called forward from Site 3 to reinforce the ambushed element. This action resulted in the inspection team at Site 3 (which had been augmented by the team from Site 4) being alone at the largest AWSS, after the ambush erupted, holding about fifty USC/SNA detainees.

With the exception of the team at AWSS 5, Aideed did not direct his attacks against teams located at the AWSS. In fact, the main casualties occurred away from the AWSS. Specifically, casualties were incurred at a feeding site inside the city proper (Feeding Site 20), at a Pakistani checkpoint (CP 89) and along the route reinforcing elements traveled from the reserve assembly areas. In retrospect, it appears that security actions taken for the inventories were appropriate at the sites. However, precautionary measures by the Pakistani Brigade were not taken elsewhere in the city as feeding and convoy operations proceeded as normal.

Following the ambush of the 10 Baluch element, it became apparent to Force Command that Aideed was attempting to bloody UNOSOM II as much as he could. At Feeding Site 20 in the interior of Mogadishu a Pakistani platoon was overwhelmed by a crowd of women and children supported by militia in over watching positions. During this engagement, the Somalis used crowds to press in on the soldiers until they were in personal striking distance. Once they succeeded in hemming in the soldiers, the women and children grabbed at the weapons, preventing the soldiers from reacting in self-defense. They were then struck down with knives and swords, or bludgeoned to death. Vehicle drivers were struck by snipers at the outset to prevent vehicular escape.

The timing of the attacks throughout the city, coupled with statements made by the Radio Station Manager at Site 5, indicated that Aideed had prepared his force to assault the teams as they conduct-
ed their inspection. His actions also indicate a desire to inflict the maximum number of UNOSOM II casualties in that day. By attacking UN soldiers throughout the day at various locations, to include: activity around the Embassy compound, uncoordinated attacks on UN residences and one incident of small arms fire directed against a QRF helicopter, it was readily apparent Aideed was attempting to cow the UN. By using a series of well planned ambushes and vicious close-in combat methods, coupled with placing women and children in front of fighting militia, Aideed was able to kill 23 Pakistanis, and wound over 75 other UN soldiers. The methods of assault, and the trauma of large numbers of soldiers killed, coupled with selective mutilations of remains, would ultimately affect adversely some members of the coalition. Aideed’s forces established their “modus operandi” on 5 June 1993. Force Command did not learn an effective counter to these tactics until months later.

The ironic part about the events of 5 June and the aftermath was the fact that the inspections of the weapons storage sites were completed without incident, other than at Radio Mogadishu, before the fighting started. In fact, at all locations, the USC/SNA on site helped in the inventory, to include assisting in finding hidden weapons at Site 4. Results of the inspections were revealing. At each site, the weapons present were completely different than the inventories provided by UNITAF. At Site 3, there was a twelve-fold difference in the amounts of anti-armor ammunition on site. In addition, UNOSOM II found one SA-7 “GRAIL” SAM and eighty-six TOW missiles. There were no technicals located at any site. This represented a difference of twenty-five vehicles plus their associated weapons from the file inventories.

**Combat Operations (5 June–29 August 1993)**

**General Background**

This period of UNOSOM II operations was marked by intense open combat between UN Forces and the USC/SNA militia. The United Nations Security Council adopted UNSCR 837 on 6 June 1993. This resolution set a new direction for UNOSOM II. The resolution:

1. condemned the unprovoked attack against UNOSOM II Forces which appeared to be a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate;

2. condemned the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by USC/SNA, to incite attacks on UNOSOM II;

3. reaffirmed that the UN was authorized under UNSCR 814 to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks to include those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks...to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial, and punishment;

4. re-emphasized the importance of neutralizing radio broadcast centers that contribute to the violence and attacks against UNOSOM II;

5. re-emphasized the immediate need for disarmament of all Somali parties and factions.

With the 5 June ambush of UN peacekeepers and the passage of UNSCR 837, the situation in Somalia substantially changed. The operation now clearly took on a combat role. The mission was altered to include arresting those responsible for the June 5 ambushes and would eventually lead UN forces on a hunt to arrest Aideed and bring him and his senior assistants to justice. This particular task was one which Force Command believed required special purpose forces, exceeding the capability of
UNOSOM II. However, an increase in U.S. forces would have been contrary to keeping a low U.S. profile and accomplishing the desired movement of the U.S. QRF over the horizon by the August time frame.

One of the principal issues, of course, was that after transition to UNOSOM II, the operation appeared to drop in priority within the U.S. government. The thought appeared to be that now it was a UN led operation, it was appropriate to reduce the visibility of resources devoted to Somalia.

When the 5 June attacks occurred, everyone was surprised by the intensity and savagery of the Aideed militia’s attacks. In Washington, there was no standing crisis response cell available to provide advice on the full range of options to execute the proposed resolution or that considered the military and political implications of various options. The U.S. consideration of UN Security Council Resolution 837 would seem to have benefited from the existence of a standing crisis response cell that could have assessed a fuller range of options to execute the tasks of the proposed resolution. According to policy level authorities, an interagency meeting in which the Joint Staff and OSD participated was held on 5 June. At that meeting it was agreed that a strong diplomatic response on the part of both the U.S. Government and the UN was required. UNSCR 837 approved on June 6, apparently without further formal by the inter-agency regarding the potential impacts that the mandate might have on the military operations and events in Somalia.

The language and tenor of UNSCR 837 supported a more aggressive military approach rather than a diplomatic one. The resolution further called on member states to contribute armored personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters to provide UNOSOM II the capability to “confront and deter armed attacks directed against it. The U.S. was among those nations which responded to this request by: immediately providing AC–130 gunships to support the operations of UNOSOM II forces; and supporting subsequent operations directed against the militia of General Aideed during the months of June and July. The resulting operations undertaken by UNOSOM II Force Command were more offen-
sive in nature as mandated by UNSCR 837, and set a decisively different tone for operations in Somalia.

With the adoption of UNSCR 837, UNOSOM II Forces took on an offensive approach to operations in Mogadishu. For the first time, the United Nations and the world community would start to recognize that Chapter VII operations clearly involve the distinct possibility of combat. This sobering reality had a significant effect on the offensive spirit of the coalition, and brought the issue of command and control of coalition forces to a head. The combination of these factors and the impact of casualties in Mogadishu on the will of coalition forces cast the UNOSOM II Force Commander and his staff into the role of a tactical command in Mogadishu. This had significant impact on operations throughout Somalia, as the Force Headquarters would be significantly diverted from its operational and strategic focus on the country to handle the tactical fight in the city.

By early July, Force Command fully recognized Mogadishu’s importance from both a strategic and operational perspective. The Force Commander made this point in a 3 July cable to the UN Military Adviser on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking, SUBJECT: Delay in Deployment of UNOSOM II Forces.

“We view Mogadishu as our center of gravity, we must control it to be successful.”

At the strategic level, success of UNOSOM II in Somalia was now being defined, by the international community, as success in Mogadishu. News coverage of Somalia riveted the attention of the world on the fighting in Mogadishu, rather than the successes that were being achieved throughout the rest of southern and northeast Somalia. The importance of Mogadishu at the operational level centered on its air and sea ports. They were the only ones in the country capable of meeting the requirements of UNOSOM II. This continued to be the situation through early January 1994, as funding had not been available to upgrade the facilities at Kismayo or Bossasso.

Operations in Mogadishu

Force Command took immediate action to restore order and security in Mogadishu following the ambush on 5 June. The objectives of operations conducted in Mogadishu from 6 June through 31 August were to:

1. re-establish a secure environment in Mogadishu;
2. secure and control key facilities and supply routes;
3. neutralize the USC/SNA militia and Radio Aidedd.

These operations centered on attacking USC/SNA militia command and control nodes, and equipment, ammunition and weapons storage sites throughout the UNOSOM II AOR. Operations were originally to be carried out in three phases. The first phase focused on the deployment of additional forces from outlying AORs to the city, and appropriate actions to strengthen UNOSOM II facilities and to protect the force. Phase two was a series of strikes against militia command and control nodes, weapons and ammunition caches, and assembly areas. The final phase was to be an aggressive cordon and search of the city to disarm all elements in Mogadishu. The campaign ultimately expanded into four phases. This additional phase was meant to allow for the arrival of the Indian Brigade, for by 20 June, it would become apparent that additional forces were required to effectively clear and secure the entire city of Mogadishu.

While French and Moroccan forces were moving to Mogadishu, Force Command began detailed planning for Phase II, attacks on selected targets in Mogadishu. The intent was to secure key UNOSOM
facilities and lines of communication. In addition, the Force Commander wanted to take decisive offensive action to (1) assure control of the city, (2) neutralize the USC/SNA militia and Radio Aideed, arrest and detain Aideed, and destroy his authorized weapons storage sites as well as other major caches around the city. The concept called for a series of ground and air attacks directed at the AWSS' and militia strongholds in the Aideed Enclave. The operations were conducted over a series of days, 12–14 June and 17 June. During the interim between 7 and 12 June, Pakistani forces, assisted by Moroccan and Italian Forces conducted clearing operations on 21 October Road and other key supply routes. While these operations were conducted simultaneously, they were either controlled and directed by Force Command, or run almost as separate operations over the same ground in the same time frame.

On the morning of 12 June 1993, AC–130 gunships and the U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) attacked AWSS 1, 4, 3 and 5 (Radio Aideed). AC–130 gunships attacked and significantly damaged the Cigarette Factory (5 June ambush site), AWSS 3 and AWSS 5, disabling Radio Aideed. The QRF attacked and seriously damaged AWSS 1, re-attacked AWSS 3; and seized AWSS 4 (the radio relay site). The objective was to seize AWSS 4 intact in order to retain a site for a Somali radio station in the future and to possibly serve as an interim site for Radio Manta, the UNOSOM II station. French Forces relieved the QRF on AWSS 4. These strikes were conducted after meticulous planning designed to achieve the military objective and limit collateral damage. Deliberate warnings were given prior to the attacks in order to allow non-combatants to evacuate the target areas. This opening operation was a success.

The operations conducted on 13 and 14 June were surgical strikes done by the AC–130 gunships on known illegal arms and ammunition caches in the Aideed Enclave. These actions were taken in preparation for a 17 June ground assault to search and clear that area. The targets were Atto’s Garage on 13 June and Aideed’s Garage on 14 June. Once again, detailed planning and target analysis was conducted to limit collateral damage and to achieve the military objective. Following clear warnings for each target, to allow civilians to leave the area, the targets were struck with precision munitions, setting off numerous secondary explosions, clearly indicating that the intelligence produced on the targets had been correct.

The operations of 12–14 June, while highly successful, brought out a number of issues which would significantly impair the effectiveness of the coalition and the employment of the U.S. QRF in future operations. However, at the time, these issues did not appear as force limitations. The most significant constraints were the consent process required by USCENTCOM for employment of U.S. forces and the differing political viewpoints among coalition forces regarding Chapter VII combat operations.

Although initially not a problem, the level of violence, casualties and visibility of operations in Somalia made the approval process for employment of the U.S. QRF increasingly difficult. Concerns regarding the high profile of U.S. Forces in offensive operations in Mogadishu led to a layered decision making process in the United States. The use of AC–130 gunships in support of coalition operations on 17 June is a case in point. The concept of operations was briefed in Washington before it was finally approved. Following this operation, coalition use of these gunships on a case by case basis would become virtually prohibited, even though the asset remained in theater until mid July. Unfortunately, an apparent reluctance by some coalition forces to execute missions in their AORs, or the inability of coalition forces to support each other, increased the likelihood of the U.S. QRF being committed in support of UN operations. By early August, it was becoming quite difficult to get concepts for employment of U.S. air assets approved for anything beyond U.S. force protection. Ground forces would be limited to search operations in areas adjacent to U.S. facilities. This reluctance to permit the use of U.S. forces was in keeping with the original command intent to maintain a low signature in order that U.S. combat forces could revert to an "over the horizon" mission by the end of the summer. The reluctance to use U.S. troops would have a mirror effect on the coalition forces and their own willingness to place soldiers at risk.
Following the operations of 12–14 June, the coalition faced a major test of resolve to discharge its duties under Chapter VII. This became apparent during the planning for the attack on the Aideed Enclave, conducted on 17 June. Some contingent commanders were reluctant to take offensive action, fearing the impact of casualties in their national capitals. One contingent was completely opposed to the operation, preferring to negotiate and return to a level of peaceful co-existence with the USC/SNA. All had their say. After much negotiation by the Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander, the coalition commanders accepted the intended operation to clear the enclave.

The coalition attack to search, clear and secure the enclave on 17 June was designed to capitalize on the success of operations 12–14 June and maintain pressure on the USC/SNA militia. The objective of the operation was to sever the local militia command and control, and drive it from its base of operations. This operation would also enable the coalition to seize and destroy a large quantity of ammunition and weapons known to be hidden there.

The operation was conducted in two phases. During Phase I, AC–130 gunships attacked selected targets in the objective area (Aideed Enclave) to destroy weapons caches and militia concentrations. Deliberate warnings were given using loud speaker teams to enable non-combatants to clear the area. Snipers were placed in key areas around the enclave to ensure that armed personnel did not enter or leave the area. This phase began at approximately 0130 and ended by 0445. Phase II began at 0514 with the Moroccan and Italian forces moving to isolate the enclave. The Moroccans were to prevent crowds from moving into the enclave from the area of the Bakara Market and National Street areas. Italian forces would prevent access down Afgoye Road and from the Medina Area southeast of the Benedir Hospital. French Forces established a screen along 21 October Road, and Pakistani forces conducted the clearing operation. Pakistani clearing operations went well although there was some sniper fire from surrounding buildings. The Pakistani plan had not included securing the dominant buildings overlooking the area to be cleared, although it had been suggested to them. By 0736 the first phase of the clearing operation was completed and the 7th Frontier Force (FF) passed through 6th Punjab. U.S. QRF helicopters provided air support and dispensed CS to assist coalition forces control crowds.

At approximately 0930, the crowds again approached the Moroccan forces, who allowed them to come in close. This time the crowds were armed. The tactic employed by the USC/SNA militia was much like that used against the Pakistani forces on 5 June. They led with women and children in front, closing to within hand grenade range (about 35 m) before engaging Moroccan forces. Women and children were reported throwing hand grenades at Moroccan troops. The Moroccans were also receiving heavy sniper fire from the Digfer Hospital and by 0945 had sustained 12 casualties. Heavy fighting continued for the next four hours in this sector and along 21 October Road. Fighting in the Moroccan area was so close that attack helicopters could not be used to provide fire support. At approximately 1100, French forces were directed to relieve pressure on the Moroccans. They had to fight their way down from 21 October Road, taking anti-tank fire from the Digfer hospital, which was controlled by USC/SNA militia. Italian forces were repositioned along Lenin Road to protect the French flank.

Pakistani forces ended their clearing operations in the vicinity of Phase Line Purple (Aideed’s House) and began to withdraw. This action precipitated the withdrawal of Moroccan and French Forces. Prior to withdrawal, French forces cleared and searched the Digfer Hospital and surrounding buildings, searching for snipers. Casualties for the operation were 46 wounded and 5 killed. The Moroccan force bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered 41 wounded and 4 killed. Initial reports, although unconfirmed, indicated that over 150 Somali had been killed in the fighting.

While the 17 June operation was costly for UNOSOM II, it achieved positive results. The operation was also a true coalition operation, with five different nations involved, controlled by the Force headquarters. Classic doctrine for military operations in urban terrain had been extensively rehearsed, back briefed and used by all coalition forces. While the operation was ongoing, a pro-UNOSOM II rally was
held in North Mogadishu reportedly by over 30,000 Somalis. Other Pro-UNOSOM II rallies were being planned for 19 and 20 June by Somalis in Mogadishu. In addition, the attack had netted over 2200 hand grenades, 3 rocket launchers, 50 rockets, 20 mortar rounds (82mm), numerous rounds of small arms ammunition and over 100 detainees. The UNOSOM II SITREP on 18 June indicated that the coalition had accomplished its military objective to seize weapons and munitions caches, and drive the militia from its base of operations. The intent for near-term was to avoid direct military confrontation, while continuing disarmament operations through aggressive searches and checkpoint operations. In addition, the UN sought to quickly restart humanitarian activities in the city. Plans continued for expansion to Galcayo once the fifth brigade (Indian Brigade) closed into the theater.

UNOSOM II forces continued to put pressure on the USC/SNA militia through increased vigilance at checkpoints, patrolling by heavy forces in the city and raids conducted against weapons caches and suspected C2 sites. The intent was to maintain pressure on the militia, while awaiting the arrival of additional forces (Indian Brigade and Malaysian forces) needed to sweep the city.

Most of the operations were undertaken at the specific direction of the Force Headquarters rather than by the responsible AOR Commanders in Mogadishu. AOR Commanders became reluctant to take unilateral, aggressive action in the city following the operation of 17 June. This lack of tactical initiative is attributed to: (1) the effect of casualties taken on 5 June and 17 June, clearly no one contingent wanted to bear the brunt of the casualties; (2) the growing need for armored personnel carriers in the city for force protection; (3) issues regarding command relationships; and (4) the growing concern over what actions were appropriate under Chapter VII. These conditions would be further exacerbated by the deaths of two Pakistani soldiers and the wounding of two others during a search of a weapons cache in Mogadishu. The operation was carried out at the direction of the Force Headquarters. During the course of the operation, the Pakistani forces were counterattacked by a large number of USC/SNA militia.

Raids on weapons caches were conducted throughout Mogadishu and the surrounding area. On 18 June, Italian forces conducted a raid against a site in Villa Somalia. The U.S. QRF, on 19 June, destroyed more than 19 serviceable mortar and artillery tubes located outside of Mogadishu. Pakistani forces conducted raids against weapons sites on 21, 23, 24, and 28 June. In addition, Force Command, seeking to limit the USC/SNA militia’s access to additional weapons and munitions, destroyed weapons and munitions at Guri Ceel, a town northeast of Belet Uen, on 18 June, AWSS 9 in Afgoye on 23 June, and the AWSS in Belet Uen on 24 June.

The situation in Mogadishu between 17 and 30 June was characterized as tense, but stable. The USC/SNA began to escalate its activities against UNOSOM II forces and installations. On 22 June, they began what would become nightly harassment of UNOSOM II installations with small arms fire and RPGs. Weekly anti-UNOSOM II demonstrations of 500–1000 people were held at the Stadium on Lenin Road. Somalis began erecting roadblocks in the Habr Gedir areas on Lenin Road, National Street, Armed Forces Street and 21 October Road. It was initially thought that the roadblocks were intended to harass UNOSOM II forces as an act of protest. However, on 27 June their tactical significance was realized when Pakistani and U.S. engineers were ambushed while clearing a roadblock on 21 October. Over the next few months, this new escalation of violence by USC/SNA militia forces became increasingly more frequent. These ambushes would further fuel the reluctance of units within the city to get out on the streets in light vehicles or on foot. In its 28 June SITREP, Force Command emphasized the need for additional armored personnel carriers, as well as the urgent need to expedite the deployment of the Indian Brigade. With the arrival of the fifth Brigade, Force Command deduced that a complete search of the city could be done to eliminate the heavy weapons. Until then, the force was limited to small-scale raids and cordon and search operations.

Despite the growing level of violence in the city, the situation remained secure enough for feeding sites to reopen on 20 June. By 25 June, 24 of the original 35 feeding sites in Mogadishu were opened.
There was, however, a growing coalition frustration with the situation in Mogadishu. The SITREP of 27 June clearly highlights that frustration. On that day, three UN soldiers were wounded on 21 October Road by Somalis, while UN soldiers in other parts of the city were assisting at feeding sites and repairing the roof of a local orphanage.

It was at this point that UNOSOM II recognized the need to isolate the Aideed led USC/SNA militia from the rest of the Habr Gedir clan. Leaflets emphasizing UNOSOM II’s desire to work with the Habr Gedir in the political process were produced and distributed. These leaflets further stated that it was Aideed who was to be excluded from the political reconciliation process, not the SNA or the Habr Gedir Clan.

The end of June saw the arrival of forces from Zimbabwe, Malaysia, Egypt, and Romania. The new Zimbabwe forces increased the size of the contingent in theater to that of a battalion. This force was destined for the Baidoa AOR to reinforce the French. Since the departure of the Australian Force in May, French forces had been covering the two battalion area with a single battalion. The Malaysian Battalion was kept in Mogadishu to serve as an armored reserve for Force Command, and to augment Pakistani and Italian patrolling operations in Mogadishu. The increased Egyptian force (battalion) assumed full responsibility for airfield security. This released one more Pakistani Company for operations in the city. The Romanian Field Hospital set up at the airfield and reinforced the medical capability in Mogadishu. All were fully operational by mid July.

This concern was also highlighted in the Commander’s comments in the 6 July SITREP:

“Italian military officials have forbidden them (Italian Forces) to conduct indiscriminate violent reprisals against Aideed’s forces. This prohibition places BG Loi in a difficult position because he is required to negotiate before engaging in military operations against Aideed... Pakistanis are hesitant to take any new action to disrupt militia activity until the arrival of tanks.”

As UNOSOM forces became more timid in their operations, the militia activity dramatically increased. Road blocks, small scale ambushes and attacks (both daylight and night) became almost a daily occurrence in July. For example, 4 July saw two daylight attacks on UN convoys. On 7 July, six UN employees (Somali) were killed in a vehicle ambush after work. On 8 July, U.S. and Pakistani elements were ambushed on 21 October Road and Lenin Road respectively. On 9 July, U.S. vehicles were again ambushed on 21 October Road. Night attacks on UN facilities also increased, and appeared to be targeting U.S. facilities more frequently. On 9 July another escalatory step was taken by the militia. Mortars were fired into the Embassy Compound. This was significant in that it was the first time that mortars were used against UN forces. These types of attacks continued throughout the month.

UNOSOM II forces regained the initiative with a decisive attack on a key militia command and control center on 12 July. The precision attack on the Abdi House dealt Aideed a significant setback. Ground and air elements of the U.S. QRF conducted the raid (approved by U.S. authorities and the SRSG) which destroyed a key militia command and communications center and much of the SNA’s hard core anti-UNOSOM II leadership who, according to intelligence, had planned and controlled attacks on UNOSOM II.

The attack on the Abdi House strengthened UNOSOM II’s position for a time, but also exposed a weakness that would prevent the coalition from capitalizing on its success. The violent, sudden, and unilateral nature of the attack disturbed some coalition partners, many of whom saw the attack as likely to bring on USC/SNA reprisals against UNOSOM II forces. Attacking the command center without warning was perceived by some as too provocative an act and an escalation of the violence. In addition, the raid received greater press attention when several international journalists, invited to the scene by the USC/SNA, were killed by angry mobs. The unilateral attack on the Abdi House implicated the coalition
partners by association. Without prior consultation, their governments were ill-prepared to respond to press and public criticisms received from this operation. The Abdi House raid may even have influenced the decision by one of the major troop contributing nations to announce the withdrawal of its forces from UNOSOM II.

Consequently, instead of exploiting the advantage gained, UNOSOM II forces assumed a defensive posture. This permitted the militia to increase its strikes against UN installations. Both day and night attacks continued until 23 July 1993. The attacks escalated in violence as militia forces increased the use of RPGs and mortars. In addition, a new dimension was added to the conflict as mines appeared on 13 and 23 July. The only real offensive operations conducted between 12 and 23 July were QRF force protection searches near the University Compound on 13 July and around the airfield on 17 and 18 July.

The QRF led search near the airfield on 18 July, and the arrival of tanks for Pakistani forces marked a turning point for the coalition in terms of regaining the initiative in the city. The search, while primarily done by the QRF, was supported by Pakistani and Egyptian Forces. This operation conducted by coalition forces and the QRF, the tanks and the operational status of the Malaysian forces served as a catalyst for more aggressive actions in South Mogadishu. By 23 July, SITREPS were indicating a decrease in the attacks by the militia as a result of the increased patrolling, weapons searches and weapons confiscation at checkpoints. SITREPS on 24 and 25 July indicated that the extensive use of aviation assets at night to attack positions had reduced militia activities at night. By the end of July, both QRF and Pakistani forces were routinely conducting weapons searches of selected areas in Mogadishu. However, coalition commanders in Mogadishu continued to be reluctant to take the initiative in their AORs. As a result, the Force Headquarters continued to direct tactical operations in the city.

Despite the tension and fighting in Mogadishu, UN forces continued to support humanitarian relief efforts. Pakistani and other contingent forces escorted relief convoys to outlying areas. All 23 feeding sites opened after the 5 June ambush continued to operate, and the period of Emergency Relief came to an end. By the end of July, feeding center operations were reduced to three days per week. It is significant to note that (apart from prior reports to the contrary) the humanitarian support effort never stopped outside of the capital city, and only for a short time in Mogadishu.

The relative calm in Mogadishu that existed at the end of July continued into August. However, the militia continued its “shoot and scoot” tactic of firing a few mortar or RPG rounds into a UN installation and then quickly escaping before UNOSOM II forces could react. The U-2 highlighted in SITREPs on 15 August and 18 August that the quiet experienced in Mogadishu during this period could be attributed to a number of factors. These included patrols and searches conducted by UN forces, the fighting in June and July, a depletion in USC/SNA ammunition stocks and a discontent among the militia and the elders within the Habr Gedir. UNOSOM II forces continued to conduct searches in selected areas of Mogadishu and outlying AORs throughout the month of August. However, Force Command believed that the only way to really get Mogadishu under control was to increase the force levels in the city to two full brigades and conduct a thorough weapons sweep. This point was highlighted in a number of SITREPs during the month of August. Force Command began planning for this in earnest as the anticipated arrival date of the Indian Brigade drew near.

The Indian Brigade which was to begin deploying to Somalia in September was considered a viable force for the sweep of Mogadishu. Force Command intended to bring the Indian Brigade into Mogadishu to assist in clearing the city, keep them separated from the Pakistani forces, and then move them to Belet Uen for expansion. There were a number of benefits, which could be derived from this option. First, it would allow the German Composite Force Somalia, now arriving in theater, ample time to prepare a suitable logistics base in Belet Uen before the Indian Brigade was deployed there. Next, holding the Indian Brigade in the city would relieve some of the burden on theater transportation assets, so fuel,
water and other stores could be stockpiled in outlying AORs. Finally, the increased force levels in the city would enhance UNOSOM II’s security posture and provide sufficient force to conduct a massive weapons sweep of the city.

August also brought an increased dedication of resources to capture Aideed and his senior advisors. U.S. Special Operations Forces were introduced in theater for this task. As UNOSOM II efforts to capture Aideed intensified, his profile lowered in the city to the point where he was seldom seen outside of USC/SNA loyal areas. It soon became apparent that the mission required a surgical strike capability. This had prompted the requests for a Ranger Task Force from the United States for the mission. It was known that the DFC supported such a request. The request was approved and by 31 August the Task Force had reached Somalia and began a brief period of rehearsals and special training.

On 4 August the USC/SNA militia further escalated violence against U.S. forces by introducing mine warfare into the conflict. Clearly, the militia was trying to regain the initiative it was losing to UNOSOM II. A Brown and Root vehicle was the first target and resulted in two injuries. It soon became apparent that the militia was not only mining the roads used extensively by UNOSOM II, but had introduced command detonated mines as a means of attacking specific contingents. Four U.S. MP’s were killed on 8 August while they conducted a routine patrol on Jiale Siad Street (commonly called the Medina Road) by the first command detonated mine. There was little doubt that the U.S. contingent was being targeted, when U.S. vehicles were hit by command detonated mines on 19 and 22 August. Logistics Support Command completed construction of a bypass road around the city in order to reduce the threat to logistic convoys. The route was secured by the U.S. QRF as a force protection measure. The combination of the mine incidents, the continuing mortar attacks and the growing threat of ambushes on 21 October Road strengthened COMUSFORSM’s concern for force protection. These factors contributed to his national request for heavy forces to enhance U.S./UN force protection. In addition, coalition patrols conducted daily sweeps of the major routes traversed in the city, checking for indications of mining. This technique was somewhat successful, although clearly not fool proof, as patrols reported finding and destroying mines on 12, 13, 15, and 17 August.

On 20 August, the possibility of a SA-7 surface to air threat led UNOSOM II to issue a NOTAM closing the Mogadishu airport to commercial aircraft and advising military airlift of the threat. Force Command, in conjunction with USCENTCOM, suggested appropriate approaches to avoid overflight of the city, and tactics to be employed during landing and take off. In addition, attack helicopters were employed as an air cap to deter surface to air attacks. An actual threat was never fully confirmed, and by month’s end, the NOTAM was allowed to expire.

The SA-7 was not the only surface to air threat that was seen as credible. Militia forces were becoming more aggressive in their attempt to shoot down a QRF helicopter. The attack helicopters were proving to be a significant deterrent to militia operations and therefore a high priority target for the militia. On 9 August, the first QRF helicopter was hit by small arms fire. USC/SNA militia forces continued to refine their techniques for surface to air engagements, and began using RPGs as well as small arms. A QRF aircraft was hit by an RPG for the first time on 25 August. The aircraft suffered only slight damage, but it was clear that evasive flying tactics must change.

The escalation of guerilla warfare and increasing violence in Mogadishu underscored the fact that the military component alone could not solve the problems in Mogadishu and Somalia. On 7 August, the Force Command planning staff presented a concept to the SRSG for voluntary disarmament in Mogadishu. The concept called for an approach to disarmament and security operations which fully integrated the political, military and humanitarian development (economic) elements of power. It proposed the establishment of district councils in areas of the city controlled by UNOSOM II. Each district council was to serve as the political body with which UNOSOM II would work through to focus development resources, police training, and other programs for restoring a full social structure and order for the area.
These district councils would be briefed on the disarmament program and asked to assist in the process by organizing the people in their districts. As these political bodies stood up and began functioning, development and humanitarian dollars would begin flowing into their districts.

One aspect of this plan was to further divide the Habr Gedir. Force Command’s plan sought to convince clan leaders that continued support of Aideed would result in their exclusion from political and economic processes. The key to its success would be visible signs of progress.

This approach was the first real attempt to fully integrate the political, economic (humanitarian/development), and military elements of power into a plan of action for UNOSOM II operations in Somalia. While progress was slow, there were a number of benefits which sprang from Force Command’s proposal. First, the Security and Reconstruction Committee (SAC) was formed. This committee consisted of staff representatives from the political, humanitarian, justice, and disarmament divisions of the UNOSOM II civilian staff, as well as NGOs and Force Command. This committee performed the detailed spadework necessary to forge an integrated approach to solving the problems in Mogadishu, and ultimately Somalia as a whole. It marked the first step in actually integrating the civil and military staffs in a common organization with a common agenda and objective. Next, UNOSOM II began to reverse the roles of the military and political and development efforts. The military began to take on a supporting role in Mogadishu rather than the lead. Finally, the UNOSOM II political division came to realize that there were sufficient areas within the Benedir Region (Mogadishu and surrounding areas) to begin to set up district councils. Prior to this time, the concept had been to leave Mogadishu to the military to secure. Then, once it was completely secure to begin establishing district councils in the region. As a result, development and humanitarian resources in Mogadishu could not be effectively channeled to support the overall strategy and goals of UNOSOM II.

The most difficult obstacle to overcome in the staff integration process was the friction between the military and the humanitarian/development community. The NGOs and the UN Agencies desired to maintain their neutral status and did not want to be perceived as supporting UNOSOM II’s political agenda. They apparently saw their role as one of philanthropic support for Somalia, not as a tool for political reconciliation. However, by the end of September and early October a common ground had been reached and there was some integration. But, the concept and need of these agencies maintaining an apolitical status continued to be problematic.

The reality of divergent agendas amongst the organizations whose charters were to assist Somalia exposed one of the major weaknesses in the organization and structure of the UN civil staff in this operation. There was no apparent unity of effort. When it came to directing the humanitarian relief effort or refugee repatriation, the SRSG and his Humanitarian Division had little or no authority over supporting agencies. The NGOs were in no way bound to support the UNOSOM II effort, as they were operating under the sole authority of their own organization. UNOSOM II had little to no influence on their operations and could, for example, only expel them from the country if there was overwhelming evidence of subversion. The same applied to UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDO) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). While theoretically the SRSG was in charge, these and other UN agencies working in Somalia and the surrounding countries in reality took instructions from their home offices rather than the SRSG. Consequently, the SRSG and his staff could not effectively use the resources and assets available in humanitarian and development agencies to support the United Nations overall strategy for Somalia. As a result, the three key elements of power in Somalia (military, political and humanitarian) could not be efficiently integrated into an effective strategy for Somalia.

Despite the fighting, progress continued to be made even on the humanitarian and political reconciliation fronts. Pakistani forces began integrating Somali Police into their checkpoint operations on 3 August. By 20 August, 31 feeding sites of the original 35 were operating three times per week. A new self-help program to clean up the city was being implemented, the “Food for Trash Program.” And on 25
August, Force Command launched “Operation Pothole”. This program was designed to employ local Somalis in a food for work program to repair the major roads in Mogadishu. Materials were purchased by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), equipment and engineer supervision provided by Logistics Support Command, security provided by Pakistanis, and laborers provided by the local community.

This period came to a close at the end of August with the arrival of Task Force Ranger. The search for Aideed was expanded. Bangladesh forces had closed into theater and taken over the K4 area from Pakistan by 23 August, and the advance party for the Indian Brigade arrived on 30 August. GECOM-FORSOM and the Irish Truck Company were also operational at this time. However, the lack of engineer assets to maintain supply routes and the lack of fuel storage capacity in the AOR continued to hinder Force Command logistics support operations.

Operations Outside Mogadishu

UNOSOM II operations outside Mogadishu flourished in June. AORs remained calm and stable throughout the month. The French in AOR Baidoa instituted a model weapons registration program and, on 29 June, opened a Labor Office to begin putting Somalis back to work. In AOR Kismayo, Belgian forces began repairing local schools. On 23 June, the Kismayo Peace Conference began. While in Bardera, Botswana forces repatriated the first 500 refugees from El Wak, Kenya on 29 June. AOR Baidoa did experience an increase in bandit activity in the Oddur-Wajid area, where the French had been forced to conduct economy of force operations when the Australians withdrew in mid-May.

Opportunities for success also presented themselves in the northeast. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) indicated a willingness to disarm voluntarily under UNOSOM II supervision, and to accept the presence of UNOSOM II troops. Seizing on this opportunity, UNOSOM II dispatched political representatives, a Force Command Representative, the members of the Cease-fire & Disarmament Division (U3) and a team of Special Forces (SF) soldiers to Bossasso. Favorable talks paved the way for the Force Command Representative and the U.S. SF Team to remain. This small element undertook a number of projects designed to help the people in the area. Their capability was bolstered by the presence of the U.S. 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (SOC) from 6–9 July. The MEU had been stationed off the coast of Somalia since 23 June. It had assisted UNOSOM II by conducting a MEDCAP/DENCAP in Marka, providing riot control training to coalition forces, and augmenting the aviation and EOD capabilities of the U.S. QRF and UN Logistics Support Command. While in Bossasso, the MEU repaired the roof of the local Police Station, and conducted a port survey for future use in developing the port of Bossasso. Force Command emphasized that this extension of military capabilities to the northeast could only be sustained for short periods of time. A more significant and permanent expansion could only be achieved when the fifth brigade and appropriate logistics forces arrived in theater.

The AORs remained stable in the month of July. The month was marked by some clan on clan fighting in the Marka area, low level militia activity in the Kismayo AOR and banditry in the Baidoa AOR. UNOSOM II forces in these areas continued to successfully conduct weapons searches and patrols designed to reduce the threat to the population in their AORs.

As in June, UNOSOM II forces continued to support humanitarian/development and political reconciliation programs in Somalia. The Kismayo Peace Conference continued through July, and the first of 20 schools in that AOR opened on 10 July. In AOR Baidoa, the security situation had reached the point where district councils were now being formed and activated. UNOSOM II forces throughout southern Somalia continued deliveries of food, school supplies and medical assistance to the Somali people in their AORs.

In August, although the situation remained tense in Mogadishu, progress continued to be made in the surrounding AORs. In AOR Baidoa, despite the banditry, the weapons confiscation and registration program continued to go well. The Moroccans were making headway with limited police training in
Burhakaba, and on 12 August issued weapons to the local police in the area. On 26 August, the UNOSOM II SITREP reflected the recovery of businesses and the booming local economy in Baidoa. In AOR Kismayo, the Kismayo Peace Conference ended on 6 August with the 154 delegates signing a peace accord for the lower Juba. On 20 August, General Morgan and Sayed Hussein were meeting with their militia in Doobley to discuss disarming and turning in their weapons to UNOSOM II. In AOR Gialalassi-Belet Uen, district councils were being formed.

An unintended outcome of UNOSOM II’s confrontation with Aideed was the opportunity to make inroads in the northeast. Until the confrontation with the USC/SNA in Mogadishu, the northeast was closed to UN forces. As UNOSOM II demonstrated its willingness and resolve to use military force in Somalia, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) began to open the region to the presence of UN forces. On 17 August, the Force Command Cease Fire and Disarmament Team deployed to Bossasso to continue discussions on voluntary disarmament. The team made visits to Bossasso, Qaardo, and Garowe discussing weapons cantonment and inventory procedures. The trip was cut short on 23 August due to the tensions in Galcayo with Aideed’s USC/SNA militia. On 24 August, UNOSOM II elements completed civil affairs projects that had begun in July and returned to Mogadishu.

Summary

During the period from 5 June through 31 August UNOSOM II not only became a combatant force, but also altered its approach to disarmament. The disarmament concept went from voluntary to coercive in its approach. From here on, UNOSOM II tended to rely on military force, rather than political and humanitarian development measures to accomplish its mission in Somalia. This trend would lead UNOSOM II to attempt to apply a military solution to a political, social and economic problem. Previous experiences, in other operations other than war, demonstrate that this approach is fraught with probable failure. UNOSOM II did not fully reverse this trend until after the large-scale bloodshed of 3–4 October. However, by early August, steps were being taken by UNOSOM II to implement just such a plan.

The intent to clear and disarm the city of Mogadishu was tactically not achievable. The forces available, numbers of weapons hidden in the city, terrain, culture of the Somalis, political/humanitarian environment, and the capability of the USC/SNA militia made this a very complex and difficult task. Initially, UNOSOM II military planners, in country less than 60 days, did not fully grasp the nature of the Somali culture nor the inordinate amount of ammunition and weapons cached throughout Mogadishu and the country. A common joke among the UNOSOM II military was that every Somali had at least one weapon he/she carried and another two or three in his/her houses. In reality, this is not far from the truth. For the Somali, fighting amongst the clans and use of weapons is a part of daily life. In addition, the Somalis are intensely loyal to clan and family. They have little concern for those outside of their clan. As a result, clans tend only to unite and work together against a common threat. In Mogadishu, these factors were compounded by the fact that the Habr Gedir, mostly if not entirely united behind Aideed. They had followed him through the civil war and came to see him as the only leader who would ensure them a favored place in the future of Somalia. As long as UNOSOM opposed him, it opposed the clan. In hindsight, military planners had clearly underestimated the capabilities and intentions of the Aideed-led USC/SNA militia. Like UNITAF, UNOSOM II planners anticipated street rioting similar to that of 25 February 1993 to be the worst case scenario. Clearly, Aideed intended to fight UNOSOM II, as it became an obstacle to his drive for power in Somalia.

Search for Aideed (31 August–3 October)

General Background

The month of September was the most violent and costly for UNOSOM II, and the Somali people. During this period, interclan fighting intensified to levels not seen since the arrival of UNITAF in
December 1992. UNOSOM II installations received mortar and rocket fire on an almost daily basis. UN forces started to use counter-fire to deter these attacks. Road blocks were constructed with increased intensity along UNOSOM II supply routes and were often used as ambush sites. All told, UNOSOM II forces clashed with USC/SNA in six (6) major engagements. By the end of September, there was rising concern regarding international support for UN operations in Somalia. The combination of intense fighting in Mogadishu, and the focus of the international press on the “search for Aideed” contributed to this rapid erosion of support. The period ended violently on 3 October with the Task Force Ranger raid in the Olympic Hotel area. This operation marked another turning point for UN operations Somalia, and reset UNOSOM on a course emphasizing political and humanitarian efforts.

What did not appear in the press was the continued humanitarian and development programs carried out by UNOSOM II forces. Despite the fighting in Mogadishu, feeding sites continued to operate three days a week. Individual contingents such as Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, and the U.S. continued to provide medical assistance, food and clothing deliveries, as well as assistance to local orphanages. The road repair program started in August, “Operation Pothole”, continued into September. By 3 September over half of the Medina Road had been completed. It had become a real success story in terms of gaining the support of the local population.

On 4 September, the Moroccan hospital treated its 100,000th Somali patient. In AOR Baidoa, French and Zimbabwe forces were working closely with police to stem the rising tide of banditry in the area. Much of the problem was the result of the growing population and economic recovery in the area. By mid-September, the banditry problem was back under control outside Mogadishu. AOR Baidoa also assisted the locals with their District Councils and helped to form committees to solve clan related problems. In AOR Gialalassi-Belet Uen, Italian forces provided clothing and school supplies in Bula Barde. And they undertook a de-mining operation in the AOR. AOR Kismayo also had a number of successes on the humanitarian and reconciliation front. The peace accord continued to hold despite reports of growing tensions. On 2 September, Belgian forces began a program to repair
the dikes along the lower Juba River. Major advances were made in the establishment of police forces and a judicial system. In Afmadow alone, they had helped to restart a school for 400 children and reestablished the police force and judicial systems. However, lack of resources proved to be a limiting factor. In addition, they continued to provide medical care and health training in the surrounding communities. Force Command even continued to provide limited assistance in the northeast. U.S. Special Forces teams provided medical assistance and helped to build some sports facilities in the city of Bossaso.

The North Mogadishu AOR turnover between the Italians and the Nigerians began with a bloody conflict on Balad Road on 5 September. The period ended with a major engagement between coalition forces and the USC/SNA militia on 3 October. This action prompted a major shift in the direction of UNOSOM II operations in Somalia. By month’s end, the Belgians had announced their intention to withdraw from Somalia by the end of the year. With this announcement, UNOSOM II had to position the Indian Battalion earmarked for Belet Uen in Kismayo. This ended any remote hopes of some limited future expansion into the Central Region and left GECOMFORSOM without a viable support mission.

**North Mogadishu Turnover**

The attack on the Nigerian forces as they attempted to replace Italian forces at Strong points (SP) 19 and 42 appeared to be a deliberate attack. UNOSOM II forces received 17 casualties and one Nigerian soldier was missing. Despite attempts by Italian and UNOSOM II negotiators, the Nigerian soldier was not released by the USC/SNA until mid-October. As a result of the attack and subsequent negotiations, Italian forces, despite their resistance, were not relieved of responsibility for North Mogadishu until 16 September. Malaysian and Nigerian forces jointly manned SP 19, while Pakistani forces assumed control of SPs 69, 77, and 207. SP 42 was left unoccupied and abandoned to hostile control. The attempted turnover of SP 42 and 19 began at 0500, when Nigerian forces departed the Old Port. The details of the turnover had been coordinated with Italian forces. The early start time was selected because Somalis rarely ever stirred in Mogadishu before 0700. Nigerian forces believed that this early start time would reduce any possibility of disruption or confrontation with local Somalis. However, on this particular morning, Italian forces reported a large crowd of Somalis concentrating at the Pasta Factory in the vicinity of SP 42 at about 0400 hours.

At 0605 hours, the Nigerian Company reached SP 42 to begin the relief of Italian forces there. According to the Nigerian Battalion Commander’s after action report, the Company Commander was approached by one of the elders from the area, Mr. Gullit. Mr. Gullit told him that the Nigerians needed to have an agreement before taking over. When the commander said that he would proceed, Mr. Gullit responded “the Nigerian Troops will see”. Five minutes later, Somali militia men opened fire on the Nigerian forces. At 0700, the Nigerian Force at SP 42 requested reinforcements from his battalion. Within minutes, the Nigerian unit at SP 19 began moving to assist their comrades at SP 42. The unit split into two elements. One moved up Balad Road, and the other went to the east a few blocks, then north to 21 October Road and on to SP 42. The element moving up Balad Road was ambushed a few hundred meters north of SP 19. Heavy fighting ensued which lasted until 0930. During the fighting one of the Nigerian APCs was cut off from the rest of the element on Balad Road. This was the unit which took the heaviest casualties.

Turnover of the other Strong points was delayed due to the tensions that existed in the city following the 5 September ambush of the Nigerian Force. This was meant to give the Italian, Pakistani and Nigerian force commanders the opportunity to meet with the local elders to discuss the AOR turnover. Initially, all meetings were set up and run by Italian forces. However, when it appeared no headway was being made, the Force Command U3 set up a series of separate meetings in North Mogadishu to discuss the turnover. The outcome of these meetings were quite different. Instead of elders refusing to accept Pakistani, Nigerian and Malaysian forces into the area, they were warmly
welcomed. Based on these meetings turnover dates were set for 14 and 16 September. The most probable cause for the change of heart was that the most influential local elders attended the U3 run meetings.

The turnover of SP 69 and 77 on 14 September went well. On 16 September, the turnover of SP 19 was conducted peacefully.

21 October Road

The violence on 21 October Road significantly escalated in September. The construction of road blocks by the USC/SNA supporters on 21 October Road became a daily occurrence. Numerous road blocks were constructed over the course of the day. Each time they were taken down by Pakistani Forces, new ones were constructed. For example, along the five kilometer stretch from the intersection with Lenin Road to the intersection with Balad Road, ten separate roadblocks were built on 5 September and the road had to be temporarily closed on 6 September. Each time, the road blocks grew in size and complexity, to include burning tires.

The crisis on 21 October Road became violent on 9 and 16 September, when Pakistani and U.S. forces engaged USC/SNA militia in heavy fire fights. The most violent and costly occurred on 9 September. On that day, Pakistani and U.S. engineers were clearing road blocks near the Cigarette Factory when they were taken under fire by USC/SNA militia with 106 mm recoilless rifles, RPGs and small arms. The militia was effectively suppressed by a combination of fires from ground forces and attack helicopters. Between 1530 and 1600, the clearing element was again taken under attack while clearing road blocks near the former Checkpoint 89. In these instances women and children built the roadblocks while militia (to include women) covered the obstacles by fire. The intensity of this fight was significantly more than the earlier one. In addition to receiving fire from heavy concentrations of militia forces in firing positions, the Pakistani and U.S. forces on the ground were attacked by over 1000 Somali men and women, many carrying weapons. As women pressed in close to the UN soldiers, armed militia fired upon the peacekeepers from within the crowd and from vantage points overlooking the battle ground. An intense fire fight ensued, lasting until about 1835. At this point the Somalis broke off the engagement, having suffered numerous casualties from both ground forces and QRF attack helicopters. UNOSOM II forces suffered 6 casualties in the engagement.

A second fire fight broke out on 16 September between Pakistani forces and USC/SNA militia. While clearing roadblocks on 21 October Road, Pakistani forces were taken under fire by RPGs. They returned fire with tank main gun and destroyed the enemy position. Although not as intense as these two confrontations small scale ambushes on UNOSOM II forces clearing road blocks on 21 October Road continued on an almost daily basis through the latter part of September. The final straw for roadblock clearing on 21 October Road appears to have come on 21 September. At approximately 0635, a Pakistani APC was destroyed on Afgoye Road near Benedir Hospital while clearing yet another roadblock. There were nine casualties, two were killed. From this point through the end of the month, 21 October Road was not used by UN traffic, and roadblocks built along it were left in place. An alternate route for resupply of Pakistani Forces at the Stadium was chosen and used.

The growing risk to logistics convoys on 21 October Road led to the decision to construct a new main supply route (MSR) linking Afgoye and Balad. This MSR would enable the force to maintain the capability to resupply AOR Belet Uen-Gialalassi while avoiding the requirement to secure an MSR through the middle of enemy territory. However, even this solution had its limitations. The road constructed was a single lane weather-dependent road. This limitation placed an increased strain on the already over extended ground transport capability of UNOSOM II. The lack of intra-theater aircraft capable of transporting large quantities of fuel further exacerbated the problem.
Mortar Attacks

In addition to harassment on 21 October Road, the USC/SNA militia significantly escalated their attacks on UNOSOM II installations. During the month of September, UN forces saw almost daily mortar and rocket grenade attacks on their installations. Both 60mm and 120mm mortars were used by the militia from firing points in the Digfer Triangle and Villa Somalia area. Initially, UN forces continued to rely on attack helicopters to quickly respond against hostile mortar firing positions.

However, this tactic changed with the militia’s increasing use of heavy mortars and the first successful engagement of a QRF helicopter by ground fire on 2 September. A review of the incident revealed that the militia had used a mortar position to draw the helicopter into an ambush site covered by interlocking ground fire. Once again, aviation tactics were adjusted to meet the new threat. On the morning of 25 September, the first QRF helicopter was shot down by ground fire. While investigating a firing incident on the seaport, the helicopter was engaged and downed by an RPG round at 0200. Pakistani and U.S. forces secured the site and evacuated the casualties under heavy fire. UN/U.S. forces suffered 9 casualties in the operation. By 10 September, Force Command permitted mortar crews to conduct counter fire into selected enemy target areas, such as the Digfer Triangle and Villa Somalia. Great pains were taken to ensure that collateral damage was minimized. All engagements were observed fire engagements and cleared only when there was no presence in the area of women and children. This proved effective in reducing the intensity of the hostile activity, but not eliminating the mortar attacks.

Other Operations (Searches)

Searches and weapons confiscation operations at checkpoints and Strong points continued in earnest during the month of September. On 1 September, Bangladesh forces found serviceable antiaircraft gun barrels and ammunition. On the same day, Pakistani forces conducted a search near Hunter Base. On 2 September, both the QRF and Pakistani forces conducted searches in the area of the airport and Checkpoint 35, respectively, netting weapons and equipment. A joint search of selected targets (Aideed’s garage and Atto’s garage) in the Aideed Enclave was conducted by Malaysian and Pakistani forces. The QRF conducted another search of Atto’s garage on 17 September. These searches were conducted because of reports that weapons and munitions were buried and hidden in drums located there.

There was only one search which resulted in a major confrontation between UN forces and the militia. On 13 September, the QRF conducted a search southeast of Benedir Hospital in the Medina Area. UNOSOM II had indicators that mortars were possibly located there. The search began approximately 0525. At approximately 0555, militia forces appeared to be consolidating for an attack near the Benedir Hospital. Fighting initially was localized there. As the QRF was withdrawing, approximately 0650, it came under intense fire. Fighting back block by block toward the Embassy Compound, the QRF appeared to be taking fire from all directions. As the search element approached the Embassy Compound, APCs from the Turkish Company and U.S. attack helicopters provided covering fire. By 0935 the element had closed into the Embassy compound and had suffered only 3 minor casualties during the two hours of intense fighting. In addition to capturing a number of weapons, documents and munitions, it appears the search may have prevented a militia attack on the Embassy Compound. Intelligence reports indicated that at 0800 approximately one hundred militia men met on Afgoye Road, split into groups of 20 to 40, moved into the Medina area, picked up weapons and joined the fight.

Task Force Ranger Operations

The arrival of Task Force Ranger in late August sent a clear signal of the world community’s intent to bring those responsible for the 5 June ambush to justice. The unit’s mission was to capture Aideed
and his top aides. The planning and execution of Task Force Ranger’s operations were unilaterally done by the Task Force Commander and carried out by U.S. forces deployed in support of UNOSOM II. Task Force Ranger was not under United Nations command or authority. Although not under the operational control of the Force Commander or the Deputy Force Commander (Commander, USFORSOM), Commander, Task Force Ranger kept them closely apprised of operations. The DFC was advised of the target area and intent to launch an operation to capture Aideed or one of his aides. The DFC in turn notified the Force Commander who likewise informed the SRSG. Although the Force Command U2 provided some intelligence support, Task Force Ranger relied mostly on its own intelligence gathering capability and information.

The first success was achieved on 21 September. Osman Atto, one of Aideed’s top advisers and his principal financier, was captured in a daylight operation. Atto was captured near the Digfer Hospital with three of his bodyguards. This was a major blow to Aideed, and a lift for UNOSOM II. With the capture of Atto, it became extremely difficult to acquire information on the location of Aideed or his senior advisers.

On 3 October, the task force received information that a number of Aideed’s senior advisers were meeting at a building near the Olympic Hotel. TF Ranger hit the site and quickly captured 24 detainees, including two key Aideed advisers. However, a TF Ranger UH–60 helicopter was shot down near the raid site. As Ranger ground forces moved to the crash site to recover those still there, they came under a barrage of fire from surrounding buildings and streets and took a number of casualties. This force formed a perimeter around the crash site. Two miles south of the crash site a second Blackhawk was hit and downed creating additional U.S. casualties. The U.S. QRF, a light infantry unit mounted in soft skinned vehicles, was unable to punch through hostile resistance to link up with Rangers at the crash site by itself. With the concurrence of the Force Commander, the UNOSOM II Deputy Force Commander activated the UNOSOM II reserve.

The UNOSOM II mechanized QRF was the Malaysian contingent. After consultation with and approval by the Force Commander, a Pakistani tank platoon, the only operational tanks in Mogadishu and two Malaysian mechanized companies, the only armor forces in Mogadishu were ordered into action. A tactical plan was completed and coordination made for a combined U.S./UN rescue. After heavy resistance, the rescue columns reached the two crash sites, and evacuated the rangers. In the course of the action, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and 84 were wounded. Three Malaysian armored personnel carriers were destroyed. One Malaysian soldier was killed, 10 wounded, and 2 Pakistani soldiers were wounded. It is estimated that some 300-500 Somalis were killed and more than 700 wounded in the clash.

Seeds of U.S. Policy Change

The deteriorating security situation in Somalia following the murder of the Pakistanis caused senior interagency officials to form and dispatch to Somalia a 10 person interagency assessment team led by Ambassador David Shinn. In Somalia from 20 to 27 July 1993, the team assessed the overall security situation and progress towards political reconstruction and economic development. Following its return to the U.S., the team noted that the UN’s security (military and police forces), political and humanitarian/economic development operations appeared to be developing in isolation from one another; it recommended linkage and subsequent implementation in a coordinated manner. Additionally the team recommended in early August that the UN develop a comprehensive strategy for restoring political institutions. This included a “bottom-up” approach by creating district councils and progressing upwards to a transnational council.

Given the conclusions of the interagency assessment team, an interagency working group was formed in mid-August to monitor events in Somalia and provide recommendations to senior decision makers. The first public indication of this U.S. refocus on the political, rather than a military solution
in Somalia was a major policy speech given by then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin on 27 August 1993. In it, he stated that the recent deployment of the Rangers had a “much too narrow” focus on the military aspects of the situation and that “if there is a solution to Somalia’s problems, it must be much more than [just] a military solution.” He posed the rhetorical question “how will we know when we have succeeded” in Somalia and, echoing the recommendations of the interagency assessment team, outlined criteria for success that included progress in the economic, political and security elements of the “Somali problem”. Before U.S. combat troops could be withdrawn, however, he noted three conditions: (1) the security problem in South Mogadishu (Aideed’s territory) would have to be “settled” (2) real progress needed to be made towards taking heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords and (3) credible, neutral police forces had to be operating in major population centers.

In September, as Task Force Ranger was beginning its training in Mogadishu, various U.S. government agencies continued the reassessment of the U.S. mission in Somalia. The fact that consideration was being given to a renewed political approach had not been conveyed to USFOR Somalia in Mogadishu. At the same time, CINCCENT forwarded an updated strategy assessment to CJCS. The CINC viewed the increase in U.S. military operations in Mogadishu as an unjustified expansion in the mission, i.e., “mission creep.” While USFOR Somalia was using the QRF within the limitations of the published “Terms of Reference,” for force protection and to meet emergency situations beyond UNOSOM II capabilities, CINCCENT was concerned about limiting the U.S. signature. Should the course of events have continued, CINCCENT saw no end to U.S. participation in the mission. With the deployment of TF Ranger, CINCCENT thought it necessary to receive clarification from JCS on the role of U.S. forces in Somalia. The CINCCENT assessment called for a review of the UN strategy that would either require the UN to “scale back its objectives” or require the U.S. to significantly “increase its commitment to underwrite this operation for an indefinite period.” This appears to be the first time a reassessment was called for to examine the two conflicting alternatives.

On 6 September, the U.S. State Department Liaison Office (USLO) in Mogadishu recommended to SECSTATE that additional U.S. forces in addition to TF Ranger (which was already in theater) were required in order to “counteract the continuing politico-military damage being absorbed by UNOSOM.” This message generated a great deal of controversy at State. Viewing an apparent lack of support by the U.S. government for the added forces, U.S. Special Envoy Robert Gosende proposed a new “disalignment” strategy. It outlined “a way to negotiate this recalcitrant group (SNA) out of the way at least temporarily if...not...completely.” It called for a cease-fire; the formation of an international commission to reinvestigate the events of 5 June (two commission members being representatives from Aideed’s own clan); an agreement by Aideed to go into exile - not house arrest - until the investigation was completed; and should a trial be recommended by the commission, then the trial would take place in Somalia; and lastly it called for the USC/SNA leadership to reconfirm its acceptance of the Addis Ababa accords (complete cease-fire, immediate cantonment of heavy weapons, and demobilization of militia).

U.S. inter-agency players apparently gave favorable consideration to this new strategy and called for the UN to promote a political dialogue in this direction. According to policy level authorities, during this same period, the SECDEF, after consulting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, elected to not approve COMUSFOR’s request for reinforcements, but to stay the coarse militarily in accordance with U.S. policy at the time.

COMUSFOR and CG, TF Ranger were unaware of the specifics of the policy review. Guidance from CENTCOM had not changed. TF Ranger operations continued and eventually ended with the Olympic Hotel raid on 3-4 October 1994. Following the raid, it was apparent that U.S. force participation in Somalia had lost the support of Congress and the American public. Events moved rapidly. U.S. policy changed and Ambassador Oakley was sent to Somalia to re-initiate the political dialogue with Aideed.
Summary

Aideed's escalation of violence in September can be attributed to a couple of key factors. First, Aideed probably perceived it to be in his interest to escalate the crisis to further split the coalition and weaken its resolve. There were indications that UNOSOM II operations in Mogadishu and in the rest of Somalia were seen by most Somalis as continuing signs that Aideed would ultimately lose his struggle with UNOSOM II. As a result, support for him within his clan was eroding. The other factor was the overt signal of UNOSOM II’s commitment to his capture, represented by the arrival of Task Force Ranger. The presence of this specialized force left little doubt as to UNOSOM II’s intention, or capability to bring him in.

Public opinion in the United States and elsewhere was deeply affected by the events of 3 October and the violence in Somalia during the month of September. Consequently, the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a Joint Task Force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV).

The United States asked Ambassador Robert Oakley to return to Somalia to restart negotiations with the USC/SNA. And, on 7 October 1993, President Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw from Somalia by 31 March 1994. The U.S. announcement was followed by similar announcements from Germany and Italy to depart the theater.

There were indications that support for UN operations in Somali was eroding before the events of 3 October. In a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State on 25 September, the Secretary General indicated that he had recognized this erosion of support, but was encouraged by a meeting held with major contributing nations on 16 September. He went on to suggest that to pull out of Somalia or surrender control of South Mogadishu to hostile forces would condemn Somalia to anarchy, and would humble the efforts of the United Nations and others for peace. Such a turn of events would have a devastating effect on UN efforts to develop and strengthen its capacity to contribute to a better world.

Strategic Reset (4 October 1993–January 1994)

General Background

Following the attack in the Olympic Hotel area in early October, Force Command was forced into a position of reevaluating its campaign to support theater humanitarian development. This was the result of aggressive political maneuvering by troop contributing nations, the most dominant being the United States. On 4 October, the Force Commander, in a memorandum to the SRSG, attempted to outline the next steps of the military in Somalia. He very clearly pointed out that the “...center of gravity both militarily and politically is Mogadishu. Therefore that will be the...main effort...” Clearly, Mogadishu and all that it represented to UNOSOM II was the operational center of gravity. However, given the number of casualties taken during the TF Ranger raid and the subsequent relief operation, the political will of the coalition to remain committed to the mission came into question; thus, the strategic center of gravity, the coalition itself, was affected by the events of 3 October.

Force Deployments and Planning Options

The Force Commander stated his intent to continue the deployment of the Indian Brigade to Baidoa and into the Belet Uen area. This would allow the force to continue the repatriation of the French Brigade, the realignment of the Zimbabwe and Moroccan forces in AORs Marka and Afgoye, and provide a battalion-sized force in Belet Uen for the GECOMFORSOM to support.
Additional plans for receiving and deploying augmenting forces from Egypt (an infantry battalion) and Pakistan (a division headquarters, a mechanized infantry battalion and a tank regiment) were outlined to show reinforcement of the main effort in Mogadishu. This course of action reflected that military operations would focus on "...stabilizing the security situation in Mogadishu, while continuing to maintain security in other AORs." The Force Command planning staff was continuing to finalize plans that would initiate offensive action against USC/SNA targets in Villa Somalia, the Digfer Hospital/SNA Enclave (Digfer Triangle) and 21 October Road (stadium area). Despite the losses incurred on 3 October, Force Command still believed its approach to stabilize Mogadishu, thereby enhancing the local environment for reconciliation, was sound and supported within the coalition. However, a very clear signal was sent to UNOSOM II during the U.S. President’s message to the American public on 7 October. It was during this speech that the decision to withdraw U.S. soldiers in their entirety within six months was announced.

Despite the very public announcement of the U.S. intention to withdraw from Somalia, both UN New York and local political leadership in Mogadishu did not immediately react. In fact, both the SRSG and the Under Secretary for PeaceKeeping Operations continued to push for Force Command to initiate some expansion into the Central Region. During meetings and briefings to the SRSG and in correspondence to UN New York, the Force Commander continued to maintain that expansion was not feasible in the near-term (six months). It appeared that pressure to employ the German contingent in support of an expansion force to Galcayo was behind continued pressure from the SRSG and UNDPKO.

In a message to UN New York on 28 October, the Force Commander clarified that force shifts in the Gialalassi-Belet Uen AOR would be from troops already in theater and did not represent any increased capability. However, this information was apparently taken as a Force Command commitment to expand. This misconception occurred in spite of the obvious retrenchment in Mogadishu, and the almost daily decisions of coalition partners to revisit their national commitment to the mission.

In October, Force Command continued to be involved in arbitrating basic command and control issues. In early October, the Egyptians stated that their National Command Authority would not authorize the subordination of their force in Mogadishu to an international division headquarters commanded by a Pakistani major general. This posed a challenge to the realignment of forces to support future operations in the city. Given that position, the Force Commander advised UN New York that should the Egyptians not accept the Pakistani headquarters, and the Pakistanis not finalize with UN headquarters the additional force structure planned for deployment into theater, then the requirement for any division headquarters should be re-looked.

**Stability in Kismayo**

At the same time, the commander of AOR Kismayo reported that the situation in the Lower Juba area and Kismayo [was] deteriorating. In a memorandum to the Force Commander, the Belgian commander advised that his forces were "...extended to the maximum feasible..." He requested reinforcement of at least one company of infantry, but more preferably three companies or a mechanized battalion. If this reinforcement was not made available, then the Belgian Brigade would be forced to realign its positions within the AOR. Specifically, the brigade commander indicated that he would be forced to thin the central portion of his AOR.

A review of situation reports during the period 31 August through mid-October shows that criminal or militia activity in the Lower Juba area was not excessive. Except for a report of gathering militia 21 September and inter-clan fighting (both in the Jilib-Jamaame area) during the period of 19–21 October, Kismayo and the surrounding area was reported stable.

In fact, the level of activity could be categorized as normal for the region. However, what the report caused was a diversion of resources and attention to an area outside of the "main effort" of Mogadishu.
In response to the brigade commander, the Force Command initially deployed a company of Zimbabwe infantry to Kismayo, OPCON to the Belgian Brigade. Later, the force was increased to two companies for a limited period. This delayed the occupation of AOR Afgoye by the Zimbabwe Battalion, and affected Force Command plans to conduct economy of force operations in the Moroccan area of responsibility. Without the complete Zimbabwe Battalion in Afgoye, the Moroccan commander was reluctant to extend his operations down to the coastal village of Baarawe. (This town had long been suspected of acting as an SNA port of entry for weapons and supplies).

