



# Department of the Army Historical Summary

Fiscal Year 2001



*CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.*



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by

Christopher N. Koontz

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UNITED STATES ARMY  
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Cover: *Members of 3d U.S. Infantry, "The Old Guard," fold an American flag outside the Pentagon following the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001.*

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HISTORICAL SUMMARY

FISCAL YEAR 2001



# 1

## Introduction

Fiscal year (FY) 2001 began auspiciously for the U.S. Army. A long period of budget and force structure reductions had come to a close, and the Army leaders were implementing ambitious plans for the future. Throughout the year, the Army planned and executed organizational, doctrinal, and technological changes to the way it conducted warfare in the new century. The Army was following an ambitious plan named Transformation, issued in 1999 by Secretary of the Army Louis E. Caldera and Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki. As part of Transformation, Army leaders envisioned fielding computerized, networked units within the next few years. The units would deploy quickly around the globe and would possess the striking power of current armored and mechanized forces without their massive logistical requirements. However, less than three weeks before the fiscal year ended, terrorist attacks in New York City and on the Pentagon claimed the lives of almost three thousand people. The Army could no longer focus on the distant future; a new conflict had begun. The Army now found itself pressed to continue modernizing while preparing for military operations in Afghanistan in the first months of what would become years of warfare.

This historical summary of FY 2001 chronicles the state of the Army as it found itself thrust into a period of prolonged conflict. Before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Army conducted a variety of missions and responsibilities throughout the globe. It sent active and reserve units as part of an international peacekeeping mission to the Balkans and maintained sizable forward forces in the Middle East, western Europe, and South Korea. While helping to keep the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Army also conducted large-scale military exercises with foreign militaries and provided humanitarian assistance to foreign nations. These and other missions would continue even after the United States struck back at terrorist enclaves in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The leaders of Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), dealt with several tumultuous issues in FY 2001. To better lead the Army in the conflicts that lay ahead, Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki realigned the headquarters and created new organizations to provide flexible and efficient management of the force. At the same time, service leaders struggled to maintain the force structure of the Army during the

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and their eventual success prevented the Army from going to war with a smaller force. Finally, an investigation into a tragic event from the Korean War proved challenging but eventually helped forge stronger bonds with South Korea.

Plans to transform the way the Army organized, trained, and waged war continued. During FY 2001, the Army selected a light swift armored vehicle for production and built a new organization around it to bridge the present Army and the Army of the future. Research and development continued to create Future Combat Systems, a collection of vehicles and sensors connected by an information network. Future Combat Systems would provide the mobility and striking power of the Objective Force envisioned by Army senior leaders. The Army also reorganized and restructured its aviation fleet to improve maintenance and field more versatile units. To change the way the Army thought about itself, Army leaders directed changes in doctrine and, controversially, altered the Army uniform to transform the identity of the force.

The Army also made strides toward maintaining its present force. During FY 2001, the Army fought successfully to increase its budget. The Army met most of its personnel requirements, with both recruiting and retention proving to be successful. The Army also sought ways to improve the leadership and development of its officers and the quality of life of its enlisted personnel. The commands of the Army Reserve and National Guard were raised to lieutenant generalships, and reservists and guardsmen continued to play vital roles in service to the nation.

## 2

# Organization, Management, and Budget


### *Reorganizations and Realignments*

Throughout the 1990s, a series of budget and personnel cuts hampered Headquarters, Department of the Army, resulting in bureaucratic inefficiencies. In 1999, Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki initiated efforts to bring greater efficiency to the management and command structures of HQDA. The first phase of institutional transformation began in July of that year and included a study conducted by Military Professional Resources, Inc. The study concluded that the Army lacked a single point of oversight and direction for long-term programmatic development and resources management and suggested the institution of a deputy chief of staff for resources, programs, and analysis. This proposed office would combine the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff with various offices across HQDA to provide unity for the Army's program development efforts.

Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki accepted the basic premise of the study. As a result, a major step in the realignment of HQDA took place on 1 December 2000, when General Orders 15 added the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs to the Army Staff and disestablished the position of assistant vice chief of staff. (*See Chart.*) The general orders placed responsibility for the planning, developing, and funding of Army programs under the new office. The office also received the mission of directing external studies commissioned by the Army. The offices that constituted the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs included the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office and the Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, both formerly part of the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. The Force Development Directorate, formerly part of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, was also placed under the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, as was the Directorate of Integration, which previously had been placed under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. The new office also included the Executive Services Division and the Quadrennial Defense Review Communications Cell. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs closely resembled the

Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff and provided an Army counterpart to the staff sections of the other armed services that dealt with issues of long-term program development. After Secretary Caldera signed General Orders 15 on 3 January 2001, Lt. Gen. Kevin P. Byrnes, who was already serving as the assistant vice chief of staff, became the first deputy chief of staff for programs, with Dr. Craig E. College as his assistant. The staff of the newly created office began operations before the fiscal year ended. (For Department of the Army organization, *see Appendixes A and B.*)

CHART— ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PROGRAMS



Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs

Other efforts to transform HQDA were under way at this time to better allocate responsibilities and functions within the understaffed headquarters. From 20–21 November 2000, the Army Staff hosted a two-day meeting in Arlington, Virginia, that gathered together general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service to consider further changes. The participants examined four major categories for improvement. The first of these categories, culture, considered personal and institutional differences between the uniformed and civilian personnel who constituted headquarters staff. The second category, process, identified areas where bureaucratic procedures and practices could be streamlined or eliminated. The organization of Headquarters, Department of the Army, itself made up the third category: structure. The final category, information technology and knowledge-based organization, sought to introduce or improve the use of automated systems in order to increase efficiency.

After the members of the meeting established these categories, working groups studied more than five hundred recommendations made by an independent contractor in May 2000 to consider whether they could be implemented, required further study, or were infeasible. After the working groups completed their assessments, Director of the Army Staff Lt. Gen. John M. Pickler assigned responsibility for creating a plan to the Strategic Management and Innovation Division in the Office of the Chief

of Staff of the Army. The division directed each Army Staff directorate to validate the recommendations of the working groups and established a council of colonels and a general officers steering committee to oversee progress. For the next six months, the division served as the lead agent for headquarters reorganization and provided Army Staff principals with proposals to consider.

While the Strategic Management and Innovation Division continued its work, Thomas E. White succeeded Caldera as secretary of the Army in May 2001. Soon after, Secretary White created the Realignment Task Force to take over the HQDA reorganization effort. The secretary directed the task force to reduce and consolidate headquarters structures to eliminate overlapping functions and redundant layers of supervision. In addition, he wanted the task force to find better ways to use technology, automation, and modern corporate business practices within the headquarters. Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs John W. McDonald led the task force, which began its work in June 2001. The Realignment Task Force worked in three phases: Phase I began in FY 2001 and concentrated on HQDA. The other two phases, planned to begin after FY 2001, would consider Army field operating agencies and major commands. During Phase I, the thirty-person task force had two guiding principles: the purpose of the Army Secretariat was to formulate policy and programs, and the purpose of the Army Staff was to prepare, plan, supervise, and execute those policies and programs. Incorporating findings and recommendations from the previous work performed by the Strategic Management and Innovation Division, the task force considered changes to the alignment of responsibilities and authorities within HQDA to reflect the guiding principles. By the end of FY 2001, the task force had completed most of the planning for a major realignment of HQDA, which the Army planned to implement during the next fiscal year.

Below the Headquarters, Department of the Army, level, the Military Traffic Management Command, which is responsible for the surface transport of supplies for all the armed services, underwent a major reorganization during FY 2001. The Army announced that the Operations Division and the Joint Traffic Management Office at the command's headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, would move to Fort Eustis, Virginia, to be combined with the Deployment Support Command. This would establish a new Military Traffic Management Command Operations Center. The reorganization would reduce 250 personnel spaces and was scheduled to take place by November 2002.

### *Information Management*

The Army began developing Army Knowledge Online (AKO) in 1997 to provide Army-wide access to unclassified information and business

processes over a secure Internet site. Army Knowledge Online provided electronic mail, search engines, the Army White Pages, and 128-bit Secure Socket Layer encryption for security purposes to its registered users. By 1999, the Army added the AKO-Secret intranet site to provide similar ease of access to classified information across the Army.

FY 2001 saw a major increase in the use of Army Knowledge Online across the service. On 1 October 2000, AKO had ninety-six thousand users across the active Army, National Guard, Army Reserve, Department of the Army civilians, Army retirees, and selected users not directly affiliated with the Army holding guest accounts. User growth continued on a voluntary basis until 8 August 2001, when Secretary White and General Shinseki issued Army Knowledge Management Guidance Memorandum Number 1. This memorandum mandated that all active duty soldiers, reserve component personnel, and Department of the Army civilians obtain an AKO account and that Army information managers develop electronic versions of applications for use on the Web site by July 2002. As a result of the mandated use of AKO accounts, Army Knowledge Online had 529,688 users by the end of the fiscal year.

Army Knowledge Management Guidance Memorandum Number 1 also designated the Department of the Army's chief information officer as the responsible officer for all Army information technology initiatives. Additionally, the memorandum subjected information technology programs operated by the Army's major commands to review by an executive board chaired by the chief information officer and directed that funds for such programs be withdrawn from major commands. These funds would henceforth be centrally managed at the HQDA level. Finally, the memorandum directed the major commands to curtail their information technology investments unless provided with a waiver and funding by the chief information officer.

### *Budget*

The Army budget fell during the 1990s as Congress cut military spending after the end of the Cold War. The Army's end strength fell from 780,000 to 480,000, and inadequate funding forced the cancellation or restructuring of over a hundred programs during the decade. Between fiscal years 1989 and 1999, the Army struggled to meet operations, personnel, and maintenance costs while investing in its future through research and development and equipment procurement. Funding for modernization was hit particularly hard. Modernization funds fell by over 40 percent in the decade leading up to 2001. Fiscal years 1999 and 2000, however, saw increases in expenditures for the Army, and the budget submission for FY 2001 continued this trend (*Table 1*).



TABLE 1—FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET REQUEST FOR TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY (*Billions of Dollars*)\*

<i>Category</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Military Personnel	28.4
Operation and Maintenance	23.8
Procurement	9.4
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation	5.3
Military Construction	1.0
Army Family Housing	1.1
Base Realignment and Closure	0.3
Environmental Restoration	0.4
Chemical Demilitarization	1.0
Total	70.8

\*Figures may not add up exactly due to rounding.

On 7 February 2000, the Army requested \$70.8 billion in total obligation authority from Congress for FY 2001. Army budget planners believed that this amount would fund training programs for active duty units to maintain current readiness levels. The budget, as submitted, would also maintain the active and reserve components at their approved end strengths. Finally, the funding request, if approved, would ensure that Army modernization and Transformation efforts could proceed at their current pace. The funding of these priorities, however, required reductions in other areas. Rather than reducing funds for quality of life programs and housing improvements, budget planners made cuts in base operations support, which would be kept at the minimum essential level, in order to fund training, personnel, and modernization costs.

In March 2000, General Shinseki defended the budget request before the House Armed Services Committee. He argued that the Army needed more funding than it had originally requested and without additional funds it would have to divert modernization funds to cover the costs of maintaining unit readiness. The chief of staff also requested supplemental appropriations to pay for operations in the Balkans. On 21 May 2001, the Department of Defense submitted a supplemental budget request for FY 2001 that included \$971.4 million for the Army to cover costs related to its current operations. Other important issues addressed by the supplemental request included the Army's rising military pay and entitlements, dwindling funds for reservist training, rising contract and program development costs, and insufficient funds for base operations support and operations

and maintenance accounts. After these and other additions to the Army's budget, including an additional \$1.6 billion for procurement, the Army received \$77 billion in total obligation authority by the conclusion of the fiscal year, \$2.9 billion over its initial request.

