what role did United States Army intelligence services play in defeating the nazis in World War two . How did Army intelligence begin monitoring the soviet Union as the Cold War began . And what's the real story of Cold War spies versus pop culture , movies and novels for answers to these questions and more insights . Stay tuned . Welcome to the U . S . Army history and Heritage podcast . The official podcast of the United States Army Center of Military History . The Center of Military History , writes and publishes the army's official history , manages the US Army Museum enterprise and provides historical support throughout the U . S . Army . Hello everyone and welcome to the United States Army history and Heritage podcast . I'm lee Reynolds , the strategic communications officer for the Center of Military History . In this episode , I'm speaking with dr thomas Bogart about his new book , covert legions which tells the story of how United States Army intelligence services guided and executed US policy in europe from 1944 to 1949 . Welcome thomas and thanks for joining me here today . Oh , thank you very much for having me . You know , it took me about seven years to write this book . Uh yeah yeah and you're kind of living like a hermit and it's great to be finally able to talk about it . And you know , tell your listeners a little bit about what I found and why I think this is an important and quite frankly , also fascinating subject . Absolutely fascinating . We're going to get into some of that . And but before we do I just want to let people know who you are and what your background is . So dr thomas Bogart is a senior historian at the U . S . Army Center of Military History before joining the center . He served as a historian at the International Spy Museum in Washington D . C . And as the Fritz Thyssen fellow at Georgetown University , he is the author of numerous articles and books on intelligence in the 20th century and he lectures frequently on this subject . Dr Bogart received his PhD in modern european history from the University of Oxford . That's the one in England isn't it ? Okay so you know , I want to start our discussion . I'm anxious to get into the material because I think it's really fascinating . But what am I missing about your background ? Tell me a little bit more about yourself . Yeah . Thanks . So I think you've you've you've touched on sort of the major milestones in my in my career as you can hear from my accent . I'm german originally I've lived here for a long time though and I'm a senior historian at the center of Military history . I have had a very long interest in in espionage . Don't ask me why . Probably just coming from from from reading spy novels and I grew up late Cold War . So the Cold War was kind of still on people's mind . I did my dissertation um in England on the topic of espionage in World War One Rater later wrote a book about the Zimmerman telegram and the intelligence involved there . And then as you mentioned , I joined the International Spy Museum here in Washington , D . C . And that was really a pivotal moment because when I did join that museum that was in 2000 and two . If I'm not mistaken , the Cold War was still very much on people's mind and I had the great privilege of working at that museum with a number of board members and the director who had served for various intelligence services during the Cold War . The C . I . A . F . B . I . We had a retired KGB general onboard and talking to these people . Um and you know , looking at these artifacts there uh just really spoke , spoke to me and it uh became a passion of mine . Um And so when I left the Spy Museum and joined the center , you know , I kind of took this interest of Cold War uh with me . And yeah and I think this is how eventually we we ended up here at this desk talking about my my book . Right . And it's it's a thrilling book , covert legions is the is the title The US Army Intelligence in Germany 1944 to 1949 . So first of all covert legions , I think it's a great title . Just explain that to folks . Thanks you know , we we thought a lot about this title and really it's a it's a fancy way of saying military intelligence , right ? I mean legions , that's um that is a an illusion to the roman legions , military units of the roman empire . Uh and um uh the army obviously as a military organization and we think of the military as well as doing things very overtly , you know , that's their job . But it's often forgotten . There's a covert part to it in many ways . Intelligence , all intelligence derives from fighting wars Learning about the enemy . And so this is what this title um you know , this is how the title came to be subtitle . Um it covers five years um from the moment that American troops entered Germany in September 1940 for Uh the military occupation began to the end of the military occupation in September 1949 . So this is how the title tries to capture the content of the book . Right . And intelligence . I mean that is just an essential part of warfare . I mean , even going back to Sun Zoo , you know , he he felt that spying and intelligence was one of the main principles . Absolutely . I mean , you can um you can go back as far in history as you like . If you look at the you mentioned san suu obviously , you know , great chinese author on warfare and intelligence , but you find the same western literature . I mean , if you go back , you know , the oldest products of Western literature , the bible , the old testament or the Iliad . You will find references to spies think about the trojan horse . It's it's it's it's a it's a piece of covert action , right ? Uh So this has always been around , you know , sometimes it's jocularly referred to as the second oldest profession . Uh and it is still with us today . You're absolutely right . It's an essential part of um of uh of a military goes beyond that . But but those are the originals and it's always been with with mankind . Right ? And then um so intelligence has been around , you know , from the founding of the U . S . Army and throughout World