U.S. Forces Augmentation

Shortly after the U.S. Presidential statement of 7 October 1993, which announced the augmentation of U.S. combat forces into theater to enhance the force protection capabilities of U.S./UN forces, the first heavy elements arrived aboard U.S. strategic airlift. Almost concurrently, the theater reach of the United Nations was bolstered by the arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. On 11 October, the carrier began support operations with air reconnaissance and “presence” sorties throughout the UNOSOM II area of responsibility. From the middle of October to the end of the month, additional U.S. forces deployed into theater raising the strength level of U.S. forces to over 7000. Two Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked U.S. Marine Expeditionary Units (special operations capable) also arrived in theater in mid-October. The operational utility of these forces gave USFORSOM the capability to reach out well beyond Mogadishu with U.S. combat power if required. The United States Central Command also deployed a Joint Task Force headquarters to assume command and control of the augmented QRF. Identified as JTF-Somalia, this additional headquarters assumed a high profile presence within the Embassy grounds.

UN - U.S. Policy Rift

Aideed himself recognized the U.S. policy change in early November 1993 when he stated that he would not attack U.S. forces unless forced to do so and that he was willing to allow the U.S. time to negotiate and mediate. During the deployment of the JTF, Aideed declared a unilateral cease-fire and released one Nigerian soldier and one U.S. soldier who had been held captive as a result of combat actions on 5 September and 3–4 October, respectively. With the declaration of a de facto cease-fire, political and military initiative moved to Aideed. In reality, this unilateral cease fire was required because of the high casualties sustained in his recent campaign especially in the 3-4 October conflict and strong questions over his leadership from within the SNA.

Further evidence of the weakening of U.S. commitment to UN operations in Somalia was demonstrated by the substance of the Oakley mission to Somalia in October–November 1993. According to a CENTCOM report at the time, the mission’s objective was to get Aideed and Ali Mahdi to deal with one another. The mission would stress the need to adhere to certain UN guidelines by removing roadblocks and technicals and permitting free movement of UN convoys. Both warlords would be instructed that if they failed to agree to this minimum requirement then the additional U.S. deployed forces (JTF SOM) would be used to ensure the LOCs were opened and safe. There was an implication that the UN political effort was not to hinder the new U.S. initiative. The U.S. appeared to be prepared to shift the political effort from the UN to other African nations and work through them for a solution if required.

This shift in policy resulted in several major problems for Force Command. First, by placing very restrictive criteria for use of force multipliers present in theater (almost exclusively U.S.), the United States had reduced the probability of any military offensive action against USC/SNA militia concentrations. Force Command staff was placed in the situation of nominating operations and targets to the Force Commander, concurrently preparing concept of operations for USFORSOM transmission to U.S. Central Command and then waiting to see if the operation or target would be supported by U.S. forces. Therefore, operations in Villa Somalia, the Digfer Triangle area, or along 21 October Road became more
difficult to coordinate within the coalition and the probability of receiving permission to execute was minimal. This apparent general reluctance to put U.S. troops in harms way should not have been surprising, considering the post 3 October atmosphere in the United States and the mounting pressure from Congress to immediately withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia. Secondly, with the initiation of the Oakley mission to Mogadishu in mid-October, U.S. policy was perceived to have assumed the dominant role in theater whether true or not.

The “shift” of policy leadership in the political arena resulted in a type of military paralysis. With no firm direction coming from UN New York or the SRSG (who also had to adjust to the policy shift), Force Command was placed in a position of accepting a unilateral cease-fire during a period when Aideed was arguably at his weakest. According to Somali sources, the fighting in the 3 October Ranger Raid had disastrous effects within the Habr Gedir/USC/SNA ranks. Most families had experienced casualties. Aideed’s position within the clan was believed to be deteriorating. With no firm political guidance to anchor itself to, Force Command reverted to predominantly garrison activities in Mogadishu and external support missions in the interior AORs.

Movement in Mogadishu was restricted to areas where the population had openly supported UNOSOM II in the past, or areas currently assessed as neutral. Additionally, UNOSOM II announced publicly (through Radio Maanta, helicopter dispersed flyers and through the UN newspaper MAANTA) in November that it would be neutral in any inter-clan conflicts that erupted in the city. These actions were taken in order to avoid placing UN soldiers into positions which unnecessarily put them at risk. Secondly, these actions were deemed appropriate to support the U.S. led peace effort. On several occasions, the UN (through the U.S. Liaison Office) notified the USC/SNA of its plans to move forces so as to avoid a “misunderstanding.” While this action may have helped to avoid confrontation with Aideed, it caused some problems with other clans (notably, the Abgal), perceiving that they were being abandoned by the U.S. and UNOSOM II. This was particularly aggravating to the predominantly pro-Mahdi Abgals who had vocally and consistently supported the UNOSOM II effort in Mogadishu since the 5 June ambush.

**Coalition Repatriations**

Throughout October, the French Brigade continued its preparations for strategic withdrawal of its forces. Coordination with the Indians was begun early in the month. However, problems with terrain management within Mogadishu started to occur because of the concurrent deployment into theater of the U.S. JTF. Due to the space required for large formations of vehicles by all parties, the Force Command staff had to resolve basing conflicts between UNOSOM II forces and the JTF.

Concurrent with the redeployment planning of the French, the Belgian contingent was planning for their withdrawal in early December. That required advanced planning on the part of the Force Command staff with regard to AOR Kismayo. Discussions were initiated with the Indian Brigade to expand their AOR in December to assume control of the combined AOR of Baidoa-Kismayo.

The new Indian deployment decision had another major impact. On 18 October, the Force Commander sent a cable to UN New York, proposing the German contingent move from Belet Uen to Baledogle in AOR Baidoa. The cable acknowledged that the original rationale for deploying the element to Belet Uen no longer existed. Citing early successes in disarmament operations in the Central Region, the announced early departures of the French and Belgian contingents and the recent decision by the United States to withdraw from Somalia required a reassessment of the Force Logistical concept. Force Command believed that relocating the German Composite Force to a more central location in Somalia would better support the Force after the 31 March withdrawal of the United States logistics structure. The cable acknowledged that some contingent reconfiguration would be required, but the location in theater would not violate the Chapter VI restriction for use of the German force. This plan would not be accepted by Bonn and would lead to that government’s decision to withdraw from the mission.
Impact of New Mandate Deliberations

In November, Force Command paid very close attention to the efforts in UN New York to craft a new resolution. Much political capital was apparently being spent as the Secretary General traveled to Somalia and the Horn of Africa to seek consensus and ascertain political positions of key players in the region. Specific emphasis was being placed on the “…preparation of a detailed plan with concrete steps setting out UNOSOM’S future concerted strategy…” On 29 October 1993, the Security Council advanced a draft resolution (878) which extended the UNOSOM II mandate until mid-November. This extension was given to allow the Secretary General sufficient time to prepare and submit a report on the latest developments in Somalia and the attendant impacts on future decisions of the mandate.

The extension also served to prolong the paralysis of Force Command military operations. During the first week of November, the Force Commander, accompanied by the Chief of Operations Branch and a logistics representative, returned to UN New York to outline options for Force Command as it awaited the decision of the Security Council on a new resolution. In the briefing presented to senior UN officials, the Force Commander recommended that the mission be changed to a traditional Chapter VI operation rather than maintaining a Chapter VII focus. It was believed that with the departure of the U.S. forces, and the loss of U.S. force multipliers, the Force would not be capable of coercive disarmament, and it would be severely constrained logistically. Also, the recent political activity in Mogadishu did not allow for the aggressive type of action needed to contain increasing incidents of limited militia activity and banditry. (Since the USC/SNA declared a unilateral cease-fire, situation reports showed almost daily occurrences of small-scale action directed against UN installations or personnel). Weapons sweeps in Mogadishu had all but ceased.

While at UN New York, Force Command officials received three options for their consideration when they returned to Mogadishu. The options presented a range of troop strengths and parameters for employment. The options outlined strengths which mirrored the current mandate configuration of approximately 28,000 soldiers, an option of 15,000 soldiers and an option of 5,000 soldiers. Additionally, Force Command was asked to develop and provide an assessment of a fourth option. That option would address the complete withdrawal of forces from Somalia.

Future Force Options

These options represented the full range of possibilities for military employment in Somalia, from the retention of Chapter VII peace enforcement operations to the traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping status of UNOSOM I or other UN missions. Option 1 established the troop strength at 28,000 and retained coercive disarmament as a viable option for the Force. Under this option, the UN would be required to replace all force multipliers lost with the U.S. pullout. Additionally, new troop contributing nations would have to be found to offset the loss of soldiers from the nations already announcing their departure. Option 1 represented the status quo (present structure of the force). Option 2 provided a troop strength of approximately 16,000. While less robust than Option 1, it retained a characterization of Chapter VII, but specifically eliminated coercive disarmament as a specified task. Force Command would resort to overt military action only in instances of self-defense, along the lines of traditional Chapter VI missions. Emphasis would be placed on supporting the humanitarian and political efforts of the mission. Success in Mogadishu would depend on successful dialogue with the USC/SNA.

Option 3 reduced Force Command to a field strength of approximately 5,000 soldiers. While more capable than UNOSOM I, its mandate would be very similar to that of UNOSOM II. It would be charged to maintain key ports of arrival (sea and air) in Mogadishu and other areas. This option presupposed cooperation with local Somali leadership to assist in providing a secure environment. This option was clearly an intentional shift to a traditional Chapter VI mission.
Option 4, which Force Command was requested to develop by the Secretary General during his October visit to Somalia, represented a complete withdrawal from Somalia. The withdrawal would be accomplished concurrent with the U.S. pullout. Given the size of the effort it would extend beyond the 31 March 1994 deadline established for U.S. participation. (An internal assessment by the Force Command Joint Movements Control Center estimated that a complete withdrawal initiated in January 1994 would be completed in June 1994). However, it remained Force Command’s assessment that a complete withdrawal by UN forces would result in a collapse of the relief and development effort. It could lead back to the agony of civil war and complete anarchy of August–December, 1992.

Force Command reviewed each option as it was outlined in the Secretary General’s report of 12 November 1993 to the Security Council. Option 1 was viewed by Force Command as the least likely of all options. First, it was dependent on retaining a status quo of 28,000 soldiers in Somalia. The UN effort to achieve similar force levels had proven to be difficult during the preceding months of the current mandate. In fact, the troop strength of 28,000 was not reached until October. It has since fallen off with recent contingent repatriations. Second, with the announced troop reductions, over two brigade equivalents would have to be resourced just to retain a five brigade structure. This does not account for a sixth brigade which would be needed for expansion/disarmament operations in the Central and Northern regions. Third, resuming coercive disarmament operations was viewed as highly unlikely given the very vocal opposition from within the coalition, their governments and the world community at large.

Option 2 was viewed as the option the current political and military dynamic was driving toward. It was felt that the troop level might realistically stabilize at 15,000 as national contingents committed or withdrew from Somalia as the mandate was renewed. Additionally, adopting a more defensive posture would be politically appealing to the contingents left behind after 31 March 1994. It recognized a shift to voluntary disarmament, and supported refugee repatriation and humanitarian development themes.

Option 3 was viewed as insufficiently resourced to accomplish the stated mission of sea and airport security. A 5,000 man force would not be able to effectively control anything outside the immediate Mogadishu area. Trying to control/secure the seaports of Baarawe, Bossasso and Kismayo would require additional logistical and command and control capabilities not present in a single brigade. For example, the strength of the Pakistani Brigade or Indian Brigade in theater in November 1993 approached the planning figure of 5,000. Neither brigade would be capable of executing a “region” security mission as envisioned in Option 3.

Option 4 was viewed as insupportable from a political standpoint. Additionally, the complete withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia would place at risk residual UN agencies or non-governmental organizations. Further, it was believed to guarantee a return to civil war and mass starvation.

On 16 November, the Force Commander provided some feedback to the SRSG and UN New York regarding these options. More importantly, he addressed the lack of political policy and its effect on the future military situation in Somalia. He raised concerns about the ability to support the repatriation of any forces after the U.S. withdrawal on 31 March 1994. It was Force Command’s position that “...final deployment/disposition of forces in theater and the degree of disarmament enforced in the country are totally dependent on decisions...” that were required immediately. Stated firmly, the Force Commander said, “...steps must be taken now to shape the force and security environment prior to U.S. withdrawal. But, Force Command is hesitant to revert to coercive disarmament methods if the future mission will return to Chapter VI or a restricted Chapter VII (OPTION 2)...”

On 16 November 1993, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 885. The resolution established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the armed attacks on UNOSOM II UN peacekeepers on 5 June. This in effect stopped the search for Aideed. This combined with the unilateral cease-fire ended the
armed conflict between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA. This cease-fire would remain in place through the withdrawal of U.S. forces at the end of March 1994.

The New UNOSOM II Strategy

As a result of UNSCR 886, the SRSG put out a draft strategy for consideration in early December. This new strategy would be based on a regional approach and attempt to better coordinate the efforts of all UN agencies acting under the umbrella of UNOSOM II. The new regional approach identified five “points of access” through which resources would flow into the country. Those points of access were Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, Bossasso and a general point of access, the northwest. For Force Command, this “new” strategy appeared to be more of the same. UNOSOM II was trying to be everywhere at once. Unfortunately, this meant that the Force would be required to be everywhere at once as well.

The new strategy proposed looking at a force deployment of two brigades/seven battalions in Mogadishu, a brigade in Baidoa/Kismayo, a brigade of two battalions in the Bossasso area and the possibility of a fifth brigade for expansion. This fifth brigade would expand from Belet Uen to Galcayo, logistically supported from a log base in Mogadishu. This concept caused some consternation within the Force Command staff. From April 1993 until December the military component had pressed the civilian leadership to address a very clear set of regional priorities from which force levels could be applied in a rational, logistically supportable manner.

While acknowledging that the 13 December draft was only a beginning, it did have some points which were disturbing to military planners. The document acknowledged the downsizing of the force through national repatriations. It also had imbedded assumptions (such as reconfigured forces, self-sustaining organizations, infrastructure upgrades to support theater logistics, etc). However, it assumed a greater force burden by proposing what appeared to be a simultaneous fanning out of the force to unoccupied areas (the northeast and central regions). The draft document stated “...UNOSOM II has no intention of leaving Mogadishu or even reducing its presence at this time...” Yet, in order to generate sufficient force into the interior to support the new regional strategy, the obvious place from which to draw forces was Mogadishu. Positioning a brigade of two battalions in Bossasso failed to sufficiently highlight the challenge for an independent logistical system to support that troop level. Ideally, this force would be self-sufficient (the draft acknowledged this point). Self-sufficiency implied either taking a currently deployed force such as the Italians, and completely redeploying that force north, or securing a new troop commitment from a larger, developed nation not currently participating in UNOSOM II. Neither option seemed feasible in the near-term.

On 15 December, the Force Commander responded to the draft document in a memorandum to the SRSG. While calling it a good initial framework, he insisted on “...more specificity... on the humanitarian and political side before we recommend specific force levels for each region...” In short, the military required a vision of the end state on which to develop a concept of operations. The Force Commander further stated: “Without clear definition, military objectives and force levels cannot be properly defined. The current planning process has failed to determine these objectives. Force Command can only provide analysis based on geographic characteristics. This approach leaves us prone to committing the same planning errors of last February as the five brigade strategy in UNSCR 814 was developed without realistic assessments of supportability, clear military objectives, and a coordinated and agreed upon end state....” Simply stated, the new strategy asked the Force to do as much, and possibly a great deal more, with less force capability. This was the same situation the Force Command experienced when it assumed a larger military mission from UNITAF with what could arguably be called a less capable force. Based on this response by Force Command and a strategy meeting on 17 December, the SRSG sent further guidance to the Force Commander regarding the evolving strategy. In a memorandum dated 18 December, he asked Force Command to develop “...further details on the military implications of the strategy options being considered.” He also acknowledged that additional work was required on the new strategy.
With regard to the regional approach, the political staff decided not to specify the quantity of force to be employed in each region. Instead, the memorandum gave broad planning guidance for the Force Command staff to assess. The SRSG also asked Force Command to conduct contingency planning for the Mogadishu area. Specifically, he asked for military options regarding reduced force presence in Mogadishu with the mission headquarters in residence; an option with Mogadishu garrisoned with a small military force (focused on security of the ports infrastructure, sea and air); and an option for the complete withdrawal from Mogadishu.

As mid-December approached, the repatriation of U.S. forces ashore in Somalia began. Concurrently, the Belgian Brigade completed its handover of the Kismayo AOR to the Indian Brigade. While Force Command’s attention was focused on the interior AORs and force redeployments, it was experiencing some successes in Mogadishu. Since the unilateral cease-fire was initiated by the USC/SNA in October, no serious incidents of fighting had occurred in Mogadishu. There were frequent small incidents of clan violence, but nothing which threatened the security in the city, UNOSOM II personnel or its bases. This lull allowed certain civil-military programs, such as “Food for Work” and “Food for Trash,” to flourish.

December also brought about a major realignment of forces in Mogadishu. With the repatriation of the U.S. forces and the realignment of the interior AORs, Force Command was required to re-look the command and control relationships of the contingents in the city. Also, with the departure of the UNLSC, base security for Brown and Root at key logistics bases, local LOC and air and sea port security needed to be addressed in a deliberate manner.

As the Force contemplated the evolving strategy, changes had to be considered in the basic mission. The Force Commander viewed expansion as unrealistic due to current and projected force levels and resources. Additionally, it had been made very clear that political reconciliation would continue to be the primary focus of UNOSOM II to achieve security goals. Concurrent to the increased emphasis on the political effort would be a shift from security provided by the Force Command military presence to security provided by a rejuvenated Somali police force.

The command structure put into place in Mogadishu to facilitate new requirements for the evolving security situation in the city did not relieve Force Command of its burden as a tactical headquarters. There were still four battalion headquarters (Bangladesh, U.A.E., Malaysian and Nepalese) and two brigades (Egyptian and Pakistani) with tactical missions in the city. They each reported directly to the Force Commander. This resulted from a national reluctance by coalition nations to accept subordination to other coalition forces. A prime example of this was the reluctance of the U.A.E. government to support a Force Command decision to relocate its battalion from the new port area to an area south of the city. (The U.A.E. force was anticipating a mission change from Chapter VII to Chapter VI status). Therefore, Force Command, rather than being able to delegate responsibility for daily tactical operations and issues in the city to a subordinate controlling headquarters would continue to serve as the theater headquarters and the controlling tactical headquarters in Mogadishu.

In December, the UN assumed the quick reaction force mission. With the departure of a U.S. infantry battalion in mid-December, the Malaysian Battalion, which proved itself extremely capable during the heavy fighting in August–October, accepted responsibility for the QRF mission. The Malaysian Battalion would have TACON of a Pakistani tank troop for QRF missions in the city. The Malaysian APCs and Pakistani tanks gave the QRF armored protection and firepower, capabilities missing from the U.S. light infantry QRF. In addition to a city focus, the battalion task force was given the mission to provide an out of sector response to Southern Somalia, augmented by Zimbabwean and Pakistani companies.

Turning over the QRF mission to a coalition force signaled the beginning of the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Somalia. It also demonstrated the special confidence that Force Command had in its coali-
tion. U.S. Forces still provided support to the QRF in terms of aviation, attack helicopter support, SOF liaison and AC–130 gun ship support, as well as the off-shore Marine force. Other contingents in the city were given revised missions as well. The Egyptian force, which had grown to brigade strength, assumed responsibility for AOR Medina. It included both the seaport and the airport. They also assisted in securing the approaches to the Embassy Compound. The Pakistani Brigade, in AOR Mogadishu, would assume responsibility for Sword Base and Victory Base from U.S. Forces and assumed responsibility for K-4 from the Bangladesh Battalion. The Bangladesh assumed Hunter Base from the U.S., took over contract logistics security and replaced the Turkish Company as the Embassy Compound security force. While this realignment supported the repatriation efforts of the UN and assured continued security in the city, it also was very time consuming to negotiate. As had been the case in previous operations in Mogadishu, contingents maintained a "right of refusal" to directives from the Force Commander. Frankly, if the directive was not in concert with a national objective or perception, it was not supported by the contingent, regardless of the directive's validity, urgency or operational necessary. Unity of effort and the Force Commander's ability to command the Force continued to be eroded by coalition political influences from outside the Somalia Theater of operations.

However, as calm as the security situation appeared, Force Command received recurring reports of threats to non-Muslims. On 27 December, a large explosive device was detonated just outside the entrance to the new port. While there were no injuries as a result of the blast, it confirmed the suspicions of senior leaders that the potential for terrorist-like bombings remained very real. As a result, increased emphasis was placed on installation security.

**Change of Command**

On 20 January 1994, Lt Gen Bir handed over command of UNOSOM II Force Command to Lt Gen Aboo of Malaysia, marking an end to another phase of UNOSOM II's mission in Somalia. The withdrawal of the U.S., Belgium, France, Germany and Italy was the final chapter in the participation of combat forces from western industrialized nations and placed the burden of combat multipliers and logistical support squarely on the shoulders of the United Nations.

**UN Security Council Renewal of UNOSOM II**

On 4 February 1994, the Security Council through UNSCR 897, approved the Secretary General's recommendation for the continuation of UNOSOM II till 31 May 1994. It revised UNOSOM II's mandate for the following:

- Assist the Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa agreements, particularly in their cooperative disarmament and cease-fire efforts;

- Protect major ports and airports and essential infrastructure;

- Provide humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country;

- Assist in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system;

- Help with the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons;

- Protect UN installations, equipment, and personnel and NGOs.

The resolution authorized a troop strength of 22,000. The mission remained one of Chapter VII but coercive disarmament was not part of its mandate. Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting viable institutions and reconstructing their country, the Council approved that international resources should be directed first to those regions where security was being re-established.
CHAPTER V

USFORSOM MISSION, ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

Mission

The mission of U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) was defined by the Terms of Reference (TOR) for U.S. Forces Somalia, dated April 1993, and CENTCOM OPORD Serial 001 (Operation Continue Hope). The CENTCOM OPORD directed COMUSFORSOM to support UNOSOM II in implementing the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 814, IAW the U.S. TOR. The TOR constituted “an agreement between the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (USCINCENT) and the Commander, United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for staffing, organization, and operation of U.S. Forces Somalia.” Under the TOR, USCINCENT tasked USFORSOM to “perform duties as assigned by USCINCENT and Commander, UNOSOM II pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 814 (UNSCR 814) 1993.” In essence, the mission of USFORSOM was to:

“CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA IN SUPPORT OF UNOSOM II TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AS OUTLINED WITHIN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE.”

The TOR further outlined specific tasks for the major subordinate elements comprising USFORSOM: the Logistics Support Command, Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and the Intelligence Support Element (ISE).

Logistics Support Command was tasked to: (1) provide combat service support to UNOSOM II until relieved by UNOSOM II donors or UN contract services; (2) provide command, control, and theater level management of common item logistics support; (3) provide selected common item support, common user services support, and distribution of bulk POL; (4) perform other logistics functions as outlined in paragraph 7 of the TOR. Although intended to provide theater level general support, the mission of the support command soon expanded to include direct support to UNOSOM II forces. Many nations failed to provide forces with an organic direct support logistics capability as required by the UN Guide to Contributing Nations. This was particularly true in terms of transport capability. Logistics Support Command, as the only unit in theater with those capabilities, had to make up for those shortcomings.

The QRF provided “a U.S. combat capability for rapid response in support of the Commander, UNOSOM II to counter specific threats that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II units.” The unique capabilities of this force made it a lynch pin in most operations conducted by UNOSOM II forces in Mogadishu. UN forces came to rely exclusively on QRF attack aviation assets, and the capability to rapidly reinforce them as a protective umbrella.

The ISE provided intelligence support to UNOSOM II and USFORSOM. It served as the sole source of all U.S. intelligence information gathered and processed for UNOSOM II and USFORSOM. The ISE and U.S. members of the UNOSOM II staff provided the only reliable and consistent intelligence collection, management, and analysis capability in theater.

The CINC’s intent as outlined in the CENTCOM order was to: (1) ensure successful UNOSOM II operations within the UNITAF AOR; and (2) to drawdown the level of U.S. troop commitment from an initial strength of 4000 to 1400 by end of 1993, with all U.S. forces gone by January 1995. Logistics forces were to drawdown as contractors or UNOSOM II logistics units took over.
The operation was envisioned to be executed in four phases. During Phase I, UNITAF would transfer command and control to UNOSOM II, deactivate and redeploy. In Phase II, the DFC would assume command of all U.S. forces remaining in theater as COMUSFORSOM. USFORSOM would support UNOSOM II operations in the former UNITAF AOR and, when directed transition to an offshore QRF. During Phase III, U.S. forces remaining in theater would continue to support operations in the former UNITAF AOR, and reduce forces as civil institutions or other forces took over. Phase IV centered on redeployment of remaining U.S. forces.

Although no specific schedule was established, some believed that by August 1993 the QRF could transition to an off-shore/over the horizon presence. Such a QRF could then reinforce when conditions warranted and the U.S. National Command Authority directed such action. The ambush of Pakistani Forces on 5 June, and the combat operations and events which followed, significantly altered this concept. It quickly became clear that urban guerilla warfare with the USC/SNA militia in many instances exceeded the capability and will of many coalition contingents. As a result, the role of the QRF and the coalition’s reliance on it significantly expanded. Thoughts of an off-shore/over the horizon QRF were shelved.

The drawdown of the Logistics Support Command was directly tied to the arrival of appropriate logistics units from UNOSOM II participating nations, or UN contract services. The lack of coalition logistics units and the onset of combat operations in early June made the Support Command an indispensable part of UNOSOM II’s capability to sustain forces in theater.

In the case of both the QRF and the LSC, the conditions for downsizing the U.S. presence in Somalia were never really met. Instead, events in Somalia led to an expanded U.S. presence by October 1993. In hindsight, both U.S. and UN military planners under UNITAF and UNOSOM II had clearly underrated the intentions and will of the Aideed led USC/SNA militia. When UNOSOM II assumed control of operations in Somalia on 4 May, the worst that anyone expected was large scale street riots and random sniping experienced by UNITAF. There was little anticipation of the sophisticated, well planned ambushes and harassing mortar and RPG fire which plagued UNOSOM II operations from 5 June through October 1993.

With the arrival of the Joint Task Force Somalia (JTFSOM), in October 1993, and modification of U.S. policy, USFORSOM revised its mission. USFORSOM OPLAN 001 stated the mission as follows:

“COMUSFORSOM CONDUCTS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO HOSTILE THREAT AND ATTACKS THAT EXCEED UNOSOM II MILITARY FORCE CAPABILITIES; PROVIDES FORCE PROTECTION FOR U.S. FORCES AND LOGISTICS BASES; AND ASSISTS UNOSOM II FORCES IN SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATION.”

According to CENTCOM FRAGO 001 to OPORD Serial 001, CINCCENT’s intent was “to create a secure environment for United Nations missions and objectives through diplomatic solutions rather than purely military solutions.” The U.S. government’s policy was “to avoid military confrontation with factional forces, while taking all appropriate actions to protect our forces.” This change in mission/policy and the President’s announcement to withdraw all U.S. Forces by 31 March 1994 had a profound effect on UNOSOM II operations. UN forces entered a period of military paralysis. The restrictive criteria for use of combat multipliers, almost exclusively U.S., reduced the willingness of UNOSOM forces to undertake offensive action against USC/SNA militia. In addition, other key nations such as Germany and Italy announced their intentions to withdraw military forces from Somalia prior to the U.S. withdrawal. The loss of U.S. combat multipliers and the erosion of the coalition force’s will to undertake offensive operations to fulfill the Chapter VII mandate led the UN Force Commander to seek a change in the mission. In November, the Force Commander recommended to the Secretary General that the mission be changed from Chapter VII, back to Chapter VI.
Organization

USFORSOM consisted of the Support Force, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) when directed, the Intelligence Support Element (ISE) when directed, and other augmentation forces, as required and when approved by USCINCCENT. The Support Force consisted of personnel assigned to the UNOSOM II staff, and the combat support/service support personnel assigned to the Logistics Support Command Somalia (LSCS). The LSCS was subsequently referred to as the United Nations Logistics Support Command (UNLSC). The QRF consisted of all U.S. combat units, the special operations forces, and other support units assigned or attached to the QRF. In addition, a Tactical Airlift Control Element (TALCE) and a Medical Support Team (MST) were also assigned to support airlift and MEDEVAC requirements.

The force package provided by the United States to UNOSOM II was not as robust or heavy as UNITAF. This was particularly significant for the Logistics Support Command. UNLSC, which essentially had the same mission as its predecessor, LSCS, did not possess the same capability. Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 3 transport units were sent to Somalia to replace the fully manned transport units of UNITAF. Military Police assets were reduced from a military police battalion to a reinforced company. Consequently, as much as 40% of the UNLSC’s available transport sat parked due to a lack of drivers. Engineer capability was also significantly reduced. A reinforced Combat Support Element (CSE), essentially an engineer company, replaced UNITAF’s engineer brigade.

The QRF and ISE were tailored to meet the reduced mission of U.S. combat and intelligence units in Somalia. The QRF, which provided the rapid response capability demanded in the Somali theater of operations, was well tailored for its mission. It consisted of a light infantry battalion, an aviation task force with four (4) AH–1 cobras, eight (8) OH–58 scout helicopters, fifteen (15) UH–60 Blackhawk helicopters, and a forward support battalion.

However, as the combat situation escalated in June and July, force protection became a significant concern for Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia (COMUSFORSOM). According to policy level authorities after the passage of UNSCR 837 and in consultation with UNOSOM II Force Command, the UN requested additional forces to assist UNOSOM addressing the deterioration of security in Mogadishu. After extensive consideration by the U.S., the request was at first denied. By August, COMUSFORSOM assessed that the situation required heavy forces (mechanized infantry units) in order to provide adequate force protection to U.S. logistics convoys and installations. COMUSFORSOM requested mecha-
nized task force composed of: three Bradley companies; a light infantry company; a headquarters company with organic scouts, mortars, maintenance and a fire support element; a civil affairs team, one combat engineer company; two counter-intelligence teams; and an air cavalry troop with four UH–1s and six OH–58s, in late August. After consultation with CINCCENT, this request was reduced to a mechanized infantry team consisting of a Bradley company, a tank platoon, a 105 mm howitzer battery, and a direct support logistics unit. This request was formally submitted in early September.

According to policy level authorities, this request was brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 23 and was the subject of later discussions between them. The Chairman made the Secretary aware that CINCCENT had deleted the request for artillery. In accordance with Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman recommended that the request be approved after receiving recommendations on both sides of the issue from appropriate members of the Joint Staff. He also discussed the issue with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, especially the Chief of Staff of the Army, who concurred with his recommendation.

After consulting with the Chairman, the Secretary elected not to approve the request at that time. At the time, U.S. policy in Somalia was to reduce its military presence and its role in UNOSOM, not increase it. This particular request, which was characterized as providing additional troops and equipment for force protection, was not considered essential by policy level authorities to carry out the mission. This assessment in Washington differed significantly from that of the Commander in the field. As a result, this request was not approved at the policy level until the President’s decision to deploy additional combat forces was made after the Task Force Ranger raid of 3–4 October.

In retrospect, it appears that the U.S. policy to reduce the U.S. presence in Somalia was the key factor influencing decisions to deny augmentation of the USFORSOM. In the eyes of many policy makers and the American people, the withdrawal of UNITAF had signaled the end of U.S. involvement in the relief effort in Somalia. The residual force left in place was intended only to bolster the capability of UNOSOM II during the early period of its existence. From a U.S. policy perspective, long-term U.S. intentions were to get UNOSOM II on its feet, withdraw from Somalia, and reinforce UN forces should the need arise. Few, if any, military or civil leaders could foresee events in Somalia after 4 May.

USFORSOM quickly expanded following President Clinton’s 7 October 1993 announcement that the U.S. would send additional troops to help stabilize the situation in Somalia. The Joint Task Force Somalia (JTF SOM) replaced the brigade size QRF by the end of October. The JTF consisted of the former QRF, which was now augmented by an armored task force (2 tank and 2 mechanized companies), an additional light infantry battalion, and a construction engineer battalion. The Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) was incorporated into a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) which also included a Special Operations Wing (SOW). In addition, an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) and an aircraft carrier were stationed off the coast of Somalia to provide support. The force assembled was robust, but primarily deterrent in nature and in its operations. U.S. policy significantly restricted its use.

**Command and Control**

The Terms of Reference specified the command relationship for U.S. forces under UNOSOM II. COMUSFORSOM was given operational control (OPCON) of the U.S. Logistics Support Command, also known as UN Logistics Support Command (UNLSC), and the members of the U.S. contingent serving on the UNOSOM II staff. The U.S. Quick Reaction Force and CISE, on the other hand, remained OPCON to CINCCENT. The QRF was then designated TACON (tactical control) to COMUSFORSOM for specific missions and operations, while the CISE was in direct support. This command relationship modified standard command relationships as outlined in Joint Pub 1-02.
The published non-standard command relationship established for the QRF, however, was not implemented in practice. CINCCENT in effect exercised OPCON of all U.S. forces, to include the QRF, through COMUSFORCSOM. However, missions for U.S. forces exceeding those outlined in the Terms of Reference had to be approved by CINCCENT before execution.

The terms of reference provided adequate flexibility for COMUSFORCSOM to employ the QRF in emergency situations. Tactical control (TACON) of the QRF was automatically delegated to COMUSFORCSOM in two situations per the terms of reference: (1) “Deployment for normal training exercises within Somalia;” and (2) When “situations within Somalia...exceed the capability of UNOSOM II forces and require emergency employment of immediate combat power for a limited period or show of force operations.” Any tasking for the QRF beyond these guidelines required approval of CINCCENT.

When it came to the conduct of critical, yet non-emergency combat operations which exceeded either the capability or will of UNOSOM II forces, the TOR proved quite restrictive. The requirement to gain approval from CINCCENT, in some instances, had the effect of temporarily paralyzing UN ground operations in Somalia. During the months of June, July, and August, the coalition, began to lose its will to carry out the necessary offensive actions (i.e., patrols, cordon and searches) to protect the force and maintain a secure environment in Mogadishu. It became increasingly important to authorize the QRF to perform these “routine” type operations in the immediate areas of U.S. bases in order to protect U.S. forces. In addition, coalition forces throughout this period also came to depend on QRF aviation support for operations they did conduct. The situation eventually reached the point where coalition forces would not conduct an operation without QRF aviation support. These factors combined with rising levels of violence increased the profile and signature of U.S. forces in Somalia. Seeking to maintain a low U.S. profile, military authorities above COMUSFORCSOM became more reluctant to approve QRF operations at the time he believed they were needed to prop up the coalition.

The CISE provided direct support to UNOSOM II, consistent with U.S. requirements on releasing information and intelligence. CISE assets were retained under U.S. supervision and control at all times.
This relationship, which proved very effective, was facilitated by the assignment of U.S. officers in key intelligence positions on the UNOSOM II staff. Their presence helped provide releasable information to UNOSOM II.

Although the command relationships actually practiced in Somalia were in line with Joint Pub 1-02, the contradiction between what was in writing (the terms of reference), and what was executed clouded lines of control, and created friction within the command. On arrival, Commander, Joint Task Force Somalia (COMJTFSOM) assumed OPCON of the QRF and all ground combat elements deployed ashore. The UNLSC and U.S. members of the UNOSOM II staff remained OPCON to COMUSFOR-SOM. Like the QRF, JTFSOM was OPCON to CINCCENT and TACON to COMUSFORSOM in accordance with the terms of reference. However, the CINC’s intent to continue to exercise OPCON of all U.S. forces through COMUSFORSOM may not have been clearly understood. It appeared that JTFSOM initially operated in accord with the command relationships outlined in the terms of reference. This gave the appearance of parallel lines of command and control especially at the staff level. This situation resolved itself when COMUSFORSOM relinquished his UN responsibilities, and assumed direct command of JTFSOM.

In retrospect, the standard command relationships as outlined in Joint Pub 1-02 and the TOR would have been sufficient in Somalia. Joint Pub 1-02 establishes the CINC’s inherent operational control of all U.S. forces assigned in his AOR, as the combatant commander. It further permits a CINC to exercise OPCON through a subordinate commander, such as COMUSFORSOM. The TOR placed sufficient limitations on the authority of COMUSFORSOM to employ U.S. forces, so as to ensure that there would be no chance or impression of U.S. combat forces serving under the control of a non-U.S. commander.
CHAPTER VI

USFORSOM MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF UNOSOM II

THE QUICK REACTION FORCE

Mission and Capabilities

The mission of the QRF, as outlined in USFORSOM OPORD 1-93, dated 20 April, clearly reflected the Terms of Reference (TOR) and intent to demonstrate U.S. resolve to support UNOSOM II.

“WHEN DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES SOMALIA, THE U.S. QUICK REACTION FORCE WILL RESPOND TO HOSTILE THREATS AND ATTACKS THAT EXCEED UNOSOM II MILITARY FORCE CAPABILITIES AND ASSIST IN MILITARY ORIENTED OPERATIONS THAT ARE BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF UNOSOM II MILITARY FORCES.”

Specifically, the QRF was tasked to:

(1) on order conduct military operations to counter hostile threats and attacks which exceed the capability of UNOSOM II;

(2) serve as a reaction force in support of UNOSOM II forces;

(3) prepare to facilitate expansion of security throughout central and northern Somalia;

(4) on order, hand over QRF mission to an Amphibious Ready Group.

The QRF, with its light infantry battalion, aviation task force, and forward support battalion, was fully capable of executing its mission in the environment at transition time. The QRF possessed a wide range of operational capabilities which included the ability to conduct: air assault, cordon and search, search and attack, aerial attack by fire, ground and air security, ground and air reconnaissance, and show of force operations. This highly mobile force provided UNOSOM II the capability to rapidly project combat power throughout southern Somalia. However, as the situation in Somalia shifted from one focused on preventing banditry, to urban combat with organized militia forces, it became clear that a heavier mechanized element was required to augment the QRF. It was against this backdrop that 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light) assumed the quick reaction force mission for UNOSOM II on 4 May 1993.

Role of the U.S. QRF (Overview)

The QRF fundamentally served as the de facto theater level reserve for UNOSOM II. No other coalition force in theater possessed the flexibility, firepower and rapid deployment capability of this force. Consequently, over time the QRF (particularly the aviation assets) became a safety net for coalition forces in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia.

The use of the QRF in this role ebbed and flowed with the tactical situation, the will of the coalition to conduct military operations in Mogadishu, and the perceptions of U.S. policy makers (military and civilian). During the months of June, July, and August, the coalition, began to lose its will to carry out the necessary offensive actions (i.e., patrols, cordon and searches) to protect the force and maintain a secure environment in Mogadishu. During this period, the role of the QRF expanded in order to protect U.S. forces. With the
CINCCENT’s concurrence, the QRF conducted “routine” operations such as patrols, and cordon and searches in the immediate areas around U.S. bases. Coalition forces throughout this period also came to depend on QRF aviation support for operations they did conduct. The situation eventually reached the point where coalition forces in Mogadishu would essentially not conduct operations without QRF aviation support.

With the rising level of violence and increased profile of U.S. forces in June and July, the terms of reference which had appeared so flexible in May, proved more restrictive now. The TOR provided COMUSFORSOM the flexibility needed to effectively employ the QRF for training, show of force operations, and in situations requiring the emergency employment of combat power exceeding UNOSOM II’s capability. However, the more aggressive nature of UNOSOM II operations during this period required the support of QRF aviation assets in a more offensive role. This expanded role was outside the guidelines of the TOR. Consequently, COMUSFORSOM was required to gain CINCCENT’s approval of the concept of operations (CONOPS) for U.S. forces involved in each operation. By this time, senior U.S. military leaders, seeking to maintain a low U.S. profile, became more reluctant to approve QRF air operations at the time COMUSFORSOM believed they were needed to prop up the coalition and bolster its will. This situation significantly influenced UNOSOM II’s inability to fully seize the tactical initiative in Mogadishu.

**QRF Operations in Support of UNOSOM II**

**Show of Force (3–7 May 1993)**

UNOSOM II sought to demonstrate to the Somalis that there would be no lapse in resolve or capability as a result of the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. In order to drive that point home, the Force Commander directed AOR Commanders to conduct show of force (air and ground) operations throughout the UNOSOM II area of responsibility from 3–9 May. This was accomplished through a combination of military demonstrations and a public information campaign designed to emphasize to the Somali people the mission, resolve, and capability of UNOSOM II to help them [in] the effort to rebuild a safe and secure country.

The intent of this show of force was to clearly show that a seamless transition had occurred between UNITAF and UNOSOM II. Additionally, it was to demonstrate to the Somali people that the “...process of security, humanitarian relief, and political reconciliation... would continue and grow under UNOSOM II.” The Force Commander made it clear that the operations would show equal presence in both pro Aideed areas of the city and those areas controlled by Mahdi. This was designed to demonstrate UNOSOM II’s neutrality and impartiality.

U.S. forces played a vital part in these operations in Mogadishu. Elements of the QRF (TF 3-25 AVN), and the 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit, joined with armored elements, of the Italian Contingent, to conduct air and ground demonstrations from 3 to 7 May 1993. Increased patrolling by Pakistani forces, Italians, Turks and Somali police were also conducted.

QRF participation in the show of force operation included overflights of critical points in Mogadishu such as K4, the Milk Factory, Bakara Market, Little Tokyo, the Old Port, the New Port, Checkpoint 50, 21 October Road, and various cantonment areas and landing zone locations. The sorties were flown by AH–1, UH–60, and OH–58 aircraft. Additionally, two infantry companies from 1-22 IN were prepared to move by truck, on two hours notice to reinforce coalition forces in the city in accordance with the TOR, should the need arise. Members of the U.S. PSYOP Team printed special editions of the “ROJO” newspaper during the period 4–7 May 1993 which outlined the UNOSOM II charter. Radio and loudspeaker broadcasts were increased in conjunction with leaflet drops in selected locations throughout the city.

The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit presented a strong presence off the coast of Somalia and contributed to the show of force by providing Harrier jets to fly over Mogadishu and the surrounding area.
In no uncertain terms, Somalis understood the military strength of the United States was behind UNOSOM II. The message was equally received by members of the UN coalition.

**Kismayo Operations (9–20 May 1993)**

The show of force operation was executed aggressively and in a near flawless manner, but its effect on the Somali populace was uncertain. Less than seventy-two hours after assuming the mission from UNITAF, UNOSOM II faced its first major test. It came in the early morning hours of 7 May in Kismayo, the southern port city and seat of the resource rich Lower Juba River Valley.

That morning, a band of approximately 150 armed men attacked the city of Kismayo. The attack was a coordinated, three pronged assault oriented along the Jilib Kismayo road. In the process, they engaged elements of the Belgian Parachute Battalion. As a result of this confrontation, one Belgian officer was wounded and an estimated forty Somalis of the attacking force were either killed or wounded. An investigation of the incident revealed that SPM-SNA militia attacked Kismayo in an attempt to drive pro Morgan SPM out of town.

The test for UNOSOM II in Kismayo provided the opportunity to exercise the QRF’s capability to support the theater of operations with air and ground combat forces on short notice. COMUSFORSOM directed the deployment of the QRF to Kismayo at the request of the UNOSOM II Force Commander. The intent was to reinforce the Belgians through a show of force in the area northwest of the city.

At this time, the QRF was in the process of consolidating in Mogadishu. TF 3-25 AVN was preparing for its move from Baledogle to the airfield in Mogadishu. The infantry element of the QRF, 1-22 IN, had just completed its move to the University Compound from Marka after being relieved by the Pakistani Sind Battalion on 28 April 1993. Despite these operational distracters, the QRF deployed 1-22 IN, TF 3-25 AVN and 10th FSB to the Kismayo airfield from 9–10 May 1993 via C–130, a 420 km ground convoy and helicopters. Upon arrival, the QRF tactical operations center (TOC) collocated with the Belgian Brigade Headquarters.

The QRF and Belgian forces worked in close coordination with each other, exchanging plans and graphics. An area of operations northwest of Kismayo (AO Manistee) was established for the QRF operations that included the road from Kismayo to Afmadow. On 11–12 May 1993, 3-25 AVN scout weapons teams conducted a zone reconnaissance of AO Manistee. Canadian FLIR helicopters supported the QRF reconnaissance efforts in this area. In addition, QRF ground elements conducted reconnaissance patrols along the Kismayo–Afmadow Road 11–13 May 1993. AO Manistee was declared to be clear of hostile presence except for some abandoned militia training sites. On 14 May, TF 3-25 AVN provided lift support to a Belgian commando unit for an air assault operation into Afmadow. On that same day, 1-22 IN dispatched a truck mounted reaction force supported by an OH–58 scout helicopter to investigate a report of militia or bandit activity along the coast road south of Kismayo. A camp of armed Somalis was located and 18 Somalis were captured, five of whom were identified as leaders and evacuated to Mogadishu for questioning.

In the meantime, Belgian forces prepared to conduct a sweep outside Kismayo, toward the town of Goob Uen where the hostile militia attack originated. To do so required the Belgians to hand over responsibility for security in Kismayo to the QRF. The purpose of the handover was to make available requisite Belgian forces for the conduct of the sweep. The handover of Kismayo to the QRF occurred on 13 May. The QRF maintained security in Kismayo until completion of the Belgian operation on 16 May 1993. Mission complete, the QRF redeployed to Mogadishu 17–20 May.

The success of the operation in Kismayo bolstered the confidence of Force Command and led the contributing nations, in capitals throughout the world, to believe that UNOSOM II had passed its initial test. However, it also highlighted a number of shortcomings. The Kismayo deployment pointed out one
of the major command and control issues facing any UN coalition force. Like any other national contingent, U.S. combat forces cannot be placed under the command or operational control of a non-U.S. contingent commander. This situation tends to create some friction as it requires detailed negotiation and clarification of missions and responsibilities between contingent force commanders and their staffs. The detailed coordination of military operations and friendly fires was essential to the success of the QRF’s deployment to Kismayo.

The deployment also demonstrated that there were very practical limits to the QRF “legs,” particularly when it came to self deploying aircraft to a trouble spot or using ground transportation to convoy essential logistical assets. The lack of an adequate road network connecting Kismayo with Mogadishu challenged both the employment and sustainment of the QRF. This deployment highlighted the importance of airlift for deployment and sustainment operations especially during the rainy seasons.

**Other QRF Training and Show of Force Deployments**

The mission of the QRF required the capability to deploy throughout the UNOSOM II area of operations to support coalition forces. To facilitate the execution of this essential mission, COMUSFORSOM directed the QRF to affect coordination with each of the AOR commanders and to conduct combined training exercises with their forces. The intent was to introduce AOR commanders to the QRF, and its capabilities; while also enabling the QRF to become familiar with the terrain and environmental conditions in each AOR.

In addition to Kismayo, the QRF conducted two other training/show of force deployments before combat operations began on 5 June. The first was conducted during the period 29 May through 3 June in the Bardera area. The QRF self-deployed from Mogadishu by ground and air to the vicinity of Garbaharrey, north of Bardera on 29 May. Over the next few days, the QRF trained on air assault operations, dismounted and aerial patrolling, and conducted a ground and aerial reconnaissance of the area. During the course of these operations, the QRF located and destroyed some anti-aircraft guns and various types of small arms and munitions in the area outside of Garbaharrey.

On 4 June, the COMUSFORSOM directed the immediate deployment of elements of the QRF to Kismayo at the request of the Belgian Commander. The Galcayo Peace Conference which had recently ended in Mogadishu had led to the opening of a peace conference in Kismayo. UNOSOM II was concerned that the militia factions in the area would try to disrupt the conference. As a result, the QRF was ordered into Kismayo to reinforce and posture additional security forces in the city during the critical opening days of the conference. The QRF Commander deployed a rifle company with supporting air assets on 4 June 1993 from Bardera. The company’s mission was to augment the Belgian security effort in Kismayo so that soldiers from the Belgian Brigade could be used to provide increased security for the delegates as they conducted their talks. With forces returning from Garbaharrey, and forces deployed to Kismayo, one Quick Reaction Force infantry company and a scout weapons team were in Mogadishu to support other UN operations and were employed when the Pakistani forces were ambushed on 5 June.

The show of force operations and deployments of the QRF in May produced a number of benefits. These:

(1) demonstrated to the warlords and to the UN coalition that the U.S. was an active coalition partner with the will to commit U.S. forces in tactical combat operations in support of AOR commanders;

(2) showed hostile forces that the UNOSOM II Force Commander possessed the capability and resolve to influence areas in the theater of operations other than Mogadishu through the projection of combat power;
(3) suggested that the QRF was correctly task organized, its soldiers well trained, and well equipped for the assigned mission;

(4) set the precedent for coalition use of QRF aircraft for air assault purposes and, conversely, it demonstrated the inter-operability of UN air assets in support of QRF deployments;

(5) validated the TOR as a functional document to guide QRF employment.

**Ambush of Pakistani Soldiers (5 June 1993)**

5 June marked the beginning of a new period for U.S. and UNOSOM II operations in Somalia. The violent and deliberate ambush of Pakistani forces on 21 October Road, at Strong Point 40 (Bakara Market) and Feeding Site 20 by the USC/SNA militia opened hostilities between the USC/SNA and UNOSOM II. This period of open combat in the city of Mogadishu lasted until Aideed declared a unilateral cease-fire in October 1993. As the level of violence escalated throughout this period, coalition forces lost their will to conduct the military operations needed to restore security. This led to a widening of the role of the QRF in ground and air operations.

On 4 June, members of the UNOSOM II staff delivered letters to the USC/SNA announcing the intent to conduct a routine inspection of the five Authorized Weapons Storage Sites in the Mogadishu area. At 0615 on 5 June 1993, five AWSS inspection teams departed the U.S. Embassy complex to link up with their Pakistani security escorts and move to the AWSS'. All sites were inspected within a two and one-half hour period. The first indication of any type of resistance or opposition to the inspections occurred at AWSS 5, the main offices of Radio Mogadishu/Aideed. A large, vocal crowd started to form at approximately 0830. Two individuals, claiming to be members of “Aideed’s government” were agitating the crowd. As the crowd attempted to push into the compound, Pakistani soldiers of the 7th FF fired warning shots in the air. At approximately 0930 the inspection team, having completed its mission departed the site. One of the team members was hit by a rock as the team left the area.

At 1030, the majority of the Pakistani security company at AWSS 3 initiated an administrative movement from the site to the 10 Baluch Battalion area in the soccer stadium on 21 October Road. While enroute, the convoy was ambushed by Somalis firing automatic and anti-tank weapons near the Cigarette Factory. The company (—) was pinned down by cross fire from three different positions, at least two vehicles were struck immediately by RPG rounds. Two Pakistani soldiers were killed and two were wounded in the attack. The remainder of the company (a platoon) was called forward from AWSS 3 to reinforce the ambushed element. Pakistani forces dispatched from the stadium down 21 October Road to reinforce and assist in the withdrawal of forces at the Cigarette Factory were also ambushed.

By 1100, Somalis had established roadblocks and were gathering in increasing numbers at Strongpoints 4, 5, and 7. At 1105, two U.S. soldiers on a routine patrol were wounded near K4 and evacuated to the U.S. hospital. Gunfire and violence continued throughout the day between coalition and hostile forces. Small arms fire was directed against UN personnel at the airfield and against U.S. personnel at Sword Base. Fifty (50) Somalis attempted to penetrate the Embassy Compound, the UN residences north of the airfield were fired upon, a UH–60 received small arms fire while flying from the airfield to the Embassy Compound, and 60mm mortar fire was directed against UN soldiers at the New Port. Sporadic gunfire continued throughout the night.

In the meantime, at a feeding site in the interior of Mogadishu, (Feeding Site 20) a Pakistani platoon was overwhelmed by a crowd of women and children supported by armed militia positioned in buildings that over watched the feeding site. During this engagement, the Somalis used crowds to press on the soldiers until they were close enough to touch the soldiers. Once they succeeded in hemming in the soldiers, the women and children grabbed at the weapons, preventing the soldiers from reacting in self-
defense. They were then struck down with knives and swords, or bludgeoned to death. Vehicle drivers were struck by snipers at the outset to prevent vehicular escape.

**Employment of the QRF (5 June 1993)**

The QRF brigade headquarters and 1-22 IN were consolidated in Mogadishu by 26 May 1993. Portions of TF 3-25 and 10th FSB were still moving from Baledogle to Mogadishu. Additionally, a QRF company was deployed to Kismayo in support of the peace talks. Despite their dispersion, the experience demonstrated the QRF’s flexibility and agility to rapidly respond to crisis situations within the area of operations.

U.S. QRF support of UNOSOM II on 5 June consisted of both air and ground operations designed to relieve the pressure on Pakistani forces trapped on 21 October Road and assist in their withdrawal. At 1130 COMUSFORSO, at the request of the Pakistani Brigade Commander, ordered the QRF to attack up 21 October Road to relieve Pakistani Forces trapped at the Cigarette Factory. The Quick Reaction Company (QRC) (A Co, 1-22 IN) was ordered into action and by 1145 the company moved from the University Compound toward a linkup point designated by Pakistani forces on 21 October Road. The linkup point was vacant when the QRC arrived at 1200 hours, so the Brigade Commander directed the company to move toward the sound of small arms fire further to the northeast on 21 October Road in the vicinity of the Cigarette Factory. The QRC linked up with the Pakistani company commander at 1246, just southwest of the Cigarette Factory. At 1300, the QRC attacked north of 21 October Road to relieve the pressure on Pakistani soldiers who were pinned down by hostile fire, and to evacuate wounded and dead Pakistani soldiers from the street. This activity continued until about 1400 when the hostile force withdrew from the Cigarette Factory. At 1330, AH–1 aircraft attacked a machine gun position located on top of a building adjacent to the Cigarette Factory, effectively eliminating the threat. After consolidating forces in the Cigarette Factory area, the QRC conducted a sweep of 21 October Road northeast to the vicinity of the Pakistani stadium, capturing eight armed Somalis and recovering two dead Pakistani soldiers. At 052000 June 1993, the QRC withdrew to the University Compound to rearm and refit.

The coordinated attacks throughout the city, coupled with statements made by the radio station manager at Site 5, indicated that Aideed had prepared his force to assault the teams as they conducted their inspection. His actions also indicate that he intended to inflict the maximum number of UNOSOM II casualties possible. By attacking UN soldiers throughout the day at various locations it was readily apparent Aideed was attempting to cow the UN. By using a series of well planned ambushes and vicious close-in combat methods, coupled with placing women and children in front of fighting militia, Aideed was able to kill 23 Pakistanis, and wound over seventy five other UN soldiers. The methods of assault, the trauma of large numbers of soldiers killed, and the selective mutilations of the remains had a significant effect on some members of the coalition. Aideed’s forces established their “modus operandi” of using women and children as shields for militia on 5 June 1993. Force Command did not learn an effective counter to these tactics until months later.

**Aftermath of 5 June 1993**

The events of 5 June 1993 compelled the United Nations Security Council to adopt UNSCR 837 on 6 June 1993. This resolution established a new direction for operations in Somalia, as UNOSOM II took a more offensive approach to operations in Mogadishu. The United Nations and the world community now recognized that combat was a very real possibility in Chapter VII operations. This sobering reality had a significant effect on the offensive spirit of the coalition, and brought the issue of command and control of coalition forces to a head. The combination of these factors and the impact of casualties in Mogadishu on the will of contributing nations cast the UNOSOM II Force Commander and his staff into the role of a tactical command in Mogadishu. This had an impact on operations throughout Somalia, as
the Force Headquarters was forced to add to its operational and strategic focus on the country, the tactical fight in the city.

**Overview of QRF Support of Combat Operations in Mogadishu**

Following the ambush of 5 June, UNOSOM II, Force Command sought to regain the initiative and restore order and security to Mogadishu. UNOSOM II launched a series of military operations during the period from 6 June through 31 August to achieve that goal and the mandate outlined in UNSCR 837. The objectives for these operations were to:

1. Re-establish a secure environment in Mogadishu;
2. Secure and control key facilities and supply routes; and

These operations centered on attacking USC/SNA militia command and control nodes, equipment, ammunition, and weapons storage sites throughout the UNOSOM II AOR.

The QRF played a key role in UNOSOM II military operations in Mogadishu from 6 June through the arrival of Task Force Ranger at the end of August. In addition to supporting coalition military operations, the QRF at times assumed a leading role in order to protect U.S. forces. The QRF also initiated “Eyes Over Mogadishu”, a day and night surveillance of the city designed to deter militia operations against U.S. and UN forces. These bursts of tactical initiative on the part of the QRF: bolstered the morale of some coalition force contingents; and helped to deny the USC/SNA the tactical initiative when the coalition lacked the will to do the job itself.

The initial actions of the QRF centered on the destruction of the AWSS’ and support of a coalition offensive operation designed to drive the militia from its stronghold in the Aideed Enclave. The concept called for ground and air attacks directed at the AWSS’ followed by a ground attack by UNOSOM II forces into the Aideed enclave to eliminate the militia stronghold in the area. The operations were to be conducted over a series of days, the AWSS’ were attacked on 12–14 June and the Aideed enclave on 17 June 1993. During the interim between 7 and 12 June, Pakistani forces, assisted by Moroccan and Italian forces conducted clearing operations on 21 October Road and other key supply routes.

Within the framework of this concept, the QRF plan of support consisted of four phases. During Phase I, the QRF conducted reconnaissance and intelligence gathering activities to identify critical targets and security measures at AWSS 1, 3, 4, and 5. Units were authorized to conduct an unobtrusive route reconnaissance to the sites and to conduct all necessary aerial reconnaissance. A major concern to commanders and planners was the potential presence of women and children at these sites. Presumably, placed there by hostile militia as human shields to ensure that the sites would not be attacked by UN forces. Consequently, reconnaissance assets were focused on the AWSS to determine if they contained women and children.

The neutralization of Radio Aideed at AWSS 5 would be conducted during Phase II. AWSS 5 served as a major source of anti-UNOSOM II propaganda in Mogadishu. The site was also declared by Aideed and his USC/SNA militia as a weapons and ammunition storage site. Task Force 3-25 AVN was to attack AWSS 5 by fire to destroy critical components of the radio station and 1-22 IN was to conduct an air assault to seize the radio relay facility at AWSS 4 in order to deny its use by hostile forces and to preserve the equipment at the site for use by UNOSOM II.
AWSS 3 and 1 would be attacked and seized during Phase III of the operation. The main effort was to be conducted by 1-22 IN with TF 3-25 AVN supporting as required.

During the final phase of the operation, all ordnance and weapons located by 1-22 IN on AWSS 1, 3, and 4 would be destroyed, rendered inoperative, or evacuated. TF 3-25 AVN was to provide observation and fires in support of 1-22 IN and aerial security escort for the movement of forces and the evacuation of weapons and ammunition from the sites.

**Attack on Authorized Weapons Storage Sites (12–14 June 1993)**

On the morning of 12 June 1993, AC–130 gunships from the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) and the U.S. QRF attacked AWSS 1, 3, 4 and 5 (Radio Aided). AC–130 gunships inflicted heavy damage on the Cigarette Factory (site of the 5 June ambush), AWSS 3 and AWSS 5, disabling Radio Aided. QRF AH–1 helicopter fires seriously damaged AWSS 1 and TOW missiles were used to destroy all armored vehicles located at AWSS 3. QRF ground forces seized AWSS 4 (the radio relay site). The objective was to seize AWSS 4 intact in order to retain a site for a Somali radio station in the future and to possibly serve as an interim site for Radio Manta, the UNOSOM station. French Forces relieved the QRF on AWSS 4 before dark on 12 June.

These strikes were conducted after meticulous planning and target analysis. They were designed to eliminate the AWSS's as a source of weapons for the USC/SNA militia while limiting collateral damage. Loss of these arms and munitions severely limited Aideed's ability to conduct long term operations against UNOSOM II forces. More than 22 tons of ammunition were destroyed as a result of the 12 June operation. To limit injury to noncombatants, appropriate warnings were given prior to the attacks to allow them the opportunity to evacuate the target areas. This opening operation was deemed a success and served as a model for future employment of air assets.

**Attack on Atto and Aideed Garages**

On 13 and 14 June 1993, AC–130 gunships attacked known illegal arms and ammunition caches in the Aided Enclave. Osman Atto's Garage was struck on 13 June and Aideed's Garage the following day. In addition to the AC–130 strikes, a BM–21 rocket launcher was observed, engaged and destroyed by a QRF attack helicopter in the Aideed compound on 14 June. These attacks served as a follow up to the AWSS operation and preparation for the coalition ground assault to search and clear the Aideed Enclave. The strikes demonstrated Force Command's ability to conduct sequential operations against a hostile force, although they relied heavily upon the use of U.S. combat multipliers and ground forces.

Once again, detailed planning and thorough target analysis were conducted to limit collateral damage and to achieve the military objective. Following an appropriate loudspeaker warning for civilians to exit the area, the targets were struck with precision munitions. As a result of these strikes, numerous secondary explosions were clearly observed, validating the intelligence regarding the presence of munitions in large quantities.

**Attack on the Aideed Enclave (17 June 1993)**

The coalition plan to clear, search and secure the enclave on 17 June was designed to capitalize on the success of operations conducted 12–15 June and to maintain pressure on the USC/SNA militia. The operation was conducted in two phases. During Phase I, AC–130 gunships attacked selected targets in the objective area (Aideed Enclave) to destroy weapons caches and militia concentrations. PSYOP loudspeaker teams issued 15 minute warnings and spotlighted each target prior to the strikes so that non-combatants could clear the target area. U.S. snipers were placed in key areas
around the enclave to ensure that armed personnel did not enter or leave the area. This phase began at approximately 0130 and ended by 0445.

Phase II began at 0514 with the Moroccan and Italian forces moving to establish the cordon and isolate the enclave. The Moroccans were to prevent crowds from entering the enclave from the Bakara Market and National Street areas. A U.S. QRF air and ground liaison team was assigned to support the Moroccan effort throughout the operation. Italian forces were to deny access to the enclave from Afgoye Road and the Medina Area southeast of the Benedir Hospital. French Forces established a screen along 21 October Road. Once the cordon was in place, Pakistani forces were to clear, search and secure the enclave. The U.S. QRF was tasked to provide attack helicopter fire support as well as reconnaissance and surveillance support to UNOSOM II forces conducting the cordon and search operation.

In support of the cordon and search operation, QRF attack helicopters fired eleven TOW missiles and 962 rounds of 20mm cannon ammunition. All eleven TOW rounds were fired in support of the beleaguered Moroccan element and its attached U.S. QRF liaison team. No 2.75" rockets were fired. QRF scout weapons teams carefully selected munitions and engaged targets in order to avoid friendly fire incidents and limit collateral damage. Munitions were selected for the specific engagement based on the nature of the target, the proximity of friendly troops, and the potential for collateral damage. All targets that were engaged were marked by the QRF LNO team with hand delivered or M203 delivered smoke grenades. On numerous occasions, U.S. attack helicopters did not engage hostile targets because of the danger or potential danger to friendly forces or civilian personnel.

The USC/SNA militia tactic of using women and children as human shields further complicated the situation for attack helicopter support. The intensity of enemy fire and nearness of opposing forces required attack helicopters to fire most engagements as danger close. At one point, the entire Moroccan task force command group was under a Somali grenade attack, AH–1 helicopters fired a TOW missile within 30 meters of friendly personnel in order to protect the survivors. In this particular instance, a member of the QRF LNO team, stunned by a grenade blast, was present with the Moroccans to direct the fires. At another point, when the QRF LNO team and several wounded Moroccans were pinned down by hostile fire in an isolated area, AH–1 helicopters fired 20mm cannon at attacking militia who were within approximately 40 meters of friendly personnel.

While the 17 June cordon and search operation of the Aideed enclave was costly for UNOSOM II in terms of casualties and political credibility, it achieved some positive results. The combined operation was truly a coalition effort involving five nations. It was meticulously planned, extensively rehearsed and back briefed. It also showed how difficult it is to plan, execute and complete a major tactical operation within the coalition framework. Finally, it clearly demonstrated the capability of the QRF aviation to support coalition operations in the city. From this point on, coalition forces would demand QRF aviation support for all their [operations].

The operations conducted 12–14 June and on 17 June, while highly successful, brought out a number of issues which would limit the employment of the U.S. forces in future operations. The level of violence in Mogadishu, the number of civilian and military casualties, and the high profile of U.S. operations in the news media made the approval process for employment of U.S. forces by COMUSFORSOM increasingly difficult.