While deliberations continued with Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Defense, the Army began to formulate its budget request for the next fiscal year. Congress received the Army's FY 2002 budget request on 27 June 2001 (*Table 2*). This request totaled \$80.2 billion in total obligation authority, an increase of \$6 billion over the previous fiscal year's request. The Army argued that the increase was necessary to fund modernization costs while maintaining readiness and executing its current missions. The new budget would keep end strengths for the active duty Army, National Guard, and the Army Reserve at their same levels as the previous fiscal year and maintain rigorous training. Negotiations concerning the next fiscal year's budget carried on between the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress after FY 2001 ended.

TABLE 2—FISCAL YEAR 2002 BUDGET REQUEST FOR  
TOTAL OBLIGATION AUTHORITY (*Billions of Dollars*)\*

<i>Category</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Military Personnel	30.2
Operation and Maintenance	26.7
Procurement	11.2
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation	6.7
Military Construction	2.1
Army Family Housing	1.4
Base Realignment and Closure	0.2
Environmental Restoration	0.4
Chemical Demilitarization	1.2
Total	80.2

\*Figures may not add up exactly due to rounding.

### *The Quadrennial Defense Review*

The first Quadrennial Defense Review took place in 1997. The intent of this congressionally mandated process is to align the force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budgets of the armed services with the National Security Strategy. The Army, hampered by

a disorganized effort, unclear definitions of its purpose and goals, and internal divisions within the service itself, fared poorly in the 1997 review. The Army had emerged from the deliberations with increased funding for modernization, but not with the desired increase in force structure and personnel necessary to support the high operational tempo experienced since the end of the Cold War. Instead, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army to maintain its current force structure, based upon ten active duty divisions, with a smaller number of uniformed and civilian personnel.

The Army's senior leaders wanted to avoid the mistakes of the previous review. One mistake had been that the Army organized itself only six months before the review took place. For the 2001 review, the Army began to prepare more than a year in advance. In January 2000, the Center for Land Warfare, a small cell remaining from the 1997 Army QDR Office and part of the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, received additional personnel to form a new office to oversee the review. Three months later, Brig. Gen. H. Lynn Hartsell was named director and began overseeing further growth and reorganization of the office. The office created seven panels, each led by a general officer and staffed by Army Staff and Secretariat personnel. The panels' tasks were to consider the Army's plans and policies for the following subjects: strategy, risk assessment, and transformation; force generation capability and structure; modernization; sustainment; strategic mobility and infrastructure; readiness; information superiority; and human resources. At the end of the year, the enlarged office fell under the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs as part of the realignment of the Army Staff.

Throughout early and mid-2000, the review panels identified thirteen areas of concern and developed a strategy to address them in the impending QDR. At the beginning of FY 2001, after the review panels had completed their work, Army planners solicited advice from defense experts, retired senior leaders, and commanders of regional, unified, and Army service component commands. General Hartsell's office also ran an extensive analysis of the Army's force structure, demonstrating that further cuts in personnel would reduce its effectiveness.

Despite over a year of preparation, the Army still faced considerable difficulty during the review. Relations between the Army and the OSD became strained after Donald H. Rumsfeld became secretary of defense in January 2001. Secretary Rumsfeld, often working with little communication or consultation with the armed services, established ten senior review panels of his own, as well as several smaller working groups, to frame his goals and intent for the impending discussions. The Army's argument to preserve its current force structure ran counter to the vision of military transformation endorsed by Secretary Rumsfeld, who argued that advanced technology

could supply, if not exceed, many of the capabilities then provided by large land forces. Also, many of the studies and analyses that the Army QDR Office had conducted during the previous administration appeared irrelevant to the issues and arguments raised by the civilian appointees of the new administration. This forced the Army to react, often in a hasty and improvised manner, to arguments and objections raised by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Finally, the Army's land power-based concept of military transformation seemed less futuristic than those of the Air Force and Navy, which shared Secretary Rumsfeld's enthusiasm for small, light, and mobile air and sea forces equipped with precision-strike munitions. To redress these problems, in March 2001 General Byrnes directed General Hartsell to reassess his office's procedures and analysis to better accommodate the new issues raised by Secretary Rumsfeld and his subordinates and to create new working panels to prepare Army responses.

After the turbulent preliminary meetings between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army ended, the review began in April 2001 and lasted through August. The Director, OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), oversaw the review and directed the services to develop two Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) for fiscal years 2003–2007. The services were to submit both documents and PA&E would use them during program review. The Army Staff briefed both POMs to the secretary of the Army on 10 September 2001. After the attacks of 11 September, the secretary of defense directed the services to use the higher POM as their total obligation authority, leading the Army Staff to rebuild the fiscal years 2003–2007 POM in six weeks.

By September, the review began to take shape. A new strategic framework formulated by Secretary Rumsfeld's office broke with the policies and guidance of the previous administration, which had based the previous QDR on the presumption that the United States should be able to wage two simultaneous major theater wars. The new concept became known as the "1-4-2-1" strategy, its name derived from the number of missions the U.S. military had to be prepared to perform in order to meet different national security requirements. The 1-4-2-1 strategy articulated the following roles for the U.S. military: homeland defense (1), forward deterrence in four critical regions (4), the ability to "swiftly defeat the efforts" of enemy states in two near-simultaneous conflicts (2), and the ability to "win decisively" in one of them, meaning the total defeat and overthrow of the enemy regime at the president's option in one of those conflicts (1).

The Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted the draft of its QDR report on 24 September 2001 to the Joint Staff, the armed services, and combatant commanders for review. The report addressed fourteen critical issues related to national strategy and assessed each armed service's ability

to execute that strategy. Each armed service was allowed to return only three critical comments. General Hartsell's office prepared the Army's response, which noted that responsibilities and requirements for homeland defense were unclear, that the report distorted assessments of the current force against planning scenarios and acceptable risk estimates, and that the report overemphasized the role of long-range precision-strike weaponry. Despite these concerns, the report that Secretary Rumsfeld submitted to Congress on 30 September 2001 was essentially unchanged from the draft of six days prior.

Although contentiousness had marked the process, by the end of the fiscal year the Army considered its effort in the QDR a qualified success. It had preserved its force structure and budget from suggested reductions, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense accepted approximately two-thirds of the Army's recommendations when it prepared the initial draft of the final report.



# 3

## Personnel

### *Army Strength*

The active Army's end strength, established by the National Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2001 stood at 480,000. As of 30 September 2001, the actual number of soldiers in the Army totaled 480,801 and consisted of 400,461 enlisted personnel; 11,350 warrant officers; 64,829 commissioned officers; and 4,161 cadets. Females made up 15.5 percent of the active force, and 41.7 percent were minorities. As an incentive to maintain end strength, the fiscal year budget allowed a 3.7 percent pay increase and began a six-year program to improve pay comparability levels at one-half percent above the national employment cost index to adjust for inflation.

By the end of FY 2001, the Army National Guard was comprised of 351,829 guardsmen. Of these, 315,250 were enlisted personnel and 36,579 were officers. Minorities made up a total of 26.8 percent of the National Guard, and 12.1 percent were female.

The authorized end strength of the Army Reserve for FY 2001 was 205,000. At the end of the fiscal year, the actual end strength of the Army Reserve stood at 205,628, with 164,760 enlisted personnel and 40,868 officers. A total of 41.2 percent were minorities, and almost a quarter of reservists were women. The National Defense Authorization Act allowed for 13,106 reservists to serve on full-time active duty or full-time duty during the fiscal year to support the organization, administration, and training of the Army's reserve component.

### *Manning Initiatives*

In November 1999, General Shinseki created the Manning Task Force within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The task force was to study the individual replacement system used by the Army to assign soldiers to brigade combat teams and its effects on readiness. At the time, the Army manned and equipped its units according to Authorized Levels of Organization, which determined the personnel and assets necessary to fill the unit's table of organization and equipment. Historically, units with higher Authorized Levels of Organization, such

as divisions, Special Forces, and separate brigades, received priority for personnel, equipment, and other resources. This left other units in a degraded state of readiness and less able to deploy for unplanned crises. General Shinseki halted this preferential practice and directed that all units should receive 100 percent of their personnel and resource requirements. By the end of FY 2000, the Army was able to man its ten active component divisions and two armored cavalry regiments at a rate of 100 percent. The personnel requirements for these units had been met, but not all soldiers assigned to the units held correct grades and military occupational specialties.

In FY 2001, the Army took steps to ensure that proper personnel were assigned to these twelve units. By the end of the fiscal year, 93 percent of the soldiers serving in those units met the correct grade and military occupational specialty requirements after the Army transferred selected soldiers to them from other units. Headquarters elements also saw manning improvements, with particular attention paid to units designated for deployment in the early stages of major operations. Specific units above the division echelon level that were expected to deploy in the first thirty-five days of a major theater war achieved 100 percent personnel rates during FY 2001, with 91 percent of their soldiers placed in the correct grades and military occupational specialties. Manpower restraints, however, prevented the Army from manning its remaining units at 100 percent during the fiscal year.

### *Enlisted Personnel*

Recruiting was a tremendous success for the active duty Army in FY 2001. On 4 September 2001, the Army announced that it had reached its recruiting target of 75,800 new active duty troops and was also on course to meet its reserve component recruiting quotas by the end of the month. By the close of the fiscal year, the Army had exceeded the active duty goal of 75,800 by fifty-five recruits. Overall, these recruits met or exceeded the Department of Defense's three main standards for intelligence and aptitude: possession of a high school diploma, consistent high scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), and a low rate of poor scores on the AFQT. Over 90 percent of Army recruits during FY 2001 held high school diplomas. A total of 63.2 percent scored in the upper half of the AFQT, which placed them in the top three of the test's eight scoring categories. Less than 2 percent of those admitted scored in category IV, the lowest a recruit may score and still remain eligible to enlist.

There were a total of 52,259 enlisted promotion allocations during the fiscal year: 30,081 to sergeant; 13,061 to staff sergeant; 6,421 to sergeant first class; 2,296 to master sergeant; and 400 to sergeant major.



The Army exceeded its annual goals for initial term, mid-career, and career retention for the fiscal year. A total of 64,982 soldiers in these categories reenlisted, surpassing the quota of 64,000. In a departure from established practice, soldiers were allowed to reenlist up until the date of their separation from the service, as opposed to the previous policy that required soldiers to reenlist no less than ninety days before separation. To keep soldiers with high-demand skills in the civilian workforce, the Army increased its payments of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus from \$44 million to \$107 million. In addition to these incentives, soldiers serving in South Korea or at eleven stateside installations with low retention rates were eligible for an incentive called the Targeted Selective Reenlistment Bonus. An additional 12,099 soldiers transitioned into the Army Reserve, exceeding the targeted goal by over 1,500.

In FY 2001, there were a total of 85,246 enlisted separations, including those for retirements and administrative or physical disabilities. The numbers of separations for entry-level performance and conduct, nondisability medical conditions interfering with performance of duty, misconduct, poor physical fitness, and homosexual conduct increased from fiscal year 2000. However, the numbers of separations for discharges in lieu of trial by court-martial, hardship and dependency, parenthood, erroneous enlistment, and failure to maintain weight standards decreased from the previous fiscal year.

### *Recruiting Programs and Incentives*

Improved educational incentives assisted the Army's recruiting efforts during FY 2001. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel continued its evaluation of two education-based initiatives: College First and GED+ (General Educational Development Diploma Plus). Under the College First Program, the Army enlisted 342 recruits in FY 2001. College First allowed college students to enlist in the Delayed Enlistment Program and to receive a monthly stipend from the Army while attending classes for up to two years. The other pilot program, GED+, assisted promising individuals without high school diplomas who had achieved high scores on the AFQT and the Army's Aptitude for Individual Motivation Test. Under the GED+ program, thousands of prospective soldiers enlisted in the active and reserve components and received tutoring and mentoring to help them earn their General Educational Development diplomas before they entered service. The Army also implemented a program called Army University Access On-Line, a \$453 million program in which twelve private technology companies and twenty-nine accredited higher education institutions provided distance education to soldiers. As planned, Army University Access On-Line would allow an estimated eighty thousand



*From right, Secretary Caldera, with General Colin L. Powell (USA, Ret.) and General Shinseki, announces the College First and General Education Development Diploma Plus initiatives, 3 February 2000.*

soldiers to earn postsecondary degrees and technical certifications through Internet instruction between fiscal years 2001–2006.