War Two , but you're focusing on when the army actually gets into Germany . So let's talk about that . Let's talk about the beginning of army Intelligence with Germany describe what was happening . Right ? So um obviously this is a , a a broad field and I tried to capture that in the book . Um So when , when World War Two starts , um there was an army intelligence organization , but it had to be revamped . It had to be reorganized and expanded massively . Um important to keep in mind that especially in the european theater , the army was really virtually the only american organization with an intelligence organization . So anything that was done in terms of intelligence operations in the european theater was conducted um by the US army um when the Americans came to Germany in September 1940 for they immediately needed to retool from simply um um you know , assessing the order of battle of the wear amount of the german army too to anything that was required in the occupation . And that was the notification for instance , you know , finding out the bad guys uh and and removing them um um exploiting um you know german technology . You know the Germans were very advanced and you know we wanted to capture some of that stuff for ourselves , placing capable administrators and reliable people in key positions . Uh You know that type of thing . Um finding out what the other allies , you know this of course was an alliance work against Germany , finding out what what what they were up to in Germany . All these things are are are classic classic intelligence missions and really simply by the fact that there was no other organization to do it . The army took all of this on which is why the subtitled US Army Intelligence in Germany maybe a little misleading um It could also be called US Intelligence because the army was virtually the only organization that you know had to deal with with with these these multifarious tasks . So I I know there was the O . S . S . Right , the Office of Strategic Services . So what was the difference in in their role as compared to army Intelligence ? Yes , very good question . So there was the O . S . S . The O . S . S . Was a service that did not report to the Army had reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff . Um It was founded really sort of as a on the one hand as a coordinating body . It was supposed to coordinate intelligence activities between uh the army , the Navy . Um And you know the State Department they had some intelligence functions . Um But it was also modeled after um the Special operations Executive in Britain which was kind of a covert action um um um outfit um You know they were supposed to blow up bridges and this and that . The main function of the always as was um when we did invade europe France . He always as was supposed to work with um local resistance groups against the Germans . Uh The issue here was that as you know the once Normandy succeeded the german resistance in France folded the Germans were essentially withdrawn back to Germany . So there was very little for the O . S . S . To do . And then once we reached the german border the O . S . S . Didn't really have assets there and it really fell to the army um um to to to get the job done if you like . Um And so the O . S . S . Is an important organization but I would say it's important it's really in um laying the groundwork and providing continuity for what then becomes the C . I . A . All right . Great . Yeah . So um so now where d day has happened the army and the allies are on the continent . Um So what what tools what units you know what type of people were what was army intelligence using to do their work ? So , again , the title army intelligence um obscures the fact that we're actually talking about a number of organizations , uh , you know , every unit , um um almost down to the platoon level had some some sort of intelligence personnel attached to it . And then the higher you go , uh , you know , core division army army group , these units become bigger and bigger and more specialized . Uh they did everything that you would expect a modern intelligence service to do . They did signals intelligence . So interception of radio signals . Uh they had spies , um , especially um once they entered Germany , uh you know , the recruitment of of locals that that could perhaps tell , you know , here's someone who really should be removed from office or here's someone who , you know , was an anti Nazi and you should work with this with this person because he has he has good credentials , that type of thing . Um , The most important function during the war . And you find that in the memoirs of generals who served was actually the interrogation of prisoners of war , General Sybert who was the g two of um The 12th Army Group and then became the main army intelligence chief in in Germany after the war . He said that 70% of the intelligence that commanders needed came from prisoner of war interrogation . Yes , because this was , there was a lot of it . Um it was um it was timely , you know , you captured someone , he could tell you , you know , what had happened within the german armed forces yesterday or even today . And uh and the army was very , very good at processing um this this this multitude of of information in a very quick manner . Actionable and exactly actual intelligence correct . But how , I mean , how willing were the Germans to talk , you know ? Um so that the intelligence could be actionable . Um I mean , who is doing the interviewing ? How are they getting this information out of that ? Right . I mean , of course it differs . You know , if you get um An SS General Officer , you know , he might be a little less willing to talk than , you know , a private 17 years have just been drafted . The point here is a that you have a lot , you know , you don't depend on one person or this . And even if one person gives you a piece of information that seems um you know , not interesting in itself . If you put it together with 1000 other piece of information , you know , you're kind of putting together a