Abdi House (12 July 1993)

Despite its success on 17 June, UNOSOM II lost momentum. Contributing nations began to question the direction which UNOSOM II was taking, and coalition forces were reluctant to conduct offensive operations needed to sustain the initiative. As a result, USC/SNA militia assumed a more aggressive posture in July.
On 2 July, Italian forces were attacked by USC/SNA militia near the Pasta Factory. The Italian forces had just completed a joint search operation with Somali Police in the area and were returning along Balad Road when they were ambushed. The element had encountered a road block and began receiving heavy fire from the Pasta Factory and surrounding area at 0945 hours. Heavy fighting ensued. The U.S. Quick Reaction Company (QRC) was put on alert and QRF aviation was sent to the area to provide air support. QRF attack helicopters and Italian tanks dispatched to the area engaged enemy forces in the Pasta Factory. In actuality, QRF attack helicopters only fired once before the Italian Force Commander asked for a cease fire in order to negotiate the withdrawal of his forces. By 1330, the fight was over.

UNOSOM II needed a major success in order to regain the tactical initiative. That success came on 12 July with the QRF attack on the Abdi House, a key militia command and control center for operations directed against U.S./UN forces.

The U.S. Intelligence Support Element (ISE) had been collecting information on the Abdi House and the meetings conducted there for a number of weeks prior to the attack. Typically, the meetings were used to plan military operations and demonstrations against UNOSOM II. A number of reliable UNOSOM II sources indicated that the agenda for the 12 July meeting was to: (1) Plan an intimidation campaign against Habr Gedir sub-clans desiring to cooperate with UNOSOM II; and (2) Plan additional acts of violence and other anti-UNOSOM II activities.

Intelligence also indicated that Aideed’s support within the Clan had been eroding since mid-June. Apparently, all sub-clans were beginning to withdraw their support as he was perceived as losing his struggle with UNOSOM II. This seems to explain the escalation in violence and attacks he made on UNOSOM II in early July. However his attack on the Italians on 2 July and the bold actions he was currently undertaking against UNOSOM II seemed to be uniting the sub-clans.

The precision attack on the Abdi House dealt Aideed a significant blow. It was conducted without warning, a significant change from previous attack helicopter or AC–130 operations. Ground and air elements of the U.S. QRF conducted the raid which destroyed a key militia communications center/planning cell and much of the SNA’s hard core anti-UNOSOM II leadership. Among those killed were a number of his top financiers and military planners, to include the overall planner for the 5 June ambush of Pakistani soldiers. This sudden attack significantly disrupted Aideed’s growing momentum and plans to reestablish himself as the undisputed leader of the Habr Gedir. It also created an opportunity for some of his opponents to seize power and develop a more cooperative position towards UNOSOM II. Finally, it broke the cycle of harassment and guerilla tactics used against UNOSOM II since mid-June.

Operations on 21 October Road

During the remainder of July and August, QRF operations focused on U.S. force protection operations and aerial support of coalition cordon and search operations. The month of September was both violent and costly for UNOSOM II and the Somali people. During this period, interclan fighting intensified to levels not seen since the arrival of UNITAF in December 1992. Road blocks were constructed with greater intensity along UNOSOM II supply routes and were used as ambush sites.

The violence on 21 October Road also significantly escalated in September. The construction of road blocks by the USC/SNA supporters on 21 October Road became a daily occurrence. Numerous road blocks were constructed over the course of any day. Each time they were removed by Pakistani Forces, new ones were constructed. As an example, on 5 September ten separate roadblocks were built along the five kilometer stretch from the intersection with Lenin Road to the intersection with Balad Road. Road blocks were removed on a number of occasions, but they were replaced in a short time with one of greater size and complexity. The road had to be temporarily closed on 6 September.
The crisis on 21 October Road became violent on 9 and 16 September, when Pakistani and U.S. forces engaged USC/SNA militia in heavy fire fights. The most violent and costly occurred on 9 September. On that day, Pakistani and U.S. engineers were clearing road blocks near the Cigarette Factory when they were taken under fire by USC/SNA militia with 106 mm recoilless rifles, RPGs and small arms. The militia was effectively suppressed by a combination of fires from ground forces and attack helicopters. Between 1530 and 1600, the clearing element was again taken under attack while clearing road blocks near the former Checkpoint 89. The intensity of this fight was significantly more than the earlier one. In addition to receiving fire from heavy concentrations of militia forces in firing positions, the Pakistani and U.S. forces on the ground were attacked by over 1000 Somalis. Numbers of women were also combatants. An intense fire fight ensued, lasting until about 1835. At this point the Somalis broke off the engagement, having suffered numerous casualties from both ground forces and QRF attack helicopters. UNOSOM II forces suffered 6 casualties in the engagement.

A second fire fight broke out on 16 September between Pakistani forces and USC/SNA militia. While clearing road blocks on 21 October Road, Pakistani forces were taken under fire by RPGs. They returned fire with tank main gun and destroyed the enemy position.

Although not as intense as these two confrontations, small scale ambushes of UNOSOM II forces clearing road blocks on 21 October Road continued on an almost daily basis through the latter part of September. The final straw for road block clearing on 21 October Road appears to have come on 21 September. At approximately 0635, a Pakistani APC was destroyed on Afgoye Road near Benadir Hospital, while clearing yet another road block. There were 9 casualties, two of which were killed. From this point through the end of the month, 21 October Road was not used by UN traffic, and road blocks built along it were left in place. An alternate route for resupply of Pakistani Forces at the Stadium was chosen and used.

The growing risk to logistics convoys on 21 October Road led to the decision to construct a new main supply route (MSR) linking Afgoye and Balad. This MSR would enable the force to maintain the capability to resupply AOR Belet Uen-Gialalassi while avoiding the requirement to secure an MSR through the middle of enemy territory. However, even this solution had its limitations. The road constructed was a single lane weather-dependent road. This limitation placed an increased strain on the already over-extended ground transport capability of UNOSOM. The lack of intra-theater aircraft capable of transporting large quantities of fuel further exacerbated the problem.

FORCE PROTECTION AND THE EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. FORCES

Cordon and Search Operations

The situation in Mogadishu between 17 June and the arrival of JTFSOM in Mid October was tense and extremely volatile. Somalis began erecting road blocks along Lenin Road, National Street, Armed Forces Street and 21 October Road in mid June. These were initially believed to be meant to merely harass UNOSOM II forces as a form of protest. However, on 27 June their tactical significance was realized when U.S. engineers and Pakistani security forces were ambushed while clearing an obstacle on 21 October Road. Ambushes such as these further fueled the reluctance of some coalition forces to get out and patrol the streets.

Perceiving a lull in Force Command operations, the USC/SNA began to escalate its activities against U.S./UN forces and installations. On 22 June, hostile forces began what became nightly harassment of UNOSOM II installations, particularly U.S., with small arms fire and RPGs. These type of harassing attacks continued through September. The nightly attacks on U.S. and UN installations in Mogadishu and a growing reluctance on the part of the coalition forces in the city to actively patrol raised concerns over U.S. force protection. These concerns led COMUSFORSOM to employ the U.S. QRF to conduct
cordon and search operations in areas adjacent to U.S. occupied installations. These operations were implemented as a U.S. force protection measure with the concurrence of CINCCENT. The first of these cordon and search operations was conducted on 30 June north of the airfield. This operation netted some RPGs, a mortar, small arms and communications equipment. Searches were also conducted in the Medina area adjacent to the U.S. Embassy and the University compounds on 10, 11, and 13 July; and around the airfield on 17 and 18 July. These too netted numerous small arms, ammunition, and mortars. QRF forces continued to conduct search operations as part of USFORSOM’s force protection program through August and September.

Only one search ever resulted in a major confrontation between UNOSOM II forces and the militia. On 13 September, the QRF conducted a search southeast of Benadir Hospital in the Medina Area. UNOSOM II had indications that mortars were possibly located there. The search began approximately 0525. At approximately 0555, militia forces appeared to be consolidating for an attack near the Benadir Hospital. Fighting initially was localized there. As the QRF was withdrawing, approximately 0650, it came under intense fire. Fighting back block by block toward the Embassy Compound, the QRF appeared to be taking fire from all directions. As the search element approached the Embassy Compound, APCs from the Turkish Company and U.S. attack helicopters provided covering fire. By 0935 the element had closed into the Embassy compound and had suffered only 3 minor casualties during the two hours of intense fighting.

**Mines and a Request for Additional Forces**

The attack on the Abdi House on 12 July knocked the USC/SNA off balance, and reduced the frequency of attacks through the end of July. However, on 4 August the USC/SNA militia once again escalated violence against U.S. forces by introducing mine warfare into the conflict. Clearly, the militia was trying to regain the initiative it was losing to UNOSOM II. A Brown and Root vehicle was the first target and resulted in two injuries. It soon became apparent that the militia was not only mining the roads used extensively by UNOSOM II, but had introduced command detonated mines as a means of attacking U.S. forces. Aideed and his militia appeared to believe that by mining roads and establishing roadblocks he could completely isolate and neutralize U.S. forces in Mogadishu.

Four U.S. soldiers were killed on 8 August by a command detonated mine while they conducted a routine patrol on Jialle Siad Street (commonly called the Medina Road). At 150400 August 1993, 2-14 IN executed Operation Justice to arrest those Somalis responsible for the deaths of four U.S. military police soldiers killed on 8 August. Under the cover of darkness, the battalion conducted a dismounted tactical movement from Mogadishu airfield to a residential area north of the airfield. The raid resulted in the arrest of two Somalis believed to be responsible for the deaths of the U.S. soldiers.

There was little doubt that the U.S. contingent was being targeted when U.S. vehicles were hit by command detonated mines on 19 and 22 August. Logistics Support Command constructed a bypass road around the city in order to reduce the threat to logistics convoys. The route was secured by the U.S. QRF under the auspices of U.S. force protection. In addition, coalition patrols conducted daily sweeps of the major routes traversed in the city, checking for indications of mining. This technique was somewhat successful, although clearly not fool proof, as patrols reported finding and destroying mines on 12, 13, 15 and 17 August. The combination of the mine incidents, the continuing mortar attacks and the growing threat of ambushes on 21 October Road strengthened COMUSFORSOM’s concern for force protection. These factors contributed to his request for heavy forces to enhance U.S./UN force protection.

By August, COMUSFORSOM assessed that the situation required heavy forces (mechanized infantry) in order to provide adequate force protection to U.S. logistics convoys and installations. On 26 August, COMUSFORSOM sent the DCINC a fax message proposing the requirement for a mechanized infantry task force with: 3 Bradley companies, 1 light infantry company, a headquarters company with organic fire support element, scout, mortar and maintenance platoons, civil affairs teams, 1 combat engi-
neer company, 2 additional counter-intelligence teams and an air cavalry troop equipped with 4 AH–1 and 6 OH–58 aircraft. COMUSFORSOM was told CINCCENT would discuss this during his forthcoming trip to Somalia. In early September COMUSFORSOM, in consultation with CINCCENT, prepared another request for augmentation. This request however, asked for a smaller, yet acceptable force. On 14 September, COMUSFORSOM submitted this second request for heavy forces (1 Bradley company, 1 tank platoon, 1 105mm howitzer battery in lieu of 107mm mortars and a direct support logistics package) as the level of violence and sophistication of USC/SNA militia attacks escalated. According to policy level authorities, after consulting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense elected not to approve the request at this time. This decision was in keeping with the U.S. policy at the time, to reduce the U.S. presence and role in UNOSOM. As a result, this request was not approved at the policy level until the President’s decision to deploy additional combat forces was made after the Task Force Ranger raid of 3–4 October.

**Mortar Attacks and the SA–7 Threat**

The first mortar attack of a U.S. or UN facility occurred on 9 July. Although not used extensively until late August and September, this first mortar attack on the Embassy Compound was a significant escalatory step by USC/SNA militia. Throughout the remainder of July and August, UN and U.S. installations received indirect RPG fire on an almost daily basis.

In September the ante went up, as mortars were now included in the almost daily attacks on U.S. and UN forces. Both 60 mm and 120 mm mortars were used by the militia from firing points in the Digfer Triangle and Villa Somalia areas. Initially, UN forces continued to rely on attack helicopters to quickly respond against hostile mortar firing positions.

However, this tactic changed with the militia’s increasing use of heavy mortars and the first successful engagement of a QRF helicopter by ground fire on 2 September. A review of the incident revealed that the militia had used a mortar position to draw the helicopter into an ambush site covered by interlocking ground fire. Aviation tactics were adjusted to meet the new threat. On the morning of 25 September, the first QRF helicopter was shot down by ground fire. While investigating a firing incident on the sea port, the helicopter was engaged and downed by an RPG round at 0200. Pakistani and U.S. forces secured the site and evacuated the casualties under heavy fire. UN forces suffered 9 casualties in the operation.

By 10 September, COMUSFORSOM authorized U.S. mortar crews to conduct counterfire into selected enemy target areas where mortars were seen, such as the Digfer Triangle and Villa Somalia areas. Great pains were taken to avoid collateral damage. All fires were observed and adjusted by helicopter observers. This proved effective in reducing the intensity of the hostile activity, but not eliminating the mortar attacks.

On 20 August, the possibility of an SA–7 surface to air threat led UNOSOM II to issue a NOTAM closing the Mogadishu airport to commercial aircraft and advising military airlift of the threat. Force Command, in conjunction with USCENTCOM, suggested appropriate approaches to avoid overflight of the city, and tactics to be employed during landing and take off. In addition, attack helicopters were employed as an air cap to deter surface to air attacks. An actual threat never fully materialized, and by month’s end the NOTAM was allowed to expire.

The SA–7 was not the only surface to air threat that was seen as credible. Militia forces were becoming more aggressive in their attempts to shoot down a QRF helicopter. Attack helicopters were proving to be a significant deterrent to militia operations and therefore a high priority target for the militia. On 9 August, the first QRF helicopter was hit by small arms fire. USC/SNA militia forces continued to refine their techniques for surface to air engagements, and began using RPGs as well as small arms. A QRF aircraft was hit by an RPG for the first time on 25 August. The aircraft suffered only slight damage, but it was clear that evasive flying tactics must change.
SEARCH FOR AIDEED

QRF/JSOTF Operations

In August, there was an increased dedication of resources to capture Aideed and his senior advisers. UNOSOM II Force Command developed the following mission statement for the operation:

UNOSOM II Force Command conducts military operations to locate, capture, and arrest personnel responsible for attacks against UNOSOM forces and civilians, per Security Council Resolution 837.

COMUSFORSOM received authorization from CINCCENT to dedicate elements of the U.S. QRF and Special Operations Forces in theater for this task. Intelligence Support Element (ISE) provided the operations/intelligence planning function and a secure place from which to conduct the required staff work. The purpose was to capture Aideed alive with minimal friendly casualties and collateral damage.

The Task Force 3-25 AVN provided command and control for the operation and was task organized in the following manner. “Team Attack” was comprised of one UH–60 helicopter with sniper and three attack helicopters. “Team Snatch” was made up with the scout platoon, two UH–60’s, one UH–60 MEDEVAC, and one EMT with surgeon. A rifle platoon (—) and two UH–60’s made up “Team Secure.” Special Operations Forces initially provided the sniper and the “snatch” element, but handed over these taskings to the QRF.

The concept of the operation was bold, but simple: maintain continuous surveillance of Aideed and, when the conditions were right, conduct an air assault raid to capture him; a supporting attack with attack helicopters would serve to isolate the objective area. A source was to provide continuous observation of the target and trigger the employment of the task force. Upon notification, “Team Attack” was to conduct a supporting attack to fix the lead vehicle of the Aideed escort convoy, destroy the trail vehicle, and then occupy battle positions to block hostile reinforcement of the objective area. “Team Snatch”, the main effort, was to capture Aideed and move him out of the area. “Team Secure” was to provide ground security by occupying battle positions to block civilian traffic from entering the objective area.

The key was to catch Aideed in the open while he was moving from point to point. To accomplish this, all air assault aircraft, attack and observation aircraft, ground assault elements, and command and control nodes were on 30-minute recall, day and night. Twenty-four hour operations would be conducted, if required.

Although the task force was alerted on numerous occasions, conditions required to execute the QRF plan to capture Aideed were never met. As efforts to capture the warlord intensified, his profile lowered in the city to the point where he was seldom seen outside of USC/SNA strongholds. It soon became apparent that the mission required a surgical strike capability similar to that associated with units trained for hostage snatches. This prompted COMUSFORSOM to support a request for a Ranger element from the United States for the mission. By 31 August Task Force Ranger reached Somalia and began a brief period of area familiarization, rehearsals and special training.

TF Ranger Operations

The arrival of Task Force Ranger in late August 1993 sent a clear signal to Aideed and his USC/SNA militia that the world community, and certainly the United States, intended to bring to justice the individuals responsible for the 5 June ambush of Pakistani soldiers. The unit’s mission was to capture Aideed and six of his top aides. The planning and execution of Task Force Ranger’s operations were unilaterally done by U.S. commanders and carried out by U.S. forces deployed in support of UNOSOM II. Task Force
Ranger was under tactical and operational control of CINCCENT. Although not under the tactical or operational control of the Force Commander or COMUSFORSOM, Commander, Task Force Ranger kept them fully apprised of operations. COMUSFORSOM was advised of the target area and intent to launch an operation to capture Aideed or one of his aides. When intelligence indicated a good sighting, COMUSFORSOM was informed, the operation was launched, and the appropriate AOR commander was notified of an operation in his area by Force Headquarters. This approach was used to protect operational security.

Commander, TF Ranger proposed to conduct the hunt for Aideed in three phases, which was approved by CINCCENT. For the first four days, he would set up his operation at the airfield, conduct rehearsals and exchange liaison officers with U.S. and UN forces in Mogadishu. Next he wanted to concentrate all the assets at his disposal exclusively on the capture of Aideed. If the warlord still remained at large, he would then go after Aideed’s top six aides. By focusing his efforts on the lieutenants and Commander, TF Ranger hoped to flush Aideed into the open where he could be caught. If the warlord still remained at large, he would then go after Aideed’s top six aides and key infrastructure.

In early September, the task force set up its base of operations at Mogadishu airfield, conducted rehearsals and operations designed to familiarize the unit with Mogadishu. Overflights of all parts of the city were conducted in order to better mask when an actual snatch operation was in progress. It was clear from the beginning that accurate and timely intelligence would be the key to mission success.

Within a few days of arrival, Task Force Ranger launched its first operation. The target was the Lig Ligato House in the area just north of K4 off Via Lenin. The Lig Ligato compound was on the UNOSOM II priority target list as target “Flute”. The validity of the target was fully coordinated with the UNOSOM II U-2. Intelligence indicated that it was a command and control center which had been directing mortar attacks against the airfield. There was also analysis by the CISE that the Lig Ligato House had replaced the Abdi House as a command and control node and planning location for operations against U.S./UN
forces. Sources indicated that Aideed had visited the house in the last 24 hours and had used the house previously as a bed-down location.

At approximately 0300 hours on 30 August, the operation was launched. It was a text book operation, but it came up empty. Some United Nations Development Program (UNDP) personnel and their Somali guards, a total of eight people, were arrested and later released. Confiscated with these personnel were baskets of Somali currency, baskets of the local drug Quat and large quantities of black market items such as new automobile parts. Some weeks before the operation, UNDP had been directed by the SRSG’s security manager to move out of this particular area. They did not comply with the directive and failed to inform the UNOSOM II staff. UNOSOM thought the area was no longer occupied by UNDP.

A week later, TF Ranger conducted its next operation. During the early hours of 7 September, 17 Somalis identified as USC/SNA militia were captured in downtown Mogadishu and evacuated by TF Ranger. Two U.S. Rangers participating in the operation were slightly wounded.

Another operation was conducted on 14 September, this time in North Mogadishu. The Force Command staff pointed out that the Mahdi area of Mogadishu was a very unlikely place for Aideed and his operatives to be found. However, the intelligence report indicated that Aideed was seen departing the Italian Embassy. After deconflicting the target with UNOSOM II, TF Ranger launched an element to apprehend the suspect. At 1300, former Somali police chief General Ahmed Jialow and 38 others were arrested. Jialow, the security chief under former Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre and a significant Mahdi and UN ally was quickly released. To those in theater, it was very clear that Aideed had really gone to ground, and locating him or his senior advisers in Mogadishu would be difficult.

A few days later on 16 September, TF Ranger attacked a compound south of the Bakara Market after it was identified as a USC/SNA command and control site. One Somali was killed in the operation and several detainees were taken.

At 0845 hours on 18 September, TF Ranger attempted to apprehend Osman Atto, Aideed’s financier and key aide, while he was visiting one of his garages in Mogadishu. Eight Somalis were detained, but Atto escaped arrest.

On 21 September, Osman Atto and three of his bodyguards were captured in a daring daylight operation near the Digfer Hospital. The operation went smoothly with no U.S. casualties, but for the first time U.S. helicopters encountered heavy RPG fire from USC/SNA militia. TF Ranger responded with small arms and 7.62 mini-guns mounted in the helicopters killing an unknown number of Somalis.

Atto’s capture was a severe blow to Aideed, and a lift for UNOSOM II and TF Ranger. With his capture, it became extremely difficult to acquire information on the location of Aideed or his senior advisers, as they went even further underground.

On 3 October, at about 1530, the task force received information that a number of Aideed’s senior advisers were meeting at a building near the Olympic Hotel. The site was located in the heart of the USC/SNA controlled area of Mogadishu. Elements of the task force were quickly alerted and briefed. The operation commenced at approximately 1530 hours. They hit the site and immediately captured 24 detainees, including two key Aideed advisers. At 1600 hours, a U.S. wheeled convoy was dispatched to evacuate the detainees.

Near the objective area (at approximately 1620 hours), a TF Ranger UH–60 Blackhawk helicopter was shot down by one of a score of RPG’s fired at it. As they had on 21 September, hostile militia fired RPG rounds in volley at the helicopters. One of the assault helicopters in the vicinity of the crash site
landed under fire and extracted two wounded survivors of the UH 60 crash. Four additional crash survivors were left at the crash site initially reinforced by rangers from the target area. A fifteen man security and medical team was inserted by fast rope from the preplanned combat search and rescue helicopter. As Task Force Ranger ground forces moved to the crash site to recover those still there, they came under a barrage of fire from surrounding buildings and streets and took a number of casualties. The force of about 100 U.S. troops formed a perimeter around the crash site. Two miles south of the crash site, a second Blackhawk was hit and downed creating additional U.S. casualties.

Rescue columns of both U.S. Rangers and the U.S. QRF, who had earlier been dispatched and staged at the airfield, moved up Lenin Road where they were ambushed and forced to pull back. The Ranger Force was resupplied at the first crash site. It was determined that their situation was stable and air cover could help protect them until they were rescued. The Ranger element did not want to leave the crash site without their dead comrades, one of whom was pinned inside the downed helicopter. They continued to take sustained fire as they waited for the rescue column.

With the concurrence of the Force Commander, the UNOSOM Deputy Force Commander (COMUSFORSOM) activated the UNOSOM II reserve. After consultation with, and approval by, the Force Commander, a Pakistani tank platoon and two Malaysian mechanized companies, the only armor forces in Mogadishu, were ordered into action. They were staged at the New Port by 1830 hours. A tactical plan was completed and coordination made for a combined U.S./UN rescue of personnel at the crash sites. At 2320 hours, this rescue column, which included 4 Pakistani M48 tanks and 28 Malaysian armored personnel carriers, moved out. At about 0230 hours on 4 October, after fighting through heavy resistance, the rescue columns reached the two crash sites, secured them, evacuated the wounded and recovered the dead from the northern site. None from the southern site.

As a result of the combat operation conducted by Task Force Ranger, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, and 84 wounded. It is estimated that some 300–500 Somalis were killed and more than 700 wounded during the fighting. In addition, 22 detainees were captured.

**JOINT TASK FORCE SOMALIA**

**General**

Public opinion and the political environment in the United States were deeply affected by the violence in Somalia during the month of September and especially so after the fighting conducted 3–4 October 1993. However, the most significant event affecting UNOSOM II and USFORSOM was President Clinton’s address to the Nation on 7 October. The President announced his intentions to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia by 31 March 1994. Further, he ordered the deployment of joint combat forces to enhance the security of U.S. and United Nations personnel in Somalia. The stated mission of these augmentation forces was to protect U.S. troops and bases; secure essential lines of communication; and deter future attacks against military forces and humanitarian relief organizations.

Shortly after the U.S. Presidential announcement on 7 October 1993, the first heavy elements arrived in Mogadishu aboard U.S. strategic airlift. Almost concurrently, the theater reach of USFORSOM was greatly extended with the arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. Additionally, the two ARG/MEU (SOC) teams made available to the ground commander greatly enhanced operational flexibility. On 11 October, the carrier began support operations with air reconnaissance and “presence” sorties throughout the UNOSOM II area of responsibility. From the middle of October to the end of the month, additional U.S. forces deployed into theater raising the strength level of U.S. forces to over 17000 personnel. In addition to combat forces, USCENTCOM deployed a joint task force headquarters to assume command and control of the augmented QRF. Identified as Joint Task Force Somalia, this additional headquarters assumed a high profile presence within the Embassy Compound.
Joint Task Force Somalia’s impact on the tactical environment of Mogadishu was as swift as it was
dramatic. Not coincidentally, during the deployment of Joint Task Force Somalia into the theater of oper-
ations, Aideed declared a unilateral cease-fire and released one Nigerian soldier and one wounded
American soldier, captives as a result of combat operations conducted on 5 September and 3–4
October, respectively. Mortar and RPG rounds stopped finding their way into U.S. and UN installations.
Roadblocks were no longer constructed on the main arteries of Mogadishu with any regularity and the
ambush of U.S. and UN vehicles no longer occurred. The mining of thoroughfares in the city ceased and
command detonated mines were no longer employed against U.S. and UN vehicles. The daily mayhem
that gripped Mogadishu and the UNOSOM II coalition between the months of June and October 1993
was ostensibly over.

In addition to increasing force levels in Somalia, the United States sent a high profile political team,
headed by former U.S. Envoy Robert Oakley, to Mogadishu. The mission of this team was to enter into
direct negotiations with Aideed and the USC/SNA in an effort to move away from a policy of confronta-
tion with the warlord. This was a major reversal of U.S. policy regarding Aideed and, in effect, overnight
transformed him into a viable player in the political reconciliation process. At a UN donors’ conference
on 8 July 1993, the U.S. clearly affirmed its policy regarding Aideed. U.S. representatives indicated “the
U.S. Government, believed that Aideed had removed himself from the political process and that he must
be captured and tried before a court.” Furthermore, it appeared that the U.S. policy in Somalia had now
shifted from a policy which supported coercive disarmament and military action, to a policy of negotia-
tion. Whether intended or not, this change in policy led the coalition leadership to perceive that U.S. for-
eign policy regarding Somalia once dominated UN policy and continued to steer a meandering course
for the United Nations.

CENTCOM FRAGO 0001 to OPORD Serial 001 (Operation CONTINUE HOPE), dated 17 October 1993,
was the execute order to carry out the President’s directive. It established the Joint Task Force Somalia
(JTFSOM) and revised the mission, task organization and command relationships of USFORSOM.

Under this order, COMUSFORSOM continued to control all U.S. military operations in the Somalia
Theater in support of UNOSOM II. Logistics support continued to be provided by UNLSC which
remained OPCON to UNOSOM II per the Terms of Reference. However, JTFSOM assumed the com-
mand and control of the Quick Reaction Force and its mission. COMUSFORSOM now controlled mili-
tary operations conducted in support of UNOSOM II through COMJTFSOM. It appeared that the intent
of this command and control structure was to enhance COMUSFORSOM’s capability to command and
control joint UN/U.S. forces by replacing his pocket staff with a JTF. This was meant to free COMUS-
FORSOM to concentrate on operational matters and his duties as the UNOSOM II Deputy Force
Commander, while COMJTFSOM would concentrate on tactical combat missions.

CINCCENT’s intent and the concept of the operation emphasized that the priority mission for Joint
Task Force Somalia’s was U.S. force protection and preparation for redeployment, then providing sup-
port to UNOSOM II. The intent was “not to expand military operations in the interest of seeking a mili-
tary solution in Somalia, but rather to minimize U.S., UN, and Somali casualties while supporting the
political process as it continues to move towards a solution.” Accordingly, he ruled out the expansion of
military operations “unless it contributed directly to the political solution.” Likewise, in accordance with
NCA directives, offensive operations without provocation to attack installations, logistics sites and hos-
tile force caches could not be undertaken by QRF assets without CINCCENT approval in advance. This
restriction did not apply to legitimate quick-reaction force missions as outlined in the Terms of Reference.
Finally, he underscored the need to encourage stability and political reconciliation through the aggres-
sive use of psychological operations and civil affairs campaigns.

The shift in U.S. policy in Somalia and the restrictive criteria for the use of U.S. combat forces in
offensive operations caused virtual military paralysis for UNOSOM II. Coalition forces were extremely
reluctant to undertake any type of aggressive military action without the support of U.S. combat assets, particularly combat aviation and armor. In effect, UNOSOM II’s military operations became limited only to those which would be supported by U.S. combat forces. Consequently, UNOSOM II offensive operations designed to clear militia strongholds such as Villa Somalia and the Digfer Triangle, and reopen 21 October Road were dependent on CENTCOM approval.

Although the President had indicated his resolve to use U.S. forces to “open lines of communications”, the UNOSOM II staff and coalition forces realized that the likelihood of U.S. forces being employed in any operation against USC/SNA militia areas was extremely low. The high profile assumed by the Oakley negotiations with the USC/SNA, and the emphasis on avoiding military confrontations with factional forces were clear signals that U.S. forces would not participate in offensive combat operations. This, along with the announced intention to withdraw all U.S. forces by 31 March, was perceived by the coalition as a loss of U.S. commitment in Somalia and further eroded the will of coalition forces to undertake any operations. This apparent general reluctance to put U.S. troops in harms way should not have been surprising, considering the post 3 October atmosphere in the United States and the mounting pressure from Congress to immediately withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia. As a result, UNOSOM II returned to a bunker mentality even with the overwhelming presence of U.S. military power in Somalia.

The paralysis of UNOSOM II Force Command can be directly attributed to UNOSOM II’s weakening strategic center of gravity, namely the unity of the coalition to accomplish the mission as stated by the UN charter and the dwindling participation of U.S. combat forces in the coalition.

Mission and Organization of Joint Task Force Somalia

The mission of Joint Task Force Somalia was published in a Joint Task Force message dated 24 October 1993, SUBJECT: Change 1 to Activation of Joint Task Force Somalia.

“Joint Task Force Somalia provides force protection for U.S. Forces in Somalia and facilitates continued U.S. support of UN operations. As required, conduct operations to secure lines of communication to ensure the continued flow of supplies. Be prepared to redeploy U.S. forces.”

The mission and intent statements of the Joint Task Force order were based on CINCCENT’s 17 October 1993 order, verbal guidance provided to COMJTFSOM during briefings at MacDill AFB, and draft versions of the USFORSOM order.

Both CINCCENT and COMUSFORSOM intent statements emphasized the need to protect U.S. forces while taking actions to encourage political reconciliation and assist in humanitarian development efforts. COMUSFORSOM’s intent statement further highlighted the need to “maintain military pressure against hostile forces” and to “reestablish access and assist with UN control within the city of Mogadishu”. Based on CINCCENT and COMUSFORSOM intent statements referencing securing lines of communications, JTF staff members began planning offensive operations to open lines of communication in Mogadishu.

Joint Task Force Somalia was activated on 14 October 1993 and became fully operational six days later. It consisted primarily of Army forces from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) and special operations forces from all services. Initially, two Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable), though not under JTF command, were also available offshore. At least one MEU (SOC) was continuously available to the commander of the JTF throughout the existence of the JTF. Other forces (U.S. Navy, PSYOP, and civil affairs) augmented the JTF at various times during its deployment in theater.
The nucleus of Joint Task Force Somalia was present in theater when CINCCENT issued the activation order on 14 October. The JTF was prepared to accept battle hand over on 16 October. The aviation brigade headquarters from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) deployed into theater in late July and early August as part of the third rotation of forces from Fort Drum, New York. The Falcon Brigade, as the unit was known, brought with it a headquarters company and selected combat support attachments. The brigade headquarters provided command and control for three subordinate units: Task Force 2-14, built around a light infantry battalion; Task Force 2-25, consisting primarily of attack and assault helicopters; and 46th Forward Support Battalion.

The Joint Task Force Somalia staff was a composite one with half of the 145-man JTF staff coming from Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division (Light). Lead elements of the JTF staff began deploying in theater on 13 October with the command group arriving two days later. The remainder of the joint staff, comprised of individual augmentees from all services, deployed over the next few weeks.

Immediately following the President’s decision to send additional troops to Somalia, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) deployed its immediate ready company (IRC), task organized with M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles. The company team deployed from Fort Stewart, Georgia by strategic airlift and closed in Mogadishu within a few days; it provided a powerful, heavy-force capability that had been lacking in theater up to that point. The IRC was the lead element of Task Force 1-64, a heavy force, which arrived by strategic sealift in mid-November.

In addition to the heavy forces from Fort Stewart, two additional battalion-size units deployed to Somalia. The first was Task Force 2-22, an infantry task force from Fort Drum which arrived during the second week in October. Its mission was to provide force protection for Sword Base and to secure the Bypass Road between the airfield and Hunter Base. The other newly arrived unit was the 43rd Engineer Battalion, a vertical-construction battalion from Fort Benning, Georgia. Its primary mission was to construct Victory Base for Task Force 1-64, a secure facility north of Mogadishu. Other forces deploying into the theater under JTF control included joint special operations forces, a psychological operations task force, and elements of a civil affairs unit. These additional units brought the total number of personnel in JTF to approximately 4,300 (not counting naval forces afloat).

Operations from Activation to 4 December 1993

Operation SHOW CARE

Joint Task Force Somalia conducted two major humanitarian operations between its activation and 4 December 1993. The first of these was “Operation SHOW CARE” and it was conducted 11–14 November in Marka, a small town about 75 kilometers southwest of Mogadishu, controlled by the Royal Moroccan Task Force. The population of Marka and the surrounding area is about 150,000 people. This operation was the first employment of the majority of the 13th MEU (SOC), which was TACON to the JTF for this operation.

It commenced with amphibious and helicopter borne landings followed by a link up with the Moroccans. The purpose of the operation was to provide medical and dental assistance to the people of Marka and nearby Qoryooley. Military physicians established treatment sites in both locations within secure areas established by the ground combat element of the MEU. Concurrently, JTF and Moroccan forces conducted a link up, combined tactical road march, helicopter borne landings, show-of-force operations, security operations, and civic action projects.

Publicity for the operation was widespread through the distribution of handbills printed by U.S. psychological operations units. At Marka, doctors treated a total of 553 people (270 children) and dentists treated 55 people (16 children). At Qoryooley, 357 people (160 children) were treated by doctors and 44 people (9 children) received dental care.
Additional projects in the region included the distribution of food and water, excavation of a hospital courtyard and two burn pits for trash disposal, and 200 meters of road were graded. The medical, dental, and engineering support was very warmly received by the local Somalis.

“Operation SHOW CARE” served to remind Aideed and his USC/SNA militia about the mobility and capabilities of U.S. forces. The operation concluded with a show of force in which amphibious forces appeared off the coast of Baraaawa. Hostile factions reportedly abandoned their positions there in fear of being apprehended by U.S. forces.

Operation MORE CARE

The second major humanitarian operation, “Operation MORE CARE,” was a medical and dental civic action program conducted near the Old Port in the sector of Mogadishu controlled by the Nigerian Battalion. The operation was conducted from 2–4 December 1993 and was designed to supplement the humanitarian relief effort in Somalia. It commenced prior to H-hour, D-day (2 December), with a link up of U.S. Army forces with the Italian force at Strongpoint 94, on the Balad Road northeast of the city.

On D-day, an amphibious task force aboard air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC) and helicopters landed at the Old Port. Following a link up with the Nigerian Force, two LCACs moved to Gold Beach to load a platoon of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and transport them to Old Port. Concurrent with the landing of the amphibious task force, an Army mechanized company team maneuvered from Victory Base, through Strongpoint 94, to a predesignated link-up point northeast of Mogadishu. After the link-up, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine, and Nigerian forces conducted coalition training.

Once ashore, military doctors and dentists began treating patients. Physicians treated 899 people (282 children) and dentists treated 76 people (37 children). Besides the medical and dental care provided, U.S. troops distributed food stuffs and dispensed more than 2,500 gallons of purified water. Engineers made repairs on an orphanage and fixed some of the Nigerian facilities. They also delivered books to a local school.

21 October Road

In addition to conducting the two humanitarian operations, Joint Task Force Somalia planned a tactical combat operation to clear and reopen 21 October Road in Mogadishu. The keys to success in the operation were stated in the JTF commander’s intent: (1) Use standoff and precision fires before maneuvering, if engaged; (2) Integrate combined arms; (3) Generate and demonstrate overwhelming combat power, but use it only if necessary; (4) Seize and maintain the initiative; (5) Destroy key buildings, if engaged from them, but clear them only if necessary; and (6) Secure key terrain, including key buildings.

The concept of operations called for U.S. forces and the Malaysian Battalion to support the main effort conducted by the Pakistani Brigade. U.S. Army forces would maneuver north of 21 October Road and occupy support-by-fire positions. U.S. Marines would conduct an amphibious landing northeast of Mogadishu and maneuver to the east of U.S. Army forces. An aircraft carrier battle group would provide E–2C recon aircraft to monitor the operation, with a full complement of F–14A, F/A–18C, and A–6E tactical aircraft ready to provide close-air support. Also providing support from above would be U.S. Air Force AC–130s, U.S. Army AH–1F, OH–58A, OH–58D, and UH–60L helicopters, and U.S. Marine AH–1W helicopters. The commitment of ground forces would occur only after all other available artillery, aviation, close air support firepower was employed.

Neither the 21 October Road operation, nor any other operation designed to clear lines of communication was ever executed. The UNOSOM II leadership determined that 21 October Road was not
a critical line of communication because another route connecting Afgoye and Balad roads had been improved into an all-weather road. More importantly, UN and U.S. political will to use force waned as the chances of a Somali political reconciliation appeared to decline. Virtually no one wanted to undertake operations to open roads today that might be closed tomorrow because of renewed civil war. By finding another route to deliver supplies, UNOSOM II avoided the rekindling of hostilities between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA militia.

Role of Joint Task Force Somalia in Support of UNOSOM II

JTF Somalia played a very important role in supporting UNOSOM II. By providing a powerful quick reaction force and by maintaining a strong, visible presence in and around the city, attacks on coalition forces declined significantly. Additionally, the presence of a strong naval force, which included carrier aircraft and embarked Marines, provided the capability to rapidly influence events within a wide geographic area. Meanwhile, humanitarian development efforts continued relatively unimpeded by outside interference and violence.

A final assessment of the JTF role in supporting UNOSOM II, however, must consider the complex political factors that contributed to the uneasy calm in Mogadishu after the JTF’s arrival. As the likelihood of a lasting political settlement declined, so, too, did the will to employ military force. Leaders were reluctant to put soldiers at risk to achieve, in the near term, what would not last in the long term. As a result, missions requiring high profile operations (e.g., opening key lines of communication through the city) were curtailed and put on the shelf. Coalition forces essentially avoided trouble and “hunkered down” behind barricades, strongpoints, and fortified bases.

Even U.S. forces, despite their overwhelming combat power, had to consider as a planning factor whether an operation would be construed as antagonistic or provocative to the Somalis. Since August, engineers maintained the Bypass Road around the west side of Mogadishu to obviate the need for U.S. traffic to traverse city streets; U.S. Army and Marine helicopter’s followed the same route from above, instead of flying directly over the city; United Nations contract helicopters did the same. The exception was the continuation of “Eyes Over Mogadishu” at night. JTF plans for road-clearing operations were not executed because of the perception that the costs of the operation outweighed the potential benefits.

A tenuous calm remained over Mogadishu and its environs. Whether it was due to the show of U.S. force, conciliatory gestures by coalition forces, or both, violence directed at U.S. forces and the coalition declined significantly. The permanence of this situation after U.S. forces depart on 31 March, again, remains to be seen.

Once it was clear that the 21 October Road operation would not occur, the JTF Somalia planning focus shifted to two other missions, namely non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. NEO planning began in early December in anticipation of a worsening security environment in Mogadishu. Redeployment planning was ongoing, keyed to the 31 March 1994 deadline set by President Clinton.

Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Wary of the deteriorating security situation in Mogadishu as U.S. forces withdrew, Commander, JTF Somalia directed his staff to prepare for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia. NEO planning began in early December in anticipation of a worsening security environment in Mogadishu. Redeployment planning was ongoing, keyed to the 31 March 1994 deadline set by President Clinton.

The JTF conducted detailed NEO planning with representatives from the Department of State, UNOSOM II, intelligence agencies, and naval forces afloat. Planners identified the number and location of
evacuees, secure assembly areas, evacuation points, and intermediate staging bases. Approximately 1,900 personnel, U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals, were identified as potential evacuees. NEO’s success depended on rapid execution, safe evacuation of personnel, neutralization of hostile elements interfering with the NEO, control of key facilities, and coordination with coalition forces.

**Redeployment of USFORSOM**

COMUSFORSOM assigned Commander, JTF Somalia the specified task to “be prepared to redeploy U.S. forces” (JTF MSG dated 24 October 1993, SUBJECT: Change 1 to Activation of JTF Somalia). Redeployment planning, which began almost immediately upon formation of the JTF, accelerated during the month of December. However, political uncertainties surrounding the future of the UN in Somalia complicated the planning process. Leaders at the highest levels of the U.S. Government and UN New York wanted to avoid the impression of a precipitous U.S. pullout that would undermine future UN efforts in Somalia and elsewhere. They were also concerned that a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces in Somalia would create the conditions for UNOSOM II to fail.

Despite the uncertainties, COMUSFORSOM’s guidance was clear. The redeployment would be planned as a tactical withdrawal to ensure continuous force protection. Joint combat power, integrated with a full range of combat support, would remain robust throughout the operation. The design of the tactical withdrawal to the airfield-port complex would make use of interior lines to simplify logistics and command and control. The final withdrawal of U.S. Army forces would be covered by amphibious forces after a relief in place. Final withdrawal of the amphibious forces would close out the involvement of U.S. combat forces in Somalia on 25 March 1994.

With this guidance in mind, planners developed a series of withdrawal options code named “Super Bowl,” “Valentine,” and “Saint Patrick,” indicative of the month the operation would end in each scenario. Meanwhile, representatives of JTF-Somalia attended a planning conference in early December at the headquarters of Amphibious Ready Group Three in San Diego. The purpose of the conference was to arrange for an appropriate mix of naval assets to cover the withdrawal and to coordinate the relief in place between U.S. Army and U.S. Marine forces on the ground.

The JTF commander advocated an expeditious withdrawal as the surest way to protect the force. Recognizing that U.S. forces would relinquish virtually all UN responsibilities by January 1994, his concern was that continued presence beyond then would make the JTF a more likely target of the violence that had long plagued Mogadishu. From a purely military perspective, force protection (the JTF’s primary mission) could be best achieved by a rapid withdrawal from Somalia. COMUSFORSOM disapproved this approach and planning continued for a March withdrawal as per his guidance.

In December, the UN forces assumed the ground quick reaction force mission from U.S. forces. The Malaysian Battalion, which was already UNOSOM Force Command’s ground QRF and had proved itself extremely capable during the heavy fighting in August through October, assumed the mission. A Pakistani tank troop was TACON to the Malaysian Battalion for QRF missions in the city. Malaysian Battalion APCs with task organized Pakistani tanks provided the QRF armored protection and firepower, capabilities absent from the U.S. light infantry QRF. In addition to the city focus, the Malaysian task force was given the mission to provide an out of sector response to Southern Somalia, augmented by Zimbabwean and Pakistani companies.

Handover of the ground QRF mission to a coalition force signaled the beginning of the withdrawal of the U.S. from Somalia. U.S. forces, however, still provided support to the QRF and to UNOSOM in terms of aviation, attack helicopter support, SOF liaison and AC–130 gunship support. In addition, sufficient U.S. combat power was in position to maneuver if required.
COMUSFORSOM directed the JTF to maintain a strong ground presence through March. Units currently in country were extended as necessary to complete the mission; exceptions were a light infantry task force (TF 2-14) and an engineer battalion (43d Engineers), both of which exceeded force requirements. The aviation task force (TF 2-25), because of the need to maintain robust air support until the very end of the operation, was the only unit to rotate. Its replacement, TF 4-4 from Fort Carson, deployed in the first two weeks of January 1994. On 17 January, COMUSFORSOM assumed direct command of JTF Somalia. The USFORSOM and JTFSOM staffs were combined to form one staff.

The majority of the heavy task force (TF 1-64) and 46th Forward Support Battalion redeployed in February; portions of both units remained until the end to provide essential security and log functions. A light company from TF 2-22 also redeployed in February, once U.S. forces closed Victory Base and relinquished the Bypass Road security mission. TF 4-4 began the incremental redeployment of its helicopters and battalion headquarters around mid-month as more of the aviation missions shifted to U.S. Marine forces afloat. Finally, the Falcon Brigade Headquarters redeployed on 2 March 1994 after conducting a relief in place with the 24th MEU (SOC).

On 4 March, a ground combat element of the 24th MEU (SOC), Battalion Landing Team 1/6, conducted a relief in place with TF 2-22 (—), now reinforced by two heavy companies from TF 1-64 and Team (formerly Task Force) 4-4. The operation permitted the subsequent redeployment of all remaining Army units under the cover of the 24th MEU (SOC) ashore and the 11th MEU (SOC) in reserve afloat. By 25 March, all U.S. forces, including the JTF headquarters and amphibious forces, had withdrawn from Somalia in good order.

USFORSOM redeployment planning and operations are discussed in greater detail in Chapter VIII, Special Subject Areas (USFORSOM Redeployment).

USFORSOM Contributions

U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) significantly contributed to UNOSOM II’s successes during its first year. U.S. forces supported UNOSOM II military and humanitarian operations in a wide variety of ways.

Humanitarian Contributions

The Quick Reaction Force (QRF) adopted a local orphanage, provided school supplies, clothing, and the materials and troop labor to repair the facilities. Logistics Support Command (LSC) units assisted local inhabitants in neighborhood clean up projects and did most of the construction work on the more than 105 kilometers of new roads built, and the 100 kilometers of roads repaired by UNOSOM II engineer units. U.S. soldiers on the UNOSOM II staff provided construction and material support to a local school in North Mogadishu.

The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), stationed off the coast of Somali from 23 June–9 July, assisted UNOSOM II by conducting a MEDCAP/DENCAP in Marka, and repairing the roof of the local police station in Bossasso. In addition, the MEU also conducted a port survey for future use in developing the port of Bossasso.

Joint Task Force, Somalia (JTFSOM), which arrived in theater in October 1993, further contributed to the humanitarian support of the Somali people. Medical personnel from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC) treated 910 people in Marka and
Qoryooley, and 899 people in North Mogadishu in MEDCAP/DENCAP operations conducted in November and December 1993. In addition, JTF soldiers and marines repaired a local orphanage in North Mogadishu, provided books to a local school, and delivered food stuffs and more than 2500 gallons of purified water to local Somalis. These operations also included joint and coalition security operations and training.

**Military Contributions**

U.S. forces played a key role in UNOSOM II military operations. The U.S. QRF provided both ground and air support for UNOSOM combat operations in Mogadishu from June through October 1993. In June 1993, the SOCCE played a key role in helping UNOSOM II expand its disarmament program into the northeast area of the country. The Special Forces teams proved instrumental to opening the door for future UNOSOM II military forces. Coalition forces came to depend on the support of the QRF’s attack helicopters in all of their operations. Aerial observation was key to real-time intelligence gathering and convoy security. Cordon and search operations conducted by U.S. ground forces in Mogadishu from July through September were essential for U.S. force protection and contributed significantly to what little stability existed at that time. These U.S. operations enabled UNOSOM II to prevent the USC/SNA militia from completely seizing the initiative in Mogadishu, when coalition forces lacked the will to act aggressively in the city. U.S. forces also assisted coalition forces in unit level training. The 24th MEU provided riot control training to Pakistani forces in June. The QRF offered and provided training to Pakistani and Malaysian forces in military operations in urban terrain, call for fire, clearing obstacles and convoy security. The JTF and SOCCE provided sniper training to coalition forces in Mogadishu.

The U.S. contingent of UNOSOM II played a vital role in establishing and operating the UNOSOM II Force Command Headquarters. U.S. officers arrived in Mogadishu in early April 1993 designated to work as coalition staff members. They formed the nucleus for UNOSOM II’s military staff and were key to UNOSOM II’s ability to assume control of the Somalia Theater of Operations from UNITAF. U.S. staff members, with those limited coalition staff members available early on, assumed responsibility for setting up Force Command Headquarters and establishing standard procedures for planning, coordination, and staff operations. Finally, members of the U.S. contingent played a large role in day-to-day and long-term decision making and operations of the UNOSOM headquarters.

Logistics Support Command (LSC) and the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) provided the backbone of UNOSOM II’s logistics and intelligence capability respectively until they departed theater in January and March 1994. The LSC served as the theater level general support unit for UNOSOM II and assumed an additional mission to provide direct support for the many national contingents which deployed to Somalia without organic logistics support assets. U.S. transportation units provided UNOSOM II both its long haul and local transportation capability. Until the arrival of the Irish Truck Company in August 1993, LSC was the only source of transportation assets in theater. The same was true for engineer capability. The engineer company assigned to LSC was the only engineer force in theater available to maintain UNOSOM II’s vital lines of communications and outlying airfields until the arrival of the Korean Engineer Squadron (company) in July 1993.

The CISE provided the only source for intelligence collection management and production in the theater of operations. Unlike LSC, whose functions have been completely assumed by civilian contractors, a small residual cell remains in theater with the U.S. Liaison Office and UNOSOM II.

While benefiting from the association with the other coalition partners, U.S. forces served as the backbone for UNOSOM II operations in the first year of this historic Chapter VII operation. The training
and flexibility of U.S. soldiers and units served as a model for other coalition forces. U.S. units, like their coalition counterparts, proved to be resiliently tough, versatile, and compassionate. It was not unusual for military forces to conduct security or combat operations one day, and humanitarian relief work the next. The diversity of tasks in this theater demonstrated the unique challenge of Chapter VII operations and the requirement for high quality soldiers and leaders.
## CHAPTER VII
### CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS

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<td>UNITS BEGIN DEPLOYING INTO INTERIOR.</td>
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<td>JTFSC ASSUMES THEATER CSS MISSION.</td>
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8 MAR  LT GEN BIR, FORCE COMMANDER, UNOSOM II, ARRIVES IN MOGADISHU.

9 MAR  MG MONTGOMERY, DEPUTY UNOSOM II FORCE CMDR, ARRIVES IN MOGADISHU.

15–27 MAR  SECOND ADDIS ABABA RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE.

22 APR  GENERALS BIR AND JOHNSTON AGREE TO TURNOVER DATE ON 4 MAY.

29 APR  U.S. AND UN SIGN TERMS OF REFERENCE.

4 MAY  UNITAF-UNOSOM II CHANGE OF COMMAND.

4–6 MAY  U.S. AND UN SIGN AGREEMENT ON REIMBURSEMENT FOR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF UNOSOM II.

7 MAY  JESS ATTACKS BELGIANS IN KISMAYO.

9–20 MAY  QRF DEPLOYED TO KISMAYO.

12 MAY  USG ISSUES A “SERIOUS THREAT” WARNING TO ALL AMERICANS IN SOMALIA.

21 MAY–2 JUN  ABORTIVE GALCAYO PEACE CONFERENCE.

31 MAY–4 JUN  QRF SHOW OF FORCE OPERATION PLANNED FOR BARDERA.

5 JUN  PAKISTANI SOLDIERS AMBUSHED AT CIGARETTE FACTORY ON 21 OCT ROAD AND AT FEEDING STATION #20. U.S. QRF PROVIDES GROUND AND AIR SUPPORT.

6–7 JUN  USLO/UN OFFICES RELOCATE TO EMBASSY COMPOUND. NON-ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES SENT OUT OF COUNTRY.

9 JUN  FOUR AC–130 GUNSHIPS ARE STATIONED AT DJIBOUTI AIRPORT.

10 JUN  UNIV COMPLEX BEGINS RECEIVING NIGHTLY SPORADIC SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM ADJACENT BUILDINGS.

12 JUN  UNOSOM II, QRF AND AC–130 GUNSHIPS ATTACK WEAPONS STORAGE SITES AND RADIO AIDEED.

17 JUN  AC–130 ATTACKS IN SNA ENCLAVE, FOLLOWED BY UNOSOM II FORCES GROUND SEARCH OF ENCLAVE.

SRSG ORDERS ARREST OF AIDEED, OFFERS $25K REWARD.

19 JUN  TASK FORCE 3-25 ENGAGED BY HMGs.

INF CO RAID DESTROYS ARTILLERY NEAR AFGOOGYE.
22 JUN  AMMUNITION/WPNS STORAGE SITE #9 BLOWN UP; SOMALIS BEGIN CONDUCTING DEMONSTRATIONS AT K4 CIRCLE, STADIUM, REVIEWING STAND; U.S. UNITS RESTRICTED FROM K4.

UNLSC G3 COMPLETES U.S. INSTALLATION SECURITY ASSESSMENT; RECOMMENDS ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSETS.

25 JUN  UNOSOM II BEGINS PLANNING FOR ADDITIONAL M48A2C TANKS FROM TURKEY; UNLSC HAS NO MAINT CAPABILITY.

UNOSOM BEGINS COMO INTERFACE PLANNING FOR INCOMING SUBORDINATE COALITION UNITS (GE, KOR, IRE, ROMAN).

COMUSFORSOM DIRECTS MSG TO CINCCENT REFERENCE FOLLOW-ON MPs—MUST BE C1 FOR PERSONNEL; WANTS INFANTRY CO TO PROTECT U.S. FORCES AND RESOURCES.

USS OSPREY HIT BY 2 PROJECTILES; 100–200 BARRELS FUEL LOST; NO FIRE.

27 JUN  LOGCAP TRUCK & DRIVER MISSING; INSTALLATION SECURITY AGAINST VEHICLE BOMBS INCREASED. USAREUR TO PROVIDE VEHICLE INSPECTION MIRRORS.

UNOSOM INTEL OFFICER CONTS TO REPORT THREAT "RED" IN MOGADISHU; BARRICADES; POSSIBLE AMBUSHES 10–20 PERSONNEL USING RPGS AND GRENADES. CSS VEHICLES HARDENED W/SANDBAGS, SHEET METAL; CREW SERVED WPNS MOUNTED ON UNIT-CONSTRUCTED MOUNTS.

30 JUN  U.S. FORCES ATK ATTO GARAGE #2 BY AIR.

UNLSC CONVOYS CONT TO RECEIVE FIRE; REQUESTS AIRCRAFT SECURITY; QRF REJECTS IDEA; COMUSFORSOM DIRECTS AIR ESCORT FOR CONVOYS EXITING/ENTERING MOGADISHU ALONG 21 OCTOBER ROAD.

COMUNLSC DIRECTS COORDINATED MSG FOR COMUSFORSOM REQUESTING ADDITIONAL ASSETS (MP, 5-TON TRUCKS, AND ENGINEERS) IN NEXT U.S. FORCE ROTATION.

1 JUL  FRENCH REPORT INABILITY TO ESCORT UNLSC CONVOYS TO BAIDOA PER UNOSOM FRAGO 63/64; FUEL & WATER TO FRENCH FORCES NOT DELIVERED; FRENCH RELENT AND BEGIN PROVIDING ESCORT AGAIN.

2 JUL  ATK HELOS SUPPORT ITALIANS CAUGHT IN AMBUSH AT PASTA FACTORY. GROUND QRC BEGAN MOVEMENT TO REINFORCE AND ARE WITHDRAWN AS ITALIAN COMMANDER WITHDRAWS.

3 JUL  SNA CLOSES 21 OCTOBER ROAD; MSR RED IS ONLY ALTERNATIVE ROUTE TO GILALIASSI, BELET UEN.
U3 CONTINUES TO PLAN FOR 3 BDE OPERATION IN MOGADISHU AFTER INDIAN CONTINGENT ARRIVAL.

5 JUL
ROMANIAN HOSPITAL MAIN BODY ARRIVES; UNIT OCPON UNLSC AT MOGADISHU AIRFIELD.

7–8 JUL
U4 RELEASES U.S. PROVIDED M79 GRENADE launchers FOR ISSUE; GE CONVOY RECONNOITERS ROUTE TO BELET WEYNE VIA AFGOYOYE-GILALASSI, TO BELET UEN. REPORT IT UNSUITABLE FOR TRAILERS.

UNOSOM DROPS CHALLENGE/PASSWORD SYSTEM; UNWORKABLE.

9 JUL
300TH MP CO RELIEVED OF CP 4 & 7 AS PAKIS RECEIVES M79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS.

100 ADDITIONAL TRUCK DRIVERS ARRIVE—ASSIGNED TO CSG.

COMUNLSC DIRECTS COMPLETION OF AIRPORT-PORT ROAD IN PHASES.

COMUSFORSOM DIRECTS QRF TO USE AIR FOR SELECTED GROUND CONVOYS, ESPECIALLY THOSE TRAVELING TO/FROM BALAD VIA 21 OCT RD.

KOREANS BEGIN UNLOADING SHIPS; REQUEST AIR COVER FOR CONVOYS TO BALAD THROUGH 14 JUL.

10 JUL
MORTARS IMPACT NORWEGIAN BILLETS IN EMBASSY COMPOUND: 4 INJURED; VIA LENIN ROAD CLOSED DUE TO THREAT.

10–13 JUL
QRF CONDUCTS SEARCH/CLEAR OPERATIONS NEAR UNIVERSITY COMPOUND.

11 JUL
SECOND LOGCAP (WATER) TRUCK STOLEN. CONTINUED CONCERN ABOUT ATTEMPTS TO USE THEM FOR EXPLOSIVES INSIDE HQ COMPOUND.

12 JUL
UNOSOM AIR ATTACK ON SNA COMMAND AND CONTROL SITE: “ABDI HOUSE.” 4 JOURNALISTS EMPLOYEES KILLED IN MOGADISHU.

13 JUL
UNLSC ENGINEERS PERFORM DEMOLITION ASSESSMENT OF “FRUIT FACTORY” OUTSIDE UNIVERSITY PERIMETER—SOURCE OF SNIPER FIRE.

U.S. FORCES ON HEIGHTENED ALERT AFTER ATTACK (CONT) ON SNA SITE. U.S. PROVOST MARSHAL ON UNOSOM STAFF AMBUSHED VIC K4; 2 U.S. WOUNDED.

KOREAN CONVOYS TO BALAD DELAYED FOR SECURITY REASONS.

COMUSFORSOM REQUESTS ADDITIONAL MP OR INFANTRY
COMPANY WITH HUMMWV. ADDITIONAL FORCE REQUIRED FOR
FORCE PROTECTION.

15 JUL
HQ ARCENT REJECTS REQUEST FOR M2 BFVs AS INFEASIBLE;
RECOMMENDS COMBINING REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL Q36
RADARS, INFANTRY, AND MPs INTO ONE MESSAGE.

19 JUL
GERMAN COMPOSITE FORCE MAIN BODY ARRIVES UNDER CHAP
VI; 10 AUG SUBORD TO UNLSC AT BELET UEN. INTENDS TO BE
FULLY OPERATIONAL BY END OF AUGUST.

20 JUL
43RD REDEPLOYMENT BEGINS WITH ARRIVAL OF INITIAL 507TH CSG
(AIRBORNE) UNITS FROM XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS. REDEPLOYMENT IS
COMPLETED BY 10 SEPTEMBER.

21 JUL
QRF AVN BN ENGAGES/DESTROYS RPG GUNNER & MORTAR POSITION;
TUNISIANS HAVE 2-HOUR FIRE FIGHT W/SOMALIS AT UNIVERSITY.

22 JUL
CINCCENT DISPATCHES A SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEAM TO
SOMALIA.

24 JUL
TWO U.S. VEHICLES AMBUSHED IN MOGADISHU; 2 U.S. WOUNDED;
3 ATTACKERS KILLED.

26 JUL
COMUSFORSOM REQUESTS TWO Q36 RADARS TO ASSIST
TARGETING OF MORTAR POSITIONS.

27 JUL
COMUSFORSOM REQUESTS RECONSIDERATION OF EARLIER REQUEST
TO FORSCOM FOR AN ADDITIONAL LIGHT INFANTRY COMPANY WITH A
REQUEST FOR AN ADDITIONAL MP PLATOON. MESSAGE ALSO ALERTS
CINCCENT TO FORTHCOMING MESSAGE THAT WILL PROVIDE DETAILED
REQUEST FOR SECURITY AND FORCE PROTECTION MATERIAL AND
PERSONNEL. ULTIMATELY, AN ADDITIONAL INFANTRY PLATOON IS SENT,
WITH VEHICLES, TO PERFORM THE TASK. IT IS ATTACHED TO THE QRF,
RELIEVING THE JMP PLATOON TO JOIN THE MP COMPANY.

28 JUL
REQUESTED ADDITIONAL COUNTER INTEL TEAMS IDENTIFIED AND
INBOUND.

CISE REPORTS SNA $10,000 BOUNTY ON DOWNED U.S. HELO; USE OF
WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO PLANT LAND MINES; INCREASE IN USE OF
MINES AND DAYTIME AMBUSHES, TARGETING U.S. PERSONNEL.

1 AUG
BANGLADESH BATTALION ARRIVES; SCHEDULED TO PROVIDE
SECURITY FOR U.S. INSTALLATIONS (TBD).

2 AUG
U2 CONTINUES TO RECEIVE REPORTS OF MINES; MOST UNFOUNDED.

U4 REQUESTS UNLSC ESTABLISH A TRAILER TRANSFER POINT
ON MSR ORANGE.
4 AUG  COMUSFORSOM DIRECTS ACQUISITION OF VIDEO RECORDER CAPABILITY FOR OH–58 AIRCRAFT—TO ASSIST TRAINING AND REVIEW ENGAGEMENTS.

CISE ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT ATTACKS ON UNOSOM COMPOUNDS ARE HIGHEST ON TUES/WED; LOWEST ON SUNDAY/THURSDAY.

5 AUG  SWORD BASE RECEIVES INDIRECT FIRE.

6 AUG  FRENCH AGREE TO PUT AIR COVER OVER U.S. CONVOYS IN FRENCH SECTOR.

8 AUG  COMMAND DETONATED MINE KILLS FOUR MPs. THIS CATASTROPHIC ATTACK IS THE FIRST SUCCESSFUL USE OF A COMMAND-DETONATED MINE.

10 AUG  COMUSFORSOM ALERTS CINCCENT OF FORTHCOMING REQUESTS FOR MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL TO ENHANCE PHYSICAL SECURITY AND FORCE PROTECTION FOR U.S. FORCES.

BASED ON DAMAGE TO VEHICLES AND INJURIES TO CREWS, COMUNLSC SENDS MESSAGE REQUESTING THAT CASCOM BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF CREW PROTECTION KITS FOR CREWS OF THIN-SKINNED VEHICLES.

OH–58D HIT BY SMALL ARMS FIRE; OTHER AIRCRAFT FIRED AT; AIRFIELD RECEIVES 4 MORTAR RoundS; AH–1 ENGAGES VEHICLE NEAR MILITARY HOSPITAL.

11 AUG  USCENTCOM VALIDATES USFORSOM G3 REQUEST FOR AN IMPROVED IMAGERY ENHANCEMENT VEHICLE (IIEV); AND A “NIGHT STALKER” SYSTEM IS DEPLOYED. IT IS USED NIGHTLY THROUGH FEBRUARY 1994 AND ASSISTS IN INSTALLATION DEFENSE.

CORDON AND SEARCH OF MEDINA AREA.

13 AUG  46TH COMBAT SUPPORT HOSPITAL PERSONNEL ROTATION BEGINS.

14 AUG  QRF RAID TO CAPTURE SUSPECTS IN 8 AUG ATTACK AGAINST 4 U.S. MPs. 4 DETAINNEES.

16 AUG  SECSTATE AUTHORIZES FUNDING FOR EXTENSION OF USMC SECURITY FAST PLATOON AT EMBASSY THROUGH DECEMBER 93.

18 AUG  BANGLADESH CONTINGENT REQUEST ISSUE OF BODY ARMOR FROM UNLSC.

19 AUG  SECOND COMMAND DETONATED MINE VIC BYPASS ROAD. NO INJURIES.

22 AUG  2-14 IN ASSUMES BYPASS SECURITY MISSION; THIRD COMMAND DETONATED MINE VIC NEW PORT.

23 AUG  COMUSFORSOM DIRECTS ALL CONVOYS BETWEEN AIRPORT AND PORT TO MOVE THROUGH THE UAE AND PAKISTANI CAMPS.

154
25 AUG UH–60 FIRED ON BY SUSPECTED RPG ROCKETS.

