At the end of June 1951 during the Korean War , the front lines have settled around the thirty-eighth parallel . What happened on the battlefield after the stalemate began ? When did peace talks begin and what were the contentious points ? What innovations were developed during the war ? For answers to these questions and more army history insights , stay tuned . Welcome to the US Army History and Heritage podcast , the official podcast of the United States Army Center of Military History . The Center of Military History writes and publishes the Army's official history , manages the US Army Museum Enterprise , and provides historical support throughout the US Army . Hello everyone and welcome to the United States Army History and Heritage podcast . I'm Lee Reynolds , the strategic communications officer for the Center of Military History . In this episode we're discussing the Army's role in the Korean War from the summer of 1951 through December of 1952 . And joining me for this discussion is Army historian Doctor Michael Criveto . Welcome back , Michael . Well , thank you , Lee . I appreciate the opportunity to talk about one of my favorite subjects , the US Army in the Pacific . Thank you again . Yeah , um , my pleasure . So just to remind folks who you are , Doctor Michael Criivto is the command historian for the US Army Pacific Command . He previously served in the Marine Corps for 25 years as an infantry officer and special operations officer . Uh , he has authored several NATO manuals , served as a United Nations military observer team leader , and was the first US Pacific Command representative to the Republic of Korea Marine Corps . After leaving active duty , he earned a doctorate in military and diplomatic history from Texas A&M , where he taught military history for 2 years until hired by the US Special Operations Command as a civilian historian . In addition to publishing historical articles , he co-authored a book for the Army University Press on special operations support to large scale combat operations . All right , well , Michael , um you've got a lot of background and like you said you know you're the historian out there in the Pacific so I can't think of a better person to uh to help us talk about uh this stage of the Korean War . So as previously mentioned , you're we're in a stalemate now , right ? We the Chinese came in , they , they , they , they pushed the UN forces back , UN forces pushed them back up . It was a little bit of a back and forth , but now we're in a bit of a stalemate around the 38th parallel here in about June of 1951 . So can you just kind of describe that current situation and and some of the key players here . OK , uh , some of the key players , uh . Basically , in October of '50 , UN forces of the 8th Army in its elements under the command of General of the Army , Douglas MacArthur , were driving pretty much all remaining elements of the shattered North Korean People's Army north towards the North Korean border with China . Units were even filling canteens in the Yellow River on the far northern border between North Korea and China . It appeared that a UN victory was near , and many observers predicted the troops would be home in time for Christmas , but that proved not to be the case when over 300,000 communist Chinese army troops surprisingly intervened in the Korean conflict . It changed everything . The sudden introduction of the Chinese army into the conflict took the UNC by surprise and changed the character of the war . UNC troops were forced to retreat out of North Korea , and the communists recaptured Seoul again and held it for a time . But after the last major Chinese offensive stalled with only limited games , In May of 1951 , the United Nations Command And overwhelming air superiority . Additionally , naval forces of the UN command maintained complete dominance along both the east and the west coast of Korea . Both the United Nations Command air and naval forces were able to provide unhampered and total support for current and future ground operations , which helped us out considerably . After stabilizing the line of contact in the vicinity of the current demilitarized zone , United Nations command forces rightly felt that they had the overwhelming military advantage . While the United Nations command Western forces were located below the 38th parallel , their forces in the east were well above the 38th parallel . Forces on both sides occupied defensive positions on terrain that they felt would be critical to military victory . In the interim , forces from both sides pounded the other , inflicting large numbers of casualties with little gain to show for it . The ground war was simply turning into a stalemate . By 19 May 51 , the second phase of the spring offensive , the Battle of the Soyang River on the eastern section of the front , was losing momentum due to reinforcement of the UN forces , supply difficulties , and mounting losses from UN . Air and artillery strikes . On 20 May , the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army began to withdraw after suffering heavy losses . Simultaneously , the UN launched their counteroffensive in the west and central portions of the front . On 24th May , once the PVA and KPA advance had been halted . The UN began a counter offensive there also . In in the West , UN forces were unable to maintain contact with the PBA KPA as they withdrew faster than the UN advanced . In the central area , the UN forces contacted the PVA KPA at various choke points north of Chunchan , inflicting heavy losses . In the east , UN forces had remained in contact with the PVA and KPA and progressively pushed them back north of the Soyang River . So by mid-June , United Nations forces had reached Line , Kansas , approximately 2 to 6 miles north of the 38th parallel from which they had withdrawn at the start of the spring offensive , and in some areas they advanced all the way to Line , Wyoming , which was located further north . With the discussions for the start of ceasefire negotiations underway , the UN advance stopped on the Kansas-Wyoming line , which was fortified as the main line of resistance , and despite some limited attacks , this would essentially remain the front line . Throughout the next 2 years of stalemate . So here we are now , we're in basically the beginning of July and I know like the North Koreans and the South Koreans are still wanting to go at it to fight , but they're Cold War supporters , right ? The the Americans and on , on the South Korean side , the Chinese , the Soviets on the North Korean side , they're ready for peace talks . So , so talk us through that . So we're in July , we're in a stalemate on the battlefield . Conflict is still going on , but talk to us about the the armistice , how and why did they begin and and what were some of the topics discussed ? Well , you know , basically what we just talked about with the uh the spring offensive , and you know , the , it's basically the fighting itself has turned into a stalemate . Nobody's making any significant gains . But both sides are killing a lot of people . They're inflicting a lot of casualties for no apparent gain , and like you mentioned , You know , some of the uh some of the Cold War supporters uh are starting to notice this . And on 23 June of '51 , Jacob Malick . The deputy foreign minister of the USSR made a statement in a recorded broadcast in New York City , implying Chinese and North Korean willingness to discuss armistice terms . This is a big breakthrough . First time that they'd heard that . When communist China soon after indicated that it also desired peace , President Truman authorized General Ridgeway to arrange to meet with the communists . Uh , for an armistice conference . With the North Korean commander . Both sides essentially agreed to begin negotiations at the city of Kaesong on 10 July of 1951 . The chief delegate for the UN at the conference was Vice Admiral C . Turner Joy , and the enemy delegation was led by Lieutenant General Nam Ill . It was agreed at the first meeting that military operations would continue until an arms disagreement was eventually signed . However , neither aid , neither side was willing to start any large scale offensive while peace talks were still in progress . UN military action in this period was limited to combat patrolling . Artillery In air bombardment and the repulsive of enemy attacks . So the start of negotiations . The first armistice negotiations began on July 10 , 1951 in Kaesong , a historically significant North Korean city that was once the former capital city of Korea during the Kou dynasty 1000 years before . The participants followed a five-part agenda , which was quickly agreed upon by the United Nations command in the North Korean and Chinese forces . That included the establishment of the military demarcation line , a demilitarized zone . The supervision of the truce and the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war . But the Kaesong talks were generally marred by the disputes over security and neutrality in the area , with the United Nations command accusing the North Koreans of several violations and sabotage . And many times the North Koreans refused to let negotiators in , even disrupting from the procedures . Finally , the negotiation building was accidentally destroyed in August of 1951 . This broke off truce negotiations until 22 August of 1951 . Because the negotiating building was destroyed and the talks were suspended . General Van Fleet used the opportunity to launch a series of limited objective attacks to try to improve the 8th Army's defensive positions , essentially , you know , taking advantage of the pause in the talks . So he wasn't trying to really get , get more land . He was just trying to uh to improve his positions . Yeah , for the most part , I mean , it wasn't so much the amount of land , it was , it was basically Uh , the lay of the land in trying to improve the uh positions that the ground forces were on to give them better observation of fields of fire in the event that the , the fighting renewed . So they're trying to , you know , basically get what they can out of it and improve the positions for their own forces . If possible . The US 10th and the Iraq 1st Corps in east central Korea fought for terrain objectives 5 to 7 miles above lying Kansas . And then it included bloody and heartbreak ridges , the scenes of what would become the scenes of many uh costly battles for both sides . They attempted to drive enemy forces from positions that favored an attack on the line , Kansas , basically trying to defend their own forces . By the last week in October , these objectives had been secured . Along the western portion of the front . Action in September was characterized by local attacks , counterattacks , and combat patrols . But by 12 October 5 divisions of the