puzzle . That's one thing . And another thing is , and I know we'll talk about this more later is that the army made very good use of sort of the human reservoir of uh of American society . They targeted for their prisoner of war , interrogators , german immigrants . Uh You had a lot of um Germans many jews who fled Nazi Germany in 19 thirties came to the United States , uh , were then trained at Camp Ritchie in Maryland . This was the main intelligence training center as P . O . W . Interrogators . Then they came back to Germany , of course they spoke to the Germans in their own language . They could make them feel comfortable and that cultural aspect . So they , you know , they knew what they were talking exactly . Exactly . They would , you know , might just sit down and say , hey , let's talk about the Rhineland or let's talk about Munich or wherever , you know , they got one of the best known of these people of course is Henry Kissinger . Uh , Henry Kissinger . Yes , I mean , he , he and his family fled from Bavaria , you know , in the 1930s , because of his Jewish background , he then became a prisoner of war interrogator . He spoke German like a native because he was a native . And you know , he he put these German prisoners of war at east . The writers happy to talk . They were just happy to talk and this is part of why the pOW interrogations were so absolutely valuable for the army . Wow , that's that's amazing . Yeah . So , so the Ritchie boys . Um , so , so talk a little bit about um , the types of information that they got and how did it ? You know , we were talking about it being actionable history . What is um , what are some examples of of how they were able to use that information to their advantage . Um Let me let me just preface it by saying , you know , when we look at intelligence , of course is we always want to see , you know , that flashy piece of intelligence that that gave us that one piece of information that changed the course of history , Right ? Uh and I hate I hate to tell you , but that rarely happens intelligence think of it like diplomacy , right ? Um it provides a steady stream of information that hopefully will be integrated into decision making and you know , then we'll play their role . It's it's often hard to say , okay , here's a piece that um you know , change the course of history . But for instance , uh we can say now with certainty that we had a very good idea of the order of battle of the wear mark . Can you just explain that ? Yes , absolutely . So basically it means that the strength and the disposition , the organization of the of the german army . We kind of knew what what type of units they had . We knew how they moved their units . We knew a good deal about the morale of the units of the logistics of their um um you know , disposition . Um although I should also caution that That's not the be all and end all . So if you think for instance about the battle of the bulge , this was the one major battle that the Americans faced when they invaded Germany in this winter of 1940 for 1945 . It is often attacked as an intelligence failure because we didn't predict that attack and I talked about that in my book . Um so my conclusion is that we actually had a very good idea of the type of forces the Germans had . Um we also knew they were up to something because they were moving stuff . We did not anticipate the attack because that would have us to require us to look inside the head of Adolf Hitler and we couldn't do that . It's also interesting to see that the german generals themselves advised against an attack because it doesn't make sense . You know , we have so few resources , let's not waste them on that . That was our conclusion to Now , then you have someone who is somewhat irrational and makes a decision anyway . Same with Pearl Harbor . You know , we , we kind of knew something was up but an attack on Pearl Harbor . It just didn't make sense from our point of view . That is the hardest part of intelligence . Nonetheless , we did have a pretty good idea of german strength Germans disposition , we were able for instance , to assess that the german guerilla movements , the so called werewolf . Once we looked a little bit more closely and it was really non existent , uh you know , did not would not pose much of a threat . And uh and and those types of things . So um I would say look at intelligence at wartime or peacetime as an important stream of information that needs to be integrated well . And then it can play a valuable role in decision making , right ? And your book really highlights , you know , how that happened . And I think there's a lot of lessons there , I hope so , you know , definitely . And then you talk about counterintelligence and throughout the book as well , just talk a little bit about that . How did this , how does that apply to all this ? Um , so intelligence , um , you know , comprises the discipline of counterintelligence . You know , we of course want to learn what our opponent is doing and the opponent wants to learn what we're doing and this is where counter intelligence comes in . Um , the idea here is to deny him that um um that opportunity be it by identifying arresting their spies , be it through communication security . That's a big problem , especially in wartime , you know , commanders and forces on the ground need to get need to relay information fast if it's sent over the air as opposed to wire information , it can be plucked from the ether by the enemy . And if it's not encrypted , you know , they can read it in real time . Incidentally , this is something apparently that's happening in Ukraine right now . Um , the Russian forces from what you read in the press are are not practicing very good communication security . Therefore the Ukrainians often . No , what what what what the Russians are up to And another reason why this book is so important these lessons seriously ? These lessons learned , you've got to keep applying them . And unfortunately for the Russian lessons learned , a lessons learned or not learned , that is the question . Um