A major change in marketing the Army brand accompanied these new educational incentives. More than two decades had passed since the Army unveiled its highly successful “Be All You Can Be” recruiting campaign in 1980, and Secretary Caldera decided it was time to change the recruiting message. In June 2000, the Army hired three civilian advertising agencies to create a new recruiting campaign. Leo Burnett USA served as the lead of the contracting team, and two minority-owned firms, Cartel Creativo and IMAGES USA, provided demographic marketing strategies to reach Hispanic and African American audiences. The centerpiece of the campaign was a new slogan, “An Army of One,” which was intended to emphasize the teamwork and unity of the Army. On 10 January 2001, the Army announced the new recruiting message and campaign, and the first primetime televised commercial followed the next day. In print and broadcast advertisements, soldiers told of the challenges and rewards of service and stressed the wide range of opportunities for personal and professional development within the Army. A redesigned recruiting Web site and streamlined Army logo featuring a white and gold star on a black background accompanied the new advertisements.

### *Officer Personnel*

Although the accession of enlisted personnel was a success for the Army in FY 2001, accession of officers proved difficult. The Army commissioned a total of 5,540 officers during the fiscal year: 2,955 from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 930 from the U.S. Military Academy, 752 from Officer Candidate School, and 903 from direct commissions or other means of accession, such as interservice transfers and officers returning to active duty. A total of 938 officers receiving their commission through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps were nonscholarship participants. Further, the Army struggled to fill the numbers of officers commissioned in its basic branches and specialty areas, adding only 3,979 of the 4,100 new officers needed.

### *Army Training and Leader Development Panel*

In FY 2001, the Army continued with its Training and Leader Development Panel, a major effort to study and improve the retention of junior officers. General Shinseki had chartered the panel in June 2000 and charged General John N. Abrams, the commanding general of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, with its oversight. General Shinseki instructed General Abrams to review the way the Army trained soldiers, developed leaders, and prepared its members to conduct both combat and noncombat missions. The panel met with over 13,500 officers and spouses in the first of four planned research phases. During these meetings, the panel members conducted interviews, surveys, and focus groups. Work on future research phases continued into the next fiscal year.

Between October and December 2000, the panel presented its findings to the chief of staff and other general officers. The panel reported that respondents noted concerns about the housing, health care, and retirement benefits provided by the Army to soldiers and their families. The lack of off-duty time for junior officers represented another critical concern. Many junior officers believed that the Army's rigorous training programs, while effective, intruded on family and personal time. The panel also identified widespread concerns harbored by junior officers regarding their professional development. Some officers believed that the development of junior officers was too hurried and that lack of time prevented them from mastering basic tactical and leadership skills. Others judged the officer assignment process to be more concerned with bureaucratic personnel management than with individual professional development. Not all of the panel's findings, however, were negative. The research also confirmed a strong sense of dedication to the Army and the nation among the officer corps and their families.

The panel completed its research on junior officers in February 2001 and summarized its findings in the Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report. This document identified seven major areas as “imperatives” where the Army would have to make improvements to better recruit, develop, and retain future leaders. The first imperative was the need for senior officers to tolerate errors made by subordinates in order to train soldiers and to develop leaders. The second and third imperatives cited the need to adapt the Officer Education System and the ways that the Army trained its soldiers for missions in the post–Cold War strategic environment. The fourth imperative proposed a need to articulate and enforce clear standards for success and failure in training officers. To make officers aware that training affected their development as leaders, the fifth imperative expressed the need for a model of officer professional development. In order to facilitate the necessary changes identified or implied by the five preceding imperatives, the sixth imperative charged the Army with developing a management process that could enact changes in training and leader development. The final imperative was to support lifelong learning, and the panel called for the continued educational development of officers throughout their careers. With its research on officers completed, the panel reconstituted itself in April 2001 and began its study of noncommissioned officers.

The panel also submitted a list of recommendations to remedy its previously identified imperatives. By May 2001, the Army began implementing the panel’s recommendations by altering policies regarding permanent changes of station and changes of command to provide greater stability to soldiers’ families. The chief of staff directed that soldiers should receive more family time on weekends and holidays by restricting garrison activities and by scheduling four-day weekends in conjunction with national holidays. General Shinseki further directed that tasks not related to combat training be eliminated and that minor tasks with short response times be reduced. To reduce personnel turnover and to provide adequate time to develop leadership skills, lieutenants would spend at least one year leading at the platoon level. Finally, the chief of staff directed U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to revise Field Manual (FM) 25–100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25–101, *Battle Focused Training*. These two field manuals concerned the Army’s basic training doctrine and that doctrine’s application to the development and execution of training programs, respectively.

The panel also recommended that the Army should designate a single proponent for training and leader development. Acting on this recommendation, General Shinseki transferred the responsibility for leader development from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. In July 2001,

the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans approved the establishment of its Leader Development Division, which would begin operations in the next fiscal year.

At the beginning of the fiscal year, Vice Chief of Staff General John M. Keane directed Lt. Gen. Timothy J. Maude, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, to create the Army Pregnancy and Readiness Working Group to examine and reduce the effects of unintended pregnancies on Army readiness. The working group included representatives from the Office of the Surgeon General, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, and Human Resource Policy Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The working group reviewed the pregnancy policies of each armed service and other documents to help shape a new Army policy based on dignity, respect, and individual responsibility. This new policy, which was still under development at the end of FY 2001, included instructions for handling the impact of sexual behavior and pregnancy on individual soldiers and the Army in general, as well as improved physical training for pregnant and postpartum soldiers.

### *Civilians*

Civilians continued to play an important role in the Army, although there was a slight decrease of 0.2 percent in the number of direct-hire civilians from the previous fiscal year. The Army employed 204,506 direct-hire civilians during 2001, a total of 591 less than in fiscal year 2000. Indirect hires of foreign nationals in Germany, the Republic of Korea, and other nations also decreased by approximately 293 in 2001 to a total of 17,875. Like their uniformed counterparts, Army civilians also received a 3.7 percent pay raise in FY 2001. To redress the shortage of civilian employees, the FY 2002 budget request submitted in June 2001, called for an increased direct-hire civilian workforce of 215,600.



## 4

# Force Development, Training, and Operational Forces

### *The Interim Force*

On 12 October 1999, Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki released a document entitled *The Army Vision*. In this important statement, the two senior leaders of the Army declared that the service would have to adapt itself to meet the challenges of the post–Cold War world. Since World War II, the Army had prepared to deter Soviet aggression in Europe and, if necessary, wage a large-scale conventional war against an enemy that used similar equipment, organizations, and tactics. After its resounding victory over Iraq in 1991 with Operation DESERT STORM, the Army found itself responsible for smaller peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. To improve the Army’s ability to conduct rapid deployments to such missions while retaining its superiority in future conventional conflicts, Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki explained in *The Army Vision* that the Army would need to develop and retain leaders and to provide a high quality of life for soldiers while remaining ready to respond to a wide variety of missions. Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki also called for a transformation of the Army with *The Army Vision*. The Army of the future, they wrote, should be composed of smaller and easily deployable units able to respond more rapidly and effectively to a greater number of missions than the current Army’s heavy and light units. Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki sought to ensure that the Army of the future could fight from a position of dominance, maintain the initiative throughout engagements, and defeat any and all enemies decisively.

By the end of 1999, General Shinseki had given further details as to how the service would transform itself with the release of the Transformation Campaign Plan. Developed by the Army Transformation Office, a cell within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans’ Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy, the Transformation Campaign Plan identified three forces the Army would employ during Transformation. The first was the Army’s current force, called the Legacy Force, which could be trained and ready to meet conventional challenges.

The second, the Interim Force, would use technological improvements to provide the quick-response and limited logistical requirements of the Army's light forces with the firepower and survivability of the Army's armored units. The final force, the Objective Force, would employ Future Combat Systems, a suite of aerial and ground sensors, unmanned attack systems, and futuristic combat vehicles linked by an information network. The Objective Force, as Secretary Caldera and General Shinseki described it, would provide the capabilities outlined in *The Army Vision*.

The year after the release of *The Army Vision*, the Transformation plan called for a new force, the Initial Force. The Initial Force would serve as a bridge between the Legacy and Interim Forces and test new doctrine, organizations, and technology. To establish the Initial Force the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, and the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, which were stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington, were reorganized and given new equipment in April 2000. Designated as Initial Brigade Combat Teams, the two units were reorganized into a novel brigade structure of five battalions: three mechanized infantry; one artillery; and, in order to provide increased intelligence-gathering equipment and capabilities to the brigade, one reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and acquisition battalion. In addition to testing the new organizational structure, the two reconfigured brigades also experimented with existing light armored vehicles and equipment that could be bought commercially to avoid the lengthy delays and costs required by internal development of new materiel.

The lessons learned from the experiments at Fort Lewis led the Army to purchase a new combat vehicle for equipping the Interim Force. After conducting a series of tests at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on 16 November 2000 the Army awarded a contract for the production of the Interim Armored Vehicle to GM GDLS Defense Group, a joint venture of General Motors and General Dynamics Land Systems. The Interim Armored Vehicle was not a single vehicle but a series of vehicles designed in two main variants. The first of these was the Mobile Gun System, which would be armed with a 105-mm. gun to provide direct-fire support for infantry. The second variant, the Infantry Carrier Vehicle, could hold a crew of two and nine soldiers with their equipment. The Infantry Carrier Vehicle would provide the prototype for eight further variants, which would enter production in 2003. The Interim Armored Vehicle could reach a maximum speed of sixty miles per hour and travel three hundred miles on a single load of fuel. Lighter than other armored vehicles, such as the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, they could also be airlifted by C-130s or larger aircraft. With a common chassis and interchangeable parts, the vehicles required simpler maintenance and repair and had less logistical constraints than the Army's other armored vehicles.





*Mobile Gun System variant of the Interim Armored Vehicle*

The contract with GM GDLS Defense Group called for the construction of 2,131 vehicles over a six-year period at a cost of \$4 billion, with initial delivery to begin in 2001. This first delivery would consist of more than three hundred vehicles, enough to outfit one of the brigades at Fort Lewis. The contract called for enough vehicles to equip the six Initial Brigade Combat Teams by FY 2006. A competing firm filed a protest against the contract shortly after it was made public, causing a delay of almost four months. On 9 April 2001, the Government Accountability Office rejected the protest and upheld the award to GM GDLS Defense Group.

The organization of the Initial Force Brigade Combat Team and the selection of the Interim Armored Vehicle put into place two elements that would be central to the successful development of the Interim Force. The Interim Force would be able to deploy six to eight brigades worldwide within ninety-six hours if given adequate strategic airlift. The two Initial Brigade Combat Teams at Fort Lewis became the first element of this force. One of the brigades was expected to be ready for deployment in FY 2003, and the other in the following fiscal year. Plans called for the Initial Force to be joined by another six to eight brigades equipped with Interim Armored Vehicles. On 12 July 2001, the Army announced that three active component brigades and one reserve component brigade would be the next four units to begin converting to Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This group consisted of the 172d Infantry Brigade; the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment; the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; and the Pennsylvania National Guard's 56th Brigade, 28th Infantry Division. The establishment and equipping of the Interim Brigade Combat Team represented the first successful step toward realizing the transformation of the Army outlined in *The Army Vision*.

### *The Objective Force*

The Objective Force described in *The Army Vision* remained a future goal in FY 2001, to be reached within eight to ten years. In addition to the Interim Force's ability to deploy brigades within ninety-six hours, *The Army Vision* required that the Objective Force be able to deploy a division within 120 hours and five divisions within thirty days. The Objective Force would be based on the development and fielding of Future Combat Systems, a planned family of vehicles that would use advanced technology and be more capable than existing combat vehicles. The Army entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in February 2000 to fund and develop Future Combat Systems. Future Combat Systems would provide a means to deliver the striking power and survivability of heavy forces with the mobility of light forces described in *The Army Vision*.