First Corps had advanced the front 3 to 4 miles to a brand new line in Jamestown to protect the Chorewan Seoul Railroad . The 9th Corps followed with aggressive patrolling towards Kumsong . On 21 October , it sees the commanding heights just south of that city . At this point , are we still maintaining the same amount of troops in South Korea ? We are , how strong were we on , you know , on the , on the UN side , the American UN side and then the North Korean Chinese side ? Well , the on the American side , we had about a little over half a million troops counting the uh counting the Republic of Korea augmentation . And the contributions of 17 contributing countries from the United Nations , which were basically rolled into the forces and uh spread along the front according to the type of unit that they contributed and their strengths . So they've been well integrated within the UN command . You know , to , to basically uh perform some of the functions that they were best at . Yeah , so there's no like , like scaling back of the forces at at this point as a show of goodwill or anything for the armistice . No , not really , not , not yet , you know , we , they haven't uh even uh hinted at that because they're not sure of whether the full scale fighting is going to break out again . So you want to make sure that you've got , uh , that you're still in a strong position to be able to counter any major attack from the other side . So there's there's this little push back back and forth going on . And um but then let's , how do we get back to the armistice ? What's the key , I guess thing that that brought everyone back to the peace talks ? Basically , most of it is casualties , you know , there's a sense that , uh , you know , in order to stop the bleeding , you know , let's get back into negotiations and try to settle this matter , so that then we can uh take a look and , and possibly start to uh lower some of our troop strength that's in country . And so during the two years of negotiations , there were many pauses that occurred in the Armistice negotiation process , some short and some long . The process was uh best described by some of the people who were involved with it as frustrating . And there were uh some psychological games and political games that were played , uh , mostly by the communist side , even in , uh , in , in posturing and And uh trying to view uh the United Nations command in a , in a bad light , every opportunity that they could do . So , for Kim Il-sung , however , his primary goal was still to conquer the entire peninsula , the entire Korean peninsula . The same goal that he had when he launched his June 1950 surprise attack . Now , on the other side , South Korean Presidenting Moree was also determined to reunify the peninsula , but under his control , a goal that kept him from participating in the armistice talks . Basically , he didn't want to put himself in a position that would keep him from pursuing his policy of also trying to reunify the peninsula by force under his control . Both sides sought to use the pauses in the armistice talks to their advantage by conducting offensive operations that were designed to put them on better defensive ground in the fight and perhaps improve their position militarily at the negotiation table . Seizing a prominent terrain to prompt the other side to want to come back to the table and negotiate for favorable conditions . Did this become just happenstance is that you know one side or the other um you know they they stopped the talks because they want to go back on the offense or is it just talks stopped for whatever reason . And then , you know , they took action . In general , it's the , it's the latter , it's that the talks would stop for whatever particular reason and and like I said , there was some , there was a lot of uh political posturing that was taking place , particularly on the communist side . Uh , where they would bring up some trivial point and then discuss it and then decide that they could not decide on the size or the shape of the table , negotiating table , and then call off the talks for a couple of weeks , but then , uh , the UN command would utilize that as an opportunity . You know , since they're not negotiating , the negotiations are going nowhere to at least try to improve their position on the ground if possible . Those kinds of points , those sticking points , uh , just they seem very trivial and it almost seems like , you know , they're just , it's just a delaying action . There there it is , but there are also some major challenges and sticking points with the negotiations themselves . The , the major point of contention in the talks . Was prisoner of war repatriation , the subject of , uh , you know , repatriating prisoners of war that have been taken by both sides . Uh , particularly regarding the 50,000 UN held prisoners who essentially did not want to return to communist countries . They , in many cases , sought their freedom by surrendering to the United Nations command , and the best thing in the world they wanted to do was to be forcibly repatriated , to have to go back to China or North Korea . And uh perhaps face punishment for having surrendered . Oh , wow . Yeah , so , and then then the uh from the UN perspective , the last thing they wanted to do , I mean they are , they consider themselves a force of the free , the last thing that they wanted to do was forcibly , uh , You