you know , of course that is frustration of the historian , we would like that to be the case . Um You know that the lessons are learned and of course that's also part of the mission of the center of military history . And you write this history . Of course they're interesting . But the key point here is um is there something to be learned um um in the future in the case of covid legions ? Um and the Ukraine war of course , one of the things that stands out is the cooperation between army intelligence and Ukrainian refugees . In early Cold War Germany , you had a lot of Ukrainians fleeing from from Eastern europe because either they had worked with the Germans or they were afraid of the Soviets coming to Germany mostly bavaria . And here the army and intelligence services worked closely with these people because clearly there was a commonality of interests there . Right ? Um and so this is something that in some way , you know , all of a sudden that seems very timely . Yeah , so intelligence clearly plays a huge role in combat operations . I've talked about that now the end of World War Two comes in europe and now we've got the occupation , we've got , I guess growing threats , you could say from the soviet union ? Um so Talk to me about how army intelligence , what what was their new role ? Yeah , think about it this way . Think about Europe in 1945 . Picture a map of europe in 1945 . You know the third Reich is dying . You have the grand alliance between the soviet union , great Britain and the United States and then fast forward four years 1949 . And think about the world then and you'll see something , you know , I think it's unique in european in world history is such a dramatic change in the europe is identified that you have an iron curtain Germany is separated in two states and the U . S . And the USSR facing each other off sort of on the brink of a third World war . Um much of this change happens or is triggered in Germany because here the two superpowers are facing each other . Um So for american officials in Germany and the army again was the was the supreme political authority of the United States . In Germany was a military governor . General , Clay has to deal with this enormous change and they have to deal with it in a country that is virtually destroyed . Where you have millions of people moving around where the goals of the allies are shifting where the future is extremely hazy and unclear . And yet you have thousands of american troops there . It's vital to american interests . So the one thing that Clay that the governor and and the United States needs information , what is actually happening on the ground ? What's happening with these millions of nazis that have disappeared ? These people going to be loyal ? Do we need to prosecute them ? Are they going to come back ? Um what are the Soviets up to ? What , what are the Soviets goals in Germany ? Um you know , then more basic problems hunger for refugees . So essentially this is really about simply trying to get the information that american authorities in Germany and the United States need To devise a sensible policy . And that is a huge task indeed . And really it really involves most aspects of life in Germany and Central Europe in the late 1940s . So this information that they're collecting as you alluded to , It really helps to to guide the decision making in Washington , which is what intelligence is supposed to guide and implement . It's kind of a both , it's both ways . You know , let's just pick up an obvious example example . And this is something that the book deals with extensively as a changing relationship between the United States and the U S S R 1945 . We are allies . You know , people often forget that we were allies , the Soviet Union bled heavily In defeating the Nazis and in 1945 , I don't think anybody really foresaw this radical break that would occur . You know , the idea was that Germany would be occupied jointly . It would be governed jointly ? And we would together find a solution to this to this german problem ? You know , this is already the second time that Germany had um you know , sort of involved the war in the world , in a in a world war . And then that changes over time . And we can discuss why , I think essentially you could say that the goals of these two countries were really incompatible , but but to kind of find that out , you know , what are the Soviets actually up to ? What are they doing in East Germany ? So , for instance , they were they were very quickly building structures in east Germany , secret police units , concentration camps , uh , totalitarian political system that were totally incompatible with what we had in mind . Um how does this exactly look like ? And what does that mean for us ? So that's one thing . And then of course , once the americans devised policies to be implemented in Germany , you needed agents on the ground to implement those . Once again , intelligence comes into play because they're often the only ones who have the language experience , the cultural experience , the authority , you know , you didn't want to involve combat troops and that the military government essentially administrators . Um and also by the end of the occupation , 1949 there were twice as many army intelligence personnel , the military government personnel . So that kind of tells you again , how absolutely critical this , this , this large and very diverse army intelligence organization in Germany is for the implementation of american policy in in post war europe . So who were these army intelligence agents that were on the ground ? Um , were some of them the Ritchie boys , Were they just um other american um , military . So it's a very diverse group , you know , the leadership , their professional soldiers . Uh you know , the man who ran the show until I believe , 46 early 47 is General Edwin Sybert . He's a brigadier general , very competent man who really set up this system . He's a top american intelligence officer in europe and and he sets up the system that then stays in place for the next years and many of