To provide institutional momentum behind Transformation, Secretary White and General Shinseki placed Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Cosumano Jr. in command of a new office, the Future Combat Systems Task Force, in October 2000. Six months later, General Shinseki ordered that the task force's responsibilities be broadened, and it became the Objective Force Task Force. General Shinseki also directed the expanded task force to develop Future Combat Systems into an acquisition program, to set benchmark dates for the deliveries of critical technologies, and to ensure that Future Combat Systems programs would deliver the capabilities required for the Objective Force. With its charter expanded, the task force also served as the chief of staff's liaison for Transformation-related issues with Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency, subordinate commands within the Army, and various private corporations involved with the development of Future Combat Systems. After Lt. Gen. John M. Riggs succeeded General Cosumano as director in June 2001, the task force began preparing a detailed campaign plan to describe and define the purpose, missions, and capabilities of the Objective Force. The study was released in FY 2002.

The growing organizational support placed behind the Army Transformation program was not the only sign of the growing resources required to realize the ambitious goal of the Objective Force. To accommodate the growing fiscal demands of Transformation, the Army restructured its budget to offset the costs of planning, testing, and development. To help pay for the development of Future Combat Systems and other Transformation programs, the Army restructured the Crusader self-propelled howitzer and Future Scout and Cavalry System in the FY 2001 budget. Additional budget changes for the fiscal year included the

divestiture of seven major weapons systems and reallocation of their funding to other programs for Future Combat Systems. These restructures and budget cuts provided over \$11.2 billion that could be reprogrammed between fiscal years 2001 and 2014.

### *Army Aviation*

As the Army planned for its future armored ground vehicles, it also unveiled a plan to modernize and recapitalize its present aircraft fleet during FY 2001. Army aviation had been a major concern of General Shinseki since 1999, when two events highlighted shortcomings in the Army's ability to field an effective aerial force. Task Force HAWK, which included two battalions of AH-64 Apache helicopters, performed poorly in Albania, exposing a shortage of trained pilots, experienced leaders, and maintenance and equipment assets. Shortly thereafter, the entire UH-1 Iroquois and AH-1 Cobra fleets of the National Guard were grounded because of widespread maintenance and reliability issues.

To address the problems with its rotary-wing fleet, in April 2000 the Army announced a new version of its Aviation Modernization Plan. The new plan was the result of a two-year effort to modernize the Army's rotary-wing aviation assets and intended to reduce maintenance, training, and operating costs. It proposed a reduction in the different types of helicopters used by the Army, along with the Army Reserve and National Guard, from seven to four: the AH-64 Apache, the CH-47 Chinook, the UH-60 Black Hawk, and the under-development RAH-66 Comanche. The plan also endorsed the creation of multifunctional battalions. Composed of multiple types of helicopters, these units would be smaller but more capable than the current single-airframe battalions used by the Army. In December 2000, Vice Chief of Staff General John M. Keane created a task force to execute an aviation modernization program that would maintain readiness while divesting obsolete aircraft from the active and reserve component fleets. The task force was chaired by Brig. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, head of the Force Management Directorate in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. After two weeks of deliberation, the task force suggested minor changes to the current aviation plan.

After taking the task force's recommendations into account, the Army announced its revised Aviation Modernization Plan on 7 September 2001. It called for all UH-1 Iroquois and AH-1 Cobra helicopters to be retired from service by 2004, when only the AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, OH-58 Kiowa Warrior, and CH-47 Chinook would be in service. The plan also reduced the number of aircraft by over four hundred in the active component and six hundred in the reserve component between fiscal years 2001 and 2007. This reduction of almost a quarter of the Army's aircraft

would allow the Army to fund the recapitalization and modernization of its remaining helicopters. The Army's aviation capabilities were also reorganized, with the majority of its attack aircraft placed in smaller battalions within the active component and the majority of its lift and support aircraft placed in the Army Reserve and National Guard. A total of 240 aircraft were moved from active to reserve units. The reorganization and reduction in the number of aircraft units provided more repair and maintenance assets to a fewer number of aircraft needing service. Planners predicted that these improvements in equipping, maintaining, training, manning, and funding would raise the operational readiness rate of the Army's aviation units from 75 percent to 90 percent within three years.

The Aviation Modernization Plan dealt not only with the Army's present inventory of rotary-wing aircraft, but also with the future technological development of Army aviation. Procurement of the RAH-66 Comanche reconnaissance helicopter played an important part in the Aviation Modernization Plan. The Comanche, the centerpiece of Army aviation modernization, was expected to be the first fielded system of the Objective Force. The FY 2001 budget funded the testing of two prototypes and the development of an engine and other related systems to support the Comanche. With the release of the modernization plan and continuing development of the Comanche, the Army moved toward its goal of fielding a capable and more easily supportable aviation component.

### *Technological Transformation and Testing*

While developing long-term programs such as Future Combat Systems and the Comanche, the Army also began to bring new technologies into the field for testing during FY 2001. At Fort Irwin, California, the 2d and 4th Brigades of the 4th Infantry Division conducted a two-week exercise called the Division Capstone Exercise in April 2001. The exercise included the final test of Army Battle Command Systems, a networked suite of six technologies that integrated information systems between tactical and strategic echelons. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System coordinated artillery missions and assigned target priorities to the artillery crews linked with the system. The All Source Analysis System processed intelligence and could transmit it from echelons above corps down to the battalion level. The Maneuver Control System distributed electronic tactical reports and orders between commanders and subordinate units. The Air and Missile Defense Work Station delivered early warning and targeting information for air defense. The Combat Service Support Computer System provided commanders with logistical information. The final piece of the Army Battle Command Systems, the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, was a distributed tactical internet that could broadcast

locations of friendly and enemy vehicles. When combined, the six systems promised to deliver improved awareness of battlefield conditions and an increased ability to spread information between levels of command.

The Division Capstone Exercise demonstrated that Army Battle Command Systems improved the amount of information available to commanders, thereby giving them greater ability to maneuver their units and make swift decisions. Also, at lower echelons the better-informed soldiers displayed greater initiative than the opposing force. The success of the Army's first "digital division" in the Division Capstone Exercise added momentum to existing plans to digitize the remaining units of the III Corps by FY 2004.

The lessons learned from the Division Capstone Exercise became part of a subsequent war game designed to evaluate the Army's technological transformation efforts intended for the Objective Force. Shortly after the exercise at Fort Irwin ended, the Army held its Army Transformation War Game at the Army War College from 22 to 27 April 2001. Headquarters, Department of the Army, sent representatives, as did U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School, U.S. Army Science Board, and U.S. Army Research Laboratory. Additionally, participants from the other armed services and Department of Defense commands and offices, three executive departments, eight federal intelligence agencies, and eight allied armies also contributed to the events. The war game, named VIGILANT WARRIORS 01, incorporated lessons learned from the Division Capstone Exercise, as well as from the Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment held in September 2001 at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The scenario of VIGILANT WARRIORS 01 involved a major theater war in the Middle East in 2015 and envisioned a Blue Force of U.S. armed forces, other governmental agencies, and multinational partners fighting against an unconventional enemy employing both regular and irregular tactics to offset American technological and materiel advantages. The scenario also contained events to test the Blue Force's ability to respond to noncombat crises and conduct operations after combat had ended.

The victory of the Blue Force in three simulations suggested to observers that the Objective Force, as currently planned, would be capable of deploying rapidly and defeating a variety of opposing forces. Throughout the war game, the Blue Force was able to strike unexpectedly and overwhelmingly at the opposing force, disrupting the ability of opposing commanders to control and maneuver their units. The war game, however, also suggested that further study would need to be conducted in several areas, including training, leader development, communications,

information collection, logistics, and the provision of air- and sealift. A Senior Leader Seminar, attended by the chief of staff and other senior leaders from the Army, the other armed services, and the Department of Defense, followed the war game to disseminate and discuss its findings. Although the war game raised issues for further study, the Army announced that it had demonstrated the value of ongoing Transformation efforts.

### *Doctrine*

To align its doctrine with its technological and structural transformation, the Army released two new versions of field manuals that laid out its methods of waging war and preserving peace. On 14 June 2001, Field Manual 100–1, *The Army*, was replaced by FM 1, *The Army*. FM 1 provided the basic doctrine for the use of land power in warfare to support the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The new field manual described the fundamental reasons for the Army's existence and the basic functions it bore responsibility for in defending the United States. The authors of the manual took care to make sure it could be understood by a wide audience, including political decision-makers, members of the other armed services, and Department of Defense and Department of the Army civilians.

Accompanying FM 1 was FM 3–0, *Operations*. FM 3–0 represented the most comprehensive change in the Army's combat doctrine since 1982 with the adoption of AirLand Battle, which envisioned large-scale conventional operations against an armored and mechanized enemy, in FM 100–5, *Operations*. By incorporating experience from the Army's post–Cold War deployments and engagements, including joint operations with the other armed services, the authors created a new manual including combat and peacekeeping operations to replace the updated 1993 version of FM 100–5. FM 3–0 established the concept of a “full-spectrum force” capable of executing a wide variety of missions. It divided operations into four major categories: offense, defense, stability, and support operations. Together, FM 1 and FM 3–0 laid the doctrinal and intellectual foundation for an Army capable of operating with the other armed services to protect and advance the nation's strategic interests.

### *The Black Beret*

A controversial part of General Shinseki's Transformation efforts was his decision to adopt the black beret as the Army's standard headgear, which he announced on 17 October 2000 at the Association of the United States Army conference. The previous year, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command had begun studying the beret as a means of overcoming

parochialisms of branch and specialty. Accordingly, the command surveyed a wide range of active and retired officers and soldiers to learn what they thought of the idea. The survey results suggested that resistance to the idea would be pronounced. Although designed to reinforce the fundamental point that all soldiers share the same sense of purpose, duty, and sacrifice, the initiative indeed encountered a great deal of resistance. Serving and retired members of the Ranger and Special Forces communities, as well as organizations such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion, strongly objected to the idea that all soldiers should wear the same beret. The Office of the Chief of Staff received hundreds of letters and over a thousand e-mails, mostly registering opposition to the idea. The controversy over the beret also invited official scrutiny. Within five months, seventy-one congressional legislators had submitted 112 inquiries to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The White House also requested information. As a result of the uproar, General Shinseki agreed to modify his plan. On 16 March, an announcement that Rangers would be authorized to wear a distinctive tan beret helped to ameliorate criticism, and instructions that soldiers in airborne and Special Forces units would continue to wear maroon and green berets, respectively, followed.

The berets began to appear at central issue facilities and supply distribution centers in April 2001. Many had to be returned, however, after the politically awkward revelation that some of the berets had been made in China or with Chinese content. Nevertheless, soldiers who had completed entry-level training began wearing the black beret on 14 June 2001. Soldiers entering units after that date had to first complete initial-entry training and qualify in weapons and physical training before earning the right to wear the beret. They would then receive their beret in a “rites of passage” ceremony. Three-fourths of the Army received two pieces of the new headgear by the end of the fiscal year, and the remaining quarter received them in the following fiscal year. The estimated cost of this first issue of two berets per soldier was \$26.6 million between fiscal years 2001 and 2002.

### *Training*

Between fiscal years 1998 and 2000, the Army realigned \$1.1 billion dedicated to armor training, in order to fund other programs, and failed to meet tank-mile training goals by an average of 20 percent. In FY 2001, members of Congress, concerned about training tempo, recommended that the Army develop a new methodology to determine its funding requirements for training. The Army’s senior leaders responded by making changes to its business practices. During FY 2001, major commands began to execute the ground operating tempo and the Flying Hour Program

at the levels specified in command audit trails and in accordance with the Army's Combined Arms Training Strategy. Major commands could request permission to realign funds, but none of these requests were approved during the fiscal year. To ensure adherence to the new policy, major commands submitted quarterly projections for the fiscal year to Headquarters, Department of the Army, for scrutiny and approval. At the end of each quarter, expenditures of funds and the training miles and hours performed by the major commands would be compared to projections, with explanations provided in the case of deviations of plus or minus 5 percent from quarterly projections.