know , cause some of those prisoners to go back and perhaps , you know , face punishment , uh , simply because they were held in UN control for a period of time . So this is the , this was the main issue between the two sides . And it boiled down to the question of voluntary repatriation of prisoners . The United Nations command and the communist side disagreed on the handling of POWs who did not wish to return to their homelands . The UNC would not agree on forced repatriation of persons who simply did not wish to return to their origin country . The communist side was for forcing repatriation regardless of the desires of the individual . So the issue resulted in two additional years of war . So really this is , this is what they argued about for 2 years . Yeah , 2 years , they're discussing this this simple clause , and they're they're exploring all sides of it , you know , I mean , but uh basically they are . Uh , dissecting this one point , even in comparing it with what the language says in the Geneva Convention , that prisoners should be returned to their country of origin . But it really didn't say anything about forcing them to return . Right . That was the main issue . That was , that was a real sticking point . So you said there were about 50,000 prisoners that the United Nations forces were holding a mixture of North Korean and Chinese . What about the prisoners on the other side ? How many Allied prisoners were there ? Well , there's the North Koreans in particular in the uh in the communist Chinese . Uh , together held about 50,000 US prisoners as well , not just the United States , but also , uh , at , at one of the big concerns was how Uh , the North Koreans counted . South Korean prisoners of war , uh , they counted them as North Koreans who were simply returned to their control . So in other words , they did not count them as POWs , they counted them , you could consider it , considered them as slave labor , or counted them as as return troops in some cases . Did they put any of the South Koreans in uniform to fight for the North ? Absolutely , absolutely , they would . They would , uh , you know , pull them back into service and send them up to the front , perhaps not give them a weapon , but make them carry ammo until they drop , you know , and , uh , still support the war cause in , in some way , shape or form , whether it's digging ditches , uh , building fortifications . Even mine clearing , you know , was one of the favorites that they used uh some of the POWs for . So that also was an issue of , you know , uh , trying to make the North Koreans account for South Korean prisoners . Uh , as POWs and not as Uh , reconscripted Koreans . So that , you know , you can see here , you know , there were many different issues to explore in the subject of uh of POWs that resulted in in discussions for two years , arguments back and forth for 2 years , while frustratingly , people are dying at the front . In large numbers , yeah . Yeah , I mean , I mean , as you said , they , they , they looked at this from from every angle . I mean , it's from when you first mentioned it , I'm like , wow , how can they be stuck on just just this but really a lot of different layers here when you're talking about the exchange of of these prisoners . Yeah , there's a lot more to it than uh than just a , you know , the what it sounds like at the At first glance . What was the state of fighting then um um from this point in the fall of '51 through the end of , of 52 , was it , was it this same thing , you know , um defensive uh posturing and then peace talks and then more defensive posturing and , and were there any major battles at this point ? Yeah , there were a number of major battles all at the same time , which is increasing that sense of urgency to make the negotiations work to stop the bleeding . But on 25 October , Armistice negotiations , which had been stopped at Kaesong back in uh in June . Uh , were resumed , but at a new site of Panmunjom . Oh , OK . It's it's , it's located about 10 miles away from the town of Case . Now you said um uh in October , are we talking 51 or 52 ? 51 . All right , so it switches to Pan Moonjam then , which is of course , you know , still to this day , I believe the the same place where the armistice talks . It is , that's where the , that's where the uh joint security area . Is where all , all of the main uh communications and uh and physical contact , prisoner exchanges , uh , you know , uh , repatriations , all those things occur in the , in the JSA area at Pen . So it becomes kind of like the meeting place , you know , for the , the normal discussions and the committee meetings and so forth . And this , it's there where all the rest of the negotiations will occur and there where eventually the armistice will be signed . And we'll talk more about that , I think in the next podcast , but it's an armistice . It's not a a peace treaty . It's not a peace treaty at all . It's just a cessation of hostilities . Yeah , there's some other complications as well . Even uh the Korean armistice negotiations took place over that two year period from 51 to 53 . And and interestingly enough , it's between the United Nations command , China , and North Korea . And it results in the Korean Armistice Agreement in July of '53 , but noticeably absent from the armistice talks with South Korea . Whose presidenting Mun Rie , strongly opposed the idea of talks that would