his subordinate leaders are the same , you know , the professional soldiers that not necessarily , they do not necessarily know german or maybe not even have a profound background in intelligence , but they didn't have to be , there had to be good leaders and good administrators and they were that . And then below that you have a very diverse group . You do have a number of um , ritchie boys . You know , these , these german emigres who stay on , unfortunately for the americans , many of these get demobilized , Someone like Henry Kissinger , you know , he was not a professional soldier , he did his time and then in 1946 he , he came back to the United States and the rest is history . We know what he pursued a somewhat different career and um , so there were many like that unfortunately . So the army lost some some real expertise , they try to um they certainly try to get people through the draft to Germany who had somewhat of a german background who maybe spoke the language . It does become a little bit of an issue because you know , these young draftees , someone from the midwest or wherever it may not may not be as attuned to , you know , operating in such an environment . But but the army certainly tried through language training and also training in Germany To give these people some sort of you know , background from the late 1940s , there were also trained in Russian . But yeah , it's a very it's a very diverse mix of professional soldiers , draftees and civilian contractors . So let's talk a little bit about the tactics techniques , procedures that they were using . Because when you say agents , you know , um and and again I you know , I alluded to earlier about pop culture spies , you know , um we think of James bond or people like that . But what was really happening ? What were these agents actually ? Right , so first terminology , when I say agents um you know , I'm referring specifically to um members of the counterintelligence corps . This was the largest organization of the U . S . Army Intelligence organization as the name indicates originally it was a counterintelligence organization , but once , you know , the americans were in Germany . It quickly also became an espionage organization simply because there was no one else to do the job . So the job of these people and and the counterintelligence ci si personnel in the field had the title special agent . This is this is what they call themselves . Um and they did this through recruiting sources . So they would let's say let's say they were interested in what was going on at the local Communist Party meeting , West german Communist Party meeting , they would recruit someone ideally member of the party who would attend this and then would later report back to to the handling a special agent . So that was an important part of of of what they were doing . But then you had other organizations , a big one was the censorship division . So remember this was the military occupation . So we had every right to do pretty much whatever we wanted . And we used that um with abandoned . So any german phone call , any telegram that was sent , Any letter could be read by us . Um And once I've asked by by by by the by the army by the americans , it was also important in the sense that um at that time a lot of international phone calls were routed through Germany , Berlin was a major switch operations . So if the french ambassador to Moscow relate information to paris guess where the switch station was absolutely . And so here you have another organization come into play . You know the army security agency which is the precursor of the N . S . A . Which it all signals intelligence operations in um in Germany . And you had a number of other organizations as well . So when you ask about the techniques , I would say it depends . But the point here is this was all source intelligence . When we say intelligence , we often think espionage . Yes , that was part of it . But it was much bigger of that . And as a result of that , we had a very very comprehensive idea of what was going on in Germany at all levels with the Germans . But quite frankly also with our allies . And where were these agents working ? Was it just in West Germany West Berlin or was it in the the soviet zones ? Yeah , good question . Um so just in terms of organization , there were two headquarters . One was in Frankfurt later Heidelberg and the other one was in Berlin depending on what organization you talk about . And Berlin of course becomes absolutely pivotal because it is a divided city . The Soviets in the east , the western powers had the three sectors in the west . And the city itself is um inside the soviet zone of occupation . Now , initially that doesn't seem to be a big deal because we're thinking of , you know , doing this jointly . But then as the Cold War really sets in all of a sudden west , Berlin becomes strategically enormously important because all you have to do is take the metro or S bahn as it's called in Berlin across into the soviet sector and there you are . And in East Berlin , of course that's where you have all the soviet headquarters . This is where you have the , what later becomes the east german government . Uh It was also relatively easy at that point to travel across the soviet zone . Uh And of course we were very interested what , for instance , how many troops did the Soviets have there ? And we discovered they had up to half a million there . And then you kind of wonder , you know , why do you need half a million soldiers um for the occupation of a very small zone ? So these were all questions that that we asked and uh those were the tasks of uh you know , these various intelligence organizations . Yeah , that's that's fascinating . So did that again this information , did it raise a red flag ? Um and and how did the US government respond to this information ? Great question . I think it's very important . One can , can get really get wrapped up in these operations because they are fascinating . You know , and then you have honey traps and you know , these fascinating human