With Resolute and Thorough Planning:
Captain Meriwether
Lewis’ Preparations for the Journey to the Pacific Ocean
By Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Reardon
The saga of Lewis and Clark is much more than just a dramatic tale
of two Army officers who trekked across the American continent. That
tale began long before the first step of the journey took place and
involved a lengthy period of detailed preparation by the officer in
charge, Captain Meriwether Lewis, with the personal support and assistance
of the President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson. Lewis had been
charged by the President with paving the way westward for the future
expansion of the newly independent United States. With little information
available for detailed planning, the task before young Captain Lewis
was indeed a daunting one. One can only imagine the dozens of issues,
both large and small, which occupied Lewis’ thoughts as he prepared
to lead a squad of soldiers to the Pacific coast. Since Lewis did not
leave extensive notes on his preparations, this process has not previously
been discussed in detail.
It was fortunate for Captain Lewis that the President’s vision of westward
exploration was based on events spanning a decade or more in the past.
President Thomas Jefferson had long possessed a great interest, for
both practical and scientific reasons, in exploring the American west.
In 1783 he had asked Brigadier General George Rogers Clark to lead an
expedition to the Pacific, but Clark refused. Ten years later, Jefferson
helped raise money for a westward expedition by botanist Andre Michaux,
which was then canceled. In 1801 Jefferson’s interest in exploration
was once again awakened by the publication of a book by Alexander MacKenzie
in which he chronicled his adventures as the leader of a British expedition
searching for a water passage in Canada that stretched from the Atlantic
to the Pacific.
With the American Revolution a recent memory, President Jefferson did
not want Canadian fur trappers probing deeper and deeper into territory
the United States might seek to acquire. Should the British lay formal
claim to the Northwest Pacific, the newly independent United States
would be hemmed in on virtually all sides by European powers (the Spanish
to the south, French to the West, and British to the north and northwest).
Additionally, the British would gain exclusive rights to the lucrative
fur trapping industry in that region. Confronted by this disturbing
specter, President Jefferson summoned Captain Lewis to begin detailed
planning for an American expedition to the Pacific.
Jefferson’s choice of Lewis as the leader of an American expedition
to the Pacific coast reflects a mix of practicality, common sense, regional
alliances, and the turbulent political times in America at the turn
of the nineteenth century. Recent British expeditions along the Pacific
Coast by Captains James Cook and George Vancouver had convinced Jefferson
that modern exploration was best accomplished by combining the resources
and talents of both the military and scientific communities. Unlike
the British, Jefferson did not choose to rely on the U.S. Navy because
he wanted to explore deep into the interior of the North American continent.
As a result, the President turned to the U.S. Army.
Captain Meriwether Lewis was a native Virginian whose family was known
to Jefferson. Lewis was an ardent political supporter of the President,
which was a sought after quality in an Army then known for its political
opposition to Jefferson. As for his professional qualifications, Captain
Lewis had been a regimental paymaster whose duties took him to many
of the frontier posts in the Ohio Valley. Not only did he know the terrain
that the expedition would encounter in the initial phase of its journey,
but Lewis was also on friendly terms with many of the officers commanding
the forts. The deep personal trust that the President had in Lewis’
professional abilities was reflected by Jefferson’s selection of the
young officer as his personal military aide. Impressive qualifications
aside, planning for a trans-continental expedition would prove to be
a daunting task for a “mere” Captain of the First Infantry Regiment.
While his’ burden was somewhat lightened by the President’s involvement
and the unflagging support of Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, Lewis
knew he would be ultimately held responsible for the success or failure
of the expedition. He soon discovered that planning without concrete
information certainly did not make matters much easier, despite highly
placed supporters. His knowledge of the western expanses of the North
American continent was confined to the Ohio River valley. French and
Spanish troops prevented him from sending out patrols in advance of
the expedition to gather additional intelligence from beyond the Mississippi
River. As such, Lewis could not anticipate what he might encounter once
the expedition moved west of the supporting chain of American frontier
forts. He could only be sure of one thing: there was no way he could
summon help. Surrounded by Indians and wild animals, the success of
Lewis’ expedition would rest on his ability to predict unforeseen events
and plan accordingly.
Intent on discovering a water route to the Pacific that would support
commercial traffic, Jefferson and Lewis pored over every piece of published
data, to include Jean-Benjamin Francois Dumont de Montigny’s 1728 manuscript
“Plan of the Course of the Missouri River”, Antoine Soulard’s “Topographical
Sketch of the Upper Mississippi and the Missouri” dated 1795, as well
as Nicolas de Finiel’s “Map of a Part of the Course of the Mississippi
River” published in 1798. While these works did not form a complete
picture of the Pacific Northwest, the documents began to provide Lewis
with a rough idea of the best route from the Ohio Valley to a point
just east of the modern day Rockies.