result in anything less than a unified Korea under the Republic of Korea control . So he's not even participating , and he's , and he's a , you know , I would say a major player in , uh , in the outcome of , of the conflict . He didn't participate because he chose not to or because the UN command said , hey , you know , you , you , we don't agree with what you want , we want to get a settlement . Well , it was a little bit of both , you know , because of his hard stance on , uh , you know , towards the , the idea of an armistice . He did not want to . See any kind of an agreement which would keep him from being able to take action on his own to forcibly reunify the peninsula under his control . So in some ways , he had assumed pretty much the same policy as Kim Il-sung did in the north to begin with . That's why he started the war was was to try to reunify the peninsula . Under his control . So the two of them are alike in these ways , but where North Korea would at least participate in the armistice agreements or the armistice talks , Sigma refused to . He didn't want to tie his hands . He didn't want to , he didn't want to see the conflict end unless he was in control of the whole Korean Peninsula . Mike , at this point , I want to step away from the combat and the peace talks for for the rest of this , this discussion and shift the focus over to uh some of the army innovations , I guess you you you can call them that took place during this war because there were some significant . Innovations by the army and and um you know if we can talk about some of these and I think the big one almost almost like the elephant in the room , you know , when people think of the Korean War uh culturally , you know , we think of MASH , the TV , the movie , the TV series , and um so that was a big innovation during this time frame . Can you , can you talk about that ? Yeah , absolutely , absolutely , and also one of the most iconic scenes is the helicopter . Which was , which was newly invented . So working off the recent experiences that the Americans had gained in World War II . The Korean War spurred innovations within the US Army , particularly in military medicine , in such technological leaps like the widespread use of helicopters for medevacs . The extensive deployment of mobile army surgical hospitals from ashes . Advances in vascular surgery and blood banking , and the introduction body armor to help prevent injuries to begin with . Other advancements included the development of jet fighter tactics , the creation of a specialized guerrilla command for special operations , and the establishment of formal civil affairs training for the first time . For medical innovations , and I'll count the helicopter as as part of that . The Korean War was , of course , the first conflict to feature the large scale use of helicopters , which quickly found a niche in rapid medical evacuation . New and innovative techniques and procedures leveraging helicopters significantly improved survival rates for wounded soldiers by reducing the time that it took to reach medical facilities . And I'll mention here that uh part of the innovation was the fact of marrying up . The helicopters with the with the uh significant fact that we had pretty much . Uh , carte blanc , or , you know , we had a blank check in uh running up and down both coasts of the peninsula . So we were never far from the water and the marriage as a helicopter with naval , uh , with naval platforms was significant because , you know , you could always get somebody out to sea into a stable , uh , well supported . Uh , medical unit located afloat , you know , you don't have to worry about attacks and everything else , you get out of a combat zone at the same time . Uh , that , that's pretty significant , but you know , and how do you , and how do you , uh , not only just take this new technology of a helicopter , but also how to land those things on ships at sea . Yeah , it's really fascinating to um to look back and see these , these types of innovations or , or , you know , what we call today more like , you know , how the army adapts and transforms itself over time . And with these helicopters before they would go out to sea right they would these helicopters were there and and um there's some very brave and and and heroic actions by picking up wounded uh very close to the front lines and moving them back initially to these mass units and then and then from the mass units they would either go out to the sea or I think larger hospitals that were set up further south . Right , absolutely . And speaking of the mash units . Those mobile Auy surgical hospitals were established near the front lines , very close to the front lines , to provide immediate surgical care , a key innovation that revolutionized trauma care and significantly lowered their mortality rates . The idea for mash units originated in World War II , where small portable surgical hospitals located close to the front lines were modified to slightly larger but more capable units located near the front but with improved anesthetic , operative , and diagnostic capabilities . Plus mobility assets to increase the speed of wounded . In receiving that life saving treatment . That's what is key . And along with that same idea , the surgeons developed new techniques such as vein grafts to repair blood vessel injuries . In a national blood banking program was also rapidly geared up with