stories , but ultimately what you asked exactly right , you know , what , what what was the option of all that didn't make a difference . Um And I think it really did , especially in terms of the red army , um if you look at our estimates of soviet troops in East Germany . And now of course after the end of the Cold War , we actually know what the Soviets really had . And if you look at the army intelligence estimates and the real numbers , you will find that we were very , very close to the truth of anything interestingly , we underestimated the Soviets . The Soviets actually might have had a little more than we thought that it certainly , it wasn't alarmist or anything like that . So the order of battle estimates that we produced were excellent , Absolutely excellent . The question then becomes , well , what are soviet intentions ? And that's more challenging . We already talked a little bit about the battle of the bulge . And how do you assess someone like joseph Stalin ? You know , this was basically the soviet union was a one man show . Um Not even soviet officials in Germany might know what Stalin always wanted , but what I found fascinating is that throughout this period and continues the army and army intelligence keeps telling Washington two Things . One thing is if there was a war , the Soviets would be totally capable of overrunning Western europe within six weeks . And if you look at the weakness of the western forces , that seems reasonable . However , the army was also saying , and this was contrary to what a lot of alarmist in the United States were saying . You remember McCarthy was just coming up . He said , no , the Soviets do not actively plan for war , it might be that there's an accident , you know , Stalin might might play brinkmanship and that might trigger a war . But as far as they could tell , the Soviets were not planning for World War three actively . And now , you know , we're still debating what Stalin school were today and that kind of shows you how difficult it is . But that seems to have been a very , very accurate assessment . And to the extent that american policymakers were listening to that , I think they were valid . Well advised Really at this time you you mentioned the importance of Berlin , it really Berlin became very pivotal in the late 40s . Um as we began the Cold War and well , um for again to Berlin the Cold War , that concept , when would you say that began ? And can you just like defined Cold War ? Yes . I mean , Cold War , um you know , obviously the obvious explanation is the opposition opposite of Hot War . You know , it's not a real war . It's it's sort of a a competition between two systems economically , culturally ideologically with spies , but stopping short of of war . So this kind of Unfriendly rivalry that you have between these uh these two systems systems Berlin . So , so when did it start ? You know , depends on who you ask . I would say , I mean personally , I would say , you know , President Truman delivered a speech in March 1947 in which said , you know , the United States needs to help free peoples who you know , are are under threat by by armed minorities . He didn't mention the soviet union communist explicitly , but it was clear he was referring to them . So I think that was 111 major stepping stone towards the Cold War . The other one is of course the Berlin located in 1948 , What happened was that , you know , as I mentioned , Berlin was West Berlin was essentially enclosed by the soviet zone and the Soviets decided to cut off land and sea access to Berlin for the Western powers and the Western powers . Now I have to the americans first and foremost have to decide , you know , a what does this mean ? Is this a prelude to war and what are we going to do about it ? You know , they what they do about it , they start this airlift which provides um you know , the city with anything , everything it needs for a year and there was a logistical miracle really . Um but more importantly , from an intelligence perspective , the ideas why Stalin doing that and what does it mean ? Of course , a lot of things , a lot of people were thinking at the time in Berlin particular , this is a prelude to war . Uh And of course the Soviets could have occupied Berlin , you know , at the drop of a hat , I mean there was nothing that stood in their way . Um but once again , if you look at the assessments of army intelligence , they're actually not alarmist . Their very reason They say , you know , know the Soviets for for one they said the Soviets are not reinforcing their troops in the soviet zone , they're moving them around to to deceive us and make us think that they are . That's their counter exactly . But our assessment was that no , you know , there's there's no increase in in in in in no augmentation in troops . And we also don't see that they're that they're planning a war . So this was actually a very balanced and restrained assessment . And to the extent that we can now look into Stalin's thinking um you know , many years later , that is true . I don't think he was really planning for war . He kind of wanted to see how far either forced the americans out or get some concessions for us . But this was not a prelude to war . And again , um that was communicated to the pentagon and that did play a role in us not overreacting to what was going on in Berlin . And did that make us feel more comfortable about doing the Berlin airlift then ? I think so , yes , because well Stalin didn't think this airlift would work . Um And quite frankly , initially knew that if we think about , you know , providing 2 to 3 million people from the air , I mean it's it's even under today's circumstances that's that's , you know , that's that's that's a major feat Stalin didn't think that was possible . Once it turned out the air force was able to do that . Yes that was reassuring because we knew well as long as we can do that we just have to keep doing it and basically outlast Stalin . And this is exactly what happened in May 1949 . You know Stalin basically said you know what that's going to