UN HEADQUARTERS ANNOUNCES THAT ITS INVESTIGATION OF 5 JUNE ATTACK ON PAKISTANI CONCLUDES THAT AIDED’S MILITIA CARRIED OUT ATTACKS.

26 AUG SWT SUPPORTS SECOND SEARCH OF SNA ENCLAVE.

MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST SWORD BASE.

UH–60 STRUCK BY 57MM ROCKET.

COMUSFORSOM FAXES MSG TO DCINC REQUESTING MECH BN PLUS FOR FORCE PROTECTION.

27 AUG SWT BEGIN AIRPORT AIR COVER MISSION.

28 AUG AH–1 DESTROYS RECOILLESS RIFLE VIC AWSS #3.

29 AUG MORTAR ATTACK (6 ROUNDS) AGAINST UNIVERSITY COMPOUND; AIR DISPATCHED TO SUSPECTED MORTAR POSITION.

TF RANGER ARRIVES.

30 AUG MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST SWORD BASE.

TF RANGER CONDUCTS RAID ON THE LIG LIGATO HOUSE.

1 SEP IRISH TRUCK COMPANY MAIN BODY ARRIVES.

7 SEP USCINCCENT VALIDATES USFORSOM REQUEST FOR MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL REQUIRED FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY AND FORCE PROTECTION UPGRADE.

8 SEP QRF CORDON AND SEARCH IN MEDINA.

9 SEP PAKISTANI AND U.S. FORCES AMBUSHED ON 21 OCT ROAD. SIGNIFICANT SOMALI CASUALTIES. WOMEN TAKE PART IN THE AMBUSH.

12 SEP COUNTER MORTAR FIRE INTO DIGFER TRIANGLE AREA.

13 SEP CORDON AND SEARCH IN MEDINA.

14 SEP COMUSFORSOM, FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH CINCCENT ON 9 SEP, FORWARDS PFOR CINCCENT REQUESTING ARMOR/MECH TEAM PLUS FOR FORCE PROTECTION.

15 SEP QRF COUNTER-FIRES MORTARS INTO ATTO’S GARAGE.

16 SEP IN RESPONSE TO COMUSFORSOM REQUEST, USCINCCENT DIRECTS DEPLOYMENT NLT 26 SEP OF ONE ADDITIONAL COMBAT ENGINEER PLATOON WITH MINE DETECTION AND MINE CLEARING CAPABILITY.
TF RANGER CONDUCTS SUCCESSFUL RAID ON THE OLD RUSSIAN COMPOUND.

17 SEP IN RESPONSE TO G3 REQUEST, U.S. ARMY ENGINEER SCHOOL CONDUCTS COUNTERMINE ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDS COUNTERMINE TECHNOLOGY FOR THE THEATER.

18 SEP MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST EMBASSY COMPOUND (QRF HQ).

COMUSFORSOM PROVIDES CINCCENT DETAILED LISTS OF MATERIAL AND PERSONNEL FOR FORCE PROTECTION, INCLUDING ADDITIONAL CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAMS.

19 SEP QRF INF RAID OF SUSPECTED MORTAR LOCATION VIC BENADIR HOSPITAL.

20 SEP SHOW OF FORCE/LEAFLET DROP IN MEDINA/K4 AREAS.

20–25 SEP AS RESULT OF FORCE PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT REQUEST, PROJ MANAGER, NIGHT VISION & ELECTRO OPTICS LAB CONDUCTS NIGHT VISION ASSESSMENT IN THREAT.

21 SEP PAKISTANIS AMBUSHED NEAR K9; TF 2-25 SUPPORTS WITHDRAWAL.

OSMAN ATTO CAPTURED BY TF RANGER.

COMUNLSC, IN COORDINATION WITH COMMANDER, TACC, BG SAMS, VALIDATES NEED FOR AND REQUESTS USAF “RED HORSE” TEAM TO BUILD REVETMENTS TO PROTECT U.S. AIRCRAFT, AND HARDENED SHELTERS FOR AIRFIELD PERSONNEL.

23 SEP COMUSARCENT SENDS MESSAGE TO USCINCCENT, CONCURRING WITH COMUSFORSOM’S REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL HEAVY FORCES; SUGGESTS AN INFANTRY-HEAVY CO/TEAM (3 PLT M2A2/2 M1 W/Front “BLADES”; SIX 4.2 IN MORTARS AND FDC; AND DIRECT SUPPORT SUSTAINMENT PACKAGE).

24 SEP FOUR AIRCRAFT DAMAGED BY MORTAR ATTACK ON AIRFIELD.

25 SEP UH–60 SHOT DOWN (3 KIA).

27 SEP CINCCENT TASKS USCINCSOC TO PROVIDE COMUSFORSOM 3 ADDITIONAL CA TEAMS UNDER OPCON COMUNLSC.

30 SEP COMUSFORSOM ORDER DIRECTS III CORPS TO ASSUME UNLSC AND AVIATION TASK FORCE MISSION FROM XVIII ABN CORPS IN ROTATION 3 OF UNOSOM II. XVIII ABN CORPS WILL RETAIN THE QRF MISSION, USING A BRIGADE FROM THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT), INCLUDING A BATTALION, BRIGADE HQ, AND A FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION.

3 OCT TASK FORCE RANGER CONDUCTS RAID VIC OLYMPIC HOTEL IN MOGADISHU. 18 U.S. SOLDIERS KIA WITH 84 WIA; 1 MALAYSIAN SOLDIER KIA, 10 WIA; 2 PAKISTANI SOLDIERS WIA; AND 300+
SOMALIS KILLED, 700+ WOUNDED (ACCORDING TO SNA REPORTS) AND 22 DETAINNEES CAPTURED.

4th COMMAND DETONATED MINE, EXPLODED VIC NEW PORT.

4 OCT CJCS AUTHORIZES DEPLOYMENT OF TWO AC–130 AIRCRAFT.

CJCS DIRECTS DEPLOYMENT OF AN M2 BRADLEY (CONT) TEAM, REINFORCED WITH AN M1 TANK PLATOON TO SOMALIA, OPCON COMUSFORSOM.

5 OCT USCENTCOM APPROVES USFORSOM/CENTAF REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL REFUELING VEHICLES AND FIRE TRUCKS TO THE AIRFIELD IN MOGADISHU.

6 OCT USCENTCOM VALIDATES NIGHT VISION/ELECTRO-SENSORS DIRECTORATE ASSESSMENT TEAM. TASKS ARCENT TO FILL USFORSOM G3 REQUEST FOR SENSORS.

MORTAR ATTACK ON TASK FORCE RANGER COMPOUND AT MOGADISHU AIRPORT. (1KIA, 12 WIA)

7 OCT PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES DEPLOYMENT OF JTF AND 31 MARCH 1994 WITHDRAWAL DATE FOR U.S. FORCES.

CJCS ORDERS THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL ARG AND MEU(SOC), TWO AC–130 AIRCRAFT, AND A HEAVY TASK FORCE TO SOMALIA.

8 OCT USCINCCENT ORDERS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE HEAVY TASK FORCE, INCLUDING AN ARMOR BATTALION HQ, ADDITIONAL ARMOR, SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY, UH–60 AIRCRAFT, AH–1F, AND OH–58D HELICOPTERS; ADDITIONAL SOF PERSONNEL.

10 OCT FIRST ELEMENTS OF 2-22 INFANTRY/10TH MOUNTAIN DIV ARRIVE AS PART OF INCOMING JOINT TASK FORCE. JTF DEPLOYMENT CONTINUES THROUGH 26 OCTOBER.

AIDEED DECLARES UNILATERAL CEASE-FIRE.

AMBASSADOR OAKLEY ARRIVES MOGADISHU.

14 OCT USCINCCENT ACTIVATION ORDER FOR JTF-SOMALIA.

CWO DURANT RELEASED BY AIDEED SUPPORTERS.

17 OCT CENTCOM FRAG ORDER 001 ISSUED. USFORSOM BEGINS REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING.

20 OCT JTF-SOMALIA OPERATIONAL.

22 OCT UN SECRETARY-GENERAL BOUTROUS-GHALI VISITS BAIDOA AND MOGADISHU.
28–29 OCT Fighting between Habr Gedir and Hawadle resumes in Mogadishu.

13 NOV French handover Baidoa AOR to Indians.

11–14 NOV Operation “Show Care” in Marka. (JTF plus Moroccan forces)

16 NOV With UNSCR 885, arrest order on Aideed is rescinded.

24 NOV UN SecGen announces formation of a new investigating board (under leadership of former Zambian Chief Justice Ngulube) to look into attacks on UN personnel in Somalia.

28 NOV OPORD 002, USFORSOM redeployment published.

2–4 DEC Operation “More Care” in North Mogadishu.

4–12 DEC Political reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa. Special Envoy Oakley orders use of USFORSOM air asset to transport Aideed. Despite presence of all warlords, talks are ultimately unsuccessful.

12 DEC French forces depart Somalia.

15 DEC QRF mission handover to Malaysian battalion.

17–18 DEC 2-14 in and 43 CBT ENGR redeployed to CONUS.

20 DEC The Chairman JCS visits Mogadishu.

22 DEC Belgian handover to Indians in Kismayo.

30 DEC Belgian forces depart Somalia.

31 DEC Brown and Root assumes log support mission.

UNLSC reduced to 1400 personnel.

1 JAN UNLSC HQ deploys to airfield.

15 JAN Decision made not to fly commercial aircraft into Mogadishu airport due to possible manpad threats.

PAK forces complete move from stadium to sword base. Aideed militia immediately takes over stadium site.

16–21 JAN Hirab conference of elders from many clans in Mogadishu.

17 JAN USFORSOM and JTF-Somalia staffs merged. Comusforsom takes direct command of JTF-S.
21 JAN  UNOSOM II CHANGE OF COMMAND. LTG CEVIC BIR TURNS OVER TO LTG ABOO SAMAH ABOO BAKR.

28 JAN  TASK FORCE MOMBASA ESTABLISHED AT MOMBASA AIRFIELD.

2 FEB   TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS THROUGH MOMBASA BEGIN.

4 FEB   BYPASS ROAD SECURITY MISSION PASSED TO EGYPTIAN BDE.

22 FEB  TURKISH FORCES LEAVE SOMALIA.

24 FEB  NGULUBE BOARD PRESENTS FINAL REPORT, NOTING THAT AIDEED REFUSED TO BE INTERVIEWED.

28 FEB  FALCON BDE HQ COMPLETES C2 HANDOVER WITH 24 MEU.

2 MAR   FALCON BDE HEADQUARTERS DEPARTS SOMALIA.

4 MAR   24 MEU ASSUMES DEFENSE OF MOGADISHU AIRPORT AND SEAPORT COMPLEXES. (REDEPLOYMENT SUPPORT AREA)

5 MAR   THE 12 SOMALI FACTIONS ALLIED WITH ALI MAHDI AGREE IN CAIRO ON FOUNDING A NEW GOVERNMENT.

8 MAR   MORTAR FIRE CLOSES THE MOGADISHU AIRPORT FOR A FEW HOURS.

12 MAR  THE CHAIRMAN JCS AGAIN VISITS MOGADISHU.

14 MAR  AC–130 CRASH LANDS OFF COAST OF MALINDI, KENYA. SAR OPERATIONS BEGIN.

19 MAR  GERMAN FORCES LEAVE SOMALIA.

23 MAR  ITALIAN FORCES DEPART SOMALIA.

23–24 MAR JTF-SOMALIA STAFF DEPLOYS TO MOMBASA.

25 MAR  LAST U.S. GROUND FORCE DEPARTS MOGADISHU.

27 MAR  U.S. FORCES COMPLETE REDEPLOYMENT. USFORSOM AND JTF-S STANDS DOWN.

28 MAR  COMUSFORSOM/CJTF AND STAFF ARRIVE ANDREWS AFB. END OF MISSION.
CHAPTER VIII
SPECIAL SUBJECT AREAS

Purpose

This section addresses special subject areas of interest which had a significant impact on USFOR-SOM operations in support of UNOSOM II, and U.S. personnel assigned for permanent duty to the UNOSOM II staff. These special subject areas include: Center of Gravity, Coalition Command and Control, Intelligence Support to UNOSOM II, U.S. Manning of the UNOSOM II Staff, Aviation Operations, PSYOP Support, Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, Legal Support of USFORSOM, Medical Support of USFORSOM and USFORSOM Redeployment.

Center of Gravity

Design of a campaign plan requires planners to identify strategic and operational centers of gravity for both friendly and enemy forces. Once identified, opposing centers of gravity are attacked directly, by pitting centers of gravity in opposition to one another, or indirectly by focusing resources on decisive points. Decisive points are not centers of gravity but are keys to getting at the centers. They are critical activities, assets, places or personages that contribute directly to the strength of the center of gravity. A friendly center of gravity can be safeguarded by protecting its decisive points. Likewise, the enemy’s center of gravity can be weakened and eventually destroyed by striking at his decisive points.

On arrival in theater, a center of gravity assessment was not conducted by the UNOSOM II military staff. This can be attributed to the perceived lack of a clearly defined hostile force and the focus of security tasks on protection of humanitarian efforts from attacks by local bandits.

During the breathing spell provided by UNITAF’s presence, Somalis began to rebuild their lives, while the warlords, who had promulgated the civil war and brought on the mass starvation, were being increasingly marginalized. Eventual confrontation with one or more warlords appeared increasingly likely after the departure of UNITAF. However, the accords reached by factional leaders at Addis Ababa in March 1993, when they agreed to reconciliation and disarmament, and UNITAF’s belief that the greatest threat against UNITAF or UNOSOM II at the time of transition consisted of large scale riots in Mogadishu similar to those organized in February, led UNOSOM II into thinking the situation in Southern Somalia would remain a fairly benign environment.

Throughout most of 1992, United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) factional leader Mohamed Farah Aideed had openly opposed UN intervention in Somalia. His grudging last minute “acceptance” of the UNITAF deployment to Somalia may have been based on his desire to avoid a confrontation with the potent U.S. force. However, his refusal to share power with others after the overthrow of the dictator Siad Barre was known to be one of the key factors which plunged Somalia into civil war. Aideed and his allies were generally recognized to be a potential risk to UN operations in Somalia. Yet, UNSCR 814 provided no clear guidance regarding what the UN wanted done with warlords who directly opposed UN intervention.

UNOSOM II began to implement the new mandate with political and disarmament measures after 4 May. Despite the Addis Ababa accords, during the weeks that followed the anti-U.S. and anti-UN radio and leaflet campaign sustained a fever pitch in Mogadishu. On 4 June the USC/SNA was informed in advance that an inspection would be made on 5 June of their several declared weapons storage sites. Planners recognized the possibility of resistance and the inspection teams were therefore escorted by company-sized UN forces. Nonetheless, when UN peacekeepers were ambushed on 5 June, all parties
were caught by surprise. UNOSOM II underestimated the intentions and military capability of the USC/SNA leadership. UNOSOM II, as had UNITAF just a month before, believed that the worst case scenario to be expected consisted of street riots in Mogadishu and possible clan on clan confrontations in the Kismayo area. Although UNOSOM II expected to be tested by the warlords, the ferocity and nature of the 5 June ambush against UN peacekeepers was not anticipated. It was not until these attacks occurred that an analysis of potential centers of gravity was made concerning the warlords.

In retrospect, for Chapter VII operations or Chapter VI operations where hostilities are possible, a center of gravity analysis should be completed. Chapter VII operations are forcible, armed interventions which are most severely tested in chaotic “failed nation state” situations. UN forces will often be uninvited by the internal parties. Their presence may be resented, and, in some cases, violently opposed by some of the belligerents. UN traditions of impartiality and strict neutrality may be incompatible with peace enforcement operations. Until the conditions are right for political reconciliation, the UN force may have no choice but to take action against one or more belligerents openly opposed to the UN intervention. Military planners going into such operations should conduct a thorough analysis of the main belligerents so their centers of gravity or decisive points can be neutralized as operations progress.

In Somalia, there were strategic and operational centers of gravity for UNOSOM II and the hostile clans. Decisive points were exploited which had significant effect on the outcome of events during the UN intervention. Operations at the tactical level also had significant effect on the center of gravity at the strategic level.

**Strategic Centers of Gravity**

- **UNOSOM II Center of Gravity**

Strategically, the coalition of force contributing nations was UNOSOM II’s center of gravity. The success of UNOSOM II is dependent upon the strength of the alliance and the ability of the UN to find and retain contributing nations who could effectively support the operation. In this center of gravity, several decisive points could be identified:

— The participation of the United States in UNOSOM II with its associated leadership; commitment; manpower and equipment; and other resources that only the U.S. could provide;

— The participation of forces from other western industrialized nations in an enterprise as logistically ambitious as the one undertaken in Somalia. The presence of self-sustaining forces in a theater of operations with an infrastructure as austere as Somalia cannot be overestimated. Military forces from most non-western industrialized nations do not possess a self-sustaining capability and therefore place a burden on the theater logistics support structure.

- **USC/SNA Militia Center of Gravity**

Aideed himself, and the power he wields within the USC/SNA militia, represented the militia’s strategic center of gravity. He and a few of his top aides appeared to comprise the nucleus of opposition to UNOSOM II. Their influence enabled them to control the political, financial and military arms of the USC/SNA organization.

**Operational Centers of Gravity**

Operationally, the center of gravity for both UNOSOM II and the militia was the ability of their forces to control key areas of Mogadishu. There has been a good deal of discussion about the importance of Mogadishu to the UN’s success in Somalia. There has been inference that UNOSOM II paid too much
attention to Mogadishu at expense to the rest of the nation. Mogadishu, the location for both the country’s national airport and its only major seaport, simply could not be ignored when armed resistance developed. There are no alternative seaports or airports which could support either military or humanitarian operations. As desirable as diversification might have been, the infrastructure elsewhere did not support it.

The importance of Mogadishu to southern Somalia is illustrated in a meeting between the USLO staff and key leaders from Belet Uen in late July 1993. The Belet Uen leaders requested help in gaining access to roads and facilities in Mogadishu. UNOSOM II and clans not allied with the USC/SNA were denied access to those areas in Mogadishu controlled by the USC/SNA militia. At this time, Belet Uen itself was peaceful and to some extent prosperous. However, it had gone as far as it could toward reconstruction and rehabilitation without access to the markets of Mogadishu for the sale of its agricultural products and access to the port of Mogadishu for the export of its livestock. Without access through North Mogadishu near Check Point 42, this essential commerce was not possible. Bossasso and Berbera could be utilized for the northeast and the northwest respectively but there is no way for the south-central part of the country to return to any semblance of normalcy without free access to the markets and port of Mogadishu.

Arguably, UNOSOM II lost control of Mogadishu on 5 June 1994. Lack of political reconciliation among civil war antagonists, the presence of armed and organized militia throughout the city and in outlying areas, and ubiquitous caches of weapons suggest that the grip of UNOSOM II on Mogadishu was tenuous when it assumed the mission on 4 May 1993.

Actions Directed at Decisive Points

The authorized weapons storage sites (AWSS) proved to be decisive points for the hostile force. As UNOSOM II slowly increased the pressure on Aideed, his ability to control events in Mogadishu began to wane. UNOSOM II effectively blocked his attempt to subvert the judicial system in Mogadishu and prevented him from dominating the Galcayo Peace Conference. When UNOSOM II forces threatened the AWSSs in Mogadishu by conducting short notice, on site inventories, Aideed and his militia reacted violently on 5 June 1993. This indicated the importance of these sites to the USC/SNA effort.

Aideed’s operational arm is the USC/SNA militia. His ability to influence events in Mogadishu when he was displeased with the direction of the political process became dependent upon his use of military force. Evidence suggests that Aideed’s capability to conduct organized military operations against UNOSOM II reached a culminating point, or at least an operational pause, on 3 October after the battle with Task Force Ranger devastated his militia. It is further suggested that the setback suffered by the USC/SNA militia and the announcement by President Clinton of his intention to send more U.S. combat forces to Somalia compelled Aideed to sue for peace and announce a unilateral cease-fire.

Forces hostile to United Nations efforts in Somalia predictably directed their energies against members of the coalition while trying desperately to protect their political leadership and hold their own alliance together. The contingents were individually and sequentially bloodied by USC/SNA instigated ambushes, snipers, mortar and RPG fires, land mines, and other attacks. The cumulative effect of these attacks weakened UNOSOM II’s resolve to accomplish the mission. This was evident in the performance of UNOSOM II contingent forces. Some refused to permit their forces to reside and operate within the city limits of Mogadishu. Others would not conduct military operations against hostile forces or participate fully as a Chapter VII force. These actions indicate just how well Aideed had succeeded in attacking the will of the coalition to act decisively.

Aideed and his militia further exploited this decisive point, when they attacked U.S. forces. As U.S. casualties mounted, the will of the American people to sustain the effort dwindled. The American public and Congress began to question the U.S. mission in Somalia, particularly after the events of 3 October 1993. The end result was President Clinton’s decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from Somalia by 31
March 1994. The absence of forces from western industrialized nations placed severe limits on what the Force Command can do to realize the goals of the UN charter.

**Tactical Level**

The United States' participation in UNOSOM was critical to UNOSOM II's strategic center of gravity. U.S. will and U.S. Forces Somalia (QRF, LSC, CISE, Task Force Ranger and Joint Task Force Somalia) were decisive points that required protection. At the tactical level, an event can often have operational and even strategic repercussions. This is particularly true in the politically charged arena of the United Nations. The perception was created by the media that Task Force Ranger, a strategic asset of the United States, suffered a defeat at the hands of USC/SNA militia. The tactical success of the mission became irrelevant. Regardless, the event led to President Clinton's decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994 and the deployment of a Joint Task Force to Somalia to ostensibly establish the environment for political reconciliation and to cover the withdraw of U.S. forces.

**Coalition Command and Control**

**General**

UNOSOM II had great difficulty in achieving unity of effort. Throughout most of its first year, its command and control system was plagued by parallel lines of authority and lack of a clear consensus on the authority of the Force Commander. The absence of a consensus building process in New York further compounded the command and control issues confronting the Force Commander in theater.

The command and control structure used for UNOSOM II appeared to be straightforward in theory. The Security Council, using the Security Council Resolutions, established the policy and strategic direction for Somalia. The Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping and the Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) directed the implementation of the Security Council Resolution. The operational and tactical decisions for military operations were left to the Force Commander. All national contingent forces were under his operational control. The Force Commander in turn exercised operational and tactical control through brigade level headquarters.

**UNOSOM II's Command and Control Problems**

While the UNOSOM II command and control system appeared sound, it was weak in execution. The first indication of coalition command and control problems came on 6 June. The Force Commander directed Italian and Pakistani forces to conduct joint patrols in the areas of Mogadishu where the attacks on UN peacekeepers occurred the previous day. The Force Commander intended to place Italian armored forces under tactical control (TACON) of the Pakistani Brigade Commander for operations in the Pakistani area of responsibility. Both the command relationship and the necessity to operate outside of the Italian AOR were causes of concern for the Italian Contingent Commander. Both requirements appeared to be an expansion of the Italian mission and beyond the Force Commander’s authority. Consequently, national approval was required. Ultimately, Italian forces were permitted by their national authorities to participate in the operation provided they operated separately and under control of the Italian Force Commander.

Command and control authority became an issue a week later, this time with the French and Moroccan Contingents. Seeking to reinforce the city with additional armored forces, the Force Commander directed French and Moroccan forces to deploy a company size force to Mogadishu. Similar to the situation with the Italian forces, both the French and Moroccan governments conditionally approved the deployment of their forces out of sector. In general, the conditions required that the
troops remain OPCON to the Force Commander, and could only be used for a specific mission of limit-
ed duration.

Both the Force Commander and SRSG expressed their dismay with the interference of nation-
al command authorities in these early operations. The Force Commander, in a letter to the SRSG at the end of June (Subject: Cooperation-Donor Country Contingents), stated:

“Since 5 June some participating national contingents have refused to accept my direction until it was agreed by their national command authority of their home government. These impediments arose particularly in cases in which I required elements of one nation to cooper-
ate with elements of another at the tactical level.”

“Being continually forced to delay implementation of my plans for the purpose of receiving national agreement on every mission I order is inappropriate and unacceptable.”

The SRSG relayed similar concerns to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping in an 18 June cable, SUBJECT: Need for Armored Units in Mogadishu.

“It is unconscionable that a distant national command authority would interfere in ongoing operations by ordering force dispositions which are counter to the restoration of stability in the principle area of confrontation.”

The concerns expressed by the SRSG and Force Commander clearly demonstrated the debilitat-
ing impact that national command authorities were having on operations in Somalia. National inter-
ference in operational and tactical decisions hampered the Force Command’s military initiative and may have put the lives of other contingent soldiers at risk. Further, as casualties and violence rose, national command authorities, to include the U.S., began to place more restrictions on the employ-
ment of their forces in theater. By July, these actions had almost brought security operations in Mogadishu to a standstill.

The Force Commander in a 6 July cable to the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping expressed his frustration with UNOSOM’s command and control dilemma.

“National authorities and local commanders feel free to ignore direction and urging for aggres-
sive action.”

The growing command and control crisis in Somalia was a major topic of concern in New York. On 8 July, at a meeting of the major Somalia troop contributors, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping emphasized that the violent situation in Somalia demanded that UNOSOM forces act as one. Sector Commanders had to do their best to implement the Force Headquarters plans instead of asking their capitals for instructions. He further appealed to the nations to instruct their forces to coop-
erate with the Force Commander. In retrospect this was probably the first indication that there may have been a lack of consensus on the course that UNOSOM II was taking in Somalia and the authority of the Force Commander among the contributing nations.

This apparent lack of consensus became a central issue at this meeting (8 July). The Italians in par-
ticular felt that contingent commanders and contributing nations should have a more active part in mili-
tary decision making in Somalia. The Italian PermRep to the UN pressed for the formation of a military advisory committee to consult with the SRSG and Force Commander on all aspects of UNOSOM oper-
ations. The PermRep further suggested that there should be regular consultations in Mogadishu between the SRSG and third-country representatives. According to a U.S. Defense Department mes-
sage regarding this meeting, the Italian PermRep stated that “In no democratic country could parlia-
mentary and public opinion accept heavy casualties in operations carried out without its own participation in the planning.”

This topic was again discussed at the 21 July meeting of troop contributing nations. According to a State Department message, the UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping emphasized:

“The correct forum for discussing strategic and political issues was in New York, not in the field. The Security Council set political and strategic direction, which the Secretariat implements. Tactical decisions were under the Force Commander, who held discussions in the field with sector commanders.”

He further emphasized the “Impropriety of Ambassadors in Mogadishu discussing tactical objectives with the SRSG and the Force Commander. Ambassadors could, of course, meet with the SRSG, but all political and strategic questions would be forwarded to New York for decision, not taken in the field.”

Command and control problems continued to plague UNOSOM II operations through the end of 1993. In September, the Force Commander intended to use the arriving Indian Brigade (5000 troops) to assist in offensive operations in Mogadishu to disarm militia forces. This mission was clearly within the mandate of UNOSOM II. However, the Indian government intervened and refused to allow the employment of their forces in Mogadishu. National concerns regarding Indian troops working alongside Pakistani troops was one of the reasons given. In addition, the government of India further emphasized that their troops had been contributed for expansion, not operations in Mogadishu. Therefore, Indian troops were diverted to Baidoa and Kismayo to back fill departing French and Belgian forces. In fact, the Indian contingent was extremely flexible on this deployment except for the issue of Mogadishu. This deployment also raised a command and control issue. Due to the size of the Indian contingent, it could cover the French and Belgian sectors with minimal augmentation from other nations. This caused the Force Commander to approve a plan to redeploy Zimbabwe and Moroccan forces into Mogadishu in order to augment forces there. The government of Zimbabwe interceded in this operational decision and refused to allow their forces to be employed in Mogadishu.

In November, plans to establish a coalition division headquarters to command and control tactical operations in Mogadishu were scuttled by the Egyptian government’s refusal to subordinate their forces to a Pakistani led coalition headquarters. This headquarters would have enabled the Force Command Headquarters to cease functioning as a tactical level headquarters.

### U.S. Forces and UNOSOM II Command and Control Problems

Even the United States support was conditional when it came to committing combat forces to support UN operations in Somalia. The Terms of Reference provided fairly strict guidance regarding conditions under which U.S. combat forces could be committed. At no time were they permitted to serve under the operational control of any contingent commander other than U.S. CINCCENT reserved the decision to commit U.S. forces to combat operations in all but emergency conditions. Under these limitations, COMUSFORSOM was required to forward a concept of operations (CONOPS) to CINCCENT for approval of any commitment of the QRF beyond the authority granted him in the TOR. As casualties and violence increased in Somalia, it became increasingly difficult to gain approval to use the U.S. QRF to support ground operations, except within the strict Terms of Reference.

By early August, it was quite difficult to get CONOPS for employment of U.S. ground and aviation forces approved for anything beyond force protection. While COMUSFORSOM had inherent authority to provide for U.S. force protection using the QRF, he was aware that his decisions would have to stand the TOR test. The only real way to protect the force was to take the fight to the enemy. This was something coalition troops were reluctant to do, and U.S. troops were not allowed to do beyond their immediate bases.
Limitations on employment of U.S. combat resources had a detrimental effect on the coalition. U.S. forces represented the primary source of combat multipliers, particularly attack helicopters. Without the use of helicopters, the coalition would, many times, not act.

**Summary**

UNOSOM II tactical operations in Somalia were strongly influenced by the policies of individual nation-states. Each of the major contributing nations placed restrictions and conditions on the employment of their forces. These restrictions altered and at times paralyzed the operational and tactical operations of UNOSOM II. Without unhindered operational control of military forces committed to the theater, the Force Commander could not concentrate critical resources and employ forces when and where needed. These factors further forced the Force Commander and his headquarters to assume the role of a tactical headquarters at the expense of strategic and operational functions. Unity of effort was clearly lacking in Somalia, and may have contributed to unnecessary casualties in some cases.

This discussion highlights the unity of command crisis that will face any future UN Chapter VII operation. Given national concerns regarding sovereignty and control of military forces and resources, unity of effort is the best we can achieve. The United Nations faces the arduous task of building consensus and gaining the complete support of nation-states to provide soldiers to serve under UN control in what may amount to combat operations. Until appropriate processes have been established to accomplish this, the UN should seek a single nation or alliance to lead future Chapter VII operations. These alternatives offer a more unified command and control system than an ad hoc coalition. Although they also hold some inherent shortcomings, unity of effort will be achieved more easily.

**U.S. Manning of UNOSOM II Staff**

**General**

The United Nations authorized 45 positions on the UNOSOM II staff for the American Contingent. The number of positions authorized was directly related to the number of troops committed to the theater. Consequently, the United States, Pakistan, and Italy held the largest number of positions on the staff. In addition to the 45 authorized positions, the United States also sent two officers to augment the staff on a six month Temporary Change of Station (TCS). The additional two officers came from the United States Military Academy, West Point, as a result of an agreement between the Commandant and the Chief of Staff of the Army. The 45 permanent positions were filled by the United States with representatives from the Army, Air Force, and Marines. All of these personnel were assigned for one year.

**UNOSOM II Staff Manning**

The positions on the Force Headquarters allocated to the United States allowed U.S. staff officers to provide a strong influence on all Force matters. The key positions held by U.S. officers included: the Deputy Force Commander, Chief Operations Officer (U3), two Plans Officers within the operations branch (U3 Plans), and the Deputy Intelligence (U2), Logistics (U4) and Signal (U6) Officers. The personnel in the operations, intelligence, logistics, and communication branches facilitated the effective coordination, integration and employment of USFORSOM units and assets in support of UNOSOM II operations. In addition, the broad base of training and experience of the U.S. staff officers, especially in large scale military operations, significantly contributed to the UNOSOM II staff’s capability to plan, coordinate and control theater level operations.

UN regulations, duty descriptions, and actual staffing requirements forced some adjustments in the staff assignments and duties of some U.S. officers. Two officers slated to work as comptrollers were
assigned to the logistics branch. Under United Nations regulations, the Chief Administration Office (CAO) budgets and obligates all fund expenditures. The Force Headquarters has no obligation authority, consequently requires no comptrollers. One officer was mal-assigned by the U.S. Army Personnel Command (PERSOM) to fill a Force Engineer position, and was subsequently assigned to the operations branch to take advantage of special computer skills. Another officer was originally assigned to work as an Administrative Assistant to the Deputy Force Commander, but was reassigned to the Personnel Office (U1). This was done to reduce the American signature in the command group and make better use of the officers skills and training. Two other U.S. officers were assigned to different positions based on previous training, skills and staffing needs. One was diverted from his original position as an Air Plans Officer to head the cease-fire and disarmament division. The other was assigned as an air operations officer in lieu of serving in a civil affairs position.

Duties assigned to noncommissioned officers (NCOs) proved to be a troublesome area. Few contingents, represented on the UNOSOM II staff, assign NCOs to senior staff positions with the same responsibilities and authority that we do in the United States Armed Forces. Consequently, all noncommissioned officer positions on the UNOSOM II manning document were identified as clerks or senior clerks. In most instances, U.S. NCOs were assigned to sections run by U.S. officers and were given duties and responsibilities similar to those they were accustomed to. However, this did create an initial uncomfortableness as U.S. NCOs were coordinating with field grade officers from other nations. In a short time this was overcome, as international officers came to observe the level of competence and staff training of the U.S. noncommissioned officers. The U.S. should closely scrutinize any future United Nations request for noncommissioned officers, to ensure that they will be used to perform duties commensurate with their training and expertise.

Deployment of the U.S. Contingent

Although UNSCR 814 was not passed until 26 March 1993, selected members of the staff were alerted for deployment prior to 20 March 1993. These included the chief operations officer (U3), the senior U.S. plans officer, the deputy chief logistics officer (U4), and the chief of the cease-fire and disarmament division. These staff members were directed to deploy as soon as possible, but not later than 10 April 1993. This was to facilitate the initial coordination for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM. These early deploying personnel processed for deployment at their station of origin and Aberdeen Proving Ground. The remainder of the Contingent were directed to report to U.S. Central Command Headquarters at MacDill AFB for briefings and processing for overseas deployment.

Due to the urgency of the situation, most members of the U.S. Contingent received approximately two weeks notice for preparation for deployment. Medical requirements, such as physicals, dental work and inoculations, were handled at the individuals’ home installations. It appears that the military community from which service men and women were deploying bent over backwards to assist them and their families.

By 7 April 1993 ten (10) of the forty-seven (47) members of the U.S. contingent had reached Somalia. These included: the Deputy Force Commander and his personnel staff, the chief of operations, three plans officers, the deputy logistics officer, and the public affairs officer. The remainder of the U.S. officers assigned to the UNOSOM II staff arrived in country by 17 April 1993. These officers and enlisted staff members had to “hit the ground running”, as they in essence formed the vanguard of the UNOSOM II Force Headquarters staff. They had the responsibility of standing up a theater level headquarters with no standing operating procedures (SOPs), organic communications equipment or supporting infrastructure (i.e., computers, office supplies, tables etc.), to assist. The U.S. contingent created the majority of the headquarters SOPs, particularly logistics and operations. For the most part, the STANAG was used as the model. In addition, the contingent established the layout of the headquarters and the development of an austere command and control system for the theater. When the official transition
between UNITAF and UNOSOM occurred, on 4 May, the U.S. contingent was manned at 58% of its authorized strength. Between 4 May and 3 July the remainder of the U.S. contingent arrived, including 14 of 17 authorized enlisted soldiers.

**Personnel Administration for the U.S. Contingent**

Personnel administration for the U.S. contingent was handled by three U.S. personnel (2 Army, 1 Air Force) assigned to the military personnel office. These personnel performed double duty as members of the UNOSOM II personnel staff and the administration section for the U.S. contingent. In this capacity, they processed virtually all personnel actions for the U.S. contingent. The presence of both Air Force and Army representatives in the personnel section significantly facilitated the section’s ability to work personnel issues for the whole contingent. Personnel actions for Marine Corps members of the contingent were handled by CENTCOM.

The servicing finance office assigned to the U.S. Logistics Support Command provided superb service to U.S. personnel assigned to the UNOSOM II staff. Despite not being the responsible servicing office, they provided leave and earnings statements (LESs), initiated many pay transactions (start of Basic Allowance for Subsistence, Imminent Danger Pay, Family Separation Allowance, Cost of Living Allowance), and offered check cashing services which were not otherwise available. These services proved invaluable for members of the U.S. contingent, as every member experienced significant problems with the initiation of their Imminent Danger Pay, Family Separation Allowance and Cost of Living Allowance entitlements. Without their assistance, timely processing of pay and finance support would have been unavailable.

One area that hampered the administrative support was the complete lack of day to day supplies and manuals. This forced the staff to either borrow or rely on what they may have brought from their own professional files. In many instances, members acquired administrative materials from their home installations. Additionally, no medals or promotion certificates were provided from CENTCOM. This again forced the staff to borrow, and in some cases provide a medal for presentation only to take the medal back for future use.

Unlike some of the other national contingents, the U.S. did not form into a contingent company supported directly by their national government. Instead, the intent was to integrate fully into the UN community at large. This approach initially met with great success when the contingent lived in the UN residences located in Mogadishu. However, after 5 June, when UN personnel were relocated to the U.S. Embassy, this approach proved unsatisfactory.

Unlike other large contingents, U.S. personnel had no organic support or assets such as tents, cots and MWR items. Nor did they have access to the normal U.S. supply system. Consequently, when the UN could no longer provide adequate billeting, quality of life for U.S. members of the staff took a significant dive.

A U.S. contingent was officially formed in order to improve the quality of life for U.S. personnel assigned to the UN staff. An officer and senior NCO were assigned the additional duties as the contingent Company Commander and First Sergeant. The primary task of this ad hoc headquarters element was to represent the interest of the U.S. contingent and insure that the contingent received an appropriate share of MWR items and living accommodations. As a result of the efforts of this headquarters and the support of other U.S. units serving in Somalia, the quality of life for UN staff members significantly improved.

Approximately four months into the mission the Deputy Force Commander (dual-hatted as the U.S. Forces Somalia Commander) determined that the tour length for the 45 personnel assigned to
the UNOSOM II Staff should be reduced. The arduous duty conducted under austere, combat conditions, and the fact that the U.S. was one of only three contingents requiring UN staff members to remain in Somalia more than six months led COMUSFORSOM to seek a tour length reduction. The initial recommendation was to limit tours for U.S. personnel to seven or eight months. CENTCOM did not support this position and felt for continuity reasons tour lengths should not be reduced. However, they would support requests for tour curtailments at the ten-month mark. This is consistent with Army regulations that direct that a soldier must complete all but 60 days of an assignment to receive short tour credit. CENTCOM further agreed that all future UNOSOM II Staff positions (except for 7 key positions) would be converted to a 179-day TCS status. The seven key positions that remained as one-year tours were the DFC, chief operations officer (U3), the deputy U2, the deputy U4, the deputy U6, and the senior plans officer. A rotation plan was developed which rotated all personnel assigned on one year tours near or on the ten month mark. At the same time it identified 12 positions which should not be filled upon the completion of the incumbent tour. This plan was forwarded to CENTCOM for processing through the JCS and the State Department. This proposal was approved and the United Nations was notified of U.S. intentions not to fill those 12 positions.

When the United States decided in November 1993 to withdraw its personnel from Somalia by 31 March 1994, USFORSOM interpreted this to include personnel assigned to the UNOSOM II Staff. The ten-month rotation plan developed by the personnel section remained in effect. However, all personnel who arrived in June or July of 1993 were rescheduled to rotate in March and in some cases February of 1994. This meant that some personnel served less than ten months, but all received short tour credit since their reassignment was for the convenience of the government.

Aviation Operations

General

UNOSOM II Force Command aviation functions fall into three broad categories: Intra-theater operations; Inter-theater operations; and Theater level management of air resources, including airfields, airspace, and aircraft. Apart from combat air operations, the UN does not consider these categories as necessarily military functions. These categories are used as a framework for discussing U.S. forces air involvement in UNOSOM II.

Theater Airlift Operations

Under UNITAF, principally U.S. forces conducted airlift operations. Limited logistic theater airlift was provided by other contingent forces, as the majority of the theater forces under UNITAF were U.S. troops, and were thus providing self support airlift. Several contingents used C–130 class airlift and organic helicopter lift to resupply and support contingent requirements. Occasionally, they would transport some UNITAF and UNOSOM II cargo on what would otherwise be considered “dead leg” flights.

During the transition period from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, a minimal airlift capability was available in theater via UNOSOM II contract aircraft. They provided the non-combat logistic cargo and administrative passenger lift. This UN capability was inadequate to fulfill the needs of a 20,000-person force in theater. UN New York was slow to contract the required airlift capability and when UNOSOM II assumed responsibility for the theater of operations on 4 May 1993, there was a theater airlift shortfall. The U.S. agreed to provide some transition airlift capability with two Mombasa based C–130’s, but withdrew this support after a few weeks to force UN New York to expedite the acquisition of contracted airlift. Therefore, from late May to mid-November 1993, the U.S. provided no theater airlift capability in Somalia.
Air dispatch and personnel movement within the city of Mogadishu during this period was provided by armed, U.S. UH–60 Blackhawk helicopters. A differentiation was made between the UNOSOM II air capability and the conduct of tactical operations in Mogadishu. By 1 June 1993, theater airlift was provided on a larger scale utilizing UNOSOM II contracted aircraft with occasional assistance by non-U.S. contingent aircraft.

The arrival of Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (SOC) in October 1993 resurfaced the requirement for dedicated theater airlift for U.S. Forces. Theater airlift was used to resupply the MEU afloat and provided a backup capability to assist the redeployment of U.S. forces. Four C–130 cargo aircraft from Little Rock AFB were deployed to Mombasa to provide Naval MEU logistic support. They also provided backup general support for U.S. and, if required, UNOSOM II support. One of the C–130’s was configured to carry bulk fuel for the resupply of remote areas inaccessible by road convoy. A few of these missions were flown in December 1993 and January 1994 as UN Logistic Support Command (UNLSC) missions for UNOSOM II. U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine requirements necessitated a daily flight from Mombasa to Mogadishu. Daily airlift missions (except for Sundays) continued until the U.S. troop withdrawal was completed at the end of March 1994.

Theater MEDEVAC Operations

UNOSOM II was responsible for theater level MEDEVAC, while inter-theater MEDEVAC (repatriation) was a national responsibility. On site MEDEVAC to nearby hospitals was conducted by helicopter assets assigned to AOR Commanders. These organic assets provided a MEDEVAC capability to both the UNOSOM military and civilian workers within that AOR. U.S. “Dustoff” MEDEVAC helicopters provided area support to fill shortfalls, particularly in the Mogadishu and Bardera areas. Use of these MEDEVAC assets was coordinated through the UNOSOM II Force Headquarters Medical Officer (FMO). Approval for use was granted only when it would not excessively degrade the MEDEVAC support for U.S. forces.

For theater MEDEVAC operations, UNOSOM II fixed wing assets were utilized from Mogadishu to Nairobi. Nairobi offered the advantages of a regional medical capability, an easily accessible international airport for repatriating patients on connecting commercial flights, the largest portion of the fixed wing fleet was based in Nairobi, and patients were removed from the combat zone. Many different UNOSOM II aircraft were used for this task, but none were specifically acquired or configured for it on any long-term basis. No UNOSOM II MEDEVAC team existed to provide in-flight care to patients. The lack of this capability forced the “on-loan” use, on numerous occasions, of the U.S. C–141 MEDEVAC crews and equipment to provide in-flight care.

Tactical Air Operations:

Combat Air Support/Close Air Support (CAS)

Theater level (i.e., UNOSOM II Force Headquarters Joint Operations Center) command and control (C2) of CAS assets was not in place prior to the 5 June 1993 ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers. All CAS training had been tasked in advance by fragmentary order or other staffing, and controlled by AOR brigade commanders. When multi-national units trained together, air assets were directed by their respective brigade level C2. When U.S. QRF elements were committed to assist the Pakistani Brigade on 5 June 1993, an impromptu “crisis action team” formed in the UNOSOM II Joint Operations Center (JOC) for battle management. U3 Air was compelled at that time to play a greatly increased role in tactical C2 for a number of reasons, to include: U.S. air assets were engaging the Somali militia in close coordination with Pakistani ground forces who had no organic air assets or air coordination staff; U.S. Brigade level leaders wanted extra guidance and clarification of the rules of engagement for real time targets and the number of utility helicopters to commit to Pakistani requests for troop movements; there
was a need to de-conflict airspace when Italian attack helicopters were employed in the combat air support role for Italian ground forces reinforcing the Pakistanis while U.S. assets were still engaged.

This U3 air battle management role continued throughout major UNOSOM II militia clashes in June 1993 and throughout AC–130 gunship operations over Mogadishu. Procedures were developed for dividing the city into safe and hot sectors with the assistance of an airspace NCO from the U.S. QRF. This U3 air role decreased sharply after UNOSOM II’s attack into the Aideed enclave on 17 June 1993, as the badly depleted militia forces in Mogadishu began a guerilla campaign instead of organized confrontation with UNOSOM II. When the Falcon Brigade Headquarters (the Aviation Brigade Headquarters of the 10th Mountain Division) replaced the 1st Brigade Headquarters in July 1993 the U3 air tactical role further decreased. The change over between Task Force 3-25 Aviation and Task Force 2-25 Aviation was also helpful in this regard. The previous QRF liaison officer (LNO) to UNOSOM FHQ, who had been a senior NCO, was replaced by a U.S. Army aviator (Captain) helicopter pilot, who was also a trained battle captain from the Falcon Brigade. From late July onward, real time Brigade information and tasking worked through the QRF LNO until the arrival of the JTF structure in October 1993. When the QRF was subordinated to JTF Somalia, air taskings were passed through the JTF JOC.

**Convoy Protection**

Convoys carrying food, water and fuel could not travel safely over the streets of Mogadishu to outlying rural areas due to the hostile activities of militia forces in Mogadishu and banditry in rural areas. Scout weapons teams (SWT) were employed to protect high value convoys by sweeping the roads ahead of the vehicles, providing an air escort and maintaining a visible deterrent to hostile interdiction. The coordination procedures and rules for eligibility were jointly developed by the U.S. QRF and U3 Air. Users would request protection and U3 Air would task the QRF via the flying schedule. Peak activity for aircraft resulted in the requirement to escort four convoys a day at times, usually entering/exit- ing Mogadishu and extending to the limits of the city’s high threat area, which varied from the city limits at times to nearby Balledogle at others, a distance of approximately 70 miles. Selected contingent unit rotation convoys had protection “in reserve” from U.S. standby helicopters in January and February 1994.

This was coordinated as FRAGO tasking through the UNOSOM JOC. Mission requirements decreased dramatically in early September 1993 when the Bypass Road was completed around the western outskirts of Mogadishu, thus eliminating much of threat to convoys. With the arrival of Task Force Ranger, some QRF assets were committed to the intensified hunt to capture Aideed.

**Reconnaissance**

Air reconnaissance was conducted day and night from June 1993 until March 1994. By day, U.S. utility helicopters with photographers on board flew over areas of interest and took pictures and by night, U.S. utility helicopters or SWT did the same over the city of Mogadishu. Utility helicopters were used primarily to conserve the SWT’s, with their advanced target acquisition systems, for night operations.

Mogadishu was the primary area of threat from militia forces. Other reconnaissance in the theater was conducted by organic air assets assisting brigades with operations within their AORs. The high operational tempo of QRF brigade missions made continuous airborne surveillance of the city impossible. U3 Air played the role of moderator between the many users requesting U.S. helicopters to look at almost every activity in the city and the QRF Brigade who needed to keep enough crews and aircraft available for flying QRF FRAGO missions. Italian helicopters based in Mogadishu provided some reconnaissance capability, but were limited in seating (4–5 in their UH–1s vs 10 in a U.S. UH–60), English language skills, lack of low level night flying capability, and lack of willingness to fly into certain target areas.
In June 1993, AC–130 gunships deployed to Djibouti and were positioned over Mogadishu and the surrounding area at night. They provided a night reconnaissance capability as well as a firing platform for precision attacks against selected militia stronghold targets in the city. The presence of AC–130’s significantly reduced hostile activity in Mogadishu.

In late June and early July 1993, when additional helicopters arrived in theater, the U.S. QRF was able to provide virtually continuous coverage of Mogadishu with helicopter patrols. The “Eyes over Mogadishu” program continued until U.S. forces departed Somalia. As JTF Somalia and Naval forces afloat arrived in October and November 1993, fixed wing aircraft were used for reconnaissance missions over Mogadishu and throughout Somalia. The detailed planning for these missions gradually shifted away from the UNOSOM FHQ, and towards the unit level as larger numbers of U.S. planners and staffers moved into theater with the additional air assets.

Special Operations Forces (SOF)

U.S. Theater level SOF air activity consisted of the insertion of ground forces with helicopters, attacks on fixed targets with AC–130 gunships, and psychological operations such as leaflet drops and loudspeaker announcements from helicopters. There was also considerable air activity involved in supporting Task Force Ranger from August to October 1993.

UN helicopters were employed by U.S. forces when the cargo capacity, number of passengers, or range of the U.S. helicopters was inadequate for the task. This was generally the case when transporting/inserting other U.S. troops carrying large loads, vehicles, pallets, or in instances when the signature of a U.S. helicopter was inappropriate for the mission. Examples include the insertion of U.S. Special Forces with vehicles and supplies on 9 September 1993 into areas 200–300 miles from Mogadishu for a special reconnaissance and deterrence mission and the establishment of a remote detention facility to hold key Somali militia detainees commencing 21 September 1993.

Tactical Helicopter Lift/VIP Lift

Helicopters were used extensively for UNOSOM and U.S. VIP transportation and visual reconnaissance of the city due to the lack of secure ground travel in Mogadishu. These missions were generally conducted by U.S. helicopters with frequent assistance from Italian helicopters and helicopters from other contingents. U.S. Marine helicopters would also provide this capability when a MEU LHT or aircraft carrier was in the area.

Gradually, more and more missions were pushed onto U.S. UH–60 helicopters. This occurred for a number of reasons, primarily only the U.S. had a significant lift capability and most VIPs were American. U.S. helicopter crews spoke better English, the helicopters were equipped with more headsets so that passengers could communicate with the aircrew, and UH–60's seated more passengers (10 passengers in a UH–60 versus 3–5 in other contingent helicopters). It was also widely recognized that the UH–60 aircraft was more crash survivable than other helicopters in theater.

Italian UH–1’s received limited use because they were ill suited for VIP missions. VIP’s were frequently late, requiring the helicopter to shut down its engines and wait. The UH–1 engine design kept it from shutting down and starting back up again within 20 minutes of shutdown. The deployment of the Italian Force out of Mogadishu further decreased the availability of Italian helicopters for VIP missions. By the end of September 1993, virtually all UNOSOM II VIP taskings were conducted by U.S. UH–60s.

UNOSOM II contract helicopters arrived in July 1993. The QRF thought that their presence in theater might lessen the burden and allow them to focus on tactical missions in support of the QRF. However, the Russian built helicopters were unarmed, unarmored, and had no night capability. Additionally, they had
civilian crews who were billeted 45 minutes driving time from the airfield, and required a security escort to take them to and from work in daylight hours only. And, contractual requirements limited the civilian helicopters to non-combat environments. The cumulative effect of these factors limited the employment capability of UNOSOM II helicopters over Mogadishu. An agreement was made to fly the UNOSOM II helicopters into the embassy compound helipad (LZ Jaybird), the seaports, and the airport.

All missions to other parts of Mogadishu, and all reconnaissance and special operations missions in the city continued to be conducted by military helicopters, primarily U.S. helicopters.

A Special Case: Shuttle Flights

A large demand for air transportation to Mogadishu airport, seaport, and the embassy compound was realized in the July and August 1993 time period when UN civilians who were evacuated to Nairobi after the 5 June ambush of Pakistani peacekeepers returned to Mogadishu, new civil employees were hired, and security problems with ground transportation in Mogadishu continued. To compensate for the increased demand, a safe air route was constructed and the UNOSOM II helicopter shuttle service was initiated. This shuttle service was not a U.S. mission and was accomplished using UN helicopter assets. UNOSOM II civil leadership determined it was necessary to fly their employees to and from work. Many civilians lived near the airfield, a considerable distance from the embassy compound across a threatened section of town. The UNOSOM II helicopter shuttle service was increased to the point that it took 5 helicopters full time to meet the demand. This equated to having helicopter service to the airfield and the ports every 20 minutes.

The threat of surface-to-air missiles in theater during the latter part of August 1993 made air travel over Mogadishu city even more dangerous. Secure ground transportation remained a problem so the demand for some air shuttle service from the airfield to the embassy compound continued. To overcome the many intermittent demands for lift, the QRF instituted a shuttle service of its own with UH–60s in September 1993. The QRF shuttle service was maintained well into November 1993, when threat levels were re-evaluated and the UNOSOM II helicopters restarted the shuttle service.

Inter-Theater Air Operations Airlift

U.S. strategic airlift, during UNITAF and UNOSOM II, provided C–5 airlift into Mogadishu three times a week with C–141 and C–5 requirement channel flights. These flights supported U.S. Forces Somalia, the UN Logistic Support Command (which was composed of U.S. Army forces), and the U.S. military personnel serving on the UNOSOM II Force Command staff.

The UN had also contracted inter-theater airlift into Somalia as well. This was supported by two methods. First, contractors who needed to move equipment and supplies would deal with the UNOSOM II civil administration to work out details for a one-time lease of cargo aircraft such as CIS built IL–76s or AN–124s. Second, use could be made of the UNOSOM II IL–76 to pick up loads in other African or Middle Eastern countries. Had the U.S. not been providing UN logistic support, the U.S. inter-theater airlift requirement would have been greatly reduced. Very few of the C–5 and C–141 support missions flown were UN Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM). The vast majority were flown (and billed) as U.S. Channel Flights.

Aeromedical Evacuation

U.S. C–141 flights originating in Germany staged through Cairo West Airfield into Mogadishu, providing an inter-theater MEDEVAC platform for U.S. forces. Aeromedical teams lived at Mogadishu airfield and could make use of retrograde C–141 capability, if time was not available to send a team from Cairo West.
Management of Theater Air Resources

**Airfields**

U.S. presence was minimal in airfield operations throughout Somalia after UNITAF, with the notable exception of Mogadishu. The remainder of UNOSOM II managed airfields in southern Somalia, where a military presence existed, were run by the contingent who had geographic responsibility for that area. Mogadishu was a special case since it was not only the center of gravity for U.S., UNOSOM II, and international air operations, but it was also the primary aerial port of entry for most contingents in Somalia, the primary fuel storage area for the theater, and it was the billeting overflow area for about a dozen contingents. Its close proximity to the seaport made it a hotbed of activity for ground traffic movements, warehouse storage activities, and contingent rotations.

Initially, there was no billeting authorization for a military airfield commander. Rather, the UN manpower plan had a UN Development Program (UNDP) civilian as the airfield manager. Early on, a position was created under U3 UNOSOM II for a U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel to be the airfield commander.

The need in Mogadishu for a U.S. Air Force TALCE and later a Mission Support Team (MST) was realized during Operation RESTORE HOPE to service U.S. C–5 and C–141 aircraft and to deliver the cargo to the local U.S. Army ADAG storage area. The MHE and trained cargo and fuel specialists provided tremendous assistance to incoming UNOSOM II contract and national military aircraft. The MST camp at the airfield also provided housing and messing of the U.S. Army C–12 crews, C–141 MEDEVAC crews, and occasional housing, equipment, and services for transient U.S. forces who were not formally assigned to a particular unit at the airfield.

**Airspace**

The absence of a Somali government precluded a Somali airspace authority. The airspace management for Somalia was the responsibility of the UNOSOM II Force Commander, who delegated the routine stewardship of the airspace to U3 Air Operations. There was major U.S. involvement in airspace management in the specific geographic areas the U.S. controlled during UNITAF. This was eliminated with the transition to UNOSOM II. Airspace management at the national level was developed by a one person military office in a pre UNOSOM II role working with the Kenyan airspace authorities in a liaison role. The U.S. Marines from UNITAF handed over the air traffic control function at Mogadishu airfield to the UN Development Project (UNDP).

The U.S. involvement in managing ATC at Mogadishu became greater after 5 June ambush when many UN civilians, including UNDP, were evacuated to Nairobi. The U.S. QRF aviation battalion, located at Mogadishu airfield, took over the air traffic functions and ran 24-hour tower operations for several months until the UN requested and received a contingent of Australian military ATC personnel in October 1993.

A ship-borne approach control capability was set up for the Mogadishu area low altitude airspace to assist in the vast increase in workload which came when U.S. Navy forces and JTF Somalia arrived in late October 1993. This approach control remained in place until the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Somalia was completed at the end of March 1994.

**Airlift Aircraft**

UN aircraft contracting and acquisition was centralized by UN New York and managed locally by a civilian deputy in the UNOSOM II Chief Administrative Office (CAO), an organization which controlled all money and contracting for UNOSOM II. CAO was not part of the UNOSOM II Force Headquarters, but was part of the UNOSOM II civilian headquarters. Both the CAO and the Force
Commander worked under the oversight of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Because of the small UNOSOM II staff, many personnel on the aircraft operations staff maintained a very close relationship with the aircraft acquisition staff. UN aircraft typically operated on monthly contracts.

By contrast, U.S. aircraft were part of established units which deployed here (theater aircraft) or were Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircraft which transited Somalia and already had an established structure for management. The U.S. aircraft, when used, deployed all necessary planning staffs, maintenance crews, cargo/aerial port elements, equipment, and command and control elements. This is true of the C–130 element in Mombasa which was leftover from the UNITAF period, the AC–130 gunship deployment to Djibouti in June, and the later AC–130 and C–130 deployments to Mombasa in October and November.

**Command and Control Communications**

**General.**

Somalia had no infrastructure, power grid, or communications. International connectivity was limited initially to 22 DSN trunks using U.S. Army communications assets or 6 commercial trunks through a UN leased Intelsat space segment accessed by an earth station in the U.S. Embassy, Mogadishu. Communications for the UNOSOM II military force were to be procured, installed, and maintained by the UN civilian communications element responsible to Field Operations Division, Peace Keeping Directorate, UNNY. UNOSOM II was responsible for higher to lower communications from Force Headquarters to each direct subordinate element. Three means of communication were planned to tie in each element. The subordinate elements were responsible for providing their internal communications as well as reach-back systems to their own country for national coordination and morale purposes. Immarsat A and C, and HF radio were used to provide communications to a parallel civilian structure from UNOSOM II Headquarters, civilian side.

**Means of Communication Used.**

1) **FM Single Channel Radio.** Motorola GP 300 hand-held radios were used to net subordinate element within the greater Mogadishu area. The radios had 16 separate channels that were used as follows:

- **Channel 1** Force Admin (repeater channel)
- **Channel 2** Local security coordination
- **Channel 3** UNOSOM civilian net (repeater channel)
- **Channel 4** Force Command net (repeater channel)
- **Channel 5** Pakistan Bde command net (repeater channel)
- **Channel 6** Force Operations net (repeater channel)
- **Channel 7** Backup medical emergency evacuation net (repeater channel)
- **Channel 8** MOVECON (repeater channel)
- **Channel 9** Backup channel
- **Channel 10** UNOSOM II Humanitarian and civil-military operations (repeater channel)
- **Channel 11** Backup channel
- **Channel 12** Force Logistics net (repeater channel)
- **Channel 13–15** Backup channels
- **Channel 16** Scanner channel

Channels that were designated as repeater channels had a range of approximately 15–20 KM; without repeaters, the range of the radios was not greater than 5 KM. Additionally, each subordinate element
was provided a base station that by itself had the same range as the repeater stations. Prior to 3 October 1993, all operations were performed nonsecure in accordance with UN doctrine. After the U.S. Department of State licensed the export of secure technology to the UN, the Force Command net, the Force Operations net, and the UNOSOM II civilian net were secured using a Motorola secure radio which was compatible with the GP300 nonsecure radios. This allowed the original net structure with critical users provided secure capability which could operate both secure and nonsecure as dictated by the situation. Decision to “go secure” was the responsibility of the sender.

(2) Trunking Radio. Motorola M2000 trunking radios were used for the primary medical emergency evacuation net. This was a five channel (repeater) system that operated in the 800 MHZ band. The five repeaters were controlled by a software system controller which changed the frequency of the repeater upon user demand providing reliable nonblocking radio communications. There was one problem with the controller board which was exacerbated by transportation difficulties causing the system to be down for a three-week time period in late June to mid-July. Once the board was received, the system operated flawlessly. The Force Medical Officer reported that it was this system that saved countless lives in Somalia during MASCALs.

(3) HF Radio. HF radio was used to communicate with the outlying subordinate Force elements in Baidoa, Bardera, Kismayo, Balad, and Belet Uen. Two types of HF radios were used: Motorola Micom 1, Automatic Link Establishment (ALE) radio which provided a point to point HF link terminating in a telephone instrument, and Motorola Micom XR radio which was a typical HF broadcast radio transmitting at 125 W output power. The critical locations were connected by both types of HF radios to ensure HF communications. The HF communications were planned to be a backup voice means of communications.

(4) Long-Haul Multichannel Systems. FOD/PKO UNNY planned a 10 earth station SATCOM network for UNOSOM II for primary connectivity to the outlying subordinate military force elements and subordinate UNOSOM II civilian zone offices. The network was planned as a hub and spoke with the hub terminal at Mogadishu. All international calls would access through the hub terminal. FOD/PKO UNNY initially had difficulty getting contract approval through the UNNY bureaucracy. The contract was approved in July 1993. The vendor then had 6 weeks to assemble the equipment, and the UN was responsible for shipping and installation. Best estimate at that time for completion of the system was 1 November 1993. During the interim period, the U.S. Army (11th Signal Bde, Information Systems Command), provided the connectivity to the outlying subordinate Force elements with long-haul troop systems to Baidoa, and Bardera and TACSAT systems to Kismayo and Belet Uen. Each subordinate Force element was provided three telephones, Commander, Operations Center, Logistics Operations. A civilian leased SATCOM system contract was pursued to provide relief for the U.S. equipment but stalled in the UNNY bureaucratic process.

(5) Line of Sight (LOS) Systems. UNOSOM II LOS systems used VHF thin root applications systems providing one to six channel capacity. These systems had a maximum operating range of 10–15 KM. The U.S. also provided some LOS support to the Pakistan Brigade located in Mogadishu. Most of the U.S. LOS capability supported internal U.S. communications requirements. Additional LOS support was provided by pushing U.S. analog signals across Italian and French systems to each of their respective brigades and the Korean Engineer Bn.

(6) Switching Systems. The start-up UNOSOM II network consisted of 32 line Panasonic switches trunked together by VHF thin root LOS radios. Trunks were configured as analog, loop start circuits. Dial tone had to be acquired from each called switch in order to proceed through the network. It was a sequential, non-deterministic dialing pattern. This proved to be quite cumbersome for military command and control. The hub switch at the U.S. Embassy consisted of stacked Panasonic switches. The hub switch was replaced in June 1993 by a 128 analog 36 digital line Alcatel switch. This switch was more sophisticated and provided some deterministic routing easing the user’s dialing burden, however, the network still lacked robustness.
An interface was developed into the U.S. switching system through the TTC 39A. It was automatic through the TTC 39A; however, it had to be a manual interface back into the Alcatel switch because of the lack of DISA (direct inward subscriber access) cards. The interface proved to be short-lived because of a problem with the TTC 39A. After lengthy diagnostics, tech reps were unable to discover why the problem occurred, and the decision was made by USAISC to interface the Alcatel switch to a SB3614 tandemed to the TTC 39A. The interface was extremely awkward and difficult for customers to use.

The combination of a lack of effective interface and U.S. long haul systems providing the connectivity to the outlying Force subordinate elements caused the deployment of many more U.S. telephones to support the Force Headquarters than should have been necessary. The decision was made in July to procure a larger Ericsson switch for UNOSOM II instead of expanding the Alcatel to 600 lines. This model Ericsson switch had already been successfully used by the UN in UNTAC, Cambodia. The end state would consist of a 1500 line hub switch linked to subordinate 100 line switches at the airfield and seaport by means of 2 MB microwave links operating at approximately 14 GHz. The switch would see all calls within this configuration as local calls. Other sites would continue to be connected by VHF thin root LOS. This project also required the installation of a professional cable plant within the U.S. Embassy and was still not completed by 15 December 1993 although the equipment was on hand.