While attempts to improve training occurred at the HQDA level, commanders also worked to improve the quality of reporting in the Unit Level Logistics System, the basis for tracking and reporting time and expenditures related to training. As a result of the new scrutiny on tracking and expending training dollars and a renewed command emphasis on reporting the execution of the Combined Arms Training Strategy in an accurate manner, the Army met its ground training goal and achieved 787 tank miles during FY 2001, the most executed since Operation DESERT STORM.

Resource and policy decisions made in FY 2001 affected the president's budget for the next fiscal year, as well as the construction of the Program Objective Memorandum for fiscal years 2003–2007. When constructing the Army's POM submission for fiscal years 2003–2007, the Army decided to accept significant risk to training readiness. The Training Program Execution Group reduced several programs below the presidential budget's funding level in order to increase funding in other programs and fix readiness problems identified by unit status reports and POM submissions from major commands.

### *Deployed Operational Forces*

Throughout FY 2001, the Army conducted missions and deployments outside of the continental United States. During the year, approximately 125,000 soldiers and 15,000 Department of the Army civilians were stationed or deployed overseas to meet the Army's global commitments. The most critical of these commitments was the Army's ongoing rotation of units to participate in Operation JOINT FORGE, the multinational peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rotation under way when the fiscal year began was historic because it marked the first time since World War II that a reserve component unit served as an operational headquarters for active duty units. That distinction fell to the headquarters of the 49th Armored Division, a Texas Army National Guard unit, which had replaced the 10th Mountain Division in March 2000 as the headquarters for troops serving in





*Brig. Gen. Robert L. Halverson, commander of the 49th Armored Division, and General Shinseki*

Multi-National Division–North of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Stabilization Force. Based in Tuzla, the Multi-National Division–North bore the responsibility for peacekeeping in northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. After assuming command of Multi-National Division–North, the soldiers of the 49th Armored Division and the active duty 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, which reported to the 49th Armored Division, conducted peacekeeping and civil-military operations. These operations contributed to greater security in the region and allowed for a successful legislative election in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 11 November 2000.

The election was the high point of the 49th Armored Division's rotation in the Balkans. On 5 October 2000, its command of Multi-National Division–North came to an end, and command transferred to the headquarters of the 3d Infantry Division. The 3d Infantry Division held responsibility for the command until October 2001. Between October 2000 and April 2001, Multi-National Division–North included troops from two National Guard brigades, the 30th Infantry Brigade from North Carolina and the 45th Infantry Brigade from Oklahoma, and troops from the active duty 25th Infantry Division. Units from the Georgia National Guard's 48th Infantry Brigade joined active duty units from the 3d and 25th Infantry Divisions in April and remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the remainder of FY 2001.

In December 2000, General Shinseki approved a schedule to assign a mix of active, reserve, and National Guard units to six-month rotations in the Stabilization Force or the smaller Kosovo Force. General Shinseki concluded that enlarging the number of units eligible for duty in the Balkans would allow returning units greater time to train before subsequent deployments. Also, he believed that serving together would strengthen the relationships between active and reserve component units. To realize these benefits, the schedule called for Army National Guard divisions to command six of the next eight Stabilization Force rotations, which were planned through April 2005. It also called for active duty troops from the III Corps, the V Corps, and the XVIII Airborne Corps to command the Kosovo Force for rotations planned through May 2005.

As the troops of the Stabilization Force kept the peace in the Balkans, another sixty-two thousand soldiers served in U.S. Army, Europe, and the Seventh Army. In addition to the soldiers serving in Multi-National Division–North, troops from U.S. Army, Europe, served in the Balkans under the auspices of NATO. The 21st Theater Support Command oversaw the transit of personnel, equipment, and supplies through Burgas, Bulgaria, en route to Kosovo, Macedonia, and Greece, to support the NATO mission in eastern Europe. While providing forces for these missions, U.S. Army, Europe, also conducted a major aviation training exercise in Poland called VICTORY STRIKE, which tested pilots and air crews in attack and logistical missions simulations.

In addition to its soldiers in Europe, the Army also had thousands of troops active in the Middle East. An Army infantry battalion and a support battalion provided the core of the Multi-National Force and Observers contingent responsible for peacekeeping along the Sinai Peninsula border between Egypt and Israel. More importantly, the Army continued to maintain a forward presence in the Persian Gulf by contributing approximately three thousand troops to Coalition Joint Task Force–Kuwait at Camp Doha, Kuwait. The combined joint task force oversaw an ongoing training cycle called Operation DESERT SPRING, in which four armored and cavalry brigades from the Army trained alongside the Kuwaiti Army, tangibly demonstrating the commitment of the United States to a secure and stable Middle East.

## 5

# Army National Guard

### *Organizational Change*

In the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress elevated the positions of director of the Army National Guard and chief of the Army Reserve. On 13 June 2001, Maj. Gen. Roger C. Shultz of the National Guard and Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Plewes of the Army Reserve were both promoted to lieutenant general, the first in their positions to hold that rank. These promotions recognized the increasing importance of the reserve component, as evidenced by the growing reliance on guardsmen and reservists for overseas deployments to Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Middle East.

### *Personnel Management*

The Army National Guard met its end-strength objective of 350,526, finishing the fiscal year with an end strength of 351,829. Enlisted gains were programmed at 60,252, and officer gains at 3,175. The National Guard surpassed its recruiting quota during the fiscal year. It enlisted 61,956 new guardsmen, exceeding the 60,252 target goal by 1,704. Taken as a group, the National Guard recruits met the two aforementioned Department of Defense quality standards related to the AFQT, but the number of high school graduates came in slightly below expectation. National Guard recruiters, however, judged the group to be the best in a decade, and seasonal and targeted bonus payments helped to fill several critical military occupational specialty shortages in the National Guard. The Guard set its non-prior-service and prior-service accession targets at equivalent 50 percent ratios for the fiscal year, but the resulting rates showed an imbalance of 53.4 percent non-prior-service and 46.6 percent prior-service accessions. The Army National Guard continued to lead the reserve components of the armed services with a 10 percent overall attrition rate. The Guard finished the fiscal year with its officer accessions at 107 percent of the goal of 3,175 but ended the year short 821 total officers due to higher than expected loss rates.

### *Training and Readiness*

The overall unit resources and training levels of the Army National Guard declined by .9 percent during FY 2001. The primary causes for this decline were mobilizations in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and a shortage of personnel. Fourteen of the Army National Guard's enhanced separate brigades met their required readiness criteria as defined by Defense Planning Guidance, and the equipment on hand for these units increased by 7 percent during the fiscal year. Army National Guard divisions, however, declined in readiness due to lack of full-time support personnel. Postmobilization training levels and overall readiness for these units remained below acceptable levels. During the fiscal year, the overall unit resources and training levels for the eight Army National Guard divisions declined by 5.1 percent because of decreases in skill qualification levels, maintenance, and training.

Despite these difficulties, over forty thousand soldiers deployed to the various combat training centers to conduct Army National Guard training rotations or in support of active component training rotations. The Army National Guard's Training Strategy dictates that each of its eight combat divisions complete a Battle Command Training Program rotation every four years. The Battle Command Training Program is a computer-based simulation exercise designed to hone command and staff skills, the military decision-making process, and integration of combat assets into a realistic division-level battle. It consists of a five-day seminar followed by an exercise. In FY 2001, the 40th and 42d Infantry Divisions completed the combination seminar and computer exercise at the Army National Guard Leadership Development Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Approximately four thousand guardsmen from the two divisions participated in Battle Command Training Program exercises in FY 2001. In addition to the division-level Battle Command Training Program, eight National Guard enhanced separate brigades conducted training rotations related to the Brigade Command and Battle Staff Training Program, a brigade-level exercise.

### *Mobilization*

During FY 2001, the National Guard continued to provide support to civil authorities in emergency and crisis situations. State or local governments requested National Guard assistance 312 times to deal with natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or other situations. Guard members served a total of 236,179 man-days on state-active duty status throughout the year to meet these demands.

The majority of events requiring governors to request assistance from the National Guard were natural disasters. Flood relief efforts represented the primary reason for activation of the Guard, resulting in 67,569 man-days on state-active duty. Major flooding in West Virginia, caused by a series of four deluges throughout the year, required guardsmen from four states to put in 48,100 man-days on state-active duty. Additionally, floods that broke out in the wake of Tropical Storm Allison in June 2001 affected coastal areas in Texas, Louisiana, and Florida. The cities of Houston, Texas, and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, were particularly hard hit, as were areas of southeastern Texas, where approximately 1,200 Army and Air Guard members conducted air and ground search and rescue missions.

Firefighting continued to be another major service provided by the National Guard. In the first six months of 2001, the Florida Guard spent 6,431 man-days helping local authorities fight a series of wildfires in that state. Over one-half million acres of land in ten western states were consumed by wildfires in August 2001, and the Guard put in 29,959 man-days fighting the blazes alongside 21,000 civilian firefighters.

In addition to flood and fire emergencies, members of the Army National Guard also provided civil defense and security when political unrest threatened public order. Two notable National Guard call-ups occurred in the nation's capital during January 2001. Over a thousand guardsmen and air guardsmen contributed to the orderly inauguration of President George W. Bush, providing security and communications support. Less orderly were the organized protests and demonstrations aimed at disrupting the International Monetary Fund conference in Washington, D.C. To support the conference, the District of Columbia National Guard provided security, manned traffic control points, and stood ready to respond in case armed force became necessary. Less than three weeks before the fiscal year ended, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 caused activations of Guard members throughout the country. The attack on the Pentagon resulted in the deployment of Guard members from the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and South Carolina to the scene, while the New York National Guard responded to the site of the collapsed World Trade Center buildings.

### *Equipment and Maintenance*

The modernization of the Army National Guard's combat vehicles continued during FY 2001. Three infantry battalions in Army National Guard divisions received the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, and seven divisional armored battalions received the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank. The Guard also fielded eighteen artillery battalions equipped with the M109A6 Paladin howitzer system. Nine of these battalions

were fielded to echelons above division units: eight to enhanced separate brigades, and the ninth to a divisional battalion. Three artillery battalions also received the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System, which was the first component of the Army Battle Command System acquired by the Guard. The National Guards of four states fielded Avenger air defense artillery battalions, continuing the Army National Guard's plan to replace its obsolete Hawk and Chaparral air defense systems with the Avenger.

One materiel issue facing the National Guard in FY 2001 was the lack of surplus inventory of selected items to provide immediate replacements when units sent equipment to depots for repair. This resulted in degraded readiness as units waited for equipment to return from depots after maintenance and service. The amount of items sent by National Guard units to depots for repair increased by 11 percent during the fiscal year, primarily due to an increase in maintenance requirements for the Guard's aging tactical wheeled vehicle fleet and aviation modernization upgrades. Inadequate funds to support the increased workload of depot maintenance resulted in a backlog of unserviceable equipment. The Army National Guard's depot maintenance programs were funded at only 77 percent of the required amount during the fiscal year. Early deploying units, such as the enhanced separate brigades, received 80 percent of their maintenance funding requirements, and the Guard's divisional units received only 74 percent of theirs for the fiscal year.

## 6

# Logistics

### *Single Stock Fund*

The Army continued to implement the Single Stock Fund program, which was first approved in 1997. The Single Stock Fund program is a business process reengineering initiative designed to integrate logistics and inventory accounting processes in the Army Working Capital Fund, Supply Management–Army business area. The program merged wholesale and retail elements below the HQDA level into a single nationally managed element. During FY 2001, the program moved from the planning stage to implementation, reaching the first two of its three planned milestone objectives. On 18 October 2000, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics announced that work would begin on reaching Milestone 1, the conversion of installation-level, retail stock–funded inventories, and Milestone 2, the conversion of corps and theater operations and maintenance retention stocks. Completed by April 2001, the Army managed to merge 91,164 lines of materiel valued in excess of \$489 million. The program also capitalized former retail stock–funded inventories valued at \$451 million and former corps and theater operations and maintenance retention inventories valued at \$38 million.

During FY 2001, the Army coordinated planning for Milestone 3, which would extend the Single Stock Fund to tactical supply support activities at division, nondivision, and regimental levels. After initial testing of software and communications systems, the Milestone 3 operational test was scheduled to begin at Fort Hood, Texas, in June 2002 and would involve the 1st Cavalry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, the Texas Army National Guard, and selected U.S. Army Reserve activities.