reopen up . You know technical difficulties solved . Exactly . Yeah . Because the um just for for some people listening who aren't sure the Berlin Wall still does not exist . That doesn't come in until 1961 . That's a very good reminder . Yes . The Berlin Wall did not exist . As I said if you wanted to go from east to west Berlin , all you had to do was hop on an S . Bahn there weren't even any controls . It was not really a divided city yet . So there was a free flow of information of spies . Also refugees . I mean if if you didn't like it in east Germany and many people didn't you know , all you had to do was was come to Berlin you know get to West Berlin and you know then you were um then you're off the hook . All right . And then last question about spies . So we had a lot of army intelligence and I'm assuming the our allied nations that were there had intelligence as well Later on some of these folks would go on to write books . So what are some of the popular books about actual spies . Yeah . One of the the things that's really fascinating about this period is of course it is also the the birth of the modern spy novel . Spy espionage , Writing about espionage has been around for a long time just like espionage itself . But the spy novel as we know today was really born I would say in this time , 1940s 1950s , especially in Berlin . Now there were a number of authors who um they're mostly british authors who actually were intelligence officers during the war , the Cold War . And then turned to writing Ian Fleming is of course the one that we know best . He was an intelligence officer in in World War Two and apparently he came up with all these crazy ideas and his supervisors , you know , that's not gonna work . But then he became a writer and you know it worked very well there James James James Bond . Exactly and probably for Ian Fleming commercially , it also worked very well . Um but there were others , you know uh the most famous , perhaps this is Jonah Carrie , you know , he was a british intelligence officer who served in Germany in the early Cold War and that certainly inspired him um um to write these books and of course they're fiction books of fiction . But you actually do learn a lot about the time and intelligence . Graham Greene , another great british author , you know , who served in intelligence during the war and wrote a number of spy espionage related novels that are inspired by , by what was really going on and what you take away from this is you know , how , you know , in fact and fiction sort of are intertwined , but also the central importance of of early Cold War Germany in Berlin in particular . I mean , I would say that the single best novel , if one can say that of of espionage is the spy who came in from the cold and absolute classic by john Dockery , which is set in early sixties Berlin and really captures this sort of the grittiness and the despair , you know , that the city experienced as as really the fulcrum and the focal point of the Cold War . Um so it's kind of a two way street between between the real world of espionage and the fictional one . And uh and that's what I love about the book . Is it it really um it explains I think really , well , you know , how army intelligence played a key role . Um but how some of these these spies came into being and and as a fan of the spy novels and the spy movies , it was really interesting to balance these and and to learn the real story of it . So I love it for that and the history of that era as well . Um and it's fascinating . Um I told you we had a lieutenant general , retired army lieutenant general picked up the book And he contacted us . He could , he said he read it in one night , he could not put it . It's quite an accomplishment to read 500 pages . Yeah . And um , he called it brilliant . And um , I just think it's absolutely , but it really is fascinating and I didn't realize the um , how much of the role of the US army actually played in this . Um , so I think the last main question for you is really , um , why , you know , this is the beginning of the Cold War in 1940 for 1949 . So why is it relevant to people today ? Why should people read this ? I think for a number of reasons , as you said , you know , you were surprised by the role of the us Army . Remember that the so a few things remember that the american national security apparatus as we know today was essentially set up by the National Security Act in 1947 . So there's a smack in the middle of this time that that act creates um Air Force that creates the Department of Defense . It also creates the C . I . A . Um , so , and of course it takes awhile for these organizations to to come into being . So what then eventually emerges as the modern american intelligence community really was shaped by the army at the time . It was shaped operationally by Germany . If you look at the biographies of many pivotal intelligence officials later in the Cold War , they all learned their trade in Germany in Berlin . This really , this really shaped them . You know , allen Dulles . Richard helms peter cycle many , many famous names . So , um , and again , it was the army that created this , this this apparatus . Another thing uh , that that struck me is how of course we were looking at the creation of West Germany and army intelligence was absolutely pivotal in in in in helping set up this this system . You know , hopefully make it democratic . One of the things I found is I wasn't aware of how many people , politicians , lawmakers who later became famous , well known were actually agents of the army . Tell me the most of the best known name is Willy Brandt , you know , the man who later became mayor of West Berlin and Chancellor of West Germany , we kind of know know him mostly as someone who tried to work with the East , but He was a paid agent of the Counterintelligence Corps from 1948 to 1952 because he was an idealist because he was anti communist and he saw an alignment between our interests and and his . And there are many other examples . And then of course , you know , I already