(7) Record Traffic. Other than special U.S. circuits, the record traffic was done by facsimile, 24-hour unclassified through the UNOSOM II civilian radio room; telex, using Immarsat C applications; STU III fax for selected UNOSOM II U.S. staff officers; DDN email for UNOSOM II U.S. staff officers; and USMTF using ARCENT provided commcenter. These services were expanded considerably with the deployment of the USJTF in October 1993.

General Issues.

(1) Level of Conflict. U.S. involvement in Somalia began as a humanitarian mission (RESTORE HOPE). When the mission transitioned to UNOSOM II, it was defined as a peace-enforcement mission, which normally demands a more robust and reliable communications architecture. In fact, just the reverse was true, and the U.S. support left behind IAW a UN request were limited, greatly reduced from Operation RESTORE HOPE levels. The U.S. communications primarily supported U.S. troops in Somalia providing logistics support and a Quick Reaction Force.

(2) UN Planning and Procurement. A lack of specific planning for UNOSOM II communications support was evident from the outset. Time lines were not adhered to and a communications architecture was nonexistent. The UNOSOM II Chief Communications Officer (CCO) who was responsible for provision and installation of UN communications was mercurial in his changes of agreed-on positions in regards to communications structure. This lack of planning and overarching architecture combined with an extremely bureaucratic and inefficient procurement system increased the dependence upon the U.S. provided communications support. The Force Headquarters U-6 finally put together a planning document based upon UNOSOM II CCO agreements, attached as enclosure. Any future involvement with the UN must include a planning phase with firm timetable and an agreed-upon architecture prior to the beginning of the operation.

(3) Common Language for Communications. English was deemed the common language for command and control, however, there were not enough English speakers within the 30 coalition units themselves to make it work. The U-6 requested an English-speaking signal detachment that could provide radio and SATCOM operators at the coalition units. A Zimbabwe signal detachment was provided. This was somewhat effective, but could have been much more so with a native English speaking country such as the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, etc. Additionally, coalition forces with secure communications equipment would not allow the UN Zimbabwe radio operators within their communications cell supporting the unit operations center because of lack of clearance. This led to the Force Headquarters radio net being placed in a location where it did not support the coalition force as well as it could have.
Technical Issues.

(1) Frequency Management. A frequency management position was requested by the U-6 section, however, was unfilled by the UN for the entire period of this report. U.S. frequency managers greatly supported UNOSOM II by taking on the role of frequency manager for the entire theater, which consisted of approximately 100,000 frequencies for more than 80 different customers. In my opinion only well trained U.S. Army frequency managers could have succeeded with a mission of this magnitude. Other nations as well as other U.S. military services do not have the big picture view for frequency management nor the sophisticated automation support to run it.

(2) Network Management. There was no designated theater network manager for DSN. A DISA representative was on hand to support Operation RESTORE HOPE, however, when the mission transitioned to UNOSOM II control from UNITAF and the U.S. JTF left theater, the DIA representative left with them leaving no DISA involvement with Operation CONTINUE HOPE. Essentially the same DSN and special circuit support remained under the control of the G–6 USCOMFORSOM who reported back to USCENTCOM and USAISC, their parent unit. This resulted in DISA having no visibility of circuits in a major theater.

(3) Switching Network. The integration of many different switching networks was difficult. In most cases, the common denominator was analog. In several instances where switches would not talk to each other, service was still provided a common network by pushing analog circuits through coalition LOS systems and switches. Concern is that the U.S. is pursuing a complete digital system that will be unable to interface by analog circuit and trunk with coalition partners or with some commercial switches.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Support

U.S. PSYOP personnel provided continuous support to UNOSOM II and USFORSOM from 4 May 1993 until 31 March 1994. PSYOP support encompassed all the medium of psychological operations (print, radio, newspaper and loudspeaker support) at both the tactical and operational level. The eighty soldier PSYOP Task Force (POTF) which had supported UNITAF returned to Ft. Bragg, N.C. and was replaced by a far smaller PSYOP support element. This support element consisted of one officer seconded to UNOSOM II, four soldiers assisting the radio and newspaper and four additional soldiers supporting the U.S. Quick Reaction Force with Tactical PSYOP (loudspeaker) operations. The stable security situation which obtained upon UNITAFs departure in May 1993 deteriorated throughout the period culminating in the Olympic Hotel Battle on October 3, 4. In response to these events, and in an effort to prevent additional casualties, the POTF was reestablished on October 15, 1993 under the command of JTF-Somalia. The POTF rapidly expanded from nine to forty eight soldiers and a civilian analyst from the 4 POG (A) Strategic Studies Division.

PSYOP personnel supported civic action and humanitarian relief activities conducted by UNOSOM II and USFORSOM military forces and civilian agencies. These activities were conducted as a combined effort of an austere UNOSOM II USFORSOM PSYOP staff and international UN personnel in the information department. The meshing of UN military and UN civilian assets required detailed coordination for the overall information program to be successful. When coordination occurred, the system was successful. However, a detailed information campaign was never developed to synchronize information processes with UN policy.

Psychological Operations Environment

Upon the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, hostile forces were conducting psychological operations. Two factional leaders (Aideed and Ali Mahdi) controlled radio stations in Mogadishu which were
capable of transmitting propaganda messages. Both stations were in use and producing active propaganda in support of their respective groups. Morgan and Jess were also employing short wave radio broadcasts in the Kismayo area to disseminate their propaganda.

All factional leaders conducted propaganda through word of mouth. The importance of oral communication in the Somali culture made this a particularly effective means of conducting information operations against United Nations forces. Some groups were capable of producing printed materials such as handbills and newsletters.

UNOSOM II’s inability to develop a coordinated information plan surrendered the initiative to the USC/SNA. The USC/SNA skillfully used the international and local media to present its views. UNOSOM II was consistently on the defensive in the information battle. The USC/SNA developed simple, but effective themes and retained them during their entire campaign. These themes were:

- Somalia would not accept colonization by foreign powers;
- UNOSOM II must not interfere with internal Somali affairs;
- UNOSOM II should limit itself to Humanitarian Relief;
- UNOSOM II is trying to divide the Somali people;
- UNOSOM II injustices to the Somali people;
- UNOSOM II illegally holding detainees;

Factional leaders portrayed themselves as allied to United Nations forces and in control of areas despite United Nations presence; or, the factional leader would attempt to portray the presence of United Nations forces as a precursor for the return of foreign domination in Somalia.

Lack of an Information Strategy and PSYOP Campaign Plan

Before one PSYOP soldier deployed in December 1992 to support UNITAF a comprehensive information strategy and PSYOP campaign plan were approved and in place. This was based upon clearly stated and understood national goals and objectives. In contrast, the only guidance provided to UNOSOM II was a request from the Security Council to the Secretary-General “to develop appropriate public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia.” (From Security Council Resolution 814, March 26, 1993, paragraph 4.f.) The UNOSOM II PSYOP officer was acutely aware that UNITAF’s success was largely based upon a cohesive information strategy and PSYOP campaign plan. Therefore he attempted to bring about a defacto information strategy and PSYOP campaign plan by initiating a UNOSOM II Information Strategy Group.

The Information Strategy Group was established in July 1993 to coordinate all information activities within Somalia and was an attempt to build consensus for information activities. The group included members from the UNOSOM II civilian and military staffs. Representatives were invited from the Policy Planning Group, Humanitarian Relief, Justice, Spokesperson, Media Chief, Force Command Spokesperson, U-3 PSYOP and the Force Command U-3 Future Plans section. The UNOSOM II Chief of Staff chaired the meetings.

Meetings were weekly. After the second week the Chief of Staff delegated responsibility and chairmanship of the Information Strategy Group to the UNOSOM II Spokesperson. The group never performed its function as director of or approval body for information activities. Absent the Chief of Staff’s
support, the group addressed inconsequential issues. The only time that the group functioned as a monitor/approval authority for information activities occurred in August when a small Crisis Action Team was formed to develop an information strategy in the event that Aideed was captured or killed during operations by UN forces. After departure of the Chief of Staff, the Group ceased to meet. The best opportunity to redress the lack of an information strategy was lost.

September 1993—The PSYOP Campaign Plan

After three months of attempting to achieve defacto consensus on the UNOSOM II staff for an information strategy and a PSYOP campaign plan based upon that strategy, the U-3 PSYOP officer wrote a campaign plan which was approved by the Force Commander. The contrast to UNITAF’s synchronized, comprehensive actions was never more stark, yet it was clear that this requirement must be met. The campaign plan articulated the Force Commanders vision and the work of numerous 4th PSYOP Group (A) military regional experts and civilian analysts. It emphasized:

- Communicate with the Somali people—complete honesty;
- Keep the positive in sight—do not allow the negative to set the agenda;
- The enemy is anarchy—not other factions or UNOSOM II;
- Never lose sight of common humanity;
- Contribute to force protection.

UNOSOM II PSYOP Approval Process

Approval of a planned PSYOP campaign is required before the execution of psychological operations. It follows the chain of command and should rest with the highest military and civilian leaders. The approval authority for PSYOP products during UNOSOM II was the Force Commander and not the SRSG. The UNOSOM II political headquarters was not involved in the approval process for any PSYOP products, except for the Aideed wanted poster, until after October 1993. This is the result of the original decision to bifurcate the information process. Upon the return of Ambassador Oakley, all psychological operations were suspended. With the reestablishment of the POTF on October 15, the UNOSOM II political leadership became involved in the approval process. The Director of the political section would review all PSYOP products and provide comments to the Force Command PSYOP officer.

The sensitivity of PSYOP, combined with the need to coordinate all information efforts and agencies, dictates the retention of PSYOP approval at the SRSG level, and possibly UNNY, if the campaign involves the use of products that will go beyond the boundaries of the theater of operations. The SRSG may delegate approval authority to the Force Commander for tactical PSYOP products. However, the political sensitivity of peace enforcement operations may require that tactical product approval for sensitive operations be retained at the SRSG level.

UNOSOM II/USFORSOM Employment of PSYOP

Upon the transition to UNOSOM II, the PSYOP effort would focus primarily on leaflets. This focus would lead to the belief that leaflets were virtually the only tool available and that newspaper and radio were a civilian information asset and not PSYOP tools.

The initial focus of the UNOSOM II staff was a countrywide campaign using all of the available UN forces. For many reasons, chief among them the inability of national contingents to work together, after
5 June UNOSOM II was forced to have both a theater and tactical focus. UNOSOM II’s battle for survival was fought in the streets of Mogadishu and on TV screens across the world as the international press focused on the struggle within the city.

PSYOP, although restricted to leaflet drops due to the bifurcation of information processes in UNOSOM II and the violent environment, worked extremely hard to remind Mogadishuans of the humanitarian effort being made on their behalf by the international community and that progress was being made in those parts of the region where peace prevailed. PSYOP also attempted to convince Somalis loyal to Aideed that UNOSOM II welcomed all peaceful leaders to the political process. As the intensity of combat increased through September 1993 PSYOP also prepared numerous products designed to reduce casualties on both sides.

Somalis were informed what actions would cause UNOSOM II to react violently, e.g. UNOSOM II commanders had a responsibility to protect their soldiers and although they did [not] seek combat they would not hesitate to use deadly force for self protection. At the infantry battalion level the QRF successfully utilized the TPTs on numerous cordon and search operations. They were extremely effective in conducting surrender appeals. The TPTs were utilized in all means of employment: man-packed, vehicular mounted, and aerial dissemination platform. Although by doctrine only one TPT is allocated to one battalion, the success of the loudspeaker operations were such that each infantry company clamored for this support.

Upon arrival of the JTF, the number of teams doubled. The POTF was able to utilize the increase in teams to expand support to JTF ground units in the most effective PSYOP role of face-to-face communications with the Somali people. TPTs were included in all operations conducted by the JTF. These operations encompassed TPT support of landing teams coming ashore in Marka to MEDCAP/DENCAP operations in the AOR.

The other PSYOP media utilized during UNOSOM II operations were leaflets. From the beginning of UNOSOM II leaflets were the primary agents for influencing the Somali people because the radio and newspaper were not part of the PSYOP effort. Aircraft disseminated over four million leaflets during the period from May through November. The leaflets were effective in getting an immediate response, but they were the lone media available and dropping a leaflet on someone’s head can be perceived as a hostile act. Leaflets were the only choice of media from May through August because it was thought that the Information Strategy Group might gel and a comprehensive PSYOP effort utilizing all media might emerge.

By September it was clear that UNOSOM II military PSYOP would have to execute the entire PSYOP strategy. Alternative media were considered and rejected as being too dangerous. No national contingent would consent to having a message painted on its building for fear of reprisal. Art work similar to that found on walls surrounding large construction sites in the U.S. was considered for the Embassy Compound walls. This idea was rejected because the safety of the artist could not be assured. Helicopter leaflet drops were the only conduits for UNOSOM II to communicate with the citizens of Mogadishu.

It bears repeating that the two most effective means of influencing behavior and emotions to support UNOSOM II, radio and newspaper, were not integrated into a PSYOP campaign nor were they integrated into an overall information plan. These assets were utilized, as envisioned in the UNNY report of February 1993, as strictly information tools.

**Intelligence Support to PSYOP**

Intelligence support for military PSYOP requires extensive information concerning the target identity, location, vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, and the political, economic, social/cultural and historical con-
ditions in the target area. The intelligence support for PSYOP in Somalia was provided by the CENT-COM Intelligence Support Element through the UNOSOM II Information Management Office (U2). The deputy U2 provided intelligence information to the PSYOP staff officer and often assisted in developing PSYOP products. The support that was provided was important, but there were areas where access to compartmented information was not freely assayed. This was not due to a lack of security access by the PSYOP officer, but the effort to ensure that intelligence was not compromised by other personnel and lack of familiarity with intelligence support to psychological operations. However, without access to all pertinent intelligence, the PSYOP analysis process was handicapped.

Interagency Support to USFORSOM

Coordination of PSYOP with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies ensured that policies and plans supporting PSYOP objectives were articulated in consonance with NCA approved themes. USIA has the primary responsibility for conducting diplomacy and for advising the U.S. Government on policy implications of foreign attitudes and perceptions. Public diplomacy includes communication, public affairs, press relations, people to people exchanges, and cultural ties with other nations. Public diplomacy should be part of a unified, coherent effort to communicate with the people and governments of other countries. PSYOP can support UN public diplomacy initiatives.

The guiding policy for Peacetime Psychological Operations (P3) is DOD Directive S-3321.1. These P3 programs will provide the status of approval with country teams; specifically, how the elements of the program support U.S. objectives in the region, program objectives for each country, intended target audiences and themes, funding requirements, status of coordination with supporting CINCs. Approval of an overall annual program is required before the conduct of specific operations.

USFORSOM PSYOP coordinated its PSYOP operations/plans with the USIS representatives with the United States Liaison Office located in the U.S. Embassy grounds in Mogadishu, Somalia. The coordination was primarily a sharing of information, as USFORSOM was not conducting a psychological operations campaign. The PSYOP campaign was a UNOSOM II product. However, to ensure that USG concerns were considered, a friendly relationship existed between the PSYOP staff officer and the USLO USIS representative. The major difficulty in maintaining the relationship was the constant turnover of USIS personnel. During the period April through November, there were four different USIS personnel. This was compounded by the fact that during periods of heavy fighting the USLO staff would be reduced to a minimum number of personnel. Usually, the USIS representative would be one of the personnel that would be sent to Nairobi, Kenya until the situation stabilized. This continued absence made all efforts to ensure coordination and cooperation extremely difficult if not impossible. Were it not for the efforts of the U.S. Military Liaison Officer the venture would have collapsed. Colonel Wahlquist was a constant supporter and advisor to the USFORSOM PSYOP staff officer during the entire period.

In January 1994, the Ambassador directed the USIS representative to establish a Mogadishu Coordinating Group on Public Affairs to ensure coordination of all information elements. The committee would consist of the USIS representative, the UNOSOM II Spokesman, Special Advisor to the SRSRG on Public Affairs, and the USFORSOM PSYOP officer.

UNOSOM II USFORSOM Logistical Support to PSYOP

In September 1993 UN logistic support to PSYOP was completely ineffective. The situation was so desperate that the Commander, Army Central Command felt compelled to personally intervene at the request of the Deputy Force Commander to authorize the U.S. logistic system to support the UNOSOM II PSYOP support element. This vignette illustrates the inability of the UN at this time to conduct sustained logistic operations. This area must be addressed prior to the next U.S. participation in a non-U.S. led or dominated peace operation.
With the February 1993 recommendation to retain the newspaper and radio functions under UNOSOM II, there was a recognized need for logistical support of the function and the need to acquire equipment that would replace that of the UNITAF PSYOP section upon its departure. The decision was made to purchase the equipment proposed in the February UNNY assessment. The equipment was obtained and provided to the PSYOP section. Along with the purchase of the equipment, the CA, CPO, and CLO were provided a detailed listing of the supplies that would be required to keep the section functioning at 20,000 copies of the newspaper daily.

The UN Theater logistical system was not able to respond to the operational demand of supplies that the section used to accomplish their mission. Had the UNITAF PSYOP section not left their supplies when they departed, the UNOSOM II PSYOP section would never have been able to perform its functions. Additionally, there was a problem with the manner in which the supplies had to be ordered. Supplies that were strictly for use by the military had to go through the Force Command Chief Logistics Officer and then to the CPO and CA for approval. Those supplies that were for use in support of the newspaper and radio station could go directly to the CPO and CA. The system resulted in a great deal of duplication of effort and was confusing to the PSYOP personnel and to the CPO personnel who had to make the system operate.

In addition to inadequate logistical support, the UN system did not have the capability to maintain and sustain the equipment that had been purchased to perform the PSYOP mission. The UN maintenance and communications personnel were not trained to maintain SOF peculiar equipment.

The USFORSOM Logistic Support Command (LSC) provided limited theater logistic support to the PSYOP elements. When UNOSOM II was unable to provide maintenance support for the radio and print equipment, LSC offered to repair the equipment. However, they were unable to repair the equipment. The task fell to the PSYOP section personnel to maintain the equipment. This was accomplished through numerous conversations directly to the manufacturer of the equipment and their maintenance personnel. PSYOP units as part of ARSOF are small and normally consume few critical combat supplies (Class I, Bulk Class II, and Class V). However, they use special operations peculiar and/or low-density items of standard and nonstandard configuration. LSC was not equipped or manned to maintain PSYOP peculiar equipment, e.g. broadcast systems, printers, and loudspeaker systems. Future support operations must be capable of sustaining and maintaining SOF peculiar equipment.

If this is not possible, then foreign national support will become the preferred means to meet non-resourced CSS needs. However, when supporting UN operations, i.e. Somalia, the infrastructure may not be available to provide the FNS that is required. Additionally, the amount of FNS that can be accepted must be balanced without unduly jeopardizing OPSEC and the mission.

Civil Affairs (CA) Support

General

U.S. CA personnel provided continuous support to U.S. Forces Somalia (USFORSOM) military and humanitarian operations from 4 May 1993 until 31 March 1994. During this period, CA support encompassed all aspects of civil military operations (CMO) and humanitarian assistance at the tactical level. The six Civil Affairs Direct Support teams of C Company Civil Affairs Battalion, FT Bragg, NC and the G–5 section comprised of three CA officers which had supported UNITAF was replaced by a far smaller CA support element. This CA element consisted of one USFORSOM CA staff officer, the G–5, one Area Support Group S–5, and two, three man CA direct support teams (CADST). These teams were augmented with local Somali translators. Under this concept one CADST supported the UN Logistics Support Command (UNLSC) and the other supported the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). This structure was based on the reduced U.S. role anticipated for UNOSOM II.

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However, the threat to U.S. forces expanded with the increasing violence from June through early August 1993. In August, the ARCENT G–5 staff conducted an assistance visit, and recommended that the USFORSOM CA section be increased by three CA direct support teams (CADST) and a CA Operations and Planning Team (CAOPT). The recommendation was included in COMUSFORSOM's request for additional force protection assets in August 1993. These assets arrived concurrently with the JTF in October 1993.

Mission

The USFORSOM CA mission was to provide mission legitimacy with the local Somali population. CA personnel conducted operations to assist local U.S. commanders promote cooperation in the execution of their military tasks and reduce any negative impact of military operations on civilians. They enhanced their capability by coordinating civic action programs with developmental and relief UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Civil Military Operation Environment

UNOSOM II civil military operations were decentralized both in planning and execution. Military commanders planned and coordinated military support for humanitarian relief and other activities to support recovery in the local area directly with the UN zone director and humanitarian relief NGOs operating in his area of operation. Each UNOSOM II contingent developed its own independent civil military operations program. These individual programs were based on type unit and resources available. Coalition forces recognized the positive impact of civil military operations in enhancing their relationship with the Somalis, and each proceeded to develop their own independent civil affairs plans and operations. CA personnel often tended to be the area commander's liaison with local Somali elders and worked with them to restore and enforce societal order based on the culture and traditions of the clans.

In Mogadishu, a UNOSOM II Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) was formed to coordinate military support to humanitarian relief agencies in the city. The CMOC served as the primary liaison between the humanitarian community and the force headquarters. Its mission was limited to coordinating security support for humanitarian convoys and feeding sites, and coordinating the use of civilian facilities for incoming military units. As military staffing improved, the CMOC assumed responsibility for a number of larger tasks which included assisting with the relocation of refugees and displaced people and coordinating various “food for work” programs in the city.

Lack of an UNOSOM II Civil Affairs Strategy and Civil Military Operations (CMO) Plan

UNOSOM II never fully developed the U5 function to coordinate an overall CA effort. This resulted in a failure to develop an overarching CA strategy that could synchronize and thereby maximize support from the developmental and relief UN agencies and NGOs resources in the theater. It also caused duplication of effort and lead to the inefficient use of these scarce resources.

The existence of a UN CMO plan would have allowed the CA to develop some intermediate objectives that would have allowed both to monitor progress toward a defined end state. Notwithstanding, it was difficult to develop any sort of cohesive plan oriented toward a specific end state when the UN had defined none. In essence, it was difficult to define how to achieve end state objectives when they were not defined.

USFORSOM Civil Affairs

Through close interaction with the tactical commanders and local Somali population, CA units proved to be a force protection multiplier. They reduced tensions, averted conflicts, and gained local clan support in resolving problems before U.S. personnel were harmed. Local U.S. commanders used the CA teams as their cultural and local area experts providing interface with clan elders in the communities affected by U.S. bases.
CA executed active humanitarian assistance programs providing food assistance and medical aid to appreciable numbers of orphanages, schools, hospitals and clinics or through the establishment of force sponsored MEDCAP and DENCAP programs. CA personnel also recommended and coordinated civic action programs under the “food for work” umbrella coordinated through the UN humanitarian division. Both the humanitarian assistance and civic action programs promoted good will with the population and influenced Somali attitudes in those areas where U.S. forces were based or operated.

CA teams were also used to reduce tensions by mediating disputes with local clan elders. This was particularly important in resolving LOGCAP hiring disputes and in settling Somali damage claims.

In resolving hiring practices for work on local bases CA teams worked with LOGCAP contractors to ensure equitable distribution of jobs with the Somali factions that lived in proximity to U.S. bases. This averted local confrontations on this effort. In resolving damage claims, the CA teams identified affected citizens and conducted investigations for military legal authorities. Their efforts proved most effective in resolving property claims resulting from the construction of both the southern by-pass route and Victory base. In a “failed nation state” where property records are lost or destroyed, CA personnel successfully worked with local clan elders and district councils to either establish or negate the validity of claims. Anecdotal evidence was allowed if it could be verified by the clan elders.

CA teams also assisted the UNOSOM II political staff. The teams proved invaluable in arranging and facilitating meetings between the political staff and the local elders in the Medina and Dharkendly.

The good will generated by CA units along with the routine, daily contact with the local population had an additional side-benefit—HUMINT. Clans sympathetic to UNOSOM II approached CA personnel with information on posed threats to U.S. bases and passed to appropriate U.S. intelligence channels.

**Logistics Support Command (LSC) Organization & Capabilities**

**Background**

In mid January 1993, the Joint Task Force Support Command (JTFSC) supporting “Operation RESTORE HOPE” was at the apex of its personnel strength and capability. From one seaport, one airport, and four logistics support bases providing supply point distribution services, it supported over 26,000 US and 13,000 coalition personnel in six UNITAF humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). By May, when the LSC’s successor, the United Nations Logistics Support Command (UNLSC), activated, its capabilities were significantly reduced. Table 1 shows the support requirements for each base under UNITAF. The UNLSC inherited the JTFSC’s base support concept of four area support bases, (Belet Uen, Baidoa, Kismayo and Baledogle), and one general support base (Mogadishu). The JTFSC mission reflected a broad mandate to project U.S. logistical assets to ensure the UN’s success.

**TABLE 1. JTFSC LOG BASES AND SCOPE OF SUPPORT—FEB 93 (UN/U.S.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOG BASE</th>
<th>HRS POP (UN/U.S.)</th>
<th>CLASS I (RATIONS)</th>
<th>WATER-LTR (UN/U.S.)</th>
<th>CL III-GAL (UN/U.S.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOGADISHU</td>
<td>23607/19000</td>
<td>45/23,000</td>
<td>297/151000</td>
<td>159/108000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISMAYO</td>
<td>2270/1500</td>
<td>6/3000</td>
<td>6110/19000</td>
<td>54/22000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAIDOA</td>
<td>4515/2150</td>
<td>13/3000</td>
<td>88/20000</td>
<td>46/22000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALEDOGLE</td>
<td>9529/3436</td>
<td>24/6000</td>
<td>158/39000</td>
<td>70/29000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>39921/26086</td>
<td>88/53000</td>
<td>653/229000</td>
<td>329/181000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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[Provide logistics, and medical support for U.S. forces, and as directed or required, coalition forces, deployed in support of “Operation RESTORE HOPE”; provide common item support and or inter-service support, inland distribution of POL and dry cargo, and common user port operations as directed by CJTF.]

The JTFSC consisted primarily of transportation, quartermaster, medical and material management units and activities that were capable of providing supplies and services over all of southern Somalia. During the JTF withdrawal, other UN member nations began to commit forces and this increased the support requirements that the new UNLSC would have to meet. Anticipating the strength or composition of incoming coalition forces was difficult. In April, USCINCCENT directed the JTF Commander to plan for a total of 28,000 UNOSOM personnel, including U.S. logisticians. The JTFSC staff began estimating and tracking incoming forces as it attempted to assess the size and mix of the force necessary to provide adequate support to UNOSOM II to expand operations throughout Somalia. By July 1993, the UNOSOM II plan projected that UN forces would conduct operations from the Juba Valley in the south, to Dhuusa Mareeb and Galcayo in the north, and possibly with smaller units as far north as Bossaso. UNOSOM II’s plans for expanding the area of operations beyond UNITAF’s HRS would require significantly more logistical support capabilities than the new UNLSC could provide. To maintain the same support capability that the JTFSC gave UNITAF would require coalition augmentation to the LSC. This was later provided by Germany, Ireland and Korea.

**TABLE 2. JTFSC Commodity Capacity at End State—May 1993.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>ON HAND BAL (GS)</th>
<th>PRODUCT CAP (GS)</th>
<th>STORAGE CAP (GS)</th>
<th>30 DAY AV (GAL/DAY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BULK WATER</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>370,000</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>149,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>1,343,270</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNITAF JTFSC Capabilities**

In January, prior to the drawdown of UNITAF forces, the JTF’s combat service support functions were performed by the 13th Corps Support Command Headquarters and over 5,200 assigned U.S. personnel. From mid-January through mid May 1993, this organization was reduced in size and capability to reach a 2500 man end strength objective. JTF combat forces that secured the LSC were not replaced. The LSC’s structure and composition enabled it to extend combat service support throughout southern Somalia and reflected USCINCCENT’s December 1992 UNITAF logistical support concept that would be carried on into UNOSOM II. This concept required the following:

- Four main log bases at Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baledogle, and Baidoa, providing support on an area basis; and, general support to area support centers not configured as basic log bases—Oddur, Belet Uen, Gialalassi, and Bardera;

- Main log bases configured to provide: water, Class I, III, limited II, IV, V, VIII and IX; transportation, terminal operations services and maintenance;

- Area support centers configured to provide supply point distribution, emergency maintenance operations, and services as required, including laundry, bath and medical aid;

- Ten days of supply of common item support supplies at basic log bases;

- Logistics bases were made up of coalition force CSS elements, including contractors, and U.S. when available. The long-term goal was to transition to contractor operated main logistics bases and area support bases. The JTFSC, therefore, consisted primarily of
transportation, supply (quartermaster), material management, and area support units. Major subordinate unit missions are described below.

7th Transportation Group

*Mission*

Operate a common user airport and seaport using U.S. military or contract personnel; provide common user inland transportation; provide seaport damage assessment, repair, port maintenance and port development; provide ROWPU assets to support water requirements.

62d Medical Group

*Mission*

Provide/coordinate medical support and service to the theater of operations.

593rd Area Support Group

*Mission*

Provide logistic support to U.S. forces and common item support of coalition forces in Somalia.

49TH MOVEMENT CONTROL CENTER (MCC)

*Mission*

Provide centralized movement control and transportation support for U.S. forces.

4TH Material Management Center

*Mission*

Perform general support supply management for Class I, III (B), V; limited general support management of theater controlled items, Class II & IV; ADP interface between DSUs and wholesale system; act on requirements of supported U.S. and coalition forces.

542D EOD Control Team

*Mission*

Ensure the maneuverability and survivability of U.S. and coalition forces; provide advice and technical assistance on matters concerning EOD operation; command and control all ARFOR EOD assets. On order, command, control, plan and coordinate activities of all other U.S. services’ and coalition forces’ EOD assets.

546th Personnel Service Company

*Mission*

Provide personnel service support to U.S. Army personnel attached or assigned to the JTFSC and all U.S. Army units other than 10th Mountain Division.
720th Military Police Battalion

Mission

Provide military police support to the JTFSC, to enhance force protection and support CSS to theater. Perform staff provost marshal functions for the command.

UNLSC Organizational Development

The transition from the UNITAF support structure to the UNOSOM II downsized logistical task organization began as soon as the JTFSC main body finished closing on Mogadishu in January 1993. By late January, mission analysis based on perception of the threat, the broad of spectrum of operations, and forces available resulted in two transition determinations. First, the basic plan would be to eventually contract all U.S. requirements through LOGCAP (Brown and Root Corporation). Second, all coalition requirements that could not be provided by the coalition force would be contracted. By 5 February, JTFSC planning had produced a three-phase concept that would result in a 2500-man LSC end state strength. Contract funding and execution, communications links, transfer of equipment between the MARFOR and the JTFSC, and northern sector logistics support were serious concerns.

The rationale for a UNLSC, versus a USLSC, was simply to have a logistics command and control structure underneath the UNOSOM II Force Commander to provide coalition combat service support. CINCENT guidance was to perform the U.S. logistical responsibilities under the TOR, but not to expand the scope of the assigned tasks, and to ensure that UNOSOM II operations succeeded. COMUSFORSOM was the impetus behind assigning a general officer to command the UNLSC. CINCENT designated the UNLSC Commander as COMUSFORSOM’S deputy. His rationale was that UNITAF was a logistically focused operation, and his intent was to give UNOSOM II a significant logistical capability with a quick reaction force. Ultimately, the UNLSC would exercise operational control over a Korean engineer squadron and a German composite force (operating under Chapter VII of UNSCR 814), a Romanian hospital, an Irish truck company, and a Swedish hospital.

UNLSC Mission and Operational Concept

U.S. Logistics Support Command mission had already been determined by UN and U.S. agreements, COMJTFLSC and ARCENT staffing decisions for the incoming UNLSC commander, and the actual disposition of UN forces on the ground.

Provide command, control and management of theater level logistics in Somalia for UNOSOM II forces deployed in support of UN Resolution 814. Provide selected common item support/common user service support and inland distribution as required to support operations in southern Somalia as directed by the Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia.

Common items of support for the theater level support of coalition forces were defined as general support combat rations (reception, storage, issuance and distribution), general support water production, storage, issuance and distribution as required, general support petroleum reception, storage, issuance and distribution, seaport operations, and transportation services. As a result, at UNITAF’s end state LSC provided common item logistics capabilities in the form of seaport and airport operations in Mogadishu, general support production and storage for water, general support storage for petroleum, oil, lubricants, bulk water, fuel, and dry cargo transport, direct support and class I general supply, and an ammunition supply point. It did not provide support outside the UNITAF area operation, nor did it operate area support bases, or perform equipment maintenance for coalition allies. It was anticipated
that logistic support functions, through contracts, would be assumed incrementally by the UN after UNOSOM II’s activation.

Despite the order’s reference to the new logistics organization as the “U.S. Logistics Support Command,” the LSC Commander, OPCON to the Force Commander, affiliated his organization closely with the UN by using “UN Logistics Support Command” or “UNLSC” in all briefings, correspondence, and in discussions. The title “USLSC” was not predominantly used again until after the merging of USFORSCM and JTF-Somalia staffs.

**Force Commander’s Operational Concept**

By 1 May 1993, the Force Commander had outlined the UNOSOM II military concept of operation to achieve the objectives outlined in the UNSCR 814. He linked successful military operations with “...parallel political and humanitarian relief operations...” and he envisioned a six-phase operation that would encompass the UNSCR’s four phases, and included expansion into Galcayo and Hobyo in northeast and northwest Somalia.

The TOR, USCINCCENT OPORD 002, and the Force Commander’s operational concept collectively determined the parameters under which the LSC would execute its mission. On 1 May, the LSC was clearly expected to sustain existing support, ensure insofar as it could UNOSOM II’s success, support expanding UNOSOM II operations, draw down to 1400 personnel by December 1993, and redeploy by January 1995.

**Development of the UNOSOM II Log Support Command Mission**

The UNOSOM II Logistics Support Command mission developed from decisions to reduce U.S. forces in Somalia, to comply with U.S. policy decisions in response to the 27 March Addis Ababa Agreement and subsequent UN requests to maintain U.S. logistical support, USCINCCENT’s orders to the Commander of the Joint Task Force to continue to provide logistical support after UNITAF, and to change the Logistical Support Command (LSC) command relationships with the UN organization in Somalia after UNITAF.

Throughout the winter and early spring of 1993, CENTCOM reviewed its continuing logistical commitment to UNITAF and increasing U.S. commitments to its successor, UNOSOM II. USCENTCOM’s approach to the U.S. logistical role reflected the following support decisions:

- Logistics is a national responsibility;
- Coalition forces can be provided logistic support through foreign military sales and cross servicing agreements;
- No statutory authority exists for USCENTCOM to provide direct logistic support to allied or coalition forces without Presidential approval. U.S. forces will provide assistance to friendly forces upon approval of NCA through USCINCCENT;
- Cross servicing agreements exist with the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, and the UK.

**The UN’s Early Vision for U.S. Logistical Support Under UNOSOM**

By 1 March 1993, the UN envisioned the U.S. logistical framework to be reduced as contractors and the UN assumed support functions. UNOSOM II expected 14,000 troops to arrive by mid-March, and they would be dispersed into the central, northeast and northwest regions as UNITAF forces withdrew. At full deployment, five independent brigade sector headquarters, with components totaling 22,000 to
25,000 personnel, would be located in Hargesa, Garawe, Mogadishu, Kismayo, and the Galcayo areas. Few would be logistically self sufficient, and some would need full “third-line” logistical support. The theater logistics concept depended upon four logistics support bases, and four forward bases in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baledogle, and Baidoa. The inclusion of central and northern Somalia in the LSC’s potential responsibilities caused the JTF commander concern. It was an expanded U.S. commitment. Throughout this period, the JTFSC continued to plan for operations under UNOSOM II using the following assumptions:

- UNOSOM II would assume the peacekeeping mission;
- There would be minimal U.S. participation in peace keeping;
- U.S. forces included organic support; coalition forces would require CSS in excess of their organic capability;
- The U.S. would manage common item logistical support to all forces;
- The U.S. would complete U.S. initiated engineer projects;
- The U.S. would provide level III medical support to contingents;
- The U.S. would support the remaining U.S. Brigade at UNITAF’s end state;
- UNOSOM would increasingly contract for combat service support.

On 12 March 1993, the UN Secretary General submitted a request to the U.S. for logistics, engineering, and communications support beginning 1 May 1993. He cited the need for the continued support by the “UNITAF Support Command,” in support of the UNOSOM II military forces, and requested that a final assessment of what units would be required to remain to support UNOSOM II be made between the UNITAF and UNOSOM II commanders.

The SRSG confirmed UNOSOM II’s intentions in a 7 April SRSG communication to the UN. He assessed the post UNITAF logistics capability as “… a limited (2300 man) divisional logistic capability with a 25% divisional engineering strength. In our view, this structure will only be able to support fully second line capable…brigades in the south, with insufficient spare capacity to fill missing brigade support elements and no realistic capacity to support the center and north.” However, even at that late planning date, UNOSOM II was, as he stated “… several weeks away from identifying specifically what … (was needed).” The SRSG’s concerns focused on the perceived lack of engineers, and UNITAF’s “bare bones” approach to the UN’s need to expand the mission once the southern position could be consolidated. At this time the UN was specifically assessing support requirements for communications, special forces, psychological operations forces, air surveillance, and aviation. In stark contrast to U.S. intentions to reduce its UNOSOM II role, the UN had a vision for UNOSOM II not only to continue to rely heavily on U.S. logistical assets, but to use them for expansion into the extreme north and south of Somalia. Force growth and operations expansion would continue to strain the Log Support Command’s ability to execute its mission.

**U.S. Attempts to Obtain Coalition Support**

In response to a Secretary General (SYG) request, on 17 March, USCINCCENT requested the Secretary of State assistance in obtaining a dedicated U.S. and UN effort in obtaining donor nations to fill projected UNOSOM II log shortfalls. On 26 March, the State Department directed the UN Mission, New York, to try to obtain other donor nations’ support to meet UN requirements. The U.S.
agreed to continue to work with the UN and to provide log support to UNOSOM II. It also proposed to help define precisely the logistical, and communications, requirements, and to assist in identifying coalition capabilities to satisfy them, so that other potential donors could be approached to make contribution. In addition, the U.S. offered to have the UNITAF JTF provide interim log support as the UNOSOM II military force continued to support operations. It cautioned that expansion of the UNOSOM II military AOR beyond UNITAF Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS) should be contingent on obtaining adequate support forces and communications from other donor countries or civilian contractors. The U.S. declined to accommodate the UN request for aviation support for the planned five UNOSOM II brigade sectors; however, it offered helicopter support for the QRF and offered to help identify additional aviation assets sought by the UN. In addition, the U.S. was prepared to leave a heavy engineer company in country. An important aspect of the U.S. response was an offer to help the UN to define financial arrangements for U.S. contractual and troop support. The U.S. expressed a desire to understand UN contracting procedures in anticipation of future support requests. The UN’s attempts to establish a logistical system would later become a major U.S. concern as the LSC attempted to cope with inadequate UN procurement methods.

The UN formalized its intent and expressed its required support as it developed Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 814. The resolution expanded the size of the UNOSOM II force and its mandate in accordance the 3 March SYG report. It requested the SYG to maintain the fund established in Resolution 794 “…for the purpose of receiving contributions for maintenance of UNOSOM II forces following the departure of UNITAF forces … and through the SRSG direct the Force Commander of UNOSOM II to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.”

U.S.-UN Terms of Reference

The U.S. and the UN agreed upon the terms by which the U.S. would provide support to UNOSOM II. The terms of reference (TOR) were approved by the Joint Staff, CJCS, and USCINCENT, and constituted an agreement between the UNOSOM II Force Commander and USCINCENT. The TOR specifically included reference to USFORSOM’s “Support Force,” as OPCON to UNOSOM II Force Command; and, it stated, “…the primary element of the Support Force will consist of the Logistics Support Command Somalia (LSC), whose mission is:

a. During the transition to UNOSOM II, to provide UNOSOM II Force Command the same level of combat service support being provided by U.S. forces to UNITAF, until relieved by other UNOSOM II Force Command donors or UN contract services, or as directed by USCINCENT. Transition of logistics support functions to the UN Field Operations Division (FOD) logistics support structure will be event, not schedule driven.

b. After completion of the transition to UNOSOM II, be prepared to provide command, control, and management of common item theater level logistics support for UNOSOM II Force Command, to include all units of USFORSOM deployed in support of UNSCR 814. Provide selected common item support and common user service support and inland distribution of bulk POL, as required to support the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command.

Mission Analysis Prior to CENTCOM OPORD Serial 002

HQ FORSCOM and HQ ARCENT discussed the future JTFLSC and UNLSC mission intensively from February through March 1993. Several proposed mission variants were considered. By 8 April, UNLSC mission development was being determined largely by the result of U.S. and UN negotiations. The “emerging reality” was that UNOSOM II did not have a sufficient, enough commitment from UN member nations to ensure its success, and, this directly affected the negotiated UN U.S. MOU.
USCENTCOM continued to attempt to clarify the anticipated logistics support responsibilities that the LSC would provide UNOSOM II. For example, upon activation of UNOSOM II, CENTCOM expected the UN to assume financial responsibility for the entire UN operation, including contracts assumed as part of the transition. JTFLSC, UNLSC would maintain a continued contracting officer presence, and would provide assistance as required until UN contracting officers became self sufficient. By 20 March, the UN had issued the UNOSOM II chief accounting officer, Mr. Manson, the authority to contract with the Brown and Root Corporation. This enabled projects such as the construction of the airfield tower to begin. In engineering matters, the LSC would continue to provide minimal engineering support to UNOSOM II during the transition or until coalition engineering forces were committed. Prior to 4 May and the activation of U.S. Forces, Somalia, the LSC made efforts to identify those CSS functions that a civilian contractor could perform: laundry, showers, generators, portable latrines, trash haul, fire fighting, refrigeration, and camp maintenance. The Commander, LSC, proposed, on 19 March, that these functions be turned over to the LOGCAP contractor since 70% of them had existing contracts in place.

As a result of these developments, by mid March USCINCCENT changed the mission statement proposed by JTFLSC:

During the transition to UNOSOM II, continue to provide to UNOSOM II forces the same level of combat service support being provided by U.S. forces under UNITAF in southern Somalia until relieved by UNOSOM II forces or UN contract services. Transition of some logistics support functions to the UN Field Operating Division (FOD) logistics support structure will be event, vice schedule, driven. Following completion of the transition to UNOSOM II, be prepared to provide command, control and management of common item theater level logistics support in southern Somalia for UNOSOM II forces, to include the U.S. Quick Reaction Force and other forces in Somalia, deployed in support of UN Resolution 814. Provide selected common item support/common-user service support and inland distribution of bulk pol, as required to support operations in southern Somalia and as directed by the Commander, U.S. Forces, Somalia.

USCINCCENT guidance emphasized the need for JTFLSC and UNLSC to provide support until the UN FOD could establish its logistics support structure in a “phased and incremental basis.” CENTCOM emphasized that the process would be event driven, and dependent upon FOD’s ability to establish its contracting functions and to obtain additional contributions. It described the “end state” level of U.S. logistical support as follows:

• JTFLSC would have theater level command, control and management expertise and oversight for common item general support to all UNOSOM II force. Specifically, the U.S. forces will control/manage, i.e., ensure that the function is accomplished, but not necessarily with U.S. forces performing the function, the requisitioning/production, receipt, storage, issue and delivery of Class I (combat rations), Class I (water) and Class III (bulk).

• JTFLSC would provide limited common item support/common-user service support for all UNOSOM II forces, to include the receipt, storage, and issue/distribution (to area support centers) of Class I (combat rations); production/purification, storage and issue/distribution (to area support centers) of Class I (water); and receipt, storage and issue/distribution (to areas support centers) of class III (bulk).

• For specific inferred functions but not specifically addressed, CENTCOM anticipated the USLSC would be required to continue providing control of seaport operations at Mogadishu, common user transportation and classes II, IV, V and IX (within capability) only during the early transition phase. These functions would be transferred to UNOSOM II at the earliest possible date.
As the UN and the UNOSOM II staff continued to conform donor commitment for UNOSOM II and stand up the FOD log support structure, the U.S. support role would become “better defined” (USCINCENT Message (unclas), 8 Apr 93).

**USCINCENT Operation Order Serial 001**

On 21 April, USCINCENT issued Operation Order Serial 001, **OPERATION RESTORE HOPE II**, which provided guidance and policy regarding the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, and inactivation/redeployment of UNITAF, and for activation of U.S. Forces, Somalia and U.S. military support of UNOSOM II (USCINCENT Message (Secret), 211701Z Apr 93, SUBJ: Operations Order Serial 001, Operation RESTORE HOPE II (S), HQ CENTCOM, MacDill AFB, FL). The order acknowledged:

- A planned UNOSOM II personnel strength of 28,000;
- The *Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. and the UN* (Terms of Reference, 29 Apr 93);
- The UN’s intent to activate UNOSOM II on or about 1 May, and the UN’s intent to field about 20,000 “peace enforcers” plus necessary logistics personnel;
- The UN’s plan for five brigades, a logistics support command and other elements as required to accomplish the mission;
- The UN’s preparation to assume the task of expanding security and relief operations, and the beginning of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The order established the area of operations as the “… airspace and land mass of the horn of Africa to include Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and respective territorial waters, the airspace and waters of the Gulf of Aden, and the Somali Basin,” and it directed the following:

- Inactivation of UNITAF and the redeployment of U.S. Forces not dedicated to support UNOSOM II;
- The UNOSOM II Deputy Commander (MG Thomas M. Montgomery) would assume duties as Commander, U.S. Forces, Somalia;
- U.S. Forces, Somalia, would continue the same level of logistical support already provided by UNITAF until support functions would be assumed by other non-U.S. UNOSOM II military forces or contractors. To this end, the U.S. would furnish a “significant number” of personnel to provide logistics support, a brigade (minus) sized Quick Reaction Force, and Intelligence Support Element (ISE), and other U.S. Forces in support of UNOSOM II but not OPCON to the UN;
- The U.S. would support UNOSOM II in implementing UNSCR 814 IAW the U.S.-UN MOU by providing, among other assets, “limited combat service support, … but the level of commitment would start at approximately 4,000 personnel, and draw down to about 1,400 personnel by the end of 1993 … as logistics functions, now performed by U.S. military personnel (would be) assumed by civilian contractors or non-U.S. UNOSOM II military forces … The target date for termination of all U.S. force presence in UNOSOM II (was) January 1995.”
- When directed, COMUSFORSOM would transfer operational control of logistics support forces designated to support UNOSOM II to the UN Force Commander.
• All UN Force Commander requests for additional personnel, equipment or services to UNOSOM II would be forwarded via the UN to the Department of State and Department of Defense.

• COMUSARCENT would designate the commander for the U.S. Logistical Support Command in support of UNOSOM II and to provide combat service and combat service support units to maintain the U.S. commitment to UNOSOM II.

• USCINCCENT’s expressed intention was to “...provide personnel, equipment, forces, assets, and other necessary support to ensure successful UNOSOM II operations.”

**UNLSC Headquarters Staffing**

By mid-March, USCINCCENT, COMUSARCENT, and COMJTFSC had already decided against fielding a separate theater logistical headquarters. On 31 March FORSCOM asked COMJTFSC to develop from the basic JTFSC TOE structure a TDA organization that would support the UNOSOM Force Commander. FORSCOM proposed a 167 space “Support Activity” TDA; the incoming 43rd Support Group would provide 108. The 59 difference would be made up from individual augmentees and would become both the USFORSOM and UNLSC “Pocket level and above headquarters, special staff and low density units” (FORSCOM staff briefing to Gen Reimer, 3 Apr 93). JTFSC did not concur with the Somalia Support Activity TDA concept and based in part on discussions with COMUSFORSOM, proposed an alternative Pocket Staff. JTFSC wanted a corps support group to deploy as a unit to assume the critical CSS role. It cited UNITAF lessons learned—that certain staff functions were critical, and an augmented CSG should provide them: MWR, Red Cross, interpreters, provost marshal to provide command and control to the MP company internal to the CSG, civil affairs, and a comptroller section to manage the budget in a command with multiple funding sources.

By 1 April, the headquarters staffing effort resulted in a JTFSC proposal to field a pocket staff of 20 personnel to augment the CSG capability. The JTFSC Commander considered the pocket staff necessary for command and control and planning. It would provide a “cerebral” element designed to advise the U.S. forces Commander and Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II, on theater level logistics, and would serve as the liaison with the UNOSOM II, CENTCOM, ARCENT and FORSOM staffs on all logistic matters. It would focus on future operations, and would assist in resolving logistical issues that might affect current and future operations. On 7 April, COMJTFSC recommended another “strawman” TDA for COMUSFORSOM’s review (COMJTFSC Somalia, Message 070900Z Apr 93, Subj: Somalia Support Activity TDA).

ARCENT deferred to the JTFSC for staff organization analysis, and on 16 April, the JTFSC Commander presented five final UNLSC staff options for CENTCOM review. They ranged from a separate headquarters with a robust staff, to a staff that would be integrated into the corps support group, thereby making the CSG commander the Deputy UNLSC Commander. The organizations ranged from 20 to 80 personnel and the LSC commander urged prompt resolution of the TDA problem. COMUSARCENT endorsed a 29 man TDA and the JTFSC Commander requested that USCINCCENT validate and fill the requisitions (COMJTFLSC, memo, Subj: Request for Personnel Fill, 28 Apr 93).

Some of the staff positions called for “dual hatting” the UNOSOM II and UNLSC positions. MG Montgomery rejected this concept. By 4 June, the authorized TDA total had increased to 36, and included CENTCOM, ARCENT and Air Mobility Command liaison officers. These additions added significantly to the staff’s abilities to plan, coordinate and report to USCENTCOM, and USTRANSCOM. The succession of FORSOM liaison officers proved less useful. Part of their intended role included management of JOPES information provided by a few WWMCCS operators using inadequate equipment; eventually the equipment was redeployed and HQ CENTCOM deployed a capable team that planned and coordinated redeployment of U.S. Forces. By 30 April, COMUSFORSOM and part of the new UNOSOM II staff were in Somalia. He
conducted meetings every Friday with the LSC commander, his staff, and the incoming UNLSC staff. The handover from UNITAF to the new UNOSOM II Logistics Support Command occurred 4 May. COMUSFORSOM’s first daily situation report (SITREP) was submitted to USCENTCOM on 5 May. BG Williams, the COMUNLSC designee, arrived 24 May, four days after COMJTFSC, BG Solomon departed.

**Staff Functions and Capabilities**

The UNLSC staff achieved its greatest strength of 57 personnel in June 1993. Although they represented all generic functional areas, the UNLSC/USFORSOM staff lacked the resources, personnel strength, and automation to adequately plan, coordinate and report operations in a joint and coalition combat environment. The G–1 lacked personnel processing authority, and had to “jury rig” SIDPERS for the theater. The G–6, tasked with supporting all coalition forces within his capability, ended up providing all U.S. equipment for coalition communications interfaces. He lacked adequate automation tools and Class IX to support the staff. Intelligence functions were performed by the Intelligence Support Element, OPCON to CINCENT and TACON to COMUSFORSOM. Except for liaison officers, the staff consisted of Army augmentees on tours varying from 130 days though “mission completion.” Some, such as COMUNLSC, arrived in TDY status, others arrived on Temporary Change of Station orders. The UNLSC commander’s intent was to have a small staff that executed directives, and did not pass actions or tasks to subordinate commanders. COMUNLSC saw them as “fire fighters”—problem solvers, not “… task passers between the UNOSOM II and Support Group staffs…but liaison between them” (BG Williams, interview with CALL, 10 Oct 93). Their second principal role was to serve as COMUSFORSOM’s staff. Because the Commander UNLSC also served as the Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces, Somalia, the staff served the Commander from the logistical headquarters at the university. The JTFSC redeployed almost all TOE and TDA equipment and the incoming staff had no office supplies of its own. It operated initially with minimal office equipment, locally manufactured furniture, a collection of well-used HUMMWVs and without radios. Task Force 11 provided telephone and facsimile communications equipment. Individuals brought their own computers, or obtained them eventually through the UNOSOM II communications office.

**UNLSC Operations**

U.S. Forces had three principal staffs in the theater—UNLSC/USFORSOM, the Corps Support Group, and the QRF brigade. The UNLSC staff was designed, developed and provided guidance to focus on theater logistical matters and could not perform combat or combat support tactical functions. It focused on monitoring strategic, operational, and tactical logistical lines of communication, determining U.S. and coalition logistical requirements and status, and reporting to HQ CENTCOM and UNOSOM II Force Headquarters. The CSG staff planned and coordinated the execution of day to day logistical operations, planned their own redeployment, developed staff estimates for installation and logistical operations security, and conducted other routine staff functions. The QRF focused on combat operations. Since the QRF brigade did not provide routine physical security of LSC installations or operations, the LSC and QRF staffs rarely coordinated other than for QRF sustainment. In retrospect, the UNLSC Commander felt that a deployed unit staff would have been a better organizational alternative.

USFORSOM task organization and headquarters staffing had significant consequences during combat operations. Urban terrain which favored the attacker, hostile force capabilities to attack U.S. forces at any time, the lack of U.S. TOE combat forces for day to day logistical operations security, inherent difficulties in obtaining and coordinating coalition combat support for U.S. logistical units, and the paucity of combat multipliers in CSS units at every level contributed to USFORSOM’s vulnerability. Designed entirely for wholesale logistical support, and having to rely primarily on coalition partners for security, the corps support group was required to expend a significant part of its manpower to protect itself.

From USFORSOM’s inception, CSS units were significantly hampered by this necessity. For example, critical engineer projects were severely curtailed because the equipment operators performed guard duty. In frustration, the UNLSC and CSG commanders relied on military police as a principal security
source because the QRF, OPCON to USCINCCENT, and TACON to COMUSFORSCOM, was not available for this purpose. But the first U.S. mass casualty situation occurred on 4 August, caused by a buried command detonated mine. A four-man military police team consisting of Specialist Mark Gutting, Sergeant Christopher Hilgert, Specialist Keith Pearson, and Sergeant Ronald Richerson died while patrolling by vehicle on a Mogadishu street within one mile from the U.S. Embassy Compound. Attacks against U.S. convoys and bases increased dramatically from June through September 1993.

Despite its unique logistical mission, the UNLSC staff was responsible for all required theater level functions. Without a joint task force mission or organization, and without the resources to perform joint tasks in a combat environment, the staff relied on expedient solutions. For example, a U.S. casualty required an OPREP-3 Report within minutes to the JCS, HQ CENTCOM, and Department of the Army. CENTCOM provided USFORSOM OPREP requirements a few days prior to the first of over 30 casualties to be taken. Within the UNLSC headquarters the staff developed a reporting procedure, but the UNLSC Commander felt that the CSG and QRF commanders were better suited to submit reports. They did not, because they looked to the UNLSC as the theater headquarters responsible for communicating directly with HQ CENTCOM. Ironically, the UNLSC staff did not have the communications ability to monitor tactical operations. When units received casualties, the G–3 relied on a reporting SOP to generate information for this time sensitive report to the National Command Authority.

Coalition logistical support requirements, growing with the arrival of each contingent, became a major concern. UNOSOM II's intention to support the growing force beyond the original HRS area of operations was a significant planning challenge that would face the UNLSC throughout the summer of 1993. COMUNLSC frequently honored appeals by other nations and the UNOSOM II staff for support outside the TOR to ensure that critical UNOSOM II operations succeeded. The U.S. provided small amounts of ammunition, sandbags, and concertina when the UN procurement methods failed. UNLSC was directed to provide all the wholesale services that UNITAF provided, but with less than half the personnel. (Water, fuel, rations, and transportation.) (BG Williams interview with CALL, 10 Oct 93).

By early February, the LSC had been reduced from 5,200 to 4,100 personnel and plans were being finalized for the JTFSC drawdown and the transition to UNOSOM II. By now, a distinct change in the LSC mission to provide “common item” support had been made.

**TABLE 5. JTFLSC Support Concept Until UNOSOM II Activation.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>END STATE</th>
<th>U.S. FORCES</th>
<th>COALITION</th>
<th>BASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>2 BDES (+)</td>
<td>13,400</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>MOGADISHU BALEDOGLE BAIDOA KISMAYO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>2 BDES (–)</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>MOGADISHU BALEDOGLE MARKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>1 BDE</td>
<td>6–7,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>MOGADISHU BALEDOGLE MARKA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Common items” were now defined as follows:

(U.S.): any item of supply or repair part that the support force has on hand and the supported force, regardless of service, needs, is a common item and will be issued.
Transition from UNLSC to LOGCAP Contractor

During the period 15 November through 31 December 1993, UNLSC focused its attention on the efficient transition of UN logistics operations from military to civilian contractor. The Commander’s intent was to systematically transfer the logistics mission without support degradation. The mission of UNLSC was to continue to conduct combat service support operations in support of U.S. and UNOSOM II coalition forces, hand-off logistic support operations to non-U.S. elements in theater and to prepare for redeployment to home station. The 31 December 1993 date to complete transition was driven by the requirement to reduce the UNLSC to 1400 by 31 December 1993, IAW the President’s 7 October 1993 announcement.

Brown and Root, the LOGCAP contractor assumed responsibility for transportation services, Class III (Bulk) distribution, bulk water distribution, management of general supplies, maintenance management, mortuary affairs, civil engineer support (MSR maintenance), and services supporting U.S. redeployment such as messing, property disposal, medical services, and port operations. A work force of 200 U.S. civilians and approximately 2,000 Somalis assumed these functions from UNLSC. The availability of government furnished equipment (GFE) and presence of numerous ex-military members on the Brown and Root staff expedited the transition. U.S. forces provided tractors, cargo trailers, fuel trailers, tank and pump units, wreckers, fuel bags, hoses, ROWPUs, forklifts, pumps and other equipment as GFE.

The transition was conducted in parallel with the UNLSC’s four phased redeployment in order to ensure a seamless transfer of responsibility. During UNLSC redeployment Phases I and II, all USFOR-SOM elements retained the capability to provide organic CSS functions and, as appropriate routine direct support (DS) logistics. Brown and Root and other UN agencies provided general support logistics. U.S. direct support logistics units assigned to Joint Task Force Somalia (JTFSOM) assumed the direct support missions of UNLSC DS units. This allowed UNLSC DS units assigned to the 507th CSG to redeploy. UNLSC became USLSC in Phase IV. Throughout this phase, USLSC retained responsibility for port operations (TF 24), departure airfield operations, redeployment support (169th CSB) and MP customs functions.

Although the contract logistics support proved quite efficient in terms of supply and logistics functions, it also proved to be burdensome. An infantry battalion, the Bangladesh, performed the sole mission of providing security for Brown and Root contract logistics units. This diverted a combat asset from other operational requirements in order to provide security typically done within the military area support group itself. In addition, specific operating hours were established in accordance with labor contracts. As a result, the capability to respond to last minute requirements was limited. One could conclude that, although more efficient in terms of production and logistics workload capability, contract logistics is not a feasible option in a Chapter VII operation until a reasonable level of security exists within the area of operation.

Medical Support of UNOSOM II and USFORSOM

General.

Medical support for coalition forces was primarily a national responsibility. Each participating country provided for its own Echelon I and II medical support, including medical resupply, communications, patient transport (ground) as well as preventive medicine and dental care. Echelon III medical support for all UNOSOM II personnel was provided by one of two contingent hospitals in theater, initially by the
First Swedish field hospital, then by a Pakistani field hospital or the U.S. Army Medical Task Force (MTF). The primary receiving medical facility for all UNOSOM II personnel (minus U.S. personnel) were the Swedish and Pakistani field hospitals. The secondary receiving facility for UNOSOM II and the main medical treatment facility for all U.S. forces, including civilians, was the U.S. medical treatment facility. Additional hospitalization and enhanced operating capabilities with associated specialized services were provided by the U.S. Army hospital.

The theater evacuation policy was 7 days. Strategic medical evacuation was a contingent responsibility for out of theater evacuation. U.S. MTFs coordinated directly with the various U.S. Air Force Air Evacuation Liaison Teams (AELT) for all U.S. strategic evacuations. Of the eleven contingent hospitals in theater, only the U.S. Army hospital possessed the capability to provide aero-medical evacuation within the Mogadishu and Kismayo AOR. Tactical fixed wing medical evacuation was limited throughout the AOR.

Medical Task Force 42

Medical Task Force (MTF) 42 assumed the medical support mission for UNOSOM II on 1 May 1993. The medical task force consisting in large part of the 42d field hospital replaced the 86th evacuation hospital which redeployed to the U.S. on 6 May 1993.

The mission of the medical task force was to provide command and control for corps level medical units in the Somalia theater of operations. As the medical support element of the UN Logistics Support Command, MTF 42 provided direct and area medical support to U.S. forces. In addition, MTF 42 provided emergency support to the coalition forces assigned to UNOSOM II and emergency care to selected Somali nationals.

The 42d field hospital operated a level III medical facility consisting of 32 beds, expandable to 52. The hospital was capable of providing the full range of medical services including emergency services, surgical services, general thoracic, neurological, orthopedic, anesthesiology, radiological service, OB/GYN, pharmacy, laboratory, preventive medicine and aviation medicine. In addition, the hospital provided dental support services, hospital support services and could provide its own direct support medical maintenance support. The MTF 42 staff also provided limited support to UNOSOM II for theater medical support planning.

There were 180 personnel assigned to the 42d Field Hospital. Forty-five officers, including physicians, nurses and services personnel and 62 enlisted personnel. Medical staff subordinate units included a medical logistics detachment, air ambulance company, an area support medical company, a preventive medicine detachment and a veterinary medical detachment.

Medical Task Force 46

The Medical Task Force 46 arrived in country on 11 August 1993 and replaced the 42nd field hospital, which was located at the embassy compound in Mogadishu. The task organization for the MTF consisted of the following units and detachments: 46 CSH (--), 32 Medical Logistical Bn (--), A Co (--), 261 ASMB, 82 Medical Company (AA) (--), 528 Medical Detachment (CSC) (--), 926 Medical Detachment (PM), and the 248 Medical Detachment (Vet). Initially, the MTF deployed with a total of 267 personnel.

The 46th CSH received an execution order to deploy to Somalia on 10 June. Unit planning and preparation was conducted 14–30 June. In July, the unit focused on four major events. The battalion change of command was scheduled for 6 July and block leave commenced 13–23 July. Unit training was conducted 26–31 July with emphasis on METL tasks. Soldier Readiness Program (SRP) was conducted on 27 July.
On 1 August, medical fillers or PROFIS personnel arrived at FT Devens, MA. Upon arrival, the physicians received unit level mission oriented training in preparation for the health service support mission in Somalia. The advance party deployed on 5 August with the main body deploying on the 10th.

The 46th Combat Support Hospital (–) and the six medical detachments arrived in Somalia on 11 August. Medical Task Force 46 was formed 14 August 1993. In retrospect, there were a number of concerns. There was a lack of clear planning or mission guidance for activities at Ft Devens. Support from Fort Devens was less than adequate. And the PROFIS personnel required additional integration training at the unit level as well as at the FORSOM and HSC levels.

The mission of the Medical Task Force was to provide health service support for U.S. Forces operating in Somalia and emergency health services for coalition forces and qualified Somali civilians.

Medical Task Force 46 provided command and control, staff surgeon services, management of disease and non battle injuries, hospitalization, air and ground evacuation, medical logistics, medical laboratory services, blood management, veterinary services, preventive medicine services, dental services, combat stress control, radiological services, pharmacy, and nutrition care services. MTF-46 provided level III health service support to all U.S. forces and some coalition forces within Somalia. Also, qualified Somali personnel were treated for various battle and non-battle wounds; each Somali seen had the prior approval of the DCCS. The 46th CSH(–) maintained a 32 bed facility from August through October with the ability to expand to 52 beds in case of a mass casualty situation. In November, the MTF increased its bed capabilities to 52 beds. As the overall U.S. force strength decreased in theater, the hospital bed status decreased to 32 beds, then to 14 beds by mid January 1994.

Initially, the MTF 46 troop strength was 267 personnel. As hostilities increased in frequency and the situation in Mogadishu become more unstable, particularly after the Task Force Ranger operation of 3 October, the need for additional medical personnel grew to 335. By mid November, unit strength peaked at 344. During the initial redeployment phase, the MTF incrementally redeployed personnel as fast as they received newly assigned augmentees. By the end of December, there were 214 assigned personnel and, by end of January, the troop strength was 202. As of 1 March, the MTF strength fell to 122 personnel.