### *Recapitalization*

As the funding for Army modernization decreased during the 1990s, the service began to search for ways to extend the service life of its aging equipment, vehicles, and weapons systems. To this end, in April 2001, the Army established the Army Recapitalization Program. The program would extend the service life of selected weapons systems, vehicles,

and equipment while reducing their operating and support costs and improving their reliability and ease of maintenance. Recapitalization included the rebuilding or replacement of engines, transmissions, hydraulics, and wiring systems, as well as the improvement of weapons, sensors, and other technological systems.

In FY 2001, the program selected twenty-one Army systems for recapitalization, including the M1 Abrams tank; AH-64 A/D Apache/Longbow helicopters; UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter; CH-47F Chinook cargo helicopter; M88A1/M88A2 Hercules recovery vehicle; M48/M60 armored vehicle-launched bridge; M9 armored combat earthmover; M2/M3 series Bradley fighting vehicles; Multiple-launch rocket system; Patriot missile system; M113 family of vehicles; heavy expanded-mobility tactical truck; small emplacement excavator; M915 A4 line haul tractor; AN/TPQ-36/37 Firefinder; AN/ASM-190 electronic shop shelter (includes AN/ASM-146, AN/ASM-147, and AN/ASM-189); M992 field artillery ammunition support vehicle; D7F/G tractor, full track; small-unit support vehicle; scraper, earth-moving; and the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle. Of these twenty-one systems, funding existed to begin the recapitalization of only the first sixteen in FY 2002, leading the Army to examine options for increasing or reprogramming funds to recapitalize the remaining five vehicles. Scheduled to begin in FY 2002, priority for equipment recapitalization would be given to the headquarters of the III Corps (including both the active and reserve echelon-above-division units supporting the headquarters), the 1st Cavalry Division, the 3d Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. The equipment of other units would be recapitalized as funding allowed in the ensuing fiscal years.

### *Information Technology*

The Army continued to make progress throughout the fiscal year in improving the software and hardware systems used to control logistical inventories and to monitor the distribution of materiel. Originally conceived as a means to correct logistical difficulties identified during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the Total Distribution Planning system supported the combat support and combat service support units of the Army, as well as the technological transformation of operational forces. Funding for the system in FY 2001 focused on development, fielding, implementation, and integration of communication services for logistical applications and the acquisition of Automatic Identification Technology to enhance the visibility of assets in inventories and in transit.



Automatic Identification Technology included a suite of storage technologies, such as bar code readers, radio frequency identification devices, and magnetic storage media, and was used to process information on logistical assets throughout the distribution system. It also included the hardware and software required to provide these devices with data, read the information on them, and integrate that information with information from other devices or systems. The Army's infrastructure for logistical information consisted of Automatic Identification Technology devices and their supporting servers, networks, communications links, databases, and transportation and supply nodes, through which supplies and units move along the supply and deployment pipeline from factory to unit, from home base to theater deployment locations.

The Automatic Identification Technology logistical devices and systems operated by the Army had remained unchanged since their initial acquisition, yet the technology outside the Army continued to evolve. In response, during FY 2001, the Army examined the use of readily available, off-the-shelf commercial devices and systems to incorporate into the suite. Examples of current commercially proven and available technologies useable for military applications included radio frequency labels for hazardous material tracking, chemical defense sensors, radio frequency connections with satellite communications, and property book automation systems.

To take advantage of Internet technologies, the Logistics Integration Agency began to develop a Distribution Knowledge Center Web site for the Force Projection and Distribution Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The agency made progress on the development of content and design of the Web site and served as the primary liaison between the directorate and technical subject matter experts throughout the logistics staff, as well as the Logistics Knowledge Center. When completed, the Distribution Knowledge Center would improve the management and oversight of materiel distribution. The Web site would also serve as the central comprehensive repository for distribution-related policies and provide access to current and emerging regulations and doctrine governing materiel distribution. Users of the Web site would also be able to identify and synchronize ongoing distribution-related efforts conducted by organizations external to HQDA, including the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, Defense Logistics Agency, and U.S. Transportation Command. The Web site would also keep track of the efforts of various civilian contractors working under these organizations. Finally, the Web site would provide an interface for ongoing Department of Defense and joint transformation initiatives involving logistical processes, such as the integration of logistical functions and end-to-end distribution management of materiel.

*Research, Development, and Acquisition*

The Army restructured the acquisition program for the Crusader self-propelled howitzer in January 2000 and began seeking weight reductions that would improve its ability to deploy by air, rather than by sealift. Despite these steps, the Army still faced considerable congressional opposition to the continued funding and development of the program. During the debates over the FY 2001 budget, the Senate Appropriations Committee cut \$155 million from the program's \$355 million budget, pending a review to be conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and suggested that the Army restructure the program to develop a next-generation self-propelled artillery system that would be compatible with Future Combat Systems. In December 2000, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's report defended the program, and Congress restored full funding in February 2001. Work then continued to complete the design for the program's preliminary review, scheduled to take place in early fiscal year 2002.

The RAH-66 Comanche, the Army's next-generation armed reconnaissance helicopter, was the first helicopter designed and developed specifically for both light attack and reconnaissance missions. When fielded, the Comanche, equipped with modern avionics, electronic sensors, and weapons systems, will replace both the Army's AH-1 Cobra light attack and OH-58 Kiowa Warrior reconnaissance helicopters. The Comanche program passed a series of tests and entered a two-year engineering and manufacturing development stage in April 2000. Work began on producing five pre-production aircraft within two years, and eight production aircraft by 2004. The prime contractor, Boeing-Sikorsky, however, had difficulty producing an aircraft that met the Army's required weight and engine power requirements. To redress these and other problems with the helicopter's design, in January 2001, the Department of Defense increased funding for the program by \$504 million, including approximately \$420 million for production costs. Despite the increased funding, in early September 2001, the Comanche project manager reported that the aircraft's cost, schedule, and performance requirements could not be met. This resulted in plans for a fifth major restructuring of the Comanche program, to take place in the subsequent fiscal year.

In 1999, the AAI Corporation won a competition of prototype unmanned aerial vehicle systems. In January 2000, the Army, impressed with the company's Shadow 200 test model, awarded the company the contract to develop the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The ensuing development work proceeded rapidly, leading to an initial operational test and evaluation in only seventeen months. The Shadow 200 underwent developmental testing at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, between December 2000 and April 2001. In May of 2001, the Shadow began the initial operational

test and evaluation process at Fort Hood, Texas. Several incidents resulted in the Army converting the evaluation to a limited user test. Between July and September 2001, AAI modified the Shadow to correct several design deficiencies identified during the evaluation process. The Army expected to complete the evaluation process in FY 2002.



## 7

# Support Services

### *Morale, Welfare, and Recreation*

In FY 2001, the Army's budget included a total of \$48.2 million for the Army Community Service, a 7 percent increase over the amount programmed in the previous fiscal year. Before the year had ended, the Army received a total of \$50.9 million for the service. A total of \$2.97 million provided a broad range of employment services to more than 267,140 patrons. The Employment Readiness program made more than 45,503 job referrals and helped secure paid employment for 7,750 family members, bringing in revenue of more than \$155 million to Army households. In addition, Employment Readiness provided career assessment and employment search counseling to 37,950 clients worldwide, including soldiers, family members, Department of Defense civilians, and retirees. A further 14,903 clients received job skills training to assist with their professional careers.

In addition to these funds, the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act supported several new and expanded benefits that were advanced through the ongoing Army Family Action Plan process: military participation in the Federal Thrift Savings Plan; chiropractic services at selected locations; elimination of TRICARE Prime copayments and expansion of TRICARE Prime Remote to active duty family members; reduction of catastrophic cap for retiree health care from \$7,500 to \$3,000; TRICARE for Life for seniors over the age of sixty-five; and retiree access to retail and national mail-order pharmacies. Policy changes that resulted from Army Family Action Plan issues included granting dependents of full-time, local-hire–nonappropriated-fund employees equal enrollment priority with local-hire–appropriated-fund employees at Department of Defense Dependents Schools; authorizing family readiness group newsletters to include unofficial information not exceeding 20 percent of the printed space; and allowing soldiers to request tour stabilization if a graduating high school senior was in their household.

### *Installation Management*

In FY 2001, Army installation managers faced numerous budgetary pressures that affected daily life for tenants and residents on Army posts.

The Army received \$898 million for the year to construct housing, training facilities, and air, sea, road, and rail mobility facilities on its active duty installations. The National Guard received \$59 million in military construction funds for its installations, and the Army Reserve received a further \$82 million. Despite these sums, the Army's installations continued to be underfunded for base operations services, including transportation, utilities, leasing, food service, and morale, welfare, and recreation activities. The Army also received inadequate funds for real properties maintenance accounts, which were necessary for maintenance, restoration, and modernization of facilities. As a result, quality of life and provision of services on bases suffered during the fiscal year.

### *Housing and Infrastructure*

Despite inadequate funding to support base maintenance, the Army made housing improvements on its installations a priority for FY 2001. The annual budget provided \$92 million for new housing construction, while total Army Family Housing funds for operations and utilities, maintenance, and leasing amounted to \$1.14 billion. The Army entered the fiscal year with a goal, previously agreed to by the Army and Department of Defense, of eliminating all inadequate family housing in the continental United States by 2007. The Army hoped this could be accomplished through additional military construction of new housing, increases in Basic Allowance for Housing funds, and increased privatization. The latter, supported by the 1996 Military Housing Privatization Initiative Act, allowed the private sector to provide housing construction, maintenance, and management services to the Army. With congressional support and aided by privatization, the Army aimed to provide adequate housing for all soldiers within seven years.

The centerpiece of the Army's attempt to reinvigorate its housing was the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), in which the Army entered into contracts with private real estate developers to provide quality modern residential communities for soldiers and their families. In FY 2001, four RCI projects were under way at Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Lewis, Washington; and Fort Meade, Maryland. Plans called for another twenty-four projects by FY 2005 that would build or renovate over sixty-nine thousand new homes, or almost 80 percent of the Army's housing inventory. The Fort Carson RCI effort, the first to begin, started in 1999. By the end of FY 2001, the initiative funded the construction of 240 new houses and the renovation of 480 preexisting houses. When the RCI project reaches its conclusion, the post will have 840 new homes and an additional 1,823 homes renovated.

As part of RCI, the Army announced in April 2001 that it would request Congress to approve the largest public-private joint venture for military housing privatization at Fort Hood. Upon approval and transfer of assets and operations to the developing partner at the beginning of the next fiscal year, this effort will result in the construction of 290 new homes and revitalization of a further 5,622 homes, completely replacing or improving the post's family housing within fifty years at a cost of \$4 billion. The next month, the Army signed a contract to begin an RCI housing project at Fort Meade to build 308 new homes and renovate 2,862 others, and another to construct 345 new homes and upgrade 3,637 existing homes at Fort Lewis. The implementation of RCI represented the Army's first attempt to develop and manage soldier housing in a central and comprehensive manner, rather than at the installation level, and provided quality housing to soldiers and families more rapidly than in the past.

To coordinate the Army's housing programs and initiatives, the Army gained congressional approval for its Army Family Housing Master Plan. The plan included a long-term investment strategy based on privatization and military construction to eliminate the Army's inadequate housing by 2010. The Army would reach this goal by adding twenty-five RCI project to the four already under way. Unfortunately, Congress found the ambitious goals of the Army Family Housing Master Plan unaffordable and did not authorize the additional \$186.3 million in federal equity contributions to support the twenty-five RCI projects. To offset part of the unfunded requirements, in August 2001 the Army eliminated five of the new RCI projects, which reduced projected costs for the remaining twenty by \$130 million. At that time, the Army also revised its Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2003–2007 and shifted its goal to eliminate inadequate housing by 2007, rather than 2010. To meet this accelerated goal, the Army reprogrammed \$1.09 billion for housing construction between fiscal years 2005 and 2007.