new techniques for collecting and delivering blood within plastic bags . This is when you first start to see blood being supplied to the front in plastic bags . And then you , you mentioned the term medevac was , was , was that actually used during this war , that that term ? It was , it was uh the whole idea of medevac or medical evacuation . was , was used , it was invented as a way to describe the process by which you get the wounded out of the , out of harm's way as fast as possible and in the arms of the caregivers , you know , so that that way , the faster you can do that , the greater the chances . Of the individual recovery . Right , and then you also talked a little bit about body armor . So talk about that . I mean , you were all the soldiers issued what we call today body armor or I know like in the Vietnam era it was called like flak vests . What were they wearing , how heavy was it and and how effective was it ? Well , initially body armor goes all the way back to the use of uh of armor by uh by tail gunners and Waste scanners and bombers in World War II . That's where you first start to see that , you know , it's a way of protecting those individuals from the fire , the firing of uh fighters and flak . So it's just basically converting that , it's expanding its use to uh infantry troops , and at first it's very , very heavy , very unwieldy , and at the same time it fatigues the troops and in some cases even causes medical injuries of its own through , uh , you know , uh . Heat casualties , you know , the heat stroke or heat exhaust . So through time it becomes lighter , you know , as a way of trying to improve its , you know , capabilities . But yeah , the widespread introduction of body armor afforded them increased mobility and protection , which is a revolutionary advancement , which continues to develop today . We're still looking for ways to , to make the body armor , uh , stronger and uh . You know , lighter is one of the key things that try to do , but like I say , at first it was uh very heavy , not all the , not all the troops had it , and not all the troops would want to wear . But It depends . If you were in the defense , you would probably see most of the infantry troops uh running around with body armor , but a lot less so if they were in the offense and moving into the attack . Were there any tactical innovations that really stand out during this time period ? Well , there's a number of different tactical innovations , mainly with the uh with uh since you have increased capabilities for fire support . Getting , doing the same thing that we're doing today with what you see today in in today's multi-domain task forces , what we're trying to do is myriad the capability of spotting the enemy , targeting the enemy , and bringing some sort of fire on the enemy from as far away as we can with , with the increased accuracy and and lethality . So yes , there were the same type of innovations that were going on procedurally with trying to uh . Uh , not just in the areas of fire support but also close air support . You know , uh , the some of the techniques that had been tried and true in World War 2 were relearned during Korea and then adapted because the aircraft were becoming faster . And uh their targeting abilities allow them to greater standoff before targeting troops on the ground . The first world we had jets . Now were we using jets at this time for close air support ? Absolutely . And that was the next thing I was going to talk about one other point in between , it's the use of antibiotics and pre-hospital care . The use of antibiotics was expanded to treat battlefield injuries and pre-hospital emergency care , including first aid and stabilization , which became the , the gold standard . Uh , that fighter development , aviation technology was anything but stagnant during these years and changed dramatically and permanently during the Korean War . All piston-driven fighter planes like the P-51 Mustang . Uh , were rapidly phased out phased out of service and replaced with turbine-powered aircraft like the P-80 and the F-86 saber jet . The war saw the first jet on jet combat , leading to the development of new tactics for jet powered air superiority fighters like the F-86 . The increased , uh , the greatly increased capabilities of modern jets forced the development of modern air traffic control and early warning systems . To aid in the pursuit , interdiction and response , because you , you need to be able to take that enemy further out in order to get a good pursuit response . They're moving much faster . Great advancements were made in integrating air defense systems into a workable architecture to counter the increased speeds , more capable payloads , and the targeting systems . And then , uh , even in the area of special operations , special operations comes to the forefront within the Korean War . As I'll mention later , the army established the guerrilla command to coordinate , administer , direct , and train partisan forces , and it's formed the first special forces units . These are the first special forces units are created in 1952 . And then Ranger infantry companies were resurrected to be able to provide specialized reconnaissance and raiding capability for our frontline divisions . And then a military government school was created to train soldiers for civil affairs , establishing a foundation for future special operations . As well as the