Health care statistics

As of 28 February 1994, the 46 CSH admitted a total of 630 patients: 474 U.S. military personnel, 22 U.S. civilians, 89 Somali citizens, 9 foreign civilians and 36 coalition personnel.

The following statistics are the patient dispositions that the hospital treated from 14 August through March 1994: 198 strategic medical evacuations, 284 returned to duty personnel, 100 civilians discharged, 28 personnel transferred to other medical facilities, 17 deaths within the hospital and 1 death enroute to the hospital.

Since C-day, there have been 5,938 admissions: 4,936 U.S. military personnel admitted, 397 U.S. civilians, 321 Somali citizens, 40 foreign nationals and 244 coalition force personnel.

Blood Statistics

MTF 46 received 3,723 units of blood since C-day. Within the theater of operations, 1,424 units of blood were shipped for use to various coalition hospitals and U.S. medical units. 1,765 units expired in
Somalia, while 438 units were transfused and 11 were evacuated with patients being strategically evacuated out of theater.

**Veterinary Service Statistics**

A total of 3,395,118 pounds of subsistence were inspected. There were 905 pounds of distressed subsistence discovered. The distressed products included: 435 pounds of papaya, 130 pounds of cucumbers, 25 pounds of radishes due to age/decay and 7 cases of eggs, totaling 315 pounds distressed due to age. Throughout the operation, no food was condemned. 1,400 pounds of watermelons were rejected due to poor condition and wholesomeness quality.

**Air Medical Evacuation (tactical)**

The 82nd Medical Company (–) Air Ambulance, deployed to Somalia on 27 August and remained until the end of March 1994. It deployed with a total of fifty personnel and eight UH–1V aircraft in support of Operation Continue Hope. Two additional air crews and 7 more ground personnel arrived in mid October, after the Task [Force] Ranger operation of 3 October to augment the medical company. Commencing the end of December through mid January, 31 personnel and two aircraft were incrementally redeployed to home station. This left a total of four air crews with six aircraft and four ground support personnel to provide patient evacuation support until the mission is passed to offshore U.S. Naval Forces.

The 82nd Medical Company (–) (AA), flew over 622 missions and evacuated 1,280 patients during the eight months it operated in Somalia. The majority of patients flown were sick call patients being transported from various bases within the theater, to the U.S. Army Hospital (MTF 46). A total of 987 patients were ambulatory and the remaining 293 were litter patients for a total of 313 flight hours. Another 900 hours were flown for troop movement, orientations, reconnaissance, evaluations, and training and maintenance flights. The 82nd Medical Company (–) worked for MTF 46 at the embassy compound, while the air ambulance company was co-located with the Aviation Task Force at the airfield.

**Conclusion**

By doctrine, a Combat Support Hospital is a Corps level medical asset with a basis of allocation of 2.4 per division. This hospital is designed to accept all categories of patients with the medical capabilities of supporting 296 operating beds and 604 assigned personnel. Currently, there is no doctrine for a MASH or a CSH in support of a humanitarian aid mission. Throughout this operation, all U.S. Army medical units were sent to Somalia to support a division (+) and were located within the FEBA with known hostile forces along its perimeters.

On 4 March 1994, U.S. Naval Forces (the Peleliu and Inchon ARGs) assumed the level III Health Service Support (HSS) mission. The 24th MEU Medical Element from the USS Inchon relieved in place the MTF 46(–) as it prepared to redeploy. The 24th MEU provided level I and II HSS at the RSA during the final phase of the redeployment, with three organic forward deployable medical aid stations. The U.S. Army Medevac Detachment, 82nd Medical Company (–), augmented the 24th MEU during the HSS mission at the RSA with two UH–1V helicopters. It redeployed on 15 March 1994. The USS Peleliu was designated the primary casualty receiving ship, and provided level III HSS for all U.S. forces [in] Somalia throughout the final redeployment phase. The 24th and the 11th MEU provided security for NEO operations overwatch during the tactical retrograde from RSA AOR. The Medical Task Force (–) redeployed its final increment of 101 personnel on 9 March 1994. On 1 March, the 82nd Medical Company (A) (–) became OPCON to the 4-4 Aviation Company as it augmented the 24th MEU medical elements at the RSA and then redeployed to home station on 15 March 1994.
Public Affairs

Introduction

The public affairs situation in Somalia was the exact opposite of our most recent combat experience during Operation DESERT STORM. Maintaining credibility under these difficult circumstances was a continual challenge.

In DESERT STORM, a high degree of military control was exercised over press activities. In Somalia, the press was completely unconstrained by UN authorities.

The UN military command was constrained behind compound walls while reporters had complete freedom of movement on the “battlefield.” They often went places the military could not go, or they used local Somalis to capture footage of action and information. For example, after any given fire fight between U.S. or UN forces and the USC/SNA militia, reporters many times went to the scene, talked to Somali witnesses and scrutinized first hand the results of the events that had taken place. The public affairs challenge for the military was to assemble the facts based on fourth or fifth hand reports and present them in a credible and believable fashion. Under these conditions, the key to presenting accurate information was to be close to the commander and the operations staff.

Mission

The mission of the USFORSOM public affairs office was to communicate USFORSOM accomplishments to internal and external audiences.

Organization

The U.S. military public affairs organization began with one officer assigned for that purpose. This reflected the notion that the U.S. contingent should be a low profile part of the UN force. As the security situation in Mogadishu deteriorated, more personnel were provided to USFORSOM. However, until the arrival of JTF Somalia, after the TF Ranger battle of 3 October 1993, the public affairs element of USFORSOM saw no significant increase in personnel.

Initially, there was one public affairs officer at USFORSOM level, without a staff, who worked directly for COMUSFORSOM as U.S. spokesman. Because there was no officer in the UN Force Command to perform the public affairs functions, the U.S. public affairs officer also became the de facto UN military spokesman for the UN Force Commander. After four months, another officer and an NCO arrived TDY to assist.

A public affairs team, located at UNLSC, worked for the Deputy Commander USFORSOM and published the twice-weekly newsletter for U.S. troops. A broadcast team from American Forces Network (Europe) established and operated two FM radio stations and one television station. The AFN crew worked for COMUSFORSOM.

After the Task Force Ranger raid of 3 October 1993, a 35-member Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was deployed to Somalia as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. The JIB, headed by an Army colonel, assumed responsibility for the U.S. public affairs mission from the USFORSOM commander’s spokesman. In addition, a three-member team from the Department of Defense, consisting of media escorts from OATSD (PA), Joint Staff and USCENTCOM, was deployed to Mogadishu on 5 October to escort a pool of U.S. journalists seeking to return to Mogadishu. A fourth OATSD (PA) representative was also sent to Nairobi to support this effort.
According to public affairs representatives from the Joint Staff, with the uncertain security situation in Somalia following the events of 3 October, Washington media bureau chiefs filed requests with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for the Department of Defense to sponsor the return of a pool of U.S. journalists to Mogadishu. In concert with USCENTCOM, it was determined that the pool would be made up primarily of regional media. It was for this reason that the three-member DoD team had been sent to Mogadishu.

On arrival in Mogadishu, with the assistance of the FORSOM PAO and 13th Public Affairs Detachment, the escorts prepared to receive the pool. In addition, two members of the team also assisted in the stand up of the JIB. The journalist pool arrived with their equipment on or about 9 October. Although support facilities were austere, the pool was adequately accommodated. A difficulty noted was the absence of any pre-positioned equipment, such as helmets and flak jackets, for journalists use. This equipment was flown in several days later at the direction of USCENTCOM. The pool was dissolved a week later. However, a number of journalists remained in Somalia, placing an additional burden on an already taxed UN and FORSOM PA staff.

The principal lesson learned from this deployment of a regional media pool into Mogadishu was the necessity for detailed pre-deployment coordination. The PA structure and equipment had not grown as rapidly as the mission and U.S. media attention on Somalia evolved and grew after October 3.

**Review and Analysis of Actions**

There were a number of actions taken to enhance public affairs operations and media relations in Somalia.

Initially, there was one on-the-record press briefing daily, at 1730. Interview requests and media opportunities were handled as they arose. After 5 June, a background briefing was added at 0900 to inform reporters of the previous night’s events. It was effective. As events waned, UNOSOM spokesman kept the 0900 “back grounder” because journalists appreciated the regular contact with the military to schedule interviews and coordinate other opportunities. They knew we would be there.

Many of the senior UN military commanders had no media experience. Their opinion of the media often depended on their nationality. Providing thorough media training for senior military leaders helped them to overcome their misgivings about the press. It also paid dividends as crises arose and they faced the cameras to answer reporters’ questions.

Providing limited media training for the command also proved helpful. Military liaison officers in the headquarters received periodic updates that they disseminated to their contingents. The updates included the number and type of media in Somalia, what they were reporting, how to handle requests for interviews and the right to not be interviewed.

Reporters’ faces changed constantly. There were some who were regulars, who covered Somalia from Nairobi. Others came only when there was a lot of action. Some came once and never returned. In the last year we provided credentials for nearly 600 journalists, most of whom had little knowledge of Somalia. On request, a background briefing on the general situation in Somalia and the structure and deployment of UN troops in country was provided by the public affairs officer. This background session became known as “UNOSOM 101” and helped establish rapport with the continual influx of journalists.

**Public Affairs Support to UNLSC**

Public affairs operations were handled by a Public Affairs Detachment (PAD), deployed to support LSC and U.S. forces operations. The PAD is authorized 5 personnel and is ALO 1. It was deployed to theater with 4 personnel. The element deployed without an NCO. The lack of NCO support to this section has
made mission support harder to do for this element. One of the largest frustrations the PAO section had was having to deal with numbers of VIPs and Distinguished Visitors from DOD, DA, etc. deploying to Somalia without personal weapons, vests, TA 50 etc. The PAD was not equipped or manned with the capability to support the needs of these visitors. With the reinforcement of U.S. forces the DoD Press Pool was activated. Messages had been sent from the States to the PAO in theater to be prepared to equip these people. The PAO in Somalia could not, and reported that fact back. There is and was no means available for the PAO to assist in equipping any of the DoD Press Pool. A theater as austere as Somalia will not be able to equip personnel like the press.

Media relations continued to improve in-country. Commanders were using a media card prepared by the PAO to help in their relations with the press. Additional awareness of the role of the press improved with the commanders in-country. However the PAO believed more formal training for commanders would help. PAO equipment and deployment would improve with the immediate fielding of PAO equipment package, the FCD. This set should be fielded down to the PAD level. Additional U.S. PAO personnel arrived with the reinforcement force.

USFORSOM’s experience in having to handle media support with only a few personnel assigned and then later (after 3 October’s TF Ranger battle) being reinforced by a 30 plus member Joint Information Bureau provided a very important lesson learned. It is important to the mission to ensure that any similar U.S. Command in the future has a first rate joint information organization to support the command and the press. USFORSOM’s press coverage after reinforcement was accurate and positive. The press found an organization in place which made their access and coverage much easier. No U.S. Command should be fielded in the future without such a capability.

**Legal Support of USFORSOM**

**General**

The USFORSOM Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) provided legal support and advice to COMUSFOR-SOM regarding his role as the Commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia, and as the Deputy Force Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command. The SJA provided the complete menu of legal services to U.S. Forces. These included legal assistance, Article 15 processing and counseling, administrative actions, and claims. Additionally, the SJA also provided advice to U.S. members of the UNOSOM II staff on a wide range of legal issues to include rules of engagement and Somali claims against military forces.

**UNOSOM II SJA**

The UNOSOM II SJA consisted of: an LTC, Staff Judge Advocate; three Assistant Judge Advocates (2 MAJ and 1 CPT), and two legal clerks. The SJA provided legal advice to the Force Commander, and worked under the supervision of the Chief of Staff. The UNOSOM SJA provided legal advice in the areas of: Host Nation claims against UN Forces, treatment of detainees, rules of engagement, disciplinary matters, legal matters arising out of dealings between UNOSOM II and contributing nation and those relating to UNOSOM II operations.

The office was well-staffed with qualified personnel who can handle the legal issues confronted by UNOSOM II. Using the UN Field Administration Manual as a guide, the office issued various SOPs to contingents for streamlining procedures on various subjects.

**USFORSOM SJA**

The Deputy Force Commander’s legal staff consisted of one attorney (LTC), who provided technical supervision to all U.S. legal assets in theater. The Joint Task Force had three Army attorneys, seven
legal specialists, and one interpreter. The Navy and Marine forces had legal assets with them off shore. The United Nations Logistics Support Command had two attorneys, five legal specialists, and one interpreter. As the senior U.S. military lawyer in Somalia, the Deputy Force Commander’s attorney provided advice on all legal matters including military justice, fiscal law, international law, operational law, contract law, and administrative law. In addition, the SJA operated the Foreign Claims Program for USFORSOM and coordinated all appropriate actions with the United Nations (UN), Justice Department and the Staff Judge Advocate, UNOSOM II.

Support to UNOSOM SJA

In addition to supporting U.S. forces, the USFORSOM SJA also provided assistance to UNOSOM. The SJA assisted the United Nations’ Justice Department in establishing the Somali Justice Division and the Somali Police Force. We assisted with sensitive issues concerning the detention of Somali people by UNOSOM II (e.g., legal authority to detain and humanitarian treatment), as well as handling Somali claims against UNOSOM. Finally, the SJA’s office helped the UNOSOM SJA draft and monitor its claims procedures, and detention facility SOP.

Special assistance was also provided to U.S. members of the UNOSOM staff. The SJA advised the U3 on rules of engagement issues. In addition, the SJA drafted and coordinated responses to concerns raised by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) on the detention facility. It also prepared responses to UNOSOM II Board of Inquiry concerning the death and injury of UNOSOM II personnel by Somali bandits. And, provided information on the U.S. claims procedures and processed all claims arising from U.S. operations.

The relationship between the Staff Judge Advocate, UNOSOM II and the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Forces Somalia was excellent. Actions, which impacted on both organizations, were routinely coordinated. On numerous occasions, the offices worked jointly in responding to legal issues confronting UNOSOM II.

USFORSOM Redeployment Planning

Mission

COMUSFORSOM established J5, Plans and Redeployment Operations Directorate, with an implementing directive on 10 November 1993 [(Memorandum for Cdrs JTF-S/USLSC/46th CSH and Director CISE, USFS-CG, dated 8 Nov 1993).] The J5 was to develop long range plans for U.S. Forces Somalia and provide direction and guidance in all matters concerning the drawdown of forces, redeployment operations, and force protection of U.S. Forces in Somalia to all U.S. Forces assigned, attached, OPCON or TACON by USCINCCENT to USFORSOM.

Organization

COMUSFORSOM recognized the need to establish this organization based on the U3, UNOSOM, analysis of the following information:

On 12 October 1993, the President of the United States directed the withdrawal of all U.S. Military Forces from Somalia not later than 31 March 1994 (President’s Report to the Congress on U.S. Policy in Somalia, dated 12 Oct 1993). Additionally, the President directed the reduction of U.S. Logistics Support Command to 1400 personnel not later 31 December 1993.

On 14 October 1993, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command, proposed establishing a Director of Mobility Forces within USFORSOM.
Between 20 and 26 October 1993, the U3 reviewed successive draft copies of the USCINCCENT Planning Directive for the Redeployment of Forces from Somalia [(Planning Directive, HQ, USCENTCOM, CCJ5, 28 Oct 1993, Subject: Planning Directive for Drawdown/Redeployment of U.S. Forces Somalia, Final Draft).] The first task specified in the Planning directive was for COMUSFORSOM to “…develop a U.S. Force drawdown and redeployment plan that includes input from all elements under your control. After conducting your initial assessment of the overall situation concerning the redeployment of U.S. Forces, submit a drawdown and redeployment plan with recommended dates of withdrawal to USCINCCENT not later than 30 November 1993.”

On 27 October 1993, COMUSFORSOM provided U.S. Central Command with his concept for a Strategic Planning Cell [(USFORSOM MSG, 271359Z Oct 1993, Subj: USFORSOM Strategic Planning Cell).] The embryonic organization described to U.S. Central Command provided the foundation for the J5 and identified several critical elements of the redeployment process:

- Ground Tactical Planning;
- Strategic Airlift and Sealift Planning;
- Use of Joint Operations Planning Execution System (JOPES);
- Coalition Forces Redeployment.

Discussions with the U.S. Logistics Support Command and Joint Force-Somalia identified two pivotal elements for the “Strategic Planning Cell.” First, the Strategic Planning Cell should have access to the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) from a terminal located in-theater under COMUSFORSOM’s control. Second, that the “Strategic Planning Cell” contains a Redeployment Coordination Activity to synchronize the tactics of withdrawal with strategic transportation assets through the airfield and seaport terminal transfer operations. On 7 November 1993, COMUSFORSOM directed the formation of the J5.

J5 Directorate Organization

The J5 was COMUSFORSOM’s staff asset for planning and initially orchestrating the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia. The concept was for the J5 to consist of 13 officers and 12 NCO’s organized in four working cells: Administrative Support Cell, Operational Plans Cell, Strategic Mobility Planning Cell, and Redeployment Coordination Cell. The J5 actually comprised 11 Officers and 4 NCO’s on a more or less permanent basis. Crucial to organizing the J5 was COMUSFORSOM’s intent for the J5 to function as the higher headquarters for USFORSOM, but separate from the UNOSOM II staff. This intention reflected COMUSFORSOM’s desire to separate the U.S. withdrawal from the UNOSOM II mission.

Administrative support cell was to consist of 3 NCO’s to provide administrative support to the Chief, J5. The NCO’s never materialized. A Surface Warfare Officer (LT/USN) performed all administrative and operations support functions.

Operational planning cell was to consist of officers and 1 NCO. Initially, JTF-Somalia provided only 1 officer, a Special Forces Officer (MAJ/USA), who was the Chief of the Cell. Later, U.S. Central Command augmented the cell with another field grade officer from MacDill AFB. The cell developed long range plans for USFORSOM. The Chief of the Plans Cell led the Operational Planning Group in mission analysis; course of action development, analysis, and comparison; and presented recommended plans to COMUSFORSOM for approval. The cell also monitored current operations and recommended CONPLANs. COMUSFORSOM directed the following representation in the Operational Planning Group:
In order to develop the withdrawal plan, the Operational Planning Group met on a daily basis in November 1993. The Director J5 was authorized to assemble the OPG on four hours notice.

Strategic mobility planning cell was to consist of 7 Officers and 3 NCO’s. This cell used the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System input for the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). Two Air Mobility Plans Officers and two Sealift Plans Officers were requested to check the transportation feasibility of courses of action developed by the OPG, identify air and sealift requirements, track the location of mobility assets and required support equipment, and coordinate with the Mogadishu APOD and SPOD. Military Sealift Command provided one Sealift Planner. Air Mobility Command provided one air mobility planner. U.S. Central Command provided a WWMCCS terminal with three JOPES trained officers and three computer operators for the WWMCCS terminal. They made changes and updated the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD-11993RH/RR) for all U.S. Forces in Somalia. U.S. Army Central Command operated a WWMCCS terminal in USLOGSUPCOM. However, due to maintenance and software problems, it could not provide adequate access for JOPES.

Reliable communications became a crucial consideration in each of three subsequent displacements of the WWMCCS terminal. Within the overall theater communications plan, the circuitry for WWMCCS access required extensive rewiring each time the terminal moved. The greatest technical concern for the WWMCCS operators was the time delay incurred when a break in connectivity occurred. The operators had to essentially "reboot" the USFORSOM connection from scratch. Detailed planning and coordination prior to each displacement prevented any downtime.

Redeployment coordination cell was conceived as 3 officers and 5 NCO’s unit supported by a permanent ground vehicle escort provided by subordinate commands. The cell was to locate in the Redeployment Support Area (RSA), which consisted of the airfield (APOD) and seaport (SPOD) in Mogadishu. This cell would synchronize units and equipment with departure dates. The cell allowed the J5 to track the flow of units from their assembly areas through each station of the redeployment process. COMUSFORSOM would use this cell to control the redeployment rate of units according to his priorities for:

- Tactical security of forces, convoys and facilities;
- Physical security of equipment;
- Efficiency of staging areas;
Adjustments to air and sea lift assets;

De-confliction with coalition usage of APOD/SPOD.

The Chief for this cell was a Transportation Officer (MAJ/USA) from the Office of the Chief of Transportation, Fort Eustis, Virginia. Initially, the RCC co-located with Headquarters, USLOGSUPCOM at the University complex. When Headquarters, USLOGSUPCOM displaced to the airfield in Mogadishu in late December 1993, the RCC moved with them. Several elements were at one time or another under the staff supervision of the RCC:

An Air Mobility Command Logistics Planner;

The Military Sealift Command Detachment—Mogadishu;

A movement control center (1 Officer and 1 NCO);

A Transportation Coordination Automation Command and Control Information System (TCAC-CIS) team.

Commander, U.S. Logistics Support Command was the executive agent for USFORSOM in all matters concerning transfer or coordination with civilian contractors assuming functions of the U.S. logistics support to UNOSOM II. This was a critical task in the withdrawal of U.S. Forces. Essentially, without the logistics support provided to UNOSOM II by the United States, UNOSOM II military operations would not be possible. The COMLOGSUPCOM was responsible to COMUSFORSOM for ensuring that after the U.S. departure, the required level of support continued.

Review and Analysis of Operations and Actions

The J5 conducted these principal activities:

• Served as the COMUSFORSOM point of contact for all withdrawal information and coordination required by USCINCCENT and supporting Unified and Service Component Commands.

• Developed and published the USFORSOM operations plan and order for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Somalia.

• Developed a branch to the original withdrawal plan to employ sea-ferry operations to Mombasa, Kenya.

• Coordinated and organized the Redeployment Support System for the initial redeployment and rotations of U.S. Forces from Somalia.

• Integrated coalition repatriation operations.

USFORSOM Point of Contact for Redeployment

In addition to the four major subordinate commands of USFORSOM and the coalition forces of UNOSOM II, the J5 provided information on a formal and informal basis to every major Department of Defense and Department of State agency associated with U.S. Central Command and Operation Restore Hope. For example, there were a combined fifty-eight “To” and “Info” addresses on each mes-
sage originating out of the J5. The assimilation, control, and preparation of responses for AUTODIN message traffic alone significantly taxed the single-man administrative support section.

The use of facsimile and data transfer through a computer-modem was extensive. Virtually every briefing slide and draft copies of correspondence were reviewed and sometimes edited through the use of data transfer via communications software. Passenger manifests were sent from the airfield via electronic mail on a local area network operated by U.S. Forces Somalia. The manifests were then sent to Headquarters, U.S. Forces Command to allow continuing travel arrangement for redeploying soldiers and to notify units of the return, by name, of assigned individuals.

By early December 1993, the use of the WIN tele-conference net through the WWMCCS terminal was providing an invaluable information conduit. The WINET (WWMCCS Information Network) not only supported transportation request validation, but facilitated on several occasions rapid problem resolution between USFORSOM and elements of USCINCENT and USCINTRANS.

In late December 1993, the J5 relocated to the original office of the Special Representative to the Secretary General on the ground floor of the former U.S. Embassy. This displacement occurred with no degradation in the J5 operation. Thirty days later the J5 moved to the airfield with no degradation in operations. When the staffs merged, the J5 was now located on the ocean side of the airfield with COMJTF-Somalia while the WWMCCS access terminal was located on the airfield terminal side of the airfield with the Deputy JTF-S Commander for Support. In mid-March 1994, the USFORSOM WWMCCS access terminal was located on-board the USS Peleliu. The equipment and hardware from USCINCENT that was in Mogadishu redeployed to CONUS.

Critical to the redeployment information process was keeping up with and informing external agencies and headquarters about the status of the following issues:

- Coalition Repatriation;
- Who was leaving;
- When were they leaving;
- What assistance did they want from the U.S.;
- What was the impact on the U.S. seaport and airfield redeployment operations;
- The status of turnover of the functions performed by USLOGSUPCOM to a contractor;
- How much Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) would remain in Theater after 31 March 1994;
- What was the size of the U.S. Force remaining in March 1994.

These issues provided the initial focus for the activities of the J5 in November 1993. The RCC in coordination with the COMUSLOGSUPCOM and his staff provided daily input to the J5 on these subjects.

**Development of USFORSOM OPORD 002**

Beginning in mid-October 1993, the U.S. Central Command Planning Directive was sent each day to USFORSOM for review and comment. Initially, the U3/J3 for USFORSOM reviewed the document.
The last two draft versions were reviewed by the new Plans Cell of the J5. The CCJ5 published a Planning Directive on 28 October 1993 (Message, USCINCCENT 281808C Oct 1993, POC: CCJ5). The Planning Directive described three courses of action. Each course of action presented a scenario for planning that described a time-frame for the withdrawal, how strategic lift was to be used, and implications for the coalition in UNOSOM II.

The first course of action described a deliberate withdrawal of all U.S. Forces not later than 31 March 1994. The scenario was based on an efficient use of strategic lift. Efficiency meant cargo went by sealift and passengers went by airlift. The hand-off of the responsibilities described in the Terms of Reference (TOR) between USCINCCENT and UNOSOM II would be conducted in a coordinated manner satisfying both sides.

The TOR described command relationships for USLOGSUPCOM, the Quick Reaction Force, and the Intelligence Support Element. The key element of concern for the United Nations Forces in the TOR was the Logistical Support the United States provided. The transfer of logistical functions from the U.S. Military to a contractor to support the United Nations was the vital task COMUSFORSOM had to address before any logistical forces could be withdrawn.

The second course of action described an accelerated withdrawal caused by external, unnamed contingencies. J5, USFORSOM looked at three branches to this scenario using no-later-than dates for withdrawal of 1 January 1994, early February 1994, and early March 1994 respectively as frameworks for planning. Inefficient use of strategic lift was assumed. This meant that more airlift was planned for cargo in increasing amounts based on the date of required withdrawal occurrence. It was also assumed for planning that a coordinated hand-off of the TOR would not occur. This would likely precipitate a collapse of UNOSOM II.

The final course of action postulated an extended withdrawal. Since the National Command Authority's guidance clearly indicated 31 March 1994 as a deadline, this scenario did not seem valid. However, U.S. Central Command planners included this scenario to cover the possibility of “what if” the U.S. decided to stay and assist all of the coalition to withdraw from Somalia. A total withdrawal from Somalia would take longer than a 31 March 1994 deadline would cover. Efficient use of transportation was assumed and the hand-off of the TOR was unnecessary.

Following the Planning Directive, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command provided COMUSFORSOM with a detailed Strategic Concept for the Withdrawal of Forces. The strategic concept directed Commander, USFORSOM to provide direction and guidance at the operational level for JTF-Somalia’s execution at the tactical level. It contained assumptions that built upon the planning factors given in the earlier Planning Directive. Analysis of the key planning factors provides the best foundation for the shape of the final USFORSOM plan for withdrawal.

**USLOGSUPCOM draws down to 1400 personnel NLT 31 Dec 1993.**

This planning factor came directly from the President’s Report to Congress on Policy towards Somalia. It represented two conditions for logistics planning. First, it forced USLOGSUPCOM to withdraw 1,700 soldiers rapidly. Second, it was the upper limit for logistics support troops that could remain to support the entire force (U.S. and coalition) until it withdrew. A significant portion of the 1,400 would have to be units with redeployment functions or U.S. direct-support units. The effect of the 1400 troop ceiling was to force the United Nations to act on the future of UNOSOM II or risk its failure.

In order to support the planned reduction of USLOGSUPCOM, U.S. Central Command provided the following assumptions: Funding for uninterrupted LOGCAP support to supplant USLOGSUPCOM will be available; selected U.S. owned equipment in Somalia will be available as Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE) to the LOGCAP contractor; and a passive enough security environment will exist to permit contractors to perform operations. The first two factors provided the resources to allow replacement of USLOGSUPCOM. They also demonstrated the Government of the United States commitment to continue nonmilitary support for UNOSOM II. The third factor removed from the USFORSOM planning effort any security considerations for whatever organization was to replace USLOGSUPCOM.

There is no host-nation support.

This planning factor meant two things for the planning of the withdrawal. First, any support required to support the redeployment would have to be brought into theater. This demanded an immediate estimate of what was needed for terminal operations. Secondly, no existing logistics services or commercial enterprises would or could be used. No reliance on any Somali labor or enterprise for redeployment was considered.

USFORSOM drawdown goal for 31 Dec 1993 is +/-5000 personnel.

The U.S. Central Command goal to drawdown to 5000 personnel by 31 December 1993 seemed arbitrary at first. Analysis of the following numbers revealed the implied task. On 1 December 1993, USFORSOM had 7,700 personnel ashore. By subtracting 1,700 as directed to reduce USLOGSUPCOM, 6,000 would remain. By withdrawing Task Force 2-14 Infantry (Light) which numbered just under 1,000 personnel, no later than 25 December 1993, just over 5,000 personnel would remain.

The reduction of TF 2-14 INF was justifiable for several reasons. First of all, the unit had been in-theater almost four months, the period for the U.S. Army rotation policy. Second, the withdrawal of 1,700 soldiers from USLOGSUPCOM reduced in-theater force protection requirements. Thirdly, the drawdown of USLOGSUPCOM argued for a corresponding reduction from JTF-Somalia to ensure adequate troop and logistical support.

As is operationally feasible, efficiency will be the fundamental principle of this redeployment.

This planning factor provided two considerations. First, the implied task was to conduct a tactical withdrawal to an area for an administrative redeployment. Tactical considerations and force protection measures would outweigh administrative transportation requirements. The next consideration was that some cargo could be shipped by airlift if it was a required force protection measure and it would be retained in-theater beyond the time it could be placed on a ship.

Prior to departure from Somalia, U.S. Forces will comply with U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Department of Agriculture inspection and clearance standards.

This planning factor amplified the planning consideration of what was operationally feasible for determining the means of vehicle redeployment. Compliance with the rigid standards of inspections required by the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) necessitated an extensive vehicle preparation process. Wash-racks needed to be constructed, staging areas for sterile vehicles had to be found, water for washing had to be produced, and a team of inspectors had to be trained. The time required to clean, inspect, and load vehicles on ships or planes meant that the time-line for transporting the last vehicles by ship required them to be free from tactical, force protection missions before the third week in March 1994.

During the early analysis of the withdrawal, contingencies were foreseen that involved the rapid loading of vehicles either on commercial or amphibious shipping for transport to an intermediate staging base for completion of inspection for USDA and Customs regulations. After discussion with U.S. Central
Command and U.S. Army Central Command (the U.S. Central Command executive agent for the Military Customs and Inspection Program), USFORCEN realized that any contingency requiring a rapid departure where the MCIP could not be accomplished was invalid because security would be restored even if an operational pause in redeployment was required. Carrying this thought to its logical conclusion points out that most likely the same equipment used to restore order would be the equipment not available for inspection.

**The tempo of redeployment will be limited by the throughput capacity of the Air Port of Embarkation and Sea Port of Embarkation.**

Specifically, this statement identified requirements for all planners both in and out of theater. These factors were important because U.S. Transportation Command was parallel planning with U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces Somalia. Both Air Mobility Command and Military Sealift Commands made their initial estimates and issued warning orders based on these factors. USFORCEN needed to execute at least the minimum planning factors to keep U.S. Transportation Command synchronized to support the redeployment.

Originally Kismayo, [Somalia] was considered as both an air and seaport of embarkation. It was ruled out for several reasons. The harbor was unsuitable because of wrecks blocking access and the low draft eliminated U.S. Fast Sea-Lift (FSS) and Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) Ships. The airport could be used by up to C5B aircraft, but extensive augmentation with personnel and equipment would be required for sustained airlift operations.

In Mogadishu at the airfield, several planning factors were specified. While 24 hour operations were possible, they were not anticipated. During “surges,” the airfield needed a throughput of 400 passengers per day. The total lift requirement was estimated at twenty 747 equivalents (20X400=8,000). The biggest constraint was the maximum aircraft on the ground limitation of two wide-body equivalents.

At the seaport, volume was the primary concern. It was assumed that USFORCEN would always have access to at least one RO/RO or FSS berth at a time. The staging area in the port could hold up to three FSS equivalents or 300,000 square feet of cargo. Ships were to be loaded with at least 25,000 square feet per day. These were equivalent to the same factors used when U.S. Forces redeployed from Somalia at the end of UNITAF in March through May 1993.

The one wild card in sealift planning was weather. Initially, the effects of weather were considered from a ground perspective. The rainy seasons were seen as impediments to washing vehicles and therefore extending the wash down and MCIP process. The more critical weather problems were related to sea-states. The sea-states in February and March could deny entrance and exit from the harbor. In fact, early mornings from 0500 to 0900 were the best times for movement in the harbor.

USFORCEN may have to redeploy those UN forces which the USA assisted in deploying to Somalia.

This planning consideration provided the largest variable in the plan development. There were many nations who could qualify. However, without official announcement of who would be leaving the plan had to consider the worst case. The inverse of this planning factor was the implied task of assisting nations arriving into the theater. Both arrivals and departures would impact the throughput capacity of the port terminals.

The Strategic Concept also provided a U.S. Central Command Concept of Operation. The redeployment would occur in four phases: first, preparation of the plan and enhancement of the APOE and
Preparing the Operational Plan for Withdrawal of U.S. Forces was the immediate planning task for the J5. The J5 conducted a mission analysis of this task and developed a set of enabling tasks leading to OPLAN development.

The first enabling task would be to develop a concept for Force Reduction. Essentially this was the scheme of maneuver for the withdrawal and redeployment. First, U.S. responsibilities by the Terms of Reference had to be transferred to UNOSOM II military forces or contractors. Next an estimate was made of what forces were required to support the withdrawal. Finally a time line to synchronize the withdrawal and redeployment would have to be constructed.

Identifying the security requirements for the force was the next enabling task. U.S. Forces would continue to operate in support of UNOSOM II. Additionally, U.S. Forces would secure lines of communication throughout the Mogadishu area. The most significant task for USFORSOM was force protection in a low-intensity conflict environment with a history of ambushes and attacks by mortar and sniper. CJTF-Somalia was responsible to COMUSFORSOM for overall force protection of U.S. Forces.

Another enabling task for the J5 was to establish logistical priorities and responsibilities. Responsibility for combat support and combat service support had to be matched with capabilities as the force drew down. Responsibility for the critical nodes of the redeployment process had to be assigned. The driving factor in establishing logistical priorities was the transfer of responsibility to a LOGCAP contractor.

The most complex enabling task was determining the command and control relationships for the withdrawal and redeployment. The coalition nature of the operations in theater combined with the presence of joint forces under three separate headquarters (USLOGSUPCOM, JTF-S, and CTG 156/158 offshore) did not provide uncomplicated lines of command and control. Who was in charge, and of what, depended on the location and date a particular event would occur.

The most sensitive enabling task involved the integration of UN Forces realignment with the U.S. withdrawal and redeployment. When the J5 began analysis of the U.S. withdrawal and redeployment, the future of UNOSOM II was unclear. While some nations had announced their intentions, most had not.

Just as important as knowing who was leaving was knowing who was coming. The problem for the J5 was not just coordinating use of the port facilities, but also aligning which coalition forces would relieve U.S. Forces from missions under the Terms of Reference. A final part of this task was arranging which coalition forces would occupy facilities relinquished by the U.S.

The most stressful task for the J5 was incorporating contingencies for either an extended or rapid withdrawal. Decisions to execute either of these options could not be made with enough time to execute plans requiring significantly different resources than from the plan for a deliberate withdrawal. This task simply forced the J5 to develop a deliberate withdrawal plan that could be accelerated with existing resources or extended with the resources still remaining.

The J5 analyzed the mission for COMUSFORSOM using the Planning Directive and Strategic Concept as foundations. The J5 presented a single concept of the operation to the Commander, USFORSOM for his review on 16 November 1993. The USFORSOM concept of the operation used the four phases of the Strategic Concept, but allowed for them to overlap by making them event driven. The
criteria to start and end a phase did not depend on events in other phases. The only specified times for any events were the reduction of USLOGSUPCOM to 1400 personnel by 31 December 1993 and the withdrawal of all personnel by 31 March 1994.

COMUSFORSOM’s primary concern for the withdrawal and redeployment of U.S. Forces was protecting the force. Every measure possible for reducing the risk was to be considered for inclusion in the plan. While an expeditious tactical withdrawal would reduce risk, it would most likely precipitate failure for UNOSOM II’s mission in Somalia. Reducing the risk to the U.S. Forces during a deliberate withdrawal could only be done by substituting for the forces ashore with forces that could rapidly withdraw by sea, U.S. Amphibious Forces.

U.S. Central Command directed that the USFORSOM Withdrawal OPLAN be completed not later than 30 November 1993. This would allow U.S. Central Command to issue a directive to USFORSOM to commence redeployment. This was critical to coordinating Strategic Lift requirements as sea lift required a thirty day validation window in the Joint Operations and Planning Execution System. With only two weeks to work with, both Central Command and USFORSOM realized that planning was now “time-sensitive” and not “deliberate.”

U.S. Central Command dispatched a planning team consisting of the Chief, Operational Plans Division, J3; Chief, Plans Branch, J5; Chief, Plans, J4/7; and the Chief, JOPES Branch, Plans Division, J3. This team worked vigorously alongside the planners in J5, USFORSOM from 19 to 23 November 1993. The plan rapidly developed into a comprehensive order that COMUSFORSOM approved on 28 November 1993 for execution.

The J5 decided to forego publishing an OPLAN for execution on order. Instead, J5 issued an Operations Order for execution. The primary reason for this was the U.S. Central Command directive that upon approval of the OPLAN, Phase I would be complete and execution of Phase II would begin. Since the time of completion of planning and execution was less than three days it was more logical to just publish the order outright without having to publish another implementing instruction. The mission, commander’s intent and concept of the operation are presented next.

**USFORSOM Mission Statement**

“USFORSOM continues force protection operations and secures critical lines of communication, facilities, and installations; transfers its UNOSOM II responsibilities to coalition forces and civilian contractors; assists designated coalition forces with redeployment; and withdraws all U.S. Forces from Somalia NLT 31 March 1994.”

**COMUSFORSOM Intent**

“I want to withdraw all US Forces from Somalia NLT 31 March 1994 in a manner that protects our soldiers throughout every phase of the withdrawal and maintains a firm US commitment to the UNOSOM II mission until we leave. Our withdrawal must be deliberate and efficiently use strategic lift assets. I will minimize risk to the forces awaiting withdrawal by reinforcing Joint Task Force Somalia with amphibious forces, by conducting deterrent operations and by retaining a strong combined arms capability tailored to each phase. We will meet the requirement to reduce USLOGSUPCOM to 1400 soldiers by 31 December 1993. To meet that requirement, our first priority of work is the transfer of the logistical responsibilities to a UN contractor as soon as possible. I will not abruptly terminate any function we now provide the UN, but in order to redeploy we will stop providing communications, logistics and the QRF prior to the end of January 1994. I will send soldiers home as soon as they are no longer needed for the UNOSOM II mission. By the end of March 1994, I want the departure of all US forces accomplished in a safe and orderly manner that does not disrupt the capability of the military forces continuing the UNOSOM II mission.”
Concept of Operations

Phase I—Preparation:

USFORSOM conducts force protection operations of U.S. forces and continues fulfilling responsibilities described in the terms of reference for UNOSOM II: COMUSLOGSUPCOM-Somalia provides the logistical support while CJTF-Somalia provides the quick reaction force. USFORSOM concurrently conducts preparation for withdrawal and redeployment of forces from the area of responsibility, including receipt of personnel, equipment, and unit augmentation for redeployment operations.

In coordination with UNOSOM II forces, COMUSLOGSUPCOM-Somalia establishes the USFOR-SOM redeployment support area (RSA) consisting of all U.S. logistical facilities and equipment at the Mogadishu airport and seaport. COMUSLOGSUPCOM-Somalia establishes the redeployment support area command post; completes airfield and seaport improvements to increase throughput capacity; establishes the COMUSFORSOM Redeployment Standing Operations Procedures; stockpiles supplies in anticipation of redeployment operations and sustainment of JTF-Somalia security operations in Phases II, III, and IV to include amphibious units ashore. Simultaneously, COMUSLOGSUPCOM-Somalia prepares to transfer UNOSOM II logistics responsibilities to UN contractors.

In coalition with UNOSOM II forces, CJTF-Somalia secures all U.S. bases and facilities including the redeployment support area and lines of communication between all U.S. bases, installations and facilities.

End state: Phase I ends when the redeployment support area is established, non-essential personnel and equipment are redeployed, the aerial and sea ports are improved to support increased throughput operations, supplies are stockpiled for Phase II operations, and CJTF-Somalia is securing all U.S. lines of communication, bases, installations, and facilities, including the redeployment support area.

Phase II—Initiate withdrawal and transfer of UNOSOM II responsibilities:

USFORSOM continues conducting force protection operations for U.S. forces, begins withdrawal and redeployment of U.S. forces, assists designated coalition redeployment, initiates transfer of USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia responsibilities to UNOSOM II, and provides the QRF for UNOSOM II Forces Command.

USLOGSUPCOM Somalia is the main effort. USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia units conduct the transfer of responsibilities, provide designated government furnished equipment, and relinquish facilities to UN contractors and coalition forces. When each logistics element terminates its USLOGSUPCOM function it withdraws and redeploys. When directed, USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia releases OPCON of coalition forces to UNOSOM II Force Headquarters. Headquarters, USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia displaces to the redeployment support area when the majority of USLOGSUPCOM units are in the redeployment process. USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia augments the combat service support elements of JTF-Somalia to sustain future operations and continues stockpiling supplies for operations in phase III and IV. USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia withdraws communications support from areas outside of Mogadishu. USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia assists designated coalition withdrawals through the redeployment support area.

USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia conducts limited reception operations within the redeployment support area. When directed, JTF-Somalia and USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia receive designated replacement units, conduct relief in place operations, and redeploy relieved units.

In coalition with UNOSOM II Forces, JTF-Somalia continues securing all U.S. bases and facilities including the redeployment support area and lines of communication between all U.S. bases, installa-
tions and facilities. When directed, JTF-Somalia conducts relief in place operations at Hunter Base and prepares to conduct relief in place operations at Sword Base.

End state: Phase II ends when COMUSLOGSUPCOM-Somalia has transferred selected UNOSOM II responsibilities to UN contractors and is reduced to 1400 personnel; communications support provided to UNOSOM II outside Mogadishu is terminated; and augmentation of JTF-Somalia CSS assets for sustaining future operations by JTF-Somalia has been completed. End state of U.S. forces (5,000–6,000) personnel.

Phase III—Complete transfer of UNOSOM II responsibilities and main body withdraws:

USFORSOM continues conducting force protection operations for U.S. forces, completes the transfer of UNOSOM II responsibilities, continues to assist or conduct redeployment of designated coalition forces, and commences redeployment of the main body of USFORSOM from the area of responsibility. Amphibious forces offshore overwatch redeployment operations.

JTF-Somalia is the main effort and it continues securing all U.S. bases and facilities including the redeployment support area. When directed, JTF-Somalia relinquishes UNOSOM II LOC security missions to UNOSOM II Forces. When directed, JTF-Somalia transfers responsibility for the UNOSOM II QRF to designated coalition forces. When directed, JTF-Somalia withdraws from Sword Base.

USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia continues redeployment and limited reception operations within the redeployment support area. When directed, JTF-Somalia and USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia receive designated replacement units, conduct relief in place operations, and redeploy relieved units. USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia completes transfer of UNOSOM II responsibilities; then withdraws and redeploy forces except those operating the redeployment support area. When directed, USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia inactivates.

When directed, JTF-Somalia assumes TACON of the U.S. Forces in the redeployment support area. When directed, remaining ground forces withdraw and redeploy through the redeployment support area. When directed, JTF-Somalia redeploy the aviation task force. When directed, amphibious forces become TACON to JTF-Somalia to secure the withdrawal of U.S. Forces.

End state: Phase III ends when USLOGSUPCOM-Somalia completes transfer of all UNOSOM II responsibilities to UN contractors; USFORSOM has transferred the QRF mission and responsibilities for security of UNOSOM II lines of communication to UNOSOM II; and the only U.S. Forces remaining in support of UNOSOM II are the Headquarters, USFORSOM, amphibious forces, JSOTF elements, and JTF-Somalia in the redeployment support area. End state of U.S. forces (approximately 1,000 personnel ashore).

Phase IV—Complete the withdrawal:

USFORSOM continues conducting force protection operations for U.S. forces, continues to assist redeployment of designated coalition forces, and completes the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Somalia. When directed, AC–130’s and other support aircraft redeploy from the Somalia area of responsibility. When directed, JTF-Somalia transfers TACON of amphibious forces to COMUSNAVCENT. When directed by USCINCCENT, JTF-Somalia is disestablished and redeploy. When directed by USCINCCENT, COMUSFORSOM inactivates Headquarters, USFORSOM and redeploy.

End state: Phase IV ends when all U.S. Forces have redeployed from Somalia NLT 31 March 1994.

In early December 1993, U.S. Central Command issued a Fragmentary Order (USCINCCENT FRAGO 004 to Operations Order Serial 001 issued 302330Z Nov 1993) directing Commander, U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command and Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command to designate Amphibious Force Commanders who would report to Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia to conduct planning for the final Phase of the withdrawal. USNAVCENT selected the Commander, Amphibious Group Three and USMARCENT selected the Commander, I Marine Expeditionary Force. At the request of Commander, Amphibious Group Three the initial planning conference was held in San Diego, California.

In late December, after the planning conference concluded, COMUSFORSOM approved the Amphibious Concept. COMUSFORSOM then provided additional guidance to clarify the command relationships and fix the timing of selected key events. The J5 analyzed the guidance and prepared Fragmentary Order 002 that COMUSFORSOM approved on 28 December 1993. Additions to the commander’s intent and revision to the concept of the operation were made.

**Additions to Commander’s Intent**

“We will retain the capability to conduct the withdrawal by sealift only.”

COMUSFORSOM added this statement to focus the withdrawal effort on efficiency through sea transportation. Also, this focus would provide flexibility to the withdrawal plan by preventing interdiction of aircraft from affecting the completion of the mission.

“We will keep a robust US force presence until completion of our withdrawal to include maintaining the ‘Eyes over Mogadishu’ operation.”

This reflected COMUSFORSOM’s commitment to support the UNOSOM II mission and protect the force until the last U.S. Forces departed. “I will assume command of JTF-Somalia NLT 7 February 1994. Prior to this, we will merge and reduce the staffs from the USFOR, JTF-SOMALIA, and USLOG-SUPCOM Headquarters into a single staff to complete the withdrawal.” This unified the command of U.S. Forces Somalia under one leader and clarified responsibilities for the entire theater.

**Revised Phase IV—Concept of the Operation:**

Complete the Withdrawal: COMUSFORSOM/JTF-SOM continues conducting force protection operations for U.S. Forces, assists redeployment of designated coalition forces, and completes the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Somalia. COMPHIBGRU 3 (CATF) secures the RSA on 15 March 1994. Falcon BDE (10th MTN AVN BDE) and the RSB (169th CSB) begin redeployment after 15 March 1994; one heavy force TM(1-64AR) will be the last U.S. Army element to deploy. When the last team from 1-64AR begins redeployment, NET 20 March 1994, and when directed by USCENT, JTF-Somalia inactivates and redeploys. COMUSFORSOM remains ashore. NET 310800C March 1994 AC–130’s and other support aircraft redeploy from the Somalia area of responsibility. On 310805C March 1994 COMUSFORSOM transfers TACON of amphibious forces to USNAVCENT and redeploys.

End state: Phase IV ends when all U.S. Forces have redeployed from Somalia NLT 31 March 1994 and amphibious forces under COMPHIBGRU 3 return to the OPCON of USNAVCENT.

On 17 January 1994 the Commander of JTF-Somalia departed command for return to his state-side duties. Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia merged all U.S. Forces under his command. With the merger of the staffs, the J5 primarily focused on the Joint Operations and Planning Execution System to complete the withdrawal. The higher headquarters planning function of the J5, U.S. Forces Somalia, terminated officially on 1 February 1994 [USFORSOM FRAGO 003, 212359Z Jan 94].

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Sea-Ferry Operations to Mombasa, Kenya

During the last week in December 1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff visited U.S. Forces Somalia. During a Command Briefing the Chairman discussed with the Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia a contingency plan involving the use of a ferry to another country where personnel would trans-load onto commercial aircraft for transportation to home station. This plan surfaced as part of a discussion concerning security at the airfield and the anti-aircraft weapons threat to large passenger aircraft.

During a visit in the first week of January 1994, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command discussed with Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia contingency operations in the event aircraft could not use the airport at Mogadishu. This had previously occurred in Somalia in August 1993.

The J5 studied the two discussions and concluded that the Joint Staff and the Central Command Staff were contemplating the “ferry option,” but that the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief had apparently “decided” the ferry was not optional. Without waiting for guidance from higher headquarters, the J5 began studying plans to ferry by tactical airlift (KC–10 or C–130) or sea lift (USN Landing Ship Tank or commercial ferry) personnel to Mombasa, Kenya or Djibouti, Djibouti. The J5 felt it was prudent to develop a “ferry plan” because Aviation Task Force 2-25 (10th MTN DIV) was scheduled to rotate over 400 personnel with 4-4 Assault Helicopter Battalion (4 DIV MECH) in mid-to-late January 1994.

In mid-January 1994, U.S. Central Command announced that no commercial passenger aircraft would depart from Mogadishu beginning 1 February 1994. Complicating the initiation of ferryboat operations was the need to obtain diplomatic clearance from the Government of Kenya. U.S. Central Command coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya to arrange clearance for the operation. The explanation to the Government of Kenya included provisions for “air ferry” as well as sea ferry operations. The initial air ferry operation, using C–130’s based in Mombasa, was necessary to complete the rotation of TF 2-25 and 4-4 AHB because the sea ferry would not be operational in time. Subsequent air ferry operations were coordinated on a contingency basis in the event the ferry boats could not operate due to mechanical problems or berthing problems due to sea states.

Military Sealift Command provided two ferryboats:

- Motor Vessel Mediterranean Sky, Greek Registry, 700 PAX, arrived 1 February 1994;

Military Sealift Command placed on each ferry a three-man detachment consisting of a U.S. Navy Captain, a U.S. Navy Administrative/Executive officer, and a U.S. Navy Senior Chief Petty Officer. These detachments served as the military command and control element for each ferry. The troop commander was under the tactical control of the MSG Ship’s Captain while aboard the ferry.

The U.S. Ambassador to Kenya employed her country team to gain the approval and support of the U.S. Central Command ferry plan from the Government of Kenya. The following stipulations were agreed upon by the Government of Kenya and the U.S.:

- Personnel would stay on the ferry in port until just prior to loading. Government of Kenya would provide priority of berthing at harbor in Mombasa.
- Personnel would move to airport after dark to reduce security risk and minimize U.S. signature in Kenya.
• U.S. would contract with the Government of Kenya to provide transportation and security enroute to the airport.

• U.S. personnel could transit Kenya without going through Kenyan Customs.

The Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia created “Task Force Mombasa” to provide overall command and control of the ferry operation from the Mogadishu seaport to the Mombasa airport. Beginning 1 February 1994, this three-man team led by a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel was under the direct supervision of the JTF-Somalia Deputy Commander for Support. The principal duties of the Task Force were:

• Coordinate ferry arrival and departures with Redeployment Coordination Center and Kenyan officials in Mombasa;

• Arrange security, transportation of soldiers and baggage from the seaport in Mombasa to the airport;

• Report departure of passengers and aircraft from Mombasa;

• Keep the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi informed of all ferry boat operations and any requirement for air ferry operations.

Organization of the Redeployment Support System for USFORSOM

The USFORSOM plan for organization of the redeployment consisted of three distinct organizations:

• Strategic Mobility Planning Cell;

• Redeployment Coordination Cell;

• Redeployment Support Battalion.

Strategic Mobility Planning Cell

The Strategic Mobility Planning Cell consisted of two elements:

• Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES);

• Air and Sea Lift Planners.

U.S. Central Command provided the personnel and equipment for the JOPES element. This dynamic group of three officers and three non-commissioned officers quickly established USFORSOM through the U.S. Central Command host computer in the World Wide Military Command and Control System.

Their first task was to construct a Time Phased Force Deployment Database (TPFDD) for USFORSOM. Because virtually all of the units had undergone some form of rotation since the beginning of OPERATION RESTORE HOPE, the database for deployment did not even closely portray what was actually in theater. The team chief developed a single page data entry work sheet for Unit Movement Officers (UMOs). Next he conducted an extensive two-day course of instruction for all UMOs to show them how to enter their units’ transportation data into JOPES.
By 10 December 1993, the TPFDD for units redeploying by mid-January 1994 was complete. From this point until the redeployment of the final elements in March 1994, the JOPES element continued to add and modify the TPFDD in accordance with Commander U.S. Forces Somalia’s guidance. When the staffs merged in February 1994, the JOPES element worked closely with the J3, JTF-Somalia to coordinate every airplane and ship arriving or departing Somalia. U.S. Central Command also back-filled the JOPES team with trained replacements.

Providing “visibility” of in-coming cargo and personnel was a critical function of the JOPES element for U.S. Forces Somalia. Some of the important items and missions that JOPES provided advance information on were:

- Reception of the Somali Police force equipment;
- Reception of UN leased M60A3 Tanks and AH–1 Helicopters;
- Reception of the “Shrink-Wrap” team for redeploying helicopters;
- Reception of up-graded armor, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheel Vehicles.

The other element of the Strategic Mobility Planning Cell was the contingent of air and sea planners. Air Mobility Command provided two officers to assist in coordinating availability of aircraft and advising the planning staffs on the various ways to capitalize on Air Mobility Command’s routine operations. Military Sealift Command initially sent a detachment to assess the Mogadishu seaport operations and assist in estimating the total sealift requirement by vessel type. By the end of December 1993, both the airlift and sealift planners had completed their assistance to the various planning staffs and they departed or were absorbed into other redeployment organizations.

Redeployment Coordination Cell

The establishment of the Redeployment Coordination Cell (RCC) during the first week in December 1993 allowed the J5 to guide or direct the following activities:

Preparation of equipment for redeployment:

- Accounting for unit equipment using The Transportation Coordination Automation Command and Control Information System (TCACCSIS);
- Synchronize equipment departures with TF 24 and 314 MST Airfield and SeaPort Terminal Operations;
- Establish equipment marshaling areas;
- Coordinate equipment wash-down schedules;
- Control personnel departures;
- Coordinate the establishment of the ferry (air & sea) operations;
- Coordinate Coalition departure schedules.

The RCC set up operations adjacent to office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G3, USLOG-SUPCOM. Estimating the total transportation requirement by weight and volume was the priority task for the
The Chief of Staff, USLOGSUPCOM decided that the best way to accomplish this task would be to establish a TCACCIS team. Headquarters, Military Transportation Management Command (MTMC), Falls Church, Virginia dispatched a team with equipment to Somalia the first week in December 1993.

The efforts of the TCACCIS team provided three critical services for the redeployment operation:

1) A listing of individual pieces of equipment and supply containers for use in determining the transportation requirement;

2) A marking system (bar-codes on adhesive backed stickers) for tracking equipment and supply containers through the terminal operation back to home station;

3) Until the TPFDD was completed, TCACCIS projections of square footage for shipping by each phase of the withdrawal.

Units of the USLOGSUPCOM began processing through TCACCIS immediately. Shortly thereafter, units from JTF-Somalia followed in mid-December 1993. By mid-January 1994, virtually all units in USFORSOM had processed through TCACCIS. By early January 1994, the only practical function required for TCACCIS was the production of bar-code labels for Transportation Movement Control Documentation. The TCACCIS team departed in late-January 1994 after transferring the responsibility for listing the small amount of remaining property to the Port Terminal Operation.

Simultaneous with the efforts to estimate the transportation requirement, the RCC began to organize, in coordination with USLOGSUPCOM, the movement control system. This system would orchestrate the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies from unit areas through critical nodes. Convoys were armed between each node of the redeployment. Every convoy, including the positioning of material handling equipment (MHE) and transportation, required an armed escort and integration into the overall JTF-S and UNOSOM II movement control system. There were a limited number of rough terrain cargo handlers and chassis for containers. Troop transport required marshaling of truck assets prior to load times. Most convoys required augmentation with communications assets to conduct operations.

Clearance of Unit Areas

COMUSFORSOM appointed the Commandant for USLOGSUPCOM as the Theater Facility Clearance Officer. The U.S. Commander for each facility and base occupied by U.S. Forces was required to remove all U.S. property and clean the facility to U.S. standards. Included in this process was the legal transfer of any equipment or property to UNOSOM II. A crucial element of the clearance process was obtaining relief from accountability for theater property.

Ammunition Turn-in

Units had three types of ammunition to turn in. Unit Basic Loads (UBL), individual ammunition, and additional or special ammunition. Units retained their UBL until relieved of mission. Upon mission relief units turned in all ammunition except for individual ammunition required for personal protection until departure. Normally this was 90 rounds of 5.56 MM for rifles or 45 rounds of 9MM for pistols.

Equipment Wash-down

Units washed their vehicles and large equipment twice. Initially vehicles, except tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, were washed at the University Compound. Upon arrival in the Redeployment Support Area they were washed again for final inspection. After mid-January 1994, all vehicles were washed at
the seaport in the RSA. Vehicle wash-racks required coordination for availability of the racks themselves, high-pressure pumps, and water.

**Military Customs and Inspection Program**

USLOGSUPCOM and, eventually, 169th CSB supervised the execution of the MCIP by customs inspectors provided from first the 977th MP Co and then the 21st MP Co. Every piece of equipment was inspected for compliance with USDA regulations for entrance into the U.S.. This essentially prevented the transport of hazardous biological vectors into the U.S.. Each piece of equipment and every soldier’s baggage was inspected for compliance with U.S. Customs regulations to prevent transport of contraband or prohibited items into the U.S.. During the packing of every container, a customs inspector verified compliance in person.

**Equipment Staging Areas**

The RCC’s most complicated task was planning and executing the usage of the limited staging areas in the RSA. Equipment and containers had to be staged with the following considerations: pre-inspection by MCIP, staging for preparation for transportation including palletization for aircraft movement or “shrink-wrapping” of helicopters for sea movement, sterile (inspected and cordoned from contamination) staging prior to loading on ships or planes.

**Personnel Holding Area (PHA) for Air Transport**

Prior to departure by aircraft, either AMC channel mission from Mogadishu or after ferrying to Mombasa, soldiers not living in the RSA required a place to stay until departure. This facility served as a “call-forward” area for passenger operations and expedited the conduct of MCIP for personnel. The RCC coordinated the construction of 400 man PHA in the old Mogadishu Terminal building. The PHA provide hot meals, showers, and access to the PX and Post Office prior to departure.

The USFORSOM redeployment operations order directed the Commander, USLOGSUPCOM to accomplish the following tasks:

- Publish the Redeployment Standing Operations Procedures.
- Organize a Redeployment Support Battalion.

The Redeployment SOP provided the detailed instructions each unit or element required for processing through the critical nodes leading up to departure from theater. USLOGSUPCOM published the SOP on 10 December 1993. The RCC closely coordinated with USLOGSUPCOM in the SOP effort.

The organization of a Redeployment Support Battalion was originally envisioned by the J5 Planning Group as an ad hoc organization that would provide command and control for the following functions:

- Port Terminal Operations Seaport;
- Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group Airfield Operations;
- Military Customs and Inspections Program;
- Wash-down operations;
Inspections (Customs/USDA);
Personnel Operations;
Holding Area;
Personnel Manifesting.

The Commander, USLOGSUPCOM analyzed his mission taskings and decided that forming an ad hoc Headquarters from the former pocket staff was not feasible. The pocket staff was the collection of 35 members of the USLOGSUPCOM staff who were dual-hatted as the USFORSOM staff for COMUSFORSOM. With the activation of JTF-Somalia in October 1993, the pocket staff ceased to act as the higher headquarters for COMUSFORSOM. He then decided to rotate the 169th Corps Support Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas, with the 507th Corps Support Group in USLOGSUPCOM. The 169th CSB was then designated as the Redeployment Support Battalion. The 169th CSB arrived in theater in late December 1993.

Until the arrival of the 169th CSB, the RCC was used by U.S. Forces Somalia and the USLOGSUPCOM to provide command and control of Redeployment Support Activities. During the month of December 1993, the RCC oversaw the movement of over 4,500 personnel and 250,000 square feet of cargo. This effort successfully completed the NCA’s directive to drawdown the USLOGSUPCOM to 1400 personnel by 31 December 1993 and met the U.S. Central Command goal of only 5,000–6,000 soldiers remaining by the end of 1993.

At the end of December 1993, USLOGSUPCOM moved to the Redeployment Support Area (RSA). As a result, the redeployment systems were in place and the 169th CSB was providing command and control for the RSA. The J5 then directed the RCC to focus on “cargo generation” for sea transportation. This was made easier when U.S. Forces Somalia merged all the Headquarters and the RCC began working closely with the J3/Redeployment Section of JTF-Somalia. This provided the necessary information and staff coordination about when units could and would be released from their tactical withdrawal missions and then scheduled for a transportation date.

The RCC also coordinated the establishment of the system for ferrying personnel to Mombasa, Kenya. The RCC expanded the personnel processing system to include an extended, intermediate move from the point of origin: Mogadishu to the port of departure: Moi International Airport, Mombasa, Kenya.

The RCC was the USFORSOM liaison element with the Joint Movement Control Center of UNOSOM II. At first it appeared that the United States would provide “repatriation” assistance to many of the participating members of the coalition. This did not happen as most nations found their own transportation home. The RCC spent most of its time coordinating for the use of the airport and seaport because of the limited space at both facilities.

The Commander, U.S. Forces Somalia was guaranteed the use of one U.S. Fast Sealift Ship or RO-RO equivalent at the port in Mogadishu. This essentially took up two berthing spaces at the south pier. Because of the ferry operation and the fact that some nations used “stern-loading” ships which blocked access to the port for periods of time, the timing of U.S. ship and ferry arrivals and departures was critical. The RCC successfully coordinated all U.S. ship and ferry arrivals.

The “MOG” or “maximum-aircraft-on-the-ground” in Mogadishu was two “wide-body” or C5B equivalents at one time. From December 1993 through March 1994, the MOG required careful monitoring and coordination because of the following users:
• The UN operated Soviet-made transports (IL–76 and AN–12) flying from Nairobi, Kenya to Mogadishu;

• Irregularly scheduled commercial aircraft service existed between Mogadishu, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and Nairobi;

• Coalition nations used the international airport terminal for repatriation or arrival of contingents on “wide-body” commercial aircraft;

• Air Mobility Command flew a schedule of channel flights into Mogadishu along with a weekly Medical Evacuation Flight to Germany;

• The United States flew in various shipments of police equipment, tanks, helicopters, and supporting equipment for UNOSOM II.

On 1 February 1994, the J5 merged with the combined staffs of the former USLOGSUPCOM and JTF-Somalia. The RCC and its coordination functions were placed under the staff supervision of the J4, Logistics. The Strategic Mobility Planning Cell was reduced to only the JOPES team operating the WWMCCS terminal. The JOPES team was left under the J5’s supervision.

The merger of the staff essentially terminated the successful completion of the J5 Redeployment Planning Directorate’s mission. Under a single Chief of Staff, the functions of the J5 were spread throughout the JTF-S staff and integrated fully with the ground tactical operations, to include withdrawal and force protection. The J3 determined the priorities of lift by releasing units from missions, entering unit line numbers (ULN) into the TPFDD, and establishing ready to load dates. The J4 continued the RCC functions of planning, marshaling, and loading cargo and personnel. The JOPES team under the control of the J5 connected lift requirements with strategic lift assets. Finally, elements of the J5 served in TF Mombasa to supervise the ferry operations between Mogadishu and Mombasa.
# VOLUME II

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SOMALIA AFTER ACTION REVIEW PROCESS

PURPOSE

Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Somalia theater of operations in March 1994, the Army Chief of Staff directed that a formal review of U.S. participation in support of UNOSOM II be conducted. The purpose of the review was to examine the chronology of the U.S. military mission to Somalia, to record the history of the operation, identify appropriate lessons learned, record observations, and recommend applicable solutions.

The conclusions and lessons learned presented in this portion of the report represent the results of discussions and general consensus of the Somalia After Action Review Committee, which completed its work in June 1994. It does not, however, reflect the official positions of the agencies the participants represented.