As improvements to installation housing made measured progress during FY 2001, the Army also secured legislative and executive approval for the expansion of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The Army successfully argued that improvements to its equipment, the growing sophistication of its doctrine, and the increased number of training scenarios demanded by the changing face of warfare in the modern world justified the enlargement of the National Training Center. The expansion increased the installation by 131,000 acres.

While improving soldier housing and training, the Army also continued to preserve the heritage of its installations. On 28 August 2001, the Army entered into contracts with two private companies to redevelop Fort Sam Houston, Texas, two-thirds of which was considered historic. Agreements called for a real estate developer and environmental engineering company

to preserve three buildings on the post, including the Brooke Army Medical Center, and to redevelop 465,000 non-excess square feet of building space on the installation at an estimated cost of \$50 million. The two companies later subleased the new properties to private and public companies that provided services to post tenants. By entering into this precedent-setting partnership, the Army hoped to receive almost one-quarter billion dollars over the three fifty-year leases signed with the developers while avoiding maintenance and preservation costs and protecting a crucial part of its history.

### *Safety*

The Army lost 168 soldiers to accidents in FY 2001, six more than in the previous fiscal year. The greatest killer continued to be accidents involving personally owned vehicles, which accounted for one hundred, or 59.5 percent, of the deaths. Other accidental deaths included thirteen from fires and explosions, eleven from aviation operations, ten from Army motor vehicle accidents, two from Army combat vehicle accidents, and thirty-two from personal injury accidents such as sports, recreation, and military training. In addition to the deaths of soldiers, the Office of Workers' Compensation, Department of Labor, recorded nine Army civilian employee fatalities during the fiscal year. Of these nine cases, seven were determined to be unrelated to official duties.

The Army's Class A–D ground safety record for FY 2001 improved since the previous fiscal year. There were 355 privately owned vehicle accidents, down 22 percent from FY 2000; 1,255 personnel injury accidents, down 9 percent; 542 Army wheeled motor vehicle accidents, down 26 percent; and 38 Army combat vehicle accidents, down 33 percent. Army aviation, however, experienced a 7 percent increase in Class A–C accidents over FY 2000, primarily due to an upsurge in Class A and B accidents.

To help monitor safety-related information, the Army continued to develop and improve the Risk Management Information System, a Web-based system designed to provide management information and hazard controls to commanders, leaders, and other personnel. The system utilized state-of-the-art risk management tools, including information systems, databases, leader training, and safety media.

### *Army and Air Force Exchange Service*

The Army and Air Force Exchange Service provided support to deployed forces during FY 2001, operating sixteen facilities throughout the Balkans, in addition to temporary facilities for soldiers participating in



major exercises in the continental United States, Egypt, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Poland. A national economic downturn, coupled with customer access restrictions in the wake of the 11 September attacks, adversely affected the Army and Air Force Exchange Service's revenues during the fiscal year. Projected worldwide revenues of \$7.143 billion represented a decrease from the record high of \$7.369 billion reached in FY 2000, but earnings of over \$360 million exceeded the service's planned goal of \$345 million. These earnings were higher than had been forecast and provided a dividend of \$243.9 million for the morale, welfare, and recreation programs of the armed services. In support of operations in 2001, appropriated funds offset approximately 2 percent of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service's expenses. This funding paid for worldwide transportation of merchandise, overseas utility costs, defense telephone system access, external facility maintenance, and the salaries of the sixty-eight active duty Army and Air Force members assigned to the service. Capital expenditures for construction and renovation in 2001 exceeded \$205 million, up from the \$202 million expended in the previous fiscal year. These expenditures subsidized the construction of new shopping and food service facilities at Yongsan Garrison, South Korea; Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi; Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico; Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; Fort Eustis, Virginia; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina.



## 8

# Special Functions

### *Civil Works*

The Civil Works Program, executed by the Army Corps of Engineers, provided for nationwide water resources development and management in FY 2001. The program carried out investigations and surveys, engineering and design, construction, rehabilitation, and the operation and maintenance of flood control, navigation, environmental restoration, and multipurpose hydroelectric power projects having a replacement value of over \$125 billion. The program supported improvements in flood control, storm damage prevention, navigation, environmental restoration, and other water resources issues. In addition to this direct federal investment program, the Civil Works Program also included an important mission to regulate the discharge of dredged and fill material in waters and wetlands of the United States.

During FY 2001, there were an average of 161 military personnel assigned to the Civil Works Program. Civilian employees accumulated 24,670 work-years for this program in FY 2001. This figure represented a decrease of 106 work-years from the previous fiscal year. There were a total of 1,481 civil works projects under construction during the fiscal year: 454 that were specifically authorized by Congress and 1,027 that were smaller projects.

The annual appropriation for civil works during FY 2001 totaled \$4.544 billion. Presidential budgets of recent years included few new construction starts and stretched out construction schedules because of funding constraints. In FY 2001, Congress responded by both adding new starts and increasing financial support for underfunded projects. However, funding for construction programs in various stages of planning, design, and construction or operations remained inadequate, delaying their completion and resulting in increased building and maintenance costs, lost benefits, accelerated deterioration of facilities, and reduced services.

### *Environmental Protection*

The Army received 107 new enforcement actions for environmental concerns in FY 2001, a 15 percent reduction from the 126 new enforcement

actions received in FY 2000. This decrease occurred even though the number of inspections conducted by regulatory agencies remained constant. The enforcement action-to-inspection ratio decreased by 17 percent to 0.14 percent during the fiscal year, the lowest level since FY 1993, when the Army began keeping statistics on such actions. During the fiscal year, 57 percent of installations received no new enforcement actions. This improvement was achieved in spite of the fact that the number and stringency of laws and regulations has continued to increase significantly over time. Despite the improvement made during FY 2001 in reducing new enforcement actions, the Army was still assessed sixteen fines for environmental infractions for a total of \$884,000 and paid \$2.3 million to settle twenty-two other cases.

### *Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization*

The Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SADBU) bore the primary responsibility for the Army Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority Institutions Program, which was established by the National Defense Act of 1987. This mandate required the Army to set a goal for 5 percent of its contracts to go to small and disadvantaged businesses, historically black colleges and universities, and minority-owned institutions. The Army SADBU office focused on securing contracting opportunities for historically black institutions of higher learning and minority-owned institutions in the areas of procurement, research, development, testing and evaluation, military construction and operations, and maintenance. The Army also participated in technical assistance conferences and workshops to enhance the participation of such institutions in Army-sponsored programs.

In FY 2001, the Army exceeded the goals assigned to it by the Department of Defense for prime contracts awarded to small disadvantaged businesses and to historically black colleges and universities and minority institutions. The Army awarded slightly more than \$86 million, or 15 percent, of all funds allocated to institutions of higher education to historically black colleges and universities and minority institutions. Historically black colleges and universities received contracts and grants totaling \$20.4 million; Hispanic-serving institutions received contracts and grants totaling \$30.3 million; tribal colleges and universities received \$3 million in contracts and grants; and other minority institutions received contracts and grants totaling \$32.3 million.

Lasting the four years prior to FY 2001, the Army experienced a consistent increase in contract awards to women-owned firms, rising from \$860 million in FY 1998 to a high of nearly \$1.4 billion for FY 2001. The Army was the first and only federal agency to award more than \$1 billion

to women-owned small businesses in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. While the Army did not quite meet the federally mandated goal of 5 percent, it achieved 4 percent in FY 2001, up from 3.5 percent in the previous fiscal year.

*Legal Affairs*

Overall, the court-martial rate during the year was 2.35 per thousand soldiers (Table 3). The number of nonjudicial punishments imposed during this same time frame was 45,082, for a rate of 94.1 per thousand soldiers. There were increases in the number of soldiers accused of absence without leave and computer offenses involving pornography. A recent change in Army policy returns most soldiers who surrender or are arrested for absence without leave to their home stations. Military judges at installations with significant numbers of returnees noted a corollary increase in the number of courts-martial for both long and short-term absences.

TABLE 3—COURTS-MARTIAL STATISTICS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

Type Court	Tried	Convicted	Acquittals	Compared to FY 2000
General	770	739	31	+5.33%
Bad Conduct Special	354	331	23	-8.29%
Non-Bad Conduct Special	3	2	1	-57.14%
Summary	672	645	27	+0.9%

During FY 2001, Army attorneys defended the Department of the Army and its officials against civil litigation in approximately 470 actions filed in federal, state, and international courts. Most of these cases were filed by former soldiers seeking collateral review of courts-martial proceedings or back-pay actions filed in the Court of Federal Claims. Other suits involved challenges to confinement conditions, to decisions to deny clemency or parole, to revoke parole, or to other administrative actions taken by confinement facility officials.

One case of particular note, *Hall v. Department of Defense*, involved a class action suit filed in 1997 by the entire inmate population confined to the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The inmates claimed they were subject to unsafe living conditions, violating the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. They alleged that the main building of the barracks was structurally unsound, that they were exposed to unsafe environmental conditions, and that they were improperly subjected to certain administrative practices. The district court denied the inmates’ request for a preliminary injunction

ordering the Army to transfer them to other correctional institutions. In January 1999, the Army filed a motion for summary judgment, maintaining that the inmates were not exposed to unsafe living conditions and that the barrack's administrative practices were proper and accepted correctional methods. The plaintiffs' attorney later moved to dismiss the case, claiming that because the new disciplinary barracks would be completed in 2001, the issues presented by the lawsuit would be moot. The court dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice in February 2001. Several of the inmates, however, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers moved back the completion date for the new barracks to June 2002. By the time the fiscal year ended, the Court of Appeals had remanded the case to the district court to determine what effect, if any, the new completion date would have on the inmates' health and safety.

### *Reviews and Inspections*

On 29 September 1999, the Associated Press published an article about a purported massacre of approximately 350 South Korean civilians at the hands of American airmen and members of the 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, in July 1950. The day after the appearance of the report, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen directed the secretary of the Army to conduct a review of the allegations. On 25 October 1999, Secretary Caldera assigned Lt. Gen. Michael W. Ackerman, the Department of the Army Inspector General, to begin a formal review. The Republic of Korea also began its own investigation into the incident. The American and Korean efforts operated independently but cooperated closely and shared information.

The Inspection Division of the Department of the Army Inspector General formed the No Gun Ri Review Team (also called the U.S. Review Team). To monitor and oversee the review team, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Charles L. Cragin created a steering group, which included Patrick T. Henry, the assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve affairs, and Charles A. Blanchard, the Army general counsel. In order to increase public trust in the independence and veracity of the review, Secretary Cohen invited eight outside experts in the fields of military history, journalism, and U.S.-Korean relations to join the review team.

The review team started work on 27 October 1999. For the next fifteen months, Army investigators and researchers studied the available evidence and official records, examining over a million pages of official documents and tens of thousands of reels of Air Force reconnaissance film. They also conducted almost two hundred interviews with soldiers who served in the vicinity of No Gun Ri at the time of the incident.

On 28 December 2000, General Ackerman forwarded the final report of the review team to the secretary of the Army. Secretary Caldera approved the findings and sent them to the secretary of defense for further review. Public release of the report came the next month. The investigation concluded that the deaths of the South Koreans at No Gun Ri was a regrettable tragedy caused by the Army's lack of preparedness for major combat operations when the Korean War broke out. American troops at No Gun Ri, the report found, had deficient leadership and were inadequately trained for the kind of combat they faced. At the time of the incident, the soldiers of the 7th Cavalry were conducting a hasty, confused, and disorganized retreat, engaging in sporadic skirmishes with North Korean forces, and had legitimate concerns about North Korean infiltrators hiding among the masses of South Korean refugees. The report did not find evidence of a concerted or deliberate plan or policy to kill South Korean civilians. It also faulted the South Korean National Police for its inability to control the overwhelming number of refugees. Finally, the report suggested that the number of victims cited in the original Associated Press story and by the official South Korean investigation was most likely inflated.