Jefferson and Lewis shared the belief that a yet undiscovered water
route connecting the East to the West Coast existed. This theory was
largely based on a popular scientific notion touting the symmetrical
aspect of nature. If the Mississippi River bisected the North American
from North to South, then there must be a similar river running lengthwise
across the continent. No one knew, however, exactly how wide North America
was. Nor was there any reliable hydrological data that could aid the
expedition as it traveled by boat from the Ohio Valley to the Pacific
Ocean. Additionally, little was known about the characteristics of the
terrain bordering the rivers.
Political and logistical factors dictated the size of Lewis’ expedition
to the Pacific – in particular, the fact that the French controlled
the Louisiana territory, which stretched virtually from British controlled
Canada to New Orleans on the Gulf of Mexico. Lewis felt that a small
group (15 or less personnel) would have a better chance of getting through
undetected by the French than a larger expedition. Because a large group
would require a greater amount of supplies. By limiting the number of
men that would be accompanying him, Lewis would not have to employ a
flotilla of boats to carry supplies, which in turn meant that he would
be able to keep his operational “footprint” fairly small.
After much study, Lewis and Jefferson agreed upon a basic concept that
broke the expedition into four distinct phases. These phases included
initial preparatory efforts in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky;
a “shakedown” period at an army post in the Illinois Territory during
the first winter; movement west to the Pacific in the early spring;
and finally the return trip after spending the winter on the Pacific
coast. Midway through the expedition, Lewis also planned to send back
a detail bearing maps, specimens of newly discovered flora and fauna,
and a copy of is scientific observations to date. This prudent measure
would not only preclude a worst-case scenario in which all of the data
collected by Lewis were lost through an unexpected calamity, but it
would also reduce the expedition’s daily supply requirements as it drew
even further west of the Mississippi River.
As Lewis completed each preparatory task, he would meet with Jefferson
to conduct what would be called in modern terms “an After Action Review”.
Based on the President’s feedback, Lewis made adjustments to the draft
concept. For example, he originally intended to send the expedition
covertly through French Territory. In order to slip through the chain
of outposts along the Mississippi, Lewis limited his party to 15 men
because they could be carried aboard a single vessel. As the operational
concept began to mature, however, the size of the expedition had to
be increased to accommodate Jefferson’s desires. Fortunately for the
Americans, evolving political events soon permitted the expansion of
the expedition. In 1803, Thomas Jefferson successfully concluded the
Louisiana Purchase with Napoleon Bonaparte. With this strategic obstacle
removed, Lewis was only faced with logistical constraints as he adjusted
the plan to account for Jefferson’s evolving requirements.
Most of the changes to the original plan resulted from the fact that
the President wanted Lewis to make contact with all of the Indian tribes
he encountered along the route to the Pacific. In order to transport
sufficient numbers of diplomatic items, such as axes, hatchets, and
peace medals, which were intended as gifts from Jefferson to the Indians,
Lewis was forced to devote a portion of his available cargo space to
gifts at the expense of supplies. He would have to procure larger watercraft
to carry all of the necessary cargo. Because few soldiers possessed
the skill to handle a boat large enough to transport everything, he
had to hire a number of civilian contractors, called “engages”, that
possessed suitable experience. Fortunately, Lewis was no longer bound
by political restrictions governing the number of men required to make
the trek west. However, the expedition would no longer consist solely
of uniformed military personnel.
The decision to hire contract boatmen lay in keeping with Lewis’ desire
to confine acceptance of volunteers for the expedition to those personnel
possessing a required mix of critical skills. Amongst the 32 soldiers
and civilians who would eventually make up the permanent party, there
were interpreters, hunters, cooks, river men, salt makers, carpenters,
blacksmiths, tailors, interpreters and trackers. A carpenter, for example,
could hew timber needed to construct a fort, build huts, repair damaged
watercraft, construct crude wagons for overland transport of good and
boats, and supervise the carving of dugout canoes as necessary. Recognizing
that even Lewis lacked depth in certain areas, Jefferson made arrangements
for the young Captain to receive additional schooling in botany, natural
history, medicine, celestial navigation, map-making and geology from
some of the best minds in the American scientific community.