THE SOMALIA AFTER ACTION REVIEW COMMITTEE

In May 1994, representatives from seventeen agencies and activities met at the Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania to begin the formal review process. Participants included former members of USFORSOM and UNOSOM II, representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Joint Staff, Department of the Army, U.S. Central Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Forces Command; U.S. Special Operations Command, First Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF), and Amphibious Squadron 3 (PHIBRON 3). Collectively this group was referred to as the Somalia After Action Review (SAAR) Committee.

STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW

The Somalia After Action Review Committee was organized into three panels. The first addressed U.S. and UN policy, mandate issues, and implications. The second addressed command and control of U.S. forces participating in Chapter VII peace enforcement operations. The third addressed U.S. title X implications resulting from the Somalia operation.

The intent of the review was to produce a comprehensive product organized into several supporting volumes and independent briefings. These products were to be made available for broad review and distribution consistent with security classification limitations. Information was gathered through a review of official USFORSOM and UNOSOM II records, discussions held within each panel, comments from plenary sessions and interviews conducted with key senior personnel from the agencies and activities represented. All information was gathered on a non-attribution basis.

PANEL I— U.S. and UN POLICY AMD MANDATE ISSUES

The primary focus of Panel I was to examine policy issues associated with U.S. force participation in UNOSOM II. Specific emphasis was directed to the role of the UN in peace enforcement operations. Discussions included the process of developing and supporting UN mandates, the criteria to commit U.S. forces to peace enforcement operations, the strategic shift from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, civil direction of UNOSOM II, sustaining the coalition (with special emphasis on force contribution to mission cohe-
sion) and the effects of parallel lines of authority. As a result of their deliberations, Panel I identified seven policy issues for presentation in Volume II.

**PANEL II—COMMAND AND CONTROL OF U.S. FORCES PARTICIPATING IN CHAPTER VII PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS**

The primary focus of Panel II was to examine the command and control structure required for U.S. forces participating in peace enforcement operations. They reviewed the structure used in the Somalia theater of operations during the period of U.S. involvement and recommended alternative U.S. command and control structures for future peace enforcement operations. Specific emphasis was placed on coalition building and achieving operational clarity. Discussions included the effects UN mandates had on UNOSOM II operations regarding command and control and translating those UN mandates into military objectives. They examined the inter-relationships of political, humanitarian and military dimensions of peace operations, resourcing peace operations, the media’s impact on command and control and the evolution of political objectives. Additionally, the panel discussed the current UN command and control structure, and presented possible steps for consideration which could enhance the U.N.’s ability to command and control future peace enforcement operations.

**PANEL III—U.S. TITLE X IMPLICATIONS RESULTING FROM THE SOMALIA ACTION**

The primary focus of Panel III was to examine the Somalia action and determine any impact on the legal responsibilities and relationships for the Department of Defense or other federal agencies. Specific emphasis was placed on the departmental responsibilities to recruit, organize, supply, equip, train, mobilize, demobilize, and maintain the armed forces. Panel III included members from both Panels I and II and key combat, combat support, and combat service support commanders who executed the mission. As a result of their deliberations, eighteen issues were developed and are presented in this report.

**VOLUME II PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION**

**PURPOSE**

This volume of the USFORSOM After Action Report captures the lessons learned, observations and recommendations of the Somalia After Action Review Committee. They were drawn from a review of official USFORSOM and UNOSOM II records, discussions within each panel, comments from plenary sessions, and interviews with key senior personnel from the agencies or activities represented. The conclusions and lessons learned presented here represent the consensus of the committee.

**ORGANIZATION**

Volume II consists of this introduction and two chapters. *Chapter One* presents the lessons learned from USFORSOM’s experience in the first UN authorized chapter VII operation. Recommendations and observations presented address lessons learned in the areas of: U.S. and UN policy; U.S. and UN command and control; U.S. manning and support of UN staffs, title X issues, UN staff training and operating procedures, operations, intelligence, logistics, medical support, public affairs, and redeployment. *Chapter Two* is the summary and conclusion. It provides the USFORSOM After Action Report with a summary of the major lessons learned and a discussion of the implications of U.S. and UN participation in future Chapter VII operations.
CHAPTER I
LESSONS LEARNED

Policy

1. LESSON: The United Nations must organize itself properly to prepare and lead a coalition Chapter VII operation.

DISCUSSION: The collapse of central authority in Somalia, a lingering civil war, and the effects on the Somali people of widespread displacement and starvation presented new and unfamiliar challenges to the United Nations whose previous experience had been limited to Chapter VI operations. The establishment and management of a Chapter VII coalition force representing 28 nations highlighted significant deficiencies in procedures and structures developed during nearly forty years of Chapter VI operations. The civilian component of the UN operation, never fully staffed, was unable to provide the effective, integrated humanitarian, political, and security direction required for success in peace enforcement operations. On the administrative side, the elaborate procedures developed over time to support Chapter VI operations proved to be unsuitable for the demands of fast-moving political, economic (humanitarian) and military operations in a frequently hostile Chapter VII environment.

Peace enforcement operations, such as Somalia, remind us that the UN is not a sovereign nation. The Secretary-General serves the Security Council; he may have his own agenda, but he must first achieve consensus and then obtain a mandate before he can act. He has no direct control over the activities of UN specialized agencies, a situation that inhibits establishing unity of effort and command and control as understood by the U.S. Lacking authority to establish policies and to direct UN agencies in country, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) must, therefore, serve at various times as head of mission, administrator, international fund-raiser, and negotiator with donor nations and international developmental and relief agencies.

The deficiencies of the UN’s organizational culture and bureaucratic processes are most apparent in the coordination of military operations. At the highest level, United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) are mandates that represent a consensus of participating Security Council members. UNSCRs, by their very nature, require significant interpretation before their broad statements of purpose yield military objectives and conditions for determining an end state for the intervention. Contributing nations subsequently negotiate their participation in UN operations bilaterally with the United Nations. The UN invariably compromises on mandate provisions and individual member states’ participation, equipping, and missions. All member nations - not just the U.S. - are notably reluctant to grant UN force commanders full authority over national military contingents. Each of these intrinsic problem areas affected the Somalia operation.

There are also deficiencies in the UN headquarters structure itself that inhibit its ability to manage the many competing demands of a Chapter VII operation. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25 provides initiatives which would substantially improve the UN’s capability to conduct Chapter VII missions in the future. The initiatives are directed at methods to strengthen UN management; they direct U.S. support for strengthening the UN’s planning, logistics, information, and command and control capabilities. The U.S. should continue to examine and identify impediments to UN reform, recommend solutions, and act in concert with like-minded nations to eliminate them. The U.S. should still selectively contribute unique capabilities to UN led Chapter VI operations to enhance their probability for success and to broaden the experience base of the U.S. military in UN peace operations. Such a policy will help to ensure that the U.S. remains an active participant in the development and refinement of multi-national
peace operation doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, until the essential Presidential Decision Directive-25 initiatives are adopted by the UN leadership, the U.S. should limit its participation in Chapter VII operations to U.S. led coalitions (i.e., UNITAF and DESERT SHIELD/STORM) or to participation with competent regional organizations such as NATO.

There is no substitute in Chapter VII operations for strong and imaginative leadership by both the designated Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Force Commander. Therefore, U.S. participation in the identification and designation of the SRSG and senior military leadership is an essential step to create conditions for success. There may be situations where the U.S. government wants to provide one or both of the senior leaders in a Chapter VII operation to underscore U.S. commitment. However, each circumstance and mission is unique. Appointment of both a prominent U.S. civilian and a senior military officer to lead a peace enforcement operation could create the perception that the U.S. alone is calling the shots. This perception could adversely affect the spirit of cooperation among the various national military components.

**OBSERVATION:** The most important lesson of Operation CONTINUE HOPE is that the United Nations is not properly constituted to lead a coalition Chapter VII intervention at this time. It is arguable whether sufficient reforms can be achieved to allow it to do so in any mode other than through a lead nation or established alliance. For the immediate future, Chapter VII operations sanctioned and funded by the UN should be led by a single nation or an established military alliance. DESERT SHIELD/STORM may be a model for such interventions.

The Security Council should provide mandates with clearly defined, realistic political and military objectives, an achievable end state, and a viable exit or hand-off strategy. It should then designate a nation or alliance to lead the operation. The Secretary General with his staff should work to gain international consensus for the operation and solicit national contributions. The lead nation or alliance should execute the mission, frequently reporting progress in the achievement of mandate objectives and tasks to the Security Council. In such single nation or alliance led operations, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) should act as a liaison between the lead nation or the alliance and the UN to coordinate support from UN agencies and identify impediments to that support.

**2. LESSON:** UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) directing Chapter VII operations must clearly define realistic political and military objectives, an achievable end state and a viable exit or hand-off strategy.

**DISCUSSION:** Neither UNSCR 794 nor 814 clearly defined realistic objectives and an achievable end state for the military in Somalia. This was particularly true with respect to disarming of the warring factions and dealing with the warlords. UNITAF, operating under UNSCR 794, did not view disarming the factions as a part of its mission. This was a major issue with the Secretary General and was one of the principal reasons for his hesitation to actively participate in the handover from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. UNSCR 814 tasked UNOSOM II to disarm the factions and clans, but was unclear on the issue of coercive disarmament. UNSCR 814 also failed to clearly define what was to be done with the warlords. From the outset, Aideed had indicated his opposition to UN intervention in Somalia. His refusal to share power with others after the overthrow of the dictator Siad Barre was one of the key factors which had plunged Somalia into civil war. Yet, neither UNSCR 814 nor 794 provided clear guidance regarding what the UN wanted to do about those warlords who directly opposed the intervention.

UNSCR 837 also failed to define realistic objectives and in fact expanded the role of UNOSOM II. While it directed UNOSOM II to arrest and detain those responsible for the 5 June killing of UN peacekeepers, it did not directly address actions to be taken regarding Aideed and other recalcitrant warlords.
UNSCR 794 failed to identify an exit or handover strategy from UNITAF to UNOSOM but merely requested “the Secretary General to submit a plan ... within 15 days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfill its mandate upon withdrawal of the unified command.” By not defining an end state and time line in the UNSCR, it allowed the UN Secretary General to recommend on 19 December 1992 that the Council defer its decision on a transition back to UNOSOM until it became clear whether UNITAF had achieved its goals. This began a series of delays by the Secretary General that may have been detrimental to the transition process in the long term. If a strategy and approximate time line for transition had been established in UNSCR 794, the UN and world community may have begun active recruitment from potential troop contributing nations as well as begun staffing upgrades for both the civilian and military UNOSOM staffs. Despite active recruiting efforts by UNITAF through the U.S. government, potential donor nations deferred decisions on participation until the publication and review of UNSCR 814 in March 1993. This resulted in critical shortfalls in UNOSOM manning well beyond transition in May.

UNSCR 814 also failed to identify a clear exit strategy for the UN. While the Secretary General’s report to the Security Council on 3 March 1993 defined a four-phased operation in Somalia, it failed to define an approximate time line for accomplishing the measurable political, military, and economic (humanitarian) goals.

**OBSERVATION:** The Security Council should clearly outline its intent, objectives, and end state conditions in resolutions directing Chapter VII operations. UNDPKO should develop and provide clear political, military, and economic (humanitarian) objectives for the Head of Mission and Force Commander based on the mandate outlined in the Security Council Resolution. UNDPKO must also define a clear exit or hand-off strategy, as appropriate. UNDPKO is currently too understaffed to effectively perform this function. The U.S. should consider assisting UNNY in the outline of the intent, objectives, and end state conditions in new resolutions involving peace operations.

**3. LESSON:** To accomplish mandate objectives, a Chapter VII operation requires a single integrated theater strategy that links the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power in a coherent approach that establishes unity of effort.

**DISCUSSION:** The confrontation with the USC/SNA was partly attributable to the lack of a coordinated over-arching theater level strategy that integrated the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power in Somalia. Political, humanitarian, and military strategies were developed independently. There was no senior-level strategy group charged with developing a coherent, integrated approach to operations in Somalia that encompassed the entire mission.

While UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali assigned responsibility for executing the UNOSOM mandate to his Special Representative (SRSG), the SRSG had very little or no authority over many of the component UN agencies whose help he required. Furthermore, it seemed Boutros Boutros Ghali was himself in many cases equally powerless to make demands on these agencies. As a result, there were major disconnects in terms of both strategy and operations.

The political strategy for Somalia was exceedingly ambitious and did not take into account the limitations of the military and humanitarian divisions. The military strategy for expansion was tied to the ability of Force Command to generate and sustain combat power throughout the theater of operations, including economy of force operations in those areas already considered stable and secure. This strategy was clearly dependent on complementary political and humanitarian strategies. The political strategy should have focused on the development of district and regional councils in those areas where the military was exercising its economy of force operations. This objective would have supported an orderly transition to local institutions especially the police force, and release military forces for expansion. The political strategy should have developed political initiatives in support of
proposed military expansion into the central and northeast regions of Somalia on a time line consistent with projected military deployments.

An attempt was made to develop a long range humanitarian strategy, but it failed to take root or develop due to two principal reasons: lack of proper staffing within the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II, and the unstable situation in Mogadishu. As a result, the humanitarian development effort sought short-term immediate effect solutions, which did not always complement or support political and military efforts.

A successful humanitarian strategy would have focused appropriate resources to create and promote selected social institutions and infrastructure in those areas targeted by the political and military strategies. Unfortunately, the Humanitarian Division had little or no control over resources to support any strategy. This was due to the stovepipe organizational structure and apparent autonomy of UN developmental and relief agencies and those nongovernmental relief organizations (NGOs) which controlled humanitarian resources. This severely limited the ability of the SRSG to focus relief and development resources where they could have the most effect in support of political and military initiatives in response to the UNSCR.

Finally, UNOSOM II failed to develop an effective informational strategy to explain its activities and operations to the Somalis, the contributing nations, other UN agencies, NGOs, and outside observers, especially the news media.

**OBSERVATION:** To accomplish mandate objectives, a Chapter VII operation requires a single integrated theater strategy that links the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power in a coherent approach that establishes unity of effort. The SRSG, assisted by senior civilian and military staff members, should be responsible for developing and overseeing the execution of an integrated theater strategy for the Chapter VII operation. Senior staff members assigned this task must be identified and brought together as early in the process as possible.

The strategy should focus on and integrate the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power. This over-arching strategy is the basis for developing and supporting individual political, economic (humanitarian), and military strategies and operational plans. The SRSG should have the requisite authority to establish priorities for and task UN agencies. This is not possible given the current structure of the UN. Therefore to achieve unity of effort in executing an integrated strategy, the SRSG must emphasize a consensus and team building approach among UN developmental and relief agencies. At an early stage in the process of developing the theater strategy, those UN developmental and relief agencies and NGOs considered most appropriate to meeting strategic requirements should be actively drawn into consultation. At the discretion of the SRSG their inputs should be acknowledged and, to the extent possible, incorporated into the final theater strategy.

**4. LESSON:** The inter-agency decision process for UN Security Council resolutions that results in commitment of U.S. forces must ensure that resolutions clearly define realistic political and military objectives, an achievable end state and a viable exit or hand-off strategy.

**DISCUSSION:** The primarily humanitarian focus of the mission in Somalia, as defined by UNSCR 794, was transformed into a broader mission by UNSCR 814, with full inter-agency approval. According to policy level authorities, the inter-agency participants recognized that the objectives of SCR 814 were more demanding than those of SCR 794. However, given the experience of UNITAF and the anticipated resources being offered by member states, coupled with the relatively benign environment at the time, interagency participants believed that the mission was appropriately resourced and recommended approval of SCR 814.
The most striking difference in end states was UNOSOM II’s mission to prevent the resumption of violence and to disarm the militia and political factions. In retrospect, this fundamental difference and its more ambitious implications were not clear to contributing nations. Clearly, given the differences in military capability between UNITAF and UNOSOM II, the more demanding, potentially explosive mission was given to the less capable force.

UNOSOM II’s expanded mission can be traced, in part, to a fundamental disagreement between the UN Secretary General and the United States over the scope of UNITAF’s mandate. This disagreement, voiced in an exchange of letters between Boutros Boutros-Ghali and President Bush in December 1992, focused on two key issues: disarmament and geographic coverage. With regard to disarmament, Boutros Boutros-Ghali believed the U.S. led UNITAF coalition must undertake comprehensive, and if necessary forcible, disarmament in Somalia. Otherwise, the initiative could be lost to the warlords, and the mission would be much more difficult for follow-on UN forces. The United States, by contrast, insisted on keeping UNITAF’s mission narrowly defined to humanitarian relief and to pursue disarmament “as necessary” for force protection and to accomplish its primary mission of securing the delivery of humanitarian relief. UNITAF never had comprehensive disarmament as a military objective.

On the question of geographic scope, Boutros Boutros-Ghali wanted UNITAF operations to cover all of Somalia. By contrast, the United States believed that UNITAF, in keeping with its mission to secure humanitarian relief, should focus only on southern and central Somalia—the main areas of famine. Although apparently fully supportive of the broader mandate, the U.S. more restrictive interpretation of UNITAF’s mission left much for the UN to accomplish with UNOSOM II.

The United States voted to approve UNOSOM II’s mandate, knowing that the objectives in UNSCR 814 would be difficult to achieve. The U.S., believing that a benign environment would continue to exist, expected the UN to be able to obtain and tailor forces for this enhanced mission. Some participants may have believed the objectives were achievable over time assuming that a benign environment would continue to exist. Participants in the U.S. inter-agency process reportedly believed that the U.S. role in UNOSOM II could be limited and short-term; taking a supporting rather than a leadership role. The U.S. government viewed these objectives as UN objectives for which the U.S. would not necessarily be responsible. There was no reassessment of the policy to marginalize the warlords given the nation building nature of UNOSOM II’s mission. UNSCR 814 tasked UNOSOM II to disarm the factions and clans, but was ambiguous on the issue of coercive disarmament. From the outset, Aideed had indicated his opposition to UN intervention in Somalia. His refusal to share power with others after the overthrow of the dictator Siad Barre was one of the key factors which plunged Somalia into civil war. Yet the UN provided no clear guidance regarding what it wanted to do about those warlords who directly opposed UN intervention. Despite this omission, the U.S. apparently wanted the resolution passed as quickly as possible so that the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II could be concluded, and the majority of U.S. troops could be withdrawn from Somalia.

**OBSERVATION:** The inter-agency process must produce suitable criteria for determining when the U.S. should support or participate in a UN peace operation. These criteria should be weighed in deciding our votes on UN Security Council Resolutions. At a minimum, the decision process must be based on a clear analysis and related assessment of the root causes and dynamics of the situation as well as the requirements for a successful operation. From this assessment, clear and achievable objectives based on an integrated strategy linking the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power must be identified. This analysis must identify an achievable end state and a viable exit or hand-off strategy.

**5. LESSON:** Inter-agency crisis response cells must be developed and manned during any peace operation where U.S. forces are deployed in a possible combat environment. There was no standing inter-agency response cell for Somalia from May through August.
DISCUSSION: After transition to UNOSOM II, the operation appeared to drop in priority within the U.S. government. Further, after 17 June, it also appeared increasingly difficult for COMUSFORSOM to employ U.S. resources as he deemed necessary in order either to accomplish the U.S. and UN goals or to respond to emergencies when they arose.

In May 1993, the UN asserted control over the various institutions established during the period of UNITAF’s narrow mandate with the intention of redirecting them for longer-term goals. Little appreciated at the time were the frenzied efforts of certain local communal/military leaders to husband their resources for an eventual confrontation with UNOSOM II. When the 5 June attacks occurred, everybody was caught by surprise. In Washington, there was no standing crisis response cell available to provide advice on a full range of options to execute the proposed resolution or that considered the military and political implications of various options. The UNITAF response cell had disbanded after transition. The rush to approve and implement UNSCR 837 would have benefited from the existence of a high-level crisis cell that could have provided a full range of options to execute the proposed resolution and considered the military and political implications of each option.

OBSERVATION: For each Chapter VII operation or other peace operation where U.S. lives may be at risk or whenever the potential for combat exists, a U.S. government focal point should be maintained throughout the life of the operation. When there is a hand-off from a U.S. coalition to a UN led operation, there would seem to be a need for a built-in lag of several months before the various specialized response cells in the U.S. Government are disbanded. This does not mean that such cells must remain fully-manned, but the interagency expertise of the U.S. Government should not be dissipated too early for any reason.

6. LESSON: The UN needs an oversight system which can report back to the UN Security Council on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution mandates.

DISCUSSION: There is no system or mechanism of checks and balances for holding the UN staff accountable for implementing UNSCRs. There appears to be no apparent independent audit agency or capability to monitor the distribution of funds or execution of policy and programs in theater. In addition, senior UN officials may implement UNSCRs at a pace that is not consistent with the desires of the contributing nations who likely proposed the UNSCRs in the first place. Policy manipulation of this nature was evident in the efforts to re-establish the police force in Somalia.

The establishment of a functioning police force was recognized as essential to the stability of Somalia as early as November 1992. Debate began on the most effective way to re-establish the force; there was international dialog seeking assistance to rebuild the system. In May 93 UNOSOM II outlined their staffing requirements and identified 156 billets to man a justice division capable of rebuilding the Somali judicial system. In August 93 UNDPKO distributed to the international community a draft plan for the reestablishment of the judicial system and requested their input on capability to support the plan. On 22 September 1993 the Security Council, in resolution 865, approved the Secretary-General’s plan for the re-establishment of the Somali Police, Judicial and Penal systems.

Despite considerable study, effort, and diplomatic demarches none of the 156 approved UNOSOM staff positions were filled. Following an effort lasting several weeks to assist the UN to move this process along, representatives from OSD and DOS asked a senior UN official why the manning of the police advisors was so difficult, especially given the relative successes in other PKO missions. The response was that there was a policy decision by UNDPKO not to move the justice development process forward until the political process in Somalia was farther along. No consultation had been made on this decision and the SRSG, to our knowledge, was not informed about the decision. To stave off international pressure a Director for Justice was hired and a Senior Police Advisor was identified. They were deployed to Somalia in November 93 only to find that they had no staff, and no resources.
Letters from UNDPKO to the international community formally requesting police advisors were not sent until 17 January 1994, four months after the UNSCR calling for the program to be established and in excess of 12 months after identifying an urgent need. Prompt responses were received and the first of the advisors began arriving within 6 weeks of the request.

This appears to be an example of a UN department, not accountable to any authority, making policy decisions that contradict the will of the Security Council and donor nations.

**OBSERVATION:** The United Nations needs a mechanism, such as an Inspector General who answers directly to the Security Council, to oversee implementation of UNSCRs, audit the expenditure of the world’s financial contributions to the UN, and investigate complaints from contributing nations.

The U.S. government should also insist on a timely review by the Secretary General of the various mission areas in any UNSCR that is tied to an assessment of objective accomplishment of tasks listed in the resolution. An Inspector General or independent audit agency that reports directly to the Security Council would be beneficial to ensure that the views of the force commander are included in such reviews.

**7. LESSON:** The United Nations (UN) lacks the capability to adequately resource Chapter VII operations.

**DISCUSSION:** The UN has no standing military force or equipment reserves to draw from to resource Chapter VII operations. Therefore, the UN must identify its requirements and request force and equipment contributions from member states. Consequently, the force provided is not always suitable for the mission, nor is it available for deployment when the situation or mission requires it. In addition, although the UN does outline the minimum force capability and equipment requirements, contributing nations do not always possess the national resources to meet the guidelines.

These systemic shortcomings were particularly apparent in Somalia. Although many nations were forthcoming with infantry type forces, few were willing to provide the logistics and engineer forces so key to success in an austere environment like Somalia. In addition, a number of the units deployed to Somalia were not equipped in accordance with UN guidelines. This further exacerbated the problems associated with the shortage of logistics and engineer forces in theater.

The UN also could not get donor nations to deploy forces pledged to Somalia in a timely manner. Traditional bureaucratic processes used to contract for troop movements and political concerns among contributing nations often delayed the deployment of critically needed forces. When combat operations began on 5 June, 18,000 of the required 28,000 soldiers requested to support UNOSOM II were in Somalia. The 3000 man U.S. Logistics Support Command, with one engineer company, was the only logistics unit in theater. This shortfall forced UNOSOM II to accept a security risk in Mogadishu, and made expansion out of the question. The increasingly dangerous situation in Somalia after 5 June further delayed the deployment of pledged forces as contributing nations took a “wait and see” approach to the UN request. UNOSOM II did not reach full strength until mid October. This situation, however, was short lived as the French and the Belgians withdrew in December 1993; followed by the U.S., Italy, Germany, and Korea in March 1994.

**OBSERVATION:** The United Nations should ensure that troop and supply requirements are adequately resourced at the start of Chapter VII operations. The UN currently and for the foreseeable future will lack the authority and capability to adequately resource Chapter VII operations. Therefore, the United Nations should seek out a single nation or alliance capable of meeting troop and other resource requirements to lead UN sanctioned Chapter VII interventions.
Any United Nations request for forces to supplement a single nation or alliance led Chapter VII intervention, or any operation led by a coalition should indicate the specific types of forces and capabilities required. Forces should not be accepted for Chapter VII operations if they do not meet the theater requirements, nor should they be deployed into the theater improperly equipped. The U.S. can assist the UN in acquiring the capabilities and expertise to establish such standards. In addition, provisions should be established to assist nations that want to participate but cannot meet the minimum UN guidelines for deploying forces.

**Command and Control**

**UN Command and Control**

1. **LESSON:** There should be a process or mechanism established to develop, gain, and sustain consensus in the international community—especially with force contributing nations—on the military, political, and humanitarian objectives and tasks to be undertaken by the Force Command.

**DISCUSSION:** The Force Commander received strategic guidance from the Security Council through the Secretary General or Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping and the SRSG. As a result, the Force Headquarters simultaneously served as a strategic and operational planning headquarters for Somalia. Force Command reviewed, analyzed, and converted UNSCRs outlining grand strategy into strategic and operational objectives for the theater. There was no formal process created by the Secretary General or the Security Council to review the strategic and operational direction of UN forces in Somalia. Nor was there a mechanism to gain political and military consensus from participating nations on the strategic direction of the mission in Somalia. Consequently, when national interests conflicted with operations in Somalia or raised national concerns, governments intervened directly through their contingent force commanders. This created a unity of command problem within the Force and often paralyzed military operations.

**OBSERVATION:** UNDPKO should create a mechanism in UNNY to review the strategic and operational direction of Chapter VII operations and of peace operations where combat is possible. This mechanism could be in the form of a standing or consulting political - military committee that meets periodically to review all initiatives and progress, especially when there is a major shift in strategic direction. This committee must be able to expeditiously resolve concerns of participating nations regarding the direction of operations or employment of their forces. It could also serve to obtain their views on the strategy.

2. **LESSON:** Parallel lines of authority and communication among UN forces and their respective national authorities caused command and control problems that were not fully anticipated by the UN Force Command in Somalia.

**DISCUSSION:** Coalition cohesion must be gained and sustained throughout any UN Chapter VII operation. This requires revalidating consensus whenever there is a major change in mission or operational direction. The rapid approval of UNSCR 837 did not allow for a thorough consultation with contributing nations at UNNY.

UNSCR 837 was adopted by the Security Council on 6 June 1993 in response to the ambush of UN peacekeepers on 5 June. The resolution marked a major shift in the mission and operational direction of UNOSOM II. First, it reaffirmed the direction and authority given the Secretary General and UNOSOM II in UNSCR 814. It further called for the investigation, arrest and detention of those responsible for the attack, as well as the neutralization of the radio broadcast systems (Radio Aided) that contributed to the violence. This resolution set UNOSOM II on a more offensive course in response to activity of the USC/SNA militia. At this point UNOSOM II was compelled to act, having the effect of voiding its neutrality with regard to the attacking militia.
The offensive operations undertaken by UNOSOM II under the expanded mandate of UNSCR 837 were in stark contrast to those anticipated when UNSCR 814 was passed by the Security Council. UNOSOM II focused now on attacking USC/SNA militia command and control centers, and weapons and ammunition caches. As violence increased and casualties began to mount, some members of the coalition began to question the course being taken by UNOSOM II. A few contingent commanders found it necessary to consult with their national command authorities before executing the orders of the force commander in the field. Some coalition partners apparently became concerned that they were being pulled into a guerilla war without political consultation and their willing support.

In Somalia, these concerns translated into a loss of momentum, as some contingent commanders sought the approval of their national command authorities before executing the orders of the force commander. In addition, it created a unity of effort problem coalition partners debated both in New York and in Somalia over the course of UNOSOM II.

**OBSERVATION:** In any future Chapter VII operation, the existence of parallel lines of authority will be a reality for the force commander and should be anticipated. This condition underscores the importance of defining clear, achievable objectives and tasks in designing a UN mandate. It also emphasizes the importance of developing and sustaining consensus on a coordinated strategy among contributing nations prior to deployment of their forces to the theater of operations. It further highlights the risks to consensus posed by hasty course changes that prevent thorough policy assessment, mission analysis, and revalidation of a consensus among the coalition.

This consensus building process should not limit the Force Commander’s discretionary authority to take necessary measures, to include offensive operations, to protect UN forces when threatened.

**3. LESSON:** Command authority of the Force Commander must be understood and accepted by all participating coalition national authorities prior to deployment of contingents.

**DISCUSSION:** In UNOSOM II, many Force Commander directives providing operational missions to contingent forces were referred to national authorities by the contingent commander. In June 1993, the French and Moroccan commanders refused operational missions in Mogadishu after the attack on the Aideed enclave. In July 1993, the Italian commander refused to execute offensive operations in Mogadishu and reverted to a Chapter VI status. In September, the Zimbabwe force commander refused to deploy his forces to Mogadishu as did the Indian brigade commander in that same month. In each instance, the matter had to be referred for resolution through diplomatic channels between UNNY and the respective national authority.

**OBSERVATION:** The United Nations must identify and adequately define in writing the terms of the force commander’s authority. Participating nations should accept the terms of the Force Commander’s authority prior to deployment into the mission area. It must in every case provide him the flexibility to task organize smaller contingents into major force formations.

**4. LESSON:** Until standard command and support relationships are developed by the UN, sufficient time must be built into the planning process to permit negotiation and consensus building between the various forces.

**DISCUSSION:** U.S. doctrinal command and support relationships do not apply when task organizing coalition forces (e.g. attached, OPCON, TACON). The majority of coalition forces are not familiar with U.S. doctrinal concepts on command and support relationships, and those forces that are may not agree to them. In practice, coalition forces prefer to work “in conjunction with” or “in support of” other coalition forces. Issues of national sovereignty and historical relationships between contingents must also be considered when establishing coalition command relationships. Consequently, task organizing the force
requires time for consensus building as coalition forces negotiate suitable “work” relationships. This additional time must be anticipated and allotted by operational and tactical planners. Until standard command and support relationships that are both understood and accepted by coalition forces are developed by the UN, this issue will remain a constant source of friction for UN military commanders and staff officers.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The U.S. should work closely with the UN to develop standard command and support relationships that are understood and accepted by contributing nations.

**U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL**

1. **LESSON:** Senior U.S. policy makers and military leaders must ensure that guidance and instructions in UN mandates and orders, U.S. terms of reference and memorandums of understanding, and the political and commander’s intent provided to U.S. forces committed in peace operations are unambiguous and mutually supporting.

**DISCUSSION:** Differences between interpretations of the U.S. Terms of Reference (TOR), the UNSCR mandates, mission statements, and commander’s intent among senior policy makers and military leaders created some friction and complicated command and control of U.S. forces in theater. The terms of reference (TOR) provided USFORSOM with clear guidance for the employment limits of the forces originally assigned to Somalia. Initial broad guidance to COMUSFORSOM, before he deployed, was to 1) do what you can to ensure that the UN is successful, 2) limit the visibility and role of U.S. forces in order to transfer functions to the other UN forces. This guidance, although initially consistent with the TOR and the UN Mandate (UNSCR 814), proved inherently incompatible over time.

The tactical situation in Somalia changed dramatically in June 1993. UNSCR 837, adopted on 6 June 1993, expanded the mission and significantly altered the course of UNOSOM II. The resolution called for UNOSOM II to arrest and detain those responsible for ambushing the Pakistanis on 5 June, and to neutralize the radio broadcast systems (Radio Aided) used to help incite the violence. U.S. policy level leaders strongly supported this expanded mission, and worked for its adoption.

UNSCR 837 prompted UNOSOM II to take a more aggressive approach to operations in Mogadishu, and opened the way for offensive combat operations directed against the USC/SNA militia. This change in the nature of the mission made it virtually impossible, after 5 June, to meet previous U.S. guidance. The QRF aviation battalion provided UNOSOM's only attack helicopter and general air support capability. This made it an indispensable part of any UNOSOM II coalition operation. Furthermore, as violence and the direct threat to U.S. forces increased, COMUSFORSOM was authorized to use the infantry battalion to conduct patrols in the immediate area of U.S. facilities and to secure the U.S. supply route (by-pass route) in order to adequately protect the force. The importance of the QRF to ensure UN mission success, and the active posture it had to assume to protect U.S. forces after 5 June, made it impossible to simultaneously provide the requested support and limit the U.S. visibility.

In a more benign environment, perhaps the guidance could have been followed. The situation in Mogadishu, however, was certainly not benign, and open combat in the capital city appeared to unhinge U.S. policy in Somalia. This situation was exacerbated by the UNNY bureaucracy and its inability to replace U.S. capabilities.

**OBSERVATION:** The inter-agency process and national command authorities must do a thorough mission analysis and provide clear military goals and objectives consistent with the intended U.S. role and UN mandate. Should the situation on the ground change, a standing interagency cell must thoroughly review and revalidate the U.S. military role, including its goals, objectives and force structure.
2. LESSON: Contradictions between published command relationships and those intended and practiced clouded the lines of command and control among U.S. forces.

DISCUSSION: Differences between the command relationships outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR) and those actually practiced in Somalia created confusion and at times friction among U.S. staffs. Command relationships established for U.S. forces in the TOR modified standard command relationships as outlined in Joint Pub 1-02.

The Commander of U.S. forces in Somalia (COMUSFORSOM) was also the UN Deputy Force Commander (DFC). He was given operational control (OPCON) of the U.S. Logistics Support Command, also known as UN Logistics Support Command (UNLSC), and of the members of the U.S. contingent serving on the UNOSOM II staff. On the other hand, as outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR), the U.S. Quick Reaction Force was designated OPCON to CINCCENT, and TACON (tactical control) to COMUSFORSOM for specific missions and operations. This command relationship was not in accord with standard practices.

Joint Pub 1-02 states that the CINC has inherent operational control of U.S. forces in his theater, as the combatant commander. This gives him “the authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.” Normally, the combatant commander exercises OPCON “through the commanders of subordinate organizations.” TACON, defined as “the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned”, is a much more restrictive relationship.

The published non-standard command relationship established for the QRF was not implemented in practice. CINCCENT actually exercised OPCON of all U.S. forces, to include the QRF, through COMUSFORSOM, as outlined in the TOR. Missions for U.S. forces exceeding those outlined in the TOR had to be approved by CINCCENT before execution. Although the command relationships actually practiced in Somalia were in line with Joint Pub 1-02, the contradiction between what was in writing (the TOR), and what was executed clouded lines of control, and in the last phase of the operation created friction within the command.

In October 1993, CENTCOM provided a JTF headquarters and commander to relieve COMUSFORSOM and U.S. members of the UNOSOM II staff of the burden of tactical command and control of U.S. combat forces. On arrival, Commander, Joint Task Force Somalia (COMJTFSOM) assumed OPCON of the QRF and all ground combat elements deployed ashore. The UNLSC and U.S. members of the UNOSOM II staff remained OPCON to COMUSFORSOM. Like the QRF, JTFSOM was OPCON to CINCCENT and TACON to COMUSFORSOM IAW the TOR. However, the CINC’s intent to continue to actually exercise OPCON of all U.S. forces through COMUSFORSOM may not have been clearly understood. JTFSOM initially operated as if OPCON directly to CINCCENT. This gave the appearance of parallel lines of command and control especially at the staff level.

OBSERVATION: Standard command relationships are appropriate for U.S. forces involved in coalition led Chapter VII operations. Terms of Reference, similar to those used in Somalia, can limit the roles and employment options for use of U.S. forces to ensure that the CINC or other appropriate U.S. military authority retains command.

Non-standard command relationships can lead to confusion and should be avoided. However, if they must be developed and published, then they should be followed in practice.

3. LESSON: The U.S. forces command and control structure must be tailored, staffed, and equipped to command and control U.S. forces committed to Chapter VII operations.
DISCUSSION: The USFORSOM staff was not sufficiently robust to effectively command and control U.S. forces committed in Somalia. CENTCOM resourced an ad hoc “pocket staff” in lieu of an appropriately sized JTF staff to provide administrative and operational control of U.S. forces in Somalia. Given the short term U.S. commitment envisioned, and the intent to maintain a low U.S. signature, the pocket staff was deemed adequate.

Forty-two U.S. personnel were grafted to the Logistics Support Command staff to perform this function. CENTCOM intended to provide this staff to COMUSFORSOM from the outset. However, it was not formed until late June/early July 1993. By that time, combat operations in Somalia were already well underway and operational lines of control for the QRF had become firmly established. With no other staff available, COMUSFORSOM exercised command and control of the QRF through the Force Command operations officer (U3) and the U3 plans shop which contained three U.S. officers. For all intents and purposes, these officers in U3 operations became the de facto U.S. “pocket staff” for operations. Additionally, the U.S. officer who served as the deputy U2 intelligence officer on the Force Command staff became the de facto USFORSOM G–2.

Although initially forced into this command and control structure, it proved invaluable for COMUSFORSOM during combat operations. The QRF provided the only force multipliers available in theater, as well as the most effective fighting force. Dual-hatting the U.S. members of the operations and intelligence branches of the UNOSOM II staff streamlined the planning and execution process for U.S. forces. COMUSFORSOM quickly grew comfortable with this arrangement and became confident in his dual hatted staff.

The intense combat situation, lack of equipment and ad hoc nature of the real “pocket staff” prevented the formation of a truly separate U.S. staff for COMUSFORSOM. Consequently, the forty-two man USFORSOM “pocket staff” performed only the administrative-logistics component of their intended charter: reporting, administrative support, and correspondence on non-operational U.S. only issues. This staff also assumed the role of the Logistics Support Command (LSC) staff for both U.S. and UN logistics forces in theater.

While this arrangement was workable initially, it proved inefficient as combat operations and U.S. troop strength expanded. The QRF received both operational and tactical direction from the U.S./UNOSOM II staff, while receiving administrative support and oversight from the pocket staff (UNLSC). In effect, this command and control structure for U.S. forces blurred the lines of control.

In October 1993, CENTCOM provided a JTF headquarters and commander to relieve COMUSFORSOM and U.S. members of the UNOSOM II staff of the burden of tactical command and control of U.S. combat forces. With a significantly expanded U.S. presence, CENTCOM planners believed that the presence of the JTF headquarters would:

- Provide COMUSFORSOM a separate staff robust enough to command and control all U.S. forces in theater;

- Free COMUSFORSOM and U.S. personnel on the UNOSOM II staff to focus on the operational level and UN force employment.

JTFSOM arrived with a much more robust and capable staff than its senior headquarters. It also came with a different view of the command relationships with COMUSFORSOM. As a result, these goals were never realized due to the confusion over command relationships. This initially created friction between the JTFSOM staff and the USFORSOM staff. Over time, the issue was resolved.

RECOMMENDATION: The U.S. command and control structure for peace operations should be tailored (sized, manned and equipped) to command and control committed forces. The JTF staff model
should be used for peace operations. It not only provides a robust capability, but also the necessary flex-
ibility to size the staff to meet mission requirements through augmentation packages.

However, the core of any headquarters committed to peace operations should be an extant one. The
immediate effectiveness of JTF J3 Plans section and each of the QRF Brigade headquarters deployed
to Somalia is a case in point. The 10th Mountain Division essentially deployed its G3 plans section and
one of its brigade headquarters to Somalia to form the JTF J3 Plans section and QRF headquarters.
This enabled them to function effectively from the start, by minimizing the training time typically associ-
ated with ad hoc staffs.

While it can be effective to dual hat the U.S. force commander as a key member on a coalition staff,
it is detrimental to do that with the staff, whether by design or force of events. However, the U.S. force
commander should have a separate staff, appropriately resourced, to effectively command and control
U.S. forces committed to peace operations.

4. LESSON: The U.S. must hold key staff positions on a coalition staff in UN-led peace enforcement
operations where the U.S. participates with forces.

**DISCUSSION:** The U.S. held key positions on the UNOSOM II staff which ensured that U.S. forces
committed in Somalia were effectively employed IAW U.S. policy and objectives. The Deputy Force
Commander (DFC), the Chief of Operations, the Deputy Chief of Intelligence, and senior plans officer
positions in the UNOSOM II Operations Branch proved to be critical for control of U.S. combat and intel-
ligence forces. The DFC position provided the U.S the opportunity to place a major general in a senior
command position within UNOSOM. This ensured that the U.S. would retain and exercise command of
U.S. forces under a U.S. commander. Through the other U.S. officers on staff in the operations and intel-
ligence branches, the U.S. was able to significantly influence the development and execution of military
plans and operations involving U.S. forces. This facilitated the effective employment of U.S. combat and
intelligence forces in support of UN forces within the Terms of Reference. It also facilitated gaining CINC-
CENT approval for use of U.S. forces in major operations, on a case by case basis.

The Deputy Chief Logistics Officer and a logistic plans officer positions were key to effective control
and management of U.S. logistics assets, both forces and materiel. The U.S. also held the Senior
Logistics Command position, which facilitated the efficient employment and eventual replacement of
U.S. logistics forces in theater.

In addition, the U.S. also held a number of other key positions on the UNOSOM staff to include the
Deputy Chief Communications Officer, the Airfield Commander and the Information Management
(PSYOP) Officer. This permitted the U.S. to influence and support the communications system archi-
tecture, the airfield operations, and the PSYOP Information campaign.

**OBSERVATION:** The U.S. should seek senior/key staff positions in any future UN-led Chapter VII
operation where U.S. forces are committed to a major role or mission. This will enable the U.S. to sig-
nificantly influence the employment of U.S. forces committed to the operation IAW U.S. policies and
objectives. Positions sought should be commensurate with the forces committed.

**Title X**

**TRAINING**

1. LESSON: Officers and noncommissioned officers identified to serve on UN staffs or support UN
missions should be familiar with UN staff procedures and UN staff organizations.
**DISCUSSION:** The nature of UN coalition operations and the experiences of individual staff members call for the development of formal training and familiarization programs to ensure that all officers, regardless of nationality, report to the UN mission trained in the basics of UN operational procedures and with some coalition related staff skills.

Currently there is no training available to familiarize deploying personnel with UN operational and staff procedures. We currently provide such orientation training for UN observer missions only. This training, while sufficient for training individual observers, will not serve to meet the needs of personnel assigned to peace operation (coalition) staffs.

**RECOMMENDATION:** To support PDD 25, and to provide the United Nations with the best possible talent for on-going operations, DOD should encourage the UN to establish a program of instruction for all prospective coalition and military UN staff members, especially those assigned to key positions on UN staffs. This will have the collateral benefit of forcing the UN to establish organizational models and techniques and procedures which do not exist at present.

To assist in the selection of experienced U.S. officers and noncommissioned officers for UN duty, Services need to be able to identify those personnel with previous UN staff experience.

**2. LESSON:** A JTF staff, designed to support peace operations, should have as its core elements of a headquarters, trained and experienced in joint operations.

**DISCUSSION:** The nucleus for the Joint Staff Force Somalia was drawn from the 10th Mountain Division (Light) staff. Early constraints imposed by the Central Command limited the size of the nucleus drawn from the 10th Division to approximately 60 personnel. While this cross-section of staff members represented a good balance of technical and tactical expertise in division level operations, there was very little knowledge of or experience in the complexities of joint operations.

Training programs, such as Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), help produce competent and qualified staff officers and noncommissioned officers. U.S. corps staffs frequently train to deploy JTF staffs. Based on aggressive training programs designed around OOTW scenarios, USCINCs could develop training support packages for use at CORPS/MEF level to assist in JTF staff formation and training.

Any time U.S. forces are committed, care must be taken to ensure that the force commander has the capabilities in his force structure to complete his mission and provide adequate force protection. Providing the JTF commander with trained and qualified officers and noncommissioned officers for his staff will greatly assist him in accomplishing his tasks.

**RECOMMENDATION:** USCINCs are responsible for the identification and training of individuals for manning JTF staffs. Each USCINC should maintain a roster of positions to be filled by service components and regularly train and exercise contingent JTF’s within his area of operations.

For conducting OOTW the doctrinal force headquarters is a JTF; by definition a JTF requires joint manning. The Joint Staff should develop a JTF staff manning model that standardizes the manning and training levels for all JTF staffs. The guidance set forth in Joint Publication 5-00.2 should be expanded to include specific guidance for the composition, structure and function of JTF staffs. A model derived from USCINCPAC instruction 3120.26E dated 20 January 1993, Subject: Establishment of Contingency Joint Task Force and USCINCPAC instruction 3030.11, dated 17 July 1992, subject: Organization and administration of USCINCPAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) could be excellent starting points.
Once a formal model or standing operating procedure is identified, each CINC should identify one or more service components to form a stand-by JTF staff, and then train and be prepared to establish a headquarters able to function as the core for executing a JTF staff mission.

Formation of a JTF headquarters should be focused on the ability of the headquarters to deploy into a theater of operations and immediately integrate the available service specific combat capabilities into a cohesive joint combat force. The staff should be formed from a headquarters with the requisite operational level resources, doctrinal focus, training and seniority.

Sources for joint billets must be kept current. To assist in the stand-up of JTF staffs, each service should develop an ability to identify and track service personnel with JTF staff training or experience.

The CJCS should consider creating an external evaluation program designed to train, assist, and ensure that CINC staffs develop and maintain the means to staff, train, deploy, and support a JTF headquarters.

3. LESSON: Improper use of peace operations terminology leads to confusion and misunderstanding.

DISCUSSION: Operations in Somalia showed that many documents and discussions used the terms peace keeping, peace enforcement, and peace making interchangeably. Misuse of these terms causes confusion over the differences between these missions. Furthermore, organizations may define the terms differently, leading to unfounded assumptions about comprehension when the terms are used in directives or conversation.

Rules of engagement, force structure, equipment, types of operations, and political, public, and world support of each type of peace operation will vary widely depending on the nature of the operation to be conducted. Each of these factors directly affects the ability of the force to successfully complete its mission. We should be precise in mission language to avoid possible confusion at various levels in the chain of command and at the policy level.

RECOMMENDATION: The services should immediately adopt and use the doctrinal terminology found in Joint Pub. 3-07.3 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations) and FM 100-23 (Peace Operations) and encourage UN use of these terms.

4. LESSON: Officer and noncommissioned officer professional development programs should include training and education on Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

DISCUSSION: OOTW missions are expected to occur frequently in the foreseeable future. Training at the collective and individual level is required to maintain a basic level of capabilities to execute OOTW missions. Somalia demonstrated that OOTW includes planned combat operations.

The successes enjoyed by U.S. forces in Somalia can be directly attributed to individual and collective training throughout the U.S. armed forces. The fundamental soldier skills for which units routinely train during Mission Essential Task List (METL) training served our forces in Somalia very well. However, familiarity with OOTW doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures would have served to significantly enhance the understanding and performance of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines deployed to Somalia.

Recent missions given the armed forces clearly illustrate the need for training exposure to OOTW doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Collective training packages much like the training initiatives on-going at the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) can serve as the model for
building an easily exportable training program that a unit can use as part of its preparation for an OOTW mission.

Individual professional development and training for OOTW missions should start at the very basic levels of military education with simple exposure to the concepts of such missions. The objective would be to familiarize our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and young officer leaders with the peculiarities of peace operations. This will help more senior leaders, both officer and noncommissioned officer, meet challenges of peace operations where coalition structures and operational restraints can cause confusion among our forces.

RECOMMENDATION: Training designed specifically to address the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures involved in OOTW operations should be introduced at all levels of military education. However, this training should not be done at the expense of training on war fighting skills. We should not change the focus of our training from what is now and must remain to fight and win the nation’s wars. Although this task adds to an already burdened military education system, we should accommodate it if we are to better prepare leaders and soldiers for future OOTW. This concept supports PDD 25.

Initially, introductory level training of OOTW terms and basic concepts should be added to basic officer and enlisted training curriculums. This training should be aimed at providing service members with a very basic understanding of the nature of OOTW operations on which unit commanders can build.

Formal training of OOTW emerging doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures should be added at the intermediate level service schools, such as officer advanced courses and Command and General Staff College or other staff college courses. The instruction at this level should address the planning, coordination, training, liaison, and supervisory challenges associated with coalition and OOTW operations.

Advanced OOTW topics should be introduced at the Senior Service College level. These topics should focus on the strategic and operational implications of OOTW.

5. LESSON: The CINCs should ensure those requirements for individual and unit pre-deployment training and processing for OOTW are established and executed.

DISCUSSION: Minimum pre-deployment training requirements must be identified by supported CINCs, as was done for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Individual units and services, deploying to Somalia, did very little pre-deployment training because requirements were not directed by CENTCOM and were not clearly articulated for individual replacements.

Pre-deployment training should include the minimal training for both individuals and units deploying into a theater to support any operation, especially for OOTW missions that place unique requirements on units and individuals. Essential pre-deployment training for OOTW should include familiarization with individual weapons and NBC procedures, to include mask fitting and NBC chamber, an understanding of the ROE and culture for the area of operations, required medical (immunization) and dental checks, and required uniforms and equipment.

With the identification of minimum standards of pre-deployment training required for a particular theater, each commander could then be held accountable for meeting the training requirements set by the CINC.

RECOMMENDATION: CINCs and their service components should identify pre-deployment training requirements as soon as possible for developing OOTW missions. These requirements should be continually adjusted as missions and conditions in the theater evolve. The requirements must be widely disseminated and enforced by supporting commands and agencies.
6. LESSON: Receipt of new equipment for deploying units requires close coordination, especially when the unit is in the process of executing a deployment sequence.

DISCUSSION: Receipt of new equipment after notification of deployment places exceptional hardship on the deploying unit. When a unit is executing a deployment sequence it does not have time to receive and train on new equipment. Neither will its maintenance and logistics systems be prepared to support and sustain the troops in its use.

Fully recognizing the fact that units must continue to modernize, care should be given to the timing of introducing new equipment. In Somalia there were several examples of force modernization which illustrate the right and wrong way to introduce new equipment into a unit deployed under hostile conditions. A night observation device called Night Stalker was brought into theater with a complete support package of technicians and support personnel. The receiving unit quickly gained all the expert training and support required to field and obtain maximum benefit from the equipment in a very short period of time. On the other hand, reactive armor was delivered for the Bradley fighting vehicle without technical support. Most units had a very difficult time assimilating the new equipment, in some cases relying on trial and error to fit the armor to their vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION: Equipment which requires little or no training to enhance soldier and crew safety and effectiveness can be made available during deployment until units arrive at the air or sea ports of departure. It should be moved by the project managers or commodity managers, not the deploying unit. Other new equipment requiring soldier or crew proficiency should be provided to follow-on forces.

7. LESSON: Class V training ammunition accounts are required for all deploying U.S. units involved in OOTW missions.

DISCUSSION: U.S. forces did not have training ammunition accounts established in Somalia. The issue of ammunition for training became a word game. Ammunition could only be issued for mission requirements, which forced units to call standard marksmanship training a required mission.

RECOMMENDATION: Automatically establish a training ammunition account whenever U.S. troops are deployed in an area where hostile fire is a possibility. Troops must train, especially when deployed into hostile regions of the world.

MANNING

1. LESSON: Current policy for manning Combat Support and Combat Service Support units does not support OOTW operation requirements.

DISCUSSION: OOTW missions such as Somalia require a significant commitment of CSS units and assets. To minimize the effects of these operational missions on total force unit training, the Army attempts to task echelon above corps (EAC) units to support these missions. However, limitations in resources have forced the Army to man many of these units at ALO 3. Because many of these units have a high percentage of low density MOS’s, such manning shortfalls produce an even greater impact on overall unit capability once deployed.

While this manning policy allows the Army to distribute personnel shortages Army-wide and keep divisional CSS units at higher manning levels, it did not provide sufficient unit strength to accomplish mission requirements in Somalia. A mission which clearly included the requirement for a unit to provide individual and force protection for itself.
CINCCENT approved only fully mission capable units for deployment to Somalia. Consequently, most logistics units, especially transportation, and MP units deployed to Somalia required augmentation prior to deployment to bring them up to ALO 1 fully mission capable status. Inability to access RC units and individuals required FORSCOM to task additional units to fill personnel shortages. While every effort was made to protect division CSS units from these taskings, the small number of these type units in the current active force precluded this from being successful in all cases.

**RECOMMENDATION:** All services, but especially the Department of the Army, must reassess manning policies for those units which have proven to be in high demand for OOTW missions. This recommendation includes continuing an aggressive effort to gain early access to the RC, especially individuals, and a higher priority reexamination of the present combat service support structure and force authorization within the active component.

One solution the Army must evaluate is establishing an OOTW Temporary Tour of Active Duty (TTAD) account to fund RC soldiers who are willing to volunteer for these types of missions. While this is not a total solution because it does not insure access to trained, cohesive units and unit equipment, it does provide a means to access highly qualified RC personnel for specific missions. SOCOM effectively used this process to gain access to required civil affairs and PSYOP personnel and FORSCOM was able to use TTAD RC soldiers to fill requirements for an aircraft shrink wrap team during re-deployment.

Due to downsizing and the importance of sustaining AC combat units, the future does not offer much hope for significant increases in active component CSS force structure. Alternatives, such as contract services, could possibly offer some relief for active military units in this regard.

**2. LESSON:** Department of Defense did not have access to Reserve Component (RC) units and individuals possessing specific skills to support operations in Somalia.

**DISCUSSION:** The Army has a large percentage of its combat support, combat service support, civil affairs, and PSYOP structure in the Reserve Component. Current requirements for a partial mobilization make it difficult to access these forces for operations other than war. Somalia clearly highlighted the requirement to have these forces available in appropriately sized force packages to adequately support the mission. Without access to the RC for OOTW missions, the active component is severely stretched to support simultaneously both operational missions and training.

This shortage is further highlighted by the fact that recent OOTW missions, such as Somalia, can become long term missions requiring multiple troop rotations. For each unit deployed, two additional units are required, one preparing for deployment and one recovering. Because RC mobilization was not authorized for Somalia, repeated deployments of limited AC units were required. Had the decision to re-deploy all U.S. forces by 31 March 1994 not been made, USFORSCOM would have been required to re-deploy eight units for a second tour to Somalia for the February/March rotation. Civil Affairs (CA) units offer a good example of the problem. Civil Affairs skills relative to nation building and long term CA operations are based on civilian skills and experiences not available in the active force. Future JTF commanders will be dependant on the ability to access this capability from the RC.

Inability to selectively activate RC capabilities also prevented the Army from accessing a large pool of low density MOS’s (38A, 95B, 51M, 88M, 77LV6, 7LF5, 74F) many of which were critically short in the active structure. Under the current law, the President has access to RC units (DOD limit of 200,000) for limited periods (90 + 90 days) under a Presidential Selective Call up. Access to RC individuals is restricted to congressional declaration of partial mobilization. These are severe limitations, which significantly affect the ability of the services to support OOTW missions. The constraints on unit capabilities will increase as the services continue to draw down.
As further example, the Army would have required reserve component access to simultaneously run both the port at Mogadishu, and provide support to another peace operation should such a contingency have materialized. Many other logistics units which are often essential to success in operations other than war, such as transportation, water production, material handling, are also in short supply. Those units in the active force are usually manned and equipped at ALO 3, which limits capabilities. In Somalia, an additional 100 truck drivers had to be individually assigned to fill out a deployed ALO 3-truck company. Military Police, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, and engineer forces available for Somalia were also insufficient for the mission. This was due to both the policy requirement to keep a low U.S. troop strength (profile), and the requirement to man the total force in other areas. The bottom line is that there are not enough of these critical CS and CSS units to go around. We realize there are difficult policy considerations at work in this issue; the problem was significant in Somalia and could be more so in the future.

**RECOMMENDATION:** DOD must continue to press aggressively for access to RC units to support OOTW missions. This requirement includes timely access to individuals as well as units. Should this effort fail, the Army will have to reevaluate the adequacy of its active force structure to realistically meet future CSS, civil affairs and PSYOP operational requirements for OOTW.

JCS and combatant commanders need to use all service capabilities for operations other than war. Sustainment operations should not be “Army by doctrine.” For example, Army logistics can be augmented by Navy logistics as was done during Hurricane Andrew relief for Operation Guantánamo (GTMO) and done in a limited way (medical) during the withdrawal phase in Somalia.

3. LESSON: Assignment of U.S. personnel to UN Headquarters in New York could have significantly improved the UN's ability to manage UNOSOM II.

**DISCUSSION:** The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which is responsible for managing all UN peace operations, is seriously undermanned. To compensate for this shortfall, the UN accepts military personnel from member states on a “seconded” or loan basis. These personnel provide essential managerial skills to improve peace operations.

The U.S. has traditionally not provided large numbers of personnel for duty in UN Headquarters. When personnel have been provided, they have normally been assigned on a temporary duty basis for a specific project and have had limited influence on policy.

During the period October-December 1993, the Joint Staff sponsored a Logistics Working Group in DPKO. This group, in addition to their primary mission to improve logistics planning and operations, influenced processes in UN Headquarters to the extent that the UN Logistics Support Command was replaced by a cost plus logistics services contract.

U.S. military personnel bring significant military planning and management skills that would significantly help DPKO. They can help to anticipate requirements as well as decrease response time to requests. Providing personnel for duty at UN Headquarters will also develop a pool of trained and experienced U.S. military personnel in both the active and reserve components.

GEN Sanderson (Australian Army), former United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Force Commander, dispatched several Australian officers to UN Headquarters during the period of his mandate. These officers provided liaison and assisted the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to better manage UNTAC operations.

As a result of a UN request for military support, the U.S. has assigned seven officers to UN Headquarters for two years to provide the following functions:
NATO has assigned a liaison officer to DPKO to assist in coordinating a potential NATO involvement in the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. This liaison officer has provided invaluable assistance to both NATO and the UN in planning and coordinating potential operations.

RECOMMENDATION: The Department of Defense should fully implement the PDD-25 initiative to provide U.S. personnel to augment the UN Headquarters staff. The Joint Staff and OSD should thoroughly analyze UN staffing requirements to identify the key positions in which U.S. personnel could have the greatest influence on UN operations, and work to provide officers to fill those positions.

The command organizing a JTF for UN operations should include liaison officers in the JTF structure to serve at UN Headquarters and assist in coordinating operations.

EQUIPMENT

1. LESSON: Future peace enforcement operations will require additional force protection capabilities at unit level.

DISCUSSION: Units deployed to Somalia and performed missions for which they were not well equipped. Force protection missions required equipment beyond the units’ table of organization and equipment (TOE). This often resulted in increased risk to CSS units in the course of mission performance. As an example, CSS units in Somalia provided both their own base camp security and convoy protection. CSS units do not have enough organic crew served weapons and other equipment to provide both base camp and convoy protection. In addition, infantry units operating in urban areas also found a need for additional equipment to enhance force protection.

Since the 10th Mountain Division’s return from Somalia, they have requested changes to their TO&E to reflect force protection items which they believe are needed to perform similar missions. This is an effort to acquire evolving available technology and provide the combat soldier with state-of-the-art equipment to enhance his survival on the battlefield. Following are comments from the 10th Mountain Division’s brief at the Infantry Commander’s Conference.

EQUIPMENT OBSERVATIONS:

(1) Soldier loads averaged 40-50 pounds without rucksack;
(2) Tradeoffs on level II vs level III body armor: Mobility vs. survivability;
(3) M-16 add-ons would have helped: PAQ-4B and taclites;
(4) Anti-tank vehicles converted to MK-19 or .50 CAL platforms; Gunners required additional protection;
IR covers for BFV service drive;
Knee and elbow pads are a must;
Radio headsets needed to keep hands free;
HUMMWV hardening kits required;
Light infantry requires transportation augmentation;
BFV needs exterior mounted telephone integrated into vehicle intercom;
Hand held laser pointers needed by infantry and aviation units.

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION OBSERVATIONS:
Light infantry needs mounted .50CAL and MK 19 in MOUT;
M203 provides immediate and precise illumination;
Concussion grenades preferred over fragmentation;
M249 works well in the assault;
SIMRADS night sights effective for M21 sniper system;
LAW not always an effective bunker buster; AT-4 works well, but size and weight make man transportability difficult.
Cayenne pepper spray and CS worked well to disperse crowds when lesser measures failed;
Barret .50 CAL sniper rifle was very effective.

RECOMMENDATION: When deploying units on OOTW missions, a force protection plus-up package of additional equipment and weapons tailored to the type of unit and expected missions should be provided. The package should include: crew served weapons such as MK19s, .50 cal and M-60 machine guns; night vision goggles; ammunition such as LAWS and AT-1s; grenade launchers; ground positioning systems; communications packages; upgraded body armor; class IV barrier material; and automatic weapon mounts.

Exportable training programs for non-standard equipment should be provided to ensure that units are prepared to employ additional equipment. Ideally, a contingency stockpile of force protection items could be maintained and issued for specific missions. Time should be allowed for units to train on the newly acquired items before their deployment into a peace operation.

Force protection supplies (i.e. ammunition, barrier material, etc.) should automatically be pushed to theater to arrive either before the force is on the ground or to coincide with the arrival of the force. Force protection items could be left in theater for incoming units.

Services should also re-evaluate the table of organization and equipment for combat service support units to ensure they are adequately equipped for OOTW.
2. LESSON: Transferring unit equipment from one rotating unit to the next in extended OOTW missions worked well in Somalia.

DISCUSSION: Funding transportation costs for sustainment equipment for each rotation carried a tremendous expense. The bill goes to the MACOM which provided the units. Reimbursements have often proved to be insufficient and late. The result is degradation in overall unit training and maintenance.

RECOMMENDATION: Review equipment and unit rotation policies. Do not rotate all equipment. Two possible courses of action are:

(1) Leave the original unit’s equipment in theater. Have follow on units fall in on that equipment. Upon return of the unit originally deployed, concentrate efforts to reconstitute from available resources and back fill as equipment becomes available. Report as C-5 until reconstituted. Particular command emphasis is required to ensure units take pride of ownership of this equipment and maintain it.

(2) Designate a sustainment set of equipment to be used specifically for OOTW missions. Cost is not prohibitive when considering the cost of transportation and effects on readiness. Recommend work begin to place typical CSG set of equipment in PREPO.

3. LESSON: Creating a central receiving activity for returning equipment from Somalia worked well.

DISCUSSION: The decision to use a central activity (Ft Polk) to receive and refurbish non-unit equipment facilitated the re-deployment and redistribution processes.

RECOMMENDATION: Always designate a central activity to receive and refurbish non-unit equipment upon redeployment. Redeployment of equipment from Somalia to a central location was a success and undoubtedly saved resources.

FORCE STRUCTURE

1. LESSON: OOTW chapter VI and VII operations in third world countries place high demands on engineer support.

DISCUSSION: The maintenance and repair of the roads in Somalia became critical to achieving the U.S. mission of moving Class III (bulk) to the various contingencies within Mogadishu and to the outlying areas. American engineers were not manned nor equipped to undertake this massive project and were overtaxed to provide road repair missions plus complete numerous assigned force protection tasks. A Korean engineer battalion was brought into Somalia to assist with the road building and repair, but were restricted from coming into Mogadishu due to political constraints imposed by their government.

It is understood that U.S. engineers were drawn down to limit the U.S. contribution and profile, but only one other nation contributed a small engineer force. The burden fell on the U.S. unit and it could not meet all requirements. The mission suffered.

RECOMMENDATION: Engineer assets are absolutely vital to the achievement of peacekeeping operations due to the requirement for road maintenance, repair, construction, and the need for various force protection barriers. In future OOTW missions, if U.S. CSS forces will be dependant on engineer support, ensure adequate engineer support is available. There were not enough engineers in Somalia to support U.S. forces assigned to UNOSOM II.
2. LESSON: Contracting provides a force structure alternative to increasing the number of logistics units in the total force.

DISCUSSION: The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) process was validated in Somalia as an alternative means to provide logistics support in some operations other than war. As U.S. forces began to withdraw in December 1993, the LOGCAP contractor successfully assumed all logistics missions formerly provided by military units, albeit at considerable expense to the U.S. in money and equipment.