In addition to the No Gun Ri review, the Inspection Division of the Office of the Inspector General completed two other major inspections during the fiscal year and assisted with a third. The first, requested by the secretary of the Army, concerned the resourcing, equipping, and manning of the Army Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC) Program. The inspection found that many instructors, some of whom spent their own money to support cadets, did not fully understand JROTC funding regulations and procedures. Further, the inspection concluded that insufficient funding and a shortage of qualified instructors discouraged cadets from participating in the program. Vice Chief of Staff General John M. Keane requested the second inspection, which regarded compliance with environmental regulations at Army installations. This inspection revealed that the Army's environmental regulations and responsibilities were largely misunderstood or ignored at installations and that inadequate training and funding was in place for environmental programs. Lastly, the Inspection Division assisted in a triennial review of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service led by the Air Force Inspection Agency, which identified several weaknesses to be corrected in its customer relations, employee development, and marketing programs.

In addition to these major inspections, the Assistance Division dealt with 2,022 Inspector General Action Requests regarding non-senior officials or individuals, a slight increase of 6 percent from the previous fiscal year. A total of 1,369 of these were requests for assistance, and 653 were allegations, of which 476 were found to be unsubstantiated.

*Army Audit Agency*

During FY 2001, the U.S. Army Audit Agency performed a triennial quality control review of the Army's Internal Review Program going back for a twelve-month period to 31 March 2000. The review included the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Management Services; the Internal Review Directorate; and twenty-eight other internal review activities, including those of five Army major commands and two HQDA internal review offices. The review found that four of the five major commands and both HQDA internal review activities had adequate quality control programs in place or had programs needing only minor improvements. One major command needed to implement a quality control review program for its subordinate internal review offices. In addition, some major command field offices needed to improve aspects of their quality control systems in order to provide reasonable assurance that the auditors followed established policies, procedures, and applicable auditing standards.

In addition to the triennial review, the audits performed by the Army Audit Agency during the fiscal year included reviews of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' financial statements for its civil works programs, modernization training, distance learning programs, railway usage, financial management of the Army General Fund, and contracting services on Army installations. Alongside its auditing responsibilities, the Army Audit Agency also provided consulting services to the Army's leadership. During FY 2001, consulting took up approximately 15 percent of the agency's time and personnel resources.



## 9

# Attack on the Pentagon

On the morning of 11 September 2001, al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airliners in mid-flight over the eastern United States. At 8:46 a.m., the first airplane crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, New York. At the time, General Shinseki was in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, attending a conference of the chiefs of staff of Pacific nation armies. He telephoned Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans Maj. Gen. Phillip R. Kensinger, and Brig. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, the director of operations, mobilization and readiness in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. As General Shinseki was on the telephone, a second hijacked aircraft struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center. Following General Shinseki's instructions, Generals Kensinger and Chiarelli activated the Army Operations Center's Crisis Action Team to monitor the situation and began developing plans to respond to the disaster.

Approximately thirty minutes later, American Airlines Flight 77, hijacked by five terrorists as it left Dulles International Airport, crashed into the western side of the Pentagon. All onboard the aircraft, including the terrorists, fifty-eight passengers, and the flight's six crewmembers, perished in the crash. The plane smashed through the first three rings of the Pentagon, spreading fire and smoke throughout the building and damaging the remaining two rings. A total of 125 Department of Defense personnel lost their lives in the attack. A further 106 received injuries that required hospitalization. The Department of the Army, with seventy-five dead, including twenty-two soldiers, forty-seven civilian employees, and six contractors, suffered more casualties than any other Department of Defense organization. (*See Table 4.*) Most of the Army's losses were soldiers and civilians located in offices on the first and second floors of the Pentagon, between the fourth and sixth corridors. Two Department of the Army offices were particularly hard hit by the attack. Thirty-two civilians working for the Resource Management Directorate of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army were killed. Twenty-six personnel in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel lost their lives, including the deputy chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Timothy J. Maude. He was the highest-ranking soldier to die in the attack.



*General Maude*

After the initial shock of the attack wore off, personnel began to exit the stricken building, and military and civilians alike assisted in rescuing trapped coworkers and administering first aid. Responders from local city, county, state, and federal agencies swiftly and capably conducted most of the firefighting, medical care, and other emergency response tasks. A total of seventy-seven HQDA personnel later received decorations for their actions or injuries sustained on the morning of 11 September.

Following the plane's crash, almost all Department of the Army personnel evacuated the building, most heading for the parking lots or the courtyard in the center of the Pentagon. The Army Operations Center remained manned throughout the attack and its aftermath, and Secretary White and General Keane made their ways there to provide leadership and guidance. The vice



*General Keane, left, and Secretary White, 13 September 2001*



*The Pentagon burning at night*

chief of staff sent messages throughout the Army to inform subordinate commands that HQDA was still directing operations. Amid the hectic activity and confusion, the Army Operations Center staff removed Secretary White, despite his objection, to a remote location. Later, the staff realized that his relocation had not been required by the situation in accordance with contingency plans. The evacuation of Secretary White left General Keane in charge at the Pentagon for the remainder of the day.

Despite the destruction caused by the impact of the airliner, the Pentagon still stood. The damage to the building would have been greater had the plane not struck an area recently improved and reinforced during an extensive, years-long renovation project. Although parts of the Pentagon remained filled with flame and smoke, the grim work of recovering the dead began the next morning. Soldiers of the 3d Infantry (The Old Guard) received the task of collecting remains, which they turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation after proper military honors and respects were rendered.

As recovery efforts continued, the Department of Defense established a family assistance center based at the Sheraton Hotel in nearby Crystal City, Virginia. There, the families of victims received counseling and medical and legal advice. The center ultimately came under control of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy Lt. Gen. John A. Van Alstyne



*General Van Alstyne*

provided the leadership and day-to-day supervision necessary for the center to perform its sensitive and important duties.

Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the domestic response to the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, began on 15 September 2001. President Bush authorized the mobilization of ten thousand Army reservists and guardsmen, along with thousands of reservists from the other armed services. The mobilized soldiers performed homeland defense missions, such as guarding the attack sites and airports, as well as civil support missions. Operation NOBLE EAGLE continued on into the next fiscal year as planning began for

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the retaliatory strike against al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies in Afghanistan.

TABLE 4—ARMY PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS KILLED  
ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

Spec. Craig S. Amundson	DCSPER
Max J. Beilke	DCSPER
Carrie R. Blagburn	RS-W, OAASA
Lt. Col. Canfield D. Boone	DCSPER
Donna M. Bowen	Verizon (OAASA)
Sfc. Jose O. Calderon-Olmedo	DCSPER
Angelene C. Carter	RS-W, OAASA
Sharon A. Carver	RS-W, OAASA
John J. Chada	IMCEN
Ada M. Davis	RS-W, OAASA
Lt. Col. Jerry D. Dickerson Jr.	DCSPRO
Amelia V. Fields	RS-W, OAASA
Gerald P. Fisher	Booz Allen Hamilton (DCSPER)
Cortez Ghee	RS-W, OAASA
Brenda C. Gibson	RS-W, OAASA
Ronald F. Golinski	DCSPER
Diane M. Hale-McKinzy	DCSOPS
Carolyn B. Halmon	RS-W, OAASA

TABLE 4—ARMY PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS KILLED  
ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 (*Continued*)

Sheila M. S. Hein	RS-W, OAASA
Maj. Wallace C. Hogan Jr.	DCSOPS
Jimmie I. Holley	RS-W, OAASA
Peggie M. Hurt	RS-W, OAASA
Lt. Col. Stephen N. Hyland Jr.	DCSPER
Sgt. Maj. Lacey B. Ivory	OAASA (M&RA)
Lt. Col. Dennis M. Johnson	DCSPER
Brenda Kegler	RS-W, OAASA
David W. Laychak	RS-W, OAASA
Samantha L. Lighbourh-Allen	RS-W, OAASA
Maj. Stephen V. Long	U.S. Total Army PERSCOM
Terence M. Lynch	Booz Allen Hamilton (DCSPER)
Teresa M. Martin	RS-W, OAASA
Ada L. Mason-Acker	RS-W, OAASA
Lt. Col. Dean E. Mattson	IMCEN
Lt. Gen. Timothy J. Maude	DCSPER
Robert J. Maxwell	IMCEN
Molly L. McKenzie	RS-W, OAASA
Maj. Ronald D. Milam	OAASA (M&RA)
Odessa V. Morris	DCSPER
Teddington H. Moy	IMCEN
Diana B. Padro	RS-W, OAASA
Spec. Chin Sun Pak	DCSPER
Maj. Clifford L. Patterson Jr.	OAASA
Scott Powell	BTG Inc. (OAASA)
Deborah A. Ramsaur	DCSPER
Rhonda S. Rasmussen	RS-W, OAASA
Martha M. Reszke	RS-W, OAASA
Cecelia E. Richard	RS-W, OAASA
Edward V. Rowenhorst	RS-W, OAASA
Judy Rowlett	RS-W, OAASA
Robert E. Russell	RS-W, OAASA
CWO4 William R. Ruth	DCSPER
Marjorie C. Salamone	RS-W, OAASA
Lt. Col. David M. Scales	DCSPER
Janice M. Scott	RS-W, OAASA
Michael L. Selves	IMCEN
Marian H. Serva	DCSPER
Antoinette M. Sherman	RS-W, OAASA
Donald D. Simmons	RS-W, OAASA

TABLE 4—ARMY PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS KILLED  
ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 (*Continued*)

Cheryle D. Sincock	ACSIM
Gary F. Smith	DCSPER
Patricia J. Statz	DCSPER
Edna L. Stephens	RS-W, OAASA
Sgt. Maj. Larry L. Strickland	DCSPER
Maj. Kip P. Taylor	DCSPER
Sandra C. Taylor	ACSIM
Sgt. Tamara C. Thurman	DCSPER
Willie Q. Troy	RS-W, OAASA
Lt. Col. Karen J. Wagner	DCSPER
Meta L. Waller	RS-W, OAASA
S. Sgt. Maudlyn A. White	DCSPRO
Sandra L. White	RS-W, OAASA
Ernest M. Willcher	Booz Allen Hamilton (DCSPER)
Maj. Dwayne Williams	DCSPER
Edmond G. Young, Jr.	BTG Inc. (DCSPER)
Lisa L. Young	DCSPER

# 10

## Conclusion

The Army entered FY 2001 with great optimism. The service had begun to shake itself out of the doldrums of the post–Cold War drawdown and budget reductions. It had a compelling, albeit fiscally expensive and technologically audacious, vision of its future. While focused on the developments of the next twenty to thirty years, the Army’s leaders were also keenly aware of the need to improve its current inventory of equipment, materiel, and installations, as well as the quality of leadership and the quality of life it offered to its soldiers and their families.

On the eve of 11 September 2001, the Army appeared to be on a stable and secure institutional footing. No major foreign power capable of threatening U.S. security and interests existed, and although the peacekeeping mission in the Balkans continued, Department of Defense officials expected that no major conflicts would arise in the near future. The leaders of Headquarters, Department of the Army, therefore concentrated their efforts during FY 2001 on internal reorganizations, making what improvements they could under budgetary constraints and maintaining current readiness levels. Despite its peacetime priorities and activities during the previous eleven months, the Army would still prove itself ready and capable of toppling the Taliban regime and disrupting the al-Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan during the next fiscal year. The events of 11 September, however, were only the beginning of what would become an era of protracted conflict and uncertainty for the Army.





## Further Readings

Army Modernization Plan, FY 2001

Army Posture Statement, FY 2001

Army Training and Leader Development Panel Report

Budget Green Book, FY 2001

Budget Green Top, FY 2001

Department of the Army General Orders 3

Department of the Army General Orders 15

No Gun Ri Review Executive Summary



# Glossary

AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test
AKO	Army Knowledge Online
FM	Field Manual
FY	fiscal year
GDLS	General Dynamics Land Systems
GED+	General Education Development Diploma Plus
GM	General Motors
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
JROTC	Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PA&E	Programs Analysis and Evaluation
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RCI	Residential Communities Initiative
SADBU	Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization



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
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


Appendix A—Organization of the Department of the Army (Before December 2000)



Source: *The United States Government Manual, 2001/2002* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2001).

Appendix B—Organization of the Department of the Army (as of December 2000)



Source: *The United States Government Manual, 2001/2002* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2001).