mentioned Ukraine early on , all of a sudden , some of the things that I found in my research are very relevant . You know , us working with the Ukrainians against the Soviets . Um , um , you know , later on we we parachute Ukrainians from Germany , these are exiles into the soviet union . Um , and of course it's not exactly the same today , but there are all these ties um that seemed dormant , but all of a sudden seems very relevant again . And it really separates theory from reality . And it just shows you that , you know , these give great examples of reality . Maybe taking theory and putting it into practice , but why understanding your past , why understanding what happened then is so applicable to today ? Yes . And of course , and that's what we hope to do with our books , not just mine , but all of ours , you know , we write about wars that are passed , but um past is always prologue and you know , very often you can pick any war you like . Uh the idea here is to learn from from our success and failures . Uh and and and hopefully apply that in the future as the saying goes , and I can't remember the name of the person who said it , but when we ignore the past were condemned to repeat it . Yes . And unfortunately , uh that has happened many many times , Right ? Um , so I'd like to end each each episode with my hula trivia . So it's um what what piece of trivia , what what is maybe the most fascinating thing you learned researching the book or something that's really fascinating about this era . What's what's your piece of trivia for this time . Yeah , I think I think hand stone unidentified flying objects . So I i as you know , it was in the papers , you know , the pentagon is currently um is looking into this phenomenon UFOs and also sort of from a historical perspective . And so I I spoke to them and I said , oh yeah , I have a contribution . Uh so when the army came to Berlin army intelligence came to Berlin . They , as I said , you know , they were involved in all aspects of german life and all of a sudden they had there , his name was Colonel Harry , predict pretty . I was tasked to investigate the phenomenon of unidentified flying objects . Yeah , which is of course that fascinated me . Uh and I looked into it and well in that case it turned out so the Germans in World War Two had built a prototype of a what is it called ? A wing one wing airplane . You know , these are sort of like RB to correct , correct . That looked very futuristic . And apparently you know , they did some test flights at the end of the war and uh that's what triggered this , this um this notion of , you know , there are UFOs over Berlin . Of course our interest was then more well did they actually complete this ? Are the Soviets using it . And what happened to the people who built it . You know , that was another interesting important task . You know , make sure that um scientists who have knowledge that could be applied more peace , um um not fall into the wrong hands . Uh We're not from Brown is a great example , you know , rocket rocket scientists who then came to the United States and built the Apollo , which which , you know , brought the First man to the moon . But the UFOs that was , that really struck me and that was before , you know , it was all in the press . But as you said earlier , you know , the past repeats itself and here does so in a very curious way . That's fascinating . Yeah , I didn't , I've never heard that . That's all in the book . It's all , it's all , yeah , it is . And um , yeah , just it's it's a great book . It's really , it's fascinating history . But the relevance to today is is just important . Um , before we close out . This takes us through 1949 . Can we look to maybe another book in the future that covers more of the cold ? Yes , absolutely great . Great , great leader . Leader , by the way . Yes . No . Originally when I started this book , the idea was to take the story to 1961 . But , but as as I got into it , you know , I , and , and center , you know , we decided , no , it's there's just too much ground to cover and the periods of the late forties and fifties are really very different . So we decided to split this project and this is volume one of what will be a two volume history of Army intelligence in Germany . The second volume , which I'm just actually completed the first chapter . Well then cover the same geographical area , but from 1949 to 1961 , the building of the Berlin Wall , which is often um you know , defined as the end of the early cold war . And I would agree with that so well , thank you so much thomas for your discussion and insights today about covert legions and army intelligence from 1944 to 1949 . Uh Terrific book . Thank you . Thank you for being here . Thank you very much . I really enjoyed this and yeah , I'm great talking to you to So now if anyone wants to get a copy of covert legions and learn more about the Cold War or army history in general , then I encourage you to explore our website at history dot army dot mil . The book is available as a free pdf download . It can be ordered for free if you are part of the Department of Defense or anyone can purchase it from the government publishing office and all the links to that are online at our website . So be sure you check it out at history dot army dot mil and if you want to experience army history every day , then visit our social media sites on facebook twitter and instagram and join us every week on this podcast for more in depth discussions about army history as we cover topics from all eras of the US army examining battles , soldier experiences , equipment , weapons and tactics . Thanks for joining us today on the United States Army history and Heritage podcast for the Center of Military History , I'm lee Reynolds and until next time we're history . The views expressed in this podcast reflect those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of policies or opinions of the U . S . Army or Department of Defense . For more information about the Army's proud history and heritage , go to history dot army dot mil .