The present mix of active and reserve component CSS units will not support long duration, multiple rotation operations other than war. Some low-density active component units were returned to Somalia for a second tour during the third rotation of U.S. forces.

Based on experience with Somalia, access to RC units for operations other than war does not appear forthcoming. Without this access, provisions must be made to augment AC CSS units because the low density of these type units will not support multiple rotations.

Many appear to consider contracting as “too expensive” and rule it out as a viable alternative. If included in the planning process for operations other than war, expenses could perhaps be decreased via competition among competing firms. The high cost of equipment and personnel movement to and from a theater of operations makes this alternative worthy of serious consideration.

RECOMMENDATION: Contracting for logistic support may be one alternative to service manning and logistics support structure shortfalls. Contracting for UN logistics support proved its value in Somalia and should be actively considered for missions suitability during all initial planning for OOTW missions. It is expensive, will likely require government furnished equipment and commitment of an additional security force, but may provide a worthwhile alternative in some missions.

Begin now to:

— Conduct cost analysis of using contractors to perform logistics in operations other than war;

— Apply to OCONUS and CONUS operations (peace operations and disaster relief);

— Define in terms of dollars, readiness of military units, repair of military equipment, replacement of military equipment, and quality of life of AC CSS and CS soldiers and their families.

3. LESSON: The Department of the Army needs to review its doctrinal requirements for combat support and combat service support units to provide local security for their units.

DISCUSSION: Combat support and combat service support forces are deployed at ALO 3 which in the case of Somalia meant that about 40% of the trucks used for handling supplies laid idle for the outset. When tasked to defend themselves and maintain constant security around their bases that figure quickly rises to 50-60% idle.

Additional Military Police units are not the answer. There are not enough of them to go around either. The command in Somalia was forced to use combat forces to perform security operations for combat support and combat service support units.

Somalia taught that during OOTW missions CS and CSS units are on the front lines. These units must be capable of providing for their personal and equipment security; however, significant mission
CAPABILITY IS LOST WHEN PERSONNEL FROM THESE UNITS MUST BE DIVERTED TO PROVIDE COLLECTIVE SECURITY. NAVY MPF EXPERIENCED THIS PROBLEM DURING THE INITIAL OFF-LOADING OF MPS SHIPS AT THE PORT AND NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF ARMY DRIVERS, MECHANICS AND OTHER SUPPORT PERSONNEL BEING DIVERTED FROM THEIR SUPPORT MISSIONS TO FILL ESSENTIAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. PLANNERS MUST CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE TRADE-OFF IN MISSION CAPABILITY WHEN SECURITY FOR BASE CAMPS AND OTHER COMMON USE AREAS IS NOT INCLUDED IN TOTAL FORCE DESIGN. SHOULD THE DECISION BE MADE THAT CS AND CSS UNITS LIKE THE 507TH CSG AND NAVY MPF BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE COLLECTIVE SITE SECURITY, THEY MUST BE ADEQUATELY AUGMENTED WITH CREW SERVED WEAPONS AND CREWS TO PROVIDE THE SECURITY SINCE THESE TYPES OF UNITS GENERALLY ARE NOT EQUIPPED WITH THE WEAPONS REQUIRED FOR EFFECTIVE GROUND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

RECOMMENDATION: CONDUCT A REVIEW OF CURRENT DOCTRINE REGARDING SECURITY OPERATIONS FOR COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS IN OOTW ENVIRONMENTS. EXPERIENCES IN SOMALIA SUGGEST THAT IN THESE ENVIRONMENTS WHERE EVERYONE IS ON THE FRONT LINE, CURRENT DOCTRINAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS IS INADEQUATE.

SERVICE PLANNERS MUST CONTINUALLY STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEquately SUPPORTED AND PROTECTED CS AND CSS FORCES FOR MISSIONS SUCH AS SOMALIA. THE EFFECTS OF TRADE-OFFS IN STRUCTURE BETWEEN CS AND CSS SUPPORT AND SECURITY FORCES MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND ARTICULATED ONCE DECIDED, AND THEN COMMUNICATED TO ALL LEVELS OF SERVICE AND NATIONAL COMMAND.

U.S. LOGISTICAL FORCES NEED BASE AND CONVOY SECURITY TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSIONS. GIVEN THE INHERENT COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE FORCE, SENIOR LOGISTICS COMMANDERS SHOULD HAVE INTERNAL CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE SECURITY WITHOUT DEGRADING MISSION SUPPORT. DIVERTING TRUCK DRIVERS TO PERFORM PERIMETER SECURITY IS AN INEFFICIENT USE OF ESSENTIAL RESOURCES. THE ISSUE IS ONE OF RECOGNITION AND RESOURCING OF THIS CRITICAL FORCE PROTECTION REQUIREMENT PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

4. LESSON: INDIVIDUAL REPLACEMENTS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED FOR MOVEMENT INTO SOMALIA OR ANY OTHER THEATER OF OPERATION.

DISCUSSION: SOMALIA RECONFIRMED THE NEED TO CONSOLIDATE THE FLOW OF INDIVIDUALS INTO OPERATIONAL THEATERS. INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL UNITS WERE REQUIRED TO FILL DEPLOYING UNITS AND STAFFS. THESE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED FROM A WIDE RANGE OF INSTALLATIONS, MANY OF WHICH WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONDUCT REQUIRED PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING AND ISSUE NECESSARY UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT. TOO OFTEN THIS RESULTED IN SOLDIERS ARRIVING IN THEATER WITHOUT REQUIRED EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. ADDITIONALLY, THESE INDIVIDUALS OFTEN ARRIVED IN THEATER WITH LITTLE NOTICE TO THE GAINING UNIT OR STAFF. AS AN INTERIM CORRECTION TO THIS PROBLEM, FORSCOM, IN COORDINATION WITH PERSCOM, DESIGNATED AND RESOURCED FT DIX AS THE CONUS DEPLOYMENT CENTER. THIS SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVED FORSCOM'S ABILITY TO INSURE THE THEATER RECEIVED PROPERLY PREPARED INDIVIDUAL REPLACEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED THE THEATER'S REQUIREMENT TO COORDINATE TRANSPORTATION AND RECEPTION OF THESE INDIVIDUALS. DURING DESERT SHIELD/STORM THIS ESSENTIAL MANAGEMENT WAS PERFORMED AT THREE CONUS REPLACEMENT CENTERS (CRC).

RECOMMENDATION: SERVICES SHOULD ESTABLISH A SINGLE INSTALLATION AS THE SINGLE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL UNIT DEPLOYMENTS TO ANY OCONUS OOTW MISSION. A SINGLE INSTALLATION COULD SUPPORT MULTIPLE OOTW MISSIONS. SUCH AN INSTALLATION NEEDS EASILY EXPANDABLE BILLETING SPACE AND ACCESS TO SMALL ARMS RANGES, NBC CHAMBERS, MEDICAL AND DENTAL FACILITIES AND A FULLY CAPABLE AIRFIELD. CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING A SINGLE JOINT DEPLOYMENT CENTER FOR ALL SERVICES SUPPORTING OOTW MISSIONS.

FUNDING

1. LESSON: LACK OF ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE (HCA) TITLE 10 USC FUNDS AFFECTED OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA.
DISCUSSION: During both the initial deployment and transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM, commanders and staffs at all levels were generally unfamiliar with the use of “spontaneous funds” for incidental humanitarian and civil assistance activities. The JTF execution of the operation plan adhered to the “limited and specific” guidelines and focused on security for the ongoing humanitarian relief effort. Funding for humanitarian and civil assistance activities was not adequately addressed, and a senior civil affairs staff, omitted from the initial force structure, was not available to the UNITAF, JTF, or UNOSOM to provide the necessary advice and assistance.

Civil Affairs teams frequently coordinated civic action projects, negotiated the resolution of claims for damages by U.S. forces, negotiated the use of labor to include interpreter/translators, and generally served as the liaison for acquisition between the commander and the local community. There frequently were situations where the civil affairs team or local sector commander would have expeditiously resolved minor problems, settled minor disputes, reduced hostility, or increased good will had access to limited funds been available. Spontaneous access to limited and relatively insignificant amounts of funds could provide immeasurable benefits with lifesaving potential in a hostile or non-permissive environment as frequently was the case in Somalia.

Section 401, Title 10 USC specifically authorizes humanitarian and civil assistance activities in conjunction with military operations when such activities promote “security interests” and “operational readiness skills”. Title 10 relieves the commander of concerns raised when O&M funded activities are conducted concurrent with humanitarian relief activities.

RECOMMENDATION: Issues related to humanitarian and civil assistance funds as prescribed in Title 10 USC must be resolved at the DOD or appropriate level and guidelines, and access to those funds must be incorporated in the operation plan prior to deployment.

Civil affairs staff officers in theater should have immediate access to spontaneous funds for incidental humanitarian and civil assistance as provided in Section 401, Title 10 USC.

Operations

1. LESSON: Rules of Engagement (ROE) must provide the maximum flexibility necessary to protect the force and permit the judicious application of force to accomplish the mission.

DISCUSSION: Chapter VII operations demand that UN and U.S. forces judiciously apply force and, when required, conduct combat operations to accomplish the mission mandated by the Security Council. UNOSOM II’s ROE permitted soldiers to use deadly force to defend themselves and other UN personnel or persons against hostile acts or intent. It also permitted the use of deadly force against hostile elements attempting to prevent the Force from accomplishing its duties. However, it further required soldiers to challenge suspected hostile personnel when practical and apply only the degree of force necessary. The flexibility of the ROE enabled soldiers to execute their duties with minimal risk to themselves or innocent bystanders. The UNOSOM ROE was adequate for U.S. forces deployed in theater.

RECOMMENDATION: UNOSOM II ROE should be adopted as a model for other Chapter VII operations. With some limitations placed on the scope and nature of operations, the UNOSOM II ROE could be used in some Chapter VI operations. The Force Commander must play the key role in developing and approving the ROE in his theater. However, the United Nations must oversee that process and ensure that the ROE adopted is within the intended scope of the mandate.

2. LESSON: Soldiers need a clear understanding of the rules of engagement (ROE) and must be able to apply them to real world situations under less than ideal circumstances.
DISCUSSION: Some U.S. forces deploying to Somalia, particularly logistical support units, were not prepared or adequately trained to apply the ROE to the situations they encountered in theater. Specific situations in which U.S. forces found difficulty employing the rules of engagement were crowd control and convoy operations.

As the threat increased—urban and rural ambushes, command detonated explosives, and small arms, mortar and rocket propelled grenade attacks against UNOSOM compounds — the U.S. forces received intensive training on ROE. Commanders used Situational Training Exercises (STXs) to ensure that all soldiers understood the ROE and the differences between restraint and allowance in specific situations. These situational training exercises were successful in teaching soldiers how to recognize and avoid potential trouble situations. STXs were also useful in teaching soldiers how to identify “hostile intent” and how to respond appropriately, i.e., firing warning shots. Through the situational training exercises, commanders provided additional emphasis and guidance on the use of ROE without placing additional restraints on the use of force.

RECOMMENDATION: Units deploying for peace operations should conduct STXs on the ROE as part of its pre-deployment training. These exercises should be continued and reinforced in theater.

3. LESSON: The UN needs to develop standard agreements and procedures for tactical operations (similar to NATO STANAGs).

DISCUSSION: Coalition forces conducted combined operations on a daily basis. The ability to successfully conduct combined operations was directly affected by the forces working together against a standard of expected performance. For example, it was a rather simple task to infuse a U.S. liaison team into the French battalion conducting the northern screen mission and later a critical counterattack during the 17 June attack against the SNA in the Aideed enclave. It was a more difficult task to form a multinational armored task force of Malaysians, Pakistanis, and Americans to assist in the extraction of Task Force Ranger from vicinity of the Olympic Hotel on 3 October. This operation would have benefited from standard procedures understood and practiced by the forces prior to mission execution. However, in Somalia, many factors worked against this.

RECOMMENDATION: UN should develop and distribute to member nations for concurrence, standard agreements and procedures for tactical operations as part of a United Nations force.

4. LESSON: Leaders and staff have found that “back briefings” are extremely important to ensure that coalition forces understand the commander’s intent and tasks they are to accomplish.

DISCUSSION: Language barriers and cultural assumptions contribute to misunderstandings not only of the tasks coalition forces are being directed to accomplish, but also the commander’s intent. Furthermore, a heavy reliance is placed on interpreters and liaison officers to pass command information. As a result, the information becomes filtered and portions are invariably lost. To overcome this problem, the use of back briefs, ranging from conversations between commanders to formal staff supported back brief communication, proved effective in reducing potential misconceptions of intent or instructions.

RECOMMENDATION: Continue to stress back briefing techniques at officer advanced courses, CGSC and AWC.

5. LESSON: The use of jargon and acronyms can adversely affect mission performance when conducting coalition operations. All involved in such operations must consciously avoid using jargon and acronyms in official communications.


**DISCUSSION:** The unconscious use of acronyms and jargon has become second nature to U.S. military personnel. The effects of this habit become readily apparent during combined operations. Operation Continue Hope included coalition forces from more than 20 countries. Most of these forces struggle with English (UNOSOM II’s common language) comprehension and the use of acronyms and jargon further complicates both spoken and written dialogue. U.S. military officers on the UNOSOM II staff came to appreciate the unfortunate consequences that acronyms and jargon can have on mission success, and learned to moderate their own use of both forms of shorthand communication.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Officers and NCOs assigned to coalition staffs should avoid the use of U.S. military jargon and acronyms. This requirement should be a discussion point in staff and senior service colleges.

6. **LESSON:** U.S. Army procedures notwithstanding, all tasks need to be identified as “specified tasks” in operations orders when conducting combined operations.

**DISCUSSION:** The variety of forces participating in Operation Continue Hope requires officers working at the UNOSOM II staff level to “specify” all tasks in orders to subordinate units. This was not initially well understood by U.S. officers on the UNOSOM II staff who prepared operations orders in the style and format used by the U.S. Army. These officers soon realized that many coalition forces do not agree with U.S. Army doctrine that permits operations orders to contain both implied and specified tasks. Although this problem was soon identified and corrected, the need to specify all tasks challenged U.S. Army officers on the UNOSOM II staff.

**RECOMMENDATION:** This subject should be addressed during instruction at CGSC and AWC.

7. **LESSON:** Developing plans and preparing operations orders at the UNOSOM II staff level required “consensus building”. The negotiation process required to reach a consensus can be frustrating and time-consuming, but it is a necessary aspect of conducting combined operations.

**DISCUSSION:** Preparing plans and orders at the UNOSOM II level required negotiation to build consensus on proposed actions. Each nation providing military forces to Somalia under the UN Charter placed certain restrictions on their forces. These restrictions, combined with differing views on basic military employment doctrine required the UNOSOM II staff to seek and build consensus on proposed military actions. This need for consensus building was not familiar to U.S. military personnel who had never served in such an environment. It became a significant source of frustration for those attempting to maintain operational tempo. Without consensus building, however, orders to coalition forces are likely to result in few accomplishments. Inevitably, the need for consensus building complicates the orders process.

**RECOMMENDATION:** This subject should be addressed during instruction at CGSC and AWC.

8. **LESSON:** Special Forces (SF) Coalition Support Teams (CSTs) are essential components in successful coalition operations.

**DISCUSSION:** Since UNOSOM II was a UN operation, SOF participation was intentionally constrained as an additional means of minimizing U.S. involvement. In spite of this circumstance, the operations in Somalia revalidated the necessity of using CSTs when conducting coalition operations. These teams proved to be invaluable assets for USFORSOM as well as UNOSOM II.

CSTs facilitated coordination between U.S. and coalition forces in both military and humanitarian operations, and conducted training for coalition forces. The language capabilities, coupled with cultural and area orientations permitted the CSTs to communicate and work in harmony with the coalition. CSTs
and liaison teams from the Quick Reaction Force were routinely assigned to coalition forces to coordinate U.S. aviation and fire support for raids, cordon and searches, and other security operations. This use of CSTs proved to be the key in preventing friendly fire incidents and gaining the confidence of coalition forces in the capability and support of U.S. forces in theater. CSTs were also used to negotiate and coordinate with, as well as inform the local populace on operations and humanitarian support.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Properly trained, organized, and experienced CSTs should be employed in all coalition operations to maximize the U.S. Commander’s capabilities to accomplish his mission. These assets should be applied as soon as coalition forces are within the command and must continue to operate throughout the duration of the coalition operations being conducted.

**Psychological Operations**

1. **LESSON:** Chapter VII operations require a PSYOP capability.

**DISCUSSION:** Recent experience in Somalia demonstrates that PSYOP can play a vital role in peace enforcement operations. PSYOP in Somalia focused primarily on tactical operations. Leaflet drops and loudspeaker teams were effectively used to limit casualties among non-combatants (warnings); to enhance the security and image of military forces during operations; to inform Somalis about humanitarian assistance operations ongoing; and to a limited extent, to tell the UNOSOM story.

Unfortunately, a complete PSYOP campaign was not developed for UNOSOM II. Shortage of PSYOP planners and resources, as well as a lack of experience with PSYOP among the UN civilian staff, significantly contributed to this shortcoming. Loudspeakers and a leaflet production capability were the most significant PSYOP resources.

Although the UN operated a radio station and small newspaper in Mogadishu, they were used as information media as opposed to PSYOP. The aversion to the use of PSYOP within the UN civilian community may have contributed to this situation. In future Chapter VII operations, where PSYOP is necessary, we may need to find a new name for it.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

1. The UN, with U.S. and allied assistance, should create a sophisticated public diplomacy capability in New York and at each UN peace operation headquarters.

2. U.S. PSYOP forces should undertake a combined PSYOP training program to enable other nations to participate in future peace operations with a PSYOP capability.

3. For future U.S. led peace operations, audio and audio-visual capabilities must be actively and aggressively employed to document regional success stories.

4. U.S. PSYOP, public affairs, and civil affairs forces should procure contingency radio stocks to enhance radio reception for future peace operations.

**Civil Affairs**

1. **LESSON:** A Civil Affairs capability should be an inherent part of coalition forces conducting Chapter VII operations.

**DISCUSSION:** Coalition forces conducting peace enforcement operations must be seen as providing assistance to the local community as well as serving as part of a security force. This image is essen-
tial if UN coalition forces are to avoid being seen as just an occupation force. UNOSOM achieved only partial success in this area due to the lack of a force-wide civil affairs capability.

UN planners saw little need for a discrete U5 Civil Affairs staff for the force commander. The Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II was responsible for coordinating the relief/development strategy and effort in Somalia. Force Command’s role was seen as primarily one of providing security for humanitarian and development relief workers. The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) was the closest that Force Command came to a civil military operations planning staff. The CMOC, however, focused primarily on coordinating military security requirements for humanitarian relief agencies, and coordinating the military use of civil facilities and property in Mogadishu. The civilian staff gave little thought to combining the capabilities of the military force and civilian relief agencies into an integrated civil military operations strategy to support UN objectives in Somalia.

Coalition forces recognized the importance of integrating civic action projects with their military operations. However, with no planning and integrating staff to develop plans for such projects, contingent forces developed and resourced their own. Although a good effort, lack of resources and the loss of prospective synergy limited what could have been done by military forces.

Despite the lack of an integrated civil military operations plan, coalition forces worked closely with the zone directors and Somali leaders in their AOR to develop local civil affairs programs. These programs ranged from humanitarian assistance to large-scale projects such as flood control, irrigation projects, and construction projects to restore public services. Most of these programs were resourced and supported by the contingent’s own country.

In late September 1993, the UNOSOM II civilian staff and humanitarian relief organizations and development agencies began to recognize the need to integrate civil and military operations. Force Command, in conjunction with the Humanitarian Division, began planning and coordinating limited civil military operations. Force Command planners developed and implemented a “Food for Work” program to repair the main streets in Mogadishu. Both of these were well received by the Somalis and significantly improved relations between the military and local community. In addition, Force Command also worked closely with local clan elders to identify infrastructure development projects that would best meet the needs of the various regions.

RECOMMENDATION: Future OOTW operations involving U.S. troops should include a robust CA capability. In addition, the United Nations should be encouraged to include a CA staff planning capability in the structure of its Chapter VII forces.

Logistics

1. LESSON: Requirements for logistical units to provide for their own security in a Chapter VII operation can significantly reduce their ability to provide adequate logistics support.

DISCUSSION: The USLSC did not have sufficient force to simultaneously provide adequate security for its base and convoys, and still meet its logistics support mission requirements. The commander used his organic transportation and engineer assets to perform this security function. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that transport units deployed to Somalia manned at ALO 3. This reduced manning level and the requirement to provide for its own defense limited USLSC’s transport capability by over 50%, and for periods of time brought engineer operations to a halt.

RECOMMENDATION: Support Groups deployed to support Chapter VII operations should deploy at ALO 1, and be tailored to simultaneously execute both their logistics and security missions. The German logistics force, which deployed with an attached infantry company, is an appropriate model.
2. LESSON: Diversion of CSS personnel in an austere theater of operations ultimately places a heavy burden on all aspects of the support mission.

DISCUSSION: The U.S. inherited the material distribution mission for the coalition forces after the transfer to UNOSOM II. The Movement Control Center (MOVCON) personnel micro-managed transportation equipment, particularly requirements for large trucks, since the U.S. had the only heavy truck hauling capability in the theater. The Corps Support Group (CSG) had to augment the transportation unit with 180 drivers from CONUS bases, due to the added responsibilities of moving supplies to more units at greater distances than had been anticipated or planned for. The unimproved roads placed great stress on drivers, heavy equipment and the supply lines.

By late June 1993, it was obvious that the growing UN force, its expanding operations, and the necessity to divert combat service support soldiers to force security tasks would require the UNLSC to request additional CSS transportation personnel. The UN had clearly declared its intention to expand operations in March and April. Despite the Terms of Reference and CINCENT’s expressed intent in CENTCOM OPORD Serial 001, UNOSOM support requirements for daily operations from June through August, and the increasing commitment of CSS soldiers to force protection tasks, resulted in a shortage of equipment operators and other unit personnel in logistics support units. Although the LOGCAP contractor, Brown and Root Corp., was present, the contract to expand its operations was not finalized before the critical need for additional transportation developed. DEPCOMUSFORSOM/COMUNLSC decided to retain rather than redeploy trucks with the 43rd CSG. Additional truck drivers were deployed to Somalia to compensate for the CSG’s diverted manpower. Their decisions significantly improved the UNLSC’s ability to provide long haul capability to Baidoa, Bardera, Marka, and other outlying nodes. When the Irish Truck Company arrived and was subordinated to the LSC, the southern burden was reduced.

RECOMMENDATION: CSS units must deploy into theater with the capability, (personnel and equipment), to conduct their support mission. Force protection is a serious matter. It must be planned for prior to deployment into a hostile theater of operations and not left to ad hoc arrangements involving diverted logistics personnel once deployed.

3. LESSON: U.S. forces should not rely upon the UN to sustain the force and should continue to plan for worse case logistics scenarios, particularly in an austere theater of operations.

DISCUSSION: The UN, using terms of agreement drawn up between themselves and a commodity provider, would contract for logistical support from host nation or coalition forces. Contracting officers bought the cheapest products, not necessarily the best products. The standards for shipping materials from host nations and coalition forces caused many delays in handling, i.e., weak pallets and faulty strapping. Contracting agents did not follow regulations, guidelines and stipulations for purchasing materials for the mission. These procedures cover goods for soldier consumption, also packaging, palletizing and containerization of material for efficient handling at all levels of transport. The UN needs a standard to effectively provide distribution to coalition forces.

Although Germany, Korea, Ireland and Sweden provided logistics units, USFORSOM provided all wholesale services. The U.S. logistical system buffered both U.S. forces and on occasion UN forces from the vagaries inherent in the UN procurement, maintenance and supply, and feeding methods. The U.S. contingent of the UNLSC was asked on a number of occasions to provide support that the UN could not and to assist when the UN procurement system broke down. Consequently, when UN orders for concertina wire were filled, and pallets of useless wire, without barbs, appeared on the Mogadishu docks, coalition partners turned to the U.S. to provide essential concertina wire. The U.S. also provided other badly needed material the UN was slow to acquire, such as sandbags and flares. Finally, the USFORSOM staff made a major effort to determine whether the UN initiative to contract feeding to the force was suitable for U.S.
soldiers. After extensive study and discussion with USCENTCOM and USARCENT, COMUSFORSON determined that the U.S. would not participate. Initial problems with the system justified U.S. concerns.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The U.S. must be prepared to not only sustain its own force, but coalition partners as well when the UN cannot deliver essential support.

4. **LESSON:** Property accountability needs high visibility and supply discipline is a requirement, particularly in a hostile theater of operations.

**DISCUSSION:** Property accountability in the theater was a continuing problem. Units deploying into the TOA did not bring automated download or hand receipts of property book items. This degraded the Theater Property Book Officers’ ability to provide the Theater Commander vital property book information.

Second, the UNOSOM II U4 would not honor requisitions processed by U.S. forces, because the material was deemed too costly, or not considered usable by all coalition forces. To alleviate this problem, coalition forces processed all requisitions through the U4 prior to submitting them to the supply support activity.

Third, once U.S. equipment is in the hands of coalition forces, it is extremely difficult to account for and recover. Retrieving this equipment from coalition forces can have an effect on side-by-side relationships. A UN PBO could not be found to reconcile equipment when it was being issued to coalition forces so it became difficult, if not impossible, to later establish the value of the equipment at time of transfer. The Theater Property Book Officer (TPBO) estimated several million dollars would be lost through waste, malutilization, and unaccountable equipment.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Continue to enforce regulations regarding property accountability. Encourage the UN to establish a property accountability system for all coalition forces receiving UN equipment and property.

5. **LESSON:** The U.S. must always plan to depend upon its own proven logistical supply methods.

**DISCUSSION:** UNOSOM required all Class II, III, and IV requisitions from all coalition forces to pass through the U4 for cost considerations. This was a manual process. The U4 purchased material from the “lowest bidder”. One case in point was 30-weight motor oil. U.S. analysis showed the use of this oil would adversely affect end items. The U.S. command made the decision not to use the oil. Class IV material was difficult to obtain and virtually non-existent in country. Units did not deploy with a class IV ASL anticipating that it would be available through host nation support. U4 contracted for this material from the lowest bidder, and material was not standard, e.g., sandbags were of various sizes and made of different materials.

To say that the UN procurement system is broken is incorrect; the UN has no system. U.S. procurement worked because of effective communications between the direct support managers in Somalia and the general support activities in CONUS. In contrast, the UN has no logistical backup system for field operating activities. The UN has no supply warehouses; they have no stock numbers to order items. The sandbag example is symptomatic of a systemic failure within the UN methodology. When water was ordered, there was no way to tell when it would arrive. When it did arrive, it was not containerized and had to be handled by hand. Some plastic bottles were so thin that the shipment suffered 50% losses. In some instances, water draining out of the boxes flooded electronic parts stacked below the water bottles. The UN started the inventory at the port warehouse; losses between the ship and the warehouse were significant. Other more graphic UNOSOM II examples abound: tons of barbed wire arrived, but without the barbs, just the wire; over 100 4-wheel drive vehicles arrived, but the tire changing tools would not release the spare tire (it was necessary to tear open an access port).
CINCCENT directed USFORSOM to leave significant equipment assets for the LOGCAP contractor, Brown and Root Corporation, to continue the UN support. This Government furnished equipment (GFE) will remain in country, and may eventually be leased or purchased by the UN as an alternative to redeploying it to CONUS. The LOGCAP contractor alternative to U.S. Forces poses some difficulties. The contractor has always required military security; the CSG provided it until U.S. Forces began to withdraw, then the Bangladesh contingent was tasked to provide English speaking guards. The contractor was not directly accountable to the local commanders; instead, local managers responded to priorities and tried to fill them. Equipment maintenance requires continued U.S. support. Retrograde of equipment will be at issue until the UN commits to either buying or leasing it indefinitely.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The UN should develop a standard, automated system for requesting material. U.S. units deploying to areas where the infrastructure is poor should deploy with the understanding that items such as class IV, force protection materiel, will have to come from U.S. sources. U.S. units should not rely on UN or host nation support during the early periods of a deployment.

**6. LESSON:** Graves registration support is essential in Chapter VII operations. In chapter VII operations where the U.S. has the lead or has a significant force deployed, we must be prepared to assist other coalition partners in this important battlefield function.

**DISCUSSION:** Graves Registration GRREG Support - Within the theater of operation, only U.S. forces have a systematic method of providing GRREG. The other UN forces were not prepared nor equipped to take action dealing with GRREG. Quite often the U.S. forces had to help in the accomplishment of matters pertaining to GRREG. This included the identification, removal of remains, and collection and processing of their effects for the coalition forces.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Continue to deploy with grave registration assets to support the force in Chapter VII operations. OSD should develop clear guidance on accounting procedures for support provided to coalition forces during UN operations. Deployed GRREG units should capture and report costs. OSD should handle reimbursement procedures.

**7. LESSON:** Sustainment of U.S. leased equipment for UN operations requires review.

**DISCUSSION:** Prior to U.S. redeployment from Somalia in March 1994, the U.S. leased a significant amount of equipment to the UN including 8 Cobra helicopters, 30 M60 Tanks, 80 M113 APCs, 143 pieces of wheeled stock and miscellaneous support equipment. This equipment was provided with only 90 days of spare parts based on a UN plan to establish a separate Letter of Assist (LOA) with the U.S. for a spares ordering agreement. The Byrd Amendment prohibits the U.S. from providing any support for the UN or Somalia without an advanced payment of funds. Although the UN has recently agreed to provide advance funds, it has not yet done so. Bottom line is that loaned or leased U.S. equipment has been in Somalia for over 2 months without an adequate sustainment base. Concerns are:

1. U.S. equipment is required to fill a capability void in UNOSOM II and ensure the continued success of UNOSOM II. Sustainment and adequate maintenance capability of this equipment is in the best interest of the U.S.

2. The longer this equipment is operated without an adequate sustainment base, the greater the risk of catastrophic loss.

3. Equipment will ultimately be returned to U.S. for use by U.S. or other coalition forces in a condition that could cause it to be scrapped.
RECOMMENDATION: That JCS-ILD in conjunction with Department of State should mandate the purchase of a full sustainment package as a pre-condition to future leases/loans of U.S. equipment.

8. LESSON: Availability of OCIE (Organizational clothing and individual equipment) in theater.

DISCUSSION: There was no system in theater to replace lost/damaged/destroyed OCIE. Units deployed without any overage of OCIE and there was no capability to receive, issue and store OCIE. Equipment was replaced through ordering from the States or via supply sergeants who happened to deploy with some excess OCIE items.

RECOMMENDATION: The supporting logistics units should carry a minimum set percent of designated OCIE items with them when deploying.

9. LESSON: U.S. forces in Somalia experienced difficulties in obtaining UN reimbursements for support provided to UNOSOM II forces.

DISCUSSION: U.S. forces had limited experience with the complicated and cumbersome UN reimbursement procedures. In broad terms, reimbursement required prior authorization from the UN in terms of a Letter of Assist issued from UN Headquarters to the U.S. Government, and a certification in the field that the support was provided. Lack of experience resulted in inadequate documentation and led ultimately to denial of legitimate reimbursements.

The process was complicated by the Terms of Reference (TOR), which placed the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and other U.S. forces outside of UN control in a non-reimbursable status. Since both “blue-hatted” and “non-blue-hatted” forces were supported by the UN Logistics Support Command, reimbursable and non-reimbursable support requests could not always be identified and handled appropriately. The UN refused to pay for support to “non-blue-hatted” forces.

Clear guidance was issued to USFORSOM regarding reimbursement procedures. Conflicting guidance on specific problems was issued by a number of agencies (Joint Staff, Army Staff, USCENTCOM, and USFORSCOM). As a result of conflicting guidance and inadequate experience, staffs in Somalia expended considerable energy for little or no results.

Letters of Assist issued to the U.S. were vague and ambiguous. The U.S. was asked to provide Class III, VIII, and IX support “on a limited basis.” “Limited basis” was never defined to forces in the field.

RECOMMENDATION: OSD and the Army Staff develop clear, unambiguous guidance for field commanders and staff on accounting procedures during UN operations. Deployed forces should only be concerned with capturing and reporting cost data, not whether such costs are allowable. OSD and the Army Staff should be familiar with UN reimbursement procedures and Letter of Assist status so as to develop adequate accounting guidance.

Whenever possible, the U.S. should assign all forces in the UN mission area in a single status to simplify accounting.

Mission requirements to deployed forces should be in the form of an order, not via a Letter of Assist.

Medical Support of UNOSOM

1. LESSON: Enhanced communications capabilities are required for medical forces in an austere theater of operation.
DISCUSSION: Communications with the U.S. Navy medical facilities offshore proved extremely difficult. AM radio provided the most reliable means of communication with the supporting Naval forces offshore. This was particularly critical during a mass casualty situation, where immediate coordination for the transfer of casualties was necessary.

In order to save valuable time, it is imperative to communicate immediately and directly with the casualty receiving ship. This alerts the deck crew to clear a space for the incoming wounded, as well as alerting the litter teams and medical personnel of the inbound MEDEVAC.

RECOMMENDATION: Establish compatible means of communications between the Army and Navy medical forces. Exchange reliable liaison personnel between the services for the duration of the operation. Keep all support elements aware of operational planning.

2. LESSON: A field hospital that supports an expedition or a humanitarian aid mission similar to Operation CONTINUE HOPe-Somalia has much broader requirements than any single field hospital now in the TO&E.

DISCUSSION: The combat support hospital deployed in Somalia was required to perform numerous activities usually associated with echelon V facilities. For all Somali civilians and many coalition force soldiers, the 46 Combat Support Hospital (CSH) was not a station along an evacuation trail, but the institute of last resort. In order to function effectively in this role, numerous highly sophisticated diagnostic devices such as arthroscopy and endoscopy sets were necessary. Additionally, there was the need for more definitive orthopedic equipment as well as specialized surgical packs.

RECOMMENDATION: The AMEDD should review and assess requirements to supplement or to complement the current deployable medical units to improve capabilities to support humanitarian aid missions.

3. LESSON: The medical personnel deployed must be able to practice trauma care as a team immediately after arriving on station.

DISCUSSION: One of the most important aspects of trauma care is speed. Economy of motion and teamwork are both essential to trauma medicine. Most Professional Filler System (PROFIS) personnel do not have sufficient experience in trauma care and few, if any, have ever worked together.

When there are no U.S. casualties requiring treatment and major operations are not planned or underway, the field hospital should treat coalition force members or civilians. The minimal outlay in terms of equipment and bed space are more than adequately returned by the wealth of experience gained by the treatment of real trauma patients. There is absolutely no substitute for actual hands-on trauma medicine training.

RECOMMENDATION: AMEDD doctrine be revised to indicate that deployed field hospitals begin treating real world casualties immediately upon arrival in country, and to continue to do so in the absence of U.S. casualties.

4. LESSON: The Professional Filler System (PROFIS) system is unreliable.

DISCUSSION: Prior to the 46th CSH being deployed to Somalia, the unit had approximately 96% assigned to the unit’s PROFIS roster. As soon as the unit was alerted, the PROFIS roster immediately fell to 48-50% assigned. The current system allows for individual negotiating and local deletions from the PROFIS roster. This unnecessary delay in identifying medical fillers caused a severe detriment to the unit’s readiness status. The 46th CSH had no idea of the quality of the pro-
fessional staff nor had the opportunity to train with the clinicians or nursing personnel. A personnel readiness exercise is literally impossible to conduct, if those identified prior to a deployment are changed, and those that show up are unprepared and unfamiliar with the unit’s equipment, personnel and mission.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Centrally manage the PROFIS system to ensure its reliability and eliminate last minute deletion of medical fillers. Ensure PROFIS units train and work together on a periodic basis to build cohesion and improve readiness.

5. **LESSON:** Excess rations must be identified as early as possible when an operation is drawing down.

**DISCUSSION:** The identification of excess rations by the J4 is vital for proper disposition. This allows the Veterinary Food Inspectors to work with the theater logisticians and to determine the disposition of the rations while still in theater. This coordination will ensure the retrograde of acceptable or consumable rations and will save the cost of transporting either distressed rations (for sale or for humanitarian aid) or condemned rations (requiring destruction).

There were significant amounts of excess rations that should not have been returned to CONUS. The rations which are retrograded should be sent to specific installations for use rather than to a depot for further storage.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Inspection of excess rations should be performed in theater and completed at least 60 days prior to cessation of operations.

6. **LESSON:** UN food contracts did not require procurement of food items from approved sources.

**DISCUSSION:** UNOSOM II, United Rations Operations Somalia, solicited bids for a private caterer to provide three A-ration meals daily to all forces in theater. There were no requirements for inspecting the food sources nor did they meet U.S. or comparable standards for approved food establishments used by U.S. personnel. Due to the purchase from non-approved sources of supply, the quality and wholesomeness of food served to U.S. forces could not be guaranteed.

For joint UN and U.S. forces operations, early input by the Veterinary Food Inspector concerning all food contracts is vital for the health of the force. The consumption of food from only approved food sources, as approved by the veterinary inspectores, will help to eliminate potential health risks associated with the consumption of unfit food. In return this will contribute to maintaining the health of the force.

**RECOMMENDATION:** The U.S. must have official input early in the deployment phase concerning all UN food contracts when supporting U.S. troops. Insist that all food procured meet U.S. standards.

7. **LESSON:** UN HIV policy placed UNOSOM medical and other personnel at risk of contracting the AIDS virus.

**DISCUSSION:** The UN did not require coalition forces to screen their units for HIV prior to deployment to Somalia. As a result, Medical personnel may have been unknowingly exposed to the HIV virus while treating combat casualties.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Medical personnel should expect to confront a similar situation in future coalition operations, and take appropriate precautions.
1. LESSON: The United Nations is not prepared to manage an appropriate public affairs campaign to support Chapter VII operations.

DISCUSSION: The United Nations Public Information Office is not organized, staffed, resourced, or trained to develop and manage an appropriate public affairs strategy in support of Chapter VII operations. The focus of UN public affairs is that of providing information. It essentially develops and publishes pamphlets and booklets designed to inform the public about the organization and its programs. The United Nations has never had to develop and implement a media plan to manage the press and get out the appropriate message to support its operations. Consequently, instead of getting out the positive side of UN operations in Somalia, the press focused world attention on the violence and horrors of combat operations in Mogadishu. The U.S. Department of Defense has acquired a significant amount of experience in developing an appropriate public affairs campaign and media management plan to support military operations of U.S. forces. Much of that experience is applicable to Chapter VII operations.

RECOMMENDATION: The U.S. should consider assisting the UN in developing appropriate procedures, training programs and strategies for public affairs programs to support future Chapter VII operations. Until this has been accomplished, the U.S. Government should actively seek and fill Public Affairs positions on UN staffs when U.S. troops have been committed to UN Chapter VII operations. These staff officers should be permitted to participate to the full extent possible to support the UN public affairs program. In addition, the Department of Defense should develop an appropriate public affairs strategy to parallel and supplement the UN’s when appropriate.

2. LESSON: A joint organization, along the lines of an information bureau and capable of providing a public affairs capability to support U.S. forces is required in peace operations. This applies to operations led by the U.S. or those in which U.S. forces may generate newsworthy interest.

DISCUSSION: Under UNOSOM II staffing between March and October 1993, the meager public affairs staff was forced to deal exclusively with media operations and reactive damage control. Concern was expressed about a U.S. officer being the UNOSOM II military spokesman. There was no alternative available as no other qualified UN officer existed. The public affairs effort would have been completely haphazard without this talented officer’s work and would have been more detrimental to both the UN and the U.S. The public affairs officer, a U.S. Army major, was charged to explain to upwards of 70 national and international news media, the doings of a 25,000-member, 25-country coalition. Despite a heroic effort and attitude, he was by necessity bound to the UNOSOM II headquarters and was hampered by a lack of transportation, a lack of support staff, a lack of facilities and a lack of equipment. That he held out so well for so long speaks to the officer’s professionalism.

In October, a 35-person Joint Information Bureau was deployed, initially to support the Joint Task Force, Somalia, and ultimately, in support of all U.S. Forces in Somalia. The organization was further augmented with a two-person Joint Visitors Bureau, which was employed to coordinate visits of senior U.S. military and civilian officials to the theater. The Joint Information Bureau gave the COMUSFOR-SOM the means to be proactive in his approach to media relations; it also provided a significant capability to disseminate command information throughout U.S. Forces. The Joint Information Bureau deployed with a full range of equipment, including faxes, computers, vehicles and supplies. It is clear that even a reduced capability of this kind would have greatly assisted that single UNOSOM II PAO during the summer of 1993.

In actuality, the bulk of news coming from the theater during the summer reflected the combat operations of the Quick Reaction Force and to a lesser extent the operations of coalition forces. An appropriate American-staffed JIB could have proactively countered adverse publicity during such operations.
as the search and clear operations near the University Compound in July, the Task Force Ranger operations in August and September, and other American contributions toward the UNOSOM II mission. Also, a JIB-like organization could have supported U.S. national media pools and could have provided a seamless transition to the JTF, Somalia phase of the operation. That organization would have provided a cadre of experienced public affairs personnel for further expansion. Additionally, with nearly 5000 American troops in theater, a greatly expanded command information effort was sorely needed.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Whenever significant U.S. forces are stationed in a theater of operations as part of a OOTW mission or the bulk of newsworthy interest is expected to be generated by American forces, a U.S. Joint Information Bureau should be employed. Further the JIB should have the staffing, equipment, and capability for immediate and continuous operation.

3. **LESSON:** An organization dedicated to the coordination and support for visits by senior U.S. military and civilian officials is mandatory.

**DISCUSSION:** Immediately after the events of 3 and 4 October and the subsequent deployment of Joint Task Force, Somalia, UNOSOM found itself faced with a growing number of official visitors. In any such situation, the number of requested visitors would be inversely proportional to the threat situation. A central clearing house for in country clearances and an office which would coordinate visits of senior officials became mandatory. The deployment of a two-person Joint Visitors Bureau resulted in the successful visits of more than 20 senior officials and preparation of country clearances for 323 other visitors. This team of officers centralized an effort that before their arrival had been parcelled out to staff sections which were faced with other pressing duties.

**RECOMMENDATION:** A small Joint Visitors Bureau should be deployed if the U.S. makes a significant contribution to a United Nations operation. The size of the JVB should be regulated by the number of anticipated visitors and the threat situation.

**USFORSiOM Redeployment**

1. **LESSON:** Directing the use of JOPES for planning deployments and redeployments requires unit level movement officers knowledgeable in JOPES.

**DISCUSSION:** U.S. Central Command directed the use of JOPES for all redeployment activities. To use JOPES three elements are required: ADP Hardware, to include the required communications circuits; JOPES software, to include permissions to enter and modify data in the TPFDD; and personnel trained in the use of JOPES. These conditions did not exist in theater until early December 1993 when U.S. Central Command deployed a team to theater.

Combined with the lack of JOPES or WWMCCS availability, unit movement officers (UMOs) lacked a basic working knowledge of how a TPFDD was actually constructed or how strategic transportation requirements were validated. Many units required their UMOs to be proficient in air load planning and some were even proficient in certifying hazardous cargo for shipment aboard aircraft. However, no unit except TF 24, a U.S. Army Port Terminal Operations Unit, had the required proficiency in shipload planning or certifying hazardous cargo for transport by sea vessel. Not one UMO at the battalion, squadron, or separate detachment level was familiar with how to enter data into a TPFDD. Also, no UMO was knowledgeable of the validation requirements to match lift requirements with transportation assets.

This uniform lack of knowledge frustrated the planning and execution of the redeployment. Units did not understand the relationship between the data required to construct a TPFDD and the system for requesting lift assets. This resulted in numerous “in-the-window” validation changes and misunder-
standings about exactly how equipment and personnel were to arrive at home station. While these changes were manageable, they complicated and added to the workload of the small JOPES team.

Currently, UMO training programs in the U.S. Army do not include training in sea movement planning or the use of the TPFDD-JOPES management system. This training is only conducted for transportation units or for selected officers assigned major army commands or higher.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Certify unit movement officers at the battalion, squadron, and separate detachment level to provide proper input data to the TPFDD and assist in planning sea movements as well as air movements.

**2. LESSON:** Redeployment Planning should begin before the operation begins.

**DISCUSSION:** Nowhere in any Joint or Service Doctrine is there a requirement or even mention of planning for or considering redeployment as part of OPLAN development or deployment process. Winning or successfully completing an operation is the first and only concern of the Warfighting Commander-in-Chief. While it is difficult to conceive of how to redeploy without a solid end-state to build upon, there are some critical redeployment elements that should be considered before operations begin. What agency within the area of responsibility will be accountable to the Commander for building the redeployment TPFDD? Along with that responsibility, where is the location of its headquarters? Where will the equipment, software, and JOPES trained personnel come from?

Who will retain the validation authority for redeployment? Along with that authority is a description of the criteria for determining the mode of transportation. In an increasingly conscious military operating environment, decisions about which equipment and personnel will fly and which will sail becomes increasingly important. This can be a critical element if multiple contingencies arise requiring inter-theater transfers.

A viable tool for integrating redeployment into an Operation or OPLAN would be to establish the event or point in time when R-day begins. This trigger point for redeployment would focus inter and intra theater agencies on when they must begin marshaling activities.

Rapid redeployment will be a critical element for a military built upon force projection. Additionally, rapid redeployment provides not only a way to bring the troops home for a proper welcome, but it serves as a key element of national security strategy by returning the force to full readiness rapidly.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Every OPLAN should have a redeployment annex that describes at a minimum: responsibility for managing the redeployment PID, validation authority for redeployment, and the transition point between C-day and R-day.

**3. LESSON:** TCACCIS and JOPES are not connected.

**DISCUSSION:** TCACCIS uses the same information required for input at Level-IV (F11W-Report) to a TPFDD. Units must input the data into each system separately. TCACCIS produces a bar-code label for application to an item of equipment.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Develop TCACCIS software to input Level-IV detail to the TPFDD.

**U.S. CONTINGENT SUPPORT**

**1. LESSON:** U.S. contingents assigned (PCS) to UN staffs for Chapter VII operations require a U.S. source for administrative support.
DISCUSSION: The U.S. contingent for UNOSOM II had no in-theater personnel to provide administrative and finance support. Service members arriving in theater had problems with pay transactions such as Imminent Danger Pay and Family Separation Allowance. There was no servicing finance center to assist in the timely processing of appropriate pay transactions. In addition, there was no servicing personnel center to assist in routine actions such as updating ORB’s, processing DA 31s, 4187s or OERs and NCOERs. Appropriate forms for personnel and finance transactions were also not readily available to support U.S. contingent personnel in-theater. Army and Air Force personnel assigned to the UNOSOM II Personnel Section performed double duty as UN staff members, and as the personnel and administration section for the U.S. contingent. Although not the servicing finance center for U.S. contingent personnel’s finance records, the finance section supporting the U.S. Logistics Support Command (LSC) assisted the U.S. contingent in resolving pay problems. However, they were limited in the support they could provide.

RECOMMENDATION: Measures should be taken to ensure that large U.S. contingents assigned for duty with the United Nations on a PCS basis receive adequate personnel administration and finance support. This could be provided through routine visits by personnel administration and finance personnel to the theater from the headquarters to which they are assigned (monthly or quarterly visits would be appropriate).

2. LESSON: Tour lengths for U.S. personnel assigned to UN staffs in Chapter VII operations require careful consideration.

DISCUSSION: The UN standard for tour lengths for any assignment in a UN Mission is 6 months. All countries with personnel on the UN staff except the U.S., Italy and Australia (initially) assigned their personnel for a period of 6 months. Due to the conditions in the Somalia Theater, Australia also reduced their tour length to 6 months. With the exception of some key personnel, 6 month tours proved adequate for continuity and staff rotation.

RECOMMENDATION: Tour lengths should be set based on the conditions of the UN mission. With the exception of selected key personnel, the U.S. should strongly consider limiting staff assignments to Chapter VII missions to six months. Key personnel should continue to be assigned PCS for a period of up to one year.
CHAPTER II
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the major lessons learned and implications for U.S. and UN participation in future Chapter VII operations.

Reality of Chapter VII Operations

Chapter VII operations are forcible, armed interventions which are most severely tested in chaotic “failed nation state” situations. UN forces will often be uninvited by the internal parties. Their presence may be resented, and, in some cases, violently opposed by some of the belligerents. UN traditions of impartiality and strict neutrality may be incompatible with peace enforcement operations. Until the conditions are right for political reconciliation, the UN force may have no choice other than to take action against one or more belligerents openly opposed to UN presence. It is highly likely that UN military forces will be tested by one or more belligerents. Such interventions will always require forces prepared and equipped to conduct combat operations, for deterrence, force protection, and to enforce the mandate.

Nations participating in peace enforcement operations must be committed to stay the course; deal with the inherent potential for violence, and accept the fact that casualties may result from combat operations. This will be true regardless of any humanitarian aspects of the mission. In the “failed nation state,” the humanitarian effort is only the initial phase in a mission designed to provide viable political and social institutions required for nation building. Facilitating political renewal can be a long-term process. As the mission progresses, the humanitarian component will find itself supporting the more complex tasks related to nation building activities. This evolution may tend to highlight the more volatile areas of political reconciliation and long term economic development. The attendant shift from humanitarian relief which benefitted all parties, to humanitarian development, which could appear to favor some elements, could alienate one or more of the internal parties. The shift could create an increasingly dangerous environment for all forces and organizations identified with the intervention.

Much more work needs to be done to educate the American public and Congress on the risks involved in peace enforcement operations. U.S. doctrine categorizes peace enforcement as an “operation other than war (OOTW).” The definitions for OOTW are currently misleading and should be revised. Peace enforcement operations do not fit the environment described in FM 100-5 as one “that may not involve combat.” More accurately, in a Chapter VII, peace enforcement operation, combat should be anticipated and prepared for. Our own doctrine should acknowledge peace enforcement as a combat operation falling along the continuum of military operations depending on the threat expected.

Future U.S. Participation

The most important lesson of OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE is that the United Nations is not properly constituted to lead a coalition Chapter VII intervention at this time. It is arguable whether sufficient reforms can be achieved to allow it to do so in any mode other than through a lead nation or established alliance. For the immediate future, Chapter VII operations sanctioned and funded by the UN should be led by a single nation or an established military alliance. DESERT SHIELD/STORM may be a model for such interventions.

The Security Council should provide mandates with clearly defined, realistic political and military objectives, an achievable end state and a viable exit or hand-off strategy. It should then designate a nation or alliance to lead the operation. The Secretary General with his staff should work to gain inter-
national consensus for the operation and solicit national contributions. The lead nation or alliance should execute the mission frequently reporting progress in the achievement of mandate objectives and tasks to the Security Council. In such single nation or alliance led operations, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) should act as a liaison between the lead nation or the alliance and the UN to coordinate support from UN agencies and identify impediments to that support.

Challenges for the UN

Single nation or alliance led UN interventions may not be practical in the long term. Therefore, the community of nations should carefully examine the challenges the UN faced in Somalia and seek reforms that would enable the UN to lead such an operation in the future.

The collapse of central authority in Somalia, a lingering civil war, and the effects on the Somali people of widespread displacement and starvation presented new and unfamiliar challenges to the United Nations whose previous experience had been limited to Chapter VI operations. The establishment and management of a Chapter VII coalition force representing 28 nations highlighted significant deficiencies in procedures and structures developed over nearly forty years of Chapter VI operations. The civilian component of the UN operation, never fully staffed, was unable to provide the effective, integrated humanitarian, political, and security direction required for success in peace enforcement operations. On the administrative side, the elaborate procedures developed over time to support Chapter VI operations proved to be unsuitable for the demands of fast-moving political, economic (humanitarian) and military operations in a frequently hostile Chapter VII environment.

Peace enforcement operations, such as Somalia, remind us that the UN is not a sovereign nation. The Secretary-General serves the Security Council; he may have his own agenda, but he must first achieve consensus and then obtain a mandate before he can act. He has no direct control over the activities of UN specialized agencies, a situation that inhibits establishing unity of effort and command and control as understood by the U.S. Lacking authority to establish policies and to direct UN agencies in country, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) must, therefore, serve at various times as head of mission, administrator, international fund-raiser, and negotiator with donor nations and international developmental and relief agencies.

The deficiencies of the UN's organizational culture and bureaucratic processes are most apparent in the coordination of military operations. At the highest level, United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) are mandates which represent a consensus of participating Security Council members. UNSCRs, by their very nature, require significant interpretation before their broad statements of purpose yield military objectives and conditions for determining an end state for the intervention. Contributing nations subsequently negotiate their participation in UN operations bilaterally with the United Nations. The UN invariably compromises on mandate provisions and individual member states' participation, equipping, and missions. All member nations - not just the U.S. - are notably reluctant to grant UN force commanders full authority over national military contingents. Each of these intrinsic problem areas affected the Somalia operation.

There are also deficiencies in the UN headquarters structure itself that inhibit its ability to manage the many competing demands of a Chapter VII operation. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) - 25 provides initiatives which would substantially improve the UN's capability to conduct Chapter VII missions in the future. The initiatives are directed at methods to strengthen UN management and direct U.S. support for strengthening the UN's planning, logistics, information, and command and control capabilities. The U.S. should continue to examine and identify impediments to UN reform, recommend solutions, and act in concert with like-minded nations to eliminate them. The U.S. should still selectively contribute unique capabilities to UN-led Chapter VI operations to enhance their probability for success and to broaden the experience base of the U.S. military in UN peace operations. Such a policy will help to
ensure that the U.S. remains an active participant in the development and refinement of multi-national peace operation doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. However, until the essential Presidential Decision Directive-25 initiatives are adopted by the UN leadership, the U.S. should limit its participation in Chapter VII operations to U.S. led coalitions (i.e., UNITAF and DESERT SHIELD/STORM) or to participation with competent regional organizations such as NATO.

There is no substitute in Chapter VII operations for strong and imaginative leadership by both the designated Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Force Commander. Therefore, U.S. participation in the identification and designation of the SRSG and senior military leadership is an essential step to create conditions for success. There may be situations where the U.S. government wants to provide one or both of the senior leaders in a Chapter VII operation to underscore U.S. commitment. However, each circumstance and mission is unique. Appointment of both a prominent U.S. civilian and a senior military officer to lead a peace enforcement operation could create the perception that the U.S. alone is calling the shots. This perception could adversely affect the spirit of cooperation among the various national military components.

Just as Somalia produced many valuable but sometimes painful insights for each participant, the experiences of the UNOSOM II Chapter VII coalition operation had a substantial effect on the United Nations’ leadership. There are indications that the institution is gradually adapting to the special requirements of Chapter VII operations. But specific initiatives to increase UN capability and provide a reasonable assurance of mission success—such as outlined in PDD-25—must be implemented before the U.S. considers participation in any future UN-led Chapter VII mission.

The Mandate Process

Besides institutional reforms, the world community must also review the UN procedures for initiating peace operations. The Security Council should clearly outline its objectives, end state conditions and intentions in resolutions directing Chapter VII operations. UNDPKO should develop and provide clear political, military, and economic (humanitarian) objectives for the Head of Mission and Force Commander based on the mandate outlined in the Security Council Resolution. UN Directorate for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) must also define a clear exit or hand-off strategy, as appropriate. UNDPKO is currently too understaffed to effectively perform this function. The U.S. should assist UN New York in the outline of objectives, end state conditions and intentions in new resolutions involving peace operations.

Presidential Decision Directive-25 provides criteria to the U.S. inter-agency process for determining when the U.S. should support or participate in UN peace operations. The criteria outlined in Presidential Decision Directive-25 should be weighed in deciding our votes on UN Security Council Resolutions. At a minimum, the decision process should include a clear analysis or assessment of the root causes and dynamics of the situation as well as the requirements for a successful operation. The review should ensure that mandates clearly define realistic political and military objectives, an achievable end state, and a viable exit or hand-off strategy. Every effort must be made to ensure end state and exit or hand-off strategies are realistic and not just politically expedient.

An Integrated Strategy

To accomplish mandate objectives, a Chapter VII operation requires a single integrated theater strategy that links the political, economic (humanitarian), geographic, and military elements of power in a coherent approach that establishes unity of effort. The SRSG, assisted by senior civilian and military staff members, should be responsible for developing and overseeing the execution of an integrated theater strategy for the Chapter VII operation. Senior staff members assigned this task must be identified and brought together as early in the process as possible.
This over-arching strategy is the basis for developing and supporting individual political, economic (humanitarian), and military strategies and operational plans. The SRSG should have the requisite authority to establish priorities for and task UN agencies. This is not possible given the current structure of the UN. Therefore to achieve unity of effort in executing an integrated strategy, the SRSG must emphasize a consensus and team building approach among UN developmental and relief agencies. At an early stage in the process of developing the theater strategy, those UN developmental and relief agencies and NGOs considered most appropriate to meeting strategic requirements should be actively drawn into consultation. At the discretion of the SRSG their inputs should be acknowledged and, to the maximum extent possible, incorporated into the final theater strategy.

**UN Command and Control**

There should be a process established to develop, gain and sustain consensus in the international community, especially with force contributing nations, on the military, political and economic (humanitarian) objectives and tasks to be undertaken by the designated Force Command. UNDPKO should create a mechanism in UN New York to review the strategic and operational direction of Chapter VII operations and of peace operations in a hostile environment. This mechanism could be in the form of a standing or consulting political-military committee that meets periodically to review all initiatives and progress especially when there is a major shift in strategic direction. The committee must be able to expeditiously resolve concerns of participating nations regarding the direction of operations or employment of their forces. It could also serve to obtain their views on the strategy.

Parallel lines of authority and communication among UN forces and their respective national authorities will exist and may cause command and control problems. In any future Chapter VII operation, such parallel lines of authority will be a reality for any force commander and should be anticipated. This underscores the importance of defining clear, achievable objectives, tasks in building a UN mandate and building a consensus on a coordinated strategy among contributing nations prior to the deployment of their forces to the theater of operation. It also emphasizes the need to try to avoid hasty course changes that prevent thorough policy assessment, mission analysis, and revaluation of a consensus among the contributing nations. This consensus building process should not limit the Force Commander’s discretionary authority to take necessary measures, to include offensive operations, to protect UN forces when threatened.

The United Nations must identify and adequately define the terms of the Force Commander’s authority in writing. Participating nations should accept the terms of the Force Commander’s authority prior to deployment into the mission area. It must, in every case, provide him the flexibility to task organize smaller contingents into major force formations.

The United Nations should identify and adequately define standard terms outlining acceptable command relationships among coalition forces. Participating nations should accept these standard terms prior to deployment into the mission area. Until command relationships are developed by the UN, sufficient time must be built into the planning process to permit negotiation and consensus building between the various forces.

In addition to reforms required for the UN, there are implications and lessons that should be reviewed to improve U.S. force participation in future peace operations.

**U.S. Command and Control**

Contradictions between published command relationships designed for USFORSOM and those intended and practiced may have clouded the lines of command and control among U.S. forces in theater. Standard command and control relationships described in our Joint doctrine (Joint Pub 1-02) are adequate for future Chapter VII operations. Terms of Reference (TOR) similar to those used in Somalia
can limit the role or employment of U.S. forces and ensure that the CINC or other appropriate U.S. military authority retains command during UN operations.

The U.S. command and control structure for peace operations should be tailored (sized, manned, and equipped) to command and control committed forces. The JTF staff model should be used for peace operations. It not only provides a robust capability, but also the necessary flexibility to size the staff to meet mission requirements through augmentation packages.

A JTF staff, designed to support peace operations, should have its core formed from a headquarters possessing the requisite operational level resources, doctrinal focus, training and seniority. Experience in Somalia has demonstrated that “ad hoc” staffs require a ramp up or preparation period that may not always be available.

To conduct OOTW, the doctrinal force headquarters, a JTF, by definition requires joint manning. The Joint Staff should develop a JTF staff manning model that standardizes the manning and training levels for all JTF staffs. The guidance set forth in Joint Publication 5-00.2 should be expanded to include specific guidance for the make up, structure and function of JTF staffs. The CJCS should consider creating an external evaluation program designed to train, assist and ensure CINC staffs have the ability to man, train, deploy and support a JTF headquarters.

**Title X Implications**

The U.S. experience in Somalia holds a number of implications for the military services in terms of force structure, doctrine, and training as well. The UN bureaucracy and world community demonstrated the capability to mobilize to relieve famine. But in Somalia, they have proven to be relatively ineffective and lethargic in providing the resources and expertise to rebuild a “failed nation state.” Military forces deployed to conduct peace operations, particularly Chapter VII peace enforcement, must possess the capability to conduct security operations and support “nation building.”

Civil affairs, PSYOP, and engineer forces were conspicuously absent in Somalia under UNOSOM II. Army and Joint force structure for these type forces, as well as military police, transportation, water production, air and sea port handling units and other combat service support forces to support peace operations should be examined. The bulk of these forces are also in the reserve component. In the case of Somalia, ready access to the reserves through partial call-up was either not considered or was determined to be “too hard” to do.

Increasing demands for military forces to support peace operations around the world and the declining Services’ force structure may indicate a need to reevaluate the base force. Requirements generated by OOTW for command and control headquarters and specialized combat support and combat service support forces could quickly consume active forces available for Major Regional Contingencies (MRC). The Joint staff may want to review its Illustrative Planning Scenarios used to determine the base force and factor peace operations in the scenario process.

While there is much work to be done in the area of force structure, doctrine and training appear to be a success story in OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE. However, the experience in Somalia highlights the need to ensure that we do not lose sight of the fact that peace operations can rapidly escalate into ground combat, including classic urban guerrilla warfare. We should ensure that our emerging doctrine on operations other than war incorporates our war fighting principles. In addition, we need to focus a portion of the doctrine on how to work within a coalition as a participant versus leadership role.

The success enjoyed by U.S. forces in Somalia can be directly attributed to the superior level of individual and collective training. The fundamental soldier skills which units routinely train in the execution
of their Mission Essential Task List (METL) training served our forces in Somalia very well. Collective training packages much like the training initiatives on-going at the Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) can serve as the model for building an easily exportable training program that a unit can execute quickly to assist in its train-up for an MOOTW mission.

Individual professional development and training for MOOTW missions should start at the very basic levels of military education with simple exposure to the concepts of MOOTW missions. The objective would be to familiarize our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and young officer leaders with the peculiarities of peace operations. This will help more senior leaders work through the leader challenges in peace operations where coalitions pose interpersonal challenges and operational restraint can be confusing to our soldiers.

In Somalia, our military leaders found themselves not only leading U.S. forces, but also building support among coalition forces, and helping Somalis re-establish social order and civil services at the local level. Our leader training should include skills such as consensus building, techniques to overcome coalition command and control problems, PSYOP, and civil affairs skills. *In no case should these additional requirements detract from the basic imperative that U.S. forces must be trained, equipped and prepared to win our nation’s wars.*

Somalia challenged our soldiers and leaders to perform simultaneously as humanitarians and as warriors. They clearly met that challenge. The average service man or woman today is intelligent, motivated and able to handle much of the complexity inherent in peace operations. We must continue to resource our services to recruit top quality men and women into our armed forces.

**Conclusion**

On 3 December 1992, the United Nations took an unprecedented step to resolve the problems of starvation, famine, and lawlessness in Somalia. It was the first attempt by the international community to deal with a new post-Cold War phenomenon referred to as the “failed nation state.” It was also the first attempt by the United Nations to execute a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation to execute the parameters of Security Council mandates. However, the “failed state” appears not to be a phenomenon but a trend for the near future.

The United States in its world leadership role may not be able or desire to avoid participation in operations that attempt to prevent, contain, or resolve similar conflicts. Properly constituted, peace operations can be a useful tool to advance United States national interests and pursue our security objectives. However, the U.S. cannot afford to participate as a lead nation in every instance, nor should it try. It is clearly in our interest to strengthen the UN’s capabilities to become an effective instrument for collective security. Presidential Decision Directive-25 initiatives are a start point to help put the UN on the correct footing. Lessons learned from UNOSOM II and specifically USFORSOM validate the need for these reforms. The U.S. should encourage similar initiatives from allies, friends, and others in the international community.

It is not in our interests to simply continue to criticize the United Nations for its shortcomings. What is in our interests is to provide constructive leadership and garner support to make this great institution a more effective tool for world peace and stability. Only then can the burdens of leadership be more equitably shared by the entire world community.