field of psychological operations was created and employed with great effect to influence the enemy and convince them to cease their resistance . Other innovations include logistics and mobility . The war allowed the Transportation Corps to extensively test new transportation modes . Including the extensive use of helicopters , and again , to increase the mobility and support logistical operations , and even to use in uh combat with the moving , you know , frontline troops forward . Uh , to be able to engage the enemy faster . Oh , OK . Yeah , I didn't realize that , you know , I like the size of our helicopters if they were capable of of doing that in the Korean War . I I we we know that happened all the time in the the war in Vietnam , but . But this is where it originates . Yeah , this is the first , the first use of it to be able to uh to move those forces , you know , to even move them behind it . Enemy forces to be able to uh use the mobility of the helicopter as a as a a new capability to explore with the ground troops . Yeah , uh , uh , Michael , we're we're gonna have to start to to wrap this up , but uh is do you have any other really uh key points that you want to make before we wrap up ? The only other thing I'd say is that large scale problems were apparent with the American infantry training . It worn during the early phases of the Korean War . So a lot of effort was put into educating the troops and training them properly , uh , to be able to , uh , you know , get them , make them combat ready and increase their capabilities by the time they get to the front line . In other words , provide them with sufficient training and education in how to fight a ground war , something that had stagnated during the peacetime . Those are the big things . This is when you start to see qualified NCO schools uh come about . And we can pick up that topic again , I think in in in the next podcast . But uh um but so Mike , yeah , before we close this one out is uh you know , this is our segment that we call hula trivia . So is there any piece of trivia that you want to share about this time in the Korean War ? Absolutely . I'm gonna talk about something that probably most people have never heard of . One interesting bit of trivia that uh came to effect is the US Army administered its own force of North Korean expatriates who fought as guerrillas for the United States and the United Nations command over the last 3 years of the war . These were people dissatisfied with living under communist rule . North Koreans within the North . That force varied in size , but at one point , It numbered about 10,000 fighters who rose up against North Korean military and police forces during the short period between when the UN troops moved north . Uh , and when those same forces had to retreat south in response to the intervention of the Chinese communist forces . Beginning as a resistance force , those local citizens rose up and took control of their towns and villages , kicking out North Korean government forces and established their own local governments . But when , but when the UN forces pulled out of North Korea , these mostly rural . Resistance forces moved to and occupied the offshore islands and continued to conduct raids and attacks on the communist forces as they reoccupied the north . In January of 1951 , the 8th Army in the Far East Command formed a US-led guerrilla command , the formerly secret 8240th Army unit , to coordinate and direct the combat actions of these 10,000 fighters , and to use them against the Chinese and the North Koreans . The guerrillas garrisoned many of Korea's offshore islands , turning them into well-armed safe havens , from which they could conduct raids and limited attacks against the North , all coordinated by the US . For 3 years , hundreds of select US Army soldiers , many with Ranger or former Philippine guerrilla backgrounds , administered and led these North Korean guerrillas in their fight against the communists , integrating their efforts into the larger Far East Command and UNC fight . In addition , The creation of US Army Special Forces in 1952 gave the army a way of testing its unconventional warfare . Ideas . That , that's fascinating . I mean , that's definitely some great trivia , something I didn't didn't know about at all . Yeah , it's uh that , you know , they were able to basically test that . In fact , it's during this time frame that the brand new United States uh special forces . It's his first combat experience there in Korea running these guerrillas . Well , thank you so much , Michael , for all of your insights today about the army in the Korean War from the summer of 1951 through December of 1952 . And if anyone wants to learn more about the army in the Korean War or learn more about Army history in general , then I encourage you to explore our website at history.army.mil and if you want to experience army history every day then visit us on our social media sites on Facebook , X and Instagram . So thanks for joining us today on the United States Army History and Heritage podcast for the center of military history . I'm Lee Reynolds , and until next time . We're history . The views expressed in this podcast reflect those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views , policies , or opinions of the US Army or Department of Defense . For more information about the Army's proud history and heritage , go to history.army.mil .