Once the questions of manpower and skill mix were solved, Lewis turned
his attention back to gathering supplies and equipment. The city of
Pittsburgh would figure prominently in the preparations for the expedition
by virtue of the fact that it was a nationally known shipbuilding port
located on the Ohio River. Procuring suitable transportation was especially
critical since the president had specifically instructed Lewis to find
a water route to the Pacific. This meant that one of his first orders
of business was to procure a suitable vessel. The ship had to be capable
of bearing all of the critical items that the expedition needed, yet
would remain light enough to be manhandled over unexpected shallows.
Hoping to test the ability of commercial shipping to navigate the route
to the Pacific, Lewis instructed the Pittsburgh shipwright to build
a vessel similar to those used to haul goods along the Ohio River. The
keelboat design, which was in widespread use at the time as a means
of transporting cargo along relatively shallow and calm inland waterways,
would measure fifty five feet in length, eight feet four inches in width
and fifteen feet high, seemed to fit the bill. The keelboat was a very
flexible design in that it could be powered by oars or a sail depending
on wind conditions. It also had an artificial keel nailed on to the
bottom of the boat to protect it against hull damage from inadvertent
grounding. Not only did it represent the most common type of commercial
craft being used on inland waterways, but also it was large enough to
transport all of the personnel and equipment required by the expedition.
Lewis soon realized, however, that he would be ill advised to rely
on making the entire journey aboard the keelboat. Preparing for a worst-case
scenario, in which water travel might prove impossible, Lewis also designed
an experimental collapsible “steel frame boat” consisting of bolted
together steel strips covered with animal skins. This collapsible boat
design weighed only 176 pounds (without hides) and could carry up to
8,000 pounds of equipment and personnel. He also purchased two smaller
boats, called “pirogues” (one was bought at Pittsburgh and the other
at Wheeling, Virginia). Lewis hoped that having a mix of watercraft
would give the expedition the flexibility to transfer a portion of its
supplies and personnel to smaller vessels should a particular stretch
of the river prove too shallow. It would also minimize the possibility
that the expedition would have to turn back should one of the watercraft
meet with misfortunate.
A quick inspection of the regular Army supply depot at Schuykill Arsenal
in Philadelphia served to convince Lewis that most of his equipment
needs could not be filled through normal supply channels. The newly
constructed arsenal at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, with its skilled crew
of artisans, seemed the perfect location to obtain specialized equipment
needed for a cross-continent trek. Captain Lewis arrived in Harpers
Ferry on March 16, 1803 with a letter from Secretary of War Henry Dearborn
addressed to U.S. Armory and Arsenal superintendent Joseph Perkins that
read: Sir – You will be pleased to make such arms & iron work,
as requested by the Bearer Captain Meriwether Lewis and to have them
completed with the least possible delay.
Lewis’ list of requirements included rifles, tomahawks, knives, powder
horns, bullet molds, gun slings, fishing hooks, a small grindstone,
and the collapsible iron frame boat. Anticipating the need for firearms
that could be easily repaired by the members of the expedition rather
than a skilled gunsmith, he asked for thirty sets of interchangeable
trigger mechanisms and firing locks made from standard patterns for
the fifteen Model 1792 pattern rifles he had acquired. This was an unheard
of technological development in the United States, where most gunsmiths
crafted each weapon in a unique and individual manner.
Lewis also thought of an ingenious solution to the challenge of carrying
ammunition and powder aboard the keelboat. Instead of relying on sacks
of lead musket balls for his supply of ammunition, Captain Lewis hired
a plumber to cast cylindrical lead canisters. Once filled with gunpowder
and capped with wax, the canisters proved both waterproof and buoyant.
If the keelboat capsized or were sunk, Lewis could count on a readily
available supply of bullets and powder. As the need for ammunition arose,
the members of the expedition only had to melt the lead canisters into
bullet molds to produce more musket balls.
Problems with the construction of the collapsible iron framed boat
delayed Lewis’ departure from Harpers Ferry until 18 April 1803. From
there he traveled to Philadelphia and Lancaster to attend the specialized
scientific instruction previously arranged by the president. While in
Philadelphia, Lewis purchased some useful items available only from
commercial sources, including 193 pounds of a new type of condensed
food known as “portable soup”. Not to be confused with the powdered
soup of modern times, this concoction consisted of a glutinous paste
of boiled oxtails that had long been a staple of campaigning armies
in Europe.
In light of the growing complexity of the mission, Lewis soon realized
he would need a second officer with skills that complemented his own.
He asked former Army officer and fellow Virginian William Clark to join
the expedition as his second-in-command. Clark, who was no longer on
active service, possessed considerable combat experience, had traveled
widely, and was also well known as a competent cartographer. He readily
agreed and was reinstated in the U.S. Army as a Second Lieutenant of
Artillery. Despite Lewis’ unsuccessful attempts to have his friend commissioned
as a Captain of Infantry, he accorded co-equal status to Clark rather
than treating him as a subordinate. Lewis also insisted on addressing
Clark as “Captain” and ordered his men to do the same.
Lewis’ efforts to identify and empower proven leaders to assist him
was not limited to asking Clark to join as the expedition’s co-commander.
Lewis also realized that by carefully choosing the non-commissioned
officers he recruited, he would be well served as uncertainty loomed
and weather conditions grew harsher during the westward trek. Three
sergeants and one corporal were appointed, all of who enjoyed the confidence
of their commander. Corporal Richard Warfington, for example, was charged
with taking Lewis’ preliminary report, along with journals containing
scientific observations, newly sketched maps, and wildlife specimens
back to St. Louis aboard the keelboat mid-way through the expedition’s
journey.
While Lewis and Clark were busy making last minute arrangements in
St. Louis before the expedition departed in May 1804, they left the
men in the capable hands of Sergeant John Ordway, who was responsible
for maintaining discipline and training the new recruits. The versatility
of these men is highlighted by the fact that Ordway, who was in essence
the detachment’s first sergeant, also kept a detailed journal during
the trek that later provided valuable scientific information. Lewis
was obviously a keen judge of men because his non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) never failed to accomplish the missions he assigned them, in
addition to the daily routine of housekeeping and logistical chores,
during the two year, four month, and ten day journey.
The enlisted contingent had been chosen with no less care and attention
to detail. Lewis initially enlisted seven privates from Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania in August 1803 to assist him in transporting the partially
loaded keelboat and pirogues downriver from Pittsburgh to Louisville,
Kentucky. Those men returned to Pennsylvania once the watercraft reached
their destination. At Louisville, Lewis met William Clark on 14 October
1803, who was accompanied by a number of prospective recruits. Over
the next two weeks Lewis and Clark selected nine of the most promising
recruits from Kentucky, to include two sergeants, the best hunters (the
Field brothers), the salt maker (John Field), and the expedition blacksmith
(John Shields).
Armed with Jefferson’s letter permitting him to levy personnel from
other Active Army units, Lewis collected the remainder of the enlisted
personnel from Forts Massac and Kaskaskia in Illinois, as well as South
West Point in Tennessee. These soldiers came from the 1st and 2nd Regiments
of Infantry and the Regiment of Artillery. The latter were needed to
man the small cannon added to the keelboat by Clark while the expedition
wintered at Camp River Dubois, Illinois in 1803 – 04. Most were volunteers,
although one or two were detailed to the expedition by their commanders.
The benefits of Lewis’ detailed approach to planning continued even
as the expedition waited for spring in its winter quarters at Camp River
Dubois. Clark experimented with cross-loading the keelboat and smaller
pirogues, juggling the placement of food, equipment, and weapons to
minimize loss of critical items in event of the inadvertent loss of
one or more watercraft and also to provide for mutual defense should
they become temporarily separated. The experiments were also designed
to test the stability of the vessels after they were fully loaded. Clark
supervised efforts to ensure that the expedition’s arms, ammunition,
tools, gifts for Indian chiefs, and critical foodstuffs were shielded
by water-resistant material in an effort to minimize potential loss
in case of a significant shipboard mishap.
Clark improved upon the defensive capabilities of the keelboat by modifying
the lids of on-deck equipment lockers so they could be raised on hinges
and fixed in the upright position, which would then provide protection
to rifleman firing at an attacking force. Reconfiguration of the expedition’s
flagship would provide Lewis with a floating fort capable of protecting
the perimeter of the expedition’s daily campsite on the riverbank. For
self-defense, a small cannon was mounted on a swivel on the bows, while
two blunderbusses (huge shotguns) were positioned on either flank of
the stern mounted cabin. On 26 May 1804, the expedition set off on its
journey to the sound of cheering crowds lining the banks of the Missouri
River. All told, Captain Meriwether Lewis had spent more than a year
immersed in the details of planning and preparing for the expedition.
CONCLUSION
If any nineteenth century scientific expedition ever had an excellent
chance of success, this was the one. Mutual respect, trust, and common
sense successfully bridged the tremendous gap between the Nation’s Commander
in Chief and Captain of Infantry. Originally intended as a “small caravan
to go to Louisiana for the advancement of geography”, the expedition
continually grew in size and scope. Through it all, Lewis maintained
an inherent sense of flexibility and focus that permitted him to successfully
make adjustments to account for what would amount to a significant departure
from his original mission requirements. It was his meticulous preparations,
not a grand sense of adventure, that ultimately ensured the expedition
accomplished everything it had been tasked to do and more.